2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"1. On 8th November 2020, the multi-party democratic general election was
held in accordance with the Election Laws and Rules by the Union Election
Commission in a free and fair manner and was actively voted by the citizens
with a strong desire for democracy even during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis.
2. In the election, 1117 seats out of 1171 constituencies were successfully
voted for Pyithu Hluttaw, Amyotha Hluttaw and Regional/State Hluttaws and
there were a total of 5639 candidates from all the political parties and
independent members. More than 71 percent of the eligible voters took part
in the election and it was recognized as a free and fair election by the teams
of local and international observers.
3. On 1st February 2021, against the result of the votes from the citizens,
the brutal State Administrative Council (SAC) accused that voting fraud was
found in the election and seized the state power from the civilian government
neglecting the Election Law and Rules and the 2008 Constitution. The
announcement of the invalidation of the 2020 general election's results by
the SAC was only to destroy the desire and hopes of the citizens using the arm
power. Therefore, in order to retain the citizens' rights, including the Civil
Disobedience Movement (CDM), people took part in different ways of protest
against the military coup.
4. The peaceful protestors against the dictatorship were handled by the
SAC with violence including illegal arrests, unjust detentions, murders,
appropriation and destroying the properties of the people which have created
the emergence of revolution.
5. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw has been formed with
the mandate from the people to conduct the functions of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
and we have performed the legislation, relations with international
parliamentary bodies and revoking the 2008 Constitution. We have also
formed the Interim National Unity Government (NUG) after the
announcement of the Federal Democracy Charter drafted by the National
Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).
6. We appreciate and recognize all the contribution and efforts in the battle
for democracy in Myanmar by our new generations, public officials and
people in the Civil Disobedience Movement, Ethnic Armed Organizations,
political parties, protest groups, civil societies, organizations for public
security and those international governments, parliaments, organizations
who stand with us at this challenging period.
7. On the anniversary of the 2020 election, we, the Committee
Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) would like to announce that we will
continue working together with all stakeholders to eliminate military
dictatorship and establish a federal democratic state in the future and will
continue working steadfastly to ensure the State power is returned to its
original owner, the citizens..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-08
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, National Unity Government (NUG), Anti-coup protesters
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"၁။ ၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ (၈) ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်က ပါတီစုံ ဒီမိုကရေစီအထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲကို လွှတ်တော်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေ၊ နည်းဥပဒေများ နှင့်အညီ လွတ်လပ်ပြီး တရားမျှတစွာ ကျင်းပပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ဒီမိုကရေစီလိုလားသည့် ပြည်သူလူထုမှ COVID-19 ကူးစက်ရောဂါ ကပ်ဘေးကြားမှပင် ရဲရဲဝံ့ဝံ့ တက်ကြွစွာ ဆန္ဒမဲပေးခဲ့ကြသည်။
၂။ ၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ပါတီစုံဒီမိုကရေစီ အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်၊ အမျိုးသား လွှတ်တော်နှင့် တိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ်လွှတ်တော်မဲဆန္ဒနယ် ၁၁၇၁ နေရာရှိသည့်အနက် ၁၁၁၇ နေရာ အတွက် ကျင်းပပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများနှင့် တစ်သီးပုဂ္ဂလလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်း ၅၆၃၉ ဦး ဝင်ရောက်ယှဥ်ပြိုင်ခဲ့ကာ ဆန္ဒမဲပေးပိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသူဦးရေ၏ ၇၁ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကျော်က ဆန္ဒမဲပေးခဲ့ပြီး ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲလေ့လာစောင့်ကြည်ရေး အဖွဲ့များက လွတ်လပ်ပြီး တရားမျှတသည့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိအမှတ်ပြုခဲ့သည်။
၃။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ တခဲနက်ဆန္ဒမဲပေးရွေးချယ်ခဲ့သော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်လျက် မဲမသမာမှုရှိသည်ဟု မမှန် မကန်စွပ်စွဲ၍ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲဥပဒေ၊ နည်းဥပဒေများအရ ဖြေရှင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းထားသည်ကို လျစ်လျူရှုလျက် ၂၀၀၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေကို ကျော်လွန်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို ပြည်သူက ရွေးချယ်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် အစိုးရထံမှ အတင်းအဓမ္မ သိမ်းယူခဲ့သည်။
၄။ ၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်အား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ဖျက်သိမ်း ကြောင်း ကြေညာခဲ့ခြင်းသည် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ဆန္ဒသဘောထားနှင့် မျှော်လင့်ချက်ကို လက်နက် အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုက အကြမ်းမဖက် အာဏာဖီဆန်မှုအပါအဝင် နည်းလမ်း မျိုးစုံဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏ နိုင်ငံသား အခွင့်အရေးမဆုံးရှုံးစေရန် ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့သည်။
၅။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်ခဲ့သည့် ပြည်သူလူထုအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များက အင်အားသုံး အကြမ်းဖက်ဖြိုခွင်းခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်း၊ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ့အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်များအား ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ မတရားသိမ်းဆည်းလုယူခြင်း စသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်ခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရေး အခင်းအကျင်းသည် တော်လှန်ရေးအသွင် ပြောင်းလဲလာခဲ့သည်။
၆။ ပြည်သူလူထုက အပ်နှင်းထားသည့် အခွင့်အာဏာကို ကျင့်သုံးလျက် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH) ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကို တာဝန်ခံလျက် ဥပဒေပြု ကိစ္စရပ်များကို ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာလွှတ်တော်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ဆက်ဆံရေးထူထောင် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုနှစ် ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေကို ဖျက်သိမ်းခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီကရေးဆွဲသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို အတည်ပြုထုတ်ပြန်၍ ကြားကာလ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ(NUG) ဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်းတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည်။
၇။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ရရှိရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် ပါဝင်သည့် မျိုးဆက်သစ် လူငယ်များ၊ အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာဖီဆန်မှု (CDM) လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ပါဝင်သည့် ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ပြည်သူ များ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများ၊ သပိတ် အင်အားစု များ၊ လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ဘဝလုံခြုံရေးကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးသည့် အင်အားစုများ နှင့် ခက်ခဲကြမ်းတမ်းသည့် ယခုကဲ့သို့ အချိန်ကာလတွင် မိမိတို့နှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည် ကူညီပေးကြသော နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းမှ အစိုးရများ၊ လွှတ်တော်များ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို တန်ဖိုးထားလေးစားစွာ ဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၈။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ စစ်အာဏာရှင် အမြစ်ပြတ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ထောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်နေသော အင်အားစုအားလုံးနှင့် လက်တွဲ ပြီး နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို မူလပိုင်ရှင်ဖြစ်သည့် ပြည်သူလူထုထံ ပြန်လည်ရောက်ရှိရေးကို မမှိတ်မသုံ ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတစ်နှစ်ပြည့်မြောက် သည့်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ(CRPH) အနေဖြင့် သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန် အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-08
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, National Unity Government (NUG)
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Sub-title:
Justice For Myanmar reports that Mytel suffered major financial losses in the three months after the military coup due to a boycott campaign
Description:
"Telecommunications provider Mytel lost nearly US$25m in profits and millions of customers in the three months that followed the February 1 coup, activist group Justice for Myanmar (JFM) announced on Friday.
The losses were due to boycotts by both users and shops due to the company’s ties to the junta; Mytel is jointly owned by the Myanmar military and Viettel, under Vietnam’s defence ministry.
Boycotts launched after the coup by the public called for Mytel sim cards to be destroyed, a refusal to accept calls from those using Mytel mobile numbers, and a blacklisting of Mytel products by shops. Signboards and banners advertising Mytel were also removed and destroyed.
The company lost staff to mass resignations, too, according to JFM. Mytel’s sales representatives dropped by around 30 percent in six months from more than 54,400 in January to around 38,190 in July.
Citing leaked data, JFM said that some 80 percent of Mytel’s sales came from private mobile phone shops nationwide.
A mobile phone shop owner from Mawlamyaine in Mon State told Myanmar Now that they destroyed 700,000 kyat (nearly $390) worth of Mytel top-up cards and sim cards in the days immediately after the coup.
“We never used Mytel but we had to sell their products because we’re a phone shop,” the shop owner said. “We’re not going to sell them again. We don’t even accept phone calls from Mytel numbers.”
The owner said that some wholesale shops have continued to offer Mytel products, since the company has offered incentives—such as new phones, power banks, and even a new Hyundai car—if they meet certain sales benchmarks.
“Turning down their offers would mean great losses for the wholesale businesses. Therefore, I’m sure they won’t be boycotting them. Several retail stores are part of the movement, though,” he explained.
He said he hoped that other shops and users would participate in the boycott campaign.
“We can’t only think about our own interests at a time like this. The whole country is in peril and we can’t give them the money they will use to buy ammunition,” he said. “I am going to boycott them no matter how hard it gets for us or no matter what incentives they offer us.”
“I want everyone else to boycott them, too,” he added.
Another staff member from a Mytel shop in Mon State said that while users have widely stopped using the provider’s services in other states and regions, sales in Mon State had actually gone up around 30 percent since the coup.
He attributed this to the reliability of Mytel’s signal in rural areas where other operators, such as MPT, Ooredoo and Telenor, offer less stable connections.
Mytel has also been offering internet data packages and top-ups at half-price during the boycott campaign, the staff member added.
He estimated that use of Mytel’s wifi doubled in Mon State when the military council cut off mobile internet services on March 15, amid a crackdown on anti-coup protests.
“Mytel likely gained subscribers by selectively implementing the military’s own shutdown orders, maintaining internet access for users when other subscribers were in the dark,” JFM wrote, adding, “Mytel has deployed costly and illegal strategies that undercut the market, breach telecommunications regulations and hurt their own staff.”
JFM’s analysis of the Myanmar Investment Commission reveals that the junta is expected to earn more than $700m from Mytel over the next decade, according to the whistleblower site Distributed Denial of Secrets.
Mytel is 49 percent owned by Viettel, with the remaining shares owned by Star High—28 percent—under the junta-run Myanmar Economic Corporation, and 23 percent by Myanmar National Telecom Holding.
The company had not responded to JFM’s statement at the time of reporting.
Mytel telecoms towers have been targeted for attack nationwide by anti-junta resistance forces in recent months, using bombs and makeshift explosive devices at the sites. The military responded by laying landmines around towers, engineers on strike in accordance with the Civil Disobedience Movement told Myanmar Now.
Former military officer and Mytel executive Thein Aung was shot dead near his Yangon home on Thursday morning, in what some speculated was an inside job. Myanmar Now was unable to verify those claims..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-07
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Sub-title:
The judge who will decide the NLD leader’s fate may not be your average apparatchik, but don’t expect any surprises when he reaches his verdict
Description:
"In a country notorious for the opacity of its justice system, Ye Lwin is a rare bird: a judge who is not just a faceless cog in a machine that routinely does the bidding of Myanmar’s military.
Currently serving as a judge in Naypyitaw’s Dekkhina District Court, he has presided over a number of high-profile cases, including those against Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the country’s ousted civilian government.
Most recently, he was the lead justice in a two-judge panel that last week sentenced Win Htein, a patron of the deposed ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to 20 years in prison for sedition.
But it was more than three years ago that he first came to prominence, both for his role as information officer during the trial against the killers of Ko Ni, Suu Kyi’s long-time legal advisor, and as the judge who found two Reuters reporters guilty of violating the Official Secrets Act for their reporting on military atrocities committed in Rakhine State.
Now presiding over Suu Kyi’s trial under the same colonial-era law, Ye Lwin’s reputation for coming down hard on defendants is hardly reassuring. But that hasn’t stopped lawyers who have seen him in action from expressing a grudging respect for him.
In the case against Win Htein, for instance, he betrayed no obvious prejudice against the defendant of his defence team, according to Myint Thwin, the lead lawyer for the 79-year-old NLD stalwart.
“The judge was just doing his job. He didn’t stay to look at Win Htein. He just left the court after handing down the sentence,” he said, adding that Ye Win allowed the team to practice “their full rights to defend” their client.
But that will be little comfort to Suu Kyi, who is under no illusions about her chances of receiving a fair trial under the regime that seized power on February 1.
When Myint Thwin, who happened to speak with the NLD leader the day before Win Htein was sentenced, informed her that his client was facing up to 20 years in prison, she jokingly responded: “I think it could be longer for me.”
Unexpected praise
Described by some colleagues as “charismatic” and a good communicator, Ye Lwin is also widely seen as a judge who takes his responsibilities seriously.
“In general, I would say that he is quite trustworthy. He is not the kind of person to get caught up in corruption scandals,” said a retired court officer familiar with Ye Lwin’s career, which began more than two decades ago.
But it is probably his reputation for being approachable, rather than his apparently unimpeachable integrity, that has made the 50-year-old Ye Lwin a suitable pick to handle cases that have attracted both national and international attention.
“He was not a difficult person to talk to,” said one reporter who covered the Ko Ni assassination trial for a foreign news outlet. “Even if he didn’t want to answer a question, he would just try to walk around it, rather than getting angry.”
As the person charged with explaining the verdict in that case, Ye Lwin faced a barrage of questions about why two of the defendants did not receive heavier sentences.
While the two convicted killers, Kyi Lin and Aung Win Zaw, were both given the death penalty, the accused mastermind, former military intelligence captain Zeyar Phyo, received only five years for destroying evidence, while a fourth defendant, Aung Win Tun, got off with just three years for harbouring an offender.
Ye Lwin’s considerable communication skills were on full display as he tried to justify these decisions. But when the name of another suspect—Lin Zaw Tun, a retired army colonel and former aide to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing who went on to win a seat in parliament for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party—was raised, Ye Lwin knew better than to test the limits of his abilities as a public speaker.
“I am just relaying the information on the court’s actions today regarding the case as an information officer. I have already described in detail regarding all the findings and comments in today’s report. I have no other comment to give on this case,” he said calmly as he brought his press briefing to an end.
Even his handling of the case against Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo earned Ye Lwin praise from an unlikely quarter: a police officer whose testimony as a witness for the prosecution exposed a conspiracy to frame the two defendants.
When former police captain Moe Yan Naing testified that Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo had been set up, it nearly destroyed the case against them. But rather than attempting to silence him, Ye Lwin allowed Moe Yan Naing to speak.
“He did not dismiss my statement. He accepted it as evidence. But in the end, my testimony had no impact on the sentence given to the two reporters,” said Moe Yan Naing, who was later imprisoned for speaking the truth on the stand.
Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who had written an investigation into a massacre of 10 Muslim men and boys in northern Rakhine State’s Maungdaw Township in September 2017, were both given seven-year sentences under Section 3(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act, but were later released on a pardon.
The judiciary since the coup
Myanmar’s judiciary is led by Tun Tun Oo, who has been the chief justice of the Union Supreme Court since 2011. Under the 2008 Constitution, the former military officer (who is not to be confused with Tun Tun Oo, the attorney general who was replaced after the coup in February) can remain in his current position until he reaches the age of 70. In his case, that means he can serve as the country’s top judge for five more years.
But having a former officer in charge of Myanmar’s highest court is not the only way the military exerts its influence over the country’s judicial system. Indeed, since it first seized power nearly six decades ago, the military has steadily stripped the courts of any vestige of the independence they once had.
Aung San Suu Kyi, who was appointed to lead a parliamentary “rule of law” committee months after winning a seat as an MP in a 2012 by-election, has long stressed the need to re-establish the independence of courts as a key pillar of democratic rule.
“My party has repeatedly emphasized rule of law because of the very fact that our judiciary is far from independent. It is a mere tool of the executive. That means not just that the judiciary is undemocratic, but the executive is undemocratic as well and the legislature, too, is undemocratic,” she said in a TED Talk in July 2014.
Now, however, she is once again a captive of the generals, who have not hesitated to use their complete control over the courts to deprive her and all other opponents of their regime of their most fundamental rights.
Currently facing a total of 11 charges, she was not even allowed to have some of her defence lawyers present during the first hearing of her trial under the Official Secrets Act. She faces a sentence of up to 14 years in prison on that charge alone.
This decision sends a clear signal that Ye Lwin, who is presiding over that case, has no intention of breaking with decades of judicial subservience to the will of the military.
Another attorney who has crossed paths with Ye Lwin several times declined to make any comment on his character based on what he has seen in court. In the end, he said, it doesn’t matter what kind of person he is: He will do what is expected of him, as he has done in every other case he has been involved with.
“He did what he had to do during those court hearings. But he may hand down verdicts that we are not happy with at the end of the day,” said the lawyer, who asked to remain anonymous.
Even Moe Yan Naing, who was so impressed by Ye Lwin’s willingness to hear him out when he presented damning testimony of wrongdoing by the authorities, recognized that it was unlikely that he would show such even-handedness under the country’s current circumstances.
“Most of judiciary matters were beyond our control even when we had a president. Now that we’re under a dictatorship, things can only get worse,” said the former police captain..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-07
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"ပြည်ထောင်စု သမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
အမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်နှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်ရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမိန့်အမှတ်(၁၀/၂၀၂၁)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ (၇)ရက်
၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စု သမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်နှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်ရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းကောင်း လူမှုဝန်ထမ်းများ၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေး၊ ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံရေးနှင့် ဖိအားကင်းစင်ရေးအတွက် အထူး(အထူး)အလေးထားဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၂။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင်အာဏာလုစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ယန္တရားတွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ကာ နိုင်ငံတော်ပုန်ကန်မှုကို အားပေးထောက်ပံ့ပြီး (CDM) လူမှုဝန်ထမ်းများအား ဖိအားပေးခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ရာထူးမှထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းနှင့် ဖိနှိပ်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးကို ယနေ့အထိ ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည့် ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ထမ်းကျင့်ဝတ်နှင့် မလျော်ညီသော လူမှုဝန်ထမ်းဦးစီးဌာနမှ အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အရာရှိများအား ယနေ့ (၇.၁၁.၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ အမည်ပျက်စာရင်း (Black List) သွင်းလိုက်ပြီး ထာဝရ နိုင်ငံ့တာဝန် ထမ်းရွက်ခွင့် ပိတ်ပင်ကာ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ် (Dismiss) ကြောင်း အမိန့်ချမှတ်လိုက်သည် -..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-07
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"Over 20 years ago in exile, I co-founded the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) to monitor political prisoner numbers in Myanmar, so we can advocate and lobby the outside world to apply pressure on the Myanmar military, which once again seized power on February 1.
On October 18, I saw the success of that political pressure when the junta announced a mass prison release days after coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was rightfully excluded from the October 26-28 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit.
This is not the first so-called amnesty since the coup and it must not be the last. Yet, the outside world must continue to pay close attention. The junta will use so-called prisoner releases to deceive. On June 30, the regime announced the release of 2,342 prisoners. But AAPP has identified only 371 prisoners who were actually freed. Most remained in detention and their torture continued.
It has been over two weeks since the junta announced on October 18 the supposed release of another 5,636 political prisoners. Only 4,072 of those detainees have had their releases confirmed by AAPP, but just 949 of them have been properly identified because the military refuses to be transparent.
Our democratically-elected leaders remain in prison, as do many others as hostages. Arrests and killings by the junta have not slowed down. On October 23, the 1988 generation activist Ko Jimmy was violently arrested at a home in the Panglong housing complex in Yangon’s North Dagon Township. Another bargaining chip for the military regime in any future “concessions”.
Thousands of less well-known political prisoners are at risk of being forgotten by the outside world. This is what the Myanmar military wants. Therefore, they arrest people in the middle of the night, refuse to acknowledge the location of detainees or to allow independent observers inside prisons. This corrupt and power-hungry institution wants to make it as difficult as possible for ASEAN and others to know how many people they arrest, and whether any amnesty is authentic.
Actually, the stories of re-arrests outside prison gates and at homes soon after release demonstrate the reality of the junta’s tactics. Kyaw Naing Tun was one of those released from Magwe Central Prison on October 19, but the former political prisoner was re-arrested just eight days later. He was taken to an interrogation center and tortured to death, His body, and in particular the back of his head, had been violently smashed.
At least 127 detainees supposedly released on October 18 have been re-arrested since then. Among them were 11 democratically-elected politicians who were taken to the gates of Meiktila Prison, only to be cynically re-arrested by the police and charged under the Counter-Terrorism Law.
This is a pattern from before the February coup. Min Ko Naing, another 1988 generation activist, was released on two separate occasions during the time of the previous military regime, and both times was soon re-imprisoned.
It was the same story for leading National League for Democracy (NLD) member U Win Htein, who on October 29 was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in a Naypyitaw detention center under Section 124(a) of the Penal Code. Back in 2008, U Win Htein was waiting in a guesthouse to be reunited with his daughter after being released from prison. It was less than 24 hours later when military intelligence sent him back to Katha Prison and charged him under the State Protection Act, a repressive piece of legislation subsequently repealed by the now ousted NLD government. Such re-arrests are motivated by the desire of the military to psychologically intimidate others.
Treating political prisoners like pawns, the military re-arrests them just when they think they are free. AAPP released a statement on this tactic after October 18, highlighting the impact on the mental health of political prisoners and families. In fact, this is a type of psychological warfare, a torment which does not end with conditional release. Forced to sign pledges, all can be re-arrested at any time, for any reason, under Section 401 of the Penal Code.
This is how it was in the past when persecution continued long after detention ended. Former political prisoners were always the first target if something went wrong in a community and they were continually harassed as a type of social punishment. When I was released for the first time in 1993, businesses felt intimidated to hire me and military intelligence followed my every move. It was not long before I was arrested again and sentenced to a longer, harsher term.
While in prison, protestors detained for practicing fundamental human rights are forced to hold stress positions for hours, sticks are used to repeatedly hit their shins and backs, they are refused anything to drink, and made to hear the screams of fellow inmates. Even if they are spared brutal interrogation, political prisoners are housed in overcrowded cells and need to bribe guards just to get enough space to sleep, enough food to eat and water to drink. Every day is a struggle to survive. These are experiences that AAPP staff understand intimately.
The scars of torture linger long after detention. A young man from Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State, was arrested on August 8 on unfounded suspicion of links with a People’s Defense Force. He was released the next day with wounds across his body consistent with severe torture. The man could barely speak, traumatized through vicious interrogation by the junta. Photos circulated of another detainee from North Dagon in Yangon, showing his neck tattoo burned off by cigarettes. The tattoo read “we will never forgive”, a reference to the Myanmar peoples’ hatred of the coup and desire for justice.
Nowadays, people in Myanmar know that the coup leader’s greed and brutality will impoverish entire generations. We’d seen the prospect of a better future. Political prisoners and the entire population profoundly hate Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing for destroying that possibility and will never subject themselves to his rule, whatever the level of repression. Brutal interrogations, however, will create long-term mental health implications. Former political prisoners and their families need urgent support. Fundamentally, Myanmar is a deeply traumatized society. Just being released is not enough; we need accountability to tackle the loss of dignity.
Families embracing loved ones after being released is one of the reasons I really appreciate what ASEAN did on October 15 by excluding the coup leader from its October summit, as well as the support of the United States and other like-minded governments since the coup. It was political pressure which allowed the possibility of rehabilitation to happen. Nowadays, the junta does not have legitimacy from its own people, its neighbors or the international community.
Before the coup, the military’s spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said torture survivors and families could make complaints to the military. People in Myanmar understand, then and now, that you cannot submit a complaint of torture to the torturer, when that same torturer continues to hold a gun to your head on release. People in Myanmar need a civilian government, with no role for the military in politics or government.
This why ASEAN’s decision to deny the coup leader the legitimacy he craves was so significant. Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews powerful statement said of the subsequent prisoner ‘amnesty’, “their release is clearly not because the junta has had a change of heart”. The October 18 releases happened because of pressure from inside and outside Myanmar. But I want to advocate for the international community to do more. The international community’s demand now must be for the release of detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, all other political prisoners, and a return to civilian rule.
For this purpose, United Nations (UN) member states need to implement the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar’s ‘Three Cuts” policy. The office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights spoke for civilians in Chin State and Magwe and Sagaing regions earlier this month. It noted the junta’s “established pattern of attacks… against unarmed individuals using lethal force, destruction of residential properties, mass arbitrary detention and deaths in military custody”. As long as the Myanmar military has cash and weapons, atrocities will continue..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Defenders
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"Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government will start selling bonds this month to fund the revolutionary movement against the junta. It is a first for shadow administrations from Myanmar opposing military rule since the 1962 coup.
A large majority of Myanmar’s population rejects military rule and the junta faces opposition in various forms, including flash-mob protests, armed resistance, cyberattacks and advocacy.
The NUG, which was largely formed by the National League for Democracy and representatives of ethnic minorities and anti-regime protest groups in April, said the bond sales will offer no interest.
Anti-regime movements have been largely supported by donations since the February coup, although the NUG officially introduced voluntary taxation in August.
Excluding military spending, the NUG is hoping to raise at least US$800 million (1.4 trillion kyats) for social and humanitarian support, including health care, education, social care and funding for military personnel and police officers who defect.
The alternative government is offering three ways to contribute: lottery ticket sales, bonds and voluntary tax.
The NUG is urgently seeking to fund health care, education, and humanitarian assistance, U Tin Tun Naing, the NUG’s minister for planning, finance and investment, told an online press conference on Thursday.
He said he hopes citizens at home and abroad will help as the majority of people desperately want the dictatorship to fall.
U Tin Tun Naing said the move to sell bonds by a “revolutionary government” against a dictatorship is unique in history.
The bonds are valued at $100, $500, $1,000 and $5,000.
It aims to raise $1 billion from the two-year bonds, which do not offer interest.
“We sell bonds to help our revolution prevail. People have shown their willingness to buy bonds for the revolution to succeed, not for the interest,” he said.
U Tin Tun Naing added that businesses can safely buy bonds with each investor given a secret ID to hide their identity for security reasons.
In August, the NUG introduced a pilot project selling “Spring Lottery” tickets online to support civil servants in the civil disobedience movement (CDM). More than 200,000 ticket orders were made but many of the payments were cancelled and the actual sales only managed to support around 5,800 striking staff.
Almost 410,000 civil servants have joined the anti-regime movement, refusing to work under the junta, according to the NUG.
Increasing numbers of civil servants, military personnel and police are joining the CDM with some 800 military personnel and police defecting in September and October, according to the NUG.
On Friday, the NUG began the commercial launch of its lottery and aims to secure 20 billion kyats ($11 million) to support around 200,000 CDM staff, who have been deemed most in need.
Last month, the NUG invited taxpayers, including businesses at home and abroad, to voluntarily pay tax online through a self-assessment process, after the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament) approved the Union Taxation Law in September.
In a month, the NUG said it collected more than $150,000 in tax.
U Tin Tun Naing said the tax payments prove businesses and individuals have joined the anti-regime movement..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-05
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ်(၃၉/၂၀၂၁)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ (၄) ရက်
ရာထူးမှ ထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Health, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-05
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Individual Documents
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"ကြေညာချက် အမှတ် (၇/၂၀၂၁)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ (၄) ရက်
အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းကြေညာခြင်း
၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ် ကောင်စီမှ မတရားရယူခဲ့ပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများအနေဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်အလုပ်အကျွေးမပြုဘဲ တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် ပြည်သူတို့၏အကျိုးကို ရှေးရှု၍ မတရားသော အမိန့်အာဏာအားဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) တွင် ပါဝင်ကြရန် အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ဖိတ်ခေါ်ကမ်းလှမ်းခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ဆက်သွယ်ရေး၊ သတင်းအချက်အလက် နှင့် နည်းပညာဝန်ကြီးဌာန ၏လက်အောက်ရှိ မတရားသောအမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေး CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှု၌ ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိသည့် ပြည်သူ့၀န်ထမ်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ် ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လျက်ရှိသော Non-CDM ၀န်ထမ်းအချို့မှ ဖိအားပေးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်း၊ ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုတော့သည့် လစာချေးငွေများအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်ခိုင်းခြင်း များပြုလုပ်နေသည်ကို နေ့စဥ် တွေ့မြင်နေရပါသည်။
၃။ ယင်းကဲ့သို့ CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအပေါ်၌ မတရားသဖြင့်ဖိအားပေးခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံနှင့်ပြည်သူကို သစ္စာဖောက်ကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအတွက် ထိရောက်သော အခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ကျိုးနွံစွာ အလုပ်ကျွေးပြုနေသည့် ပြည်နယ်/တိုင်း ဒေသကြီး၊ ခရိုင်တာဝန်ခံအရာထမ်းဝန်ထမ်းများ အားလုံးနှင့် အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်ခံများအား နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ (၄၁) အရ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်(dismiss) ပြီး ယင်းတို့သည်နိုင်ငံ့သစ္စာဖောက်များဖြစ်ကြောင်း အမည်ပျက်စာရင်း ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Communications, Information and Technology - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
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"In the nine months since the coup, we have seen an intensification of inhumane acts committed by the terrorist-like junta.
The military are violently raiding towns and villages, causing civilian casualties across all states and regions. Children have not been spared. After being arbitrarily arrested, civilians are often forced to pay a ransom for their release. Those in refugee camps face threats and harassment, and torture is systematically committed against innocents. These acts of terror are perpetrated by the junta, to instill fear in the population.
On October 18, the terrorist group announced they would release (1316) people who had been sentenced and (4320) people who were facing trial, a total (5636) arbitrary detainees. The releases were achieved because of political pressure by ASEAN and the international community, but this was never an absolute amnesty, they were conditional releases. According to AAPP documentation, as of October 31, only (4072) were released, (122) of whom have been re-arrested. The number of re-arrests is likely to be higher, as some releases have not yet been identified by AAPP.
In October, a church and at least 400 houses in Thantlang, Falam and Mindat Townships in Chin State were set on fire by the junta. The military denied responsibility for the arson that occured in Thantlang Township, on October 29. However, a spokesman for the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) threatened the public on social media, “to see the Thantlang incident as an example of what is to come”.
In fact, the junta is also targeting National League for Democracy MP’s, officials, and supporters. The NLD Party which won the largest number of votes in the November 2020 election. In October, at least 10 NLD offices were attacked. The junta has also broken into NLD offices, looting items, committing arson and setting off bombs. At least 25 properties owned by Hluttaw representatives, NLD members, and ordinary civilians such as hotels, hospitals, houses and shops, were illegally seized by the junta in October.
Arrests
According to AAPP documentation, (319) civilians were detained by the terrorist junta between October 1 and 31. (80) women were detained, and (27) were taken as hostages, including (9) children, under the age of 18.
In Mandalay, the Monk Union has been protesting daily against the military coup. On October 2, at around 1:30 pm, some 10 junta soldiers, armed and in plain clothes, arrived at Mya Taung Monastery in two cars. The military troops used a car to crack down on the protesting monks. During the crackdown, five monks were forced to change into normal clothes and were beaten, held at gunpoint and arrested. The same night, three other civilians were searched and arrested by the junta.
Families continue to be held as hostages on a daily basis. At the beginning of this attempted coup, the wife and nine-year-old daughter of a Naypyidaw-based police superintendent, who was involved in CDM, were arrested. Still, no one knows where they are being detained. When a father was not found in Thayet Chaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, his wife and two children, aged two and six-years-old, were arrested and detained on October 9.
Killings
In October, at least (79) civilians were killed in the junta’s targeted attacks. This includes (6) women and (3) children, under the age of 18. Of those, (17) died as a result of torture.
On the morning of October 1, around 100 terrorist junta soldiers raided Pyindaung village in Khin Oo Township, Sagaing Region, and chased the fleeing villagers. Five villagers, including a five-year-old boy, were shot dead in a field in the village. Houses were destroyed. Tractors, five cars, 40 motorbikes, rice and oil, were also stolen by the junta.
Ko Kyaw Naing Tun a.k.a Ah Nge Lay, who was released from Magway Central Prison on October 19, was re-arrested at his home in Magway on October 27, on suspicion of killing the Aung Metta ward administrator. The family was notified to retrieve his dead body on October 28. Police say he died due to COVID, but his body and head (especially his back), were covered with injuries consistent with torture.
This is but a summary of human rights violations committed by the terrorist junta group in October. In this climate of fear, similar atrocities have been widely perpetrated across the country, amounting to crimes against humanity..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Defenders, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
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"Introduction
The 2021 coup in Myanmar spotlighted the inability of the United Nations Security Council (hereafter UNSC) to uphold its primary responsibility, “the maintenance of international peace and security,” which entails mass atrocity prevention. For months after the coup, I joined millions of peaceful protesters across Myanmar, taking to the streets and calling on the UNSC to invoke its ‘Responsibility to Protect’—“a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution” that was unanimously adopted by United Nations (UN) member states at the 2005 World Summit. With respect to invoking this Responsibility to Protect (R2P), expectations from the resistance movement primarily revolved around humanitarian intervention or at least coordinated sanctions and embargoes. A tyrannical crackdown by Myanmar’s military and countless atrocities later, the situation has escalated from a coup into a full-blown humanitarian crisis. But much to the dismay of protesters, the UNSC has yet to go beyond a statement of condemnation when it comes to addressing the deteriorating situation in my country. The reason for this inaction transcends intent—it is a direct consequence of UNSC’s structure, and UNSC reform is, therefore, the remedy.
Since its first meeting on January 17, 1946, the UNSC has evolved little despite seismic shifts in geopolitical realities. Structurally unchanged since its inception, the Council is comprised of 15 seats: 10 nonpermanent seats whose appointees are elected for two-year terms, and five permanent seats held by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, and the United Kingdom. The permanent seats wield veto power, allowing them to block UNSC resolutions regardless of the degree of support from the rest of the Council. Criticisms of the UNSC by international actors and proposals to change its institutional design have echoed across the globe since the end of the Cold War. The bulk of such scrutiny is directed towards the UNSC’s tendency to give unequal weight to differently positioned member states’ national interests and let the political interests of individual member states get in the way of resolving humanitarian crises. Accordingly, calls for reform are primarily connected to the “antiquated” concept of the veto held by the permanent five seats (the P5) and its inability to “reflect 21st-century realities.”
The UNSC’s efforts to resolve humanitarian crises in the 21st century have been mostly ineffective. This is because vetoes and a fundamentally unequal electoral system for seats are conducive to hegemony, or the inflexibility or inability to adapt to change, due to the dominance of a select few member states. Though the membership structure was initially established with the hope it would allow competing geopolitical superpowers to keep each other in check, it has recently achieved the opposite by allowing actions that go against the founding ethos of the Council to go unchecked. The structure of the UNSC needs reform to address the needs of and contribute to a new world that has developed with the coming of the 21st century: an arguably more egalitarian world order that places emphasis on holding those in power accountable for their actions.
The UN Charter obligates the UNSC to respond to the crisis in Myanmar, but the UNSC nevertheless cannot respond to the ongoing catastrophic situation because of its organizational structure. The UNSC has ‘failed’ Myanmar and consequently its founding ethos by showing what internally prevented the Council from responding. Structural reform could prevent future inactions.
A Neorealist Look at the Security Council
To understand why the UNSC’s structure is inefficacious, one must first establish why the Council holds an obligation under the UN Charter to respond to humanitarian crises: for this, the UNSC response to the Myanmar crisis serves as an ideal case study. The UNSC is given under Chapter V, Article 24 of the Charter of the UN, “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” It is also responsible—under Chapter I, Article I—for “the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” The actions of the State Administration Council and its military wing, the Tatmadaw, following the February 1 coup in Myanmar can objectively be interpreted not only as threats to and breaches of the peace but also acts of aggression. Appropriately, the demands of Myanmar’s protesters have centered around invoking the aforementioned UN Charter articles—in addition to the Responsibility to Protect agreement—in relation to the actions of the Tatmadaw.
Since its February coup, the Tatmadaw has been responsible for the extrajudicial killings and the torture of peaceful protesters, regime critics, and journalists. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners has confirmed that 1,139 people have been killed by the Tatmadaw and 6,891 are still detained as of September 28, though “the actual number of fatalities is likely much higher.” According to Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2021, the Tatmadaw’s “arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, and killings” of political dissidents was in addition to its “campaign of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity against the ethnic Rohingya.” This obligation is also present beyond the Charter due to the aforementioned R2P principle, in which the UN unanimously agreed to “halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The mass incidence of one-sided violence and persecution perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against an indefensible population undoubtedly warrants a response by the UNSC, as it did during the Rwandan Genocide, the Kosovo War, and the Syrian Civil War.
If an international response is warranted, and the UNSC is under obligation by its founding Charter and R2P to administer it, why doesn’t the UNSC do so? The answer to this question may seem obvious, but to properly address it, we must delve into the power dynamics of the Council and the intentions of its members. We can do this by using neorealism as a lens to look at the UNSC. Neorealism contends that the system of international politics is defined by its ordering principle (anarchy), units of the system (nations), and the distribution of capabilities (the number of superpowers within the system). The international order—and the UN—is by nature a decentralized system in which nations have equal rights and use egoism to make decisions that further their national interest and maximize their relative gains in power. These relative gains are important for member states due to the security dilemma—a theory that contends that member states maximize relative gains and minimize relative losses in power to protect themselves from potential threats to their survival and economic wellbeing.
Through a neorealist lens, votes “for” or “against” UNSC resolutions can be viewed as member states’ attempts to maximize their power and ensure their geopolitical and economic survival. Resolution A/RES/75/287 on the conflict in Myanmar during the UN General Assembly’s 75th session is an example of this. The 119 member states who voted to adopt the resolution did so because they stand to benefit from condemning the military coup, whereas the vote against (by Belarus) can be seen as motivated by ideological alignment with Myanmar’s State Administration Council. The 36 abstentions can be viewed as a refusal to take a position because joining a bloc could damage these states’ pre-established economic or diplomatic ties. The General Assembly’s structure allows for a balance of power in which nations pursue interests but the majority always prevails. When this is not the case, the international system can become more unstable and less efficient.
In the UNSC, an uneven distribution of capabilities makes the decisions of certain member states far more consequential. The distribution of capabilities refers to the number of member states that possess an abundance of economic, nuclear, and military capabilities, making them superpowers. The distribution of capabilities, and accordingly, power, in the UNSC is concentrated in the P5 seats that wield veto power. From a critical perspective, the concept of permanent membership or vetoing may seem fundamentally unequal or unjust. But through neorealism, one can see how in an order where countries compete to further their interests and ensure survival, countries with the greatest capabilities hold the most power and will unequivocally exercise it. Hence, it becomes quite evident that the structure of the UNSC is a direct consequence of global power dynamics. This structure served the world well in a bipolar post-WWII era. But with the rise of China marking the dawn of a multipolar system, the UNSC structure that once reflected the balance of power may be obsolete and a deterrent to peace and security.
The Importance and Challenges to UNSC Alignment on Myanmar
UNSC alignment on the situation in Myanmar is much more crucial than alignment in the General Assembly due to the binding nature of resolutions in the UNSC. In accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter, resolutions passed in the UNSC under Chapter VII—Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression— require member states to “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” In essence, in any other UN organ, a resolution is a recommendation, but in the UNSC, a resolution is a mandate of sorts. This gives the UNSC the ability to enact whatever countermeasures it desires against the State Administration Council.
The United Nations General Assembly, its President, the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoy to Myanmar have condemned the SAC’s coup and urged “decisive action” on the matter, but nothing tangible can be done until the UNSC is aligned. Furthermore, statements of condemnation and support do little to boost the morale of the Myanmar population that has visibly grown tired of waiting for the UN to take action. The Burma Campaign UK reflects this in its statement: “The Burmese military consists of people who are soldiers, not diplomats. They respect strength, not statements. What might be considered something of major diplomatic significance by many UN members may be perceived as insignificant by these authoritarian generals.” Since February 2, 2021, countless pleas to the UNSC echoed by millions of Myanmar protesters have gone unanswered: it is due time to start discussing structural reform to the UNSC so that action can be taken in the future.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have engaged in double-vetoing responses to humanitarian crises by citing the violation of national sovereignty and interference in internal affairs. Coincidentally, the vast majority of these vetoes initiated by Russia and followed by China have been in response to resolutions concerning conflicts that have Russian military involvement, such as the Syrian Civil War, the War in Donbas, and the Russo-Georgian War. In regards to the situation in Myanmar, the UNSC met informally in March to release a statement initiated by the United Kingdom: “Members of the Security Council expressed deep concern at the rapidly deteriorating situation and strongly condemned the use of violence against peaceful protesters and the deaths of hundreds of civilians, including women and children.”
It was evident that the veto was still used by the P5, albeit in a de facto capacity: Beijing blocked western countries from including a “readiness to consider further steps” in the statement because it alluded to a possibility of sanctions. Beijing also blocked the use of the word “killing,” suggesting “deaths” instead. Moscow tried to block the statement several times because it did not condemn the “the death of security forces.” Needless to say, Russia and China have extensive ties to Myanmar’s Tatmadaw—China supplied 48% and Russia supplied 15% of Myanmar’s total arms imports between 2016 and 2020. It indeed seems that a council created to maintain international peace and security has constantly undermined its founding principles and the resources at its disposal because a single—or sometimes two—nations exploit their vetoing rights without justification.
With its mishandling of the Myanmar crisis, the UNSC is facing mounting pressure to stop remaining idle. At the 47th Session of the United Nations Humans Rights Council, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet demanded that the UNSC not “fail the country (Myanmar) a second time” by allowing for an “all-out attack against the civilian population” and a “multi-dimensional human rights catastrophe.” The UNSC’s inaction on Myanmar, however, not only enabled “an escalation in violence” that led to “horrific consequences for civilians,” as Bachelet said, but it also showed dictators all around the world that the international community will not hold them accountable.
In the 21st century, the UNSC needs to uphold its founding ethos and be an enforcer of international peace, given that the Council is fully able to collectively authorize the use of force if necessary. This should not apply to two-sided conflicts, and mediation is preferable when an issue is complex in nature. However, in humanitarian crises in which an indefensible population is attacked, the use of force and immediate humanitarian intervention should be on the table. To ensure prudence when administering force, however, the UNSC needs to reform such that there is a rational distribution of power and five nations with diametrically opposed ideologies do not have the final say.
Proposals for UNSC Membership Reform
Member states previously formed alliances to call for structural reform of the UNSC by citing a need to reflect a fair distribution of power, coherency with the multipolar geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, and changes in sources of UN funding. In addition to these goals, reform could also prevent future inactions like the response towards the Myanmar coup from occurring. One type of proposal for UNSC reform is membership reform, which is amending the amount of permanent or nonpermanent seats in the councils, or who holds those seats. The objective of such a proposal is to give fair representation to member states by assigning seats in a manner that prioritizes geographic balance. The most prominent of these proposals was laid down in the five-year progress report In Larger Freedom spearheaded by Kofi Annan, and Uniting for Consensus, also called the Coffee Club, spearheaded by the Italian Republic.
Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the In Larger Freedom report on March 21, 2005 to the General Assembly. It contained four sections that Annan thought were of concern to the Assembly: Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear, Freedom to Live in Dignity, and Strengthening the United Nations. The final section—Strengthening the United Nations—was a recommendation to revitalise the UNSC by expanding the number of members from 15 to 24 so that it would be more “broadly representative of the international community” and “reflect the geopolitical realities of today.” Annan laid out two plans to achieve this: Model A and Model B. Model A would create six permanent and three nonpermanent seats. By contrast, Model B would create eight new “four-year renewable seats” and one more nonpermanent seat. Uniting for Consensus, on the other hand, was a movement founded in 1995 by Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, and Egypt to counter the bid for permanent seat expansion made by the G4 nations. The Coffee Club proposed that the UNSC should be expanded with nonpermanent members. They made a formal proposition at the 59th Session of the General Assembly in 2005 to expand the number of nonpermanent members from 10 to 20, also citing the need for a more “equitable geographical distribution.” Neither suggestion for UNSC reform was enacted.
These proposals for membership reform could have allowed for a more stable UNSC, by creating a more equal distribution of power via a greater number of either nonpermanent, permanent, or renewable seats. In particular, Annan’s Model A could have allowed for less P5 hegemony due to the granting of permanent seats, and thus veto power, to six non-P5 member states. However, both these proposals fail to address the single issue that has repeatedly impaired the Council’s ability to administer humanitarian intervention during crises: the veto. Membership expansion does not allow the Council to annul a veto due to the conditions of Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter, no matter how much Consensus exists against a veto by other member states. A veto issued by China or Russia against humanitarian intervention in Myanmar would trump any wider consensus if there were a formal resolution on the matter. Due to China and Russia’s ideological alignment with the State Administration Council and many other draconian regimes, they are also likely to veto resolutions encouraging humanitarian intervention. Thus, for the UNSC not to fail Myanmar and nations with similar crises in the future, reform must occur to regulate the veto in reference to the principles of the Charter, or the veto should be abolished altogether.
Veto Reform: Abolition or Regulation?
In its annual report, Amnesty International’s Secretary-General Salil Shetty accused the veto as being a means for P5 member states to promote their political self-interest or geopolitical interest above the interest of “protecting civilians.” Similarly, at the 73rd General Assembly Session, Indian delegate Syed Akbaruddin—backed by the G4—declared that “Naysayers cannot be allowed to cast a dark shadow over the entire membership and hold the overwhelming majority back.” Both these individuals draw attention to a sophism: in the 21st century, the veto contradicts the fundamental precepts of international relations. Given that nations are inclined to oppose measures that could impede their national interests regardless of their international consequences, why must we pretend that certain nations are moral authorities, befitting an ability to single-handedly trump the majority? Why is the vote of a sole diplomat so consequential as to enable the killings of ethnic minorities and protesters in Myanmar? Any discussion of UNSC reform must include the question of the veto, for equal representation means nothing if the UN is unable to uphold its promises of peace and security.
Calls for the abolition of the veto have long been echoed by non-P5 member states during General Assembly sessions. Kuwait, representing the Arab Group, condemned the arbitrary use of veto power by claiming “use of the veto reflects the purely political interests of permanent Council members.” Sierra Leone, representing the African Group, is “opposed in principle to the veto,” outlining a need to progress towards “effective democratic multilateralism.” Italy, representing the aforementioned Coffee Club, is open to “abolishing veto power” in addition to its proposal of membership expansion. Mongolia, Singapore, Argentina, Colombia, Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, and Malaysia—in addition to the aforementioned African and Arab groups—also vehemently oppose the use of veto power. The opposition to the veto generally stems from perceiving it as hegemonic, undemocratic, and a “contradiction” of the UN Charter, whose preamble states that the UN affirms the “equal rights” of “nations large and small.” However, a significant number of nations also advocate for the abolition or regulation of the veto not due to inequality but its inefficacy during crises.
Use of the veto power has come under scrutiny in regards to the conditions that ensued subsequent to the Myanmar coup: namely “mass atrocity,” “crimes against humanity,” “war crimes,” and “genocide.” Estonia and even P5 member UK seem to be in favor of the withholding of veto power in such conditions. This position against veto use stems from a belief that humanitarian crises should be dealt with in a manner that is independent of the interests of individual member states. If the Council worked this way, a formal resolution of a binding nature taking decisive action to alleviate the crisis in Myanmar could have easily made its way into the chambers of the UNSC—because the prospects of such wouldn’t be interdicted by Chinese or Russian de facto vetoes in preliminary discussions. This is evident because resolution A/RES/75/287 in the General Assembly condemning the SAC was adopted with a majority voting for, showing that if the UNSC did equitably represent the collective interests of member states—or in the absence of the veto—a resolution on Myanmar could have passed in the UNSC too.
A proposal by the President of the French Republic in 2013 suggests an alternative to altogether abolishing the veto: the regulation of veto issuance. France proposes that P5 members should voluntarily self-regulate by not issuing vetos in the event of “mass atrocities.” This could pave the way for the UNSC to act on issues like the murder of over 800 civilians and airstrikes on villages in Myanmar, as “crimes against humanity and large-scale war crimes” are considered to be in the same class of crises as “mass atrocities” by France. This may seem like a pragmatic and efficient solution to the question of responding to humanitarian crises, but this opens up the possibility for ambiguity in the interpretation of “mass atrocities.” Because the proposition is for self-regulation, Russia or China could simply refuse to acknowledge the existence of “massacres” by deeming the conflict to be of a two-sided nature or declare a blatant coup to be a mere “cabinet reshuffle” as they did in the past. If any sort of regulation were to be brought about in the UNSC to keep veto power in check, it needs to scrutinize a veto on a case-by-case basis so that P5 nations can be held accountable by the wider Council. This would certainly allow the SC to respond to humanitarian crises, as arbitrary vetoes could be objectively deemed impermissible by a collectively more prudent Council.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s crisis is well-positioned to be a feasible opportunity for multilateral cooperation. Domestically, the crimes against humanity are blatantly one-sided and the democratic resistance movement is clearly aligned with UN values, thus streamlining the possibility of UNSC alignment. In addition, the Myanmar crisis has also shown that attempts to engage in track one diplomacy or condemnations by the UN do not work against a regime whose only real interest is self-preservation.
The crisis has also added an extra dimension to the question of structural reform of the United Nations Security Council. Firstly, the cases of mass murder, torture, rape, and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar have shown the world the consequences of idleness. The UNSC is fully authorized under Article 42 of the UN Charter “to use force to maintain or restore international peace and security,” but their inability to do so was what exactly enabled the escalation of the situation in Myanmar into a mass atrocity. A resolution calling for humanitarian intervention or the coordination of targeted sanctions may have served to decrease the incidence of crimes against humanity, but because the prospects of such a resolution have been struck down, an indefensible population has been forced to defend themselves and a full-fledged civil war is taking shape.
Secondly, it ensures perpetrators of crimes against humanity across the world that they will not be held accountable as long as they have diplomatic ties to a nation with a P5 seat. Moscow indirectly enabled the Tatmadaw’s General Min Aung Hlaing to carry out mass killings unencumbered consequent to their military ties, as it did before with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Learning from Myanmar, the UN should recognize that states with veto power are inclined to block interventionist resolutions if they perceive them as threats to the expansion of their relative power in the international system and that the presence of the veto is always going to withhold any active response to humanitarian crises. The UNSC was supposed to represent the best of humanity when it was founded after the Second World War, now it is time for the Council to honor the founding ethos. The Council should take an active role in the prevention of atrocities by either holding P5 nations accountable for arbitrary veto issuances or abolishing the veto altogether..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Coup and chaos have devastated the economy with GDP set to fall 18% and half the population plunged into poverty by 2022
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"As Myanmar descends deeper and deeper into civil war, a conflict driven by nationwide resistance to the military’s disastrous democracy-suspending coup, the economy is taking the brunt of the chaotic collateral damage.
The February 1 coup sparked countrywide labor strikes, runs on banks and now rising warfare punctuated by bomb blasts in key urban areas including the commercial capital of Yangon.
That’s all put the economy in a tailspin while raising stability risks that have caused a growing number of foreign investors to either suspend or abandon their operations and outlays, many committed earlier on the belief Myanmar’s “last frontier” market was moving in a new hopeful democratic direction.
The opposite has happened since the coup. According to the World Bank’s Myanmar Economic Monitor, the economy contracted a whopping 18% in the year period spanning October 2020 to September 2021. The bank predicted the number of people living in poverty is likely to more than double by the beginning of 2022, compared to 2019 levels.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) predicted back in April, before the full impact of the coup had been registered, that the Covid-19 pandemic and political instability would by next year plunge almost half of Myanmar’s 54 million population into poverty, reversing gains made over the past 16 years.
The country’s dire economic straits is being reflected in the Myanmar currency, the kyat, which has lost more than 60% of its value since the coup. The official exchange rate on February 1 was 1,395 kyat to the US dollar but the money changers who are still operating are now asking for anywhere between 2,700 to 3,000 kyats per greenback.
The sharp depreciation is driving up prices on fuel and food, with gasoline prices nearly doubled and a 48-kilogram bag of rice up 40% since the coup.
Those economic pressures are raising concerns about the stability of the banking sector, which was already laden with non-performing loans before the coup and collapse of the economy. The regime has imposed hard limits on the amount account holders at banks may withdrawal daily, including at ATMs.
Aung Naing Oo, the junta’s minister for investment and foreign economic relations, blamed “foreign-backed sabotage” for the country’s rising economic plight in an October 19 interview with Reuters. However, the minister did not specify which foreign powers were allegedly sabotaging the economy, or how.
The minister also claimed that Myanmar’s foreign reserves stand at $6.04 billion; the World Bank estimated foreign reserves at $7.70 billion in March. But it is impossible to gauge the accuracy of those figures, nor do they indicate the junta’s true underlying financial position.
Myanmar’s recent history – notably the economic collapse that followed the military’s brutal 1988 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters — shows the Tatmadaw has a remarkable ability to stay in power in the face of economic and financial calamity.
Economists and academics familiar with the Tatmadaw’s ability to survive past crises note that much of Myanmar’s economy transacts in black and otherwise illicit markets, and thus revenues and profits do not appear in official statistics or are recorded by international economic monitoring outfits like the World Bank.
The Tatmadaw controls large swathes of the economy through its controlled Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, massive conglomerates that are engaged in everything from banking, industrial parks, shipping, real estate, sugar factories, tobacco companies and supermarkets.
The US has imposed targeted sanctions on the conglomerates since the coup, though it’s not clear if and how those punitive measures have crimped the junta’s commercial interests.
The conglomerates are not the only economic resource keeping the regime afloat, far from it. The Tatmadaw is known to be deeply involved in the nation’s sprawling black economy, illicit gains that are often funneled to top generals and officers to maintain their loyalty and underwrite the political status quo.
According to the international environmental watchdog Global Witness, the jade trade in Myanmar’s far north is worth more than US$30 billion annually, representing nearly half of the country’s GDP.
“The industry buoys the weapons trade and enriches military officials, including the son of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing… Aung Pyae Son,” Global Witness stated in a June report, which added: “the generals enrich themselves and war continues to rage, the environment and the people who depend on it pay the ultimate price.”
Much of the jade trade is conducted off the books mainly Chinese buyers making bids and purchases on their mobile phones, far away from the mines in Myanmar’s north and market places on the Chinese border.
More insidiously, the illegal narcotics trade is also known to be worth billions of US dollars per year. While Myanmar’s production of opium and its derivative heroin has declined in recent decades due to reduced demand in China and Southeast Asia, methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs have replaced the old drugs.
Most of the narcotics are still being produced in Shan state and, to a lesser extent, Kachin, Kayah and Karen states, while the main manufacturers and dealers are local Tatmadaw-allied militia forces known as pyithusit.
It is impossible to quantify the total value of the narcotics trade, as it is conducted in an even more clandestine manner than the jade trade, but it is likewise believed to top $30 billion. The military is also believed to be involved in lucrative and largely unregulated exports of gold, primarily to China, the total value of which is unknown.
Despite all those hidden reserves and revenues, it remains to be seen how the current social, political and economic crisis will play out. The withdrawal of major foreign investors whose outlays were, directly and indirectly, enriching top generals and their subordinates is bound to have hit many where it hurts most.
In July, Norway’s telecom giant Telenor announced that it was selling its mobile operations to the M1 Group, a Lebanese investment firm, but the transaction was deemed invalid due to non-compliance with local regulations.
Telenor’s decision was apparently prompted by a demand that it had to install invasive technology that would allow the Tatmadaw to freely eavesdrop on user communications. Reports have indicated the firm has completely written off its $782 million investment in the country.
Other companies that have pulled out, or are in the process of doing so, include the French renewable energy firm Voltalia and Japanese beverage company Kirin, which has written off its $193 million investment in the country since the coup. Japan’s Suzuki announced shortly after the coup that it was suspending production at its two factories, which produced 13,300 vehicles in 2019, mainly for the local market.
Several global clothing suppliers have also ceased producing in Myanmar, among them Italy’s Benetton. Within days after the coup, Amata, Thailand’s largest industrial estate developer, suspended work on a $1 billion project on the outskirts of Yangon that was designed to kickstart more modern manufacturing in the country.
The junta may have enough resources, guns and money to survive in the months ahead. But that could change if or when the junta’s coffers start to run dry, meaning less trickle-down of resources to mid-ranking officers as well as the rank and file.
Morale inside the Tatmadaw is reported to be lower than ever, as soldiers are not only fighting against ethnic insurgents in frontier areas but also their own kin, the ethnic Bamars in the Myanmar heartland. Whether the confluence of battlefield losses and economic decline starts to crack military cohesion is yet to be seen.
But it’s by now plain for all to see, including inside the Tatmadaw, the spiraling economic disaster caused by a coup that could have been avoided by sharing rather than grabbing power from Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected democratic government..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"In the 2020 general election, the Mon Unity Party made a strong showing, encouraging hopes of a political breakthrough. These were abruptly ended by the February coup of the State Administration Council. Since this time, Mon politics have become divided. Amidst countrywide breakdown, some leaders have accepted cooperation with the SAC, others declare support for the opposition National Unity Government, while others urge caution for the Mon people. Kun Wood analyses the dilemmas facing the Mon movement, explaining why lessons from history need to be learned.
The political backdrop
It has been eight months since the military coup in Myanmar, and the situation remains very serious. Mon State is one territory in the country that has suffered greatly from this crisis. Social, economic, healthcare and education systems have broken down; the people are facing daily difficulties in their livelihoods; and many lives have been lost. The generals are good at talking but take no actions for the benefit of the people. Meanwhile the country is sinking ever deeper into poverty.
In the meantime, the struggle to bring down dictatorship is continuing in line with the desire of the people for democracy. But dead bodies are the only measure that have increased in the country. The third wave of the Covid-19 pandemic occurred at the same time as the military coup. But, since the military rulers prepared nothing for the pandemic, many people have died; the generals only sought advantage. The whole country has suffered from the negative consequences, and Mon State is suffering as well. The result eight months after the coup are tears, grief, homelessness, the deaths of innocents, broken families, a lost young generation, and countless fallen stars who died before their time.
The Mon Unity Party is one of the political organisations that collaborated with the military State Administration Council after 1 February 2021. Different people have given various criticisms. In the 2020 general election, a large number of the Mon people supported the Mon political movement, and there were good results. After over 60 years of civil war, the 2020 polls were considered to mark a historic turning-point in Mon politics.
At the time of the election, the Mon people were proud to vote for Mon parties. They declared that the ballots of the Mon people are for the Mon nationality cause. As a Mon, it was an honour for them to vote for a Mon party. It is not wrong to say that the 2020 election was considered a most beautiful painting in Mon politics. Unfortunately, the new military regime discoloured this painting in a very short time.
The reason why the Mon people voted for a Mon party, the MUP, was because the two main nationality parties joined together before the polls to create a power-base to take the Mon movement forward. In Mon politics, this unification was regarded as a foundation to build a future federal nation for the Mon people in which they can achieve their demands for the rights to self-determination and ethnic equality. Equally important, these two parties were brought together by joint efforts among different sectors in Mon society, including Buddhist monks, intellectuals, community leaders and youth groups who overcame various challenges.
Unfortunately, the leadership of the national armed forces (Tatmadaw) seized control of the government for the whole country on 1 February after claiming that there had been election fraud by the National League for Democracy. Following the coup, the generals approached different political parties to form a coalition. Most of the nationality parties refused to join them, but there were some parties that agreed to do so. Among these parties, the MUP – which is supposed to represent the Mon people and their aspirations – accepted this collaboration.
Since this time, the MUP decision has caused great disagreement within the party and many members have left. The outcome is felt not only within the party but it has also had huge impact in Mon communities as well. Two groups have appeared: those who thought the decision was right and those that could not accept it. Since unity is needed for the strength of the Mon people, this split and diversity of views have become a weakness.
The Thanlwin Bridge and Mon political dilemma
Eight months after the military coup, many people are considering whether the subsequent course of events has proven the MUP decision wrong or right. Following its alliance with the new regime, the party were given one seat at the union level and one at the state level under the SAC. On 1 June, in one new initiative, they renamed the bridge which connects Mawlamyine and Belu Island from the “General Aung San Bridge” to “Thanlwin Bridge”. The name, though, that the Mon people prefer is “Ramanya”, a traditional term for Mon State.*
The reasons for this compromise change to Thanlwin, which is the river name, were given as pragmatic. As is recognised, Mon State is made up of different nationalities, and there are different political perspectives as well. No matter what the differences are, it is important that the vision of building a future federal state together must be the same. But, if there are no common goals or firm positions, the future of the Mon people will be swept away in the tide of current politics.
Thus a question arises: how can Mon political parties guarantee that their decisions are made on the basis of “do no harm” to their people? As long as I can remember, Mon politics have been struggling up until now. In 1995, after the New Mon State Party made a ceasefire agreement with the military government of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, Tatmadaw bases were expanded, people’s land was grabbed and many human rights violations carried out. As a result, although political dialogue has been held several times in the intervening years, the right to self-determination and federal state that the Mon people truly want still seem far away.
For the moment, it remains uncertain why the MUP is collaborating with the SAC. But it is sure that the Mon people do not want the Tatmadaw to be in their homeland for even a second. Nobody will be happy if the land that they inherited from their ancestors is grabbed and becomes military-owned property. But, since Mon issues are about Mon people, how can we resolve the political crisis that we are facing? Do we continue living according to the desire of dictators and under their orders? Or do we move forward, without self-interest, along with other nationality peoples so that our future generation will fully enjoy federal democracy?
Although our paths and approaches to reach our goal may be varied, it is essential that our objectives are the same. It is necessary to learn the strengths and weaknesses of different peace and political processes, and new steps should be taken. Unity of the Mon people is the power of the Mon people.
Economics
Before the military coup, people in Myanmar had already been struggling with their jobs and businesses due to the first and second waves of the Covid-19 pandemic. There were fewer job opportunities for the daily-wage workers, and it was not easy to have a meal each day. Many families were facing difficulties in their livelihoods due to the closure of markets, workplaces, transport and other facilities around the country.
After the military coup, the third Covid-19 wave followed, increasing the struggles of the ordinary people. Prices rose further as well as the number of jobless persons. Compounding the crisis, daily-wage workers face renewed difficulties due to travel restrictions imposed by the SAC. In some areas, families also lost their sources of income from wages earned from illegal immigration to Thailand, where many jobs have also been lost.
Following the NMSP’s 1995 ceasefire, people had been persuaded with the prospect of economic opportunities. However, until now, many working people are still struggling to even have regular meals. In the past, the fishery sector was the type of business which supported the economy of Mon State. But because of travel restrictions, it is presently difficult for people to come and buy products as well as for local people to go and sell their products. The worries in many communities are only increasing.
There are also many concerns over land. A recent case is the confiscation of farmlands for the airport project on Kaleguak Island, Ye township. Although the project is being implemented following the military coup, the affected communities have not been paid as yet. Said a local resident: “It is very difficult for us. We have been using the land on this island for our livelihoods since the time of our ancestors. But they came and confiscated the land, but we have heard nothing about compensation.”
There is thus a dilemma. Many lands have been confiscated with the purpose of expanding military camps, but very few people have received compensation. The economy is failing, but few people are receiving support. How do we solve these problems? Who should we ask to help us?
Healthcare
After the coup on 1 February, healthcare workers across the country decided not to work under the military regime, and many of them joined the Civil Disobedience Movement. There are hospitals but no health workers, and the health system has continued to deteriorate. Consequently, since the third Covid-19 wave is significantly worse than the first and second waves, many people have died who could otherwise have been treated.
Among those suffering, many are people living in Mon State. The collapse of the health system has become a perfect storm in many communities. Although people feel sick, the hospitals and clinics are shut down. In the past, there were many humanitarian organisations and charity groups that provided aid to local communities. But they, too, face challenges and delays in delivering services due to the SAC crackdown. Even though they are willing to help, they face security oppression. As a result, many lives have been lost during the past few months through the combination of a lack of treatment, medicines and SAC restrictions.
This raises the question of the MUP, which is cooperating with the SAC, and what they have achieved so far. They explained that they joined hands with the regime in order to improve the situation for the Mon people and prevent them from being harmed. But the Mon people are now in trouble, so how can they help?
For the moment, the Mon people are having to work in their own ways to protect themselves from the Covid-19 pandemic. To do this, they are undertaking their own fundraising and programmes to get the necessary medicines and supplies that will be used for the benefit of their own communities. Presently, there is no other way.
Social affairs
The current social and political situation in Mon State is not about being red (NLD) or green (Tatmadaw). There are many organisations with different colours. This creates a situation where people do not know who to trust. There are people who support the red and who like the green. Among them, there are people who support alignment with the military SAC and people who are against it. The MUP’s Nai Layi Tama, for example, was appointed as a Mon State economic minister. There have also been killings due to political violence in Mon State as well as cases of suicide since the SAC coup. According to a report by Lagoon Eain, 411 people were arbitrarily detained amidst protests during the Myanmar Spring Revolution that followed the military takeover. Mon State politics and society remain very unstable.
The peace process and New Mon State Party
It is now a quarter of a century since the NMSP ceasefire with the then SLORC government. Leaders chose to talk peace at the table instead of killing one another. The NMSP has been following this peace agreement until now, avoiding conflict as much as possible. However, although it has been 26 years since the ceasefire, neither the NMSP nor Mon people have achieved their goal of federal democracy and the right to self-determination.
Negotiating, however, with a military ruler is like people talking to each other while an unleashed tiger is still moving about. This is not just the Mon experience. According to the Pa-O National Organisation, which has also been involved in peace negotiations: “The current peace process is dark now and we don’t see any light. In the past, we could see a sparkle of light.”
The humanitarian and internally-displaced situation
Shortly after the coup, the third wave of the Covid-19 pandemic occurred. Internally-displaced persons from Mon areas have fled from civil war many times and, even with the 1995 ceasefire, many could not return home. Since the February coup, the dream of IDPs to return has been pushed back even further. In the past, if there was fighting, they could flee and take refuge in Thailand or in a border area. But in the current crisis, it is very difficult to travel and nobody wants to accept IDPs any more.
Who, then, will take responsibility for the IDPs not to be homeless again? With the spread of the third wave, villages have been locked down, and there are people who cannot afford even a regular meal. The crisis means that it is more important for them to find food rather than to be afraid of Covid-19. As there is lockdown between villages, it is hard for people to work outside of the displacement camps.
The health crisis for the IDPs is also very serious. It is difficult for households in the camps to buy preventive masks and, if somebody contracts Covid-19, they have no choice but to remain at home, risk spreading the virus and face potential death. Health treatments are rarely available. A community member from Chaung Phya, an IDP camp in Ye township, described the IDP plight:
“It costs about 1000 Kyat for one mask. We can’t afford to buy it. We can buy a meal for our family with that 1000 Kyat. We just go and cut bamboo shoots and banana trunks everyday, but that is not sustainable. It is our hope that the disease will disappear quickly. We have no paddy and we have to buy rice. Now, all the prices have risen and it is really difficult for us.”
In this situation, local communities have been struggling against the humanitarian emergency as best they can. Since the coup, however, commodity prices have increased rapidly while the price of local products, such as lemons and bananas, has fallen even lower than before. Said a local resident:
“Now, we are not sure whether we have to be afraid of Covid-19 or not. We normally went to the hospital whenever we are sick and we could get treatment. But currently, it is like we are challenging death. We don’t know who to rely upon. Our future is very uncertain.”
Conclusion
In Mon politics, it is a time to question whether other people are leading us or are we following other people. Is it because of ethnicity? And why are the politics of “divide and rule” always working? Along with these questions, it is time to review the peace process for the whole country in the light of the military coup.
There are many points of view and analysis among the Mon people. In the current crisis, it is like walking but not moving forward, and there is a concern that our way will be lost altogether sooner or later. For many reasons, Mon politics are now in a very unpredictable situation. Therefore it is necessary to review past activities and, from this, learn and prepare for the future. It also important not to blame each other but to work together for the common good. Future generations in Mon State must enjoy a brighter future.
In many respects, the present situation repeats the moment when the Mon people tried to merge two different parties into the MUP. If the current differences in Mon politics can be rectified, then there is hope for a better future. If we are to achieve equality, the right to self-determination and federal democracy along with other nationality peoples, it is essential that we are united among ourselves. No matter how hard the journey is, if we can eradicate racism and work together with other peoples, then we can surely achieve our goal.
In summary, it is the duty of both the Mon people and their leaders to ensure that our identity does not disappear and that we remain free from oppression. If we are united and living in harmony, our goals will be in sight and remain very close to us.
* The naming of this bridge, which opened in 2017 under an administration led by the National League for Democracy, is controversial. General Aung San was the father of the NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi. After its opening, Mon people continued to lobby for a name, such as Ramanya, that signifies Mon land and identity.
“Kun Wood” is the pseudonym for an activist engaged in Mon national and political affairs. She has been working on community development and the right to land for ethnic nationality peoples since 2006. She has carried out research on customary tenure in different parts of the country..."
Source/publisher:
Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar
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"At first glance, it was a meeting between a former US ambassador to the UN and the Myanmar military junta chief in the country’s capital, Naypyitaw.
To some politically aware souls, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s reception of Bill Richardson on Tuesday appeared significant: The former New Mexico governor is, after all, the first US non-state figure to pay a visit to the Myanmar regime, which has been shunned internationally for seizing power from the democratically elected government of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup in February, and for its subsequent deadly crackdowns on anti-regime protesters. It raised more than a few eyebrows to see the coup leader welcoming the former US diplomat after repeatedly turning away ASEAN’s special envoy, who was appointed by the bloc to help find a resolution to the post-coup turmoil. Myanmar is an ASEAN member.
In fact, the two men who met in the Diplomatic Hall of the regime’s office on Tuesday have something in common: Both seek to keep Myanmar’s ousted democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi out of the country’s politics.
Since day one of the coup on Feb. 1, she has been detained—along with the country’s President U Win Myint—by Min Aung Hlaing and charged in 11 absurd criminal cases. If found guilty of all charges, the 76-year-old would spend 102 years behind bars. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is a towering political figure who has been highly revered by the majority of the country’s people for the sacrifices she has made on behalf of the Myanmar democracy movement since 1988. Her political popularity has been unrivaled since then. Take her National League for Democracy (NLD)’s electoral victories in 1990, 2015 and 2020. One of her missions has been to root out the military’s long involvement in the country’s politics—which dates back to 1962—because it’s simply undemocratic. Unsurprisingly, she has been a thorn in the generals’ side.
Richardson, a onetime friend and supporter of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, clearly stated his stand against her on the first day of the coup in a Twitter post.
“The Myanmar military must show the utmost restraint in any further use of force. B/C of Suu Kyi’s failure to promote Democratic values as Myanmar’s de facto leader she should step aside & let other Myanmar democratic leaders take the rein w/ international backing and support,” he tweeted.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Richardson’s friendship dates back to 1994, when she was under house arrest and he was one of her first visitors outside of her immediate family. When her NLD government established an advisory board to help solve the Rohingya issue in 2017, the former New Mexico governor was among five prominent international figures appointed to it.
However, he became a hater of the State Counselor the following year when he abruptly quit the body after clashing with her over his attempt to secure the release of two Reuters journalists detained for their reporting on a massacre of Rohingya committed by the army. The military chief at the time was—and remains—the current coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing.
Richardson said at the time that the panel was engaged in a “whitewash” of military atrocities and he did not want to be part of “a cheerleading squad for the government” led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he accused of lacking “moral leadership” in her handling of the crisis.
More than two years later, the former US diplomat met with the general who bears ultimate responsibility for the soldiers’ atrocities against the Rohinyga. It would be interesting to know whether the former governor tried to raise the issue with Min Aung Hlaing, as his Richardson Center also works for the wellbeing of Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh.
Richardson said his Myanmar trip this time was a humanitarian mission to discuss pathways for the humanitarian delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, medical supplies and other public health needs.
The State Department said the trip was not an effort sponsored by or on behalf of the US government, but added, “We hope his trip contributes to improve humanitarian access (to the country).”
While the humanitarian issue is important for Myanmar, the US shouldn’t forget that the root causes of the crisis were mostly political and sparked by the coup. So, we shouldn’t expect any positive outcomes from the meeting of these two birds of a feather.
Another interesting question is whether he asked the regime for permission to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Allowing the detained State Counselor to meet with foreign diplomats seems to be a very sensitive issue for the junta. The ASEAN special envoy’s visit to the country has been blocked by the regime as he made the same request. On Wednesday, the regime’s No. 2 leader, Vice Senior General Soe Win, insisted that allowing a foreigner to meet someone charged with crimes was unlawful.
Currently all eyes are on the case of Danny Fenster, a US journalist detained by the junta for incitement since May, as Richardson is known for his previous attempts to negotiate the release of international hostages and US citizens in rogue nations around the world. Given his previous efforts on behalf of the Reuters journalists—and no doubt looking to maintain his “negotiator” reputation—it is reasonable to assume the ex-governor tried his luck with the regime to secure the release of the journalist, as well as that of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Australian economic adviser Sean Turnell, who has been detained since February and is accused of breaching the country’s Official Secrets Act.
It is known only to Richardson whether he requested the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—if only for the sake of their former friendship..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
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Description:
"အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စု၏ လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်စက်မှုများမှာ မတရားအာဏာလုယူမှု လပေါင်း (၉) လ ကြာလာသည့်အချိန်ထိ ဆထက်တိုး၍ ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားလာနေသည်။
မြို့ရွာများအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်ဝင်ရောက်စီးနင်းမှုများ၊ လက်နက်ဖြင့်ပစ်ခတ်မှုများကြောင့် ကလေးသူငယ် များအပါအဝင် အရပ်သားထိခိုက်နစ်နာခံစားရမှုများမှာ တိုင်းနှင့်ပြည်နယ်အနှံ့ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရလျက်ရှိသည်။ ထို့အပြင် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးပြီးနောက် အခကြေးငွေဖြင့် ပြန်လည်ရွေးခိုင်းမှုများ၊ စစ်ဘေးရှောင်များ၏ နေရာ များထိ လိုက်လံခြိမ်းခြောက်နှောင့်ယှက်မှုများ၊ ညှဉ်းပန်း နှိပ်စက်မှုများကိုလည်း စနစ်တကျကျူးလွန် လျက်ရှိရာ ပြည်သူများအား အကြောက်တရားလွှမ်းမိုးနေစေရန် အလို့ငှာ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိဖြင့် အကောင် အထည်ဖော်လျက်ရှိသည်။
အောက်တိုဘာလ ၁၈ ရက်နေ့မှစတင်၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့်ဆက်နွယ်သော ပြစ်ဒဏ် ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံရသူ (၁၃၁၆)ဦး၊ တရားရင်ဆိုင်နေရသူ (၄၃၂၀)ဦး၊ စုစုပေါင်း (၅၆၃၆) ကို လွှတ်ပေးမည်ဟု ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့သည်။ မတရားဖမ်း ဆီးခံခဲ့ရသူများကို ယခုကဲ့သို့ ပြန်လည်လွှတ်ပေးမည်ဟု ကြေညာ ခြင်းမှာ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်း၌ မျက်နှာပန်းလှစေရန် နိုင်ငံရေးရည်ရွယ်ချက်အရ လွှတ်ပေးခဲ့ခြင်းသာ ဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ လွှတ်ပေးခဲ့သည်ဟု ကြေညာခဲ့သော်လည်း နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီ စောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း (AAPP) မှ မှတ်တမ်းပြုချက်များအရ အောက်တိုဘာ ၃၁ အထိ အရေအတွက် အားဖြင့် (၄၀၇၂) ဦးမှာ လွတ်မြောက်လာခဲ့ပြီး ထိုအထဲမှ ပြန်လည်ဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူ အရေအတွက်မှာ (၁၂၂) ဦး ရှိသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ပြန်လည်ဖမ်းဆီးမှုများကြောင့် တိမ်းရှောင်နေရသူများလည်းရှိနေသလို ပြန်လည်အဖမ်းခံရ သော အရေအတွက်မှာ မြေပြင်တွင် ထိုထက်ပိုများမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်း ချင်းပြည်နယ် ထန်တလန်မြို့၊ ဖလမ်းမြို့နယ်နှင့် မင်းတပ်မြို့နယ်အတွင်းရှိ ကျေးရွာများမှ ဘုရားကျောင်းတစ်လုံးနှင့် အိမ်ခြေ (၄၀၀) လုံးထက်မနည်း မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခံခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရ သည်။ အောက်တိုဘာ ၂၉ ရက်နေ့က ထန်တလန်မြို့ မီးလောင်မှု ဖြစ်စဉ်ကို စစ်အုပ်စုဘက်က ငြင်းဆန်ထား သော်လည်း စစ်အုပ်စုအမာခံ ပြည်ထောင်စု ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးနှင့်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးပါတီ၏ ပြောရေးဆိုခွင့်ရှိသူက လူမှု ကွန်ရက်စာမျက်နှာထက်မှတစ်ဆင့် ထန်တလန်ဖြစ်စဉ်ကို နမူနာယူကြရန် ပြည်သူလူထုကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှု ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။
၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် ပြည်သူ့ထောက်ခံမဲအများဆုံးရရှိခဲ့သော အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ်ပါတီ၏ ပါတီရုံးများ၊ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၊ ထောက်ခံသူများကို စစ်အုပ်စုက ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်လျက်ရှိရာ အောက်တိုဘာ အတွင်း ပါတီရုံး အနည်းဆုံး (၁၀) ရုံးထက်မနည်း တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရမှုဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့သည်။ ပါတီရုံး၏ ခြံစည်းရိုး၊ တံခါး၊ ဆိုင်းဘုတ်၊ ဗီနိုင်းနှင့် အလံများ ရိုက်ချိုးဖျက်ဆီးပစ်ခြင်းများအပြင် ရုံးခန်းအတွင်း ဝင်ရောက်ကာ ပစ္စည်းများ ဖျက်ဆီးယူငင်ခြင်း၊ မီးကွင်းပစ်ခြင်း၊ ဗုံးပစ်ထည့်ခြင်းနှင့် ဖောက်ခွဲဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း စသည့်ပုံစံများ ဖြင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။
ထို့အပြင် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ NLD ပါတီအဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် အရပ်သားများ ပိုင်ဆိုင်သော ဟိုတယ်၊ ဆေးရုံ၊ နေအိမ်နှင့် ဆိုင်ခန်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက မတရားသိမ်းဆည်းချိတ်ပိတ်မှုများကို အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်း အနည်းဆုံး (၂၅) ခုထက်မနည်း ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည်။
ဖမ်းဆီးမှု
AAPP မှ လက်လှမ်းမီသမျှ ကောက်ယူရရှိထားသည့် အချက်အလက်များအရ အောက်တိုဘာ ၁ ကနေ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့အထိ စစ်အုပ်စု ၏ တရားလက်လွတ်ဖမ်းဆီးမှုကြောင့် ထိန်းသိမ်းခံခဲ့ရသူပေါင်း (၃၁၉) ရှိခဲ့သည်။ အမျိုးသမီးဦးရေ (၈၀)ဦး၊ အသက် ၁၈ နှစ်အောက် ကလေးသူငယ်ဦးရေ (၉)ဦးနှင့် ဓားစာခံအဖြစ် ဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူ (၂၇) ဦး ပါဝင်သည်။
စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို နေ့စဉ်ဆန္ဒပြနေသည့် မန္တလေးမြို့မှ သံဃသမဂ္ဂစစ်ကြောင်းသည် အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂ ရက်နေ့၊ မွန်းလွဲ ၁ နာရီခွဲခန့်တွင် လမ်းပေါ်၌ ချီတက်ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်နေစဉ် အရပ်ဝတ်များ ဝတ်ဆင်ထားသော စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လက်နက်ကိုင် ၁၀ ဦးခန့်က အိမ်စီးကား နှစ်စီးဖြင့် ရောက်ရှိလာပြီး ကားဖြင့်တိုက်၍ ဖြိုခွင်းခဲ့သည်။ အဆိုပါဖြိုခွင်းမှုတွင် သံဃာ(၅)ပါးကို လူဝတ်လဲကာ သေနတ်ဖြင့်ချိန်၍ ရိုက်နှက် ဖမ်းဆီးသွားခဲ့သည့်အပြင် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ် (၃)ဦးကိုလည်း ဖမ်းဆီးသွားခဲ့ကြပြီး ယင်းနေ့ ညပိုင်းတွင် မြတောင်ကျောင်းတိုက်ကို ဝင်ရောက်စီးနင်း၍ ရှာဖွေခဲ့ကြပြန်သည်။
အလိုရှိသူကို ဖမ်းမမိ၍ မိသားစုကို ဓားစာခံအဖြစ် ဖမ်းဆီးမှုများမှာ နေ့စဉ်ရက်ဆက် ဆက်လက်ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေဆဲဖြစ်ရာ စစ်တပ် အာဏာသိမ်းအပြီး ပြည်သူ့ဘက်ရပ်တည်၍ အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သူ နေပြည်တော်အခြေစိုက် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့မှ ရဲအုပ်၏ဇနီးနှင့် အသက် (၉) နှစ်အရွယ် သမီးတို့မှာ ဖမ်းဆီးခံရပြီးနောက် လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင် မည်သည့်နေရာတွင် ချုပ်နှောင်ခံထားရသလဲဆိုသည်ကို မသိရှိရသေးပေ။ ထို့အပြင် အောက်တိုဘာ ၉ ရက်နေ့တွင် တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း၊ သရက်ချောင်းမြို့နယ်၌လည်း ဖခင်ဖြစ်သူကို ဖမ်းမမိ၍ ဇနီးသည်နှင့်အတူ နှစ်နှစ်နှင့် ခြောက်နှစ်အရွယ် ကလေးငယ်နှစ်ဦးကိုပါ ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခဲ့မှု ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့သည်။
သတ်ဖြတ်မှု
စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အညှိုးထားတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်း အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၇၉) ဦး အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည်။ ထိုအထဲတွင် ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုကြောင့် သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသူ (၁၇) ဦး၊ အမျိုးသမီး (၆) ဦးနှင့် အသက် ၁၈ နှစ်အောက် ကလေးသူငယ် (၃) ဦး ပါဝင်သည်။
ခင်ဦးမြို့နယ်အတွင်းရှိ ပျဉ်ထောင် ကျေးရွာကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏တပ်သား (၁၀၀) ခန့်မှ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၁ ရက်နေ့ နံနက်ပိုင်းတွင် ဝင်ရောက်စီးနင်းခဲ့ပြီး ထွက်ပြေးသော ဒေသခံရွာသားများကို လိုက်လံပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့သောကြောင့် အသက် ၅ နှစ်အရွယ် ကလေးတစ်ဦး အပါအဝင် ဒေသခံရွာသား (၅) ဦးမှာ လယ်တောအတွင်း ကျည်ထိမှန်၍ အသက်သေဆုံးခဲ့ကြ ရသည်။ ထို့ပြင် နေအိမ်များကို ဖျက်ဆီးသွားခဲ့ပြီး ဒေသခံများ၏ ကား ငါးစီး၊ ထော်လာဂျီနှင့် ဆိုင်ကယ် အစီး ၄၀ နှင့် ဆန်၊ဆီ စသည့် ရိက္ခာများကိုပါ ယူဆောင်သွားခဲ့သည်။
မကွေးဗဟိုအကျဉ်းထောင်မှ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၁၉ ရက်နေ့က ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသူ ကိုကျော်နိုင်ထွန်း (ခ) အသေးလေးကို အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၇ ရက်နေ့က မကွေးမြို့၊ အောင်မေတ္တာရပ်ကွက် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုနှင့် ပက်သတ်ပြီး မသင်္ကာမှုဖြင့် နေအိမ်တွင် စစ်တပ်က ထပ်မံလာရောက်ဖမ်းဆီးပြီးနောက် နောက်တစ်ရက်အကြာ အောက်တိုဘာ လ ၂၈ ရက်နေ့တွင် အလောင်း လာထုတ်ရန် မိသားစုကို အကြောင်းကြားခဲ့သည်။ ကိုဗစ်ရောဂါကြောင့် သေဆုံးသွားသည်ဟု ရဲက ပြောဆိုသော်လည်း သေဆုံးသူ၏ ခန္ဓာကိုယ်နှင့် ဦးခေါင်းတခုလုံး (အထူးသဖြင့် နောက်စေ့) ပျက်စီးကျေမွနေကြောင်း သိရှိ ရသည်။
အထက်ပါဖေါ်ပြချက်များသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်၏ အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်း၌ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော တရားမဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု များအား အကျဉ်းချုပ်ဖေါ်ပြချက်မျှသာဖြစ်ပြီး အခြားသော တိုင်းနှင့်ပြည်နယ်များတွင်လည်း ထိုကဲ့သို့ လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်ကျူးလွန်မှုများ များစွာရှိခဲ့သည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း.."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Defenders, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
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Description:
"November 3, 2021, Myanmar: Leading international and regional accounting bodies from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, UK, USA and across Southeast Asia are acting disgracefully by participating and sponsoring the upcoming ASEAN Federation of Accountants Conference, in which the junta’s auditor general is “Guest of Honour”.
This high-level accounting conference is co-organised by the Myanmar Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), a semi-independent body that operates under the junta-controlled Myanmar Accountancy Council. The military junta is a systemically corrupt terrorist entity that continues to commit atrocity crimes, financed by the theft of public assets. Since February 1, the military junta has murdered 1,233 people, including children, and arrested over 9,600.
MICPA Chairperson Wan Tin is the current President of the ASEAN Federation of Accountants (AFA), an umbrella organisation of accounting bodies of ASEAN member states based in Jakarta. MICPA and AFA are co-organisers of AFA’s upcoming annual conference, where the Myanmar military junta’s auditor general, Dr Kan Zaw, is providing the welcome speech. Dr Kan Zaw was appointed auditor general following the military’s unlawful attempted coup. Dr Kan Zaw previously served as Minister for National Planning and Economic Development under the military’s proxy government led by the Union Solidarity and Development Party, prior to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy-led government.
The ASEAN Secretary General is following Dr Kan Zaw in giving the keynote speech, as ASEAN continues to give a free pass to the military junta, despite excluding war criminal Min Aung Hlaing from last week’s ASEAN Summit. ASEAN must exclude Myanmar military junta representatives and associates from all platforms and mechanisms.
The second keynote speech is being given by Alan Johnson of the US-based International Federation of Accountants.
AFA’s 22nd conference is facilitated by Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Accountants) and supported by Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA ANZ) and CPA Australia. Event partners are the UK-based Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the US-based Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) and the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA).
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is abhorrent that regional and international accounting bodies are reputation laundering for the Myanmar military junta through involvement in the 22nd AFA Conference. The junta is a terrorist organisation that has committed egregious international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Dr Kan Zaw, the AFA’s “guest of honour”, is a key member of this international criminal cartel and, as auditor general, is directly implicated in the military’s theft of public assets. The junta’s auditor general must be rejected for his role in war crimes, crimes against humanity and grand corruption, not legitimised on the world stage by leading bodies of the accounting profession in the name of accountants across the world. These accounting bodies must act with integrity, not cosy up to international criminals. We demand the AFA immediately suspend MICPA’s membership and exclude Dr Kan Zaw from their conference. We demand international partners, sponsors and speakers boycott the AFA conference unless the Myanmar junta and MICPA is excluded. We stand in solidarity with the many Myanmar accountants who courageously resist the Myanmar military junta.”
MICPA was set up by the Myanmar military’s Ministry of Home Affairs in 2013. Under the 2015 Myanmar Accountancy Council Law, MICPA is required to support and report to the Myanmar Accountancy Council, chaired by Dr Kan Zaw..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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pdf pdf
Size:
204.15 KB 156.8 KB
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Description:
"Jaguar/Land Rover are not a suitable partner for the COP26 climate change conference because their owner, Tata, supplies vehicles to the genocidal Burmese military.
The UK Presidency of COP26 has made Jaguar Land Rover an official partner of the conference: https://ukcop26.org/uk-presidency/partnerships-and-support/
Tata, which also owns Tetley Tea, have supplied troop carriers and military staff cars to the Burmese military. They feature on the Burma Campaign UK ‘Dirty List’: https://burmacampaign.org.uk/take-action/dirty-list/ which names and shames companies linked to the Burmese military.
Tata also boast of their plans to increase their role in the coal industry, one of the dirtiest and most polluting fossil fuels. The Tata International website states:
“Having established ourselves as one of India’s leading private coal importers in the last few years, our aim is to grow into one of the largest coal trading companies in the country. Our short term goal is to grow our traded volume of thermal coal to 10 million tons per annum in the coming years with focus on India.”
https://tatainternational.com/minerals/coal-coke-and-anthracite/
Burma is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change.
The Burmese military have been documented by the United Nations as committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. They are currently being investigated for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court, and face charges of genocide at the International Court of Justice.
In February the military held a coup, and since then have killed more than 1,000 people, jailed more than 7,000, and forced more than a quarter of a million people to flee their homes.
“Jaguar/Land Rover are part of a company which equips a military responsible for genocide,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Tata should not be allowed to use the COP26 conference to promote its companies and brands at the same time as it equips a military which tortures critics and rapes children.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Military History
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
A local guerrilla group has claimed responsibility for the killing and said it also destroyed five junta-owned phone towers
Description:
"Soldiers burned down the home of an anti-coup activist and arrested the mother of a protest leader in Tanintharyi on Monday after local guerrillas shot and killed a police officer.
Military units arrived in Pyinhtein village, Launglon Township shortly after officer Nay Myo Aung was gunned down on the nearby Launglon-Sitpye road.
The soldiers raided the home of Min Lwin Oo, 31, who is part of the anti-junta Dawei District Strike Committee. When they were unable to find him they took his 56-year-old mother, Cho Than, instead.
“It’s just absurd that my mother was taken for my involvement in the revolution,” Min Lwin Oo told Myanmar Now.
“There’s no law stating that they can do such a thing,” he added. “I should be the one paying for my actions, not my mother. She didn't even talk with anyone in the neighbourhood. She was always just busy with housework.”
He added that he would not surrender to the junta despite his mother being taken hostage.
“My mother’s a fearless woman, she would have already expected this. I even told her to stay elsewhere but she didn’t. She just said that she would face them bravely if she got arrested.”
Soldiers also ransacked the neighbouring village of Sitpyea the same day. They stormed the home of 21-year-old Wai Yan Soe, another Dawei District Strike Committee member, and when they couldn’t find him they burned the house down.
The military also broke furniture and stole his belongings during the raid on his house, Wai Yan Soe told Myanmar Now.
Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun did not answer calls seeking comment.
Soldiers arrested a 14-year-old girl and four women working as Covid-19 control volunteers in Sitpyea in late August following an anti-coup street protest the same day. Those arrested were not involved in the protest, locals said.
The Dawei District Strike Committee has used flash mob tactics to keep street protests alive in the area amid deadly crackdowns by the junta. Meanwhile other local groups have engaged in armed resistance.
A group called the Nway Oo Guerilla Force claimed responsibility for the assassination of the police officer on Monday and said it has also destroyed five junta-owned Mytel communication towers.
Junta forces have repeatedly targeted the family members of protesters since the February 1 coup with arrests and violence, which serve both as an attempt to coerce activists into handing themselves in and as a means to punish them.
Late last month soldiers viciously beat a five-year-old girl and a 70-year-old woman in a village in Magway Region because, locals believe, they are distantly related to a local protest leader..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Message from the Head of the Mechanism
In September, I presented the Mechanism’s annual report to the Human Rights Council. The report was transmitted to the General Assembly later that month. My statement to the Council described the progress that the Mechanism has made over the past year in fulfilling our ongoing mandate to collect and analyse evidence regarding the most serious international crimes and violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011.
Tragically, serious crimes and violations of international law continue to be committed in Myanmar. The nation’s long history of impunity continues to impact the lives of its people. Men, women and children from diverse regions and ethnic groups are suffering. Four years since the military’s 2017 clearance operations in Rakhine state, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya continue to live in temporary shelters in Bangladesh, their lives on hold and many hoping to return to homes which have been burned and bulldozed. Since the military seizure of power in February this year, thousands more people have fled their homes in various regions, devastating the economy of Myanmar and straining the resources of neighbouring states. More than ever, there is a need to end impunity and break this cycle of violence.
The Mechanism continues to closely monitor events in Myanmar since the coup. We have received reports and collected information on the use of unjustified force against peaceful protestors, arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances and killings.
Our initial analysis of the available information indicates that crimes committed in the aftermath of the coup are both widespread and systematic in nature. Under international law, crimes such as killings and arbitrary detentions committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population are crimes against humanity and thus fall within our mandate. We are working to verify and analyse the available evidence concerning these events, and to identify individuals who bear criminal responsibility for these crimes.
Going forward, we expect that the progressive relaxation of travel restrictions will enable the resumption of essential activities that were suspended during the pandemic. This includes the in-person collection and verification of information and evidence, as well as high-level missions to facilitate the negotiation of cooperation arrangements and advance the Mechanism’s outreach efforts. The resumption of in-person dialogue with key Member States will be a critical priority for the Mechanism during the upcoming period.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those who have helped with the Mechanism’s efforts to collect and verify evidence, including victim and survivor groups, civil society organizations, businesses and many brave individuals. We will continue to do all we can to collect evidence of the most serious international crimes so that one day, there will be justice for victims from Myanmar and all will know that impunity for such crimes will no longer be tolerated..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
424.43 KB
Local URL:
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Description:
"1. The terrorist State Administration Council (SAC) is ruthlessly attempting to install military
rule through nationwide military offensives which purposefully target civilians and their
properties. This signifies utmost violation of international human rights conventions.
2. It is heartbreaking to see several churches and civilian homes in Thantlang, Chin State,
destroyed by indiscriminate artillery shelling of the military junta on October 29, 2021.
3. These incidents are irrefutable evidence of purposeful violation of international
humanitarian laws and crimes against humanity.
4. We urge international communities to closely monitor SAC’s violation of international
humanitarian laws and Geneva Convention, to urge SAC to end its inhumane crime
against the civilians, and to stand by the SAC-victimized people.
5. We express our deepest sympathies with grieving people of Thantland, and affirm that, in
solidarity with the oppressed people of the country, we will continue fighting against the
fascist dictatorship..."
Source/publisher:
Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team - KPICT
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Chin (Zo) discussion groups, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
20.45 KB 200.56 KB
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Description:
"ကြေညာချက် အမှတ် (၅/၂၀၂၁)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ (၂) ရက်
အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းကြေညာခြင်း
၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီမှ မတရားရယူခဲ့ပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများအနေဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်အလုပ်အကျွေးမပြုဘဲ တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် ပြည်သူတို့၏အကျိုးကို ရှေးရှု၍ မတရားသော အမိန့်အာဏာအားဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) တွင် ပါဝင်ကြရန် အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ဖိတ်ခေါ်ကမ်းလှမ်းခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ဆက်သွယ်ရေး၊ သတင်းအချက်အလက် နှင့် နည်းပညာဝန်ကြီးဌာန ၏လက်အောက်ရှိ မတရားသောအမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေး CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှု၌ ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိသည့် ပြည်သူ့၀န်ထမ်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လျက်ရှိသော Non-CDM ၀န်ထမ်းအချို့မှ ဖိအားပေးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်း၊ ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုတော့သည့် လစာချေးငွေများအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်ခိုင်းခြင်း များပြုလုပ်နေသည်ကို နေ့စဥ် တွေ့မြင်နေရပါသည်။
၃။ ယင်းကဲ့သို့ CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအပေါ်၌ မတရားသဖြင့်ဖိအားပေးခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံနှင့်ပြည်သူကို သစ္စာဖောက်ကာ စစ်ကောင်စီအတွက် ထိရောက်သော အခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ကျိုးနွံစွာ အလုပ်ကျွေးပြုနေသည့် အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံများအား နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ (၄၁) အရ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပယ်(dismiss) ပြီး ယင်းတို့သည်နိုင်ငံ့သစ္စာဖောက်များဖြစ်ကြောင်း အမည်ပျက်စာရင်း ကြေညာ လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Communications, Information and Technology - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
727.67 KB
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Sub-title:
The former student union leaders and strike committee staff were taken into junta custody in a raid by 100 soldiers on a safe house in Chanayethazan Township
Description:
"Around 100 Myanmar army soldiers raided a safehouse in Mandalay’s Chanayethazan Township on Saturday, arresting eight people, including two former student union leaders and two members of an education strike committee.
Among those taken into junta custody were Yan Soe Paing, the former chair of the Mandalay University Student Union and Naung Htet Aung, the former chair of the Yangon Education University Student Union.
Two members of the basic education staff’s general strike committee—Nine Thiha Kyaw and Thet Su Hlaing—were also arrested.
Aung Pyae Sone Phyo, the chair of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, said the identities of the remaining two detainees had not been verified.
“The house where they had recently been staying was raided. Six of our people were taken and we only managed to identify four of them. We still don’t know who the other two are, which group they are from or why they were arrested,” he told Myanmar Now on Sunday.
The victims’ families were worried for their safety and had received no information on their whereabouts, Aung Pyae Sone Phyo said.
“We heard that the military also kicked and beat a disabled woman at the house during the raid,” he added.
Locals who spoke to Myanmar Now on the condition of anonymity claimed that the troops who carried out the raid on the safehouse also later searched other homes in the neighbourhood and interrogated pedestrians.
The junta’s information team did not answer calls from Myanmar Now regarding the arrests.
Daily protests against the dictatorship are ongoing in Mandalay and have been met with brutal crackdowns by the military, whose troops have been known to open fire on demonstrators and hit them with cars.
According to documentation by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 9,000 people have been detained by the junta in the nine months since the February 1 coup. More than 1,000 have been killed.
The military council has declared the AAPP an unlawful organisation..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
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"News of former US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson’s visit to conflict-torn Myanmar has not generated excitement among the public. Reports suggest that Richardson is scheduled to meet the regime’s health and foreign ministers, and that he is likely to meet coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
The Biden administration welcomed former New Mexico governor Richardson’s private mission as a possible way of speeding up the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Myanmar.
“Governor Richardson has extensive experience working on humanitarian issues,” the US State Department said. “While this is not an effort sponsored by, or on behalf of, the United States government, we hope his trip contributes to improved humanitarian access.”
“The humanitarian and health needs in Burma are extraordinary,” it said, using Myanmar’s other name. “We continue to call on the military regime to cease its violence, release those unjustly detained, allow unimpeded humanitarian access, and ensure the safety of health and humanitarian workers,” AP quoted it as saying.
In a statement announcing his trip, the ex-governor said his nonprofit organization, The Richardson Center, had a long history of involvement in Myanmar, but he did not mention the coup or provide details on whom he planned to meet. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres was aware of the mission, according to Richardson spokesperson Madeleine Mahony.
In a visit to Myanmar in 1994, the former US congressman met with high-ranking junta officials including then Secretary One Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, who was at the time the country’s feared military intelligence chief.
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt was then in his mid-50s and a protégé of former dictator General Ne Win.
During that trip, Richardson was allowed to meet with detained democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at her lakeside residence, becoming the then dissident’s first non-family visitor since 1989.
Through Richardson—as well as a correspondent from The New York Times who was allowed in to interview her—the democracy icon was able to get her message out to the world.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who had made repeated calls for dialogue with her captors, told Richardson during their meeting, “I don’t see any problem with sitting down with anybody.”
Following the visit, Richardson remarked, “I think the future of Burma will be determined by two people—Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi.”
In his second visit to Myanmar, Richardson had less success, as the junta refused to allow him to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Then, to the surprise of the world, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was freed in 1995, though she would return to house arrest some five years later.
Throughout the turbulent years that followed, Richardson maintained strong ties with both U Khin Nyunt and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and as the country began to open up, Richardson came back to Myanmar.
In 2018, he was appointed to an international panel set up by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government to address the Rohingya crisis, but later resigned over what he called a “whitewash” of military atrocities.
Richardson said at the time that he did not want to be part of “a cheerleading squad for the government” led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he accused of lacking “moral leadership” in her handling of the crisis.
Richardson has remained in touch with both the current regime’s advisers and U Khin Nyunt’s former fellow intelligence officers. Khin Nyunt and his entire intelligence apparatus were purged in 2004.
After the Myanmar military overthrew Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government and detained her in February this year, Richardson said in a tweet that was widely shared by military regime supporters: “Because of Suu Kyi’s failure to promote Democratic values as Myanmar’s de-facto leader she should step aside & let others take the rein with international backing and support.”
Richardson has shown he is capable of cultivating durable friendships with both Myanmar’s military leaders and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, though in the case of the latter it ended on a sour note. This time, should the junta leaders decide to allow him to meet the detained State Counselor, we may be in for a playback of Richardson’s 1994 visit..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-02
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, USA-Burma relations
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"People in Myanmar are on the brink of starvation and in urgent need of medical supplies and food after months of sustained assaults by junta forces, SAC-M has learned. The UN Security Council must finally issue a resolution to consolidate international action towards resolving the crisis.
A representative of the Mindat People’s Administration spoke of his people’s desperation in Mindat, Chin state, at a panel discussion hosted by SAC-M today. Mindat has been subjected to months of sustained attacks by the Myanmar military.
“We want the world to act within the spirit of humanitarian assistance. For four months we’ve had our supplies destroyed, we’re running out. We will either die of starvation or die fighting. Those are our two choices,” said the representative of Mindat People’s Administration, who cannot be named for security reasons.
The Myanmar military has cut off access to the region in northwest Myanmar, restricting food supplies. Thirty-three people have already died from malnutrition and lack of medicine, according to the representative.
“Our people can’t withstand another month in this situation, so if we are to continue resisting the military, we need medical supplies, we need everything,” he said.
The statement comes as the military has launched a so-called clearance operation in the northwest of Myanmar on a scale potentially not seen in modern times. Other parts of Myanmar, including Karenni (Kayah) state in the east are also under severe attack.
The Foreign Minister of the National Unity Government of Myanmar, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung told the panel that the crisis is having a destabilizing effect on the region and is not only an issue for Myanmar.
“We are being threatened every second of every minute. Our human security is under constant threat. We need ASEAN, the Security Council and the rest of the international community to work with us to find a solution to this crisis,” said the Foreign Minister.
Marzuki Darusman, founding member of SAC-M and former chair of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, said the ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar must meet with the UN Security Council in New York and request it issue a resolution that consolidates the actions of the international community on one single track.
“The resolution must, as a starting point, recognise the illegality of the coup and the need to enforce arms embargos, sanctions, an end to impunity and the release of all political prisoners,” said Marzuki Darusman. “It must commit all parties to implementation of the ASEAN five-point consensus. Of no less importance is the great need for humanitarian assistance.”
Yanghee Lee, founding member of SAC-M and former UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar responded by saying that “I certainly hope that the people in New York, especially those sitting in the UN Security Council, are listening.”
Both Yanghee Lee and Marzuki Darusman commented on Min Aung Hlaing’s failed leadership, noting that cracks are starting to show, and the crisis may be at a tipping point.
“The junta has driven itself into a corner. For the first time we’re seeing the junta is under considerable pressure from both within and from outside Myanmar. The junta is running out of options,” said Marzuki Darusman. “But time is of the essence.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"Former US diplomat Bill Richardson will arrive in military-ruled Myanmar on Monday on a private mission and meet with some regime officials.
The ex-New Mexico governor said in a statement that he is on a humanitarian trip in coordination with his contacts in Myanmar.
“We are visiting the country to discuss pathways for the humanitarian delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, medical supplies, and other public health needs,” he said.
The statement didn’t mention whom he would meet during the visit, but The Irrawaddy has learned that during his stay in Myanmar, Richardson will meet regime-appointed Health Minister Dr. Thet Khine Win and Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin.
The Southeast Asian country has been in political turmoil and plagued by deadly violence and civil unrest since the military staged a coup in February by toppling the democratically elected government led by the country’s de facto leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. So far, the junta has killed more than 1,000 people who opposed its rule.
Following the takeover, the US imposed sanctions against the ruling military leadership and their family members while suspending a trade deal with the country. Richardson is the first US non-state figure to engage with the regime.
The former New Mexico governor’s last visit to the country was in 2018 as a member of an international panel set up to help resolve the Rohingya crisis. But he abruptly quit the body after clashing with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on a related issue—his attempt to secure the release of two Reuters journalists detained for their reporting on a massacre of Rohingya committed by the army.
When the Myanmar military staged a coup in February, Richardson tweeted: “Because of Suu Kyi’s failure to promote Democratic values as Myanmar’s de-facto leader she should step aside & let others take the rein with international backing and support.”
Richardson’s visit this time coincides with the junta’s detention of American journalist Danny Fenster, who was arrested in May and has been charged with incitement for spreading false information. Given his previous efforts, it’s not clear whether the ex-governor will try his luck with the regime and attempt to secure the release of the journalist.
The ex-governor will be joined on the trip by Cameron Hume, former US ambassador to Indonesia, South Africa and Algeria; and two officials from the Richardson Center..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"1. On behalf of the people of Myanmar it is my great pleasure as the Acting President of
the National Unity Government (NUG) to extend my gratitude to the Government of the
United Kingdom as the Presidency in partnership with Italy for hosting the historic
COP26 in the wonderful city of Glasgow.
2. It is also my great honor to send this message on behalf of the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar. The NUG is the legitimate representative of Myanmar and is constituted of
democratically-elected parliamentarians.
3. Recalling the 'code red' warning for humanity that emerged from the ongoing IPCC 6th
Assessment, revealing that the temperature has already crossed the 1.1°C mark and
that climate change threats are becoming more and more obvious, I believe that this
must be the year of climate action. We must work together to protect our planet while
ensuring a greener and more climate resilient future for us all.
4. Under the age of 'code red' for humanity, Myanmar, as one of the least developed
countries, is highly exposed to climate change impacts. Climate change is a 'threat
multiplier' in Myanmar as it compounds our parallel struggles with armed conflict and
poverty, both of which issues stem from decades of military rule. This makes us one of
the most vulnerable countries in the world, despite our small contribution to emissions,
which comprises just 0.61 % of the global share
5. Nonetheless, we have already submitted our NDC, committing ourselves to more
determined and detailed climate actions than those contained in the INDC, both in terms
of mitigation and adaptation. We have set both conditional targets to reduce 413 million
tons of C02e by 2030 and unconditional targets to reduce 244 million tons of C02e.
These targets reflect our commitments to more ambitious climate actions, while recalling
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in
light of different national circumstances.
6. Adaptation will remain the key priority for Myanmar across all sectors. The Country has
adopted and taken steps to implement the Myanmar Climate Change Policy, Strategy and Action Plans as an essential framework to strive against the impacts of climate
change and to achieve climate-resilient development for the present and future
generations.
7. The failed coup of 1 February 2021 staged by the illegal military junta has, however, set
back the significant momentum that Myanmar had gathered in support of all-inclusive
and climate-resilient development. The military junta has exacerbated the already
vulnerable situation of the country and has triggered a catastrophic multi-layered crisis,
compounded by the COVID-19 global pandemic and the severe impacts of climate
change. Myanmar is now in economic distress. Millions of people have been pushed
below the poverty line while efforts made to ensure sustainable development has been
derailed.
8. The recent horrible example is the crime against humanity and presumably, a genocide
committed by the military junta in the Chin State, the most vulnerable region to the
climate change in the country, where a town called Htantlang was brutally attacked by
burning down more than 100 houses and 2 churches within a day due to the military
troops.
9. As the world moves toward a climate resilient and net zero economy, the National Unity
Government calls for international support so that Myanmar is not left behind. We remain
committed to the fight against climate change. The military junta, however, has been
escalating deforestation and resource exploitation, all to fuel its war against its own
people.
10. To the military regime, the NDC submitted is merely a document that will never see the
daylight of implementation. The NUG’s commitment to change, however, is greatly firm.
11. The only answer, then, is the NUG as the sole legitimate governing body representing
the people, and with the mandate to fulfil our climate commitments.
12. As the Acting President of the National Unity Government, I deeply appreciate all efforts
of the international community and the UN organizations to recognize the NUG and its
legitimacy while denying the military council such recognition, especially their
involvement in the current COP 26. The provision of support and recognition to the NUG
through all possible means, including technical and financial assistance, would
constitute an important step towards the active implementation of our climate actions
while promoting the rights of the people of Myanmar and their democratic aspirations. It
would also further the fulfilment of the Paris Goals in accordance with the core values of
the Convention, benefiting the planet and its people.
13. In conclusion, the NUG, on behalf of Myanmar, wishes to remind all Parties that it is high
time to come together in our shared fight against climate change. Every action will count.
Being a party to the UNFCCC, we will continue to lead the people of Myanmar on climate
actions in the interests of our nation and our planet..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s junta atrocities are continuing with the murder of more than 10 civilians, including a Buddhist monk and National League for Democracy (NLD) supporters, over the past five days.
Regime forces have looted houses, destroyed property, bombarded civilians with artillery, burned down homes and arbitrarily killed civilians during operations against civilian resistance forces, especially in Magwe and Sagaing regions and Chin, Shan and Kayah states.
By Saturday, 1,222 people had been killed by junta forces since the February coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which records deaths and arrests.
Last Thursday, the bodies of two NLD supporters, U San Lwin, 60, and U Kyaw Htay Aung, 50, were reportedly dumped by junta forces near the NLD office in Chanayethazan Township, Mandalay.
A photo was released of two bloody bodies lying beside a road in Mandalay.
The two victims were arrested with another NLD supporter, U Moe Gyi, 50, on Wednesday night, according to the AAPP.
The police retrieved the bodies and then reportedly asked family members to retrieve the corpses, according to the media.
Many torture injuries, including knife wounds, were found on the bodies, according to the AAPP.
A 25-year-old NLD member Ko Min Min Thu, also known as Mohammad Har Ni, from East Mawtone village in Tanintharyi Region, on Wednesday was tortured to death two days after being detained. He was seized at his home by regime forces last Monday.
On Thursday night, regime forces detained a married couple, U Myo Lwin and Daw San San Lwin, after failing to find their son who has been accused of being a People’s Defense Force (PDF) member.
U Myo Lwin was reportedly tortured to death during interrogation after the couple were accused of supplying the PDF, according to the media.
The AAPP said a Buddhist monk, U Kuthala, an assistant head of the monastery in Yinshae village, Yegyi Township in Ayeyarwady Region, was shot dead by regime forces last Tuesday while returning from shopping in Ngathaingchaung near Yegyi.
A novice monk was also injured in his ear during the junta shooting, the AAPP said.
On Thursday, former political prisoner Ko Kyaw Naing Tun, who was released from prison in Magwe Region in mid-October, was reportedly tortured to death by the regime after being detained again on Wednesday.
Another three civilians were shot dead by junta forces during raids on villages in Myaung, Budalin, and Khin-U townships in Sagaing Region on Sunday and Monday.
One or two displaced villagers were shot dead by the regime forces while returning home to fetch food at a village in Demoso Township, Shan State, on Sunday.
The Demoso PDF said junta forces burned down houses and randomly attacked villages and residential areas of Demoso on Sunday and Monday.
Troops burned harvested rice in Demoso on Saturday while advancing on neighboring Pekon Township in Shan State, the PDF said.
On Friday, troops bombarded the mountaintop town of Thantlang in Chin State. More than 160 houses, including two churches, burned down in junta artillery fire.
Except for Rakhine State, regime forces nationwide are facing increasingly intense attacks by civilian resistance forces and ethnic armed forces..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
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"သတင်းအဖြစ် ယာယီသမ္မတ၏ COP26 အစည်းအဝေးသို့ ပေးပို့ခဲ့သည့် သဝဏ်လွှာအား အင်္ဂလိပ်/ မြန်မာနှစ်ဘာသာဖြင့် ပူးတွဲထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၁ ရက်
ကုလသမဂ္ဂရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုဆိုင်ရာ မူဘောင်ကွန်ဗင်းရှင်း (UNFCCC) အဖွဲ့ဝင် နိုင်ငံများ၏ (၂၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် အစည်းအဝေး (COP26) အား ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တို ဘာလ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့မှ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၁၂ ရက်နေ့အထိ ဗြိတိန်နိုင်ငံ ဂလက်စကိုမြို့တွင် ကျင်းပလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အဆိုပါကွန်ဗင်းရှင်းတွင် ၁၉၉၄ ခုနှစ်၌ လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုး အတည်ပြုပါဝင်ခဲ့သော နိုင်ငံတနိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင်အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ယာယီသမ္မတ ဒူဝါလရှီးလက အဆိုပါအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများ၏ (၂၆) ကြိမ်မြောက်အစည်းအဝေးသို့ သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့ခဲ့ပါသည်။
ယာယီသမ္မတ၏ သဝဏ်လွှာအား အောက်ပါအတိုင်း အကျဉ်းချုပ်ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်-
(က) ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုဆိုင်ရာ အစိုးရအချင်းချင်း ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေးအဖွဲ့ (IPCC) ၏ ၆ ကြိမ်မြောက် ဆန်းစစ်ချက်အရ ကမ္ဘာ့အပူချိန်သည် စက်မှုထွန်းကားကာလ မတိုင်မီထက် (၁.၁) ဒီဂရီ စင်တီဂရိတ်ကို ကျော်လွန်ခဲ့လျက်ရှိပြီး လူသားထုတရပ်လုံး အတွက် စိုးရိမ်ဖွယ် အန္တရာယ်ရှိသည့် အနီရောင်အဆင့် သို့ရောက်ရှိလာနေပြီးဖြစ်သဖြင့် ယခုနှစ်သ်ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုကို မဖြစ်မနေ ထိန်းချုပ်ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့်နှစ် ဖြစ်ပါ ကြောင်း၊
(ခ) မိမိတို့အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် UNFCCC ကွန်ဗင်းရှင်းသို့ ၁၂-၇-၂၀၂၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် တင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် “အမျိုးသားအဆင့် ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှု လျှော့ချရေးနှင့် လိုက်လျော ညီထွေရှိစေရေးဆိုင်ရာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်မည့် လုပ်ငန်းအစီအစဉ် (Nationally Determined Contributions-NDC)” အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် မိမိတို့ကတိကဝတ် ပြုဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည့် လုပ်ငန်းများကို ထည့်သွင်းထားပါကြောင်း၊
(ဂ) ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုလျှော့ချရေးနှင့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေရှိစေရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကြိုးပမ်း ချက် အရှိန်အဟုန်များမှာလည်း ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့ စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာသိမ်းမှု ကြောင့် ဆုတ်ယုတ်ပျက်စီးခဲ့ရပြီး ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုအပြင် ကိုဗစ်-၁၉ ရောဂါနှိပ်စက်မှု ကြားက အာဏာသိမ်းမှုတို့ကြောင့် ပြည်တွင်းတွင် ကဏ္ဍတိုင်း၌ များစွာဆုတ်ယုတ် ပျက်ဆီးလျက်ရှိပါကြောင်း၊
(ဃ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုတိုက်ဖျက်မည့် ကတိကဝတ်အား ဆက်လက်ဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဟု သန္နိဠာန်ချထားသော်လည်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်များမှာ ပြည်သူများအား သတ်ဖြတ်ရန် သစ်နှင့်သယံဇာတများအား အရှိန်အဟုန်မြှင့် ထုတ်ယူသုံးစွဲပြီး ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုကိုပိုမိုဖြစ်စေလျက်ရှိကြောင်း၊
(င) မိမိတို့အစိုးရအား အသိအမှတ်ပြု ထောက်ပံ့ခြင်းသည် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ ရာသီဥတု ပြောင်းလဲမှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းများ တက်တက်ကြွကြွ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် အတွက် သာမက မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ အခွင့်အရေးမြှင့်တင်ပေးရန်နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ မျှော်မှန်းချက်များ ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးရန်တို့အတွက် အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်ချက်ပင်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊
(စ) ကွန်ဗင်းရှင်းအဖွဲ့ဝင် နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ လူသားများနှင့် ကမ္ဘာမြေ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွား အတွက် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအား ဦးဆောင်ကာ ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းများအား ဆက်လက် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း။..."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-01
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Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ ဖွဲ့စည်းကြောင်းကြေညာခြင်း
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၈ /၂၀၂၁)
၃၀ ရက်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို အဓမ္မနည်းဖြင့် ရယူသိမ်းပိုက်ခဲ့သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (Civil Disobedience Movement - CDM) ဖြင့် ပါဝင်လှုပ်ရှားနေကြသည့် CDM လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဦးစီးဌာန ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းတိုင်ပင်ပြီးသည့်နောက် CDM လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ဝန်ထမ်းမိသားစုများ၏ ကြုံတွေ့နေရသော အခက်အခဲများအားကူညီဖြေရှင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်ရန် နှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုဗဟိုပြုလုပ်ငန်းများအကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် စနစ်တကျ စုဖွဲ့ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် တို့အတွက် “လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီ” အားဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။
ပုံ
လွင်ကိုလတ်
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး
ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ.."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
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Individual Documents
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Sub-title:
Before he became the leader of the Zero Guerrilla Force, Thet Naing Aung was putting his life on the line in other ways
Description:
"Most of Myanmar’s resistance fighters prefer to keep a low profile on social media; but one, a 47-year-old man from Myingyan, in Mandalay Region, is more than happy to show his face to those who would just as happily see him dead.
“I’m not afraid of them,” says Thet Naing Aung, a sturdily-built man with a greying beard and a determined look. “I’ve been fighting them since before I had a weapon. Now that I have weapons in my hands, I have nothing to fear at all.”
Thet Naing Aung—or Thet Gyi, as he is usually called by those who know him—is the leader of the Zero Guerrilla Force, one of many armed resistance groups that have emerged around the country in the months since the military seized power.
Like most other groups of its kind, the Zero Guerrilla Force is a largely anonymous outfit—a small army of faceless fighters who ambush troops, carry out hits on regime collaborators, and sabotage telecoms towers.
But as leader of the group, Thet Gyi stands out. On his Facebook page, for instance, he can be seen posing in front of an array of rifles as his juniors pay their respects to him at the start of this year’s annual Thadingyut festival.
While another photo shows him in an even more militant light—holding a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, ready to fire—he was not always so keen on displays of firepower.
The turning point came on March 3, when a young protester named Zin Ko Zaw was shot in the head in the same ward that Thet Gyi lived in in Myingyan. It was then that he decided he had to join the fight against a murderous regime.
But what truly radicalized him, he said, was witnessing firsthand the carnage that the junta would continue to inflict on innocent civilians over the ensuing weeks.
Before he actually joined the armed resistance movement, he spent his days trying to deal with the horrific situation unfolding around him, and around the country, as the junta unleashed hell on unarmed protesters.
He did this by risking his own life to recover the bodies of those murdered by the regime. He also formed a funeral committee and raised funds for the families of fallen youths.
In all, he pulled 22 bodies out the junta’s killing fields.
“I carried their bodies myself, cleaned them, and buried them. The more people I buried, the more my hatred for the military grew,” he said.
From volunteer to ‘terrorist’
Thet Gyi had a reputation for helping others in need long before the coup. According to one local volunteer, he regularly assisted Myingyan’s social welfare association with its Covid-19 relief efforts.
“He helped out at first as an external volunteer during the pandemic, but later joined the group as a member,” said the volunteer, who asked to remain anonymous.
But it was after the crackdowns began that Thet Gyi really started to be noticed in his community. In his neighbourhood, he was famous for showing up while the bullets were still flying to rescue bodies from the clutches of their killers.
“Whenever the military opened fire, he would arrive on the scene and just start collecting bodies while everyone else was running around in a panic,” said a local politician who also did not want to be identified.
There was little in Thet Gyi’s past to suggest that he would one day take the path of an armed insurgent.
After graduating from the Meiktila Technological Institute in 1997, he went into several different lines of work, from sculpting to recycling old vehicles and renting out cranes.
Politics held little appeal for him, but he always had an interest in finding practical ways to make a difference in people’s lives. By the time Covid-19 hit, he had amassed enough money to feel that he could afford to dedicate himself to charity work.
When the coup happened a year later, he was ready to play a different role, although it wasn’t immediately clear what that would be. It was only after finding himself drenched in the blood of young activists that he decided that combat was his true calling.
After a period of training in an area under the control of an armed group, he returned to his hometown to found the Zero Guerrilla Force. Active since April 18, it was among the first resistance groups formed in the wake of the coup.
Armed at first with handmade hunting guns, the group later acquired rifles and started using makeshift mortars in clashes with regime forces. Labelled a terrorist group by Myanmar’s junta, the Zero Guerrilla Force has killed at least 40 soldiers, including six army officers, according to Thet Gyi.
Its main targets, however, have been military informants and other junta collaborators. It has also destroyed a number of communications towers used by Mytel, a telecoms company partly owned by the military.
Nothing left to lose
So far, the deadliest mission carried out by Thet Gyi’s band of guerrillas has been an ambush on a military outpost in Mandalay Region’s Natogyi Township that left 11 soldiers dead and three others wounded on October 15.
Even before this incident, however, Thet Gyi had already been identified and targeted by the regime. In late September, a building he owned in Myingyan’s Sunlun ward was raided and all of his most prized possessions were confiscated.
“They couldn’t find me, much less capture me, so they took my belongings to deprive me of a livelihood,” he said.
The junta took everything he owned—from pots and pans to priceless antiques (including a vintage silver cup used by the great stage actor Shwe Man Tin Maung for his makeup and a sword that once belonged to a Shan prince).
Thet Gyi said he couldn’t begin to put a price on all the things he has lost because of his involvement in the armed resistance movement. (And as petty thieves, the regime’s forces certainly would have no idea of their value, he added.)
Now that he has nothing left to lose, Thet Gyi feels even closer to those who look to him for leadership.
“All of my comrades have been blessed by a monk. We’re not afraid to die in battle. Our group has exceptional unity. We’ve had no problem whatsoever to this day,” he said.
But even as he contemplates his own death, he dreams of a more peaceful future—of a time when weapons will no longer be needed. When that day comes, he says, he won’t hesitate to hand over all the arms he now has at his disposal and start a new life under a legitimate government.
Part of that life, he says, will be creating a new social welfare organization of his own. And he can think of no better name for it than one that has come to mean everything to him: Zero..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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"Throughout the ages to this day, the fascist military has been oppressing the people by
means of weapons. To this day, for the prosperity of the generals and their kins, they have
been terrorizing ethnic regions, including homelands of minorities, by robbing their
properties and committing genocides. Even more recently, on 29.10.2021, they set fire to the
town of Htantalan in Chin State, burning down 164 houses, including churches. The military
has been leeching upon the people by forcibly taking lands, farms and businesses, belonging
to civilians, and converting to military-owned businesses. Thus, the main income-generating
enterprises of the nation are owned by generals and their kins, and now the military has
unlawfully seized power to exploit the economy of the entire nation.
Even before the unlawful military coup, the people, who do not wish to be oppressed, have
strived to refrain from using products of military-owned businesses and, accordingly, to stop
the income of the military. And now, after the coup of the fascist military, the movements
have become more rigorous, boycotting not only military-owned businesses but also those
associated with the fascist State Administrative Council and those providing income for the
illegitimate government. Every civilian is appalled by the fact that their money will fund
bullets to murder another civilian. Yet, we have learned that the fascist military is going to
have bullets funded by billions of dollars provided by international oil enterprises. Providing
taxes to the fascist military, who are actively committing genocides, equates to funding for,
and thus, committing the genocides ourselves.
Therefore, we, the Student Unions, call for the following actions from respective international
oil enterprises and governments:
1. To absolutely stop the flow of income from international companies to the
illegitimate terrorist military.
2. To temporarily reserve taxes, that are to be paid to Myanmar’s government, in a bank
until democracy is restored and the people’s government is in power. (To keep in an
Escrow Account.)
3. For international governments to impose targeted sanctions on Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise (MOGE) which is now under control of the military regime.
Right now in Myanmar, the oppressed people are being confronted by the fascist military
who have been oppressing us for the sake of the generals and their associates. Even now the
people’s resistance has not died down. Therefore, we, the Student Unions, urge international
governments and companies not to stand against the people of Myanmar and to respect and
support the wills of the people..."
Source/publisher:
236 Myanmar Student Unions
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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172.7 KB 1.43 MB
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Sub-title:
Two of Thantlang’s churches also caught fire, and some 20 children are feared to be trapped in an orphanage in the besieged town
Description:
"Amid an escalation of both armed resistance to military rule and reprisals from the junta forces, Myanmar army troops shelled the largely deserted western Chin State town of Thantlang on Friday, causing fires that destroyed more than 160 of the town’s 2,000 homes.
The attack came after a junta soldier was shot dead at 9:30am by the Chinland Defence Force (CDF)—which has been monitoring the situation in Thantlang—after members of the local resistance group said they saw him looting a shop.
In retaliation for the killing, the junta’s armed forces occupying the area shot at least 10 rounds of artillery into the town, which started fires upon exploding. Within an hour, several troops had arrived at the location at which the soldier was killed and also began torching houses “for no reason,” a CDF spokesperson said.
“They walked into the town at around 10:30am and torched the houses at random,” the spokesperson from the CDF’s Thantlang chapter told Myanmar Now.
By 5pm, at least 40 houses had burnt down, with the fires continuing to burn throughout the night, he said.
A man who lives near Thantlang told Myanmar Now that there was “still smoke coming out” of the town on Friday evening.
By 9am Saturday morning, the fire had died down but homes were still smoldering, according to the Zalen news outlet.
The Thantlang CDF took note of the estimated 160 houses that were destroyed and at the time of reporting were still notifying the homeowners, the group’s spokesperson said.
The Church on the Rock, the Presbyterian church, and a building attached to the Thantlang Baptist Church—the town’s largest congregation—also caught fire in the shelling, the Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO) said in a statement on Friday night.
International non-profit organisation Save the Children also reported that their local office in Thantlang was destroyed in the fire.
Nearly all of Thantlang’s 8,000 residents fled following military assaults that destroyed 18 homes and a government building in September. This too was seen as a retaliation against the public and the resistance after an attack by the CDF and the Chin National Army on a junta base reportedly killed some 30 soldiers.
Thousands of the civilians displaced from Thantlang have been taking shelter in villages along the India-Myanmar border, with others crossing into India’s Mizoram State.
At least three people, including two elderly women, were known to have stayed behind in Thantlang after others had fled. Myanmar Now was unable to contact them on Friday after the military shelling.
In their Friday statement, CHRO reported that more than 20 children and their teachers had stayed behind in an orphanage located at the entrance to Thantlang and remained trapped.
“The extensive destruction of civilian property, carried out wantonly and not justified by any military necessity, represent war crimes and grave breaches of international humanitarian law,” CHRO’s Salai Za Uk Ling said in the statement. .
Salai Issac Khen, a former municipal minister of Chin State under the National League for Democracy administration ousted in Myanmar’s February 1 coup, condemned the shelling on Friday in a Facebook post blaming the military for the destruction after rumours circulated that the residents of Thantlang were somehow responsible for the blaze.
“It is not easy to build a house in the Chin hills. The Chin people do not have any reason to torch their own homes,” he wrote.
On Sunday, junta mouthpiece the Global New Light of Myanmar accused the PDF burning the homes in Thantlang and committing “terrorist acts.” Military council spokesperson Gen Zaw Min Tun also said in a statement on Sunday that the local PDF—encouraged by the shadow National Unity Government and living “under the cover of [the] people”—had started the fire and that the military was unable to extinguish it.
In September 2017, following a scorched earth military campaign against the Rohingya population of Rakhine State—south of Chin State—the Myanmar army and government infamously accused the fleeing Rohingya of burning down their own homes. The claim was widely dismissed by the refugees themselves, human rights groups and the international community, and later submitted to a UN court as evidence of genocide.
“The military council will go down in history as responsible for this fire in Thantlang today,” Salai Issac Khen wrote, and urged all ethnic Chin members of the military council to “immediately resign.”
Around 200 troops from the military’s Light Infantry Division 11 and Light Infantry Battalion 269 based in the Chin State capital of Hakha have been stationed on a hill overlooking Thantlang, according to the CDF.
“We will take our town back,” the Thantlang CDF spokesperson said.
The Myanmar military deployed thousands of troops to northwestern Myanmar, including Chin State and Sagaing and Magway regions, earlier this month. The move appears to be preparation for a concerted push to crush the resistance movement that has inflicted heavy casualties on the junta’s army.
Myanmar’s Permanent Representative to the UN Kyaw Moe Tun said on Friday in an address to the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly’s 76th session that “decisive timely action” by the UN on the country’s situation was “well overdue,” and highlighted the most recent military assault on Thantlang as evidence of the deteriorating conditions in Myanmar.
“All people, I repeat all people in Myanmar, are suffering every day, every hour, every minute from atrocities, crimes against humanity committed by the military and some even brutally killed,” Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun said.
“Your serious attention to basic rights of all people and your action to prevent all people from such atrocities is seriously needed,” he said.
Editor’s Note: This article was updated on October 31 to include reference to the junta’s report and their spokesperson’s statement on the fire..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Military History, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"The Republic of Union of Myanmar
National Unity Government
Ministry of Health
Announcement (10/2021)
30th October 2021
1.Due to the terrorist military council’s inhumane atrocities and ethnic cleansing activities in Thantlang, Chin State, more than 10,000 residents have been displaced from their homes and are having to find refuge in the hills.
2.Starting from the morning of 29th October 2021 the terrorist military council, not only started a campaign of raiding and misappropriating the deserted homes of the town’s folks, bombarded the place with artillery fire and torched the place. By the morning of 30th October 2021, this has caused damage to a total of more than 160 buildings, properties and businesses including Christian Churches.
3. The Ministry of Health, National Unity Government strongly condemns the inhumane atrocities such as lootings, indiscriminate killings and torching of properties in the whole of Myanmar including Chin State, Kayah (Karenni) State, Sagaing Division and Magwe Division.
4.The Ministry of Health, National Unity Government is supporting and giving aid to the affected population in these areas in terms of medicines and medical aid and is proffering aid to the displaced people of Thantling as a priority.
5.We also strongly urge the international community that treasures human rights and human dignity including ASEAN and the UN to keep a watchful eye on the criminal activities and the inhumane atrocities of the terrorist military council and to take appropriate effective action without delay..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Health, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations, Chin (Zo) discussion groups
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Description:
"1. On October 29, 2021, the terrorist coup military’s forces intentionally attacked and burned people’s houses with heavy artilleries, and about 300 houses of Thantlang residents and religious buildings were destroyed.
2. Moreover, since February 1st coup, the terrorist SAC’s forces have been committing numerous atrocities in Chin State such as burning people’s homes, robbery and destroying public properties, unlawfully arresting, killing innocent civilians, and sexual assaults against women.
3. This is a serious warning to the terrorist military’s forces to immediately stop all fascist and violent campaign against people of Chin State – such as air strikes, heavy artilleries on civilians’ homes, targeting innocent civilians, using civilians as porters for the military purposes, and all genocidal acts.
4. Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration stands committed to ensuring all those responsible in the fascist military to be held accountable for such atrocities under the Law, and will collaborate with the international community to take actions against the fascist military.
5. We urge that international community as well as both domestic and international organizations provide support to humanitarian needs of conflict-affected people of Chin State..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Chin (Zo) discussion groups, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
31.56 KB
more
Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ
ရက်စွဲ။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ (၃၀) ရက်
ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ထန်တလန်မြို့၌ အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ၏ အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၉ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ၏ လက်နက်ကြီးများဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်မှုများ၊ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးမှုများကြောင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ထန်တလန်မြို့ရှိ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ် ၁၅၀ ကျော်နှင့် ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အအုံများ မီးလောင် ပျက်စီး သွားကြောင်း သိရှိပါသည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များသည် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်များကို မီးရှို့ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ ငွေကြေးနှင့် အဖိုးတန်ပစ္စည်းများကို ခိုးယူလုယက်ခြင်း၊ အပြစ်မဲ့ အရပ်သားများကို ဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ကျူးလွန်လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်အတွင်းရှိ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေးသူများသည် စစ်ဘေး ဒဏ်ပြင်းထန်စွာခံစားရလျက်ရှိပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ၏ အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များ နှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန် ရှုံ့ချပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရန် အသိပေးအပ်သည်။
၄။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် လိုအပ်သည့် အရေးယူဆောင် ရွက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရေး ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းနှင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်ရှိ စစ်ဘေးသင့် ပြည်သူများအတွက် ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီပေးကြပါရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။.."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Military History, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
235.13 KB
more
Description:
"ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ထန်တလန်မြို့၌ အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်များ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
၃၀ ရက်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၉ ရက်နေ့တွင် အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်၏ လက်နက်ကြီးများဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်မှုများ၊ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ လူနေအိမ်များကို မီးလောင်တိုက်သွင်းမှုများကြောင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ထန်တလန်မြို့၌ အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ် (၃၀၀) ခန့် နှင့် ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အအုံများ မီးလောင်ပျက်စီးသွားပါသည်။
၂။ ထို့အပြင် အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ် တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့နောက်ပိုင်းမှစ၍ ချင်းပြည်နယ်ရှိ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်များကို မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ ငွေကြေးဥစ္စာပစ္စည်းများ ခိုးယူခြင်း နှင့် ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ အပြစ်မဲ့ အရပ်သားများကို ဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက်ညှဉ်းပမ်း သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးများအား အဓမ္မပြုကျင့်မှုများကို တရားလက်လွန် အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ကျူးလွန်လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်အတွင်း အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်၏ လေကြောင်း စစ်ဆင်ရေးများ၊ လက်နက်ကြီးများဖြင့် လူနေအိမ်များကို ပစ်ခတ်မှုများ၊ ပြည်သူလူထုကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ၊ စစ်ဆင်ရေးများတွင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား လူသားဒိုင်းအသုံးပြု နေမှုများ၊ လူမျိုးနွယ်စုများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ပျက်သုဉ်းအောင်တိုက်ခိုက်နေမှုများ စသည့် ဖက်ဆစ်ဆန်ဆန် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ချက်ချင်း ရပ်တန်းက ရပ်ရန် သတိပေးလိုက်သည်။
၄။ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များကို အပြည့်အဝ တာဝန်မှုရှိစေရေး၊ တရားဥပဒေအောက် အရောက်ခေါ်ယူ၍ ပြည်သူ့တရားစီရင်နိုင်ရေးတို့ကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းနှင့်လည်း ချိတ်တွဲလျက် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်အပေါ် အရေးယူနိုင်ရေးကို ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင် ရွက်သွားမည်။
၅။ နိုင်ငံတကာမိသားစုများ၊ ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်ရှိ စစ်ဘေးသင့် ပြည်သူများအတွက် လိုအပ်နေသည့် လူမှုဘဝဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများကို ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီပေး ကြပါရန် တောင်းဆိုတိုက်တွန်းလိုက်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Chin (Zo) discussion groups, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
274.28 KB
more
Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန
စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များ နှင့် စပ်လျဥ်းသော ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်
၁၃၈၃ ခုနှစ်၊ သီတင်းကျွတ်လပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အောက်တိုဘာလ ၃၀ ရက်
၁။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ထန်တလန်မြို့ရှိ ပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်အဆောက်အဦးများ၊ ဘာသာရေး အဆောက်အအုံများ အား အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ ၏ တပ်များမှ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၉ ရက်နေ့တွင် မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့သဖြင့် ထန်တလန်မြို့ရှိ နေအိမ် ၁၅၀ ကျော်နှင့် ဘာသာရေး အဆောက်အအုံများ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည် ဟုသိရှိရပါသည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ယခုကဲ့သို့ မြို့လုံးကျွတ် မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ ငွေကြေးနှင့် အဖိုးတန်ပစ္စည်းများကို ခိုးယူလုယက်ခြင်း၊ အပြစ်မဲ့ အရပ်သားများကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများ စသည့် လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား ပြင်းထန်စွာ မိမိတို့ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ကန့်ကွက်ရှုတ်ချ ပါသည်။
၃။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လူမဆန်သော ရက်စက် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ အနေဖြင့် တာဝန်ယူရမည် ဖြစ်ပြီး မိမိတို့ အလုပ်သမား ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် အလုပ်သမားထု တစ်ရပ်လုံးက ချင်းပြည်နယ် ထန်တလန်မြို့၊ မြို့လုံးကျွတ် မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခံရခြင်းအတွက် များစွာ စိတ်မချမ်းမြေ့ဖြစ်ရပါကြောင်း နှင့် အချိန်နှင့် တစ်ပြေးညီ အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူများအား ဝိုင်းဝန်း ကူညီပေးကြပါရန် လေးစားစွာ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
121.72 KB
more
Description:
"ဝန်ထမ်းသစ်များခေါ်ယူ၊ရွေးချယ်၊ ခန့်ထားခြင်းများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ကြေညာချက်
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၇/၂၀၂၁)
၂၉ ရက်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
၁။ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ပြည်သူလူထုရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအစိုးရထံမှ ပြည်သူ့ အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် မတရားလုယက် အာဏာသိမ်းယူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယင်းသို့ အာဏာသိမ်းယူပြီးသည့်နောက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လက်အောက်ခံ စစ်ကျွန်ယန္တရား ဖြစ်သည့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အင်အားဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် လစ်လပ်နေသော လက်ထောက် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးမှူး၊ အငယ်တန်းစာရေး၊ ဒုတိယလက်ထောက်ကွန်ပြူတာ လုပ်ဆောင်ရေးမှူး၊ ယာဉ်မောင်း-၅၊ အမှုတွဲထိန်း၊ အစောင့်၊ ရုံးအကူ ရာထူးများဖြင့် လစ်လပ်နေရာ (၁၉၄၅) နေရာအတွက် ဝန်ထမ်းသစ်များ ခန့်ထားခဲ့ကြောင်းတွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။
၂။ ထို့ကြောင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုလက်အောက်ခံ လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အင်အား ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ လစ်လပ်ရာထူးနေရာများအတွက် ဝန်ထမ်းသစ်များခေါ်ယူ၊ ရွေးချယ်၊ ခန့်ထားမှု များနှင့် ခန့်ထားခံရသော ဝန်ထမ်းသစ်များအား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် လုံးဝ(လုံးဝ) အသိအမှတ်မပြုကြောင်း အသိပေး ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
ပုံ
လွင်ကိုလတ်
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး
ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-30
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"In the eight months since the military coup of the 1st February 2021 Myanmar's economy
and health care systems have been crippled and internal armed conflicts have been
expending across the country. Since September 7th, the day the National Unity
Government (NUG) announced a defensive war against the military junta by the National
Unity Government (NUG), armed conflicts between local resistance forces and the military
(SAC) have intensified in some states/ regions of Myanmar. Military arrests of civilians
targeted women activists and youths, and the military has used artillery attacks on civilians
during the armed conflicts. Within the armed conflict, the military is systematically
suppressing women in their political resistance, including through the use of sexual abuse
during detainments and interrogation.
Women have to gamble with their lives under the military dictatorship and collapsed
heath care system, there is a general lack of physical security in the country. Women can
be arrested anytime, anywhere and could be taken as hostages, as well as the ever-present
threat of being caught in active conflict. Despite the extreme risk of being imprisoned,
tortured, or killed, the women's hunger for peace inspires them to continue this revolution
by leading strikes and organizing support for members of civil disobedience movement,
and even taking up arms.
According to information from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
and Burmese Women's Union (BWU), from February 1 to September 30, a total of 1267
women were arrested and 57 women were sentenced. In addition, 78 women were
murdered by the military (SAC). The information presented here comes from credible sources collected by the BWU. BWU accepts the facts that the actual death rate and
eradication of public property likely to be significantly higher.
Women in Political Conflicts
In civil wars and situations of political uncertainty, women and children suffer the most. In
the period following the military coup, countless civilians were killed and injured due to
artillery attacks, abandoned military weapons, and land mines in the villages. Among these
deaths and injuries, there are women and children as young as two years old Some deaths were due to the lack of health care services during detentions and
imprisonment. A woman named Khin Mar Cho who suffered from diabetes was arrested
There are reports that there are many cases where the military has informed family
members that such deaths during detention, imprisonment and interrogation were due
to covid-19. Family members have lost the right to accurate information and face
difficulties when trying to meet their detained family members.
One of the barbarous acts of military juntas is that a pregnant woman was arrested under
the suspicion of being a member of a people's defense force (PDF). She gave birth at a
village while under arrest, as soldiers were forcing her to walk to their station. As soon as
she gave birth, she immediately had to carry on to the station; the soldiers forced the
villagers to carry her.2 Ma Soe Mi Mi Kyaw who was arrested on September 20th tried to
under the 505(B) law and detained by Minkin Police. During the detainment, she did not
get permission to receive medical treatment and as a result, she died while in detention.1kill herself by drinking methylated spirit due to torture during the interrogation. By
scrutinizing her case, it is impossible to even imagine the level of torture women
experience at the hands of the military junta, to acquire information during the
interrogation process. Through the observation of several cases, it is found that the
military is violating fundamental human rights through using torture and denying health
care to detainees..."
Source/publisher:
Burmese Women's Union
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Women's rights, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Burmese women's organisations, Discrimination/violence against women: reports of violations in Burma, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Myanmar junta forces used 19 detained civilians as human shields during a raid on a village in Pekon Township, Shan State on Wednesday, according to local civilian armed forces.
After sustaining heavy casualties in ambushes and mine attacks by civilian resistance forces, the military regime’s forces are using arrested civilians as human shields in their operations in Magwe and Sagaing regions and Chin and Kayah states.
Junta forces are also using civilian vehicles and ambulances while traveling and conducting operations against People’s Defense Forces to deter ambushes and landmine attacks.
Previously, 30 people were used as human shields by junta troops while marching in
Demoso, Hpruso and Bawlakeh in Kayah State and Pekon Township in southern Shan State in late August.
On Friday, a leaked photo went viral online showing more than a dozen civilians, blindfolded and tied together with a rope, being forced to march in front of a military column in a village in Pekon Township, Shan State.
The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force of Pekon confirmed that all the arrested people are from Shwe Pyi Aye Village, which was bombarded by military regime forces early on Wednesday morning.
The KNDF-Pekon shared a list of the detainees’ names on Friday and said some of them had yet to be released.
Junta forces shelled a civilian area in Shwe Pyi Aye Village at around 3 a.m. on Wednesday. The shelling occurred after the regime forces, who were deployed on a hill, engaged in an intense firefight with a joint force of Pekon People’s Defense Force fighters and other Karenni armed forces on Tuesday afternoon. After the clash, three civilians were also injured by random junta attacks on residential areas, according to the Pekon PDF.
Due to the junta bombardment, more than 500 residents of Shwe Pyi Aye Village had to flee into the forests.
An official of the Free Burma Rangers, an armed group assisting the fleeing villagers, told The Irrawaddy on Friday that the 19 villagers including some aged between 50 and 60, were arrested by junta soldiers while returning to their homes.
KNDF-Pekon said that military regime forces destroyed property belonging to the fleeing villagers, as well as looting houses and stealing vehicles during the raid on the village on Wednesday.
Currently, around 3,500 residents from several villages and wards of Mobye and Pekon, Shan State have fled their homes due to junta raids and artillery strikes on civilian areas following the clashes with civilian resistance forces.
On Friday morning, two people including a woman were killed and three people including a 6-year-old-boy were injured when military regime forces attacked civilian areas of Mobye using artillery shells.
On Sunday, one civilian was also killed and five others including a 3-year-old girl and a 9-year-old boy were injured when the junta shelled residential areas of Mobye.
In early October, junta soldiers also used 15 detained villagers as human shields while marching through the north of Gangaw Township, Magwe Region, where many dozens of junta troops had been killed in landmine attacks by local PDFs.
While marching to locations in Chin State recently, junta forces reportedly forced civilian vehicles including private buses and passenger buses to accompany their military convoy in order to deter ambushes by the Chinland Defense Force, according to the armed group.
Junta forces also used local civilians in Mindat as human shields while raiding the mountainous town in Chin State in mid-May.
Regime forces have continued to commit atrocities including raiding and burning down villages, bombarding residential areas of towns and arbitrarily killing civilians, especially in Magwe and Sagaing regions and Chin and Kayah states.
With the exception of Rakhine State, military regime forces nationwide are facing a growing number of attacks from PDFs and ethnic armed forces..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
Junta soldiers’ scorched-earth operations force villagers to flee to the jungle.
Description:
"Myanmar junta troops have laid waste to more than 60 civilian homes and a church in months of scorched-earth operations in Chin state, a western region where fighting between the junta and ethnic armed organizations has raged on since the Feb. 1 coup, RFA statistics showed.
The military rampaged through Chin’s Thantlang township, on Sept. 18, destroying 19 houses. Between Oct. 13 and Oct. 25, junta soldiers torched 42 houses and one church in nearby Falam township, in parts of Talang Ron and Tal villages, and the entire village of Rialti.
Witnesses said they saw the military not only burning homes, but also looting them and killing farm animals. About 900 residents from seven villages fled to the deep forest to escape the onslaught.
“It costs more than 10 million kyat (U.S. $5,572) to build a house. We put everything, all our savings, in building a house according to our Chin traditions, so it will be very difficult to rebuild when we are fleeing war, have no money, and not enough food to eat,” a resident who fled Tal village told RFA’s Myanmar Service.
“Now we have no house in the village because of the fire. Do we have to just live in our forest hut? I don’t know what to do anymore. Everyone is in tears,” the Tal villager said.
Though the military has denied carrying out the arson attacks, sources told RFA that the junta soldiers were the only possible culprit.
“They were the only ones in our village as everyone had already fled. If they didn’t burn the houses, who did?” a resident of Talang Rong village, who declined to be named for security reasons, told RFA’s Myanmar Service.
“It is unforgivable that they set fire to the village and stayed in our houses and ate our food… They did whatever they wanted. They killed our animals for the sake of killing them. There are so many cases like that,” the Talang Rong resident said.
The October arson attacks happened just after major military reinforcements to the region on Oct. 9, as soldiers opened fire on every village along the Kalemyo-Falam-Hakha road, a highway that connects that part of Chin state with the southern part of the Sagaing region.
Both Chin and Sagaing have been hotbeds of armed resistance by local militias against the troops that overthrew Myanmar’s elected government nine months ago.
RFA attempted to contact military spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun for commen,t but calls went unanswered. On Oct. 14 he denied to RFA that the military burnt the 12 houses and church in Rialti village.
The military in Chin state has violated international law, Salai Za Op Lin, executive director the India-based Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), told RFA.
“Almost the entire town of Thantlang was burned to the ground,” said Salai Za Op Lin.
“We are carefully recording and documenting what is going on. We will keep this information and will one day publish it,” he said.
According to CHRO statistics, about 30,000 people have fled across the Myanmar-India border to India’s Mizoram state. Another 30,000 people are displaced within Chin state.
CHRO said about 30,000 people have fled to Mizoram, India, due to the ongoing fighting in Chin State, and another 30,000 people have been displaced in Chin State.
Since August, military troops set fire to 300 homes in the state, the CHRO said.
Myanmar’s military has been conducting combat operations against armed ethnic groups in areas close to its border for decades. Many of the groups who signed cease-fire agreements with the democratically elected government declared those agreements invalid after the coup.
As of Thursday, the junta has killed 1219 people since the Feb. 1 coup, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Armed conflict in Burma - Impact on village life, including health and education, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political
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The 79-year-old was arrested days after the February coup for remarks he made condemning the military’s power grab
Description:
"A tribunal in Naypyitaw on Friday handed a 20-year prison sentence to National League for Democracy (NLD) party stalwart Win Htein, who was arrested in early February after condemning coup leader Min Aung Hlaing’s power grab during media interviews.
The 79-year-old former military captain, who is in poor health, appeared for the verdict at a court inside the Naypyitaw Detention Center, where he has been on trial for sedition under Section 124a of the Penal Code.
The two-judge tribunal, presided over by judge Ye Lwin, handed down the maximum sentence allowed under the law at around 3pm.
Defence lawyer Myint Thwin said Win Htein was ready for a harsh sentence. “He is firm in beliefs and resilient so he was not fazed at all. Since the time he was detained and charged, he has told the court to hand down the sentence as it sees fit, no matter how many years it may be.”
Chit Suu, Win Htein’s youngest daughter, told Myanmar Now the sentence was not surprising but was an “injustice.”
“This is as we expected. It's not a surprise but it's a sad and outrageous thing to hear about the ridiculous sentencing. The perpetrators of this injustice will be held accountable,” said Chit Suu, who lives in Australia and spent most of her childhood separated from her father.
Win Htein was among the few top NLD leaders who was not detained in the early hours of February 1 as the military toppled his party’s elected government. Later the same morning he used his freedom to excoriate the military during interviews with journalists.
Min Aung Hlaing acted “without thinking of what is right and wrong,” he told reporters, “I feel pity for him.” He was arrested at his home in Yangon three days later.
Myint Thwin said that Win Htein made the comments on the day of the coup because, as a leader of the ruling party that was being toppled, he felt responsible for communicating the unfolding situation to the country.
Win Htein was forced to retire from the military in 1976 after being accused of involvement in a plot to assassinate then dictator Ne Win.
He went on to work as a businessman until 1988, when he became close with democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi after an introduction from Tin Oo, the former military commander-in-chief who was also forced to retire in the late 1970s and later helped found the NLD.
As Suu Kyi emerged as the most prominent leader of the democratic uprising in 1988, Win Htein took responsibility for her security at protests. He was arrested for his political activity in 1989 and spent the majority of the next two decades in prison before being freed in 2010.
In July Nyan Win, another senior NLD leader who was detained following the coup, died in junta custody after contracting Covid-19 at Insein Prison.
The junta has also detained most of the country’s NLD-appointed state and regional chief ministers, charging them with incitement and corruption.
Several NLD office buildings, including its Yangon headquarters and its regional branch in Mandalay, have been targeted in bomb or arson attacks in recent months. Senior NLD figures believe that the junta is trying to destroy the party.
After appointing himself the prime minister of the “caretaker government” in early August, Min Aung Hlaing has stepped up efforts to change Myanmar’s electoral system to one of Proportional Representation. The new system would make it harder for any party to secure a crushing landslide victory like that enjoyed by the NLD in last year’s election.
Win Htein will now be transferred to a different prison to serve his sentence, but it is unclear which one..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ မြောက်ပိုင်းနှင့် အနောက်မြောက်ဒေသ တခုလုံးအား ကြီးမားသည့်ထိုးစစ်ဆင်ဖို့အတွက်
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် “အနော်ရထာစစ်ဆင်ရေး”1 ဟုခေါ်ဆိုသော စစ်ဆင်ရေးတရပ်ကို ပြင်ဆင်ဆောင်ရွက်
နေသည်ကို တွေ့ရသည်။2 ဤစစ်ဆင်ရေးကြောင့် ယင်းဒေသအတွင်းနေထိုင်သည့် လူထုများအနေဖြင့်
ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သည့် နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့်ရှိပြစ်မှုကြီးများ (လူသားဖြစ်မှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်သောပြစ်မှု၊ လူမျိုးတုံး
သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု) မလွှဲမသွေ ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့ လာရနိုင်ဖွယ်ရှိသည်။
၂။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ စစ်ရေးမဟာဗျူဟာအရ ဒေသတခုခုအား စစ်ဆင်ရေးနယ်မြေ
အဖြစ်သတ်မှတ်သည့်အခါ အခြားဒေသများ၌ စစ်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု၊ တိုက်ပွဲဖော်ဆောင်မှုများကို လုံးဝနီးပါး
သို့မဟုတ် လုံးဝ ဆိုင်းငံ့ထားပြီး စစ်ဆင်ရေးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်လေ့ရှိသည်။3 ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ပွင့်လင်းရာသီ၌
1 ဒေသကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် PDF တွေ ကြုံလာရမယ့် အနော်ရထာ စစ်ဆင်ရေး။ အောက်တိုဘာ ၁၉ BBC သတင်းဌာန။
https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma-58976376?fbclid=IwAR1dbUcKxa1Ztxl629naJ5a6Nagam7ErrRGesUa5xwKq-
1nlue3m_nyn80
2 ပလက်ဝဘက်မှ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ ကန်ပက်လက်၊ မင်းတပ်နှင့် စစ်ကိုင်တိုင်းဘက်သို့ ရေ့ေွှ ပြာင်း။ ပလက်ဝမြို့တွင ်
ယာယီတပ်စွဲထားသည့် တပ်မ (၁၁) ၊ (၅၅) နှင့် (၇၇) မှ လက်အောက်ခံတပ်ရင်းတချို့ စက်တင်ဘာလ (၁၉) ရက်က
စစ်ကားအစီး ၃၀ ကျော်ဖြင့် ပလက်ဝမြို့ ကင်းချောင်းဝမှတဆင့် ဆမိးလမ်းကြောင်း အတိုင်း ကန်ပက်လက် မြို့ဘက်ခြမ်းသို့
တက်သွားကြသည်။ Mizzima သတင်းဌာန။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ၊ စက်တင်ဘာ ၂၁ရက်။
https://www.facebook.com/216265185075061/posts/4793130514055149/?sfnsn=mo
Myanmar: UN expert fears spike in atrocities amid reports of troops massing in north
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?LangID=E&NewsID=27693
3 ၁၉၈၀ ကာလနောက်ပိုင်း မြန်မာစစ်တပ်က ဗကပကို အမြစ်ပြတ်တိုက်ခိုက်ချေမှုန်းဖို့အတွက် ကေအိုင်အိုအပါအဝင်
မြန်မာပြည် တောင်ပိုင်းအခြေပြုလှုပ်ရှားသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲအတုများ ပြုလုပ် ကျင်းပခဲ့ပြီး
စစ်ရှိန်လျော့ချခဲ့သည်။ ၁၉၈၉ ခုနှစ် ဗကပ ပြိုကွဲသွားပြီးနောက်၊ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်က မြန်မာပြည်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ
တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် တဖွဲ့ပြီးတဖွဲ့ အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲမှုများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်တောင်ပိုင်း အခြေစိုက်
တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များအား အပြင်းအထန် ထိုးစစ်ဆင်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၁၁ ခုနှစ် ကချင်ပြည်နယ် နှင့်
ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်း၌ ကေအိုင်အိုနှင့် တကျော့ပြန် စစ်ပွဲဖြစ်သည့်အခါ မြန်မာပြည်တောင်ပိုင်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသား
ခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် ပြည်နယ်အဆင့် အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲမှုများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် ၂၀၁၈ ခုနှစ် နောက်ပိုင်း
မြန်မာပြည် အနောက်ဘက် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း ရခိုင့်တပ်တော် (အေအေ) အား အပြင်းအထန် ထိုးစစ်ဆင်နွှဲသည့်အခါ
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ မြောက်ပိုင်းနှင့် အနောက်မြောက်ပိုင်းဒေသအား ကြီးမားသည့် အနော်ရထာစစ်ဆင်ရေး မစတင်မှီ
မြန်မာပြည်ရဲ့ အရှေ့မြောက်ဖျားဒေသ၊ အနောက်ဘက်ဒေသများ၌ အခြေပြုလှုပ်ရှားသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသား
ခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့တချို့နှင့်တွေ့ဆုံပြီး4 စစ်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု လုံးဝနီးပါး ဆိုင်းငံ့ထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။5 ဤသည်မှာ
ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုအခြေခံကနေ ဖိနှိပ်တဲ့ စစ်ဆင်ရေးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်နေခြင်းသာ ဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ နိုင်ငံတကာစစ်ဥပဒေ (ဂျီနီဗာကွန်ဗင်းရှင်း) ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး သာလွန်စစ်အင်းအားအသုံးပြု6၍
အရပ်သားလူထုအပေါ် သိမ်းကျုံးတိုက်ခိုက်7 လာနိုင်သည့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ အနော်ရထာစစ်ဆင်ရေးအား
ဥပဒေအထောက်အကူပြုကွန်ရက် အနေဖြင့် အပြင်းအထန်ကန့်ကွက်လိုက်သည်။
၄။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ စစ်ဆင်ရေးကြောင့် ယင်းဒေသအတွင်းနေထိုင်သော ဒေသခံပြည်သူလူထုများက
ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သည့် နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့်ရှိပြစ်မှုကြီးများမလွှဲမသွေ ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့ လာရနိုင်သည်။
ယင်းသို့သော အခြေအနေဆိုးများမှ ကြိုတင်ကာကွယ်မှု ပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အင်အားစု အသီးသီးထံသို့
အောက်ပါအတိုင်း တိုက်တွန်းတောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
(က) လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခအတွင်း လိုက်နာရမည့် ဂျီနီဗာကွန်းဗင်းရှင်း
အား အပြည့်အဝလေးစားလိုက်နာဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းတောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
(ခ) စစ်ဆင်ရေးဒေသအတွင်းနေထိုင်သည့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများရဲ့ အသက်လုံခြုံမှုနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ
ထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွှတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် ဒေသ
အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အာဏာပိုင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် လူမှုကယ်ဆယ်ရေးအသင်းအဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် ကြိုတင်ပြင်ဆင်
ဆောင်ရွက်ထားနိုင်ဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
(ဂ) နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့် ဆိုးဝါးပြင်းထန်သည့် ပြစ်မှုကြီးများအား ကျူးလွန်သူများကို ပြည်တွင်းနှင့်
နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့်တရားရုံးများ၌ ထိရောက်စွာအပြစ်ပေး အရေးယူနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်တွင်း ပြည်ပ
ဥပဒေအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ လူထုအသင်းအဖွဲ့များ၊ သတင်း မီဒီယာများနှင့် အင်းအားစုအသီးသီးတို့
မြန်မာပြည် တောင်ပိုင်းတွင် လုံးဝ အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲထားနိုင်ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်မြောက်ပိုင်းအား ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှု
အရှိန်လျော့ချထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
4 အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက် ဧပြီလ (၇) (၈) ရက်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် မြန်မာပြည်အရှေ့မြောက်ဖျားဒေသရှိ
အင်းအားကြီး လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့ ဖြစ်သည့် ဝသပ နှင့် ရှမ်းပြည်တိုးတက်ရေးပါတီ SSPP တို့နှင့်တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ကြသည်။
အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအုပ်စုသည် ဝ အပါအဝင် မြောက်ပိုင်းမဟာမိတ်တပ်ဖွဲ့နှင့် ဆက်တိုက်တွေ့ဆုံ။
5 မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် မြန်ပြည်အရှေ့မြောက်ဖျားဒေသရှိ အင်းအားကြီးတိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်များနှင့် လွန်ခဲ့သည့်
နှစ်ပေါင်း သုံးဆယ်ကျော် ကတည်းက အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည့်အပြင် မြန်မာပြည်အနောက်ဘက်ခြမ်း၌ ၎င်းတို့အား
စစ်ရေးအရ ခြိမ်းခြောက်နိုင်သည့် ရက္ခိုင့်အမျိုးသားအဖွဲ့ချုပ်/ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်နှင့်လည်း ၂၀၂၀ နှစ်ကုန်းပိုင်း မှစပြီး
အပစ်အခတ် ရပ်စဲထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
6 The principle of proportionality in attack.
7 Indiscriminate attack.
အနေဖြင့် လိုအပ်သောစီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို ချမှတ်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ဖို့ တိုက်တွန်း တောင်းဆို
အပ်ပါသည်။
(ဃ) တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် ခေတ်
အဆက်ဆက် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုအခြေခံကနေ ဖော်ဆောင်နေသည့် ဖိနှိပ်သော
မဟာဗျူဟာစစ်ဆင်ရေးအား တညီတညွှတ်တည်း ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ကြဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းတောင်းဆို အပ်ပါ
သည်။
(င) မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အား ဘဏ္ဍာရေး၊ စစ်လက်နက်၊ နည်းပညာ နှင့် သံတမန်ရေးအရ တနည်းတဖုံဖြင့်
ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနေသည့် နိုင်ငံများ၊ ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အစုအဖွဲ့များ နှင့် လူပုဂ္ဂိိုလ်များ
အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်နှင့် လုံးဝ အဆက်အသွယ်မပြုလုပ်ကြဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းသည်။
ဥပဒေအထောက်အကူပြုကွန်ရက်..."
Source/publisher:
Legal Aid Network
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-29
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Political History
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"At least 297 attacks and threats against health workers, facilities, and transports in Myanmar were perpetrated from February 1 to September 30, 2021, according to an analysis based on open-source reports compiled by Insecurity Insight, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), and the Johns Hopkins University Center for Public Health and Human Rights (CPHHR).
Myanmar’s armed forces and police reportedly committed the vast majority of attacks amid resistance to the military takeover. The Myanmar military’s (“Tatmadaw”) wanton violence against health workers and facilities is fueling the collapse of the country’s health sector and its COVID-19 response, as the emergency in Myanmar devolves into a protracted conflict.
Within the 297 total incidents that took place across Myanmar during the first eight months of the military’s coup and crackdown (February 1 to September 30, 2021), Insecurity Insight, PHR, and CPHHR highlight reports of:
210 health workers arrested
40 health workers injured
29 health workers killed
Hospitals raided at least 87 times
Hospitals occupied at least 56 times
25 incidents impacting COVID-19 response measures
“The Tatmadaw uses restrictions on health services as a tool of repression and control,” said Christina Wille, director of Insecurity Insight. “Many people are denied health care. Amazingly brave health workers continue to provide care in clandestine ways but frequent raids and curfews, medical shortages, and power outages jeopardize health facilities and put patients’ lives at risk. The international community needs to take bolder steps to address Myanmar’s tragedy.
“The humanitarian tolls have increased as COVID-19 spreads largely unchecked. The recent military build-up in Myanmar’s border areas portends additional atrocities and the displacement of more people,” said Wille. “Myanmar’s catastrophe won’t remain inside the county’s borders.”
The incidents referred to are based on the dataset 01 February – 30 September 2021 Violence Against Health Care in Myanmar Data, which is available on the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX). For the purposes of this research brief, one incident can comprise multiple types of violence or threats such as those above. The brief does not include incidents of violence against patients. Selected events can also be viewed on the global map on threats and violence against health care.
The new research brief highlights several alarming developments in the military’s ongoing crackdown on the medical profession and the anti-coup movement.
The military has used health facilities to arrest civilians suspected of participating in the anti-coup movement. For example, an elderly pro-democracy activist received a call about his eligibility for a COVID-19 vaccine. Upon arrival at a COVID-19 vaccination center on August 4, he was reportedly arrested by armed forces and remains detained in the county’s capital. The Tatmadaw often denies medical care to detainees in its custody.
Health workers continue to be targeted for providing care, with detainees coerced into confessing to falsified charges, such as possession of weapons or links to anti-junta terrorism. In one instance on September 25, a doctor and nurse who volunteered to treat COVID-19 patients were reportedly dragged out of their homes in the middle of the night, tortured, and killed by the military-run State Administrative Council (SAC).
The COVID-19 response has been derailed by the military’s violence against health care. For example, four NGO workers for an organization that transports COVID-19 patients and delivers medical supplies were arrested by the SAC, who also reportedly seized two of the group’s ambulances. The military has blocked numerous international and local aid groups from reaching people in need. Patients are also routinely blocked from accessing care.
State and non-state actors continue to use explosive weapons around health facilities. In one case, on September 22, a car bomb exploded outside the military-occupied Public Hospital in Mandalay region, killing one person and injuring two others.
“There is no doubt that the emergency has spiraled into a protracted humanitarian crisis,” said Sandra Mon, a PHR expert and epidemiologist from Myanmar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health and Human Rights. “The military junta continues to intimidate and threaten health workers, even during the third wave of COVID-19 that devastated the country. The collapse of Myanmar’s health care system and the evolution of the conflict has now led to health being used as a political bargaining chip. Conflict should never justify inaction, especially where public health is concerned. Myanmar’s international allies must continue to press for unhindered delivery of medical and humanitarian aid to the people. Global health diplomacy must be invoked.”
While the vast majority of attacks and threats against health care have been perpetrated by Myanmar’s armed forces, non-state actors also reportedly committed violence against health care in May and June. Of the 297 total incidents, at least 267 are attributed to Myanmar’s armed forces (State Administrative Council/SAC or the Tatmadaw) and 14 to non-state actors. The perpetrators are unclear in 16 incidents.
The increase in attacks by non-state actors was driven in part by escalating conflict between the military and local ethnic militias in recent months, particularly in the Chin and Kachin states, as well as the shadow government’s September declaration of a “People’s Defensive War.”
The research brief also includes testimonies from nurses in Myanmar, collected by Insecurity Insight with support from the Tropical Health and Education Trust in September 2021.
“We are not criminals,” said one nurse, whose identity is concealed due to extreme security risks. “We are caring and compassionate nurses who want to help reduce pain and suffering. We just want to give care to our people.”
Another nurse told researchers: “This is not the first time in our history that we suffer from dictators. Back then, we couldn’t let the world know what was happening. Today, we are globally connected and want to raise our voices. We don’t want our country and health system to deteriorate. It is our human right to speak out and say where we stand on this.”
Insecurity Insight, PHR, and CPHHR used an open-source methodology to compile incidents noted in local, national, and international news outlets, online databases, and social media reports. The incidents reported are neither a complete nor a representative list of all incidents. Most incidents have not undergone verification by Insecurity Insight, PHR, and CPHHR. Data collection is ongoing and data may change as more information is made available. However, the data offers a snapshot of how Myanmar’s military is persecuting health workers and targeting facilities amid its broader crackdown on dissent.
“Myanmar’s military must immediately cease hostilities and allow prompt, equitable, and unhindered delivery of COVID-19 vaccines and lifesaving aid to the country’s besieged civilians,” said Susannah Sirkin, director of policy at Physicians for Human Rights. “UN member states must use all tools at their disposal to pressure and influence the Myanmar military to abide by international humanitarian and human rights law. In a year that has seen rampant conflict- and COVID-19-related violence against medical professionals, Myanmar may be the worst place on Earth to be a health worker today due to the onslaught from the military. The global community cannot let this stand.”
The research brief makes several recommendations to UN member states, urging the international community to ensure the full implementation of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2286, adopted in May 2016, which strongly condemns attacks on medical personnel in conflict situations, as well as UNSC Resolution 2565, which calls for a global ceasefire during the COVID-19 pandemic..."
Source/publisher:
Physicians for Human Rights (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Public Health, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Right to Health: reports of violations in Burma
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Family and friends had recently expected the reporters to be released as part of an amnesty
Description:
"Three journalists jailed by the junta after reporting on the fallout from its February 1 coup are now facing terrorism charges that could see them sentenced to several years in prison, lawyers have told Myanmar Now.
The journalists are Win Naing Oo, a senior Channel Mandalay reporter, D Myat Nyein, a reporter with the now defunct Zayar Times in Sagaing Region, and Pyae Phyo Aung, who worked for the same outlet.
All three were initially charged under Section 505-A of the Penal Code for incitement. A Mandalay-based lawyer familiar with Win Naing Oo’s case said more details of the new charge against him would be released at his next hearing on November 5.
“I learnt from the court that his Section 505 charge had been changed to one under the Anti-Terrorism Law,” he said.
Win Naing Oo was due to appear at a hearing relating to his 505-A charge on Tuesday but did not show up even though other co-defendants in the case did, the lawyer added.
“Only the others charged with him under the same case file were… indicted with Section 505 charges. Win Naing Oo didn’t appear at the court,” he said.
Family members and friends of the three journalists had expected them to be released as part of a recent junta amnesty after it was announced that people charged under 505-A were due to be set free.
Another lawyer said police and court sources had revelaed that the Zayar Times reporters would face terrorism charges, but no detailed information was available yet.
“Only one charge has been filed to the court so far,” the lawyer said. “The terrorism charge is still being filed at the police station, according to my sources.”
D Myat Nyein, 25, has been in detention at Obo Prison in Mandalay since July 26 and has been attending hearings at a court set up inside the prison. His lawyer could not be reached for further details about the case against him.
Pyae Phyo Aung, 30, was arrested on October 11 and is due to attend his first hearing under the 505-A charge at a court in Sagaing Township on October 29.
Myanmar Now was unable to contact the No.1 police station in the town of Sagaing, where Pyae Phyo Aung is being held.
The Zayar Times was forced to stop publishing in late July after the junta began targeting its journalists. Its chief editor Saw Yan Paing and two other reporters there have gone into hiding to avoid arrest. It is unclear if the three journalists in hiding will also face terrorism charges.
“As journalists we have to have connections with both sides so we can hear both sides of the story. It’s really sad that we have to face such major charges,” said one of the Zayar Times journalists who is in hiding and did not want to be named.
The junta has arrested roughly 100 journalists since its February coup and at least 53 of them were still in detention as of October 1, according to Reporters Without Borders. Around 20 journalists were released as part of the amnesty in mid-October..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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Sub-title:
Stronger International Pressure Needed to End Abuses
Description:
"“They placed a plastic bag over my head to suffocate me. They did this three times…. They held mock executions.… They pointed a rifle at me and pulled the trigger repeatedly.”
This is how a detainee in Myanmar, recently released after arrest for anti-junta protests earlier this year, described to Human Rights Watch some of the torture tactics that Myanmar soldiers used during an interrogation session in a military facility. The detainee suffered extensive beatings even before the interrogation. “My back felt broken,” the former detainee said. “I was on my knees and they had kept kicking my head… There was so much blood. I really didn’t think I was going to come out alive.”
Reports of torture by Myanmar’s long-abusive security forces are being increasingly well-documented. An expose by the Associated Press on October 28 includes credible and consistent accounts of torture of 28 detainees released in recent months, with information from victims, medical forensic analysts, and military defectors who witnessed abuse.
Myanmar’s junta announced a partial prisoner amnesty on October 18. The announcement said 1,316 people would be pardoned and charges dropped against 4,320 people who “participated in protests.” But many of these people have yet to be released, and some of those freed have given harrowing accounts of their mistreatment.
Several women released described to Myanmar media abuse they suffered at an interrogation center in Yangon, including mock executions and sexual assault. Human Rights Watch documented similar accounts at the same facility and elsewhere since the February 1 military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government.
Consistent accounts of torture of those critical of the junta, as well as widespread and systematic killings and other atrocities by Myanmar’s security forces, has led Human Rights Watch to conclude that abuses since the February coup amount to crimes against humanity.
Concerned governments need to increase pressure on Myanmar to end this brutal crackdown. Targeted sanctions on the military leaders overseeing abuses have not been enough. Governments should block foreign currency transactions to overseas banks controlled by the junta, including billions of dollars in revenues from oil and gas, mining, and timber ventures that are paid to junta-controlled entities. The United Nations Security Council should impose an arms embargo and refer the country’s situation to the International Criminal Court. Failure to act will only invite more impunity, and more torture..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Watch Reports on Burma/Myanmar
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Description:
"Noeleen Heyzer, a former United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General who had a warm relationship with Myanmar’s previous military regime and its proxy government, was appointed on Monday as the new UN Special Envoy for Myanmar.
The 73-year old Singaporean is the successor to Christine Schraner Burgener. As well as inheriting the mission to tackle the Rohingya Muslim issue in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, she must also continue with the task of trying to persuade the Myanmar junta leaders to engage in dialogue to settle the ongoing political and social turmoil caused by their February 1 coup.
Unsurprisingly, Noeleen Heyzer’s appointment as the new UN Special Envoy has drawn considerable interest from Myanmar’s politicians. The Irrawaddy talked to some local politicians – including one from Myanmar’s parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG) – and a political analyst to find out what they think of the UN’s latest appointee.
Sai Leik, General Secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
The appointment of a Singaporean to tackle Myanmar affairs is because of the country’s influence on Myanmar, such as in financial or social issues including labor and education. We hope that she will be able to put more pressure on the current military government than her predecessor. At the very least, she should be allowed to visit the country and hold talks.
Zin Mar Aung, NUG Foreign Minister
From a diplomatic point of view, Myanmar’s issues are not easy for anyone to tackle. We see it as a huge challenge to engage with a dictator who thinks only of staying in power, who is extremely stubborn when it comes to tackling political issues and who puts his own personal power above the interests of the country.
No matter how good the diplomats are, there will be challenges for them. Rather than focusing on individual efforts, Myanmar’s issues need to be addressed by the international community with a really well-coordinated approach.
U Pe Than, Former Rakhine Lawmaker
No matter who is the new UN Special Envoy, it will be very difficult for them at this time to work inside the country as the junta will not permit that. The regime is under diplomatic pressure from all the international community, including the UN, the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
If the UN envoy is allowed to visit Myanmar, they [the military] will suffer even more. There may be more demands from the UN, just as ASEAN’s Special Envoy is demanding to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and calling for the release of political prisoners.
The junta has no willingness to comply with these demands. Thus, the UN envoy will be limited in what she can do. No matter who holds the position of envoy, they will not be able to do very much in practice.
U Aung Thu Nyein, Political Analyst
She is a veteran ambassador from Singapore. She came to Myanmar to help during Cyclone Nargis [in 2008]. She also had a good relationship with former prime minister U Thein Sein in 2009.
Her predecessor as UN Special Envoy was not allowed to enter Myanmar [after the coup], and it was challenging for her.
Noeleen Heyzer’s strengths are her close ties to the previous regime and its proxy government. I think the UN appointed her on the grounds that Singapore, as an Asian country, is in a better position to talk to Myanmar. But success or failure does not depend on her alone. It has to do with all aspects.
All the stakeholders need to engage in dialogue. The talks need to include the junta, local political parties and all opposition groups, including ethnic groups..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
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Description:
"Last week in East and Southeast Asia, Myanmar military forces clashed with the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) in Kayin state. Meanwhile, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) barred the head of the Myanmar military regime from attending the ASEAN summit beginning on 26 October, instead offering an invite to a non-political representative. In Indonesia, state forces shot a Papuan miner during an eviction operation at a mining site. North Korea test-fired a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). In South Korea, workers affiliated with the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) held mass rallies across the country to demand better work conditions. Lastly, in Taiwan, a series of rallies were reported ahead of a vote to recall a legislator on 23 October.
In Myanmar, clashes between the Myanmar military and the KNU/KNLA broke out in Kawkareik and Kyainseikgyi townships in northern Kayin state last week. On 20 October, military forces reportedly pushed into KNU-controlled territory in Kyainseikgyi township, prompting the firefight. The clash came as military sources confirmed reports that additional troops had been deployed to northern Kayin state to counter the KNU/KNLA, which the regime has accused of providing military training to People’s Defense Force (PDF) members (Karen News, 18 October 2021).
Meanwhile, ASEAN announced on 16 October that the regime chief, Min Aung Hlaing, would not be invited to attend the ASEAN summit starting on 26 October. ASEAN cites a lack of cooperation from the regime in taking action on the agreed points in the Five-Point Consensus reached between them in April (RFA, 19 October 2021). The Five-Point Consensus calls for an immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar, constructive dialogue among all stakeholders, the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and a visit by the envoy to Myanmar. The decision marks a rare move by the bloc, known for its united decision-making, non-interference, and engagement (Reuters, 26 October 2021). The regime has since responded sharply to the decision, asserting its right to a ministerial representative at the summit according to the ASEAN charter. The regime vows to pursue “due processes under the ASEAN Charter and the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in resolving the differences on Myanmar’s representation at the ASEAN Meetings” (RFA, 25 October 2021)..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Karen State - general articles and reports, Karen National Union (KNU), ASEAN-Burma relations
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"The decision of ASEAN to block coup-maker and junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from attending its ongoing summit, which started Tuesday and ends on Thursday, has taken the world by surprise. ASEAN does not normally make any decision that could be seen as “interference” in one of its 10 member states’ internal affairs. The military-appointed Foreign Ministry in Naypyitaw issued a statement saying that the decision “was done without consensus and was against the objectives of ASEAN.” Junta spokesman Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, not surprisingly, blamed foreign powers for the snub, claiming that the United States and the European Union had pressured ASEAN to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from the online meeting.
But it may be much ado about nothing because the leaders of Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, are in the long run unlikely to pay much attention to what ASEAN does or doesn’t do. The generals’ decision to join the grouping in 1997 had more to do with finding allies in their altercations with critical Western powers than a desire to change their ways. There is, in fact, only one foreign power that has the power and the means to influence and manipulate the internal situation in Myanmar: the People’s Republic of China.
China is also the only neighboring country that has fundamental strategic and economic interests in Myanmar—and it is prepared to do whatever it takes to protect those interests. We all know about the multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Described as a global infrastructure development strategy, it includes investments in nearly 70 countries worldwide as well as some international organizations, such as those engaged in protecting the environment and even wildlife.
The aim is evidently to connect China with the outside world in a way that has never been done before and, ultimately, make China the world’s foremost superpower. But it is often forgotten that this policy of finding new outlets for trade with the outside world predates the BRI—and that it was first conceived in the 1980s in relation to Beijing’s plans to exert a new kind of influence in Myanmar. I have written a lot about this in the regional and international media, but it’s worth reminding readers of an article outlining those plans which I have quoted numerous times in the past.
The article appeared, at the time almost unnoticed, in the Beijing Review as early as Sept. 2, 1985. Titled “Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,” it was written by the former Vice Minister of Communications Pan Qi and outlined, in detail, the possibilities of finding an outlet for trade from China, through Myanmar, to ports at the coast of the Indian Ocean. Pan mentioned the Myanmar railheads of Myitkyina in Kachin State and Lashio in northeastern Shan State as possible conduits for the export of Chinese goods. But he refrained from mentioning that all relevant border areas were then not under central Myanmar government control.
At that time, nearly the entire, 2,192-km Sino-Myanmar frontier was actually controlled by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and other non-state armed groups who had ties―political, ethnic or both―to China. But by early 1987, the Tatmadaw had managed to recapture a few CPB strongholds along the frontier, including the booming border town of Panghsai, where the fabled “Burma Road” crosses into China at Wanding, east of the city of Ruili. At the same time, the Chinese, whose policies had changed dramatically since the Cultural Revolution, had already begun to penetrate local markets through an extensive economic intelligence reporting system within Myanmar. This network monitored the availability of domestically manufactured Myanmar products, as well as the nature and volume of illegal trade from other neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India. China could then respond to the market conditions by producing goods in its state sector factories. Before long, more than 2,000 carefully selected items were reported to be flooding the Myanmar market. Chinese-made consumer goods were not only made deliberately cheaper than those from other neighboring countries, but were also less expensive than local Myanmar products.
Then, in March-April 1989, to the surprise of many, the hill tribe rank and file of the CPB’s army mutinied and drove the party’s Maoist leadership into exile in China. The mutiny came after years of simmering discontent between the hill tribe cannon fodder, who had been forcibly recruited into the CPB’s army, and the ageing Burman intellectuals who were still clinging to their orthodox Maoist ideals. The government in Yangon quickly and shrewdly exploited the mutiny: the leaders of the new forces that emerged from the ashes of the old CPB, primarily the United Wa State Army (UWSA), were promised that they could engage in any kind of business, if they agreed to a ceasefire with the government.
The most potent military threat to the regime was neutralized, and, as a result, the cross-border trade flourished—and so did the newly won friendship between the leaders of two of Asia’s most repressive regimes. At the same time, China could, through its peculiar two-tier foreign policy, maintain government-to-government relations not only with the ruling military, but also party-to-party relations with Myanmar’s many ethnic armed groups, including the UWSA. In more recent years, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has established relations with both the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy. It is important for the leaders in Beijing not to put all their eggs in one basket because no one knows who will rule, or be influential, in Myanmar in the future.
In the early 1990s, I was at Jiegao, a small enclave of Chinese territory on the south side of the Shweli River opposite Muse and saw a giant monument showing four figures wheeling a circular object between them, their determined faces pointing south. The Chinese characters on the base say “Unite, Blaze Paths, Forge Ahead!” Or, in more mundane terms: “Southeast Asia, here we come!” There was no doubt that the monument and the message on its base appeared provocative to people in Myanmar. In the early 1990s, there was little more than bamboo huts and rice fields in the Jiegao enclave. But today, 25 years later, Jiegao is full of high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, and stores selling all kinds of wares. There is also a huge jade market where buyers from all over China come to shop for the precious stone, which is found in its imperial green form only in northern Myanmar.
Every morning—until the COVID-19 pandemic forced a closure of the border—caravans of trucks laden with Chinese consumer goods left Jiegao through a border gate for points beyond Muse: the towns of Lashio, Mandalay and Yangon, and even as far as Moreh on the Indian border. Not only Myanmar but also northeastern India was being flooded with cheap Chinese merchandise. And not far from Ruili are pipelines through which oil and gas are being transported from the Myanmar coast to Yunnan.
It is not clear when the border will be open for trade again, but given the strategic importance of what’s now known as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Beijing is not likely to abandon its long-term plans for Myanmar and the region. Myanmar is the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to Indian Ocean ports, bypassing the contested South China Sea as well as the congested Malacca Strait. The CMEC is one of the most important pillars of Xi’s BRI; without it, China would not be able to fulfill its plans for global dominance. For that very reason, whatever government is in power in Naypyitaw, China would court it in order to safeguard those strategic interests. Beijing may prefer a like-minded authoritarian regime, but we also have to remember that it was State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who signed up to the BRI when she attended the Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017.
But how—and where—do the ethnic armed groups, with which China also maintains close relations through its security services, fit into the picture? If we venture further back in history, and then before Pan Qi wrote his article for the Beijing Review, Myanmar was also of utmost strategic importance to Beijing, but then at a time when China wanted to export revolution, not consumer goods. The CPB’s 20,000-sq.-km base area along the Sino-Myanmar border was there not only to support the intended revolution in Myanmar, but also to serve as a springboard from where Maoist communism, the CPC hoped, would spread to other parts of Southeast Asia. The mastermind behind that plan was Kang Sheng, a dreaded hardliner who, during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s, worked for China’s internal security and intelligence apparatus—and was in charge of the CPC’s contacts with fraternal Maoist parties in Asia and beyond.
The plan—and CPB Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin told me this when I interviewed him at the party’s Panghsang headquarters in 1987—was to link up with the Communist Party of Thailand’s (CPT) guerrillas; the Communist Party of Malaya, which was led by Chin Peng, a hero of the struggle against the Japanese during World War II; the Communist Party of North Kalimantan (the Malayan communists did not recognize the Malaysian Federation, so there was a separate communist party in Sarawak and Sabah); the once powerful Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI); and, eventually the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), actually a tiny Maoist party led by Edward Fowler Hill, a fairly prominent lawyer and barrister.
Thakin Ba Thein Tin and Hill met in Beijing, relations with Chin Peng were maintained through intermediaries in Kunming, and CPT activist stayed in Panghsang until they returned to Thailand in 1983. When I was at Panghsang in 1986-87, I saw a concrete well with Thai writing on it, built by CPT cadre. When I was out in the field with the CPB’s troops, I heard numerous stories about “the Indonesian comrades” and their exploits. Among them were two daughters of PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, who was killed in Indonesia in 1965. The CPC had sent a dozen or so PKI militants, who happened to be in China in the 1960s, down to the CPB’s base area where they were going to learn guerrilla warfare. CPB leaders told me they were used as radio operators during battles with the Tatmadaw when messages could not be encrypted. The Tatmadaw interceptors did now know what they were saying—because they spoke in Bahasa Indonesia. The PKI militants had left when I was there, and I was told they had gone into exile in the Netherlands and Canada.
Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s return to the political fold, China changed its policy towards the region. However, whether China wants to export revolution or expand and protect commercial interests, to safeguard and even control the “Myanmar corridor” has always been of vital importance to Beijing’s security planners. In the past, the epicenter for that policy was Panghsang. Today it is Jiegao.
But the ethnic armed organizations are also important. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw. Significantly, when President’s Office Minister Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project at Letpadaung northwest of Mandalay, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China… we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.”
Aung Min was right, but by “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, whose weaponry and vast quantities of ammunition had been supplied by the UWSA. The Kachin Independence Army has also benefited from some support from the UWSA, but not to the same extent as the other groups in what is usually referred to as the Northern Alliance. While the UWSA is not engaged in any fighting itself, it has become a major source of the weaponry that is being used in the war in northern Myanmar.
The Chinese may be denying giving any material support to the UWSA and indirectly supporting its allies, but what the Wa have received from China is not the kind of equipment that “falls off the back of a truck”, or could be sent to them by some local officials in Yunnan. The deliveries were almost certainly directed from the highest level of China’s intelligence and military authorities in Beijing. And it is no secret that Chinese security officials have had several meetings with representatives of the Northern Alliance—and told them not to fight too close to the border or to damage the oil-and-gas pipelines.
The CPC’s position above the government as well as the military, the People’s Liberation Army, in the Chinese hierarchy explains why China could publicly praise Myanmar’s now collapsed peace process while quietly providing the UWSA with heavy weaponry. Support for the UWSA and its allies serves as a “stick” in Beijing’s relationship with Myanmar, while diplomacy and promises of aid and investment are the “carrot.”
In the official rhetoric in Beijing as well as Naypyitaw, relations between China and Myanmar have always been characterized by pauk-phaw, a Burmese word for siblings, but nothing could be falser than that cliché. Sino-Myanmar relations have always been anything but brotherly, and decades of history show us how China plays games with Myanmar to achieve whatever strategic goals the leaders in Beijing might have. Forget about ASEAN’s actions, statements and awkward attempts at exercising influence. It is China and its plans and strategic maneuvers that count.
Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, ASEAN-Burma relations, China-Burma relations, Political History
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"On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) seized control of the country, following a general election that the National League for Democracy party won by a landslide. The military-run State Administrative Council (SAC) has targeted doctors and other health workers for taking a leading role in the nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
Doctors and nurses have been served with warrants and arrested, health workers have been injured while providing care to protestors, ambulances have been destroyed, and health facilities have been raided. Now, nine months into the coup, the emergency in Myanmar has evolved into a protracted crisis; the violence against health care workers continues as part of the military’s offensive against anti-coup movements, and civilians’ access to health care is becoming increasingly compromised.
This document is the result of collaboration between Insecurity Insight, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health and Human Rights as part of the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC).
It discusses reported incidents of violence against health workers, facilities, and transport in Myanmar between February 1 and September 30, 2021 to highlight the impact on the health system as a whole. It further includes personal testimonies by nurses on how the conflict is impacting them and analysis on the security situation for aid organizations working there. It does not include information on violence against patients.
The incidents referred to are based on the dataset 01 February - 30 September 2021 Violence Against Health Care in Myanmar Data, which is available on the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX)..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ်(၃၈/၂၀၂၁)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ (၂၇) ရက်
ရာထူးမှ ထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း
*ထပ်မံပေးပို့လာမည့်စာရင်းများကို ဆက်လက် ထုတ်ပြန်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-27
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"Excellencies,
The National Unity Government (NUG) of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
extends its greetings and good wishes to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Summit 2021.
The NUG expresses its appreciation to ASEAN Member States for their continued
efforts to resolve the military junta-induced crises in Myanmar. These crises - political,
economic, humanitarian, and human rights - constitute a grave threat to regional
security and the interests of ASEAN Members and their populations.
The NUG regrets, however, that I, the Acting President of the NUG, am unable to be
present at the Summit in-person to deliver this address. The decision of the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers on 15 October 2021 to reject the representatives of the illegal military
junta is welcome. However, it follows that an invitation should have been extended to
the NUG. As for the interim step of inviting a "non-political" representative, the NUG
remains of the strong view that it is for Myanmar alone to determine its representatives
and that this decision must rest with the NUG as the legitimate Government.
The NUG is constituted of and was established by parliamentarians elected
democratically less than a year ago and it enjoys the popular support of the Myanmar people. The United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-
General have affirmed the continuing authority of our President U Win Myint and our
State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Furthermore, the NUG's Permanent
Representative to the United Nations continues to represent Myanmar in the United
Nations fora.
The NUG stands ready to partner with ASEAN in restoring democracy to Myanmar and
stability to our region. We welcome the concerted efforts of Special Envoy Erywan Yusof
and thank him for those efforts. We have been cooperating fully with him and will
continue to do so. In line with the Five-Point Consensus, we are committed to working
with ASEAN to secure the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance.
While the NUG extends these commitments to you, the military junta is doing
everything possible to undermine ASEAN. It has reneged on its commitments, and it
has sabotaged the Special Envoy's efforts. It has weaponized COVID-19 with a deadly
intent that threatens the entire region.
And as I address you today, the military junta is massing troops in preparation for an
escalation of the slaughter. Frustrated by its failure, the military has defaulted to the
methods it knows best - terrorism and brutality. ASEAN will be forced to bear witness
to what follows, as it has in the past - murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearances,
and displacement, potentially on an unprecedented scale in modern Myanmar. Only a
determined, unflinching regional and international response will prevent it.
Excellencies,
The NUG will continue to serve in a way true to its name: it will govern the nation in
unity. Alongside an inclusive National Unity Consultative Council, we are committed to
the shared vision of a peaceful Federal Democratic Union grounded in freedom, justice,
and equality. On this foundation, the NUG has developed its roadmap to full democracy over three stages: an interim period, a transition period, and, ultimately, the full
achievement of Federal Democracy.
We are currently in the interim period and will remain so until a democratic civilian
government is restored. This does not mean the generals trading their military fatigues
for the civilian dress. It means NUG governance.
In the nine months since the failed military coup d'etat, the Committee Representing
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) has enacted a Federal Democracy Charter, constituted a
National Unity Consultative Council, and appointed a representative democratic
Government. Collectively, we have strived to address the shameful failures of the past,
most notably, atrocities against the Rohingya and other minorities. We have actively
pursued accountability, empowering the International Criminal Court's investigations
and pledging support to the deliberations of the International Court of Justice. We have
established diplomatic relations with States. And, while calling on the people to rise
and defend themselves against the junta's atrocities, we have been direct in insisting
that all defensive actions must respect international norms; this is our obligation, and
it distinguishes us from the terrorist military.
Excellencies,
In the NUG, you have a partner committed to the Myanmar people, committed to
working with its ASEAN partners, committed to the development, and committed to
stability and the betterment and prosperity of our region. We will advance the
constitutional process, we will rebuild the economy, we will restructure the security
services and bring them under full civilian control, and we will place at the heart of
these efforts' inclusion, acceptance, justice, and equality.
The military junta, for its part, will continue to bring you war and plague that spills
across borders and seas and undermines regional and international peace and security.
It will offer you empty promises and bring continued shame and strife to our region.
The NUG, therefore, calls on its ASEAN partners:
1. to acknowledge us as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar.
2. to coordinate with us urgently in delivering humanitarian aid and medical care
to the rapidly rising number of people in desperate need; and
3. to assist us in starving the military junta - of its weapons, of its cash, of its
impunity. The damage wrought on the Myanmar people is harm inflicted on all
the peoples of ASEAN.
The NUG stands committed to Myanmar's responsibilities as an ASEAN Member State
and to working together to meet our common interests of peace and prosperity. The
NUG also hopes that ASEAN Summit will become the starting point of a new
democratic transition in Myanmar. Together we can resolve this multi-dimensional,
junta-induced crisis for our people and the region.
I thank you.."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
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"ဂုဏ်သရေရှိနိုင်ငံခေါင်းဆောင်များခင်ဗျာ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG)မှ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အရှေ့ တောင်အာရှနိုင်ငံများအသင်း (အာဆီယံ) ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးသို့ တက်ရောက်လာသူများအားလုံးကို ရွှင်လန်းချမ်းမြေ့ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်း နှုတ်ခွန်းဆက်သအပ်ပါသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်စုကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပါ်လာသည့် အကျပ်အတည်းများကို ဖြေရှင်းရန် ဆက်လက် ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်မှုများအတွက် အာဆီယံ အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများအပေါ် ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိကြောင်း NUG အနေဖြင့် ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားရေးနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ အကျပ်အတည်းများက ဒေသတွင်း လုံခြုံရေးအပေါ် သာမက အာဆီယံအဖွဲ့ဝင် နိုင်ငံများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ကြီးမားသော ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှု တစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်နေပါသည်။
ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးတွင် NUG ၏ ယာယီသမ္မတအဖြစ် ထမ်းဆောင်နေသူ ကျွန်တော် လူကိုယ်တိုင် တက်ရောက်ကာ မိန့်ခွန်း မပြောကြားနိုင်သည့်အတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ NUG အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် စိတ်မကောင်း ဖြစ်မိပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် အောက်တိုဘာလ ၁၅ ရက်တွင် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများအနေဖြင့် တရားမဝင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်စု ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များကို ငြင်းပယ်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ သို့သော်လည်း ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်၏ နောက်တွင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ NUG အစိုးရကို တက်ရောက်ရန် ဖိတ်ခေါ်သင့် ပါသည်။ “နိုင်ငံရေးအရ ကိုယ်စားမပြုသူ” တစ်ဦးကို ဖိတ်ကြားရန်ဆိုသော ကြားကာလ လုပ်ဆောင်ချက် ကို ပြောရလျှင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ တစ်ဦးတည်းသာလျှင် မိမိကိုယ်စားလှယ်များကို ရွေးချယ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ရမည် ဖြစ်ပြီး တရားဝင် ခိုင်မာသော အစိုးရဖြစ်သည့် NUG ကသာလျှင် ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ချမှတ်ရမည် ဆိုသည့် အချက်ကို NUG က ဆက်လက် ခိုင်မာစွာ ခံယူထားပါသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော တစ်နှစ်မပြည့်ခင်က ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ခံထားရသော လွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များနှင့် NUG ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ထားခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တစ်ခဲနက် ထောက်ခံမှုကို ရရှိထားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော် အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်တို့တွင် လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အာဏာ ဆက်လက်ရှိနေကြောင်းကို ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေး ကောင်စီ၊ အထွေထွေညီလာခံနှင့် အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်တို့က အတည်ပြုထားကြပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအစည်းအဝေးများတွင် NUG ၏ ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ အမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ်မှ ဆက်လက်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ကိုယ်စားပြုလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေး နှင့် ဒေသတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်မှု ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ NUG က အာဆီယံ နှင့် မိတ်ဖက်ဖွဲ့ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် အသင့်ရှိပါသည်။ အထူးသံတမန် အာရီဝမ် ယူဆော့ဖ်၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုများကို ကြိုဆိုပြီး ၎င်းကြိုးစားမှုများအတွက် ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် သူနှင့် အပြည့်အဝ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပြီး ဆက်လက်၍ ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တူညီဆန္ဒငါးရပ်နှင့်အညီ အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်နေသော လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ၊ သေချာစွာ ပေးအပ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အာဆီယံနှင့် အလုပ်လုပ်သွားရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ သန္နိဋ္ဌာန် ချထားပါသည်။
NUG က ထိုကတိကဝတ်များကို အဆွေတော်တို့ထံ ကမ်းလှမ်းနေချိန်တွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်စု အနေဖြင့် အာဆီယံကို အားနည်းအောင် လုပ်နိုင်သမျှ အမျိုးမျိုးလုပ်ဆောင်နေပါသည်။ သူတို့ ပေးထားသော ကတိကဝတ်များကို လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ပြီး အထူးသံတမန်၏ ကြိုးပမ်း အားထုတ်မှုများကိုလည်း ထိခိုက်ပျက်စီးစေခဲ့ပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ဒေသတစ်ခုလုံးကို ခြိမ်းခြောက် နေသည့် အသက်အန္တရာယ်ကို ထိပါးစေလိုသော ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ဖြင့် ကိုဗစ်-၁၉ ရောဂါကိုလည်း လက်နက် သဖွယ် အသုံးချနေပါသည်။
ယနေ့ အဆွေတော်များကို ယခုကဲ့သို့ မိန့်ခွန်းပြောနေချိန်တွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်စုက လူပေါင်းများစွာ ကို ရက်စက်စွာ သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုကို တိုးမြှင့်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုတင်ပြင်ဆင်မှုအဖြစ် တပ်ဖွဲ့များကို စုစည်းနေ ပါသည်။ ၎င်းတို့ စစ်ရှုံးနေသောကြောင့် စိတ်ပျက်နေသည့် စစ်တပ်သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုနှင့် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုစသည့် သူတို့ အကျွမ်းကျင်ဆုံး နည်းလမ်းများကို တစ်ကျော့ပြန် အသုံးပြုလျက် ရှိပါသည်။ အတိတ်၌ ဖြစ်ပျက်ခဲ့သည့် လူသတ်မှု၊ နှိပ်စက်ညှင်းပန်းမှု၊ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု၊ လူပေါင်းများစွာ ပျောက်ဆုံးမှုနှင့် အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်မှုများ ခေတ်သစ်မြန်မာပြည်တွင် တစ်ကြိမ်မှ မကြုံဖူးခဲ့သည့် အတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် များပြားစွာ ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာမည့် အလားအလာကို အာဆီယံကလည်း မျက်မြင်သက်သေအဖြစ် မြင်တွေ့ သက်သေခံရပါတော့မည်။ ဒေသတွင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာမှ အလျှော့ မပေးဘဲ ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား တုန့်ပြန်မှသာလျှင် ၎င်းတို့ကို တားဆီးနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။
နိုင်ငံ့ခေါင်းဆောင်များခင်ဗျာ
NUG သည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရဟူသည့် နာမည်နှင့်အညီ ဆက်လက် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင် သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတော်ကို စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ပါမည်။ အားလုံးပါဝင်မှုရှိသော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီနှင့်အတူ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှမှုကို အခြေခံပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတစ်ခု တည်ဆောက်ရေး၊ တူညီသော မျှော်မှန်းချက်ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချမှတ်ထားပါသည်။ ထိုအခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်ပေါ်တွင် NUG က ဒီမိုကရေစီ အပြည့်အဝ ရရှိရေးအတွက် ကြားကာလ၊ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းကာလနှင့် နောက်ဆုံး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အပြည့်အဝ ရရှိအောင်မြင်ပြီးကာလ ဟူ၍ အဆင့်သုံးဆင့်ဖြင့် လမ်းပြမြေပုံကို ရေးဆွဲထားပါသည်။
ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင် ကြားကာလအတွင်း၌ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီး ဒီမိုကရက်တစ် အရပ်သား အစိုးရ ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်နိုင်သည့်အထိ ဆက်လက်ရှိနေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုသို့ဆိုရာတွင်စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များ စစ်ဝတ်စုံကို အရပ်သားဝတ်စုံအဖြစ် ပြောင်းဝတ်ပြခြင်းကို မဆိုလိုပါ။ NUG ၏ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကိုသာ ရည်ညွှန်းခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှု မအောင်မြင်ခဲ့သည့် (၉)လအတွင်း ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH)က ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခဲ့ပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ ကိုယ်စားပြုမှုရှိသော ဒီမိုကရက်တစ် အစိုးရတစ်ရပ်ကို ခန့်အပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ အတိတ်က အရှက်ရဖွယ် ကျရှုံးမှုများ - အထူးသဖြင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများနှင့် အခြား လူနည်းစုများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှုများကို ဖြေရှင်းရန် စုပေါင်းအင်အားဖြင့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် တာဝန်ခံမှုရရှိရေးအတွက် တက်ကြွစွာ ဖော်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပြီး အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံး၏ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများကို အားကောင်းလာစေရန်နှင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ တရားရုံး၏ စစ်ဆေးသုံးသပ်မှုများကို ပံ့ပိုးကူညီရန် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံများနှင့်လည်း သံတမန် ဆက်ဆံရေးများ တည်ထောင်ထားပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်စု၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှုများ ကို ပြည်သူများက ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး ခုခံကာကွယ်ကြရန် နှိုးဆော်နေချိန်တွင် ခုခံကာကွယ်ရေး လုပ်ဆောင် ချက်များအားလုံးသည် နိုင်ငံတကာစံနှုန်းများကို လိုက်နာရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာ တိကျရှင်းလင်းစွာ တောင်းဆိုထားပါသည်။ ဤအချက်သည် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ တာဝန်ဖြစ်ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်နှင့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အစိုးရ၏ ခြားနားချက်လည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံ့ခေါင်းဆောင်များခင်ဗျာ
အဆွေတော်တို့အတွက် NUGဟုဆိုရာတွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအတွက် သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချထားသော၊ အာဆီယံ မိတ်ဖက်များနှင့် အတူ လက်တွဲ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန်၊ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေး၊ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ ဒေသအတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်ရေး၊ ပိုမို တိုးတက်ကောင်းမွန်ရေးနှင့် သာယာဝပြောရေးအတွက် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားသော မိတ်ဖက်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေရေးဆွဲရေး လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို တိုးတက်အောင်လုပ်ပြီး စီးပွားရေးကို ပြန်လည်တည်ဆောက်ကာ လုံခြုံရေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုများကို ပြန်လည် ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင် ပြီး အရပ်ဘက် ထိန်းချုပ်မှုအောက်သို့ လုံးလုံးလျားလျား ခေါ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကာ ထိုကြိုးစား အားထုတ်မှုများ အားလုံး၏ အနှစ်သာရအနေဖြင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်မှု၊ လက်ခံမှု ၊ တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှမှုတို့ကို ထားရှိမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်စုအနေဖြင့်မူ အဆွေတော်များထံသို့ နယ်စပ်များနှင့် ပင်လယ်များကို ဖြတ်ကျော် ယိုဖိတ်လာမည့် စစ်မက်ရန်ပွဲနှင့် ကပ်ရောဂါဆိုးများကို ဆက်လက် သယ်ဆောင်လာမည် ဖြစ်ပြီး ဒေသတွင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကိုပါ ထိခိုက်လျော့ပါးစေမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ သူတို့သည် အနှစ်သာရမဲ့သည့် အတုအယောင် ကတိကဝတ်များပေးပြီး ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ ဒေသအတွင်းသို့ အရှက်တရားနှင့် စစ်မက်ရန်ပွဲကိုသာ ဆက်လက် ယူဆောင်လာမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် NUG က မိမိတို့၏ အာဆီယံ မိတ်ဖက်များအား အောက်ပါအချက်များကို တောင်းဆိုလို ပါသည် -
၁။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အား မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို ကိုယ်စားပြုသည့် တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုပေးရန်။
၂။ အရေအတွက်တိုးလာသော အကူအညီ အလွန်အမင်းလိုအပ်နေသည့် ပြည်သူများအား လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီပေးနိုင်ရေး နှင့် ဆေးဝါးအကူအညီပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့နှင့် အမြန်ဆုံးပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန်။
၃။ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်း အုပ်စုကို ၎င်းတို့၏လက်နက်များ၊ ငွေကြေးများနှင့် ပြစ်ဒဏ်မဲ့ ကင်းလွတ်နေမှု များကို ခမ်းခြောက်သွားအောင် အကူအညီပေးရန်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ထိခိုက် ပျက်စီးမှုများသည် အာဆီယံ ပြည်သူအားလုံးအပေါ် သက်ရောက်သည့် ဒုက္ခဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ASEAN အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် လိုက်နာရမည့် တာဝန်များနှင့် နိုင်ငံများ၏ ဘုံအကျိုးစီးပွားဖြစ်သည် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးနှင့် တိုးတက်ဝပြောရေးအတွက် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် NUG အနေဖြင့် အပြည့်အဝရပ်တည်သည်။ ယခုကျင်းပ ပြုလုပ်သည့် အာဆီယံ ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး လမ်းသစ်၏ တာထွက်ဖြစ်လာစေရန်လည်းမျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။ ကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံမှ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသည့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ပြည်သူများနှင့်ဒေသ၏ ပဋိပက္ခများ ကို ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းဖြင့် ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
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Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၃၇ /၂၀၂၁)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ (၂၇) ရက်
ဆရာ၊ ဆရာမ၊ ဝန်ထမ်းများကို ဖိနှိပ်ခြိမ်းခြောက်လျက်ရှိသော
Non-CDMဝန်ထမ်းများ နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ကြေညာချက်..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Anti-coup protesters, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
153.24 KB
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Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အထူးငွေတိုက် စာချုပ်များအား ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေး ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း။
၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်သည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၁၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုဥပဒေကို တတိယအကြိမ်ပြင်ဆင်သည့်ဥပဒေ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ဥပဒေအမှတ် ၄ အား အတည်ပြုပြဌာန်း ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အဆိုပါ ပြင်ဆင်သည့် ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၁၆ နှင့်အညီ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအထူးငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်များရောင်းချခွင့်ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းအဝေးအမှတ်စဉ် (၂၈) က သဘောတူခွင့်ပြုခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အထူးငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်များ၏ သက်တမ်းမှာ ၂ နှစ်ဖြစ်ပြီး အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ သန်းတစ်ထောင်ဖိုး နှင့်ညီမျှသော အတိုးမဲ့စာချုပ်များအဖြစ် ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချ သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ ကမ္ဘာ့သမိုင်းတွင် ယခုကဲ့သို့ အထူးငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်များအား တော်လှန်ရေးအစိုးရတစ်ရပ်က အတိုးမဲ့ ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချခြင်းသည် ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်ဖြစ်ပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ကို လိုလားသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူ များက စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို အဆုံးစွန် ဆန့်ကျင်အာခံတော်လှန်ခဲ့သည့် သမိုင်းမော်ကွန်းအဖြစ် ခမ်းနားစွာထင်ရှား ကျန်ရစ်ခဲ့မည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ သို့ပါ၍ မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင် ပျောက်ကွယ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းသွားစေရေးကို ပြင်းပြသော ဆန္ဒနှင့် လိုလားတောင့်တလျက်ရှိသူတိုင်း နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အထူးငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်များကို တော်လှန်ရေး အောင်စိတ်ဖြင့် မဖြစ်မနေ ဝယ်ယူကြပါရန် လေးနက်စွာ မေတ္တာရပ်ခံတိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၆။ စတင်ရောင်းချမည့် နေ့ရက်၊ ဝယ်ယူနိုင်သည့် နည်းလမ်းများနှင့် အသေးစိတ်စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းများအား ထပ်မံ၍ ကြိုတင် အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်ပေးသွားပါမည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-27
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"26 October 2021
On October 18, the military junta announced they would release 1,316 sentenced detainees and 4,320 more facing trial, i.e., a total of 5,636 civilians were promised to be released. However, according to AAPP documentation, as of October 25, only 4,065 victims have been released, 480 of whom have been identified.
In the past, the military junta has refused to release official data on arbitrary detentions, nor published lists of those being released. The exact number and identification of prisoners must be publicly announced.
AAPP is now collecting and verifying data on those detainees being released. Therefore, we invite the public holding any further information about the release of survivors to contact the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. We will continue to confirm the recently released after having verified.
Once again, we call on the military junta to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint. We request the international community’s support, to put pressure on the military junta and hold accountable the arbitrary detentions and all other inhumane acts.....အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၆ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
အောက်တိုဘာလ ၁၈ ရက်နေ့မှစတင်၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့်ဆက်နွယ်သော ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံရသူ (၁၃၁၆)ဦး၊ တရားရင်ဆိုင်နေရသူ (၄၃၂၀)ဦး၊ စုစုပေါင်း (၅၆၃၆) ကို လွှတ်ပေးမည်ဟု ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့သည်။ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း (AAPP) မှ မှတ်တမ်းပြုချက်များအရ အောက်တိုဘာ ၂၅ အထိ အရေအတွက်အားဖြင့် (၄၀၆၅) ဦးမှာ လွတ်မြောက်လာခဲ့ပြီး ထိုအထဲမှ နာမည်နှင့်တကွ အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၄၈၀) ဦး ရှိသည်။
စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် ယခင်ကတည်းက မတရားဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံရသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များကို တရားဝင် ထုတ်ပြန်လေ့မရှိသလို လွှတ်ပေးသည့်အခါတွင်လည်း မည်သူတို့ကို လွှတ်ပေးလိုက်သည်ဆိုသည့် စာရင်းကို တရားဝင် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်းမရှိခဲ့ပေ။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူများနှင့် ပြန်လည်လွှတ်ပေးခြင်းခံရသူများ၏ အချက် အလက်များကို အများပြည်သူ သိရှိနိုင်စေရန် အလို့ငှာ တရားဝင်တိတိကျကျ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေအတိအကျနှင့် အမည်စာရင်းမှာ ချက်ချင်းရရှိရန် လက်လှမ်းမမီနိုင်သလို လွတ်မြောက်လာသူ တစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ အချက်အလက်များအား စုဆောင်းအတည်ပြုမှုများကို AAPP အနေဖြင့် အချိန်ယူ၍ ဆက်လက်စိစစ်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ လွတ်မြောက်လာသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များနှင့် ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံ ရသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များ ရရှိပါက မိမိတို့ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်းထံသို့ ပေးပို့ပေးရန်အတွက်လေးစားစွာဖြင့် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံလိုပါသည်။ အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် အမည်စာရင်းများကို ဆက်လက် ဖော်ပြပေးသွားပါမည်။
လက်ရှိ အထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရဆဲ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့် သမ္မတကြီးဦးဝင်းမြင့်အပါအဝင် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသူ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားအားလုံးကို စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် ချွင်းချက်မရှိ အမြန်ဆုံးပြန်လည်လွှတ်ပေးရန်၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်း အဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့်လည်း တရားလက်လွတ်ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသူများအရေးအပါအဝင် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လူမဆန်သော လုပ်ရပ်များအတွက် တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု ရှိလာစေရေး ပိုမိုဖိအားပေးဆောင်ရွက်ရန် မိမိတို့မှ အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"Bangkok, October 25, 2021 – Myanmar’s military junta should immediately follow up its recent release of at least 15 jailed journalists by freeing all those still wrongfully held in detention, the Committee to Protect Journalists said today.
On October 18, the country’s military government announced the release of over 5,600 prisoners in an amnesty on humanitarian grounds, according to news reports. At least 15 journalists were subsequently freed, according to local news reports and CPJ’s communication with editors and executives at their respective news organizations.
“Myanmar’s release of at least 15 journalists while leaving over 20 others to languish behind bars is a cynical attempt to alleviate rising international pressure against its repression,” said Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s senior Southeast Asia representative. “Partial measures simply aren’t good enough: Myanmar’s junta must free all of the journalists it is holding wrongfully in detention.”
A CPJ special report in July documented the situation of journalists jailed in the wake of the military’s democracy-suspending February 1 coup, and found that at least 32 journalists were imprisoned due to their work as of July 1.
Many were held on charges under Article 505(a) of the penal code, a broad and vaguely worded provision that penalizes incitement and the spreading of “false news” with maximum three-year prison penalties, according to CPJ research; four of those recently released had been sentenced to prison terms under the provision.
The journalists, who were freed October 18 and 19, included:
Local independent media outlet Democratic Voice of Burma journalists Min Nyo, Kaung Myat Hlaing (Aung Kyaw), and Thet Naing Win, according to DVB editor-in-chief Aye Chan Naing, who communicated with CPJ via email. All three had been handed prison sentences under Article 505(a), according to CPJ research.
Mizzima news website co-founder Thin Thin Aung, reporter Zaw Zaw, and office assistant James Pu Thoure, according to news reports and Mizzima founder and chairman Soe Myint, who communicated with CPJ by email. Zaw Zaw had been handed a two-year prison sentence under Article 505(a), according to CPJ research.
Independent news outlet Myitkyina News Journal reporters Myo Myat Myat Pan, Tu Lawt (Christopher), and Ah Je, who were released in Kachin State, the local publication’s chief executive Brang Mai told CPJ via email.
Kachin Wave News website photographer La Raw, according to Htoi Awng, an editor at the local publication who communicated with CPJ via messaging app.
The 74 Media news website reported on its Facebook page that its reporter Chan Bu was released.
Voice of Thanbyuzayat news website photographer Htet Myat Thu, according to the publication’s editor-in-chief Paing Htoo, who communicated with CPJ via messaging app.
Tachileik News Agency reporter Kyaw Zin Hein, according to the agency’s editor Cherry Htike, who communicated with CPJ by messaging app.
Dakhina Insight reporter Naing Linn Tun, Thanlyin Post editor Tu Tu Thar, and freelance reporter Aung Kyaw Oo, according to local reports and the Detained Journalists of Myanmar private Facebook group administrator Han Zaw, who communicated with CPJ via email.
CPJ emailed Myanmar’s Ministry of Information for comment, but did not receive an immediate response.
In an open letter in April, CPJ called on coup maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to release all of the journalists jailed by his military regime..."
Source/publisher:
Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"JAKARTA – Southeast Asian parliamentarians call on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to use this week’s ASEAN Summit to take concrete actions to resolve the disastrous situation in Myanmar, including by immediately engaging with the National Unity Government (NUG).
“We’re soon approaching one year since the Myanmar military conducted its coup and launched unspeakable violence and terror against the people, and devastated millions of lives,” said Charles Santiago, chair of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) and a Malaysian Member of Parliament (MP). “This week’s Summit must be the occasion for the bloc to put in place concrete steps to help the people of Myanmar, who everyday since February 1 have so bravely displayed to the world that they do not accept this murderous junta.”
APHR is encouraged by ASEAN’s decision to exclude coup leader Min Aung Hlaing from attending this week’s ASEAN Summit, citing a lack of progress on the Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar agreed in April, but called for much more to be done.
“We recognize that ASEAN took a major step in disinviting Min Aung Hlaing and letting him know that his toying with them doesn’t come free of consequences. Now our regional leaders must use this unprecedented opportunity to step up their response even further, and make real progress on putting Myanmar back on the democratic path. First and foremost, ASEAN must meet officially and publicly with representatives of the duly elected NUG.” said Santiago.
ASEAN’s credibility depends on its ability to act decisively and bring the Myanmar military junta to end its relentless campaign of violence against the people of Myanmar, APHR said. In particular, it must hold the Myanmar military to the Five-Point Consensus agreed between the leaders of nine ASEAN Member States and Min Aung Hlaing in April.
Further, ASEAN must discontinue inviting any other junta representatives to all ASEAN official meetings until there is an end to violence, all political prisoners are freed, and the will of the people for fully-fledged democracy has been heard, the group said.
ASEAN member states, in particular Thailand, must also be supported by the region and ASEAN Dialogue partners to respond to the movement of refugees in a way that respects human rights, including by providing humanitarian assistance and by allowing those fleeing Myanmar to seek asylum, APHR said.
“As well as threatening regional stability and peace, let’s not lose sight of the fact that Myanmar’s junta leaders are also accused of the worst crimes imaginable, including genocide. There’s only one place Min Aung Hlaing belongs: not at ASEAN’s next meeting, but in an international court of justice,” Santiago said..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-26
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"National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met virtually today with Burmese NUG representatives Duwa Lashi La and Zin Mar Aung. Mr. Sullivan underscored continued U.S. support for the pro-democracy movement in Burma and they discussed ongoing efforts to restore Burma’s path to democracy. Mr. Sullivan expressed concern over the Burmese military’s brutal violence and noted that the U.S. will continue to promote accountability for the coup. Mr. Sullivan also expressed concern over the recent arrest of pro-democracy activist Ko Jimmy and noted the U.S. will continue to advocate for his release and the release of all those unjustly detained. They also discussed regional and international engagement, and Mr. Sullivan reiterated U.S. support for ASEAN efforts to hold the Burmese military regime to its obligations under the Five-Point Consensus. Mr. Sullivan and the NUG officials discussed the COVID-19 pandemic in Burma and ongoing U.S. efforts to provide humanitarian assistance directly to the people of Burma. Mr. Sullivan underscored that the U.S. will continue to support the people of Burma in this moment of need..."
Source/publisher:
The White House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-26
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Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, COVID-19 (Coronavirus)
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"A former under-secretary-general of the United Nations who had warm relations with Myanmar’s previous regime and their proxy government has been appointed as the new United Nations special envoy on Myanmar.
On Monday, UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the appointment of Noeleen Heyzer as the successor to Christine Schraner Burgener, who was appointed in 2018 when the post was first created, mainly to tackle the Rohingya Muslim issue in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, in partnership with the country’s government.
The newly appointed 73-year-old Singporean will not only inherit the main mission but also her predecessor’s failed task of trying to persuade Myanmar junta leaders to engage in dialogue to settle the ongoing political and social turmoil caused by the coup in February.
At a press conference last week, the outgoing Schraner Burgener said the regime would not be ready for compromise because they didn’t react to her “proposal for dialogue.”
“I’m sure my successor will try to do the best,” she said.
Trained as a social scientist, Heyzer has also served as the UN secretary-general’s adviser for Timor-Leste to support peace-building and sustainable development.
As a former head of the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Heyzer is no stranger to Myanmar. She visited the country several times under the previous military regime, which ruled Myanmar until March 2011, and knows well the poverty endured by many in the Southeast Asian country. She was also a supporter of the country’s transition to democracy, which was halted by the coup.
When the then regime was reluctant to allow international relief assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, which wreaked havoc in the country’s Irrawaddy Delta area in 2008, killing more than 130,000 people, the then head of ESCAP was also involved in getting aid delivered to those in need by organizing a post-Nargis recovery conference in Bangkok.
After the then junta released Myanmar’s popular democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in late 2010, the UN official stepped up her dialogue with the generals for the sake of the country’s development, telling them, “We can bring the best minds here to work with you,” according to Thant Myint-U latest book The Hidden History of Burma.
Then she invited Nobel Prize-winning US economist Joseph Stiglitz to Myanmar to hold a talk for civil society representatives and government officials, including then Prime Minister U Thein Sein, who would become the country’s president a few months later in the regime’s proxy government. Thant Myint-U served as an adviser to President Thein Sein.
Heyzer has good relations with Daw Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). When the news of her would-be appointment as the special envoy circulated, some elected lawmakers—since ousted by the coup—welcomed it, expressing hope that she would be able to break the political impasse.
You may also like these stories:
Myanmar Regime Shuns ASEAN Summit, Citing Limited Participation
Thai Foreign Policy at a Low Point, Experts Say
Junta Forces Suffer Heavy Losses in Weekend Resistance Attacks Across Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-26
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Today, AAPP learnt Kyaw Min Yu (a.k.a Jimmy), a leading member of the ’88 Generation Students Group, was ruthlessly arrested by the junta on 23 October. Ko Jimmy was severely injured in his head during arrest and remains in critical condition at a military hospital.
We have witnessed this illegitimate military junta arrest political activists and anyone against them in brutal crackdowns. Many have been shot dead or brutally tortured to death. It is clear, the military is unlawfully committing crime against civilians as they wish.
The military junta is the one fully responsible and accountable for whatever happens to Ko Jimmy (a.k.a Kyaw Min Yu). We humbley request the international community apply pressure to protect political detainees from any torture committed by the unlawful military group. Fundamentally, we urge the immediate release of all political detainees.....၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၃ရက်နေ့ ညပိုင်းတွင် ၈၈ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်ပွင့်လင်းလူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်း၏ ခေါင်းဆောင်တဦးဖြစ်သူ ကိုဂျင်မီ(ခ) ကိုကျော်မင်းယုအား အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုမှ အင်အားအလွန်အကျွံသုံးပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။ ထိုသို့ ဖမ်းဆီးစဉ်အတွင်း ဦးခေါင်းတွင် အသက်အန္တရာယ် စိုးရိမ်ရသည်အထိ ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၎င်းတို့နှင့် အယူအဆမတူသူများအား ဖမ်းဆီးရာတွင် မလိုလားအပ်ဘဲ ကြမ်းတမ်းစွာဆက်ဆံခြင်းများကို ပြုလုပ်နေသည်ကိုလည်း တွေ့ရှိနေရပါသည်။ ဖမ်းဆီးစဉ်ပစ်ခတ်ခံရပြီး သေဆုံးမှုများ၊ စစ်ကြောရေးတွင် ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုကြောင့် သေဆုံးမှုများလည်း ရှိနေသည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့သော လုပ်ရပ်များသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၎င်းတို့အာဏာတည်မြဲရေးအတွက် တရားဥပဒေကို မထေမဲ့မြင်ပြုပြီး အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူများကို စိတ်ထင်တိုင်း တရားမဲ့ပြုကျင့်နေကြောင်း ပေါ်လွင်စေသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် ကိုဂျင်မီ(ခ) ကိုကျော်မင်းယု နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာမည့် အကျိုးဆက်များအားလုံးသည် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည့် စစ်အုပ်စုတွင် တာဝန်အပြည့်အဝရှိပြီး စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် တာဝန်ယူ၊ တာဝန်ခံရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်း အနေဖြင့်လည်း ကိုဂျင်မီအပါအဝင် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသူများအား ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုများမှ ကာကွယ်ပေးရန်နှင့် လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် အားထုတ်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးပါရန် မိမိတို့ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်အသင်း (အေအေပီပီ) မှ အလေးအနက် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-25
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Student Groups, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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Sub-title:
Ye Htet will still be allowed to have brief notes with him when he takes the stand, Suu Kyi’s lawyer said
Description:
"The plaintiff in detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s corruption case has been banned from reading statements while testifying against her in court, the judge said during a hearing on Friday.
The order came after Suu Kyi’s legal team submitted a complaint about the pre-written testimony from Ye Htut, an officer from the junta’s Anti-Corruption Commission who is pressing charges against the leader.
Judge Myint San, who is presiding over the case at a special court in the Naypyitaw Council compound, approved the request.
“The witness can longer give statements by reading out pre-written documents,” a member of Suu Kyi’s legal team told Myanmar Now. “They will still be allowed to have notes containing numbers and dates.”
Suu Kyi is accused among other things of building a house on land owned by the Daw Khin Kyi Foundation, the charity she founded in the name of her mother.
If found guilty, Suu Kyi could be sentenced to 14 years prison under Section 55 of the Anti-Corruption Law.
She is also accused under the same law of taking gold and cash as bribes from Phyo Min Thein, the former chief minister of Yangon Region. She was in good health during Friday’s hearing, her lawyers said.
The leader faces a total of 11 charges that could see her handed a decades-long sentence..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, About Aung San Suu Kyi
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime has imposed yet another gagging order on a lawyer representing detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, before her latest appearance in court on Tuesday.
U Kyi Win is the fifth member of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team to be barred from speaking to the media, foreign diplomats and international organizations.
The regime imposed the gagging order after U Khin Maung Zaw, the head lawyer representing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, gave details of President U Win Myint’s testimony during a court hearing on October 12, when the President said that the Myanmar military threatened to force him to resign during the February 1 coup.
Lawyers U Khin Maung Zaw, U Thae Maung Maung and Daw Min Min Soe were also recently barred from speaking to the media, foreign diplomats and international organizations under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Another one of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers, Daw San Mar Lar Nyunt, was barred in August from speaking about the trials.
The junta has brought 11 charges against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and two against U Win Myint.
The gagging order could prevent first-hand accounts of Suu Kyi’s weekly hearings from reaching the public, said lawyers.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team has been the only source of information on the trials and on the well-being of the State Counselor and President U Win Myint..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, About Aung San Suu Kyi
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Description:
"Myanmar’s junta seized veteran political activist Ko Jimmy, also known as Kyaw Min Yu, a prominent 88 Generation Student leader, on Saturday night in Yangon for his anti-regime activism.
Ko Jimmy, 52, sustained a severe head injury during the arrest at Pin Lon Hnin Si villa in North Dagon Township.
His wife Daw Nilar Thein, another leading 88 Generation Students figure who also took part in the 1988 pro-democracy movement as a university student, has been in hiding elsewhere for her anti-junta activism. She is worried about her husband’s health and says, “the regime must take all responsibility for whatever happens to him”.
Ko Jimmy has been evading arrest since February. The junta issued arrest warrants for him along with Ko Min Ko Naing, another prominent 88 Generation figure, and a few others on Feb. 13 for alleged incitement.
The junta has killed nearly 2,000 people, detained more than 9,000 others and tortured those in captivity and committed gross human rights violations against civilians resisting military rule.
By THE IRRAWADDY 25 October 2021
Myanmar’s junta seized veteran political activist Ko Jimmy, also known as Kyaw Min Yu, a prominent 88 Generation Student leader, on Saturday night in Yangon for his anti-regime activism.
Ko Jimmy, 52, sustained a severe head injury during the arrest at Pin Lon Hnin Si villa in North Dagon Township.
His wife Daw Nilar Thein, another leading 88 Generation Students figure who also took part in the 1988 pro-democracy movement as a university student, has been in hiding elsewhere for her anti-junta activism. She is worried about her husband’s health and says, “the regime must take all responsibility for whatever happens to him”.
Ko Jimmy has been evading arrest since February. The junta issued arrest warrants for him along with Ko Min Ko Naing, another prominent 88 Generation figure, and a few others on Feb. 13 for alleged incitement.
The junta has killed nearly 2,000 people, detained more than 9,000 others and tortured those in captivity and committed gross human rights violations against civilians resisting military rule.
The Irrawaddy spoke to Ma Nilar Thein, who was also a political prisoner under a previous military regime, about Ko Jimmy, her concerns and her message to those opposing the regime.
How much do you know about Ko Jimmy since his arrest?
I have heard that he is in Mingaladon Military Hospital. He is being watched.
Do you know about his head injury?
I’m not sure how he got his head injury.
You said two people escaped. What did they say about his arrest?
Two young people escaped while junta forces were breaking down the door. They do not know what happened after that. They said there were a lot of troops.
There was a rumor Ko Jimmy was arrested with weapons.
I do not know.
Why was he still in hiding in Yangon?
There are a lot of people in hiding in Yangon knowing they face arrest any day. People are in hiding, avoiding arrest and trying to keep anti-regime activities going.
It has been eight months. People in Yangon move around. We knew the risks when we joined the pro-democracy movement. We are doing our best. Not only people inside the country but those aboard are also fighting the dictatorship. People are doing different things in different ways.
It is important to try to stay safe while doing what you can. But we all know we are no longer safe anywhere. Some think it is safer in liberated areas [controlled by ethnic armed groups]. But people there are fleeing the war. They face different problems.
How worried are you about Ko Jimmy and yourself?
If we are arrested by the junta, we know we will be tortured and maybe killed as we have heard many stories over the past eight months. We are all worried about everyone in captivity.
Our concerns reduce slightly when we hear someone has arrived alive in prison. We are worried about him. We heard many things but we can’t confirm anything. I’m worried about him.
Does he have a lawyer?
No. We won’t hire any lawyer because we will not cooperate with those who arbitrarily arrest people, act with injustice and manipulate cases.
People are saddened by the arrest of Ko Jimmy. You have been involved in this revolution and been freed from detention. Would you like to share any message with the people?
Ko Jimmy has been arrested. Before that, our beloved and respected Generation Z, our other dear comrades and student unions members have been arrested in many places. There are deaths. We have to turn these sorrows into strength and we will continue to work to overthrow the dictator. The more we face such difficulties and pain, the more determined we are to work harder to overthrow this dictator..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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Title: Singapore authorities must act urgently to cut business links with terrorist Myanmar military
Description:
"Oct. 25, 2021, Myanmar: As the military prepares to launch catastrophic clearance operations in north-western and upper Myanmar as part of the “Anawrahta” campaign, Singaporean radar engineer Lee Kar Heng is set to speak at the military’s annual Conference on Science and Technology Development. The conference takes place in Pyin Oo Lwin from October 26-27.
Lee Kar Heng is the sole proprietor of TBSS Group, a Singapore company that has provided equipment, training and support for the Myanmar military to development its radar capabilities, in partnership with Myanmar military broker Life and Challenge Company Limited. TBSS Group has involved its international partners in supplying equipment and training to the Myanmar military, including Keysight Technologies (USA), SkyRadar (Luxembourg/Germany), Dspnor (Norway) and RFBeam (Switzerland).
Recent engagement with US State Department Counselor Derek Chollet shows Singapore is considering using its financial leverage over the illegal military junta. Justice For Myanmar calls for concrete action now to stop the trade in arms, related materiel, training and support.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is deplorable that Singapore businesses are aiding the Myanmar military, which is a terrorist entity. Singaporean authorities should take immediate steps to end the use of their territory as the Myanmar military’s international business hub. This criminal military has been terrorising the people of Myanmar as they have continued to courageously resist the military's bloody and illegitimate coup attempt for nearly 9 months in the Spring Revolution. In response, the Myanmar military is attacking the people, committing inhumane acts, including deliberate killings, torture and rape. These crimes amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. As of October 23, 1,196 people have been murdered, including children, and over 9,000 arrested. This is the backdrop in which Lee Kar Heng is speaking on radars and electronic warfare, continuing to pursue his business with war criminals. TBSS Group has also implicated businesses in Europe and the US, which have provided equipment and training. We demand an investigation into whether this training and supply of technology to Myanmar has breached EU or US arms controls. Myanmar arms dealers including Life and Challenge must be designated for targeted sanctions. The Myanmar military is about to commit a new wave of atrocity crimes against people of Chin State and Magway and Sagaing Regions. This yet again shows the urgency of a global arms embargo to end the international flow of arms to Myanmar military terrorists"..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Economic activities of the Myanmar Military, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"As the military takeover in Myanmar enters its ninth month of oppression and threat, university teachers committed to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) are facing more difficulties and challenges. Most of the university teachers chose this vocation for its stability and prestige. However, Myanmar’s coup is making university teachers’ lives unthinkably difficult. Therefore, this article, based on open-ended survey research with university teachers participating in CDM,[1] will explore the pathways that university teachers are using to overthrow the military regime and the challenges they have faced since the military coup.
This article is structured around Matthew Mullen’s argument that democratic change in Myanmar developed around three pathways: contentious politics; everyday resistance; and reconstructive politics. I use Mullen’s ‘pathways’ as a theoretical framework to explore how university teachers participate in the revolution against military dictatorship. The first pathway (contentious politics) entails people organizing and publicly challenging political targets. The second pathway (everyday resistance) describes how people in a personal capacity are engaging in subtle behaviors on a daily basis to subvert military rule. The third pathway (reconstructive politics) describes how people try to change the situation around them by creating new opportunities. I argue that through these three pathways Myanmar’s university teachers undermine the junta’s plan to use education as a site of normalizing military rule.
Contentious politics: university teachers and the CDM
After the coup on 1st February 2021, thousands of university teachers and school teachers, doctors and nurses across Myanmar joined the CDM. Soon after the military coup, some CDM teachers and students in various universities (including Dagon University, Mandalay University, Yadanarbon University, Technological Universities, Yangon University of Education, among others) staged a rally called the “Red Ribbon Campaign” in front of their respective universities, where they displayed the three-finger salute popularized by Thailand’s protesters. University teachers also joined in street protests by wearing teachers’ uniforms until the end of February and early March. The military targeted these university teachers in their crackdowns.
Although university teachers cannot participate in strikes and demonstrations any longer because of arrests by the military, many are still participating in the CDM. When asked about why she participated in the CDM, an associate professor at Mandalay University said “I participate in the CDM to reject military coup and get truth and justice by means of the CDM.” A tutor at Mandalay University said “I joined the CDM in order to end military rule, to show our disobedience against any forms of the junta and to reflect what we [university teachers] can do for our future generations.”
In early May, the state-run newspaper Global New Light of Myanmar announced that the Education Ministry would reopen 134 universities on 6 May, demanding that teachers arrive on campuses on 3 May to prepare for teaching. Owing to fears about how the military would treat dissenting educators, some university teachers ended their commitment to the CDM when universities reopened.
“Some university teachers have already withdrawn from the CDM and come to class because of the threats made by the military” said a lecturer. Another lecturer said “I have withdrawn from the CDM to protect my family.” Many university teachers are returning to their respective universities, worried that they could lose their job and with it the income that their families rely on. Other CDM teachers think that those who suspended their involvement in the CDM lack the commitment necessary to end military rule.
On 6 May when universities reopened, university teachers who were still actively participating in the CDM had their jobs suspended by the military. Some university teachers that were suspended eventually returned to work, where they had to sign a pledge not to take part in the CDM. People in Myanmar are reluctant to speak up because they are living under the surveillance of military intelligence personnel and informers. Those who act against the military risk torture, long-term imprisonment and being treated as outcasts for life. To protect themselves and their families, Myanmar people participate in creating the silence that constrains many aspects of their lives.
On 21 May, the military issued removal letters for CDM teachers. However, many university teaching staff did not return to work despite various challenges and difficulties. In the words of an assistant professor at Mandalay University, CDM teachers believe that “CDM is very effective for overthrowing military dictatorship because until now governmental control or governance is not functioning all over the country”. Moreover, a tutor at Mandalay University added, “to some extent, it’s effective in overthrowing the military dictatorship. Even now, most of the students and teachers are not following the military’s rules to attend the classes. That’s absolutely what makes the junta look foolish.” Another tutor at Mandalay University answered “CDM is one of the most effective tools to overthrow the military regime, especially in challenging the military regime’s legitimacy.” Thus, many university teachers firmly determined that they will do CDM to the end.
Everyday resistance: other ways that university teachers challenge the junta
In addition to the CDM, university teachers are also using other ways which can overthrow the military regime. For instance, they refuse to pay taxes, boycott military products, and participate on social media. An associate professor at the Yangon University of Distance Education said “besides the CDM, I support the CDMers as much as I can by collecting the information and help them join the organizations they need”. A lecturer at Mandalay University answered “to reject the dictator, I don’t pay the municipal tax, don’t use the military products and don’t give back the government loan, etc.” A tutor at Mandalay University added “I act as a keyboard warrior on social media and also support the CDMers and the People Defense Force (PDF) as much as I can.” Another lecturer at Mandalay University said “I don’t pay electricity fee, I disobey the junta’s orders, and I share posts on social media to shame the military regime.” Thus, CDM university teachers also challenge the junta by using subtle tactics that subvert the junta.
Reconstructive politics: engaging in federal education with the NUG
Some university teachers are also participating in online educational activities with the National University Government (NUG). The NUG is working on plans to build a parallel education system for students who do not want to study at junta-controlled universities, in order to prevent the coup regime from governing and building legitimacy. Ja Htoi Pan, the Deputy Education Minister under the NUG, said “the NUG will first focus on an interim education plan for final year university students and Master’s students.”
Since then, universities have formed the University Interim Council, with student representatives and teacher representatives, to implement the NUG’s education plans. An associate professor at Yangon University of Distance Education said, “I am preparing for online education and collecting the information of the CDMers to join with the NUG.” A lecturer at Mandalay University answered, “now I am trying to build capacity by attending online classes under the support of the NUG.” Thus, CDM university teachers are engaging in parallel education with the NUG to create new federal educational opportunities for students. This demonstrates reconstructive politics, or the creation of new opportunities as a form of resistance.
Challenges faced by university teachers since the military coup
Since the military coup, university teachers who committed to the CDM faced various challenges and difficulties. At least 90% of students and teachers joined the CDM before university reopened and many have been forced by the military to return to universities. State-run newspapers and television report that around 20 people a day were issued arrest warrants, including education staff who participated in the CDM throughout April. Teachers from various townships taking part in protests against the coup have been charged under section 505 (a) of the criminal code, which makes it a crime to circulate any statement, rumor or report which could cause any military person to fail to carry out his duties. Hundreds of rectors, lecturers and teachers have been charged under 505 (a) and could be imprisoned for a maximum of three years if found guilty. At least a hundred educators have been detained. Door-to-door searches have forced many teachers and civil servants to go into hiding.
On the other hand, on April 26th, the NUG announced that they would blacklist 32 educators who had threatened or coerced CDM participants. The NUG also released the following statement: “Non-CDMers are betraying the country and they will be removed when the people’s government takes back power”. Some NUG supporters also posted on social media the names and pictures of non-CDM university teachers and added harsh comments in the name of social punishment.
Under this difficult situation for university teachers, there are growing concerns about the future, as university teachers play a vital role not only in providing high quality education but also in developing the human resources of the nation. University teachers described their difficulties and challenges of participating in the CDM as follows. A lecturer at Mandalay University said “I can’t live in one stable place as I am worried about arrest and persecution by the military as well as the lack of income and living difficulty. But I overcome these difficulties through my willingness to win the revolution. Therefore, I am firmly determined not to return to work.” An associate professor at Mandalay University answered, “there are many challenges that I faced in participating in the CDM such as insecurity, fear of arrest, and removal order.” Moreover, she added that “temporary dismissal and removal order are challenges that I face because university teacher is my vocation. But this is the end of the military coup in our generation and so I decided to participate in the CDM to the end despite challenges.”
Despite the determination of these educators, it is important to understand the serious challenges university teachers face, including threats to their safety and livelihoods. A tutor at Mandalay University reported “I face three main challenges by participating in the CDM. The first challenge is living difficulty as I do not receive my regular salary and it makes our living difficult sometimes. The second challenge is safety – we have to stay in a safer place due to arbitrary detention of CDM teachers. The final third challenge is that of emotional attacks because even though we participate in CDM, sometimes, most people near us don’t support the CDM and even discourage us. We don’t ask for much help from our neighbors but just for some words of support like ‘we will win one day, stay strong!’” She also added that “I feel depressed sometimes as there is no work or income but I feel proud to stand against injustice and I continue my life with the perception that I did what I should do for the public.” Thus, offering moral support is also vital for CDM teachers.
There have also been complications regarding the loans that university teachers have received. A lecturer at Mandalay University reported “while the National League for Democracy (NLD) government was still in power, the NLD government gave loans that were equal to two months of salary for university teachers. The NUG said that university teachers do not need to give back loan. But the military dictatorship said that they will prosecute CDM teachers who don’t repay the loans. That threatens all CDMers.” Moreover, university teachers who are participating in educational activities with the NUG described that they have internet and communication difficulties and also fear for personal security.
Overall, the main issue for CDM teachers is security. They face fear of arrest and threat by 505 (a) and thus many are living in hiding. The loss of a regular salary and a job they loved creates many difficulties for CDM teachers. Although CDM teachers sometimes feel depressed because of discouragement by neighbors and no income, they overcome these difficulties with a strong willingness to win the revolution.
Support for university teachers participating in the CDM
There are many local, regional, and national support groups like universities’ CDM support teams and the CRPH-CDM support team which are trying to provide financially for the CDMers. University teachers hold a variety of opinions about the financial support they have received while participating in the CDM. A lecturer at Mandalay University answered “I am satisfied with the supporting groups as they support as much as they can even though there are many difficulties. For instance, the military tries to disturb and block the supporting groups.” An associate professor at Mandalay University said, “I didn’t join the CDM with the expectation that I would be as well supported as we have been, so I am satisfied with how much support people have given us.” Although there are support groups which are trying to provide for the CDMers, there are still some teachers falling through the gaps. A tutor at Mandalay University responded, “I am not satisfied with support as teachers in rural areas do not have enough financial support from the support groups. Even if some CDMers receive support, it is not enough for their living costs.”
There seems to be a big difference between the CDMers who are well off economically and those who are not. Although the loss of regular salary may not be as big of a problem for the CDMers who can rely on savings and support from their families, the CDMers who lack this security face more challenges due to loss of their regular salary. It is also difficult for the CDMers to find another job. Knowing that the CDMers will eventually return to their old jobs makes employers reluctant to hire CDMers over other candidates looking for permanent positions.
As there is no regular income during this period, university teachers are trying to survive with the help of their family, or by living off savings or making more through irregular self-employment, like starting online shops. A lecturer at Mandalay University said “as I am single, my parents support me. For another job, as I got traditional medicine diploma certificate in 2001, I am trying to produce a medicine product to sell.” A tutor at Mandalay University answered “I try to survive by living with money I saved throughout the year and I have the plan to start working a new job but at the present I can’t do anything due to COVID-19 pandemic and political instability.” A lecturer at Yadanarbon University said, “I am running online shops and also my parents are able to support me.” It was found that although CDMers are facing difficulties, they never regretted their choice: they made up their mind to commit to CDM to the end.
University teachers also recommended various ways to overthrow the military regime, encompassing international action, donations to the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), and the involvement of the ethnic armed organisations. They all stress unity for the cause. A tutor at Mandalay University suggested “international forces are crucial to overthrow the dictatorship. Also, the international actors should discuss Myanmar affairs and take action.” Another tutor at Mandalay University described “donating to the CDM and PDF and persuading military officers and police officers to cooperate in the CDM should be continued to overthrow the military dictatorship.” A lecturer at Mandalay University said “now under the NUG government, Generation Z are trying to fight against military dictatorship by taking up arms and attending training under KNU, KIA, and other ethnic groups. They have a strong desire to eradicate the military dictatorship, so we are heavily reliant on Generation Z and believe that we will win.” An associate professor at Mandalay University also suggested “we must unite each other to overthrow the military dictatorship and we need to continue participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement until we achieve this revolution.”
Conclusion
University teachers, who are at the heart of political activism, are prime targets for oppression and prosecution by the junta. Despite oppression by the junta, university teachers are using three of Matthew Mullen’s pathways to overthrow the military dictatorship. The first pathway they use is contentious politics such as participating in strikes, and the CDM. The second pathway is everyday resistance such as disobedience to the military’s orders, a refusal to pay municipal tax and electricity fees, boycotts of military-related products, donating to the PDF and CDMers, and speaking out on social media. The third pathway is reconstructive politics such as participating in a parallel education plan under the NUG. Thus, we can say that teachers have been in the forefront of the fight for democracy in Myanmar since the military coup on 1 February.
Due to the impacts of the military coup in Myanmar, many university teachers who participated in the CDM have been removed from their position. They are in hiding and at risk. Some have been charged under criminal code 505(a) and detained. Besides personal insecurity, many are struggling to survive as they no longer get paid. Although they were facing various difficulties, they will continue participating in the CDM until the end and hope that the revolution shall win.
Notes
[1] The author contacted fifteen familiar university teachers through Facebook Messenger and requested that they answer a questionnaire for this article. Out of fifteen requests, ten teachers completed the survey for a response rate of 66.6%...."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-25
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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A warrant for the former student leader’s arrest had been issued in February, shortly after the military seized power
Description:
"Kyaw Min Yu, a veteran pro-democracy activist also known as Ko Jimmy, was arrested by junta forces on Saturday night in Yangon’s North Dagon Township, according to his wife.
Nilar Thein confirmed to Myanmar Now that her husband had been arrested and wrote on Facebook that his life was in danger.
“The military council must take responsibility for anything that may happen to him after the arrest,” she wrote.
It was unknown at the time of reporting where he was being held. Spokespersons for the military junta could not be reached for comment on Sunday.
According to the pro-regime news outlet People Media, Ko Jimmy was arrested in connection with a shootout that took place in a residential neighbourhood in North Dagon on Saturday night.
Citing a resident of the area, People Media said the clash began when regime forces entered Pinlon Housing to conduct a raid. Several other people were also arrested, and a number of weapons were seized, it added.
The military issued an arrest warrant for the 52-year-old activist on February 13 for allegedly inciting unrest and threatening “public tranquillity” for writing social media posts critical of the February 1 military coup.
A warrant was also issued at the same time for Min Ko Naing, another prominent figure involved in the student-led “four-eights” uprising of August 1988.
Ko Jimmy, who is also a writer, was imprisoned that year for his political activities and not released until 1996. In 2007, following the Saffron Revolution, he was arrested again and held until 2012.
As of Saturday, Myanmar’s military junta had arrested a total of 9,175 opponents of the coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Of these, 7,016 are still in regime custody..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-24
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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"NEW YORK (22 October 2021) – Myanmar could be on the eve of an even greater human rights catastrophe and loss of life amid reports the military junta is deploying tens of thousands of troops and heavy weapons to northern Myanmar, a UN human rights expert warned the General Assembly today.
“These tactics are ominously reminiscent of those employed by the military before its genocidal attacks against the Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017,” said Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. He said he had received information that large numbers of troops were moving into restive regions in the north and northwest.
“We should all be prepared, as the people in this part of Myanmar are prepared, for even more mass atrocity crimes. I desperately hope that I am wrong.”
Andrews urged States to deny the military junta the money, weapons and legitimacy that it needs to continue to hold the people of Myanmar hostage with systematic human rights violations and brutal attacks. He pointed to the recent release of thousands of political prisoners as evidence that pressure on the junta works.
“ASEAN’s announcement that the junta will not be welcome at its upcoming summit strikes at the heart of the junta’s third need — legitimacy . . . Without pressure, without denying the junta that which it needs from the international community, none of the detainees would have been released,” he said, stressing that in addition to denying legitimacy, more must be done to cut the junta off from weapons and money.
Andrews today presented the findings of his annual report to the General Assembly, stating that since the coup, the military junta has engaged in probable crimes against humanity and war crimes.
He reiterated the global call that the Security Council impose an arms embargo on Myanmar and stressed the need to significantly increase financial pressure on the junta, as many in Myanmar are doing with boycotts.
“To date, sanctions have not impacted the ability of the junta to continue to seize State revenues and foreign exchange to enrich its leaders and fuel its attacks on the civilian population,” he said. “The single largest source of revenue for the junta is the oil and gas industry. I encourage Member States to follow the call of several hundred civil society organizations within Myanmar who have called for Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise to be sanctioned.”
Andrews also conveyed a stark message to the General Assembly that he has received from scores of people inside Myanmar: “Many, I dare say most in Myanmar, have come to believe that the world and this body, do not care. Over the last several months they have experienced a steep downward trajectory, including increased human rights violations and attacks by the military junta while, at the same time, they have witnessed a grossly disproportionate response by the international community.
“I come before this venerated body today conveying a simple plea from the people of Myanmar: care about this unfolding catastrophe and then translate that care into meaningful action.
“Targeting these three needs of the junta — weapons, money, and legitimacy — while increasing humanitarian support to the people of Myanmar, is urgently needed and I believe the best means for the international community to support the people in Myanmar.
“There is global responsibility to address this crisis, and it is insufficient to pass it off to those who lack the will or the capacity to take the requisite action, particularly given the scope of the atrocities that are ongoing.”
Andrews reported that since the coup, junta-controlled forces have murdered over 1,100 people, displaced a quarter million, arbitrarily detained over 8,000 people, where many were tortured, including dozens who were tortured to death. He highlighted credible reports he received of junta forces even torturing children.
The Human Rights Council-appointed independent expert said that over 100 journalists lost their freedom, and the junta has attacked and harassed doctors, nurses and other health care professionals — even as Myanmar has suffered through a pandemic. He also said junta forces have abducted and imprisoned family members of those being sought by security forces, including very young children.
ENDS
Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-23
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Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"At least 50 journalists were among the thousands of people due to be freed from prison in Myanmar this week after the military announced an amnesty.
The military-installed government announced an amnesty for 5,600 people on Monday. The figure includes over 1,300 who had been convicted, and 4,320 who were awaiting trial.
Among those named on the list are three journalists from the independent broadcaster Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB); two journalists from the VOA affiliate Mizzima; and Sithu Aung Myint, a veteran journalist who contributes to VOA and who has been jailed since August 15. The DVB journalists were freed Monday but as of Thursday Sithu Aung Myint remained in custody.
A team of lawyers representing the journalists on a pro-bono basis welcomed the announcement but said it would continue to assist the dozens still behind bars.
"We are relieved and happy to know that three DVB journalists, including Aung Kyaw, from Myeik, and Min Nyo, from Pyay, were released. We have to wait and see whether all 50 journalists are released. If not, we'll continue to represent them,” the legal team’s spokesperson, Khin Maung Myint, told VOA Burmese.
Most of those released had faced charges under Section 505a, which criminalizes content deemed to cause fear or spread false news about the government, but it was unclear if those accused under other sections of the penal code would be freed.
Incitement charges filed against Htet Htet Khine, who freelances for the BBC, were dropped under the amnesty, but a charge under the Unlawful Association Act remains active, the spokesperson for the legal team said.
On Wednesday, the Facebook group Myanmar Press Freedom In-Depth, which tracks jailed journalists, said at least 17 journalists have left prison since the start of this week. But dozens more remain in custody.
One of those is American journalist Danny Fenster, whom Myanmar has charged under its laws on incitement and the Unlawful Associations Act. Fenster, who is managing editor of Frontier Myanmar, was not named in the amnesty and remains in custody.
Originally from Detroit, Fenster has been jailed since May 24 for offenses allegedly carried out by Myanmar Now, months after Fenster resigned from the news outlet, his lawyer says.
Frontier Myanmar has said it will end its print publication and temporarily cease its online and social media operation.
In a message emailed to subscribers, editor-in-chief Thomas Kean cited political instability and risks to staff from possible arrest or the coronavirus.
“The conditions for journalists working inside the country have gotten progressively worse over the past few months as the regime gets more desperate to crush resistance,” Kean said.
His message added that many of the outlet’s reporters are in hiding and that it has become harder for the photographers to work.
Mixed feelings
The amnesty brought mixed emotions for those freed, including DVB reporter Min Nyo, who was arrested in March while covering a protest over the military takeover, and later sentenced to three years in prison.
The reporter said that 170 people were detained under incitement charges in Pyay, in Myanmar’s Bago region, but only eight of those have been freed.
"Many youth remain in prison. We are not happy to be released, because we feel uncomfortable looking at those left behind in jail. They have hopes and vision for future,” Min Nyo told VOA. “We left prison with sadness, and we want them to be released as soon as possible."
Also freed were Mizzima co-founder Thin Thin Aung and one of her staff, James Pu Thoure. Both were arrested on April 8 on charges of incitement.
Since the February 1 coup, arrest warrants have been issued for at least 10 Mizzima journalists, including the managing director and editor-in-chief Soe Myint and managing editor Sein Win.
The amnesty deal was announced three days after the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) declined to invite Myanmar’s military leader to a summit.
ASEAN cited a lack of progress on plans the junta had agreed to in April to restore peace in Myanmar.
Myanmar's military government blamed "foreign intervention" for the decision.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) tied the prisoner release to the junta’s attempts to blunt international criticism.
The military announcement “must not be met with applause. It is a tactic of the junta to stop international condemnation. These releases will not end the coup,” the AAPP said.
The group said that as of Monday, 7,355 people were detained, including 354 who have been sentenced. A further 1,989 are under arrest warrant and Myanmar has sentenced over 100 in absentia.
Tom Andrews, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, said that while the prisoners' release was welcome, it came "not because of a change of heart, but because of pressure."
In a statement posted to Twitter, Andrews added that they had been detained "illegally for exercising their fundamental human rights."..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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Title: Ministry of Electricity and Energy: Notification No.15/2021 - အမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာအမှတ် (၁၅/၂၀၂၁)
Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ လျှပ်စစ်နှင့်စွမ်းအင်ဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ စ၍ တော်လှန်ရေး၏ အဓိက မဏ္ဍိုင်ဖြစ်သော CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ယခုအချိန်အထိ ပါဝင်ပေး နေသော လျှပ်စစ်နှင့်စွမ်းအင်ဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ ဝန်ထမ်းများအားလုံးကို လေးေလးစားစားအသိမှတ်ပြုပြီး ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း၊ ပြည်သူများ အနေဖြင့်လည်း တော်လှန်ရေး၏ ပင်မမဏ္ဍိုင်ဖြစ်သော CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ၏ လိုအပ်ချက်များအား တတ်စွမ်းသမျှ ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီပေးကြစေလိုကြောင်း နှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးသည် အားလုံး ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်နိုင်မှ ပြီးမြောက်အောင်မြင်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို ၂၂-၁၀-၂၀၂၁ ရက်စွဲပါ အမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာအမှတ် (၁၅/၂၀၂၁) ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Electricity and Energy
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-22
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Sub-title:
Activists say issuing further charges to freed prisoners was ‘mental torture’ for families
Description:
"More than 100 political prisoners freed following a supposed amnesty in Myanmar were re-arrested shortly after their release according to a rights group, in what activists have likened to “mental torture” for the detainees and their families.
Some relatives, who had waited outside prisons expecting to be reunited with their loved ones, managed to catch a glimpse of them at the gates, before they were handcuffed and taken away. Others spent hours together, only to be separated again.
The Myanmar junta, which has been repeatedly condemned for detaining thousands of its critics, including children, promised a major release of political prisoners on Monday. It stated it would pardon 1,316 people and drop charges against 4,320 people who had “participated in protests”.
The military, however, gave no details of who would be freed, or what the terms of release would be.
Human Rights Watch has since described the releases, which have taken place over the past week, as “limited in scope”. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma (AAPP), an advocacy group, has confirmed that 324 people have been freed. More than 7,031 political prisoners are still being held in detention, according to AAPP Burma. This includes anyone suspected of criticising or questioning the February military coup – from medics, to journalists, politicians and activists.
AAPP said it was aware of 110 cases where people were issued with further charges and re-arrested after their supposed release.
Ma Zin Mar, who lives in central Myanmar and spoke under a fake name, was told by a lawyer that her sister would be among those released this week. She waited outside the prison and saw her sister walk free. Then, she watched as her sister was handcuffed and placed in a car by plainclothes officers.
“When this car drove outside of the prison compound, I ran after the car and asked them what happened. They said that they were bringing her to the police station. We followed to the police station and asked to meet my sister, but we were not allowed. We were so worried about her health,” she said.
Ma Zin Mar had spent that day cheering up her mother, telling her that her sister would soon be free. She had been so happy to see her walk out of prison. “We are so depressed now. It is now even hard to breath.”
Her mother, she added, was depressed and lying in bed.
Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a prominent democracy activist, described the re-arrests as “complete mental torture of the family members and for the political prisoners.”
There have been widespread reports of torture inside Myanmar prisons, and some of those who have been released this week have described harrowing treatment at the hands of security forces.
A young democracy activist, who also spoke anonymously, said that during interrogations, which took place before he was transported to prison, detainees had no choice but to use toilet water to drink or wash their faces. He was arrested for possessing banners and posters opposing the military coup.
“They [the military] even put guns in our mouths. And they threatened us a lot. They asked us to dig graves for ourselves. Also, I have seen other people get tortured and they were even vomiting because of the severity of the torture. Some people lost their teeth,” he said, speaking anonymously for fear of arrest. Prison, he said, had felt like paradise in comparison.
He added that he cannot feel happy, even though he has been released. He lives in fear of being arrested again. He also worries for the many others left behind in prison. “Some of them got arrested for sharing a Facebook post, or they beat pots and pans [a protest act], or they got arrested as their phones were searched by the soldiers on the road. They did no crimes,” he said.
The junta appeared to be releasing prisoners who had been charged under section 505a, a sweeping law that is used by the junta to punish anyone who criticises the coup or the military. However, many face multiple charges, and so remain in prison.
The announcement of the prisoner release came just days after Min Aung Hlaing, the junta chief, was excluded from a regional summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) over his failure to commit to de-escalating the country’s crisis.
Shunlei Yi said that she believed the announcement had been in response to the pressure from neighbouring countries. “They see these leaders as their like minded people,” she said, referring to Asean, which has a tradition of non-interference and rarely condemns its members over human rights issues.
David Mathieson, an independent analyst formerly based in Myanmar, said that regardless of whether the release had been planned for some time or driven by the Asean decision, the snub by neighbouring countries would have stung. “They’re status-obsessed people, the leaders of the SAC [State Administrative Council junta],” he said.
However, he added that the prisoner releases, which appear far more limited than promised, were unlikely to impress anyone in the international community. “A lot of diplomats [should say]: ‘you said that you were going to release all these people – where are the lists and where is this happening? … You’re promising something like this and completely reneging on it. We can’t trust anything that you say from now on, which really limits the ability to construct mediation with you.’”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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Sub-title:
Deposed Political Leaders and Journalists Remain Detained
Description:
"The Myanmar junta’s recent prisoner releases are limited in scope and do not reflect a broader change in the military’s respect for human rights, Human Rights Watch said today. On October 18, 2021, the State Administrative Council junta announced that it was pardoning 1,316 people and dropping charges against 4,320 who “participated in protests.” The junta provided no details about the terms of the releases or how they were being carried out.
Concerned governments should increase pressure on the junta to release all political prisoners, end abuses against protesters and others, and commit to promptly restore democratic rule.
“The partial release of wrongfully held detainees should not distract from the junta’s egregiously abusive rule, which hasn’t changed,” said Linda Lakhdhir, Asia legal adviser at Human Rights Watch. “Some of those released have already been rearrested. The junta should release all those unjustly held since the coup, including high-profile political figures, and end all arbitrary arrests.”
The junta did not provide a list of those being released or their locations. As of October 19, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a local nongovernmental organization that has documented arrests, prosecutions, and releases since the February 1 coup, had only been able to confirm the release of 189 prisoners, including 14 journalists. Several of those released have reported torture and other ill-treatment in detention.
The junta’s announcement suggests that the authorities are dropping charges of “incitement” under Section 505A of Myanmar’s Penal Code, a vague new law promulgated by the junta to punish comments critical of the coup or the military government. However, many of those charged with incitement are facing other charges as well and may continue to be detained on those charges.
Eleven of the 38 people released in the city of Meiktila, including a National League for Democracy member of parliament, were rearrested immediately after their release and are now facing possible charges under Myanmar’s Counter-Terrorism Law. The authorities are also requiring all those released to promise not to participate in further anti-coup activities, in violation of their basic rights. A military spokesman warned that anyone rearrested would serve the remainder of their original sentence in addition to any new sentence.
The AAPP reported that while the junta claimed to have released over 2,000 prisoners in June, they were only able to verify the release of 372.
“The authorities’ lack of transparency and immediate rearrest of some released prisoners reinforce the need to keep the pressure on to release all political prisoners,” Lakhdhir said. “As with the prisoner release in June, the actual numbers released may prove to be far lower than claimed.”
In the eight months since the coup, the junta has arrested more than 9,000 people, with more than 7,100 still in detention as of October 19, the AAPP said. Nearly 2,000 more are known to be evading junta arrest warrants. Those still detained include the senior leadership of the National League for Democracy, including its de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the deposed president Win Myint, elected members of parliament, and dozens of journalists. Security forces made at least 24 new arrests on the same day the junta announced the prisoner releases.
Since the coup, the junta has committed widespread and systematic abuses against the civilian population that amount to crimes against humanity, including murder, enforced disappearance, torture, rape and other sexual violence, severe deprivation of liberty, and other inhumane acts causing great suffering. Many of those detained have said that security personnel tortured and otherwise ill-treated them and others in custody. Methods of torture reported include beatings, mock executions with guns, burning with cigarettes, and rape and threatened rape. Security forces have killed at least 1,181 people, including some who appear to have been tortured to death in detention.
Concerned governments should impose tougher economic measures against the military, its leadership, and its vast business activities to cut off the military’s sources of foreign revenue, most of which are kept outside of Myanmar in foreign banks. The United Nations Security Council should impose a global arms embargo on Myanmar.
“Governments should not mistake these releases as a sign that the junta is taking a new approach,” Lakhdhir said. “Instead, the releases appear to be a cynical gesture to blunt growing international pressure to sanction the junta and its generals.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-22
[field_licence]
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Category:
Human Rights Watch Reports on Burma/Myanmar, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"SUMMARY:
This briefing covers the situation of human rights, which were
documented by the Chin Human Rights Organization in
northwestern Burma/Myanmar, primarily in Chin State,
Sagaing and Magwe Regions, between August and September
2021. Under the reign of terror imposed by the junta, hundreds
have been arrested, dozens of people killed, injured and
thousands exiled in a matter of months.
Evidence contained in this briefing demonstrates that there is a
clear pattern of serious violations of international human rights
and humanitarian laws, which are being committed by the
Burmese/Myanmar military junta State Administration Council
(SAC) against civilian populations with complete impunity..... This document details human rights violations committed by SAC actors
during August and September, 2021. Attacks on the civilian population and
civilian infrastructure initiated by the State Administration Council (SAC) junta
have become increasingly relentless in western Burma/Myanmar since
August 2021. Junta soldiers operating in Chin State and parts of Sagaing and
Magwe Regions, under the Northwestern Regional Military Command based
in Monywa, have conducted a campaign of unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest
and detention, torture and deliberate targeting of civilian and religious
infrastructure.
During August and September, the numbers of attacks on civilian and
religious infrastructure in western Myanmar where Tatmadaw forces have
escalated military activities against civil militias from the Chinland Defense
Force (CDF) in Chin State and the various Peoples Defense Force (PDFs)
operating in Sagaing and Magwe Regions has increased. These conflicts have
led to radical violations of international human rights and humanitarian law,
resulting in the massacres of civilians and causing civilian casualties, damage
and destruction to private and public property.
These ongoing violations constitute part of what the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet described as the “human rights
catastrophe” in her report to the UN Human Rights Council session in Geneva
on Thursday, September 23.1 The violations documented by CHRO and other
groups have clear patterns in which perpetrators’ actions are demonstratively
deliberate and intended to cause harms to civilians. The destruction of lives,
livelihood and properties are directly linked to the military scorched earth
counter-insurgency policy.
The notorious “four-cuts” doctrine, which has been employed in active war
zones in ethnic areas for decades, is now being applied in the junta’s military
campaigns in urban areas in the fight against local militia groups such as CDF
and PDFs in western Myanmar/Burma. In implementing the four-cuts
doctrine designed to cut off food, funding, intelligence and
recruits to the
resistance groups, civilians are deliberately exposed to extreme violence and
livelihood destruction. The deliberate and indiscriminate nature in which the
policy is being applied in the current conflict circumstance has led to
unnecessary deaths, destruction of livelihoods and properties of civilians..."
Source/publisher:
Chin Human Rights Organization
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Human Rights Defenders, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political
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"Introduction:
1. This report complements the earlier report produced by the National Unity Government (NUG) of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on the human rights situation in Sagaing and Magway Regions.2
2. Since its failed military coup d’état of 1 February 2021, the illegal military junta has directed escalating, excessive and disproportionate force against the people of Myanmar. As at 18 October 2021, at least 1181 civilians had been killed by security forces countrywide, while another 7355 remained in detention.3 An estimated 612 persons had been arrested in Chin State alone, 70 of which (61 males and nine females) took place in August and September 2021.4
3. Increasingly since April 2021, security forces – operating at the direction and in the full knowledge of the junta leadership – have intensified operations in ethnic minority areas and in centres of resistance. The military continues to employ its long practised ‘four cuts strategy’, known as Pyat Ley Pyat, cutting off communities and presumed insurgents in these areas from funding, food, intelligence and recruits. This strategy has been accompanied by internet and phone blackouts, and forced displacement.
4. The NUG has documented credible reports of grave human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, including unlawful killings and murder, torture and mistreatment, sexual and gender-based violence, abductions, arbitrary detention, the use of human shields, the indiscriminate use of landmines, the destruction of homes and property, and looting. The information contained in this report is drawn from multiple sources, including victims, witnesses, medical personnel, and local residents and organisations. Select emblematic incidents are set out below. Other incidents remain under investigation and subject to verification. Open source references are provided where available.....Chin State: 5. Chin State is located in western Myanmar and borders Bangladesh and India. It shares internal borders with Rakhine State, and Magway and Sagaing Regions.5 Chin State comprises 9 townships, including Falam, Hakha, Kanpetlet, Mindat, and Thantlang, and is amongst the poorest parts of Myanmar.
6. At 18 October 2021, at least 33 civilians, including eight children, had been killed by junta security forces in Chin State since February 2021. Unconfirmed reports suggest that four military battalions, including Light Infantry Battalion 222 (LIB-222) and Light Infantry Division 66 (LID-66), have been deployed to Chin State.
7. The international community has expressed growing alarm at troop build ups in Chin State. Notably, the United Kingdom (penholder on Myanmar at the United Nations (UN) Security Council) and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released recent statements. On 15 October 2021, the United Kingdom acknowledged that ‘[r]epeated large scale attacks have demonstrated the Myanmar Military has no regard for the people of Myanmar’.6 On 8 October 2021, OHCHR noted the military’s ‘established pattern of attacks’ against unarmed individuals and urged ‘the international community to speak with one voice, to prevent the commission of further serious human rights violations against the people of Myanmar’.7
8. This escalation of force in Chin State has included the use of artillery, with multiple reports of civilians having been killed and injured and homes destroyed by shelling. On 18 September 2021 in Thantlang Township, 18 civilian homes were destroyed by shelling. As many as 15,000 villagers have fled Thantlang Township on account of these indiscriminate attacks.8
9. The military has also employed airstrikes in Chin State. On 10 September 2021 in Lon Ler village of Thantlang Township, local villagers were forced to flee airstrikes that reportedly followed clashes between the Chin National Front and junta forces.9
10. The NUG is also investigating multiple incidents in which junta troops have allegedly shot and killed civilians. On 18 September 2021 in Thantlang Township, a Christian pastor was murdered by junta soldiers.10 His wedding-band finger was cut off and his ring removed, acts that constitute despoliation and pillage of the dead.11 On 29 September, two men – one aged in his seventies, the other in his fifties – were shot and killed by junta soldiers while they were driving in Thantlang Township. Two other civilians were reportedly injured in the same incident.12
11. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Mr. Thomas Andrews, has deemed as credible reports that junta soldiers used an estimated 10 to 14 civilians, including a pregnant woman, as human shields during an attack on Mindat Township in August 2021. The Special Rapporteur has also documented the use of sexual violence, arbitrary detention, the blocking of roads, and the cutting off of the water supply in Mindat, forcing the displacement of over 30,000 villagers.13
12. According to the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), between 30,000 to 35,000 persons from Chin State have fled to Mizoram State in India since 1 February 2021, while another 20,000 people remain internally displaced in Mindat Township. CHRO also estimates that up to 10,000 residents of Thantlang Township have been displaced since 6 September 2021.14..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders
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"Since the military February 1, 2021, coup the junta has been brutally cracking down, arbitrary detaining thousands, relentlessly torturing, and ruthlessly killing civilians against an illegitimate coup attempt. Most of the political prisoners are mentally and physically tortured, and do not even have access to a fair trial.
The military junta released some political detainees on October 18, 2021, with the promise of retrospective sentences. It was never an absolute amnesty for political detainees. However, some were even released then cynically re-arrested as soon as they arrived home. Some others were told they were on the released list, taken to the jail entrance, only to be taken back to prison in the face of additional charges.
These actions, of re-arresting soon after supposed released, having met with family for some hours or even arriving at jail gates only to be taken back to prison, are a form of physical and mental torture, not only to the political detainees, but their families.
According to AAPP documentation, 110 political prisoners were re-arrested soon after release since 18 October’s announcement. And yet, there will be more arrests as some are in hiding or have been in lost contact. The hope is for every detainee to be released. These re-arrests destroy this desire. It is clear, the military junta is targeting the mental wellbeing of not only the political prisoners, but their children and family members.
We, AAPP, condemn these cruel acts committed by the military junta. We also urge the immediate release of Burma’s elected President, State Counsellor, and all political detainees. AAPP will continue our efforts against the military perpetrated arbitrary detentions, torture, and barbaric killing. Yet we urge the international community to put further pressure on this illegitimate junta group..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"ရက်စွဲ။ ။ အောက်တိုဘာ ၂၁ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
၁) ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့ စစ်အုပ်စုမှ နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို မတရားသိမ်းယူပြီးချိန်မှစတင်၍ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို ဆန့်ကျင် ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖေါ်မှုနှင့် သဘောထားကွဲလွဲသူများအား အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်က အကြမ်းဖက်ရိုက်နှက်ဖြိုခွဲခြင်း၊ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ ရက်စက်စွာ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာသော အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများကို ဖမ်းဆီးအကျဉ်းချမှုများ ဆက်တိုက်ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။
၂) မတရားသဖြင့်ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်း အကျဉ်းချခံရသူများအားလုံးနီးပါးသည် ရုပ်ပိုင်း၊ စိတ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုများ ခံခဲ့ကြရပြီး မျှတသောတရားစီရင်မှုလည်း မရရှိခဲ့ကြပေ။
၃) အောက်တိုဘာ ၁၈ ရက်နေ့ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် လွှတ်ပေးခဲ့သည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများမှာ နောက်ကြောင်းပြန်ပြစ်ဒဏ်ဆိုသည့် နှောင်ကြိုးဖြင့်သာ လွှတ်ပေးခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဤသည်မှာ အကျဉ်းထောင်တွင်းမှလွှတ်ပေးလိုက်သော်လည်း စစ်မှန်သောလွတ်မြောက်ခြင်း မဟုတ်ပါ။
၄) အချို့မှာ လွတ်မြောက်စာရင်းတွင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့၍ လွှတ်ပေးရာတွင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့သော်လည်း ထောင်ဗူးဝ၊ ထွက် ပေါက်ရောက်မှ နောက်တိုးမှုဖြင့် ပြန်လည်ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံလိုက်ရသူများရှိသကဲ့သို့ အချို့မှာ နေအိမ်သို့ ပြန်ရောက်ပြီးမှ ထပ်မံ၍ လာရောက်ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ကြရသည်။
ထိုကဲ့သို့ လွတ်မြောက်ပြီး ထောင်ဗူးဝရောက်မှ ထပ်မံဖမ်းဆီးခံရခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် မိသားစုနှင့်နာရီပိုင်းမျှ နေ၍ ထပ်မံဖမ်းဆီးခံရခြင်းသည် ကာယကံရှင် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားကိုသာမက မိသားစုကိုပါ ပြင်းထန်သော စိတ်ဒဏ်ရာများရစေပါသည်။ တနည်းအားဖြင့် ထိုလုပ်ရပ်သည် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော စိတ်ပိုင်း/ရုပ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုပင် ဖြစ်သည်။
ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ မိမိတို့ အေအေပီပီ က ကောက်ခံရရှိသော စာရင်းမှတ်တမ်းအရ လွတ်မြောက်ပြီး ပြန်လည်ဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူနိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား အရေအတွက်မှာ (၁၁၀) ဦး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ပြန်လည်ဖမ်းဆီး၍ တိမ်းရှောင်နေရသူများလည်းရှိပါသည်။ အမှန်တကယ် ပြန်လည်အဖမ်းခံရသော အရေအတွက်မှာ ထိုထက်ပိုများမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
ဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသူတယောက်၏ မျှော်လင့်ချက်သည် လွတ်မြောက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုသူများအား လွတ်မြောက်ပြီးမှ ပြန်လည်ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းသည် ထိုသူတို့၏ မျှော်လင့်ချက်ကို ရိုက်ချိုးလိုက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။
ထိုလုပ်ရပ်သည် စစ်အုပ်စုမှ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား တဦးချင်းစီကိုသာ စိတ်ဒဏ်ရာပေးခြင်းမျိုးမဟုတ်ဘဲ မိသားစုဝင်များ၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များကိုပါ ပစ်မှတ်ထား နှိပ်စက်ညှဉ်းပန်းမှုဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထင်ရှားစွာ သက်သေပြလိုက်ခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။
အဆိုပါလုပ်ရပ်သည် လူသားမဆန်သောလုပ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် မိမိတို့ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများကူညီ စောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း(အေအေပီပီ) အနေဖြင့် ကျူးလွန်သူ စစ်အုပ်စုအား ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုံ့ချလိုက်သည်။
မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ၊ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အပါအဝင် ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းထားသူများ အားလုံး ခြွင်းချက်မရှိလွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် မတရားညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းများနှင့် လူမဆန်စွာသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သူများအား အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူမှု ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း နှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝန်းအနေဖြင့်လဲ စစ်အုပ်စုကို ဆက်လက်၍ ထိရောက်သည့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို ပြုလုပ်ပေးရန် လေးနက်စွာ တိုက်တွန်း လိုက်ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Emerging as the first act of defiance after the military coup on 1 February 2021, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is a general strike mobilisation spearheaded by hundreds of thousands of civil servants. The CDM has become the centre of focus for all parties involved in the post-coup era in Myanmar. To those opposing the coup and the military, the CDM is not only an anti-coup campaign but also a foundation from which to replace the military-controlled administrations. For the military and its supporters, the CDM was a surprise, and represents a threat to maintaining coercive and central power in the post-coup era—a threat that needs to be dealt with through the strongest measures available.
The civil disobedience campaign in Myanmar comprises a wide range of forms including banging pots and pans, street protests, refusal to pay bills, and boycotting state-sponsored lottery and military-affiliated businesses. However, this report, which can be downloaded by clicking on the cover image below, mainly focuses on the actions and roles of CDM civil servants, locally known as the CDMers, as the civil disobedience campaign is widely referred to the act of civil servants pledging not to work under the military. The report explains the CDM in three different phases—emergence, growth, and consolidation—by highlighting the significant developments, campaigns, and relationships among key political actors and organisations involved; it also explains the measures taken against the CDM by the military to consolidate its grip.
The coup was almost universally unpopular, sparking mass protests and boycotts against military-affiliated businesses, but also creating renewed fighting with several ethnic armed organisations, including signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).
The Emergence of the Civil Disobedience Movement
Mobilisation of politicians and activists to launch the civil disobedience campaign was vital, but the movement began with healthcare workers refusing to go to work on the day after the coup. In his first interview with the local media on 1 February, U Win Htein, a patron of the NLD, urged the public to initiate a non-violent movement to protest against the coup, referring to the civil disobedience movement of India led by Mahatma Gandhi. A group of medical doctors from Mandalay created a network and launched the online campaign by circulating a statement condemning the military coup. A day after the coup, healthcare workers from about forty hospitals, medical institutes, and COVID-19 testing centres announced their decision to join the movement and stop work indefinitely.
Growing popularity of the Civil Disobedience Movement
The CDM gained momentum with the onset of street protests. The “CDM” and “Don’t go to office, break away” became some of the most popular slogans of the anti-coup demonstrations across the country. While some portrayed the CDM as the best bulwark in defense against the military-rule, others went further in describing the CDM as a silver bullet that could entirely end the military’s dominance in politics.
The health and education sectors have the highest volume of CDM participation. About 90% of the total number of healthcare workers reportedly joined the CDM in the first month after the coup. In some states and regions, 50 to 65 percent of teaching staff joined the movement. The participation of civil servants from three military-controlled ministries—Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Border Affairs—has attracted much public attention. In some townships in Yangon and Mandalay, CDM participation among ward offices is as high as 100%. Moreover, at least 2,000 soldiers and police have reportedly joined the movement as of mid-August. However, all of them are low-ranking, with the highest rank being an acting police colonel and army major, proving the military’s leadership is less likely to split. The movement was nominated for the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize by six academics in Norway. It is estimated that more than 410,000 of about one million civil servants have participated in the CDM since the coup.
Consolidating the Civil Disobedience Movement
Having witnessed the deadly crackdown and impact of the CDM, the CDMers and tech-savvy youth have resorted to various tactics, including controversial online “Social Punishment” campaigns, to grow and sustain the movement. For the National Unity Government (NUG), an alternative government to the State Administration Council formed by the military, the CDM is perceived as the most important pillar in boosting domestic support; some CDM participants have become leaders of the NUG. The CRPH and civil society organisations have set up networks across the globe to finance CDM participants, despite the military’s strict control over banking systems.
With the assistance of the CDMers, there have been efforts to develop alternative administrative mechanisms to challenge the military’s rule, which are most evident in education and heath sectors. Defectors from the security forces have also been known to conduct training for the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), liaising with others keen to defect, and leaking information about military affairs to the press and the NUG. In Kayah (Karenni) State, groups opposing the coup formed a state police force comprised of 300 CDM police as part of an alternative governing force.
Military’s Responses
Surprised by the impact and popularity of the CDM, the military has used all the tools at its disposal to weaken and co-opt the movement. The military at first only asserted authority through intimidation and warnings via their subordinates and lure the civil servants with promotions and benefits. When the movement grew exponentially, soldiers and police carried out lethal and extra-lethal violence to crackdown on the movement. As of May, more than 140,000 teaching staff were suspended. At least 252 attacks were carried out against healthcare workers and medical facilities, resulting in 25 deaths by 31 July. Hundreds of CDMers and supporters have been charged and more than 70 of their family members have been taken hostage by the military. In mid-August, more than 150 people, including 48 doctors, were still in custody in connection with the CDM and many of them were reportedly sexually abused, beaten, or tortured to death..."
Source/publisher:
New Mandala
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
World attention to Myanmar is waning, despite the deepening impasse between the junta and resistance forces. Major powers should back the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in reinvigorated efforts to relieve the suffering of people facing poverty and disease as well as regime repression.
Description:
"What’s new? A dangerous stalemate has developed between Myanmar’s military regime and resistance forces. Both sides are determined to prevail, but neither seems likely to deliver a knockout blow imminently. With deadly attacks on regime targets and brutal regime retaliation continuing, violence and insecurity will persist across the country.
Why does it matter? The crisis is playing out against a backdrop of deepening economic recession, health system collapse, and surging poverty and food insecurity. In addition to violence and regime oppression, people across Myanmar face a dire humanitarian predicament and long-term development challenges, with serious implications for South East Asia and beyond.
What should be done? Myanmar’s crisis should be a higher priority for Western and Asian governments, which should throw greater weight behind the so-far dysfunctional process led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. External actors urgently need to address the humanitarian emergency without reinforcing regime structures – a political challenge requiring creative diplomacy.
I.
Overview
Since the 1 February coup d’état, Myanmar’s military regime has brutally repressed the population as it tries to quash dissent and consolidate its grip on the country. A broad-based resistance movement is using non-violent and violent means to prevent the junta from succeeding. With no sign that the deadlock will end soon, vulnerable populations face a dire future. In addition to the insecurity, Myanmar’s economy is in freefall, the national currency is crashing, health and education systems have collapsed, poverty rates are estimated to have doubled since 2019, and half of all households cannot afford enough food. Despite the severe situation and the considerable risks associated with having a failed state at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, international attention is waning. Myanmar needs to be a higher foreign policy priority for Western and regional governments, with greater weight thrown behind efforts by the regional bloc, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). An urgent focus should be finding ways to deliver crucial aid – including COVID-19 vaccines – in a way that does not reinforce regime structures.
To date, most foreign governments, as well as the UN Security Council, have been content to leave the international diplomatic response to ASEAN. The ASEAN process, aimed at resolving the political crisis in Myanmar and providing urgent humanitarian assistance, gained initial momentum at a special summit the organisation convened in Jakarta in April 2021, which coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attended. The region’s leaders agreed on a five-point consensus, including an immediate cessation of violence, the delivery of humanitarian aid and the appointment of an ASEAN envoy to facilitate dialogue among all parties concerned. Since then, the process has atrophied, with the bloc taking more than three months to appoint an envoy, who has not been able to visit Myanmar. As a result of the regime’s lack of cooperation, ASEAN leaders decided to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from their 26 October summit.
Meanwhile, the military regime, or State Administration Council, has continued to target its foes as well as their supporters and sympathisers. Its forces routinely carry out summary executions and torture of detainees – including children – and have used heavy weapons heedlessly in attacking cities. UN investigators have stated that these tactics likely constitute crimes against humanity.
In response, the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) in September declared a “people’s defensive war”, calling on civilians across the country to rise up against the regime. While the NUG has no military capability of its own, and its declaration has not led to the hoped-for escalation, resistance forces continue to stage attacks on a daily basis, ambushing military convoys, bombing regime-linked targets and assassinating regime-appointed local officials, suspected informants and others seen as loyal to the ruling junta. The NUG’s efforts to secure diplomatic recognition – including its goal of occupying Myanmar’s seat at the UN – will be complicated by the fact that it has now put its imprimatur on a struggle that includes killing of civilians and use of indiscriminate weapons.
International actors should redouble efforts to address the crisis’s humanitarian and economic fallout.
Outside powers have little room for manoeuvre, with both sides determined to prevail, and therefore showing no interest in any negotiated settlement. Still, international actors should redouble efforts to address the crisis’s humanitarian and economic fallout. ASEAN, while continuing to pursue its five-point plan, should focus in particular on using its access to the generals to help negotiate expanded aid delivery. Other countries should back up their expressions of support for ASEAN with more active reinforcement of the bloc’s efforts. They could, for instance, provide advice and expertise to bolster ASEAN’s diplomatic and humanitarian engagement and help iron out divisions among its member states.
Any international strategy for supporting Myanmar’s population will have to grapple with how to deliver aid at scale without reinforcing regime structures and how best to support civil society organisations without overwhelming their capacity or exposing them to security risks. These tasks will require political discussions with the junta, the NUG and other legitimate representatives as well as de facto local authorities such as ethnic armed groups to secure access, preserve operational space to deliver via non-regime channels and ensure that assistance has the buy-in of beneficiaries. The UN and its new special envoy are probably best placed to take the lead, in close consultation with donors and ASEAN. The rollout of COVID-19 vaccinations will be a key test in determining what is possible.
While it will be hard to de-escalate the conflict or protect civilians at present, international accountability mechanisms have an important role as a deterrent and to keep hope alive that those responsible for atrocities – primarily the military, but also other armed elements – can be brought to justice. Those outside actors engaging with the NUG and other resistance actors should also press them to take action on alleged violations by forces they claim to represent, and provide training and advice to help them do so.
II.
A Deadly Stalemate
Eight months after the coup, the Myanmar junta continues to use violence, intimidation and arbitrary arrests in its efforts to secure its hold on power. To date, it has reportedly killed at least 1,178 demonstrators, dissidents and bystanders, detaining 7,355 more. In addition to small-scale acts of defiance and peaceful protests, locally organised anti-regime militias and underground networks operating in the country’s larger cities (collectively known as “people’s defence forces”) are mounting resistance, including assassinations, improvised explosive device attacks and ambushes of regime targets. On 7 September, the NUG – a parallel administration in hiding, appointed by elected lawmakers ousted in the coup – declared a “people’s defensive war” against the regime, hoping to prompt a major escalation in resistance activity.
With both sides dug in, but neither seemingly strong enough to defeat the other for good, a deadly stalemate has emerged in Myanmar that will likely continue for many months. Meanwhile, the country is suffering severe economic decline, runaway poverty and food insecurity, and terrible strain upon the health system amid a wave of COVID-19 infections.
A.
The Regime’s Brutal “Pacification Campaign”
Since the 1 February coup, the regime has cracked down hard on peaceful protesters, activists and the general population, triggering more violent forms of resistance. In its attempts to smash dissent, disrupt armed resistance and consolidate its grip on power, the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, relies on the following methods:
The regime continues to carry out daytime and night-time raids on communities, detaining dissidents and suspected members of resistance groups, and in some cases arresting family members as hostages if they are unable to locate the person they are looking for. Some targets are summarily executed on site, and those detained are routinely tortured in interrogation centres, sometimes to death. On 2 September, for example, soldiers arrested two men in Sagaing Region’s Shwebo township, beating one to death during the arrest. The other, a 20-year-old, succumbed to his injuries two weeks later.
The military also deploys heavily armed combat battalions to crush urban dissent, using tactics that appear intended to kill as many people as possible. For example, security forces have fired rifle grenades at protest camps and herded unarmed civilians into what in military terminology are known as “kill zones” before starting to shoot. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar – established by the UN to build case files on possible international crimes to facilitate future prosecutions – says its preliminary analysis of information collected about such attacks “indicates that crimes against humanity … have likely been committed” by the Myanmar security forces. The UN human rights office has issued similar findings.
In rural parts of the country where resistance groups are persistent in their attacks, the Tatmadaw has unleashed its pitiless “four cuts” counter-insurgency strategy. Long used by the Myanmar military when battling ethnic armed groups in the uplands, this approach aims to deny rebels four essentials – food, funds, intelligence and recruits – and deliberately targets civilians on the grounds that they are a key support base for insurgency. The security forces are applying this approach against anti-coup militias in ethnic areas such as Kayah and Chin States, as well as against resistance groups in lowlands inhabited by the Burman majority. For example, following a spate of ambushes by militias in Magway Region’s Gangaw township, on 9-10 September the military occupied the area, killing and in some cases torturing to death at least 24 villagers, including teenagers and elders, and burning down about 100 houses.
In addition to the military’s actions, a degree of mobilisation against resistance forces is taking place within communities. In light of the security forces’ inability to protect regime-appointed local administrators, retired soldiers, members of the military-linked Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and others marked for death by resistance groups (see below), regime supporters have formed their own paramilitary networks, known as Pyusawhti groups, particularly in rural areas. Pyusawhti was a semi-mythical king of Bagan, the dynasty that at its height around 1200 was the first to incorporate most of what is now Myanmar. The government used his name in the mid-1950s to describe the auxiliaries it recruited locally to deal with widespread lawlessness and insecurity. The formation of these networks today has raised the prospect of escalated tit-for-tat killings in various localities, with Pyusawhti groups targeting active resistance members and vice versa. There are indications that the regime is arming some of these groups, and some have reportedly fought people’s defence forces alongside regular soldiers.
B.
Violent Resistance to the Coup
In the weeks after the 1 February coup, as the Tatmadaw began its campaign to quash protest and other dissent, many communities and groups of protesters across Myanmar began forming militias to protect themselves from regime violence and launch an armed resistance. Some 250 such groups have emerged over the last six months and are carrying out regular attacks on regime targets. Although numbers are difficult to verify, the NUG claimed in September that popular resistance forces and ethnic armed groups had killed 1,710 regime troops over the preceding three months.
The resistance groups … range from underground urban cells consisting of a few people to large, well-organised militias.
The resistance groups, many of which have the words “defence force” in their names, range from underground urban cells consisting of a few people to large, well-organised militias with hundreds of fighters equipped with modern light arms. Some of these are working closely with – and being trained by – ethnic armed groups. All the resistance groups rely predominantly on asymmetric warfare tactics, including:
Assassinations. Resistance forces have been killing several people per day in recent months, including regime-appointed local administrators, USDP members, security force personnel and alleged informants (known as dalan in Burmese). The regime claims that, as of 9 September, the resistance had murdered 799 such individuals since the coup and injured another 726 in assassination attempts – numbers that are broadly consistent with Crisis Group tallies compiled from independent media reports. On 30 August, for example, an assailant shot dead a village tract administrator in his home in Taungtha township, near Mandalay. The junta had appointed the administrator two months earlier. A local anti-regime militia, the Taungtha Guerilla Task Force, claimed responsibility for the killing.
Improvised explosive devices. Since early April, there have been hundreds of explosions across Myanmar. While some of these incidents have gone unclaimed, the targets and the methods used suggest that anti-regime forces carried out the vast majority. Targets include government and local administration offices and houses, businesses owned by or seen as supportive of the military, homes or businesses of alleged informants, public places (such as city intersections), and police and military posts. In the lead-up to the school year, which began on 1 June, parties unknown planted bombs at schools – in some cases apparently to support an education boycott and in others to attack troops posted or billeted at schools. (For their part, Pyusawhti groups appear to have carried out other bombings aimed at the regime’s political opponents. )
Drive-by shootings and ambushes. As underground resistance cells have gained better training, mostly from ethnic armed groups, and managed to supplement their makeshift arsenals with more modern firearms, they have been conducting more deadly attacks on security forces. In various cities, militants have killed policemen and soldiers manning security posts and checkpoints in drive-by shootings. In rural areas, resistance forces have regularly hit military convoys with roadside bombs, including as part of complex attacks where fighters follow the explosions with small arms fire, causing double-digit death tolls. There have also been a few similar attacks in urban areas. On 9 September, for example, a resistance group threw a bomb into a passing army truck in downtown Yangon, and then engaged in a shootout with surviving soldiers; a major and a private were reportedly killed, and several other troops injured.
Sabotage of critical infrastructure. Resistance groups have also been targeting economic, communications and transport infrastructure deemed important to the regime. They have sabotaged more than 120 cell phone towers since June, most of which were used by MyTel, a company partly owned by the military. Resistance groups have also hit electricity transmission towers, bridges and railway lines. All these targets are soft and dispersed, making them difficult for the regime to guard effectively.
Decisions on who or what constitutes a legitimate target, and what methods and tactics are appropriate, are in the hands of the individual resistance groups, who lack experience or clear criteria for making such judgments. Recognising that abuses could discredit the resistance movement, the NUG has issued guidance, in the form of a brief set of ethical rules in May, followed by one page of disciplinary rules in September. The NUG has no command and control over resistance groups, however, and no obvious way of enforcing compliance. In any case, the rules it laid out are very general, with no explanation of how militants should apply them in real-world situations.
Resistance forces have staged a number of problematic attacks and sometimes failed to prevent harm to bystanders. In these cases, it is rare for any group to admit responsibility. On 25 May, for example, a parcel bomb disguised as a present exploded at the wedding of a well-known nationalist who had reportedly participated in pro-Tatmadaw rallies. He was unharmed, but his bride, cousin and another distant relative were killed while three more people, including two children, were injured. In another example, a bomb that exploded on 14 September in front of the USDP office in Magway town killed a five-year-old child and wounded two other passers-by. Targeting alleged informants carries obvious risks of misidentification or other mishap: in some cases, militants might be acting upon personal grudges or misinformation from third parties.
C.
Socio-economic Crisis
Myanmar’s political turmoil and the resulting violence is taking place against a backdrop of a grave economic crisis, a sharp rise in poverty and food insecurity, a collapsed health system, and a serious COVID-19 outbreak. The junta may be able to insulate itself and its security apparatus from major hardship, but the implications for the population are devastating.
The shock of the coup hit a Myanmar economy already reeling from the global impact of COVID-19.
The shock of the coup hit a Myanmar economy already reeling from the global impact of COVID-19. The World Bank has estimated that the economy will shrink by 18 per cent in the fiscal year to September 2021. Combined with the pandemic’s effects in 2020, this damage will have made the economy shrink by close to a third in less than two years. Myanmar’s currency, the kyat, has lost half its value since the coup, dramatically increasing the cost of imports, such as cooking oil or refined petroleum products, which has a knock-on effect on the price of all goods.
The economic crisis is compounded by the fact that the coping mechanisms Myanmar people typically resort to when faced with economic difficulties, such as rural-urban migration and emigration overseas, are no longer available. Formal sources of employment have dried up, with a collapse in manufacturing, tourism, hospitality, construction and other sectors leading to 1.2 million job losses in the second quarter of 2021. Add these figures to COVID-19’s ravages, and more than 3.2 million people, or 15 per cent of the formal work force, have lost their jobs between the end of 2019 and July 2021, while millions of others have seen their working hours reduced. Women have been disproportionately hurt due in particular to the impact on the garment industry, which employs mostly young women. Border closures and slow economic recovery in destination countries, particularly Thailand, means that heading abroad to work is not feasible. The damage to livelihoods has been extreme, with the number of people in poverty estimated to have doubled since 2019, and around half of households unable to afford sufficient food.
Since the coup, Myanmar’s public health system has fallen apart. Doctors and nurses have been at the forefront of protests and public-sector strikes known as the Civil Disobedience Movement. The security forces have targeted medical staff, emergency responders and private clinics with violence, with the World Health Organization reporting 260 such attacks across the country. The resulting blow to the health-care system has coincided with – and greatly exacerbated – a wave of COVID-19 that has killed thousands since July. The collapse, combined with a general loss of public trust in regime-controlled services, has also severely disrupted routine childhood immunisation, as well as testing and treatment for communicable diseases including malaria, tuberculosis and HIV – putting many lives at risk and threatening a setback to global efforts to combat these illnesses.
III.
Future Trajectory
A.
The Regime’s Political Roadmap
On 1 August 2021, exactly six months after the coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing provided details of the regime’s political roadmap. He announced the formation of a “caretaker government” with himself in the new position of prime minister and most sitting ministers, who were appointed shortly after the coup, remaining in place. Six weeks later, for reasons it did not explain, the junta renamed the caretaker government as a “union government” (the standard usage in Myanmar). The State Administration Council (SAC) remains the ultimate decision-making authority, meaning that Min Aung Hlaing has given himself both the head of state (SAC chairman) and head of government (prime minister) positions.
In the same 1 August speech, Min Aung Hlaing announced that elections would be held and power transferred by 1 August 2023 – presumably with him as civilian president. The regime’s timetable for holding new elections has thus slipped from the “one to two years” announced at the time of the coup to two and a half years. While the coup itself was unconstitutional, this extended period is longer than the two-year maximum for a state of emergency set out in the constitutional provision that the junta invoked to justify the military takeover.
It seems clear that the military intends to refashion the electoral landscape to ensure a result amenable to … its interests.
It now seems clear that the military intends to refashion the electoral landscape to ensure a result amenable to what it perceives as its interests. In detention since the coup, Aung San Suu Kyi, the 76-year-old former head of government, faces a raft of charges that could see her sentenced to up to 75 years of prison. The regime-appointed election commission has suggested that the state will dissolve her National League for Democracy party, which won the November 2020 polls with 82 per cent of the elected seats, due to unsupported allegations of fraud. The junta and its election commission have also talked regularly about changing the electoral system from first-past-the-post, which has delivered large majorities to victors in nearly all Myanmar’s elections since colonial times, to a more proportional system that would likely prevent any party from winning big, allowing the military to dominate a fractured legislature. This change would seem to require altering the constitution, requiring a referendum, but the regime-appointed election commission has recently stated that no constitutional amendment is needed.
The regime has shown no inclination toward dialogue.
The regime has shown no inclination toward dialogue as a way out of the crisis that the country is facing. It has designated the NUG a “terrorist” organisation, stated that it will not negotiate with terrorists and demanded that outside actors – such as the ASEAN special envoy – refrain from engaging with the parallel administration. Rather, the regime is attempting to use violence and intimidation to bring the country to heel. It appears determined to crush the resistance as quickly as possible and move ahead with its political roadmap without compromise. Through mass arrests and interrogations, it appears to have improved its intelligence on its adversaries, leading to a number of arrests in September that have disrupted resistance cells, although to what degree is unclear.
The junta’s timeframe could, however, still stumble. In light of the great challenges it faces, and considering that some of the steps will not only be difficult but may provoke unrest given the regime’s tenuous authority in many parts of the country, it is possible that the regime will not be able to meet its self-declared August 2023 deadline for returning power to civilians. In any case, a shift from direct military rule to an elected pro-military government with Min Aung Hlaing as president would do little to assuage public anger or placate the resistance movement. Despite its efforts to quash dissent and apply a veneer of legitimacy to its rule, the military is likely to face more resistance, both non-violent and violent.
B.
The Resistance Forces
While the regime is focused on repression and rolling out its political roadmap, resistance forces continue their efforts to disrupt these plans and deny the junta the ability to rule. Locally organised networks, some of which are cooperating closely with ethnic armed groups, are carrying most of this load. On 7 September, in an effort to lend further momentum to these actions, the NUG declared a “people’s defensive war”, calling on the population “in every corner of the country” to rise up against the military regime. Since then, resistance activities have continued to expand in some areas, but have not escalated dramatically nationwide.
The NUG hopes to develop its military and bureaucratic capabilities to be able to control territory and administer populations, but so far these aims remain aspirational. It has released a $700 million budget, including $300 million for mass COVID-19 vaccination, and large allocations for supporting striking public-sector workers. The parallel legislative body, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), issued a tax law for the fiscal year from October. But the NUG’s ability to raise tax revenue and execute its budget remains extremely limited due to its lack of administrative and territorial sway. These announcements are therefore more about projecting legitimacy than actual governance. Similarly, the war declaration allowed the NUG to demonstrate agency at a time when there were signs that people were increasingly perceiving it as “all talk and no action”.
That declaration, which gave the NUG’s imprimatur to the actions of independent resistance groups, received a wary international reaction. It was not the first instance when the parallel administration publicly backed violent resistance. The CRPH first endorsed armed revolution a month after the coup, in March 2021. The NUG then announced on 5 May its intention to form an armed wing, which remains a work in progress. While many people in Myanmar welcomed the 7 September war declaration enthusiastically, the international response was lukewarm. The British ambassador in Yangon tweeted that his country “supports peaceful efforts to restore democracy”, warning that “further violence will harm vulnerable communities”; a State Department spokesperson said the United States “does not condone violence as a solution to the current crisis” and “calls on all sides to remain peaceful”.
The NUG’s declaration came as the UN General Assembly was about to get under way in New York and needed to decide which competing set of credentials – those of the NUG or those of the regime – to accept. The parallel government has denied that it timed its declaration with the aim of influencing the credentials debate, but regardless of whether it did, the call for war has complicated its diplomatic efforts. Inevitably, the NUG will be now be seen as a party to a conflict, rather than a purely political entity. Despite its efforts to come up with a code of conduct for resistance forces, it also risks being perceived as endorsing tactics that have included the killing of civilians and the use of indiscriminate weapons.
The question of who represents Myanmar at the UN remains unresolved. Ahead of the General Assembly, the U.S. and China reached a deal, backed by other key states, that the UN would take no decision until at least October on the competing credentials submitted by the NUG and the regime. The deal allowed the incumbent Permanent Representative of Myanmar in New York, who was appointed by the Aung San Suu Kyi administration and has backed the NUG, to remain in place for the moment, on the understanding that he will keep a low profile, in particular by refraining from speaking at the high-level debate.
IV.
What Can International Actors Do?
There is no end in sight to the deadly stalemate that has emerged in Myanmar, suggesting that civil strife will continue to roil the country for months, if not years to come. With both sides focused on defeating the other, there appears to be very little room for dialogue about a negotiated solution.
The outside world has little space or capacity to address the central political crisis and shows waning interest in Myanmar’s plight. The crisis has dropped far down the international agenda, partly due to other global priorities – COVID-19, Tigray, Afghanistan – and partly because most governments have concluded that they have little leverage in Myanmar and that while ruinous for the country, the current turmoil will have limited ramifications abroad. The UN special envoy, Christine Burgener, has been increasingly vocal, but she still has not been able to visit Myanmar since the coup and the regime has repeatedly rebuffed her efforts to kickstart dialogue. As a result, diplomatic efforts to address the crisis in Myanmar have largely been left to ASEAN.
ASEAN’s efforts, notably a special summit it convened in April attended by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, have gained little traction. The summit saw leaders agree upon a five-point consensus, including a call for an immediate cessation of violence, the appointment of an ASEAN envoy to facilitate dialogue among the parties and the delivery of humanitarian aid from ASEAN member states. But immediately on his return to Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing began walking back commitments he had made at the summit. There was no reduction in regime violence.
Divisions among other ASEAN members then delayed the appointment of an envoy by another three months – Brunei’s second minister for foreign affairs, Erywan Yusof, took on the role only in August. He has not been able to visit Myanmar, as the regime has not consented to his precondition that he have access to Aung San Suu Kyi. As a result of Myanmar’s lack of cooperation and failure to implement the five-point consensus, ASEAN leaders decided to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from their 26 October summit, triggering an indignant response from the regime. Erywan has signalled that his position will rotate as the yearly ASEAN chairmanship moves from Brunei to Cambodia for 2022, giving him only a few more weeks in the job.
Despite its clear limitations, which largely stem from the body’s consensus-based non-interference approach and its internal divisions, other international actors seem content to outsource the global diplomatic response to ASEAN. The UN Security Council has repeatedly expressed its support for the ASEAN process, as have its permanent members and many other countries and groupings, including the G7 and the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.). Beyond public statements, however, none of these countries or groupings have provided tangible support to ASEAN in carrying out this role. The continued expressions of support appear to stem more from an unwillingness on the part of these countries to address the problem themselves, rather than any conviction that the ASEAN process can achieve meaningful results.
Action to address the crisis in Myanmar must start with recognition that the situation warrants greater international attention. Myanmar is a failed state in the heart of the Indo-Pacific, with a health system in tatters, a dysfunctional COVID-19 response, a massive humanitarian emergency unfolding and a crumbling economy. Its troubles will not stay within its borders: they are likely to be a significant regional and global challenge, due to public health concerns, refugee flows and security issues, particularly in the form of the drug trade and other illicit activities. There is also no prospect of resolution to the Rohingya refugee crisis as long as Myanmar’s predicament persists.
Aid delivery [to Myanmar] is fraught with difficulties … but [this] should not lead donors to give up on the Myanmar people.
While international actors, including ASEAN, have limited leverage for now to address the political crisis and its violent manifestations, they should redouble efforts to address the humanitarian and economic fallout. The extent of damage to the economy and social service delivery means that the prognosis for Myanmar’s population is grim in the near to mid-term future. Supporting vulnerable people through the extremely tough months and years to come must be a priority for the outside world. At present, to be sure, aid delivery is fraught with difficulties, including potential aid diversion and the risk of giving undue recognition to the junta. But these problems should not lead donors to give up on the Myanmar people or limit their interventions to small-scale humanitarian projects. More attention and creative diplomacy can play a critical role.
International actors should thus throw greater weight behind ASEAN’s process. While ASEAN should continue pursuing its five-point plan, its prospects for addressing the political turmoil are limited. It does have one of the few channels with some access to the generals, however, which can also play a role in negotiating expanded aid delivery. If ASEAN as the regional grouping is considered best placed to lead the charge, other countries should more actively reinforce its diplomacy. They could, for example, provide advice and expertise to ASEAN to reinforce its diplomacy and humanitarian engagement. They could also work more closely with ASEAN member states themselves, in part to help overcome divisions among them that have slowed the momentum of the process. While Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines have been pushing for a more robust ASEAN intervention, other member states such as Vietnam and Thailand are wary of applying too much pressure on the Myanmar junta, for fear of harming their own interests, and arguing that isolating Myanmar would be counterproductive for ASEAN.
An effective aid strategy will need to address several complex issues. First is how and when it is appropriate to engage state structures. While working through the regime or its ministries is out of the question other than in exceptional cases, it will be difficult, for example, to restore childhood vaccinations and treatment for infectious diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis without dealing with public-sector hospitals and clinics. Second is how to support civil society organisations consistent with their own priorities while being conscious of constraints and risks they face. Those groups that have navigated the enormous security and logistical difficulties of delivering aid risk being swamped with funds that donors are desperate to spend, or having to comply with bureaucratic and documentation requirements that can put beneficiaries at risk by not accounting for the fact that aid must often be delivered discreetly. Last is how to deliver cross-border assistance in a way that takes account of political sensitivities in neighbouring states, particularly Thailand, which does not want to anger the Myanmar regime.
Working out how to support vulnerable people without inadvertently reinforcing repressive regime structures or putting implementing partners or recipients at risk will be no small challenge. Donors might be able to draw some lessons from places like North Korea, Syria and now Afghanistan, though any solutions will have to be tailored to Myanmar itself. Aid delivery in Myanmar in the 1990s and 2000s offers lessons: for example, supporting civil society organisations with flexible small grants, achieving scale through multi-donor funds separate from government structures and reaching populations through cross-border delivery. That said, such approaches will need to be updated to factor in crucial differences today in the regime’s nature (it has not managed to consolidate control and sees aid as more of a threat), external leverage (diminished even from the low levels it was at back then) and regional politics (with Thailand, for example, having far closer relations with the regime than in the 1990s).
Apart from immediate humanitarian aid, long-term support for public health, education and livelihoods will be essential, as will other forms of assistance to civil society, such as protections for journalists, legal counsel for dissidents, and funding and other support for local organisations working on gender, human rights and environmental issues.
Overcoming the obstacles is a fundamentally political challenge. Progress inevitably requires political discussions with the regime to get visas, access and other permissions; and with the NUG and other legitimate representatives, as well as de facto authorities, such as ethnic armed groups, in parts of the country where the junta has little clout, to secure access, preserve operational space to deliver via non-regime partners and ensure that beneficiaries see the assistance as legitimate. Any negotiation is likely to be strewn with pitfalls. Still, discussions on these essential issues are, for now, more likely to bear fruit than efforts to tackle the political crisis.
While ASEAN’s role is important and the body has an explicit mandate for humanitarian aid in the five-point consensus, the UN, given its expertise, is the most appropriate body to coordinate the actual delivery of assistance, in close consultation with ASEAN and donor countries. The new UN special envoy for Myanmar, who is expected to be named imminently, can have a critical role to play in these efforts alongside the UN Secretariat and the incoming resident coordinator, whose appointment is urgent. The UN’s planned rollout of COVID-19 vaccinations will provide an important early test case for these efforts.
Finally, while the regime is unlikely to be steered off its repressive path, it is vital to support international accountability mechanisms – both for any deterrent effect they may have and for ensuring that those responsible for atrocities can be held to account in the future. For example, countries should provide legal support to The Gambia in its genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice and consider joining the case; and provide diplomatic, practical and funding support to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
Outside powers should stress the importance of preventing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by resistance groups.
Similarly, outside powers should stress the importance of preventing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by resistance groups when engaging with the NUG and others arrayed against the junta. It is crucial that the NUG, ethnic armed groups and people’s defence forces issue stronger guidance to their forces, promptly investigate alleged violations and publicise the findings, take action against perpetrators and provide remedies, possibly including reparations to victims of abuses. Countries or organisations with access and ability to do so should provide all necessary training, capacity building and assistance in this regard.
V.
Conclusion
The Tatmadaw and resistance forces are locked in a violent stalemate that shows no sign of abating. The regime has stepped up raids and arrests to disrupt urban guerrilla activity, and is continuing brutal attacks on communities in areas where armed resistance groups operate. The resistance continues its efforts to prevent the generals from consolidating control, through ambushes of military convoys, bombings of regime targets and assassination of individuals associated with the junta. With both sides determined to prevail, the room for a negotiated solution is extremely limited.
This deadlock is having a catastrophic impact on the lives and livelihoods of Myanmar’s people. The economy is in freefall, health and education services have collapsed, and rates of poverty and food insecurity are surging. The country is in dire straits and its plight will have serious implications for South East Asia and beyond. In addition to efforts to address the political crisis and associated violence, there is an urgent need for international actors to support vulnerable populations through the arduous months and years to come. Achieving this end is a political challenge that requires deft diplomatic engagement from states and the UN. Myanmar needs to remain a priority for the outside world..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
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Description:
"Introduction
Nine months since a military coup, the future of Myanmar remains uncertain. Despite a brutal crackdown, millions of people continue to resist the military junta that seized power, both through civil disobedience and armed resistance. What is certain is that a humanitarian and displacement catastrophe has engulfed the country and is likely to get worse. Myanmar's neighbors and leading donors of humanitarian aid, including the United States, cannot allow the complex domestic, regional, and geo-political dynamics preventing resolution of the ongoing violence to prevent the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need---nor refuge to those fleeing for their lives.
Since February 1, 2021, the military leaders responsible for decades of repression of minority groups and genocide against the Rohingya have expanded their abuses to target all citizens of Myanmar who oppose their power grab. The junta's actions have resulted in the killing of more than 1,100 civilians and the forcible displacement of more than 200,000 people, and have left an estimated 3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The junta continues its attacks on civilians, which includes the targeting of health workers and the blocking of aid---in the midst of economic failure and the COVID-19 pandemic---virtually guaranteeing a worsening crisis likely to continue to spill over to countries throughout the region.
The junta's actions have also dissolved any hopes of return for those displaced by previous violence by the military. Some 1 million Rohingya refugees remain in trying conditions in Bangladesh, living in the largest refugee settlement in the world. Hundreds of thousands of other ethnic minorities from Myanmar remain in Malaysia and Thailand, and thousands more have recently fled to India.
The nature of the atrocities committed by the military junta and the trajectory of the humanitarian and displacement crises demand regional and global attention. Yet, torn by competing interests, the UN Security Council and regional powers, led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have failed to act decisively to address the crisis in Myanmar. Coordinated targeted sanctions, a global arms embargo, and further efforts at accountability are sorely needed. But even as the struggle continues to push actors like China, Russia, and ASEAN countries to address the roots of the crisis, more must be done immediately to mitigate the humanitarian catastrophe engulfing the country and affecting the region.
An effective response must start with Myanmar's neighbors holding up global standards of refugee protection and non-refoulement---permitting access to those fleeing for their lives and not returning them to a country where they would not be safe. With the support of global donors, Myanmar's neighbors must also immediately mobilize and facilitate the delivery of aid across borders in coordination with local organizations and ethnic groups controlling border areas. Coordinated global pressure must also be brought to bear on the military junta in Myanmar to demand an end to atrocities, including attacks on health and aid workers, and to secure unfettered access for humanitarian relief.
The United States should press ASEAN governments and the members of the UN Security Council to take a stronger stance, but not wait to do so itself. It should simultaneously coordinate increased pressure on the junta through a global coalition of like-minded states, including more forward leaning ASEAN countries. Major donor countries must also continue humanitarian support and increase responsibility sharing with countries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand that are hosting those who fled previous persecution at the hands of Myanmar's military. This should include ensuring meaningful access to refuge and resettling refugees, while at the same time urging host countries to permit access to those fleeing violence and to change restrictive refugee policies.
The tragedy in Myanmar is far from over. While complex geo-political dynamics may prevent broader measures from being taken to address its root causes, actions to provide humanitarian aid and refuge for those fleeing for their lives need not and must not wait..."
Source/publisher:
Refugees International
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations, COVID-19 (Coronavirus)
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Description:
"On 19 October 2021, the military coup council released over 5000 detainees, who were
unjustly arrested and detained. Together with the family members and friends, Women's
League of Burma (WLB) is very delighted for the release of Daw Thin Thin Aung, who was
arrested on 8 April 2021.
WLB would like to express our gratitude to all our friends and supporters, national and
international organizations and individuals who painstakingly campaign for the release of
Daw Thin Thin Aung & other women's human rights defenders, and the unjustly arrested. We
acknowledge your support and solidarity efforts for us.
Special thanks are to Asia Pacific Forum for Women, Law & Development (APWLD), Nobel
Women's Initiative (NWI), Amnesty International (AI), Melanne Verveer, the executive
director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security at Georgetown
University & Human rights lawyer and author Nandita Haksar.
WLB urges friends and supporters around the world, national and international organizations
and individuals to continue your encouragement and solidarity campaigns for the release of
the remaining detainees unjustly arrested, the elimination of all kinds of dictatorship
including military dictatorship, and our movement to establish federal democratic union
which guarantees self-determination, equality, peace and justice..."
Source/publisher:
Women's League of Burma
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Women's rights, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Burmese women's organisations
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"This is the joint press release statement by the Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs and the Ministry of Human Rights Affairs on the report which highlights the situation of violence against women committed by security forces of the State Administration Council in the period of eighth months (up to September) since the beginning of coup on February 1.
Women of Myanmar are facing grave danger and violation of their rights under the military regime. The report aims to reveal the regime’s oppression against women, to hold SAC accountable for its inhumane abuses, and to promote and protect women rights..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights and Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Discrimination/violence against women: reports of violations in Burma, Women's rights
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Sub-title:
Statement on the release of the report of the State Administration Council (SAC)’s security forces’ violation of women rights during conflict
Description:
"စစ်တပ်မှအာဏာသိမ်းလိုက်သည့် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ၊ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ စက်တင်ဘာလထိ ၈ လတာ ကာလအတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် စစ်တပ်မှ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် အမျိုးသမီးအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှု အခြေအနေများကိုတင်ပြထားသည့် အစီရင်ခံစာကို အမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်နှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်ရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့ပူးပေါင်း၍ ယနေ့ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။
စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်ထက်တွင် အမျိုးသမီးထုသည် အသက်ဘေးရင်ဆိုင်နေရခြင်းများအပြင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးကိုလည်း ကျူးလွန်ခံနေရပါသည်။ နိုင်ထက်စီးနင်းပြုကျင့်ခံနေသည့် အမျိုးသမီးထု၏ ဆုံးရှုံးနစ်နာမှုများကို ဖော်ထုတ်တင်ပြရန်၊ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ တပ်များ၏ လူမဆန်သည့်ကျူးလွန်မှုများကို ထိရောက်စွာအရေးယူနိုင်ရန်၊ အမျိုးသမီးထု၏ အခွင့်အရေးကို ထိရောက်စွာ ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်နိုင်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ ဤအစီရင်ခံစာကို ပြုစုထုတ်ပြန်ရခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights and Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Discrimination/violence against women: reports of violations in Burma, Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group, Women's rights
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Sub-title:
Dr Aung Moe Nyo is facing two charges of corruption, each accompanied by up to 15 years in prison if he is convicted, after already being sentenced to two years for incitement
Description:
"The military council filed a second corruption charge against Dr Aung Moe Nyo, the detained Magway Region chief minister under the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, on Monday.
Facing the same charge are Magway’s minister for social welfare, Dr Khin Maung Aye, and Tin Nwe Oo, the regional minister for transportation and construction, according to their lawyer.
“The military filed charges against the three of them for alleged misconduct in the tenders regarding the construction of Magway Education College in 2020,” Aung Naing, the group’s lawyer, said.
The junta accused the trio in June of costing the government nearly 54m kyat ($28,727) when they allegedly selected a company for the project in a manner that was not in accordance with tender regulations.
“We still haven’t received copies of the documents or the evidence submitted by the prosecution for the new corruption charge. Our request is that his trial continue only after the court has approved [our request] to obtain those documents,” the lawyer said.
Another charge was filed against the 63-year-old chief minister and NLD central executive committee member under Section 55 of the Anti-Corruption Law on June 23. The statute states that those in political office who are convicted of bribery face a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison, as well as a fine.
The junta’s previous corruption charge is linked to the allegation that Aung Moe Nyo accepted 50m kyat (US$26,540) from the Denko Petrol Company and subsequently provided the company with land on which to construct a petrol station, according to Aung Naing.
On June 8, the chief minister was also given a two-year prison sentence for incitement charges filed against him by the junta for allegedly violating Section 505b of the Penal Code.
Multiple NLD chief ministers who are also members of the party’s central executive committee have been charged by the junta with corruption and incitement in recent months.
Aung Moe Nyo’s legal team has only able to meet with him during his court hearings, since they have not been granted permission to speak with their client privately, Aung Naing said.
The lawyer explained that during his brief discussions with the chief minister at the hearings, his client had told him that the money in question—50m kyat—was spent on the development of Magway Region.
“He is not guilty as he did not use the money for his own personal use. He only used it for the wellbeing of the community,” Aung Naing told Myanmar Now.
Aung Moe Nyo was placed under house arrest after the February 1 coup that ousted the elected NLD administration. He was moved to Magway Prison after he livestreamed his opposition to the coup on social media from house arrest.
Although there have been rumours that Aung Moe Nyo was also facing charges under Section 25 of the Disaster Management Law, his lawyer told Myanmar Now that he had not been charged under the statute in court..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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Local URL:
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Sub-title:
The announcement follows the bloc’s decision to bar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, citing a lack of cooperation.
Description:
"Myanmar will send a “non-political, high-level” envoy to next week’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit, an official said Tuesday, after the bloc barred junta chief Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing from attending, citing a lack of cooperation by the military regime.
Junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun told RFA’s Myanmar Service that an official from the foreign ministry will attend the three-day summit, which kicks off on Oct. 26 in Brunei, after getting the green light from ASEAN representatives. He declined to provide the name and position of the envoy.
The announcement follows a decision by ASEAN foreign ministers at an emergency meeting on Oct. 15 to deny Min Aung Hlaing a seat at the table for next week’s gathering because he had reneged on implementing steps to restore peace and democracy following the military’s Feb. 1 coup, as reported by BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated online news service.
The bloc also cited the junta’s refusal to allow ASEAN special envoy Erywan Yusof access to detained former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders of the deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) government.
Min Aung Hlaing had agreed to allow the special envoy meet with all stakeholders as part of a five-point consensus reached at an ASEAN meeting in April that was called to discuss the post-coup situation in Myanmar. Yusof, who was appointed on Aug. 4, canceled his trip to Myanmar this week after being refused the meetings.
In response to last week’s decision, Myanmar’s junta issued a statement alleging the decision was taken without all members’ agreement—ASEAN decides on issues and actions based on consensus.
On Monday, in an emergency address, Min Aung Hlaing said Yusuf’s demands were a “not negotiable,” but that his government would cooperate “as much as possible.”
“The ASEAN special envoy’s visit to Myanmar is still under discussion due to various proposals,” he said.
“A country is governed jointly by the legislature and the judiciary. Apart from special laws issued as required, the two bodies must make everything work in unison. The demands of the ASEAN envoy are not negotiable. In any case, our country is a member of ASEAN, and we will do our best.”
Min Aung Hlaing blamed the international community for pressuring the military, while remaining silent about “violence” committed by the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), Parliament’s Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Committee of Representatives (CRPH), and the anti-junta People’s Defense Force militia.
Ruined credibility
In the more than eight months since the coup, security forces have killed 1,181 civilians and arrested at least 7,190, according to the Bangkok-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners—mostly during crackdowns on anti-junta protests.
The junta says it unseated the NLD government because, they claimed, the party had engineered a landslide victory in Myanmar’s November 2020 election through widespread voter fraud. It has yet to present evidence of its claims and public unrest is at an all-time high.
On Monday, the junta released 5,636 political prisoners in what observers said was a bid to ease pressure from ASEAN and the international community—claims Zaw Min Tun denied.
Speaking to RFA on Tuesday, political analyst Dr. Sai Kyi Zin Soe said it would be best for the junta to comply with ASEAN demands after ruining its credibility by going back on its promises.
“I don’t think it will be easy now for the junta to act as it wants while trying to make the international community accept it, so now things depend on how many international requests it will accept,” he said.
“It hasn't accepted any yet. If it continues to refuse to agree to implement the five points previously agreed upon, ASEAN might impose some kind of action or punishment, which it has never done before.”
Call for dialogue
Moe Thuzar, an expert on ASEAN affairs, said the bloc had stepped up its diplomatic pressure because it wants to give a stern warning to the junta not to take advantage of its cooperation, despite a long-standing relationship with the military.
“ASEAN has led the international community to support recommendations in the hope of bringing about a positive outcome in Myanmar,” she said.
“In this situation, ASEAN will not decide on an excessive action that might break mutual ties. But ASEAN might take a firmer stand to make sure its constructive approach is not taken advantage of.”
However, she added that pressure was unlikely to result in the junta making any immediate changes to its attitude or holding a meaningful political dialogue anytime soon. She said ASEAN and the international community “still need to do more” to push the junta on holding talks.
Kyaw Htwe, a member of the NLD Central Committee and a former member of parliament for Zabu Thiri township, said it is imperative that all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, be released before meaningful political talks could be held.
“A positive and open dialogue for the good of the country needs to be inclusive,” he said.
“For the talks to be truly meaningful, all current detainees must be released unconditionally, and all legitimate political parties must be able to function without disrupting the political process.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-20
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Type:
Individual Documents
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"A final-year engineering student who led anti-regime protests in Naypyitaw and Mandalay has died in military custody, his friends told The Irrawaddy.
Ko Lin Paing Soe, a Buddhist Gurkha student from Kyaukse Technological University, was tortured because of his ethnicity and died on his first night in custody, said his friend, who is a member of Mandalay Yadanabon University student union.
“We only just learned that he died. He died soon after he was detained on Sept. 30. He was beaten because he was non-Burmese and died in interrogation. The regime said he was sent to Obo Prison in Mandalay, which was a lie,” he told The Irrawaddy.
Ko Lin Paing Soe led protests in Mandalay and Naypyitaw and was detained with two classmates and a striking nurse when junta forces in Mandalay raided the houses of protest leaders on Sept. 30.
They were beaten by junta soldiers while being taken away, said another friend.
He said a military source says they were taken to Mandalay Palace and interrogated the whole night.
“I was told [soldiers] used racially and religiously offensive language against Ko Lin Paing Soe during interrogation and he was beaten inhumanely,” said his friend.
His death was only revealed on Monday. “It is the inhumanity of the fascist military. Besides jailing civilians, they are killing people and covering up the deaths. Ko Lin Paing Soe’s family should have been told about his death,” said his friend.
The military regime has used live ammunition on peaceful protesters and rammed them with vehicles. It has detained thousands of anti-regime activists and striking government employees.
Non-Buddhists, LGBT people, student union members and National League for Democracy supporters were reportedly subjected to harsher torture during interrogation..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
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Local URL:
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Description:
"Some political prisoners freed by the junta on Monday were rearrested on the same day and charged under the terrorism law, their colleagues said.
Myanmar’s regime released over 5,600 people, most of whom were arrested and facing trial for participating in anti-junta protests. As of Saturday, more than 7,300 people had been detained by the junta since the coup.
In Mandalay Region’s Meiktila town, 11 of 38 political prisoners released were apprehended by police after walking out of Meiktila Prison. Those rearrested were an elected lawmaker from the National League for Democracy (NLD), other NLD members, and political activists including members of the ’88 Generation students movement.
NLD sources said on Tuesday morning that the 11 would be charged under sections 50A and 52J of the Counterterrorism Law for attempted terrorism and having contact with terrorist groups. If found guilty, they could be sentenced to up to seven years in prison.
Sources at the Mandalay branch of the NLD said U Lwin Maung Maung, who was elected to the Mandalay regional parliament in 2020 on the NLD ticket, was taken by the police at around 6 p.m. in Mandalay.
“I saw Ko Lwin [U Lwin Maung Maung] at the prison gate but police took him to the No. 1 Police Station near Meiktila Prison right after his release and some were arrested before arriving home,” said a source who was in front of the prison at the time.
U Lwin Mg Mg was first arrested in late April and charged with sedition under Section 505-A of the Penal Code, which carries a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisoment.
The Irrawaddy could not reach police for comment.
Monday’s amnesty came right after ASEAN’s exclusion of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing from the group’s upcoming summit for his regime’s failure to collaborate with the regional bloc’s efforts to resolve Myanmar’s post-coup political crisis. The junta said the prisoners were freed on humanitarian grounds, but many believe the amnesty on Monday was the regime’s attempt to appease 10-member ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a member.
Previously, the regime announced mass amnesties in February and April..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
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Description:
"A National League for Democracy (NLD) official and other party members, around a dozen journalists, student activists, a writer, a comedian and a few striking civil servants were among those released under Monday’s amnesty order.
Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing on Monday announced the regime’s decision to free over 1,300 people jailed for participating in anti-coup protests and more than 4,300 detainees who were facing trial on incitement charges for their anti-regime activism.
The amnesty followed an announcement by ASEAN that Min Aung Hlaing would not be invited to its annual summit later this month after the regional bloc’s call to end the ongoing violence in Myanmar in April was ignored.
NLD information secretary released
Monywa Aung Shin’s wife, Daw Kay Thwe Moe, told The Irrawaddy the detained politician returned to the family on Monday evening.
Monywa Aung Shin was arrested by regime forces at his home in Yangon’s Tamwe Township at around 4:30 a.m. on Feb. 1, the day the junta overthrew the democratically elected NLD-led government.
He was one of around 150 senior NLD leaders and Central Executive Committee members, prominent activists, writers and monks who were arrested on the first day of the coup.
Since then, the whereabouts and condition of the 76-year-old politician had remained unknown to the family until his release.
In an interview with local media outlet DVB news, Monywa Aung Shin said he was kept at a military interrogation center in Mingalardon Township and no charge was filed against him, despite his being detained for over eight months.
Several NLD members and elected lawmakers remain in detention. And some of those who were included on the release list on Monday were rearrested for allegedly having connections with the parallel National Unity Government, its parliamentary committee and the People’s Defense Force, according to sources.
The junta has brought several charges, from bribery to incitement, against NLD leaders including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint, chief ministers and the party’s elected parliamentary speakers.
Some journalists freed
As of late Tuesday afternoon, the release of around a dozen journalists had been confirmed. Those included three journalists from Myitkyina Journal, one each from 74 Media and Kachin Wave, three from DVB who were sentenced to prison terms, and three from Mizzima including its co-founder Ma Thin Thin Aung and one reporter from Mon State.
Ko Aung Kyaw, the recently released DVB reporter, said that during his detention he was interrogated and tortured, and also forced to labor in prison, according to DVB.
He was violently arrested on March 1 after he livestreamed police and soldiers shooting at houses and destroying possessions of civilians during their crackdown. He also reported that a pregnant woman in Myeik had been beaten and her home looted by security forces.
He was convicted of incitement and sentenced to two years in June. He said that more than a hundred dissidents remained in Myeik Prison.
Writer, comedian released
Well-known comedian U Zaganar was also released on Monday, according to his friends. The comedian, who was in and out of prison under the previous military regime for his pro-democracy activism following the 1988 uprising, was detained at his home in Tamwe Township, Yangon Region in April. No reason has been given for his abduction this time.
Writer and media trainer Ma Tu Tu Tha and a member of her family who were arrested at their home in Thanlynn Township in Yangon were released on Tuesday. According to local residents, soldiers and police searched her house and arrested four, including her son, brother and one of their friends during an overnight guest inspection.
Activists among the released
According to a local media report, two ethnic Kachin youth political activists, Lum Zawng and Seng Nu Pan, were released from Myitkyina Prison on Tuesday.
Ma Shwe Yupar Linn, Ko Lin Htet, Ko Kyaw Min Tun and Ko Soe Htet Oo from the University Students Unions Alumni Force were also freed from Insein Prison on Tuesday after six months of detention for their anti-regime activism.
Junta tactic
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), an activist group recording killings and arrests of junta forces, more than 9,000 people have been arrested since the coup.
The group described the detainees’ release as a tactic of the junta to stop international condemnation.
“These releases will not end the coup,” the AAPP said in a recent report.
The group called for the unconditional release of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and all political prisoners, and the restoration of the democratically elected leaders to their positions.
As of Oct. 18, at least 1,181 people had been killed by junta forces and 131 had been tortured to death, according to the AAPP.
“Action must be taken against those who committed arbitrary arrests and torture. Moreover, the junta must take full responsibility as perpetrators, apologize and institute reparations for those arbitrarily detained and physically and mentally tortured,” the AAPP said.
The 5,600-odd people freed under Monday’s amnesty were warned that if they are rearrested they will have to serve the rest of their original sentences, as well as any additional sentence. “If they commit crimes again, they will have to serve the remaining sentences in addition [to the old one],” said a junta statement accompanying the prisoner release.
UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews said in a statement released after the announcement of the amnesty that the release of detainees is clearly not because the junta has had a change of heart, but because of the pressure on it.
He urged sustained pressure to deny the junta money, weapons and legitimacy, saying this is the best way the international community can support the people of Myanmar, as the arbitrary arrest and persecution of those exercising their fundamental human rights continues..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"Lu Nge Khit, the era of youth, is a small media organisation formed by young journalists in Myanmar on Monday, 13 September, when they held their very first newsroom meeting. The founding group of journalists, from a variety of backgrounds, all shared a desire to unite and create a new platform to fill the huge information void left by the military coup on 1 February. A string of subsequent measures inflicted on the people by the Tatmadaw, first as the “State Administration Council” and now as a “Caretaker Government” have stymied access to information across the country.
Soon after Senior General Min Aung Hlaing fronted the cameras on 8 February, seemingly confused at the millions-strong rejection of his poorly thought-out grab, the Tatmadaw began increasing murders, detentions and other attacks on civilians and peaceful protesters, and banned existing media houses, starting with those most extensively covering the anti-coup protests. The Tatmadaw raided offices, explicitly targeted journalists for abduction and tortured them on the street and in shadow detention centres.
The Detained Journalists Information Group and Reporting ASEAN has counted a total of 102 journalists arrested, of whom 48 are still detained, including American Danny Fenster. Four media houses have been charged under Section 505 (a) of the Penal Code and seven media houses have had their publishing licenses revoked. Although some organisations have managed to relocate staff to areas in the country outside of the Tatmadaw’s control and continue reporting, others, such as 7 Day News Journal and The Voice Daily, have completely ceased their operations. Myanmar is now “the country without newspapers”: for the last seven months since March 17, 2021, Myanmar has not had a single independent print newspaper in publication.
Since 1 February, as the Tatmadaw’s horrific subjugation of the nation’s people has increased, so has public access to information decreased. After initially imposing nationwide internet blackouts, the Tatmadaw has shifted to employing strategic township-level blackouts, with 25 townships still affected this month. Some of the military’s most egregious crimes and massacres in rural areas take place under these blackouts.
One consequence of increasing challenges to accessing information is a rise in the spread of propaganda, “fake news”, disinformation and misinformation. Access to accurate and balanced information is crucial in this time of crisis. In such an unsafe reporting environment, media organisations are now––more than ever–– dependent on citizen journalists. Organisations struggle every day to verify sources and claims from these brave people on the ground, who are shot at, beaten and arrested by security forces and their proxies if caught filming newsworthy events.
At the same time, many young journalists have lost their jobs and others are in hiding, with either no income or with meagre support from the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Even though activists have been shouting out loud that “Journalism is Not a Crime”, reporters are being treated as criminals under the military regime. The story of one of our own reporters, pseudonym Ko Y, illustrates this.
Ko Y was arrested earlier this year while reporting on mass street protests in Yangon. He was held in Insein prison for three months. When released, the newspaper he worked for had stopped publishing due to having its license revoked by the military.
“While I was in prison in March, I heard the news that my newspaper had stopped printing and I felt helpless. For me, it is not only about me losing my job, but also about losing press freedom in our country,” he said.
Nevertheless, Ko Y is eager to continue reporting under the military regime and went into hiding after joining Lu Nge Khit. As a newsroom team member of Lu Nge Khit, he risks his life along with the rest of the team and Myanmar’s thousands of citizen journalists every day. Ko Y says, “I’m glad that I can continue my work reporting conflicts over the country. It makes me feel confident that I’m reporting right and accurate news for the people who need it”.
Lu Nge Khit was formed to be a bridge between the people of Myanmar––who deserve easier access to journalism of the highest standard––and journalists with the passion and skills to pursue the verification and reporting of news needed to meet this essential right to information. As part of this goal, one of Lu Nge Khit’s missions is to target and support youths with information useful for them and their generation. The majority of the Lu Nge Khit team lived their childhood and adolescence under the military regime before the changes of the decade from 2010-2020, but we were also shaped by that decade and its opportunities, helping us to understand the profound concerns facing Myanmar’s youth of today.
Many of my own childhood memories are filled with military propaganda. It is a shame, but I believed it all then. It was hard for me in my young age to find job and opportunities. Access to information is a basic human right and we do not want today’s youth to suffer from a lack of information like we did.
Lu Nge Khit is also intended to be a platform for youth, enabling and supporting young people to raise and express their own voices. As a first step, we are developing an online program for youth to share their experiences, their concerns and opinions. The program will be open to all young people in the country, and more information will be available soon.
Another mission of Lu Nge Khit is to create opportunities for journalists and try to rebuild the devastated media industry in Myanmar. Lu Nge Khit cannot hire all the journalists who have been forced out of work by the Tatmadaw, but it can create opportunities for those journalists who are particularly energetic and keen to continue their career during this terrifying crisis. At present, a team of seven reporters and three editors are running the newsroom in collaboration with a video editor and a translator.
Please visit Lu Nge Khit and like/follow its Facebook page, which is currently the best way to stay engaged with the organisation. We are currently in the process of setting up a website and other secure media channels to reach the people of Myanmar, but for now, Facebook remains our central distribution service..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-18
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Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Bomb blasts not only in major cities like Yangon, Mandalay and Naypyitaw, but also in smaller upcountry towns, ambushes on army convoys, gun battles in Magwe and Sagaing regions, and, across the country, assassinations of suspected military informants. While it is too early to describe the violence that has broken out in the Myanmar heartland since the Feb. 1 coup as a full-scale civil war, the military, known as the Tatmadaw, has for the first time in decades had to fight armed rebels in areas far away from the country’s traditional trouble spots in the ethnic-minority-inhabited frontiers. It is an entirely new kind of conflict that the Tatmadaw is not used to fighting and, therefore, incapable of containing. It is, for instance, doubtful whether its intended attacks on the rebel forces—which amount to indiscriminate firing into inhabited areas because the soldiers are unable to locate them—will have any effect other than further alienating and radicalizing a population that previously only demonstrated peacefully against the coup.
Myanmar’s new kind of armed conflict differs also in many other respects from the old wars against ethnic rebels in the border areas, as well as the fighting in the heartland in the years immediately after independence from Britain in 1948. Myanmar’s ethnic insurgents have always been organized along strict military lines, which makes them unique in a global perspective. Unlike rebels in other countries, they are dressed in distinct uniforms with insignia showing their ranks. Myanmar’s ethnic rebels look more like regular armies and control and administer areas, and have camps complete with barracks, parade grounds and makeshift office buildings.
The Burman militants who after independence resorted to armed struggle against central authorities were not that well-organized. But they also established huge base areas which they governed and from there launched attacks on government positions. That applied to smaller groups like militants from the People’s Volunteer Organization, a paramilitary force formed by General Aung San after World War II that rebelled after independence, and various bands of mutineers from the Tatmadaw—but mainly to the once powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB).
Communist strongholds attacked
Soon after the outbreak of the civil war in 1948—and at that time, it was an all-out civil war—the CPB established strongholds in the Pegu Yoma mountains north of Yangon, in the Irrawaddy Delta, the Arakan Yoma, Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi), and upper Sagaing Division (now region). It was also active in and around Pyinmana, where the party organized farmers in struggles and strikes against landlords and moneylenders. At one stage, the cabinet of the then prime minister, U Nu, was referred to as “the Yangon government” because it did not control much more than the then capital itself.
Karen rebels battled in the eastern mountains and in the Irrawaddy Delta for independence. In northern Arakan (now Rakhine State), Muslim rebels known as mujaheeds fought for accession to Pakistan (Bangladesh was then the eastern part of Pakistan.) Smaller groups of Karenni and Mon rebels had their own armed bands in areas near the Thai border. Nationalist Chinese, or Kuomintang, forces that had been defeated by the communists in the Chinese civil war, had bases in northern and eastern Shan State from where they tried, unsuccessfully, to re-enter China and foment an uprising against Mao Zedong’s government. In the late 1950s, a rebellion broke out among the Shan and, in the early 1960s, the Kachin organized one of the strongest ethnic resistance armies in Myanmar.
While the Tatmadaw never managed to defeat the ethnic rebels in the border areas, it was more successful fighting the CPB. By the late 1950s, the CPB’s forces had been more or less contained to the Pegu Yoma with smaller units holding out in the mountains of northwestern Arakan, the jungles of Tenasserim, and the Pinlebu area in upper Sagaing. The Kuomintang, meanwhile, had been driven across the border to Thailand and no longer poses any serious threat to national security. Myanmar’s communist insurgency would also have been over—had it not been for the People’s Republic of China.
In 1968, CPB soldiers, of whom many were Chinese Red Guard volunteers accompanied by Burman political commissars, poured across the border with China into northern Shan State. They soon recruited local tribesmen to fight for them and, within a couple of years, a new and very different CPB base area had been established. It encompassed more than 20,000 square kilometers of territory adjacent to China, stretching from Panghsai and Mong Ko in northernmost Shan State, to Kokang and the Wa Hills, and down to the mountains north of Kengtung. The “new” CPB had its own administration in those areas—and was much better armed than the “old” CPB. During the decade 1968-1978, China poured in more arms, ammunition and other supplies to the CPB than to any other foreign communist resistance movement outside Indochina.
But the CPB never intended to stay in the wild mountains on the Chinese frontier. The plan was to push down to the Pegu Yoma and other strongholds in central Myanmar and, eventually, take over Yangon. The Tatmadaw realized that, and also concluded that it would not be able to defeat the new, well-equipped forces. Hence, the Tatmadaw decided to contain the CPB in the northeast — and to wipe out what remained of the CPB in central Myanmar. In that way, the CPB would never be able to seize power.
That strategy was clever and it worked. The Irrawaddy Delta region and some smaller strongholds were “pacified” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A massive offensive was then launched against the Pegu Yoma. The CPB camps there were overrun in 1975 and the civilian population in and around the mountain range was resettled in other parts of central Myanmar. After that, there was no more fighting in the Myanmar heartland against the CPB. Karen rebels who had also been active in the Pegu Yoma and the Irrawaddy Delta lost their bases there as well, and the survivors retreated to the Thai border.
It was only in 1991 that the Karen National Union (KNU) managed to send some troops to re-enter a Karen-inhabited area in the Irrawaddy Delta. Unexpectedly for the Tatmadaw, Karen rebels, who had come from the Thai border, were seen digging trenches and stockpiling guns in the Bogalay area only some 140 km southwest of Yangon. The Tatmadaw responded with fury using newly acquired Chinese aircraft and gunboats. The then commander of the Tatmadaw’s infantry, General Than Shwe, led the campaign, which was codenamed Operation Storm and led to the KNU troops in the area being eliminated—but at a heavy price for the civilian population, who suffered badly during the onslaught on the rebels. Villages were bombed and, among those killed, most were ordinary villagers, not insurgents.
Ceasefire with the Wa
After the fall of the Pegu Yoma, insignificant CPB units managed to hold out in northern Arakan and in Tenasserim, but the party had become isolated in its base area in the northeast, where it did not belong and never had any intention of staying. That, in turn, led to a mutiny within the non-Burman, mainly Wa but also Kokang, rank-and-file of the CPB’s army in 1989. The old CPB leadership was driven into exile in China while its former forces were reorganized into ethnic armies, the strongest of which became the United Wa State Army (UWSA). But rather than fighting, it entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw soon after the mutiny.
Since then, rather curiously, the UWSA has become stronger and better equipped than the CPB ever was—and its guns and other supplies have been obtained from China. While the UWSA is not doing any fighting on its own, it has shared some of its weaponry with other ethnic armies such as the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and, to a lesser extent, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
Those armies are fighting the Tatmadaw, but the powerful Arakan Army (AA), which has also benefited from UWSA arms supplies, has distanced itself from all other resistance armies in Myanmar. The AA says it wants to regain the independence the old Arakan kingdom lost to the Burman kings when they occupied the area in 1785. With that aim in mind, the AA has not established any liberated areas but, instead, built up a parallel administration in Rakhine State.
That, briefly, was the situation until the Feb. 1 coup. The new Burman resistance fighters are supposed to be organized into a loose alliance called the People’s Defense Force (PDF). That umbrella organization is considered the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), which was set up by ousted MPs and other politicians after the Tatmadaw staged its coup and formed a junta called the State Administration Council (SAC). But it is uncertain how much coordination there is between the different PDFs and, in addition to those, there is an abundance of other local resistance forces that operate independently. But all in all, the anti-SAC resistance is active mainly in Magwe, Sagaing, Ayeyarwady, Mandalay and Tanintharyi regions, where there has been no heavy fighting for decades. Fighting has also flared up in Chin and Kayah (Karenni) states, ethnic areas which before the coup were the scene of only low-intensity conflicts.
PDF/ethnic alliance
The PDFs in the far north are allied with the KIA, whose soldiers have even accompanied groups of Burman resistance fighters in raids outside the boundaries of Kachin State. By doing so, the KIA is hoping to draw Tatmadaw units away from its besieged bases in Kachin State, a military strategy that seems to have had the desired effect. The Tatmadaw now appears to be gearing up for major offensives in Magwe Region and Chin State, not in the far north.
The outcome of the fight against the PDF is uncertain, as the Tatmadaw cannot employ the same tactics as it did against the CPB. The new-era rebels, unlike the CPB in central Myanmar in the old days, do not have any “liberated areas” with camps that can be overrun. And they cannot be contained in the border areas because those are controlled by the KIA and other ethnic armies. In rural areas, it is a hit-and-run game while, in the towns, Myanmar is for the first time in history facing urban guerrillas—and the Tatmadaw has zero experience of that kind of warfare.
It is also a question of what kind of resources the Tatmadaw can throw into battling this new kind resistance. An offensive in one part of the country could lead to more rebel activity, ethnic as well as Burman, in other states and regions. The Tatmadaw will be stretched thin on many battlefronts at a time when the morale of its troops is already low. Constant ambushes and bomb attacks along roads which only a year ago were considered safe have taken their toll on the soldiers’ willingness to fight—and that applies to all corners of the country. According to local, non-partisan civil organization workers, Tatmadaw units in Karen State have even resorted to reporting phantom battles to their high command in Naypyitaw. They claim that they have captured Karen rebel camps and outposts when no such attacks occurred, and to have been engaged in battles that never took place.
It is impossible to say what the extremely complex situation that the coup has caused will lead to. In the worst-case scenario, it could cause a fragmentation of Myanmar with no one able to hold the country reasonably well together. Dissent within the ranks of the Tatmadaw could also led to coups or coup attempts with extremely uncertain outcomes, even a repeat of the mutinies and chaos that prevailed in the wake of independence in 1948. But gone is the cautious optimism that many, falsely it turned out, felt after the Tatmadaw decided to open up the country in 2011. False hopes on the part of the Tatmadaw because it had not expected the massive rebirth of the National League for Democracy—and a development that was misinterpreted by mostly foreign pundits who seemed to believe that the generals had gone through some democratic awakening experience. In the end, it was inevitable that the Tatmadaw would intervene and try to reassert power. We are now experiencing the disastrous consequences of that fateful decision.
Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"October 18, 2021, Myanmar: A leaked November 2020 Myanmar army procurement document shows attempts to procure parts for tactical radios from Barrett Communications, an Australian defence firm that has been selling equipment to Myanmar for almost twenty years.
The army’s request specifies handsets, battery packs, display modules, internal modems, antenna tuning units and power amplifier interfaces for Barrett’s PRC-2090 manpack. According to the Barrett Communications website, a feature of the unit is frequency hopping, which is a prohibited export under Australia’s sanctions regime on Myanmar. The company told Justice For Myanmar that frequency hopping is not a standard item on the PRC-2090.
Barrett Communications disclosed to Justice For Myanmar that their last sale to Myanmar was in 2017, with Australian government authorisation. The company would not provide further details, stating that "all business transactions are commercial in confidence." 2017 is the year that the military launched a campaign of genocide against the Rohingya.
A spokesperson for Barrett Communications acknowledged that PRC-2090 parts could have been sold to the Myanmar military by third party sellers without authorisation from Barrett Communications.
Justice For Myanmar found that Barrett radios are also deployed in military airports and airports with heavy military traffic. In addition to Barrett equipment, Myanmar has also procured radios from Codan Limited for use in airports and the army may have received ultra-long range telemetry radio modems from RFDesign Pty Ltd. Codan and RFDesign are also Australian companies.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We are appalled that the Myanmar military is using Australian technology for troop communications and air force operations. It has been known for over a decade that Barrett Communications provides advanced technology to the Myanmar military, an organisation that has committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people of Myanmar for decades with total impunity. Why then is the Australian government allowing this equipment to be sold to this terrorist organisation, which is waging a war against the Myanmar people? We want to know if the Australian government is complicit by approving these exports. If Barrett Communications is breaching Australia’s export controls, then they must be held accountable by law. It is appalling that successive Australian governments have courted the military and are now giving the junta a free pass, not even sanctioning coup leader and war criminal Min Aung Hlaing. Australia needs to immediately strengthen and reinforce its arms control regime to ensure that no more equipment is transferred to the Myanmar junta.”
Codan Ltd and RFDesign did not respond to a request from Justice For Myanmar for an explanation of their business with Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-18
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Sub-title:
Announcement follows junta chief being barred from summit over failure to commit to de-escalation
Description:
"Myanmar’s military has announced plans to release more than 5,000 prisoners, days after the junta chief was blocked from attending an upcoming regional summit over his failure to commit to de-escalating the country’s crisis.
A total of 5,600 people arrested or subject to arrest warrants for taking part in anti-coup protests since the military seized power in February would be released, it was announced on state TV on Monday.
Late into the evening the first of the prisoners were released. It was not immediately clear how long it would take for all those scheduled for release to be freed.
More than 7,300 political prisoners – including medics, elected politicians, journalists and protesters – are being held, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) Burma, an advocacy group that tracks the arrests.
In cases where the military’s targets cannot be found, security forces have instead abducted their relatives, including children, the UN special rapporteur for the country, Tom Andrews, said last month.
Many rushed immediately to find out if their relatives or friends would be released following the announcement. A woman from Yangon, who spoke anonymously, was among those who went to the prison to search for information about her sister, a journalist detained in August.
The family had not been able to visit her sister since the arrest, she said. “We received a letter that says she is healthy and OK. We didn’t hear any other news.” The letter had asked for the family to send her a newspaper to read; they tried to pass one to prison staff, but are unsure if she received it.
“We hope for her freedom. But we can’t expect too much,” she added.
Another woman whose two younger brothers were arrested separately, in May and July, said she too was trying to find out if they would be released. Both were in their 20s, she said. “There is no reason to thank [the military]. We even want to curse them. Many of my friends and two brothers are arrested, so there is no reason to thank them.”
At least 1,178 have been killed in the military’s deadly crackdowns, according to AAPP Burma, including 131 people who were killed in detention. There have been widespread reports of torture in prisons.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), which has led international efforts to negotiate, agreed a five-point plan with the military to de-escalate the crisis in April. This included an agreement that Asean would send an envoy, Brunei’s second foreign minister, Erywan Yusof, to the country to mediate. However, he cancelled his trip this week after the military announced he would not be permitted to meet Aung San Suu Kyi.
The bloc decided to exclude the junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing, from its upcoming summit, which will be attended by Joe Biden, due to the lack of progress. The decision was a rare rebuke from Asean, which maintains a non-interference policy, and is a major blow to the junta’s hopes of gaining greater legitimacy internationally.
Minn Khant Kyaw Linn, a 23-year-old student activist whose friends were killed during the spring revolution protests this year, said the international community should not be fooled into believing the military’s pledges. “This army also tortured and arrested innocent people. We demand the international community to take action on this army,” he said.
Among those being held is the American journalist Danny Fenster, who has been in detention since his arrest on 24 May.
AAPP said in a statement that the prisoner release was intended as “a form of distraction for the foreign governments” and that it was no coincidence that the announcement came days after Asean’s decision to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from its gathering.
“The junta will continue to refuse to be transparent about the individual persons released, and who remains detained. Released prisoners from 18 October may include some political prisoners but the intention is not to relax repression,” AAPP said.
“If the junta wanted to make concessions, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint and all political prisoners would be released unconditionally, and the democratically elected leaders reinstalled.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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Sub-title:
Regional bloc has a bevy of good reasons to block junta representatives from attending this month's summit meeting
Description:
"Has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the first time foregone its longstanding policy of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of one of its ten member states by blocking a representative of Myanmar’s junta from attending the bloc’s upcoming summit in Brunei? And, if so, why?
Is it concern over a February 1 coup and the brutal repression of massive public opposition to the military power grab, which has left more than a thousand dead and many more who have been arrested and tortured?
Or is it simply a face-saving gesture from a regional bloc that has come under increasing criticism for being ineffective and therefore is losing its credibility at a time when global superpowers are playing a rising role in the region’s power politics?
ASEAN is heavily dependent, especially on what may come after the pandemic, on the goodwill of the US and other Western nations that in no uncertain terms have condemned Myanmar’s coup and urged the bloc to do more to restore normalcy in the country.
Myanmar demonstrators have also condemned the bloc for its inactivity and set ASEAN flags alight at public protests in the old capital of Yangon.
To be sure, ASEAN can hardly be described as a gathering of liberal democracies. The bloc’s current chair, Brunei, is an absolute monarchy. Two of its members — Vietnam and Laos — are communist-ruled one-party states.
Cambodia is governed by Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has recently outlawed the political opposition and in the process made the country into an even harsher autocracy.
Singapore also lacks fundamental freedoms when it comes to the media and civil rights and Malaysia is best described as a semi-democracy. Rodrigo Duterte, the president of the Philippines, is known for his disdain of the media and all opposition to his rule.
In Thailand, the military has staged several coups to oust elected governments and retains an outsized political role despite 2019 elections. That leaves, ironically given its history of autocratic rule, Indonesia as the most, some would argue the only, democratic ASEAN member.
ASEAN’s two cardinal principles, non-interference and consensus, have until now made it impossible for the bloc to take any decisive action when there has been trouble in or between its non-democratic member states. But it is also clear that ASEAN leaders are running out of patience with the Myanmar junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC).
Its leader and now self-appointed prime minister, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, paid a one-day visit to Jakarta on April 24, where he and his ASEAN partners agreed on what was called “a five-point consensus” comprising calls for an immediate cessation of violence and the exercise of utmost restraint and a dialog among all parties concerned to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis.
It was also decided to appoint a special envoy by the ASEAN chair to “facilitate mediation in the dialogue process” and to provide humanitarian assistance through AHA, the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management.
Even Min Aung Hlaing agreed that the special envoy and his delegation should be given the right to visit Myanmar and there meet with “all parties concerned.”
ASEAN’s decision to prevent junta representatives from participating in the summit, which is scheduled to take place on October 26-28 via videoconference, was explained in a statement issued at the bloc’s foreign ministers’ meeting — also online — on October 15.
While noting “the principles enshrined in the ASEAN charter”, meaning non-interference, the ministers stated that “the situation in Myanmar was having an impact on regional security as well as the unity, credibility and centrality of ASEAN as a rules-based organization.”
ASEAN would, therefore, “invite a non-political representative from Myanmar to the upcoming Summits.” Who that “non-political” individual will be is unclear, nor how and by whom he or she would be appointed.
The junta’s response was that it had cooperated on the five-point consensus by accepting the appointment of Brunei’s Foreign Minister Erywan Pehin Yusof as ASEAN’s special envoy — and that it had distributed aid delivered through AHA “to those in need.” But the envoy was not allowed to meet the deposed and detained president Win Myint and state counselor Aung San Suu Kyi because they are facing criminal charges in Myanmar courts.
In other words, the SAC has closed the door to any dialogue with the ousted leaders and opponents to military rule. The Myanmar foreign ministry also remarked that Myanmar “hopes that he [the ASEAN envoy] will be able to avoid actions from anyone with the intention of putting politically motivated actions and pressures on Myanmar.”
SAC has always claimed that it assumed power constitutionally, because the president had decided to hand over power to the generals, which he has the right to do under the country’s 2008 constitution.
According to the SAC, the military-appointed First Vice President Myint Swe, a retired lieutenant-general, had taken over the presidency from Win Myint, who the military body claimed had resigned for health reasons.
But during court testimony on October 12, Win Myint let it be known that he was in good health. According to his lawyer Khin Maung Zaw, the military had tried to force him to relinquish his post hours before the February 1 coup by warning him he could be seriously harmed if he refused.
Win Myint replied that he “would rather die than consent”, the lawyer stated in an English language text message sent to reporters. That undermined any SAC claim of legality, even under the 2008 constitution, which was drafted under the auspices of the military.
ASEAN’s initiative to block Myanmar appears to have been taken by Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah who, on October 6, even said that his country is ready to consider holding dialogue with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) — consisting of ousted MPs and other opposition figures — if SAC does not fully cooperate with the five-point consensus.
Indonesia’s outspoken Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi went even further in a Twitter message on October 15 that said Myanmar “should not be represented at the political level until Myanmar restores its democracy through an inclusive process.”
But, regional security analysts argue, ASEAN’s annoyance with the SAC’s intransigence and the bad rap the bloc has received because of Myanmar’s membership may not be directed solely by concerns about democracy and human rights.
Malaysia and Indonesia have for years been at the receiving end of a flood of Muslim Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. According to UNHCR, at the end of August, there were 179,390 refugees and asylum seekers registered with the international body in Malaysia.
Of those, 102,990 are Rohingyas, 22,470 Chins (a mainly Christian minority) and 29,390 from other ethnic groups from conflict-affected areas in Myanmar. Although the exact number is unknown, thousands of Rohingya refugees have also ventured in rickety boats to Indonesia.
Attempts to have them repatriated have failed; neither Malaysia nor Indonesia is in a position to integrate the high number of people fleeing oppression and persecution in Myanmar.
The February 1 coup has also been bad for intra-ASEAN business. Singapore exported US$2.7 billion worth of goods to Myanmar in 2020, mainly mineral fuels, oil, electronics and machinery. But companies from Singapore and other ASEAN members may now face sanctions and boycotts for dealing with Myanmar.
Trade with Vietnam was also booming before the coup, with Vietnamese companies investing in real estate and a huge new modern shopping mall in Yangon. Mytel, one of Myanmar’s top telecom operators, is a joint venture between the military-controlled Myanmar Economic Corporation and Viettel, which is owned by the Vietnamese military.
Vietnam, hardly a democracy, would not normally have cared about a military takeover in a foreign country, but the Vietnamese can hardly be pleased to see their co-owned communication towers being blown up by anti-junta protestors and other investments being ruined because of the coup.
No serious observer of the post-coup situation in Myanmar believes that the SAC would ever engage in a meaningful dialogue with Win Myint, Aung San Suu Kyi and other ousted — and now detained — leaders.
So ASEAN is stuck with an ostracized member that had dragged its reputation in the mud and there is little it can do about it than what it has done already: wait and see what happens next.
In true ASEAN manner, the foreign ministers’ statement “reiterated that Myanmar is an important member of the ASEAN family” so Myanmar should be given “the space to restore its internal affairs and return to normalcy.”
But not many will be holding their breath on that one. Myanmar is in turmoil, and there is very little ASEAN can do about it apart from symbolic summit snubs..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"“I would rather die than resign.”
This was the response of President U Win Myint when two senior army officers told him to resign on health grounds on the morning of the military coup on Feb. 1 and threatened him with harm if he refused.
U Win Myint testified about the circumstances of his detention during a court hearing in Naypyitaw on Oct. 12. The regime has filed several charges against him since his detention.
“He was then told that he could be harmed if he refused, and was told to reconsider. He replied that he had faced dangers along the way and faced the risk of death,” lawyer U Khin Maung Zaw said, recounting U Win Myint’s testimony to the court.
U Win Myint also told the two military officers to act in line with the 2008 Constitution and not to stage the coup.
Though President U Win Myint, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Naypyitaw Mayor Dr. Myo Aung were detained on the day of the military takeover on Feb. 1 and have been isolated since then, the regime has charged them with incitement over a statement condemning the coup that was issued by the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s Central Executive Committee a few days after their detention.
While U Win Myint’s testimony has won loud applause from many in Myanmar, the response to another detained senior NLD member, Yangon Region Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein, has turned out to be just the opposite. In the eyes of many, U Phyo Min Thein’s political career ended the moment he testified that he bribed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi with more than 11 kg of gold and US$600,000—a claim that angered and disappointed many in the country.
“When there are violent political storms, U Win Myint is prepared to row with his hands if there is no oar. U Phyo Min Thein belongs to those who want to hitch a lift,” said political analyst U Than Soe Naing.
A true people’s representative
U Win Myint has won four electoral races on the NLD ticket—in the general elections in 1990, 2015 and 2020, and in a by-election in 2012.
Born in Danubyu Township of Ayeyarwady Region, U Win Myint was trained as a lawyer. He has engaged in politics for more than 30 years since the pro-democracy movement in 1988, joining the NLD in its early days.
Like many other politicians of the time, U Win Myint ended up in prison after the military refused to honor the results of the 1990 general election. Back then, he was offered large sums of money and a permit to import a car, a rare luxury at the time, if he resigned from the NLD. But he chose prison over the money, and not even the lousy food and terrible conditions in prison could shake his faith.
“U Win Myint is imbued with all four attributes of a politician—bravery, honesty, industriousness and humility,” remarked U Than Soe Naing, who has known U Win Myint for two decades.
When the NLD boycotted the military-orchestrated general election in 2010, U Win Myint stood firmly with the party line. And when he was elected to Parliament alongside Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the 2012 by-election, he was the youngest member of the NLD’s Central Executive Committee. When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed to the Committee for Rule of Law and Stability in the Lower House in the same year, U Win Myint served as the committee’s secretary, and the two worked together more closely.
“He seems to be meticulous and uncompromising, but he is very cooperative and hard-working, both in the party and the government,” said NLD lawmaker U Bo Bo Oo.
Stony-faced Speaker
One question on voters’ minds ahead of the 2015 election was who would serve as Myanmar’s president if the NLD won, as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was constitutionally barred from taking the country’s top job. Myanmar’s military and their allied parties expressed doubts as to whether the NLD had a person capable of assuming the presidency.
In response to the criticisms, U Win Myint, speaking in a pre-election debate program organized by media outlet DVB, implied in his comments that no one could do a worse job of managing the country than the military, saying, “Every bird is as beautiful as a vulture.”
After the NLD won a majority in the 2015 poll, U Htin Kyaw became president, and U Win Myint, due to his legal knowledge, was elected Lower House Speaker. He was 66 at the time.
As Parliament Speaker, U Win Myint was not liked even by fellow NLD lawmakers, as he never hesitated to complain about any lawmaker—regardless of what party they were from—for any act deemed to be inappropriate, including reading journals during parliamentary sessions.
He often confronted ministers when they failed to give clear answers to lawmakers’ questions.
It was the first civilian government since 1962, and U Win Myint shrewdly managed the Parliament to avoid friction between military-appointed representatives and elected lawmakers, according to political analysts.
“There could have been problems, should there have been constant friction between elected lawmakers and the military appointees. The problem, I mean, is that there could have been a coup back then,” U Bo Bo Oo said.
U Win Myint did not show any bias toward his party when he was in charge of the Lower House, said Shan Nationalities League for Democracy chairman U Sai Nyunt Lwin.
“When I asked how he was doing as the Parliament Speaker, he said it was an ‘unspeakable’ trouble,” said U Sai Nyunt Lwin.
U Win Myint’s daughter married while he held the Parliament Speaker role, but he insisted that no wedding gifts would be accepted. The politician also earned plaudits for his handling of land issues for farmers.
Lowly politician to President
After two years as the Parliament Speaker, U Win Myint became the President in March 2018 after U Htin Kyaw retired on health grounds.
Anti-graft efforts were stepped up after he assumed the presidency, both in the administrative and judicial branches. One of the most significant reforms was to bring the General Administration Department, which had been overseen by the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs, under civilian oversight. However, the military transferred the department back to the Home Affairs Ministry after the coup.
“He has not changed his stance along the way from a [rank-and-file] politician to a president,” said U Than Soe Naing.
No fault can be found with U Win Myint throughout his political journey to the presidency, said politicians and political analysts.
“We believe he will remain firm in his stance. And we should praise him for that,” U Sai Nyunt Lwin said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Articles and reports about the NLD
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Description:
"Junta troops advancing from Sagaing Region to Chin State have been torching houses and a church along the Falam-Hakha road, forcing hundreds from their homes.
More than 40 trucks carrying junta soldiers and an armored vehicle arrived in Falam on Wednesday and they torched houses and a church along the road to Hakha.
At least six houses and a church in a village about 15km from Falam were reduced to ashes on Wednesday, according to the Chin Baptist Convention (CBC). Two more houses were burned down in another village the following day.
According to the CBC and other sources, junta troops set ablaze at least 15 houses and a church on Wednesday and Thursday.
“It was an indiscriminate attack on homes and religious buildings. People are devastated. They think it disregards and insults religion,” said the CBC chairman.
The village that was torched on Wednesday has only around 40 inhabitants from 10 households. Another small village was torched on Thursday and all the residents have fled their homes.
A junta deployment has entered northern Chin State and another from Magwe Region into the south of the mountainous state to attack Chin resistance forces.
Chin resistance groups have ambushed junta troops entering the state. Around 300 residents from at least five roadside villages have fled the clashes, said the CBC chairman.
Humanitarian aid cannot reach those displaced due to tightened road checks.
“There is no one to help them as there is no guarantee for security on the road,” he said.
A resident who fled to Hakha said: “I am sad that I might lose my house and all the belongings that I left behind. But life is the most important and I can do nothing.”
Salai Htet Ni, a spokesman for the Chin National Front (CNF), said the regime was targeting the CNF headquarters as it works with the civilian National Unity Government to train and arm resistance fighters.
“Clashes will intensify in Thantlang, Falam and Hakha in northern Chin State. We are prepared. We are working with the Chin Defense Forces to repel attacks,” Salai Htet Ni told The Irrawaddy.
The CNF has negotiated with humanitarian agencies to enable civilians to take shelter on the Indian border, he said.
The military regime has not commented on its Chin operations and did not reply to The Irrawaddy’s requests for a comment.
In September, dozens of houses were destroyed in Thantlang by junta shelling and firefights with the combined Chinland Defense Force in Thantlang and Chin National Army.
A Chin pastor Cung Biak Hum was shot dead by junta forces during a clash with the resistance in Thantlang on September 18.
The Christian leader left his church to help put out fires caused by a junta artillery barrage. His wedding ring was taken by junta soldiers who cut his finger off..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Chin (Zo) discussion groups, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political, Inter-Communal violence and discrimination - Myanmar - General articles and analysis
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Description:
"Myanmar's ruling military has not blocked a special Southeast Asian envoy from visiting the country but will not allow him to meet detained former leader Aung San Suu Kyi, because she is charged with crimes, the junta's spokesman said.
A delay in the United Nations approving the military government's U.N. ambassador nomination was politically motivated, spokesman Zaw Min Tun added, saying the U.N. and other countries and organisations "should avoid double standards when they are engaging in international affairs".
The spokesman's remarks, issued by the military in a summary dated Wednesday, come as international pressure builds on the junta to implement a five-point peace plan its top general Min Aung Hlaing agreed to in April with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Myanmar has been in political and economic paralysis since the military's Feb. 1 coup, which triggered an outpouring of anger and protest that has not abated, with some civilians forming militias to take on the powerful army.
The junta's inaction on the ASEAN plan was "tantamount to backtracking" and some member countries were "deep in discussions" about excluding Min Aung Hlaing from a summit this month, Erywan Yusof, the bloc's special envoy, said last week.
Erywan earlier this week said he was in consultations with parties in Myanmar, does not take sides or political positions and looks forward to a visit.
The junta spokesman also insisted Myanmar's judicial system was fair and independent would handle Aung San Suu Kyi's case accordingly, adding the chief justice was appointed by the previous government..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-16
[field_licence]
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Description:
"1. The National Unity Government extends its gratitude towards the European
Parliament that voted to support the National Unity Government (NUG) and the
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) of the Republic of Union of
Myanmar and France’s Senate, the Upper House of the French Parliament, that adopted
unanimously the resolution to recognise the National Unity Government (NUG) as the
official government of the Republic of Union of Myanmar.
2. The National Unity Government's Ministry of Finance, Planning and Investments
advises that those who wish to contribute income tax are able to do so through ird.nugmm.
net. All the relevant information relating to taxation can be found on the socialmedia
page (https://www.facebook.com/IRDMOPFI) of the Inland Revenue Department
of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Investment.
3. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar’s Permanent Representative to the UN
had been taking part in discussions in the Interactive Dialogue of the Third Committee
at the 76th United Nations General Assembly held in New York. His intervention can be
seen on Myanmar Mission’s social-media page:
https://www.facebook.com/Mvanmarmisson.
4. People’s defensive operations are taking place throughout the country and their
news updates can be seen on Ministry of Defence’s social-media webpage
https://www.facebook.com/modNUG and the Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigratin’s
social-media webpage https://www.facebook.com/mohaimvanmar.
5. The National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defence is collating data on those
heroes who had valiantly joined battle and sadly lost their lives for the country. Their
data can be safely entered in these forms: https://forms.gle/7NoT9SZuvcwJXa9v7.....ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
https://nugmyanmar.org
အပတ်စဉ် သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၁၈/၂၀၂၁)
၁၆ အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်
၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော တရားဝင် အစိုးရဖြစ်သည့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ( National Unity Government - NUG Myanmar ) နှင့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ CRPH တို့အား ထောက်ခံအားပေးရေးအဆိုကို အတည်ပြုပေးခဲ့သည့် ဥရောပပါလီမန်နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုခဲ့သည့် ပြင်သစ်အထက်လွှတ်တော်တို့ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက ကျေးဇူးမှတ်တမ်း တင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ သို့ အခွန်ထမ်းဆောင်လိုသည့် ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် ird.nug-mm.net မှတဆင့် အခွန် ပေးဆောင်နိုင်ပြီ ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာနက အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန ၏ ပြည်တွင်းအခွန်များဦးစီးဌာန လူမှုကွန်ယက်စာမျက်နှာ https://www.facebook.com/IRDMOPFI တွင်လည်း အခွန်ဆောင်ခြင်းနှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သိရှိလိုသည်များကို လေ့လာနိုင်ပါသည်။
၃။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ မြန်မာအမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ် သံအမတ်ကြီး ဦးကျော်မိုးထွန်းသည် (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အထွေထွေညီလာခံ ဘာသာရပ်ဆိုင်ရာ ကော်မတီအစည်းအဝေးများတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ပတ်သက်သော အရေးကိစ္စများကို ဝင်ရောက်ဆွေးနွေးလျက်ရှိပြီး ဆွေးနွေးချက်များကို နယူးယောက်မြို့ ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ မြန်မာအမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့ရုံး၏ လူမှုကွန်ယက်စာမျက်နှာ https://www.facebook.com/Myanmarmisson တွင် ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။
၄။ ပြည်သူ့ခုခံစစ်များ နိုင်ငံအနှံ့ဖြစ်ပွားလျက်ရှိပြီး သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ လူမှုကွန်ယက်စာမျက်နှာ https://www.facebook.com/modNUG နှင့် ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ လူမှုကွန်ယက်စာမျက်နှာ https://www.facebook.com/mohaimyanmar များတွင် နေ့စဉ်စုစည်းဖော်ပြလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ပွဲများအတွင်း ရဲရင့်စွာ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားကြသော ကျဆုံးသူရဲကောင်းများ၏ ကိုယ်ရေးအချက်အလက်များကို ကောက်ယူလျက်ရှိပြီး ကျဆုံးတိုက်ပွဲဝင်သူရဲကောင်းများ၏ အချက်အလက်များကို အောက်ပါ Form တွင် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချစွာ ဖြည့်စွက်နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://forms.gle/7NoT9SZuvcwJXa9y7..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-16
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Sub-title:
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ CDM မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီဖွဲ့စည်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
Description:
"မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ CDM မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီဖွဲ့စည်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၅/၂၀၂၁)
ရက်စွဲ ၊ ၁၃ ရက် အောက်တိုဘာလ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် တက်ကြွစွာပါဝင်လှုပ်ရှား နေကြသည့် CDM ပြည်သူ့မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများ နှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းတိုင်ပင်ပြီး၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်အတွင်းရှိ ကုန်ထုတ်အရင်းအနှီးများ၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုအမွေအနှစ်များကို မီးဘေးအန္တရာယ်မှ တားဆီးကာကွယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ် နှင့် သဘာဝဘေးအန္တရာယ် အပါအဝင် အခြားသော ဘေးအန္တရာယ်များကျရောက်သည့်အခါ အရေးပေါ်ရှာဖွေ ကယ်ဆယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက် ခြင်း၊ CDM ပြည်သူ့မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများကို စနစ်တကျစုစည်းခြင်း နှင့် အထောက်အပံ့များပေးနိုင်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ CDM မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ” အား ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။
ပုံ
လွင်ကိုလတ်
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး
ပြည်ထဲရေး နှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-15
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"Today is the 6th Anniversary of signing the Nationwide Ceasefi re Agreement. With the aspiration
to achieve sustainable peace, the Karen National Union signed the Nationwide Ceasefi re
Agreement and committed to solve the over 70 years long political problems peacefully through
political dialogue, which was not resolved by the successive governments.
In the NCA implementation we, the KNU. along with the implementation partners have firmly and
tirelessly overcome many challenges. W e achieved the gradual progressive trend of establishing a
federal democratic country beyond 2020 through the Three Steps and Three Phases Approach in
the Union Accord.
It is with great regret that we see the military coup on 1 February 2021 has breached all NCA's
principles and stopped the NCA implementation, so that the military returns to dictatorship with
the use of coercive force for solving what are political problems.
As a result of the military coup, all citizens and ethnic people arc suffering from many socioeconomic
related problems resulting from the various forms of oppression, and the country faces
collapse. The KNU stands on the principle of " solving political problems by political means" .
However, according to our experience in the implementation of the NCA. to achieve this it totally
depends on the stakeholder's honesty and commitment to comply with the agreements.
Therefore, to save the country from chaos, the KNU requests to all relevant stakeholders the
following:
1. To release unconditionally those detainees including political leaders detained following
the coup.
2. To withdraw police and military troops back to their stations/bases throughout the country
and to declare and practically implement a nationwide ceasefire.
3. Focus immediately on implementation of humanitarian activities freely with the help of
international support, remove restriction on all mcdical treatments including Covid-19
vaccination, protection, and treatment.
4. Release firm orders for the provision of civilian protection to be followed by the police and
military forces, and broad international monitoring process through international observers.
5. Accept UN-supported international mediation for the ending of the military rule, and
negotiation for transfer of power to an inclusive and participative unity government with
representation from all key stakeholders who are committed to federalism and solving the
over 70 years long internal political conflict, rooted problems and causes.
6. Tatmadaw to declare officially its commitment to a federal democra tic state, and its
withdrawal from politics.
The KNU firmly believes that with the country of Burma’s diversity of ethnicity and religions, its
history of chauvinism and dictatorship, the problems of Burma can only be solved, and a peaceful
society can only be achieved, by building a federal state and applying democratic practices..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Karen National Union (KNU), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကော်မတီ
ဖွဲ့စည်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၆/၂၀၂၁)
၁၄ ရက်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလ၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ(၁)ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာအား အဓမ္မနည်းဖြင့် ရယူသိမ်းပိုက်ခဲ့ပြီးနောက် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး၏ မောင်းနှင်အားတစ်ခုဖြစ်သော အကြမ်းမဖက် အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု ( CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT ) ဆောင်ရွက် နေကြသည့် အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲ ရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့မှ အောက်ပါလုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို ဆက်လက်အကောင် အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ညှိနှိုင်းအစည်းအဝေးကျင်းပပြီး “အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကော်မတီ” အား ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။
(က) CDMဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ယင်းတို့၏ မိသားစုဝင်များအား ပြန်လည်စုစည်း၍ ဘေးကင်း လုံခြုံမှု ရှိစေရေး စီမံဆောင်ရွက်ရန်။
(ခ) CDMဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် မိသားစုများအကြား ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာမည့် အခက်အခဲများကို ကူညီ ဖြေရှင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်ရန်။
(ဂ) CDM မပြုလုပ်ရသေးသောဝန်ထမ်းများအား CDM နှင့် Pre CDMများ ပြုလုပ်လာ စေပြီး မကြာမီ ကာလများတွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်အတွက် ပြည်သူဗဟိုပြု အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးစနစ်သစ်တစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာစေ ရေး အထောက်အပံ့ကောင်းဖြစ်စေရန်။
ပုံ
လွင်ကိုလတ်
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး
ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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"Ahead of the ASEAN Summit on 26 October, the European Union reiterates its strong support for ASEAN’s efforts in finding a peaceful solution to the current crisis and stresses the need for Myanmar to implement swiftly and faithfully the five-point consensus, in order to begin a process of de-escalation and return to democracy. The EU has welcomed the appointment of the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy, Brunei Darussalam’s Minister of Foreign Affairs II, Erywan Yusof, and stands ready fully to support the Special Envoy in facilitating a constructive and inclusive dialogue with all key stakeholders, in all regions of the country, and in partnership with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The European Union calls on Myanmar to engage constructively with the ASEAN Special Envoy to implement fully and completely the ASEAN Five Point Consensus. It stresses the need for the military to facilitate regular visits to Myanmar by the ASEAN Special Envoy, and for him to be able to engage freely with all he wishes to meet.
The European Union underlines that a meaningful political dialogue must include all relevant stakeholders, including the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic groups, political parties and other pro-democracy forces committed to working towards a peaceful resolution of the current crisis. Only a truly inclusive dialogue from the outset can ensure a peaceful and sustainable future for Myanmar.
The European Union is deeply concerned about the escalation of armed conflict, significant deployment of the armed forces in rural areas, and an increase in clashes, causing civilian casualties and displacement, and calls for an immediate end to the violence and the full respect of human rights. The European Union firmly stands with the people of Myanmar/Burma and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and all those detained in connection with the coup, the establishment of a genuine political dialogue and a peaceful return to the country’s democratic path. This can only be achieved by respecting the will of the overwhelming majority of the people in the country.
The European Union will continue to provide humanitarian assistance, in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, including urgent aid to contain the outbreak of COVID-19 in the country. It urges the military authorities to ensure rapid, safe and unhindered access to all displaced persons and people in need, including by ensuring the safety of humanitarian and health workers. The EU stands ready to cooperate with international partners, including the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance, to provide such aid..."
Source/publisher:
European Union
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
European Union-Burma relations (commentary/analysis), ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG)
Language:
Local URL:
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