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Title: Myanmar's Suu Kyi dizzy and drowsy, skips court appearance
Description: "Deposed Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi was unable to appear at a court hearing on Monday for health reasons, a member of her legal team said, describing her condition as dizziness caused by motion sickness. Suu Kyi, 76, who has been detained on various charges since her overthrow in a Feb. 1 military coup, did not have the coronavirus but felt ill having not traveled in a vehicle for a long time, lawyer Min Min Soe said. The popular Nobel Peace Prize winner has spent about half of the past three decades in various forms of detention over her non-violent struggle against dictatorship and her health is closely watched. "It is not serious sickness... She suffered car sickness. She cannot stand that feeling and told us she wanted to take a rest," Min Min Soe told Reuters. Sept 13 (Reuters) - Deposed Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi was unable to appear at a court hearing on Monday for health reasons, a member of her legal team said, describing her condition as dizziness caused by motion sickness. Suu Kyi, 76, who has been detained on various charges since her overthrow in a Feb. 1 military coup, did not have the coronavirus but felt ill having not traveled in a vehicle for a long time, lawyer Min Min Soe said. The popular Nobel Peace Prize winner has spent about half of the past three decades in various forms of detention over her non-violent struggle against dictatorship and her health is closely watched. "It is not serious sickness... She suffered car sickness. She cannot stand that feeling and told us she wanted to take a rest," Min Min Soe told Reuters. Suu Kyi's only communication with the outside world has been through her legal team, which says its access to her is limited and monitored by authorities. She is on trial in the capital Naypyitaw over charges that include illegal importation and possession of walkie-talkie radios and violating coronavirus protocols. She has been accused of accepting big bribes, and has been charged with unspecified breaches of the Official Secrets Act in a separate and more serious case, which is punishable by up to 14 years in jail. Her lawyers reject all of the allegations. Khin Maung Zaw, who heads her legal team, said Suu Kyi could not take the stand on Monday and the judge consented to her absence. "She seemed to be ill, sneezing and said she was drowsy. Therefore the lawyers talked only briefly with her," he said in a text message..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-09-13
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: What Has Happened to Myanmar’s Tatmadaw?
Description: "The decision by Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) to declare a “defensive people’s war” against the military junta that usurped power in Naypyitaw on Feb. 1 has not been met with much sympathy from the international community. The British ambassador designate to Myanmar, Pete Vowles, tweeted on Sept. 7 that his country “supports peaceful efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar. We strongly condemn the coup’s coup and brutality, we call on all parties to engage in dialogue.” Two days later, The Irrawaddy quoted the US Embassy in Yangon as stating that they encourage “all sides to be peaceful and to avoid an escalation of violence.” Chris Sidoti, a member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, an independent group of international experts, told Reuters on Sept. 8 that “Violence is the cause of the suffering of the people of Myanmar, it is not the solution…We empathize with the NUG, but we fear for what will happen as a result of this decision.” ASEAN has proposed a four-month ceasefire to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid and is also encouraging a dialogue between the junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), and its opponents. The Australian government, which before the coup had a bilateral Defense Cooperation Program with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military), has repeatedly urged the SAC to engage in a dialogue and somehow believes that ASEAN can play a constructive role in solving the crisis in Myanmar. No one in his or her right mind would be against a dialogue leading to a peaceful solution to Myanmar’s escalating civil wars between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed organizations and now also a host of new resistance armies which are active not in border areas but in the country’s heartland. But it is recklessly naïve to believe that the Tatmadaw, with or without foreign encouragement, would be even remotely interested in engaging in such a dialogue. Exchanging views and reaching compromises have never been on the generals’ agenda. They have always believed in military might and demanded surrender from their opponents. But if a peaceful solution to Myanmar’s many conflicts is not possible, what’s the alternative? Does the NUG and its armed wing, the loosely organized People’s Defense Force (PDF), and its ethnic allies have any chance of defeating the mighty Tatmadaw? As all the readers of The Irrawaddy are aware, I’ve been writing about Myanmar’s civil war for more than four decades. During that time, I have also on numerous occasions seen the Tatmadaw in action and also been in the middle of two major battles in the frontier areas. The first was in the Naga Hills in December 1985 when the Tatmadaw launched an early morning attack on the headquarters of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland in northwestern Sagaing Region (then Division). It is quite possible that my presence there was a major reason why the Tatmadaw decided to move troops across those remote and rugged hills and attack. The battle was fierce because troops from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were there, and that made a difference from fighting the poorly armed Naga. But, in the end, the Tatmadaw captured the camp. I and other survivors had to flee and hide in the jungle for days before it was possible to move to more secure locations. The second time was at the battle of Hsi-Hsinwan in northern Shan State in November 1986. I was in a trench together with commanders of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) when their “people’s army” attacked a Tatmadaw position on the top of the mountain. Hundreds of CPB soldiers had been mobilized for the fight, which began at dawn. I have never seen such an arsenal anywhere in Myanmar’s war-torn areas. The CPB’s troops were equipped with 120mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, machine-guns and automatic rifles. The Tatmadaw camp was blown to pieces and casualties were severe, but the few surviving troops refused to surrender. I did, though, meet a wounded soldier who had been captured by the CPB. I had witnessed the fight from the CPB’s side, but, as I wrote about the encounter in my book Land of Jade: “I was disappointed at not being able to interview him. I would at least have liked to tell him that I had been impressed by the fighting spirit of his unit.” In those days, the Tatmadaw was also an extremely brutal force committing numerous and often unspeakable atrocities on the civilian population in the frontier areas. I had learned that from many interviews with villagers and other victims of Tatmadaw cruelty. At the same time, it was actually quite poorly armed — but, despite all that, a battle-hardened and largely effective light infantry force. Soldiers were constantly on the move and there were fights against the CPB, the Karen on the Thai border, the Kachin in the far north and other pockets of resistance in ethnic minority areas. All that changed after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. The main fear within the Tatmadaw leadership was that disgruntled soldiers might join the pro-democracy activists and that, in turn, would be the beginning of the end of military-dominated rule in Myanmar. Consequently, in order to prevent a crack in the ranks, everything was done to keep at least the officer corps satisfied. Beginning in 1989, the Tatmadaw spent more than a billion dollars on procuring new, more sophisticated military equipment. It came primarily from China but also from Singapore, Pakistan and Israel. Most of it, however, was materiel that Myanmar did not actually need, such as missile systems that would be of little use in counter-insurgency operations, huge tanks, armored vehicles, naval patrol boats and various kinds of radar equipment. It was simply toys for the boys and the troops also got new, smart uniforms. Before long, Myanmar’s own defense industries began producing new infantry rifles to replace the old, heavy G-3 which was based on German designs. Equally important was a decision to scrap the previous, unpopular system of constant rotations of regional commanders, which had been done in order to make sure that no such officer built up his own power base in a certain part of the country. And then came a series of ceasefire agreements between the Tatmadaw and a number of ethnic rebel armies. The Wa, the Kachin, Khun Sa’s drug army, the Mon and Pa-O and others made peace with the Tatmadaw. Those agreements, initiated by intelligence chief Gen. Khin Nyunt, were struck in order to prevent a link-up between the urban dissidents and the ethnic rebels, which could have proven disastrous for the junta that took over power on Sept. 18, 1988. It worked. Only a few pro-democracy activists remained with the Karen National Union, the only sizable ethnic army that refused to enter into a truce with the Tatmadaw. But, to be on the safe side, the size of the Tatmadaw was increased dramatically. The three services — the army, the air force and the navy — amounted to no more than 195,000 men before 1988. Nearly all of them belonged to the army; the air force as well as the navy were very small and, many would argue, almost insignificant. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and other international think-tanks, the army has now 507,000 men, the air force 23,000 and the navy 19,000, so altogether 549,000 in total. Those think-tanks may have grossly overestimated the strength of the Tatmadaw because most units are undermanned and many troops may exist only in official reports from the field. Be that as it may, it is undeniable that the strength of the Tatmadaw in terms of manpower and equipment is way above that of the 1980s. But, because of the old ceasefire agreements, which lasted for nearly two decades, that also means that a generation of troops have very limited fighting experience. They are, as a source said, better at parades showing off their new uniforms and guns than at combat. And then, the embrace of the market economy that followed the 1988 uprising gave the officers ample opportunities to earn vast amounts of money. As one Myanmar source wrote on social media: “the army officers are only interested in taking bribes and making business deals with the cronies, they don’t want to fight battles anymore, they joined the army to get rich quickly.” Or, as a retired Tatmadaw officer once told me: “luxury when I was in the army consisted of a badminton set and a bottle of army rum, and I was a colonel. Now even captains and lieutenants have more than one car, several sets of golf clubs, and at least two mistresses. And they don’t have to fight.” That changed again when, in June 2011, the ceasefire with the KIA broke down. For the first time in more than a decade, major battles raged in an ethnic minority area. I was at the KIA headquarters in Laiza in December 2012 and I was astonished to observe the poor performance of the Tatmadaw. In the beginning, they sent in the infantry, which was poorly trained and had zero fighting experience. Casualties were extremely heavy as the advancing Tatmadaw troops were mowed down by KIA guerrillas. It became so bad that the Tatmadaw had to withdraw its infantry and rely instead on its Russian-supplied helicopter gunships, attack aircraft and heavy artillery fired from bases far from the KIA’s positions. According to credible reports from Yangon at the time, some officers paid bribes to avoid being sent to Kachin State to fight. This was not the Tatmadaw I saw in the 1980s. Then came another fierce war in Rakhine State as a new rebel force, the Arakan Army (AA), rose up in arms. Tatmadaw dead and wounded numbered in the thousands, including some senior officers. And, again, the infantry’s poor performance prompted the Tatmadaw to resort to air power, firing indiscriminately into villages where they thought the AA would be present — but to no avail. Today, the AA and its civilian wing run a de facto parallel government in Rakhine State. The AA is closely allied with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, a Palaung force, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which is made up of fighters from Kokang, an area in northeastern Shan State dominated by ethnic Chinese. Judging from independent reports, those three armies, called the Brotherhood Alliance, have fought what appear to be numerous successful battles with the Tatmadaw. According to a November 2020 paper published by the United States Institute of Peace, “Myanmar has not experienced this intensity of fighting in decades.” Nor has it suffered such heavy casualties. The big question now is: What’s next? Today, the Burmese-dominated Tatmadaw is sent out to gun down people not only from the ethnic minorities but also their own kin in parts of the country where there has been no insurgency since the years immediately after independence in 1948. That, and the casualties they are evidently suffering even there, must have a devastating effect on the morale of the troops. For the first time in decades, there are now speculations about possible rifts within the Tatmadaw. If NUG sources are to be believed, more than 2,000 security personnel, most of them policemen but also soldiers, have defected to the pro-democracy movement. None of those reports can be independently verified, but it is clear that something that has never happened before is brewing within the Tatmadaw. It remains to be seen whether the NUG’s “defensive people’s war” will accelerate that process — or have the opposite effect, namely to make the Tatmadaw close ranks even more firmly than before. A main problem is that many officers and even private soldiers must be acutely aware of what they have done when it comes to corrupt practices and atrocities they have committed. They may fear that a change could mean that they would be held accountable for all that — and the brutality that the Tatmadaw now has unleashed in towns and villages all over the country is almost unprecedented. What began as carnival-style protests immediately after the coup became something entirely different when the police and the Tatmadaw began killing peaceful protesters. Such brutality breeds resistance, and that is what we are seeing in Myanmar today. In any case and whatever the future will be, forget about “dialogues” and futile attempts at urging the two sides to refrain from violence..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-09-13
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-13
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Title: Letter from Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun to Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres on 3 Sep 2021
Description: "Letter dated 3 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations, H.E. U Kyaw Moe Tun, addressed to the Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres, on the heartbreaking situation in Myanmar, together with the weekly information update on current situation in Myanmar as of 29 August 2021..."
Source/publisher: Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations (New York)
Date of publication: 2021-09-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Letter from Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun to Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres on 10 Sep 2021
Description: "Letter dated 10 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations, H.E. U Kyaw Moe Tun, addressed to the Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres, on the worsening situation in Myanmar, together with the weekly information update on current situation in Myanmar as of 5 September 2021..."
Source/publisher: Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations (New York)
Date of publication: 2021-09-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-12
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Title: Weekly Updates on Current Situation in Myanmar (5-9-2021)
Description: "After more than 200 days have passed since the coup, the Myanmar military group is still ignoring the will of the people, putting the country into turmoil with disproportionate actions when the people are facing the nationwide health crisis under the resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, demonstrations against the military, anti-coup movements, and pro-democracy activities are still actively and coordinately continued across the country. Deaths and Arbitrary Arrests As of 5 September 2021, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a total of people 7,876 have been arrested, 6,230 people have still been detained, whereas 1,984 people have been issued with warrants and 1,046 people were ruthlessly murdered by the military since 1 February 2021 when the military unleashed systematic and targeted attacks and violence against innocent civilians. AAPP also reported that at least 110 political prisoners have died in custody since the coup d’état. Dozens of them died within 24 hours of their arrests after being tortured, whereas many others died due to lack of health care in prisons. A relative of one of the victims reportedly stressed, “We don’t want the international community just to keep sanctioning and condemning the military. We just want them hung. We need to make all the spilled worth something”. Never- Ceasing Groundless Seizures and Arrests On 30 August 2021, in Ingapu township in Ayeyarwady Region, it is reported that the three sons of Mr. Shwe Win (trishaw driver) were arrested at home when they did not find their father. The boys were aged only 11, 13. The 13-year- old was reportedly released the following day. However, the other two were still detained. According to a resident, Mr. Shwe Win is a supporter of the NLD party, and he had attended rallies for the party. Detaining children as a hostage is illegal under customary international laws. The Myanmar military has no regard for international laws. On 31 August 2021, in Sintgaing township in Mandalay, hundreds of police officers and soldiers reportedly arrested 31 young men. According to the news received, the security troops went to Mon Pin, Kan Gyi, and Ywar Bo villages in 10 military trucks. In Mon Pin village, they arrested 25 people after ransacking the village for an hour. A resident reportedly said, “the troops didn’t say what they were looking for. They were here for illegal portering, and those who were detained were farmers. They didn’t involve in political activities ”. During this week, Ms. Win Mar, the mother of Mr. Nyi Nyi Aung Htet Naing, who was shot dead while protesting against the military in late February, was reportedly arrested at home as a hostage when the security forces could not find the twin brother of the fallen hero. Due to changing the NUG support profiles on Facebook, four youths named Mr. Dezin Htan, Mr. Htaal Twee, Mr. Htaung Pein, and Mr. San Thein, from Chan Pyan Village Matupi Township of Chin State were reportedly arrested on 20 and 22 August 2021. They were charged under Section 52(a) of the Counter-terrorism Law on August 24. Unstoppable Brutal Killings On 30 August 2021, Mr. Kyaw Myo Zin, a village administrator under the NLD government in Thae Phyu Wa Ywarma village in Myingyan Township of Mandalay Region, was reportedly apprehended, and his hands were tied on his back. He was later shot dead at the top of the village. On 1 September 2021 in Paung Township of Mon State, Mr. Min Nay Lwin and his wife, Ms. Ei Thwe Moe, were reportedly shot by the military troops returning from a farm around 10 pm. Mr. Min Nay Lwin reportedly injured eyes and leg, but his wife, Ms. Ei Thwe Moe, who was five months pregnant, died on the spot. According to a local, the incident happened while the military troops were on patrol; around ten gunshots were heard, and they just left the couples at the scene after the shots. On 1 September 2021, in Khin Thar village in Pale Township of Sagaing Region, military troops reportedly killed a local villager named Than Htay. According to the witness, knife injuries were found in the victim's stomach, chest, and neck. On 4 September 2021, Mr. Kan Tun from Falamchai village in Taze Township of Sagaing Region was reportedly shot and killed when he ran into the soldiers to Chaung Sone Village. According to the eye witness, gunshot injuries to his leg and stomach and knife cut injuries were seen on his neck. Destroying Religious Buildings in Chin State It is reported that three regiments have attacked in villages around Mindat Township of Chin State since mid-August. During attacks, the military troops reportedly ransacked and destroyed a church in Chat village on 30 August 2021 and a monastery near Khwee Rein village on 24 August 2021. According to the photos from the credible report, furniture and Bibles were destroyed in the church, and the monastery was looted. The military also reportedly burned motorbikes, destroyed houses, and robbed the villagers. According to the Mindat People’s Administration spokesperson, the soldiers who committed the actions belong to the Myanmar military's 101st and 11th Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs). Failing to Recruit New Military Officers On 2 September 2021, the SAC announced on its controlled media that it had extended the deadline for applications to the military academies for the second time. The deadline was extended to one during August, supposedly due to the COVID-19. According to Captain Lin Htet Aung, who defected from the military, around 100 applications have been submitted to join the military academies. Most of the applicants are from military families. Following the coup d’état in February, it is reported that more than 1,500 soldiers, including a hundred officers, had defected from the military. Activities of the National Unity Government On 27 August 2021, the Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government issued a Statement on International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearance on 30 August. In the statement, the definition of the enforced disappearance was explained. That enforced disappearance happened in many countries when dictator governments intentionally arrest or make human rights defenders, their families, and documents for human rights violations disappear. It was further stated that enforced disappearance not only affects individuals, their families, and the justice system, it also is a violation of human rights that affects the right to life, security, and development of every citizen in a country. In the statement, the Ministry has informed that the data collection and archiving is of great importance for those who suffered the human rights violations and the crimes committed by the military group and that it will work together with international organizations, civil society organizations, and people to prevent the crimes from happening again, to reveal the truth, and to remedy the grievances for each disappeared or fallen individuals. The Ministry of Human Rights released an Announcement on the Formation of Advisory Board on the same day. According to the announcement, the Advisory Board was formed to obtain technical inputs in handling human rights issues and is comprised of several activists and experts who have been continuously engaged in the promotion of women’s and ethnic minorities’ rights, including human rights activist U Aung Kyaw Moe and peace educator and member of Muslim of Myanmar Multi-Ethnic Consultative Committee and will be expanded as necessary. The Ministry also stated in the announcement that on August 25, 2021, when Ministry officials discussed documentation and measures to bring justice for human rights violations and ensure NUG functions are in accordance with human rights norms, the Advisory Board held their first meeting and provided recommendations. On 30 August 2021, the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Investment of the NUG has released the Announcement 10/2021, “Publication of a list of Illegal Investments and a Special Directive demanding their immediate and unconditional suspension.” In the announcement, the Ministry referred to the Announcement 1/2021 of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations of the Cabinet of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) which declared all investment permits and endorsements to be suspended without exception from 1 February 2021 and Announcement 3/2021 of the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment of the National Unity Government dated 16 May 2021, which reaffirmed the earlier statement. The Ministry further recalled the Announcement 6/2021 of 21 July 2021. The NUG stated that new investment proposals, agreements, or approvals made by military-controlled entities on or after 1 February 2021 would neither be recognized nor honoured. In the announcement, the Ministry informed that the indiscriminate issuance of investment permits and endorsements by the Myanmar Investment Commission controlled by the illegal military council runs counter to the tenets of federal democracy, and such actions shall not be tolerated. Together with the Announcement, the Ministry has published a list of companies undertaking illegal investments by seeking permits and endorsements from the Myanmar Investment Commission controlled by the unlawful military council. As the Ministry instructs those companies on the list to cease and suspend those illegal investment activities immediately and unconditionally, the Ministry further warns that any listed company that fails to comply shall be liable to persecution according to the existing laws. On 5 September 2021, the National Unity Government released an Announcement (9/2021), “Announcement on Military Offensive of State Administrative Council in Ethnic Areas. The statement stressed that since the illegal military coup on 1 February 2021, they have killed, detained, and tortured innocent civilians across the country, both in major cities and in rural and ethnic areas. Furthermore, despite the verbal pledges of military leadership and SAC that they are working for peace, they have been waging offensive military operations, including both ground attacks and airstrikes in a disproportionate and indiscriminate manner with excessive forces in EAO-controlled areas causing civilians who were living there to be forced to flee their homes. The announcement further stated that according to the UN reports, the number of IDPs has been over 300,000 due to the ground and airstrikes of the military. It was informed that those military attacks in ethnic areas could further cause a major humanitarian crisis that millions of civilian populations will be forced to leave their homes and that with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, such a situation can seriously impact the security of neighboring countries along with regional stability and security. The NUG has vehemently opposed the foreign governments and organizations cooperating in the procurement of weapons to support those violent acts of the military council against the civilians and requested the international community to work effectively to stop the offensive military operations of the Myanmar military as soon as possible, to end suppression and torture of innocent civilians and to bring an end to the coup d’état and hold generals accountable for the crmes they have committed. Visit of China’s Special Envoy for Asian Affairs to Myanmar Sun Guoxiang, Special Envoy for Asian Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, paid a visit to Myanmar from 21 to 28 August 2021 upon invitation and met with the military leader Min Aung Hlaing, according to the Regular Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin on 31 August 2021. Regarding the Special Envoy’s visit, the Chinese side stated that the friendly policy of China towards Myanmar is for all the Myanmar People, based on the “pauk-phaw” friendship between China and Myanmar. The Press Conference by China’s Spokesperson of Foreign Ministry stated that China hopes for a proper solution through political dialogue with all parties and groups in Myanmar. International Action and Pressure The embassy of the United States in Yangon announced on 30 August 2021 that the United States is providing more than $50 million in critical humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar, among them over 700,000 refugees and others internally displaced in the country. The aid will support people fleeing violence and persecution in Myanmar following the military coup on 1 February. In the Inaugural Australia-France 2+2 Ministerial Consultations held on 30 August 2021, Ministers underscored their grave concerns about the crisis in Myanmar, particularly the deteriorating COVID-19 situations and its implications for regional stability. They called on the military to immediately end the violence, cease measures to curtail freedom of expression, release those arbitrarily detained, and revert the country to its democratic path. Ministers welcomed the appointment of the ASEAN Chair's Special Envoy on Myanmar, stressed the need for a political dialogue with all relevant parties, and urged the Myanmar military to engage with ASEAN to implement the “Five Point Consensus” fully and swiftly. On 1 September 2021, German wholesale food distribution Company Metro announced that it would cease its operation in Myanmar by October due to its volatile investment and business environment. Following the military coup, 15 Foreign companies have suspended or terminated their operations in Myanmar, and Metro is the latest international company to leave Myanmar. On 2 September 2021, UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab announced new Myanmar sanctions against Myanmar businessman U Tay Za and his business empire Htoo Group, the key business associate of the military. Foreign Secretary said that the military junta had shown no signs of halting its brutal attack on the people of Myanmar, and the UK will continue to restrict the junta’s access to finance. The supply of arms is used to kill innocents, including children, and target those who support the junta’s actions. In response to the new sanctions of the UK against Myanmar, the U.S. Secretary of the State Antony Blinken remarked on 2 September 2021 that he welcomes the announcement of the UK’s new sanctions against Myanmar businessman U Tay Za and his network of companies for providing financial support and arms to the military that help enable its brutal violence against the people of Myanmar. On September 3, 2021, the Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Saifuddin Abdullah commented that the situation with the planned trip of the ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar, Brunei's Second Foreign Minister Erywan Yusof, is that the visit has not yet been scheduled and that Erywan is still trying every available resource and communication channels to do so. Malaysian Foreign Minister also highlighted that “the ASEAN Special Envoy must be given access to meet as many groups as possible in line with the point number five of the consensus.” In addition, he also highlighted the difficulty of providing humanitarian assistance to Myanmar, particularly to the conflict zone, through the AHA Centre. ASEAN Special Envoy Erywan Yusof, Second Foreign Minister of Brunei, said on 4 September 2021 that he is still negotiating with the military for his visit to Myanmar and has requested the military to get access to State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He also added that he wants to go to Myanmar before the ASEAN summit held in October, yet no date has been finalized for his visit to Myanmar. In addition, he remarked that there is an urgent need to go to Myanmar now, and it is also required to talk to all the parties concerned. ***** Date: 5 September 2021 Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations, New York..."
Source/publisher: Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations (New York)
Date of publication: 2021-09-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-12
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Title: BRIEFING PAPER: THE RESPONSE SO FAR OF UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL BODIES TO THE UNLAWFUL MILITARY COUP IN MYANMAR
Description: "Since the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar, three political bodies of the UN have discussed the situation and passed resolutions or adopted statements that include expressions of support for democratic processes, an end to violence and calls for the immediate release of political detainees. However, to date there have been no legally enforceable actions. The New York-based UN Security Council has held formal and informal meetings on Myanmar but has not exercised the significant powers available to it to address the impunity enjoyed by the military and to stop the flow of weapons and cash to it. Also in New York, in June the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that called for the military to respect the results of the November 2020 general elections, release political detainees and cease violence against protestors. It also called upon States to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar. Although not legally binding, the resolution is a politically significant international expression against the coup. The Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council has passed three resolutions on Myanmar since the coup. Two called for the coup to be reversed through restoration of the elected government. A third resolution on the human rights of Rohingya and other minorities was also adopted, although it contained few specific references to the coup. Human Rights Council resolutions are not legally binding. SAC-M has issued this briefing paper ahead of the start of the 48th session of UN Human Rights Council on Monday 13 September and the start of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly on Tuesday 14 September..."
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication: 2021-09-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: International community must hold the line after Myanmar’s ‘D-Day’
Sub-title: Myanmar’s friends need to deny the junta legitimacy and work with the National Unity Government
Description: "On Tuesday, the president of Myanmar’s democratic National Unity Government (NUG) proclaimed D-Day, the launch of a “people’s defensive war” against the military government, to overthrow it and end the oppression. Predictably, that caused a stir in the international community. One Western embassy reacted by asking its nationals to leave the country as soon as possible, while another ambassador issued a statement calling on all parties to work on restoring democracy peacefully. D-Day was not, as some surmised, a call to arms to sweep away the Tatmadaw in a large, bloody offensive. Rather, it was a demonstration of will and the acknowledgement of a reality. Myanmar is in the midst of an uprising against what its people consider a murderous occupying force. The call was taken up by the NUG’s allied ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the Kachin Independence Army, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Karenni Progressive Party, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta-ang National Liberation Army, as well as the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), an NUG-allied but disparate host of dozens of militias operating mostly in Myanmar’s Bamar-dominated center. Fighting increased on that day, but not significantly, compared with the days and weeks before. In its call, the NUG proclaimed a state of emergency, provided advice to civilians on how to protect themselves, and issued strict rules of engagement to its allied forces, to ensure the uprising complies with the Geneva Conventions. It called on Tatmadaw soldiers and police officers to defect and offered them protection. Some analysts lamented the call, fearing further doom for Myanmar. Others have pointed to the reality that the military is facing a credible strategic challenge. I am of a somewhat more optimistic predilection. EAOs are holding their territory, PDFs are proliferating and will continue to do so. Once the rainy season stops, one well-informed analyst told me, they may pop up in locations that have so far been peaceful. Tatmadaw defections are up. Guerrilla action has reached its gilded capital. All of this could in time overwhelm the Tatmadaw, sap the will of their rank and file to continue the fight, and may lead to them being unable to maintain their posture. No matter what they believe, everybody observing Myanmar agrees: The fighting will not stop right now, and there is currently no window for a negotiated solution. We need to remember: The uprising against the military is wildly popular, the military remains utterly despised, and the collapse of the economy was a calculated strategy in the early days of the coup to force out the military junta peacefully. Everybody agrees that the humanitarian fallout needs to be addressed, and the NUG is certainly willing to do so. The effort by ASEAN’s envoy to declare a humanitarian ceasefire, though, was doomed all along – it suited the Tatmadaw, who would love nothing more than having a ceasefire with EAOs to turn around and stamp out the PDFs. Had the envoy bothered to speak to the NUG, it would have told him that. Another thing is unchanged: Myanmar still has a legitimate, elected government that has built the most inclusive multi-ethic coalition in the history of the country, and remains the only actor that might have enough about them to keep the country together – if it wins. It has developed a democratic interim constitutional arrangement and principles for a federal democratic future. It has opened a pathway to Rohingya citizenship. D-Day has confirmed that there is political will and strategic purpose about this government and its allies. The overwhelmingly positive reactions around the country, from EAOs to student unions, have again demonstrated the support the NUG has. The NUG has made progress in establishing working relationships with a number of foreign governments. Still, few of these deal with the NUG as they would with an established government. In that respect the decision of the United Nations’ Credentials Committee next week on whether to accept the credentials of the NUG-loyal UN ambassador remains key. The international community needs to support this claim to strengthen the hand of the NUG, open it up to aid and support from the UN and beyond. Myanmar’s friends need to hold the line, deny the junta legitimacy and work with the NUG. The stronger the NUG and its alliance, the more quickly this uprising will be over. Building channels for mediation and low-level cooperation is no wasted effort even now. On the question of delivering humanitarian aid and of countering Covid-19, there may be potential for dialogue and limited cooperation at the grassroots level, between the junta and NUG-aligned EAO authorities, with the blessing perhaps of the NUG. That is all there can realistically be hoped for right now. At the end of it all, there will be a negotiated outcome, but only when the situation is ripe for a solution. For now, interests remain diametrically opposed: Nothing short of the complete overthrow of the regime and the fundamental remaking of the military is acceptable to the people of Myanmar. Without one side all but collapsing, that situation will not change. Representatives of the diplomatic community and international organizations have a responsibility to communicate the situation as it is clearly to their capitals, and not to muddy the waters by going through the motions: expressing concern, and calling for a peaceful return to democracy. That return is not in the cards right now. That fact needs to be understood by the decision-makers in the capitals, but also that it does not preclude constructive international engagement in Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2021-09-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-10
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Title: Joint statement of 246 Local and Foreign students’ unions - ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂ (၂၄၆)ဖွဲ့ ၏ ပူးတွဲကြေညာချက်
Description: "Now is the third time of the repeated coups by the fascist military with the purpose to oppress and exploit the people for the benefit of their own kith and kin. Throughout all those recurring coups of the fascist military, we, students, have fought, handing on the unyielding red flag of the fighting peacock, and our fight rages on to this day. Even amidst the crackdowns by the military, the chants of Students’ Unions and youths against military dictatorship are still covering the streets to this day. Overseas students are still serving the revolution in every possible way as well. The common goals of all the people are the absolute eradication of the fascist military and dictatorship and building Federal Democracy Union. We now observe that the fascist junta is relentlessly trying to earn international recognition, including that of the United Nations. We, students, and the people have demonstrated our objection against ASEAN's attempts of helping the fascist junta gain recognition. Furthermore, we, the Students’ Unions, earnestly request United Nations, International Governments and Organizations not to acknowledge the terroristic fascist junta. Concurrently, we declare unequivocally that we, the Students’ Unions, condemn nations and organizations that are helping the fascist junta to get recognition..."
Source/publisher: 246 Local and Foreign students' unions
Date of publication: 2021-09-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-10
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Title: Myanmar Shadow Government’s Declaration of War Echoes 1949 Rebellion
Description: "The shadow National Unity Government’s (NUG) declaration of war earlier this week against the military regime has echoes of 1949, when armed organizations rebelled against the government, occupied half the country and fought the Myanmar military. With NUG Acting President Duwa Lashila calling on civilian resistance fighters to target the junta and its assets and for ethnic armed organizations to join the fight against the regime, the NUG is hoping to unify anti-coup forces to fight the junta in more effective fashion. But just a few months after Myanmar gained its independence in 1948, several armed organizations took up arms against the then Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government over ideological conflicts and racial tensions. At that time Myanmar’s population was 17 million, compared to around 54 million today. The Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the then armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) – which was established before independence – rebelled against the government after their demand to be allowed to secede from the Union was denied. The KNU was also at odds with the government over the Karen peoples’ territorial boundaries within the Union. Two Karen battalions from the Myanmar military – one based in Pyay and the other in Taungoo in today’s Bago Region – as well as ethnic Karen police joined the KNDO. Other leftist units in Myanmar’s military including Battalions 1 and 3, based respectively in Thayet in today’s Magwe Region and Mingalardon in Yangon, and some Bago-based units also rebelled against the government. The military-published history of internal insurgency in Myanmar said that there were only around 2,000 officers and men left in Myanmar’s military at the time. Anti-government groups, which also included different factions of communists, were stronger than the Myanmar military because they had weapons left behind after World War II and also because the defecting units took their arms with them when they joined the revolt. Troops from the Communist Party of Burma, which had a force of between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters, occupied towns in today’s Ayeyarwady, Bago, Mandalay and Magwe regions, including Hinthada, Pyinmana, Yamethin, Myingyan and Pakokku. Meanwhile, the white-band faction of the People’s Volunteer Organization, which was formed by independence hero General Aung San from war veterans as his own paramilitary force for the independence struggle, occupied towns in central Myanmar. The KNDO, which was believed to have at least 10,000 soldiers, occupied Mawlamyine and Thaton in Mon State, in collaboration with the Mon National Defence Organisation. By early 1949, the KNDO had taken control of Mandalay, Pyin Oo Lwin, Taungoo, Pathein, Meiktila and several other towns before its troops reached and occupied Insein Township in the north of Yangon. Between February 1 and May 22 in 1949, the KNDO was able to retain control of Insein, posing a great threat to the central government in Yangon. Amid the chaos, government employees went on strike across the country, which was ultimately counterproductive as it gave the government a breathing space. “At the time, the Union government was completely broke. Fortunately, government employees came out on strike across the country. We didn’t even have the money to pay their salaries,” said the then Prime Minister U Nu. Yangon was surrounded by the vanguards of armed groups. The government was unable to control the rebellion around the country and was struggling to hold Yangon. Some international newspapers even started referring to the U Nu government as the ‘Yangon Government’. “The Union of Myanmar (then Burma) was rocked violently throughout 1948 and until April 1949,” wrote U Thant, a civil servant in the U Nu government who would later become United Nations Secretary-General, in his book Journey to Pyithawthar. As Myanmar’s military units were short of weapons, U Nu had to fly to New Delhi to seek help from his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru. Only after Nehru provided arms was the AFPFL government able to start reoccupying the towns taken by the rebels. U Nu’s government was also helped by the fact that the different armed groups were no longer collaborating because of their different political objectives. By 1950, the government had retaken control of most of the occupied towns. But more armed groups would later emerge and, over the next 70 years, Myanmar would continue to suffer from insurgencies until today’s civil war..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-09-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-10
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Title: STATEMENT ON DECLARATION OF PEOPLE’S DEFENSIVE WAR
Description: "8 September 2021: The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) finds it unfortunate that the National Unity Government (NUG) was ultimately forced to react in calling for a people’s defensive war against the military junta, but also understands the NUG and the people’s frustration after seven months of brutality by the junta and inaction by the international community. “Violence is the cause of the suffering of the people of Myanmar, it is not the solution,” SAC-M’s Chris Sidoti said. “We empathise with the NUG, but we fear for what will happen as a result of this decision.” The Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s rapacious military, has killed more than 1,000 people since it launched its illegal coup in the dead of night on February 1. It has launched airstrikes against civilians and displaced 300,000. It then deepened the massive humanitarian crisis it set in motion by weaponizing the latest COVID-19 outbreak, hoarding medical supplies for itself and denying oxygen to the people most in need. “The junta responded to the peaceful resistance to the coup with sheer brutality, employing horrific tactics that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes,” said SAC-M’s Yanghee Lee. “The people have been under attack for seven months now from a military that has remained both intransigent and indifferent to their suffering.” Myanmar’s broad democracy movement, represented by the NUG, has stepped in to provide vital services to people in the vacuum created by the military. This democratic groundswell includes the NUG’s People’s Defence Force (PDF) and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) across the length and breadth of the country. It is important to note that the NUG has prescribed a military code of conduct for the PDF that places protection of civilians first and foremost. In July the NUG made the decision to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, enabling the Court to hold all actors, including the PDF and EAOs, in Myanmar accountable under the Rome Statute. The international community has had ample opportunity to come to the aid of the people of Myanmar but has consistently failed. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations took six months to merely appoint a Special Envoy and has yet to deliver humanitarian assistance despite promising to do so in April. “The ASEAN Special Envoy, finally appointed after six months of unacceptable inaction, made an ill-judged call this week for a ceasefire in Myanmar, when what should have been emphasised was the immediate cessation of violence as was included in the five-point consensus,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “A ceasefire is totally different. It does not reflect the situation on the ground and fully meets the interests of the Tatmadaw, which has always used ceasefires to gain a strategic advantage.” The NUG’s declaration reflects the increasing frustration of those inside Myanmar who have bravely resisted the junta’s brutal campaign of violence for seven months with minimal international support. The international community has another chance to take action and support the people of Myanmar when the United Nations General Assembly convenes next week..."
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication: 2021-09-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-10
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Title: Australia must not follow ASEAN’s lead in Myanmar response, MPs say
Description: "JAKARTA – More than 60 former and current parliamentarians from across Southeast Asia have signed an open letter to Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, urging his administration to take urgent action to support human rights and democracy in Myanmar, and express concern about its stated policy to wait on action by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). “Although many of us had hoped ASEAN would rise to the occasion and formulate an effective response to the Myanmar crisis, in recent months it has become abundantly clear that the bloc has failed at all levels. ASEAN’s response has been not only lethargic, but also dangerous, by emboldening the military,” said Charles Santiago, chair of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (MP), and a Malaysian Member of Parliament (MP). “As representatives of the people of ASEAN, we urge Australia to hold true to its democratic principles and foundations, and not hide behind the harmful response of its undemocratic neighbors,” Santiago said. “Australia should be a strong regional partner to the people of Myanmar and the people of Southeast Asia, not our region’s authoritarian leaders, who are working together to protect themselves from scrutiny and accountability.” The signed letter was partly in response to comments made by Australia’s Foreign Minister Marise Payne in June, who said that placing targeted sanctions on the Myanmar military would not advance Australia’s interests, as well as “interests in supporting the ASEAN-led solution and the ASEAN efforts that are being made.” “Time and again, rather than standing up for the Myanmar people, who could not have made their rejection of the military any clearer, ASEAN has kowtowed to the murderous junta, by inviting its representatives to official meetings, granting it a veto over the choice of a special envoy, and even watering down a UN General Assembly statement aimed at preventing the sale of arms to the regime,” said Kasit Piromya, an APHR Board Member and former Thai Foreign Minister. The MPs urged the Australian government to follow the actions of democratic allies including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union, who have placed targeted sanctions against the military and its business interests, including its major conglomerates, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC). “It’s crucial that the military’s business interests are targeted as heavily as possible, since it’s revenues from these entities that fund their deadly campaigns against the people, including killing more than 1,000 people since the coup,” Piromya said. “In addition, in contrast to ASEAN’s actions so far, Australia’s government must not lend any form of legitimacy to the regime, and should instead formally engage with the democratically-elected representatives of Myanmar, including the National Unity Government (NUG),” Piromya said..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication: 2021-09-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-09
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Title: China Invites National League for Democracy to Summit for Asian Political Parties
Description: "Myanmar’s National League for Democracy will attend a summit for Asian political parties hosted by the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Thursday. The CPC is planning to hold a virtual meeting with political parties from Southeast and South Asia on Thursday. The party has invited four out of Myanmar’s 93 political parties, including the NLD. The invitation can be seen as Beijing’s official recognition of the NLD despite attempts by Myanmar’s regime to dissolve it. The NLD won the 2020 general election by a landslide but the regime accused it of vote-rigging and nullified the results. The party leadership, including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, have either been arrested or went into hiding. U Bo Bo Oo, a Yangon regional NLD lawmaker and a member of the Committee Representing Yangon Region Hluttaw (CRYH), told The Irrawaddy that he will represent the party. Military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party’s spokesman Dr. Nandar Hla Myint wrote on Facebook on Wednesday that central youth affairs committee member Dr. Thant Zin Lwin will attend the “Strengthening political parties’ cooperation in joint pursuit of economic development” meeting. In last year’s general election, the NLD won over 80 percent of all elected constituencies. The junta says it will hold a new election and has since taken steps to disband the NLD. In early August, in an online meeting between the junta-appointed foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin and China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, the envoy referred to the State Administration Council (SAC), the governing body of the regime, as the Myanmar government but also voiced concerns over plan to dissolve the NLD. Sun Guoxiang, a Chinese special envoy for Asian affairs who was in Myanmar from Aug. 21 to 28 at the invitation of the regime, reportedly asked to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. His request was denied and the regime was tightlipped about the visit. According to sources, Chinese officials have told the regime that Beijing wants the NLD to continue as a political party. In late July, the CPC also sent a letter of thanks to the NLD’s central executive committee in response to its congratulations on the centenary of the Communist Party’s founding..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-09-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Declaration of War Necessary as International Pressure Fails: Myanmar Shadow Govt
Description: "Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) call on Tuesday for a war against the military regime generated mixed reactions. While the majority of Myanmar people, who have endured the regime’s atrocities such as arbitrary killings, arrests and indiscriminate shootings, heartily embraced the announcement of ‘the nationwide revolt’, the international community was not impressed. On Tuesday, the UK’s ambassador designate to Myanmar, Pete Vowles, tweeted that “the UK supports peaceful efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar. We strongly condemn the junta’s coup and brutality; we call on all parties to engage in dialogue”. This means that the UK, which has supported the anti-regime movement since the coup, does not support the NUG’s call for a war to topple the junta. Echoing what the UK said, the US embassy in Yangon told The Irrawaddy that they encourage “all sides to be peaceful and to avoid an escalation of violence”, while continuing to push the regime to end all violence. China, Myanmar’s biggest neighbor and one of the regime’s protectors at the United Nations Security Council, just repeated its unpractical old mantra on Myanmar, saying that “all parties and factions in Myanmar should find a proper way to address problems through political dialogue under the constitutional and legal framework”. The NUG’s Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung has her say on the reason behind the declaration of war, and offers her view on the international response and the controversial ceasefire request made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) special envoy for Myanmar. What is the reason for the announcement of a nationwide defensive war and all-out revolt against the junta? The [acting] president’s speech encourages the existing resistance movement to step up the momentum of its activities. Actually, the people have been acting in self-defense in their respective regions since before the NUG’s call for a war. The official announcement on Tuesday was a consequence of the diplomatic failures we have seen, because the international pressure and sanctions [on the regime] have proved to be ineffective in the seven months since the coup. So the call is an alert to the existing revolutionary movement. What is the NUG’s response to the international community’s reaction to the announcement? Some countries have asked why we announced it. Our answer is simple. We have people who are continuing the peaceful protests under the leadership of the strike committees, as well as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against military rule. The CDM and the non-violence movement aren’t stopping, while our political efforts [to get recognition and to reject the military regime] via international pressure and diplomatic channels will continue. But these efforts are not enough. Therefore, we have to put some momentum into the resistance movement. This is not a shift from a non-violent movement to violence. It is just that we will use all possible means to restore democracy. What is the NUG’s stand on dialogue with the regime? Every experienced person focused on peace building and conflict studies knows that there have to be pre-conditions before dialogue can happen. A period of time is needed. A change in political circumstance is needed before dialogue can happen. Such conditions and changes need to come first. Until then, we should not be pressured to hold dialogue. The international community has always expressed their concerns since the coup. But there is no action. Our people are suffering all the time. We have been raising our voices loudly to the international community to intervene and to exert pressure on the junta. The international intervention was sluggish. It took four months to appoint an ASEAN special envoy. During those four months, the number of civilian deaths and civilian arrests rose from the hundreds to the thousands. They could not even pressure the military’s State Administration Council to allow the ASEAN special envoy to visit Myanmar. Our people are too frustrated. We, the NUG, have a responsibility to reflect our peoples’ voices and suffering. Our call for a war is our response to the depressing lack of action by the international community. What is the NUG’s position on the ASEAN special envoy’s proposal of a four-month ceasefire? The envoy did not directly talk to us about the proposed four-month ceasefire. As far as we understand, the ASEAN special envoy is trying to visit Myanmar and has requested to meet all relevant stakeholders, including detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, strike committees, ethnic groups, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and the NUG. That has been ASEAN’s five-point consensus and we understand that ASEAN is trying to implement it. Regarding the call for a ceasefire [until the end of this year], it is totally dependent on the regime as they are the ones who have been shooting civilians. People would not need to respond with defensive acts if the regime stopped attacking them. Our peoples’ actions in self-defense are the result of the military’s attacks against civilians and treating them as if they are an enemy on the battlefield. The junta has the sole responsibility and it must hold its fire. The junta’s spokesperson has accused the NUG of inciting instability. What is the NUG’s response to that? The NUG’s Defense Ministry has strictly instructed all the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) to follow its code of conduct. That is also publicized to make sure that the PDF’s under the NUG’s command abide by those instructions. I think people will not worry [about the NUG’s announcement on war]. They all know who is indiscriminately shooting passers-by, children and pregnant women. The reason the PDF’s were formed was because of the military’s aggressive actions. Instead of protecting the public, the military is treating the people as the enemy. Targeting civilians is not the policy of the NUG or the PDF’s. Professional armed forces don’t go on killing sprees and commit indiscriminate attacks. The PDF’s are the first step towards changing Myanmar’s whole security sector, which has been in ruins for decades under previous military regimes as well as the current one. Regarding the NUG’s call for a war, I think the people are excited rather than worried. They have been waiting for this day and some have said that the NUG’s declaration should have come earlier. The NUG has no responsibility for the instability in the country. It’s the coup leaders who created the instability in the country by seizing power and overthrowing the civilian government on February 1..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-09-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-09
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Title: Open Letter to Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison
Description: "Re: Australia’s response to the crisis in Myanmar Dear Prime Minister, We, current and former parliamentarians from Southeast Asia, are writing to you to urge the Australian Government to take urgent action to support human rights and democracy in Myanmar, and to express our deepest concern at Australia’s stated policy to wait on action by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As elected representatives of the people of the ASEAN region, we would like to respectfully urge you to anchor Australia’s response to the military coup in Myanmar to what its people have been demanding, and what other democratic nations have done, not ASEAN’s lack of action. More than six months since the military coup and the subsequent campaign of violence unleashed by the Myanmar Army, ASEAN has failed in its responsibility to the people of Myanmar, and the broader international community. Despite an initial meeting on 24 April 2021, during which ASEAN Member States reached a Five-Point Consensus, little further action has taken place. It took four months for ASEAN to reach an agreement to appoint on 2 August the second Foreign Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Erywan Yusof, as its Special Envoy. We would, however, welcome with caution this appointment. It is important to keep in mind that the Minister, as the representative of ASEAN’s Chair, has led the bloc’s ineffective response so far, including a delegation to Myanmar in June, during which he not only met solely with the junta, but also pushed their narrative that elections could take place, even suggesting that ASEAN sends monitors. We are also concerned that the Minister of an absolute monarchy that does not abide by international human rights standards has been tasked with convincing a murderous army to respect these principles. Furthermore, no humanitarian aid has been provided so far, and ASEAN is still yet to engage all relevant parties in Myanmar, in particular the National Unity Government. ASEAN’s actions even raise questions as to whose interests it is truly representing when it invites Myanmar Army representatives to its official meetings, granting them political and regional legitimacy, or works to water down a UN General Assembly Resolution calling for the prevention of arms sales to the Myanmar military. Meanwhile, the situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar and Human Rights Watch recently concluded that since the coup the Myanmar military has committed the crimes against humanity of murder, enforced disappearance, torture, rape and other sexual violence, severe deprivation of liberty, and other inhumane acts causing great suffering. In recent weeks as Myanmar has witnessed a rapid spike in coronavirus cases, the junta has confiscated oxygen, and attacked healthcare workers and facilities, actions that risk turning a crisis into a disaster. Yet, ASEAN’s very own principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision making prevent the bloc from taking any meaningful steps towards an end of violence in Myanmar. Even its provisions of humanitarian aid, if it takes place, risks further legitimizing the junta, and not reach those in need. In that regard we would like to echo the findings of our fellow parliamentarians from Australia who in their recent Inquiry into certain aspects of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Annual Report 2019-20 – Myanmar noted that: “there are complex relations within and between ASEAN nations, and that this led to concerns that ASEAN would not intervene decisively on the Myanmar crisis.” ASEAN’s limiting founding principles and division among its Member States have allowed Myanmar’s military to stall the little efforts it has made so far and to use ASEAN as a shield to strengthen the junta’s position regionally and internationally. Therefore, we are writing to you to ask you bluntly, is this really what Australia wants to align its foreign policy with? Instead, we would like to ask you to be a regional partner to the people of Myanmar and the people of ASEAN, not the authoritarian leaders of our region, who are working together to protect themselves from scrutiny and accountability. We believe that, given Australia’s position in the region, strong democratic institutions, and its close ties with both ASEAN and democracies elsewhere in the world, it is perfectly placed to play a leading role in helping to put an end to the violence and support the desire of the people of Myanmar to live in a democracy that fully respects human rights of all. That is why, while we call on your government to demand action by ASEAN, we urge you not to wait to follow the bloc’s lead. Instead, as a starting point, Australia must urgently use its position to impose targeted sanctions on the generals leading the junta, and the economic entities they control, as recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, implemented by Australia’s key partners such as the EU, US, UK, and Canada, and most importantly requested by the people of Myanmar. In contrast to ASEAN’s actions so far, we also call on your government to not legitimize the military junta’s authority in any way, and instead follow the recommendations set out by Australia’s Parliament by formally engaging with the democratically-elected representatives of Myanmar, including the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the National Unity Government (NUG)..."
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-09
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Title: Revisiting the wages of ‘Burman-ness’ after the Coup
Description: "Author’s note: The following is a summary and post-coup adaptation of a longer article in Journal of Contemporary Asia entitled “Revisiting the wages of Burman-ness: Contradictions of privilege in Myanmar,” which was accepted for publication in October 2020, and which elaborates these points in detail. The February 2021 military coup that has shaken Myanmar and ended the country’s fraught experiment with liberal transition has left millions of Burmese furious and disgusted. But despite hundreds of protesters slaughtered by the military and thousands more infected by a COVID-19 wave exacerbated by military negligence, those feelings have not metastasized into generalized despair. This seems, in part, because activists and the public writ large have sublimated their opprobrium and anger into political projects: specifically, rather than only condemning the coup and demanding a return to the earlier status quo, popular movements have interpreted the seizure of power by the sit-tat[1] as implicit commentary on the contradictory conditions of the earlier democratic moment. Some protestors thus sought to push beyond an earlier imaginative failure. This became clear symbolically when, early in the uprising, protesters began spontaneously eschewing the red of the National League for Democracy (NLD), donning black instead, therein indicating the necessity of a new politics. And while many have retained faith in an NLD-centered politics, other protesters – in particular activists such as Ei Thinzar Maung (now NUG Deputy Minister for Women and Youth) and Thinzar Shunlei Yi – have made it explicit that a new politics is necessary. This politics, they say, must address inter-ethnic injustice that had for years been brushed aside by the very same democratic leaders, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been deposed. She had, after all, patronizingly told ethnic minorities to sacrifice their interests for the nation, aligned with the military in its negotiations with ethnic armies, and provided the sit-tat cover by defending it against charges of genocide while denying its campaign of mass rape. By contrast, an outpouring of popular discourse, much rendered in street protest signs, implicitly repudiated those positions, addressing the collective failure for the polity’s majority – the Burmans – to care for inter-ethnic issues. Many identified how the military had revealed that it ultimately viewed all of its subjects as subject to brutal domination; as one popular sign put it: “First they came for the Karen, and we didn’t speak out. Then they came for the Rohingya, and we didn’t speak out. Now they are coming for ALL OF US.” Others addressed themselves to ethnic groups, Rohingya included, apologizing either for not believing reports about abuse and genocide, or not taking action. Many endorsed trans-ethnic solidarity (See Figure 1); others directed anti-coup energies not just at the State Administrative Council (SAC) that had seized power, but at a more general “Burman chauvinism” (See Figure 2). But even as conversations on Burmese Facebook focused on how Burmans must acknowledge and apologize for past abuses, there has been a perceptible gap between self-flagellation and material steps that would precipitate substantive change. Nowhere has this been registered more starkly than in comments by ethnic nationality subjects who have expressed skepticism that these declarations of solidarity would translate beyond the struggle against the SAC. To take one example, after Min Ko Naing, in an early outline of what would become CDM, which he sketched on 2 Feb and which his comrades passed to one of us, exhorted everyone to “beg the ethnics” (see Figure 3), an online commentator questioned the sincerity of his commitment to equality, adding: “When things are ok for you again, you will forget about us.”[2] This leaves a burning question: if this is indeed an inflection point in how ethnic justice is considered by many in Myanmar, and if Burmans are in fact interrogating the privileges they have enjoyed, how can these be translated into substantive political programs that will transform a future society? Specifically, how effective can we expect such performances of apology and acknowledgment to be in bringing along those Burmans who support right-wing Burman Buddhist movements? Will they feel they have much to apologize for? Moreover, if we consider those who do not endorse such ideologies but who have nonetheless been excluded from the largesse of Myanmar’s “development” over the past decade, are they likely to suddenly identify ethnic others as brothers and sisters rather than threats to their livelihoods and social reproduction who are “jumping the queue” (see Figure 4). As these hypotheticals suggest, apologies and the acknowledgment of unearned benefits – what we call “liberal privilege theory” – may founder against entrenched realities in Myanmar and remain feel-good performances of virtue signaling that, while able to absolve guilt, leave inequality firmly intact. In what follows, we draw on our recent article, “Revisiting the wages of Burman-ness: Contractions of privilege in Myanmar,” published in Journal of Contemporary Asia, to describe facets of this theory and how it plays out in Myanmar studies scholarship, before turning to a radical strain of privilege theory to advance an argument for why this more radical articulation of privilege has the potential to fundamentally redress entrenched Burman chauvinism. Reconsidering Liberal Privilege Theory The analytic of “Burman privilege” has been popularized in Myanmar studies circles through the influential article “The Wages of Burman-ness” by Matthew Walton. Walton begins by outlining a theory of white privilege, as it has been used in the United States, to conceptualize unearned material benefits – “wages” – that white people enjoy by dint of the US’s structurally-entrenched and long-unacknowledged white supremacy. He then identifies the parallels between American whites and Burmans, while adding that it is particularly challenging for Burmans to perceive these benefits because they too have been oppressed by Myanmar’s military governments and because many are not aware of the disproportionate suffering endured by ethnic members of the polity. One of Walton’s particular insights, for instance, is how he identifies the subtle false equivalence that Suu Kyi draws between Burman and ethnic nationality suffering under the sit-tat: Not only does [Suu Kyi] effectively ignore the historically real and continuing effects of ethnic conflict, she does not acknowledge the disparities in sacrifice and suffering experienced by non-Burman ethnic groups. She asks them to put aside their own experiences of injustice and oppression to follow her plan (Walton 2013:16). There is much to recommend in Walton’s article, particularly given that it was published nearly a decade ago. And his focus on Burmans is refreshing especially given the amount of blame put on ethnic groups for desiring autonomy and dignity. As Walton puts it, “Burman dominance and privilege can be overcome only through active struggle and repudiation by Burmans” (21) who are “the only group in a position to challenge structures of Burman privilege” (22). But ultimately, because Walton takes Burman privilege as an un-analyzed outcome, such privilege appears as the aggregate product of individual bias – bias that can be excised from the body politic by the righteous actions of individual Burmans. And while we can think of important actions that such individuals can take that might change the minds of some – standing up against hate speech, challenging propaganda, encouraging people to know more about the history and perspectives of ethnic people – a question is whether such actions are enough. There is a risk they amount to allowing people to apologize for their privilege while doing little to change it. Moreover, even if self-examination was widespread and led to changed attitudes, the reality remains that given the skewed distribution of resources from earlier historical eras, whether there would be any real mechanism for redressing economic inequalities. This is ultimately why such an approach to racial/ethnic inequality remains liberal. For “liberal antiracist analysis,” writes Harsha Walia (2021: 13), “obsessed with superficial representation and flag-waving, purposefully fails to interrogate the material structures upending racism.” Radical Privilege Theory Walton’s thesis thus ultimately offers a false promise that Burman privilege can be resolved without addressing those economic inequalities. Walton’s theory falls short not simply because economic justice is entwined in racial justice, but because capitalist class relations play a large role in generating those racial cleavages. This is the main thesis of the alternative and unfortunately somewhat displaced version of radical privilege theory articulated by W.E.B. DuBois more than a century ago, and since expanded upon by the Black radical feminist tradition, including the Combahee River Collective, Audre Lorde, bell hooks, and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor. And it is from this radical perspective that critics of racial privilege have identified whiteness as what scholars Noel Ignatin and Ted Allen call a “bourgeois poison” offered to all whites, but ultimately “utilized as a weapon by the ruling class to subjugate” not just non-whites, but poor whites as well.[3] More specifically, a material/ideological “wage” is offered to those interpellated into the dominant race/ethnicity – enticing even poor and otherwise exploited members to identify with and defend racialized class rule to the point of betraying their own interests – leaving them to defend a capitalist system that leaves them worse off. In other words, while a poor Burman might receive additional scraps from the proverbial table – in terms of having his culture exalted, in terms of her gaining a mild advantage in labor markets – these benefits pale in comparison to the benefits poor Burmans might gain by joining with non-Bama ethnics to reject the entire exploitative system. Having clarified the radical theorization of racial/ethnic privilege, we can turn to Myanmar to assess the theory’s analytical usefulness in this otherwise different context. Revisiting Ethnic History through Radical Privilege Theory In his article, Walton describes a long history of ethnic Burman chauvinism, one present during the anti-colonial struggle, which was waged, he has it, along specifically Burman ethnic lines. Walton argues that 1930s-era nationalist group Dobama Asiayone (“We Burmese Association”)—which he uses as a synecdoche for the entire nationalist movement—sought “to promote what [it] saw as ‘Burmese’ culture (in reality, Burman culture)” (Walton 2013: 8). But he bases this claim on a misreading of the 2000 article “The Concepts of Dobama (Our Burma) and Thudo-Bama (Their Burma) in Burmese Nationalism, 1930-1948” by Japanese scholar Kei Nemoto. In his misreading, Walton asserts that the Dobama fostered a racialized Burman against an internal enemy—the thudo-Bama (“Those Burmese”), which Dobama members “saw as collaborators with the British colonialists” (ibid). However, Nemoto stresses the mutability, rather than the fixity, of the concept of Burman, which was constructed in terms of vague nationalism and socialism. Moreover, Nemoto makes clear that the key distinction dividing dobama and thudobama was that between those who worked for the nation and those who did not. Here the thudobama were “the Burmese people who collaborated with the colonial regime” (Nemoto 2000: 1) – particularly Indians, Chinese, and kabya (those of mixed heritage who wanted to be white). And while traditional Burmese proverbs and literature presented upland tribes as “uncivilized,” such figures were incompatible with those performing the machinations resented by the thudobama. Moreover, as scholar Phyo Win Latt has identified in recent historical research, not only did the Dobama Asiayone include Rakhine, Shan, Indian, and so forth, but the figure of the “dobama Muslim” existed as a way to describe a patriotic Burmese Muslim. He argues that “Dobama” should be seen as an adjective describing a kind of conduct, a way of behaving, rather than a noun indexing an ethnic essence. We would like to advance a humble provocation here: that “Burman” is more open than scholars have asserted—less rigidly reified in the ascriptive sense— but that its openness derives from its formation as a class-inflected hegemonic category. In this sense, “Burman-ness” operates even more effectively than does whiteness as a racialised category of class privilege, as it makes itself more available for entry of “non-Burmans” initially outside of it. In particular, we argue that it was only in the post-Independence era that Burman-ness as a privileged social category became constructed against that of other ethnic nationalities—a process that was tied up in the particular dynamics of post-colonial capitalism. Indeed, not only were residents of Indian and Chinese ancestry dispossessed, and much of that property transferred to lowlanders (read: Burmans), but Nu’s independence government pursued a project of capitalist modernization in which Burmanization was inseparable from industrialization. Ne Win subsequently worked to establish state capitalism under military rule and further marginalize Indians and Muslims. With those groups marginalized, “development” in Burma was mostly enacted in the lowlands, and what little was brought to non-Burman spaces was still encoded as Burman: roads and bridges were icons of military state expansion rather than belonging to the nation. “Burman” came to be linked with ideas of national progress, modernity, and development within Myanmar, while the non-Burman minorities went from being the backwards-but-assimilable cousins, to those who were impeding the march “toward a more modern and developed nation.” Propaganda and conventional wisdom in the lowlands had it that upland ethnic minorities undermined development either directly (by trying to leave the country and take resources with them), or indirectly (by causing trouble, which justifies military-state authoritarianism, which perpetuates civil war, which prevents development). The result, for the social category “Bama,” was a clearer distinction from ethnic nationalities, even as the category remained incorporative. We argue that Burman-ness should best be understood as an identity that has a broad semiotic range, partaking of classic (if vaguely defined) “ethnic” indices, and privileged class-inflected expressions simultaneously. Put more clearly, in certain contexts (such as in rural villages) Burman-ness can be expressed through: modes of speaking (Burmese); worshipping (Buddhism); working (agrarian-based livelihoods); tracing genealogy (kinship); adorning the body (clothing, face cream, tattoos); and naming (having a “Burmese” name). Against this “strong” version of Burman-ness, however, significant deviation is permitted in relatively cosmopolitan contexts (urban areas). Numerous colleagues and informants, who are at least nominally non-Burman, have conveyed to us that they act as Burmans in their daily lives. As one puts it: For people like me who live in cities and don’t speak an ethnic minority language, don’t have ethnic minority names and who are Buddhists, I don’t think it would be a problem to identify ourselves as “Bamar” in the first place…. I am Bamar… but also Mon, Pa-O, and Chinese. Further, this particular informant stresses that asking what he really “is”—either Burman or non- Burman—misconstrues his lived mutability: that it is both/and rather than either/or. As the now-moribund “transition” of the 2010s increased inequality – not only making more wealth available but fueling dispossession and destroying livelihoods for many poor people – ethnicity became more potent as a means of securing one’s life. This is at least one explanation for the rise of MaBaTha as a trans-ethnic movement (provided those ethnicities were over-coded as being predominantly Buddhist) that provided populist succor to the alienated and marginalized “Burman.” What to do? In his 1963 novel, Yoma Taikbwe, ethnic Chin author Bhamo Tin Aung highlighted the challenges for inter-ethnic solidarity building against an historical backdrop of political economic inequality, particularly between the Burman lowlands and ethnic minority uplands.[4] But while not to be taken for granted, such solidarity, Bhamo Tin Aung suggests, is both possible and necessary for any collective emancipatory project. In a similar vein, we encourage here a more explicit discussion of political economic inequality as the material conditions of possibility for enduring ethnic division in Myanmar. From this perspective, durable inter-ethnic solidarity in the struggle against military rule requires explicit critique of the liberal politics that preceded the February 2021 coup—a politics that purposefully failed to interrogate the material structures upholding ethnic inequality. Ultimately, however, the failure of pre-coup liberal politics to deal with material inequality in Myanmar hurt not only ethnic minority upland villagers, but poor Burmans in the lowlands as well. For this reason, a serious project of political economic restructuring—involving land reform, nationalization of military holding companies, and significant redistribution of wealth, for example—has the potential to address the material structures upending inequality, both between the lowlands and uplands, and between elite and marginalized populations within the lowlands. While such policies will not ineluctably lead to improved inter-ethnic relations, a politics – building on Burma’s rich leftist tradition – that stresses how average Burmese subjects of every race and religion have more in common among themselves than with economic elites – even those of their own ethnicity – that have raided the country for decades, just may..."
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Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2021-09-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-09
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Title: Myanmar’s Monks, Leaders of Past Protests, Are Divided Over the Coup
Sub-title: Some senior members of the Buddhist clergy have given their blessing to the generals in power. But hundreds of lower-ranking monks have been jailed for protesting.
Description: "Day after day, despite a raging pandemic and the threat of snipers’ bullets, a small band of Buddhist monks in burgundy robes gathers in the city of Mandalay in Myanmar. Their acts of dissent last only a few minutes, hasty candlelight vigils or flash-mob protests in the shadow of a monastery with gilded eaves. The clerics’ demand is lofty: men in uniform, men who protest a bit too loudly that they are pious Buddhists, must exit politics. The military has dominated Myanmar for the better part of 60 years, most recently by staging a coup against an elected government and killing more than a thousand people for daring to oppose its power grab. “In the future, there should be no dictatorship at all,” read one sign held aloft by a monk on Monday. In an overwhelmingly Buddhist nation where monks are seen as the supreme moral authority, the political chaos since the Feb. 1 coup has laid bare deep divisions within Myanmar’s clergy. While a minority of monks have openly joined the protest movement, and hundreds have been imprisoned for it, clerics have not taken the leadership role that they were known for in past bouts of resistance to the military. Some prominent monks have even given the generals their blessing. This split in the monastic community, Buddhist clerics say, is partly due to the military’s assiduous courting of influential monks, luring them with donations and promises that soldiers, more than civilian leaders, are the true defenders of the faith. Harder-edged tactics have also been used to discourage monks from protesting, as armed security forces occupy monasteries — potential centers for resistance — and order clerics to return home, citing the coronavirus pandemic. The relative absence of monks from the protests, particularly in the first weeks after the coup, has not matched the broader mood in Myanmar. Millions marched in the streets after Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the army chief, ordered the jailing of elected leaders. Even today, as security forces shoot protesters on sight and the coronavirus rips through the country, pockets of democratic rebellion have endured. For centuries, Myanmar’s monks have taken bold political stands, from hunger strikes demanding independence from Britain to street protests against the army’s rule in 2007. And though the government-run national clerical council mostly capitulated to the new order imposed in February, some monks have defied it. U Mani Sara, a monk from Mandalay, spent a month in prison for attending anti-military rallies earlier this year. On the way to his cell, he was forced to jump like a frog for hours, he said. Spoiled rice was delivered in the morning in a plastic bag, which he had to use for other purposes because there was no toilet. “The military is a demonic force that uses Buddhism for political purposes to build power,” Mr. Mani Sara said. The Tatmadaw, as the military is known, has always used lavish displays of religiosity to legitimize its rule. On the day after the February coup, General Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of the putsch, prostrated himself at the feet of a senior Buddhist abbot. The image of the general and the monk, which appeared in state media outlets, carried a clear message: In a deeply devout country, the army takeover had been sanctified by a higher authority. “The military is one of the main culprits in tarnishing the image of Buddhism in Myanmar,” said U Ariyawuntha, an abbot in Mandalay. General Min Aung Hlaing, who has ordered multiple pogroms against religious minorities, has deliberately fused faith to flag. His army has instructed Buddhists that protecting the religion is a national duty, and that the Tatmadaw is the country’s ultimate spiritual guardian. When an army-led campaign of atrocities drove more than three-quarters of a million Rohingya Muslims into neighboring Bangladesh in 2017, monks were among the fiercest champions of the violence, echoing the military’s baseless claims that Buddhism was being threatened by a resurgent Islam. The public largely supported the deadly campaign, which the United States has described as ethnic cleansing. But the junta’s sectarian justifications for its coup — that the civilian government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was in cahoots with oil-rich Muslim nations to degrade Buddhism — have not gained such widespread acceptance. And some monks, far from supporting the generals, have disrobed to join the armed People’s Defense Force, which is aligned with a self-declared opposition government formed from remnants of the ousted civilian leadership and representatives of ethnic, religious and civil society groups. “I will be a soldier until we get democracy,” said Bo Thaid Dhi, who was a monk until he began training with the People’s Defense Force this summer. “I have traded the monkhood for manhood.” In 2007, tens of thousands of monks marched, some with their begging bowls upturned to symbolize their discontent with military rule. With the clergy leading the way, hundreds of thousands of laypeople joined the protests. The military responded by shooting pro-democracy protesters who had gathered in the shadow of a golden pagoda. Dozens of monasteries were ordered shut. Public sentiment hardened against the generals, and the military eventually fashioned a power-sharing agreement with Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party, whose second landslide victory at the polls, in November, was followed by the February coup. This time around, many Buddhist institutions have stayed silent as the military has cracked down on dissent, though a vocal minority of monks participating in the flash protests have had their actions amplified on social media. The state religious council, which depends on official funding, has largely toed the line. Nationalist monks have echoed the military’s criticism of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, accusing her of betraying Buddhism to Islam (even though, while in office, she defended the military’s persecution of Rohingya Muslims). “Only pessimists or dissidents have accused Senior General Min Aung Hlaing of using Buddhism to gain power,” said the monk U Su Citta Sara, a spokesman for the Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion, or Ma Ba Tha, which preaches against mixing with Muslims. “The people who were killed by the military on the streets during the protests may not be really innocent.” Monks associated with Ma Ba Tha receive financial support from Tatmadaw generals. They have toured razed Rohingya villages and offered benediction to Buddhist civilians who took part in the bloodshed. “After 2007, the military understood the strength of monks and tried to create Ma Ba Tha to create divisions between monks using Islam, so that is why fewer monks are involved in the 2021 revolution,” said U Par Kata, another monk who escaped to the area where the People’s Defense Force has conducted training. “Monks who support the military and coup are not only destroying the country, they are also destroying Buddhism.” After the coup, the nation’s most respected monk, Ashin Nyanissara, known more commonly as Sitagu Sayadaw, was silent as security forces shot and killed unarmed demonstrators and child bystanders alike. He allowed men in uniform to pray at his feet. Only weeks later did he urge the junta to stop killing peaceful protesters. Sitagu Sayadaw has monastic outposts in the United States and runs theological universities. As the army’s campaign of slaughter, mass rape and arson against the Rohingya intensified, he delivered a sermon to military officers that provided religious justification for killing non-Buddhists. The military and monkhood cannot be divided, he said. When General Min Aung Hlaing went to Moscow on arms-buying trips in 2018 and 2019, Sitagu Sayadaw accompanied him. When the general, now Myanmar’s self-appointed prime minister, returned to Russia in June for more weapons procurement, he attended a ceremony at a temple complex that Sitagu Sayadaw had blessed on one of their earlier trips. Another chief monk who stayed silent while soldiers killed protesters was Sayadaw Bhatanda Kavisara, the abbot of a monastery near Naypyidaw, the military-built capital. It was at his feet that General Min Aung Hlaing prayed on the day after the coup. In June, a military plane carrying Sayadaw Bhatanda Kavisara, army officers and some of his wealthy donors crashed in bad weather, killing nearly everyone on board. His ornate funeral, attended by General Min Aung Hlaing, was front-page news in state newspapers. Some Buddhists who oppose the coup said they saw something close to karmic retribution in the abbot’s death. A very different path was taken by another abbot, U Kay Tha Ya, who until earlier this year led a monastery in Yangon, the nation’s biggest city. When the police tried to arrest him for joining the protests, Mr. Kay Tha Ya fled to a part of Myanmar controlled by ethnic rebels, where he gave up his robes. Since then, he said, he has killed two soldiers as a member of the People’s Defense Force. “As a monk I couldn’t kill them, so I decided to become a soldier,” he said. “It’s like going down from heaven to hell. But I think it was necessary.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The New York Times" (USA)
Date of publication: 2021-08-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Atrocity Alert No. 267: Afghanistan, Niger and Myanmar (Burma)
Sub-title: Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.
Description: "DESPITE TALIBAN PROMISES, REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES EMERGE Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, reports of widespread human rights abuses are already emerging. A day after the capture of Kabul on 15 August, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned the Security Council of “chilling reports of severe restrictions on human rights throughout the country,” particularly violations against women and girls. Over the past week small demonstrations against Taliban rule have also taken place across the Afghanistan and the Taliban have responded with violence, including shooting at protesters. Although the Taliban declared a “general amnesty” on 17 August for those who worked for the previous Afghan government, there have also been numerous reports of their forces searching for Afghans who previously worked for United States (US) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, as well as former members of the security forces. Taliban spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, has reiterated their promise of no reprisals, but allegations of arrests and property seizures, as well as unverified reports of reprisal killings, continue to emerge. Internal UN reports indicate that their Afghan staff have also been beaten, harassed and threatened by the Taliban since 15 August. Mujahid also issued a series of conditional assurances regarding the Taliban’s respect for human rights principles, including support for a free press that does not “work against national values” and no discrimination against women “within the limits of Islam.” However, freedom of the press and the fundamental rights of women and girls have previously been infringed upon, including the at least 30 journalists and media workers who have been killed, wounded or abducted by the Taliban and other armed extremists so far this year. Despite Taliban assurances of safe passage for Afghans wishing to leave the country, at least 20 Afghans have been killed over the past week either by shootings or stampedes while attempting to flee via the airport. The US has suggested the potential extension of their troop presence to assist with evacuations from Kabul airport, but the Taliban has threatened that the presence of foreign forces beyond 31 August would be met with “consequences.” Universal human rights are unconditional. There should be no diplomatic recognition of any Taliban-led government unless it is willing to honor Afghanistan’s international treaty obligations and demonstrate its commitment to uphold the human rights of all Afghans, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religious belief or sexual orientation. The UN Human Rights Council should immediately establish an independent international mechanism to monitor the human rights situation in the country. TILLABÉRI BECOMES EPICENTER OF ATROCITIES IN NIGER On 20 August suspected fighters from an Islamist armed group opened fire during evening prayers in the village of Theim in the Tillabéri region of Niger, killing 16 people. This attack followed the killing of 37 civilians, including 13 children, in the village of Darey-Dey in Tillabéri on 16 August. According to local authorities, the unidentified armed men “found people in the fields and shot at anything that moved.” This was the third such attack in Darey-Dey so far this year. A state of emergency has been enforced in Tillabéri since 2017, but civilians have come under increased attack as armed groups linked to the so-called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara have made inroads in the region. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has expressed his concern for “the cumulative impact of these frequent attacks on the humanitarian situation in the region of Tillabéri, where already more than 100,000 people have been displaced and 520,000 are in need of humanitarian assistance.” Since the start of 2021 western Niger has experienced some of the worst atrocities in its recent history. More than 450 civilians have been killed by Islamist armed groups, with the majority of attacks targeting civilians along ethnic lines. The recent attacks in the tri-border region of Niger are also part of a wider conflict in the Central Sahel, encompassing Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Last Wednesday, 18 August, at least 59 civilians were killed in an attack near the town of Arbinda, northern Burkina Faso. The ongoing violence is also exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Tillabéri. Since the start of the rainy season in June, armed groups have targeted civilians working in the fields, which has disrupted agricultural production and transhumance at a time when over 686,000 people are at risk of severe food insecurity. According to Human Rights Watch, Islamist armed groups have also destroyed 147 granaries so far this year in the Banibangou administrative area in Tillabéri. Over 100 civilians have been killed since the start of July, many of whom were attacked as they were farming. All civilians, regardless of ethnicity or religion, are entitled to equal protection in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. The Nigerien government must apprehend and prosecute all perpetrators of alleged war crimes. The authorities should bolster the early warning capabilities of the army, protect vulnerable populations in the Tillabéri region, and ensure that these efforts do not lead to further human rights abuses. FOUR YEARS SINCE THE ROHINGYA GENOCIDE IN MYANMAR Today, 25 August, marks four years since Myanmar’s security forces initiated so-called “clearance operations” against the minority Rohingya population in Rakhine State. The operations were characterized by indiscriminate killings, sexual violence and forced displacement on a massive scale. More than 350 Rohingya villages were destroyed and 745,000 people were forced to flee. In 2019 the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded that senior members of the military should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity and war crimes as well as genocide against the Rohingya. This includes General Min Aung Hlaing, who subsequently led a military coup on 1 February 2021 that overthrew Myanmar’s civilian-led government. The genocide was the culmination of decades of institutionalized persecution of the Rohingya, including the denial of citizenship and severe restrictions on their freedom of movement as well as access to education and employment. Four years later, all these discriminatory laws and policies remain in place. Impunity for their role in the genocide has emboldened Myanmar’s security forces to commit other human rights violations and abuses, including potential crimes against humanity perpetrated by the new military junta against civilian protesters. More than 1,000 people have been killed by Myanmar’s security forces since the 1 February coup. Thousands more remain in detention where they face torture and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment. The Rohingya continue to face an existential threat under the junta. During May General Min Aung Hlaing publicly rejected the term “Rohingya” and cast doubt on the return of refugees from Bangladesh. Amidst a catastrophic wave of COVID-19 infections, junta-appointed authorities said they had no plans to include the remaining Rohingya population in Rakhine State, who are forced to live in densely-packed displacement camps, in their vaccination plans. Since the 2017 genocide some progress has been made in pursuing international justice for the Rohingya. During 2019 The Gambia brought a historic case to the International Court of Justice, accusing Myanmar of violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention. The Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court has also authorized the Chief Prosecutor to investigate possible crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya, resulting in their forced deportation to Bangladesh. Meanwhile, on 17 August a court in Argentina heard testimony from Rohingya survivors regarding a case initiated under the principle of universal jurisdiction. “Since the military coup, the lives of the Rohingya as well as millions of other civilians in Myanmar are under heightened threat,” said Nadira Kourt, Program Manager at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. “The UN Security Council and the entire international community should publicly recognize that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya and impose punitive measures against the military, including targeted sanctions. All justice and accountability processes in relation to both past and current atrocities in Myanmar should be fully supported.”..."
Source/publisher: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication: 2021-08-25
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: More than a thousand killed in Myanmar as repression of activists continues unabated
Description: "Nearly seven months on following the coup, Myanmar remains on the CIVICUS Monitor Watchlist due to the ongoing repression of civic freedoms on the country by the military junta. On 27th July 2021, the military junta revoked the results of the 2020 general election, in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, claiming the poll was “not free and fair” and “not in compliance with” the constitution and the law. On 1st August, junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing named himself prime minister and said emergency rule may now extend to August 2023. He also pledged to hold a "free and fair multi-party election" but also described the ousted NLD as "terrorists". On 4th August 2021, ASEAN finally appointed Erywan Yusof, the second foreign minister of Brunei Darussalam as its special envoy to Myanmar more than 100 days after the Southeast Asian bloc’s members agreed to send an emissary to help resolve the post-coup crisis there. Observers have greeted the appointment with scepticism. Myanmar civil society groups rejected the appointment and expressed “deep disappointment with ASEAN and their lack of inclusive decision-making process”, said a statement from 413 groups. More than a thousand civilians have been killed in Myanmar since the 1st February coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a human rights group that records killings by the junta. As of 18th August 2021, the NGO said 1,006 people had been killed since the junta seized power, triggering nationwide protests and a mass civil disobedience movement. Among those killed are more than 100 teenagers. Some were killed while troops suppressed protests, but others fell in random and unprovoked shootings. As of 23rd August, at least 5,821 political prisoners remain in detention according to the AAPP. On 31st July 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that Myanmar’s military junta had committed numerous abuses against the population that amount to crimes against humanity in the six months since the coup. Apparent crimes against humanity include murder, enforced disappearance, torture, rape and other sexual violence, severe deprivation of liberty, and other inhumane acts. Activists have mobilised ahead of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021 when UN member states will select the country’s ambassador. The General Strike Coordination Body (GSCB) launched the “Accept NUG, Reject Military” campaign in August 2021, which called on social media users to support the National Unity Government (NUG) and its UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun. The United Nations Secretary-General’s special envoy for Myanmar, Christine Schraner Burgener, said the junta had not responded to her request for talks as it tries to consolidate its rule. Over the last month, concerns have been raised by the UN around the situation of human rights defenders as arrests and attacks on activists continue. A new report shows the systematic targeting of healthcare workers. The crackdown on the media has continued with arrests and sentencing of journalists. Civil society groups criticise the exit of Norwegian telco, Telenor. Protests continued across the country, including in prisons by political prisoners. There were reports of attacks on protests by the junta. Association Terror campaign against human rights defenders On 19th July 2021, UN human rights experts expressed their concern for the situation of human rights defenders in Myanmar and called for a stronger international response to the military coup, including coordinated sanctions and an arms embargo against the junta by an “emergency coalition of nations”. The experts highlighted credible information they had received concerning human rights defenders being forced into hiding after having arrest warrants issued against them under section 505(a) of the Penal Code. Their homes were raided, their possessions seized, and family members threatened and harassed. Many others, unable to flee, have been arbitrarily arrested, including labour rights defenders and student activists. Lawyers representing people detained following the coup have themselves been detained, as have journalists covering the protests. Women have played a leading role in the protest and civil disobedience movement that has emerged in the country in response to the military's seizure of the State apparatus in February, and the experts expressed particular concern for the situation of women human rights defenders in the country. “The brute force terror campaign we are witnessing in Myanmar continues to be directed towards human rights defenders,” said Mary Lawlor, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, and Tom Andrews, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. “For years, human rights defenders have been doing essential work promoting human rights in the country,” Lawlor said. “Since the coup, and despite enforced internet blackouts along with difficulties accessing basic resources, especially for defenders forced into hiding or living in rural areas, they have been documenting the mass violations being perpetrated by the military. As a result, they have been targeted,” the expert said. Two pro-democracy activists died and three others were seriously injured when they jumped from a building in Yangon to avoid capture by the junta. Ye Min Oo and a woman, Wai Wai Myint, also called Pan Thee, lost their lives when they and three friends jumped from the roof of a building as junta forces stormed their apartment in Botahtaung township in Myanmar’s largest city. The three who survived the jump - Wai Phyo Aung, Thiha Kaung Set and Poe Kyaw Kyaw - were arrested by police and taken with the bodies of those killed to a military hospital in Mingaladon township in northern Yangon. Tin Zaw, the father of Ye Min Oo, said he was told by witnesses that his son was still alive after the fall but was beaten to death. A witness, who spoke on condition of anonymity for safety reasons, told RFA the fleeing activists apparently got trapped on the rooftops of the old buildings. A police report circulating on social media says the raid on the activists’ apartment was carried out by a team led by Tactical Commander Col. Soe Tun of the ruling junta. A youth leader from the Mandalay Protest Alliance Force was arrested by the military junta while driving near Mandalay University on 17th August. Plainclothes soldiers stopped a motorbike driven by activist Kyaw Thiha, beat him, and took him with them at gunpoint, according to an eyewitness. Thura Aung, a friend who had been staying with him and another leader of the alliance, said that over 20 troops later inspected Kyaw Thiha’s former home in Patheingyi Township that night. The Mandalay Protest Alliance Force has been a frequent target of the brutal crackdowns by the military on anti-coup resistance. The Mandalay Protest Alliance Force was formed when multiple Mandalay protest columns joined forces to revolt against the dictatorship. They include Daung Sit Thi (Peacock Warriors); All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU); Academics; Labourers; Farmers; Mandalay University Students; BEHS (7) Students; and Sein Pan. Threats and attacks on healthcare workers A new report by Insecurity Insight, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and Johns Hopkins University Center for Public Health and Human Rights (CPHHR) in August 2021 found that there were at least 252 attacks and threats against health workers, facilities and transport that have been perpetrated in Myanmar from 1st February to 31st July 2021 The country’s armed forces and police reportedly committed the vast majority of attacks. Health workers have been targeted for providing medical care to injured civilians and for their participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), which is protesting the military takeover. 190 health workers were arrested, 37 health workers were injured and 25 health workers killed. Hospitals were raided at least 86 times and occupied at least 55 times. The report also highlights that staff from the World Health Organisation (WHO), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international NGOs have been threatened and forced to return to work by the military council. There are reports that the junta is trying to replace NGO workers believed to be close to the CDM with government appointees. The military junta has continued to arrest and prosecute journalists.Two journalists were arrested on 15th August 2021 at an apartment where they had been hiding in Yangon’s Bahan Township. Sithu Aung Myint, a Frontier Myanmar columnist and contributor to Voice of America, now faces a charge of sedition under section 124a of the Penal Code on top of an outstanding incitement charge. Sithu Aung Myint has been evading arrest since 24th April 2021, when the junta opened a case against him under section 505a for incitement. Htet Htet Khine, a freelance producer for BBC Media Action, has been charged under section 17(1) of the Unlawful Association Act for associating with the NUG, which the junta labels a terrorist group. According to Human Rights Watch on 27th July 2021, since the coup the junta has arrested 98 journalists, 46 of whom are currently in detention, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). Six journalists have been convicted, including five for violating section 505(a) of the penal code, a new provision that makes it a crime to publish or circulate comments that “cause fear” or spread “false news.” Those sentenced under section 505(a) are: Kaung Myat Hlaing, from Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), who was arrested at his home in Myeik, Tanintharyi Region, and sentenced to two years in prison; Min Nyo, from DVB, who was arrested while reporting on a protest in Pyay Region, and sentenced to three years;Thet Naing Win, from DVB, who was arrested in Bago Region and sentenced to three years; Zaw Zaw, a freelance reporter who was arrested while covering demonstrations in Myeik, Tanintharyi Region and sentenced to two years; and Htoo San, a freelance photographer in Myeik, Tanintharyi Region, who was sentenced to three years. On 28th July 2021, the Committee to Protect Journalists published a report, “Bitter reversal: Myanmar military coup wipes out press freedom gains,” which found the country has become one of the world’s worst jailers of journalists. The broadened language of penal code 505(a) has effectively made independent journalism a crime. The threat of arrest has driven many news organisations to close their offices and forced journalists underground or into exile. Further complicating access to information and the ability to report, authorities have banned satellite media and imposed rolling restrictions on the internet. Journalists who spoke with CPJ said their colleagues behind bars have been subjected to abuse and torture; at least three have reported health problems. International reporting from Myanmar is also restricted. Few foreign journalists have been allowed access. Civil society groups criticise exit of Norwegian telco In a letter to Gunn Waersted, the chair of Telenor Group’s board, a group of 45 global and Myanmar human rights, media and other organisations called on Norway’s Telenor Group to halt the controversial sale of its Myanmar operation to the M1 Group, a Lebanese company with ties to Myanmar’s junta. The group included ALTSEAN-Burma, Free Expression Myanmar, Global Witness, PEN America, Justice for Myanmar and dozens of other international and Myanmar organisations. Saying they were “surprised and dismayed” by Telenor’s deal with M1, the organisations said Telenor had acted “without seeking the views of the civil society stakeholders with whom it previously significantly engaged on responsible business, including some of our undersigned organisations. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Telenor had undertaken the “credible assessment of potential adverse human rights impacts of disengagement” from Myanmar required under the UN Principles on Business and Human Rights. Telenor announced on 8th July 2021 that it had agreed to sell its Myanmar operations to M1, which was added to the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List in 2019 for doing business with the Myanmar military. Telenor confirmed that as part of the deal it would transfer the call records of its more than 18 million subscribers to the Lebanese company. Rights activists say allowing the junta to access such information would be dangerous, pointing out that phone subscribers in Myanmar must supply ID cards and addresses when registering SIM cards. Protests continued across the country in Yangon, Mandalay and other townships including by youth, workers and LGBTQI+ activists. On 28th July 2021, the junta shot three people, killing at least one, during a crackdown on an anti-coup demonstration in Mandalay. Around 20 people were taking part in a flash mob protest near the east gate of Mandalay’s famous Mahamuni pagoda when they suddenly came under attack. On 2nd August 2021 it was reported that a 22-year-old anti-coup protester in Mandalay, who was shot and injured before being detained during a raid, had died in military custody. Political prisoners inside Myanmar’s most notorious jail held a protest on 23rd July 2021, singing popular songs opposing the military government and chanting political slogans, according to nearby residents and video uploaded to social media. One video showed a street close to Insein Prison in Yangon with clear audio of voices shouting support for ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi and ousted President Win Myint. According to a lawyer representing some of those detained, the prisoners were demanding the release of all those held on political charges, an easing of prison regulations and medical treatment for those who have fallen sick amid spiralling cases of the coronavirus. A representative of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) said: “We are concerned about torture and potential additional charges being filed against the political prisoners as a consequence if the protest is dubbed a prison riot. Such incidents happened under the previous military dictatorships” Following the incident at Insein Prison, prisoners at Shwe Bo Prison in Sagaing Region and Obo Prison in Mandalay Region also protested, according to the AAPP. Anti-coup protesters mark 1988 uprising anniversary On 8th August 2021, protesters came out in cities across Myanmar to protest against the military junta and to mark the 33rd anniversary of an uprising against military rule that was violently put down. Protests took place across Myanmar, including the main cities of Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing, Mongwa and Myitkyina, according to local news reports. Protesters remembered the thousands of people, many of whom were students, who rose up against military rule in 1988. That uprising was crushed in a bloody crackdown. They also organised online campaigns, bringing people out dressed in red to show the eight-finger salute, which has become one of the symbols of the protest movement, and to hold banners saying: "Let's return the old blood debt of 1988 in 2021."..."
Source/publisher: Civicus (Johannesburg)
Date of publication: 2021-08-26
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Can a UN Arms Embargo on Myanmar Work?
Description: "The crisis in Myanmar has slipped from the headlines. In a predictably peripatetic news-cycle world, the continued post-coup crackdown, Covid-19 surge and humanitarian catastrophe evinces little international attention. The corroded global conscience has been gripped by the debacle of Afghanistan, the Delta variant and pandemic social disorder in multiple countries. Many of the condemnatory statements being released by Western states, much reduced now that the crisis has been sub-contracted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), remain ‘deeply concerned’. Crucially, they have refused to recognize the junta’s ‘interim government.’ That’s so far. But a combination of sanctions and the lackluster efforts of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Special Envoy Christine Burgener Schraner have replaced calls for the Responsibility to Protect. In other words, worn tools of inaction. Often included among these, but rarely elaborated on, is the option of imposing a UN arms embargo on Myanmar. But is that actually feasible? Hopes were certainly bolstered by the non-binding UN General Assembly Resolution passed on 18 June, the text of which stated: “(I)n line with the Secretary General’s call for a global ceasefire as supported by the Security Council in its resolution 2532 (2020) of 1 July 2020, the need to de-escalate violence, and in that regard calls upon all Member States to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar”. That has been interpreted as a call supporting an arms embargo. The resolution, which had been delayed due to divisions within ASEAN, was passed with 119 votes, 36 abstentions, and one no vote from Belarus, Europe’s pariah state. ASEAN split their votes with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines voting for the resolution and Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei abstaining. This doesn’t bode well for either ASEAN mediation or the likelihood of a comprehensive arms embargo. On May 5, 200 international groups, including human right organizations and Myanmar community support groups, called on the UN Security Council to institute a global arms embargo. The statement called for “(a) comprehensive UN arms embargo on Myanmar should bar the direct and indirect supply, sale, or transfer of all weapons, munitions, and other military-related equipment, including dual-use goods such as vehicles and communications and surveillance equipment, as well as the provision of training, intelligence, and other military assistance. Such an embargo should be accompanied by robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms”. This wording is identical to a call by 137 groups in February. Western military assistance to Myanmar has been restricted for years. Rigid arms embargoes were imposed by individual states for three decades. The United States (US), Great Britain, Australia, Canada and the European Union (EU) have had long-standing sanctions on the sale of weapons to Myanmar, including even dual-use technology. Those measures were maintained over the past decade, even as these states sought enhanced interaction with the military. However, those embargoes were ineffective in stopping atrocity crimes against the Kachin, Rohingya, Karen and Shan ethnic minorities. There are an estimated 42 countries who have imposed arms embargoes on Myanmar over the past three decades. Many of these are EU member states or are aligned with the various common positions imposed since 1996. South Korea suspended defense ties and a ban on arms exports in March. There are several obvious reasons why a call for a UN arms embargo faces intractable impediments to succeed. First, it’s highly unlikely to work because much of the firepower being directed at ordinary people is domestically manufactured. The Myanmar military produces almost all of the light arms and ammunition it needs to kill civilians and put down urban uprisings: the same hardware it used to wage war against insurgents and ethnic civilians throughout Myanmar. This network of defense industries (Ka Pa Sa) are located mostly in central Myanmar, in Pyi, Bago and other locations, with an estimated 38 facilities in total. Anyone who has visited the Defense Services Museum in Naypyidaw will have been struck by the evident pride in domestic military self-sufficiency; perhaps also seized by just how over the top this pride, to the point of mania, really is. The Ka Pa Sa manufacture everything from small arms, ammunition, anti-personnel landmines, mortars, uniforms, mess kits, soccer balls, army rum and many other items. The military has constructed this system with a large amount of foreign assistance, particularly German, and in later years from North Korea, Ukraine and Russia, but now largely runs the system independently. Watching police officers in diverse towns such as Dawei, Yangon, and Mandalay firing live rounds against unarmed civilians, the shots mainly come from the German-designed Heckler and Koch Gewehr 3 (H&K G3) 7.62mm assault rifles, once the standard infantry weapon for the Myanmar military, designated Burma Army Type 63 or BA63. These were provided by the German firm Fritz Werner starting in the 1950s and through a close partnership up until the 1990’s. Many of these weapons were transferred to the Myanmar Police Force as the Ka Pa Sa started to manufacture the MA series of assault rifles (with Israeli assistance) in the early 1990s, which the military now uses. Should the members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and the civilian resistance fighters of the People’s Defense Forces target the network of Ka Pa Sa – its facilities, supply chains, raw materials and personnel – that could potentially have a serious effect on production and supplies. Harrying domestic manufacture of armaments and non-lethal supplies (food, uniforms, basic equipment) could impact internal military morale and drive increased defections. One officer from a defense factory who recently joined the CDM and fled to the border with India told Radio Free Asia’s Myanmar service that much of the raw materials for the factories is sourced from the Chinese defense firm China North Industries Group (NORINCO) and transited through Singapore. However, it is unclear to what extent the trail of spare parts and raw materials are sourced outside Myanmar. That is one potential avenue for further investigation: resupply, replenishment and sourcing links to the domestic arms industry. The next major impediment is the continued close links the military has with Russia and China. China accounts for half of the arms exports to Myanmar, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report of March 2021 estimating that, between 2016 and 2020, China accounted for 48 percent of imports. India accounted for 16 percent and Russia 15 percent. China has been a major arms supplier for over 30 years, including NORINCO, and several large aerospace companies. China has supplied numerous fighter planes to the Myanmar Air Force, including F-7 fighters in the early 1990s and, in recent years, the joint China and Pakistan manufactured JF-17 Thunder fighter. Much of the lavish arms sales from the early 1990s was disappointing in terms of quality, but China remains a major supplier and also trainer of Myanmar’s armed forces. Jane’s Defence Group reported that Chinese supplied drones, the CH-3A ‘Rainbow’ surveillance UEVs, have been deployed in Mandalay to observe demonstrations. China is also one of the major suppliers of weapons to the ethnic armed organizations, especially the United Wa State Army. Beijing, or more likely local officials in Yunnan, is the single biggest outside arms supplier to Myanmar’s multiple conflicts. Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has turned to Moscow in recent years, expanding a relationship that started two decades ago and which has seen thousands of Myanmar personnel trained in Russian defense establishments. The commander in chief’s visit to Russia in June signaled continued firm ties, with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu expressing support for the junta leader. Arms sales have continued, with the Moscow Times reporting that the military had imported US$15 million worth of radar equipment since the coup. Just days before the military takeover, Justice for Myanmar reported that the military was buying Orlan-10 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Pantsir-S1 short range air defense systems. The air force originally purchased second-hand MiG-29 fighter jets from Belarus, since sourced from Russia, and have announced plans to buy SU-30 fighter jets and Yak-130 training aircraft. These air assets sales should be a focus of intense attention for any arms embargo campaign, given how much more frequently air strikes, especially ones conducted at night, have been directed at civilian targets such as those in Kayin State in late March. An arms embargo campaign must also widely condemn the continued sales or support of helicopter gunships, such as the Mi-35 which has been used against both insurgents and civilians, as well as ground attack aircraft. Ukraine is an often unacknowledged arms supplier to Myanmar. In 2004, the military purchased an estimated 1,000 BTR-3U armored personnel carriers (APCs) to be assembled in Myanmar, although the exact number in the order of battle is unclear. The BTR’s include German-made Deutz diesel engines and American-made General Motors Allison automatic transmissions. These vehicles made an appearance on the streets of Yangon in February (and were not manned by Chinese soldiers as was widely reported at the time) but are not reported to have been used against protesters. Israel has had a long relationship with the Myanmar armed forces, since establishing formal ties in 1953. Israeli officials have helped train elite units, assisted with intelligence gathering and sold patrol boats to the navy, as well as providing technology for the domestic manufacture of the Uzi submachine gun, primarily used now by the police. It was a police officer firing an Uzi at unarmed protestors in Naypyitaw that resulted in the Spring Revolution’s first casualty: 19-year old Myat Thet Thet Khaing, who was shot in the head. Israel is reported to have suspended arms sales to Myanmar following an order in the Supreme Court in 2017, but this has not been confirmed. Another challenge is one of unacknowledged but naked hypocrisy. Proponents of an arms embargo are calling on some of the world’s largest arms dealers to support imposing an embargo on one country, when the US accounts for the majority of arms sales globally, significantly more than China and Russia. The United Kingdom lauds its principled approach to Myanmar, but lavishes weapons on Saudi Arabia, resuming its sales of some £1.4 billion earlier in 2021 after a pause of two years following an outcry over the bombing campaign in Yemen. The Biden Administration has suspended sales to Saudi Arabia for the same reason, but continues to supply half of the weapons to the Middle East. It is doubtful if Washington will dilute any diplomatic capitol to exert pressure on its allies in Israel and the Ukraine in order to have a questionable effect on the ability of the armed forces to violently suppress resistance in Myanmar. The Biden Administration resumed military support to Ukraine in March with a US$125 million arms sale. The credibility of the West suffered a crushing blow in its scramble out of Afghanistan. So how could an arms embargo actually work? Who will provide leadership? Human right groups, beyond the flash-in-the-pan issuance of ‘joint letters’, have publicized no clear plans for how an arms embargo could operate. The special rapporteur Tom Andrews has done little more than repeat the rhetoric of condemnation and called for an arms embargo, but has failed to articulate how it could work. His mandate is ill-suited to taking a leadership role in any campaign for an arms embargo: he is an independent expert who reports to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Andrews may also be keeping one eye on his future in US politics, so cannot be relied upon to push the Biden Administration or Congress hard and expend political capital for a ban on arms sales. International leadership for an arms embargo could be spearheaded by the venerable troika of the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar (SAC-M): former UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee, and Chris Sidoti and Marzuki Darusman, from the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. Formed following the February 1 coup, but conceived before it, the SAC-M has formulated what it calls a ‘Three Cuts’ approach to pressuring the military: cut the weapons, cut the cash and cut the impunity. It has assembled some fine understanding of the cash and impunity cuts, with Chris Sidoti especially vocal on interdicting the military’s financial sector. But the SAC-M website has no details on cutting weapons. Nevertheless, given the more legible approach of the trio and their background on Myanmar going back years, they have the skills, energy and commitment to corral the global community into at least discussing forms of an arms embargo. An arms embargo requires concerted diplomatic efforts backed up by skillful research and documentation. Where to get all the necessary details to make an effective arms embargo feasible? There are two possible sources that offer the best chance of success, if the West directed the requisite funding and technical support. The first is increased support for groups such as Justice for Myanmar, which has done the most impressively forensic work on the finances and arms supplies of the Myanmar military. This clandestine collective is effectively producing the schematics for sanctions and to scupper arms supply chains. It should receive even more resources: they are doing far more important and relevant work than the UN, Western governments and international research and rights organizations. Another source of activity is to create numerous funds for investigative journalism and academic research, utilizing the human capital of the many Myanmar people who have been displaced or exiled by the coup. Increasing investigative journalism funding for Myanmar media outlets is one step, including The Irrawaddy, Burma News International, Myanmar Now and others. Another is for donors to fund projects dedicated to uncovering the domestic arms industry. Following the threads of domestic and international supply chains and finding ways to harry and disrupt production, recruitment and supply could be as effective as armed action. This could be a component of what Western donors should have supported ten years ago: an ‘Understanding the Military’ initiative, which scrutinizes the internal dynamics of the armed forces and questions some of the canards built up around its size, internal culture and psyche, fissures and strengths, local economic behavior and relationships with varying communities. In other words, a Myanmar-driven research focus to assess the military’s vulnerabilities. There is already some fine work being pursued by the Myanmar media and in academia, with the recent publication of crucial data on Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and top generals by the Institute of South East Asian Studies. The answer to toppling the military will always be a home-grown endeavor; trust in the West to assist on this should be tempered. Calling for an arms embargo takes multi-staged, painstaking work, not just the rhetoric of performative activism. If there is no sincerity in pursuing an embargo, stop talking about one. The world has a responsibility to protect the expectations of people in Myanmar. Further failure will only compound the post-coup betrayal..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-08-24
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Neither Sanctions Nor Engagement Will Influence Myanmar’s Military
Description: "As the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, appears to be consolidating its grip on power, at least in the capital Naypyitaw, the debate over whether sanctions or engagement would be the best way to influence the generals has once again begun. There is, however, a simple answer to that question: neither is effective. Myanmar’s military rulers have always had their own agenda and don’t listen to people outside their own inner circle, regardless of what outsiders say or do. Attempts to understand the Tatmadaw by using as yardsticks the standards of modern Western militaries such as conventional command structures, promotions, equipment, orders of battle and deployment is equally fruitless. The way the Tatmadaw works and functions can best be described as feudal and deeply rooted in traditional authoritarian values where the king was God. The supreme ruler demands and rewards loyalty and disowns and punishes those who dare to be different—and this is the system that was introduced by General Ne Win when he built up the Tatmadaw in the 1950s and created a state within a state, which in 1962 seized absolute power. Ne Win stepped aside in 1989 and died in 2002 but the system lived on under Senior General Than Shwe, supreme ruler from 1992 to 2011. Than Shwe even changed the stated purpose of celebrating March 27, which in the past was called Resistance Day and meant to commemorate the day in 1945 when the Myanmar military, armed and equipped by the Japanese, turned against their former masters. Now, in the new, monumental capital Naypyitaw created by Than Shwe, there stands an enormous statue of the three main warrior kings in Myanmar history: Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. Tributes to them and their virtues have replaced references to the anti-Japanese struggle, which may still be mentioned but only in passing. But he is now 88 years old, has been hospitalized with COVID-19 and may not be around for much longer. That means that Myanmar right now is at a crossroads. Although Than Shwe retired from active duties after the 2010 election, he has remained a father figure for the military and when he is gone there is no obvious candidate for the role as the next King of the Tatmadaw. The new junta leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is perceived by many as weak, and lacks charisma as well as leadership qualities. As a Yangon-based Myanmar analyst put it: “He doesn’t have the political stature of General Ne Win, the military manpower of General Than Shwe or the wiliness of both.” The future of military rule is therefore up for debate and that is where the question of sanctions versus engagement comes into the picture. Sanctions and boycotts serve a purpose when it comes to rallying support for Myanmar’s democratic forces, which is important in order to keep the movement alive and prepare for possible future scenarios, but recent history shows that such measures have so far had zero impact on how the Tatmadaw as an institution acts and thinks. The views of those in the West who advocate engagement actually reflect what amounts to a blatant neo-colonial attitude or, as I wrote in The Irrawaddy on June 11, 2015, words to the effect of: “We have to go and tell those funny little brown fellows how to run their country, and, because we are big and clever white guys, surely they will listen to us.” It is, however, easy to image what the generals’ reaction is when they receive those Western proponents of engagement: “Those myaukpyu [white monkeys] are sort of amusing. But they are not very clever. So let’s use them.” Or words to that effect. The third way, some Western diplomats and academics argue, is to apply a carrot-and-a-stick policy with punishments such as sanctions when the Tatmadaw behaves badly, and rewards in the form of aid and investment if the generals take some positive steps such as allowing more openness and demonstrate a willingness to negotiate a peaceful solution to the country’s decades-long civil wars. But, as one analyst put it: “That would work only if you are dealing with a donkey or a rabbit.” Josef Silverstein, a renowned Myanmar scholar who died on June 29 this year, once said: “If you offer them [the generals] a carrot, they will just eat it and ask for another one.” Proponents of engagement have always underestimated the manipulative skills of the Tatmadaw and failed to realize that using military officers as intermediaries in the belief that their Myanmar counterparts would be more willing to listen to them than to civilians does not work. This was clearly demonstrated when Vice-Admiral David Johnston, vice chief of the Australian Defense Force, rang Vice-Senior General Soe Win, number two in the junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), to press for the release of Sean Turnell, an Australian academic and economic adviser to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s ousted government who was detained after the coup. Johnston also said that he urged the Tatmadaw not to use force against the protesters who were then filling the streets of Yangon and practically every city, town and major village in the country. But in Myanmar’s military-controlled media, the talk was described as a friendly discussion between two equals, thus appearing to be an endorsement of the coup. When the European Union’s military chief of staff, Vice-Admiral Hervé Bléjean, called on Soe Win on March 9 to urge the Tatmadaw to stop all violence and release the country’s democratically elected leaders, the official media reported that they had discussed the SAC’s efforts to establish “community peace and the rule of law.” Myanmar analyst Ye Myo Hein pointed out succinctly in The Irrawaddy on Aug. 13: “Constructive engagement with the military by Western democracies did not transform the military into a professional organization, but instead and inadvertently emboldened and legitimized its leadership to do whatever they wished.” Calls for engagement can also be outright distasteful and lacking in respect for the victims of the Tatmadaw. Erik Solheim, a Norwegian politician and former development minister who became a controversial figure when he unsuccessfully tried to mediate in the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka, wrote in the Norwegian journal Bistandsaktuellt on March 15 that the best way to honor Kyal Sin or “the Angel”, a 19-year-old demonstrator in Mandalay who was shot and killed by a sniper, would be through engagement and investment. Solheim asserted that the Norwegian telecom giant “Telenor is more important than the [UN] Security Council.” That, of course, was before Telenor in July sold all its businesses to a Lebanese company because it was too difficult to operate in SAC-ruled Myanmar. Telenor’s Sigve Brekke told Reuters after the pull-out: “There are three reasons why we think a sale is necessary: it is the safety of our employees, but also the regulatory conditions and also that there is good compliance.” Sanctions, smart or otherwise, will remain ineffective for two major reasons. The first, which is also mostly overlooked, is the size of Myanmar’s parallel, or greyish-black, economy, which does not show up in any official statistics, and then the fact that countries such as China, Russia, Thailand, India, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore—Myanmar’s main trading partners—are happy to continue dealing with whoever is in power in Naypyitaw. Actually, most of them would prefer to deal with a military-run Myanmar than a democratic, transparent and accountable system where the authorities may have the audacity to clamp down on corruption and other malpractices. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a speech at a forum at Tsinghua University on July 3 that the international community should refrain from imposing sanctions on the SAC, branding such actions as “inappropriate intervention.” Russia, another SAC ally, said as early as April 6 that sanctions against the SAC were futile and extremely dangerous. “In fact, such a line contributes to pitting the sides against each other and, ultimately, pushes the people of Myanmar towards a full-scale civil conflict,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said, as quoted by the Interfax news agency and reported by Reuters. Russia and China, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, have consistently vetoed any attempt by other members to get the world body to take action against the SAC. China was also for years the Tatmadaw’s main source for military hardware and Myanmar has long been a buyer of Russian fighter jets, helicopters, drones and anti-aircraft missile systems. And then there is the underground economy, which has kept Myanmar alive throughout rigid socialist policies before 1988 and sanctions and boycotts after that and until the West changed its policies in the aftermath of the 2010 election and the formation of a quasi-civilian government led by ex-General Thein Sein. Drugs, precious stones, timber, antiques and other artifacts have always been smuggled out of the country while assorted consumer goods have traveled in the other direction from countries such as China, India, Thailand and Singapore. The exact value of this informal—and illegal—trade is not known but runs into millions if not billions of dollars. With an inadequate and largely untrustworthy banking system, many people in Myanmar prefer to utilize the services of dealers in what is called “hundies”, which in the Indian Subcontinent and the Middle East is known as “hawala”. Through this system, money is transferred via a network of private brokers, leaving no paper trail that any authorities can track down and follow. In short, Myanmar will, as it always has done, survive another round of punitive measures imposed by the West. All that does not mean that change is never going to come to Myanmar—but it would have to come from within the Tatmadaw. And even the officer corps must realize through their Buddhist belief in anicca that nothing is permanent. The possibility of splits within the military is usually dismissed by most foreign observers as unlikely because of the remarkable cohesion among officers that exists in the officer corps and their loyalty towards the supreme leader. While that is correct, Australian Myanmar expert Andrew Selth pointed out in a Feb. 19 article for the Lowy Institute, a Sydney-based think tank, that the highly unpopular coup will test the loyalty of military and police officers. “Times have changed and the latest generation of men in the security forces has grown up in a different environment than its predecessors…it would be a mistake to assume that they are just a mindless mass prepared to do whatever they are told,” Selth wrote. Even more important—and crucial for Myanmar’s future—would be what happens after the death of Senior General and Tatmadaw King Than Shwe. Many pundits predicted that Myanmar, and the Tatmadaw, would change after the demise of Gen. Ne Win. But that did not happen. After an interregnum with the almost farcical junta leader General Saw Maung, a new strongman emerged. That may happen this time as well and it is highly unlikely that he will be more democratically minded than his predecessors. On the contrary, if Min Aung Hlaing were to be replaced because of his weaknesses, the new King could be even more savage and barbarous. But, on the contrary, if no person with strength and omnipotent stature is to be found, it would open a Pandora’s box of possibilities that could lead to unimaginable chaos and mayhem. And that is the grim legacy of the system Gen. Ne Win laid the foundations for—and which has prevailed since the military takeover in 1962. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-08-20
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Wang Yi Speaks with Special Envoy of ASEAN to Myanmar and Bruneian Second Minister of Foreign Affairs Erywan bin Pehin Yusof on the Phone
Description: "On August 18, 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone conversation with Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Myanmar and Bruneian Second Minister of Foreign Affairs Erywan bin Pehin Yusof at request. Wang Yi expressed his appreciation for Brunei's contribution to the development of China-ASEAN relations as the rotating chair of ASEAN, and thanked Brunei for its support in elevating the positioning of China-ASEAN relations. He hopes that Brunei will continue to play a positive role to ensure that a commemorative meeting marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of dialogue relations between China and ASEAN will be successful and achieve more important results. Noting that September marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Brunei, Wang Yi expressed his hope that the two sides will take this opportunity to carry forward traditional friendship, deepen the Belt and Road cooperation, and push for the new development of China-Brunei strategic cooperative partnership. Anti-pandemic cooperation remains a top priority currently, China attaches great importance to the needs of Brunei, and will send a batch of vaccines to Brunei and deliver them as soon as possible, and lend a helping hand to Brunei when the country needs it most. After listening to Erywan's views on the current situation in Myanmar, Wang Yi said that both China and ASEAN countries are friends of Myanmar and all hope that Myanmar will achieve peace and stability. China welcomes the appointment of you as ASEAN's special envoy to Myanmar, and I believe that you can uphold the ASEAN way and play a unique role in accordance with ASEAN's five-point consensus on Myanmar to help different parties in Myanmar find a political solution within the constitutional framework through dialogue. China has the following suggestions. First, deal with all parties in Myanmar in a rational and pragmatic manner and gradually build trust; second, give top priority to helping Myanmar in its fight against COVID-19, and ensure the accessibility and effectiveness of the anti-pandemic assistance; third, remain patient and determined, stick to the direction of promoting peace through talks, return state power to the people in an orderly manner and restart the democratic process, which not only serves the interests of Myanmar but also meets the expectations of the international community; fourth, stay vigilant against and oppose interference in Myanmar's internal affairs by extraterritorial forces, and earnestly respect Myanmar's sovereignty and the choice of its people. Wang Yi stressed that China's friendly policy toward Myanmar is always for all the people of Myanmar. We will provide urgently-needed help to Myanmar through various channels. China will fully support ASEAN's special envoy in performing his duties and is willing to continue to play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement of the Myanmar issue. Erywan thanked China for its continuous assistance of medical supplies and vaccines to Brunei when Brunei is confronting a new wave of COVID-19 pandemic. He hopes that the two countries can mark the 30th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties as a milestone, to give full play to the role of the China-Brunei intergovernmental joint steering committee, and further deepen cooperation in various fields, such as energy, agriculture and fishery. Erywan said Myanmar is an important member of the big ASEAN family. As ASEAN's special envoy to Myanmar, I will be dedicated to pushing forward the implementation of the five-point consensus, advancing dialogue among relevant parties in the ASEAN way, stopping violence, promoting inclusiveness, and helping Myanmar better fulfill its commitments to the international community. ASEAN appreciates and supports China's continuous crucial role in the Myanmar issue, and is willing to strengthen coordination and carry out cooperation with China..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China
Date of publication: 2021-08-18
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s post-coup Internet: dangers and alternatives - အာဏာသိမ်းအပြီး မြန်မာပြည် အင်တာနက် – အန္တရာယ်နှင့် အခြား ရွေးချယ်စရာများ
Description: "၂၀၂၁ ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီလ (၁)ရက် နေ့မှစ ၍ မြန်မာ စစ်တပ်သည် နိုင်ငံအတွင်းအင်တာနက်သုံးစွဲမှု့ကို ရုတ်ချည်း ပိတ်ပင် ခဲ့ပါသည်။ စစ်အုပ်စုမှ မည်သည့်ဖိနှိပ်မှုနည်းလမ်းများအသုံးပြုခဲ့ပါသလဲ ၊ သူတို့အောင်မြင်ခဲ့ပါသလား နည်းပညာ ဆိုင်ရာ ကုမ္ဗဏီများ နှင့် ထည့်ဝင်လှူဒါန်းသူ များက အာဏာသိမ်းအပြီး မြန်မာပြည်တွင် ပေါ်ထွန်း လာသည့် ဒီဂျစ်တယ်ယဉ်ကျေးမှု့ကိုမည်သို့တုန့်ပြန် ကြပါသလဲ ယခုထင်မြင်သုံးသပ်ချက် သည် အင်တာနက် အသုံးပြုပုံ နှင့် အရပ်ဖက် လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းတော်လှန်ရေး ၏ အဓိကနယ်ပယ်များ အကြောင်းကို RightsCon 2021 တွင် သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူ (၃)ဦး ၏ ဆွေးနွေးချက်များ ပေါင်းစည်း တင်ပြထား ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဆွေးနွေးပွဲ ကို ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်လုံခြုံရေးသုတေသန၊လေ့ကျင့်သင်ကြားရေးနှင့် အားလုံးအတွက် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သောဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်အနာဂါတ် ဖြစ်လာစေရန်မြေတောင်မြှောက် ပေး သည့် ကနေဒါနိုင်ငံ အကျိုးအမြတ်မယူသောအဖွဲ့အစည်း SecDev Foundation မှလက်ခံကျင်းပပေး ခဲ့ပါသည်။ “သူတို့တရားဝင်ဖြစ်တည်ရေးအတွက် ကြိုးစား ရာမှာ အင်တာနက် က အသက်တမျှအရေးကြီးတယ်ဆိုတာ စစ်တပ်က ကောင်းကောင်းသိပါတယ်” ဟု သုတေသီနှင့် တသီးပုဂ္ဂလအကြံပေးဖြစ်သူ အဲလက်စ် အောင်ခန့် ကပြော ကြားသည်။ အဲလက်စ်နှင့်အတူ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် အခွင့်အရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူနှင့် မြန်မာ အိုင်စီတီ( သတင်းနှင့်ဆက်သွယ် ရေး နည်းပညာ) MIDO Development Organisation မှ ယခင် ပရိုဂရမ် မန်နေဂျာ ဖြစ်သူ မျိုးမင်းအောင်၊ အာဏာ မသိမ်းမီက ရန်ကုန်အခြေစိုက် နည်းပညာ ဗဟိုတွင် နည်းပညာစီစဉ်သူအဖြစ် ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သူ Saijai Liangpunsakul တို့ဆွေးနွေးပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် ခေတ်အတွင်း လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ဆိုင်ရာ နှစ်စဉ်ညီလာခံ ကျင်းပသည့် RightsCon တွင် သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူ (၃)ဦး ၂၀၂၁၊ ဇွန်လ ၉ ရက်နေ့က အွန်လိုင်း ၌ တွေ့ဆုံကြပါသည်။ သူတို့က ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီ (၁)ရက်နောက်ပိုင်း ဖြစ်ပေါ်ပြောင်းလဲလာသည့် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် အခင်းအကျင်း တွင် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကောင်စီ(စစ်ကောင်စီ ဆိုသည်မှာ အာဏာသိမ်းအဖွဲ့က သူတို့ကိုယ်သူတို့ ပေးထားသည့် ဂုဏ်ပုဒ်အမည်)ဆန့်ကျင်ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်သူများ နှင့် ပုဂ္ဂလိက ကဏ္ဍ တို့မည်သည့်နည်းဖြင့် ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းနေကြသည်ကို ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ဖိနှိပ်သည့်နည်းလမ်းများကို တန်ပြန်ခုခံသည့် အာဏာသိမ်းအပြီး တက်ကြွသောဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ယဉ်ကျေး မှုု့တရပ်ထွန်းကားလာခဲ့သည်ကို ဆွေးနွေးပွဲက ရှင်းလင်း ပြသခဲ့ပါသည်။ သို့ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ဖိနှိပ်သည့်နည်းလမ်းများကို တန်ပြန်ခုခံသည့် အာဏာသိမ်းအပြီး တက်ကြွသောဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ယဉ်ကျေး မှုု့တရပ်ထွန်းကားလာခဲ့သည်ကို ဆွေးနွေးပွဲက ရှင်းလင်း ပြသခဲ့ပါသည်။ သို့သော် စစ်တပ်၏စောင့်ကြည့် ထောက်လှမ်း နိုင်စွမ်းအရ အာဏာသိမ်းဆန့်ကျင်သည့်လှုပ်ရှားမှုများမှာ အသိပညာကွာဟချက်များကြောင့်ကန့်သတ်ခံနေရသေးသည်။ ပြည်သူများ၏အင်တာနက်ရယူသုံးစွဲနိုင်မှုကိုဆက်လက်တည်တံ့အောင်ထိန်းထားပေးရန်နည်းပညာကုမ္ဗဏီများ နှင့် ထည့်ဝင်လှူဒါန်းသူများ က မိမိတို့၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍ ကို ပြန်လည်စဉ်းစားပေးဖို့ သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူများမှ တောင်းဆိုကြပါသည်။[1] စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် ဖိနှိပ်မှု့ အင်တာနက်ပိတ်ချခြင်းသည် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ဖိနှိပ်မှု့ဗျူဟာများတွင်လူသိအများဆုံးဖြစ်သည်။ အင်တာနက်ချိတ်ဆက်နိုင်မှု့ကို အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးအချိန်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း စစ်တပ်မှပိတ်ဆို့လိုက်သည်။ ထို့နောက်တွင် ညပိုင်းအင်တာနက်ပြတ်တောက်မှုဆက်တိုက်ဖြစ်လာသည်မှာအနည်းဆုံးရက်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကြာမြင့် ခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ဧပြီလ မှစပြီး ဖိုင်ဘာအော့ပ်တစ်ကေဘယ်လ်မှလွဲ ၍ အခြားမည်သည့်နည်းနှင့်မျှအင်တာနက်ချိတ်ဆက်မရအောင်စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ပိတ်ဆို့ထားခဲ့သည်။ အဓိပ္ဗါယ်မှာ ကုန်ကျစရိတ်နဲသောမိုဘိုင်းလ် ကွန်ယက်များနှင့် broadband ဆက်သွယ်မှုများကိုသာအားထားနေရသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သားအများစု အင်တာနက် လုံးဝချိတ်ဆက်မရတော့ခြင်းပင်။ ဖိုင်ဘာအော့ပ်တစ်ကေဘယ်လ်များမှာ လည်း မြန်နှုန်းလျော့ချခံထားရသည့်နှုန်းဖြင့်သာ ဝန်ဆောင်မှု ပေးနေရသည်။ အင်တာနက်ပြတ်တောက်ခြင်းကိုအရေးထားရန် တောင်းဆိုနေချိန်တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီကမြန်မာ့ဆိုင်ဘာ နယ်ပယ်ကို ရုတ်ချည်း လုံးဝထိန်းချုပ်လိုက်နိုင်သည်ဆိုသည့်အချက်ကိုတော့သုံးသပ်ဆွေး နွေးသူများမှ ကွဲပြားသည့်အမြင်ကိုတင်ပြကြသည်။ ဥပမာ တစ်ခုအနေနှင့် အင်တာနက်အမှောင်ချခံရခြင်းမှာ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသည် မဟုတ် ဟု မျိုး က ထောက်ပြသည်။ ၂၀၁၉ ခုဇွန်လ နှင့် ၂၀၂၁ ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီ အကြားကာလ တွင် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်နှင့်ချင်းပြည်နယ် ၉ မြို့နယ် တို့ ၌ တင်းမာသည့်လက်နက်ကိုင် ပဋိပက္ခများဖြစ်ပွားနေသည့်ကြားက အင်တာနက်မှောင်ချထားရန်အမိန့်ကိုအမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီ ပါတီအဖွဲ့ချုပ် NLD အစိုးရမှ ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည်။အခြားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်အတူ MIDO နှင့် ဖန်တီးရာ တို့ကအင်တာနက်ပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းကို ရပ်ဆိုင်း ရန် ကာကွယ် ပြောဆို ခဲ့ကြသည် ၊ သို့သော် အာဏာသိမ်းသည့်ရက်မတိုင်မီ ( ၁ ) ရက်အလိုမှ ရပ်ဆိုင်း သွားခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်တပ်က အာဏာသိမ်းရန်အတွက် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်တွင် အကြိုလေ့ကျင့်နေပုံရသည်ဟု မျိုးကပြောသည်။ ၂၀၂၀ နိုဝင်ဘာလတွင်လည်း Information Controls Fellow of the Open Technology Fund ဖြစ်သူ ဖြူဖြူကျော် မှ NLD လက်ထက်တွင် အွန်လိုင်းတားမြစ်စီစစ် ချက်များ၊စောင့်ကြည့် အကဲခတ်မှုများ ကိုလှစ်ဟပြခဲ့သည်။သူ၏ လေ့လာချက်တွင်မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသော ဖိနှိပ်မှု ဗျူဟာများ သည် အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးချိန်တွင် အလုံးအရင်းနှင့် ကျင့်သုံးခဲ့သော ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် ကိရိယာများသိမ်းဆည်းခြင်း၊ ပစ်မှတ်ထားသည့်ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက် များကိုပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်း စသည့် ရှိနှင့်ပြီး ဗျူဟာ အမျိုးမျိုး ကို ရှေ့ပြေး နိမိတ်ပုံ ထင်ဟပ်စေသည်။[2] အာဏာသိမ်းမှု့မတိုင်မီ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ဖိနှပ်မှု့များ အပေါ်ထပ်လောင်းထားသည့် များပြားလှသောရင်းမြစ်များ အကြောင်းကိုလည်း သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူ များက အလေးအနက်တင်ပြကြသည်။ တရုတ်၊ ဥရောပနှင့်အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံ တို့မှတင်သွင်းလာပုံရသည့် တပ်မတော်၏ စောင့်ကြည့်ထောက်လှမ်း ခြင်းနည်းပညာ အကြောင်းကိုအဲလက်စ် မှဆွေးနွေးခဲ့သည်။ အများတကာသွားလာနေ သည့်နေရာတွင် လူမျက်နှာသွင်ပြင်ကိုမှတ်မိနိုင်သည့် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ နည်းပညာ ပစ္စည်းများ တပ်ဆင်မှုကို အဲလက်စ်မှ အထူးစိုးရိမ်သည်ဟုဆိုသည်။ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများဖြင့်သက်ဝင်လှုပ်ရှားနေပြီး အကြမ်းတမ်းဆုံး ဖြိုခွဲခံရသောနေရာများဖြစ်သည့် မန္တလေး၊ နေပြည်တော် နှင့်ရန်ကုန် မြို့ကြီး (၃) မြို့ တွင် ထိုသို့တပ်ဆင်မှု့ကို၂၀၂၀ နှင့် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်တို့တွင်စတင်ရန်ရည်ရွယ် ခဲ့သည်။ NLD အစိုးရ မှ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ၄့၆သန်း ကိုလူမှု့ကွန်ယက်စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာရေးနည်းကိရိယာများအတွက် ၂၀၁၇ ခုနှစ်တွင်သုံးခဲ့သည်ဟုဖြူဖြူကျော်၏ သုတေသန ပြုချက်ကိုမှီငြမ်း ၍ မျိုး မှလည်းပြော ဆိုသည်။ NLD အစိုးရသည် ၂၀၁၉ – ၂၀၂၀ အကြား ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ကြားဖြတ်သတင်းယူနိုင်သည့် စံနစ်ကိုတည်ထောင်ရန် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၄သန်းဝန်းကျင်ကို လျာထားသုံးစွဲ ခဲ့သော်လည်း ယခုချိန်အထိ ထိုစံနစ်မှာတည်ရှိ ပေါ်ပေါက်မလာသေးဟု မျိုးမှဆက်လက်ပြောကြားသည်။ ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ကြားဖြတ်သတင်းယူခြင်းဆိုသည်မှာ ပုံမှန်အားဖြင့် ရာဇဝတ်မှု့များကို ဖြေရှင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် နိုင်ငံသားများအချင်းချင်းပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ရေးရာကိစ္စ များ ပြောကြားခြင်း ကို သတင်းရယူရာ၌ အကန့်အသတ် မရှိခွင့်ပေးထားသည့် ဥပဒေမူဘောင်ကိုရည်ညွှန်းသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ထိုသို့အကာအကွယ်အထိန်းအကွပ်မဲ့ခြင်း က ဥပဒေအရမည်သို့မျှတန်ပြန် အရေးယူခံရမည်မဟုတ်သဖြင့် နိုင်ငံသားများအပေါ် စိတ်ကြိုက် လွတ်လပ်စွာသူလျို ထောက်လှမ်းနိုင်ရန် စစ်ကောင်စီကို အခွင့်ပေးလိုက်သကဲ့သို့ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီမှ အင်တာနက် နှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် လုံခြုံရေး ထိန်းချုပ်ရန် သူတို့ဖာသာ ကျင့်သား ယူထားပြီး၊ ကြိုတင်ကြံစည် တွေးထားပြီး ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူများမှ သံသယ များစွာဖြစ်ဖွယ်မရှိပါ။ မည်သို့ဖြစ်စေ အမြင်ကျဉ်းမြောင်းစွာအင်တာနက်အမှောင်ချခြင်းက အခြားနည်းဖြင့်ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ဖိနှိပ်မှု့ကိုအာရုံစိုက် ခြင်းမှသွေဖယ်သွားစေသည်ဟုမျိုးကဖြည့်စွက်ပြောကြားသည်။ စစ်ဆေးရေးနေရာများတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီအရာရှိများက လူထုထံမှဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ကိရိယာ (လက်ကိုင်ဖုန်း)များကိုစစ်ဆေးပြီး အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်ကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်သည့် ပို့စ်များ တင်မတင်စစ်ဆေးဖော်ထုတ်သည်။ “ပထမဆုံးသူတို့ကြည့်တာကတော့ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်၊နောက်ပီးတော့ (ဓါတ်ပုံတွေ)သိမ်းထားတဲ့ဖိုင်နဲ့ မက်ဆင်ဂျာပဲဗျ “ဟုမျိုးကပြောသည်။ “ဘာတွေပါနိုင်မလဲ ဖြစ်နိုင်ခြေရှိသမျှ အမျိုးစုံ သူတို့ရှာတယ် ၊ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းတာကိုထိခိုက်တာ တခုခုတွေ့တာနဲ့ ဒီအရာရှိတွေက( ဖုန်းပိုင်ရှင်ကို) ဖမ်းတော့တာပဲ။ စစ်ကောင်စီ က လူငယ်ဆိုလျှင် ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော် သူများဟုမှတ်ယူ ထားသဖြင့် ယင်းသို့ နှောင့်ယှက်မှုကိုအများဆုံးကြုံတွေ့နိုင်ခြေရှိသူများမှာ စစ်ဆေးရေးနေရာများကို အုပ်စုလိုက် ဖြတ်သန်း သွားလာနေကြသောလူငယ်များဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ဖုန်းများစစ်ဆေးသည့်လုပ်ရပ် ကိုဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်လှုပ်ရှား သူများ နှင့်သတင်းထောက်များ က စိုးရိမ်ပူပန်ဆုံး ဖြစ်သည် ဟု Saijai ကဖြည့်စွက်ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့သည်။ “ဒီလိုလုပ်တဲ့နည်းကပြည်သူ လူထုအကြားမှာ ကြောက်ရွံ့ ထိတ်လန့်မှုတွေ ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေတယ်၊ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူခေါင်းဆောင်ပိုင်းတွင်သာမက ရိုးရိုးပြည်သူ တွေကပါ ကိုယ့်ဖုန်းနဲ့ကိုယ် အပြစ်ရှိတဲ့ ရာဇဝတ်သားဖြစ်မှာကြောက်နေကြတယ်” စစ်ကောင်စီ ၏ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် ဖိနှိပ်မှုတွေ ကပြီးပြည့်စုံရဲ့လား အင်တာနက်ကိုလုံးဝဥဿုံ ထိန်းချုပ်ရန် အမျိုးမျိုးလုပ်ဆောင်နေရသော်လည်း အခက်အခဲများနှင့်သာရင်ဆိုင်နေရ သောစစ်တပ်အခြေအနေ ကိုထောက်ပြပြီးမြန်မာပြည်တွင် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ဖိနှိပ်မှုမှာ မပြည့်စုံကြောင်း သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေး သူများမှ တသဘောတည်း တင်ပြကြသည်။ပထမဦးစွာ- စတီဖင် ဖဲလ်စတိန်း အခေါ်အရပြောရလျှင် “အာဏာရှင်များ၏ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် အကျဥ်းအကြပ်” တွင်စစ်ကောင်စီ ချောင်ပိတ်မိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းမှာ အာဏာရှင်ဆန်သည့် အုပ်ချုပ်သူများ မိမိတို့ ဖိနှိပ်မှုမှရရှိသည့်အကျိုးအမြတ်နှင့် အင်တာနက်ဖွင့်ပေးလိုက်ရသည့်အတွက် ရလိုက်သော အကျိုးအမြတ်ဆုံးရှုံးမှု့တို့ အကြား အလဲအလှယ် အပေးအယူဖြစ်သည်။ လူအများလက်ခံထားသကဲ့သို့ ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီ (၁)ရက်နေ့ နံနက်စောစော စစ်တပ် စတင် ဝင်ရောက်နေရာယူချိန်မှ စပြီး အင်တာနက်ပိတ်ခံရသည် ဆိုခြင်းမှာမဟုတ်ပေ၊ သူတို့အာဏာသိမ်းတပ်အချင်းချင်း ချိတ်ဆက်နိုင်ရန် အင်တာနက်ကို သုံးနေရ ၍ ဖြစ်သည်ဟု အဲလက်စ် ကထောက်ပြခဲ့ပါသည်။ တကယ်အင်တာနက်ဖြတ်ခံရချိန် ကနံနက် ၇နာရီခွဲ ခန့်ဖြစ်ပြီး လူထုထံမှ မကျေနပ်သံများ ချက်ခြင်း ပေါ်ထွက်လာသည်။ညစဉ် ညဉ့် ၁နာရီ မှ မနက် ၉ နာရီအထိအင်တာနက် ဖြတ်တောက်ခြင်းက ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ( ၆) ရက်နေ့မှစတင်သည်ဆိုခြင်းမှာလည်း စစ်ကောင်စီ၏သူတို့ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်အကျဉ်းအကြပ်ကို တနည်းအားဖြင့် ဖြေရှင်းခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ နေ့ပိုင်း ပုံမှန်ရုံးချိန်တွင် လုပ်ငန်းများလုပ်ဆောင် နိုင်ရန်အင်တာနက်ခွင့်ပြုပေးထားပြီး ညအချိန်တွင် အကြောက်တရားလွှမ်းမိုးစေရန်၊အရပ်သားများကိုအကြမ်းဖက်ရန်၊ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများ အချင်းချင်း ချိတ်ဆက်မှုကိုဖြတ်တောက်ဖြိုခွဲရန် ဆိုသည့်တန်ပြန်ဆန္ဒကိုအကောင်အထည်ဖော် နေသည့် ထိုအချက်နှစ်ချက်မှာ အဲလက်စ်၏ သုံးသပ်ချက်အရ အလုပ်လုပ်ချင်သူများကို ဖော်ရွေလိုက်လျောပါသည် ဆိုသည့်ပုံရိပ်ကို အတင်းထိန်းထားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် စစ်အုပ်စု၏အထူးအားစိုက်ကြိုးစားထားရသည့် ရလာဒ်များ ဖြစ်သည်ဟုဆိုသည်။ ထို့အပြင် စစ်တပ် သည်လည်း အင်တာနက် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ အများနှင့်အတူရောပြီးအင်တာနက်အကုန်ပိတ်သွားသည့်အတွက် တပ်အချင်းချင်းဆက်သွယ်ရန် မဖြစ်နိုင်တော့ပဲ မြေပြင်တွင်တာဝန်ကျနေသောစစ်သားများ၏စိတ်ဓါတ်ရေးရာ ကိုပါ အတားအဆီး အနှောက်အယှက်ဖြစ်လာစေသည်။ “ဖုန်းတစ်လုံးနဲ့ တစ်တော့ ဆော့နေကြပီး နားနေကြတဲ့စစ်သားတွေ ကျွန်တော်တို့အားလုံး တွေ့ဖူးကြတာပဲ” ဟုအဲလက်စ်ကပြောသည်။ ထိုတစ်တော့ ဗီဒီယိုများမှာ ကြည့်ရှုသူအတွက် အဆိပ် အတောက် မရှိသည်မဟုတ်ချေ၊ လူမှု ကွန်ယက်တွင်တင်ထားသော ဓါတ်ပုံများ၊ အသက်ကိုခြိမ်းခြောက်သည့်ပို့စ်များသည် စစ်တပ်အတွင်း ရာထူးအဆင့်အလိုက် အရေးမယူ၊ ဒဏ်မခတ်သည့် ထုံးစံ တရပ်ကိုပြန့်ပွားစေသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ စီးပွားရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့်အကျိုးစီးပွားနှင့် သူတို့တပ်အချင်းချင်းအကြား တရားဝင်အသိအမှတ်ပြုခံရမှုသည်လည်း အင်တာနက်ချိတ်ဆက်ရရှိနိုင်ခြင်း အပေါ်တနည်းနည်းဖြင့်မှီ နေသောကြောင့်လုံးဝအပြီးသတ်ပိတ်ချလိုက်ရန်မှာ ဖြစ်နိုင်ဖွယ်မရှိပါ။ စီးပွားရေး လုပ်ငန်းများလုပ်ဆောင်ရန်နှင့် စစ်တပ်အကျိုးစီးပွားကို အထောက်အကူပြုသည့် အင်တာနက်သုံးစွဲမှု ပုံစံကိုချဲ့နိုင်သမျှတိုးချဲ့ပြီး ၊ တော်လှန်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှု ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေသည့် အင်တာနက်စွမ်းအင်ကို ချုံ့ နိုင်သော အဆင့်မြင့် ဆန်းကြယ်သည့် ထိန်းချုပ်နည်းများ စစ်ကောင်စီမှအကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်မည်လားဟုမေးစရာရှိသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့် ဒုတိယ အခက်အခဲများ ကိုလည်း သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူများကထောက်ပြခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၎င်းမှာ စစ်တပ်တွင် အလုံးစုံလွှမ်းခြုံသည့် စောင့်ကြည့် ထောက်လှမ်းခြင်းဗျူဟာချမှတ်နိုင်သည့် နည်းလမ်းမရှိခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ မျိုး၏ဆွေးနွေးချက်အရ “စစ်တပ်ရဲ့စောင့်ကြည့်ထောက်လှမ်း နိုင်တဲ့စွမ်းရည်ဘယ်လောက်ရှိလဲအပြည့်အစုံမသိရပေမယ့်သေချာတဲ့ အချက်တစ်ခုကစစ်တပ်က ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာတွေ ဝယ်ယူပြီး ဆော့ဖ်ဝဲများတပ်ဆင်လိုစိတ် တော့ အလွန်ပြင်းပြနေတယ် ။ဒီအရင်းအမြစ်တွေ ကို စစ်အဖွဲ့မှညွှန်ကြားအသုံးပြုနိုင်ခြင်းရှိမရှိကလည်း အလွန်မေးခွန်းထုတ်စရာကောင်းနေတယ့်သူတို့မှာ ဗျူဟာမဲ့နေတယ်”ဟုဆိုသည်။ မျိုး ဆိုလိုသည်မှာ စစ်တပ်က ပြဿနာကိုဖြေရှင်းရာ တွင်ရှေ့အနာဂါတ်ကိုကြိုတွေးသည့်ဗျူဟာထက် ငွေကိုသာပုံအောသုံးတတ်ပုံရသည်ဟုဆိုလိုခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်း၏ရလာဒ်မှာ ပြည်သူပြည်သားများ၏ ကျရာအခြေအနေတွင်ဖြစ်အောင်လိုက်လျောညီထွေနေတတ်မှု နှင့် ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံနိုင်သည့် စိတ်ဓါတ်တို့ကို စစ်တပ်က တသမတ်တည်း လျှော့တွက်နေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အလုံးစုံလွှမ်းခြုံမှု ဗျူဟာမဲ့နေခြင်းကို အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးစမှ ၅လအတွင်း ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ဖိနှိပ်ခြင်းကိုဆက်လက် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နေ သော ၎င်းတို့၏ ဗရမ်းဗတာလုပ်တတ်သည့်စရိုက်တွင် တွေ့နေရသည်။ ကနဦးတွင် အင်တာနက်ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းကို အချိန်အတိအကျ လုပ်ဆောင်သည်။ တဖန် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်နှင့် တွစ်တာကဲ့သို့ ထင်ရှားသည့် အချို့ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်များကိုပိတ်ပြီး အင်တာနက်ကို လိုင်းပေါ်ပြန်တင်ပေးပြန်သည်။ မကြာသေးမီ ၂၀၂၁မေလ က Zoom၊ LinkedIn နှင့် အခြား မိုဘိုင်းလ် ဘဏ်ဝန်ဆောင်မှု့များကို မိုဘိုင်းလ်ဒေတာမှ လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် “ခွင့်ပြုစာရင်း” ဗျူဟာ သို့ပြောင်းပြန်သည်။ အခြားအင်တာနက်သုံးစွဲမှုပုံစံများမှာ ဖိုင်ဘာချိတ်ဆက်မှုလိုနေသေးပြီး စောစောကတင်ပြခဲ့သည့် “နာမည်ပျက်စာရင်း”တွင်ပါသည့် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ် နှင့် တွစ်တာ တို့မှာ VPN (Virtual Private Network)မရှိပဲ ချိတ်ဆက်အသုံးပြု ၍ မရသေးပေ။ မိုဘိုင်းဒေတာဖြင့်သုံးနိုင်သည့် “ခွင့်ပြုစာရင်း” ဆိုသည်မှာလည်း ကျရောက်လာမည့် စီးပွားရေးကပ်ကို ဟန့်တားနိုင်ရန်မျှော်လင့်ပြီးခွင့်ပြုခြင်းဖြစ်နိုင်သည်။ မည်သို့ပင်ဖြစ်စေပို၍အကြမ်းစား နည်းပရိယာယ်များကိုသုံးနေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၁ခု ဇွန်လ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင်ကျင်းပသော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ပထမဆုံး သတင်းစာရှင်းလင်းပွဲပြု လုပ်နေချိန်တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီမှတနိုင်ငံလုံး အင်တာနက်မရအောင် ဖြတ်တောက် လိုက်သည်။ ယခုလိုစစ်တပ်က သိမ်းကျုံး ရန်မူသည့်နည်းပရိယာယ်များ နှင့်အာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့်လှုပ်ရှားသူများမှ ယင်းပရိယာယ်တို့ကိုရှောင်လွှဲ ကျော်လွှားနိုင်မည်ဟုမျှော်လင့်ချက်ကို ပိုမိုနားလည်ရန် လိုသည်ဟု မျိုး ကပြောကြားသည်။ “ဒါက ကျွန်တော်တို့ တွေ၊ တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူတွေ ၊တော်လှန်ဆန့်ကျင်သူတွေအားလုံးပိုမို လေ့လာရမယ့် နယ်ပယ်ပဲ” ဟုမျိုးကဆိုပါသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ယဉ်ကျေးမှု့ မျိုး၏စကားအတိုင်းဖော်ပြရလျှင် “ စစ်တပ်ကအောင်မြင်ခဲ့ပါသလား ဒီမေးခွန်းရဲ့အဖြေကိုကျွန်တော်ဖြေရရင် မအောင်မြင်ပါဘူး လို့ပဲပြောပါမယ့်”ဟုဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းမှာ ဖဲလ်စတိန်းပြောသည့် “အာဏာရှင်များရဲ့ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်အကျဉ်းအကြပ်” ကို ကိုင်တွယ်ရမည့် လမ်းကြောင်း သိနိုင်စွမ်းမရှိသည့်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အရည်အချင်းညံဖျင်းမှုကြောင့် တစိပ်တပိုင်းဖြစ်သလို၊ ဖိနှိပ်ခံရမှု့များကိုရှောင်ကွင်း ဖောက်ထွက်နိုင်သည့် အရပ်သားများ၏ အရည်အချင်း ကြောင့်ဟုလည်းပြောရမှာဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဖိနှိပ်ခံရလျက်နှင့်ပင်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်း ရှိအင်တာနက်သုံးစွဲသူများ မှ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ယဉ်ကျေးမှု့ကိုအောင်မြင်စွာဖြစ်ထွန်းစေခဲ့ပြီး ထိုမှတဆင့် ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်သည့်နည်းသစ်များ ၊ လူမှု့ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းများစွာပေါက်ဖွားစေခဲ့ပြီး အချင်းချင်းလည်း အန္တရာယ်မှလုံခြုံစေရန်စောင့်ရှောက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများ၏ ဖန်တီးနိုင်မှုအရည်အချင်းကို နိုင်ငံတကာက သတိထားမိခဲ့ကြရာဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်လောကထဲသို့ပါ ပျံ့နှံ့ရောက်ရှိလာသည်။ထိုအကြောင်းအရာနှင့်ပတ်သက် ၍ Saijai က အချက်(၃)ချက်သတိပြုမိသည်။ ပထမအချက်မှာအရပ်သားများ ကဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံစေရန်နှင့်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုကိုရှောင်ကွင်းရန် အင်တာနက်သုံးကြသည်၊ ဥပမာ စောင့်ကြည့်ထောက်လှမ်းခံရ မည်ကို စိုးရိမ်ပူပန်မှုများမြင့်မားနေသည့်ကြားက တဖက်နှင့်တဖက် လျို့ဝှက်ပြောဆိုနိုင်သည့် Signal ကို အရပ်သားများ ပြောင်းသုံးကြသည်။ ဒုတိယ အချက်အနေနှင့် သုံးစွဲနိုင်သည့်application ပေါ်မူတည်ပြီး အရပ်သားများမှ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖေါ်သည့်နည်း ကိုပုံစံပြောင်း ကြသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းကာလတွင် တွစ်တာ အထူး လူသိများထင်ရှားလာသည်၊ အကြောင်းမှာ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများ တွစ်တာမှတဆင့် ပြင်ပကမ္ဘာနှင့်ဆက်သွယ်ရာတွင်ပိုမိုထိရောက်သည့်အတွက်ဖြစ်သည်ဟု Saijai ကဥပမာ ပြသည်။ သတင်းမီဒီယာမှထုတ်ပြန်သည့် သတင်းများပိတ်ပင်ခံရသည့်အချိန်တွင် မိမိ တွစ်တာ အချင်းချင်း မှဖြစ်စေ တရားဝင်ရှိနေသောတွစ်တာသတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖြစ်စေ အရပ်သားများက တွစ်တာကိုသုံးပြီး သတင်းရယူကြသည်။ #whatshappeninginmyanmar ကဲ့သို့ ခေတ်နှင့်အညီ Hashtag များသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ပြည်သူများ၏စိတ်ခံစားမှု့ကိုသက်သေထူချက်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများ က တွစ်တာကိုသုံးပြီးနာမည်ကျော်သတင်းထောက်များ ကိုလည်း tag တွဲသည်၊ ထိုနည်းဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ် “နိုင်ငံတကာမှအာရုံစိုက်လာစေရန်” ဖြစ်သည်။ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများက တွစ်တာ၏ တစ်ဦး မှ တစ်ဦး သို့ဆက်သွယ်ခြင်း နှင့် အများ မှ အများသို့ဆက်သွယ်ခြင်း နှစ်မျိုး စလုံးကို အကျိုးရှိရှိထိရောက်အောင် အသုံးပြုကြသည်။ တတိယအချက် တွင် အင်တာနက်ကိုသုံးပြီး ဆန္ဒပြသူများ တစ်ယောက်နှင့်တစ်ယောက် အားပေးကူညီ ကြကြောင်း Saijai ကဆွေးနွေးခဲ့သည်။ ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်သူများသည်မြို့ကြီးများတွင် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့တည်နေရာကို လမ်းကြောင်း ရှာဖွေနိုင်သော OpenStreetMap မြေပုံကိုသုံးသကဲ့သို့ Way Way Nay app သည်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ဆက်စပ်မှု့ရှိသည့်လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များလုပ်ငန်းများကိုဖော် ပြသဖြင့် သပိတ်မှောက်လှုပ်ရှားမှုများလွယ်ကူစေပြီး ချိတ်ဆက်ရ လည်း လွယ်ကူစေသည်။ ထို app များသုံးခြင်းက အွန်လိုင်း ချိတ်ဆက်မှု့များသည် လိုင်းပေါ်မှာမရှိသည့် ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများကိုမည်သို့ ဖြည့်တင်းကူညီရာရောက်သည်ကိုပြနေသည်။ လိုင်းပေါ်မှာမဟုတ်သည့် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းတမ်းစွာ ဖြိုခွင်းမှု များကြားကပင်၊ အွန်လိုင်းပေါ် ကလူမှု့ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းကိုလည်း ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများကလှုံ့ဆော်နိုင်ကြောင်းပြသည်။ “ လူငယ်တွေဟာ စိတ်မကျေနပ်မှုကို အခြားတမျိုး နဲ့ဖော်ပြပြီး ဒေါသကို အသစ်အဆန်းတွေအဖြစ် ဖန်တီး ပြောင်းလဲယူ နိုင်ကြတယ်၊ သူတို့အချင်းချင်း အားပေးကူညီနေတာတွေ့ရတာလည်းကျွန်တော့် ရင်ထဲတကယ်ခံစား ရတယ် “ဟု Saijai ကပြောပါသည်။ မြို့ကြီးများတွင် ခေတ်မီစမတ်ဖုန်းများ ကိုင်နိုင်ခြင်းကလည်း၊ သတင်းထောက်ဆိုလျှင် ပြည်တွင်းဖြစ်စေ ပြည်ပသတင်းမီဒီယာ ကဖြစ်စေ ဖမ်းဆီးခံရခြင်း၊ညှင်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခံရခြင်း နှင့်ထောင်ကျ ခြင်း တို့ကြုံရသည့်မီဒီယာကို မုန်းတီးရန်ရှာသည့်အခြေအနေ တွင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများမှသတင်းထောက်များကို ကူညီနိုင်ခွင့်ရစေသည်။ နှိမ်နင်းဖြိုခွဲပုံဗီဒီယို ဓါတ်ပုံများကိုရိုက်ကူးပြီး လိုင်းပေါ်တင်ကာ လူမှုကွန်ယက်တွင် မျှဝေသည်။ ယင်းမှာ မီဒီယာအသုံးပြုသူများနှင့် သတင်းထောက်များ၏ဆက်ဆံရေး အပြောင်းအရွေ့ဖြစ်သည်ဟု အဲလက်စ် ကရှင်းပြသည်။ သတင်းထောက်များအနေဖြင့် အန္တရာယ်အလွန်ကြီးမားသဖြင့် လူအုပ်ထဲတွင်မိမိမည်သူမည်ဝါဖြစ်ပါသည်ဟုပြောဆိုရသည့်အခါ မိမိမှ သတင်းပေးသည်ထက် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ သတင်းပေးချက်အပေါ် မှီခိုအားထားနေရသည်။ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများဖက်ကလည်း သူတို့ လုပ်ဆောင်ရမည့်အပိုင်းကိုချက်ခြင်း အဆင်ပြေအောင်ကူညီကြပါသည်။ သတင်းထောက်များကို ပြည်သူမှပေး သောဗီဒီယိုများမှာ အာဏာသိမ်းခါစကာလ ကပေးသောဗီဒီယိုများထက် ယေဘုယျအားဖြင့် ပိုကြည်လင်ပြီး သတင်းထောက်များလိုချင်သည့်အချက်များဖြစ်သည့် နေ့ရက်၊အချိန်၊နေရာတို့ပါ ပါဝင်သည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ဗီဒီယိုများမှာ အရေးပါသော်လည်း အရပ်သားများအတွက် အန္တရာယ်ကို ဖိတ်ခေါ်နေသည်။ ဥပမာ ဆန္ဒ ပြသူများ ပေးသည့် ဗီဒီယို မှ မြေပြင်အမှတ်အသား၊ မည်သည့်နေရာဆိုသည့် အတိအကျပုံရိပ်ဖမ်းစံနစ်တို့ပါဝင်သဖြင့် နှိမ်နင်းဖြိုခွင်းရန် နှိုးဆော်နေသကဲ့သို့ဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းအလွန်ကာလ မြန်မာပြည်တွင် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်လုံခြုံရေး အသိမှာ ထိတ်တန်းအရေးကြီးကြောင်း ယင်းအန္တရာယ်များက ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်း ညွှန်ပြနေသည်။ အင်တာနက်သည် အာဏာသိမ်းအပြီး ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ရာတွင် အသွင်တမျိုးဖြင့် ဆက်သွယ်ပေးလေသည်၊ ထိုအရာမှာလျို့ဝှက် စာရွက်စာတမ်းများပေါက်ကြားခြင်းပင်။ ဤနည်းဖြင့်ပေါက်ကြားနိုင်ခြေမြင့်ကြောင်းအဲလက်စ် က TOTAL ပြင်သစ်ရေနံကုမ္ဗဏီနှင့် ဥပမာပြသွားသည်။ စစ်တပ်နှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်သဖြင့် TOTAL အကျိုးအမြတ်မည်သို့ရနေပုံကို မေလဆန်းတွင် Justice for Myanmar ဆိုသည့် လှုပ်ရှားတက်ကြွသည့်အဖွဲ့က၊ ပေါက်ကြားသည့်မှတ်တမ်းစာရွက်စာတမ်း များကို အသုံးပြုပြီး ပြသသွားသည်။ TOTAL လည်းဖိအားပေးခံရသဖြင့် ထိုအချိန်မှစ၍ စစ်တပ်သို့ အမြတ်ငွေကြေးခွဲဝေပေးခြင်းကို ရပ်ဆိုင်းခဲ့သည်။ “ဒီလိုသတင်းအချက် အလက်တွေက ပေါက်ကြားစေချင်သူမရှိပဲ ကျွန်တော်တို့ဘယ်လိုမှ ရနိုင်မှာမဟုတ်ဘူး၊ လူမှုမီဒီယာကွန်ယက်မှတဆင့် ပေါက်ကြား သည်အထိသတင်းကိုလုံလုံခြုံခြုံနဲ့ နာမည်မပေါ်အောင် ထုတ်သွားနိုင်တာဟုအဲလက်စ် က ပြောဆိုသည်။ယခုသုံးသပ် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲကို နိုင်ငံတကာမှ နားထောင် နေသူများကိုလည်း မီဒီယာကဏ္ဍ (ပုဂ္ဂလိကပိုင် လုပ်ရင်) လွတ်လပ်မှာ ပါဟု အနောက်နိုင်ငံ ဒီမိုကရေစီ အတွေ့အကြုံများကိုအခြေခံသည့် ယူဆချက်များကို မေ့ထားလိုက်ရန် အဲလက်စ်ကတိုက်တွန်း လိုက်သည်။ အရေးကြီးသည့် သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို အများတကာကြည့်ရှု နိုင်သည့် မီဒီယာအားပြည်သူများလက်လှမ်းမမီနိုင်သည့် မြန်မာပြည်တွင် လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပျက်နေသည်များကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားရန်လိုအပ်ချက်ကိုလျှော့တွက်၍ မဖြစ်ပေ။ နောက်ဆုံးတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဗရမ်းဗတာ အင်တာနက် ပိတ်ဆို့မှု့များရှိသည့်ကြားကပင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအွန်လိုင်းပေါ်ဆက်လက် နေနိုင်အောင် ကြံဖန်နိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ဥပမာ – အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးပထမသီတင်းပါတ်လောက်ကစ ၍ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်နှင့် အခြား ပိတ်ထားသော ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်များသို့ဝင်ရန်VPNs များသုံးပြီး အကွာအဝေးတို ဆက်သွယ်ပြောဆိုရန်အတွက် mesh network ကဲ့သို့အကွက်ကွန်ယက် ကိုသုံးသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးရက်များအတွင်း ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် အခွင့်အရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများက မိုဘိုင်းဒေတာထက်စာလျှင်တာတို Bluetooth နည်းပညာကိုသုံးပြီး အကွက်ကွန်ယက် မက်ဆေ့ချ်စာပို့နိုင်သော Bridgefy app ကိုသုံးရန် ဆော်သြခဲ့ကြသည်။ အွန်လိုင်းပေါ်ဆက်ပြီး နေနိုင်အောင်အားထုတ်ကြိုးပမ်းကြသည့်ပြည်သူပြည်သား များ၏ အောင်မြင်မှုကို ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီလမှ ဧပြီလ အတွင်း နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းဆင်နွှဲခဲ့ကြသည့် အကြောင်းအရာ ခေါင်းစဉ်အလိုက် ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်ပွဲများတွင်တွေ့မြင်နိုင်သည် ဟုအဲလက်စ်က ဆက်ပြောပါသည်။ လမ်းပေါ်တွင် ဆန္ဒပြသူများက သူတို့၏စည်းလုံးညီညွှတ်မှု့ကို ချိတ်ဆက်မှုရှိရှိ နည်းဗျူဟာများ၊ သင်္ကေတများဖြင့် ပြသ သွားခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၎င်းတို့တွင် ဖရဲသီးများ၊ ဆေးခြယ်ထားသည့်ကြက်ဥများ နှင့် ဖိနပ်များ ပါဝင်သည်။ ယင်းသို့ အားလုံးတညီတညာ တည်းကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်မှာ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအွန်လိုင်းပေါ်ရှိမနေပဲ မည်သို့မှမဖြစ်နိုင်ပေ။ တခါသုံးပြီး လွှင့်ပစ်လို့ရသည့်ဖုန်းများနှင့် မိမိနေထိုင်ရာအိမ်ကို ဝင်ရောက်စီးနင်းရှာဖွေခံရချိန်နှင့်စစ်တပ်၏စစ်ဆေးရေးနေရာများတွင် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် ဆက်သွယ်ချက်များကို ဝှက်ထားနိုင်သည့် Android app Second Space များတွင်ကျယ်စွာအသုံးပြုလာခြင်းကိုလည်း မျိုးကထောက် ပြသည်။ အင်တာနက် တင်းကြပ်ခြင်းပြဿနာကိုဖြေရှင်းနိုင်မည့် စိတ်ကူးကောင်းများကိုလည်း လှုပ်ရှားတက်ကြွသူများက ထပ်မံရှာဖွေ နေလျက်ရှိသည်။ “ ‘StarLink ’ ကတော့အကောင်းဆုံးနောက်တနည်းဖြစ်မယ်ထင်တယ်” ဟု SpaceX မှ ဦးဆုံးလမ်းပြခဲ့သည့် ဂြိုလ်တု အင်တာနက် စံနစ်ကို မျိုးကရည်ညွှန်းခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူပြည်သားများကို StarLink ပေးရန် တွစ်တာဖြင့်စည်းရုံး လှုံ့ ဆော်ပေးခြင်း ရှိခဲ့သည်။ ဤ နယ်ပယ်တွင် ဆယ်စုနှစ်တစ်ခုခန့် အလုပ်လုပ်ခဲ့သူ မျိုး အနေဖြင့် “ယခု အကြပ်အတည်းကာလအတွင်းအဆိုးထဲက အကောင်း လို့ ဆိုရမှာက ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် လုံခြုံရေးအကြောင်း ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့်သိရှိမှုမြင့်တက်လာတာပဲနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာမြန်မာ ပြည်ထဲကို စမတ်ဖုန်း တွေ ဝင်ရောက်ထိုးဖောက်လာတဲ့ နှုန်းက မြန်မာလူဦးရေရဲ့ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာသိနားလည်မှုနှုန်းကို ကျော်နေခဲ့တာ့အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် လုံခြုံရေးက အသက်ရှင်ရပ်တည်ရေးပညာတစ်ခု လိုဖြစ်လာတဲ့ဒစ်ဂျစ် တယ်လုံခြုံမှု့ အကြောင်းမသိရင် အပြင်ထွက်လို့မရဘူး” ဟုပြောပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ဆန္ဒပြပွဲများကို စိတ်ကူးယဉ်မဆန်ကြဖို့ သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူအားလုံးကသတိပေးပါသည်။ အဲလက်စ်ပြောသကဲ့သို့ပင် “မြန်မာပြည်မှာဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် အသိပညာဆိုတာ လိုအပ်ချက်အရမွေးဖွားလာတာဆန်းသစ်တည်ထွင်ယုံသက်သက်မဟုတ်ဘူး ” ဆန္ဒပြသူများအနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ စောင့်ကြည့် ထောက်လှမ်းနိုင်စွမ်း ကို ပိုသိဖို့လိုပြီး သို့မှသာ အွန်လိုင်းပေါ်တွင်အမြဲနေနိုင်မည့် နည်းလမ်းများကိုလည်း ရှာဖွေနိုင်မည် ဟု မျိုးက ဆက်လက်ထောက်ပြသည်။ ထိုအခါမှသာ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် ယဉ်ကျေးမှု့ ဆက်လက်တည်တံ့နိုင်မည် ဖြစ်သည်။ ကမ္ဘာ့ ထိပ်တန်းနည်းပညာ ကုမ္ဗဏီကြီးများ နှင့် ထည့်ဝင်လှူဒါန်းသူများ ဘာဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်မလဲ နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်း က တိုင်းပြည်၏အစိုးရနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကိုသာအာရုံစိုက်နေစဉ်တွင်ပုဂ္ဂလိက ကဏ္ဍအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေး လမ်းခရီးတွင် အရေးပါသောအခန်းမှဝင်ရောက် ပါဝင်နိုင်ကြောင်း သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူများက အလေးအနက်ပြောကြ သည်။ ” ကျွန်တော်တို့သိထားရမှာက နည်းပညာကုမ္ဗဏီကြီးတွေဆိုတာလက်ရှိအစိုးရထက်ပိုမကြီးတောင်မှ နီးပါး ကြီးမားကြတယ် ဆိုတာပါပဲ့့ဒါကြောင့် ဒီလုပ်ငန်းကြီးတွေရဲ့တာဝန်ခံမှုကို အစိုးရတွေ လို တန်းတူ ထားသင့်တယ့့်ကြားနေတယ်ဆိုပြီး စစ်တပ်က မကောင်းဆိုးဝါးလုပ်ရပ်တွေ လုပ်ချင်တိုင်းလုပ်နိုင်အောင်လမ်းဖွင့်ပေးနေတာကို ကျွန်တော်တို့မြင်တွေ့ခဲ့ရပီ” ဟုအဲလက်စ် ကပြောပါ သည်။ အချို့နည်းပညာ ကုမ္ဗဏီ တည်ထောင်သူများမြန်မာပြည်သို့လာရောက်ခဲ့ဖူးကြသည်။ ၂၀၁၈ ခုနှစ်တွင် တွစ်တာ၏ အမှုဆောင်အရာရှိချုပ် Jack Dorsey မြန်မာပြည်တွင် တရားစခန်း ဝင်ခဲ့ရာ ရိုဟင်ဂျာဆန့်ကျင်ရေး စိတ်ဓါတ်ကိုဆွပေးသည့်လူမှုမီဒီယာကွန်ယက်၏ အခန်း ကဏ္ဍကို ပေါ်လွင်တောက်ပြောင်လာစေသည်ဟုသူပိုင်တွစ်တာပေါ်တွင်ပင် ဝေဖန်ခံရသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်ပြီး တွစ်တာ ကအချိန်အတော်ကြာ တိတ်ဆိတ်မြဲတိတ်ဆိတ်နေသည်။တစ်တော့ခ် မှာ စစ်တပ်၏ဝါဒဖြန့်ချီရေးပို့စ်များ စီးဆင်းနေခြင်းကို စီမံ ထိန်းကွပ်ရန်မနည်း ရုန်းကန်နေရသည်။ “အေးဆေး ကောင်းမွန် နေတဲ့အချိန်တွေတုန်းကတော့ ကျွန်တော်တို့ဟာ သူတို့ကို သစ္စာရှိစွာ အားပေးခဲ့သူ တွေပေါ့ဒါနဲ့ပတ်သက်လို့ လူတိုင်းလည်းစိတ်ချမ်းသာကြပါတယ်၊ မြန်မာကလည်းဒီလုပ်ငန်းကြီးတွေကို အားပေးခဲ့တယ်၊ ကျွန်တော်တို့လည်းဒီဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ပလက်ဖောင်းပေါ်တက်ခဲ့ကြတယ်၊သူတို့အမြတ်အစွန်းတွေအများကြီးရခဲ့ကြတယ်၊ မြန်မာပြည်ဟာ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်နဲ့ပတ်သက်လို့ထိခိုက်နစ်နာ လွယ်တယ်ဆိုတာမသိတာလား၊ ဂရုမစိုက်တာပဲလား မြန်မာပြည်မှာခြေကုပ်ရသွား ခဲ့ကြတယ်။ အခု အခြေအနေတွေကပြောင်းပြန်ဖြစ်ကုန်ပီ၊ (ဒီဂျစ်တယ် ပလက်ဖောင်းတွေကို) ကျွန်တော်တို့ဖက်မှာရပ်တည်စေချင်တယ်။ ဒီတော့ မေးခွန်း က- သူတို့ဘယ်မှာရပ်တည်မှာလဲ “ ဟုအဲလက်စ်ကပြောပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အင်အားအကြီးဆုံး လူမှုမီဒီယာဖြစ်သည့် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ် မှာအခြား လူမှုမီဒီယာကုမ္ဗဏီကြီးများထက်ပိုမိုခက်ခဲ ရှုပ်ထွေးသည့် အခြေအနေတွင်ရှိနေပါသည်။ လေ့လာသူများက ၂၀၁၃ ခုနှစ်တွင် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ် စာမျက်နှာများပေါ်၌ ရိုဟင်ဂျာဆန့်ကျင်ရေး သဘောထား များတွေ့မြင်နေရသည်ကို သတိပေးခဲ့သော်လည်း သူတို့က အလေးအနက်မထားခဲ့ပါ။ ၂၀၁၅ နှစ်ဆန်းတွင် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်သုံးသူမြန်မာ ၇သန်းကျော်ရှိသော်လည်း မြန်မာစကားတတ်သူ ၂ ဦး သာ အကြောင်းအရာဖတ်ရှလေ့လာစောင့်ကြည့်သူအဖြစ်ခန့်ထားခဲ့သည်။ အန္တရာယ်ဖြစ်စေသည့် အကြောင်းအရာများကိုဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်၏ အလိုအလျောက် စုံစမ်းထောက်လှမ်းသည့်စံနစ် က မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် အလုပ်မဖြစ် နိုင်ပေ။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာ( ၇) သိန်းရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မှစွန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အချက်အလက်မှန်ဖော်ထုတ်ရေး အဖွဲ့ကဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်သည်အမုန်းတရားများပျံ့ပွားအောင်လုပ်ရာတွင်အသုံးတည့်သော အရာဖြစ်သည်ဟု ၂၀၀၈ တွင် အစီရင်ခံတင်ပြ သောအခါမှ သာ ဆတ်ဆတ် ထိသွားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ယခု စစ်ကောင်စီခေါင်းဆောင်ဖြစ်သူ မင်းအောင်လှိုင်လည်း ထိုအချိန်နောက်ပိုင်းတွင် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်မှ ဖယ်ရှား ခံလိုက်ရပြီး နိုင်ငံတစ်ခု၏ စစ်တပ် သို့မဟုတ် နိုင်ငံရေးအကြီးအကဲတစ်ဦးအား ပထမ ဦးဆုံး တားမြစ်ပိတ်ပင် လိုက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်သည် သူ၏အမှားများမှ သင်ခန်းစာရခဲ့ပြီ ဟု Saijai နှင့် မျိုး တို့ကသတိရှိစွာဖြင့်အကောင်းမြင်ဝေဖန် ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်၏ ချဉ်းကပ်ပုံ ၃မျိုး ကို Saijai က အကောင်းဖက်မှမြင်ကြည့်ပါသည် -၎င်းတို့မှာ စစ်တပ်၏ကြမ်းတမ်း ရက်စက်မှုများနှင့်ဆိုင်သည့်ပို့စ်များကိုဖြုတ်ချခြင်း၊ စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့်သူများ နှင့် တပ်ပိုင်စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ၏အကောင့်ကို တားဆီးထားခြင်း၊နှင့် မိမိအကြောင်းပရိုဖိုင်းလ်ကို သေ့ာခတ် သိမ်းထားနိုင်သည့် တီထွင်ဖန်တီးမှု့အသစ် ပါရှိခြင်းဖြင့် မိတ်ဆွေ မဟုတ်သူ များမှတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်၏ပို့စ်များဓါတ်ပုံများကိုဝင်ရောက်ကြည့်ရှုခြင်းမှာကာကွယ်ပေးထားခြင်းတို့ဖြစ်သည်။ နိုင်ငံအတွင်း ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ် က တိုင်ပင်ဆွေးနွေးခြင်းကို ဝမ်းသာရသည်ဟု မျိုးကလည်းပြောပါသည်။ သို့သော် ယခုသုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးပွဲအပြီး တပါတ်အကြာတွင် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ် ၏ အယ်လ်ဂိုရစ်သမ် များမှမြန်မာပြည်အတွင်းထိခိုက်နစ်နာ စေသည့်အကြောင်းအရာများကိုမည်သို့မည်ပုံ ဆက်လက်တင်ပြနေကြောင်း အစီရင်ခံစာ ကိုGlobal Witness မှ ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ကိုထောက်ခံသောအကြောင်းအရာများ၊ အချို့ သော ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူများ၏ အမည်၊ဓါတ်ပုံနှင့်တကွ အသက်အန္တရာယ် ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခံရမှုများကျယ်ကျယ်လောင်လောင် ပျံနှံ့နေသည်ကို ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်သုံးသူများမှ အလွယ်တကုူ ကြည်ရှု့နိုင်ကြောင်း Global Witness မှ မှတ်တမ်းပြုထားသည်။ ထိုသို့အကြောင်းအရာများမှာ ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်မှလိုက်နာပါသည်ဟုပြောသည့် လူ့မှုကျင့်ဝတ်စံနှုန်း လေးစားခြင်း ကိုဆန့်ကျင်ဖောက်ဖျက်နေသည်။ ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာကဏ္ဍ နှင့်ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်အပါအဝင်၊ မည်သူမဆို လူမှုမီဒီယာကွန်ယက်မှတဆင့် အများ ပြည်သူအပေါ်သက်ရောက်စေသည့် ဂယက်မှာ မည်မျှအထိတာသွားသည်ကို အပြည့်အစုံသိနိုင်ရန် ခက်ခဲကြောင်း ဤအရှုပ်အထွေးများက ပြနေသည်။ Saijai နှင့် မျိုးတို့မှ ထောက်ပြ သွားသည့် အာရုံစိုက်ရမည့် ဗျူဟာများ မှာလုံးဝ ဖြစ်နိုင်ချေရှိသော်လည်း သူ့ကိုယ်ပိုင်အယ်လ်ဂိုရစ်သမ်ဖြင့်ပင် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ် မှာပြန်ပြီး ဒုက္ခရောက် နေရဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ယခုသုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေး ပွဲတွင် အချိန်မရသည့်အတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပဋိပက္ခနှင့် ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ် တို့ဆက်စပ်မှု့အကြောင်းမဆွေးနွေးလိုက်ရပေ။ ထိုကိစ္စမှာလည်း ပိုရှုပ်ထွေးသည့်အကြောင်းအရာများနှင့် ပြည့်နေဦး မှာဖြစ်ပြီး သတင်းအချက်အလက်မပြည့်စုံခြင်းကလည်း ရှိနေသေးသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းသည့်အချိန်မတိုင်မီက လေ့လာသူများ မှာ ရိုဟင်ဂျာအကြောင်း ကိုသာ မလွတ်တမ်းပြောနေကြပြီး စစ်ဒဏ်ခံ အခြားတိုင်းရင်းသား အုပ်စုများအပေါ် လူမှုမီဒီယာကွန်ယက်နှင့် အင်တာနက်တို့ ၏ သက်ရောက်မှုကိစ္စ ကို ကျော်သွားကြသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် နည်းပညာခေါင်းဆောင်များ အနေဖြင့် သူတို့အချင်းချင်းအကြားသော်လည်းကောင်း၊သူတို့နည်းပညာကိုအသုံးပြုသူ ဖောက်သည် များ အကြားသော်လည်းကောင်း၊ အာဏာ အကြီးအကျယ် မညီမမျှ ဖြစ်နေခြင်းကို နည်းပညာခေါင်းဆောင်များမှ ကုစားဖို့ အဓိကအရေးကြီးကြောင်း စဉ်းစားရန်အဲလက်စ်က ထောက်ပြသွားသည်။ နည်းပညာကုမ္ဗဏီများ အနေနှင့် အာဏာမညီမျှမှုကို အစဉ် အလေးအနက်ထားစဉ်းစားသည့် နေရာတွင်ရှိသင့်ပြီး သူတို့နည်းပညာကိုသုံးစွဲသူများ၏ အသံကိုလည်းနား ထောင်နိုင်သင့်သည်။ ပထမ ခြေလှမ်းအနေနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှတိုင်းရင်းသား ဘာသာစကားများတတ်ကျွမ်းသူတို့ကို ငှားရမ်းပြီး နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်း ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့များနှင့်ချိတ်ဆက်စေရမည်။ နောက်ဆုံးအနေနှင့် အခက်အခဲကြားမှထွက်မသွားကြဖို့လည်း ပါဝင်လှူဒါန်းသူများကို Saijai ကတောင်းဆိုလိုက်ပါသည်။ ရှေ့ပိုင်းက ဆွေးနွေးသွားချက်များမှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့်ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ယဉ်ကျေးမှုမှာသူ့ချည်း သက်သက် ဖြစ်ထွန်း ပေါ်ထွက်လာသည်မဟုတ်၊ သို့သော် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ပုံနှိပ်မီဒီယာချုပ်ကိုင်မှုကို တုန့်ပြန်ရင်း၊ ဒီဂျစ်တယ်ခေတ် အတွက်တံခါးဖွင့် ထားခြင်း နှင့်မြန်မာပြည်မှ ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်သူတို့၏ဇွဲနပဲ ကြောင့်သာလျှင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုနည်းတူစွာ အာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ယဉ်ကျေးမှုတည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲရေးမှာ လူထုတရပ်လုံး ကျန်းမာရေးကောင်းမွန် ရန်နှင့် ဖန်သားပြင်ကမ္ဘာ၏အပြင်ဖက်တွင် အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်း အလုပ်များ ဆက်လက်ထိန်းထားနိုင်ရေးတို့အပေါ်တွင်မူတည်သည်။ ဥပမာ စစ်ကောင်စီ ပညာရေးစံနစ် မဟုတ်သည့်Virtual Federal University နှင့် Spring University Myanmar ကဲ့သို့ အသစ်ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသော အခြားနည်းများ ဖြင့်လူအများ ပညာသင်ယူနိုင်ရန်မှာ VPN နှင့်စမတ်ဖုန်းများအတွက်ငွေကြေးအကုန်အကျခံနိုင်ခြင်းပေါ်မူတည်နေသည်။ လောလော ဆယ်ရှိနေသည့် အသိပညာ ကွာဟချက်များကို ဖြည့်ပေးရန်လိုအပ်ကြောင်း ကိုလည်း သုံးသပ်ဆွေးနွေးသူများမှ အရေးတကြီးပြောဆို ကြသည်။ နိုင်ငံ၏ စောင့်ကြည့်ထောက်လှမ်း နိုင်သည့် စွမ်းရည် နှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းပြီး ကာလ မြန်မာ့လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်း နှင့်စီးပွားရေးတွင် နည်းပညာ ကုမ္ဗဏီများ ၏အခန်းကဏ္ဍ ကို စစ်ဆေးရန် ငွေကြေးထည့်ဝင်သူများ ကို ငွေကြေးထောက်ပံ့ ဖို့တောင်းဆိုကြပါသည်။ ငွေကြေးထည့် ဝင်လှူဒါန်းသူများစွန့်ခွာသွားကြခြင်းမပြုပဲ လိုက်လျောညီထွေရှိသင့်ပြီး၊ ငွေသားရရန်အခက်အခဲအပါအဝင်ပြောင်းလဲ နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအခြေအနေ ကိုတုန့်ပြန်ရန် ပြောင်းလွယ်ပြင်လွယ်အနေအထားတွင် နေသင့် ပါသည်။ ”မြေပြင်မှာ တကယ် ကောင်းကောင်းမွန်မွန် ဆောင် ရွက်နေကြတဲ့ အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေအများကြီးရှိပါတယ်”ဟု Saijai ကပြောပါသည်။ ထိုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ တဖွဲ့နှင့်တဖွဲ့ ချိတ်ဆက်နေနိုင်မည်လော၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းကိုလူထုက ဆက်သွယ်နိုင်မည်လော ဆိုသည်ကမေးစရာဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2021-08-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Title: ‘All Lies!’: Myanmar Junta’s Clumsy Propaganda Has a Disturbingly Familiar Ring
Description: "Six-and-a-half months after Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and his generals staged a coup and launched a brutal crackdown on popular resistance to the power grab, it is becoming increasingly clear that Myanmar is seeing a return to the dark old days of pre-2011 junta rule. It is particularly evident in the abolition of the freedom of expression and press freedom that the people of Myanmar were given a taste of for almost a decade. That also means that the military has killed the hopes and aspirations of millions, young and old—and that civil-military relations, a favorite subject of national and international studies, are beyond repair. The military has become the country’s most hated institution, and the political gobbledygook it produces in print and online to justify its actions would be laughable, if not for the tragedy that surrounds the bloody coup and its aftermath. The appointment of an ex-military officer who writes under the peculiar name Chit Naing (Sate Pyin Nyar), or Chit Naing (Psychology), as the Information Minister after the coup was a clear indication of what to expect. Mischievous people with a sense of humor usually refer to him as Chit Naing (Sate Yaw Ga), or Chit Naing (Mental Case). His literary credentials rest primarily on the quantity of books he has produced, rather than their quality. Vendors who used to sell his writings on pavements in the old capital Yangon stopped doing that after the coup, while pictures on social media show the books being torn apart both by booksellers and angry customers. Chit Naing (Psychology) was promoted to “Minister of the Union Government Office” when Min Aung Hlaing formed a “Caretaker Government” on Aug. 1, which may mean that we will see more of his writings being churned out by the military’s propaganda machine. The junta’s first lengthy attempt at disseminating its version of events to the outside world came in the form of a 118-page book that was produced in time for Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to Jakarta on April 24 to meet representatives of ASEAN. Titled “The Current Political Situation in Myanmar” and written in quaintly jumbled English, it contains accusations of protester violence including alleged attacks on the police, details of supposed fraud in the 2020 election, several references to the 2008 constitution to “prove” that the military, known as the Tatmadaw, had not broken any laws—and then an assertion and a pledge: “the Tatmadaw always keeps its promise” (sic) and “we can reassure all the member states that we will be fully cooperating with all of friendly member states including other countries across the world.” (sic) Then, the supposed author, Min Aung Hlaing, added a caveat: “We can vividly learn that the interesting issues have emerged in all respective ASEAN member states…I kindly remind all of you that we may possibly face with certain difficulties, it we miss something at the certain corner.” (sic) Before that, the military produced much shorter newsletters called “Information Sheet” with headlines such as “Containing Riotous Situations in Some Townships in Line with Rules and Regulations”, “The Rioters’ Conducting Anarchic Mob like Activities and Sabotage Activities”, and “Findings on the Announcement of UEC [Union Election Commission] regarding the Inspection of the Voter Lists and Withdrawal/Receipt/Use Remaining Ballot Papers.” An amnesty announcement from the military’s “information team” published in the official newspaper The Global New Light of Myanmar on April 2 was headlined: “Re-invitation to Myanmar citizens who have arrived at various regions for many reasons.” While it may be easy to make fun of the military spokespersons’ lack of proficiency in English, their mumbo jumbo doesn’t make any more sense in Burmese, thus echoing the disinformation campaigns of old juntas, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was set up after the 1988 massacres and in 1997 became the more palatably named State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). In the late 1980s, the military published collections of speeches by SLORC chairman General Saw Maung, and, at the same time, a book titled “A Skyful of Lies” (sic) accusing the BBC, the VOA and other foreign broadcasters of reporting falsehoods about the situation in Myanmar. But street vendors were soon forbidden to sell both books at the same time because crafty street vendors would first hold up one of the them, saying “General Saw Maung’s speeches!”, then lower their hand and raise the other holding the book about the broadcasters: “All lies!” So it became “General Saw Maung’s speeches! All lies!” It is unclear whether any vendors were arrested for making this rather humorous protest against military rule. In fact, the lies begin on the front page of The Global New Light of Myanmar and its Burmese edition, Myanmar Alin. “Founded in 1914” has at last been taken off the English edition but it remains on the Burmese version. While it is true that a vernacular newspaper called Myanma Alin with The New Light of Myanmar on the front page also in English was founded in 1914, it has nothing to do with today’s paper of the same name. The real New Light of Myanmar was very outspoken against colonial rule and, from 1920 to 1947, managed by U Tin, a well-respected newspaperman who became independent Myanmar’s first Minister of Finance and Revenue. But that paper was shut down by the military in 1969. After general Ne Win’s coup in 1962, his ruling Burma Socialist Program Party began publishing its own, tabloid-sized propaganda sheet called The Working People’s Daily in English and Loktha Pyithu Nezin in Burmese. That name was not in line with the new, ostensibly free-market oriented policies that were introduced after 1988, so the name of the state organ was changed to The New Light of Myanmar and Myanma Alin respectively. U Tin would turn in his grave if he knew about this theft of the name of his paper. Its website claims that it is “Myanmar’s oldest English daily” and the lie has even made it into Wikipedia, where it says that “the newspaper was founded in 1914.” How many others this has fooled is hard to say, but it can’t include many of those who are familiar with the history of the media in Myanmar. Successive attempts by the generals at presenting themselves in a more favorable light have been equally unsuccessful. After the February coup, the latest junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), hired Dickens & Madson, a firm headed by Israeli-Canadian lobbyist Ari Ben-Menashe, to help polish its image. According to documents filed with the US Justice Department, the contract Dickens & Madson signed with Myanmar’s military leadership is worth US$2 million and is designed to explain “the real situation in the country” and to communicate with the United States and other counties who had “misunderstood them.” Ben-Menashe’s own record is far from stellar. A former Israeli intelligence officer, he was arrested in the US in 1989 for violating the law by trying to sell three C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to Iran, but was later acquitted. After that, he worked as a PR agent for Zimbabwe’s strongman Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe-born drug trafficker Paul Le Roux (who after his arrest in the US agreed to cooperate with its Drug Enforcement Administration), and Sudanese warlord General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, whose forces committed crimes against humanity in Darfur in 2014-15. Ben-Menashe’s involvement in Myanmar goes back to the 1990s when he, according to internal documents in my possession, tried to sell sophisticated military equipment to the Tatmadaw, including missiles and attack helicopters. Nothing came of those attempts, but his standing with the Tatmadaw doesn’t seem to have been shaken by those shenanigans. Even so, his $2-million deal with the SAC appears to have come to nothing. In mid-July, Ben-Menashe announced that he had ceased working with the generals because sanctions prevented him from being paid. The track records of previously employed PR firms also leave little hope for Myanmar’s generals. Few, if any, of those efforts to gloss over Tatmadaw atrocities had any influence on US and other Western opinions. The first was also the worst of several ill-fated attempts at improving the image of the Tatmadaw. It involved Edward von Kloberg, whom many described as “a lobbyist from hell”. Prior to representing the Myanmar Embassy in Washington after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, he had defended Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Liberian coup maker Samuel Doe, Romania’s tyrant Nicolae Ceausescu and Zaire’s dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein write in their book Washington Babylon about von Kloberg that “even within the amoral world of Washington lobbying, [he] stands out for handling clients that no one else would touch.” Sick and broke, von Kloberg committed suicide in 2005 by jumping from the walls of the Castel Sant’Angelo in Rome. Next in line was Jefferson Waterman International, then headed by Ann Wrobleski, who had served as assistant secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan in 1986 and was instrumental in denying Myanmar US anti-narcotics aid following the 1988 massacres. At that time, she said Myanmar was unlikely to make progress in fighting narcotics “until a government enjoying greater credibility and support among the Burmese people than the current military regime [is] seated in Rangoon.” As a PR agent for the generals, Wrobleski advertised Myanmar as a “beautiful and exotic country” and repeated the generals’ claim that the US had engaged in terrorism by supporting pro-democracy groups outside the country. That did not help the military dictatorship burnish its reputation in the US or elsewhere; nor did endeavors by the Atlantic Group, a lobbying group that was working more directly to help overturn US sanctions, or the DCI Group, which was hired for the same purpose. The sad state of the media in Myanmar under military rule does not do justice to the country’s rich literary and intellectual traditions. Prior to the 1962 military takeover, the country had more than 30 daily newspapers. Apart from the leading ones in Burmese and English, there were also five in Chinese, two in Hindi, and one each in Urdu, Tamil, Telugu and Gujarati, apart from magazines and journals in Shan, Kachin, Karen and other ethnic minority languages. The vitality of Myanmar’s press was effectively undermined at the beginning of 1964 when the Law to Protect National Solidarity was promulgated. All privately owned newspapers were to be banned and all their property and assets confiscated. Printing, the military stated, had to be done only in English or Burmese. Apart from The Working People’s Daily and the Loktha Pyithu Nezin, there were three papers—the Guardian, Kyemon and Botahtaung—that had been nationalized by the then junta, Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council, and ceased being independent publications. Nothing changed until the August-September 1988 uprising, when the traditional creativity of the Myanmar psyche flourished again after 26 years of silence. New privately produced publications appeared, some daily, some intermittent, with fanciful names such as The Light of Dawn, The Liberation Daily, Scoop, Victory and The Newsletter. But that brief period of freedom ended when the military stepped in on Sept. 18 to reassert power and announced the formation of the SLORC. People were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere, thousands were arrested and former activists fled to Thailand and India, where new publications—first printed and later online—began to appear. One of them was The Irrawaddy, which first appeared as a newsletter in Bangkok in 1990, published by exiles from Myanmar. It was not until after the 2010 election and the appointment the following year of a quasi-civilian government headed by Thein Sein, a former general, that Myanmar experienced another rebirth of its proud media traditions. But that too has now come to an end, as the military is tightening its grip on the nation. Journalists especially have become targets of the SAC’s efforts to try to crush all opposition to its self-imposed rule. Many journalists, poets and other writers are languishing in jails all over the country. Many more are in hiding while a fortunate few have managed to flee to other countries. The Committee to Protect Journalists stated in a July report that Myanmar has become “one of the world’s worst jailers of journalists.” At the same, two things are evident: Myanmar’s generals don’t realize they have no credibility, and they have not learned from the past. They are yet again printing crude propaganda and wasting huge amounts of money on feeble and fruitless attempts at defending their violent repression of a population that does not want to live under yet another dictatorship. The independent press is back in exile, now using the internet to disseminate their work and, in that way, reaching many more people inside the country than the printed publications ever did after the 1988 crackdown, when there was no digital media. It is anybody’s guess how long it may take before the exiled journalists can return to Myanmar and continue the work they were doing before the coup. But the formation of a “caretaker government” with Min Aung Hlaing as its prime minister and characters like Chit Naing (Psychology) in charge of publicity is a clear sign that the military is determined to exercise absolute power for many years to come. “Free and fair” polls in 2023 and then a transfer of power to a popularly elected government, as the Tatmadaw has promised? Only fools, and perhaps the military’s ASEAN allies, would believe that is a likely scenario. It is, to quote what the street vendors in Yangon said in the late 1980s, “All Lies!”
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-08-16
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Coup And The Crisis In Myanmar
Description: "Myanmar, a nation whose young democracy began only a decade ago, is currently facing a threat it may not recover from. On February 1st of 2021, the military of Myanmar staged a coup d’état in the Southeast Asian country, overthrowing the democratic government and issuing a year-long state of emergency. Orchestrated under the idea that the nation’s November election was fraudulent, a claim that lacks any substantial evidence, the armed forces took control and arrested senior members of the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) party. The situation was exacerbated by the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, a pro-democracy activist and Nobel Prize winner, who led the NLD. The country’s state of emergency has been extended for another two years under the direction of Min Aung Hlaing, a leading army general who declared himself to be the nation’s prime minister at the beginning of August. Now, after months of violence and oppression, Myanmar is confronted with the same military regime that it suffered under previously. The populace of Myanmar has expressed their outrage over the return to military rule in the form of extensive protests. The demonstrations first became lethal on February 20th, when two unarmed protestors were killed by militant forces—by the 22nd, millions of civilians were marching in the streets, and the movement has since expanded into a large civil disobedience campaign. According to Reuters, at least six separate protests recently occurred on August 8th, the anniversary of a 1988 uprising against the earlier military junta. Across all of these events, violence has only escalated. Responses from the installed government have included rubber bullets, water cannons, and live ammunition – which has had deadly consequences. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners has documented the deaths of 965 protestors since the military’s coup, along with the arrests and sentencings of over 5500. Furthermore, reports from the International Rescue Committee have detailed the disruption of social media and online communications in the country, systems that protestors rely on to organize. The humanitarian crisis caused by the military takeover has left Myanmar crippled. The large-scale fighting has impeded civilian access to public services and basic life necessities, such as food and water. Businesses and financial institutions have closed, leaving people out of work and fleeing from cities while Myanmar’s economy collapses. On top of the thousands of refugees that the coup has created, COVID-19 continues to ravage the nation. Reuters announced that the United States alone has given Myanmar $50 million in aid for coronavirus relief. The situation is intensified by the government’s detainment of medical professionals who have spoken out against the military and participated in civil disobedience. According to the Wall Street Journal, almost 200 doctors have been imprisoned and many more are facing warrants for their arrest. Despite this, hospital workers and practitioners continue to toil in secret to help people suffering from COVID-19. The restraints imposed by the government have impaired Myanmar’s ability to respond to the virus and the destruction it brings, leaving millions at risk. International reactions have been consistent in the condemnation of Min Aung Hlaing and his military government. Multiple actors, including the United States and the European Union, have issued sanctions on the government’s martial officers. Other countries in the region, especially those within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have worked to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Even with these endeavors, finding an answer to end the government’s crackdown and move towards peace has been difficult. ASEAN held a summit in April at which General Min Aung Hlaing agreed to abandon the fighting and engage in communication. While this connection indicated progress, the unstable agreement lacks substance and the international denunciation of the coup has not pushed the government back towards any semblance of a democracy. The human rights abuses in Myanmar have expanded and the military government has only raised the death toll higher. As violence persists and the country’s humanitarian crisis grows, the need for progress towards a secure and peaceful state is increasingly apparent. Amidst the disorder and dangers, Myanmar is struggling with the problem of democratic backsliding; the nation’s government has gone from the bare minimum of democracy to a military junta. The electoral system only lasted a decade, having been founded in 2011, and the country has now regressed to the same militant regime that held Myanmar for over half a century. Despite the promise of General Min Aung Hlaing to return to “a free and fair multiparty general election” in the future, the chances of this happening are slim. The deconstruction of their budding democracy has only increased the trials that the public faces, and the new regime is unlikely to promote the welfare of the populace. Myanmar’s survival as a democratic government has been limited even further. With development towards a liberal democracy halted, if not completely destroyed, the future of Myanmar stands in the balance. In order for there to be a resolution to this crisis, the international community needs to create an environment conducive for peace and a strong electoral government. This involves promoting discourse between the military leadership, the opposing political party, and other countries in Southeast Asia. External actors need to use their power to influence the military regime and push them away from violent crackdowns and towards a conflict-free outcome. Isolating the administration and refusing to engage in dialogue will only aggravate the issue. Moreover, avoiding economic repercussions is crucial, as the citizens of Myanmar do not deserve and cannot handle the additional pressure that such actions would cause. The country’s current condition is perilous and requires the world’s attention, but beyond what has already occurred, there are few options that emphasize the protection of the public. The consideration of these restricted possibilities highlights a fundamental aspect of the situation that must be improved upon: intensifying the level of international accountability that Myanmar’s military is facing. Authoritarians and armies cannot be allowed to continue discrediting democratic proceedings for their own gain. Questioning the integrity of voting systems and using that as an excuse for a takeover, such as what happened in Myanmar, damages the electoral institution from the inside. It threatens the reliability and stability of democracies around the globe, and when no punitive action is taken against the perpetrators, it opens up the prospect to other abusers worldwide. The increase in democratic backsliding and corrupt leadership that can be seen in the recent past demonstrates how great the need is to encourage a resolution to this crisis. Should democracy in Myanmar be restored, returning the country to its previous state of affairs is not the most beneficial outcome. If international efforts to reestablish peace and democracy can succeed and result in the rehabilitation of the nation’s government, it cannot end with the implementation of what existed before the coup. Myanmar’s democracy was under the influence of the army before the coup. In 2017, the Myanmar government initiated a military operation against the Rohingya, a Muslim minority group. The Council of Foreign Relations approximates that 700,000 Rohingya people were forced to flee the country and become refugees. Returning to that quasi-democracy will not improve human rights or the nation’s state of affairs. World leaders need to work on building up Myanmar and giving them enough support to create a government and national order that will last. With the revival of the country’s military control, outside organizations must help in the reinforcement of democratic values and norms. Offering financial and political backing to the civilians of Myanmar throughout the myriad of crises they face is essential. While the military government will be resistant to change, combining the condemnation of democracy’s decline and the provision of aid to victims of oppression are ways in which peace and stability can at least be encouraged..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Organization for World Peace
Date of publication: 2021-08-14
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Moving beyond the politics of recognition in Myanmar
Description: "Since the 1 February coup, Myanmar’s military government is attempting to gain international recognition and legitimacy while the country’s people continue to oppose it. The international community has emphasised the need for a peaceful resolution. Against the backdrop of this political impasse, the politics of recognition is taking centre stage — but is this helping anybody? The contentious situation is challenging governments if and how they should engage with Myanmar’s military regime. The international community represented by member states at the United Nations appears unable to arrive at an effective consensus towards the turmoil in Myanmar. As states navigate diplomacy and realpolitik, their engagements with Myanmar are coming under increasing scrutiny. The impasse is drawing attention to any diplomatic signs of movement in the international community towards Myanmar, such as Myanmar’s relationship with the United Kingdom, China’s position and the composition of Myanmar’s participation in April’s ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting. It boils down to the politics of recognition and who can speak on behalf of whom. In the realm of diplomacy, nuance matters. There is a diplomatic practice that countries recognise states, not governments. This practice provides countries flexibility in their diplomatic engagements, particularly when dealing with a state whose military has taken control of government and is deemed illegitimate by its own people and the international community. It is over this point that the diplomatic world and the public are diverging. Many people see any recognition of a military appointee as affording the military with recognition to run the country at the expense of its democratically elected government. Back in April, ASEAN faced this challenge over whether the presence of a military representative at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting would constitute the regional body officially recognising the military as the government of Myanmar. At the meeting, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attended in his position as Commander-in-Chief but was not afforded official recognition as Head of Government. While this diplomatic ambiguity allowed ASEAN to initially agree on a regional approach to help address the Myanmar crisis, it is yet to break the impasse towards a peaceful settlement. The only agreement that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have reached through public statements is that the international response to the situation in Myanmar should be led by ASEAN. Six months after the coup, over 900 people have been killed and over 5300 arrested, charged or sentenced by the military. COVID-19 is rampant, and many are going without the medical attention they need. Some vaccines and medical equipment are supplied by China, the European Union, Singapore and Japan, but not nearly enough for those most in need. Food prices are also rising and the devastating impact of insufficient access to necessities is taking hold. As Myanmar faces the grim consequences of dual political and pandemic crises, more questions will be raised about the ability of the international community to help people who are suffering. Pressure will continue to mount on ASEAN to act and see through the implementation of its Five-Point Consensus. So it will be for other countries like the United Kingdom that have been at the forefront in opposing the military regime. China has supplied two million vaccines to Myanmar and 10,000 to the Kachin Independence Army-controlled areas as well as the Wa autonomous region on its border. China has interests and levers to influence the military in Myanmar and concurrently engages with ethnic army-controlled areas as local authorities. How these countries will calibrate their diplomatic engagement with the military regime in Myanmar while attempting to alleviate the worsening humanitarian situation remains to be seen. Given the efforts initiated by ASEAN to break the impasse in Myanmar, the international community should work with the regional body to fulfil the Five-Point Consensus to support those most in need. The focus needs to be people-centred to engage entities that can deliver assistance directly. This means engaging established networks with access to affected people like China has done in its vaccine distribution. The international community can use trusted partners like the Red Cross Movement, relevant UN agencies and local partners. ASEAN has the potential to provide a platform for engagement to facilitate access to support these efforts. ASEAN is supported by the international community to facilitate engagement with all parties including the military, the National Unity Government, the Civil Disobedience Movement and ethnic armed groups de facto recognised in the Five-Point Consensus. The Five-Point Consensus provides the framework for action — it is time now for ASEAN to provide a supportive ecosystem to move from words to actions. While the people of Myanmar remain resilient in the face of adversity, their neighbours and the rest of the international community must focus on helping them deal with the crisis beyond the politics of recognition. While the world of diplomacy is defined largely by the nuanced positions states take for national interest, actors must balance this ambiguity with the need to invest in a more substantive and consistent agenda to find a political resolution and support the people in Myanmar. Alistair DB Cook is Coordinator of the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programme and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Mely Caballero-Anthony is Professor, President’s Chair in International Relations and Security Studies and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication: 2021-08-14
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar Junta’s Caretaker Government on Course to Fail
Description: "Myanmar’s military regime, which has dubbed itself the State Administration Council since the February 1 coup, recently proclaimed that it was inaugurating a caretaker government which will step down after cleaning up the mess left behind by what the junta regards as an incompetent and corrupt National League for Democracy (NLD) administration. An election is supposed to follow sometime in 2023 and a new government will then be inaugurated. The term ‘caretaker government’ invokes remembrance of times past and the first of four military interventions following independence. Between 1958 and 1960, a highly successful, if authoritarian and dictatorial, military administration governed. It was formed on the basis of a “constitutional coup”, as military control seemed inevitable but was in fact approved by the legislature. Following that interregnum, the military held free elections, in which its preferred party lost, and the military retired [temporarily], returning the government to the then Prime Minister U Nu. In 1960, the military proclaimed its outstanding success. On terminating its ruling role, it specifically likened its accomplishments to Hercules cleaning out the Augean Stables. Its Ministry of Information acclaimed its deeds in the volume: Is Trust Vindicated? A Chronicle of a Trust, Striving, and Triumph. Being an Account of the Accomplishments of the Government of the Union of Burma, November 1, 1958-February 1, 1960. In the estimations of today’s internal or external observers, will this present caretaker regime succeed as the first caretaker government did in 1958-60? As Eliza Doolittle said in My Fair Lady, “Not bloody likely”. The origins and conditions of both coups are different. In 1958, the politically ubiquitous Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League was split by personal rivalries and civil war was feared by the military, which was already fighting two communist insurgencies and a Karen rebellion. It was a peaceful transfer of power, with little overt dissent, at least among the majority Bamar people, because of the blatantly ineffective civilian administration. The military substituted army officers in critical positions throughout the government and they were uncorrupt and effective, if demanding and insensitive to local feelings. But there were no political arrests and no one was killed. What was a loss for democratic governance was compensated for by a string of successful economic, political and even international measures. Prices were forcibly lowered in the bazaars, the military efficiently ran an extensive series of economic ventures, some 170,000 squatters were removed to the outskirts of Rangoon, the legal prerogatives of the Shan sawbwas were terminated, education was improved and a Burmese Oxford professor became vice-chancellor of Rangoon University, while a border agreement was negotiated with China. This period may have provided both the rationale and belief for the military that it could effectively run the country for a longer period. History has proven this to have been an illusion. Present conditions are counter to those of 1958. The NLD’s sweeping victory in the November 2020 election may not have been an endorsement of the rather ineffective Daw Aung San Suu Kyi government, although it probably was an endorsement of her personally, but it evidently reflected the widespread distrust of another potential administration influenced or controlled by the military. The extensive nationwide violence against the subsequent coup, whose opponents straddle all classes and regions, is an indication that the fairly extensive reforms of freedom over the previous decade have inoculated the population against repression. The military has responded with over 900 civilian deaths and more than 5,000 arrests and the people are equally vehement in their rejection of the coup. The deaths, violence, and unrest associated with the current state of play in Myanmar will not go unremembered in the future. In 1958, the military was uncorrupt, vigorous and motivated by a sense of patriotism in saving the state from unprincipled civilian politicians it regarded as bent on their own aggrandizement or, in the case of Prime Minister U Nu, adhering to his unrealistic Buddhist-based sense of governance. The same cannot be said today, with the generals in control of much of the economy and retired members of the military and their cohorts ensconced in positions of economic advantage. Shared poverty was once a national characteristic. It isn’t now. Today’s resistance to the military is unprecedented in modern Burmese history, surpassing the failed people’s revolution in 1988. Then, the slaughter by the military was far greater but resistance was not founded on violence. Today, the widespread opposition has discarded Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s former insistence on non-violence. Death tolls on all sides continue to climb. As hostilities on both sides continue, the purist moral position of the opposition will probably suffer. Some talk of the beginnings of civil war or a Syrian-style debacle. These seem extreme views but, even if the military were able to prevail until their supposed departure from office in 2023, public acquiescence is far more difficult. The exposure to freedoms built over the previous decade vaccinates against easy compliance with any new government the military would be willing to tolerate. Its objective is evidently to destroy the NLD and render Daw Aung San Suu Kyi politically demolished for her remaining vital years either in jail, under house arrest or under legal and political restrictions that the military will enact. The next two years, whatever the outcome, will be difficult and destructive. The caretaker government concept is more akin to a warden monitoring the activities of the state’s confined inmates, alas, than the nurturing of the needy. David I. Steinberg is distinguished professor of Asian studies emeritus, Georgetown University..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-08-14
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The battle for Myanmar’s seat in the UN General Assembly
Sub-title: An empty chair in New York would be a potent reflection of the situation on the ground in post-coup Myanmar.
Description: "Across Myanmar, the battle continues between the military and those opposed to the military coup d’etat of 1 February 2021. Opposition to the coup began with non-violent resistance in the form of the Civil Disobedience Movement. The aim is now revolution and an end to the military’s decades-long dominance of political life. The revolutionaries have brought within their fold some of the armed ethnic organisations that have long fought against the military in the country’s borderlands. Civil war is looming. A different battle for Myanmar is being fought in the United Nations. On 14 September, the 75th UN General Assembly (UNGA) will meet in New York. Presidents, prime ministers and dictators from across the world – or their representatives – will gather to discuss, debate and make recommendations on global issues. The question de jour is who will represent Myanmar – the military’s representative or the representative of the democratically elected, ousted government? It is the job of a nine-country Credentials Committee to make a recommendation to the UNGA about whose credentials to accept. It is rare for the Committee to accept the credentials of an ousted government that does not hold power or control territory, but it is not unprecedented (Haiti in 1992, Sierra Leone in 1997). In some contentious cases, the Committee has deferred making any decision at all (Afghanistan in 1996 and Cambodia in 1997). What happens in the UNGA is another matter again. It is common practice for the UNGA to accept the recommendations of the Credentials Committee without a vote. But there is no rule that it must. In 1973, the UNGA voted to reject the credentials of the representatives of South Africa because of the country’s anti-democratic apartheid regime. In the case of Myanmar, the UNGA stands with the democratically elected government. In June 2021, the UNGA passed a resolution calling on Myanmar’s armed forces to respect the will of the people – as freely expressed in the 8 November 2020 election – and called on all countries to end arms dealing with Myanmar. The resolution is not binding but it is significant – the UNGA very rarely condemns coups. The resolution was passed with only one vote against – that of Belarus – and with the support of more than half the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. A vote in the UNGA about the credentials of the Myanmar appointee would probably go the way of the ousted government. In the run-up to September, Myanmar’s government-in-exile, the National Unity Government (NUG), is engaged in a worldwide lobbying effort for diplomatic recognition. Recognition – by powerful states or by many states – would boost the NUG’s case for recognition by the Credentials Committee. Recognition of a government on a state-to-state basis is a unilateral political act – states are entitled to recognise whichever government they want. The general practice is that states recognise the government that exercises military control over the territory of the state – and holds the capital city. On this count, in Myanmar’s case, the military’s claim is stronger. The military controls Myanmar’s airspace and while it does, the revolutionaries cannot win the battle for territory. China, Russia and many of Myanmar’s neighbours in ASEAN have effectively recognised the governing authority created by the military, the State Administrative Council (SAC). The NUG is pursuing the argument that states should recognise the body that best represents the will of the people – and their right to self-determination. On this count, the NUG’s claim is undoubtedly the stronger. The National League for Democracy (NLD) was the clear winner of the 2020 election, despite the military’s claim that the election was tainted by irregularities. Key NLD members such as State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint form part of the NUG. Other members include parliamentarians from the ousted government and representatives of most of the country’s many ethnic states – and a Rohingya representative. No state has yet granted recognition to the NUG, though many have met with NUG representatives. In recent meetings of the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organisation, neither the NUG nor the SAC has been given a seat. This may be the outcome in the UNGA as well. It would be a historic moral victory for the men and women fighting in Myanmar if a representative of the NUG were to take the seat of Myanmar in September. But it would also seriously undermine the prospect of bringing the crisis to an end. With the symbolic support of the UN behind them, those on the ground in Myanmar would fight harder for a costly and improbable victory. The military, ostracised still further, would have fewer reasons to move forward with the only concession it has made to date – the Five-Point Consensus adopted at the ASEAN Leaders Meeting on 24 April. ASEAN has now appointed a Special Envoy to Myanmar and the UN has committed to working with the Envoy to alleviate Myanmar’s growing humanitarian crisis. Leaving Myanmar’s seat vacant in the UNGA is the best representation of what is happening on the ground. It also provides the best chance of stemming the tide of civil war..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Interpreter
Date of publication: 2021-08-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: EUROPE/ITALY - A Mass for Myanmar in memory of the protest of 8-8-1988
Description: "Belluno (Agenzia Fides) - The resistance of the Burmese people to the military junta continues inside and outside the country while, six months after the military coup of February 1, the "State Administration Council" (Sac, as the military junta is defined) declared itself a "provisional government" with General Min Aung Hlaing as Prime Minister. Abroad, the Burmese diaspora remembered Sunday, August 8, a historic date, known by its 4 numbers: 8.8.88. It was on that date, August 8, 1988, that students from the Yangon University of Arts and Sciences and the Rangoon Institute of Technology began to demonstrate against General Ne Win's regime. The student protests spread throughout the country with the massive participation of hundreds of thousands of monks, professionals and people of all classes and conditions. On September 18, the protests were bloodily suppressed by a military coup that imposed the "State Council for the restoration of Law and order". To commemorate that date, as well as the current situation, demonstrations were held in many countries where the Burmese diaspora is spread. In Italy, the "Special Day for Myanmar" was held in Auronzo di Cadore, a town in the northern province of Belluno. The Catholic Church was at the side of the Burmese with a "special Mass for Myanmar" celebrated at 11 am in the church of Santa Giustina, parish of Villagrande (diocese of Belluno-Feltre). "It is a Mass that we wanted to celebrate given this difficult situation in Myanmar. For this reason, we welcomed the initiative of the Burmese community in Italy", said parish priest Fr. Renzo Roncada to Fides. Thuzar Lin, spokesperson for the Community residing in Italy, explains: "In the past we organized global days held simultaneously all over the world, in Italy it was held in Rome, Milan and Venice. On this occasion, each community has decided to independently celebrate this date that commemorates 8.8.88". The choice of Auronzo di Cadore is not accidental: "The Municipality of Auronzo di Cadore has been with the people of Myanmar since the beginning of the coup d'etat", explains Thuzar, recalling the official declaration of the civil authorities for the release of the leaders and political prisoners and to end violence. In addition, the photo of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese leader whose charisma emerged during the tragic events of 1988, was posted in the town hall. "Now - concludes Thuzar - the community of Auronzo di Cadore has given us the opportunity to organize this day for Myanmar and we are infinitely grateful to them". The day was also an occasion to demand the release of political prisoners and to appeal to the international community to intervene more firmly. The dramatic health situation in Myanmar and how the coup military is exploiting the coronavirus pandemic as a weapon to stay in power was also put on the table. In the Church of Santa Giustina, a sale of items donated by Burmese living in Italy was carried out, the proceeds of which will go to humanitarian initiatives for Myanmar. (MG-PA) (Agenzia Fides, 9/8/2021)..."
Source/publisher: Agenzia Fides
Date of publication: 2021-08-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar, Six Months After the Coup
Sub-title: Moe Thuzar, Khin Zaw Win, and Nicholas Coppel discuss the situation in Myanmar six months after the military seized power.
Description: "On February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military seized control of the country, arresting civilian leaders and ousting the elected parliament. Since then, the country has perched on the edge of civil war, caught between the use of violent force by the Tatmadaw and a growing armed resistance on the part of ethnic militias as well as the proclaimed National Unity Government. On top of that, the Delta variant of COVID-19 is causing a surge in infections that threatens to collapse the health care system. Six months after the coup, what does the political and social landscape look like in Myanmar? What are the prospects for the country moving forward, and is there anything the international community can do to shift the needle toward a peaceful resolution? On August 2, Moe Thuzar, an ISEAS Fellow and co-coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme; Khin Zaw Win, director of the Tampadipa Institute in Yangon; and Nicholas Coppel, an Adjunct Associate Professor (Practice) at Monash University, and Australia’s Ambassador to Myanmar from 2015-2018, joined The Diplomat to look at the situation in Myanmar six months after the military seized power..."
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication: 2021-08-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Revenge Porn Has Become a Political Weapon in Myanmar
Sub-title: As Myanmar’s crisis deepens, the country’s women are bearing much of the burden.
Description: "Every three or four days in Myanmar, an infamous Telegram account reappears. The account has been taken down many times, usually after being reported for posting sexually explicit images. But each time it is removed, it has sprung up again shortly after in a different guise. The account belongs to Han Nyein Oo, once considered one of the main sources for celebrity gossip and yellow journalism in Myanmar. But these days, the contents are not about celebrities, as before. Instead, it’s to distribute intimate photos – both real and faked – of young female activists opposing Myanmar’s February military coup. Since the Myanmar armed forces, or Tatmadaw, overthrew the country’s elected civilian government, revenge porn has become a weapon employed used by both the military junta and its opponents, who are currently engaged in a heated war of attrition. In early February, a week after the military overthrew Myanmar’s elected government, the daughter of a minister on the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) became the first well-known victim of this tactic. Explicit videos and photos of the woman were well circulated and intentionally spread by opponents of the coup. In subsequent weeks, the same thing happened to other women who were labelled as sympathizers of the military regime, or failed to speak out sufficiently in opposition to it, in what quickly became known to anti-coup protesters as “social punishment” campaigns. Since the coup, numbers of “social punishment” pages have sprang up on Facebook and Telegram, which have targeted hundreds of women, from celebrities to teenage university students. The pages frequently publish women’s addresses and other personal information, and revenge porn is always part of the mix. Many opponents of the military junta have justified the sharing of these images and information on the grounds that “everything is fair and justified when the people’s voice is ignored and invalidated.” In this way of thinking, a decent person’s basic morality and ethics are justified according to the righteousness of the political cause for which they stand. While the anti-coup resistance has seen efforts by Myanmar women’s rights organizations to challenge the patriarchy underpinning conservative authoritarianism – one good example is the Sarong Campaign – such efforts undercut this progress, demonstrating that patriarchal norms continue to be weaponized – by both sides of Myanmar’s political struggle. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. For decades, rape as a weapon of war in frontier Myanmar has been amply documented, as has the use other forms of sexual assault. Similar, if less physical, tactics have now migrated into the portable devices that millions of Myanmar people now carrying around with them. Indeed, in many ways this has magnified the impact on women as a whole, as participation in social punishment campaigns is just a click away. Spiced up with the political justifications and messaging, Myanmar’s current crisis has allowed this human indecency to flourish. In the six months since the coup, thousands of women have been arrested, sexually assaulted, and socially marginalized in the name of a political cause. This number will increase in the upcoming months as the struggle between the military regime and those fighting for an inclusive federal democracy drags on. No doubt, the anti-coup movement has done a lot take its fight beyond opposition to the authoritarian regime, to challenge the patriarchal social system that underlies it, and to reject the social norms that have limited Myanmar’s women for centuries. At the same time, it is also true that it has failed to protect the dignity of women, regardless on which side of the political divide they stand. Dignity is not a priority for the military regime, but it should be a core value of the pro-democracy cause. It is never too late for those seeking a more democratic and inclusive Myanmar to take a stand against the use of revenge porn as a political weapon..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication: 2021-08-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: "33rd Anniversary Message of Commemoration for the 8888 Revolution"
Description: "On this day thirty-three years ago, the entire nation of Myanmar, comprising of all ethnic communities and the whole swathe of the society from the religious leaders to students, intellectuals, workers and peasants, yearning for freedom and democracy, joined hands and took part in the ‘8888’ Revolution against military dictatorship. The people of Myanmar defied brutal and ruthless suppression by the military regime, which unleashed indiscriminate killings, torture and incarceration; their brave and selfless sacrifice earned the 8888 Revolution a hallowed place in the history of our nation’s democratic evolution. Even though the 8888 Revolution did not lead to immediate victory for the people, the movement was nonetheless crucial in putting our nation on the path to freedom and democracy. The people of Myanmar have consistently and resolutely demonstrated our rejection of one-party and military dictatorships. From the 7th July Yangon University protests of 1962, U Thant funeral crisis of 1974, workers’ strike of 1975, Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing centenary uprising of 1976, the ‘8888’ movement of 1988, students’ strike of 1996 to the Saffron Revolution of 2007, we have long proved by our actions that we will never bow before our oppressors in our struggle for freedom. Thirty-three years from the historic 8888 Revolution, the people of Myanmar are now waging ‘Spring Revolution’ to uproot the military dictatorship and to establish a fair and just society where equality and democratic rights are assured to all citizens and communities in our Union. Since 1958 in Myanmar, a dictatorship with its despotic rulers had not only repressed our citizenry throughout successive eras, but also reduced one of the richest countries in Southeast Asia to become one of the poorest and most backward in the world. From the beginning of 2015, under the leadership of the first civilian government in generations, the whole country had strived hard to place ourselves on a true path to democracy, yet the reckless seizure of state power in a coup d’état by a covetous, greedy military clique had reversed our gains and brought untold hardship and enormous challenges to the people. With firm belief in democracy and revulsion of military totalitarianism, which are both firmly rooted in the 8888 Revolution, the people of Myanmar are presently waging a historic and momentous revolution to rid ourselves of the military dictatorship that for many decades had been committing unspeakable crimes, and to uproot the evil system of military domination from our soil once and for all. With principles and conviction borne out of the 8888 Revolution and the determination to persevere in the 2021 Spring Revolution till our ultimate and inevitable success, we the National Unity Government wish to honour all those who share our ideals, be they individual citizens inside Myanmar, freedom-loving expatriates, or those friends and supporters from abroad who cherish democracy. We, the National Unity Government, in conveying this message of commemoration, do solemnly undertake to pay homage to our heroes who had given blood, sweat and tears, and our martyrs who had made the ultimate sacrifice, by toiling day and night to achieve victory that our people so justly deserve..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2021-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Anti-military protests in Myanmar on anniversary of 1988 uprising
Description: "Protests against Myanmar's military government broke out across the nation on Sunday, the anniversary of the bloody suppression of a 1988 uprising against a previous army junta. At least six separate protests were documented on Facebook pages of opponents of the military, which seized power from the elected government six months ago and detained its leader, Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, and several other key officials. The Feb. 1 coup ended a brief, decade-long experiment in democracy in the Southeast Asian nation of 53 million, shattering hopes that it would emerge from more than half a century of military rule. The new government led by Min Aung Hlaing, the military's most senior general who assumed the post of interim prime minister a week ago, says it acted within the constitution to remove Suu Kyi's government after disputing the election her party won, though the election commission said the vote was fair. Many of Sunday's protests made reference to the “8-8-88” democracy uprising on August, 8, 1988, which the then-military regime crushed. Opponents of the military say an estimated 3,000 people were killed during that crackdown. "The old debt from 88, we must get it all in this 21," chanted protesters in Wundwin township in Mandalay region, recorded on Facebook videos. Another anti-protest in Myaing township featured placards reading: "Let's struggle together toward the unfinished 8.8.88 people's liberation." A military government spokesman could not be reached on Sunday for comment on the protests. The 1988 uprising was at the time the biggest challenge to army rule that had last since 1962. Min Aung Hlaing on Sunday released a statement praising another anniversary - the founding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 54 years ago. The statement did not mention the special ASEAN envoy ton Myanmar that the 10-member regional bloc appointed in recent days, who has been tasked with ending post-coup violence and fostering talks between the military and its opponents. The new envoy, Brunei diplomat Erywan Yusof, said on Saturday he should be given full access to all parties when he visits Myanmar, a trip that has not yet been scheduled..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Dark Side of Economic Sanctions: Unveiling the Plight of Women from Myanmar/Burma
Description: "1.1 Background Once again like déjà vu the land of Myanmar splashed international front page headlines for its recent brutal crackdown on protestors and monks in the autumn of 2007. People intercepted the news with unsurprised horror as their memories flashed back to the infamous 1988 uprisings that prematurely ended the lives of at least 1,000 civilians in Rangoon alone and possibly 3,000 nationwide. 1 This time around it was different with the international community and media quickly coming to the aid of the protestors in voicing condemnation of the junta‘s actions and calling for support for the protestors. Human rights and exiled Burmese activists further increased pressure on the international community to take action against Myanmar and distance themselves from the military regime. The 2007 anti-government protests (lasting from August 15th until approximately October 31st) were initially led by students and pro-democracy activists in response to the government‘s increase of fuel prices, which consequently caused a spike in public transport and staple food prices.2 In what was already an impoverished situation with inflation at ahistorical levels, it was of course no surprise that social unrest ensued. This particular fuel hike served as a watershed event for all the economic problems that had been troubling the people of Myanmar for the last two decades since the last uprising of 1988 took place. Monks from all over the country eventually joined in and took to the forefront of the protests in what would be dubbed the ―Saffron Revolution‖ symbolizing the color of the robes the monks wore. This did not appease the junta leaders as they proceeded forward with a brutal crackdown on the protestors that resulted in the beating and killing of both civilians and monks alike. The final death toll of the junta crackdown varies between the junta‘s own official figures of 10 up to the 200 casualties claimed by dissident groups. In addition, many monks were consequently detained and put in prison camps while some fear that many of them were murdered. Upward to 6,000 demonstrators in all were arrested with many of them being gradually released.3 As if it was not enough that Myanmar had garnered worldwide criticism for its loathsome antics, Cyclone Nargis would draw renewed world attention and criticism to the country. On May 2nd of 2008, less than a year after the Saffron Revolution, Myanmar experienced the worst natural disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar claiming the lives of over 100,000 people. Abundant criticisms were directed toward the junta from the bungling of their own relief effort to the blockage of international aid, and of their undeterred determination to proceed with elections the following weekend. All of the mishandling and mismanagement of the crisis kept the junta on the front page news while the international community desperately explored alternatives to get help to those who needed it most. Yet again the junta reminded the world of its indifference to its own people and mocked the world community for its inability to do anything. It is unforeseen at this point whether this catastrophe has resulted in anything more than minimal cooperation from the regime and often it is only for handouts of international aid. Cyclone Nargis will presumably serve as a painful lesson that even in the worst state of crisis the junta of Myanmar will still refuse to buckle to outside pressure. Twenty years has now passed since the 1988 uprisings that initially brought international attention to Myanmar and Nobel laureate Daw Aung Suu Kyi to the forefront of the democratic opposition. Due to Aung San Suu Kyi and her party comrades‘ repeated arrests and detentions for their political activities, the international community has adopted numerous diplomatic strategies over the years with the hopes of coercing the junta into releasing the political prisoners and into accepting the 1990 election results that favored Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). There has been consistent international pressure and activism over the years for the release of the more than one thousand political prisoners locked up for their participation in the 1988 demonstrations and/or other political activities. Despite the myriad approaches undertaken by various actors the last two decades, Daw Aung Suu Kyi and many others remain in captivity and the junta still rules the country with an iron fist. The most popular approach utilized by state actors against the junta has by far been the imposition or threat of economic sanctions. The historical timing of Suu Kyi‘s arrests and Myanmar‘s deplorable human rights behavior against the backdrop of the post-Cold War relations proved a pivotal stimulus for the use of economic sanctions as a diplomatic tool. In terms of international cooperation in the United Nations, it wasn‘t until the end of the Cold War that the international organization finally achieved unprecedented cooperation in the United Nations Security Council (UN SC). Prior to this relations amongst the Security Council permanent members had chilled from the start of the Cold War and dimmed any hopes for cooperation in the Security Council. The renewed cooperation that brought an end to the chilly relations in the UN SC was marked by the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. As a result of this new unity, a string of peacekeeping and enforcement activities followed suit, howbeit it was not military activities that proved the most popular method of choice, but alternatively it was economic sanctions that proved most appealing to Security Council members. It comes as no surprise then that the 1990s has been dubbed ―the decade of economic sanctions.‖ 4 Howbeit, not all these economic sanctions consisted of multilateral mandatory economic sanctions as outlined under article 41 of the UN Charter. On the contrary, many economic sanctions were and are indeed today unilateral. Since the rejuvenation of the UN SC following the Cold War, economic sanctions have persistently been issued often to the detriment of the civilian population. A strong majority of the literature on economic sanctions have questioned and raised doubts over the efficacy of sanctions. A magnitude of political leaders, human rights activists, and scholars remain for the most part oblivious and aloof to the detrimental harms of sanctions despite that nearly all are aware that the infamous Iraqi sanctions campaign claimed the lives of half a million (of which the majority were children). This is clearly another case of ―collective amnesia‖ since the international community too often forgets the catastrophic errors of their time in spite of slogans that cry “Never Again”. Sanctions are assumed to be a less costly alternative to armed force when measuring the cost of lives, but as former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed: Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects. 5 An overwhelming amount of literature and research by experts and scholars concede that sanctions have had in fact drastic implications for vulnerable populations and frequently did not achieve the objectives it had aimed for. My particular concern in this debate, which is needy of more research, is the impact of sanctions on women. Women have appeared to suffer the brunt of sanctions according to numerous anecdotal evidence since women are often times more vulnerable to economic sanctions due to their gender and their relative impoverished and disempowered position. Be that as it may, research in this area remains obsolete or very minimal and is henceforth worthy of attention due to the urgency of this problem as this paper will show..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Malmö University (Sweden)
Date of publication: 2009-01-14
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Embedding praetorianism - Soldiers, state, and constitutions in postcolonial Myanma
Description: "Non-democratic regimes often – but not always – seek to institutionalize their political domination and immunity through the enactment of a specifically designed constitutional document (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Military regimes, in particular, can use constitutional texts to strengthen the foundations of the political intervention of the armed forces (Feit 1972; Finer 1975; Stepan 1988). Likewise, when military juntas ultimately set in motion a transition from direct military rule to a civilian one, the armed forces are often tempted to control the constitution-drafting process and secure key legal prerogatives for the military institution under a new hybrid “post-junta” regime (Barros 2002, Croissant and Kamerling 2013; Chambers 2014; Negretto 2014). Myanmar2 offers a case of a dominant military institution using a constitutional drafting process and a new supreme law for its own corporate interests. Indeed, the constitution adopted in 2008 confers high levels of policy prerogatives upon the Burmese armed forces – or Tatmadaw – and embeds “praetorianism”3 in Myanmar’s polity in a way that the country’s two previous post-independence constitutions had not. Since it won its freedom from the British in 1948, Myanmar has produced three constitutions. The first postcolonial constitutional text was adopted in 1947, but its provisions were suspended after the coup d’état staged by General Ne Win in March 1962. A second constitution drafted by Ne Win’s military administration was passed in 1974, but was abrogated in September 1988 following a further coup d’état orchestrated by the Tatmadaw leadership. The third and latest constitutional document was promulgated in 2008 after a controversial drafting process that lasted 15 years. All three constitutional texts which Myanmar adopted in 1947, 1974, and 2008 were quite different in content and spirit. They were framed in different political contexts and under the supervision of different leaderships with divergent political agendas. Above all, they made very different references (if at all) to the role of the Tatmadaw as a major state institution and potential policy-maker. The texts adopted in 1947 and 1974 indeed aimed to neither entrench military rule nor institutionalize the political intervention of the armed forces. This chapter seeks to understand how and why the Tatmadaw has chosen to formulate its own constitutional vision in the early 1990s and thereafter establish a legal political system, which I define as “constitutional praetorianism.” Drawing on the extant literature on postcolonial Myanmar politics, this chapter first provides a comparative overview of the first two postcolonial constitutions of the country and examines why both documents bestowed a marginal role upon the Burmese military. The study then focuses on the country’s third constitution, which was adopted following a controversial referendum in 2008. It argues that the constitutional text embeds and institutionalizes praetorianism. As the literature on civil–military relations demonstrates, there are different levels of political intervention by the armed forces: they range from direct military rule to hybrid systems led by civilians, but in which the armed forces remain a powerful lobby (Egreteau and Jagan 2013; Bünte 2014). Building on this scholarship as well as on a series of interviews with Burmese parliamentarians and party leaders carried out in both Yangon and Naypyitaw (2013–2014), this chapter argues that the 2008 constitution serves three clear purposes for the Burmese armed forces. First, it manifests the Tatmadaw’s view of itself as a legitimate political and policy-making state actor following 60 years of regular and pervasive intrusion into Burmese postcolonial politics and public affairs. Second, it provides the military with legal instruments for a long-term policy intervention and influence. Third, it offers the armed forces and their personnel a form of self-insurance protecting soldiers from any form of prosecution and securing a much sought-after immunity for the leaders of the 1988 coup d’état. As long as this unhealthy policy influence of the army institution prevails, constitutionalism will not emerge in Myanmar. A thorough revision of the 2008 constitution remains highly unlikely. Despite the formation of a joint parliamentary committee tasked specifically to propose potential amendments, the first-ever attempt at reviewing the constitutional text was vetoed by the militaryappointed representatives in June 2015. Given the country’s historical and political legacies of military intervention, ethnic separatist insurgency, and political instability, I conclude this chapter with the bleak prospects for swift constitutional reform unless the Tatmadaw decides otherwise. Army and constitutions in Myanmar: a background A civilian supremacy in the 1947 constitution The 1947 constitution4 was designed to ensure a smooth – but quick – transfer of power from British colonial rule to an independent and, above all, legitimate Burmese civilian administration (Steinberg 2006: 199). Despite flaws, the constitution envisioned a federal state structure and a multi-party parliamentary system with competitive and regular elections to be held once independence was granted on January 4, 1948 (Inlow 1948; Maung Maung 1959). There were no nonmilitary functions assigned to the Burmese armed forces, nor any specific prerogative for the wider security forces enshrined in the document. The weakness of the Burmese military forces in the last months of colonial rule may explain this lack of involvement in constitutional drafting. Since the early 1940s, the Soldiers, state, and constitutions in Myanmar 119 driving force behind the Burmese independence struggle had been the Burma Independence (and, from 1943, National) Army (BIA/BNA) under the aegis of a young military officer, Aung San. Yet, despite the glory inherited from several years of anti-colonial and then anti-Japanese fighting, it was not the nascent Tatmadaw that was asked to frame the first charter of the country after the end of the war in 1945. Rather, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) – a loose coalition of political parties, charismatic politicians, and pre-war student activists – took up the task. At that time, the Tatmadaw was a fragile body, illequipped to form a powerful policy lobby. It also had to face myriad rival private armies and ethnic militias operating throughout the country (Callahan 2003: 115–116). Therefore, its senior officers, themselves bogged down in inter-ethnic dissension, could not ensure a crucial role for the military in shaping the new state structures. A civilian committee of legal, political, and academic experts gathered in 1946 to draft a new constitution. A constituent assembly was elected in April 1947. It discussed several drafts prepared by the committee. The final one was eventually adopted on September 24, 1947 – two months after Aung San’s assassination. Despite shortcomings and flaws, the constitutional text provided legitimacy to the newly created state, but interestingly not to the actors who participated in the independence struggle – the Tatmadaw in particular. This underscored some initial efforts by the AFPFL to keep the military out of politics. Aung San himself had relinquished his own military positions early on. This was not without debate, though. As highlighted by Maung Maung (1959: 146–147), in one of the first constitutional drafts submitted to the Constituent Assembly in June 1947, one article proposed the creation of a special “Defence Council.” Through this non-elected body the President of the Union would have exercised “the supreme command of the armed forces.” But the proposal was dropped at Aung San’s own suggestion. Thus, in the final text, the Burmese armed forces were not granted any special place: they had to remain subordinate to the post-independence elected civilian authorities. Besides, to avoid the maintenance of competing private armies, the right to raise and maintain national military forces was then vested exclusively in the elected Parliament seated in Rangoon (Article 97 of the 1947 constitution). The first post-independence constitutional framework lasted less than 15 years. During the 1950s, the raging civil war between Myanmar’s central government and myriad ethnic and communist insurgencies propelled a more cohesive Tatmadaw into broader non-military policy roles. Under the charismatic leadership of General Ne Win, uncontested army chief from 1949, the Tatmadaw soon transformed itself into a disciplined and unified corporate institution, increasingly willing to discuss policy issues and civilian affairs (Callahan 2003). Above all, it started to openly highlight its legitimate role as guardian of the nation and its institutions against an array of centrifugal insurgencies, but also external threats – a common trend observed among coup-prone armed forces in the rapidly decolonizing world at that time. A mere decade after the country’s independence, Maung Maung indeed noted: “the role of the [Defense] Services 120 R. Egreteau as a guardian of the constitution and servant of the people has [now] been clearly defined and deeply impressed on all officers and men by General Ne Win” (Maung Maung 1959: 146). The 1974 constitution: drafted by, but not for, the Tatmadaw A first political intervention of the Tatmadaw was staged in September 1958. General Ne Win then formed a caretaker military administration at the invitation of U Nu, leader of the civilian government since February 1957. Sanctioned by Parliament a month later, this caretaker government – a perfect example of a short-lived praetorian intrusion into politics – lasted a year and a half. The military hierarchy kept its initial promises to hold national elections, and then withdrew to its barracks in April 1960 (Butwell 1961). However, a full-fledged military coup was ultimately staged by Ne Win on March 2, 1962. Less than two years after the caretaker administration was disbanded, the Tatmadaw clearly stepped in – this time without any invitation from the civilian authorities. The 1947 constitution was not abrogated per se, but gradually all its fundamentals were nullified. Unlike in 1958, Parliament was dissolved a day after the coup, and the Supreme Court and the High Courts of the country were disbanded. A socialist revolution was then imposed, one that could not be defined by a constitution, but rather by well-oiled propaganda and ad hoc legislation enacted by the military rulers (Badgley 1962; Cady 1965). The 17-member Revolutionary Council formed by Ne Win in March 1962 began to shape the new state institutions and ideology through the release of various official documents and policy statements.5 These included the “Burmese Way to Socialism” (April 1962) and the “The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment” (January 1963), which both outlined the official ideology of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). The core objective of this newly formed legitimate political party was to mobilize and educate the Burmese population about the revolution and to pave the way for a socialist democracy under the monitoring of the Revolutionary Council (BSPP 1963; Taylor 2009: 298–300). According to the original Revolutionary Council’s statements this had to be fulfilled during a “transitional period.” Once the socialist revolution was deemed secure, the civilianization of the regime, installed in 1962, could be initiated, and the disbanding of the Revolutionary Council prepared – but not before. For that, conditions were deemed more favorable by Ne Win – then Chair of the BSPP – in the late 1960s. An observer of the time, Jon A. Wiant, argued that the BSPP could not long remain the sole instrument of the Tatmadaw or of its core leadership gathered in the Revolutionary Council (Wiant 1973: 182). Progressively, the need for the institutionalization of a civilian power and the withdrawal of the armed forces from the front scene – and therefore a new constitution – appeared obvious to the military top brass and to Ne Win himself. During a BSPP party meeting in 1965, Ne Win made his first public speech about the need for transition to civilian rule (Nakanishi 2013: 112). Therefore, a constitution-making process which claimed to involve the Burmese people was Soldiers, state, and constitutions in Myanmar 121 gradually initiated. In 1969, Ne Win asked a panel of civilian experts to make recommendations on new state institutions. For the first time since the 1962 coup, the regime openly hinted at a possible termination of the revolutionary moment imposed by the army seven years before. In September 1971, a 97-member committee convened. Its aim was to draft the new constitutional text (Moscotti 1977: 7). The process, however, was still heavily influenced by the military leadership. Indeed, one-third of the committee comprised high-ranking officers. Fifteen subcommittees were formed but all were headed by a member of the still active Revolutionary Council. Yet, the latter was openly looking for a way to bestow some sort of legitimacy upon the whole process. Ne Win, as well as the members of the 15 subcommittees, toured the country for months between 1971 and 1973, coordinating thousands of meetings with representatives of the people, the peasantry, the workers, and the armed forces in their barracks (Arumugam 1975: 41). The well-orchestrated organization of mass meetings and public consultations aimed to enlist people’s suggestions on each successive constitutional draft which had been prepared by the committee. In fact, it was a ritualistic and theatrical exercise purported to confer upon the document the necessary popular legitimacy that Ne Win was seeking for the post-Revolutionary Council regime (Steinberg 2006: 183). Ne Win and other army leaders had long considered the 1947 constitution to be the product of a handful of elite lawyers, foreign legal experts, and Burmese politicians (Moscotti 1977: 4). By involving mass consultations of the people or at least giving the impression that the Burmese population had been involved in the constitutional process, Ne Win sought a broader legitimacy for the new state institutions. The fourth constitutional draft was eventually submitted to a national referendum in December 1973. It was claimed that over 90 percent of Burma’s eligible voters approved the constitutional draft in a tightly controlled vote. The new constitution6 was then promulgated on the twenty-sixth anniversary of the country’s independence, namely January 4, 1974. A month later national elections were held, as the new constitutional text envisioned a (single-party) parliamentary system. Once the unicameral People’s Assembly (or Pyithu Hluttaw) was convened, a few weeks after the elections the transfer of power from the military-run Revolutionary Council to a civilian government dominated by the sole BSPP became effective. Ne Win was elected president, and on March 4 he nominated the new members of his Cabinet, all civilians.7 As long-time Burma watcher Josef Silverstein then noted, Burma entered a new phase of “constitutional dictatorship” (Silverstein 1977: 35). The 1974 constitution indeed offered the military-run Revolutionary Council and the armed forces a tool to withdraw from the direct policy-making process by institutionalizing the authoritarian rule of a single and trusted political party, the BSPP (Silverstein 1974). The text allowed the concentration of power in the sole hands of party members and their local representatives. Nonetheless, in the late 1970s, most of them happened to be active Tatmadaw officers seconded to the party bureaucracy or retired military officers (Nakanishi 2013: 108–109)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Politics and Constitutions in Southeast Asia
Date of publication: 2017-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-07
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Title: The politics of legal pluralism in the shaping of spatial power in Myanmar’s land governance
Description: "Over the past decade, Myanmar has undergone a rapid period of political reform as it has transitioned away from a military junta towards a civilian and democratically elected government. This period has witnessed a series of land governance reforms, being pulled into various directions by Myanmar’s pluralistic society and land use and tenure practices, resulting in overlapping and conflicting policies and legal frameworks in land governance. Struggles over control and access to land and territory are one of the most pressing political issues facing the new National League for Democracy (NLD) government, which won a historical victory in the 2015 general elections under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Maintaining its broad base support and legitimacy largely hinges on the government’s ability to tackle pressing land governance issues, while dealing with various democratic, ethnic, and developmental crises that plague the country (Callahan 2003; Ferguson 2014; Grundy-Warr and Yin 2002; Willis 2013). The military and its cronies have engaged in a long history of land grabbing that has sparked protests and civil strife (Aung 2015; Gee 2005; Jones 2014a; Woods 2011). Ongoing discussion on peace processes between ethnic armed organizations and the central government and military are in large part concerned with territorial boundaries of ethnic states and authority within them (Einzenberger 2016; Hong 2017; Kramer 2015). Insecure peasant access to and unclear ownership over land, due to the central government’s lack of recognition of customary land tenure systems, has hampered prospects of rural economic development throughout the country (Boutry et al. 2017; Huard 2016). This paper looks at how farmers and state actors shape and reshape legal pluralism within the context of dual authority, where both the Myanmar central government and the Karen National Union1 (KNU), the latter being the leading political organization representing the Karen’s struggle for political self-determination, are responsible for land management in their respective, albeit overlapping, territories. It illustrates the ongoing power struggle centered on the central government’s and the KNU’s interests and strategies to increase the land area under their respective administration, and how this corresponds with customary tenure systems and farmers’ views on land tenure security and strategies to ensure their land rights. Two village case studies in Karen State are used to illustrate how farmers shape their strategies to secure their land rights while navigating through the blurred boundaries of competing legal systems and spaces, embedded in the context of dual authority. The paper looks at state spatiality as complex processes and practices of socio-spatial regulation across scales shaping and reshaping state-society relations. Placing dual authority as one of the building blocks for state transformation, it illustrates how political authority produces rights, and vice versa (Lund and Rahman 2018), within the context of legal and institutional pluralism. It shows how these processes and practices are rooted in the production of political space, centering on farmers’ strategies to strengthen their land rights, and how these are entangled in the central government-farmers-KNU power relations. In particular, it looks at: (1) the conflicting legal frameworks pertaining to land governance in the country; (2) how these legal frameworks are negotiated and appropriated at the village level through various means and institutional set up, including how they interact with customary land rights; and (3) how it reflects back on and influences farmers’ land tenure security. Building on legal pluralism research (von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Spiertz 1996; Moore 1986; Van der Linden 1989), we argue that while inconsistent policies and legal frameworks leave the door wide open for land expropriation, as powerful actors shop for suitable and applicable laws to serve their interests, it also serves as an entry point for less powerful actors to increase their room to maneuver and reclaim their rights. Here, rather than portraying inconsistent, conflicting legal frameworks as merely a sign of a weak legal system in Myanmar’s land governance, we position it as an entry point for farmers and local communities to fight for their land rights. Building on Mann’s definition of states as merely [consisting of] ‘some degree of authoritative rule making and some organized political force’ (Brenner et al. 2003, 125), we view states as both sets of institutions and an expression of social power relations. As stated by Jones (2014b, 146): ‘States are seen as being produced, transformed and constrained by conflicts between social forces, … as they struggle for power and control over resources’. 2 Building on Brenner et al.’s (2003, 11) definition of states as ‘dynamically evolving spatial entities that continually mold and reshape the geographies of the very social relations they aspire to regulate, control and/or restructure’, we view state transformation processes as the creation of new political space and institutional emergence shaped by ongoing power struggles and contestation between and within political actors across scales. Or, as stated by Lefebvre (2003, 99): ‘State space hinders the transformation that would lead to the production of a differential space’. Here, state transformation is not limited to formal state actors, but also includes other actors and institutions with statutory capacity. Or, as stated by Lund and Rachman (2016, 1201): ‘The mutual constitution of rights and authority takes place in many institutional settings … Government institutions are not the only source of state effects’. The paper contributes to the wider literature on legal pluralism and state transformation processes in two ways. First, it brings to light the blurred boundary between the different forms of (legal) ordering (e.g. state law, customary law, religious law), and thus between legal systems and spaces. It argues that while legal scholars tend to view legal pluralism as the conception of different, yet interlinked legal systems and spaces, they are in fact more than just a compilation of different legal orders. On the contrary, it illustrates the messy realities where boundaries between the different forms of ordering are at best blurred, as actors and institutions transcend the different legal systems and spaces in pursuit of their interests, reconfiguring the boundaries of those spaces in the process. Second, it presents the concept of dual authority as a theoretical underpinning to unpack the politics of legal pluralism, centering on the question of ‘who makes the law’. Current discourse on legal pluralism has highlighted the importance of power analysis surrounding the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the overall shaping of law-society relations (Boelens, Bustamante, and de Vos 2007). However, it lacks a theoretical concept to unpack the political power shaping and reshaping the plurality of legal practices (Barzilai 2008). Legal pluralism entails that different institutions can assume jurisdiction, depending on how they view and cope with the conflict situation emerging from overlapping policies and legal frameworks. As stated by von Benda-Beckmann (1981, 145): ‘While actors in a dispute shop for various institutions of dispute settlement, institutions also shop for dispute. Depending on which aspect of the dispute is emphasized, a different institution can assume jurisdiction’. The case studies examined in this paper show how jurisdiction itself is blurred by plural legal systems and state spaces of dual authority that interpenetrate one another. As such, political authority and rights that emanate from different power domains are in a constant state of flux. Rights can emerge and submerge, depending on what legal system is referred to as well as what authority and legitimacy actors attribute it in a particular place and time. It highlights the centrality of political space and institutional emergence in state transformation processes through the illustration of how ‘state space is represented and imagined both in geopolitical struggles and in everyday life’ (Brenner et al. 2003, 7). Additionally, it raises the question as to what ‘state law’ and ‘non-state law’ is and where the boundaries lie in the context of multiple political spaces and institutions competing for authority (Sikor and Lund 2009), as manifested in the context of dual authority (Huard 2016). Taking two neighboring villages in mixed government-KNU controlled areas in Karen state as a case study, the paper shows the localized dynamics that shape the creation of new political spaces, manifested in states actors’ strategies to increase political authority and farmers’ strategies to strengthen their land rights, and how the two are intertwined within the established, yet ever changing geography of state regulation..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Journal of Peasant Studies
Date of publication: 2019-10-31
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Political Violence and Journalism in a Multiethnic State - A Case Study of Burma (Myanmar)1
Description: "By focusing on the situation of journalists from Burma (Myanmar) living in exile in Thailand, this article explores the consequences of political violence on the development of indigenous journalism in a multiethnic state. Drawing on data gathered from participant observation and in-depth interviews with Burmese journalists in Thailand and along the border between Thailand and Burma, the research examines how local journalists are struggling to develop a context-appropriate model for media development that adequately addresses their need to deal with disagreement and difference in a context of political violence. The research calls into question the relevance of the dominant U.S. approach to “objective” journalism. In this often dangerous context, the definition of concepts such as unity, media independence, and censorship must be seen as provisional and contested, given the various pressures brought to bear on journalists. The model of journalism arising organically in this context is influenced by the recent surge in foreign funding for journalism training yet borrows elements of the normative, objective model and the model of peace journalism. The inappropriate nature of imported journalistic ideologies, however, suggests the need for a more complex model of media development in such complicated and conflictual contexts.....Violence and Ethnicity in Burma: Home to the world’s longest-running civil war, Burma is characterized by great ethnic diversity, with more than 100 different languages and dialects identified (Smith, 1999).2 Population statistics are generally unavailable, and contentious when they are, because there has been no attempt to take a count of the population since the British census in 1931 (Smith, 1991). The 1974 Constitution identifies seven divisions and seven ethnic states—Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan. There are several other large minority groups in the country, as well as many Chinese, Tamils, Bengalis, and others of Indian origin. The most recent figures available, from 1983, list the majority Burmans as constituting 69% of the population (Steinberg, 2001). Annexed by Britain in stages between 1824 and 1886, Burma was governed at first as a province of India. The British divided its administration in Burma into two divisions: Ministerial Burma in the central area of the country, and the Frontier Areas, in which the ethnic minority groups were given autonomy to govern themselves. During World War II, the Burmans fought with the Japanese against the Allies while the hill peoples such as the Karens and Kachins stayed loyal to the British. The British exacerbated existing tensions between the various groups by using ethnic minority soldiers to police the Burmans agitating for independence in central Burma. After independence in 1948, civil war broke out between ethnic minority groups and the Burman government, and Burma experienced only a few years of civilian rule before a coup brought the military into power in 1962 under the leadership of General Ne Win. Despite reshuffling of personnel over the years, the military has remained firmly in power, and political violence has been a defining characteristic of its rule. Worsening economic conditions throughout the 1970s and 1980s, along with the regime’s abuses of its own people, led to the massive protests in 1988. Initially led by students, the demonstrations eventually involved hundreds of thousands of civilians who took to the streets. The Burmese military reacted with violence, gunning down thousands of people during the protests, which with few exceptions were nonviolent.3 The uprisings eventually led to a coup and the takeover by a reshuffled military under the name the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). At the time of the 1988 uprisings, nearly 20 insurgent forces were active over about one third of the country, controlling vast rural areas (Smith, 1995), and it is estimated that perhaps 60% of Burma’s land area, home to only 10% of the population, was not secured by the government (Steinberg, 2001, p. 186). The ethnic insurgencies and the government’s counterinsurgency operations have led to massive numbers of casualties4 and to the pattern of violence perpetuating long-standing distrust, especially between the Burmans and the non-Burmans, although factionalism is also widespread within the Burmese opposition groups.5 Shortly after taking power in 1988, the SLORC began arranging ceasefires with ethnic nationality groups, who would agree to stop fighting in exchange for government promises of more assistance with development in education, health care, transportation, and infrastructure (Steinberg, 2001). These two things together—the ceasefires and their relationship to infrastructural development—offered the government a cloak of legitimacy despite its status as an international pariah after the bloodshed of 1988. Yet many ethnic minority leaders believed, as did Hkun Okker, president of the Pa-O People’s Liberation Organization, that the military regime got the upper hand by making deals with groups individually. The military regime cleverly recognized that the ethnic power has a major role to play in Burmese politics, so immediately they picked up the armed ethnic groups and they spread out their power. . . . They recognized that he who rules the ethnics, rules Burma. (Hkun Okker, personal communication, July 5, 2000) Nevertheless, the resistance gained new impetus in 1988 when the border-based ethnonationalist movements were joined by thousands of Burman student activists who fled the country in the crackdown after the uprisings. Burma’s revolutionaries, so energized back then, have continued to struggle; however, after close to two decades since the 1988 uprisings, they now recognize how slow the process of genuine social and political change can be. The Burmese opposition today must be understood as a dynamic, ever-negotiated “movement” of groups constantly slipping into and out of tensions and alliances. In general terms, the movement is widely conceptualized as having, on the one hand, an “ethnic” element, a coalition of minority groups with the shared goal of a dignified measure of self-determination for the ethnic nationalities within multiethnic Burma. The opposition’s most visible element, however, is the Burman majority, primarily concerned with the development of democratic governance. Despite much genuine agreement and cooperation between Burman and ethnic nationality groups, significant tensions remain. The actions of the current incarnation of the military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), have added to the volumes already dedicated to documenting abuses by the Burmese government. Human Rights Watch (2005) sums up the current regime’s abuses in this way:6 The SPDC restricts the basic rights and freedoms of all Burmese... [and] continues to commit systematic, widespread, and well-documented abuses in ongoing conflicts with ethnic minority rebel groups, including extrajudicial executions, rape, torture, forced relocation of entire villages, and forced labor. As of late 2004, an estimated 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma alone, and at least 240 villages have been destroyed, relocated or abandoned since 2002. Some 2 million Burmese have moved to Thailand, including 145,000 refugees living in camps. (n.p.) In addition to the struggle for their survival, Burma’s ethnic minority groups are concerned about preserving their cultures, especially because many are convinced the military regime is conducting a campaign to “Burmanize” the country. The SPDC promotes an (apolitical) cultural diversity by celebrating public ethnic minority cultural performances while committing abuses against these peoples in the rural areas. Meanwhile, the ceasefires between the regime and various ethnic factions continue, although with much mutual suspicion. In addition to the violence perpetrated against ethnic minority peoples, much attention is paid to the ongoing detention of Burma’s democratic leader and 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi. Beginning with her arrest before the country’s 1990 elections, which were won by the opposition in a landslide but subsequently ignored by the regime, to her release from house arrest in 1995, rearrest in 2000, release in 2002, and rearrest in 2003, her detentions have garnered international media attention. Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest as of this writing. It is within this context of political violence against dissident Burmans and ethnic minorities that the Burmese opposition in exile is attempting to transform patterns of behavior that have led to such a factionalized, militarized pattern of leadership. Media, and especially journalism, are seen as key components in the transition to a more open and transparent democratic process and a reduction in political violence. I have seen the Burmese media in exile develop in impressive ways since my first contact with Burmese activists when I lived in Thailand as a volunteer teacher in a camp of refugees from Burma from 1989 to 1992. It is this development, a result of and also in tension with foreign assistance for media development, that is the focus of this research..."
Source/publisher: Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Date of publication: 2006-10-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-05
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Title: Appointment of ASEAN envoy to Myanmar must prompt immediate action, MPs say
Description: "Southeast Asian parliamentarians have responded warily to the decision by ASEAN to appoint Brunei’s Foreign Affairs Minister II Erywan Yusof as its special envoy to Myanmar, urging him to take immediate and decisive action to put an end to the military’s bloodshed and chaos. “While we are satisfied that ASEAN has, at last, appointed a special envoy, there are legitimate concerns with the appointment of Erywan Yusof. Let us not forget that the Minister, as the representative of ASEAN’s Chair, has led the bloc’s ineffective response so far, including a delegation to Myanmar in June, during which he not only met solely with the junta, but also pushed their narrative that elections could take place,” said Kasit Piromya, a Board Member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) and former Thai Member of Parliament (MP). “It is also unnerving that a Minister of an absolute monarchy that does not abide by international human rights standards has been tasked with convincing a murderous army to respect these principles.” This week, Erywan Yusof, Brunei’s second minister for foreign affairs, was appointed as ASEAN’s special envoy to Myanmar, following several months of negotiations between the bloc and the Myanmar military junta. The role was agreed at the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in Jakarta in April, during which Member States reached a Five-Point Consensus, which has seen little progress until this point. “Until now, ASEAN’s response to the ongoing crisis in Myanmar has been deeply, deeply disappointing. With this appointment ASEAN cannot hide behind the excuse of not having a Special Envoy anymore,” Piromya said. “The bloc must ensure that the new Envoy finally gives the bloc the leadership we have so desperately craved in this crisis. Not only do the Myanmar people depend on it, but so does ASEAN’s entire reputation.” “The Envoy must act promptly, and show skillful diplomacy to ensure he does not become a pawn in the junta’s game to pretend it is taking action, all while maintaining its grip on power and subjecting the people more and more to its oppressive rule. He cannot play into Min Aung Hlaing’s game of using ASEAN to gain international and regional legitimacy anymore, but instead must secure solutions that help the people of Myanmar reach the democracy they have spent the last six months showing the world they so desperately crave,” Piromya said. The new Special Envoy for Myanmar must change ASEAN’s course of action, and immediately step up action to end violence; secure the release of all political prisoners in the country; immediately meet with Myanmar’s National Unity Government and Ethnic Armed Organization; as well as work with the UN Special Envoy and its international partners to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance to Myanmar, not through its AHA Centre nor the junta, but through independent humanitarian organisations already operating in the country, as well as ethnic health organizations and local health providers, said APHR..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication: 2021-08-04
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar military leader declares self PM, pushes back elections | DW News
Description: "Southeast Asia's top diplomats are meeting to discuss the ongoing violence in Myanmar. The foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also hoping to finalize an emergency plan to help control the pandemic there. On Sunday Myanmar's military leader declared himself prime minister and extended military rule until August 2023. As we report, some protesters are determined to keep fighting back despite the risks. A warning to our viewers - you may find some of the footage in this report disturbing. Big protests have become too risky. In their place, flash mobs - often lasting only a few minutes - have been breaking out in Yangon and other cities. They yell "Down with the dictatorship, we must overcome" - a brief battle cry before they disappear into the back streets. Six months after the coup, Myanmar has become a full-fledged military state. Its leader and self-declared Prime Minister, Min Aung Hlaing has extended the state of emergency, and pushed back long-promised elections until August 2023. Likely to be missing from the list of candidates: Aung San Suu Kyi. The deposed leader is facing a slew of charges in what many observers are calling a sham trial. Adding to the political and economic turmoil, the country is seeing a sharp spike in COVID-19 cases - pushing the health care system closer to the brink of collapse, as people wait in line to get oxygen. With many medics part of the civil disobedience movement, they've become a target of violent abuse by the military. Human rights organizations are calling on the international community to act. Activists say they will never be able to trust the military. That's a sentiment echoed by many around the country. Six months after the coup, Myanmar increasingly looks like a tinderbox waiting to explode..."
Source/publisher: "DW News" (Germany)
Date of publication: 2021-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-04
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Title: Myanmar should return to democratically elected government, says UK
Description: "Myanmar should return to a democratically elected government, Britain said on Monday, after military ruler Min Aung Hlaing took on the role of prime minister in a caretaker administration six months after the army seized power. "The decision by the military to extend the so-called state of emergency in Myanmar is unjustifiable and a blatant attempt to solidify their undemocratic power grab," foreign minister Dominic Raab wrote on Twitter. "The junta must hand back control to an elected government and respect the democratic will of the people of Myanmar," Raab wrote..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-08-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-03
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Title: Myanmar’s post-coup Internet: dangers and alternatives
Description: "Since the 1 February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military has clamped down on internet use in the country. What repressive tactics did the coup regime use, and did they succeed? How can tech companies and donors respond to emerging digital cultures in post-coup Myanmar? This commentary sums up arguments made by three panellists at RightsCon 2021 on the coup regime’s use of the Internet and key areas of civil society resistance. The panel was hosted by the SecDev Foundation, a Canadian non-profit that supports digital safety research, training, and outreach in support of better digital futures for all. ‘The military knew perfectly well that the Internet is vital to their struggle for legitimacy,’ said Alex Aung Khant, a researcher and independent consultant. Alex was speaking alongside Myo Min Aung, a digital rights activist and a former programme manager of the Myanmar ICT [Information and Communication Technology] for Development Organisation (MIDO), and Saijai Liangpunsakul, a tech organizer who worked at a Yangon-based technology hub before the coup. The three panellists gathered online on 9 June 2021 at RightsCon, an annual global conference on human rights in the digital age. They discussed the ways in which the State Administration Council (SAC, the title assumed by the military coup party), protesters, and the private sector are dealing with Myanmar’s evolving digital landscape following the 1st February coup. The panel made clear that Myanmar has developed a vibrant, post-coup digital culture that contests the SAC’s repressive tactics. However, the anti-coup movement remains constrained by knowledge gaps pertaining to the military’s surveillance capacity. The panellists also called on tech companies and donors to consider their role in maintaining citizens’ access to the internet.[1] Digital repression and the SAC Internet shutdowns are the best-known of the SAC’s digital repression strategies. Shortly after the coup, the military blocked access to the Internet. Thereafter, nightly internet blackouts occurred for at least seventy consecutive nights. By April 2021, the SAC had blocked all means of accessing the internet apart from those using fiber optic cable. This means that most of Myanmar’s population—who rely on less costly mobile networks and broadband connections—can no longer access the Internet. Fiber optic cables have also been working at greatly reduced speeds. While panellists called attention to the internet shutdowns, they nuanced the narrative that the SAC had gained sudden and complete control over Myanmar’s cyberspace. For one, Myo highlighted that internet blackouts did not begin with the coup. Between June 2019 and February 2021, the NLD government imposed them in nine townships in Rakhine and Chin State amid intense armed conflict. MIDO and Phandeeyar, among other organisations, lobbied for an end to the shutdown, which only ceased a day after the coup. It was likely that the military had been ‘practising’ for the coup in Rakhine State, Myo said. In November 2020, Phyu Phyu Kyaw, an Information Controls Fellow of the Open Technology Fund, had already unveiled substantial levels of online censorship and surveillance during NLD rule. Repression strategies documented in this research prefigure numerous strategies used en masse in the post-coup period, such as the seizure of digital devices and targeted website blocks.[2] Panellists also highlighted the substantial resources that had been poured into digital repression before the coup. Alex discussed the Tatmadaw’s investments in surveillance technologies, likely to have been imported from China, Europe, and the US. He was particularly concerned about the installation of Chinese facial recognition technologoy in public spaces, which were to be rolled out in Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Yangon between 2020 and 2021—the three cities associated with the most vibrant protests and the harshest crackdowns. Citing the aforementioned research by Phyu Phyu Kyaw, Myo also stated that the NLD government had spent USD 4.6 million on social media monitoring tools in 2017. He also stated that despite approximately USD 4 million allocated to implement a lawful interception system between 2019-2020, such a system still does not exist. Lawful interception refers to legal frameworks that delimit the extent to which governments have access to private communications between citizens, usually to solve criminal cases. In Myanmar, the absence of such safeguards gives the SAC free rein to spy on citizens without any legal repercussions. In all, there was little doubt among the panellists that the SAC’s anxieties over the Internet were practiced and premeditated. However, Myo added that a narrow focus on Internet shutdowns diverts attention from other kinds of digital repression. At checkpoints, SAC officials check peoples’ digital devices to identify whether they pose a threat to the coup regime. ‘The first thing they check is Facebook, then [photo] galleries and Messenger,’ Myo said, ‘they search every possible kind of content. If these officials see anything offensive to the military coup, they arrest [the device’s owner].’ Youths travelling in groups through checkpoints are at particular risk of being harassed in this way, as the SAC presumes that younger people are protesters. Saijai added that phone checks conducted by the SAC are one of the key concerns of activists and journalists. ‘This technique has created fear among the people,’ she said—not only among high-level protesters, but also for regular civilians who are concerned that their phones may incriminate them. Is the SAC’s digital repression complete? The panellists concurred that digital repression in Myanmar was incomplete, highlighting two challenges that the military faces in imposing complete controls over the internet. Firstly, the SAC is caught in what Stephen Feldstein calls the “dictator’s digital dilemma”: an authoritarian regime’s trade-off between the gains derived from repression and a loss of benefits they accrue from free access to the Internet. Alex pointed out that contrary to popular belief, the internet was not shut down in the early hours of 1 February, while the putsch was taking place, as the military used the internet to coordinate between coup-makers. The internet was only cut at about 7.30 am to stem immediate public outcry. The nightly internet blackouts instituted from 6 February, between approximately 1 am and 9 am, were also a response to the SAC’s digital dilemma. According to Alex, these too were a result of the junta’s struggle to maintain a business-friendly image, by allowing businesses to use the internet during regular working hours, while pursuing a countervailing desire to propagate fear, terrorize civilians, and disrupt protest coordination at night. In addition, military operations require the internet. A blanket internet shutdown would make it impossible for troops to communicate, and would hamper the morale of foot soldiers. ‘We’ve all seen soldiers taking rest, on their phones, going through TikTok videos,’ Alex said. These videos are not innocuous: photos and death threats posted on social media have allowed the military to spread a culture of impunity within its ranks. The SAC’s economic interests and legitimacy among its troops depends on some measure of access to the internet, making a complete shutdown unlikely. The question is whether the SAC can implement sophisticated controls which maximize forms of internet usage that serve business and military interests, while minimizing the internet’s capacity for engendering resistance. The panellists pointed out a second challenge that the SAC faces: namely, that it currently lacks the means to formulate an overarching surveillance strategy. According to Myo, even though a full picture of the military’s surveillance capacities remains unavailable, ‘one thing is for sure: [the SAC] are very keen to buy hardware and to install software. But the team’s capacity to direct and utilize those resources is very questionable… They lack a strategy.’ Myo implied that the SAC appears to be throwing money at the problem, rather than coming up with a forward-thinking strategy. As a result, they consistently underestimate the population’s adaptability and resilience. The SAC’s lack of overarching strategy is evident in the scattershot manner in which it has implemented digital repression in the five months since the coup. First, they blocked all internet access at specific times. Then, they brought the internet back online while blacklisting specific websites, most notably Facebook and Twitter. More recently, since May 2021 the military has shifted to a “whitelisting” strategy, enabling access to specific apps such as Zoom, LinkedIn, and various mobile banking applications, via mobile data. Other forms of internet use still require fibre connection, while the aforementioned blacklisted websites, like Facebook and Twitter, remain inaccessible without a Virtual Private Network (VPN). This ‘whitelisting’ of apps for mobile data usage is likely being practiced in the hopes of staving off an impending economic crisis. However, more crude tactics are still at work. During the National Unity Government’s first press conference on 4 June 2021, the SAC blocked internet access throughout the country. Myo expressed the need to better understand these haphazard tactics and the anti-coup movement’s hopes of circumventing them: ‘this is an area for us, activists and revolutionaries, to study more.’ An anti-coup digital culture In Myo’s words, ‘to answer the question: did the military succeed? I would say no.’ This is partly due to the SAC’s inability to navigate Feldstein’s “dictator’s digital dilemma”, but it can also be attributed to civilians’ ability to circumvent repression. In the face of repression, internet users across Myanmar have developed a thriving anti-coup digital culture through which they experiment with new protest tactics, engender community, and keep one another safe. The creativity of Myanmar’s protesters has been widely remarked, and extends into the digital realm. Saijai provided three observations on this matter. Firstly, civilians use the Internet to keep safe and to circumvent blocks. For instance, civilians shifted to Signal, which allows for end-to-end encrypted communications, amid rising fears of surveillance. Secondly, civilians have formulated protest tactics based on the unique capacities of various apps. Saijai showed that Twitter has become particularly significant during the coup because its interface allows protesters to communicate effectively with the outside world. Amid the closure of media outlets, civilians use Twitter to obtain news—both from formal outlets and from each other. Trending hashtags, such as #whatshappeninginmyanmar, are testament to the groundswell of anti-coup sentiment in Myanmar. Protesters also use Twitter to tag specific, well-known journalists, thereby using Twitter to ‘gather international attention to Myanmar.’ Protesters thus use both the one-to-one and many-to-many communicative functions of Twitter to great effect. Thirdly, Saijai discussed how protesters were supporting one another through the internet. Protesters have used OpenStreetMap to track the location of police forces in big cities, while the app Way Way Nay provides users with a list of military-linked individuals and businesses, making boycotts easy and accessible. Their use of these apps shows how online engagements feed into the offline activities of protesters. They also show how protesters foment community online, amidst brutal offline crackdowns. ‘I see young people translating frustration and anger into innovation,’ Saijai said, ‘it touches my heart to see them supporting each other.’ Widespread smartphone ownership in big cities also allows citizens to assist journalists in a hostile media landscape, in which journalists—working for both local and foreign media outlets—face arrest, torture, and detention. Citizens take photos and videos of crackdowns, which are then uploaded and shared on social media. Alex explained that this has shifted journalists’ relationships with media users. Since journalists face immense risks when identifying themselves in public, they increasingly rely on information provided by civilians, rather than the other way around. On their part, civilians have adapted quickly. The videos that civilians provide to journalists are generally clearer than what they provided in the early days after the coup, and are accompanied by information that journalists need, such as dates, times, and locations. That said, these videos—while important—expose citizens to several risks. For instance, videos of protests could provoke crackdowns in particular areas, when videos include geotags and place-specific imagery. Such risks make clear that knowledge of digital safety is paramount in post-coup Myanmar. The Internet is a conduit for another form of post-coup resistance: leaked documents. Alex used Total, the French oil and gas company, as an example of the potency of this tactic. In early May, the activist group Justice for Myanmar used leaked financial reports to show how Total has profiteered from its links with the military. Under pressure, Total has since suspended cash dividends to the junta. In Alex’s words, ‘this is information that we would not have without people being willing to leak it, securely and anonymously, through social media.’ Alex also called on international listeners to leave behind presumptions of a free (if privatized) media sector, which are based on the experiences of Western democracies. In Myanmar, where citizens cannot expect to access critical information from the mainstream media, the need for citizens to document ongoing events cannot be underestimated. Finally, civilians have managed to remain online in spite of the SAC’s haphazard internet blocks. VPNs, for instance, have been used to access Facebook and other banned websites since the first week of the coup, while mesh networks have been used to communicate at shorter distances. Days after the coup, digital rights activists were advocating the use of the app Bridgefy, a mesh-messenger that relies on short-range Bluetooth technology rather than mobile data. The success of civilians efforts at staying online, Alex maintained, was evident in the themed protests held across the country from February to April, during which street protesters demonstrated their solidarity through coordinated tactics and symbols. These included watermelons, Easter eggs, and shoes. Such extensive coordination would not have been possible without civilians staying online. Myo also highlighted the widespread use of burner phones and the Android app Second Space to hide all or part of one’s digital engagements during home raids or at military checkpoints. Moreover, activists are exploring more imaginative solutions to internet restrictions. ‘I think StarLink will be the best alternative,’ Myo said, referring to the satellite internet system pioneered by SpaceX. There has already been a Twitter campaign pushing the provision of StarLink to Myanmar’s civilians. For Myo, who has been working in this space for a decade, a silver lining amid the present crisis has been civilians’ heightened and pervasive awareness of digital safety. For years, the rate of smartphone penetration in Myanmar outpaced the population’s digital literacy. ‘After the coup,’ he said, digital safety ‘became a survival skill. If you don’t know about digital safety, you can’t go out.’ That said, all panellists warned against romanticizing the protests. As Alex put it, in Myanmar, ‘digital literacy is borne out of necessity, not just innovation.’ Furthermore, Myo highlighted that more knowledge about the SAC’s surveillance capacity is necessary for protesters to formulate more permanent means of staying online. Only then will this anti-coup digital culture prevail. What can Big Tech and donors do? While references to the international community tend to focus on state governments and international bodies, the panellists emphasised that the private sector can play a significant role in shifting Myanmar’s political trajectory. ‘We have to keep in mind that tech companies are almost as large, if not larger, than actual governments,’ said Alex ‘so accountability for these businesses should be on the same level as governments. We have seen how staying neutral is effectively giving way to the evils conducted by the military.’ Some tech companies have founders who have travelled to Myanmar. In 2018, when Twitter’s CEO Jack Dorsey went to Myanmar for a meditation retreat, he was criticised on his own platform for glossing over the role of social media in stoking anti-Rohingya sentiment. Twitter continues to be largely silent about the coup, while TikTok struggles to manage the flow of military propaganda on the platform. ‘When times were good, we were loyal customers, and everyone was happy about it,’ Alex said. ‘Myanmar supported these businesses, we were on these platforms; they made lots of profit, and they had a foothold in Myanmar, without knowing, or caring much, that it was a digitally vulnerable country. Now that things are the other way around, we need [these platforms] on our side. So the question is: where will they stand?’ Facebook, Myanmar’s social media stalwart, is in a more complex position than other social media giants. Although observers sounded the alarm on anti-Rohingya sentiment on Facebook in 2013, they were not taken seriously. By early 2015, Facebook had seven million Burmese users, but only two Burmese-speaking content moderators. Facebook’s automated systems for detecting dangerous content did not work with the Burmese language. The needle only began to move in 2018, after 700,000 Rohingya had fled Rakhine State, when a UN fact-finding mission reported that Facebook was ‘a useful instrument for seeking to spread hate.’ Min Aung Hlaing, now the leader of the SAC, was removed from Facebook thereafter, the first time Facebook banned a country’s military or political leader. Saijai and Myo were cautiously optimistic that Facebook had learned from its mistakes. Saijai spoke positively of three approaches taken by Facebook: taking down posts advocating military violence; barring Facebook accounts associated with military personnel and military-owned businesses; and creating a new “locked profile” feature that prevents non-friends from accessing one’s posts and photos. Myo was likewise glad that Facebook had been consulting with digital rights organisations in the country. However, a week after the panel, Global Witness released a report showing how Facebook’s algorithms continue to amplify harmful content in Myanmar. Global Witness documented the extreme ease by which Facebook users can access content that conveys support for Myanmar’s junta and death threats against protesters, some of whose names and photographs circulate on the site. This content violates the community standards that Facebook professes to uphold. Such complexities speak to how difficult it is for anyone, including those in the digital rights sector and Facebook itself, to obtain a comprehensive picture of the platform’s impact on society. It is entirely possible that despite the targeted strategies highlighted by Saijai and Myo, Facebook remains betrayed by its own algorithm. Moreover, the panel did not have time to consider the relationship between ethnic conflict and Facebook, which is beset by even more complexities. There is a dearth of information in this respect, too. Many pre-coup observers zeroed in on the Rohingya crisis, overlooking how social media and the internet affect other embattled ethnic groups. Therefore, Alex’s point to consider how tech leaders can redress massive power inequalities between themselves and their clientele remains salient. Tech companies should take their role in perpetuating power inequalities seriously, and ensure that they can listen to their users. Some first steps could be to hire sufficient staff conversant in Myanmar’s numerous ethnic languages and to engage with digital rights groups across the country. Finally, Saijai called for donors not to be let off the hook. The preceding discussion has shown how Myanmar’s anti-coup digital culture has not evolved in isolation; rather, it has responded to the coup regime’s control of print media, its desire to remain “open for business”, and the tenacity of Myanmar’s protesters. Similarly, the endurance of an anti-coup digital culture depends on the extent to which people remain healthy and retain their livelihoods outside of the virtual realm. For instance, people’s access to alternatives to the SAC’s education system, such as the newly developed Virtual Federal University and the Spring University Myanmar, depend on their ability to pay for smartphones and VPNs. The panellists also foregrounded the need to plug existing knowledge gaps. They called for donors to fund investigations into the state’s surveillance capacity and the role that tech companies play in Myanmar’s post-coup society and economy. Donors should adapt, not leave, and remain flexible in response to the changing political situation, including difficulties in obtaining cash. ‘There are many organisations on the ground doing good work,’ said Saijai. The question is whether these organisations can remain connected to one another and to the people reaching out to them. [1] All three panellists consent to being named in this piece. [2] Phyu Phyu Kyaw’s analysis of blocked websites is based on research done by the Open Observatory of Network Interference..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2021-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Obituary: Unacknowledged Godfather of Myanmar’s Democracy Movement Dies of COVID-19
Description: "U Nay Min, the Yangon-based rights lawyer and indefatigable democracy campaigner, has died of COVID-19 aged 75. Few people in Myanmar will know his name, particularly not Generation Z. Yet ironically, at a similar moment of revolutionary fervor, this courageous activist seized the hour as demonstrators took to the streets against the dictatorship and at a pivotal moment in his country’s history, he changed it forever. U Nay Min came to me like a gift from God. A cub reporter, I’d been sent to Burma — as Myanmar was then known — by BBC World Service Radio on an undercover assignment in July 1988. Tensions were at boiling point and people were too afraid to talk to a foreign reporter. Enter U Nay Min. With a fearlessness that was his hallmark, under the noses of the country’s ubiquitous Military Intelligence agents, he sought me out at my hotel and offered to arrange clandestine interviews with dissident student leaders. U Nay Min went further. Having consulted the astrologers for the most auspicious date, he primed the students to tell me their revolution would start at eight minutes past eight on the eighth day of the eighth month of 1988, just weeks away. The tapes were smuggled out in British diplomatic bags, sent to BBC headquarters in London and broadcast back on the Burmese Service. Zero hour had been announced to a people desperate for change and at the appointed minute, the 1988 revolution began. U Nay Min was the mastermind of this seminal “big bang” moment, which resonates loudly today as the Civil Disobedience Movement again braves military repression on the streets. Unlikely spin doctor In a time before Twitter and Facebook, U Nay Min realized the value for Burma of getting the brutality of the military into the international headlines. In truth and with decades of hindsight, I salute his manipulation of an inexperienced reporter for the greater good. Beyond students, U Nay Min introduced me to a disgruntled army officer who described the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military, for example using villagers in the ethnic nationalities areas to walk in front of troops as human mine detectors. When the people of Burma heard these stories directly from a serving officer, hatred of the army grew further and international outrage against the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) also mounted. U Nay Min was an unlikely but artful spin doctor, who understood far better than the butchers with the guns the power of the mass media to turn world opinion. After a week I left Rangoon (now Yangon) in haste for neighboring Bangladesh on the advice of the British Embassy, who saw me as a diplomatic incident waiting to happen. Undeterred, U Nay Min tracked me down in Dhaka and sent me news by telephone on an almost hourly basis, using the codename Eastern Star. Journalists across the country had joined the general strike and were reporting in to him, sidestepping state control of the media. Eastern Star had become the most powerful opinion-maker in the land and used his newfound power to maximum effect. During the twice-daily broadcasts by the BBC Burmese Service, the country came to a virtual standstill, as 44 million people hung on every word of reports that U Nay Min had fed me. But within weeks he was arrested, given an eight-year sentence, held in solitary confinement and badly tortured. Such was his commitment to the power of truth telling, that on his release, Eastern Star called me in London to give me more information. He was rearrested and imprisoned for another eight years. Buddhist conviction When I returned to Yangon in 2013 for the first time since those events, I made my peace with U Nay Min. It was hard for him. The military told him I had betrayed him to them. He was gracious and with true Buddhist conviction confessed he must have been a bad person in a previous life. He was at one with his past, but exasperated by the lack of political movement in the country and frustrated by the military’s decision to revoke his lawyer’s license, which thwarted his raison d’etre: protecting the vulnerable and advocating for the voiceless. He’d devoted much of his life as a lawyer to defending Burma’s minorities, particularly the country’s Muslims, on one occasion risking his life to write a protest letter to the hated dictator, General Ne Win. Last week, when we heard he’d contracted COVID-19, we arranged for fresh oxygen to be taken to U Nay Min’s bedside. The tank he was already using had a faulty valve and though we fixed it, the damage had been done and he passed away in the middle of the night. My only consolation is that U Nay Min would probably have seen this as a fitting end, dying in a final act of solidarity with the most disadvantaged around him. Rest in peace, U Nay Min. Yours was a life of sacrifice, lived for others. May your foresight, courage and commitment never be forgotten, particularly in Myanmar, a country whose fate you shaped and where your legacy lives on in Generation Z. Eastern Star may have been extinguished, but your light still shines and always will. Chris Gunness is Director of the London-based Myanmar Accountability Project, which fights cases in national courts for the victims of human rights abuses committed by Myanmar security forces.
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-07-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: In Myanmar’s Divided Shan State, a New Appeal for Unity; China Will Be Watching
Description: "Last week, a newly formed Shan political organization known as the Shan State Front for Federal (SSFF) and a Shan political party, the Shan State Liberation Party (SSLP), called for a united front against the military dictatorship and urged reconciliation and a truce between two rival Shan armed groups. It is reported that this new political group comprises Shan youth and intellectuals who want to see unity in Shan State. They claim to fight for democracy, federalism, ethnic states’ rights and the right to self-determination. The group made its announcement on July 7. A few days later, on July 11, it declared war on the State Administration Council (SAC), the governing body established by the military after its coup in February. However, the newly formed Shan group remains something of a mystery, and it is not yet clear how much support it commands. Meanwhile, the two rival ethnic Shan armed groups, the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), have been fighting over a territorial dispute for a month in the mountains of Kyethi Township, southern Shan State. The war has forced thousands of villagers to flee their homes. Influential Shan monks have been trying to stop the conflict. On July 8, the RCSS issued a statement in English and Chinese calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict in northern Shan State. The statement also said that a combined force of SSPP and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) troops has been attacking military camps and strongholds of the RCSS in Namtu and Kyaukme townships. “These prolonged armed conflicts have been causing great difficulties for the local populations,” it reads. But behind both the recent and past armed clashes, Shan analysts suspect that the powerful Wa armed group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), is behind the SSPP and TNLA. This time, according to Shan observers, the SSPP and TNLA are deploying heavy artillery, suggesting some ethnic forces might have been involved in assisting the SSPP. Both the Wa and the TNLA have denied claims the former is backing the latter. Commenting on the ongoing conflict, Sao Pha, the general secretary of the SSFF, told The Irrawaddy that the group is unhappy to see armed clashes between the RCSS and SSPP and said that Shan people want reconciliation between the two Shan groups. In Shan State, he said, the RCSS and SSPP are at loggerheads and engaged in a protracted armed conflict. The Shan are frustrated as two ethnic Shan armed groups are in conflict instead of targeting the Myanmar military. In fact, these two major Shan forces have been fighting each other in northern Shan State since 2016-17. In recent years, the RCSS expanded its territory into northern Shan State, which shares a border with China. Notably, this conflict has worsened since the RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government of former President U Thein Sein in October 2015. Soon after, it expanded its forces to the north, resulting in clashes with the TNLA.
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-07-13
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Silence on Coup Makes Strategic Sense for Myanmar’s Wa
Description: "While the whole country has risen in revolt against the Feb. 1 coup—at first peacefully and then more violently when the military began to open fire on the protesters—there is one part of Myanmar that appears to be unaffected by the nationwide turmoil: the Wa Hills of northeastern Shan State. Ethnic groups like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) have provided shelter to activists who have fled urban areas and even trained some of them in guerrilla warfare. Other ethnic rebels have at least issued statements condemning Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s power grab, often working together with civil society organizations. Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army, the 20,000-30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), on the other hand, has remained conspicuously silent since the coup. But that doesn’t mean that all Wa agree with the stance that the UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party (UWSP), have taken. On March 25, 10 Wa civil society organizations, among them the Tang-yan Wa Youth Network, university students from the Wa Christian Fellowship and the Wa Women’s Network, sent an open letter to the UWSP/UWSA leadership urging them to say something about the killings and to publicize their stand on the movement for federal democracy. That hasn’t happened, though, and the issue at stake is the UWSA’s close relationship with the security services across the border in China. Those agencies do not want to get involved with any movement that wants to overthrow the coup-installed government in Naypyitaw—and the UWSA is an ally in China’s geostrategic quest for dominance in Myanmar and beyond. Put in plain words, China’s support for the UWSA gives Beijing leverage inside Myanmar, the only neighboring country that provides China with easy and convenient access to the Indian Ocean. When Aung Min, then president’s office minister in the Thein Sein administration, visited Monywa, a town northwest of Mandalay, in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project in the area, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China…we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume support to the communists, the economy in the border areas would backslide. So you’d better think seriously.” By “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, offshoots of the once China-supported Communist Party of Burma’s (CPB) powerful army, which collapsed after a mutiny among its hilltribe—mainly Wa—rank-and-file in 1989. And he was right. In fact, the UWSA, which like the old CPB is supported by China, has become even stronger and better equipped than the old party ever was. The UWSA’s strength—and the scope of its arsenal—was demonstrated on April 17, 2019, when it celebrated the 30th anniversary of the mutiny against the elderly, orthodox Marxist-Leninist and mainly Burman leadership of the CPB. The CPB with its increasingly anachronistic policies had lost its importance to the Chinese, who are now more interested in exporting consumer goods than Maoist-style revolutions. The old CPB leaders were allowed to retire in China, and the UWSA and three other components of the erstwhile CPB were born. Those four former CPB forces also entered into ceasefire agreements with the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which suited China’s interests as well. On that day, a bit over two years ago, thousands of Wa soldiers in impeccable uniforms goose-stepped in perfect formation past the grandstand where their leaders stood at attention. Then came an impressive display of surface-to-air missiles, heavy artillery, mortars, rocket launchers, machine guns, assault rifles, armored personnel carriers and even a weaponized drone. Columns of civilians, mostly Wa tribesmen but also people from other ethnic groups from the over 30,000-square-km area that the UWSA controls along the Chinese border and in the south near Thailand, made their way to the parade grounds. Spectacular fireworks lit up the sky after dark and people cheered and danced through the night. Needless to say, China’s security services do not want to see a war like the one the CPB once fought from the same areas. Such hostilities would mean instability in the border areas, a flood of refugees into China and a disruption of trade between the two countries. But China, almost the sole supplier of weaponry to the UWSA, wants it to be strong enough to deter the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, from even trying to bring its base area under central control. As Aung Min inadvertently admitted, the UWSA has become exactly what the Chinese want: a useful bargaining chip when they want to put pressure on the Myanmar government to get economic concessions. Moreover, before the coup, China was also eager to prevent Myanmar from straying too close to the West. But that is hardly an issue today as the West has condemned the coup and imposed sanctions on the Tatmadaw and affiliated entities. Today, after the coup, China wants to be seen as a moderating voice that, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the opening of the 9th World Peace Forum in Beijing on July 3, is opposed to sanctions and other punitive measures and wants to see a solution to Myanmar’s current crisis “through internal dialogue and reconciliation.” Russia, the other main power that has come out against Western condemnation and sanctions in the wake of the coup, has adopted a similar view. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated during a visit to Jakarta on July 6 that his country supported ASEAN’s five-point proposal for restoring “normalcy” to Myanmar, which includes “a constructive dialogue to find a peaceful solution” to the upheaval. But Wang is not so naïve as to believe that such a dialogue leading to reconciliation is possible, and Lavrov, an experienced diplomat, must realize that ASEAN’s five-point proposal is a nonstarter. Support for ASEAN’s “peace plan”, however, serves as a convenient cover for protecting other interests and opposition to the West’s sanctions policy. For the Russians, it is a question of protecting lucrative arms sales to Myanmar and other economic interests, as well as gaining a new ally in a region where Moscow’s influence has waned since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China’s long-term objectives go way beyond Russia’s, and access to the Indian Ocean is only one aspect of Beijing’s massive, all-encompassing and ultimately global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure project, which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Myanmar’s strategically important location between South and Southeast Asia is of utmost importance to China. There is no doubt that the Wa’s dependence on China is real and overwhelming, militarily as well as economically. Apart from being equipped with Chinese-made weaponry, the Chinese yuan, not the Myanmar kyat, is the preferred currency in the area under UWSA control. People are connected to Chinese mobile phone and internet providers, and petrol and diesel come from China, as do medical supplies and most of the food. Furthermore—and this has escaped the attention of the outside world—the UWSA-controlled area is the only part of Myanmar where nearly everyone has been vaccinated against COVID-19. Supplies and even many of the medics administering the vaccine came from Yunnan, across the border. Nonetheless, it would be a serious mistake to believe that the Wa are hapless Chinese minions and compliant pawns in Beijing’s quest for regional and ultimately global dominance. Many Wa I have met are aware that the Chinese feel superior to them and, in many instances, refer to them as erstwhile headhunters and therefore uncivilized savages. There could be as many as 600,000 Wa in Myanmar—no one knows for sure—and another 400,000 in China, where they are also recognized as an ethnic minority. But what little most Chinese outside Yunnan know about the Wa comes from a series of music videos in which young girls, accompanied by young men beating drums, shake their long hair back and forth. The girls are dressed in red woven skirts with some kind of pattern that looks like it could be of hilltribe origin, and the young men are bare-chested. The problem is that those skirts are much shorter than the sarongs Wa girls would normally wear, and no female living in the hills, where water is scarce, would have hair that long because it would be impossible to keep it clean. Besides, young Wa men these days would not go around dressed in little more than a loincloth, even when taking part in cultural events in their home villages. Tellingly, these dances are not performed in a rural Wa setting but in purpose-built theaters in front of big audiences. The famous “Wa hair dancers” are, in fact, the daughters of city cadres who are of Wa, Chinese, or mixed Wa-Chinese ancestry. According to Swedish anthropologist and Wa expert Magnus Fiskesjö, the Chinese have created “an official socialist-era image of the Wa as a member of the happy family of nationalities within the Chinese nation: as exotic dancers full of primitive energy, now sanitized and harnessed under Communist Party guidance—the socialist-era version of Wa primitivity.” In line with this thinking, ethnic theme parks have been established in several Chinese cities where one of the main attractions is “real Wa headhunters” performing exotic dances. Young Wa, because of their dark complexion, are hired to perform not only as wild Wa but, according to Fiskesjö, as Africans, New Zealand Maori and American Indians. These performers are Wa from Yunnan or Myanmar who have migrated to Chinese cities to find work in factories, and take part in such spectacles to earn some extra money. But it is easy to imagine what the Wa dancers themselves think about their ethnicity and culture being exploited and, in effect, humiliated in this way. No central or local Chinese authority ever controlled, or even showed interest in, the Wa-inhabited areas of southern Yunnan—not until the communist takeover in 1949. Remnants of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT), who had not been able to flee to Taiwan along with their supreme leader Chiang Kai-shek, retreated into those areas and, more importantly, the Wa Hills of Myanmar. Those hills were only nominally part of Myanmar; at that time, headhunting was part of the way of life there, along with local wars and feuds between different tribes and clans. In the early 1950s, the communist Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered southern Yunnan to prevent the KMT from trying to achieve their stated objective, to “reconquer the Chinese mainland”. Hardly any Chinese had been there before, and the PLA as well as the KMT were seen as foreign forces, so people did not know what to expect and were afraid of them. But the PLA, which needed local support and knowledge of the terrain to be able to push the KMT back into Myanmar, treated the Wa rather leniently. The KMT, on the other hand, could be very rough in its behavior towards the Wa and other tribes in the frontier areas. After a few years of tolerance—and as soon as the KMT threat had been eliminated—the Chinese authorities brought in an entirely new oppressive system aimed at “uprooting feudal superstition”, as the Chinese communist jargon went. Weapons in the possession of Wa tribesmen, who were used to being armed because they depended on hunting, were confiscated and, according to Fiskesjö, all headhunting paraphernalia was destroyed. Social institutions that were important in Wa society were disbanded. Drum-houses, the main meeting place in every Wa village, were torn down and the Wa’s log drums were thrown out or burned. Only a few survive in a few faraway museums, such as those on display at the Yunnan Nationalities University in Kunming, Yunnan’s provincial capital. According to Fiskesjö: “Roadside a nog [head-container posts planted along the approach to a village] were destroyed or abandoned; the fortifications protecting villages were broken up and demolished. The major rituals of the past were abandoned. Chief ritualists and other community leaders were demoted, marginalized, or even persecuted.” Wa elders Fiskesjö spoke to during his research in the area in the 1990s regarded 1958 as the key watershed: “Since in that year the Chinese shifted policy from reconciliation to enforcement.” Even the Wa had to become Chinese communists and were herded into people’s communes. Although this happened in the Wa-inhabited areas of Yunnan, the bitterness based on memories of that repression is deep on both sides of the border. That resentment, and unhappiness with the disgraceful way in which the Wa are being treated in China today, are consequences of a long-standing, strained relationship between these proud tribesmen—regardless of where they live—and the Han Chinese. Since the 1989 mutiny, the UWSA has built up what amounts to a well-organized, de facto self-governing state between Myanmar and China with its own administrative offices, courts, hospitals and schools. It may be argued that a lot of the wealth that has made this possible comes from the trade in narcotics—first opium and heroin and then methamphetamine—and that is something the Wa leadership cannot hide or escape from. Today, other sources of income exist, such as tin and rare earth metals. But the way forward, for the Wa and the rest of Myanmar, would have to take into account the unique history of the Wa, and the fact that they have never been ruled by any central authority. Before independence, colonial presence in the area was limited to occasional flag marches up to what the British perceived as the border with China. Then, in the 1950s and well into the 1960s, KMT warlords and local chieftains ruled the Wa Hills. That was the case until the early 1970s, when the CPB took over the entire border area, including the Wa Hills. And after the 1989 mutiny, of course, the UWSP/UWSA became the new governing body. An enlightened and democratic Myanmar government could through wiser policies than those of the past integrate the Wa Hills with the rest of the country. But the possibility of that happening seems remote: the military, with its chauvinistic approach to ethnic minorities, remains in power in Naypyitaw, and the Chinese are not likely to abandon their strategically important grip over the UWSP/UWSA any time soon. Sadly, the Wa issue is more likely to continue to exist as one of many sources of despair in the seemingly never-ending Myanmar tragedy. But, at least, it deserves a better understanding than what has so far been the case both in Myanmar and internationally. The Wa may be Chinese puppets, but they are no Chinese stooges..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-07-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-12
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Title: Chapter 3: Communication and media in Burma
Description: "Burma is a country of great ethnic diversity, in which over one hundred different languages and dialects have been identified (Smith, 1991b). The country is wedged between Thailand and Laos to the East, India and Bangladesh to the West, and Tibet and China to the North. The central plains of the Irrawaddy Delta are ringed by mountains that are home to a variety of ethnic peoples. Ethnic statistics in Burma are generally unavailable, and contentious when they are, since there has been no attempt to take a count of the population since the British census in 1931 (Smith, 1991a). The 1974 Constitution identifies seven divisions and seven ethnic states – Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan. There are several other large minority groups in the country as well, such as the Lahu, the Nagas, the Pa-O and the Wa, and there are many Chinese, Tamils, Bengalis and others of Indian origin living in the country. Burma was annexed by Britain in three stages between 1824 and 1886, and was governed at first as a province of India. The British divided its administration in Burma into two divisions – Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas, in which the ethnic nationalities were given autonomy to govern themselves. The British also used a divideand-conquer strategy by employing ethnic minority men to help control the Burmans, who were agitating for independence in central Burma. During World War II, the Burmans fought with the Japanese against the Allies while the hill peoples such as the Karens and Kachins stayed loyal to the British. The British exacerbated existing tensions between the various groups by using ethnic minority soldiers to police the Burmans, who were pushing for independence. After independence in 1948, Burma experienced only a few years of civilian rule before General Ne Win took over in a coup that brought the military into power in 1962. While there has been reshuffling of personnel over the years, the military has remained in power. In December 1987, Burma was accorded Least Developed Country (LDC) status at the UN, which recognized that after years of economic decline, Burma was one of the world’s ten poorest nations. This was so embarrassing that the government in power at the time, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), waited for four months to announce this news to its own people (Smith, 1991a). And so, while Ne Win instituted his plan for the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” the country languished in isolation. As conditions throughout the country worsened for the central regime, territories were designated as white, brown or black areas, corresponding with the degree of control the government had over that area. White areas were entirely under the government’s control, brown areas were partially government-controlled, and black areas were under the control of ethnic nationalist groups. Visitors to Burma were generally restricted to all but the white areas. Scholarly work in Burma has also been severely restricted by the country’s isolationist policies, and there are few works that examine the development of media and communications technology use since Burma’s independence. The few descriptions that do exist make clear that historically, Burma was a highly literate country with “proud educational traditions” (Smith, 1991a, p. 17). Western-style newspapers were introduced into the country during the colonial period, and a host of locally-produced magazines and newspapers appeared soon afterwards (Smith, 1991a). This diversity of outlets continued after independence in 1948, and the Burmese press during the 1950s was recognized as among the freest in Asia, with more than 30 daily newspapers in several languages and representing a wide variety of political viewpoints (Hollstein, 1961; Smith, 1991a). While many of these papers were sympathetic to particular political parties, they remained relatively free of government control, and there was no serious attempt at censorship or harassment of journalists or writers (Allott, 1993; Smith, 1991a; Smith, 1999c)..."
Source/publisher: Academia.edu (San Francisco)
Date of publication: 2003-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-11
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Title: Inside the Myanmar mountain camp where rebels train to fight for freedom from the junta
Description: "Camp Victoria, Myanmar (CNN)Full-throated they belt out songs of victory, their boots adding the drumbeat as ranks of new recruits jog in formation through their jungle training camp. There's no doubting the shining eyes of these young people united by an ideal -- freedom from the junta that's smothered democracy in Myanmar. Nor, perhaps, hiding from the dark tragedy that may await them. They pour into Camp Victoria, the headquarters of the long-standing ethnic army of the Chin National Front (CNF) in western Myanmar, close to India's border. They defy attempts by the camp's leadership to suspend training because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Many come from within the surrounding mountainous territory. But many others make the dangerous journey across a nation that's already riven with protests, army violence and oppression -- in search of military skills. On the cusp of adulthood, these volunteers say they demonstrated against the military coup that swept away their civilian government in February. And as the junta's response has grown increasingly bloody, so they have taken up arms. But any hope of singing songs of actual victory anytime soon are remote. Their leadership is warning of a long fight. "Now it's a kind of an urban guerrilla-type (conflict) but within months it will transform into a conventional civil war," Suikhar, vice chairman of the CNF, tells CNN. This bleak truth raises the prospect, indeed the probability, that Myanmar will descend into a protracted conflict where no victors emerge, and the country collapses. In a report on the emerging civil war in Myanmar published at the end of June, the International Crisis Group (ICG), a transnational think tank, accused the military of using a strategy that targeted civilians to undermine militia support. But the experts' prognosis for the civilian population was grim, too. "The coming period of national economic collapse, widespread poverty and deprivation will give them greater incentive to secure sources of revenue, either directly from locals or at their expense. These factors point to the likely emergence of new, sustained armed groups in these areas, following dynamics witnessed many times over the decades of insurgency in various parts of Myanmar," the report said. Suikhar insisted that his movement and the Chinland Defence Force, which are also being trained at Camp Victoria, were led by Myanmar's National Unity Government. This exiled administration that exists largely, for now, in name only, is a loose alliance of anti-junta forces and has no command or control authority over the armed groups inside Myanmar itself. And for the new graduates from the jungle training camp, there may be a bitter end to the romantic vision of a fight for freedom. Anxious to hear how outsiders saw the conflict unfolding, a young fighter, a former journalist and graduate from the University of ​Yangon explained that he was the commander of what started out as a 10-person group specially trained in urban guerrilla warfare. "At least, I did command 10 people. Now there are only seven. I lost three last week when they were carrying a homemade bomb to use against the junta. It blew up in their hands. They all died on the spot," he says. He's been ordered by his superiors in the Chinland Defence Force back to Camp Victoria for a break after this blooding. In a few days he was in a new black uniform and undergoing more specialist training. His eyes now shone with cold determination, not hope. Stalemate is not victory But the junta army is striking back ruthlessly, analysts say. "The Tatmadaw is using its long-established 'four cuts' counter-insurgency strategy in these areas, a cruel approach that deliberately targets civilians in an effort to deprive insurgents of food, funds, recruits and intelligence on troop movements (hence the four cuts). Attacks on populated areas are an integral part of this strategy, along with the looting of food stores and denial of relief supplies, in clear violation of international humanitarian law," the ICG alleges. The strategy is well enough known around Camp Victoria, where civilians are leaving outlying villages for small refugee encampments, or safety in Indian communities across the Tiau River. Most of the refugees are women, children and the old. They all left their villages for the same reasons. "I am really afraid of the Myanmar military because they're very nasty and they are ​a brutal military. Twenty years ago the military tortured my son in my own house. They hit him on the head. There was blood all over his head and that's why I am really afraid of them," said Tial Song, an elderly woman who was sitting under the orange plastic sheeting of a newly erected shelter. "How long will be you a refugee?" CNN asked Chanlal, Song's neighbor on this muddy hillside. "As long as the military rules over us," he replies. Beyond the outer defenses of Camp Victoria, the mountains of Chin State leap in near-vertical waves of thick jungle. Travel is on precipitous mountain passes along tiny mud tracks. Locals, many of them experienced hunters, have the edge over invading armies. They also have the mass intelligence network of their own communities, with fighters receiving live updates of enemy troops movements from village agents all over the state. But these advantages alone won't help the anti-junta forces survive. Stalemate is not victory. An unlikely jungle guerrilla Getting in, or out, of the Chin-controlled zone is a grueling test of endurance. It often involves entire days of back-breaking bouncing along the mud-slickened tracks on the back of small Chinese-made motorbikes. These little 125cc workhorses are the mules of the modern era, carrying fighters, ammunition and food to far-flung camps run by the Chinland Defence Force. One of these camps that CNN visited sits close to a jungle trail, with a small network of bunkers and dormitory tents for the volunteers. It may be their home and fighting base for many months to come. John Ling gave up his history studies at ​the University of ​Yangon to join the insurgency. Swapping the classroom for a hilltop camp​, he's the administrator, or quartermaster, for about 150 other volunteers. A slightly built man of 22, Ling's an unlikely jungle guerrilla. "Aren't you afraid of being killed?" CNN asks him. "No, because I stand for my country," he replies -- adding that his parents are not worried about him, but proud of the stand that he's taken. It may be noble -- but it's also open-ended. The armory is an A-framed tent of plastic sheeting and tree trunks. Its precious contents, dozens of shotguns designed for shooting birds, are lined up along each wall. On the floor, a log fire burns to keep the damp out, and rust off the guns. Suikhar, the Chin National Front vice chairman, is adamant that these fighters will soon be supplied with automatic firearms, such as AK-47s. "There are international smugglers. ... You can get weapons anywhere," he insists, but is opaque about how those weapons would be paid for. "People donate, raise the funds. So I don't think that money will be a problem." Many armed groups in Myanmar have relied for decades on smuggling, especially drugs like heroin and methamphetamines, to fund their insurgencies. And the longer they depend on local populations, the greater the chances are that civilians will be burdened by graft, protection rackets or simple taxation by rebel armies. The CNF says it believes it's one of 16 ethnic armies, and hopes for cooperation among them against a common enemy -- all in the name of "democracy and federalism." Young citizens have flocked to this ideal; it was the thwarting of a democratic future that drove so many young people into the forests with guns. But the future length of their war, indeed whether they win or lose, may depend less on the young people of the opposition than on the young soldiers and officers being sent to fight them from the national army. The quickest end to fighting rests in a "young officers' coup" against the brutality and corruption of the generals who returned to power in February. The Chin leadership knows this..."
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
Date of publication: 2021-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-09
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Title: H.E. Dr. Sasa Addressed to the Foreign Affairs Committee of Defenses and Armed Force of the Senate, the Parliament of France - ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာမှ ပြင်သစ်အထက်လွှတ်တော် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးရာ၏ ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်အင်အားစုများ ကော်မတီထံသို့ပန်ကြားလွှာ
Description: "ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာ၊( အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး၊ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ပြောရေးဆိုခွင့်ရှိသူနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာကုလသမဂ္ဂအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဟောင်း)သည် လွန်ခဲ့သော အပတ် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ၊ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြင်သစ်အထက် လွှတ်တော်၏ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးရာ ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့်လက်နက်ကိုင်အင်အားစုများ ကော်မတီထံသို့ မိန့်ခွန်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ရာ မိန့်ခွန်းတွင်ပါဝင်သည့် အကြောင်းအရာအပြည့်အစုံကို အများပြည်သူ နားလည်သဘော ပေါက်နိုင်စေရန် ရည်ရွယ်ပြီး အင်္ဂလိပ်ဘာသာမှ မြန်မာဘာသာသို့ အတတ်နိုင်ဆုံး ဘာသာပြန် ဆိုထားပါသည်။ ဤမိန့်ခွန်းသည် ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာမှ ပြင်သစ်လွှတ်တော်အမတ်များထံသို့ ဒုတိယအကြိမ်မြောက် မိန့်ခွန်းပြောကြားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ပြင်သစ်အထက်လွှတ်တော်အမတ်ပေါင်း (၁၅၀)ကျော်မှ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် ပြင်သစ်အစိုးရမှ အသိအမှတ်ပြုရန် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့ကြပြီး လက်ရှိတွင် ဆက်လက်အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်သည့်အပေါ် ဆုတောင်းကူညီပေးကြပါရန် အလေးအနက်မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။ အားလုံးကို ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication: 2021-06-30
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-07
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Title: Myanmar opens a strategic gateway for Moscow
Sub-title: Asia Times' correspondent Bertil Lintner explains why Russia has warmly embraced Myanmar's military coup makers
Description: "This exclusive Q & A first appeared on Asia Times’ Southeast Asia Insider newsletter. If you are not already a subscriber please sign up here. A recent visit to the Russian capital by Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has caught the attention of analysts and observers and raised questions over Moscow’s motives for forging ever-closer relations with the Tatmadaw, which has been shunned and sanctioned by the West following its seizure of power in a February coup. The erstwhile Soviet Union had once been a major power in Southeast Asia, but lost influence in the region following its collapse in 1991. Under President Vladimir Putin’s watch, Moscow has slowly but surely rebuilt many of those frayed ties with regional autocracies and democracies alike, primarily through arms deals. Asia Times’ correspondent and renowned Myanmar expert Bertil Lintner reported on the deepening ties between Moscow and Naypyidaw this week. In this week’s Q&A segment, Lintner weighs in on what he sees as a geopolitically resurgent Russia more clearly than ever telegraphing its presence in Southeast Asia. Why is Russia openly embracing Myanmar’s coup government while the West and US penalize and condemn its suspension of democracy? Firstly because Myanmar is a big buyer of Russian military hardware. But there are other important reasons why Moscow wants to maintain close relations with the country’s ruling military. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, old Asian allies drifted away and sought other economic as well as strategic partners. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has been able to restore some, though not all, of its former glory as a global superpower. It’s a work in progress. Moscow’s friendship with Naypyitaw should be seen from that perspective. It is also important for Moscow to set an example here as it strives to disrupt Western efforts to promote democracy in Asia and elsewhere. For the Myanmar military, which has been condemned by most of the democratic world for its coup and subsequent brutality against protesters, it is desperately looking for partners and recognition and Russia fits the bill. Not even China, Myanmar’s old ally, is willing to offer as much open political and diplomatic support as Russia. Moscow is looking for a new, trustworthy ally in the region that can help reestablish the influence lost after the Soviet Union’s demise. Both Russia and China have blocked the UN Security Council from imposing sanctions against Myanmar’s junta. Are the two powers working in concert or do they have divergent interests in Myanmar? Naturally because both countries are opposed to Western ideas of democracy taking root in Asia and both resented the influence that the US and other Western countries managed to gain during the ten years of relative openness that Myanmar enjoyed from 2011 to 2021. But there are also differences. The Russians have put all their eggs in one basket, the military, while China also maintains cordial relationships with ethnic armed organizations opposed to the Myanmar military and government, primarily the United Wa State Army. The ceasefire group is well-equipped with sophisticated Chinese weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles, artillery and even armored personnel carriers. China’s policy can be characterized as carrot and stick: the carrot is business, trade and support at the UN’s Security Council; the stick is the UWSA and its armed rebel allies. If China doesn’t get what it wants, the UWSA will get more weapons, not to fight the Myanmar military but as a show of force and to make sure that an offensive against the UWSA would be too costly. But for that reason, Myanmar’s generals are also wary of the Chinese and suspicious of their motives, which go way beyond having cordial bilateral ties. Myanmar is the only neighbor that provides China direct access to the Bay of Bengal, bypassing contested waters in the South China Sea and the congested Malacca Strait. Therefore, China is playing power games in Myanmar through its ties to the UWSA and its allies – and by cultivating individuals in the military and in politics and the media who could be used to enhance China’s strategic interests in Myanmar. Russia, on the other hand, is a relatively problem-free ally. How will a Russia-influenced and armed Myanmar potentially shift the region’s strategic dynamics and balance of power? The flow of Russian (and, of course, Chinese) weapons to Myanmar has turned its armed forces into one of the most numerous and best-equipped in the region. And even if its adversaries have been domestic ethnic and political rebels, the Myanmar military also has a long history of actually fighting. Moreover, Myanmar is now ruled by a military junta with little or no civilian input. There is no other country in the region, not even Thailand, where the military has such a strong position in governance and policy-making. Anyone including businessmen, diplomats, UN personnel and other outsiders who want to deal with the country has to deal with the generals first. There are at present no other players. A new, better-armed and more powerful Myanmar military has become a regional force to be reckoned with. The Myanmar-Russian alliance may not alter the overall balance of power in the region, but it will no doubt have an impact as it has given the Russians a new strategic foothold in Asia. But there are also differences to keep in mind. Culturally and socially, Myanmar and Russia are light years apart and for those reasons interactions between the two sides are not going to be easy. Only time will tell how this unique relationship will develop. For the time being, Myanmar has no other choice in terms of powerful outside allies and so far the Russians have played their cards quite skillfully..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2021-07-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-06
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Title: Myanmar: Facebook promotes content urging violence against coup protesters – study
Sub-title: Posts ranging from wanted posters to death threats remain online for months, breaching platform’s own standards
Description: "Facebook is promoting content that incites violence against Myanmar’s coup protesters and amplifies junta misinformation, despite promising to clamp down on the misuse of its platform, according to a study. An investigation by the rights group Global Witness found that Facebook’s recommendation algorithm continues to invite users to view content that breaches its own policies. After liking a Myanmar military fan page, which did not contain recent posts violating Facebook’s policies, the rights group found that Facebook suggested several pro-military pages that contained abusive content. Among the posts featured on one of the pages was an image of a “wanted” poster offering a $10m bounty for the capture “dead or alive” of a young woman. The post claimed she was among protesters who had burned down a factory following a military crackdown. Images of the woman’s face and a screenshot of what appeared to be her Facebook profile were posted alongside a caption reading: “This girl is the one who committed arson in Hlaing Tharyar. Her account has been deactivated. But she cannot run.” Global Witness said that its report demonstrated that self-regulation by Facebook was not working, and called for Facebook’s recommendation algorithm to be subject to independent audit. Other posts identified by Global Witness included a death threat, the glorification of military violence and misinformation, such as the incorrect claims that Isis is present in Myanmar, and that the military had seized power due to “voter fraud”. The military has accused Aung San Suu Kyi’s party of vote rigging in last year’s election in order to justify February’s coup – a suggestion that has been discredited by observers, including by the independent monitoring group Asian Network for Free Elections. Facebook said in February that it would remove false claims of widespread fraud or foreign interference in Myanmar’s November election from its site. It also said it had banned military-controlled state and media entities, and introduced a specific policy for Myanmar “to remove praise, support and advocacy of violence by Myanmar security forces and protestors”. Content that supported the arrests of civilians by the military and security forces in Myanmar would be removed under this policy. A spokesperson for Facebook said its staff “closely monitor” the situation in Myanmar in real time and has taken action on any posts, pages or groups that break its rules. However, content identified by Global Witness has remained online for months, according to the rights group. Separate analysis by the Guardian found numerous recent examples of posts that also appeared to breach Facebook’s standards: In one post from 19 June, which received more than 500 likes, an image showed a man with a bloodied face and rope tied around his neck. The caption states: “This is how you should arrest them”, referring to protesters. Posts often mock and encourage violence against protesters. One post, also from 19 June referred to a recent flower strike, where protesters wore flowers to mark Aung San Suu Kyi’s 76th birthday, stating: “Every single one of the real men that wore the flowers in public today must be killed … Trash. They all need to be killed so that the children will not have the wrong role models.” The post was liked 175 times. Another post, from 1 June, targeted children. It showed an image of students outside their school, with a sign that states: “We are students and we will go to school. You are criminals, and you will go to prison.” Many children have not returned to school, despite orders to do so by the junta. The post had been liked more than 4,300 times. Posts often share misinformation, for example, blaming pro-democracy politicians for leading “terrorists”. A post states “only real news outlets in this country are MOI, MRTV and MWD and other state-run news”, referring to military-controlled channels. Facebook has previously acknowledged that its platform has been misused in Myanmar, where it is hugely popular and influential. The site is used by almost half the population and, for many, it is the primary way of accessing the internet. In 2018, following the massacre of Rohingya Muslims by the military, Facebook admitted that its platform had been used to “foment division and incite offline violence”. A UN fact-finding mission drew similar conclusions the same year, stating that Facebook had been “a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate” and that the response of the company had been “slow and ineffective”. In February, Facebook said its staff were working around the clock to keep its platform safe. The coup greatly increased the likelihood “that online threats could lead to offline harm”, Facebook said at the time. The Global Witness report also called for Facebook to further investigate other types of content it hosted, including the circulation of forced confession videos by political prisoners, military adverts, and posts that amplified military propaganda – such as the claims that the army is acting in a measured way. In a statement, Facebook said: “We proactively detect 99% of the hate speech removed from Facebook in Myanmar, and our ban of the Tatmadaw [military] and repeated disruption of coordinated inauthentic behaviour has made it harder for people to misuse our services to spread harm. This is a highly adversarial issue and we continue to take action on content that violates our policies to help keep people safe.”..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-06-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: State-building, Military Modernization and Cross- border Ethnic Violence in Myanmar
Description: "Abstract: This article explains cross-border uses of force against ethnic armed groups along Myanmar’s bloody borders with China and Thailand. I trace the history of Burma’s ethnic disputes, its state-society relations, and the “modernization” of its military doctrine to understand how its state-building enterprise can shape the use of force along a state’s frontier. I treat each of the border regions as distinct subcategories to highlight variation in the micro-dynamics as well as types and conditions under which the use of state-orchestrated violence occurs. First, I point to the role of greater state-building – extractive, coercive, etc. – and how it influences the use of force along border regions. Second, I explore the modernization of Burma’s military and evolution of its doctrine – this includes early efforts by the tatmadaw’s post-1988 shift toward a more conventional counterinsurgency strategy. An implication of my theory is that more peaceful relations between states perversely can create the conditions for more cross-border violence, as there are greater opportunities for states to either “pool” border security or outsource the use of force to proxies or paramilitary forces.....Introduction: The world’s longest civil war rages on in the frontiers of Myanmar between a government historically dominated by its military and several bands of ethnic rebels, many of them seeking self-rule.1 At the same time, a number of other insurgencies, including one against a Muslim minority, the Rohingya, continue along Myanmar’s other frontier regions. Even as Myanmar begins to democratize, there has been little to no let-up in the violence along its periphery. To understand Myanmar’s use of force against these groups, one must understand the complicated origins of its military rule, its fitful attempts at state-building and shifts in its threat environment, both internal and external. This article posits that the Myanmar’s approach to counterinsurgency and application of force is a function of two simultaneous processes: First, the state under military rule has carried out aggressive state-building along its frontier as a way to further consolidate its boundaries, alternating between the use of local paramilitary forces and its own armed forces to quell these border regions, while purposely not eradicating these groups given that the military benefits from some level of a threat to legitimize its control.2 Simultaneously, Myanmar’s military (or tatmadaw) seeks to profit from cross-border trade (timber, jade, opium, etc.), both licit and illicit (see Lintner, 1999; Meehan, 2011). As a result, it has vacillated between military coercion and political accommodation as a means of bringing order to its frontiers while also enhancing its economy, capacity and legitimacy. To this day, these areas, hilly, remote, rich in natural resources and ethnic hodgepodges, have proved difficult to control and bring into the political fold. Second, Myanmar’s civil-military relations have gone through a series of institutional crises and challenges to the regime’s authority. Together with shifts in its threat environment, this has spurred on a modernization of its military doctrine (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, pp. 16–46). During the first years of postcolonial rule (1948–1958), Myanmar’s military posture was based largely on fear of external invasion from China (ibid., p.11). Over the next few decades (1958–1988), its doctrine congealed around the threat of the country’s internal insurgency and ethnic armed actors along the periphery. Following 1988, military doctrine focused almost exclusively on modernization, as external threats took on renewed attention and the armed forces shifted towards a more conventional warfare stance (ibid., p. 11). Interestingly, its use of force against ethnic armed groups, even across borders into neighbouring states, would become more routinized as the military modernized itself after Ne Win stepped down in 1988. Part of this modernization process was to consolidate its borders and reduce the threat these groups posed while simultaneously guarding its border against conventional threats. The tatmadaw would rely increasingly on local border patrols, some of them comprising ethnic armed factions it was previously fighting. It was a counterinsurgency policy that mixed co-optation with coercion. Myanmar’s military rules over a fragmented society. The tatmadaw itself is riven by elite divisions, yet still rules as a leviathan-like entity. It views itself as a ‘modernizing’ force, despite claims to the contrary.3 The case of Myanmar reveals how military rulers, insulated from public opinion, perceive of state and non-state threats along its periphery, and how this perception shapes its military doctrine, at a time of rapid state-building. Its use of force is manifested by the centre’s exertions of greater control—economic, political and cultural—over its upland periphery.4 Despite greater civilian control, the government still retains a strong praetorian composition, which explains its aggressive use of force along its frontier (Ben-Eliezer,1997). Externally, despite relatively peaceful relations with its neighbouring states, and despite greater civilian control, Myanmar has taken a largely offensive approach to counterinsurgency, one that mixes conciliatory gestures to co-opt armed actors with the application of brute military force. This article argues that the peripheral threat is necessary for the tatmadaw’s claims to institutional authority and legitimacy, as well as for the military to profit from the booming economy along the border. The implications of my argument are that the state should have little incentive in seeing these areas become completely pacified and so will continue to wage a border war that mixes conventional counterinsurgency with political accommodation. This article proceeds as follows: First, I examine the country’s historical background of ethnic war, looking at the postcolonial roots of the conflict. Then, I discuss its early attempts at state-building, placing Myanmar in the larger literature. Next, I situate my case study in the broader literature on civil-military relations and explore the historical evolution of its military, how its military doctrine has evolved, and specifically its use of cross-border force against rebels in Thailand and China. I conclude with a recap of my theory.....Background of Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar: Myanmar is strategically located in Southeast Asia, wedged between two more powerful state rivals, China and India.5 It is a nation hemmed in by a horseshoe of hill country, ethnically diverse, impoverished and constituting what James Scott has referred to as a ‘negative space’ (Scott, 2009). The highlands of Kachin state along the northern Chinese border provide insurgents with a natural canopy to evade being targeted (Tucker, 2000). Likewise, the jungles between Myanmar and Thailand, rich in lumber and lucrative teal, are some of the world’s thickest. As John Seabury Thomson noted in 1957, ‘[The] topography of the country and its isolation from trade routes tended to make the [Burmese] people look inward rather than outward […]’ (Thomson, 1957, p. 269). That shapes the country’s view of itself in the wider region as well as its own poorly defined borders and helps explain why the country currently faces no fewer than a dozen armed ethnic conflicts. Besides the ethnically dominant Burman, which constitutes over two-thirds of the population, the government officially recognizes 135 distinct ethnic groups. Virtually all of the ethnic groups can be carved up further into various subgroups. The categories still in use today were mostly derived by the British administrators and missionaries, who made perceptions-based differentiations mostly based on a group’s language and culture. As one British official noted in 1931, ‘[S]ome of the races or tribes in Burma change their language almost as often as they change their clothes’ (Smith, 1991, p. 34). Interpreting Myanmar’s history by delineating it into various political-ethnic groups is problematic, if only because of these groups’ complex identities and overlapping cultures.6 Myanmar retains some of the strictest citizenship laws, which in theory require proof of ancestry present in Myanmar before arrival of the British in 1824. This has typically been a ploy to discriminate against non-Buddhist minorities, like the Rohingya, a Muslim minority not considered citizens of Myanmar (Tang, 2013)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: 2018 SAGE Publications India via Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
Date of publication: 2018-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-24
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Title: “Attack the Enemy”: Chin Guerillas Hunt Down Myanmar Troops
Sub-title: When the Myanmar military started killing peaceful protesters in remote Chin State in the wake of the 1 February coup, local youths armed themselves with handmade rifles and started shooting back. They say they have killed at least 165 soldiers.
Description: "One evening in late April, a group of young men crouched in the wooded hills overlooking a narrow mountain road outside the town of Mindat, in Myanmar’s Chin State, waiting for the enemy to arrive. As expected, a large truck and three smaller vehicles rumbled up the road carrying soldiers and military equipment. As soon as they came into striking distance, the men in the hills opened fire. “We attacked them with bombs first, and we shot them with handmade rifles,” says Salai*, a leader of the Chinland Defence Force. The militia formed in the wake of Myanmar’s 1 February coup to protect the residents of Chin State—a mountainous, underdeveloped region bordering India and Bangladesh—from military violence. Amid the explosions and gunfire, Salai says he heard the Myanmar soldiers shout: “These men are really doing it! Attack them back!” The battle continued into the night. Eventually, Salai and his comrades decided they had inflicted enough damage and fled back into the hills. They stayed awake and kept watch until morning in case of a counter-attack. They were relieved when they realised every CDF member had come back alive, and they learned later that they had killed three Myanmar soldiers and wounded seven. “That [battle] was a first for all of us,” Salai says. “We didn’t have much experience before, but we did it. We became confident.” In the weeks since, the CDF have mounted several more attacks against the Tatmadaw, as the Myanmar military is known, in Mindat and throughout Chin State, scoring further victories but also suffering heavy losses. Vastly outgunned, their continued operations show the lengths many Myanmar civilians are willing to go to resist military rule. “I think their actions show the desperation of the people in Chin State, and all over Myanmar, who have suffered for many years at the hand of the Myanmar military,” says Steve Gumaer, president of Partners Relief & Development, which has been providing emergency supplies to displaced civilians in Chin State. “Reports that we have heard are that many people feel like they tried peaceful protests, and in response, many have been killed, so now they are taking up arms to fight for their freedom.”.....Childhood War Games: In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Salai had no intention of taking up arms against the military. A husband and father of two children, he previously worked in the development sector in Chin State, whose predominantly Christian, ethnic Chin population have long resisted pressures to assimilate into Myanmar’s Buddhist, ethnic Bamar majority. Like many other Mindat residents, Salai spent the weeks following the coup joining peaceful protests against military rule. But after Tatmadaw soldiers began shooting protesters in Mindat in mid-February, he and other locals—students, workers, farmers and hunters—started making plans to form a group to protect their families and neighbours from violence and detention. They officially established the Chinland Defence Force on 4 April and established chapters in all nine of Chin State’s townships. On 24 April, Tatmadaw forces arrested seven young protesters in Mindat who were demonstrating in support of the National Unity Government, a government in exile formed by deposed lawmakers. CDF members reached out to military authorities to try to negotiate the detainees’ release. “We urged the junta forces to release our peaceful civilian protesters. They promised at first to release them back to us, but they did not keep their promise and kept detaining them. So we fought their forces,” Salai says. News of the CDF’s modest victory against the Tatmadaw spread on social media, earning praise among anti-coup activists across the country, some of whom have formed local “people’s defence forces” in their own neighbourhoods. The CDF mounted several more guerilla attacks on the Tatmadaw over the following weeks. On 26 April, they allegedly attacked a police convoy near a golf course outside Mindat, killing one security officer and injuring three, according to Myanmar state media. Despite being less well armed than the state security forces stationed across Chin State, the CDF have a few key advantages: knowledge of the rugged terrain, local hunting traditions and access to small explosives and handmade rifles known as tumi, both of which are commonly used for hunting in Chin State. “When we were young, we used to pretend to fight the enemies in this mountainous terrain,” says Pau Pu*, a musician from northern Chin State whose friends and relatives have joined the CDF. “These battles are very similar to our childhood play scenarios.” “[The junta forces] could potentially attack our towns at any time, but the CDF can surely attack them in the jungles, where they have to pass to reach the towns,” Pau Pu says..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: New Naratif
Date of publication: 2021-06-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: An Ethnic Quandary - EBO Background Paper No. 3/2021
Description: "It has been four months since the Myanmar military seized power from the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and arrested most of the NLD leaders including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The reason originally given was irregularities in the voting process and lack of redress by the Union Election Commission, which was controlled by the NLD, although such reasoning, especially amidst new accusation of corruption amongst other things remains suspect. Soon after the coup, the military formed a body, the State Administration Council (SAC), under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces Min Aung Hlaing. Not unsurprisingly the return to military rule was met with widespread protests in the country and condemnation from the international community while Myanmar security forces took to the streets to brutally suppress the protestors, known as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Security forces used not only riot control techniques but live-fire resulting in the deaths at the time of writing over 860 civilians had been killed, including children, and more than 4,840 civilians convicted or arrested. 1 Protests have taken place throughout the country including areas under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The EAOs, before the coup, had been involved in an NLD led and ostensibly military supported, peace process – the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. While the peace process had been flawed and at one point stalled for two years it was expected that 2021 could see some progress made in addressing many of the problems that had occurred. The EAOs largely came out in favour of the protestors and the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) an alliance of the 10 NCA-signatories2 immediately issued the following statement 1). We condemn the Myanmar military’s way of addressing the current political crisis by carrying out a coup d’état. 2).We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all leaders who are detained and arrested. 3).We urge the resolution of political problems by peaceful means and negotiation, rather than by force of arms. 4.) We stand firm on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and act accordingly regarding the peace process. 5.) We call for the unconditional declaration of a nationwide ceasefire. 6.) We will collaborate with the public in seeking solutions, as we are aware of the difficulties faced by the people by the coup as well as the global pandemic (COVID-19). 7.) We call on the support of the international community including the UN in resolving the current crisis.3 That said, however, at least one ethnic political party the Arakan National Party (ANP), the biggest Arakanese political party in Arakan State, released a statement signalling that it would cooperate with Myanmar’s military. In its statement, the ANP said it will work together with the Tatmadaw to resolve specific Arakanese crises including the removal of the terrorist label for the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army, which the SAC later did. On March 11, the PPST, which had already suspended all political dialogue with the military on February 20, held a meeting to discuss strategies to stop the Myanmar military’s ongoing violent crackdown on anti-coup protesters and also future dialogue with the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a shadow NLD government.4 According to reporting there had been concerns among some EAOs that it could be dangerous for the PPST to prioritize coordination with the CRPH. One leader was quoted as saying, We were a dialogue partner of the military. We were a dialogue partner of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Now we cannot stand the people’s suffering. The main discussion is how to calm the situation down. We are thinking of the plight of the citizens,5 Despite several concerns, the Karen National Union, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Chin National Front still held separate talks with the CRPH. In addition, the Karen National Union’s Chairman Mutu Say Po wrote a letter on 22 March 2021, after Min Aung Hlaing had sent a letter requesting a meeting. The reply from Mutu Say Po stated, The KNU finds it completely unacceptable that police and Tatmadaw personnel, whose responsibilities are to protect and defend its own people, have killed, attacked, and threatened peaceful protesters. Such events have damaged our country's reputation and caused great pain and suffering of our people. These included a number of requirements the military had to meet before further discussions could take place these were, 1. Withdraw all riot squads and Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed against protesters and withdrawal of all Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed in ceasefire areas and send them back to their outposts and bases; Declare and implement a nationwide ceasefire. 2. Release and remove charges against those detained since Tatmadaw took over power on the 1" February 2021. 3. Fully allow access for medical assistance and healthcare to support the people's protest movement. 4. Issue orders to police and Tatmadaw troops to comply with all NCA provisions — and urgently release the following provisions regarding proper treatment of civilians: A. Stop acts violating a person's dignity, violence, extrajudicial detention, kidnapping, torture, inhumane treatment, imprisonment, killing or causing the disappearance of individuals B. Stop forcibly taking money, property, food, labour or services from civilians; in addition, halt unlawful and arbitrary arrest, entrapment, forced confession, lawsuits and prosecution against civilians; C. Stop denying individuals' right to healthcare and restriction of public health resources; and halt blocking the legal transportation of medicines for public use; D. Stop the destruction or actions that would lead to the destruction of schools, hospitals, clinics, religious buildings and their premises and the use of such places as military bases or outposts; E. Immediately stop any form of sexual attack on women, including sexual molestation, sexual assault or violence, rape and sex slavery; End all killing or maiming, forced conscription, rape or other forms of sexual assault or violence, or abduction of children. 5. Abolish laws issued by Tatmadaw since Feb 1" that violate human rights. 6. Agree to address the root causes of internal conflict of over 70 years through negotiations. 7. Agree to accept international mediation to support negotiations to end the current military administration and transfer power to a National Unity Government. 8. The Tatmadaw should publicly declare its commitment to democracy and federalism and withdraw from active engagement in politics..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
Date of publication: 2021-06-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Understanding Reforms in Myanmar: Linking External and Internal Factors
Description: "After more than two decades under authoritarian rule, the past five years have witnessed profound changes in Myanmar’s domestic politics. Albeit the flawed election in 2010, the newly elected government has symbolized the end of military regime and the restoration of civilian order. Furthermore, the new government has indicated its commitment to advance democratic transition by its progressive policies in liberalizing its economy and domestic press as well as reproaching the opposition leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as the landmark step toward national reconciliation (Thuzar 2012). As the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa, said after his visit to Myanmar, “Myanmar reform is irreversible” (Thuzar 2012). In order to understand how these reforms have been taking place, this paper will examine both external and internal factors as indispensable parts of these reforms. This paper will specifically focus on how major powers and domestic leadership affect the dynamics of political changes in Myanmar which eventually lead to the current reforms. This paper argues that both major powers and domestic leadership have contributed significantly to the dynamics of political changes in Myanmar. The diverging interests and policies among major powers have resulted in different approaches toward the military regime. While the policies of one major power have weakened the policies of others, these policies in overall have complementary effects in the democratic transition of the country. The engagement policies of China, India and ASEAN, for instance, have been crucial for the survival of the country while sanctions and pressure from US and other western countries have pushed the country forward to democratization. Likewise, different personal leaderships have resulted in different approach to democratization. A more conservative leader such as Than Shwe has succeeded in maintaining order and unity of the country, while the emergence of reformist leader, represented by Thein Sein, has advanced reform and democratization. In order to better elaborate these arguments, this paper will be divided into several parts. The first part will provide the historical background on Myanmar’s domestic politics since its independence to its current reform. The second part, then, will examine major powers’ interests and policies in Myanmar and how these external factors affect the dynamics of political changes in Myanmar. The third part, in turn, will examine the internal factors emphasizing the role of domestic leadership in this reform. Based on these discussions, the last part will conclude the findings by looking ahead the anticipated consequences of the aforementioned factors on the future trajectories of Myanmar’s democracy.....Historical Background: Nation building in Myanmar is perhaps the longest and the bloodiest compared to other countries in Southeast Asia. After gaining independence from Britain in January 4, 1948, Myanmar was torn into chaos under failed trial of multiparty parliamentary democracy in the first fourteen years. At the center, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) as the previously independent movement “who inherited the state” was apparent to be ideologically heterogeneous and failed to reach agreement on how to run the newly independent Myanmar (T. Than 1993). In the grassroots level, situation was worsening as ethnic minorities such as Karen, Kachin, Mon, and Chin revolted against the government (T. Than 1993). This has not mentioned Muslim Mujaheedin groups and communist elements who attempted to do similar actions (T. Than 1993). Under such circumstances, the government has, from the beginning, relied heavily on military intervention to appease these dissensions (T. Than 1993). While the charisma of U Nu has succeeded in maintaining this fragile regime for the first decade, the 1962 has seen relentless public dissents and significant economic decline. U Nu’s policy of installing Buddhism as state religion, followed by his resignation in early 1962 has exacerbated the situation even further (T. Than 1993). In order to prevent the state from disintegration, the Tatmadaw or Myanmar’s arms forces who previously stayed in the peripheries to halt the flow of Kuomintang refugees in the northern border has moved to the center and taken over the government under the name of Revolutionary Council (RC) (T. Than 1993). The Tatmadaw has learnt that its task was no longer promoting freedom and democracy as it did under British rule, but instead, maintaining peace and the rule of Law (T. Than 1993). Under the constitutional military regime of General Ne Win, the RC has redirected the trajectory of the state from chaotic democracy to the so-called Burmese Way of Socialism (BWS) and renamed the state as the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (T. Than 1993). In order to maintain domestic order, the regime has cut off the relations with other states and focused on building socialism under one party system. These two elements, nationalism and domestic order, are key elements in understanding military rule in Myanmar and have characterized most of the subsequent development in its path to democratization. The ratification of new constitution and the general election in 1974 were evidences that Military were not merely struggling for power, but instead, restoring order within the state..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi
Date of publication: 2013-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s Coming Revolution
Sub-title: What Will Emerge From Collapse?
Description: "Myanmar is at a point of no return. The army’s February coup, meant to surgically shift power within the existing constitutional framework, has instead unleashed a revolutionary energy that will be nearly impossible to contain. Over the past four months, protests and strikes have continued despite the killing of more than 800 people and the arrest of nearly 5,000 more. On April 1, elected members of parliament from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), together with leaders from other political parties and organizations, declared a “national unity government” to challenge the authority of the recently established military junta. And through April and May, as fighting flared between the junta and ethnic minority armies, a new generation of pro-democracy fighters attacked military positions and administrative offices across the country. The junta could partially consolidate its rule over the coming year, but that would not lead to stability. Myanmar’s pressing economic and social challenges are too complex, and the depth of animosity toward the military too great, for an isolated and anachronistic institution to manage. At the same time, the revolutionaries will not be able to deal a knockout blow anytime soon. As the stalemate continues, the economy will crumble, extreme poverty will skyrocket, the health-care system will collapse, and armed violence will intensify, sending waves of refugees into neighboring China, India, and Thailand. Myanmar will become a failed state, and new forces will appear to take advantage of that failure: to grow the country’s multibillion-dollar-a-year methamphetamine business, to cut down the forests that are home to some of the world’s most precious zones of biodiversity, and to expand wildlife-trafficking networks, including the very ones possibly responsible for the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in neighboring China. The pandemic itself will fester unabated. The task now is to shorten this period of state failure, protect the poorest and most vulnerable, and begin building a new state and a freer, fairer, and more prosperous society. A future peaceful Myanmar can only be based on both an entirely different conception of its national identity, free of the ethnonationalist narratives of the past, and a transformed political economy. The weight of history makes this the only acceptable outcome but also a herculean task to achieve. The alternative, however, is not dictatorship, which can no longer achieve stability, but rather ever-deepening state failure and the prospect of a violent, anarchic Myanmar at the heart of Asia for decades to come.....A COLONIAL INHERITANCE: Myanmar is a colonial creation. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United Kingdom conquered the coastline from Bengal to the Malay Peninsula, the valley of the Irrawaddy River (home for a millennium to Burmese-speaking Buddhist kingdoms), and then the surrounding uplands (regions that had never before come under external control). Myanmar—then called Burma—was forged through a military occupation and governed as a racial hierarchy. Imperial census administrators complained that the many and varied identities of its inhabitants were too fluid and contingent and that the country was “a zone of racial instability.” They nonetheless divided everyone into neat racial categories, with some races deemed “indigenous” and others “alien.” The British also established an incredibly unequal and exploitative colonial political economy, based on the large-scale immigration of Indian labor and the export of primary commodities—mainly rice, oil, and timber—to global markets. Modern Burmese politics emerged a century ago, and at its core was an ethnonationalism rooted in the notion of a Burmese-speaking Buddhist racial identity. In 1937, ten years before Pakistan was partitioned from India along religious lines, the British partitioned Burma from India on the basis of perceived racial difference. After winning independence in 1948, the new Burmese state tried to incorporate those non-Burmese peoples of the country also deemed indigenous, such as the Karens and the Shans, but within a framework of Burmese racial and cultural supremacy. Those peoples categorized as “aliens,” such as the more than 700,000 people from the Rohingya Muslim community viciously expelled to Bangladesh in 2016 and 2017, have fared worse. Myanmar’s nation-building project has failed for decades, leaving behind a landscape of endemic armed conflict and a country that has never truly been whole. The Burmese army has been the self-appointed guardian of this ethnonationalism. It is the only army in the world that has been fighting nonstop since World War II: against the British and then the Japanese, and, after independence, against an extraordinary array of opponents, including Washington-backed Chinese nationalist armies in the 1950s, Beijing-backed communist forces in the 1960s, drug lords, and ethnic armed forces struggling for self-determination, all the while taking as well as inflicting enormous casualties. Since the 1970s, most of the fighting has been confined to the uplands, where the army became an occupation force imposing central rule on ethnic minority populations. But every now and then, the army would descend into the cities of the Irrawaddy River valley to crush dissent. The ranks of the armed forces have grown to over 300,000 personnel. In recent years, the military has acquired new Chinese and Russian combat aircraft, drones, and rocket artillery. It is led by an officer corps that cannot imagine a Myanmar in which the military is not ultimately in control..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Foreign Affairs
Date of publication: 2021-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Trial of Aung San Suu Kyi begins in closed courtoom in Myanmar
Sub-title: No media in court and heavy police presence outside as former leader faces raft of charges
Description: "The trial of Myanmar’s ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi began on Monday in a closed courtroom in Naypyidaw, as the military junta escalated its attempts to remove her as a political threat. No journalists were present at the hearing inside the Naypyidaw council compound, where there was a heavy police presence. The defence lawyer Khin Maung Zaw said Aung San Suu Kyi “seemed not very well” in court, but that throughout the hearing “she seemed quite interested and paid keen attention.” She is suffering from toothache, according to her lawyers, who were escorted to the courtroom by police. Aung San Suu Kyi has been in detention since 1 February when the military seized power, and had just three meetings with her legal team to prepare for the start of the trial. She has been prevented from using the internet or reading anything other than state-controlled media for the past four months. She faces a wide range of charges, including three that were addressed on Monday. Plaintiffs testified that she breached a natural disaster law by breaking coronavirus restrictions in the run-up to last year’s election, and that she broke a communications law and an import law by illegally possessing walkie-talkies. The court also heard testimony alleging that the ousted president, Win Myint, had broken a natural disaster management law. Phil Robertson, the deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said the cases brought against Aung San Suu Kyi were an attempt to “nullify her landslide election victory in the November 2020 election and prevent her from ever running for office again”. There was little likelihood she would receive a fair trial, Roberston said. “In fact, the junta gives every indication that this is just the beginning and they will continue to pile on additional cases against Suu Kyi to keep her locked away into the distant future.” The military’s seizure of power has been defiantly opposed by the public, which voted overwhelmingly for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in last year’s election. Though her international stature diminished following a wave of military violence targeting the country’s marginalised Muslim Rohingya community, Aung San Suu Kyi, who previously spent a total of 15 years in detention campaigning against military rule, is widely revered domestically as an icon of democracy. Street demonstrations have dwindled since the coup, owing to the military’s brutal violence against protesters, but many workers remain on strike, bringing essential services to a standstill. More than 860 people have been killed by the junta since the coup, according to the advocacy group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). Security forces have repeatedly opened fire at protesters and bystanders, killing dozens of children. In response, grassroots defence groups have formed across the country, fighting back against the military raids and targeting army officials in shootings and bomb attacks, including in the main city, Yangon. At least 4,863 people are in detention or have been sentenced by the military, which has arrested anyone it suspects of organising against the coup, often during night-time raids. On Monday state media reported that a former head of the country’s Covid vaccination campaign, Dr Htar Htar Lin, had been arrested and faced several charges, including of high treason for colluding with the national unity government, which was established by pro-democracy politicians and has been labelled a terrorist group by the military. Doctors and nurses were among the first to protest against the coup, and many are treating patients in secret, underground clinics because they refuse to work in junta-controlled hospitals. On Monday an American journalist detained since March was released after charges against him were dropped, his lawyer told AFP. Nathan Maung, who founded the local Kamayut Media outlet, has been detained under a colonial-era law that criminalises encouraging dissent against the military. The junta has said it will hold new elections within the next two years, though the public and analysts are extremely sceptical of such promises. The military ruled Myanmar for half a century before transitioning towards democracy in 2011. If Aung San Suu Kyi is convicted, she could be barred from running in any future vote. On Tuesday the court will hear further cases against Aung San Suu Kyi. These include a charge of incitement against her, Win Myint and Dr Myo Aung, the Naypyidaw council chairman and mayor of Naypyidaw city. Aung San Suu Kyi is also accused of breaching the official secrets act, and of corruption charges, though these allegations will be handled separately. According to state media, she allededly accepted $600,000 cash and 11.4kg of gold in bribes, and misused her authority to rent land. Khin Maung Zaw described the claims as absurd. The military has justified seizing power by accusing the NLD of widespread voter fraud, a claim rejected by a group of independent observers, the Asian Network for Free Elections. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development party fell to a humiliating defeat in the vote..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-06-14
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ASEAN: Engage Myanmar’s National Unity Government to End Crisis and Military Rule
Description: "Myanmar government should have a seat at ASEAN summit (BANGKOK, April 23, 2021)–The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should work with the newly formed National Unity Government in Myanmar and the broader international community to bring an end to the Myanmar military junta’s attacks and ensure a transition to democratic, civilian rule, said Fortify Rights today. Myanmar coup-leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is expected to join a special ASEAN summit on Myanmar on April 24 in Jakarta while ASEAN sidelined the National Unity Government from the discussions. “By inviting coup-leader Min Aung Hlaing and ignoring Myanmar’s elected civilian leaders, ASEAN lends legitimacy to an illegal and brutal military regime,” said Ismail Wolff, Regional Director of Fortify Rights. “ASEAN should use this special summit as an opportunity to collectively reject the February 1 coup and the military’s subsequent attack on civilians, recognize the legitimacy of the National Unity Government, and garner collective support for economic sanctions and an arms embargo against the Myanmar military.” If Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing fails to demonstrate an immediate end to the junta’s attempted coup and attack on civilians, then ASEAN member states should consider ousting Myanmar from the regional block, said Fortify Rights. On February 1, Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing orchestrated a military coup d’état, overthrowing the elected government and detaining President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and dozens of other government leaders, parliamentarians, and human rights defenders. The junta took over the executive, judicial, and legislative levers of power and, on February 2, created the military-appointed State Administration Council to rule the country. On April 16, ousted members of parliament, anti-coup protest leaders, and representatives of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities announced the establishment of the National Unity Government. The National Unity Government committed to end military rule and build a federal democracy. Since the February 1 coup, junta-controlled security forces reportedly killed more than 700 people and detained more than 3,000 in a brutal, nationwide assault against the population. The junta also deployed the air force and launched airstrikes against villages in ethnic army-controlled border areas, killing and injuring civilians, displacing thousands, and sparking concerns of a regional refugee crisis. It has also cut internet access and mobile data nationally, preventing the population from communicating with each other and beyond. “ASEAN member states should coordinate with the international community to bring effective pressure to bear on Myanmar’s murderous regime,” said Ismail Wolff. “ASEAN can no longer hide behind its flawed policy of non-interference. Governments in this region need to show leadership and stand with the people of Myanmar by categorically rejecting the junta and recognizing the legitimate civilian leadership.”..."
Source/publisher: "Fortify Rights"
Date of publication: 2021-04-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: New Great Game rages in post-coup Myanmar
Sub-title: China and US on opposed sides in Myanmar's escalating civil war while Japan, India and ASEAN struggle to strike a middle ground
Description: " China has declared its support for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s military-coup government in Myanmar. The United States and the European Union have implemented sanctions and declared their support for the people’s power movement agitating against the dictatorship. India and Japan are keeping quiet because they don’t want to push Myanmar further back into the clutches of China. Thailand is too dependent on natural gas imports from Myanmar to dare to condemn or even criticize the coup. The rest of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, has once again demonstrated that it is wholly incapable of resolving regional crises. That, in a nutshell, is how the main external actors have reacted to the turmoil that Min Aung Hlaing thrust upon Myanmar when he and his henchmen seized power on February 1. How this Great Game proxy theater plays out remains to be seen, but it is clear that it has pitted China against the US in a conflict that is escalating into a regional crisis. Beyond the superpower rivalry, Japan, India and other regional actors are not keen to see Chinese influence grow in a desperate Myanmar. That desperation is growing. Waves of refugees are beginning to stream to Myanmar’s borders with Thailand and across the frontier into India, representing the front edge of a new humanitarian crisis that could come to rival the country’s earlier Rohinyga exodus. Economically and financially, the country is on the verge of collapse, driving out many of the Western investors who entered the country in hopes of a democratic transition. But there are growing signs that China sees opportunity in Myanmar’s crisis. At a regional meeting in Chongqing on June 8, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi assured his Myanmar counterpart Wunna Maung Maung Lwin that bilateral relations have not been affected by what he referred to as “changes in Myanmar’s domestic and external situation.” Chinese officials also pledged support for ASEAN’s diplomatic initiatives on Myanmar’s crisis, despite the fact the “five point consensus” agreed between Min Aung Hlaing and ASEAN representative at a one-day meeting in Jakarta on April 24 have been largely dead on arrival. In essence, the “consensus agreement” put equal blame on the Myanmar military’s gunning down of hundreds of peaceful demonstrators, including children as young as five, and the protesters who at that time were armed with little more than slingshots and homemade devices to defend themselves. From June 4-5, two Bruneian officials, Second Foreign Minister Erywan Yusof and ASEAN Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi, were sent by ASEAN to Myanmar but they apparently did little more than chat with junta representatives. A press release uploaded on the official website of the ASEAN Secretariat, which was later removed, mentioned the assumed government leadership titles of Myanmar junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing and others who were present at the meeting, giving ASEAN’s de facto official recognition of the coup-makers and their bloody coup. That prompted Jakarta Post editor Kornelius Purba to write in a June 9 op-ed: “Asean is now becoming the laughing stock in the eyes of the international community not only because it is failing to address the plights of the Myanmar people but also because it has fallen into the trap of Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.” It is often forgotten that ASEAN is not a Southeast Asian equivalent of the EU; rather it’s a loose gathering of mainly un-democratic regimes guided by two cardinal principles — non-interference and consensus —that make it perennially impotent to resolve regional crises. Indonesia is the only ASEAN member that has shown some willingness to address Myanmar’s problems and how they are spilling over into the wider region. After holding talks with EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell in Jakarta on June 2, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that her country is continuing to communicate with ASEAN’s chair — now Brunei — and other member states to demand an immediate end to killings and the release of over 4,000 political detainees. ASEAN’s inaction is likely to China’s liking. While Beijing may be concerned with Myanmar’s rising internal strife and intensified civil war — which now includes not only traditional ethnic armies but also a multitude of local forces in areas that have not seen fighting for decades — it has shown time and again that it can work together with Myanmar’s generals. China has big geostrategic interests to protect in Myanmar and Beijing has always sided with the political camp that appears to have the upper hand. For now, that’s Min Aung Hlaing’s unpopular junta. Myanmar is the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean. That allows Chinese shipments of fuel and other key imports to bypass the disputed waters of the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait chokepoint that Beijing fears could be blocked in any conflict scenario with the US. The US is on the other side of the political divide in post-coup Myanmar. Starting in June, the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) announced that its two media networks, the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, will launch a new 24-hour video channel for Myanmar. According to a June 9 USAGM press release, the channel will be available on two different direct-to-home TV satellites covering Myanmar and is being launched in response to the junta’s “shutdown of independent media and its intermittent blocking of mobile phone services since the military’s February 1 coup.” Civil society organizations inside the country and in exile will also get support from the US. But other than keeping hope alive among the general public, it is hard to see how this will affect the staying power of a military regime that is willing to brutally mow down civilians to survive. An estimated 861 protesters had been shot dead by the Myanmar military since the coup until June 11, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, an independent rights group. AAPP released the names of 21 people who are known to have been tortured to death by the police and military since the coup. Security and other analysts argue that neither civil disobedience nor armed struggle in frontier areas is likely to bring down the military. Only a crack within the military would do that, but there are few signs of any such significant dissent within the officer corps. Still, it is in Washington’s strategic interest to strengthen the forces that are opposed to Myanmar’s military to avoid the country once again becoming a dependent client of China. According to internal Myanmar army documents reviewed by Asia Times, it was top brass concern about the nation’s dependence on China and the need to counterbalance that with improved relations with the West that led to their introduction of a more open society in 2011-2012. Relations with the West improved until the Myanmar army drove hundreds of thousands of Muslim Rohingyas over the border to Bangladesh in 2017 and pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi refused to condemn the atrocities. While the US and EU have openly condemned the democratic reversal, Japan’s and even more so India’s responses to the upheaval have been less overtly critical. Japan has not joined the West in imposing new sanctions or even come out to strongly condemn the killings and torture of opponents to Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. For the same reason, India now faces a huge dilemma and is particularly averse to China making deeper post-coup inroads into Myanmar. New Delhi doesn’t want to antagonize the Myanmar military, with which it has recently improved ties including through a submarine sale, at the same time it is the only country that so far has received a significant number of refugees. According to local sources, there are now 21,000 refugees in the northeastern state of Mizoram and an unknown number in adjacent areas in Manipur. Both states border Myanmar and the Mizos are closely related to the Chins across the border so local authorities have ignored appeals from the central government in New Delhi not to accept refugees from Myanmar. Chin state is one of the parts of Myanmar where armed conflict rages between the military and local resistance forces. India and the US — both democracies with common strategic interests vis-à-vis China — should be natural allies in this otherwise unfathomable imbroglio. But that may not happen as China could seek to revive its old support for ethnic insurgents from India’s northeast who have sanctuaries across the border in Myanmar from where they launch occasional raids into India. In the past, China provided mainly Naga, Manipuri and Assamese resistance groups with assistance. After India signed a trade pact with Taiwan in October last year, Beijing said it could retaliate by revitalizing such support. Four months after Myanmar’s coup, the resulting crisis is no longer a mere internal affair. But what happens next in Myanmar is a question not even its most famous soothsayers and astrologers — nor Western political and military analysts — dare to predict. The only certain thing is that Min Aung Hlaing did not anticipate the scale, scope and longevity of resistance to his democracy-suspending coup, a miscalculation that has exposed his country to new great power machinations and interventions that will further fuel the instability he stoked and can’t extinguish..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2021-06-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: U.N. General Assembly: Hold an Emergency Special Session on Myanmar
Description: "Myanmar junta systematically murdering and arresting protesters (BANGKOK, March 15, 2021)—U.N. member states should move to hold an Emergency Special Session at the U.N. General Assembly to demand collective action in response to the Myanmar military’s widespread and systematic attack on protesters, said Fortify Rights today. The Myanmar Police Force and Army reportedly killed more than 120 women, men, and children and arbitrarily arrested more than 2,000 since February 1. Yesterday, security forces murdered more than 50 protesters, most in Yangon, according to local news outlets and open-source media. It was the deadliest day since the February 1 military coup d’etat. “The Myanmar military poses a threat to the peace, and its ongoing attack is grave, dire, and massive in scope,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer at Fortify Rights. “The people of Myanmar are desperate for action, and the U.N. Security Council has persistently failed them. Now is the time for an Emergency Special Session at the General Assembly, where China and Russia have no veto power.” During an Emergency Special Session on the situation in Myanmar, U.N. member states should press for a global arms embargo against the Myanmar military and targeted sanctions against Myanmar military individuals, entities, and assets, said Fortify Rights. On sanctions, specifically, governments should coordinate to block the junta’s access to billion-dollar natural gas revenues. Member states should also press for the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court to investigate atrocity crimes by Myanmar security forces in recent years, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The U.N. Security Council has issued two statements in response to the situation in Myanmar since the coup, on February 4 and March 10, but failed to take any collective action or acknowledge the junta’s overthrow of the elected government as a coup d’état. The people of Myanmar and civil society organizations have consistently called for greater action from the international community in response to the coup and the junta’s attacks on civilians. On March 10, the Security Council called on “the [Myanmar] military to exercise utmost restraint.” Since that statement, the junta murdered scores of people. The primary responsibility of the U.N. Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security. In 1950, the U.N. General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace Resolution to circumvent persistent vetoes at the U.N. Security Council by the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, if the U.N. Security Council lacks “unanimity” and “fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” then the U.N. General Assembly can convene “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” For the U.N. Security Council to request an Emergency Special Session, at least nine members of the Council must vote to refer the issue to the U.N. General Assembly. Alternatively, any U.N. member state may send a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General describing the matter of concern to request an Emergency Special Session. If a majority of member states agree with the request, then an Emergency Special Session must be held within 24 hours of receiving the majority of votes. Since 1950, the U.N. General Assembly has only ever held 10 Emergency Special Sessions on situations in several countries. During those sessions, the General Assembly recommended arms embargos on four occasions, comprehensive sanctions on two occasions, and peacekeepers on one occasion. In five of the past ten Emergency Special Sessions, the General Assembly urged military forces to withdraw. On February 1, the Myanmar military carried out a coup d’etat, overthrowing the democratically elected government. The military initially arrested State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and hundreds of others, declaring that it would control the country for one year. On February 2, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing created the State Administrative Council, with himself as chairperson. On February 3, medical professionals in Myanmar government-run hospitals went on strike in an act of civil disobedience. Their initial, coordinated act grew into the ongoing nationwide nonviolent “Civil Disobedience Movement” involving daily mass protests throughout the country and nationwide general strikes. On February 5, 15 elected members of parliament created the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), adding two additional MPs on February 10. The CRPH aims to form a government and perform the duties of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. On February 23, the CRPH appointed Dr. Sasa, an ethnic Chin medical doctor and longtime humanitarian, as its representative to the United Nations. On March 9, CRPH announced it had appointed Mahn Win Khaing Than as acting Vice President of the country. Since February 1, millions of people in Myanmar have protested the coup, including through acts as simple as banging pots and pans. Hundreds of thousands of people have taken to the streets throughout the country, protesting the military and holding evening vigils for murdered protesters in defiance of the junta’s prohibition on gatherings of five or more people. The Myanmar Police Force and military have used excessive and lethal force against protesters and, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, arbitrarily arrested at least 2,000 people. The junta amended a raft of laws to strip away rights and imposed evening internet blackouts nationwide. The military coup stands to exacerbate existing crises in the country, said Fortify Rights, citing reports of recent Myanmar military troop movements in at least northern Rakhine State and Karen and Kachin states, armed clashes with non-state ethnic armies, and attacks on civilians in ethnic areas since February 1. The Myanmar military is responsible for mass atrocities and protracted human rights violations committed with impunity against the Rohingya and the Arakanese (Rakhine), Kachin, Shan, Karen, and other ethnic minorities for decades. In its 2017 genocidal offensive against the Rohingya, the military massacred untold civilians and forced nearly 800,000 to flee to Bangladesh. Myanmar authorities continue to confine more than 125,000 Rohingya and other Muslims to more than 20 internment camps in five townships in Rakhine State. On February 12, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas Andrews, said, “all options should be on the table” in response to the coup in Myanmar. “Barring concrete steps from the Security Council,” Thomas Andrews said, “the General Assembly can convene an Emergency Special Session.” On March 11, Thomas Andrews addressed the U.N. Human Rights Council, describing “shocking video of the aftermath of attacks, including fatal gunshot wounds to the heads of protesters, and video of soldiers dragging or carrying away the dead bodies of their victims.” “There is no question that the Myanmar military poses a threat to international peace and security, even beyond this coup,” said Matthew Smith. “This is the same military that has been carrying out the Rohingya genocide for several years and committing war crimes in ethnic states.” The U.N. Security Council already recognizes humanitarian emergencies, military coups, and cross-border refugee crises as legitimate threats to international peace. Despite the Myanmar military’s long-standing threats to peace and security, the Security Council has never used its authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter concerning Myanmar. Chapter VII allows the U.N. Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security.” In 2007, China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution on Myanmar. Months later, the people of Myanmar held nationwide pro-democracy protests, similar in scale to the protests occurring now. In response, Myanmar state-security forces killed unarmed pro-democracy protesters and Japanese journalist Kenji Nagai with impunity. “The Myanmar military is not the Government of Myanmar,” said Matthew Smith. “U.N. member states must recognize Myanmar’s duly elected leaders and their chosen representatives, including the CRPH. The junta is an illegal entity formed by the Myanmar military, a criminal enterprise.”..."
Source/publisher: "Fortify Rights"
Date of publication: 2021-03-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Nearly 30 Junta Troops Killed in Myanmar’s Chin State as Rights Czar Calls For End to Violence
Sub-title: The country’s least developed state is dealing with a refugee crisis as well as a COVID-19 outbreak.
Description: "Nearly 30 junta troops were killed Thursday in Myanmar’s Chin state as fighting between militia groups and the military escalated in the country’s remote regions, prompting the United Nations rights czar to warn of a “human rights catastrophe.” Members of the Chinland Defense Force (CDF) in Chin’s Thantlang township said they attacked a column of soldiers traveling around 25 miles outside of the town center, killing as many as 17 in the ensuing firefight and suffering no casualties. “More than 100 junta soldiers were marching towards the Khuahring Thang mountain range,” said a fighter with the Thantlang CDF, who spoke to RFA’s Myanmar Service on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “We’re a little worried about the situation. There are more troops than ever pressing on us. The fighting is expected to become more intense.” The CDF fighter said his group attacked the column “because the military has been intimidating local residents.” The clash marked the first in Thantlang township and caused around 600 residents of three villages in the area to flee to the mountains, he said. “Most people fled because they were scared about the presence of the soldiers,” he said. “A lot of people in Thantlang had already fled their homes earlier [when troops began to deploy to the area].” A similar clash broke out in an area between the townships of Hakha and Gangaw, the Hakha CDF announced Thursday, saying it had killed 10 junta soldiers. The group did not report any casualties of its own in the fighting. In a statement, the CDF said it will “continue to fight fiercely in all parts of Chin state” to protect the people. RFA was unable to independently verify CDF claims about the number of soldiers killed in Thursday’s clashes and calls to Myanmar’s Deputy Information Minister Zaw Min Tun went unanswered Friday.....‘Human rights catastrophe’: On Friday, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet warned that any escalation in violence in Myanmar must be halted to prevent even greater loss of life and a deepening humanitarian emergency. “As I had feared, armed conflict and other violence are intensifying in many parts of Myanmar, including Kayah State, Chin State and Kachin State, with the violence particularly intense in areas with significant ethnic and religious minority groups,” Bachelet said in a statement, noting that the military has continued to use heavy weaponry, including airstrikes, against armed groups and against civilians. “In just over four months, Myanmar has gone from being a fragile democracy to a human rights catastrophe,” she said. “In addition to the loss of life, people are suffering from severe impacts on the social and economic rights. The military leadership is singularly responsible for this crisis, and must be held to account.” The junta deposed Myanmar’s democratically elected government on Feb. 1, claiming that the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) party had won the country’s November 2020 elections due to widespread voter fraud, despite a lack of evidence. The move prompted widespread protests that the military has responded to with violent crackdowns, killing some 860 people over the past four months. The CDF is a network of volunteers that formed in April to protect the people of Chin and has enjoyed relative success facing the military—the second largest in Southeast Asia—with slingshots and the same crude flintlock “Tumee” rifles their forefathers used to fight off British colonizers in the 1880s. The CDF said it had killed some 100 junta troops between March and May. Fighters of the CDF were engaged in daily battles from May 12 until May 15, when the junta occupied Mindat with 1,000 fully armed troops who used civilians as human shields and sprayed gunfire indiscriminately, the CHRO said recently. The CDF pulled out May 16 to protect civilians from further artillery attacks and fire from helicopter gunships, Chin fighters have said, but fighting resumed on June 3 and both sides have suffered casualties. The Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) estimates that some 40,000 civilians have fled their homes throughout Chin state since May.....Outbreak compounds challenges: As more residents flee intensifying fighting in Chin, the region is also facing an outbreak of COVID-19 that medical workers reported had killed 10 people as of Friday. Over the past three weeks, around 320 cases have been reported in the townships of Tunzan and Kyeehar, near Myanmar’s border with India. Myanmar’s least developed state had already been dealing with a shortage of health workers prior to the coronavirus pandemic, but sources told RFA that following the military coup, many of the medical personnel in the state joined the nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement, leaving few behind to control the spread of the virus and treat those infected with COVID-19, the disease it causes. “Nobody who is infected wants to go to the hospital because there are no doctors there,” said an official with the COVID-19 Relief Team in Kyeekhar, where medical students are assisting three hospital staffers attend to 195 infected patients. “They are just being treated at home … We have tried to help them. If their condition becomes serious, they call us for help, and we take them by car to the hospital so that they can be given oxygen.” The administrator of Kyeekhar township confirmed to RFA that there are no longer any doctors at the local hospital. “We are treating patients with the help of volunteer doctors and nurses,” he said. On May 28, the local government issued a Stay At Home order in Kyeekhar and Tunzang townships and similar restrictions have since been implemented in the nearby townships of Tedim, Falam, Hakha and Thantlang. According to the junta’s Ministry of Health, a total of 144,876 confirmed infections and 3,237 deaths from COVID-19 have been recorded in Myanmar beginning in March 2020. Earlier this week, the United Nations in Myanmar voiced concern about what it called “the rapidly deteriorating security and humanitarian situation” the country’s remote conflict areas. The U.N. stressed the urgent need for food, water, shelter, fuel, and access to healthcare for people fleeing the fighting, saying that the aid it has distributed is insufficient—particularly for those in remote locations, where insecurity, travel restrictions, and poor road conditions are delaying the delivery of supplies. Aid groups estimate that more than a quarter of a million civilians in seven regions of Myanmar have been displaced by clashes between the military and militias or fighting between ethnic armies in the four months since the junta coup. The 226,000 displaced in 2021 join more than 500,000 refugees from decades of military conflict between the government military and ethnic armies who were already counted as internally displaced persons at the end of 2020, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, a Norwegian NGO..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
Date of publication: 2021-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: UN decries Myanmar ‘catastrophe’ as Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial looms
Sub-title: Human rights commissioner says junta is ‘singularly responsible for crisis’ before ousted leader’s trial
Description: "Myanmar has descended into a “human rights catastrophe”, the UN’s top human rights official has warned in the run-up to the scheduled start of the trial of the country’s ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who faces criminal charges that could lead to decades in prison. Aung San Suu Kyi, who previously spent a total of 15 years in detention at the behest of Myanmar’s generals and is widely revered domestically as a symbol of the country’s yearning for democracy, is expected to appear in court in Naypyidaw on Monday. She was placed under house arrest in February when the military launched a coup, provoking defiant protests from the public who demanded the return of democracy. In a statement on Friday, the UN high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet, said the country had “gone from being a fragile democracy to a human rights catastrophe”. After peaceful street demonstrations were crushed by military violence, a growing number of grassroots defence groups have formed to defend themselves against military attacks – at times using little more than homemade hunting rifles to protect their neighbours. Some groups have received support from armed insurgent organisations, which have fought with the army for decades, seeking greater autonomy. The military has deployed heavy weaponry, including airstrikes, against armed groups and civilians to crush such resistance. More than 108,000 people have fled their homes in Kayah state alone, according to the UN. “The military leadership is singularly responsible for this crisis, and must be held to account,” Bachelet said. Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team believes she has little knowledge of what is happening across the country, where key services – such as schools and hospitals – have been brought to a standstill by an anti-coup strike. She has been unable to access the internet, watch television or read anything other than military-controlled media, according to her defence lawyer Khin Maung Zaw. Before her trial, her lawyers have been granted permission to speak with her for just three 30-minute sessions, with the final meeting scheduled for Monday morning. “The time is not sufficient. She even said: six cases, and 30 minutes, it is five minutes for each case,” Khin Maung Zaw said. Aung San Suu Kyi faces a wide range of allegations, though it is not clear which will be dealt with first by the courts. She is accused of breaching coronavirus restrictions during last year’s election, inciting public unrest, violating a telecommunications law and import law by possessing walkie-talkies, and breaking the official secrets act. On Thursday, further charges were announced in state media, which reported that she was accused of accepting $600,000 cash and 11.4kg of gold, in bribes, and misusing her authority to rent land. This case has not yet been referred to the court, according to Khin Maung Zaw. If she is convicted on each charge, and sentencing is handed down consecutively, she “will not be released in a lifetime”, he said. “She is quite experienced, so she is well composed. She doesn’t seem to be afraid or depressed,” he said. “She seemed as determined as ever.” David Mathieson, an independent Myanmar analyst, said the charges were clearly an attempt by the military to justify the coup and discredit Aung San Suu Kyi. “It’s really just to send the message that she was a traitor, corrupt, she thwarted the elections and did it for financial gain, she pretended to be a democratic purist but deep down she was just a cheap crook,” he said. “I don’t think too many people are going to believe it, because look who it is coming from.” At least 861 people have been killed by the junta, according to the advocacy group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), while almost 4,800 people are in detention or have been sentenced by the military since it seized control of the country. Protesters, poets, medics, journalists and social media celebrities are among those held. Reports of torture in prisons are widespread. On Thursday, at a trial held at a makeshift court inside a prison, 32 young activists were sentenced to between two and four years in prison for charges including incitement and unlawful assembly, according to local media. A dissident who was released told the independent outlet Myanmar Now that activists had been tortured during interrogation. Pictures printed by the news site showed dark red lashes covering a man’s back. Bachelet said she was “deeply troubled by reports of detainees being tortured” and raised concern over the collective punishment of family members of activists. One mother of an activist was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in place of her son on 28 May, according to the UN. Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial is scheduled take place at a court inside Naypyidaw council, according to Khin Maung Zaw. “As a lawyer practising in Myanmar I have an ethical duty to trust our jurisdiction, our supreme court and subordinate courts,” he said. But he added that, having worked on Aung San Suu Kyi’s case, and those of other political leaders, he was doubtful there would be a fair trial. It is expected that plaintiffs will give evidence next week, and that Aung San Suu Kyi will be cross-examined during the first week of July. However, previous scheduled hearings have been delayed..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: While Myanmar’s cities become military occupations, conflict persists in the ethnic borderlands
Description: "Following the February coup, the violence used by the security forces against civilian protestors in Myanmar’s towns and cities has shocked public opinion around the world. But, as Naw Hsa Moo and Dominique Dillabough-Lefebvre explain in this commentary, such tactics have long been used by the Myanmar armed forces in military operations in the country’s ethnic states and regions. Awareness is now building and, as they argue, the military coup has brought new understanding and sympathy between pro-democracy and ethnic nationality movements. Since the seizure of power by the military State Administration Council (SAC) on 1 February, mass protests have swept towns and cities in every state and region in Myanmar. As the days have passed by, civilians have faced the brunt of an increasingly aggressive response from the national armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, whose indiscriminate use of force has now led to over 70 killed, countless injured, and more than 2000 people detained. And yet, despite the heightened use of military force, the general public throughout the country continue to stand in defiance, leading creative protests, with people of diverse ethnicities and backgrounds joining strikes and the civil disobedience movement. All nationality peoples are being impacted. For lowland Bamar (Burman) people, the majority ethnic group, the current repression against civilians carries terrifying reverberations of past violent state-led responses towards demonstrators, most notably during the 1988 pro-democracy protests. However, for those living in many non-Bamar areas, the militarisation and pervasive sense of fear accompanying current events are sadly all too familiar. For many decades, they have been regular features of daily life, notably in the Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan States. Karen State in Myanmar’s Southeast is a poignant example of such struggles. Home to what is often considered the world’s longest-running civil war, conflict has escalated between the Tatmadaw and the armed opposition Karen National Union (KNU), with over 6,000 civilians displaced from their villages since the Tatmadaw intensified military operations in December 2020. The majority people living here identify as Karen, one of the country’s largest nationality groups, and are largely farming communities living in forested hills and winding valleys that run down the Thailand border. In response to the twin threats of military incursions and the SAC coup, villagers across Kler Lwee Htu (Nyaunglebin) and Mutraw (Hpapun) Districts have been regularly demonstrating, demanding the removal of the Tatmadaw from their lands and expressing solidarity with the protest movement across the country. Whether in conditions of war or peace, Karen communities have faced the same challenges in every era of government since the country’s independence in 1948. A ceasefire was agreed between the government and the KNU in 2012 but, to date, this has not brought about a significant reduction in militarisation in many areas. Rather, the patterns of conflict and Tatmadaw encroachment have continued. In particular, the recent increase in Tatmadaw activity is linked to road-building, the expansion of a network of military roads in northern Karen State that first began during offensives in the 1990s. The detrimental consequences for local villagers are profound. Naw Ghay Hai is the principal of Keh Der school in Kler Lwee Htu District in the KNU 3rd Brigade area. But, as she explained, there is no benefit to the local population: only an increase in land loss and fear: “The road being built crosses through the paddy fields of local farmers, destroying the irrigation systems in the fields, seriously affecting the livelihoods of local people. They [Tatmadaw troops] build camps nearby that are causing the displacement of local villagers, and they are shelling around nearby villages. When local people hear the sound of guns and mortars, they obviously flee out of fear, and don’t dare to return.” The latest military incursions are now compounding a worsening pattern of land loss and displacement that has built up among the local population over several decades. According to the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People, approximately 30,000 people have been displaced in the local area since Tatmadaw “regional clearance” operations were initiated in the 1990s. Military offensives and continuing clashes have caused a loss of shelter, a lack of access to healthcare and difficulties in delivering food supplies to displaced villagers, putting children and elderly people especially at risk. Displaced villagers now live scattered in different locations in several townships across northern Karen State. For many communities, this is not their first experience of flight. Villagers in Keh Der village tract recently explained to staff members from KESAN, a Karen civil society organisation, that they had started to hear the distant sound of gunshots and shelling from 12 December last year. Although this initially appeared to be occurring some way from their village, everyone was worried. Then, on 11 February – ten days after the coup, Tatmadaw forces moved closer to the village and people started to flee. As the troops moved in, they destroyed the food stores of displaced farmers, seized their livestock, burnt down their houses and, in nearby areas, forced villagers to act as porters to carry supplies for them as they continued their military sweep. For the local peoples, this latest displacement brought back many memories of sufferings in the past. Constant insecurity and the arbitrary use of force have long been a mainstay in the lives of local people in this region. Saw Lo Wah, head of Keh Der village tract, remembered first fleeing from the Tatmadaw as a child in the 1960s. Those who were captured were forced by the soldiers to work as porters, an especially pervasive and egregious abuse of human rights. As he explained: “Many people were injured or killed when they worked as porters for the military. For example, my father stepped on a landmine when he was a porter for the Tatmadaw. This was the case for many people as the Tatmadaw used Karen villagers to sweep the area for landmines, usually at gunpoint.” Such experiences continued into adulthood, with Saw Lo Wah describing the situation as having grown “increasingly worse” during the late 1990s: “When the military came, one family had to flee so quickly that they were unable to take their two children from their home, and the Burmese military burnt down their house. When the family returned, the children were gone.” This was by no means the end of local suffering. For his part, Saw Lo Wah had to build his own home on three subsequent occasions, but each time Tatmadaw troops burned it down again, with all of his family’s possessions inside. After six decades of military-dominated rule and a new regime in power, Saw Lo Wah’s assessment is stark. But he is expressing a view of the latest military takeover that can be frequently heard among communities in different parts of the country today: “This is the root cause of our poverty. The Tatmadaw doesn’t care if you are young or old, male or female, they will kill everybody. They spare nobody.”.....A backdrop of conflict: militarisation as a way of life: Internal military conflicts have long been central to the nation-building ambitions of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar. In a country where national identity has long been linked to a particularly “racialised” vision of ethnicity, the national armed forces have been engaged in protracted warfare with a wide range of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), amongst them the KNU, since independence from Great Britain in 1948. During these years, a simplistic vision of national politics has often pervaded popular imagination and discourse. In recent decades, this vision has been marked by the country’s democratic hero, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), who – it was hoped – were gradually leading the country on a path away from state failure and international isolationism towards democratisation and respect for human rights. These expectations reached a pinnacle when the NLD won the 2015 general election, assuming government office the following year. Yet amidst the period of economic liberalisation that followed the 2011 shift to a nominally civilian system of government, armed conflicts have persisted in ethnic nationality areas outside of the Bamar-dominated heartlands in the centre of the country. While the army's blood-stained campaign against the Rohingya population in 2017 was the subject of much international media coverage, the Tatmadaw has also continued to carry out “anti-insurgency” campaigns against EAOs among several other nationality groups, including the Buddhist Rakhine people who also hail from Rakhine State. The cycles of conflict within the country are yet to be ended. Many nationality peoples have been affected. Following the expulsion of over 750,000 Rohingya people, the Tatmadaw became locked in an increasingly bloody conflict with an emergent Rakhine force known as the United League of Army-Arakan Army (ULA-AA). But, after the NLD’s accession to office, the Tatmadaw also escalated military “clearance operations” forcibly displacing local populations in the Kachin, Karen and Shan States as well, severely impacting on the security and livelihoods of farming communities who depend on land for their survival. Accurate humanitarian statistics are difficult to assemble from different parts of the country. But up to 10,000 people are believed to have died during Tatmadaw operations in the past five years, while over a million civilians are currently displaced from their homes, either living as refugees in neighbouring countries or in displacement camps in the hills. The evidence of a pervasive culture of human rights violations is deeply troubling. Today Tatmadaw actions during the events of the past few years are the focus of ongoing human rights investigations for potential war crimes by the International Criminal Court, International Court of Justice and UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Finding a political language, though, that unites peoples and addresses the conflict challenges in inclusive ways has historically proven difficult. Distinctions between “state” and “non-state” actors have often been opaque within the geographic boundaries of Myanmar. Shifting alliances between the Tatmadaw, ethnic nationality forces, government-backed militias and local military strongmen have been one of the most persistent realities in defining the functioning of “State” in many parts of the country. Today over 20 EAOs remain active in different nationality lands, from Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal to the Tanintharyi Region in Myanmar’s far south. In this context, projections of national unity become a reflection of the complex relationship between the Tatmadaw at the political centre and the peripheries where diverse nationality peoples live in uplands surrounding the Ayeyarwady plains. Over the decades, continued exploitation of the wealth of the resource-rich borderlands has been central to the development of Myanmar state, much in the same way that the plunder of native lands, slavery and a western expansionism was central in the shaping of the American national imaginary. Much of this economy is secretive and under-reported, but Myanmar’s ethnic states are home to large mineral reserves, illicit drug production and lucrative cross-border trades from which powerful elites and outside interests – not local peoples – mostly profit. Compounding the marginalisation of local peoples, there is often a large knowledge gap in the outside world about the harsh living conditions in the country’s conflict zones. Such a lack of understanding is a constant source of frustration for ethnic nationality peoples trying to make common cause with their fellow countryman, yet find themselves stymied by urban-rural differences as well as ethnic, religious and linguistic divides. Even many well-informed urban Burmese only have a limited grasp of what is happening in the hills. The same lack of awareness exists in the international community, where the confusing array of armed groups poses significant barriers for foreign journalists, policy-makers and other outside actors who seek to understand some of the longest-running conflicts in modern Asian history. For this reason, the failure of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership to address conflict and the grievances of non-Bamar peoples remains one of the party’s most notable failures during its time in government office. The 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which the NLD-led administration inherited from its quasi-civilian predecessor, was a cornerstone in a faltering peace process that not only failed to include a majority of the strongest EAOs in the country but was also one in which the none of three words in its title could be said to be true: i.e. it was not nationwide, a ceasefire or an agreement. To try and pick up the political momentum, the NLD inaugurated a 21st Century Panglong Conference in August 2016 with a promise to re-energise the peace process. But the government never acknowledged the NCA’s many failings. The NCA’s largest signatories in terms of EAO combatants – the KNU and Restoration Council of Shan State – could hardly be seen to be representative of the entire country and both continued to clash with the Tatmadaw. At the same time, most of the eight other EAOs that signed the NCA were significantly smaller, some of which had never seriously fought with the government while others, notably the Chin National Front, had not had protracted clashes with the Tatmadaw since the early 1990s. Equally damaging to the credibility of the NCA, there were powerful and well-organised EAOs in the north of the country that were either not allowed by the Tatmadaw to join the accord or decided to boycott the process altogether. Pre-eminent EAOs which never joined the NCA include the United Wa State Party and Shan State Progress Party which have formal ceasefires with the government, and the Kachin Independence Organisation, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and ULA-AA that do not. The ethno-political landscape is now highly uncertain. Following the coup, the NCA EAO-signatories collectively issued a statement on 20 February refusing to recognise the new regime as a legitimate power, and leading to a cessation of further talks. This represents a de facto breakdown in a ceasefire which, since its inception, had given little assurances to NCA signatories that the Myanmar armed forces would hold true to their word. For ceasefire EAOs, this represents a dilemma. According to Lt-Col. Saw La Shwe Hai from the KNU’s armed wing, Tatmadaw officers claim to follow the NCA codes of conduct and that they will try to resolve issues through political dialogue, but they do not follow through in practice: “Instead they try and control more territory, build roads and further infrastructure and keep sending more reinforcements… They are trying to gradually control our area, bit by bit, but pretend they are following agreements… they couldn’t be lying any more”. For ethnic nationality communities in the conflict-zones, such experiences are hardly new. But there is evidence that the scale of human rights violations across the country since the SAC’s seizure of power is bringing about a change in attitudes among the Bamar-majority population as well. Amidst the protests in the cities, incidents are being documented that the Myanmar military has been looting shops and houses, stealing food from street vendors and taking livestock from markets. Understanding the reality of such violence from the perspective of those living in the ethnic states and borderlands sheds light on the nature of the ethnocratic state-building policies of governments since independence and the ideology of the Tatmadaw. Echoing this, a vocal minority of Bamar people have begun apologising for failing to stand behind ethnic peoples as they faced persecution. A female activist, who asked to remain anonymous, explained that “the intimidation, harassment and violence by the police and soldiers are nothing new” but that the “the violence and oppression has now been extended to the cities”. She continued: “We are not even experiencing the brutality of the military yet in the cities, like those people in Rakhine experienced every day and every night. Those in Kachin. Those in Karen. Those in Shan. Now we too have to defend ourselves.”.....Conclusion: As the military coup enters its second month, people across the country are increasingly faced with the striking parallels between the ongoing indiscriminate use of force, intimidation and suppression against anti-coup protestors and civilians in the towns and the military’s historical and ongoing systematic brutality in Myanmar’s ethnically diverse borderlands. For populations in these areas, this has long been part of their lived experience. But for many young Bamar people in the cities, a growing awareness of this offers important lessons for a country coming to grips with the reinstatement of a military dictatorship amidst longstanding ethnic strife. Such sentiments are not only rising in urban areas. Much of Myanmar’s largely rural population have also long faced the brunt of military-enabled land confiscations and repressive practices, keeping the majority of the population in poverty. As journalist and author Carlos Sardiña Galache succinctly put it: “The Tatmadaw has always portrayed itself as the only institution capable of preserving Burma's unity, and this coup is proving the point in an unintended way: virtually the whole country seems to be united in rejecting the coup and the Tatmadaw itself.” Now that these diverse groups are coming together, new alliances are beginning to emerge amidst the chaos. Although Myanmar’s future remains far from certain, the coup has created circumstances through which people in towns and cities across the country can better empathise with the long-suffering plight of residents of the war-torn lands inhabited by the Karens and other ethnic nationality peoples. Written in collaboration with members of the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) conducting on the ground interviews..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Transnational Institute (TNI)
Date of publication: 2021-03-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-12
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Title: Film festival highlights Myanmar’s long struggle for democracy
Sub-title: Online film festival that runs to June 20 aims to draw attention to Myanmar’s political crisis while raising money for groups inside the country striving to restore democracy and alleviate hardship.
Description: "Mr Kenneth Wong and his family left Myanmar soon after witnessing the military gun down unarmed protesters on the streets of Yangon in 1988. For Wong, a Burmese language lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley, there’s a painful sense of deja vu over the situation in Myanmar. He was a university student in 1988 when the military violently suppressed a national uprising in which many of his friends participated. In the decades since, Wong was encouraged by the how much Myanmar had changed each time he visited. Then came the coup on February 1. “The things I’m seeing are things I hoped the new generation would never have to experience,” he told Frontier. Wong, who is also a poet and artist, began looking for a way to support the anti-coup struggle through art. He got together with a group of filmmakers and directors based in San Francisco and began sounding out Myanmar filmmakers and distributors with the idea of holding an online film festival, with all proceeds going towards humanitarian and pro-democracy groups inside the country. These discussions resulted in the Burma Spring Benefit Film Festival, which features more than 30 films from or about Myanmar, and runs until June 20. Helping to spearhead the concept was Gaetano Kazuo Maida, the executive director of the Buddhist Film Foundation/International Buddhist Film Festival. “The filmmaker community really responded to our urgent invitations,” said Maida. “All of the filmmakers that we reached out to were very generous, knowing that this was the cause,” added Wong. The film festival has an added poignancy because of the regime’s targeting of Myanmar’s top artists, including actors, filmmakers and bloggers. A fellow film festival organiser, Min Htin Ko Ko Gyi, who founded the annual Human Rights Human Dignity Film Festival, was arrested on the day of the coup. In total, the military has issued arrest warrants for 120 filmmakers, actors, celebrities and journalists for opposing the coup. “The junta recognises that these entertainers have an incredibly powerful voice and so they target them,” Wong said. One of the most recent filmmakers to be arrested was Ma Aeint, whose latest film, Money has Four Legs, directed by Maung Sun and released last year, was about censorship in Myanmar. Ma Eaint’s family haven’t been able to contact her since she was detained by police in early June. “We want to get in touch with her her as soon as possible because the interrogation centers are known for torture,” said her sister, Ma Su Wai. Many of the titles in the Burma Spring Benefit festival encapsulate the sense of deja vu Wong is feeling, at a time when the military is once again in control of the levers of power and the people are once again fighting for democracy. Burma VJ, a 2008 Best Documentary nominee at the Academy Awards in the United States, shows how thousands of monks led a campaign of nonviolent resistance against the military junta in protests in 2007 known as the Saffron Revolution. Dozens were killed and hundreds arrested, and the Danish team that made the documentary had to smuggle their footage out of the country. Fellow festival organiser Ms Jeanne Marie Hallacy said the films in the festival were selected both for the strength of their storytelling and filmmaking craft, and their relevance for a general audience to understand the country’s prolonged struggle for democracy and human rights. One of the newest films to be screened, Burma Spring 21, is unique in that the five-minute film was shot and edited by an anonymous Myanmar filmmaker soon after the coup. Although filmmakers would ordinarily covet acclaim for a completed project, fear of being on a government blacklist and facing potential reprisals means that the message takes precedence. “Facts and figures are easy to get online,” Wong said. “But what’s difficult to get are the explanations about the socio-political issues that spawned the current crisis. This is the type of information that is better discovered in books, films, and particularly in documentary films.” A highlight of the film festival will take place on June 11 when it is due to be addressed by two members of the National Unity Government: U Aung Myo Min, the minister for human rights, and Naw Susannah Hla Hla Soe, the minister for women, youth and children affairs. The film festival is just one event in one US city that is helping to create awareness and raise funds for people resisting the coup in Myanmar. Elsewhere around the world, local activist groups have been holding rallies and raising funds for the protest movement. Wong is working with the International Network of Engaged Buddhists to transfer much-needed funds to civil servants who have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement and are refusing to work under the junta. “These are lifelines to them, because if you are participating in the CDM, a salary is no longer available,” said Wong. Although Myanmar faces an uncertain future, Wong hopes for the day when the Burma Spring Benefit Film Festival will no longer aim to raise awareness and funds, and will instead showcase a renewed entertainment scene in all its creative glory. During his trips to Myanmar, he saw clear signs that the country was moving towards a better future after nearly half a century of military rule. “There were a lot of young people who were launching their own startups and drawing inspiration from Silicon Valley,” he said. “At tea shops, taxi drivers and waiters were eager to talk about politics and express their views without [having to worry about] being arrested. I felt that these were signs that democracy was struggling to be born. So this film festival is about creating awareness.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2021-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-11
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Title: Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi faces most serious corruption charge yet
Sub-title: Myanmar's military authorities have charged deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi with corruption, the most serious charge laid against her to date.
Description: "Ms Suu Kyi is accused of accepting cash and gold in bribes, and faces up to 15 years in jail if found guilty. She faces six other charges relating to alleged illegal imports of walkie-talkies and inciting public unrest. The former State Counsellor was arrested on 1 February when the military seized power in a coup. She has since been held under house arrest, and little has been seen or heard of her apart from brief court appearances. A press release by the military council on Thursday said Ms Suu Kyi had accepted $600,000 (£425,000) in bribes and seven pieces of gold. It also alleged that the previous civilian government - the National League for Democracy (NLD) - had lost significant sums of money in land deals. Besides Ms Suu Kyi, several other former officials face similar corruption and bribery charges. Prior to this, the most serious charge filed against Ms Suu Kyi had accused her of breaking the official secrets act - which carries a term of up to 14 years in jail. Myanmar coup: What is happening and why? The small embattled town that stood up to the army Street tales from Myanmar: 'Take care of our baby if I die' The 'fallen stars' from Myanmar's deadliest day Myanmar's military seized power earlier in February on accusations of voter fraud. But independent election monitors say the election was largely free and fair, and the charges against Ms Suu Kyi have been widely criticised as politically motivated. The coup triggered widespread demonstrations, and Myanmar's military has brutally cracked down on pro-democracy protesters. They have killed more than 800 people and detained nearly 5,000 to date, according to the monitoring group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).....Myanmar in profile: Myanmar, also known as Burma, became independent from Britain in 1948. For much of its modern history it has been under military rule Restrictions began loosening from 2010 onwards, leading to free elections in 2015 and the installation of a government led by veteran opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi the following year In 2017, Myanmar's army responded to attacks on police by Rohingya militants with a deadly crackdown, driving more than half a million Rohingya Muslims across the border into Bangladesh in what the UN later called a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing"..."
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
Date of publication: 2021-06-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-10
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Title: Responding to the Myanmar Coup
Sub-title: Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°166
Description: "The Myanmar military took the world by surprise on 1 February, staging a coup d’état that abruptly curtailed the country’s democratic transition and has sparked mass protests that could lead to deadly violence. The generals say their move is con-stitutional, alleging fraud in November 2020 elections that saw the National League for Democracy (NLD) defeat the military-backed party. These claims lack substantiation. The detention of civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as her anointed president, Win Myint, has generated immense popular anger. Foreign governments are now grappling with how to respond. Some (largely Western) governments threaten sanctions to punish democratic backsliding; the U.S. has already imposed some re- strictions. Asian powers that have expressed concern focus on the risk of instability. Governments that impose sanctions should adopt measures that target coup leaders and insulate Myanmar’s people and broader economy from their effects. Regional governments should consider such steps to protect regional stability. All external actors should cooperate to prevent violence. Complicating efforts by foreign governments to react is a dynamic situation on the ground. The new regime has tried to tamp down protests by issuing a curfew order that prohibits public gatherings of five or more people, rolling back some reforms that protected civil liberties and using heavy-handed crowd control devices such as water cannons and rubber bullets (compounded, some reports suggest, by live fire in some instances). Still, demonstrations show no sign of abating. Indeed, the junta’s sharp response, which resulted in the reported killing of at least one person, appears to have drawn even more people onto the streets, including in the capital city of Naypyitaw, suggesting significant support among government workers. The security forces’ approach could take an even darker turn fast. Soldiers and armoured vehicles have begun to reinforce the police lines and, should the generals become impatient with the status quo, could easily become the sharp end of a bloody crackdown, as has happened in the past. Responses around the world have varied. Many governments denounced the military takeover. The UN Security Council issued a press statement expressing “deep concern” about the “arbitrary detention” of members of the government, calling for the release of those detained and emphasising the need to “uphold democratic institutions and processes, refrain from violence, and fully respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”. For Western governments invested in Myanmar’s democratic transition, initial statements were only an opening salvo. U.S. President Joe Biden has already approved sanctions on coup leaders, their business interests and close kin, and redirected more than $40 million of aid from the Myanmar government to civil society. New Zealand rejected “the legitimacy of the militaryled government” and suspended high-level military and political contacts. Asian governments and commentators have been more muted; many expressed concern for regional stability, but prominent voices have cautioned against a severe international reaction unlikely, in their eyes, to sway the generals.Western leaders will have to thread a needle. Targeted sanctions and the like can serve as a signal to the generals in Myanmar and others similarly inclined elsewhere. Sanctions might impose costs that will not reverse the coup but could offer modest leverage or deterrence in the future. Some measures, such as cutting off weapons shipments, can also help ensure those governments previously supplying arms are not complicit should the military again use force against Myanmar’s people. Yet sanctions should be formulated with a clear grasp of their shortfalls. Prior to Myanmar’s transition that began in 2010, the U.S., EU and others imposed ferocious sanctions that, alongside the junta’s economic mismanagement, harmed the population. The sanctions alienated Myanmar’s neighbours, which saw them as disproportionate, creating an unhelpful West-versus-East dynamic that inhibited cooperation. Sanctions did not play a decisive role in Myanmar’s 2011 democratic opening. Steering a policy course today requires humility about and historical perspective on external actors’ limited sway over internal developments. Still, outside powers can take useful steps. Governments wanting to signal the importance of a return to democracy should – as the U.S. has done – adopt tailored measures that seek to punish those responsible for the 1 February actions but avoid penalising the country’s population who are the coup’s victims and, in many cases, are risking their lives protesting it. Such punitive measures could include sanctions on military-owned enterprises, provided they do not hurt the broader economy and the people. Myanmar’s neighbours should join these efforts – whether or not, given their own systems, they are concerned about democracy in Myanmar – to help push the generals onto to a more stable path. All governments should suspend delivery and sales of weapons and other defence and dual-use equipment during this volatile period and maintain this policy until genuine civilian government is restored..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication: 2021-02-16
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-08
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Title: China supports ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar Junta
Description: "China supports the implementation of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) engagement with Myanmar and hopes for the restoration of peace and stability, said its ambassador to Myanmar during a meeting with the junta leader. Ambassador Chen Hai met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on Saturday in Naypyitaw, before Sunday’s special China-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting to commemorate 30 years of relations between Beijing and the regional bloc. The meeting, which is co-chaired by Myanmar and China, is due to run until Tuesday in the Chinese city of Chongqing. The junta-appointed foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin reportedly attended Sunday’s meetings. The Chinese embassy posted on Facebook that Chen stressed, as Myanmar’s neighbor, China “will continue to play a constructive role”. Its statement said: “China sincerely hopes for the earlier restoration of peace and stability in Myanmar and supports the implementation of consensus by ASEAN and Myanmar.” A diplomatic source said the Chongqing meetings kicked off several days ago with SME (small- and medium-sized enterprises) and media forums. Myanmar attended both forums “in a low-profile way”, according to the source. On Friday, Asean’s Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi from Brunei and Brunei’s foreign affairs minister Erywan Yusof met the senior general in Naypyitaw to discuss the special summit held in late April in Jakarta. The non-democratic, oil-rich state currently chairs ASEAN. But Myanmar’s parallel civilian National Unity Government says it has lost faith in the regional bloc as it has failed to engage with both sides, ignoring the NUG’s approaches and only engaging with the junta. Following the ASEAN summit on April 24, which was attended by Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing, China proposed this month’s meeting in China with working-level talks on the crisis. Chen has reportedly held several informal, secret meetings with junta leaders ahead of Saturday’s talks in Naypyitaw. Military-control newspapers said on Sunday that meetings focused on “bilateral cooperation” and “stability” along the border, which extends over 2,000 kilometers, and the presence of numerous powerful ethnic minority armed groups along the frontier. China’s state-controlled Global Times said Myanmar’s authorities are willing to maintain communications with China. The newspaper posted on Facebook: “Myanmar is willing to work with ASEAN to maintain the domestic stability and coordinate implementation of relevant consensus, said Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing.” The reference to “Myanmar leader” angered many social media users. One user said the military chief is not the country’s leader and does not represent the people. Another comment read: “We don’t believe in ASEAN. It is not working for Myanmar’s people but for the terrorist junta.” Anti-regime protesters have been calling on the international community not to recognize the junta and its governing body, State Administrative Council. However, China has not denounced the coup and prevented United Nations Security Council intervention while looking to influence ASEAN, according to observers..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-06-06
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Importance of Ethnic Minorities to Myanmar’s Future
Sub-title: Just as during the decades-long civil war and recent elections, Myanmar’s ethnic minorities will be pivotal in the post-coup status quo
Description: "The diverse ethnic minorities in Myanmar have a long and often troubled history with the Burmese military that seized power in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, spanning across the bloody civil war, as well as the country’s democratic reforms in the past decade. Ethnic relations and the delicate, changing balances of power between the Bamar majority, the Tatmadaw, the civilian government officials, and amongst themselves have long dictated the reality and prospects of Myanmar’s politics, peace, and prosperity. In this policy paper, Michael Martin, a long-time Myanmar expert, traces the history of ethnic minorities in the 2008 constitution, the three ensuing parliamentary elections, and now the fluid and contentious political environment after the February 1 coup. Martin outlines three potential outcomes for the future of Myanmar, either federal democracy, fragmentation, or military power consolidation—all of whose outcomes intrinsically depend on the complex political and security dynamics of the ethnic minorities dispersed across the country.....About this Series: This paper is part of Stimson’s Civil-Military Relations in Myanmar series, which seeks to analyze the complex relationship between the civilian and military sides of the Burmese government and the implications for the country’s future peace and development. Since the founding of the country, the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, has held a unique and privileged status across institutions of power. And despite movement toward democracy in the past decade, the relationship between the civilian and military sides remains deeply unsettled. This contest for power and the political, security, and constitutional crises it creates have had far-reaching effects on Myanmar’s political processes, its ongoing civil war, the Rohingya crisis, and regional peace and stability—a reality most recently and poignantly seen in the 2021 coup d’état staged by the Tatmadaw against the civilian government. The series brings together the expertise of leading experts on Myanmar, Southeast Asia, democratization, and policy to uncover the complex dynamics between the two sides. The series provides key insights and recommendations for disentangling the contentious relationship and charting a path forward for relevant stakeholders in Myanmar. More than three months have passed since Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the Tatmadaw staged their palace coup in Myanmar (Burma), setting up a new military junta entitled the State Administrative Council (SAC). The actions of the nation’s ethnic minorities1 and their associated ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) will be critical if Min Aung Hlaing and the SAC are to be defeated, either by political or military means. The failure to secure the support of the ethnic minorities and their EAOs could either doom the people of Myanmar to many more years of oppressive military rule or lead to the fragmentation of the nation into several smaller sovereign states. To properly appreciate the importance of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities and their EAOs to the nation’s future requires an examination of the country’s political developments since 2010, Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to depose the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military Union Government, and the role of the ethnic minorities and their EAOs in determining Myanmar’s future. However, in order to understand why the ethnic minorities and the EAOs are so critical to Myanmar’s future, it is necessary to first examine the Tatmadaw’s original plan for the political transition of Myanmar into a “flourishing and disciplined democracy.”2.....The Tatmadaw’s Plan for Myanmar’s Political Transition: On August 30, 2003, Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced that Myanmar’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), would undertake a “seven-point roadmap for democracy.” 3 The roadmap called for the reconvening of a constitutional convention that was suspended in 1996, the drafting of a new constitution for the nation, the adoption of the constitution in a national referendum, the holding of nationwide parliamentary elections, and the transfer of power from the SPDC to the new government.4..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Stimson Center
Date of publication: 2021-06-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-07
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Title: Myanmar’s Opposition Wants U.S. Intervention. Here Are Some Options.
Sub-title: Washington has choices, from imposing no-fly zones to tightening sanctions.
Description: "While the U.S. Congress is considering modifications of the Biden administration’s modest sanctions on Myanmar’s military junta, some voices among the protesters have called on the United States and the international community to consider armed intervention. Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations for the pre-coup Union Government, Kyaw Moe Tun, who continues to oppose the junta from abroad, asked the U.N. Security Council to enforce a no-fly zone over the country and impose a global arms embargo. The United States has had a unilateral arms embargo on trade with Myanmar since 1988, and Congress has placed restrictions on U.S. relations with the country’s military since 2011. In addition, there are a range of options on the table for harder interventions, although some are more plausible than others. This article does not advocate or endorse any U.S. military action in Myanmar in response to the Feb. 1 coup; the goal is to provide a brief overview of the options and examine the merits of each option. Given the impending end to two decades of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, military options in Myanmar are unlikely to be popular with either the Biden administration or Congress. Yet, as opposition calls for aid grow, it’s worth examining what the scope of U.S. military action could be. The most dramatic—and unlikely—option would be a full-scale invasion of Myanmar, either unilaterally (like the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989) or multilaterally (like the 1990 war against Iraq). Such an invasion would probably focus on the nation’s central axis along the Irrawaddy River, including the key cities of Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Yangon. Because of the presence of anti-junta ethnic armed organizations in the seven ethnic minority states of Myanmar (Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan) that have long fought the central government, U.S. forces would probably see limited actions in those parts of Myanmar. Although Myanmar’s military has reportedly purchased some advanced military equipment and supplies from China, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine, advancing U.S. troops would be unlikely to face sustained resistance. Myanmar’s military has sustained serious casualties in the last two years in fighting against ethnic militias—such as the Arakan Army, the Kachin Independence Army, and the Karen National Liberation Army—which do not possess the resources of the U.S. military. Not surprisingly, morale among Myanmar’s security forces is reportedly low, with many soldiers wishing to resign or defect to the anti-junta opposition. While an actual invasion might be relatively simple, an occupation would be much more difficult. The recent unity in Myanmar in opposition to the Feb. 1 coup does not extend to any consensus on what form of government should be established after the removal of the military junta. For example, the proposed National Unity Government announced by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, a small group of largely National League for Democracy politicians who were supposed to become members of the legislature before the coup overturned the election results, has received lukewarm support from the major ethnic armed groups and the civil society organizations behind the civil disobedience movement. Following an invasion, the Biden administration could find itself responsible for a politically fractious nation—and face a wary reaction from some of the ethnic armed organizations. A U.S. invasion of Myanmar also would likely be condemned by China, Russia, Thailand, and other nations. China would perceive the presence of U.S. forces in a neighboring country as a serious security threat and increase its military forces along the border. Thailand would certainly be concerned, given that its current government is the result of a similar military coup in 2014. Without the support of other nations, the United States could find itself isolated and subject to widespread international criticism. Another military option that has been suggested is for the United States to establish a no-fly zone over Myanmar to prevent the Myanmar military from using its fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters against the ethnic militias and the local groups known as civil defense forces that are springing up in various parts of the country. A no-fly zone would rebalance the fighting to the advantage of the civil and ethnic armed groups, possibly leading to the defeat of the Myanmar military. One of the main challenges of this proposal would be establishing and maintaining the logistical support to sustain the no-fly zone. An aircraft carrier off the coast of Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal could be sufficient to provide the air coverage, but some form of land-based supply system would also be necessary, especially if the no-fly zone became a sustained effort. It would be difficult to find a nearby nation willing to allow the United States to set up such a logistical support center. India is not a likely candidate; nor is Thailand. Australia and Japan are probably too far away to be practical alternatives. Also, while the elimination of air support for Myanmar’s troops would alter the situation on the battlefield, Myanmar’s military would still be able to deploy its artillery and other heavy land equipment. As such, it is unclear how significant a change the establishment of a no-fly zone would be in the balance of power in Myanmar’s ongoing and intensifying civil war. The creation of a blockade off of Myanmar’s coast is another military option. Such a blockade could include shutting down Myanmar’s natural gas and oil production, which is a major source of international revenue for the military junta. From a military perspective, the maintenance of a blockade would involve less resources than a no-fly zone. Myanmar does not have a blue-water navy of any size or capability to challenge a U.S. blockade. Yet most of Myanmar’s international trade is conducted by land, not by sea. Myanmar’s major trading partners are China and Thailand, and most of the goods are exchanged by land, thereby evading such a blockade. Both China and Thailand might be willing to assist Myanmar’s military junta by permitting blocked goods to enter Myanmar via their territory. The U.S. military could also conduct a limited number of airstrikes against key Myanmar military installations to undermine its ability to use its air force in the fighting against the ethnic armed groups and civil defense forces. It also could target Myanmar’s weapons and munitions factories. For many years, Myanmar’s military has been producing most of its light weapons and equipment in military-run factories. Airstrikes against Myanmar’s military air bases and/or its weapons factories could seriously compromise the junta’s ability to continue the civil war. An advantage of limited airstrikes over an invasion or the maintenance of a no-fly zone is it would involve a relatively discrete amount of time and resources, but it could seriously weaken the military. Also, U.S. casualties would be minimal, as the number of airstrikes necessary to seriously damage Myanmar’s air force and weapons production is fairly small given Myanmar’s minimal air defense capabilities. There would undoubtably be some international criticism of the airstrikes, most likely from China, Russia, and Thailand. It is unlikely that China would attempt to intercept the U.S. airstrikes, given the risk of direct confrontation. The airstrikes might also provide moral support for Myanmar’s opposition movement, as it would be a clear demonstration of U.S. opposition to the military junta. Yet there are downsides. First, the U.S. military would probably have to return periodically to attack the air bases and weapons factories again, after repairs had been made. Second, the damage caused by the airstrikes might not be sufficient to alter the military balance of power in favor of the opposition armed groups. Limited U.S. airstrikes in other nations, such as Libya and Syria, have not always proved to be as effective as hoped. A less discussed option is providing military assistance and training to the ethnic armed organizations and civil defense force in support of their war against the military junta. This could involve the provision of arms and military equipment to the major ethnic militias and the newly established civil ones, as well as combat training for their officers. Such a program would be a significant change in U.S. policy, which has denied such assistance and training to Myanmar’s military for more than 30 years. It would also clearly place the United States behind the opposition movement, which may not win the war against the Myanmar military. China, in contrast, has been a major provider of military assistance and training for both the Myanmar military and some of the major ethnic armed groups for decades. The provision of U.S. support to the ethnic militias would improve U.S. relations with those groups, but it may antagonize China in the process, unless there is an agreement between the two nations. Another important consideration is the long-term implications of U.S. military support for anti-government opposition forces. Recent U.S. experience with such endeavors has been rather mixed. In some cases, what were at one time allies became enemies, such as in Afghanistan. Given the history of disagreements between Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, supplying them with weapons and military training may precipitate an outbreak of these groups fighting each other after the defeat of the Myanmar military. A final option to consider is the further international isolation of Myanmar’s military, especially its commissioned officers. This could involve an international arms embargo, the freezing of military financial assets overseas, a travel embargo on the Myanmar military’s commissioned officers, and/or the instigation of criminal charges against the heads of the junta. Bertil Lintner, a renowned expert on Myanmar, recently wrote an article advocating the extraterritorial prosecution of the junta’s leaders as an alternative to the types of sanctions being implemented by the Biden administration and other governments. Previous efforts in the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar have been blocked by China and Russia. The U.N. General Assembly is supposed to consider a non-binding resolution calling for a global arms embargo on Myanmar; a proposal backed by the Biden administration. But in addition, the Biden administration could apply indirect pressure on nations to join the United States in isolating the Myanmar military. For example, it could make the continued provision of U.S. military assistance and training contingent on severing any ties to the Myanmar military. Alternatively, the U.S. Treasury could ban any American financial institution from providing financial services that involve the transfer of funds to accounts owned or controlled by the Myanmar military or its officers, as well as restrict financial services to foreign financial institutions that provide financial services to the Myanmar military. In its relative simplicity, and in following on from similar measures against Iran, this may be the most appealing option to the Biden administration and Congress—even if it doesn’t match the hopes of the opposition..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Foreign Policy" (USA)
Date of publication: 2021-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: On-The-Ground in Burma: Issue #4
Description: "This is the US campaign for Burma’s fourth monthly On-The-Ground in Burma briefer! This month’s briefer will focus on the ongoing situations between armed groups formed in ethnic states and the military, as well as how these conflicts affect the local civilians. It also includes discussions on ASEAN’s response, policies regarding arms embargo, and war crimes, but concentrates more on analyzing the increased number of IDPs and issues in ethnic states. This month’s briefer includes: An analysis on what’s in store for ethnic states, policy analysis, and critiques for ASEAN Six major policy recommendations A story by a Rohingya refugee An overview of IDP issues and rights abuses in each ethnic state As the conflict escalates in Myanmar between the militias, local armed groups, and the military, so has violence and rights deprivations of those in ethnic regions. The Tatmadaw feels comfortable attacking these areas because they are far from the prying eyes of the international media. This briefer intends to bring to attention the plight of these minorities at the hands of the military..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Campaign for Burma
Date of publication: 2021-06-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 2.51 MB
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Title: Myanmar risks state failure without significant increase in international pressure, The Elders warn
Description: "The Elders today called on the international community to intensify pressure on the military leadership in Myanmar to prevent the country descending into endemic violence and state failure. The UN, ASEAN and other regional and international actors must urgently step up their level of engagement to prevent consolidation of the coup, and give their full backing to a return to democratic, civilian rule. The Elders warned that the cost of inaction is high, as can be seen from other protracted conflicts worldwide and their humanitarian consequences. Although international media attention on Myanmar is receding, state violence, repression and coercion continue to be systematically deployed against civilians who stand up against the coup. More than 800 people have been killed by security forces since 1 February, and violence is escalating in many parts of the country. The impact of the crisis on health, education and other basic services has been devastating, and the economy is on the verge of collapse. Teachers who have been striking as part of the Civil Disobedience Movement have reportedly faced suspensions and threats by the military ahead of today’s deadline for public schools to reopen, risking further tensions and violence. Mary Robinson, Chair of The Elders and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said: “Myanmar is currently on a dangerous path towards state failure. The international community must stand firm in opposition to the military coup. Allowing the coup to succeed through inaction and disregard would further undermine the international rules-based order upon which global stability depends. Regional states and international organisations, notably the UN, should use all the tools at their disposal to convince the military of the urgent need for constructive dialogue between all relevant parties, as the only way out of the crisis." The Elders noted that divisions within the UN Security Council continue to impede concerted action, and they urged its Permanent Members to enable the Council to fulfil its obligation under the United Nations Charter to maintain global peace and security. Within the region, more than a month has passed since the ASEAN summit in Jakarta on 24 April, without visible progress on implementation of the commitments in the five-point plan. ASEAN must hold Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the coup leader, accountable for his adherence to the commitments agreed in Jakarta, without preconditions. Ban Ki-moon, Deputy Chair of The Elders and former UN Secretary-General, said: "Unfortunately, ASEAN is failing to live up to its mandate and responsibilities. It must now step up and play the crucial role expected of it by countries around the world in the resolution of this crisis. A visit by a high-level ASEAN delegation, to initiate dialogue with all parties, is long overdue. Myanmar’s regional neighbours have the levers in their hands to change the trajectory of this crisis. Now is the time to use them." The Elders warned that the State Administrative Council established following the coup does not have the legitimacy or authority to govern Myanmar. The threat by the military-appointed Union Election Commission to dissolve the National League for Democracy, which won an overwhelming majority in elections last November, only diminishes the junta’s legitimacy even further and exposes their fear of Myanmar’s people. The Elders reaffirmed their solidarity with the people of Myanmar, including those living outside its borders, in their quest for a better future based on democratic freedom, inclusion and prosperity..."
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Source/publisher: The Elders
Date of publication: 2021-06-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar pro-democracy artists vow: 'We will win'
Description: "On 1 June, it will be four months since a military coup overthrew Myanmar's elected government. Tens years of democratic reforms have been upended and bloody attempts to silence opposition have shocked the world. Those on the front line attempting to stand up to the regime are trying to delicately navigate through a new life of protest and safety. While pro-democracy demonstrations have mostly left the streets, the movement against the junta exists through other means of expression in other realms. In particular, it has made being an artist in Myanmar a dangerous business. "I'm sorry that I couldn't turn my camera… messy situation right here", illustrator Raven told RTÉ News over a secure line. Raven is one of many artists in Myanmar’s largest city Yangon who have been using art as a weapon against the country’s ruling junta, by exploring a digital canvas to showcase political messages against the February coup. Protests through paint, illustrations, images and words are a more secure place of demonstration, away from the violence on the streets. However, that is not to say it doesn’t come with its own risks. The sheer level and reach of this expression caught those in power off guard which has led to a clampdown to squeeze out any opposition voices. According to artists in Myanmar, art studios have been burnt down and state-sponsored news channels broadcast arrest warrant lists regularly that include influencers, actors, film makers, artists and graphic designers. The New York Times has reported that four poets have been killed and dozens imprisoned in the last couple of months. Poet Khet Thi, whose work declared resistance to the military, died in detention recently. His family said that his body was returned with the organs removed. Raven has a reluctance to give anything away about herself, out of fear for her safety. While working a full-time job she has been leading a double life, shielding herself online by using a fake name so she can "work harder and longer". She said: "I have been protesting physically on the streets, but when the shooting became serious and brutal, I kind of stopped going outside in person. "I've been illustrating a lot of stuff every day…listening to people listening to their stories, their ideas and trying to illustrate them and spread the message because it's the only thing you know I can do." Demonstrations against the coup have been the largest and bloodiest in decades. Myanmar was ruled by the armed forces from 1962 until 2011, when a new government began ushering in a return to civilian rule. However in February, the junta seized control again following a general election in which Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party won by a landslide. It was a vote the military claimed was rigged. Hundreds of people, including children, have been killed in the last four months. While the streets have become too risky for protest, the pro-democracy movement continues to live through art in the online world. The Hunger Games' three-fingered salute has become one of the major symbols, a defiant pose that gripped demonstrators from the beginning with interpretations of the move making its way through digital art. "Our objective is trying to reflect the people's voices as much as we can so that other people see it, hear it, because not everybody can go out" said Nyi Maw, a Myanmar filmmaker. He continued: "[The three-fingered salute] is a symbol that people can hold onto. It aligns with the people who in the beginning were demanding the three main objectives: to get democracy, to release the leaders, and to give the people's power back to the people". Red, the colour of danger, anger and violence, floods most of the imagery. Art collectives like the Raise Three Fingers group in Yangon have been founded through the frustration by artists and creatives - hoping to bring the global art community together and highlight the crisis happening in the country. "Clearly art has some kind of power, right? Because it's causing some kind of fear in the eyes of the junta" said a representative from the group to RTÉ News, who is also on the call with Raven. "We know that art is powerful because it transcends language", they said. "It can, it's emotional. It can get people to act. You don't need words, right? Anyone can feel moved by a piece of art you might ask", they added. The Raise Three Fingers (RTF) group lives online with creatives posting their work anonymously from countries around the world, in solidarity with the movement. TikTok, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram have served as platforms to spread their message far and wide, allowing this movement and many others, to grow, flourish and connect with users globally. They say access to the world at their finger trips has helped keep the situation in Myanmar on people’s agenda. It is what separates it radically from the previously pro-democracy movements that have come before in Myanmar. Unlike the revolutions of 1988 and 2007, the current protests in Myanmar are being led by a digitally savvy generation using hashtags, memes, visual graphics and social media to fight and shape the direction of the movement on a day-to-day basis. More than a decade ago SIM cards were exceptionally expensive, but after a series of reforms in the country during Aung San Suu Kyi’s time in government, this opened up the digital domain to the people of Myanmar. "There are figures to show that there are more SIM cards than people in Myanmar. In fact, Facebook is the internet in Myanmar and that's the way in which people, particularly the young, process news", Vijaya Nidadavolu, a gender and development specialist who recently worked in the country, told RTÉ News. Even now with regular patchy internet access, creatives have the ability to organise, engage and spread the message online across interactive communities. They can paint, draw, sculpt, animate, sing or dance and share works instantly within their networks through digital platforms. "The revolutions in 1988 and 2007 was very different because we didn't have this type of access to the Internet. But now it feels like the playing field is different because since day one of the coup, we saw that there was a huge outpouring of art. People were able to like organise protests around a certain theme and get people together", said the RTF spokesperson in Yangon. This online world of protest has also opened up the movement to more diverse voices. Iconography surrounding other political mobilisations revolved solely around the figure of politician Aung San Suu Kyi, who became famous in the late 1980s for campaigning to restore democracy. In 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi led the NLD to victory in Myanmar's first openly contested election in 25 years. Posters, calendars and billboards all carried her image prominently as a symbol of hope as she spent nearly 15 years in detention between 1989 and 2010, after organising rallies calling for democratic reform and free elections. "There was no alternative imagery in the public domain," said Vijaya Nidadavolu. "The current protests have enabled a diverse set of other voices to express themselves and seize the political space, including through art. Aung San Suu Kyi’s image is not the only visible symbol of protest. People are rallying around a diversity of images and iconography, which is a defining feature of the current protest", Ms Nidadavolu added. That changing political landscape can be seen in the art that has been produced and floods the Raise Three Fingers website. "It's making room for diversity and inclusion and reparations for a lot of communities, including for the Rohingya communities" said the Raise Three Fingers spokesperson. "So I think people are making different demands. It's not just about get rid of the dictatorship, we want democracy. We want a better democracy because the democracy we had before failed us", they said. According to the RTF, Generation Z have been the most active as they have known nothing other than a country moving towards a free nation. It’s in stark contrast to other age groups who have only gotten a taste of life outside a dictatorship, some of whom are disappointed with Aung San Suu Kyi's record and are still haunted by previous regimes. "We want this to be the last generation under a dictatorship because we're sick of it quite frankly. For even young adults like me, it just feels like you have to do something because you don't want to go through this anymore", they said. However, four months since the military coup, the junta still holds a tight grip on the Myanmar and Aung San Suu Kyi remains detained after being hit with a string of criminal charges including flouting coronavirus restrictions during last year's election campaign and possessing unlicensed walkie-talkies. Social media may offer an alternative reality and solace for those who are trying to keep the pro-democracy movement alive as life on the streets of Yangon and elsewhere are still very different and difficult. The spokesperson from RTF said: "I feel like I was more confined than during Covid. At least during Covid, if I had my mask on and I was keeping safe, I could go out [and] see friends. But now you know I'll go to the grocery store and I'll visit my parents house and that's about it. "For for some people life has returned to normal. I see people eating at restaurants." Many are living with a constant fear of being arrested. "They're still stopping people checking cars in this street, and there is a feeling of constant anxiety, knowing that you could be arrested at any moment for everything. For having a phone, for having social media accounts" they added. For Raven, she still puts her pen to digital paper every day with the hope that her images will keep the spirit of the movement alive. "I definitely believe that we're going to win because we have to. Otherwise it will never win" she said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: RTÉ News
Date of publication: 2021-05-30
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Begone အလိုမရှိ We Resist 알로맛시
Description: "Collection of အလိုမရှိ songs in English, Burmese, Korean... Credit to all original songs, lyrics, photos and video clips owners..."
Source/publisher: Bryan Bert
Date of publication: 2021-05-25
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Persuading Pariahs: Myanmar’s Strategic Decision to Pursue Reform and Opening
Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Description: "Abstract: Myanmar’s liberalizing reforms since late 2010 have effectively shed the country’s decades-long “pariah state” status. This article evaluates competing explanations for why Myanmar’s leaders made the strategic decision to pursue reform and opening. We examine whether the strategic decision was motivated by fears of sudden regime change, by socialization into the norms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or by the geopolitics of overreliance on China. Drawing on newly available materials and recent field interviews in Myanmar, we demonstrate how difficult it is for international actors to persuade a pariah state through sanctions or engagement, given the pariah regime’s intense focus on maintaining power. However, reliance on a more powerful neighbour can reach a point where costs to national autonomy become unacceptable, motivating reforms for the sake of economic and diplomatic diversification.....Acknowledgments: We gratefully acknowledge the participation of interviewees in Yangon, Naypyidaw, Seoul, and Washington, DC. Research assistance was provided by Andrew Choi, Esther Pau Sann Cing, Li Xuan, Li Zimeng, Wang Qichao, Wu Shangwei, Zhang Xiaorui, and Zhou Xin. We also wish to thank the editor, three anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2014 Murdoch-Macau Colloquium on Political Change and Governance in Asia, whose comments greatly improved this article. We thank the Asan Institute for Policy Studies for supporting Leif-Eric Easley’s research travel to Myanmar in 2014. Research for this article was funded in part by a grant from the University of Macau (SRG2013-00057-FSS). For over two decades, Myanmar suffered the reputation of an international pariah. After the 1988 coup that inaugurated 22 years of military rule under the State Law and Order Restoration Council / State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC),1 Myanmar incurred international condemnation and sanctions for human rights violations, including annulling the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) electoral victory in 1990; detaining opposition leaders, including NLD General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi; killing civilians during military campaigns against armed ethnic minority groups; violently suppressing civil protests in the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”; and muzzling free speech and the press.2 The junta appeared unmoved by sanctions and international exhortations to pursue reform and opening. Its apparent steps toward ending military rule under the 2003 “Roadmap to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy” were often marred by process irregularities, lack of inclusiveness and transparency, and restrictions on and sometimes violent repression of opposition parties. Though the SPDC held landmark elections for a civilian government in November 2010, supporters of democracy were not encouraged when the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) swept the polls and elevated Prime Minister Gen. Thein Sein to the presidency. Many were surprised, however, when Thein Sein initiated extensive reforms in 2011: releasing political prisoners, loosening media and civil society restrictions, and allowing Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition members to run for parliament. Myanmar’s pariah status quickly abated as a parade of foreign leaders visited the country and eased sanctions. In November 2015, Myanmar’s first general election under nominally civilian rule saw the NLD defeat the USDP in a landslide, marking a new era in Myanmar’s politics.3 The manner in which Myanmar pursued transformative reforms raises important questions. Why did the SPDC pursue reform and opening when it did? What motivated the strategic decision to pursue transformative policies? Several scholars have argued that domestic factors drove Myanmar’s reforms. Jones maintains that the junta’s co-optation of ethnic militias allowed it to resume a democratization process it had begun and aborted in 1990 and again in 1996.4 Bünte, along with Croissant and Kamerling, emphasizes the aging SPDC leaders’ desire to manage succession politics through institutionalization.5 Roger Lee Huang argues that the junta sought to retain political control but did not foresee the extent of reforms under Thein Sein, an assessment shared by MacDonald.6 Other scholarship emphasizes international factors as primary catalysts for reform. One argument is that Myanmar’s leaders implemented domestic reforms to pursue rapprochement with the European Union, the United States, and other sanctions-imposing countries, and to counterbalance China’s growing political and economic influence.7 Another possible factor behind Myanmar’s transition is the socializing role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and more generally, Myanmar’s desire for international prestige.8 While more than one of these factors may have motivated Myanmar’s reforms, an “all of the above” answer leaves the country’s political transformation over-determined and under-examined. This article weighs the theoretical logic and empirical evidence for three competing explanations for Myanmar’s strategic decision to pursue transformative policies: first, junta leaders’ desire to maintain power and avoid sudden regime change; second, socialization into ASEAN norms; and third, the desire to reduce China’s political and economic influence over Myanmar.9 We base our research on numerous interviews with key informants in or engaged with Myanmar, as well as on primary documents. We find that while multiple factors motivated Myanmar’s strategic decision, the most important driver was concern about China’s growing influence. To frame the analysis, the next section defines pariah states and what it means to make a strategic decision to pursue transformative policies and exit pariahdom. We then briefly outline our interview methodology before discussing the timing of Myanmar’s transformative reforms. Subsequent sections review theoretical bases and empirical support for each of the three competing explanations. In the conclusion, we summarize our findings and discuss possible implications for other pariah states and for Myanmar’s political future..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Pacific Affairs (Canada)
Date of publication: 2016-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Beyond the Coup: Can the United Nations Escape Its History in Myanmar?
Description: "When Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations Kyaw Moe Tun took the floor of the General Assembly on Feb. 26 to condemn the weeks-old military coup and announce his loyalty to the elected government, he not only shocked all those tuning in who expected a pro forma defense of the Tatmadaw’s power grab and denunciation of U.N. interference. He also provided Myanmar’s democratic movement a potentially powerful new tool, both to help secure their legitimacy, and to shift the historic dynamics of U.N. failure in Myanmar. To make the most of this tool, the nascent National Unity Government (NUG) must quickly learn how to work with the U.N. system and leverage it for its intrinsic utility as well as to build out their footprint internationally. To date, the results have been mixed, but there are signs that the NUG is learning. Whether these efforts ultimately will be effective also depends on whether the U.N. system can learn from its own failures in Myanmar and make the necessary course corrections at this pivotal moment.....Past Imperfect: The U.N.’s history with Myanmar has been a multi-decade case study in the moral hazards that international organizations face when dealing with regimes that do not care about either the welfare of their own people or the opinions of outsiders. After being one of the first of the newly independent post-colonial countries to join the U.N., Myanmar enthusiastically participated in U.N. activities during the parliamentary democracy period. It even requested the U.N.’s help in dealing with spillover from the Chinese civil war, when both Kuomintang (KMT) and Communist troops breached Myanmar’s border. After Ne Win’s 1962 coup, however, successive military regimes rigorously limited their engagement with international organizations out of an almost fanatical devotion to neutrality. Like other autarkic dictatorships, the Ne Win regime deeply distrusted the U.N. and particularly eschewed involvement with its field-based activities, even though his countryman U Thant served as U.N. Secretary General during much of the first decade of Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) rule. It was not just the U.N. that drew Ne Win’s suspicions: nearly all foreign organizations were kicked out of Myanmar during the 1960s and diplomats based in the country were heavily restricted. The BSPP’s fetishization of neutrality was such that Ne Win withdrew Myanmar from the Non-aligned Movement in 1978 because he was concerned it had become too partisan toward the Soviet Union. Given the role of Southeast Asia as a major theater of Cold War contestation, and China’s mercurial role in these geostrategic games, one can hardly blame Myanmar for wanting to remain aloof from it all. But Ne Win’s autarky also ensured that Myanmar essentially was suspended in amber for more than a decade. Faced with a ruinous economic situation, however, the post 1974-BSPP and its successors in the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), while no less xenophobic, recognized that the U.N.’s rapidly expanding aid agencies could be useful as they attempted to address the country’s disastrous economic situation. The Tatmadaw generals seemed to innately grasp that these various humanitarian and development agencies cared more about their agency’s particular development and humanitarian mission set than about the quality of Myanmar’s governance and these agencies were competing for “clients” in the developing world. Having been locked out of Myanmar at the height of the BSPP’s autarky, these agencies were desperate to experiment on its broken economy and what they viewed as a tabula rasa society ripe for their modernization efforts. This gave the BSPP the ability to arbitrage aid agencies’ ambitions and silos, strictly limiting their staffing and physical access and insisting on a high degree of control over their activities in the country. Even after Ne Win resigned as BSPP chairman in 1988, the SLORC and SPDC continued to use humanitarian access as a bargaining chip to ensure that agency operations were compliant. In the most striking—but far from the only– example of its extreme suspicion toward the U.N., the Burmese regime initially rejected U.N.-led humanitarian assistance in the wake of 2008’s devastating Cyclone Nargis, which killed tens of thousands of people, wiped out the critical Irrawaddy Delta rice production zone, and left millions homeless.....Political Battles at – and Over – the U.N.: In contrast to the aid agencies ostensibly apolitical approach, the U.N.’s Member State bodies have periodically attempted to involve themselves in Myanmar’s politics, especially after the Tatmadaw’s violent suppression of the 1988 uprising. The end of the Cold War and concurrent rise of liberal internationalism were rocket fuel to the U.N.’s political engagement in Myanmar. After the SLORC ignored the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) landslide victory in the 1990 elections, the United States and other western democracies supported various resolutions in the U.N. Human Rights Commission and General Assembly, condemning the military’s brutal usurpation of democracy and appointing Special Rapporteurs to investigate its wrongdoings. The United States and other major donors also restricted U.N. agencies’ and international financial institutions’ cooperation with the military. U.N. agencies, in turn, complained bitterly about what they saw as the negative impact of these donor efforts to ensure aid was not instrumentalized by the military regime. For their part, Burmese regimes did not appear to differentiate between the component parts of the U.N. system. The Secretary General’s Special Envoys typically were given privileged access to both junta members and detained opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, so long as they kept their public statements anodyne and their “negotiations” efforts within prescribed limits. Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, on the other hand, were forced to negotiate access on the narrowest of terms and often subjected to rough treatment on the ground. Special Rapporteur Paulo Pinheiro found a barely concealed listening device in the room where he was holding interviews with political prisoners. A violent mob attacked his successor Tomas Quintana’s motorcade during a field visit to Rakhine State following 2012 anti-Muslim violence there. Likewise, after she spoke out on the situation of the Rohingya, Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee was subjected to a steady stream of virulent misogynist verbal abuse before seeing her access cut off altogether. For the U.N. agencies and personnel deployed in-country after 1988, efforts to navigate between their ‘apolitical’ aid and development missions and the extremely political Member-State activities in New York and Geneva—all while dealing with a distrustful and mercurial junta-often proved untenable. The treatment of the U.N. during the Saffron Revolution of 2007 is a case in point. As anti-regime protests intensified in the summer and fall of 2007, the dual-hatted Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) in Myanmar was Charles Petrie, a U.N. veteran who had been an eyewitness to the international community’s moral failure in the Rwandan genocide, was under pressure to speak out about the situation on the ground. His home agency, the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), was often a target of criticism from human rights groups and the pro-democracy movement as soft on the military regime due to their focus on economic development. Even after the military started shooting at unarmed protesters and arresting U.N., Petrie studiously avoided direct criticism of the junta. It was only after thousands had been killed that Petrie issued a U.N. Day statement that obliquely linked economic hardship in Burma with the protests, after which the junta forced him to leave the country.....The Consequences of Contested Engagement: In trying to manage the sensitivities of both Burmese juntas and subsequent quasi-civilian governments, the U.N. generally has ended up pleasing no one and failing in its most basic tasks. The Tatmadaw was never going to embrace the U.N., given its innate xenophobia and the decades of General Assembly and Human Rights Commission and Council resolutions criticizing its ruinous and abusive rule. Prior to 2010, democratic forces and ethnic civil society criticized U.N. humanitarian and development programs on the ground as doing little more than legitimizing military rule. After a brief post-2010 honeymoon period, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy came to view the U.N. as unhelpful because she felt they consultation with treated her as a ‘box-checking’ exercise as they rushed to expand the UN presence under the Thein Sein government. After the NLD took power in March 2016, Suu Kyi’s negative view of the U.N. hardened in the face of Member State bodies’ condemnations of atrocities against the Rohingya while she was the de facto head of government. Suu Kyi’s antipathy towards the U.N. was undoubtedly fueled by veteran diplomats such as Kyaw Tint Swe who spent their careers vigorously defending military regime abuses and pushing back on the U.N. in Geneva and New York. By the time the August 2017 atrocities against the Rohingya began, there was little trust and empathy between the U.N. and the NLD government. Once again, the U.N. Resident Coordinator in Yangon, Renata Lok-Dessallien, was caught in these cross currents. A development expert by training, Lok-Dessallien was sent to Yangon to oversee the major expansion of U.N. agency partnerships with Myanmar’s government. In the end, her efforts to soft-pedal concerns about the Rohingya and other human rights issues prior to the 2017 atrocities did little to overcome the deep reservoir of hostility and distrust that colored the government’s view of the U.N. Her development-focused approach did, however, trouble her staff, especially those charged with implementing the U.N.’s “Human Rights Up Front” initiative. As the scale and scope of the atrocities in Rakhine state spiraled and international condemnation grew, Lok-Dessallien was spectacularly ill-equipped to deal with the situation. Although the U.N. secretariat in New York was aware she was flailing, they took no steps to recall or replace her until it was too late. This was all well documented in both contemporaneous media reports on the 2017 Rakhine crisis and the U.N.’s Rosenthal Report on the U.N.’s failure to anticipate or prevent the genocide. Despite this checkered history, in 2021 protestors in Myanmar initially called on the U.N. to act against the Feb. 1 coup and live up to its founding ideals. Invoking the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and seizing on condemnatory statements by U.N. officials, many young protesters looked to the U.N. to send in peacekeepers or take other steps to restore the elected government. But so far, the U.N. has spectacularly failed to rise to the occasion. Blame for this failure has largely centered on the Security Council, where the United Kingdom and other so-called like-minded countries have taken a cautious incremental approach, ostensibly due to fear of a joint Chinese and Russian veto of any resolution they might table. As time passes since the coup and humanitarian needs rise, there also are growing concerns among the anti-coup forces that various U.N. agencies may be falling back into old habits of willingness to work with the junta in order to retain access to their projects in country.....A New Hope at the U.N.? Options for Constructive Engagement: Yet even as the U.N. has proven unable to stop the junta’s illegal coup or ameliorate the situation on the ground, it does have some specific utility for the democratic movement. For the first time, those facing off against a military junta have a Burmese ambassador in New York who has declared his loyalty to the democratic movement and is empowered to work with the entire U.N. system, including and especially on human rights issues. Practically speaking, control over the U.N. seat in New York can be a beachhead for the NUG’s broader efforts towards international recognition even as the struggle on the ground continues and the democratic leadership builds out its own institutions. Because many other governments will recognize whatever authorities are recognized by the U.N., controlling the General Assembly seat is critical. Moreover, Permanent Representatives (PRs) in New York hold a privileged position within the U.N. system, surpassed only by ministers and heads of state and government from a protocol standpoint. As long as Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun remains credentialed to the U.N. as Myanmar’s PR, he is the senior-most Burmese diplomat accredited to the U.N. system. As a result, he can represent Myanmar at U.N. meetings not only in New York but also in Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Bangkok, Nairobi, or any other venue where the U.N. convenes Member States. The U.N.’s continued reliance on virtual meetings due to the pandemic is helpful in this regard, as Kyaw Moe Tun and his designates can remain in New York to defend his seat while representing Myanmar at U.N. events around the world. On the programmatic side, the Civil Disobedience Movement’s (CDM’s) efforts to shut down economic activity in Myanmar and the NUG’s demand that humanitarian assistance not flow through military controlled channels have highlighted the need to establish parameters for cooperation with U.N. agencies, funds, and programs accustomed to dealing with Member State governments. To this end, the NUG can use their foothold in New York to pull through cooperation with U.N. agencies, including negotiating Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on access, financing, and other modalities. By aligning these efforts with outreach to bilateral donors and multi-lateral development banks, the NUG can begin to demonstrate governance capabilities to their own people and the international community alike. Working together with CDM diplomats in Geneva and elsewhere, the New York mission can coordinate diplomatic engagement across the entire U.N. system on everything from credentialling for meetings to negotiating MOUs with U.N. agencies. The NUG will need to provide strategic and policy guidance, including on where within the U.N. system to prioritize limited human resources for maximum impact. This was recently and unfortunately demonstrated when the junta successfully sent its murderous police chief to a U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) senior officials’ meeting. That event seems to have served as a wake-up call for the NUG on the need to track and manage such U.N. Member State-driven activities more effectively. On May 26, for instance, the World Health Assembly (WHA) refused to seat the junta’s delegate after the NUG submitted a competing credential request. While not a total victory, having the Myanmar chair empty is preferably to having the junta represent the country. The WHA’s decision also kicked the issue back to the General Assembly, highlighting the stakes for keeping the New York mission in the NUG’s hands. Given the complexity of the task and the small number of diplomats the NUG currently has, both the New York mission and the NUG leadership will need to be creative and disciplined about staffing and other resource allocation decisions. For instance, civil society groups that work on human rights and humanitarian action have substantial resources and influence that make them potential force multipliers in these areas of alignment. While many small Member State missions in New York and Geneva have deep experience working with their own and international allied civil society partners, many experienced Burmese diplomats are more accustomed to seeing civil society as adversarial and both sides will have to overcome both a trust deficit and a learning curve to work together effectively. The CDM diplomats are fortunate, however, that Burmese civil society has decades of experience partnering with regional and global advocacy groups and diplomats from other governments, especially in the priority areas of human rights and humanitarian assistance. The New York mission should look beyond the Secretary General’s Special Envoy and engage the various Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council that have an interest in Myanmar, including Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, and Special Representatives of the Secretary General on issues such as the Responsibility to Protect, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, and Children in Armed Conflict. These U.N. experts can be both resources for information and potential allies in the system. Finally, the NUG must have a clear plan for holding on to Myanmar’s U.N. General Assembly seat when the next General Assembly session begins in September. The NUG and the junta are likely to submit competing credentials for the session, and the U.N. Credentials Committee and ultimately the General Assembly itself will likely be drawn into a credentials fight. While the technical and protocol aspects of U.N. credentialling are relatively straightforward, those credentials fights that have taken place over the 75-year history of the U.N. have largely followed a pattern where initially ‘possession is 9/10ths of the law’ but the representation usually ends up aligning with political reality on the ground—regardless of the legitimacy of that reality. The refusal to seat representatives of South Africa’s apartheid government is one of the few cases where the U.N. acted from a moral imperative. The situation of Myanmar is likely to challenge the U.N., both institutionally and among its individual member states. By working now to establish Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun as an active and credible representative of the Burmese people across the U.N. system, the NUG can create facts on the ground that may prove dispositive when his credentials are challenged in September. The more his counterparts in New York see him as the legitimate representative, the more likely they are to support him, if for no other reason than they themselves would not wish to be arbitrarily replaced as the result of an illegal coup. For its part, the U.N. system should recognize that they have an historic opportunity to align with the Burmese people’s democratic aspirations and contribute positively to this hinge moment in Myanmar’s history. By drawing lessons from the missed opportunities and failures of the past, the system can try to turn a new page. For the programmatic pillars of the system, this means being more cognizant and tolerant of political risk than they are typically comfortable being. The UNDP—both because of its past issues in Myanmar and because it has specific responsibilities with regard to governance—should stake out a leadership role in supporting the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people and work with both the NUG and civil society on urgent governance challenges that have resulted from the coup. UNDP also has an existing MOU to work on Rakhine State, signed with the NLD government, that can provide the basis for addressing that troubled region. Likewise, agencies such as U.N. Fund for Children (UNICEF) and the World Food Program (WFP) can work directly with the NUG to address urgent humanitarian needs. In the past, these agencies have been more adept at handling political ambiguity and demonstrating flexibility, and these skill sets will be necessary to navigate the current situation. On the Member State side, creativity will also be required, including looking beyond the politicized Security Council and Human Rights Council (HRC). One potential solution is to empower entities such as the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar (IIMM), that were created by Member States but operate as independent technical bodies. The IIMM’s mandate should be interpreted (or expanded) as needed to allow it to provide technical assistance directly to the NUG, including by confidentially sharing evidence about the atrocities against the Rohingya. Helping the NUG and its ministers to understand and come to terms with the scope and scale of atrocities the Tatmadaw committed during the NLD’s watch could help to advance the cause of recognition and reconciliation that ultimately is core to Myanmar’s nation-building project. This is a delicate task, but one that the IIMM – as a technical body that is built on collecting and following the evidence rather than advocating for any particular outcome – is uniquely qualified to undertake. Given that the overwhelming majority of Member States have supported resolutions in the General Assembly condemning the atrocities against the Rohingya, the NUG’s inability to date to adequately address the Rohingya issue remains a major stumbling block as countries consider whether to recognize it. A successful two-way partnership between the IIMM and the NUG could help to address this issue in a more constructive way. In light of the many challenges facing Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement at the moment, leveraging the country’s U.N. General Assembly seat may not be top of mind for the NUG. Nonetheless, the seat – and the source of legitimacy that comes with it – represents a major tangible asset that has real value to other countries that otherwise may be inclined to pay the NUG little attention. Whether the NUG can deploy this asset strategically and successfully could make the difference as it struggles to establish itself on the international stage. After decades of awkward and all-around frustrating engagement, the U.N. also needs to step forward with a more flexible and conscious approach that shows it has learned from past mistakes. Even if both sides can break old habits, there is no guarantee that the outcome will be successful for the Burmese people. But if the NUG and U.N. squander this opportunity by repeating old patterns, it is virtually guaranteed that everyone stands to lose..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Just Security (New York)
Date of publication: 2021-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: In Myanmar, the army controls its soldiers' lives, minds and finances
Sub-title: The Tatmadaw, Myanmar's powerful army, controls every aspect of its soldiers' lives. And those who leave pay a heavy price. DW spoke to three defectors.
Description: "As he witnessed the brutal crackdown on unarmed civilians protesting the army's takeover, the young lieutenant felt increasingly disgusted. Soon after, he left without saying goodbye to his parents, fleeing the country first on motorbike and then on foot, aided across the border by local villagers. Along the way, he stuck to smaller roads, carefully avoiding checkpoints and detection. For if caught, he knew he would pay a heavy price for his desertion: In Myanmar, army defectors are usually sentenced to death — which is then commuted to life in prison, as the death penalty has not been carried out in over three decades. That could, however, change as the army faces opposition within its ranks to its power grab.....Rare insight into Myanmar's military: The lieutenant is one of three defectors DW has spoken to in recent weeks, exchanging almost daily messages with them. The man, who peppers his messages with laughing emojis, is in hiding in India. The other two, both high-ranking officers, are on the run in Myanmar, moving from one safe house to the next. Their accounts provide rare insight into an otherwise opaque institution that is known for committing gross human rights violations against its own citizens — and shows the army's stranglehold on soldiers' lives, minds and, DW has learned, also finances. The interviews were conducted via messenger apps, including patchy video and audio calls, given that the army's ongoing internet crackdown hampers most communication with the outside world. DW has not been able to independently verify their accounts, but the interviews corroborate each other in key aspects. In two cases, military identification cards were shown. Their identities are not disclosed in this report due to fears for the defectors and their families' safety.....'Every move monitored': The three men describe a cloistered, strictly controlled life, based on a stringent, overarching hierarchy. Soldiers, they say, are required to live on army bases and are only allowed to leave if granted permission by superiors. The army dictates what soldiers and their families "wear, say and believe in, even how to decorate your home," one man said. "They can check your house at any moment," he added. The wives of soldiers, he explains, are not allowed to wear the color red, which is associated with Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), or spout any other political symbols. "Everything is monitored," says another defector, who was deliberate with each word used to recount his experience. "They want to turn people into robots, who don't think (for themselves)." A monitoring team within the army using Facebook, all three sources say, watches over soldiers and their families' activities, scrutinizing every single like, share and post. Soldiers, one defector says, have to hand over their log-in details for Facebook, including sign-up phone numbers. "If people post political things, they can be arrested and put in jail for three or four weeks," one defector tells DW. Another says that soldiers have been denied promotions after sharing social media posts criticizing the leadership of the Tatmadaw — as Myanmar's military is known — or voicing support for the NLD party. One man recalls taking part in a training course a few years ago, where officers were shown how to tap into CCTV and intercept phone calls using Russian and Chinese technology — although he did not know the extent of surveillance. Low-ranking soldiers, one defector says, were treated "like slaves," with their wives forced to clean high-ranking officers' homes without pay. Another said he had witnessed a superior asking the wife of a low-ranking soldier to give him a massage. He says the woman acquiesced, knowing that refusing could have negative repercussions for her husband.....Anti-Muslim propaganda: According to DW's three sources, soldiers are fed a steady stream of propaganda that views the Tatmadaw as the guardian of the embattled Buddhist nation of Myanmar. The enemies, according to this propaganda, are made up of a shadowy cabal of Muslims, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party, who are bent on destroying the Buddhist country. It's an ideology that has been forged in a decades-long, at times brutal battle against a myriad of ethnic insurgencies that have been fighting for independence from the Burmese majority and, at times, each other. In Myanmar, a state with 135 different ethnic groups, where roughly 90% of the population adheres to Buddhism, politics and religion are closely interwoven. Generals have long built pagodas, erected Buddha statues, and paid homage to influential monks to legitimize their claim to power as a unifying force. Anti-Muslim sentiments are widespread, which the Tatmadaw is adept at exploiting for political capital. And this anti-Muslim, Buddhism-first propaganda is instilled into soldiers of all ranks. Soldiers, one source says, are being "brainwashed" into buying the army's worldview. Another said while he did not believe the propaganda, he did not speak out against it, for fear of being punished. One defector recalled how he had been verbally abused when he dared to question the narrative that Rohingya — a Muslim minority long denied full citizenship rights — were "terrorists" bent on destroying the country and that they had no place in Myanmar. One of the men, who, like many officers hails from a military family and had grown up on an army base, said that he had long believed the Tatmadaw's propaganda: When friends dared to question the army, he would defend the military, recalling his anger at anyone who spoke negatively of the institution he had been taught to revere. His views, he said, only changed following the coup when he witnessed the army's crackdown on peaceful protesters — unarmed men, women and children that the army labels "terrorists.".....Myanmar army is a state within the state: The Tatmadaw's outsized role is intertwined within Myanmar's political and economic life — a lucrative advantage that succeeded colonial rule. Following independence from Britain in 1948, a military junta took control in 1962, ushering in a prolonged period of iron-fisted rule characterized by strict censorship, imprisonment of opponents and international isolation. While in power, the army — as well as individual officers and their families — amassed great wealth. This included land, economic and financial assets. The generals only eased their grip on power in 2010, which culminated in elections that allowed for Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party to form a government. Even after ceding some control to elected politicians, it continues to play a vast role in both the political and economic field: The constitution guarantees the military 25% of parliament seats, meaning that the army can block any constitutional amendments it dislikes. It also retains control of important ministries, including defense and home affairs. Likewise, it continues to own and run a myriad of lucrative business interests without any independent oversight. The Tatmadaw runs its own schools, universities, hospitals and court system. In short: The army has established what is basically a powerful state within the state. And, since the coup, it is now formally back in power. In absolute terms, this professional army is the 11th largest in the world, with some 406,000 soldiers in active duty as of 2019, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.....Economic exploitation: The Tatmadaw not only tries to control soldiers' ways of thinking — but also their finances. Military personnel of all ranks, DW has learned, are forced to support military-owned companies through two mandatory schemes: This includes, the three defectors say, requiring soldiers to sign up for a life insurance policy with Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance Company Ltd. The policy, which they are forced to select, renews automatically every five years — with no way for soldiers to opt-out. ­­ The company is an alleged subsidiary of one of the military's two conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Holding (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holding Limited (MEHL), according to a 2019 UN report. These conglomerates, benefit both the Tatmadaw and high-ranking individual officers and their families. The company did not respond to DW's requests for comment. Soldiers are also forced to make mandatory payments into MEC and MEHL, which are converted into shares. In return, soldiers receive a small dividend every year, defectors say. It is likely a way to both generate revenues for the military and individual generals — whilst buying loyalty. Many high-ranking officers upon retirement are often awarded posts in the two holdings, their subsidiaries and affiliated companies. Others are given posts in the civilian administration. The army does not respond kindly to those who attempt to leave its fold. One of the defectors tells DW that soldiers "cannot leave the army." In theory, another explained, soldiers can submit a letter of resignation after 10 years. "But that is only in the law," he explained drily. "In practice, it is not easy and it takes three to four years to submit the process (of leaving the army)." And even then, he added, it was not a given that the army would let the soldier go. He says he regrets his decision to join the army in the first place. The Myanmar Embassy in Berlin did not respond to DW's request for comment.....Tatmadaw hunting down defectors?: All three men are aware of the Tatmadaw's reach, as the army pursues defectors. One man says he had heard from a contact in the Tatmadaw's headquarters that it had compiled a list of some 300 defectors and was going after them and their families. It was, he says, "a manhunt." DW cannot verify the claim, however, given that the authorities have compiled a wanted list of activists and journalists that is broadcast every night on state television, it's likely that the same is happening with army defectors. One man describes how his family receives threatening phone calls. "They said: Where is your son? If you support him, you will get arrested." Soon after, he severed all communication with his family, fearing for their safety. Another source refuses to acknowledge whether he is still in contact with his family, fearing it would risk their safety. Despite all the high risks, one defector has no regrets. Life on the run and hiding in a different house each night to keep safe is, for him, a consequence of maintaining integrity. He stands by his decision to leave the army he had served for so many years, saying he did not want his future children to "think I did nothing to stop this illegal coup."..."
Source/publisher: "DW News" (Germany)
Date of publication: 2021-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Indonesia factor in ASEAN’s response to Myanmar
Description: "ASEAN’s capacity to spearhead a collective response to a regional crisis was tested at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting (ALM) in Jakarta on 24 April following the February coup in Myanmar. Facing backlash for its decision to invite Myanmar’s military junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing to the event, the stakes were high for ASEAN to find a unified stance on Myanmar’s rogue behaviour. But it was Indonesia’s leadership that made possible the resulting five-point consensus. Hours before the release of the ALM chairman’s statement, Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo held a press conference outlining Indonesia’s position on Myanmar, which resembled the final draft of ASEAN’s collective statement. Several differences between Indonesia and the ALM chairman’s statement stand out. First, Jokowi conveyed that the situation in Myanmar is ‘unacceptable and cannot be allowed to continue’. The watered-down ALM statement stated a ‘deep concern on the situation in the country, including reports of fatalities and escalation of violence’. Second, Jokowi called on the military government in Myanmar to cease its use of violence, while the ALM statement made no direct reference to the junta. Third, Jokowi called for political prisoners to be released. The ALM chairman’s statement worded this as: ‘we also heard calls for the release of all political prisoners including foreigners’. One of the biggest shortcomings of the ASEAN five-point consensus is the absence of a call for the junta to honour the results of the 2020 general elections that the National League for Democracy (NLD) won in a landslide. While Jokowi emphasised the Myanmar people as Indonesia’s priority, General Min Aung Hlaing’s inclusion in the ALM dashes any hope of restoring a pre-coup state of affairs. The ALM chairman’s statement confirms this. The ALM was convened on 19 March — five weeks after Jokowi called for an ASEAN special summit to discuss the political crisis in Myanmar. While the meeting was being arranged, the Myanmar military’s violent crackdown against protesters and civilians continued, with at least 739 deaths and 3331 arrests as of 21 April. ASEAN’s collective stance on the Myanmar political crisis differs from its response during Myanmar’s 2007 Saffron Revolution. When anti-government protests grew in number across Myanmar in September 2007, the military government responded violently, culminating in an ASEAN chairmanship statement three weeks later. The statement singled out the Myanmar military government and expressed revulsion for what had transpired. Yet despite Indonesia’s best efforts, the ALM chairman’s statement is less assertive than it was in 2007. Naypyidaw’s detachment from ASEAN after forfeiting its chairmanship position in 2006 encouraged ASEAN and its key member states at the time — Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines — to ensure that Myanmar ameliorated its human rights record before it was trusted with further engagement in ASEAN-led processes. Aside from the flaws in the ALM statement, there are also challenges to its implementation. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has managed to find common ground among ASEAN member states on the ongoing political crisis in Myanmar — first at an Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (IAMM) through shuttle diplomacy and subsequently in preparation for the ALM. The night before the ALM, Marsudi hosted a working dinner with ASEAN counterparts in making final preparations for the leaders’ meeting. Though the leaders of Thailand, the Philippines and Laos were absent from the ALM, a consensus was reached on how to prevent the situation in Myanmar from destabilising the wider region. Now that ASEAN has articulated a regional response to the situation in Myanmar, it needs to ensure that the junta adheres to the first two points of its five-point consensus — halting the violence and facilitating constructive dialogue between concerned parties. The other three points also require continuous commitment from ASEAN including Myanmar to appoint an ASEAN special envoy, facilitate humanitarian assistance and advance dialogue. While the implementation of ASEAN’s five-point consensus is still too early to assess, ASEAN must display a tangible commitment to its framework for peace and stability in the region. This is where Indonesia’s role and leadership within ASEAN should be nurtured. As the regional powerhouse in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is no stranger to advancing initiatives to strengthen political stability in the region. These include former president Megawati Sukarnoputri’s leadership to finalise the ASEAN Political-Security Community, former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s incorporation of democratic principles in Indonesian foreign relations through the Bali Democracy Forum and President Jokowi’s adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. In a climate where Indonesia and ASEAN depend on one another to preserve peace and stability in Southeast Asia, ASEAN needs to remain the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy — no matter who its president is. Gibran Mahesa Drajat is a Doctoral Researcher at the Graduate School of Global Studies, Sophia University, Tokyo, and a Lecturer of International Relations at President University, Cikarang, Indonesia..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication: 2021-05-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Message from the Director - ဒါရိုက်တာ ထံမှ သတင်းစကား
Description: "This is the first Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB) e-newsletter since the military took over on 1 February. Rather than the usual format, this message to MCRB stakeholders takes a wider look at responsible business in the current political crisis, and what this means for MCRB’s future activities. Since 1 February MCRB has been focused on our team’s welfare and safety. We have seen that employee and customer safety is also the top priority of all businesses, both local and foreign. We have shared tips with companies and other organisations how they can support staff digital safety and mental welfare, including responding to detention of loved ones. The MCRB team has also taken up the opportunity of a group workplace counselling session to share their feelings. Counselling Corner also have regular free online sessions. We know the other main priority of business in Myanmar right now is commercial survival. The survey undertaken in April by ten Chambers of Commerce demonstrated very clearly the massive economic impact of the coup on the Myanmar economy and employment, and showed this to be far more significant than COVID-19. Main challenges for business are disruptions to banking (77%), internet (70%) and employee safety (66%). The survey also showed that the biggest impact has been felt by Myanmar companies, particularly SMEs which unlike multinationals, have little ability to absorb it. Against this very negative business outlook, and with foreign investors now scaling back and avoiding Myanmar, MCRB has been reflecting on what responsible business means in the current crisis and how the Centre can be useful to our stakeholders.....ဤ အီလက်ထရောနစ် သတင်းလွှာသည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် တပ်မတော်မှ အာဏာသိမ်းပြီး သည့်နောက် မြန်မာ့စီးပွားရေးကဏ္ဍ တာဝန်ယူမှုရှိရေး အထောက်အကူပြုဌာန (MCRB) မှ ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ် ထုတ်ပြန်သည့် သတင်းလွှာ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤ တွင် MCRB နှင့် ပတ်သက်ဆက်နွယ်သူများ (stakeholders) အတွက် ပုံမှန်ထုတ်ပြန်နေကြပုံစံထက် လက်ရှိနိုင်ငံရေး အကျပ်အတည်းကာလနှင့် ဆိုင်သော တာ၀န်ယူမှုရှိသော စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်း အကြောင်း ပိုမိုကျယ်ပြန့်စွာ ကြည့်ရှုရန် နှင့် MCRB ၏ အနာဂတ် လုပ်ငန်းများအတွက် မည်သို့ဆိုလိုသည်ကို တင်ပြရန်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ MCRB သည် MCRB အဖွဲ့သားများ ၏ အဆင်ပြေစိတ်အေးချမ်းမှု (welfare) နှင့် ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံမှု (safety) ကို အဓိကထားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုနည်းတူစွာ ပြည်တွင်း နှင့် နိုင်ငံခြား စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်း အားလုံးအတွက်လည်း ၎င်းတို့၏ ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ဝယ်ယူစားသုံးသူများ/ ဝန်ဆောင်မှု ဌားရမ်းသူများ (customer) ၏ ဘေးကင်း လုံခြုံမှုသည် ပထမဦးစားပေး ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ တွေ့ရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် ကုမ္ပဏီများ၊ အခြားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ဝန်ထမ်းများ အတွက် ချစ်ခင်သူများ အထိန်းသိမ်းခံရပါက မည်သို့လုပ်ဆောင်သင့်ကြောင်း အပါအဝင် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ် လုံခြုံရေး (digital safety) နှင့် စိတ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ ကောင်းမွန်အဆင်ပြေစေရေး (mental welfare) အတွက် မည်သို့ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီပေးနိုင်ကြောင်း အကြံဥာဏ်များကို မျှဝေခဲ့ပါသည်။ MCRB အဖွဲ့သားများ အနေဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ စိတ်ခံစားချက်များကို မျှဝေရန် လုပ်ငန်းခွင်အတွင်း အဖွဲ့လိုက် ကောင်းစလင်း ဆွေးနွေးခြင်း အစီအစဥ် (workplace counselling session) တစ်ခု ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ Counselling Corner တွင်လည်း အခမဲ့ အွန်လိုင်း အစီအစဥ်များ ပုံမှန်ရှိပါသည်။ လက်ရှိတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်း စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ အတွက် အခြားသော အဓိကဦးစားပေးမှာ စီးပွားရေးဆက်လက်ရှင်သန်နိုင်ရန် (commercial survival) ဖြစ်ကြောင်းသိရှိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေစိုက် နိုင်ငံတကာကုန်သည်အသင်း ၁၀ ခု မှ ဧပြီလတွင် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူမှု အရ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကြောင့် မြန်မာ့စီးပွားရေးနှင့် အလုပ်အကိုင်အပေါ် ကြီးမားသော ဆိုးကျိုး သက်ရောက်မှုမှာ COVID-19 ထက်ပို၍ သိသာထင်ရှားကြောင်း ရှင်းလင်းစွာ ဖော်ပြခဲ့ပါသည်။ စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများအတွက် အဓိကစိန်ခေါ်မှုများမှာ ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်း (၇၇%)၊ အင်တာနက် (၇၀%) နှင့် ဝန်ထမ်းများ၏ ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံမှု (၆၆%) ဆိုင်ရာ မငြိမ်မသက်မှုများကြောင့်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၎င်းစစ်တမ်း ဖော်ပြချက်အရ မြန်မာကုမ္ပဏီများ၊ အထူးသဖြင့် နိုင်ငံစုံကုမ္ပဏီများနှင့်မတူသည့် ခံနိုင်ရည်မရှိသော အသေးစားနှင့် အလတ်စား စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ အပေါ် အကြီးမားဆုံး သက်ရောက်မှုများ ဖြစ်စေခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤ အနုတ်သဘောဆောင်သည့် စီးပွားရေးအလားအလာကို မလိုလားကြသော နိုင်ငံခြား ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများသည် ယခုအခါ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ရှောင်ရှားခြင်းနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ ပြန်လည်ဆုတ်ခွာခြင်း တို့ကြောင့် MCRB သည် လက်ရှိ အကျပ်အတည်းတွင် တာ၀န်ယူမှုရှိသော စီးပွားရေး လုပ်ငန်းဆိုသည်မှာ မည်သည်ကို ဆိုလိုကြောင်းနှင့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့နှင့် ပတ်သက်ဆက်နွယ်သူများ အတွက် စင်တာ (Centre) မှာ မည်သို့ အသုံးဝင်နိုင်မည်ကို အလေးအနက်ထား စဉ်းစားသုံးသပ်နေပါသည်။..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business
Date of publication: 2021-05-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar junta-appointed electoral body to dissolve Suu Kyi party -media
Description: "Myanmar's junta-appointed election commission will dissolve Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy Party (NLD) because of what it said was fraud in a November election, news outlet Myanmar Now said on Friday, citing a commissioner. Myanmar Now said the decision was made during a meeting with political parties that was boycotted by many parties including the NLD. The election fraud conducted by the NLD was illegal "so we will have to dissolve the party's registration", the chairman of the junta-backed Union Election Commission (UEC), Thein Soe, was cited in the report as saying. "Those who did that will be considered as traitors and we will take action," said Thein Soe. A spokesman for the junta and for a pro-democracy national unity government, which includes ousted members of the NLD, did not immediately respond to requests for comment. A spokesman for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party said it had representatives at the meeting, which was still going on, and he was not aware of the outcome. Myanmar's army took power alleging fraud in a November election that was swept by the party of Suu Kyi, who fought for democracy for decades before tentative reforms began a decade ago. The electoral commission at the time had rejected the army's complaints. The security forces have killed more than 800 people since a wave of protests broke out after coup, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners activist group says. Fighting has also flared between the security forces and ethnic minority guerrilla groups. The turmoil has alarmed Myanmar's neigbours and the broader international community, but the generals have shown no sign of any intention of seeking a compromise with the pro-democracy movement. Since her arrest hours before a Feb. 1 coup, Suu Kyi has been held in detention and faces numerous charges filed in two courts, the most serious under a colonial-era official secrets act, punishable by 14 years in prison. Suu Kyi, 75, has been permitted to speak with lawyers only via a video link in the presence of security personnel. Her co-defendant is Win Myint, the ousted president. Opponents of the military have formed a National Unity Government, which operates under cover or through members based abroad. It has announced it is setting up of a People's Defence Force to challenge the junta. Japan, a major donor to Myanmar, will have to rethink its aid provision to Myanmar if the situation in the Southeast Asian nation does not improve, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said in Tokyo..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-05-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Coup in Myanmar/Burma: Collective Trauma and Resilience
Description: "I wrote the following piece after 3 March 2021, on which 38 people died from the crackdown. Now the protest is over 100 days, and 782 people (as of 10 May), including children, have been killed. Over 3,740 people are in detention. Ordinary people all over Burma are living on edge due to the random acts of violence by “security forces.” When I got up on 1 February, I heard about the coup in Burma, my country. I tried to identify an assortment of feelings: anger, despair, distress, sadness, hopelessness. None of them seemed to fit precisely what I felt. Since I am not in Burma, I rely on Facebook, the communication channel most Burmese use for information, to stay informed. With those unnamable feelings in my chest, I started checking Facebook almost hourly to catch up with the ongoing situation. When a 19-year-old girl died, the first death of the protest, I could finally name the assortment of emotions I was feeling – trauma. A few years ago, a former political prisoner told me the whole country was experiencing trauma because of the violent suppression of resistance over five decades. Her words now came back to me as I tried to understand the emotions running through me. We are re-experiencing the collective trauma of living under the grip of the military. Every day the violence against protesters escalates and reminds those of us who lived and grew up under the military regime and who witnessed many violent crackdowns since 1962, of “the dark times.” I was born two years after the coup in 1962. I remember talking with my friends about politics and rumours we heard from adults, when we were about ten years old. Had Ne Win died? How much we children and the adults around us wanted him to be gone, the former dictator. My overriding memories of growing up in Burma under the military dictatorship involve a sense of lacking – of lacking necessities, and above all lacking rights and freedom. Economic struggles, censorship, martial laws, fear of the military and people associated with them; these were a big part of our everyday life. In the backdrop, there were ongoing wars with various ethnic groups. I can still recall watching tanks drive through our township to suppress the student demonstrations in 1974. The next day, we heard many young people had been killed or arrested. The atmosphere was full of fear and suppression, and it was suffocating. Then in 1988, the military killed thousands of people during a massive popular uprising for democracy. My mother went into depression in 1988 at the loss of life she witnessed. This is etched deeply in my memory. History has shown us again and again that it is always the young people who fight back, and now like before, they can be killed, beaten, tortured, raped. Still, these young people go on and take the front line. Now in 2021, Burma is a different country, but it is still beset by endless political, social and economic problems. Despite these problems, people have some freedom and hope, and communication with the outside world. There is also the widespread use of social media, which we didn’t have access to in 1988. Hence today’s young people, Generation Z, live in a very different political, social, and economic context. However, like many generations before them, they are the ones who dare to start the fight back and sacrifice their lives. The pain, sadness, anger, and anxiety of the families of those young people killed and arrested are unfathomable. Many people are saying that the revolution is close to victory. I want to believe that the people will win in the end, but at this point, it is not easy to see how the whole debacle is going to unfold. How do you fight an institution that does not hesitate or express remorse about using any weapon available to kill their own people—who are simply asking for their rights to be respected? People, especially Generation Z, persist despite the violence. On 3 March, Burma mourned the death of Kyal Sin, a 19-year-old girl who got shot in the back of her head. The words on her T-shirt said “Everything will be OK.” She left a note asking for her organs to be donated if it were not possible to resuscitate her. I felt devastated at the death of Kyal Sin and other youths on 3 March. However, it was seeing an emotional video posted on Facebook by a young woman, and recognising her own trauma, that led me to write this piece. In the video, the young woman films herself narrating her experiences of helping protesters on the frontline. This first-hand account is a plea for others to understand the violence that protesters face every day. This young woman has been helping protestors to flee from police violence. She repeatedly saw young people being brutally beaten up by the police. She had been using her car to block the road to delay the police vehicles so that she could assist the protesters to safety. It had been getting more and more difficult for her to do this because fewer people were turning up for the protests. The increasing use of tear gas, stun grenades, and live bullets emptied some of the main streets, and it was easier for the police vehicles to get through quickly to attack the protesters. Sometimes the makeshift roadblocks put up to deter police forces or police cars from passing through accidentally blocked her from reaching protesters. Other times people taking videos of the protests ignored her request to let her car pass through. Not being able to get through to the people she intended to help, and seeing police beat up her colleagues brought her to breaking point that day. She repeatedly said, “They asked the kids (protestors) to put up their hands on the heads and then they relentlessly beat them on their backs.” This broke her heart more than anything else. This woman knows she might die helping them, but she puts herself at risk to rescue the core young protestors. She wants more people to participate in protests to fight against the military and shield the front-line protestors. Since 1 February, she has hardly slept and has only eaten one meal a day because she is too tired. For her, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is not helping unless everybody participates in the protests. Like most young people, her fear of losing out to the military is far greater than her fear of dying. Her emotional response on Facebook to those criticizing young protestors for confronting the police instead of having small protests near their places of residence, and her plea to people, gave me a glimpse of what young protestors are going through. There are good days and terrible days in the over-a-month-long ongoing protests. On good days, most protestors get away unscathed, inspired, hopeful, and with renewed aspirations. On terrible days, some get killed, wounded, arrested, but the people do not give up. Every day, they come out to protest the coup. They are determined to make sure the military goes down. That’s when you can see the best of Burmese people, their resilience. The younger generation fights with creativity, resilience, and humour that keeps them going even though they are putting their lives on the line. You can see messages or posts on Facebook that encourage unity, such as “we can have different opinions but we are not divided.” People set aside religious and ethnic tensions to fight the common enemy – the military, and, by doing so, they have more compassion and understanding of years of atrocity and violence directed at ethnic groups, including the Rohingya. I have learned from a good friend of mine, a survivor of violence, that post-traumatic growth and resilience emerge in the aftermath of violence. Dealing with trauma is not a walk in the park. There are good days and bad days. Bad days can take you to the edge, but resilience can bring you back to embracing life. Sometimes it comes from inside. And sometimes the help from outside is necessary to keep on going. More than ever, people in Burma need every possible form of assistance from the international community to continue their long struggle. The UN, ASEAN, China, Russia, India, Japan, and other countries need to take action. Every country can take action if they take their mind off trade, regional competition, and geopolitical influence. The Burmese people have shown their spirit and resilience in the face of the violent suppression by the military. Day by day, people in Burma realize they cannot depend on outside help, not even the UN. Regardless, they are determined to continue their revolt against the military. The protests have grown so large and spread across the country that they have become transformed into revolution. Even if the international community fails to help Burma, the “Early Summer Revolution” (named by the protestors) will go on. People of Burma have experienced collective trauma, but they have tremendous resilience, and the world needs to stand by them. The following is an English translation of a post by a poet that was shared on Facebook:[1] I am afraid of mornings. When he wakes up, he goes straight to the bathroom, has a shower, changes his clothes, picks up his bag, and gets ready to go out of the door. He doesn’t even notice the breakfast I prepared for him. I ask, Where are you going today? He used to tell me whether he was going to Hledan, Sule, Sanchaung, or Bargyar. Now he only says where the protest is. I warn him they are going to shoot today. He said they are shooting every day. Don’t spread that kind of talk. Instead of 100 people, only 50 will come to protest. Don’t make me afraid. It’s not the time for fear. Looking thin and sunburned, no gun, no bullet, just a backpack and the three fingers salute. He: Don’t keep calling me. He goes, and I go. I can exhale when everybody comes back home in the evening. Exhausting days since the coup. I have absolute empathy for the fallen heroes and their families. Salute to them!..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2021-05-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: A wider war spreads fast and far in Myanmar
Sub-title: Myanmar's peaceful protests are morphing into a hit-and-run resistance movement against military rule
Description: "Another military airbase has come under rocket attack in central Myanmar, a shadowy but strategic assault that even tightly censored, military-controlled media felt compelled to report. On May 15, three 107mm rockets were fired at Toungoo airbase, situated just 95 kilometers from the capital Naypyitaw, according to the state mouthpiece Global New Light of Myanmar. The rocket attack follows similar assaults on air bases at Magwe and Meiktila in late April. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but they come after recent Tatmadaw aerial bombardments in Kayin and Kachin states, where ethnic armies are battling the military and anti-coup protesters have recently taken refuge from rising, lethal military violence in urban areas. Myanmar’s civil wars, until now confined mainly to relatively remote ethnic frontier regions, are now spreading to the country’s heartland and urban areas. Rather than ethnic army fighters, recent attacks have more likely been launched by new-age militants from the ethnic Bamar majority. Shadowy attacks on military soft and hard targets are mounting. On May 18, a local junta-appointed official was assassinated in Yangon’s Lanmadaw district after two bomb blasts at his office. According to Yangon-based sources, the official was known to be a key military informant and his actions had led to the arrest of several pro-democracy protesters. Bombs have also detonated in various towns in Sagaing and Mandalay Regions and in Shan, Mon and Chin states. When the coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, visited Sagaing City on May 18 a bomb exploded even there despite tight security. A clear example of this new resistance to military rule was recently seen in Mindat, a town in Chin State but close to the border with the central region of Magwe. The Chinland Defense Force (CDF), a newly formed local militia, took over the town and retreated only after heavily armed Tatmadaw units counterattacked with artillery and helicopter gunfire. Before those reinforcements arrived, local militants armed with only hunting rifles and homemade bombs killed several Tatmadaw soldiers. Until now, Chin state is the only ethnic state in Myanmar that has not seen widespread insurgency. (The ceasefire Chin National Front was never a formidable force.) What began as peaceful, even joyful demonstrations against coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s democracy-suspending February 1 coup is now morphing into shadowy armed resistance across the country. The list of anti-military counterattacks is growing by the day. For instance, a bomb exploded at the Daik-U township’s education office in the Bago Region on May 16. That same day, another bomb detonated at the Mogok township general administrator’s office in the Mandalay Region. On May 17, the Htone Bo Ward administration office in Sagaing township was burned down. On May 18, a truck carrying food supplies for Myanmar army soldiers was torched on the Mogaung-Tanai Ledo road in Kachin State. The shift from peaceful to violent protest came only after demonstrators were violently and lethally attacked by soldiers and police, with snipers shooting teenagers and even killing children as young as five, according to news reports. Nearly 800 people have been killed by the police and Tatmadaw since Min Aung Hlaing seized power from an elected government. Close to 5,000 have been arrested, including politicians, journalists, lawyers and community workers. An unknown number are now in hiding or have fled to border areas or across the border into exile. Yangon residents say the persistent unrest appears to be taking a toll on the mental health of front-line police and soldiers who are ordered by their superiors to use lethal force against the general population. “They are staying inside hospitals, schools, police stations and secluded compounds and when they venture out of those, local activists inform their comrades in other parts of Yangon,” one Yangon-based source said. Three and a half months after the coup, anti-coup demonstrators are still marching in the streets in defiance. Many others, sources say, are getting ready for more violent action. They say the assassination of the official in Lanmadaw is probably only the beginning of what could quickly turn into urban warfare scenarios in major cities nationwide. According to some reports, automatic weapons and grenades have already been sent to activists in Yangon. Myanmar may not become a full-blown failed state — much of the economy is and has always been run underground and thus not measured in official statistics — but the nation is definitely now a failing state. Tens of thousands of health workers and teachers have been fired for taking part in the so-called Civil Disobedience Movement. Banks are reportedly running out of cash as people — if they are lucky — withdraw their savings. Many have imposed fees of 8%-9% to withdraw funds or imposed outright limits on the amount that can be taken out. A brain drain has also begun as many well-educated people have leveraged various channels to leave the country. What happens next is not clear, but Min Aung Hlaing’s power-grab is measuring up as perhaps the most unsuccessful military coup in modern Asian history. To be sure United States (US) and European Union (EU) sanctions have so far had no deterrent effect on the military’s onslaught. The severest action that can be taken by the United Nations (UN) would be a resolution calling for an “immediate suspension” of weapons transfers to the junta. Although recently introduced by the tiny European principality of Liechtenstein, which is not an EU member, and supported by the EU, UK and US, it will inevitably be vetoed at the UN Security Council by permanent members China and Russia. What is clear, however, is that Min Aung Hlaing has ruined his chance of becoming a credible political leader. As military commander-in-chief, he traveled more widely than any of his predecessors on what the Tatmadaw called “goodwill missions.” According to a study compiled by the Tagaung Institute of Political Studies, a Yangon-based think tank, his trips took him to China, Russia, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Japan, South Korea, Israel, Belarus, Serbia, Brunei, Pakistan and even Belgium, Austria, Germany and Italy. He won’t likely be welcome again in many of those countries. His future standing in Myanmar is also on shaky ground, with critics and commentators saying he has single-handedly destroyed his legacy as an armed forces commander while making the military even more an object of contempt in the public’s eye. But even if the Tatmadaw moved to oust him from his positions of power in a face-saving counter-coup – for now, more wishful thinking than likely scenario – there is no guarantee that his military successors would be in favor of the kind of openness Myanmar enjoyed from 2011 until this year’s disastrous coup..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2021-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ANFREL Releases 2020 Myanmar General Elections Final Observation Mission Report
Description: "The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) released the final comprehensive report of its international election observation mission to the 2020 Myanmar General Elections on 17 May 2021. The 2020 Myanmar polls encountered several challenges including restrictions amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the observed shortcomings, the outcome of the elections were deemed to reflect the true will of the electorate. The members of the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house of Myanmar's national Parliament) were scheduled to convene for their swearing-in ceremony on 1 February 2021, but, the Myanmar military staged a coup and seized power from the civilian government alleging electoral fraud. Several key political figures and activists including President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the chair of the Union Election Commission (UEC) U Hla Thein, were arrested. The country was placed under state of emergency. The people of Myanmar continue to resist military rule through peaceful protests across the country but such efforts have been met with violent crackdowns by the military arresting thousands and killing hundreds of people. ANFREL recognizes the voice of the people of Myanmar and hopes this report illustrates the progress achieved by Myanmar as a democracy prior to the coup. ANFREL wishes that the country may soon return on the rightful path to an elected civilian government. ANFREL deployed 13 long-term observers for 24 days, eight short-term observers for eight days, three Election Day observers, a core team based in Yangon, and four electoral analysts, one in Yangon and the rest working remotely. The observers were deployed in 13 out of 14 states and regions in Myanmar. ANFREL's international election observation efforts follow a methodology based on international principles contained in documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Bangkok Declaration for Free and Fair Elections, and the Dili Indicators of Democratic Elections. ANFREL is a signatory of the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Asian Network for Free Elections (Bangkok)
Date of publication: 2021-05-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar election: No evidence fraud in 2020 vote, observers say
Sub-title: Independent observers have rejected claims of voter fraud in Myanmar's 2020 election, three months after the military took power in a coup.
Description: "The Asian Network for Free Elections said the outcome of the vote was "by and large, representative of the will of the people of Myanmar". The military has justified its February coup by alleging massive voter fraud, but provided no evidence. The vote was won by Aung Sang Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. Ms Suu Kyi and other elected officials were arrested on 1 February in a series of early morning military raids. She has only been seen by video link since. The election observers' report described the military's decision to ignore the election results as "indefensible" . Myanmar's military has yet to respond to the report. It has previously said it will hold new elections within two years. The Asian Network for Free Elections, which had observers at more than 400 polling stations during November's vote, did acknowledge a number of "irregularities" in how the vote was held - but the said they were caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and a number of conflicts in the country at the time. It also said those irregularities meant the election was not as free and fair as the previous vote in 2015. But the outcome did represent the will of the people, the report concluded, and showed Myanmar's democracy was making progress. "Despite the raging Covid-19 pandemic, 27.5 million people voted thanks to the hard work of polling staff and election or health officials; their voices cannot be silenced," the report said..."
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
Date of publication: 2021-05-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Beyond the Coup in Myanmar: Echoes of the Past, Crises of the Moment, Visions of the Future
Description: "On Feb. 1, 2021, the Myanmar military – the Tatmadaw – shattered the all too brief effort to transition to democracy in Myanmar. Over the past two and a half months, the Tatmadaw has continued its illegitimate effort to undermine the democratic elections from last year and prevent the elected government from taking power. In the face of mass popular opposition and international condemnation, the military has only escalated its use of violence against its own population – systematically stripping away rights and violently attacking protestors and dissidents, reportedly killing over 700 civilians as of Apr. 20, 2021, and detaining more than 3,000. Despite the continued threats and extreme violence, the people of Myanmar have stood their ground and refused to be silenced. On Apr. 16, opponents of the coup from across the political spectrum announced the formation of a National Unity Government (NUG) to resist the military. Just as importantly, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a grassroots movement aimed at disrupting state functions and crippling the economy in order to undermine the military’s attempt to rule, has been hugely successful in galvanizing collective action since early February. In addition to the tens of thousands of CDM participants walking out of their private and public sector positions, protests across the country have seen massive youth engagement on a scale not seen in a generation. The organizing power has been impressive. Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok have been used to spread awareness and coordinate protests, strikes, and other forms of peaceful resistance. The military has taken notice of the CDM’s power, issuing threats against young people protesting and shooting indiscriminately at protestors of all ages, including children. Parallel movements have arisen in areas like neighboring Thailand, with Thai youth protesting their own authoritarian government in solidarity with activists from Myanmar. Today we launch a Just Security series that will take a deep dive into the situation in Myanmar. The series will provide insights that put the coup and civilian response into historical and modern context, deepen unexplored angles on the current crises, and survey possibilities and ways forward over the next six months to a year. This series also aims to elevate policy discussions on a number of issues, ranging from peace and accountability to religion and democracy, asking: What is happening now and why? Within the series, contributions from authors from Myanmar and others working closely on the situation will explore topics such as youth leadership in the CDM and protests, domestic and international solidarity, environmental concerns, the dissolution of rule of law in Myanmar, and what the coup means for ongoing international accountability efforts. Below, we offer an overview of the major themes of the series, along with a timeline of the struggle for democracy in Myanmar. The current uprising against military rule must be understood in the context of these decades-long struggles for peace, democracy, accountability, and justice..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Just Security (New York)
Date of publication: 2021-04-26
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Category: Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, violations of, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Discrimination against the Rohingya, International Criminal Court, Several Groups, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - General, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Various groups, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Title: The politics of Myanmar’s agrarian transformation
Topic: Myanmar (Burma); democratic transition; rural working people; military coup; politics of agrarian transformation
Topic: Myanmar (Burma); democratic transition; rural working people; military coup; politics of agrarian transformation
Description: "Myanmar is in a dangerous and uncertain moment following the military coup on 1 February 2021. The articles in this Special Forum provide timely contextual analysis. Written before the coup, the articles delve into the politics of agrarian transformation in the context of (what was then) an ongoing (but fragile) opening up of political space. This introduction outlines three themes that connect the articles and now also shed some light on what the future may hold: (1) the limited character of the 2010–2021 ‘democratic transition’; (2) the struggles around land and natural resources amidst a social reproduction crisis and (3) the responses of rural working peoples. This Special Forum on Myanmar’s agrarian transformation concludes at a moment of great danger and deep uncertainty resulting from the military coup that took place on 1 February 2021. All the articles were written before the coup, and all the authors were keen to engage explicitly on the politics of agrarian transformation in the context of (what was at that time) a still ongoing (fragile) opening up of political space and the social-political challenges of working in such a context, including examining the changing political agency of the implicated differentiated rural peoples (along lines of class, gender, generation and in Myanmar the all-important question of ethnicity). Reading their analyses now may thus help to dampen any temptation to romanticize about what life and politics was like for many people before the coup. And it will put under a critical spotlight the call by some segments of the resistance movement for a return to where everyone/everything was before the coup, that is, to restore the NLD government to power under the military-crafted 2008 Constitution. Most of the authors who contributed insights and analysis to the six articles constituting this special forum are long-time social activists who have been working for many years outside the spotlight and under the radar, alongside many other veteran activists, grassroots organizations, issue-based associations and ethnic communities. In the years before and since the national political cycle that began with the March 2011 handover of government by the military-run SPDC to the quasi-civilian Thein Sein administration, they have been in the trenches, so to speak, along with many others,accompanying ordinary people in doing the everyday politics of regime transition. Such efforts have involved the crucial but often intangible work of feeling for openings, testing limits, deploying razor-sharp political humour, calculating risks, calibrating interventions, reaching out and ratcheting up, building bridges, stepping up and stepping back, pushing with restraint, articulating hopes, managing fears, calling bluffs, etc. It’s worth mentioning here too that this has also necessarily involved working to ensure the material conditions needed to enable these dynamics of activism to survive and thrive, despite increasingly bureaucratized and periodically politicized relationships with both government donors and international non-governmental donor agencies. While for various reasons and at various times government donors and donor agencies could become quite allergic to activism – especially activism taking extra-parliamentary form – this was not always the case, and despite what may have been risks involved in supporting social change activism during the post-2011 opening, some of these actors supported this work anyway. Much of what the bulk of ordinary people actively trying to shape the transition underway have been doing has remained invisible and in the shadow of a still fairly draconian ‘rule of law’, while the international media spotlight has tended to focus on increasing space for elite politics and elite-driven economic reform, as if these were all that mattered in the regime transition underway. It was important that these ‘invisible’ politics remained so at times, in order to protect and shelter them, and at other times, it was critical that they surface, in order to try to propel more central political processes in a more radical direction. But while much of the social activism for meaningful agrarian change has resurrected and unfurled in the lingering shadows cast by past coups, past waves of resource grabbing, and past ‘high politics’ turning points, at the same time, a fairly clear set of major neoliberaloriented economic reforms have been initiated and steadily pushed since 2011 as part and parcel of a ‘rule of law’ reform agenda aimed at creating the ‘positive enabling environment’ for big Asian, US and EU-based business interests itching to enter or do more business in Myanmar. Hitherto, earlier rounds of market liberalization following the thenmilitary regime’s response to political and economic crises in the late 1980s had mainly benefitted regional (especially Chinese and Thai) and local capitalists (with the exception of two infamous gas projects – one led by Total, one led by UNOCAL – see ERI 1996). The consequences of these reforms have been hitting the ground hard, yet affecting different groups of people differently depending on class, ethnicity, gender, generation, and geographic region. And so here is one crux of the matter for many of the hardest hit people today: as huge masses of people from all walks of life spill currently into the streets to protest the military coup – how and to what extent will the broad anti-coup resistance movement be able to take on 1. the contradictions emerging from capitalist development and 2. the growing aspiration for a democratic federal union? Capitalism is not tied exclusively to any particular kind of political system: it can exist under outright militarized authoritarian conditions, and also under still-militarized, semi-authoritarian political conditions where participation in decision making is open to some segments of society to some degree, but many (if not most) remain excluded more or less completely (e.g. more akin to what the country had been experiencing in the decade prior to the coup). Since 2011, capitalist development has wrought a new configuration of winners and losers, where a wider range of people found opportunities and breathing room to accumulate and have seen their living conditions improve, while many others have seen their situation deteriorate significantly. The ranks of those engaged in ‘3D’ migrant labour work abroad (e.g. dirty, difficult, dangerous) and the importance of migrant worker remittances to the national economy, for example, have increased dramatically since 2011 as a result partly of the new laws and policies put in place by the quasi-military Thein Sein government but then continued and even deepened by the ‘democratically-elected’ NLDled government (Borras et al. 2020). The agrarian crisis that is pushing many people, from different walks of life (both ethnic Bamar and non-Bamar), further toward or deeper into landlessness and precarious labour conditions, has been deepening throughout the country. But its precise character has varied, shaped by complex social-historical and political-economic particularities, including politicized geographies of race/ethnicity, obtaining in different regions and subregions. To be sure, however, regions and subregions where various non-Bamar ‘ethnic nationalities’ (a term increasingly preferred nowadays by non-Bamar activists themselves, in a bid to put the term ‘ethnic minorities’ firmly into the past) are most concentrated, have been clearly targeted for ‘accumulation by dispossession’ via outright extra-economic coercion, in tandem with and alongside processes of commodification, as discussed below. The increasingly organized, multiethnic demand for abolition of the 2008 Constitution and building of a democratic federal union is therefore very much underpinned by the intensely racialized/ethnicised character of Myanmar political-economy historically..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Routledge (London)
Date of publication: 2021-04-25
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.83 MB
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Title: Why the Tatmadaw won’t crack in Myanmar
Sub-title: While the world gasps at the Myanmar military's brutal crackdown, there is little hope for a soldier-led mutiny or countercoup
Description: "A military coup that overthrows a democratically elected government and sparks three months of nationwide protests and strikes. More than 700 people including children as young as five shot and killed as security forces fire into crowds of anti-military demonstrators. Thousands of people, among them not only politicians, activists and journalists but also some of the nation’s best-known singers, movie stars and celebrities arrested on various trumped-up charges. An economy on its knees with non-performing banks and foreign investors running for the exits. Such a litany would normally be enough to bring down any coup-installed government through a counter-coup or some other action by a military’s top brass who could see the self-defeatism of trying to cling to power when nearly the entire population is opposed to your takeover and rule. But not in Myanmar. Instead, the military and its controlled police seem prepared to do whatever it takes to preserve its democracy-suspending power grab. So far, there have been no signs of substantial cracks or divisions within the security establishment apart from a handful of policemen who have fled to rebel-held territories near the Thai border or across the border into neighboring northeastern India. But is Myanmar’s military truly full of spineless, mindless yes-men, or is there something else that holds the institution together in the face of massive local resistance and rising international condemnation? The simplistic explanation, put forth mostly by foreign security analysts, is that the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, is a battle-hardened force that has been fighting against an array of political and ethnic rebels continuously for more than 70 years. Myanmar’s civil wars broke out shortly after independence was achieved from Britain in 1948. Before that, an army founded by independence hero Aung San had fought alongside the Japanese military against the British and then, at the end of World War II, allied themselves with the British and turned against the Japanese. Consequently, the Tatmadaw sees itself as the true defender of the nation’s independence and the only force that can hold the ethnically diverse and politically divided country together. But that analysis misses the enigma of military power in Myanmar. Although Aung San’s daughter and coup-toppled democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi once referred to the Tatmadaw as “my father’s army”, the military force which fought during World War II had little in common with the army that emerged after independence. Because of post-war agreements with the British, most of the old fighters were demobilized and turned into a militia known as the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO) which, in turn, resorted to armed struggle against the government because it saw independence as a sham that perpetuated colonial rule. By then, Aung San had been assassinated and of the legendary “Thirty Comrades” who had followed him to Japan to receive military training before the Japanese invasion of Myanmar in 1942, only three remained in the Tatmadaw in the 1950s, including army chief General Ne Win, who eventually seized power in a 1962 coup, the first absolute military-takeover in Myanmar, then known as Burma. By the 1950s, Myanmar’s civil wars were more or less over, with the rebel Karen National Union (KNU) and Communist Party of Burma (CPB) pushed back into remote areas. Persistent internal political turmoil, though, led to the formation of a caretaker government led by Ne Win, which was in power from 1958 to 1960. Rather than fighting the rebels, Ne Win and his 4th Burma Rifles spent the latter part of the 1950s building up a power base — and a business empire that in many ways endures today — centered around their regiment. In 1958, it published a document called “The National Ideology of the Defense Services” which strikingly resembles the dwifungsi, or dual function, doctrine of the Indonesian army that stated that the military has both a defense and social-political role. Ne Win also established an entity called the Defense Services Institute. (DSI), which soon controlled vital sectors of Myanmar’s economy. It had its own retail stores in Yangon and elsewhere it controlled the lucrative importation of coal for the railroads, electric supplies and inland water transport. DSI even established an external shipping line, the Five Star Line, and took over an English-owned bank and renamed it the Ava Bank. A newspaper, the Guardian, and a publishing house were also controlled by DSI. Meanwhile, the once-tiny Myanmar Army, perhaps as few as 2,000 men in 1949, grew steadily in strength and importance. By the late 1950s, Ne Win had more than 40,000 soldiers under his command. The army was becoming a state within the state, but few Myanmars, the vast majority of whom had faith in the nation’s then democratic system, constitution and rule of law, paid much attention until New Win seized power in 1962. Significantly, the junta that overthrew a democratically elected government introduced a new economic system called “the Burmese Way to Socialism.” But rather than establishing a socialist regime reminiscent of those in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or China, Ne Win’s rendition meant that everything was nationalized and taken over by 23 military-run state corporations. Military coups were not uncommon in Asia at that time, but the difference in Myanmar was that the military seized not only political but also economic power. While the economies of Thailand and Indonesia, for instance, blossomed because the military entered into marriages of convenience with indigenous plutocracies, Ne Win took Myanmar in a completely different direction. The old business community, which was mainly of Indian and Chinese origin, had their properties and assets seized by the military, driving hundreds of thousands out of Myanmar into India, Southeast Asia or Taiwan. But if the 1962 coup had been meant to squash what was left of the insurgents, it turned out to be counterproductive. A rebellion broke out among the Kachin in 1961 in areas of northern Shan state. After 1962, it spread to Kachin state and the Kachin Independence Army took over most of the state. An even smaller rebellion among the Shan, which broke out in 1958, escalated into full-scale war as several bands grouped together to form the Shan State Army in 1964. The Burmese Way to Socialism had, hardly surprisingly, led to economic collapse — and a flourishing black market with neighboring Thailand. The KNU, which controlled the border areas, collected taxes on that trade, and was able to buy modern guns from the Thai black market. And, most devastatingly, China decided to give all-out support to the CPB, including modern, sophisticated weaponry of kinds that the old forces in central Myanmar never possessed. Thus, the new power structure that emerged in Myanmar after 1962 had more to do with preserving an order that hugely privileged the military in an otherwise collapsing society than the fact that officers had seen fierce combat. That new order had a very narrow base, consisting of men from Ne Win’s own regiment, the 4th Burma Rifles. And Ne Win himself was probably the least battle-hardened senior officer in the Tatmadaw as he arguably spent more time gambling at horse races than on the battlefield. Actually, the country’s most battle-hardened officers – among them the popular Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, who was purged in the late 1950s, later joined the CPB and ended his life in exile in China, and General Tin Oo, who fought in several frontier areas and in 1988 became one of the leaders of the then newly-established National League for Democracy (NLD) – did not become killers of civilians. Rather, it was Ne Win loyalists who opened fire on demonstrating students in 1962, on students and workers in the mid-1970s, and then the massacres in 1988, when thousands of pro-democracy protesters were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere. Ne Win and his men from the 4th Burma Rifles remained in power until after the events of 1988, when somewhat younger officers took over. Ne Win’s legacy was finally dismantled in 2002, when he died and his relatives were purged allegedly for plotting against the then-military government. But the system he created lives on today. The military became the ruling class, which enjoyed privileges denied ordinary citizens. It had its own schools and hospitals and it was rare for someone who did not come from a military family to get a job in the government. The new army that emerged after 1962 also included a series of Light Infantry Divisions, which became notorious for their brutality when fighting rebels and suppressing civil movements in urban areas, as they did in 1988 and are doing once again in the wake of the February 1 coup. The Burmese Way to Socialism was abolished after the 1988 uprising, but the military retained an important role in the semi-capitalist system that succeeded it. While Ne Win had his DSI, Myanmar’s new military leaders established powerful companies like the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, which currently have vast holdings across the economy. As such, the very concept of the 1958 declaration and the 1962 coup has not been abandoned but rather reshaped: the military should have a defense function as well as playing social, political and economic roles. Whether Suu Kyi and her NLD aimed to roll back those roles and holdings in a second elected term is an open and important question. Suu Kyi largely refrained from challenging the Tatmadaw’s political and economic power in her first term, but the NLD’s overwhelming election win last November – which coup-makers claim without evidence was fraudulent – gave her a strong mandate to push for more democratic change. Top brass leaders also likely feared the risk of retribution for their many crimes. All senior Tatmadaw officers know where the skeletons are buried of past atrocities, both in ethnic minority areas and now also in urban centers home to the middle class. The current commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is now widely loathed across the population for his regime’s ruthless post-coup clampdown. He and his associates know by now that they either maintain power or land in prison — or worse. But it is a combination of those fears, deeply entrenched economic interests and a dual-function ideology that holds the Tatmadaw so tightly together, not some underlying sense of patriotism or because officers have been hardened through battles in the field. And that explains why no cracks have or are likely to emerge in the Tatmadaw, despite the brutal, irrational and seemingly self-defeating orders being handed down by officers and carried out by unswervingly obedient foot soldiers..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2021-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s Economy in Freefall Under Military Regime
Topic: ADB, Amata Corporation, Asian Development Bank, Électricité de France, Coup, EDF, junta, Kirin, MEHL, military regime, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, National League for Democracy, NLD, Singapore, Toyota, World Bank
Topic: ADB, Amata Corporation, Asian Development Bank, Électricité de France, Coup, EDF, junta, Kirin, MEHL, military regime, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, National League for Democracy, NLD, Singapore, Toyota, World Bank
Description: "Before last year’s November election, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank predicted that Myanmar would bounce back strongly from the economic impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic, with the economy set to grow at around 6 percent in 2021. In the immediate aftermath of the military’s Feb. 1 coup, junta leaders sought to keep the economy on track by presenting themselves as business-friendly and saying that economic policies would remain unchanged during the state of emergency. The junta even appointed some individuals to Myanmar’s key economic ministries who were already well-connected and well-known to the international community. But now the World Bank’s latest forecast reveals that Myanmar’s economy is in dire jeopardy and is projected to contract by 10 percent this year due to the impact of the military takeover. 80 days after the coup, there are already many signs that the economy is in freefall, with new investment drying up, the withdrawal of existing investment and the halting of key international-backed infrastructure projects, as western countries sanction the military regime. Western business groups including the United States, United Kingdom, European, Italian and French chambers of commerce rejected the regime’s invitation to meet with its cabinet members in March. Moreover, nearly 50 international companies including Coca-Cola, Telenor and Heineken, signed a joint statement expressing their deep concern over developments in Myanmar. The impact of the coup has been to reverse the country’s economic reforms and the economic progress made during the last decade. The coup has pushed Myanmar—previously one of the region’s fastest-growing economies – back into dire poverty and left the economy on the brink of collapse. The Irrawaddy looks at what has happened to Myanmar’s economy since the military takeover and how that has impacted people across the country.....Number of new companies slumps: Company registration figures from the government investment agency, the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA), reveal a huge slump in the number of new companies being registered. DICA data shows that the number of new registered companies was 1,373 in January, 188 in February and 163 in March. The figures reveal that the number of registered companies has declined nearly 87 percent compared with the same period last year. In 2020, under the National League for Democracy (NLD) government and even with the COVID-19 crisis, the number of new registered companies was 1,415 in January, 1,298 in February and 1,015 in March.....Internet restrictions cripple digital economy and Fintech market: The emerging digital economy and Fintech market collapsed after the military regime introduced large-scale internet restrictions across Myanmar. The internet blackouts have affected everything from mobile money to e-commerce and online food delivery services. Access to mobile money services including Wave money and KZB pay has been crippled since March, when the regime blocked mobile internet and broadband services. E-commerce business is down by 75 percent, while online food delivery services nationwide are down 80 percent following the coup, according to reports. The result is that thousands of young people are now out of work.....Garment sector in jeopardy: The garment sector has also been paralyzed after the largest foreign brands halted orders over concern at the politically unstable situation, while deadly crackdowns in industrial areas have also forced factories to close down and workers to return to their hometowns. Myanmar earned between US$4 billion and US$6 billion from cut, make and pack garment exports in 2020 and the industry employed 500,000 people before the coup. Now, over 80 percent of the garment sector has been forced to suspend operations since mid-February. Labour organizations say that over one-third [200,000] of garment industry workers have lost their jobs since the junta launched deadly crackdowns on anti-coup protesters and imposed martial law in industrial areas. Since the coup, the sector has also lost major foreign brands including Italy’s Benetton and Swedish Retailer H&M after they decided to pause new orders from Myanmar. H & M, the world’s second-biggest fashion retailer, has had around 45 direct suppliers in Myanmar for the last seven years. But the company has suspended new orders, citing “practical difficulties and an unpredictable situation”. Italy’s Benetton Group has also suspended all new orders from its suppliers in Myanmar, citing concerns over the increasing use of deadly violence against pro-democracy supporters.....Thousands of construction workers out of a job: Around 300,000 to 400,000 workers in the construction sector lost their jobs following the coup, according to the Construction Workers Union. The union said that the political instability since the coup has forced a halt on all major infrastructure projects in Yangon, Myanmar’s commercial capital, including the Korean Industrial complex, the Japan-backed Yangon-Thanlyin Bridge and the extension of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone.....Stock trading at a record low: The value of shares traded on the Yangon Stock Exchange (YSX) in March declined to its lowest level in history following the coup, according to YSX records. The records reveal that the value of stocks traded on the exchange in March was just 110 million kyats. In the same period last year, the value of stocks traded on the exchange peaked at 1.425 billion Kyats. The value of stocks traded in February this year also dropped drastically compared with the figures in February 2020. YSX records show that 442 million kyats worth of shares were traded on the exchange in February, compared to 1.48 billion kyats traded in February 2020.....South Korea suspends finance for infrastructure projects: In response to the military coup, the South Korean government has decided to halt financing for Myanmar government infrastructure projects until next year, according to Korean media reports. Korea’s Ministry of Economy and Finance has temporarily suspended financial support through its Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) for any new infrastructure projects by the military regime, according to the reports. The Korean government set up the EDCF to provide support for industrial development and economic stability in developing countries and to promote economic cooperation between Korea and those countries. The EDCF signed with the ousted NLD government to provide $1 billion worth of loans to Myanmar until 2022 to support industrialization and economic growth through various infrastructure projects. Under the agreement, the Export-Import Bank of Korea also agreed to support a nearly US$63 million loan to help Myanmar build a Korea-Myanmar Industrial Complex.....Banking and cash flow crisis: Myanmar’s banking system has been paralyzed since the coup as hundreds of branches of at least 31 local banks and 13 foreign ones have closed their doors due to staff strikes. All banking services have been halted in the country except for mobile banking and ATM services. As a result almost all trading companies, especially those engaged in sea-bound trade, have been forced to halt operations, as the banks are unable to issue the documents needed to import and export goods. Companies are also struggling to pay salaries, as banks are not providing payroll services. Businesses are also suffering from a cash shortage as bank branches have closed down and the regime has ordered limits on cash withdrawals for both individuals and companies. Moreover, businesses have been constrained by cash shortages for months. Foreign businesses are also suffering from a money shortage as both cash withdrawals from the local bank and importing new funding from abroad has become difficult. Under the previous government, the review process for new transactions from abroad took only a week. Currently, business people are not allowed to know how the review process works.....Foreign firms to exit: Large foreign firms are under pressure to pull out of any businesses which help bankroll the military regime, Australia’s Woodside Petroleum said it has decided to withdraw its 100-odd workers from an offshore drilling project in Myanmar. The company said the move is a response to human rights violations following the coup, with Woodside saying that it will keep all business decisions under review until they see the future outlook for Myanmar and that political stability has improved. The company completed pulling staff and machinery out of Myanmar in March. South Korean Steel Makers Coated & Color Steel Co Ltd, an affiliate of POSCO, said that a plan is underway to end its joint venture with Myanmar Economic Holdings Public Co Ltd (MEHL), one of the country’s two military-controlled conglomerates. The company is already discussing a plan to buy MEHL’s 30 percent stake so that it can continue operations as the sole owner. The joint venture company produces sheet metal for residential and factory roofing and made profits of around US$1.7 million in the last year. The move came after the company came under pressure from human rights group in both Myanmar and Korea to end its ties with military-linked companies in Myanmar.....World Bank forecasts 10 percent slump in growth: Myanmar’s economic growth is set to shrink by 10 percent this financial year as military rule hammers one of the region’s fastest-growing economies, according to the World Bank. The global financial institution forecast in December that Myanmar’s economy would start to recover from COVID-19 in March. But it said that since the coup Myanmar has been heavily affected by protests, strikes, military action, reductions in mobility and disruption to public services, like banking, logistics and internet access......ADB halts funding for government projects: One of the Myanmar’s biggest development partners, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has also put on hold funding for Myanmar government development projects ranging from transport and energy, to education and information technology, following the lethal crackdowns on peaceful anti-regime protesters that have killed over 700 civilians. The ADB said in a statement that it remains “deeply concerned about recent developments in Myanmar, especially the loss of life during civil protests”. The bank stated that the change in the country’s circumstances will have a serious impact on Myanmar’s economic and social development. Under the latest loans agreement, the ADB approved a US$484 million loan in November 2020 to construct a new expressway connecting Bago Region and Mon State. Both areas lie along Japan’s planned East-West Economic Corridor, a grand infrastructure scheme for the Greater Mekong Subregion.....French energy giant halts hydropower project: French energy giant Électricité de France (EDF) has suspended a hydropower project worth more than US$1.5 billion in Myanmar’s Shan State over human rights concerns, as the military regime continues to use deadly force against anti-coup protesters across the country. EDF said that it has halted development of the Shweli-3 Project, including the activities of its subcontractors. Led by EDF, the 671 MW project was being jointly developed with Japan’s Marubeni Corporation and the locally owned Myanmar Ayeyar Hinthar Company. The companies received a Notice to Proceed in 2018 under the NLD government. It was expected to generate 3 billion kWh of electricity annually for the national grid and supply power to more than 8.5 million people nationwide.....Singapore’s businessman leaves: Prominent Singaporean businessman Lim Kaling has pulled out of a joint venture with ties to the Myanmar military-owned conglomerate MEHL. One week after the military staged their coup and detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, Lim said that recent events in Myanmar had caused him “grave concern”. Lim Kaling disposed of his one-third stake in the joint venture that owns RMH Singapore Pte Ltd. MEHL and RMH jointly operate Virginia Tobacco Co. Ltd. (VTCL). RMH owns a 49-percent stake in VTCL, while MEHL owns the remainder. It has been operated as a joint venture since 1993. VTCL has a virtual monopoly on the cigarette market in Myanmar, producing the country’s most popular cigarette brands, Red Ruby and Premium Gold.....Kirin cuts tie with Myanmar Military-owned firm: Five days after the coup, Japanese beverage giant Kirin cut ties with a Myanmar military-owned conglomerate saying it was deeply concerned by the recent actions of the military, which are against their standards and human rights policy. Kirin Holdings Co. Ltd. announced that it would end its joint-venture partnership with MEHL. Kirin held 51 percent of both the Myanmar Brewery and Mandalay Brewery, with MEHL holding the rest.....World Bank halts payments to Myanmar: The World Bank, one of Myanmar’s largest development partners, announced that it had put a hold on disbursements for its existing development operations in the country in sectors ranging from electricity and education to technical assistance, following the military takeover. The bank is involved in at least 24 ongoing projects in Myanmar worth billions of dollars, according to the World Bank’s development project list.....Singapore: wait and see: Singaporean conglomerate Sembcorp has decided to halt a plan to develop an industrial park in Yangon’s Hlegu Township. Sembcorp President and CEO Wong Kim Yin told media that his company would wait until the political situation stabilizes, saying the company also needs to see how its customers respond as well. The Myanmar-Singapore (Hlegu) Industrial Park is expected to be built on 436 hectares of land in Hlegu Township at an estimated cost of $230 million. The project received approval from the Myanmar Investment Commission in 2020. The project was a joint development by Sembcorp CSSD Myanmar Co.—a subsidiary of Sembcorp Industries — and Myanmar’s Pahtama Group and Myanmar Agribusiness Public Corp. The development was a priority project under the ousted NLD government’s plan to secure foreign investment to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Myanmar’s economy......Toyota postpones plan to open new plant: Toyota, the world’s biggest car manufacturer, has delayed opening a vehicle production plant in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the outskirts of Yangon, with the company citing concerns over political instability following the coup. Toyota Myanmar announced its plan to build the US$52.6 million production plant in 2019, and said it anticipated employing more than 150 staff in Myanmar. The company said in 2019 that it expected the plant to produce around 2,500 Hilux trucks annually, starting from 2021.....US$1 billion industrial complex halted: One day after the coup, work on a US$1 billion industrial hub project backed by the Amata Corporation, Thailand’s largest industrial estate developer, was suspended due to possible sanctions by Western countries. Envisioned as an industrial complex on 2,000 acres of land near Laydaunkkan Village in East Dagon and South Dagon townships in Yangon, the project was one of a number launched by the former NLD government to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Myanmar’s economy. The NLD government inaugurated the project in late December last year and it was expected to create 33,000 jobs, attract foreign investment and boost the Yangon Region’s industrial output and exports..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-04-22
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The case for a US missile strike on Myanmar
Sub-title: US could not unilaterally invoke 'R2P' to intervene in Myanmar's crisis but that doesn't mean the military option is off the table
Description: "Nearly 80 days and 800 deaths after the military coup of February 1, two divergent trendlines have emerged to define the future contours of Myanmar’s crisis: brutal reassertion of control by the military junta over a political and economic wasteland; or descent into civil war pitting the junta against a nascent coalition of forces fighting for federal democracy. Less noted and earlier in the crisis dismissed as quixotic, there is also however a third wild-card scenario involving action aimed at deflecting both of those two disastrous trajectories: foreign intervention to engage Myanmar’s generals in the only language they have ever understood or respected – military power. Impelled by the looming prospect of state collapse and humanitarian catastrophe as an inflexible Tatmadaw ratchets up its repression, the logic of external intervention in the form of US missile strikes against military targets is assuming a compelling momentum. As one well-placed Singapore-based analyst conceded: “We’re in such dire territory now that almost nothing is off-limits.” In the weeks following the putsch through February and into March many, including this writer, saw reassertion of control by the junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), as the most probable outcome. The argument was based on an assessment of four salient facets of the Tatmadaw as a military organization: its ample resources, institutional cohesion, proven ruthlessness and unblinking sense of mission. All of these characteristics had been amply demonstrated in earlier periods of popular protest. Where the assessment fell down was in underestimating the extraordinary courage and resilience of ordinary citizens. Led by a youthful vanguard armed with modern communications technology, hundreds of thousands who saw their future being torn away by the same military that between 1962 and 2011 had reduced their country to an economic basket case took to the streets in peaceful protest. This sustained outpouring of anger forced the military to move from relative restraint in the first weeks after the coup to a more characteristic resort to battlefield violence involving first targeted killings using rifles and finally open massacres with machine guns, grenades and rocket launchers..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2021-04-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s stabilisation challenges
Description: "Myanmar faces a number of significant stabilisation challenges including frequent natural disasters, environmental challenges and organised crime, in addition to the challenges associated with a nascent democratisation process. This report, however, focuses exclusively on violent conflict and displacement. Myanmar has been afflicted by armed conflict since independence. During the 1960s-1980s, a number of armed groups were able to establish ‘effectively independent micro-states’ (EC, 2016, p. 3). These had their own ‘rudimentary’ governments, service provision, and foreign policies (EC, 2016, p. 3). This situation persists in some parts of Myanmar (EC, 2016, p. 3). The communities currently most at risk of, and affected by, conflict and violence are those living in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and in other parts of northern Shan State. Other affected communities include those living in Kachin, Rakhine, Chin and Kayin States. The community most affected by the threat of forced displacement is the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group, in Rakhine State. The nature of conflict in these areas ranges from occasional to frequent clashes between armed groups and government forces. In addition to armed conflict, Rakhine State suffers from tensions between the Muslim and Buddhist communities. There were more than 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar in 2016 (McConnachie, 2016, p. 4). Moreover, more than 128,000 refugees from Myanmar were living in Thailand in 2014 (UNICEF, 2014, p. 3). According to UNICEF, displacement can constitute a driver of conflict, depending on whether it is forced or not, and on the extent to which host communities are prepared for IDPs. Women and children are reportedly disproportionately affected by migration and displacement, and make up the majority of those who are IDPs and refugees (ibid). The literature identifies a number of sources of resilience in Myanmar, which include:  Institutionalisation of peace-making: Both the previous and current governments declared their commitment to ending conflict in Myanmar. A number of peace initiatives and inter-faith dialogues have taken place in order to mitigate tensions and conflict in the country.  Economy: Myanmar’s economy has considerable potential. A number of economic reforms have been undertaken and economic growth is strong, although it has been slowing recently.  Strengthened civil society: The previous government’s decision to allow issue-driven CSOs to operate in Myanmar has led to a proliferation of such organisations.  Education: The previous government undertook steps to reform the education system in Myanmar in a bid to end discrimination against ethnic minorities.  Release of political prisoners: A significant number of political prisoners have been released since the new National League for Democracy (NLD) led government came to power.  Increased press freedom: Extensive media reform has resulted in a proliferation of ‘alternative’ information and has rendered the government subject to increased scrutiny. The literature identifies a number of policy options for mitigating tensions in Myanmar. International actors could potentially provide support and assistance in a number of areas. These include technical support for the conclusion, implementation and monitoring of ceasefire agreements, and support for an inclusive national political dialogue. They also include various forms of assistance for recovery and development, as well as support for educational reform. There is a sizeable body of literature on Myanmar’s stabilisation challenges. This consists of a mixture of peer-reviewed journal articles, policy briefs, and reports by NGOs and international organisations. While gender is not addressed in all of the papers reviewed for the purposes of this report, a number of papers do look at gender, specifically in the context of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and in the context of peace-making and peacebuilding..."
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Source/publisher: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
Date of publication: 2017-05-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar: Arria-formula Meeting
Description: "Council members will convene virtually for an Arria-formula meeting on Myanmar. Initiated by the UK, the meeting is being co-sponsored by Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway and the US. The expected briefers include Sai Sam Kham, a civil society representative from Myanmar; Richard Horsey, Senior Adviser at International Crisis Group; and Daw Zin Mar Aung, from the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). Myanmar’s permanent representative, Kyaw Moe Tun, is also expected to participate. The meeting is expected to be broadcast via UNTV. Council members have met three times to discuss the situation in Myanmar since the 1 February government take-over by the Myanmar military (also known as the Tatmadaw). In these meetings, which have been held in closed videoconference format, Council members were briefed by Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener. Thus far, the Council has not been able to hear from a wider array of briefers since the closed consultations format does not allow briefers from outside the UN system and there has been resistance to a public Council meeting on Myanmar. According to a concept note prepared by the UK, tomorrow’s Arria-formula meeting would provide a platform for “Myanmar voices to brief the Security Council on the current situation from their perspectives and those of the people they represent”. The briefers are expected to discuss the various national, regional, and international implications of the developments in Myanmar since 1 February. Sai Sam Kham is likely to address the effect of the coup on the ethnic communities in Myanmar. Council members may be interested to hear his analysis on whether ethnic armed groups may join forces with those opposing the government take-over and the possible consequences of such developments on stability in the country. Horsey is expected to cover the potential for further violence and the impact on regional stability, particularly considering the influx of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. He may also cover the economic effects of recent protests as well as the impact of the crisis on an already fragile humanitarian situation in many parts of Myanmar. Members may be interested in hearing Horsey’s views on the diplomatic and security challenges for the region and the role that ASEAN could play. Horsey may urge countries to impose arms embargoes and avoid actions that could be construed as recognition of the military regime as Myanmar’s legitimate government. Daw Zin Mar Aung is likely to focus on the Federal Democracy Charter that the CRPH— which was formed by the democratically elected representatives in Myanmar on 4 February—published on 1 April. The charter was developed following consultations with political parties, ethnic armed organisations and civil society in Myanmar. A statement from the CRPH said that an interim unity government should be formed based on the charter. Some members will be interested in further details on the CRPH’s plan to establish a federal democratic union and interim constitutional arrangements ahead of adopting a new constitution, as indicated in the charter. Kyaw Moe Tun in his statement is likely to urge the international community to increase its pressure on the military. Following the Tatmadaw’s actions on 1 February, Council members issued a press statement on 4 February and adopted a presidential statement on 10 March. Council members also agreed on press elements on 1 April, following their most recent meeting on Myanmar, which took place on 31 March. Kyaw Moe Tun may also call for stronger action from the Council, including imposing targeted sanctions and instituting a temporary halt on foreign investment..."
Source/publisher: UN Security Council
Date of publication: 2021-04-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Local uprisings emerge to challenge Myanmar’s army
Description: "Sleeping by their makeshift barricades, knots of young men at Tahan in the western Myanmar town of Kale had not expected an attack in the pre-dawn darkness. Armed with a few hunting guns made by village blacksmiths, catapults, some airguns and Molotov cocktails, they were no match for forces hardened by decades of conflict and equipped with combat weapons. The first barrage of shots and rocket propelled grenades from Myanmar's army, known as the Tatmadaw, came around 5 a.m. on April 7, the protesters and residents of Kale said. By evening, the one-sided battle was over, the sandbag barricades had been cleared and 13 people were dead, three people involved in the armed group told Reuters. Soldiers deployed on street corners and remain until now. "So many people on our side were wounded that we couldn’t do anything and had to retreat," Aung Myat Thu, one 20-year-old protester in Kale, told Reuters from there by messaging app. Although the resistance in Kale was quickly crushed, it points to a new phase of bloodshed in Myanmar after the Feb. 1 coup, with some protesters now seeking to take up arms against the junta's forces. The junta did not respond to requests for comment. The junta-controlled Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper said 18 rioters were arrested in Kale after attacking security forces with homemade weapons. "Some of the members of the security forces were seriously injured," it said Despite the early setbacks, disparate groups are trying to source better weapons, sharpen tactics, share intelligence and get training from some of the two dozen or so existing ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, several opposition politicians said. "Some small defence units have been formed across the country, in the community, villages or wards," said Moe Saw Oo, a spokesman for the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a body representing ousted lawmakers that has set up a rival national unity government. "At the same time, we are in coordination with ethnic armed organisations about the establishment of a proper defence force," he said. Over 700 people have been killed and more than 3,000 have been detained by security forces cracking down on the nationwide protests that have raged since the military deposed the civilian government led by Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi on Feb. 1. Even as the fighters in Kale retreated, other groups have sprung up elsewhere. Acts of sabotage, such as the burning of administrative buildings and attacks on businesses linked to the army have broken out the in the main city of Yangon and the second city of Mandalay. "It is a sign of the determination and the extreme violence the military has been using against protesters rather than a strategic assessment they can take on the might of the military," said analyst Richard Horsey, who recently briefed the U.N. Security Council on the threat of national collapse. Among the new groups, the Ayeyarwaddy Federal Army announced its arrival last week in the heartland of the Bamar majority, which forms the core of the armed forces as well as Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. "Armed revolution is the only way to return the people's power," spokesman Mratt Thu Aung told Reuters via messaging app. He did not disclose the group's location or the size of its force and Reuters was unable to do so independently.....'IF WE DON'T FIGHT...'.....Pressure to organise an armed group in Kale began in mid-March as the army stepped up violence against protests sweeping the largely Buddhist country of 53 million. On March 17, police opened fire on an anti-coup rally - killing four people - after chasing protesters to Myohla on Kale's outskirts, said a 36-year-old activist who was there. "From that point, the people, especially the youth, felt that we needed to do something to defend ourselves," he said, declining to give his name for reprisals against his family. By late March, at least three barricades were set-up around the main market in Tahan, hundreds of people joining to pile up sandbags. Young people in the town banded together to form the Tahan Civil Defence Group, local activists said. The group then raised funds and sought out weapons - mainly rudimentary hunting guns made by local blacksmiths, they said. "At first we had seven guns, which then increased to 15 within a short time," the 36-year-old activist said. The group went for target practice session in a nearby forest on March 26. Two days later, the Tahan Civil Defence Group held off an assault by junta forces. Shortly after, it combined with other local groups to form the Kalay (Kale) Civil Army. Such groups were getting help from the CRPH across the country, an official of the group said. Several thousand young people had been given basic training in arms and fighting by at least four ethnic armed organisations, mostly in Myanmar's border areas, he said. "More are coming," he said, declining to be named. "If we don't fight, the future of Myanmar is gone."......'DON’T UNDERSTAND THE TATMADAW'...In Kale, the little-trained fighters were emboldened by early success. The 19-year-old fighter said he was sleeping between barricades on the main road through Tahan when gunfire woke him. "I grabbed my hunting gun and two soldiers started shooting at me," he said. "I had one chance to shoot back, but my gun didn't work." He sheltered behind a wall, then fled during a lull. The Tatmadaw advanced systematically, blocking off escape routes, one resistance member in Tahan said. "We don't understand the Tatmadaw mindset," the 43-year-old said from a safe house. "That's our mistake." Several young fighters were among the 13 dead at the end of a day of fighting, activists said. Survivors had now gone underground, they said. "We were not safe in Kale anymore," the 19-year-old fighter said by phone from northeastern India, whose border is just over 100 km (60 miles away). Indian authorities declined to comment. A local NLD lawmaker involved in forming the Kalay Civil Army said fighters had been asked to lay low for now, while equipment and training were improved across Myanmar. “Maybe the time will come to fight with the Tatmadaw,” the lawmaker said, “For that, we will need good training.”..."
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Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-04-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ‘Transfer of civilians’ as a ‘colonial wrong’ in international criminal law? Myanmar’s migration history as a hazardous argument
Description: "Did migration processes into colonial Burma – from India and elsewhere – amount to a “transfer of civilians” into an occupied territory, a practice prohibited by international law today? Should the international community reconsider such colonial-era population movements as a “colonial wrong”, conceding that a historical injustice has been committed by European colonialism, in order to make contemporary Myanmar political and military actors more ready to accept accountability for the severe human rights violations committed against the Rohingya? These questions, based on problematic assumptions about history and with potentially dangerous political implications, were discussed at a meeting of international lawyers in Yangon, the proceedings of which were recently published online (Morten Bergsmo, Wolfgang Kaleck and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (eds.): Colonial Wrongs and Access to International Law; Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 9 November 2020). International criminal justice faces a crisis of legitimacy. The International Criminal Court (ICC, constituted by the Rome Statute and operative since 2002) especially stands accused of applying what Wolfgang Kaleck has called “double standards”. Its prosecution of severe human rights violators focuses on persons from countries with little power in global politics, many of them in Sub-Saharan Africa so far. At the same time, the Court finds it virtually impossible to prosecute perpetrators protected by major powers in the international system, especially the United States. The argument of “double standards” can be extended by giving it a postcolonial pitch: international criminal law is unable to address “colonial wrongs” – crimes committed by colonial powers – and thus cannot deal with the history behind current governance failures and violent conflicts that contributed to the very human rights violations it tries to prosecute. In order to address such questions, senior international law specialists and academics met for a conference in Yangon in November 2019. Myanmar constituted a very conscious choice of location for the conference and provided the backdrop to discuss questions such as: Did the migration of substantial non-indigenous populations (primarily from India) into colonial Burma constitute a “transfer of civilians” into an occupied territory – a practice that is regarded as a crime against humanity under today’s international criminal law? And if so, how should this be taken into account as a “colonial wrong” when prosecuting perpetrators of severe human rights violations, especially those perpetrated against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State in 2016-7? (The conference volume includes papers on systematic legal aspects and a few other country case studies, especially on the fate of indigenous populations in European settler colonies. However, it does not include studies on other historical examples of colonial-era population movements that could have put the Burma case into a broader historical perspective.) The decision by the Yangon conference organizers to discuss their agenda through the lens of Burmese history (and, of course, to hold it in Myanmar itself) could be seen as courageous; one may regard it as hazardous as well. The hazard is likely obvious to students of Myanmar history and contemporary politics: Does this “transfer of civilians into occupied territory” line of argument really do justice to Burma’s actual colonial history? And does it not risk undermining the citizenship rights of people whose ancestors migrated into Myanmar a century or more ago – and whose very citizenship rights are already severely embattled in Myanmar today? The organizers of the Yangon conference were of course aware they were entering a particularly difficult territory. They did so for good reason. In his concept paper laying the groundwork for the conference (first published in August 2019), Morten Bergsmo observes an “unusually polarised climate” in Myanmar around the issue of human rights violations in Rakhine. The official Myanmar narrative frames the issue primarily as one of “illegal migration” and “suppression of terrorism”. By contrast, a major strand in the international narrative (in reality mostly that of Western countries, U.N. institutions and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) discusses “the Rohingya genocide” and calls for prosecution under international criminal law. Bergsmo suggests that a recognition of “colonial wrongs”, especially the destruction of the sovereignty of the precolonial Burmese kingdom and the following mass migration of people from India into Burma, enabled by the British, may help to create a bridge, enabling a more fruitful dialogue. I certainly agree with Bergsmo’s observation on the “unusually polarized climate” around Myanmar today that currently makes meaningful dialogue about severe human rights violations very difficult, if not impossible. However, I very much doubt that the acceptance of what may be called a “postcolonial guilt theory” of acknowledging “colonial wrongs” in Burma will contribute to any greater degree of acceptance for ICC proceedings in Myanmar. I doubt this not merely because the argument is based on weak legal and misleading historical foundations. Even worse, such a line of reasoning – if it ever enters mainstream political debate – obviously risks strengthening the militant exclusionary nationalism in Myanmar that stands at the root of the Rohingya crisis. And it risks doing so for all the wrong reasons. To be sure, Bergsmo and the other international lawyers involved in this project do not want to trade responsibilities: In their view, this is not about downplaying or relativising responsibility for killings and other human rights violations against the Rohingya or others. It is about creating a dialogue that may lead to greater acceptance of international judicial proceedings on these violations. The book itself includes an explicit warning by the only Myanmar contributor and editor, Kyaw Yin Hlaing of the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony in Yangon. In his chapter, he reviews how contemporaries perceived the migration of Indians, and especially Indian Muslims, into colonial Burma as a result of the colonial situation, stoking fears of indigenous people being overwhelmed, of indigenous men losing their land and their women to foreigners; he also recalls how these sentiments were systematically fuelled further by military rulers as part of anti-colonial narratives since the 1960s. Kyaw Yin Hlaing cautions that, within this context, legal arguments about historical wrongs run a high risk of being misused to undermine peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups today: “Promoting accountability and the legitimacy of international law are valid considerations, but are less important than the lives and well-being of the populations (of all kinds) living in former colonies” (362). The remainder of the volume, however, does not take much notice of this warning. Instead, rather than reflecting the concrete historical and social context that their legal arguments about “colonial wrongs” may meet in Myanmar today, the contributors proceed, with what they appear to think of as their righteous “postcolonial” approach, into very treacherous legal and historical territory. On the legal side, the limitations of the argument are obvious and even acknowledged accordingly by contributors. The “transfer of civilians” into “occupied territory” constitutes an international crime only since the (Fourth) Geneva Convention of 1949. The Convention explicitly outlawed such a practice informed by the experiences of Nazi Germany’s exterminatory policies in occupied Eastern Europe. (In more recent decades, the concept has usually been applied to legally attack Israeli settlement policies in the West Bank, though not for example, against Moroccan population settlement policies in the former Western Sahara). “Transfer of civilians” was reaffirmed as a “crime against humanity” and “war crime” under the Rome Statute that created the ICC. Legally, therefore, any “transfers” before 1949 – including nearly all population movements under European colonial rule in Africa and Asia – are not covered under these prohibitions. Nonetheless, various contributors to the volume set out to develop lines of argument designed to describe actions by European colonial states as legally relevant “colonial wrongs” or “grievances” that may have led to atrocities later on. Not being a lawyer myself, I am not in a position to judge whether and how any such arguments have a potential to become part of relevant international law; the authors are surely committed to this. Beyond the immanent logic of these legal arguments, however, we also need to ask whether they make sense in the concrete case of the history of colonial Burma. It is one thing to assert historical and political responsibility of former colonial powers for obvious atrocities committed during their rule, such as the 1904-8 genocide of the Herero and Nama people in what was then German South West Africa (Namibia), or the issue of British capital punishment practices in colonial Kenya during the Mau Mau war in the 1950s. It is an entirely different – and very wrong – matter to group British migration policies in colonial Burma into the same (or a similar) class of “colonial wrongs”. The volume under review includes two contributions, by Jacques Leider and Derek Tonkin, which document the history of migration into Arakan / Rakhine in great detail. While there has been a presence of Muslim communities in Arakan for centuries, they show specifically that labour-related cross-border migration from the Chittagong area of Bengal began even before British colonial rule and expanded rapidly under it, especially in the latter years of the 19th and the early 20th century. Labour needs of local ethnic Rakhine landlords were a major factor; settlement and land acquisition by the migrants followed. Over time this led to a concentration of Muslim agriculturalists in Northern Rakhine who later acquired the Rohingya ethnonym (a fact disputed by Rohingya nationalists who claim a much earlier origin of the term). Until 1937, all this happened within the single territory of British India of which Burma was a part, without any internal border controls. Migration into colonial Arakan, with no force by the colonial power involved, was driven by economic needs and interests, and it was pursued by local individual and group agency. To categorize this process as a “colonial wrong” constitutes an ahistorical narrative which in effect denies agency to any colonial subjects. Likewise, Indian migration into the mainland and the urban centres of colonial Burma, especially Rangoon, was driven by the economic interest and agency of those who migrated, mostly from other parts of British India (while some came from China as well). Again, no forced labour was involved here. British policies played a stronger role than in Rakhine, in so far as the colonial state and the colonial economy created a demand for business professionals, traders and urban workers from India to move to Burma. In addition, civil servants and soldiers were temporarily transferred into colonial Burma, and some of them may have decided to settle there later on. For all of these groups, the colonial state made movement and long-term settlement possible, for example by creating an enabling environment of transport systems and urban facilities. All this led to social tension and instances of violence by the 1930s and contributed to the prominent anti-Indian streak within Burmese anti-colonial nationalism. However, the policies and incentives employed by the British in Burma were pretty much standard practices of “development policy”, as conceptualized by colonial powers in the first half of the 20th century; some of them were even continued after independence. To describe resulting migration processes under colonial rule as a “transfer of civilians” into an “occupied territory” (with the connotation that they were designed to overwhelm, drive out or exterminate the local Burmese population) does not only constitute a severe category error. It risks feeding into the “anti-foreigner”, xenophobic narrative within Burmese (and Rakhine) nationalism that has its historical roots in the late colonial period but has become ever more extreme under military rule since 1962. In effect, this narrative culminated in the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law and contributed to the perception of the Rohingya as “illegal aliens”, leading to violence and ultimately resulting in their flight and expulsion, in 2017. Of course, the experts advancing the “colonial wrongs” argument who contributed to the volume under review do not intend to condone any such discrimination or violence. But they appear to underestimate the fact that a core element of the very narrative they are proposing in order to increase global acceptance for international criminal law – that colonialism committed a crime by bringing in “foreigners” – is in fact already a core element of the exclusionary narrative of Burmese nationalism. It has been in use for decades, has been worsening over time, and it has already led to extreme marginalization and violence. Does all this matter? Clearly, a more balanced approach – one that does not just let powerful perpetrators off the hook while prosecuting only those who are already out of power – is very necessary in order to secure the very legitimacy of the international criminal law system. However, the Myanmar example shows that an inappropriate application of a simplistic, if not outright wrong postcolonial narrative is risky. Defenders of the Myanmar official position on the Rohingya issue hardly need international lawyers to remind them that “Indians”, “Bengalis” or other foreigners who migrated into the country in colonial times came in as a result of a “colonial wrong”. They have been making this point all along, but now they can do so with innovative phrasing and the international academic and legal legitimation provided by this volume. Disturbingly, they appear to do so already: Derek Tonkin (281-2, and email communication, 18.11.2020) documents the first two instances of the verbatim use of the “transfer of civilians” argument employed by high-ranking Myanmar officials in U.N. contexts, within weeks after the publication of Morten Bergsmo’s concept paper. It is difficult to think of this as a mere coincidence. The military coup of February 1st, 2021, has led the country into a massive crisis. The outcome is anything but clear at this point in time, and Myanmar may face an extended period of military rule, violent conflict, economic decline and even state failure. But the broad resistance against the military takeover and the political dynamics since the coup also have a potential to do away with long-established, outdated ideas and institutions in Myanmar’s political and legal system, in order to create a true break with the past. Many in Myanmar and internationally no longer see the Myanmar military as a legitimate partner in any substantive discussion about the political future of the country; in their view, the Tatmadaw has to return to the barracks without claiming special political prerogatives, or it has to disappear as an institution. A Rohingya voice has been emerging in the protests against the regime, and there is hope that the community will gain broader acceptance among the Burmese majority population. The declaration of the Federal Democracy Charter and the intent to abolish the 2008 constitution by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) on March 31st, 2021, imply an outright rejection of fundamental political ideas and institutions imposed by the Tatmadaw over decades. This could and should include a rejection of the very concept of belonging represented by the idea of “national races” (taingyinthar), and of the system of graded citizenship rights, based on an individual’s real or putative migratory background. Instead, Myanmar should acquire a new citizenship law that follows globally accepted standards, is inclusive and provides equal rights to everyone living in the country, not subject to political or bureaucratic manipulation. I have shown in this article that arguments about real or imagined “colonial wrongs” in the debate and legal discourse about contemporary human rights violations, when applied to Burma/Myanmar, were highly problematic even before the coup. Now and in any future processes of transitional justice, however, they deserve to be discarded in their entirety, as a misguided attempt of appeasing perpetrators of human rights violations on a grand scale and their political allies. Dr. Axel Harneit-Sievers, a historian by professional background, has been the country director of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung’s Myanmar office in Yangon from 2018 until May 2021. Opinions expressed here are personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2021-04-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-19
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Title: India and China Vying for Influence in Burma – A New Assessment
Description: "As Burma strategically lies at the crossroads of the Indian subconti- nent, southwestern China, the Indian Ocean and the rest of continental Southeast Asia, both an emerging India and a rising China have found increasing interests in this regional node since the end of the 1980s. The changing of guards in Rangoon through a military coup d’état orchestrated by a younger generation of Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) officers in September 1988 indeed offered the two giants an opportu- nity to refocus their regional strategic ambitions on Burma. A new dimension of the Sino-Indian rivalry was thus highlighted and many academic researchers pointed out the rise of the strategic competition between Beijing and New Delhi through Burma throughout the 1990s. Almost two decades after the beginnings of the Chinese thrust into the Burmese strategic field and India’s gradual reaction to it, this article seeks to assess the state of the rivalry between the two giants in Burma. By focusing the analysis on the perceptions, interests and achievements of India and China’s approach to Burma on the ground in the past 20 years, it seeks to question the severity and intensity of this Sino-Indian “competition” in the Burmese field. It is argued here that despite having realized obvious breakthroughs in the region, India and China still face many difficulties in Burma, and are unable to openly use it as a mere playground for their bilateral “rivalry.” After a brief discussion of the academic literature that has dealt with the rise of the rivalry since the early 1990s, this paper will explore the most visible expressions of this Sino-Indian contest in Burma. The energy and military sectors, tensions in border areas and the quest for a strategic access to the Indian Ocean are the most crucial factors, but it will be postulated hereafter that each has its own limits. Given internal divisions, hesitations, misreadings or misperceptions in New Delhi and Beijing, as well as the nationalist stance of the Burmese military regime, this article will claim that the Sino-Indian competi- tion over Burma must not be overestimated. Indeed, the Burmese field itself offers considerable resistance to the further thrust of India and China in the region, limiting the phenomenon to a mere “quiet rivalry.” The Rise of a “Strategic Rivalry”: Perceptions and Interpretations of Indian and Chinese Policies toward Burma since the 1990s When a new Burmese junta (SLORC2 ) succeeded the autarchic military regime of General Ne Win in September 1988, Beijing and New Delhi adopted two different approaches to the developments in Burma. After a decade of tense relations in the 1960s, China had clearly redefined its Burma strategy according to its national and security interests, through a more friendly policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Rangoon in January 1978. A few years later, with a landmark academic article published in 1985 by the official Beijing Review, 3 China unveiled its economic and military ambitions in Burma and had only a few more years to wait before taking the opportunity to fully implement them. When the SLORC, ostracized by the international community after its harsh repression of the pro-democracy movement during the summer of 1988, indicated its willingness to establish a new partnership with Beijing, China swiftly filled the vacuum left by international donors and regional powers. Confirmed after the Tiananmen Square repression by the official visit to China by General Than Shwe (then the SLORC’s Vice-Chairman) in October 1989, the new Sino-Burmese partnership enabled China to gain a sound strategic foothold in Burma within just a few years..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: India Review via Routledge (London)
Date of publication: 2008-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-18
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Title: Japan’s response to the coup in Myanmar
Description: "On 1 February 2021, military television channel Myawaddy told the people of Myanmar that a state of emergency had been declared. President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, both senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), had been arrested. Former vice president Myint Swe — now serving as President — used his constitutional authority to declare the state of emergency, then transferred state power to the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), Min Aung Hlaing. The Tatmadaw claimed that widespread election fraud in the November 2020 elections resulted in the NLD landslide victory. On 2 February 2021, they announced that a new State Administrative Council had been formed to take over all state legislative, judicial and executive functions. This has been called a coup by most Western media. After 10 years of varying levels of cooperation between the Tatmadaw and the NLD, the democratic transition has taken a serious U-turn. But given the strained relations between the Tatmadaw and the NLD — and given the fragility of all democratic transitions — the potential for such a reversal was always there, lingering in the shadows. Most Western governments and media outlets were quick to denounce and condemn the Tatmadaw and tried to draw attention to what they saw as a slow and weak response from the Japanese government. Certainly, Japan was not included in the 15 February statement by ambassadors to Myanmar that called for the military to show restraint and condemned the detention of political leaders. But Japan was a signatory to the G7 Foreign Minister’s statement on 3 February, ‘condemning the military coup’. On 21 February and again on 28 February, the Japanese government said it ‘strongly condemned’ the situation in Myanmar. In the same statement it said, ‘the government of Japan once again strongly urges the Myanmar military to release those who are detained … and swiftly restore Myanmar’s democratic political system’. Leaving aside Western governments’ failures to facilitate positive change in Myanmar — and ignoring the high probability that they are merely appealing to domestic activist stakeholders at a relatively low political cost — Japan’s different approach to the coup in Myanmar does raise questions. The day after the Tatmadaw took power, Japan’s State Minister of Defence Yasuhide Nakayama told Reuters, ‘If we do not approach this well, Myanmar could grow further away from politically free democratic nations and join the league of China’. This reveals the Japanese government’s understanding of the geostrategic significance of Myanmar in the region. China’s increasing influence in Myanmar has long been a concern for Japanese leaders. Fear over increasing dependence on China was one of the factors that led to the Tatmadaw deciding to initiate political reforms and open up Myanmar in 2011. The government of Japan was instrumental in this process, facilitating re-engagement between the international community and the government of Myanmar. On the condition that democratisation proceeded, Japan cancelled much of Myanmar’s outstanding debt in 2012. But more importantly perhaps, Japan provided a bridge loan to Myanmar to enable it to clear its arrears with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in the same year. This allowed these financial institutions to begin development aid and support the democratic transition of then-president Thein Sein. Japan’s diplomacy should also be viewed within the framework of relations with ASEAN, a key strategic partner for Japan. Tokyo has spent decades investing in the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asian countries and Japan’s economy is heavily dependent on them. On 10 February there was a phone call between the foreign ministers of Japan and Indonesia, with the main issues discussed being the situation in Myanmar and issues related to the South China Sea and the East China Sea. For Japan — and for ASEAN alike — these issues are all linked. The Japanese government’s approach to the coup in Myanmar is in some ways a middle road between the ‘distant’ Western states that prioritise human rights and democracy and the ‘local’ Asian states that prioritise stability and development. In this way, Japan is treading a fine line between its position as a liberal democracy and its dependence on stability and development in Southeast Asia. The overriding international concern for all states in Southeast Asia is China’s rise and responses to the coup in Myanmar are best understood within that framework..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication: 2021-04-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s transition : openings, obstacles and opportunities
Description: "Committed since 2003 to its “Road Map” for national reconciliation, the military regime in Myanmar persevered with the adoption of a new constitution in 2008, then held multi-party elections in November 2010. Each of these steps was criticized for significant procedural and substantive flaws, and the overall process was neither democratic, transparent, nor inclusive. The freeing of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in November 2010 was welcomed, especially her freedom to carry out political activities. Next, the new parliamentary assemblies were convened in January 2011, and the reins of government were formally handed over to a new, “civilianized” government on 30 March 2011. The new government under President (formerly General) Thein Sein began quickly to introduce some reforms and to set out its own agenda for change in line with the 2008 Constitution, and in its first twelve months in office released a large number of political prisoners. However, a number of substantive issues — such as the ongoing conflicts with several significant ethnic groups — remain unresolved, and some have even worsened. Government action in relation to the ending of human rights abuses continues to be manifestly insufficient, and the role of the military remains unchecked. No substantive measures for reforms to underpin the rule of law have been implemented, and the restoration of various freedoms, including freedom of the press and freedom of association, are being introduced only slowly and partially. The eleventh Myanmar/Burma Update conference was held at the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra on Monday, 16 and Tuesday, 17 May 2011. It was supported by a grant from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Co-conveners of the conference were Professor Monique Skidmore, University of Canberra, and Trevor Wilson and Nick Cheesman of the ANU. The conference was sponsored by the Department of Political and Social Change, School of International Political and Strategic Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU. The keynote speaker was Dr Thant Myint-U, historian and author, and formerly of the UN Department of Political Affairs..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Institute of Southeast Asian Studies" (Singapore)
Date of publication: 2011-05-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-18
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Title: Can Myanmar’s civil disobedience movement restore democracy?
Description: "Since Myanmar’s coup on 1 February, Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw General Min Aung Hlaing has been working to remake the country’s political landscape by removing the National League for Democracy (NLD), detaining its leadership and installing a military junta. But the success of the coup is not guaranteed, given the junta’s lack of control over parts of the state apparatus, population and spiralling economy. The civil disobedience movement is spreading across key ministries. Staff from the Central Bank of Myanmar and commercial banks are striking and limitations placed on withdrawals indicate a looming liquidity crisis. Foreign trade is frozen with exports down by 90 percent. Medical professionals are striking and two-thirds of the country’s hospitals are not properly functioning during a pandemic. Some police have joined protests, refusing to do the dirty work of the military. A groundswell of protests have swept across the country, with Myanmar’s tech-savvy youth proving to be a creative mobilising force the old guard has not faced before. As Min Aung Hlaing sports bulletproof vests in rare outings and uses state media to blast the civil disobedience movement and protesters, the junta’s own propaganda machine suggests the resistance is having an impact. Can the military maintain internal cohesion facing off against a nation and multiple crises? Based on 2020 election results, there may even be hints of support for the NLD within the military. A number of possible scenarios are emerging with different enabling factors, not least of which is the Myanmar people’s sheer determination for democracy. One scenario is a return to absolute military rule. The junta would use the crises, violence and coercion to remove any semblance of social order, and then present a false dichotomy to the population: anarchy or dictatorship. A delay in holding elections for several years would be justified under the guise of restoring stability. A second scenario follows the path set by Min Aung Hlaing: hold elections within a year and reinstall a semi-elected parliament. The military has likely realised by now that the political system they designed under the Constitution does not guarantee its political victory. The military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) has been unable to secure enough seats to outnumber the NLD, even with the advantage of a quarter of parliamentary seats being assigned to the military. The junta may attempt to redesign the electoral system from first-past-the-post to proportional representation, framing this as an opportunity for ethnic and other political parties to gain more seats in a new election. A sham election could then take place with the NLD removed from the electoral map. While ASEAN countries initially seemed tempted by this track, it does not provide a pathway to de-escalate resistance. A rigged military-run election would fail to transfer the electoral legitimacy voters bestowed on 2020-elected officials, some of whom have formed the Committee Representing the Union Parliament in opposition to the junta. In another, third, scenario, the coup does not either clearly fail or succeed, creating a protracted crisis. For over 70 years, the Myanmar military has failed to win a number of asymmetric internal armed conflicts. The battle for state control would become another front line of drawn-out crises where the use of state-based violence breeds further resistance and new support for the civil disobedience movement. A protracted crisis could also materialise if there is significant reorganising of power within the military leading to unforeseen contests. Potential stalemates due to the military and civilian blocs not recognising each other for negotiations, as called for by several ASEAN countries, could also prolong events. In scenario four, the coup fails and there is a return to the hybrid government under the 2008 constitution, with NLD members released and the 2020 election results honoured, as called for by the United Nations and much of the international community. For the coup to fail, the civil disobedience movement would need to sustain popular and financial support and continue to impact the junta’s control over the economy and administration. This scenario hinges on support for Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership waning as multiple crises hit regular military families and businesses..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication: 2021-03-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar coup: civil disobedience campaign begins amid calls for Aung San Suu Kyi's release
Sub-title: National League for Democracy urges military to acknowledge 2020 election result
Description: "The party of Aung San Suu Kyi has called for her immediate release and for Myanmar’s 2020 election results to be acknowledged by the military, which took power in a coup on Monday. The country’s elected leader, who was among dozens of political figures picked up by the army, reportedly remains under house arrest. The coup has provoked widespread outrage around the world, but China and Russia blocked British-led efforts at the UN security council to deliver a consensus statement condemning the military takeover. The streets of Myanmar’s main city, Yangon, were calm on Tuesday, but online many people turned their social media pictures red to signal their support for Aung San Suu Kyi, who won a landslide victory in November’s elections. In the evening, residents banged metal pots, a symbolic protest against the military, which previously ran Myanmar for some five decades. Some lit candles on their balconies. A growing civil disobedience campaign has also emerged among doctors, with health workers from dozens of hospitals across Myanmar stating they will not work under the military, starting from Wednesday. A statement on the Facebook page of May Win Myint, an official with her National League for Democracy, said the party’s executive committee urged the military to acknowledge the results of November’s election and called for the parliamentary session due to start this week to go ahead. It also called for Aung San Suu Kyi’s immediate release. Later on Tuesday, an official from the National League for Democracy said in a message on Facebook that Aung San Suu Kyi was in good health and that there was no plan to move her. It is not possible to verify such posts. The UN special envoy on Myanmar, Christine Schraner Burgener, briefed the UN security council in closed session on Tuesday. “She didn’t hold back at all,” a diplomat who was in the chamber said. “She really called for a clear signal of council support for democracy in Myanmar.” China and Russia however blocked a British-drafted statement condemning the coup and calling for its reversal, while India and Vietnam also voiced reservations. “China, weren’t actively supportive of the military vocally, but they talked about stability and internal affairs and tried not to say anything at all,” a diplomat said. “Russia supported China, and then India and Vietnam were just a bit more nuanced […] and said it was important to consider regional efforts.” Louis Charbonneau, UN director for Human Rights Watch, condemned the security council’s silence. Advertisement “The abject failure of the security council, thanks to the likes of China and Russia, to hold Myanmar’s military leaders accountable for their crimes helps them feel they can engage in horrific abuses and pay little or no cost,” Charbonneau said. A spokesperson for the Chinese UN mission said: “It’s also our hope that any move of the council would be conducive to the stability of Myanmar rather than making the situation more complicated.” Beijing has invested billions of dollars in projects in Myanmar. The state-backed Xinhua news agency described the military take over with the euphemism: “major cabinet reshuffle”. The US president, Joe Biden, threatened sanctions and called for governments to press for the military to release detainees. The UN security council will meet on Tuesday to discuss the matter..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-15
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Title: Myanmar coup: What is happening and why?
Sub-title: Mass protests have been taking place across Myanmar since the military seized control on 1 February.
Description: "Elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi and members of her National League for Democracy (NLD) party are among those detained. Hundreds of people, including children, have been killed. Where is Myanmar? Myanmar, also known as Burma, is in South East Asia. It neighbours Thailand, Laos, Bangladesh, China and India. It has a population of about 54 million, most of whom are Burmese speakers, although other languages are also spoken. The biggest city is Yangon (Rangoon), but the capital is Nay Pyi Taw. The main religion is Buddhism. There are many ethnic groups in the country, including Rohingya Muslims. The country gained independence from Britain in 1948. It was ruled by the armed forces from 1962 until 2011, when a new government began ushering in a return to civilian rule. Why is Myanmar also known as Burma? The ruling military changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. The two words mean the same thing but Myanmar is the more formal version. Some countries, including the UK, initially refused to use the name as a way of denying the regime's legitimacy. But use of "Myanmar" has become increasingly common, and in 2016 Ms Suu Kyi said it did not matter which name was used. What has happened now, and why? The military is now back in charge and has declared a year-long state of emergency. It seized control on 1 February following a general election which Ms Suu Kyi's NLD party won by a landslide. The armed forces had backed the opposition, who were demanding a rerun of the vote, claiming widespread fraud. The election commission said there was no evidence to support these claims. The coup took place as a new session of parliament was set to open. Ms Suu Kyi has been held at an unknown location since the coup. She is facing various charges, including violating the country's official secrets act, possessing illegal walkie-talkies and publishing information that may "cause fear or alarm". NLD MPs who managed to escape arrest formed a new group in hiding. Their leader has urged protesters to defend themselves against the crackdown. Who is in charge now? Military commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing has taken power. He has long wielded significant political influence, successfully maintaining the power of the Tatmadaw - Myanmar's military - even as the country moved towards democracy..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
Date of publication: 2021-04-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-15
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Title: The Long History of Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement
Topic: CDM, civil disobedience movement, colonial rule, Coup, junta, military regime, U Ottama
Topic: CDM, civil disobedience movement, colonial rule, Coup, junta, military regime, U Ottama
Description: "It was just two days after the junta’s Feb.1 coup that the civil disobedience movement (CDM) started in Myanmar. Refusing to work under military rule, doctors left their hospitals, railways staff stayed home and tellers avoided their counters. People from all walks of life have since joined civil servants in a wider CDM by saying ‘no’ to products and services from military-owned businesses. They have boycotted products and services from military-owned businesses. They have boycotted the state lottery. They stopped putting advertisements and death notices in state-run newspapers. And they are withdrawing their savings from government and military-owned banks. All of this is being done to starve the military regime of income. But the current CDM is not the first in Myanmar’s history. Myanmar people also rose in revolt against oppressive British colonial rule in the 1920s by saying ‘no’. They did not pay tax to the colonial government. They refused to obey its orders. They didn’t bid for fishing, slaughterhouse and liquor licenses. They did not appear in court when they were prosecuted. And when they were forcibly taken to court they refused to answer the judge. Buu (the Burmese word for ‘No’) associations mushroomed in towns across the country. The English phrase ‘non-cooperation’ became popular even among illiterate farmers in rural parts of the country. Just as people today are boycotting the beer, cigarettes and telecom services owned by the military, people in the 1920s boycotted imported products or burned them in protest at colonial rule. They also stopped having western hairstyles. Buu associations first emerged in Hinthada in Ayeyarwady Region, before spreading to Shwebo and Monywa in central Myanmar and Dawei in southern Myanmar. The nationalist Buddhist monk U Ottama, the first person to be imprisoned in colonial Myanmar for political activities against British rule, travelled through southern Myanmar urging the people not to pay the colonists taxes..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2021-03-29
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s civil disobedience movement is built on decades of struggle
Description: "Two months after Myanmar’s coup, the country’s civil disobedience movement is awe-inspiring in its resilience against vicious military crackdowns. According to Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, as of 28 March, 459 people have been killed and 2559 arrested, charged or sentenced. Despite this heavy price, the civil disobedience movement’s effectiveness is unprecedented. But its unity is not solely due to the current crisis, widespread hatred for the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) or the advent of digital technologies. The success of today’s civil disobedience movement comes from decades of behind-the-scenes activism to build a multi-ethnic civil society and an independent media under military dictatorship — well before the democratisation process began just over a decade ago. The expertise and infrastructure built by media veterans covering earlier crackdowns, including ethnic nationality media and the forging of international alliances, is the base upon which the current flow of accurate information and analysis depends. This work is rarely acknowledged in international media accounts of the current situation, which often focus on the newest technologies. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter are instrumental in allowing the people of Myanmar to coordinate and communicate with each other and the outside world. Digital technologies and social media provide foreign journalists immediate access to accurate information and more nuanced updates from Myanmar analysts than they themselves would be able to make. Social media sites are key ‘weapons’ in Myanmar’s current struggle, facilitating strategies such as the Social Punishment campaign that shames and ostracises family members and supporters of the Tatmadaw. Facebook responded to the crisis with a ban on all military-linked accounts. But even Facebook’s reaction is the result of years of work by local civil society organisations to push the company to address the dangerous spread of misinformation. This was especially acute during the attacks on the country’s Muslim Rohingyas. Massive protests in 1988 and the crackdown that followed caused thousands of dissident students to flee to the country’s border areas, where exile media were first established. While the movement was never solely ethnic majority Burman in its make-up, this was the first time many Burman students met ethnic ‘insurgents’. Many ethnic minority peoples in the border areas had also never before met Burmans who were not soldiers they needed to fear. Key alliances were forged and strengthened over the ensuing decades. Echoes of this same realisation have emerged in the 2021 post-coup period. Rohingya and other ethnic nationality groups quickly joined protests against the coup, despite a long struggle for recognition by the National League for Democracy (NLD) for their own suffering at the hands of the Tatmadaw. On social media, young protestors began to recognise and publicly apologise for their previous lack of empathy for the suffering of these minority groups. These sentiments have gone viral. The divide-and-rule strategy used in 1988 is today being challenged on a much broader scale. When Myanmar’s much-celebrated political opening began in 2011, its exiled media moved cautiously to return. But these media and independent media inside the country had already been pushing for decades for greater freedom of expression. That historical knowledge is playing a vital role in the current conflict, as older generations share their experiences of previous crackdowns, repressive rule and imprisonment. The tactics used by today’s protestors and dissident hackers are direct descendants of the post-1988 underground communication system. Media and civil society groups led by 1988 generation leaders of all ethnicities were among the first to publicly raise concerns about the NLD’s governing strategies. Many were bitterly disappointed and angered that crackdowns on media and other groups were worse under the NLD than under its predecessor, the military-backed Thein Sein government. A few expressed outrage at the NLD’s silence over the military’s inhumane treatment of the Rohingya, and over-simplified coverage of the issue by international journalists. While the coup does provide a clear common enemy in the Tatmadaw, the insights gained prior to this tumultuous period will undoubtedly have an impact beyond the current crisis. Groups such as Progressive Voice, Athan, the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, Action Committee for Democracy Development and Generation Wave will continue this anti-authoritarian, anti-militarisation critique regardless of the outcome of the current crisis..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication: 2021-03-29
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar police surround protesters and raid compound in Yangon
Sub-title: Demonstrators in North Okkalapa flee under fire, and junta units raid striking rail workers’ district
Description: "Police in Myanmar have surrounded and arrested at least 200 students and civilians protesting against the military coup on the outskirts of Yangon, according to witnesses who said those detained were driven away in unmarked trucks. Video footage from North Okkalapa showed protesters fleeing under fire. At least one person appeared to be seriously wounded. Earlier, military forces raided a compound in a Yangon neighbourhood that is home to state railway workers who have been on strike. Riot police sealed off the Mingalar Taung Nyunt area where the Ma Hlwa Kone train station and housing for rail employees are located. Photographs on social media showed officers blocking streets and what appeared to be people escaping. At least three arrests were reported. These could not immediately be confirmed. There was no apparent resistance to the raid, and local media said the authorities forced at least some residents from their homes. The latest clampdown follows mass arrests a week ago when about 400 young people were put in prison. As demonstrations continued in towns and cities across the country, the US embassy in Yangon condemned the police action against “innocent” people. It urged security forces to withdraw and to release all of those arrested. The military junta, led by Min Aung Hlaing, appears determined to crush the country’s general strike. Hlaing seized power on 1 February, overthrowing a civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy won elections in November and was about start a second term. The coup undid years of slow progress towards democracy following five decades of military rule, and sparked a wave of non-violent protests. A civil disobedience movement has united large numbers of public-sector employees – some of whom have taken to the streets – and there has been a boycott of military-owned companies. The raid on state rail workers comes days after several unions issued a joint call for a nationwide work stoppage. They said their strike would be part of a broader effort for “the full, extended shutdown of the Myanmar economy”. Despite the increasingly violent tactics of security forces, protests continued on Wednesday in cities including in Mandalay, Monywa, Dawei, Myitkyina, Myitkyina, Bago, Kalaw and Myingyan. Some were met with police force, while others were brief and free of violence. Riot police in the small southern city of Dawei fired teargas, forcing marchers to disperse and hide. There were reports of the use of rubber bullets. No injuries have been confirmed. A leading organiser of protests was arrested, according to the Dawei Watch news service. The city has become a hotspot for anti-coup protests and been subjected to heavy police crackdowns. Up to five deaths have occurred..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-03-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-03-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar: UN calls for 'utmost restraint' from military as more deaths reported
Sub-title: British-drafted UN statement watered down by China, Russia, India and Vietnam, as Amnesty says military using battlefield weapons on protesters
Description: "The United Nations has condemned the Myanmar military’s violent crackdown against anti-coup demonstrators as seven more people were reported shot dead in protests on Thursday. Local media, witnesses and medics said six people were shot dead in the central town of Myaing when security forces opened fire on anti-junta protests and domestic media said one man was killed in the North Dagon district of Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city. Photographs posted on Facebook showed a man lying prone on the street, bleeding from a head wound. More than 60 people are believed to have been killed protesting against the 1 February coup that removed Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government from power. The UN statement however removed language that explicitly condemned the coup and threatened possible further action from the British-drafted text, due to opposition by China, Russia, India and Vietnam. The presidential statement, signed by all 15 members of the Security Council called for “utmost restraint” by the military. A presidential statement is a step below a resolution but becomes part of the official record of the UN’s most powerful body. The statement called for the immediate release of government leaders including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint who have been detained since they were ousted in the coup. It said it supported the country’s democratic transition and “stresses the need to uphold democratic institutions and processes, refrain from violence, fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and uphold the rule of law”. But it is weaker than the initial draft circulated by the United Kingdom which would have condemned the military coup itself and threatened “possible measures under the UN Charter” – UN language for sanctions – “should the situation deteriorate further.” Diplomats said council members China, Russia, India and Vietnam, which is a member of the 10-nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations known as Asean, along with Myanmar, objected to provisions in stronger earlier drafts of the statement. China’s UN Ambassador Zhang Jun said in a statement that “it is important the council members speak in one voice,” and declared that it’s now time for de-escalation, diplomacy and dialogue. The UN statement came as Amnesty International accused Myanmar security forces of using battlefield weapons on unarmed protesters and carrying out premeditated killings orchestrated by their commanding officers. International pressure on the Myanmar junta has mounted since the army ousted and detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi last month, triggering daily protests around the country. The United States also applied fresh pressure with sanctions against Aung Pyae Sone and Khin Thiri Thet Mon, two adult children of Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. The pair have a variety of business holdings that have directly benefited from their “father’s position and malign influence”, said a US Treasury statement. The UK is also exploring fresh sanctions, foreign minister Dominic Raab said in a tweet..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-03-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-03-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar: Vast arsenal and notorious troops deployed during nationwide ‘killing spree’ protest crackdown – new research
Description: "The Myanmar military is using increasingly lethal tactics and weapons normally seen on the battlefield against peaceful protesters and bystanders across the country, new research by Amnesty International has revealed. By verifying more than 50 videos from the ongoing crackdown, Amnesty International’s Crisis Evidence Lab can confirm that security forces appear to be implementing planned, systematic strategies including the ramped-up use of lethal force. Many of the killings documented amount to extrajudicial executions. Footage clearly shows that Myanmar military troops - also known as the Tatmadaw - are increasingly armed with weapons that are only appropriate for the battlefield, not for policing actions. Officers are frequently seen engaging in reckless behavior, including the indiscriminate spraying of live ammunition in urban areas. NEWS CAMPAIGNS EDUCATION RESEARCH IMPACT NEWS (Photo by Kaung Zaw Hein/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images) MYANMAR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS SHARE Facebook Twitter Myanmar: Vast arsenal and notorious troops deployed during nationwide ‘killing spree’ protest crackdown – new research 11 March 2021, 00:01 UTC Analysis of more than 50 videos show systematic and premeditated killings amid extensive deployment of battlefield weaponry Soldiers implicated in atrocity crimes against ethnic minorities now operating in Myanmar’s cities Evidence of extrajudicial executions and killings on orders of commanders The Myanmar military is using increasingly lethal tactics and weapons normally seen on the battlefield against peaceful protesters and bystanders across the country, new research by Amnesty International has revealed. By verifying more than 50 videos from the ongoing crackdown, Amnesty International’s Crisis Evidence Lab can confirm that security forces appear to be implementing planned, systematic strategies including the ramped-up use of lethal force. Many of the killings documented amount to extrajudicial executions. These Myanmar military tactics are far from new, but their killing sprees have never before been livestreamed for the world to see. Joanne Mariner, Director of Crisis Response Footage clearly shows that Myanmar military troops - also known as the Tatmadaw - are increasingly armed with weapons that are only appropriate for the battlefield, not for policing actions. Officers are frequently seen engaging in reckless behavior, including the indiscriminate spraying of live ammunition in urban areas. “These Myanmar military tactics are far from new, but their killing sprees have never before been livestreamed for the world to see,” said Joanne Mariner, Director of Crisis Response at Amnesty International. “These are not the actions of overwhelmed, individual officers making poor decisions. These are unrepentant commanders already implicated in crimes against humanity, deploying their troops and murderous methods in the open. “For years, ethnic minorities - including the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, Rohingya, Shan, Ta’ang and more - have borne the brunt of horrific violence meted out by the Tatmadaw. Along with other rights groups, we have called on the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, and bring the Tatmadaw’s senior commanders, including Min Aung Hlaing, to justice. Instead the Security Council has done nothing, and today we see the same military units turn their fire on protesters. “The military authorities must immediately cease their deadly onslaught, de-escalate the situation nationwide, and release all those arbitrarily detained.” The 55 clips, filmed from 28 February to 8 March, were recorded by members of the public and local media in cities including Dawei, Mandalay, Mawlamyine, Monywa, Myeik, Myitkyina and Yangon. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the death toll from the protests as of 4 March stands at 61. This official estimate excludes additional known casualties in recent days..."
Source/publisher: "Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication: 2021-03-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-03-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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