Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Individual Documents
Description:
" Statement On The Death Sentence Of Seven Dagon University Students By The Myanmar Military Council..."
Source/publisher:
223 Students' Unions in Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-01
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Military History
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"Myanmar’s junta on Wednesday handed down death sentences to seven Dagon University students in Yangon who took part in anti-regime protests.
Dagon University Students’ Union confirmed that Ko Khant Zin Win, Ko Thura Maung Maung, Ko Zaw Lin Naing, Ko Thiha Htet Zaw, Ko Hein Htet, Ko Thet Paing Oo and Ko Khant Linn Maung Maung were sentenced in closed trials by a military tribunal.
The seven were arrested in April for alleged involvement in the shooting of Global Treasure Bank branch manager Saw Moe Win, a former military officer.
Ko Nan Lin from the University Students’ Union Alumni Force condemned the sentences as unjust.
“We are deeply worried for our seven comrades,” he said, given the junta hanged four pro-democracy activists, ignoring international appeals and public objections.
The regime, which has killed more than 2,500 people since the February 2021 coup, has used the death penalty to intimidate opponents as it struggles to control the country.
It carried out the country’s first execution in nearly four decades in July by hanging veteran activist Ko Jimmy, Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, former National League for Democracy lawmaker Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw and activists Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thura Zaw. It has since handed down more death penalties.
Around 100 dissidents, including students, professionals and medics, have been sentenced to death..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-12-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"On November 30, seven students from Dagon University were sen-tenced to death by
Myanmar Military Council. The military group's im-position of the death sentence is just trying
to kill innocent people using crumbling courts and laws. We, the Students Unions, do not
accept the ruling by the courts, which are the pillars of the terrorist military group, and
strongly oppose such injustice sentences imposed on innocent uni-versity students.
We, the Student Unions, stand together with the students who have been unjustly sentenced,
Ko Khant Zin Win, Ko Thura Maung Maung, Ko Zaw Lin Naing, Ko Thiha Htet Zaw, Ko Hein Htet,
Ko Thet Paing Oo, Ko Khant Lynn Maung Maung, monitoring all the situations closely.
The regime continues to torture and kill innocent students brutally. Also, in July 2022, four
pro-democracy activists were hanged by the terrorist military group, and so far, more than
13,000 people have been unjustly arrested, and 2,500 have been imprisoned across the
country.
We strongly urge the international community, including governments and organizations, to
take more focused actions to prevent the killing mechanisms of the military group from
continuing to operate.
As a whole population, we appeal to overcome fear and participate in the revolution for our
student comrades and the unjustly oppressed people..."
Source/publisher:
223 Students' Unions in Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Military History
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"The global problem of conflict and food insecurity
Conflict and food insecurity are intertwined: when one takes place, the other one usually follows. Several economic, environmental, political, or religious factors underlie armed conflicts. Every armed conflict bears tremendous human and environmental costs, but disruptions to food production and supply are often felt most immediately, with significant repercussions and flow-on effects. It is common that conflict-affected populations experience persistent hunger in the post-conflict setting as it takes time to reconstruct basic infrastructures, such as irrigation systems, roads, and marketplaces needed for the agricultural sector to operate.
When a civil war sparks between two or more warring parties, it has direct and indirect impacts on food and economic insecurity as well as environmental destruction. In Myanmar, opposing nationalisms, a fight for self-determination, and struggles over ethnic identity prolonged a civil war. The government brought to power by a military coup was characterized by its corrupt ruling regime, a lack of power-sharing, centralized political administration, and an ineffective constitution—all factors leading to the emergence of a civil war. The dominant warring party, the Myanmar military (Sit-Tat/Tatmadaw) seized land and controlled food to weaken opposition forces, especially culturally and politically marginalized groups. Deploying ‘scorched earth’ tactics are deliberately used in such wars. In a conflict state such as Myanmar, the sharp decline in food production is a result of the destruction of rural infrastructure, loss of livestock, deforestation, and the use of landmines and displacement. Consequently, countries heavily reliant on food exports from Myanmar are most vulnerable to this impact.
Introduction to Myanmar and the February 2021 Coup
Myanmar, a resource-rich and ethnically diverse country, has one of the longest civil wars in the world. Many ethnic groups have been fighting for self-determination since independence in 1948. The country experienced several military coups and was under authoritarian regimes. In 2010, it embarked on a political transition where a series of reforms were launched under a quasi-civilian government. In 2016, Myanmar had its first civilian government. Unfortunately, those days were short-lived and followed by a military coup took place in February 2021.
Myanmar is an agricultural-based country. The sector employs 70% of the rural population, and farmers play an important role in state-making. Their livelihoods, similarly, are the engine driving growth for rural development. Myanmar is also a major food supplier for neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand, Bangladesh and India.
There has been considerable resistance to Myanmar’s military in the months since the coup. Civilians took to the street in mass protests and stopped using government facilities and services. Schools were shut down, and government servants joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Boycotts were implemented against the military and military-back businesses. The international community also imposed targeted sanctions in response to the coup. Following a series of events, the economic, health, and financial sectors came close to collapse and unemployment surged. Myanmar’s youth or ‘Generation Z’ took up arms and established the People’s Defense Force (PDF) to uproot the junta regime.
This article discusses how the junta weaponizes food to weaken pro-democracy forces, deploying ‘scorched earth’ tactics to cause a sharp decline in food production, resulting in local starvation and threatening the regional food supply system. First, I explore the food supply chain mechanism in Myanmar. I highlight how policies related to food are developed in favour of generating government revenue, and at the expense of farmers’ welfare. Second, the article discusses the impact of the current country-wide conflict on hunger, specifically the way the junta uses food as a weapon against its opposition. Third, it looks at the state of food production in Myanmar and its impact on regional food security. I conclude by sharing some thoughts on how regional partners should hold the State Administration Council (SAC) accountable for atrocities committed.
Food supply chain mechanisms and the state in Myanmar
Myanmar’s food supply system has always been tightly controlled by the state. Land and agricultural policies have long determined farmers’ welfare and food accessibility. Burma’s first military coup in 1962, led by Ne Win, introduced the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism.’ Under the socialist system, farmers were forced to sell their farm products at low government-set prices as the government wanted to gain foreign exchange reserves through rice exports. As a result, farmers could not boost productivity, let alone scrape by for their own survival. This form of political intervention pushed them to sell rice on the black market. As food prices skyrocketed, village populations fell into extreme poverty. Due to the miscalculated economic strategy of the Ne Win government, Myanmar encountered economic stagnation and landed in the Least Developed Country list by 1987. The food crisis contributed to an uprising in 1988—this mass protest was brutally cracked down by General Than Shwe, the then-leader of the State Peace Development Council (SPDC).
The SPDC introduced the “Burmese Way to Capitalism” to recover the economy. Under this system, farmers were forced to take credit, which they paid back in the form of fixed portions of rice. This system ultimately trapped farmers in cycles of debt. Consequently, there was a sharp decline in purchasing power. People in hilly regions, such as Bago Yoma range, Shan Plateau and Arakan Yoma range, suffered the most as they had no alternative livelihoods. The State continued to control the food supply system, which suffered from major deficiencies in the distribution of food and further exacerbated political instability.
Ethnic conflict and oppression smouldered for years in various parts of the country. Fast forward to 2010, with a vision to hold nationwide ceasefire talks, the military-backed quasi-civilian government introduced a series of reforms, including the controversial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) law. Many farmlands were officially seized under the pro-business FDI law. Against a backdrop of a decades-long civil war and lack of concrete political settlements with ethnic groups, many issues remained unsolved under the 2016 elected government.
When the coup took place in February 2021, in a speech delivered in January 2022 by SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing, the idea of exporting rice to earn foreign income was once again put on the table. He impressed that “efforts must be made to achieve success in the yield of 100 baskets of paddy per acre. If so, paddy rice can be exported to earn foreign income. Local farmers will have increased income which will contribute to the better local circulation of money.”
Drawing on examples from Myanmar’s history of state policies and practices in the food and agricultural sector, it’s clear that military regimes of the past have prioritized generating foreign income from the sale of rice and other agricultural products to serve their own profits, rather than fostering the welfare of people and farmers. Deploying a centralized approach to control the food supply chain, the military regime is positioning itself to further weaponize food against its opponents and ordinary citizens in a bid to remain in power.
The impact of conflict on hunger and the junta’s use of hunger as a weapon
The coup has threatened food security in urban and peripheral areas, albeit in different ways. The combination of inflation, skyrocketing food prices and Covid-19 threatens access to quality food for most urban and rural populations. In urban areas, food insecurity and the rising unemployment rate has also contributed to rising criminal activity. As the prices of commodities increased sharply, the SAC has allowed trade associations to sell subsidised cooking oil in urban areas like Yangon. The urban poor line up for long hours to buy supplies at a lower price. The military has forced people to struggle for survival, so much so that they do not have time to deal with politics.
In rural areas, organized crime committed by the military includes destroying crops, stealing livestock and confiscating civilian property to weaken revolutionary resistance. International emergency food providers are not permitted to reach the most vulnerable displaced populations. Moreover, the State Administration Council (SAC) has started to block transportation routes (e.g., to Rakhine, Chin,Magwe, Sagaing and Thanintharyi) where there is ongoing intense fighting and local people are experiencing a severe shortage of food supplies.
This is not the first time the junta has weaponized food to serve themselves. The notorious ‘Four Cuts’ policy was introduced in the 1960s to fight against the Communist Party of Burma (CBP) and Karen National Union (KNU). This policy cut off food supplies to ethnic armed groups, along with funds, news, and new recruits. Local people living in ethnic areas fighting for self-determination have borne the brunt of this policy, resulting in high mortality rates during the ‘Four Cuts’ campaign.
This pattern of starvation continues to persist. In 2008, in order not to let the world see the regime’s preparation for a national referendum, the Tatmadaw banned most international relief efforts from entering the country when Cyclone Nargis left a trail of devastation in its wake. The cyclone wiped out food reserves, and as the authorities failed to provide for survivors, the death toll reached an astounding 140,000 people. In 2017, the Tatmadaw cut off food supplies to conflict-affected marginalized Rohingya communities. This was carried out by the state with the intention to starve particular ethnic groups, and under the Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court, it is considered a ‘crime against humanity’ and an act of genocide.
According to data for Myanmar (D4M) from 25 August 2022, a total of 28,434 houses were burned down by the military junta. A majority of casualties are located in Sagaing and Magway—both important hubs for the production of pulses and other food crops. The impact of this attack, once again, drove a sharp decline in production. These atrocities displaced farmers and transformed paddy fields into battlefields. As armed conflict breaks out across the country, there is no doubt that the whole supply chain has been severely disrupted.
Impacts of the conflict on regional food security
Food trade patterns directly correlate to the domestic food supply in various export countries. As Myanmar is a major exporter of rice to China and dried leguminous vegetables (DLV) to India, disruptions in trade also threaten those who rely on its supply to meet domestic consumption. The India-Myanmar border trade was supposed to resume after two years of Covid-19 restrictions, with many traders welcoming the opening of the border as it reduced smuggling activities in the borderlands. However, traders face great security concerns over trade routes as fighting intensifies in Myanmar’s border regions (such as Sagaing, where Kalay and Tamu towns are located). People fear that if the border opening is put off till 2023, this will have a negative impact on essential food supplies in India. Due to a lack of transparency and accountability during oppressive military regimes in the past, the data for exports of goods and services from Myanmar has remained undocumented. According to food trade data available from 2000 onwards, there has been a steady increase in demand for food products from Myanmar destined for China, Cambodia, India, Thailand, and other countries. It is important to note that the credibility of the data is hard to assess since it has been managed by different government administrations over the years.
How regional partners should hold SAC accountable for atrocities
Historical and contemporary examples from Myanmar demonstrate that various military regimes have consistently weaponized food to achieve their political agendas. Today, the junta continues to overlook the food insecurity challenges civilians face in the country. Controlling the profits of rice exports, the regime prioritizes generating foreign income to consolidate its own power. There is another way to interpret the trade deals between the junta and neighbouring countries: the junta is attempting to develop a niche market and control larger supply chains, thereby forging cooperation with like-minded allies to gain support and legitimacy.
If regional counterparts are serious about addressing the rapid onset of food insecurity, they must acknowledge the root causes of today’s political crisis. Prolonged hostilities not only drive domestic hunger but also undermine regional food security, especially in countries reliant upon Myanmar’s agricultural products. Therefore, regional counterparts should make all possible efforts to restore basic human rights and stability in Myanmar and enhance collaboration with governments that are finding ways to end the vicious cycle of hunger and war..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-11-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Human Rights Defenders
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"A special junta court on Tuesday jailed U Tun Tun Hein, the former deputy speaker of the Lower House under the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government, for an additional 20 years after convicting him of high treason, taking his total sentence to 24 years, according to NLD politicians.
He is also a member of the NLD’s Central Executive Committee (CEC).
The special court in Lashio Prison, northern Shan State, sentenced U Tun Tun Hein to 20 years’ imprisonment under the Penal Code’s Section 122, which pertains to high treason, said the politicians.
U Nay Zin Latt, the elected MP for Kantbalu Township and a member of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, condemned the sentence.
“Whether high treason or state defamation, all such charges against politicians or others are meaningless. I don’t even have the proper words to describe the madness of the junta regime,” he remarked.
U Tun Tun Hein was detained on the same day as State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and other members of the ruling party’s CEC on Feb. 1, 2021, the day of the coup. The junta released him on Feb. 7 and sent him back to his native town of Nawnghkio in northern Shan State.
But on Feb. 10 he was rearrested and since then he has been detained at Lashio Prison, hit with three charges. In December 2021 he was charged under the notorious sections 505 (a) and (b) of the Penal Code and sentenced to four years in prison. He was later charged under Section 130 (a), accused of breaching polling laws.
Section 130 (a) aims to penalize those who prohibit or fail to carry out the implementation of existing laws and carries a maximum sentence of three years plus a fine.
U Tun Tun Hein, 73, first won a seat in the Lower House in the 1990 general election, the results of which were ignored by the then military regime. He was imprisoned in 2012 and released in 2015. That year, he contested and won a seat representing Nawngkio Township constituency in the Lower House.
In 2018, he became third deputy speaker of the Lower House and served until the end of that parliamentary term. In 2020 he was reelected to the Lower House representing a constituency in his home town.
As part of its crackdown on political opponents, Myanmar’s junta has handed out jail sentences to NLD CEC members and former Union Election Commission members.
“I’m especially concerned for elderly persons facing such political charges. Though they are mentally strong, they are getting too old to cope with the demands of prison, as well as the multiple methods of torture used during detention or interrogation,” said U Nay Zin Latt..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-11-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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"At a special summit in April 2021, Myanmar military junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing and the nine ASEAN leaders agreed to a set of five initiatives for Myanmar to return to peace and stability amid the unrest that followed the coup launched in February that year. During the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh in November 2022, leaders reaffirmed this ’five-point consensus’ and affirmed the need for concrete, practical and measurable indicators set within a specific timeframe.
Before the Phnom Penh summit, there were predictions that the five-point consensus may be revised, or that Myanmar could be expelled from ASEAN. Myanmar’s junta rejected the ASEAN leaders’ decision to enforce the consensus, but the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) welcomed it.
The five points include an immediate end to violence in Myanmar, dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution, the appointment and visit of a special envoy to Myanmar and humanitarian assistance from ASEAN. But ASEAN’s five-point consensus has not stopped the junta’s violence and its implementation has not led to any significant progress.
In the past, Myanmar’s military junta has regularly launched air strikes on civilians in ethnic areas and central Myanmar, where armed struggles against its rule often break out. On 23 October 2022, the military launched an airstrike on a music concert in Kachin that killed at least 60 people and injured 100. Military helicopters also attacked a school in Let Yet Kone village in north-central Myanmar on 16 September. At least 11 children died in the air strike and around 15 are still missing, according to a statement by the United Nations Children’s Fund.
This is the situation in Myanmar despite the adoption of ASEAN’s five-point consensus. The NUG alleges that the junta has killed more than 3000 people over the past 11 months, while the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners has counted 2338 civilian deaths since the coup. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 986,500 internally displaced persons due to the coup. Data from the Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar indicates that the junta and armed conflicts have damaged over 36,000 homes and buildings.
The junta’s airstrikes on ethnic areas, the killing of unarmed civilians and the rejection of dialogue with opposition forces has led to the assumption that the junta will only engage militarily and not through political dialogue. The junta’s refusal to let the ASEAN special envoy meet with opposition leaders fuels this assumption.
Ongoing political turmoil, mass displacement and economic collapse are pushing Myanmar towards a humanitarian crisis. More than 1.1 million people have been displaced since the military coup and 15.2 million people are facing food insecurity.
ASEAN leaders’ five-point consensus included the provision of humanitarian assistance without discrimination. Though political turmoil and armed conflict in Myanmar may be a barrier to delivering this, ASEAN has great potential to respond to the refugee crisis since refugees from Myanmar are now sheltering in its member states. Thousands of refugees are sheltering in Thailand, but they lack support from ASEAN.
Engaging all stakeholders to solve Myanmar’s political turmoil — an important aspect of ASEAN’s charter — needs concrete and strong implementation.
In April 2021, when the ASEAN consensus was established, it was practical to recognise the junta as the main stakeholder in resolving the political turmoil as the junta controlled major regions of Myanmar. But this is no longer the case. Now only 17 per cent of Myanmar is under the junta’s total control — the NUG and other opponents effectively control over 52 per cent of the territory.
In the one and a half years since the consensus was established, democratic opponents have established the NUG and People’s Defense Force, launching a ‘people’s defensive war’ against the military junta. The area that they now control is jointly governed by the NUG and allied ethnic armed organisations and is coordinated through the National Unity Consultative Council. The NUG and its allies provide healthcare, education and humanitarian assistance — operating as functional governments in their territories.
ASEAN should exclude the military junta from political dialogue until they stop their acts of violence and brutal crackdowns. It should also impose severe and targeted sanctions on the junta. ASEAN’s sanctions on the junta may have more impact than Western sanctions as Southeast Asian countries are the largest sources of foreign investment in Myanmar. Recognising the NUG as the main stakeholder and removing the junta from the political dialogue is a more practical way to resolve Myanmar’s political turmoil than expelling it altogether..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2022-11-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"BANGKOK (28 November 2022) – The UN Human Rights Office for South-East Asia (OHCHR) is deeply concerned about the potential negative impact on civic space and human rights of new rules regulating the registration of non-profit organizations in Myanmar.
On 28 October, the military’s so-called State Administration Council unilaterally imposed a text making registration compulsory for both national and international non-governmental organizations and associations. In purportedly repealing the 2014 Association Registration Law, these new rules introduce criminal penalties for organizations who fail to comply with punishments up to five years of imprisonment.
Since the attempted coup in February 2021 and in pursuance of their “four-cuts” strategy, the military has put in place numerous measures, including internet shutdowns in over 20 townships, eroding civic space and preventing the exercise of fundamental rights and freedom, such as freedoms of expression and association.
The military has used the national legal framework and the judiciary to crush any opposition and these new provisions add to the legal arsenal at their disposal to exert authoritarian control over Myanmar.
“Civic space has been decimated in the country already due to the military’s actions, particularly its systematic harassment, arrest, and prosecution of anyone who opposed their coup,” said James Rodehaver, Chief of the OHCHR Myanmar Team.
“These new rules could greatly diminish what operational space is left for civic organizations to deliver essential goods and services to a population that is struggling to survive.”
In the context of ongoing fighting throughout the country, military decisions and actions have severely restricted humanitarian access limiting efforts to reach some of the estimated 1.4 million internally displaced people and millions of others affected by crisis with life-saving humanitarian aid.
Local civil society and grassroot organizations have played an increasingly crucial role in the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need, particularly to food, health care, shelter, safe drinking water, and sanitation facilities.
Registration obligations stemming from this new military text may jeopardize all this and expose over a million people, including children and the elderly, to life-threatening risks, said Rodehaver.
“These new requirements and penalties are likely to make it more difficult for legitimate, dedicated civil society groups to get desperately needed support to those who need it most,” Rodehaver said.
“The military has an obligation to the people of Myanmar to facilitate the work of civil society and to ensure unimpeded access to communities in desperate need of assistance, not target them through bureaucratic harassment or threaten them with prosecution.”
The UN Human Rights Office calls on the military to meet their obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, particularly to enhance protection of civilians, release political prisoners, and restore a political system representative of the will of the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2022-11-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (31/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-11-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The head of the Myanmar military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) described resistance fighters battling the military dictatorship as “thoughtless” on Monday during a meeting with USDP members in Sagaing Region’s Monywa.
U Khin Yi vowed also to “wipe away tears, grip the sword, move a step forward and fight” the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), according to the USDP’s Facebook.
The hardline nationalist also challenged the PDFs during a November 3 meeting with USDP members in Tatkon Township in Naypyitaw: “You can kill me. I am a former military officer. I am in charge of the USDP. I’m the true pillar [of the regime]. I am the hardcore. Why don’t you come and kill me?” the 70-year-old said as he condemned the killing of USDP members.
Led by former generals, the USDP took the lead role in organizing pro-military rallies before and after the February 2021 coup and has helped the regime arrest opponents and dissidents. USDP members have also joined the junta-backed Pyu Saw Htee militia.
The USDP said that over 1,600 of its members and supporters have died at the hands of anti-junta forces since the military takeover.
While meeting USDP members in Sagaing, a stronghold of the resistance and the Spring Revolution against the military regime, U Khin Yi called for better security arrangements for USDP offices and members. He comforted the relatives of slain party members and told members to be ready to fight the PDFs when the time is ripe.
“I’ve come here to help you, to listen to your concerns and solve your problems,” U Khin Yi told the USDP members.
But despite his challenge to the PDFs, U Khin Yi did not dare to travel to Sagaing by road, instead arriving by air.
Since being appointed as the USDP chair last month, U Khin Yi has travelled extensively in Yangon, Mandalay and Ayeyarwady regions, devoting himself to inflaming nationalism, slamming the National League for Democracy (NLD) and encouraging party members to fight the PDFs.
Echoing the claims of the Myanmar military, the former brigadier general accused the ousted NLD government of electoral fraud and of failing to protect Buddhism in Myanmar.
“[If the Myanmar military had not seized power], you might not have a Buddha altar in your house now,” said U Khin Yi.
A henchman of successive military dictators, U Khin Yi oversaw the brutal 2007 crackdown on the nationwide anti-regime movement known as the Saffron Revolution. He also oversaw the house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi under the previous regime.
He served as Minister for Immigration and Population in U Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian administration. U Khin Yi was also involved in planning the 2021 coup while serving as a vice chair of the USDP, organizing pro-military rallies in which so-called military sympathizers went on the rampage in Yangon, punching and stabbing those who denounced them.
After the coup, U Khin Yi was again appointed Minister for Immigration and Population, before taking over as USDP chair. It is thought he was put in place by regime chief Min Aung Hlaing to oversee the election the junta plans to hold next year, which Min Aung Hlaing hopes will enable him to seize the presidency..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-11-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"DHAKA — Several Rohingya organizations and activists have united to form a group to demand human rights in Myanmar.
The Arakan Rohingya National Alliance (ARNA) called for Rohingya unity and said the Muslim community was not secessionist.
It said the Rohingya wanted to be part of a future federal democratic Myanmar to uphold peaceful coexistence through unity in diversity.
The groups said it would work with the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and United League of Arakan in Rakhine State to achieve full and effective equality and the right to self-determination, like other ethnic groups in Myanmar.
An online press conference on Sunday aimed to unite the global Rohingya diaspora and announce the alliance’s intent to achieve self-determination for the Rohingya in Myanmar.
Rohingya leaders thanked the Bangladeshi people and government for sheltering more than a million Rohingya refugees. They also condemned the killing of a Directorate General of Forces Intelligence officer, Squadron Leader Rizwan Rushdee, by a criminal gang on Myanmar’s border on November 14.
An ARNA statement said: “For more than half a century, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have been brutally murdered, raped and tortured by Myanmar’s military and regime-sponsored non-state actors. The violence reached a peak in 2017 when Myanmar’s brutal military led the worst genocide of the 21st century in northern Rakhine State, forcing more than a million Rohingyas to cross the border into Bangladesh where they currently live in squalid refugee camps aided by the Bangladesh government and international aid organizations.
“This is the first time since the genocide of 2017 that a broad coalition of the Rohingya organizations, politicians and activists have joined together in a common platform, a development greeted with hope by the Rohingya people, including half a million stuck inside the open-air prison of Arakan [Rakhine].”
Rohingya leader Nurul Islam will chair ANRA’s central executive committee and the prominent Dr Yunus and Reza Uddin will be the vice chairs.
Other members include U Kyaw Min, Aman Ullah U Tun Khin, U Nay Saw Lwin, Dr Hla Myint, U Zaw Min Htut, Dr Habib Ullah and Dr Abu Siddique Arman.
Retired Dhaka University international relations academic CR Abrar, a specialist on refugees, welcomed the move and said unity is essential for the persecuted community, many of whom are genocide survivors.
Aung Kyaw Moe, a Rohingya activist and advisor for the NUG, told The Irrawaddy: “There is no such thing yet in the Rohingya community as representation. I wish one day it will exist. It must be secular, inclusive, and diverse and uphold human rights.
“The Rohingya are an issue for Myanmar which impacts the region heavily and must be tackled with the core leadership of emerging youth and female leaders in Myanmar and civil society organizations leaders in Myanmar.
“The diaspora may offer support but history suggests no issues in Myanmar will be solved by leaders overseas. While unity is needed more than ever in the Rohingya community, it needs to be initiated with principled and correct processes to avoid endangering the Rohingya.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-11-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"It has been nearly two years since Tracy last saw her parents. She left her family in Yangon, where she was in her final year at the University of Medicine (1), one day after celebrating her 23rd birthday in February 2021.
Now 24, Tracy is among many in Myanmar’s young generation who have traded comfortable urban lives and promising futures for a tough jungle existence with the anti-regime resistance.
The regime’s deadly crackdowns on peaceful protests after the February 2021 coup drove multitudes of young people like Tracy to seek refuge in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups who reject military rule.
Some are now fighting with the ethnic resistance forces, while others, like Tracy, are making essential contributions with what they have learned, providing medical care to comrades and locals.
Tracy now lives in Karenni State (Kayah State), which has been rocked by daily clashes between regime troops and ethnic armed forces since May last year.
Like many others across Myanmar, she took part in the 2021 anti-junta protests following the coup. As a secretary of her student union, she joined the nationwide strikes to protest military rule. However, she fled after regime troops raided her house and attempted to detain her on an incitement charge.
“I decided I would keep struggling against the regime for as long as the revolution existed. So I left Yangon,” Tracy told The Irrawaddy.
“I can’t stand by and just watch this injustice. I don’t want the future of our people to be lost. I will do whatever I can to resist this dictatorship,” she said.
Tracy arrived at Demoso township in Karenni State and began working as a medic for People’s Defense Force (PDF) members, residents and internally displaced people (IDPs). She also helps to distribute learning materials for students in remote areas of the township and provides health education in schools under the parallel civilian National Unity Government.
She arranges food supplies for IDP camps with support from Yangon Medical University 1 seniors and the public. Moreover, she and her colleagues have set up mobile medical services in their area.
A clinic in their area has now been upgraded to a hospital capable of conducting different types of surgery. Tracy said the hospital is operating with support from her university seniors, NGOs that do not want to be named, public volunteers and the NUG’s Health Ministry.
The hospital sees more than a dozen badly wounded patients after every clash between regime troops and resistance forces. At these times, Tracy and her colleagues perform surgery both day and night.
“Patients arrive in the operating theatre with missing legs, hands or with gaping belly wounds,” she said of injured resistance members.
She remembers one young comrade wheeled in with catastrophic stomach wounds after being hit by regime artillery. Tracy and other doctors operated on the youth despite knowing his chance of survival was low. He emerged from surgery alive after six hours of desperate battle, only to die 30 minutes later.
Tracy said she and her colleagues were almost broken by their grief when he died.
“I felt distraught over the struggle of the young resistance fighter. At the same time, I feel hatred, disgust and anger at the sit-khwe [junta military “dogs”] and the people who work for them” she said, her voice cracking with emotion.
Tracy admitted to sadness at being parted from her parents, who support her decision to join the resistance.
“When I get depressed, I just think about the sacrifice being made by resistance fighters. They give their lives and they never see their parents again,” she told The Irrawaddy.
It’s not just PDF combatants who depend on Tracy and her colleagues, but also civilians and IDPs in the area. Civilian residents get injured in frequent junta artillery attacks on their villages, which also destroy homes. Meanwhile IDPs in local camps often suffer poor health and emergencies through lack of humanitarian aid.
IDP camps have insufficient blankets, which leaves children prone to pneumonia in the cold weather, while lack of clean water means many residents suffer diarrhea. Meanwhile, older IDPs with chronic conditions like high blood pressure, heart disease and diabetes often arrive at the hospital desperately ill due to medicine shortages.
“We take care of them day and night. If they recover from their life-threatening condition, we are very happy,” she said.
Like Tracy, Julia travels around an ethnic area providing health services to civilians and ethnic armed combatants, in Chin State.
The strength of CDM medics
Julia, 33, was a civil servant in the public health department in Mindat Township, Chin State, before the military took power. In late February 2021, she and her friends joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Health workers nationwide were the first professionals to go on strike in protest against military dictatorship. Medics from government hospitals across the country participated in daily anti-coup protests and rejected the regime by hanging CDM hospital banners.
Myanmar’s health system ground to a halt as 60,000 of the country’s 110,000 health workers joined the CDM.
Nearly 5,000 of the CDM health workers are now working among resistance groups under the shadow civilian National Unity Government (NUG), according to the CDM Medical Network, which compiles lists of health workers. They include 320 specialist doctors, 560 nurses, 1,554 basic health workers, and volunteers, according to the NUG.
Julia is among them, having served both in a resistance group’s base camp and also in remote areas of Mindat township. Previously, she had worked at the Ministry of Health for 10 years.
“I joined the CDM movement because I strongly oppose and condemn the coup,” Julia told The Irrawaddy.
She and her friends had opened a CDM clinic just before May 2021, when the clashes erupted in Mindat. She then moved to a remote area where Chin Defense Forces (Mindat) were fighting regime troops.
She and the other five health workers served on the front line for 14 days in May 2021.
“Our side suffered casualties because of a shortage of weapons. I used a lot of bandages on comrades who were badly wounded and bleeding profusely,” Julia recalled of the battles.
Having never experienced combat conditions before, she was scared at first. But she overcame the fear by focusing on treating CDF comrades injured in battle.
She recalls seeing a tarpaulin on the ground soaked so heavily with the blood of wounded combatants that health staff could not sit down.
“One comrade was killed by a shell that shattered his skull. Others suffered smashed jaws or bullet fragments lodged in their legs. I felt sorry for them, these youths who had to take up arms instead of pens,” she muttered.
Away from the front line, she provides health services at CDF base camps. She said many resistance fighters suffer from kidney stones because the water is not clean. Some also fall sick because of the bad weather and training.
She is always ready if needed on the front line. Meanwhile, she provides maternity and child health services, her field of expertise, in remote villages in the township.
She faces many difficulties because these remote rural villages do not have enough medical equipment.
“Before the coup, we offered full services as a department.
But since last year we have been doing this work on our own. Since the coup, we have encountered a lack of equipment and inadequate medicine,” she explained of the challenges in public health provision.
However, Julia and other CDM medics remain determined to provide health services for areas under their care.
Doe Myae Medical Team
The Doe Myae Medical Team was formed by CDM health staff three months ago to provide healthcare services in western Sagaing Region, an anti-regime stronghold. The team is working for both IDPs and resistance forces.
Ko Myat Thu, 36, is the CDM medic who founded Doe Myae Medical Team.
He worked as a public health official for more than 18 years before joining the CDM movement on February 3, 2021 – two days after the military takeover.
“Our driving force to join the CDM movement was the coup,” Ko Myat Thu told The Irrawaddy.
Like other CDM medics, he has traveled around villages providing basic health care to the populace since last year. He and his colleagues have extended those services to PDF members in the last three months.
Ko Myat Thu and two other medics have stationed themselves just behind the battle lines to give first aid to wounded comrades. Seriously wounded combatants are transferred to the hospital in resistance-controlled territory.
He has seen many young resistance fighters killed, or lose legs and hands in battle.
“There is more pain than pleasure here,” he said quietly.
His family worries for him, but he also worries for them – regime troops launch artillery attacks on villages in his region almost daily.
The junta’s air force also carries out frequent airstrikes in the region.
“If the planes come, we can’t do anything. We have to run,” Ko Myat Thu said.
CDM medics unbeaten and unbowed
Having set up public health coverage in their respective areas by themselves, the CDM medical staff are determined to keep doing their jobs despite shortages of medicines and other necessities.
“I will continue to fight with my comrades until the revolution ends. After the revolution, I will return to my department,” Ko Myat Thu told The Irrawaddy.
Julia strongly believes the struggle against military rule will succeed because the public and the resistance are fighting a righteous war.
“We will inevitably succeed, but it will take time. I won’t abandon my fallen comrades, I will fight against the military to the end,” she said.
The medics also asked the public to donate to their medical teams around the country, as they provide health services not just to PDF camps but also IDP camps and civilian areas.
Tracy urged people not to relax under military rule but to participate in any way they could to support the revolutionary forces.
“We are struggling to finish the revolution as quickly as possible. I want to ask you to be part of this struggle.”
Topics: civil disobedience movement, ethnic armed organizations, Healthcare, medics, People’s Defense Forces, people’s war, resistance.."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-11-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Health Workers Strike, Human Rights Defenders
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"The November 17, 2022, junta announcement that a total of 5774 prisoners would be released in accordance with Code of Criminal Procedure Section 401, Sub-Section (1), has continued to be monitored. Through this, AAPP has been able to confirm 402 political prisoners released across 19 prisons in the country.
Up until 3.00pm of today (November 21, 2022), AAPP has documented and identified 161 released political prisoners.
The junta only announced the names of a handful of released political prisoners, exposing the utter lack of transparency regarding the released persons, and leading to delays in documenting the list of released political prisoners and confirming their names.
Release data is still being verified, we will update accordingly when further information is received. If anyone would like to share information about the prison releases, contact..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2022-11-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"When leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met at the regional summit last week, there appeared to be progress regarding how they would handle the Myanmar crisis. The bloc released an assessment recognizing the need for an “implementation plan” to support the Five-Point Consensus, along with “concrete, practical and measurable indicators with specific timeline”. A few days after ASEAN’s assessment, the Myanmar military junta granted amnesty to 6,000 prisoners including some prominent political figures and high-profile foreigners such as Australian economist Sean Turnell and former British Ambassador Vicky Bowman.
While it may be taken as a diplomatic success for ASEAN and the international community, ASEAN needs to use caution, as the Myanmar junta has used this go-to strategy of delaying and defusing ASEAN and international efforts to resolve political crises since back in the 1990s. The recent release of some political prisoners will do little to resolve the ongoing crisis, as thousands of political prisoners remain detained, hundreds of thousands of people have lost their homes, and innocent civilians remain at risk of being killed by air strikes. On the other hand, this kind of defusing of international pressure benefits the junta by allowing it to not only buy time but also remain focused on crushing the resistance and maintaining its tight grip on power, while the suffering of millions of Myanmar people continues. Myanmar people have learned from the past that this is just the junta’s attempt to defuse pressure. Thus, the release of some political dissidents will have little impact on people’s strong resistance against military rule and more importantly on the suffering of the Myanmar people.
Upholding its non-interference policy, ASEAN faces limitations in dealing with the Myanmar crisis. Thus, many criticisms of ASEAN from the international community may be undue. However, the exasperation of the Myanmar people towards the regional bloc is largely different. Myanmar people have done everything they could within their means to show their rejection of military rule, from voting for civilian politicians in the 1990, 2012, 2015 and 2020 general elections, to nationwide peaceful protests against military rule in 1988, 2007 and 2021. When decades of peaceful means still did not produce the outcomes that they strongly desired, they finally resorted to the current armed struggle, joining forces with ethnic armed resistance organizations who have been fighting for self-determination and freedom from the military’s ultra-nationalistic rule for many decades. Myanmar people have very few expectations when it comes to international support, as we know, for the most part, that we must fight our battle on our own. However, what Myanmar people are really hoping and crying out loud for, is for our neighboring countries to not enable further or inadvertently embolden the Myanmar military to continue to commit their horrific crimes with impunity.
Myanmar people have every reason to fear history repeating – any de facto recognition of the current military rule by ASEAN is expected to result in more decades of military rule and suffering, which are the Myanmar people’s worst fears. Under ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy with the Myanmar military, which dates to the 1990s, the then-military regime was admitted to the bloc in 1997. The admission to ASEAN not only let the Myanmar generals get away with their horrific human rights violations with impunity, but also shielded them from pressure from the international community. ASEAN’s constructive engagement was also taken as an example to follow by Western democracies, since Myanmar was viewed as moving in the right direction when the political transition of the 2010s seemed initially to go smoothly.
The coup in 2021 has proved that when it comes to the military, neither ASEAN’s constructive engagement nor the Myanmar political elite’s appeasement and reconciliation policy of the 2010s will work. It only confirmed that the Myanmar military never had any intention to retreat from politics or to let go of its political power and economic privileges. The continued violent and horrific crackdown on the resistance by the military has only made people more determined to end military rule once and for all. However, the people’s strong resistance and rejection of military rule appear to be misjudged by outside observers and some ASEAN leaders. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan recently described the Myanmar conflict as “a fight for the heart of the Bamar majority, between the Tatmadaw [Myanmar’s military] on one hand and the National League for Democracy led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.”
While ASEAN may see military rule as the norm in politically complex Myanmar, resistance leaders, Myanmar analysts, and ordinary Myanmar people immediately knew, as soon as the coup occurred, that the truly barbaric nature and intentions of the generals would soon be revealed. With the recent release of political prisoners, ASEAN may still hope that the Myanmar military can be convinced to bring stability and peace. However, over the past about 18 months since the agreement on the Five-Point Consensus laid out by ASEAN leaders, the Myanmar junta has had no qualms about continuing its extreme violence against its own citizens. Just a week before the 55th ASEAN ministerial summit, the Myanmar military executed four political activists. In the midst of ASEAN’s continuous calls for the utmost restraint and the end of all violence, the Myanmar military continues with its campaign of terror including recent air strikes on a school in Sagaing Region and on a concert in Kachin State.....
Options for ASEAN...ASEAN’s current assessment shows that in order to remain relevant, the bloc will need to show unity and leadership in the Myanmar crisis. After giving the benefit of the doubt to the military council for the past 18 months, the bloc now has an opportunity to take on fresh outlooks and approaches to develop the implementation plan. The regional bloc is now at a critical juncture – with a lot at stake, amid the continued deepening of the suffering of the Myanmar people, it has a chance to be on the right side of history, and save its reputation and relevance. ASEAN has three very different options: 1) maintain its old approach of constructive engagement with the Myanmar military; 2) take a politically neutral approach with effective support on humanitarian assistance; and 3) take a new direction, and listen to the people of Myanmar for a change.
The first option, constructive engagement with the junta, has been a default option for the bloc. It has raised the question of the relevance of the bloc and had a negative impact on ASEAN’s unity and leadership. To the people of Myanmar, such engagement only emboldens the junta and inadvertently sharpens the weapons that kill innocent Myanmar citizens and deepen their suffering. And the worst nightmare would be the regional bloc’s de facto recognition of the junta after its sham elections in 2023.
The second option, politically neutral support on humanitarian assistance, as also mentioned in the recent assessment, if taken cautiously, might be able to deliver urgently needed humanitarian assistance. ASEAN may be able to take a politically neutral approach, without directly engaging with the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) or the National Unity Government (NUG). However, this humanitarian assistance could only achieve so much, considering the pace and intensity of atrocities that the junta continues to commit. This in a way only prolongs the people’s suffering with occasional relief provided along the way.
The third option is to take a completely new direction, an unprecedented one for ASEAN, by listening to the people of Myanmar for a change. It also means listening to the people’s representatives—those whom the people of Myanmar have chosen to lead their desperate attempt to overthrow the military. This includes the leadership of the NUG, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
Myanmar has already experienced the harsh reality of military rule under generations of generals from the same institution for half a century. The military has a record of failing the country as a key driver of conflict and division, and mismanaging the economy resulting in poverty for the majority of the population. The junta’s atrocities since the coup have opened all the old wounds and caused fresh suffering.
None of the options will be easy for ASEAN. It will be even more difficult for the Myanmar people to comprehend if ASEAN continues falling for the junta’s ploy while our lives are at stake—the lives of Myanmar people who are also a part of the ASEAN community. And the sad reality is that there are only very limited options for Myanmar people: to live under military rule, be killed and impoverished, or remove the military from the political sphere once and for all. People have learned the hard way that there is a price to pay for peace, stability and prosperity. That’s all Myanmar people are trying to achieve today and all they are fighting for. That is the very reason why the recent military coup has only made the people more determined to break this vicious cycle of military coups and end the military’s attempts to deceive the people and the world as “transitioning to a disciplined democracy.”
It is therefore more important than ever that ASEAN not fall for the junta’s ploy whenever the generals try to defuse the pressure for a short term so that they can remain in power as long as they wish. With a more informed approach to handling the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN could still have a positive impact or even a monumental chance to be on the right side of history. That would not only save Myanmar but also reclaim the bloc’s unity and leadership role in the region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-11-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"On November 16 evening, the military junta announced via Myawaddy Television, 5774 prisoners would be released the following day under pardon order, No. 70/2022, of the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 401 (1).
Up until now, AAPP has been monitoring and can confirm the release of only 72 political prisoners following this announcement and are cautious to declare this significantly higher as yet. All political prisoners released yesterday were also done so under the condition of retrospective sentencing.
The releases were an attempt to show political good will, but tens of thousands of political prisoners including the President and State Counsellor remain behind bars. Detained political prisoners will continue to endure daily physical and mental torture whilst across the country the military junta’s arrests, arsons, torture and murder will persist.
AAPP Secretary U Tate Naing said “most these released political prisoners had already been sentenced under baseless accusations and random charges, after detaining them in the first place for no apparent reason. Others had almost already served their prison sentences. The whole charade is but an attempt to alleviate domestic and international pressure off the junta, so that it can continue to commit inhumane crimes daily against the people.
AAPP Joint-Secretary U Bo Kyi said that “just as in every prison release since the coup the junta has refused to be transparent about the numbers of political prisoners released and the identities of those released. It is a deliberate tactic meant to deceive foreign governments”.
AAPP will continue to make efforts to ensure the unconditional release of all the arbitrarily detained, including the President and State Counsellor. Perpetrators of arbitrary arrests, torture, and murder must be punished. International actors are strongly urged to take more effective measures against the junta regime.
Data on releases is still being verified, we will update accordingly when further information is received. If anyone would like to share information about the prison releases contact:..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2022-11-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"၂၀၂၂၊ နိုဝင်ဘာ ၁၇ နေ့တွင် အကျဉ်းသား၊အကျဉ်းသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၅၇၇၄) အား ရာဇဝတ်ကျင့်ထုံး ဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၄၀၁၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (၁) အရ ပြန်လည်လွှတ်ပေးမည်ဟု အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့သည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း (AAPP) မှ စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာမှတ်တမ်းတင်ခဲ့ရာ ယခု ကြေညာချက်ထုတ်ပြန်ချိန်အထိ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသော နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား (၇၂) ဦးကိုသာ မှတ်တမ်းပြု ထားနိုင်လျက်ရှိသည်။
လွှတ်ပေးခဲ့သည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများမှာ နောက်ကြောင်းပြန်ပြစ်ဒဏ်ဆိုသည့် နှောင်ကြိုးဖြင့်သာလွှတ်ပေးခဲ့ ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံရေးမျှော်လင့်ချက်အရ ဟန်ပြလွှတ်ပေးခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့အပြင် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတနှင့် နိုင်ံတော် အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိလ်များအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားတစ်သောင်းကျော်မှာ အကျဉ်းထောင်နောက်ကွယ်တွင် နိုင်ငံ ရေးအရ ဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခံနေရဆဲဖြစ်ပြီး ရုပ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ၊ စိတ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုများကို နေ့စဉ်နှင့်အမျှ ခံစားနေကြရဆဲဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးမှုများ၊ မီးရှို့မှုများ၊ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုများ၊ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ အစရှိသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို စစ်အုပ်စုက နေ့စဉ်ရက်ဆက်ကျူးလွန်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ လွှတ်ပေးမှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အေအေပီပီ၏ အတွင်းရေးမှူး ဦးတိတ်နိုင်က “အခု ပြန်လွှတ် ပေးလိုက်တဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားအများစုဟာ ဘာအကြောင်းပြချက်မှမရှိဘဲ ဖမ်းပြီးမှအခြေအမြစ်မရှိတဲ့ စွပ်စွဲ ချက်တွေနဲ့ တွေ့ကရာပုဒ်မတွေတပ်ပြီး ထောင်ဒဏ်တွေ ချမှတ်ခံထားရသူတွေပါ။ နောက်တော့ သူတို့တွေဟာ ချမှတ်ထားတဲ့ ထောင်ဒဏ်တွေကို နှစ်ပြည့်နီးပါး နေခဲ့ပြီးသားတွေဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါဟာ ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပ ဖိအားတွေကို ဖြေလျှော့ဖို့ ကြိုးစားချက်တစ်ခုသာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တချိန်တည်းမှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက လူသားဖြစ်မှုကို ပိတ်ပင် တဲ့ လုပ်ရပ်တွေကို နေ့စဉ်နဲ့အမျှ တရားလက်လွတ်ဆက်တိုက် ကျူးလွန်နေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်” ဟု မှတ်ချက်ပြုသည်။
ထို့အပြင် “စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်ကစပြီးတောက်လျှောက် အကျဉ်းသားတွေလွှတ်ပေးခဲ့တဲ့ အရင်အကြိမ်တွေလိုပဲ ဒီ တစ်ခေါက် အကျဉ်းသားတွေလွှတ်ပေးတဲ့အခါမှာလည်း စစ်အုပ်စုအနေနဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားဘယ်နှစ်ယောက် လွှတ်ပေးတယ်၊ သူတို့နာမည်တွေက ဘယ်သူ ဘယ်ဝါတွေဖြစ်သလဲဆိုတာနဲ့ပတ်သက်ပြီး ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာမှု မရှိပါ ဘူး။ ဒါဟာ နိုင်ငံတကာအစိုးရတွေကို လှည့်စားဖို့အကြံနဲ့ တမင်လုပ်တဲ့ လုပ်ရပ်တစ်ခုပဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်” ဟု အေအေပီပီ တွဲဖက်အတွင်းရေးမှူး ဦးဘိုကြည်မှ ဆိုသည်။
မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ၊ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အပါအဝင် ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းထားသူများ အားလုံး ခြွင်းချက်မရှိလွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် မတရားညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းများနှင့် လူမဆန်စွာသတ်ဖြတ် ခြင်းများကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သူများအား အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူမှု ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝန်းအနေဖြင့်လည်း စစ်အုပ်စုကို ဆက်လက်၍ ထိရောက်သည့် အရေး ယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အမြန်ဆုံး ပြုလုပ်ပေးရန် လေးနက်စွာ တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2022-11-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"An attack and fire between 18-20 July 2022 allegedly left over 10 dead and homes
incinerated across Kyi Su village, Kanbalu Township Sagaing. There are claims these homes were specifically targeted for belonging to
Muslim civilians; however, this cannot currently be confirmed.
Myanmar Witness has verified the presence of a large fire via NASA FIRMS on 19 July 2022
(figure 3), with additional imagery from 18 August 2022 giving an indication on the level of
destruction Kyi Su village sustained (figure 4). Myanmar Witness has also geolocated footage
of burned motorcycles and matched them to before and after satellite imagery of the area.
Key points:
On 18 July 2022, a fire occurred in Kyi Su village, Kanbalu, resulting in the destruction of
civilian homes as well as, allegedly, at least 10 human casualties, whose bodies were burned.
It cannot be confirmed if this burning occurred pre or post mortem. Other sources claim around
70 people were killed during this incident.
Myanmar Witness has identified user-generated content (UGC) depicting burned bodies,
although this content cannot be independently verified at this time due its inability to undergo
geolocation. Allegations of burned bodies during this event were pervasive, leading Myanmar
Witness to include them in this reporting.
Myanmar Witness has also geolocated images of burned-out motorcycles in Kyi Su.
Myanmar Witness has also investigated claims of troop movements to verify the presence of
State Administration Council (SAC) forces at the time of the alleged attack.
Although reports of this village, and certain homes within it, being intentionally targeted due to
the village’s large Muslim population are startling, Myanmar Witness is unable to verify this at
present.....Summary: Local media reports allege that across 18-20 July 2022 the village of Kyi Su was raided by
SAC and Pyu Saw Htee forces, involving both ground and aerial based assaults. The reporting
specifically mentions the use of two Mi-35 attack helicopters and three Mi-17 transport
helicopters; however, a lack of geolocatable UGC depicting these air assets leads this
assertion to remain unverified.
Reporting from around 18-20 July claims that around ten individuals (at least) were killed, with
their bodies being burned by SAC and/or Pyu Saw Htee forces.
Myanmar Witness has geolocated footage to verify:
● An area where motorcycles had been burned-out in Kyi Su village
Myanmar Witness is actively monitoring:
● The alleged presence of burned bodies following this verified fire incident;
● Conflict around the area to establish if these burnings are a pattern of attacks on the
civilian or muslim population in Kanbalu;
● Footage and images related to the burning and destruction of homes in this case; and
● Any evidence that the villages were attacked based on their relation to being Muslimmajority..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"JAKARTA – As the Myanmar military released four unjustly jailed foreigners in a mass amnesty this Thursday, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) wishes to congratulate their families. Yet this is no time to lower the guard with the military led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, as the prisoners should not have been jailed in the first place and thousands of Myanmar political prisoners remain in the country’s jails, APHR said.
As part of a mass amnesty in which 6,000 prisoners were freed, the junta released Sean Turnell, an Australian citizen and economic adviser to former State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi; Vicky Bowman, a former British envoy; U.S. citizen Kyaw Htay Oo; and Toru Kubota, a Japanese filmmaker. Another prisoner released is the former Chief Minister of Tanintharyi Region, U Myint Maung. Meanwhile, over 13,000 political prisoners remain in Myanmar’s jails, where conditions are notoriously abysmal and the use of torture is routine, often resulting in gruesome deaths.
“This is a game the Myanmar generals have been playing for a very long time. In the midst of continuous atrocities, from time to time they make an apparent gesture of goodwill, minor in comparison with the crimes they commit on a daily basis, in order to alleviate international pressure and gain legitimacy. No one should fall for this trick; the global community should not be fooled into thinking that Min Aung Hlaing and his henchmen have changed their ways,” said Kasit Piromya, former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs and APHR Board Member.
Sean Turnell was arrested on 6 April 2021, five days after the coup, under the accusation of trying to flee the country with secret information. Vicky Bowman and her husband, Htein Lin, were arrested in August this year on immigration charges, and Toru Kobuta was detained in July when he was filming a demonstration against the military.
While they have been released, others have not been so lucky. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, at least 73 detainees have died in police or military custody in police stations, military interrogation centers, and prisons since the coup last year. They include four political prisoners executed in July: Phyo Zeya Thaw, former lawmaker for the National League for Democracy (NLD); the prominent activist Kyaw Min Yu, known as ‘Ko Jimmy’; Aung Thura Zaw; and Hla Myo Aung. These were the first known judicial executions in Myanmar since 1988, according to Amnesty International.
Since the coup on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military has committed all kinds of atrocities, which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may amount to “crimes against humanity and war crimes,” in order to consolidate its power against widespread popular resistance. The self-styled State Administration Council (SAC) led by Min Aung Hlaing has killed at least 2,465 people, launched indiscriminate aerial attacks in ethnic areas, and razed hundreds of villages to the ground, throwing the country into chaos, and leading it to the brink of becoming a failed state.
Meanwhile, the international response to the crisis has been sorely insufficient, as argued in a report launched recently by the International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar, an initiative organized by APHR and whose Committee is formed by eight parliamentarians from seven different countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe.
“The international community has proven largely unable to respond effectively to the crisis. The junta’s international allies—most prominently Russia and China—have emerged as steadfast and uncritical supporters, supplying both weapons and legitimacy to an otherwise isolated regime. Foreign governments that profess support for democracy have not backed up their rhetoric with the same force of action,” said the report, titled ‘Time is not on our side’: The failed international response to the Myanmar coup.
The reasons for the mass amnesty, and the release of the three foreigners, remain unclear, but they come after an ASEAN Summit, in which its member states reaffirmed its commitment to the Five Point Consensus, an agreement signed in April 2021 to address the crisis in Myanmar that has been supported by the international community at large. The consensushas not produced any tangible results ever since, as APHR has repeatedly denounced.
“There is a legitimate concern that ASEAN member states are going to drink the kool-aid and treat the Myanmar junta with even kinder gloves after the release of these political prisoners. Against all reason, ASEAN is already sticking to an agreement that has proved an utter failure for over one and a half years, instead of doing the right thing to solve the crisis: put real pressure on the military, recognize the National Unity Government (NUG) as the legitimate authority in the country,” said Charles Santiago, former Malaysian Member of Parliament, APHR Chairperson, and one of the IPI Committee Members..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"An election is understood to mean “a formal and organized choice by vote of a person for a political office or other position.” Myanmar’s junta has claimed it will organize an ‘election’ for August 2023. Don’t call it what it isn’t. The junta’s event, whatever it is and looks like, will in no way be an election. If analysts, media, and diplomats use the term ‘election’, the onus is on them to justify and prove why and how exactly it wasn’t legitimate when in fact it wasn’t even what happened.
This isn’t just about semantics. It is about establishing the factual basis for what is transpiring in reality. Autocrats who co-opt democratic terms are very skillful at doing so to create a narrative that they are something they are not. The best way to prevent this is to stop allowing them to freely use words they have no basis for using. Simply put — democracies need to stop letting dictatorships co-opt the terminology of democracy. By not pushing back, and by not introducing new terminology that accurately describes what dictatorships are doing, it allows the autocrats of the world to claim legitimacy by dressing up their actions with words that should never have been used in the first place.
When Myanmar’s generals say “discipline flourishing democracy”, it means dictatorship. When Xi Xinping says there is a “Chinese-style democracy” and an “American-style democracy”, he is spouting utter nonsense. China under the Communist Party is a totalitarian dictatorship from top to bottom and in no way is a democracy. Even more onerously totalitarian and unquestionably not a democracy is North Korea, the so-called “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Claims of elections in such countries are nonsense. Having a ‘choice’ of one person picked by one party does not make for an election.
In Myanmar in 2008 a ‘referendum’ on the 2008 Constitution never happened. This was a coerced, fraudulent exercise that in no way reflected the will of the people or even marginally synced with the intentions of the term ‘referendum’. The fact that the exercise happened in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis highlights this point, namely that the exercise was coerced, predetermined, and never had any intention of representing the will of the Myanmar people. The sad thing is that because this term was used so extensively and became mainstream, including in international media, over the years it became, by default, accepted as what happened. This then lent unfortunate credence to the 2008 Constitution. The same is true for the 2010 election. Myanmar’s only free and fair elections in its modern history, even though problematic in important ways, were the by-elections starting in 2012 and the general elections of 2015 and 2020.
As regards the junta’s plans for a 2023 poll, commentators in the media, civil society or diplomacy that use terms and phrases like “sham elections” or “elections under military rule” unfortunately start the discourse from a disadvantage. They inherently force those rightly accusing dictators of being dictators to prove that the ‘election’ wasn’t good enough for this or that reason, when what happened wasn’t even an election in the first place. If one starts the conversation with a false term, it inherently lends legitimacy to whoever is claiming that term as being true. This approach became mainstream after being adopted by former United States President Donald Trump, when he called the 2020 US election “fraudulent”.
Words matter. They matter because they set narratives about what is happening or what will happen. By allowing the junta to use the term ‘election’ and to state that it will occur in August 2023, it catalyzes the wider international narrative about what’s happening in Myanmar. In simple terms, it creates the axis around which policy discourses begin to swirl about what to do as regards the country. Within Myanmar even if some fraudulent, coerced event occurs in August 2023 it will not actually do anything to stop the revolution against the junta because the Myanmar people have made it clear in a thousand ways that they do not accept a return to military rule. Internationally, though, the military regime is using this term to create the illusion of a clear “roadmap” of what the world can expect. While some countries have already called out the junta’s plans and said that they won’t accept the result of any ‘election’, other countries are clearly just waiting for the junta to declare the event a success, even if it will be the regime’s proxies and newly-retired generals who will ‘win’.
There is a story unfolding in Myanmar, but it does not match what the junta is saying. An August report from the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar highlighted that the junta only has stable control over 17 per cent of the country. The rest of the country is in active and escalating armed resistance against junta forces or is controlled by ethnic armed organizations that do not accept military rule in their areas, even if they maintain ceasefires with the military.
Hence, this is a country of approximately 55 million people in a sustained, committed revolution that’s focused on building a better future for themselves and future generations. It is not just about getting rid of the military or the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s myopic “returning to normalcy” tomfoolery, in other words a toxic quasi-democracy built around military paramountcy. It is about creating a fundamentally different country built around real federal democracy. As the National Unity Government’s Acting President Duwa Lashi La has so profoundly stated: this is the second war for independence. Myanmar’s people want to start afresh.
The world should stop accepting the Myanmar military’s use of the term ‘election’ completely because that is not what will happen. The military’s event — which will undoubtedly be preordained, coercive, highly violent and in no way an election in any meaning of the word — is not the pole around which the conflict in the country will be resolved. A better term doesn’t currently exist in the English language, but surely one needs to be created along the lines of “coerced deception”.
In essence, don’t accept the regime’s narrative that there is a pathway to peace and stability and that the key date is August 2023. There is a pathway to peace in Myanmar, but it means the complete defeat of the current military and the implementation of the roadmap articulated by the Federal Democracy Charter drawn up by the democratic resistance’s National Unity Consultative Council..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
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"In response to the reported release of the former British ambassador Vicky Bowman and her artist husband Htein Lin, who had been jailed in Myanmar’s post-coup crackdown, Polly Truscott, Amnesty International UK’s Foreign Policy Director, said:
“We’re enormously relieved to hear that Vicky Bowman, Htein Lin and political prisoners including U Mya Aye are among the thousands being released from prison. Many should never have been jailed in the first place and there are still thousands of others who’ve been arbitrarily imprisoned in Myanmar need to be released as well.
“Since the February 2021 coup, the authorities in Myanmar have rounded up thousands of people who’ve been jailed on spurious grounds, including for simply exercising their human rights.
“Myanmar has a history of announcing prisoner amnesties at politically opportune times, and today’s releases may have more to do with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting taking place in Thailand this week than any change of heart from the authorities.
“The UK should see today’s releases as another opportunity to press the Myanmar government to release all those who’ve been jailed arbitrarily, as well as calling on the authorities to allow proper independent investigations into the thousands of killings that have taken place in the wake of the coup.”..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"JAKARTA – Southeast Asian countries must do more to truly guarantee freedom of religion, protect minorities, and stop using “public order” and “harmony” as justifications for imposing unwarranted restrictions on this fundamental right, a new report from ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) found.
“This report shows that many laws that inhibit, restrict, and repress religious freedoms remain on the books and are implemented throughout Southeast Asia. This report is a reminder that, despite all achievements to maintain coexistence in a plural Southeast Asia, there are still many problems that remain to be solved and situations that should be improved,” said APHR member and Indonesian MP Taufik Basari.
The report, titled “Restricting Diversity: Mapping Legislation on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Southeast Asia,” was launched on 7 November 2022 and provides an overview of the laws and regulations regarding the right to freedom of religion or belief in the region. One of the key findings in the report is that, while many of the constitutions of Southeast Asian countries formally guarantee the right to freedom of religion, in practice the laws related to religion contain ambiguities and restrictions that do not conform with international standards.
National security and public order, for instance, have often been used to justify restricting the freedom of religious minorities, including Ahmadiyah, Shia, Jehovah’s Witnesses and others. Meanwhile, blasphemy laws are often used to criminalize certain religious groups that are critical to the state, government or the religious establishment of the majority, in flagrant violation of international human rights standards.
“I hope we can have more dialogues in the future and more innovative methods to promote and protect FoRB in the Southeast Asian countries. The law must serve as a tool in creating peace and balance for the community, so it should be formulated properly in order to bring justice in society.”” said APHR member and Timor-Leste MP Isabel Ximenes.
Parliamentarians can play a crucial role in working towards fully guaranteeing freedom of religion or belief in Southeast Asia by repealing and amending laws that violate such freedom, and pass new laws where necessary.
“I think that, at the end of the day, we must have a firm commitment from parliamentarians or both sides, whether in government or in parliament, to have the same understanding about human rights. If you do not speak the language of human rights, then you are the problem,” said Dr. Ahmad Farouk Musa, Founder and Director of Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF), Malaysia, and surgery professor at Monash University..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Title: Report of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar to the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits.
Description:
"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. On 01 February 2021, the Myanmar’s miliary launched a coup against the civilian government, arresting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint, along with other senior leaders of the ruling National League for Democracy, and declaring the results of the November 2020 general election invalid. What started as violence between the Tatmadaw and demonstrators quickly turned into brutal fighting in many parts of the country between the State Administration Council (SAC) and armed groups such as the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing the People’s Defence Force (PDF).
2. Cognizant of the far-reaching implications of Myanmar’s crisis on its own people and the region as a whole, ASEAN Leaders met on 24 April 2021 in Jakarta to discuss about the situation in Myanmar, and reached the Five-Point Consensus (5PC). To ensure full and effective implementation of the 5PC, Samdech Prime Minister went to Nay Pyi Taw on 7 January 2021 to meet with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and soon afterward, had two videoconferences to follow up on the outcomes of the visit. Moreover, he extensively consulted with his ASEAN colleagues and other world leaders, and also received calls and briefings from the international organizations including the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy (UNSG SE).
3. Guided by the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN’s principles, the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair (SEAC) paid two working visits to Myanmar to carry out his mandate as stipulated in the 5PC. Prior to each working visit, the SEAC always shared with his colleagues what he plans to do, and also sought their views on the best course of action to make progress. Moreover, the SEAC also had numerous meetings with external partners, the UNSG SE, Japan’s Special Envoy, UN Specialized Agencies, and other international organizations to receive updates and exchange views on how ASEAN and its partners can promote synergy and cooperation, especially in the area of humanitarian assistance.
4. Despite the complexity and difficulty of Myanmar’s political crisis, it is fair to say that the SEAC has managed to make some positive progress in the implementation of the 5PC, though not all points are moving at the same pace and scale. Since the beginning, Cambodia as the present ASEAN Chair and her Special Envoy prioritize immediate cessation of violence and ceasefire, and in all the engagements with the SAC, Samdech Prime Minister always urged for utmost restraint, and dialogue to start without delay. During the working visits, the SEAC extended this call to all armed groups including the NUG/PDF, because everyone has a share in inflicting harms and suffering on innocent people.
5. Given the SAC being the most powerful actor, the SEAC reminded his counterparts to double the efforts to end the violence, and suggested that they should deploy police instead of armed forces to maintain law and order, especially when civilians are involved. The SEAC also appealed to the EAOs and the political parties to commit to non-violent principle, and actively participate in ceasefire negotiation. In response, the SAC, the EAOs and the political parties have promised to do their utmost ability to achieve full cessation of violence, and they also shared that it was heartbroken to see this tragedy unfolding in their country. Besides heavy human costs, the SEAC emphasized that violence also undermines any efforts to begin a dialogue or even to deliver humanitarian assistance to those most in need.
6. The commencement of the political dialogue is the most difficult among the five points, and even Myanmar’s key actors themselves also thought that it is not yet the right time to bring everyone to the table. During the second working visit, the SEAC pressed Lieutenant General Yar Pyae on the possibility of a dialogue with the opposition, and he responded that it may happen but with 3 preconditions: (1) they do not seek to destroy the SAC, (2) they do not seek to replace the SAC, and (3) they agree to use the 2008 Constitution as the basis for talks. After months of intense shuttle diplomacy, the SEAC has finally managed to open a small window for dialogue.
7. The SEAC then tasked his office to share these preconditions with the NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, and she responded by rejecting them, and offered her own preconditions, which aim to put the Tatmadaw under civilian control and send Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to prison. The differences between the SAC and the NUG are gulf apart, making any dialogue impossible, even at the technical level. However, the SEAC has not been discouraged by this lack of political will, and he continues to commence the dialogue process as soon as possible. Moreover, he has encouraged the SAC to engage with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and not to dissolve her party, without which any democratic solutions will face credibility question.
8. As stated in the 5PC, the SEAC has always involved the Secretary-General of ASEAN in every important activity including his working visits to Myanmar, and has also been in regular contact with the Secretary-General of ASEAN to seek his view on a wide range of issues and to receive his updates on the progress of the humanitarian assistance to Myanmar. In facilitating mediation of the dialogue process, the SEAC met with 7 EAOs, who are the signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, to underscore the need for all concerned parties to participate in peace talks. In response, they were strongly supportive of the SEAC’s views, and also pledged to make a dialogue work in the interests of their people.
9. Moreover, the SEAC also had meetings with 8 political parties, 7 of which won votes during the 2020 general election, and he shared with them that he is always ready to facilitate a dialogue among concerned parties, if requested. These political parties pledged their full support to the SEAC, and took turn to offer their perspectives on the current situations in Myanmar and how to solve them. Acknowledging the critical role of external partners, especially Myanmar’s immediate neighbours, the SEAC has often provided them with updates of his efforts, sought their view on the situation on the ground, and listened to their recommendations when applicable.
3
10. Humanitarian assistance has always been at the heart of Cambodia’s approach to address the political crisis in Myanmar because peace talk can take time, but saving life cannot wait. Even before taking over the ASEAN Chairmanship, Cambodia already provided the people of Myanmar with medical supplies, financial resources, and vaccines bilaterally and through ASEAN mechanism. The SEAC has also made a lot of efforts to mobilize additional supports for Myanmar, and as a result, 3 million doses of vaccines together with many other medical supplies were donated by external partners. Despite not being clearly specified in the 5PC, the SEAC has worked tirelessly to facilitate, coordinate and support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Myanmar.
11. In May 2022, he co-chaired with the Secretary-General of ASEAN the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar, bringing together a wide range of stakeholders and leading to the adoption of two important frameworks, namely Joint Ministry of Health-Partners Vaccines Administration Framework and Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework. The SEAC has also managed to secure commitments from the SAC in addressing operational challenges facing the AHA Centre and other international organizations, and expanding access to more states and regions. Moreover, he has also facilitated the conduct of the Joint Needs Assessment, especially in pushing for the inclusion of areas requested by the AHA Centre, and representatives of the UN OCHA and WFP as observers.
12. Meeting all concerned parties is also one of the SEAC’s top priorities. During the working visit to Myanmar, besides his engagements with senior representatives of the SAC, he also met with 7 EAOs that remain signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and 8 political parties, 7 of which won votes during the 2020 general election. The SEAC has also demanded to engage with the EAOs that are now fighting the SAC, and 4 political parties that are now under the inspection of the Union Election Commission. The request to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint has always been on the agenda of the SEAC, but the SAC has taken strong position on this matter, suggesting that it can only be considered upon the completion of their legal proceedings.
13. Benefiting from numerous meetings and conversations with many interlocutors inside and outside of Myanmar, and for the purpose of facilitating and supporting the works of the incoming Special Envoy, the SEAC wish to make 7-point suggestions: (1) the 5PC should be accompanied by a concrete implementation plan, (2) conditions applied to the SAC should also be applied to all concerned parties, (3) ASEAN needs to press the SAC, the NUG and other parties to compromise on their preconditions, (4) concerned parties need to be clearly identified and defined, (5) restoring normal engagements with Myanmar should be based on the progress of the implementation of the 5PC, not on other factors that are outside this framework, (6) the roles of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair in humanitarian assistance should be added to the 5PC or the implementation plan, and (7) the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the AHA Centre should be empowered with an appropriate degree of autonomy for a specific period of time..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၂) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့အချိန်အခါ သမယတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားများအားလုံးနှင့်တကွ နိုင်ငံသူ၊ နိုင်ငံသားအားလုံး ရင်ဆိုင်ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေရသည့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား အသိ၊ သတိကြီးစွာဖြင့် ရင်ဆိုင်ရာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလတွင် ခွန်အား ပြည့်ဝစွာဖြင့် ဆက်လက်လျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင်ကြပါေစကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်ခံဘဝ ၁၉၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက် (မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်နေ့) တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများက ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေမူကြမ်းကို သပိတ်မှောက်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြရာမှအစပြုကာ အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ ဟူသော သမိုင်းဝင်နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် ကျောင်းသားသပိတ်သည် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးသို့ပျံ့နှံ့သွားခဲ့ပြီး အမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေးကြီးအသွင် ပြောင်းလဲသွားကာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးရရန်အတွက် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်ဓာတ်များ၊ သူ့ကျွန်မခံလိုသည့်စိတ်များ သန္ဓေတည် မွေးဖွားပေးခဲ့သော တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ ယခုအခါတွင်လည်း ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာ အာဏာကို ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒမဲဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးချယ်တင်မြှောက်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်တို့ဦးဆောင်သည့် ပြည်သူ့ အစိုးရထံမှ စစ်တပ်က လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် ရှင်သန် ထွန်းသစ်စ ဒီမိုကရေစီအသီးအပွင့်များသည် ဖျက်ဆီးခံခဲ့ရပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်မှစ၍ ယခု နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးခရီးတိုင် အာဏာရှင်များကို ရဲရဲဝံ့ဝံ့ ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ရင်း တိုင်းပြည်၏ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများကို လူငယ်များပီပီတက်ကြွပြီး လိမ္မာ ပါးနပ်စွာ ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိကြသည့် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များနှင့် တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် အသက်ပေးဆပ်သွား ခဲ့ကြသည့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများအား ဤနေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် အခါသမယတွင် ဂုဏ်ယူလေးစားစွာ ဂုဏ်ယူမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်၌ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင်ကွယ်ပျောက်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများ က နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ မျှော်လင့်တောင့်တခဲ့သော်လည်း မပြည့်ဝသေးသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံသစ်အိပ်မက်ကို လက်တွေ့ကျကျ ဖန်တီးပုံဖော်တည်ဆောက်နိုင်မည့်အခွင့်အလမ်းသည် ယနေ့ အချိန်အခါတွင် လက်တစ်ကမ်းအကွာသို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုး၏အကျိုးကို ထာဝရသယ်ပိုးလိုသည့် အမျိုးသာရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်များ အစဉ်ကိန်းအောင်းနေမည်ဆိုပါက မဝေးလှသော အနာဂတ်တွင် ပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးက ရည်ရွယ်ကြိုးပမ်းနေကြသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ် သည် ပေါ်ထွန်းလာမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၆။ လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်ထားသည့် အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်တပ်သည် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကျင်းပ၍ ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းမှုမှ ထွက်ပေါက် နည်းလမ်း အဖြစ် တရားဝင်မှုရှိသည့်အစိုးရအသွင်သဏ္ဍန်သို့ လှည့်ပြောင်းနိုင်ရန် စီစဉ်နေခြင်းကြောင့် အမျိုးသား အောင်ပွဲနေ့၏ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုအနှစ်သာရကိုအခြေခံကာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ သွေးခွဲမှု၊ လှည့်စားမှုများကို ရင်ဆိုင်ကျော်လွှားကာ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် အတူတကွ ဆက်လက်လက်တွဲ ကြိုးပမ်းသွားကြပါရန် လေးလေးနက်နက် တောင်းဆိုတိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။
၇။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် မဲဆန္ဒရှင်ပြည်သူများက ယုံကြည်စွာ အပ်နှင်းထားသည့် အခွင့်အာဏာကို တာဝန်သိစွာ ကျင့်သုံးလျက် တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုအတွက် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သောအနာဂတ်အား ဖန်တီးပုံဖော်ပေးရေး ဦးဆောင် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် ကဏ္ဍ အသီးသီး၌ ပြင်ဆင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပြီး တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံး၏ စုပေါင်းအားဖြင့် ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို အမျိုးသားရေး စိတ်ဓာတ်အပြည့်ဖြင့် အမြစ်ပြတ် တိုက်ထုတ် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြုလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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Description:
"ယနေ့ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၄ ခုနှစ် တန်ဆောင်မုန်လပြည့်ကျောာ်(၁၀)ရက်၊ ခရစ် သက္ကရာဇ် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၁၇ ရက် နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စု သမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ (၁၀၂) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အခါသမယတွင် နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားအပေါင်း ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာကျန်းမာ ချမ်းသာပြီး ဘေးအန္တရာယ် အပေါင်းကင်းဝေးအောင်မြင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်တွင် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ကို နှစ်စဉ် တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်လေ့ရှိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အချုပ်အချာအာဏာဆုံးရှုံးပြီး နယ်ချဲ့ လက်အောက်ခံ ကိုလိုနီဘဝသို့ ကျရောက်ခဲ့ရာမှ နယ်ချဲ့ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးနှင့်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖြစ် မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်း လပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ရက် (၁၉၂၀ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ၅ရက်) နေ့တွင် ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေကို တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများက သပိတ်မှောက် ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့သည့်နေ့ကို အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့အဖြစ် ဂုဏ်ပြုသတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
နယ်ချဲ့ဗြိတိသျှအစိုးရသည် တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေကြမ်းကြီးကို ပြည်သူများ ကန့်ကွက်နေသည့် ကြားကပင် ၁၉၂၀ ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာလ (၂၆) ရက်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဗြိတိသျှ ဒုတိယဘုရင်ခံ ဆာရယ်ဂျီနယ်ကရက်ဒေါက်က ရန်ကုန်အက် ဥပဒေကို ထောက်ခံခဲ့ပြီး၊ အိန္ဒိယဘုရင်ခံ ချမ်းစဖို့ဒ်က အတည်ပြုရန် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့ပြန်သည်။ နယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်မှ ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖြစ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ် တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀)ရက်၊ ၁၉၂၀ပြည့်နှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာ (၅) ရက်တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားကြီးများ ဦးဆောင်သော ပထမ ကျောင်းသားသပိတ် စတင်ခဲ့ရာ နယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်လိုသည့် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်ဓာတ်များအစပြုဖြစ်တည်ခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အနယ်နယ် အရပ်ရပ်သို့ တစ်ဟုန်ထိုး ပျံ့နှံ့သွားခဲ့သည်။ ထိုအမျိုးသားရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးကို အကြောင်းပြု၍ အမျိုးသားအထက်တန်းကျောင်းများ၊ အမျိုးသား ကောလိပ်များ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပြီး တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး နယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက် လိုသော မျိုးချစ်စိတ်များဖြစ်တည်စေခဲ့သည်။ မျက်မှောက်ကာလတွင်လည်း တိုင်ရင်းသား မိဘပြည်သူအပေါင်းတို့သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရန် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆင်နွှဲနေကြပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျောင်းများ ထူထောင်ကာ စစ်ကျွန်ပညာရေးကို ချေဖျက် အဆုံးသတ်ရန် ကြိုးစားမှုသည်လဲ တော်လှန်ရေး၏ အစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ခုအဖြစ် ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိပေသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် (၁၀၂) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့သည် နယ်ချဲ့အာဏာရှင် စနစ်ကို တိုင်းရင်းသား မိဘပြည်သူအားလုံးက စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့သည် သာမက လက်ရှိစစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို တော်လှန်နေသည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုကို လည်းအထောက်အကူပြုစေသည်ဟု ယုံကြည်မိပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် တိုင်းရင်းသားမိဘပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင် လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် ပူးပေါင်းကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ထောင်ရေးကို အလေးပေး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ၁၀၂ နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့တွင် ထပ်လောင်း၍ သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Military History
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"Documented incidents
01-02 Nov 2022: In Mandalay town, township, district and region, 24 health workers were arrested by the Myanmar military following the series of arrests and seizures of pharmaceuticals on 27-31 October 2022. Some were physicians, obstetricians, orthopaedic surgeons and public health practitioners affiliated with the CDM. Many of them were volunteering at a charity hospital called Byamaso. Sources: BBC Burmese, Mandalay Free Press and The Irrawaddy
02 Nov 2022: In Pyigyitagon town and township, Mandalay district and region, a building of a Christian orphanage and daycare school allegedly used for health care provision by the health workers arrested in the series of arrests 27 Oct – 2 Nov 2022 were seized and sealed by the Myanmar military. Around 60 child IDPs and the staff sheltering in the property were forced to leave. The Myanmar military alleged that the buildings had been used by the Kachin Independence Army and local defence forces. Sources: Chindwin News Agency, Facebook, Mandalay Free Press and Radio Free Asia
06 November 2022: In Sittwe town, township, and district, Rakhine state, a male volunteer aid worker for the LNGO Arakan Blood Donor was arrested by the Myanmar military following an attack on a government officer by gunmen earlier in the day. Source: Development Media Group
07 November 2022: In Hnget Pyaw Taing village and village tract, Kanbalu township and district, Sagaing region, a midwife was kidnapped and her husband was shot dead allegedly by the local defence forces. At the time of incident, around 70 armed people raided the sub-rural health centre, tortured the midwife and opened fire at her husband who tried to escape with their seven and nine-year-old sons. The midwife was kidnapped along with her vehicle and was not affiliated with the CDM. Sources: Facebook, Telegram, Telegram II and Voice of Myanmar
08 November 2022: Near Kyar Ta Kan village, Htan Pin Kone village tract, Kyunhla township, Kanbalu district, Sagaing region, a health worker from the NGO ASELF TOT Health was injured in a landmine explosion while on his way to meet a patient. The Myanmar military accused the local defence forces for planting the landmine. Sources: Facebook and Telegram
Reported on 08 November 2022: Htantlang township, Chin state, two clinics were amongst 25 targets for airstrikes according to leaked documents of the Myanmar military. Sources: Chin Human Rights Organisation, Facebook and Khit Thit Media
10 November 2022: In Sin Inn Gyi village, Ponnagyun township, Sittwe district, Rakhine state, a male health worker was among the ten civilians shot dead by the Myanmar military. Sources: Development Media Group and Myanmar Now
13 November 2022: In Yesagyo town and township, Pakokku district, Magway region, the local defence forces attacked the Myanmar military occupying the township hospital killing two soldiers and injuring one. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Mizzima
13 November 2022: In Hlaing town and township, Mayangone district, Yangon region, a patient was arrested by the Myanmar military from a private clinic while he was seeking treatment after being injured in an IED attack on a military vehicle by an unknown group and the shooting at the people around the scene by the Myanmar military. Sources: BBC Burmese and Mizzima
11-14 November 2022: In Kyaiklat town and township, Pyapon district, Ayeyarwady region, a male doctor was among 30 civilians arrested by the Myanmar military following the shooting of a militia member by armed men on 10 November 2022. After initial interrogation, the doctor and another civilian remained detained and were charged with violation of Penal Code Section 505(A). Sources: Delta News Agency and Voice of Myanmar
14 November 2022: In Obo Prison, Aungmyathazan town, township and district, Mandalay region, a female midwife reportedly died after being tortured during interrogation by the Myanmar military. She was arrested on 29 October 2022. Sources: Chindwin News Agency, Mandalay Free Press and Myanmar Now..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-11-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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457.76 KB
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"Almost two years after the military coup, over 1.4 million people are displaced inside Myanmar, 12,839 people are detained in inhumane conditions, at least 73 people remain on death row, and 7.8 million children are out of school. The Myanmar military has killed hundreds of protesters and bystanders, and thousands have died a result of armed conflict across the country since the coup. The Myanmar military is flagrantly ignoring calls to respect human rights, including the ASEAN five-point consensus which they agreed to implement in April 2021. ASEAN must act with the utmost urgency to convince the Myanmar military to stop committing atrocities and listen to the Myanmar people who are the key stakeholders. There is no time for further delay..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-11-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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122.19 KB
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"Few countries have suffered so much hardship as Myanmar. Throughout
its recent history, Myanmar has suffered endless civil wars, poverty and
the tyrannical rule of a military more dedicated to defending its own
interests and imposing by force, on an extraordinarily diverse society, an
ethnocentric idea of national unity than to protecting its own people.
The latest episode in a long string of tragedies started on 1 February 2021,
when, after a decade of democratic reforms that offered some glimmers
of hope for the future development of the country, the military asserted
itself again with a senseless coup d’état that would throw the country into
chaos over the coming months. The great mass of the Myanmar population
has valiantly opposed the coup from the very beginning with strikes and
peaceful demonstrations organized by a civil disobedience movement
(CDM) which emerged spontaneously out of the burning desire of the
Myanmar people to prevent at all costs a return to military rule.
At first, most of the global community seemed to take the side of the
people against the junta established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing,
the Commander in Chief of the Myanmar armed forces. As the military
launched a brutal campaign of repression, many government and
international institutions issued statements of concern condemning the
coup and the violence, but little else.
The international attention on Myanmar soon faded away, as crises
elsewhere displaced it from the headlines. Policy-makers throughout the
world seemed to forget about the Myanmar people’s plight. That neglect
was taking place as the situation in Myanmar only kept worsening. Since
the coup, the military has steadily ramped up its repression, committing
all kinds of atrocities against the Myanmar people in order to consolidate
its power. Failing, however, to do so, the junta has merely accomplished
to drive the country into a civil war that is devastating the economy,
displacing hundreds of thousands, throwing millions into poverty, and
generating a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions.
We, eight Parliamentarians from seven countries all over the world who had
been observing with concern the worsening situation in Myanmar, decided
that more needed to be done. At the initiative of ASEAN Parliamentarians
for Human Rights (APHR), we formed an international coalition to launch
the International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to
the crisis in Myanmar. Our aim has been to find out how and why the
global community has failed to address the crisis, with the view to offering
recommendations on what it should do.
The result of such work is this report, drafted to persuade the international
community to substantially increase their support for the Myanmar
people. We are convinced that such support is not only necessary as a
consequence of the crucial geopolitical importance of Myanmar, but also
because, as authoritarianism seems to be on the ascendance throughout
the world, the struggle of the Myanmar people for democracy is also the
struggle of all people who love democracy and justice everywhere.
A common theme often repeated by our witnesses has been that, in the
face of such a horrible tragedy, the countries and international institutions
that claim to support democracy in Myanmar have reacted with a timidity
that puts in serious doubt their alleged commitment to the country.
The inquiry has also given us a better understanding of the political
complexities of Myanmar, particularly its multiple ethnic conflicts, which
are crucial to understand the prominent role of the military, and the
true extent of the crimes against humanity committed by the military.
But the inquiry has also shown us the determination and courage of
those fighting for democracy in Myanmar; the heroism of civil society
organizations, most often led by admirably resilient women, working to
tackle the humanitarian crisis; and the commitment and selflessness of
those activists, particularly the youth, who refuse to give up in working to
realize their dream of a better and more just Myanmar.
We are deeply grateful for their testimonies and invaluable help in
conducting this inquiry. We are also firmly convinced that the future of
Myanmar belongs to all of them, and to millions of Myanmar people of
all ethnicities who fight everyday for their rights in many different ways,
many of them unacknowledged. They are the ones who can break the
tragic cycle of violence that has brought so much misery and misfortune
to the country, not a military that is acting as a brutal force of occupation
in its own territory. But they need our help. Let’s not fail them again..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-11-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
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2.42 MB 184.71 KB 134.17 KB 155.09 KB
Local URL:
2022-11-03-IPI-APHR-final-report_Time-is-not-on-our-side_-The-failed-international-response-to-the-Myanmar-coup-en.pdf- 2022-11-03-IPI-APHR_Report-executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-bu.pdf
- 2022-11-03-IPI-APHR_Report-executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-indo.pdf
- 2022-11-03-IPI-APHR_Report-executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-Malay.pdf
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Description:
"International actors should help Myanmar to put an end to the violence and human rights violations perpetrated by the military junta since the coup in February 2021, put the country’s military under civilian control, and establish a federal democratic system, argued the International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response response to the crisis in Myanmar (IPI) in its final report, published today.
The report, titled “Time is not on our side”: The Failed International Response to the Myanmar Coup, contains an analysis of the situation in Myanmar since the military takeover, as well as the reaction of international actors. Finding that the global response to the crisis has fallen woefully short of international obligations and standards, the IPI offers a set of recommendations to move forward and help the Myanmar people in their struggle against military dictatorship.
“It is imperative that the international community changes course on Myanmar as soon as possible, and those countries claiming to support democracy and human rights in the country live up to their stated commitments. They should begin with recognizing the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) as what it is: the legitimate authority in the country; impose effective and coordinated sanctions on the junta, and address the terrible humanitarian crisis afflicting Myanmar,” said Heidi Hautala, Vice President of the European Parliament and IPI Chair.
The IPI is an initiative launched by ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) in June 2022. Its Committee is formed by eight parliamentarians from seven different countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe who are appalled by the situation in Myanmar since the military takeover.
Since the coup, the Myanmar military has committed acts which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may amount to “crimes against humanity and war crimes” in order to consolidate its power against widespread popular resistance to its rule, throwing the country into chaos, and leading it to the brink of becoming a failed state.
The IPI Committee has held a total of six public oral hearings online, as well as several private hearings, with dozens of stakeholders and experts, and has received dozens of written submissions. Two of its members conducted a fact-finding mission to the Thai-Myanmar border in August 2022.
The Inquiry has analyzed the response to the crisis in Myanmar of a wide variety of international actors, but has paid particular attention to the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which Myanmar is a member. In April 2021, ASEAN member states and the Myanmar junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, signed the Five-Point Consensus to put an end to the violence, seek a negotiated solution to the conflict and address the humanitarian crisis. Since then, many countries have expressed their support for the agreement and largely deferred to ASEAN to solve the crisis.
“It has become abundantly clear that the Five Point Consensus has been an utter failure. General Min Aung Hlaing has shown an absolute contempt for the agreement he signed and for ASEAN’s member states, and the regional group has been unable to adopt a stance to put pressure on the Junta. Meanwhile, most of the international community has hidden behind ASEAN in order to avoid doing anything meaningful. It is past time that ASEAN ditches the Five Point Consensus and urgently rethinks its approach to the crisis in Myanmar,” said Charles Santiago, former Member of Parliament (MP) in Malaysia, APHR Chairperson and IPI Committee Member.
In the latest meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers on Myanmar, held on 27 October, the regional group agreed to “reaffirmed the importance and relevance of the Five-Point Consensus” while underscoring “the need to further strengthen its implementation through concrete, practical and time-bound actions.”
“ASEAN is not acting with the urgency that the situation in Myanmar demands. The group should have started to put real pressure on the junta and engage the NUG long ago. It is unacceptable that ASEAN continue to shirk their responsibilities to the people of Myanmar, and continue adopting half-hearted measures that only serve to embolden Min Aung Hlaing and his junta,” added Santiago.
International passivity has encouraged a sense of impunity within the Myanmar military, which most recently launched an airstrike on a multitude attending a music festival in Kachin state, killing at least 60 civilians. By the most conservative estimates, the junta has killed at least 2,404 Myanmar citizens, and arrested over 16,000 people.
The violence has also displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes, and the number of internally displaced people in the country now has reached 1.3 million, a terrible record in Myanmar’s history. Many interviewees during the IPI oral hearings described in vivid detail the humanitarian catastrophe afflicting the Myanmar people, as well as how the military junta is hijacking and weaponizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
“Myanmar is suffering a tragedy words cannot describe. The global community should urgently step up the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and it should work with local civil society organizations that know the terrain well, have ample experience and are trusted by the population. Millions of Myanmar citizens suffering the most grievous hardships cannot wait for long. International actors should leave politics aside and help the Myanmar people immediately,” said Mercy Barends, APHR Board Member and IPI Committee Member..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-11-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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- 2022-11-02-IPI-APHR-final-report-Time-is-not-on-our-side-the-failed-international-response-to-the-Myanmar-coup-en.pdf
- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-bu.pdf
- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-indo.pdf
- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-malay.pdf
- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-thai.pdf
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"Today, on International Religious Freedom Day, 27 October 2022, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published a new report entitled: “Violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief since the coup d’état in Myanmar”, which examines the situation of the right to freedom of religion or belief in Myanmar since Military coup.
Since the coup d’état on 1 February 2021, the military has been responsible for human rights violations on a large scale,[1] including unlawful killings, torture and other ill treatment and arbitrary detentions. The rights to freedom of assembly, movement, information and speech have also been severely curtailed. Less well-reported have been the Tatmadaw’s (i.e., Myanmar military) systematic violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief, particularly targeting members of Myanmar’s sizeable religious minorities despite the fact that some of these violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief have not only increased drastically, but also that they could amount to war crimes under international law.
In the aftermath of the coup, the military initially focused on limiting the rights to freedom of expression and information by suppressing the media and internet access. Since then, massive arrests of journalists, activists, human rights defenders and internet shutdown have systematically curtailed freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and media freedom. The military’s focus has also widened to include suppression of the right to freedom of religion or belief with raids and attacks on places of worship, leading to damage and destruction. The military has also set up military encampments in places of worship. There have also been reports of arrests of religious leaders, who were later prohibited from practising their religion while in detention.
This report presents an overview of the violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief that have taken place from 1 February 2021 until 30 May 2022. These include:
Incidents of violence against religious leaders and religious minority communities;
Raids on places of worship;
The use of religious sites as military camps;
The destruction of religious buildings and shrines;
The restrictions of movement and denied citizenship for Rohingya
The emergence of new forms of nationalism after the coup
In light of these serious concerns, the report offers a number of recommendations, particularly to the UN, and International Community with a view to addressing the violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief in the country.
This report is part of a series of ICJ publications on the right to freedom of religion or belief.
[1] “Human rights ‘catastrophe’ in Myanmar: UN calls for urgent action”, accessed at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100922..."
Source/publisher:
International Commission of Jurists
Date of publication:
2022-10-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights and international relations
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"Decades of experience: For over three decades, Karen community based organisations (CBOs), together with departments of the Karen National Union
(KNU), have been providing humanitarian aid to villagers in southeast Burma suffering displacement and food insecurity due to Burma Army offensives, persecution and destruction of farms and rice stocks. The aid has been delivered through our own
long-established mechanisms, systematically developed to maximize effectiveness while ensuring accountability to donors. Based at the border for security and logistical reasons, these systems have been able to deliver significant amounts of assistance, allowing hundreds of thousands of people to remain living inside Burma instead of becoming refugees. From 1992 to 2020, border-based Karen organisations assisted over 1.7 million vulnerable persons living in Burma with over US$ 32 million of aid, mainly for rice.
This aid has been delivered directly to the beneficiaries without any financial, military or political benefits going to Burma’s military governments since these programs began.
Instead of fueling centralization, this border based assistance has helped develop locally governed aid structures as building blocks for a new federal democratic Burma..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Peace Support Network
Date of publication:
2022-10-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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pdf
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2.77 MB
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"One of the biggest challenges that Indonesia will face as ASEAN Chair 2023 is how it ensures effective leadership to secure significant progress on the ongoing political and human security crisis in Burma/Myanmar.
On 1 Feb 2021, the Burmese military took over the country’s capital and detained government officials and elected parliamentarians preparing to convene parliament, dramatically halting the country’s 10-year transition to a semi-democratic system. For the people of Burma, this was only the beginning of a reign of terror - the junta has consistently ramped up the brutality of attacks against civilians, targeting them with airstrikes, artillery attacks and atrocity crimes. For ASEAN, this was the beginning of a multi-level and multi-dimensional threat to ASEAN’s credibility and regional human security.
The regime used lethal force against opponents to crush nationwide opposition to its rule. As of 6 Oct 2022, regime troops had killed at least 2,338 civilians and arrested at least 15,770. Junta tribunals also sentenced 126 people, including children, to death.1 On 23 Jul, the junta executed four prominent anti-coup activists; a first since 1976.2 In Aug 2022, Amnesty International highlighted the regime’s systematic use of torture in custody. It said the junta was ‘flout[ing] the law at every stage of the arrest and detention process’—from making arbitrary arrests to forcing confessions through torture or by threatening of reprisals against relatives.3
The junta also tried to destroy the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party that overwhelmingly won the 2015 and 2020 general elections. It sentenced top officials—on bogus charges—including President Win Myint, Naypyidaw Mayor Myo Aung, and the Chief Ministers of Mandalay, Magway, Rakhine, Tanintharyi, Mon, Shan, and Karen States/Regions.4 Ousted State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi faces almost 200 years in prison on multiple charges, and had been sentenced to 26 years as of 12 Oct 2022.5 As of late September 2022, the regime had also killed at least 56 party members.6
The regime’s escalating violence resulted in nationwide conflict with Ethnic Resistance Organizations and newly formed civilian guerilla groups.
In the first 18 months of the coup, there have been 14,076 armed clashes and attacks against civilians, compared to 12,822 in Syria, 10,204 in Yemen, and 8,110 in Afghanistan during the same period.7
During the six months of Jan-Jun 2022, the Armed Conflicts Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 668 incidents of violence directly targeting unarmed civilians by the regime - the highest figure worldwide. In the same period ACLED documented over 11,000 fatalities, mostly resulting from battles between the regime and anti-junta armed groups.8
The National Unity Government (NUG), a coalition of over 70% of MPs elected in 2020 and Ethnic Resistance Organizations, documented 2,778 war crimes by junta forces during 1 Dec 2021-31 May 2022.9 On 9 Aug 2022, the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) said there were ample indications that crimes against humanity had been committed in Burma since 1 Feb 2021.10
While the numerous crimes have taken place around the country, 3 incidents have sparked international shock and concern:
On 24 Dec 2021, regime forces captured at least 37 men, women, and children fleeing conflict in Karenni State and burned them alive.11
On 16 Sep 2022, regime helicopters fired at a school housed in a Buddhist monastery in Sagaing Region, killing at least 14 people, including twelve children.12
On 23 October 2022, regime airstrikes targeted a music concert in Kachin state, killing up to 80 people – the largest number of people killed in an airstrike by the junta which described it as a “necessary operation”. 13
Regime troops also destroyed at least 132 religious buildings as of late June 2022, mostly in Chin State (66 churches destroyed), Sagaing Region (28 Buddhist monasteries, a Buddhist convent, two mosques, and two churches), Karenni State (20 churches and a mosque), and Magway Region (11 Buddhist monasteries and a church).14 Junta soldiers burned down 28,434 houses during Feb 2021-25 Aug 2022, including 20,153 houses in Sagaing Region and 5,418 houses in Magway Region.15
Conflict in Burma also spread to neighboring countries:
On 30 Jun 2022, a regime MiG-29 fighter jet crossed into Thai airspace amid clashes with resistance forces, forcing local officials to evacuate villages and schools.16 A Thai farmer later reported that his truck was hit by shrapnel from the jet’s missiles.17
On 30 Aug 2022, a regime helicopter crossed into Bangladeshi airspace and attacked AA fighters.18
On 16 Sep 2022, five artillery shells fired from Burma killed a young Rohingya refugee and injured at least six others in Bangladesh.19 The Bangladesh Foreign Minister subsequently summoned the Burmese Ambassador over this incident and multiple other incursions. 20
On 21 Sep, the Bangladesh Army chief said his personnel was ready to respond if regime forces did not stop firing across the border.21
HOW ASEAN RESPONDED
Under Brunei’s chairmanship, ASEAN proved itself incapable of responding swiftly to the Burma crisis. On 24 Apr 2021, almost three months after the attempted coup, the bloc held talks with junta leader Min Aung Hlaing in Jakarta.22 The meeting led to the adoption of the Five-Point Consensus (FPC), calling for: (1) immediate cessation of violence; (2) constructive dialogue among all parties concerned; (3) a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair to facilitate the mediation of dialogue; (4) ASEAN to provide humanitarian aid through its AHA Centre; and (5) the special envoy and delegation to visit Burma and to meet with all parties concerned.23
Within two days, the junta walked back its commitment to the FPC, saying it would only implement these ‘suggestions’ after restoring stability in Burma.24 On 29 Apr 2021, the junta declared itself ‘recognized’ by ASEAN,25 making clear that its participation in the Jakarta meeting was merely a publicity stunt to appear as the country’s legitimate government. During 24-30 April 2021 (i.e. a week of the ASEAN meeting), the junta launched 68 airstrikes on Kachin and Karen states. 26 Brunei waited until 4 Aug 2021 to appoint an envoy to Burma; and achieved no further results.
On 1 Jan 2022, Cambodia became ASEAN’s chair and appointed its Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn as envoy. On 7 Jan 2022, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen met with Min Aung Hlaing in Burma, drawing widespread condemnation while achieving no results.27 On 7 Feb 2022, a little over a month into Cambodia’s chairmanship, Hun Sen said he would leave it to the next ASEAN chair to sort out the Burma crisis, adding that he had ‘already tried his best’ and did not need the ‘headache.’28 As of Oct 2022, the ASEAN envoy had been unable to meet with Burma civilian representatives or facilitate dialogue.
On 25 Jul 2022, ASEAN denounced and expressed disappointment at the four executions carried out by the regime but abstained from outright condemning them.29 Hun Sen had previously called on the junta to reconsider the death sentences.30 The bloc ultimately prevented the junta from attending its Foreign Ministers meeting in Phnom Penh on 3 Aug 2022, citing its lack of commitment to the FPC. It also demanded the junta changed course before its November summit, and agreed to continue to bar the regime from high-level meetings until progress was made.31
Although such a stance against a member state is unprecedented in its history, the fact that ASEAN decided to give the junta three more months to implement the FPC is symptomatic of the lack of urgency that has plagued the bloc’s response to the regime’s attempted coup and all-out war on the people of Burma.
Malaysia has been the loudest voice calling for ASEAN to harden its stance towards the regime and engage with the NUG. On 14 May 2022, Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah met with his NUG counterpart, becoming the first ASEAN minister to do so.32 On 26 Jul 2022, the country called the regime’s executions a crime against humanity and a mockery of the FPC.33 On 19 Sep 2022, Saifuddin Abdullah called on ASEAN to review whether the FPC should be replaced with a better plan.34 On 20 Sep, he called on the bloc to engage with the NUG and work towards ‘a framework that has a clear endgame to return democracy to [Burma].’35 HOW INDONESIA CAN HELP
On 19 March 2021, Indonesia President Joko Widodo called for ASEAN members to meet as soon as possible ‘to discuss Burma’, also calling for a restoration of democracy and an end to violence.36 This was the very first initiative of an ASEAN member state to take an action on the military coup in Myanmar. Following the adoption of the FPC, Indonesia constantly urged the junta to implement it in a transparent and time sensitive way. On 3 Sep 2021, a top diplomat from Indonesia expressed concerns over ASEAN’s delayed action to address the Burma crisis and urged the junta to grant ASEAN’s Special Envoy full access to the country.37
As time passed, the junta still failed to implement the FPC and continued attacking civilians. On 26 Oct, together with Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, Indonesia urged ASEAN to take a more assertive stance towards the regime, suggesting barring the junta from further ASEAN meetings or even revoke its membership, if progress remained elusive.38 On 23 Feb 2022, Indonesian President Joko Widodo called for an immediate and fair solution for the people of Burma, saying the nation’s citizens deserved peace, safety and prosperity. Widodo stressed that the resolution could not be delayed any further. In a meeting with the Singaporean PM, Widodo argued that the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus was critical.39
Under two ASEAN chairmanships, the Burma situation wasn’t sufficiently addressed and there was a significant increase in the number of atrocities committed by the junta. One and a half years after the adoption of the Five-Point Consensus, the bloc still seems to lack common ground regarding the FPC’s implementation. As an ASEAN member state, Indonesia echoed significant initiatives and clearly revealed its stance against the junta. In its upcoming 2023 chairmanship, Indonesia should trade the FPC for a more progressive and pragmatic plan with clear timelines and enforcement mechanisms in the best interest of the Burma people. The plan should also include political dialogue with NUG counterparts and engagement with international and civil society organizations working along the borders of Burma to enable humanitarian assistance..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-Burma and The Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence
Date of publication:
2022-10-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"A total of 7,703 clashes broke out in the country between February 1, 2021, and October 12, 2022 following the coup. There were more than 7,000 battles during the period, of which at least 4,520 were between SAC forces and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and at least 2,168 were between SAC forces and local armed resistance groups (PDF, LDF, CNDF, KNDF, etc.). At least 906 clashes were launched by ethnic armed organizations and local armed resistance groups against SAC forces.
Karen State saw the majority of clashes across the country with at least 4,383 out of more than 7,700 nationwide, followed by Sagaing Region with at least 830 clashes. The escalation of armed conflicts has resulted in clashes in 186 townships across the country.
Meanwhile, armed conflicts between SAC forces and the Arakan Army (AA) have resumed in Rakhine State since early November 2020 following a cease-fire of approximately one year in the aftermath of the coup. AA and SAC forces engaged in no fewer than 40 clashes in six townships in Rakhine State, which resulted in the displacement of at least 10,922 residents.
∎ Why does it matter?
By looking at the number of civilian fatalities and injuries, how they were killed and wounded, and the number of people displaced by fighting involving SAC’s forces and EAOs, or within EAOs themselves, it is possible to examine whether or not armed forces have committed human rights violations from the perspective of transitional justice. In addition, by studying the post-coup situation, further research can be conducted to examine whether there has been a change in conditions related to Myanmar’s peace process.
∎ Other relevant readings
On-the-ground reports from ethnic news organizations and other independent media groups provide regular updates about conflict situations, their impact, and the collateral damage in the aftermath of the military coup. These include reports of renewed fighting in ethnic areas, civilian fatalities, and rising refugee and IDP issues on the ground. In addition, records and reports by United Nations organizations such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and other independent local and foreign organizations also provide information about the ongoing conflict situation in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-10-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Border based Karen community groups lead aid response to post-coup humanitarian crisis in Kawthoolei..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Peace Support Network
Date of publication:
2022-10-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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pdf
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3.61 MB
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Description:
"In the evening of October 23 2022, terrorist Myanmar military launched targeted airstrikes
against civilians who were gathering at a live music event that mark the upcoming 62nd
Anniversary of the founding of Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in Ah Nant Par
village of Hpakant Township in Kachin State. Many innocent civilians including prominent
Kachin ethnic singers and artists were killed and injured during the indiscriminate arial
attacks and deliberate bombing by junta’s fighter jets.
The village is located in an area within Kachin’s Hpakant Township where internet and
telecommunication blackout have been imposed since August 20, 2021, more than 15
months ago. By the time of the release of this statement, estimated 60 people have died
while over 100 injured people are facing a life-threatening situation having been blocked
by the terrorist military troops at a checkpoint in Ginsi village to deny them any chance
of getting treatment.
We, the undersigned resistance forces, would like to declare our position as follow
regarding this tragic event.
1. We are deeply sorry for the Kachin people who have suffered from this inhuman
attack.
2. We consider this attack by terrorist junta on 62nd anniversary ceremonial event
of the KIO as an attack on all revolutionary forces and actors who are engaging
in political and armed resistance against the terrorist junta for the establishment
of a genuine federal democracy.
3. These deliberate bombing attacks on large civilian gathering which have resulted
to mass killing is a serious commission of war crime. Moreover, such targeted
mass killing of the Kachin ethnic people in particular during such gathering of
ethnic ceremonial event implies that the junta could have genocidal intent.
4. We condemn the terrorist military council in the strongest terms possible for
such attack on civilians.5. We are always proud of the commitment and effort of KIO in their struggle for
federal democracy and Kachin people’s liberation, and we vow to collaborate
more closely with them and increased the intensity of our fight against the military
junta.
6. We call on the international governments and community to block supplies of
aviation fuel to the terrorist junta, sanction its main source of revenue Myanma
Oil and Gas Enterprise, step up efforts for stripping of any form of legitimacy and
recognition that the junta is receiving on international stage, and urgently and
consistently advocate for he people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
All Kachin Students’ Federation, Anti Junta Mass Movement Committee, Blood Money Campaign, General Strike Committee, General Strike Committee of Nationalities, Kachin National Youth Network, Kachin State Civilian Movement and Women’s League of Burma
Date of publication:
2022-10-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf pdf
Size:
90.82 KB 297.76 KB 153.25 KB 290.97 KB
Local URL:
- 2022-10-24-Statement-regarding-Myanmar-junta’s-deliberate-bombing-on-civilians-gathering-site-in-Kachin-State-tu-en.pdf
- 2022-10-24-Statement-regarding-Myanmar-junta’s-deliberate-bombing-on-civilians-gathering-site-in-Kachin-State-pio-en.pdf
- 2022-10-24-Statement-regarding-Myanmar-junta’s-deliberate-bombing-on-civilians-gathering-site-in-Kachin-State-pio-bu.pdf
- 2022-10-24-Statement-regarding-Myanmar-junta’s-deliberate-bombing-on-civilians-gathering-site-in-Kachin-State-pio-kachin.pdf
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Description:
"Executive Summary: Anti-junta protests constitute 99 % of mass protests, with some socioeconomic protests including
protests organized by thousands of garment laborers in the compounds of the Zaykabar company’s
factory, strikes of Food Panda riders, PMG bottle refinery factory workers’ strikes calling for the
increase of bonus and riots-like pro-military rallies.
Following the burning of civilian homes, markets, and public property near flash mobs, the military
junta has accelerated its tactics to divide the public and strike organisers.
In total, military and private vehicles were rammed into peaceful protests and struck 19 times,
including eight times in Mandalay Region, five times in Yangon Region, three times in Sagaing
Region, and once in each of Shan State, Kachin State, and Tanintharyi State.
Prison strikes include hunger strikes against the junta, prisoner strikes calling for their rights in
prisons and strikes showing solidarity with the oppressed outside. Inmate protesters were beaten,
kept in solitary confinement, denied access to letters and family, restricted in security, and tortured
to death.
In many cases, the charges against the detained protesters were replaced with more severe offenses. Demonstrators who have been arrested face criminal prosecution under the Penal Code or the
Counter-Terrorism Act rather than under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law,
which is less intense.
The lawyers defending and providing legal assistance to the detained protesters, politicians, and
activists were also jailed. A number of young female lawyers providing legal assistance to the detainees have been sexually harassed by both junta forces and police.
Despite the violent crackdowns and oppression, anti-coup flash mobs have continued to persist in
major cities with peaceful protests such as the main strike of Kalay township, Yinmabin Shwenwethway strike, the “Our Village Searches No Savior” strike in Yinmabin and multi-village strike
of eastern Yinmabin and northern Salingyi Sagaing Region..."
Source/publisher:
Athan - Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
Date of publication:
2022-10-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
11.86 MB (Original version) - 29 pages
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Description:
"Executive Summary: Anti-junta protests constitute 99 % of mass protests, with some socioeconomic protests including
protests organized by thousands of garment laborers in the compounds of the Zaykabar company’s
factory, strikes of Food Panda riders, PMG bottle refinery factory workers’ strikes calling for the
increase of bonus and riots-like pro-military rallies.
Following the burning of civilian homes, markets, and public property near flash mobs, the military
junta has accelerated its tactics to divide the public and strike organisers.
In total, military and private vehicles were rammed into peaceful protests and struck 19 times,
including eight times in Mandalay Region, five times in Yangon Region, three times in Sagaing
Region, and once in each of Shan State, Kachin State, and Tanintharyi State.
Prison strikes include hunger strikes against the junta, prisoner strikes calling for their rights in
prisons and strikes showing solidarity with the oppressed outside. Inmate protesters were beaten,
kept in solitary confinement, denied access to letters and family, restricted in security, and tortured
to death.
In many cases, the charges against the detained protesters were replaced with more severe offenses. Demonstrators who have been arrested face criminal prosecution under the Penal Code or the
Counter-Terrorism Act rather than under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law,
which is less intense.
The lawyers defending and providing legal assistance to the detained protesters, politicians, and
activists were also jailed. A number of young female lawyers providing legal assistance to the detainees have been sexually harassed by both junta forces and police.
Despite the violent crackdowns and oppression, anti-coup flash mobs have continued to persist in
major cities with peaceful protests such as the main strike of Kalay township, Yinmabin Shwenwethway strike, the “Our Village Searches No Savior” strike in Yinmabin and multi-village strike
of eastern Yinmabin and northern Salingyi Sagaing Region..."
Source/publisher:
Athan - Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
Date of publication:
2022-10-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
10.3 MB (Original version) - 31 pages
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Description:
"22 October, 2022: The beheading of a National Unity Government (NUG) school teacher by Myanmar junta forces is an act of terror under international and Myanmar law. The United Nations (UN) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must take urgent action to hold the junta accountable for atrocities committed against school children and teachers in Myanmar, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
According to reports, U Saw Tun Moe, a teacher at a civilian NUG-funded school in Thit Nyi Naung village in southern Pauk Township, Magwe Region, was abducted by junta troops on Sunday, 16 October. The next day his body was found decapitated leaning against the gate of a school in the nearby village of Taung Myint. His head was impaled on a spike on the school gate above his body and three of his fingers had been cut off and placed between his thighs.
“The atrocities being committed by the junta in Myanmar have reached a new level of inhumanity,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The junta is escalating its barbaric attacks against children and teachers in a vain attempt to break the morale of the population who steadfastly reject it and for whom education is a pillar of the society they are sacrificing so much to create. If ASEAN supports the Myanmar peoples’ vision of the future, it must take urgent action to end the senseless junta-violence.”
Education in Myanmar is increasingly becoming a target for junta atrocities. A school headmaster who was taking part in the nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement was reportedly stabbed to death on Monday in Ayeyarwady Region while on 16 September, junta attack helicopters fired heavy weapons into a school in a monastery in Sagaing Region killing at least 11 children and injuring 17. Such attacks are gross violations of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child.
The junta has been committing systematic and widespread atrocities against the civilian population of Myanmar ever since its failed coup attempt in February 2021. Despite this, the alliance of democratic resistance forces, represented by the NUG, have the greatest claim to effective control in Myanmar. The NUG, people’s administration bodies and Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs) are delivering government services, including education, to millions of people across the country in areas under their control.
“Beheading someone and putting the body on display for the public to see is a clearly defined act of terror,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The Myanmar military leaders have waged a bloody campaign of terror against the Myanmar people for more than 20-months. They must face international accountability. The ICC urgently needs to act on the NUG’s article 12(3) declaration and the military needs to be declared a terrorist organisation under international law.”
The Myanmar military meets the criteria of a terrorist organisation under both Myanmar and international law. SAC-M continues to call on the international community to designate and treat it as such.
“The junta shells schools, massacres school children and decapitates teachers in Myanmar with impunity. This is a deliberate attack on Myanmar’s future,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “The Myanmar people know the military has no future in Myanmar. When will the United Nations wake up to this reality and finally hold military leaders accountable for their horrific crimes? The UN’s current approach to engagement with the junta makes it complicit in the atrocities being committed against the Myanmar people.”
To protect the lives of the Myanmar people and bring the leaders of the military junta to justice, SAC-M is calling on:
– The UN Security Council to put to a vote a resolution on Myanmar to impose a comprehensive global arms embargo on the junta, financial and economic sanctions against the junta, to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and to commence the process of declaring the Myanmar military a terrorist organisation and require UN members states treat it as such;
– The UN General Assembly to fully accept the credentials of Myanmar’s representative to the UN, NUG appointee Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, with all the rights and privileges of any other member state, including representation in all other UN bodies and forums;
– ASEAN to engage formally with the NUG, accept the NUG as the representative of Myanmar in ASEAN meetings and forums, and use the ASEAN Summit in November to reach a new agreement on how to respond to the junta-made crises in Myanmar, developed in consultation with the NUG;
– UN officials, agencies and other humanitarian actors to cease all activities that grant legitimacy to the junta, including presenting credentials to Min Aung Hlaing and participating in photo opportunities with the generals and their collaborators, and adhere to humanitarian principles by engaging primarily with the NUG and resistance organisations;
– The ICC to accept the NUG’s article 12(3) declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction in Myanmar dating back to 2002 and urgently expand the current investigation on the basis of the declaration..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-10-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
212.62 KB
Local URL:
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Description:
"Last week in the East Asia Pacific region, civilians were killed during a clash between the Myanmar military and a local resistance group near a Buddhist religious site in Myanmar's Mon state. The United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) attacked and occupied a border guard police outpost in Rakhine state, while the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) clashed with the Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization/Pa-Oh National Liberation Army (PNLO/PNLA) in southern Shan state. North Korea carried out another series of missile tests. In the Philippines, fighting between the communist New People's Army (NPA) and state forces intensified. Meanwhile, police shot three militant detainees dead after they took a detained former senator hostage during an attempted jailbreak.
In Myanmar, a local resistance group attacked a military checkpoint at the foot of the Kyaiktiyo Golden Rock Pagoda, a famous Buddhist pilgrimage site, in Mon state on 12 October. Three women pilgrims were killed in the crossfire. Eighteen others, including a police officer, were injured. The resistance group and military accused each other of killing the civilians (Myanmar Now, 13 October 2022).
Elsewhere, in Rakhine state, the ULA/AA attacked and occupied the Lait-ya border guard police outpost in Maungdaw township on 10 October, inflicting police casualties and seizing weapons and ammunition (Irrawaddy, 11 October 2022). One ULA/AA member was killed in the fighting (Narinjara, 10 October 2022). Members of another border guard police outpost in nearby Kyein Chaung village fired artillery at the ULA/AA during the clash. The ULA/AA claimed the Lait-ya border guard police outpost had been responsible for artillery attacks on civilians (Narinjara, 11 October 2022). Fighting between the two groups has intensified over the past few months. These trends contribute to the 717% increase in average weekly violent events in Rakhine state in the past month relative to the weekly average for the preceding year flagged by ACLED's Subnational Threat Tracker. The Subnational Tracker also warned of increased violence in Rakhine state during the preceding four weeks.
In southern Shan state, fighting broke out between the RCSS/SSA-S, an ethnic Shan armed group, and the PNLO/PNLA, an ethnic Pa-Oh armed group, on 11 October in the reportedly PNLO/PNLA-controlled Ka Du Gyi area of Mawkmai township. The PNLO/PNLA claimed that the clash resulted from the RCSS/SSA-S's failure to inform them of troop movements, as required by the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Shan Herald Agency for News, 13 October 2022). The clash came after the RCSS/SSA-S invited ethnic armed organizations operating in Shan state and other areas to meet to ease tensions and to discuss potential cooperation (Thanlwin Times, 11 October 2022). ACLED's Subnational Surge Tracker warned of increased violence in southern Shan state during the preceding four weeks. Violence in southern Shan state is both common and highly volatile; it is considered an area of 'extreme risk' by ACLED's Volatility and Risk Predictability Index.
North Korea continued to carry out missile tests last week. On 9 October, North Korea test-fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the sea off the country's east coast, before test-firing two long-range cruise missiles into the sea off its west coast on 12 October. On 14 October, North Korea flew 10 warplanes close to the border with South Korea, before launching a short-range ballistic missile into the sea off its east coast and firing hundreds of artillery shells into a maritime buffer zone surrounding the Northern Limit Line (AP, 14 October 2022). These activities came after North Korea's defense ministry criticized the recent redeployment of a US aircraft carrier near the Korean Peninsula (YNA, 6 October 2022).
Last week in the Philippines, fighting between NPA rebels and the military intensified, with clashes reported in Bicol and Soccsksargen, as well as Central, Western, and Eastern Visayas. These trends contribute to a 75% increase in violent events in the Philippines over the past week relative to the weekly average for the preceding month, as flagged by ACLED's Conflict Change Map. In Western Visayas, Himamaylan city saw fierce clashes on 8, 10, and 12 October, leaving a suspected high-ranking NPA leader, Romeo Nanta (also known as Juanito Magbanua), dead. The NPA claimed that Nanta was not killed in the clash, but rather, captured and summarily executed (Rappler, 11 October 2022). Human rights group Karapatan condemned alleged military abuses against civilians during the clashes, including allegedly indiscriminate artillery fire and aerial bombing (Karapatan, 12 October 2022). As a result of the clashes, the military implemented lockdowns in several affected barangays, and the city government declared a state of calamity (Manila Bulletin, 12 October 2022). Around 15,000 villagers were also evacuated from the area (Panay News, 12 October 2022).
Meanwhile, a high-profile jailbreak attempt led to the deaths of three detained Islamist militants in Quezon City last week. On 9 October, three militant detainees -- alleged members of Abu Sayyaf and Dawlah Islamiyah -- attempted to escape from the Philippine National Police Custodial Center, wounding a police officer with an improvised knife and taking detained former Senator Leila de Lima hostage during the attempt. Responding police officers shot the militant detainees dead and freed de Lima, who was lightly wounded. The incident led to renewed calls for the release of de Lima, a prominent critic of former President Rodrigo Duterte. De Lima has been held in police custody since February 2017 on drug-related charges, which human rights organizations and opposition groups view as politically motivated (HRW, 4 May 2022; Manila Bulletin, 9 October 2022).
Note: This dashboard automatically updates to cover the latest four weeks of data released by ACLED. Use the date filters to view data for the one-week period covered by this Regional Overview..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication:
2022-10-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Three prison staff and five visitors died after the bombs hit a crowd queuing to drop off parcels for inmates at prison housing political detainees
Description:
"At least eight people have been killed in explosions at Myanmar’s main prison for political detainees after two bombs exploded on Wednesday morning.
Three prison staff and five visitors, including a 10-year-old girl, died after the bombs hit a crowd queueing to drop off parcels for inmates at Insein Prison, junta authorities said in a statement.
The visitors were delivering parcels to prisoners when the explosion occurred at about 9.40am, according to News of Myanmar, an online news service sympathetic to the country’s military government.
The blasts occurred inside and outside the parcel reception office near the main iron gate of the prison in Yangon.
State-owned MRTV said the explosions were caused by “mines inside parcels” while the military’s information office said an unexploded bomb had also been found in a parcel. At least 13 visitors, including a nine-year-old boy, and five prison personnel were reported to be being treated for injuries at Insein township hospital.
The prison has been notorious for decades for holding political prisoners under various military governments whom often rely on friends or family for food and medicine supplies.
Several resistance groups engaged in struggle against the military government, including the Yangon revolution force, Yangon urban guerrillas and the general strike committee, quickly released statements condemning the attacks for hurting civilians.
However, a little-known anti-government group known as the special task agency of Burma later posted a statement on Telegram saying it had carried out the attack as “retaliation against (junta chief) Min Aung Hlaing” and the continued oppression of revolutionary fighters by prison personnel. The group said the civilian casualties were caused by indiscriminate gunfire by security forces after the blasts.
“Today … the special task agency of Burma (STA), carried out two attacks to execute the prison head. We’re retaliating against Min Aung Hlaing and … the prison officers for continuously oppressing our revolution comrades,” Reuters cited the statement as saying.
The south-east Asian nation has been in turmoil since a military coup last year, with swathes of the country engulfed by fighting.
About 2,367 civilians have been killed in a crackdown on resistance, according to detailed lists compiled by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a rights watchdog group.
Photos of Wednesday’s bombings distributed by the military’s information office show items scattered by the blasts and blood on the floor inside the building where parcels for prisoners are received.
A resident who lives near the prison’s entrance gate told The Associated Press by phone that he heard about 10 gunshots after hearing the two explosions but did not know if they caused any casualties.
One witness queueing at the parcel counter told Agence France-Presse the first blast hit at about 9.30am (0300 GMT). “Then another two went off quickly. After that we heard shooting as well,” said the witness, who requested anonymity. “I saw some people bleeding. The glass around the counter was all shattered.”
According to another witness, security forces locked down the area around the sprawling colonial-era prison after the explosions..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-10-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders
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Description:
"Yaw Defense Force (YDF) Deputy Commander Ko Phyo Wai Soe was returning with two comrades from a front-line guerilla operation in Gangaw township when they were ambushed by regime forces on the afternoon of Oct. 9.
The three YDF fighters were riding motorbikes when they encountered a group of eight junta policemen near Kyun Khone Thar village, 40 kilometers north of Gangaw town in Magwe Region — a resistance stronghold. Of the three, only Ko Phyo Wai Soe was armed.
The YDF deputy commander had only his 9 mm pistol as he and his comrades confronted the heavily armed police squad. He was hit in his chest and thigh, while his comrade Pwar Lay was shot in the head. Both died in the firefight. The third resistance fighter, Naing Thein, managed to escape back to base to deliver news of their deaths.
The untimely death of the 21-year-old technological university student-turned-guerrilla leader was a severe blow to fellow YDF fighters and supporters of the armed anti-regime resistance.
YDF Commander Ko Myat Thu said Ko Phyo Wai Soe’s passing was a big loss for the resistance force but also further motivation to uproot Myanmar’s military dictatorship as this was what their deputy commander had fought for.
“His final words were, ‘I do nothing without the consent of the people,’” Ko Myat Thu said.
“We will just try harder to achieve what he wanted.”
‘Outstanding young man’, ‘a person of untold bravery’
At least a dozen local resistance groups, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) – including the Arakan Army and Chinland Defense Force – and two ministries of the National Unity Government (NUG) have released statements of condolence, praising the YDF deputy commander as “an outstanding young man” and “a person of untold bravery.”
In a condolence letter from the NUG’s Ministry of International Cooperation, Union Minister Dr. Sasa described Ko Phyo Wai Soe as “one of the heroes who sacrificed themselves for the future of the country”, calling his death a big loss not only for the YDF but also for the whole of Myanmar.
The powerful Arakan Army (AA) ethnic armed group described him as a “model” leader in the country’s fight against the junta, commonly known as “Myanmar’s Spring Revolution.” The AA praised him not only for his talent on the battlefield but for leading the push to reopen schools in areas outside of junta control where the YDF operates.
“He was one of the leaders, involved in the revolution since the earliest days. He was decisive and strong-minded in military affairs. I salute him with sadness and praise,” said Ma Grace, platoon commander of the Myaung Women Warriors, a regiment of the Civilian Defense Security Organization Myaung (CDSOM) in Magwe Region.
Known as Ko Phyo by his comrades, the deputy commander not only led troops on the ground but also networked and cooperated with other armed groups, including EAOs, since their early days of operation. He forged friendships with many other armed resistance groups that emerged in the region after the February 2021 coup, and as well as with EAOs that had been fighting military dictatorship for decades.
Rich kid leading fight against brutal junta
YDF is a people’s armed resistance group founded and based in Yaw Territory, Gangaw district, covering the Gangaw, Htilin, Saw and Kyaukhtu townships bordering Chin State. The area is now a hotbed of armed resistance to the junta’s military forces.
YDF is among the area’s largest resistance groups formed since last year’s coup, and now boasts 15 units.
It was founded just days after the Feb. 1 coup by Ko Phyo, Ko Myat Thu and two other Yaw residents.
A university student and the youngest son of a wealthy family, Ko Phyo had a happy life with a bright future until the military takeover. Unlike many rich kids of his age, he loved reading and getting involved in social activities and the student union, his colleagues said.
When street protests against the coup first broke out, he and Ko Myat Thu, three years his senior, organized the rallies in Gangaw.
From the beginning, Ko Phyo believed that only armed struggle could root out military dictatorship. Having made their decision to resist the coup regime, he and Ko Myat Thu immediately traveled to EAO-controlled areas for basic military training.
They returned to Yaw territory a couple of months later, and the YDF was born with support from EAOs in Kachin, Chin and Karen States.
The YDF has offered strong resistance to regime forces in several operations and claims to have killed over 700 junta troops. Ko Phyo was responsible for directing most of the battles on the ground. The Irrawaddy is unable to verify the number of casualties claimed.
Ko Phyo was also the first to smuggle Pakistan-made automatic rifles through regime checkpoints to resistance fighters in Yaw territory. But still faced with a shortage of automatic rifles, he helped produced homemade guns and was working on manufacturing contact-explosion cannons.
But he was constantly at risk of arrest.
In September last year, Ko Phyo was returning from a meeting to buy weapons when he was arrested at a junta outpost.
Police and military personnel found out he was a YDF member and interrogated him. Ko Phyo told them he was merely a subordinate and had no serious information about the resistance group. Three days of torture followed, during which was stabbed in the ears by a screwdriver, beaten all over his body, and had his crushed by bamboo, Ko Myat Thu recalled.
Fortunately, his young age and stoicism convinced his captors he was telling the truth and they released him on parole.
Following his release, he spent one month in hospital. When he had recovered from his torture injuries, he headed straight back to the front line and his YDF comrades.
Escaping peril until the last fight
In February, the YDF joined up with the Myaing People’s Defense Force (Myaing – PDF) to attack a junta outpost in Min Ywar village, Gangaw Township. Though it was described as a police station, the outpost was housing military troops who were waiting for reinforcements before deploying in the area.
Led by Ko Phyo, the resistance operation was a success with at least 20 junta forces killed and about 30 injured.
But when Ko Phyo was hit by a bullet that pierced his jaw, entered his chest and severed an artery, his comrades thought he would die on the spot.
“But though badly injured, he gave a thumbs-up and an order to keep fighting,” said a YDF comrade who was fighting alongside him.
Luckily, he survived the battle and recovered from his wounds.
Ko Phyo recalled the experience in an online speech to mark the YDF’s one-year anniversary in May.
“I was wounded, so our medics rescued me and took me back to the base. My comrades kept fighting for an hour, and we were almost able to capture the station. But reinforcements arrived, so they had to fall back. I still feel regret today about not managing to seize the station,” he said.
Ko Myat Thu said injuries to arteries usually take years to heal but Ko Phyo recovered in just three months after a strict regime of daily exercise and determination.
However, Ko Myat Thu and other leaders urged him to take a back seat and command from behind the lines rather than fighting on the ground.
But he refused and had just resumed front-line action when he was caught in the Oct. 9 ambush with just his 9 mm pistol.
This time there was no escape.
Another who knew Ko Phyo well was Maung Saungkha, commander of the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) resistance group. He expressed his sorrow over losing a revolutionary comrade and seeing yet another young life sacrificed in resisting the military regime.
“To achieve our goal, we pay with losses like these. Those of us who remain alive need to keep up the fight to get the genuine federation we expect,” Maung Saungkha told The Irrawaddy, referring to the democratic federal Union that anti-regime forces are fighting for..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Military History
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Description:
"At least eight people have been killed in explosions at Myanmar's notorious Insein prison in Yangon.
Locals told BBC Burmese two parcel bombs went off at the entrance to the jail on Wednesday morning, killing three prison staff and five visitors.
Insein prison is the country's largest jail housing about 10,000 prisoners, many of whom are political prisoners.
No group has claimed responsibility for the attack yet. Eighteen other people were injured, officials confirmed.
The authorities said the bombs had gone off in the prison's post room. Another bomb - which did not detonate - was later found there wrapped in a plastic bag.
All five of the visitors who were killed were women and relatives of prisoners, the authorities confirmed.
One was the mother of student leader Lin Htet Naing, alias James, who was arrested by Myanmar's military authorities last June. She had been visiting the prison to deliver a rice box to her son during the week of his court hearing.
Lin Htet Naing's father-in-law, Nay Win, said he'd been allowed to see her body in the morgue.
"I feel very sad. Her husband died quite a while ago and she was the only one who always went and dispatched food and necessities to her son," he said.
Lin Htet Naing, 35, has been arrested several times since coming to prominence as a student leader more than a decade ago. His arrest in June was for opposing last year's military coup, which toppled Aung San Suu Kyi's elected civilian government.
Lin Htet Naing's wife, Phyo Phyo Aung, a mother of two, has been on the run since she took part in the protests following the coup.
Insein prison is a vast, heavily-guarded complex on the outskirts of the former capital.
The century-old prison is infamous for its harsh conditions and inhumane treatment of prisoners, rights groups say.
Tortured to death: Myanmar mass killings revealed
Why is Myanmar's military so brutal?
However the junta faces stiff resistance in large parts of the country where there is an active guerrilla front known as the People's Defence Force (PDF).
In Yangon, there have been frequent bomb attacks, most of them small, since the military crushed the mass protest movement against its coup last year.
These have usually targeted individuals viewed as collaborating with the military - such as government officials, alleged informers and more recently air force pilots accused of taking part in aerial attacks on villages which are resisting military rule.
There have also been assassination attempts, drive-by shootings and, as attitudes have hardened, beheadings in rural areas which are blamed on both sides
The extent of deadly fighting and battles this year have been indicative of a civil war, observers say..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2022-10-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders
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Description:
"Ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) based in northern Myanmar, which are long under the influence of neighboring China, are paying close attention to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) congress as changes in Beijing’s leadership and policies can impact them.
President Xi Jinping is due to be confirmed as president and CCP general secretary for a third term and head of the powerful Central Military Commission.
China is a major investor in Myanmar and has important projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative that will give it access to the Indian Ocean.
Xi visited Myanmar in 2020 and signed 33 memorandums of understanding, agreements, exchange letters and protocols with the then National League for Democracy government.
During the visit Xi acknowledged that Myanmar was an important partner.
Following the coup last year, Beijing said it will support Myanmar’s regime “no matter how the situation changes”. China and Russia are protecting the regime at the United Nations Security Council.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in April that Beijing “has always placed Myanmar in an important position in its neighborly diplomacy” and wants to “deepen exchanges and cooperation”.
Political analyst on China Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how the congress could impact Myanmar.
Will there be a change in China’s policy regarding Myanmar?
I don’t think there will be significant changes. China is looking at the whole Asian continent for its economic recovery. Xi Jinping has recently visited central Asian countries.
And China is in the ASEAN Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership together with the 10 ASEAN countries. It plans to turn the entire Asia continent into its trade routes.
Myanmar is in the network and there won’t be significant policy changes.
As to the peace process in Myanmar, China is facilitating it as best it can. In the aftermath of the coup, China sent an envoy and called for a meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
China is pushing for dialogue to build peace. It appears that China also supports the peace talks between the regime and EAOs based in northern Myanmar.
China tends to keep a low profile in what it does.
It might have been taking steps that we don’t see.
The Chinese authorities have reportedly told EAOs in northern Myanmar to make sure there is no gunfire along the border during the congress. Is it true and why did China demand this?
It is nothing new. Since the Kokang incidents in 2015-17 [clashes between Myanmar’s military and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army], when shells landed in its territory, China has warned that it would respond if stray bullets and artillery landed in China’s territory.
It has repeatedly warned both the military and EAOs against fighting near the border.
The national security strategy rolled out by US President Joe Biden on October 12 seeks to contain China’s rise and calls it the largest threat to the global order.
Will the CCP respond at its congress?
China will only view it as a seasonal US statement and Biden setting off fireworks to attract voters for the mid-term elections in November. Republicans and Democrats may have different views on other things but they both take aim at China.
Despite the war in Ukraine, the US plan says China is the main threat.
It is seasonal. They are just playing the China card to win votes. This is how Beijing views it.
Will there be more friction between Washington and Beijing and how could that affect Myanmar?
There has been constant friction between China and the US. Economically, the US cannot shun China. Their economies are intertwined and there are many US companies in China.
Chinese analysts think relations between US and China will somewhat improve after the mid-term elections.
The US is playing the Taiwan card. But China apparently is not concerned much.
China believes it can threaten Taiwan a lot with its air force and navy. As long as Taiwan does not declare independence, China will not attack and it will keep the status quo.
Will China change its policy on Taiwan? Will it use force?
The general policy of China regarding Taiwan is the peaceful reunification of the Chinese people. China said it will consider various means, including the use of force, for reunification.
Some pro-independence groups are taking action with the help of certain countries.
China is unlikely to do anything unless Taiwan declares independence. But China has made preparations to take control of Taiwan by force if it declares independence.
How can revolutionary forces in Myanmar succeed without being stuck between China and the US?
It is a good opportunity for our revolution. But don’t oppose China by placing all the reliance on the US. Don’t expect anything from China and don’t curse the US with the hope of receiving help from China.
We have to take whatever we can get from the US. The US politically supports us.
And Myanmar’s ambassador [to United Nations] can speak freely from the US and we have to make use of it.
On the other hand, China has close ties with EAOs in Myanmar, including the United Wa State Army, Mongla (National Democratic Alliance Army), Kokang (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army) and the Arakan Army.
We need to attract those forces into our revolution. It is important to attract all the ethnic armed groups into the revolution. And we should avoid being fiercely critical of China. We should be as flexible as we can be in dealing with China and persuade it.
We should take the cue from Indonesia regarding our diplomacy. Indonesia attended the Nato summit organized by the US and after it went to China and invited it to attend the G20 summit [in Bali next month]. And it also told China what it discussed at the Nato summit.
We must learn how to act between big powers. It is not good for us to take sides with one country and make another an enemy..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"The National Unity Government is saddened to learn of two explosions and shootings that took place at approximately 9:40am on October 19, 2022, near the delivery point at Insein Prison in Yangon. We understand that these explosions have killed both some prison staffs and five innocent civilians who were there to deliver parcels to imprisoned family prisoners.
It is a matter of the deepest sorrow to the National Unity Government that the mother and family members of some of the political prisoners and other civilians were killed during this bombing and explosion. It was a day on which political prisoners unjustly detained in Insein Prison happened to appear in court, and could receive parcels from their families.
The National Unity Government is investigating urgently the details of this event, including the cause of death of all civilians who died in the incident.
The National Unity Government's Ministry of Defence is committed to protecting civilians from the atrocities and torture carried out by the terrorist military Council, in accordance with its published Code of Conduct. This Code of Conduct sets out that only military targets under the command of the military dictatorship should be targeted. The intimidation of civilians and the targeting of civilians is explicitly contrary to the code, and must be avoided at all times.
All soldiers engaged in the defensive war against the junta must adhere to this Code of Conduct. Training on the implementation of the Code of Conduct is being delivered. The full Code of Conduct is available at https://mod.nugmyanmar.org/my/pdf-code-of-conduct
Any person or group committing an act that harms the civilian population will be censured and condemned by the National Unity Government.
The National Unity Government also makes clear that appropriate action will be taken against any such person or group, in accordance with our commitment to the rule of law..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-10-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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pdf
Size:
66.41 KB
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Description:
"Key Updates:
• Inconsistent responses to Afghan displacement continue to put lives at risk: There remains a lack of consistency in response to a large number of Afghan nationals moving to seek safety and stability despite pledges to receive Afghans made by the US, Australia, and some EU countries.
• Migration surges in Sri Lanka due to economic and political crises: Political and economic crises in Sri Lanka have led many to leave the country. Outward movements have surged with the majority heading to the Middle East, Australia, and India.
• Rohingya refugees are at risk of deportation from India and Bangladesh: Both countries have increased efforts to classify Rohingya refugees as “illegal” and subsequently deport them to Myanmar.
• Mental health concern among refugees in Malaysia: An incident in Kuala Lumpur on 2 August involving a father throwing his three young children off a flyover before plunging to death calls attention to mental health issues among refugees, particularly in the wake of Covid-19 related isolation and vilification.
• Demand for migrant workers is rising in post-pandemic recovery: Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are facing a shortage of workers in labour-intensive sectors.
• Pakistan floods displaced millions, including Afghan refugees and local Pakistani communities: Climate change-induced floods in Pakistan uproot not only Pakistanis, but also thousands of refugees, including from Afghanistan.
• Australia increases migrant targets in order to fill jobs and attract talent: Demonstrating the benefit of allowing increased migrant access to the labour market, Australia has raised its migrant targets to attract talent..."
Source/publisher:
Mixed Migration Centre
Date of publication:
2022-10-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.11 MB
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Description:
"၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် အောက်တိုဘာလ ၁၉ ရက် နံနက် ၉နာရီ ၄၀ ခန့်အချိန်တွင် ရန်ကုန်မြို့ အင်းစိန်ထောင် ထောင်ဝင်စာပေးပို့သည့် နေရာအနီး ပေါက်ကွဲမှု(၂)ကြိမ်နှင့် ပစ်ခတ်မှုများ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ကာ အကျဉ်းဦးစီးဝန်ထမ်းအချို့သာမက ထောင်ဝင်စာပေးပို့ရန်ရောက်ရှိနေသည့် ပြည်သူ အနည်းဆုံး(၅)ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည့် ဖြစ်စဉ် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ကြောင်း ဝမ်းနည်းဖွယ်ကြားသိရပါသည်။
အဆိုပါ နေ့ရက်သည် အင်းစိန်ထောင်အတွင်း မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံထားရသော နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသားများ ရုံးထုတ်ရက်နှင့် ထောင်ဝင်စာပေးပို့နိုင်သည့် ရက်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ပေါက်ကွဲမှုနှင့် ပစ်ခတ်မှုများ ဖြစ်ပွားသည့် ဖြစ်စဉ်အတွင်း သေဆုံးခဲ့ကြရသည့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများထဲတွင် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ၏ မိခင်များနှင့် မိသားစုဝင်များလည်း ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည်ဟုလည်း သိရှိရပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အဆိုပါ ဖြစ်စဉ်အသေးစိတ်အား စုံစမ်းလျက်ရှိသလို အဆိုပါ ဖြစ်ရပ်အတွင်း သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသော အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ သေဆုံးခဲ့ရခြင်းအကြောင်းရင်း (Cause of Death) ကိုလည်း စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ဥပဒေမဲ့ ညှဉ်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများအား အကာအကွယ်ပေးရေး ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်ကို စစ်သည်တော် ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းများနှင့်အညီ ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိရာ ယင်း စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းမျဉ်း (Code of Conduct) များထဲမှ စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာပစ်မှတ် သတ်မှတ်ရာတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်၏ ယန္တရားများကိုသာ ချေမှုန်းရမည်၊ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း မပြုရဟူသည့် အချက်များပါရှိပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းမျဉ်း များကို အားလုံးလိုက်နာနိုင်ရေး သင်တန်းများပို့ချကာ ကြပ်မတ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသလို အလွယ်တကူ လေ့လာသိရှိနိုင်ရန်လည်း https://mod.nugmyanmar.org/my/pdf-code-of-conduct/ တွင်ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် လိုက်နာရန် ပျက်ကွက်မှုများ ရှိပါကလည်း ထိရောက်စွာအရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား ထိခိုက်စေသည့် မည်သည့် လုပ်ရပ်မျိုးကို မည်သည့်အဖွဲ့က ကျူးလွန်သည်ဖြစ်စေ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ကန့်ကွက်ရှုတ်ချရုံသာမက ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော အဖွဲ့အစည်း၊ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ် မည်သူ့ကိုမဆို တရားဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးကိုလည်း မဖြစ်မနေဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-10-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Myanmar junta troops beheaded a teacher at a civilian National Unity Government (NUG) school in Magwe Region, according to sources.
U Saw Tun Moe was teaching at a NUG-funded school in Thit Nyi Naung village in southern Pauk Township. He was abducted on Sunday and killed at Taung Myint village about 3km away the following day.
Around 130 junta soldiers and junta-affiliated Pyu Saw Htee militia members entered Taung Myit on Monday morning, according to witnesses.
“I saw him when junta troops entered our village. His hands were tied behind his back and he was forced away,” a Taung Myint villager told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday on the condition of anonymity.
U Saw Tun Moe’s beheaded body was found at the school after troops left the village on Monday.
“His head was hung at the school door and his body was leaned against the door. Three fingers were cut off at the base and thrown between his thighs,” said a resident.
U Saw Tun Moe, 46, worked as a private teacher for 20 years and ran his own boarding school. After the 2021 coup, he volunteered for an NUG-sponsored school.
“He was aware he could end up like this if he fell into junta hands. Even then he took the risk and chose to teach at the NUG school. He was kind to his students. He committed himself to a historic duty as a good citizen,” said a colleague.
U Saw Tun Moe mainly taught mathematics and had many pupils across southern Pauk. He leaves a son.
Residents said the killing is to threaten others.
“They have cruelly killed him like this to instill fears in teachers and children and threaten the resistance groups,” said a resident.
NUG headmaster U Ye Thiha, who refused to work under military rule, from a middle school in Zalun Township in Ayeyarwady Region was stabbed to death on Monday.
The Basic Education General Strike Committee and Basic Education Workers Union Steering Committee on Tuesday denounced the atrocities, calling on the NUG to protect teachers and children..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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"The Myanmar Air Force has ordered several FTC-2000G midrange fighter jets from China, a major arms supplier to the Southeast Asian nation.
The Irrawaddy has learned that a group of approximately eight Air Force pilots, eight technicians and at least two armaments officers traveled to China via Kunming in June.
China has strict COVID-19 regulations and the Myanmar personnel had to go through quarantine in Kunming. The pilots are known to fly the F-7 interceptor, A-5 bomber and K-8 W trainer and light attack jet for the Myanmar Air Force.
The new jet fighters will replace the Myanmar Air Force’s aging F-7s and A-5s. Once they are delivered they are expected to be based at Namsang airbase in Shan State, according to sources familiar with the purchase.
It is not yet known when the agreement was reached between Beijing and Naypyitaw. The purchase of Chinese jet fighters may have begun in 2020, but delivery and pilot training were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s strict policy on containing the disease.
The FTC-2000G is an advanced light multi-role trainer/combat aircraft designed and manufactured by Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation (GAIC) under the supervision of Chinese state-owned aerospace and defense firm Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC).
It is the export variant of the Guizhou JL-9 trainer/combat aircraft, which is in service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
The two-seat jet fighter has training capabilities with attack and fighting capabilities in combat.
It can be used to perform pilot flight training, aerial surveillance, patrol missions, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, close-in air support and air escort missions.
In April 2020, news emerged in Cambodia and in China’s Global Times that China planned to sell the aircraft to an undisclosed Southeast Asian country. It did not say how many units were to be sold, stating only that the deal was signed in January 2020 and that deliveries would start in early 2021 and be completed after two years.
The cost of the jet fighter is around US$8.5 million.
The reports identified Cambodia and Myanmar as potential buyers, as both countries are closely aligned with China, both militarily and politically.
Well-known middleman
The sources stated that Gateways Hong Kong Ltd. was involved in brokering the deal. A key arms broker, Gateways Hong Kong Ltd is also involved in buying spare parts for F-7 and A-5 aircraft.
Dr. Naing Htut Aung, a major arms supplier to Myanmar’s military, was also a key weapons dealer for the previous regime led by dictator Senior General Than Shwe.
Registered as a director of the Yangon-based International Gateways Group of Companies Ltd., Dr. Naing Htut Aung has had strong ties with successive military leaders, including current Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, sources told The Irrawaddy.
He is a key procurer of weapons, spare parts and upgrades for the Navy and Air Force and is an agent for major state-owned Chinese arms producers, said Justice for Myanmar (JFM), an activist group that monitors the military’s businesses, citing a private-sector source with military connections.
He was a middleman in the Air Force’s procurement of 16 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan in 2015, and was also a key figure in a joint venture between the Directorate of Myanmar Defense Industries and China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation to produce the K-8 jet trainer and light attack aircraft in Myanmar.
His businesses, Gateways International Holding Company and International Gateways Group of Companies, were registered at the same address as Myanmar Consultancy until late 2020..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Climate change and the Myanmar economy, Military History
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"A former admiral’s son who used a UNESCO-funded regional media forum to attack Myanmar’s democracy movement is believed to have penned an article published pseudonymously in pro-regime media urging the country’s junta to be more assertive in dealing with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the West, while calling China, Russia and India “very good allies.”
Appearing in the Friday edition of the Myanmar junta’s English mouthpiece The Global New Light of Myanmar, “Myanmar and ASEAN”, credited simply to “U AC”, is basically an attack on the regional grouping. It says the bloc is doing as much as possible to embarrass the Myanmar regime while some member states are “contributing significantly to the instability and insecurity in Myanmar” and that ASEAN seems to be “acting as a lapdog for the US.”
“The country must move from a position of defence to a more offensive position. Because there are some people out there, who would bully us and talk bad about us, regardless of how well we do and how good our intentions are,” the author claims.
The publication of the article comes at a time when the relationship between the junta and the 10-member bloc, of which Myanmar is a member, has turned sour. ASEAN has barred the junta leadership from at least five meetings, including summits, since last year due to the regime’s failure to honor the group’s peace plan for the country, which has been ravaged by conflicts sparked by the military coup last year.
The article states that the current relationship between ASEAN and Myanmar seems to be based on the fundamental belief that the Myanmar military is good for nothing, ruthless and killing innocents, and that the current “government” is doing nothing good for the country.
It continues that the West and ASEAN are indirectly supporting the killing of innocent people and targeted assassinations in Myanmar, referring to anti-regime resistance groups’ attacks on junta targets.
Normally, whenever it is sidelined by ASEAN, the regime issues statements denouncing the bloc’s decision to exclude it.
But the opinion piece goes further by saying that “the time to appease everyone all over the world is over. We have to do what is right for Myanmar.”
It’s not clear whether the author is suggesting that Myanmar should quit ASEAN or the other way round. However, he describes Russia, China and India as “three very good allies” and encourages more engagement with them.
As the piece appears in the junta’s mouthpiece paper, it’s safe to say that the opinion stated in the story reflects the regime’s jittery view on ASEAN.
So who is behind the nom guerre U AC?
It is likely that the letters stand for a Myanmar name spelt in English. It could be U Aye Cho or U Aung Chan or U Aye Chan, among other names.
However, the excessive use of exclamation marks, sloppy arguments, and raising of unnecessary questions in the story make it possible to make an educated guess that the person behind the pen name U AC is Aye Chan, who joined last month’s UNESCO-funded Dili Dialogue Forum 2022 as a member of the regime’s press council to attack Myanmar’s democracy movement and independent journalists while defending the military’s 2021 coup. He is the son of ex-admiral and former minister Soe Thane, who in 2012 helped Myanmar’s then quasi-civilian administration fool the world into believing that the country’s military dictatorship was at an end, and is now a pro-regime hardliner.
Nobody familiar with Aye Chan’s presentation on Myanmar media at the Dili forum would argue that Aye Chan and U AC aren’t one and the same. Evidence can be found in shared sound bites such as “more than 90 percent of NLD [National League for Democracy] ministers are now in jail for corruption”, the duplicated coinage “NNCP”—created from the first letters of National Unity Government (or NUG, Myanmar’s shadow civilian government), NLD, CRPH (the NUG’s parliamentary wing) and PDF (its armed wing)—and the repeated accusation of vote-rigging against the NLD, a major feature of Aye Chan’s Dili presentation.
Any lingering doubts will be dispelled once you have read this story, which attempts to discredit Myanmar’s ongoing anti-junta movement under the name Aye Chan. It bears some striking similarities to the recent story on ASEAN, right down to the rhythm of its sentences and style of presenting information, not to mention its staunch defense of last year’s military takeover. Another similarity between U AC and Aye Chan is their penchant for peppering articles with quotations from famous figures like Bill Gates, Lee Kuan Yew and even Sun Tzu to support their lame arguments.
Demonstrating loyalty to the junta, in the story, U AC blasts Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as ASEAN’s “anti-Myanmar” wing, pointing to Singapore’s rejection of the regime; Malaysia’s meeting with representatives of the NUG, which the regime has branded a terrorist group; and Indonesia’s parliament for seeking to put the regime on trial. He also laments ASEAN’s serial exclusions of the regime leadership from group summits. The US, according to U AC, continues to push ASEAN, especially Singapore, to prevent the Myanmar “government” from accessing state funds from its banks, with the sole objective, the author writes, of bringing the regime down.
It’s noteworthy that the story appeared ahead of the ASEAN summit next month. With the bloc’s envoy to Myanmar having canceled his third trip to the country due the lack of positive engagement from Naypyitaw, the regime has been barred from the upcoming summit—another blow for the legitimacy-craving junta.
In that context, “Myanmar and ASEAN” by U AC can be viewed as nothing but a desperate howl from a pro-junta stooge looking to badmouth the regional grouping for its repeated exclusions of the junta leadership..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"An alliance of pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar has congratulated Chinese leader Xi Jinping, saying it wants to work with China to restore peace in the country.
The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) said it wanted to work with China for Myanmar and the region as a bedrock for the building of a community with a shared future.
Formed after the military takeover last year, the NUCC represents hundreds of anti-junta forces, including the shadow National Unity Government (NUG)’s parliamentary wing, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, ethnic armed organizations, political parties, civil society bodies and other groups. The goal is to achieve a federal democratic union by building unity among the forces.
The message congratulated the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people during the party’s 20th National Congress.
“This [bilateral] community is particularly important as the people of Myanmar continue their own search for a path towards peace and prosperity, which can only be realized once the military returns to the barracks and a true federal government representing the people can emerge,” said the NUCC’s congratulatory message.
China is a major investor and controls several strategic infrastructure projects in its southern neighbor, including energy pipelines and a proposed port that would give Beijing vital access to the Indian Ocean. China also has leverage over some ethnic armed organizations active near the border.
It is one of the few powerful countries, along with Russia, which has engaged with the regime since the coup.
Despite its engagement with the junta, China has said it wants to see stability in Myanmar.
The NUG, which commands the loyalty of the vast majority of citizens, has committed itself to China’s goal of a shared future with Myanmar and repeatedly pushed China to engage with the civilian administration.
It said if China continues to work with the regime, it will damage its international reputation and increase hostility from Myanmar’s population.
China has had no official engagement with the NUG..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, China-Burma relations
Language:
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Description:
"JAKARTA — Parliamentarians should uphold freedom of religion or belief and work in preventing religion from being turned into a political weapon in the midst of increasing conservatism and discrimination against minorities worldwide, a group of twelve sitting and former lawmakers from Southeast Asia said at a conference held in Jakarta.
“Religion is too often weaponized as a political tool, especially in election years. It is important for parliamentarians to connect and discuss strategies on how to combat such tactics, particularly with upcoming elections in Malaysia, Indonesia, as well as Timor-Leste,” said Timor-Leste MP Antonio Benevides.
In recent years, religion has often been used in the region to attack political enemies. One example discussed during the conference was the 2019 presidential elections in Indonesia, when supporters of President Joko Widodo and his challenger Prabowo Subianto traded accusations about the rival candidate’s lack of commitment to Islam.
In Myanmar, the military and its proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), have often accused the National League for Democracy (NLD) of endangering Buddhism and being infiltrated by Muslims plotting to take over the country. Now, the junta that ousted the NLD government in an illegal coup d’état in February last year is attempting to use Buddhism to legitimize its rule.
“The world is not okay right now and we need to work together to help make it better by ensuring that everyone enjoys basic rights including freedom of religion and faith, particularly minorities,” said Eva Kusuma Sundari, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) board member and former member of the Indonesian House of Representatives.
This and other issues were discussed by lawmakers hailing from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines, who were attending the annual Southeast Asia Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (SEAPFoRB) conference in Jakarta on 16-17 October 2022.
The SEAPFoRB conference was hosted by APHR, together with the International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (IPPFoRB), and is part of an initiative to strengthen parliamentarians’ action to promote and protect the right to freedom of religion or belief in Southeast Asia.
On the second day of the conference, eight MPs visited the Indonesian House of Representatives to have a roundtable discussion with Indonesian MPs – including Luluk Nur Hamidah, Sylviana Murni, and Bobby Rizaldi – on the freedom of religion or belief situation in Indonesia.
“Indonesia celebrates all the six religions as well as the many indigenous beliefs that are practiced here, but given the huge diversity here we face a large challenge in continuing to develop respect for plurality in order to maintain the ‘Unity in Diversity’ that is our national motto. We also realize that protecting religious freedom is something that requires a global response,” said Luluk.
The conference concluded with a number of key conclusions and recommendations, including the need to provide counter-narratives toward intolerant messaging on social media and increasing engagement with other key stakeholders such as religious organizations and civil society.
“Freedom of religion or belief is a fundamental human right that is incredibly important to protect. MPs have a huge role to play in ensuring that protection.,” said Philippine MP Arlene Brosas..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-10-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Daily ambushes and attacks on Myanmar’s regime targets have put Sagaing Region at the center of the armed revolution against military rule.
Following the 2021 coup, the revolution started in Sagaing when anti-regime protesters took up improvised firearms and old-fashioned hunting rifles to stop junta troops killing civilians during a crackdown in Kale, which has a mixed Bamar and Chin population, on March 28 last year.
In March last year, the regime escalated crackdowns, killing hundreds of peaceful demonstrators across the country, including in Yangon and Mandalay.
By April 2, 2021, a prolonged clash was reported in Yinmabin Township, Sagaing Region, when residents with improvised weapons fought nearly 100 troops attempting to raid Thapyay Aye village, where a protest leader lived.
On April 7 last year, residents in Taze Township used slingshots, air guns and improvised firearms to fight regime forces arriving in seven vehicles to break up a demonstration of tens of thousands in the town.
At least 11 civilians were killed and more than 25 injured by the regime forces using automatic firearms and sniper rifles.
Now sprawling Sagaing, which straddles the central plains and has no experience of armed rebellion, has become a resistance hub.
Many resistance groups have acquired automatic firearms and upgraded improvised weapons and explosives.
They are increasingly attacking army outposts and police stations in the large region.
An estimated 12 troops are being killed daily in raids, mine ambushes and drone attacks. In upper Sagaing, the Kachin Independence Army is cooperating with resistance groups to attack regime forces.
Outside the towns, the junta has lost control. But regime bases and junta-controlled government departments and offices in towns are increasingly being attacked by urban resistance groups.
The region has reported the second-highest number of clashes with junta forces after Karen State, which had reported over 6,000 with the armed wings of the Karen National Union and their resistance allies by September.
As a restive region, Sagaing has suffered the heaviest regime atrocities with several massacres, arbitrary killings, arson and artillery attacks on civilian targets, airstrikes and looting and acts of sexual violence.
Internet and mobile connections have been blocked in several Sagaing townships since last year and some highways have been destroyed by the regime, stopping food, trade and medical supplies.
By August 25, an estimated 38,434 houses have been burned down by junta forces across the country since the coup, according to Data for Myanmar, an independent research group that monitors the junta.
Sagaing has suffered the heaviest arson damage with around 20,153 houses torched by junta forces. Neighboring Magwe Region, another resistance stronghold, has lost around 5,418 properties in regime arson attacks.
By September 26, an estimated 1,017,000 people across the country have been displaced by conflict and violence since the coup, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef).
More than half of those displaced are from Sagaing Region, accounting for 545,200 people, Unicef reported.
On Saturday, an estimated 12 civilians and 20 resistance fighters were killed by two junta jet fighters and two Russian-made MI-35 helicopters and foot soldiers during a raid on a people’s defense force training camp and nearby Nay Pu Kone village in Wetlet Township in Sagaing Region.
An estimated 13 civilians, including seven children, were killed in Depayin Township in the region on September 16 when two MI-35 helicopters and soldiers airlifted by helicopters attacked a school with 200 children at Let Yat Kone village.
Amid junta atrocities, the resistance forces in Sagaing become more united and relentlessly attack regime targets.
“We had a chance to enjoy a taste of democracy during the past five years. We know the country will return to the dark ages under this military dictatorship due to the coup. So we found firearms to fight back,” Ko Nway Oo, a founder of the Civil Defense and Security Organization Myaung, which has been fighting the regime in Sagaing since early 2021, told The Irrawaddy.
He said Sagaing’s residents have come to sympathize with ethnic minorities who have suffered from military atrocities for many years.
“That is another reason why we are fighting to root out the military dictatorship as we don’t want other people across the country to suffer under military rule anymore.”
Topics: civil disobedience movement, civilian deaths, Coup, crackdown, Democracy, Human Rights, junta, military in politics, military regime, Min Aung Hlaing, National League for Democracy, National Unity Government, November 8 general election, PDF, People’s Defense Force, people’s war, Political Prisoners, regime, Rule of Law, Sagaing Region, State Administrative Council, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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Description:
"More than 20 Myanmar junta troops were killed or injured in the last two days when People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) attacked regime targets in Bago, Mandalay and Tanintharyi regions and Chin, Kayah and Karen states.
Meanwhile, around 10 civilians were killed or injured in regime attacks.
The Irrawaddy has rounded up the following reports of significant attacks by PDFs and EAOs as well as regime atrocities.
12 junta soldiers killed in PDF ambushes, raid in Bago
At least 12 junta soldiers were killed and many others injured when PDF groups ambushed a military detachment and raided a junta camp in Nattalin and Taungoo townships in Bago Region on Thursday, claimed Bago Region-PDF.
Four soldiers were killed and seven others injured when PDF fighters from a PDF battalion of Tharyarwaddy District, Bago used land mines to ambush a military detachment of 50 soldiers between two villages in Nattalin Township at 10 a.m. on Thursday.
Six more regime troops were also killed and eight other forces injured when the military detachment was hit by mine ambushes by resistance groups on that afternoon, the PDF group claimed. After the ambushes, the regime forces retreated.
Two regime soldiers were also killed on that afternoon in Taungoo Township, Bago when Taungoo District PDF raided a camp of 20 regime forces in a village. No PDF casualties were reported in the ambushes and raid.
Four civilians burned alive by junta soldiers in Magwe
The remains of four civilians who had been bound and burned alive by regime soldiers and Pyu Saw Htee pro-regime militia members were found in a burned house in Anout Village in Tilin Township, Magwe Region on Thursday, said Yaw Defense Force-Tilin.
Regime forces stationed in the village burned some houses before leaving on Thursday. Six male villagers are also missing from the village, said YDF-Tilin.
Junta outpost bombarded in Kayah
The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) claimed on Thursday that it and two other resistance groups managed to bombard the Pon Chaung junta outpost on the border of Loikaw and Shadaw townships in Kayah State on Tuesday.
he junta outpost has been used to randomly attack nearby areas using heavy explosives.
Regime forces are believed to have been killed or injured when the outpost was directly hit by explosives fired by resistance forces, said KNDF.
A KNDF video shows the outpost being hit directly by explosives.
Regime forces ambushed with land mines in Mandalay
TGYR-Youth Guerrilla Counter Revolution said on Thursday that it and five other resistance group used 11 land mines to ambush regime forces stationed at Thargyin Village school in Ngazun Township, Mandalay Region on Wednesday night while they were patrolling between two villages.
Following the ambush, a shootout broke out between the regime forces and the resistance groups.
At 4:15 a.m. on Thursday, the resistance groups continued to ambush military reinforcements arriving in the clash area, using 12 additional land mines.
However, military casualties for both ambushes were unknown.
Seven junta troops killed in Tanintharyi
Seven regime forces were killed and four others seriously injured on Wednesday evening when PDF-Federal Column attacked a military convoy traveling to Dawei from Myeik Township in Tanintharyi Region, claimed the PDF group.
Amid the PDF’s ambush, the convoy fled without returning fire, the PDF group said.
Two junta soldiers injured by land mines in Karen
Two regime troops were seriously injured by land mines planted by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) on Thursday morning as junta soldiers from three military battalions were entering the Luukhoe area in Myawaddy Township, Karen State, said KNLA’s Cobra Column.
Five civilians including three children injured by junta attack in Karen
Two villagers and three children were injured in Hpa-an Township, Karen State on Wednesday when regime forces in a military convoy of 10 vehicles randomly opened fire on villages along the Hpa-an- Zarthapyin highway using both firearms and heavy explosives without being attacked, said the Karen National Union (KNU) on Thursday.
In the attack, a school building was also damaged, the KNU said.
Four ethnic Chin resistance fighters killed in Chin State
Four ethnic Chin resistance fighters were killed and another injured during an intense firefight with a military detachment in Hakha Township, Chin State on Thursday, said Zalen, a local media outlet.
A clash broke out between the regime forces and Chin Defense Force groups near a college in the township on Thursday afternoon.
Military casualties were unknown..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"Bangkok, October 13, 2022 — In response to multiple news reports that a Myanmar court on Wednesday sentenced Japanese documentary filmmaker Toru Kubota to three more years in prison for allegedly violating the country’s immigration laws, bringing his total incarceration term to 10 years, the Committee to Protect Journalists issued the following statement calling for his immediate release:
“Myanmar’s latest action in adding three years to Japanese journalist Toru Kubota’s prison sentence for immigration violations is excessive, grotesque, and must be reversed,” said Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s senior Southeast Asia representative. “Myanmar’s military junta is sending a deliberate and threatening message to all foreign journalists that they too could be imprisoned under arbitrary laws if they report on its crimes and abuses.”
Kubota, a freelance filmmaker who has contributed to international media outlets including Vice Japan, the BBC, and Al-Jazeera English, was sentenced last week to seven years for violating the electronic transactions law and three years for incitement, as CPJ documented. Those sentences are to be served concurrently, and Wednesday’s additional three-year sentence brings Kubota’s total prison term to 10 years, reports said.
Authorities arrested Kubota on July 30 while he filmed a small protest in Myanmar’s commercial capital of Yangon.
Myanmar was the world’s second-worst jailer of journalists in 2021, according to CPJ’s December 1 prison census. Several journalists have been jailed under Section 505(a) of the penal code for incitement and dissemination of false news, an anti-state charge that Myanmar’s military regime has used broadly to stifle independent news reporting since staging a coup in 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-10-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
Language:
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Description:
"France condemns in the strongest possible terms the new prison sentence imposed today on State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and the manipulation of the justice system for political, partisan purposes by Myanmar’s army. This new sentence undermines the rule of law once again and shows that the individuals who seized power in February 2021 seek to discredit Aung San Suu Kyi and to permanently exclude a legitimately elected civil leader from political leadership. France recalls its commitment to seeing the establishment of a political dialogue that includes the democratic opposition, including the National League for Democracy and its historic leaders.
France reiterates its call for the immediate, unconditional release of all those who are being arbitrarily detained, including State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, as well as its call for an end to the violence committed by Myanmar’s security forces. France continues to support the efforts of ASEAN and its Special Envoy as well as those of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and states once again that the establishment of political dialogue is a necessary condition for any solution to this crisis..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs
Date of publication:
2022-10-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Sequel Report: Civilians, including children, were allegedly hit with artillery in different incidents
Description:
"Since the military attacked M’dat (မဒပ်) village with artillery shells in May 2022, leading to a 10-year-old boy and his mother being seriously injured (Child Injured in M’dat Village, Mindat Township), it has been alleged that villages in Mindat Township (မင်းတပ်မိနယ်) have suffered from further artillery shelling, the destruction of houses and the killing of civilians.
In one such case, the older brother of the child originally reported on by Myanmar Witness was allegedly killed by artillery fire a little over a month after the original incident.
In this report, Myanmar Witness has investigated reports of civilian damage and deaths in Mindat Township (မင်းတပ်မိနယ်) as a result of artillery fire from the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 274 military base. This included:
reports of homes destroyed and villagers killed in Mui Tui (မွီတွီ) village on 16 June;
the reported death of the older brother of the child whose injuries were investigated in a previous report on M’dat village, on 29 June 2022; and,
the destruction of homes in Kyam Ain Nu (ကာအိမ်း) village, also on 29 June 2022.
These villages are all located within a 7 or 8km firing range from the LIB 274 military base, located in Mindat Town (မင်းတပ်). Myanmar Witness was able to previously verify the location of the LIB 274 base in Mindat Town (မင်းတပ်), Mindat Township (မင်းတပ်မိနယ်), Chin State (ချင်းြပည်နယ်).
On 16 June 2022, there were reports of villagers killed by artillery fire in Mui Tui (မွီတွီ) village, in Mindat Township (မင်းတပ်မိနယ်). No user-generated content (UGC) could be verified of the dead individuals in Mui Tui (မွီတွီ), but their images match those described to have died and
Myanmar Witness geolocated other images of destruction to the village.
On the morning of 29 June 2022, the Chindwin News Agency, reported that the 274th Light Infantry Battalion in Mindat fired medium artillery mortar rounds at civilian areas in Mindat Township (မင်းတပ်မိနယ်), Chin State (ချင်းြပည်နယ်) killing a 13 year old boy in M’dat village (မဒပ်).
The boy was reportedly the elder brother of a 10-year-old boy who was seriously injured, also by artillery fire, along with his mother on 23 May 2022. This event has been described in more detail in Myanmar Witness’ report Child Injured in M’dat Village, Mindat Township.
Myanmar Witness was not able to thoroughly verify images of the dead child, but analysed images of a deceased child alleged to be the child in question, with wounds consistent with those described in eye-witness reports provided to Myanmar Witness by a partner.
There was no verifiable footage of the attack itself, meaning it was not possible for Myanmar
Witness to independently verify how the child was killed. However, Myanmar Witness has
geolocated images alleged to be of the child’s home in M’dat (မဒပ်) village. The hole in the wooden wall and the inside structure of the house, as well as some damaged foliage close to the home all indicate a strike of some sort that had caused this destruction. This was the same house geolocated by Myanmar Witness in the incident involving the child’s brother (see: Child Injured in M’dat Village, Mindat Township).
Images of ammunition reportedly found in M’dat (မဒပ်) village after the attack are consistent with locally produced 120mm mortar rounds known to be used by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness verified the presence of a military base within firing range of the village and identified a mortar present at the base in our last report, although it was not possible to verify whether it was a model capable of firing the particular rounds alleged. Attribution is difficult without verified UGC to confirm the munitions were found in M’dat (မဒပ်), their origin, or images of the deceased child.
While Myanmar Witness was able to identify a likely location for images of a destroyed home in Kyam Ain Nu consistent with media reporting, it was not possible to confirm this with 100% certainty or independently verify that the home was destroyed on 29 June 2022.
These collective incidents in Mindat Township (မင်းတပ်မိနယ်) are some of many monitored and analysed by Myanmar Witness documenting alleged indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas in Myanmar since the coup which has - in this case - allegedly led to the deaths of civilians.
To read the full report download the PDF.
[Warning: Graphic] has been inserted ahead of links to sources that show graphic and distressing images of injured or dead persons..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2022-10-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Chin State, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"At least 68 civilians have been killed and over 2,100 houses in 64 villages torched by the Myanmar military and pro-junta Pyu Saw Htee militia in Sagaing Region’s Taze Township since last year’s coup, according to local People’s Defense Forces (PDF).
Regime troops belonging to Division 33 and Pyu Saw Htee groups raided and torched more than 20 villages in the north of Taze in September alone, said Taze PDF.
Pyu Saw Htee militia have a strong presence in Kantbalu, Kyunhla and Taze townships in Sagaing Region. Taze has been hit hardest by the junta’s arson attacks in Sagaing, and more than 10,000 people made homeless by them have yet to receive any humanitarian assistance from the international community and are in urgent need of emergency relief supplies, added Taze PDF.
Five of the villages torched by regime forces were completely burned to the ground. Two Buddhist monasteries and a rural healthcare center were also razed. Ka Baung Kya Village was torched at least 12 times, while Chaungzon Village was torched at least seven times, according to Taze News, a group documenting junta atrocities in the township.
One resident of Ka Baung Kya Village said: “My house was burned to ashes. I don’t have any supplies of rice or even any plates and bowls now. We had to flee frequently because junta troops often came to our village. We don’t want to see them because they arrest anyone on sight and torch houses once they enter the village. My village is almost ruined.”
Some 200 junta troops guided by Pyu Saw Htee militia started raiding villages in the north of Taze on September 16. They reportedly killed two civilians and 12 resistance fighters and looted numerous houses during the raids.
A member of Taze PDF said: “They torch villages to instill fear in people. But it has only fueled their desire for vengeance. Now young people are only eager to fight back. They are determined to fight until the revolution succeeds. It is fair to say that the revolution has reached the next level. Revolutionary spirit can’t be burned to ashes.”
Displaced people need shelter, food, medicine and other emergency relief supplies, said an official from Taze Support Organization.
“As it is rainy season now, they need proper shelter even if it is temporary. The assistance they are receiving locally is not enough. If they don’t receive supplies soon, they are going to go hungry,” said the official.
Many villages were torched for no apparent reason as there were no clashes taking place near them. Over 20,000 people from 35 villages displaced by junta raids and arson attacks still can’t return to their homes. Internet access in Taze Township was cut off by the military regime over eight months ago.
A Taze resident said: “I am lost for words watching them [junta forces] torching and destroying our ancestral homeland and we can do nothing about it. We don’t know where we can live and our livelihoods have been completely destroyed.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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Sub-title:
Observers say the ruling is one of many politically motivated acts targeting the party.
Description:
"A prison court in Myanmar’s Magway region has sentenced at least 20 National League for Democracy (NLD) members to lengthy jail terms on charges of violating the country’s Counterterrorism Law, officials from the ousted political party said Monday.
The 20 NLD members from Magway’s Pwintbyu and Sidoktaya townships – which included senior officials from the party’s executive committee – were each sentenced to jail terms of 20 years or more in a closed trial at the Daungnay Prison Court on Sept. 30, the officials told RFA Burmese, speaking on condition of anonymity citing security concerns.
Sources within Myanmar’s judicial system and NLD members called the hefty punishments “politically motivated” and typical of how the military regime has threatened and harassed the party whose democratically elected government it sidelined in a Feb. 1, 2021 coup.
Pwintbyu Township NLD Executive Committee member Win Zaw Oo, and party members Zaw Myo Htet, Zaw Win, Win Kyaing, Ni Thway, Kyi Linn, Chit Nyi Nyi, Hlaing Win, Kyaw Win Sein, San Htay and Than Htay were each sentenced to 25 years in prison.
Similarly, Pwintbyu party members Kaw Zin Min, Tin Maung Htun, Nyi Nyi Aung, Than Soe, Nyo Win Aung, Sann Lin Aung, Zaw Myo Aung and Bhone Kyaw, were each sentenced to 20 years in prison.
An NLD party official from Pwintbyu who declined to be named told RFA that authorities also sentenced Aye Aye Aung, chairwoman of the Women’s Affairs Committee for the NLD in Sidoktaya township, was also sentenced to 20 years in prison for violating the Counterterrorism Law. The chairwoman had been arrested on Dec. 18, 2021 and sentenced to 20 years in prison for terrorism, and last week’s conviction brings her total term to 40 years.
A member of the NLD in Pwintbyu told RFA that those sentenced had been arrested “for various reasons,” without providing further details.
He also accused authorities of using questionable methods to arrest the two NLD executive committee members.
“[Win Zaw Oo] had been in hiding [with his brother-in-law] in the Sidoktaya area to avoid arrest … He was arrested [on Sept. 21, 2021] after authorities took his family members hostage and used them for leverage,” the party member said, adding that Win Zaw Oo was known for his charity work in the region.
“[Aye Aye Aung] was arrested in Salin township. [Junta] authorities tricked her into thinking she would meet someone she knew and then arrested her.”
Another NLD official in Pwintbyu called Aye Aye Aung’s sentencing “heart wrenching.”
“She was given another 20 years sentence on Sept. 30, as they charged her for a second time under the same articles,” the official said.
Sentences for ‘political reasons’
Speaking to RFA on Monday, a veteran attorney in Myanmar noted that all of the sentences delivered on Sept. 30 were “the maximum penalty under the law.”
“The [junta] always lectures the people about the rule of law, but they do not respect the law themselves,” he said.
“They always give the maximum penalty to NLD leaders … so we can conclude they [are doing it] for political reasons.”
Bo Bo Oo, a former NLD lawmaker for Yangon’s Dala township, said he had seen similarly lengthy punishments handed to members of the party in his region.
But he called the tactics of the junta authorities in Pwintbyu and Sidoktaya townships “particularly unlawful and underhanded.”
“In these cases, authorities arrested or harassed family members and friends when they couldn’t arrest the person they wanted,” he said. “They are increasingly using this tactic throughout the country.”
NLD members say that in addition to arrests, authorities have been confiscating and sealing off properties belonging to the party and its supporters.
According to party records, the military regime has arrested 972 members and killed 55 between last year’s coup and Sept. 23, 2022.
Speaking to the media during a Sept. 20 press conference in the capital Naypyidaw, junta Deputy Information Minister Major General Zaw Min Htun warned the public that anyone who donates as little as one kyat to anti-junta groups could be persecuted under the Counterterrorism Law.
Thailand’s Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) says that authorities in Myanmar have killed at least 2,332 civilians and arrested 15,744 others since last year’s coup – mostly during peaceful anti-junta protests. At least 12,569 of those arrested remain in detention, the group says..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-10-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"1. Kalay protesters mark 600 days of protest...2. Terrorist SAC kills hundreds of children 240 children, abducts
hundreds more...3. Over 300 advance orders in NUG investment housing project...4. NUG Labour Ministry helps secure compensation for migrant workers 28/09/2022..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-10-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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Format :
pdf
Size:
2.02 MB
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Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-10-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Format :
pdf
Size:
113.64 KB
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly News Update (23/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-10-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, National Unity Government (NUG)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.86 MB
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Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of publication:
2022-10-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political
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Format :
pdf
Size:
289.2 KB
Local URL:
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Description:
"MONTHLY HIGHLIGHTS: Director of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar announced that
Facebook provided millions of items to support accusations of genocide and war crimes against the Burmese junta.....The Burma Special Advisory Council demanded that the UNGA recognize the current NUG-appointed representative, Kyaw Moe Tun.....Since the attempted coup, the Australian government spent $2.5 million of taxpayer
funds on luxury accommodations linked to the Burmese junta.....The UN called on the international community to support human rights defenders in Burma.....APHR launched a press conference on the results from the international inquiry investigation on the global response to the
crisis in Burma..."
Source/publisher:
US Campaign for Burma
Date of publication:
2022-09-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
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Format :
pdf
Size:
1.77 MB
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Description:
"One day a civilian government will assume power in Myanmar and the United States will come back promising security, democracy, human rights and free trade.
The return is likely to happen much as it did after 2011, when as described in Erin Murphy’s new book Burmese Haze, a triumphal US State Department arrived in Naypyitaw with planeloads of people and gifts, claiming credit for “midwifing” the transition to democracy.
It will then dangle a visit by a US president as a critical marker on that western-designed road to peace and democracy. Lectures about the nobility of US-style democracy and capitalism will be delivered, while Myanmar’s explanations about its own history brushed aside as well, boring.
Bilateral relations from the perspective of the Department of State are well-described by Murphy, the occupant of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Burma desk from 2007-12. As she relates this, US policy is about democracy, humanitarianism and free-market values that both nations share. And citizens pass on information in exchange for cash and vague promises of a US visa should things become difficult.
But there are two important things left out of Murphy’s book: that the US largely views Myanmar as a pawn in the chess game with China or any acknowledgment of Myanmar’s views of the bilateral relationship.
Murphy was a front-seat observer of Myanmar’s peace and democratic reform process between 2007 (just before Cyclone Nargis) and the coup in 2021. Her views are well-informed, at least regarding the US perspective, because of her top-secret clearance and high-level access.
She conducted interviews for the book with former secretaries of state Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, and even State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, maintaining access to the highest levels of the US government, even after quitting the CIA. Academics and journalists can only dream of such access.
Covert action
Burmese Haze avoids serious discussion of US reliance on the CIA and other intelligence work in Myanmar.
The “listening post” that is the sprawling embassy on Yangon’s Inle Lake, completed under the Than Shwe regime, is passed off as basically a reading room with US magazines, computer terminals and a place to learn English.
But the embassy includes 10 buildings built since 2007, including a four-story chancery, as Google Earth shows.
In other words, Myanmar’s junta long cooperated with the US to establish facilities which presumably collect electronic data from southeast Asia and China and cultivate human intelligence in Myanmar.
Germany’s Der Spiegel magazine reported that National Security Agency eavesdropping equipment was in the embassy.
The problem for any future civilian government will be that different US hands will offer contrasting opportunities and risks.
But the only hand described in Burmese Haze is the open hand of the generous US promoting democracy and human rights and opposing the junta.
That hand can be a bit brash and overconfident but generously supports programs of democracy, human rights and development.
The other hand is ignored in Burmese Haze. The secretive security-conscious US wants to block Chinese goals for Myanmar and has routinely used Myanmar’s military to further its aims. A civilian government will need to deal with both pressures.
Cyclone Nargis: where the two US policies came together
US assistance to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008 opens Burmese Haze. Murphy describes an ever forward-thinking US Navy conducting Cobra Gold exercises in Thai waters just before the cyclone. After consulting satellite images, but without asking permission from the Than Shwe regime, the US Navy immediately repositioned itself off Myanmar’s coast for a major relief operation.
In response, the regime ignored the typhoon and focused on the threat of a potential US invasion.
Than Shwe repositioned the armed forces in preparation for an invasion. The junta denied visas to relief workers and restricted travel to afflicted areas by US Embassy staff. According to Murphy, the denials were accompanied by boring lectures from military officers, presumably about the CIA’s history of supplying insurgencies, funding the Nationalist Chinese armies in the north of the country from the 1950s to the 1980s, support for ethnic armed organizations and that spy center in Yangon.
As Murphy writes, the regime finally relented and permitted the US Navy to deliver relief. Murphy brags about how embassy staff managed the relief operation and naval planes, helicopters and relief deliveries assisted millions of victims in the Irrawaddy delta. Murphy writes that embassy staff took over management of Yangon Airport and became air-traffic controllers, managing flights that the incompetent junta could not.
By describing the airport takeover, Murphy finally describes clandestine operations and how US democratic values were compromised, while the State Department cozied up to the generals to build the huge US Embassy in 2007.
How was it that air-traffic controllers appeared from the massive embassy? Air-traffic controllers are typically not found among embassy staff. The embassy is a US intelligence hub with staff presumably focused on monitoring Chinese capabilities.
Needed to do this, it seems, are air-traffic controllers able to take over Yangon Airport at short notice.
Democracy, human rights and US jets in Naypyitaw
US visitors appeared more regularly following Myanmar’s 2010 general election. The release from house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi encouraged visits from those who believed Myanmar was on a path to democracy and human rights. Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama sought to deliver a new round of assistance for democracy, human rights and peace-building.
As Murphy tells it, Clinton planned a personal visit to Myanmar. Her staff rolled out her Air Force jet for the visit. But after some consternation, the air-traffic controllers at the embassy apparently warned that Naypyitaw Airport was too small to handle her plane. They asked if it could use the capital’s broad boulevards instead.
Murphy says the plane had five books for the visiting diplomats: David Steinberg’s Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know; Thant Myint-U’s The River of Lost Footsteps; Pascal Khoo Thwe’s From the Land of Green Ghosts, Emma Larkin’s No Bad News for the King and George Orwell’s Burmese Days. It had movies, including “Beyond Rangoon” about a US citizen who participated in the 1988 demonstrations. Somehow though they forgot 2008’s Rambo IV about a renegade US soldier rescuing an American missionary family from the military.
Strangely they forgot Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Freedom from Fear. And then halfway across the Pacific, they realized that both Clinton and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were dog lovers. A hapless foreign service officer was sent from the plane in Korea to find a dog toy for Clinton to give as a gift.
Clinton’s brief time in Myanmar was full of pomp. Much television time was spent with Daw Aung Suu Kyi, recognizing her Nobel Peace Prize. And of course, Myanmar was lectured publicly about human rights, democratic elections, peace, health, and China. And then the money spigot for supporting the police and armed forces in drug intervention programs was opened and the capacity of the military enhanced.
Quieter lectures were likely delivered pointing out that aid to the military was contingent on stopping Chinese dam construction at Myitsone, slowing China’s Belt and Road Initiative and perhaps limiting Chinese investment in factories and retail. But unlike the surfeit of detail about dog toys, such requests are left out of Burmese Haze.
How would a civilian government deal with the two faces of US policy?
If this regime eventually falls and a civilian government emerges, the US will return. The problem is that despite the failure of US policies described in Burmese Haze, the approaches are likely to be the same.
There will be an emphasis on democracy, capitalism and human rights, even while clandestine cooperation for “security” supports the armed forces and police.
This will be done in a quiet exchange for access to the huge US Embassy as Washington’s geopolitical concerns about China will remain.
The clandestine arrangements funding policy on Myanmar are always secondary to concerns about China. Issues regarding CIA activity, past and present, will remain off-the-table too, dismissed as boring history speeches. Complaints about ongoing clandestine involvement will be ignored and concerns about a US military presence in the region brushed aside.
But a civilian government should not brush aside the CIA’s involvement in the fight against drugs and Chinese Communists, dating back to the Second World War.
A new government must insist that bilateral relations run two ways. They need to make clear that the United States is deeply distrusted by generations who ask questions like, “What are those naval ships offshore doing?”, “What about the threats of armed intervention during the Rohingya crisis in 2017?”, “Why are so many visa applications rejected?” “What about that ‘war on drugs’?” and “What about the past support for the military and police?”
And, “What about the construction and maintenance of the large ‘listening facility’ at the embassy under the Than Shwe regime, despite sanctions, and US claims to be apostles of democracy and human rights?”
Such questions should be addressed in a book about US relations with Myanmar between 2010 and 2021. Burmese Haze does not do this. I guess such a book awaits a future author, although probably not one who is from the CIA.
Tony Waters is a guest professor at Leuphana University in Germany and was a professor of sociology at Payap University in Chiang Mai, Thailand. He has been writing about Myanmar since 2017..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
There is a growing consensus that the world should engage directly with the opposition National Unity Government.
Description:
"Ever since Myanmar’s military seized power and ousted an elected government, international efforts to negotiate a clear way out have focused on dealing with a military that month by month becomes more belligerent, more violent, and less capable.
The assumption was that “the military now controls Myanmar and has all the guns” and that talks – however unpalatable – must proceed. To a large extent, the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) was simply relegated and has struggled to get a hearing on the diplomatic front.
But a briefing paper by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) challenges such assumptions and says that the military junta in Myanmar simply does not have effective control of the country to warrant its engagement with the international community.
The paper applied international standards in determining which side in the conflict best meets the criteria used to establish control of a state and found the NUG and resistance groups had “effective control” over 52 percent of the country.
Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and his generals are being actively contested by opposition forces in a further 23 percent of Myanmar and therefore the Tatmadaw, as the military is known, can only claim to have stable control over 17 percent of the country’s territory.
According to the SAC-M, the “trajectory of the conflict favors the resistance, and the junta is losing what control it does have at an increasing rate despite the continued use of mass atrocities by junta forces.”
That correlates with dispatches from inside Myanmar that say independent ethnic-based rebels are increasingly working together and have emerged from the jungles and are taking out military posts in the villages and pushing the fight to the outskirts of provincial cities.
This was a turning point noted at the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh when this year’s host Cambodia admitted negotiations with the junta had failed and the prospect of opening direct talks with NUG became real.
As Bart Edes, a Professor of Practice at McGill University, noted: “ASEAN countries are sensing the weakness behind the regime. They are facing an armed opposition from many different corners within the country. Their status quo can not last.”
This notion is finding much support amid a growing body of evidence that the junta is losing its grip on large parts of the country.
“Armed resistance to the junta has now saturated wide swathes of townships across most states and regions in Myanmar, demonstrating the strength of the population’s rejection of the military playing any further role in the nation’s politics,” the SAC-M added.
Others have noted the world is running out of excuses not to recognize the NUG and the United States is pushing Myanmar up the foreign policy agenda after its plight was raised by President Joe Biden in the United Nations General Assembly last week.
To date, talks with Tatmadaw have proved insipid, at best. And the execution of the four pro-democracy activists on the eve of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was as tragic as it was stupid and warrants Myanmar’s expulsion, or at least suspension, from ASEAN.
The removal of the Tatmadaw from the negotiating table would enable Indonesia, with backing from Malaysia and Brunei, to deliver on earnest talks with the NUG when Jakarta assumes control of ASEAN’s rotating chair in 2023.
The SAC-M briefing paper also found that the military had forced Myanmar’s former central administration to the brink of collapse, adding the junta is unable to govern and has been reduced to an occupying military force with a diminishing territorial base.
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“The world needs to wake up to the reality that a new Myanmar is already taking shape,” Yanghee Lee, a SAC-M founding member, said.
“The NUG is not a shadow government or government in exile. It is the representative of the people’s revolution and resistance to the military junta, the combined of which control the majority of the country,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2022-09-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"[Warning Graphic] ...
According to local news media, on the morning of the 23 May 2022, while families were having breakfast, the military attacked M’dat (မဒပ်) village with artillery shells. A 10-year-old boy and his mother were seriously injured. The child was reportedly in a critical condition, and lost a limb...News sources claimed that the military base of the 274th Light Infantry Battalion in Mindat Town (မင်းတပ်), Mindat Township (မင်းတပ်မိနယ်) was responsible for firing heavy artillery shells at civilian areas that morning...
Myanmar Witness collected and analysed open-source footage relating to the incident and made the following conclusions:
1. Myanmar Witness was not able to fully verify the footage of the injured child as being taken in M’dat village. However, possible locations in M’dat village and Mindat Township which are consistent with footage of where a heavily wounded child was taken for medical care were identified...2. There was no verifiable footage of the attack itself to verify how the child’s wounds were incurred, but Myanmar Witness was able to verify the location at which the child was allegedly hit, with what appears to be blood stains on the wall and floor outside of a structure claimed to be the child's home...3. Footage of ammunition reportedly found in M’dat village after the attack are consistent with locally produced 120mm mortar rounds known to be used by the Myanmar military...4. Myanmar Witness verified the presence of a military base within firing range of the village and identified a mortar present at the base, although it was not possible to verify whether it was a model capable of firing these particular rounds...This incident is one of many monitored and analysed by Myanmar Witness, which documents alleged indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas since the coup. Attacks on villages like this are of particular concern as many villages do not have sufficient medical facilities.
To read the full report and gain an insight into the techniques used by OSINT investigators, download the full report..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2022-09-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Children, Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group, Children, Military History
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Sub-title:
The junta’s tactics have grown more brutal in the face of resistance. The international community doesn’t have an answer.
Description:
"Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, remains locked in an armed struggle with its own people, but the crisis barely reached the surface at last week’s United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York. Officials from the United States and Malaysia met on the sidelines with representatives from Myanmar’s National Unity Government, a cabinet formed by elected lawmakers ousted when the military seized power in February 2021. The United Nations has delayed responding to the junta’s request for a seat; Myanmar’s current representative at the United Nations, Kyaw Moe Tun, remains loyal to the overthrown government.
As diplomacy sputters, violence in Myanmar is spiraling. At least 11 children were killed on Sept. 16 when military helicopters fired on a school in Sagaing region, a resistance stronghold. The killing of students was shocking, but extreme violence has come to characterize the junta. Last month, the military allegedly rampaged through a village in Kachin State, burning down homes and killing civilians. These attacks followed a trend: The monitoring group Data for Myanmar said the military has torched more than 28,000 civilian homes since the coup, and August was the worst month on record.
The increasingly brutal tactics are a sign of the military’s growing frustration as it fails to assert control more than 18 months after seizing power. In another illustration of this dynamic, the military regime executed four political prisoners in July, the first known judicial executions in Myanmar since the 1970s. All were accused of organizing or participating in armed resistance to military rule; they were hanged at Insein Prison in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city and economic center.
Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has had ample opportunity to make minor concessions to the international community, such as allowing a meeting with detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, that would have allowed him to reenter the fold without fundamentally threatening the military’s power. At every turn, the regime has instead chosen the path least conducive to compromise. The July executions took place against a backdrop of global outcry, including from authoritarian Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who currently chairs the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. But like most of the junta’s decisions since the coup, the killings were intended for a domestic audience, not a global one.
The military regime choosing to execute four political prisoners also served as a grim reminder that the Tatmadaw is prepared to kill virtually anyone to stay in power. Among those executed was Phyo Zeya Thaw, 41, an elected member of parliament for the ousted National League for Democracy party, and Kyaw Min Yu (known as Ko Jimmy), 53, a renowned democracy activist. With most civilian political figures in military custody—including Aung San Suu Kyi, held in solitary confinement in the capital, Naypyidaw—the military sent a powerful warning to the population.
It also may have sent another message: The executions are one of “several obvious incidents that evidence the military’s desperation,” said Ye Myo Hein, a researcher on civil-military relations and a fellow at the Wilson Center, a Washington-based think tank.
Although Myanmar’s democratic resistance forces have shocked many observers with their success so far, arguments that they are on the verge of victory or that the military is on the verge of collapse are overly optimistic. The military has far superior firepower—using weapons from China and Russia—and complete air supremacy, whereas the resistance often relies on hunting rifles or homemade weapons and has no international support. The helicopters that fired on children in Sagaing were reportedly Russian-made Mi-35s.
Furthermore, the junta’s losses, while bolstering opposition morale, prompt further extremism from a regime that acts impulsively—and brutally—under pressure. Some of the deadliest atrocities since the military took power occurred in the weeks after the coup, when mass protests and strikes shut down cities, with neighborhoods barricaded, public services suspended, and trade frozen. The military unleashed violence to wrest back control. In March 2021, at least 65 people were killed in a single incident in Yangon.
Similar atrocities have followed in rural areas where armed resistance is the fiercest. With many of these regions under internet blackouts, some of the violence may go unreported. More than 40 civilians were killed in massacres in Sagaing region last July, and at least 35 people were executed in one incident in Kayah state last December. The military ramped up these campaigns last October, “but such campaigns eroded its military objectives,” fueling a cycle of violence, Ye Myo Hein said. The more ground the military loses, the more brutal it becomes, which only creates stronger resistance. “I have not seen any sign that the generals will back off in the foreseeable future,” Ye Myo Hein added.
Some analysts say the military hasn’t reached a tipping point yet. The military is “frustrated and vengeful” but not necessarily desperate, said Richard Horsey, the Myanmar advisor for the International Crisis Group. “Its frustration comes from the fact that local resistance remains determined and effective rather than quickly crumbling as the generals may have thought,” he added. “They seem to be hoping that by imposing a severe cost on civilian populations, they can undermine the support base for resistance groups without the military risks of a major offensive.”
Myanmar’s military is still capable of significantly worse violence, as the experience of the persecuted Rohingya minority shows. Although the regime has killed more than 2,300 civilians since the coup, this toll pales in comparison to the horrors of the 2017 Rohingya crisis, when the military slaughtered between an estimated 10,000 and 25,000 civilians in a matter of weeks in just the northern part of Rakhine state. The military’s dehumanization of the Rohingya is unique, but the junta leadership would not hesitate to use similar tactics against the civilian population if it felt that it truly risked being overthrown.
“If the past is any guide, I would expect the military to double down on its current strategy rather than changing course,” Horsey warned. “That implies continued punitive attacks and more atrocities for months and possibly years.”
An institutional collapse of the military or an internal coup against its senior leadership could hasten the end of Myanmar’s crisis, but Ye Myo Hein said he sees no sign of either happening soon. At this point, a “negotiated settlement is highly unlikely,” he said, and the generals will likely continue down this path even if they “ruin the country and their institution.” “The civil-military relations in Myanmar [have] irretrievably broken down,” Ye Myo Hein said.
The military is holding the nation hostage, but its people should not simply give up. The regime hopes that its extreme violence will eventually convince the public that anything, including living under military rule, is better than war. But for now, the people of Myanmar have shown they are willing to endure tremendous hardship—and even lay down their lives—to continue their struggle for democracy. The international community should respect that decision rather than blithely call for a “cessation of violence” and for “all parties” to show restraint, which is effectively a call for the resistance to surrender.
For its part, every atrocity Myanmar’s military commits proves that the regime has no intention of making even basic concessions to the international community. It is an irrational organization that only knows how to solve its problems through violence, which has only incentivized revolutionaries to approach the ongoing crisis as an existential conflict. As the violence spirals without an off-ramp in sight, countries sympathetic to Myanmar’s plight have an obligation to take more creative action to assist the people of Myanmar in liberating themselves from potentially decades of oppression..."
Source/publisher:
"Foreign Policy" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-09-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"“Mom, it hurts so bad. I can’t bear it anymore. Just put me out of my misery”. These were the actual last words of Phone Tayza, a seven-year-old Myanmar boy, to his mom just a few minutes before he passed away from gunshot wounds by Myanmar soldiers who stormed his school. The massacre took place on 16 September 2022 at Let Yet Kone village, in De Pe Yin Township, Sagaing division where at least 10 others were killed.
Since the military coup in February 2021, Myanmar has witnessed the birth of People’s Defense Forces (PDF) all across the country. Despite their overwhelming disadvantages in weapons and ammunition, the clashes between PDFs and Myanmar military have escalated drastically in the past eighteen months afflicting significant casualty to Myanmar military troops. Given their inferior armaments, PDFs have resorted to ambushes and roadside IEDs to great effect forcing Myanmar military to use helicopter and jets to attack villages and in troop movements.
In the school attack, two Russian made Mi-35 helicopters appeared on the horizon, raining down machinegun fire and rockets toward the school and the adjacent Buddhist monastery. According to the witnesses, the firing lasted about 30 minutes. At about the same time, two other helicopters dropped infantry troops who stormed the school compound shooting indiscriminately. They also warned villagers not to approach the school. As the soldiers entered the school, instead of the armed men, they encountered crying school children with fatal or near fatal gunshot wounds. The soldiers ordered everyone to come out of the school with hands above their heads. Terrified, many children despite their wounds, dragged themselves out of the building, crying and moaning.
When a teacher tried to help a girl, whose thigh was shattered and bleeding, the soldiers threatened to shoot the teacher if she moved. Many villagers whose children were in the school came running only to be blocked by the soldiers at the school entrance. When the mother of Phone Tayza recognized her son’s moans and cries she pleaded to be allowed in.
Finally, the soldiers relented. And when she found her son, those were his last words before he died a few minutes later in her hands. Later the dead and the wounded were taken away by the military. The village wasn’t even given a chance to retrieve or bury the bodies of the loved ones. At the end of the hellish episode, eleven students and villagers were killed while another twenty were wounded that day.
Sadly, for Myanmar such a tragic event is not the first or the last of its kind. The only thing certain is these atrocities are going to become worse as long as the military junta remains in power. Hasn’t the world learned yet? This is the same military command who committed genocide towards Rohingya population in 2017. And the one who fired indiscriminately time and again into unarmed protesters on the city streets in 2021 when people rose up against the coup. It also is responsible for the murder of unarmed NGO workers and civilians on Christmas 2021.
The people of Myanmar tried to protest the coup through peaceful civil disobedience, but the brutal crackdown of the military left them with no choice. The military only understands the language coming out of a gun barrel as explained here. Myanmar military leaders don’t understand the term negotiation. In July 2022, the junta carried out death sentences on four political prisoners despite the international pleas. These were the first in more than 30 years. When the international community condemned this outrage, Britain being the loudest, the junta in turn arrested a British national Ms. Vicky Bowman, the former British ambassador to Myanmar, who is now married to a Myanmar man in Yangon on flimsy immigration charges.
All of these past instances raise a question why the international community, both the west and neighboring ASEAN countries, can’t see to the fact that the military junta will not be influenced by the usual diplomatic and political means. If what is happening in Myanmar doesn’t amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, what does? The usual targeted sanctions and the diplomatic condemnation is not working and is not going to work. How many more children need to die before the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is considered?
Thankfully some countries and leaders have reached to this conclusion as witnessed in the recent remarks by UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, Malaysian prime minister Mr. Yaakob and the President of East Timor who questioned why no such aid has come to Myanmar (compared to Ukraine) when both are similarly fighting against tyranny.
The dictatorial Myanmar military regimen is heavily contributing to regional instability. Fighting against the ethnic armed resistant group Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar’s military has fired multiple rounds and motor shells into Bangladesh and its helicopters entering the airspace has led to tension between the two neighboring countries. The systemic torching of civilian villages by the Myanmar military has also created a large population of internally displaced people in the states of Sagaing, Kachin, Karen, Chin and Kayah with many refugees fleeing into neighboring Thailand and India. It is a humanitarian and regional catastrophe in the making.
The main arms supply to the Myanmar military is Russia. For example, Myanmar has just received two Su-30 fighter jets from Russia with four more on the way in the next few months. Many Myanmar officers get trained at various Russian military institutes yearly. The international outcast Mr. Putin has newly found an ardent supporter and a minion in General Min Aung Hlaing of Myanmar. Yet according to an air force pilot who defected from the military, Myanmar’s air force has only 13 functioning Mi-35 helicopters. It should not take much assistance to the parallel government, National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar and the PDFs under its chain of command, for a victory against the military. A recent report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar stated that the NUG and affiliated EROs already control about 52% of the country’s territory. A dozen 1980’s era shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, like those used in Afghanistan, could quickly reset the balance of power in the Myanmar. Currently PDFs and EROs have no anti-aircraft capability. Ironically, it is the same old adversary from Afghanistan, Russia, whose helicopters are doing the killing in Myanmar. PDFs rely on homemade single bolt-action rifles and very few automatic weapons purchased at exorbitant prices. Some assistance in upgrading their small arms arsenal would go far.
A significant interruption of cash flow to Myanmar Military’s coffers, such as sanctioning the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) that serves as its lifeline of foreign currency could also be effective. The usual argument has been that such a sanction might also create hardship towards the ordinary Myanmar population. This opposition is invalidated as the energy needs and delivery of the country are already in the hands of the junta which has diverted all the available resources to the military. To think that a military regimen that slaughters children considers the needs of the citizens of the country over its own is delusional. Finally, removing the Myanna Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) from the international SWIFT code banking system should also be used to punish the junta. The U.S. has done this to some Russian banks.
Myanmar is withering away while the world silently watches. The world needs to wake up and think outside of the box when dealing with this murderous Myanmar military regimen. Being a beacon of democracy, the U.S. should take a leadership role in rallying international action. Drastic times call for drastic measures. Time is running out before we hear a repeat cry of a Myanmar child asking to be put out of his misery..."
Source/publisher:
EurAsia Rewiew
Date of publication:
2022-09-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Description:
"Myanmar is in a state of revolution. It is a society in an existential fight against a single institution: a military that has brutalized generations of Myanmar’s people. In the early months after the junta’s February 2021 coup, peaceful protests emerged across the country. Predictably, the Myanmar military responded, as it has done for decades, with widespread, barbarous violence to crush the protests by unarmed civilians. Subsequently, and understandably, armed resistance to military rule emerged.
Amid all of this, the phrase thway-ma-aye, which translates as ‘Never Cold Blooded’, began to be used by protesters, whether the flash mobs in the cities or the demonstrators in rural areas. The phrase first emerged in Sagaing Region, notably in Monywa, Kalay and Yinmabin townships, and is most associated with a village named Shwe Nwal Thway in Yinmabin known for its strident, ongoing anti-regime protests. Now it is used across Myanmar.
In English, the term ‘cold blooded’ is generally used to describe actions done with intent but without emotion. Often, it connotes particularly cruel violence. If someone kills in cold blood, they kill in a way that seems especially cruel because the perpetrator displays no emotion. If one wishes to understand the ethos, or spirit, of Myanmar’s revolution, it is useful to peel away the layers of what ‘Never Cold Blooded’ means and why the term has become so important to the country’s revolutionaries.
Subtly distinct from the English meaning, the use of the term ‘Never Cold Blooded’ by Myanmar’s protesters has important nuances; it is more akin to being ‘warm blooded’ by continuing to strive and persevere and to keep one’s heart in the fight. But whether in Burmese or English, the phrase and its multiple meanings captures the essence of so much of what Myanmar’s revolution is about and stands in stark contrast to the junta’s tactics and objectives.
To make better sense of Myanmar’s revolution – its intents, actors, and prospects – it is useful to explore the works of one of the 20th Century’s most brilliant political theorists, Hannah Arendt. Her 1963 book On Revolution is justifiably considered one of the most comprehensive and thoughtful detailings of what revolution means and how and why it emerged as a driving political phenomenon of modern history. Core to Arendt’s conceptualization of revolution is the “idea that freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide.” Her use of the term freedom connotes “participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm.” Critically, her emphasis on freedom is additional to liberation or liberty, namely “to be free of oppression” in one’s personal life. This basic dialectic still defines the political tensions between the world’s liberal democracies, which speak of freedom, and authoritarian regimes that seek legitimacy through economic growth and domestic stability.
As Arendt so eloquently summarized, revolution fundamentally “aimed at freedom and that the birth of freedom spelled the beginning of an entirely new story.” Echoing the acting President of the National Unity Government Duwa Lashi La’s statement that this revolution is a “second war for independence”, it seeks not a return to anything but rather a new beginning. This is what defines the country’s events since February 2021 in simplest terms as a revolution. It is to be the break from the past. When protesters proclaim ‘Never Cold Blooded’, what they affirm is the conviction to persevere towards that new beginning, whatever the cost. This is why, despite all the horrors and atrocities thrown at them by the junta, they persist, and will continue doing so. Juxtaposed against this determination is the military regime’s archaic desire for the restoration of a mythologized past of Bamar nationalism. Who but a senior general of the Myanmar military could now sit in that ridiculous throne hall in Naypyitaw and not be ashamed of such backwardness?
Moreover, the intent of Myanmar’s revolutionaries contrasts with the toxic phrase thrown around by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with international backing, that the bloc supports a “return to normalcy” for Myanmar requiring dialogue and mediation with the military. This is not a new beginning, but simply an attempt at restoring a flawed process. ASEAN and the rest of the world delude themselves by believing that the decade of ‘transition’ represented some type of ‘normal’ leading to a more permanent, more democratic order. The country was effectively held hostage by the military and its self-serving 2008 Constitution, meaning it was always able and willing to stage a coup.
The rage of the Myanmar public since the putsch is that they nonetheless peacefully engaged in the military’s process for ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ and were then cheated via the coup, with thousands of people subsequently murdered. Moreover, what can ever be ‘normal’ about expecting a ‘peaceful transition’ back to [quasi/coerced] democracy when that requires engagement with a regime that is genocidal. Exactly how many genocides and massacres must a regime commit before they are no longer to be engaged with but simply ended? ‘Never Cold Blooded’ means ending a toxic disgrace of a military that has denied the Myanmar people both liberty and freedom for over six decades.
Another key insight of Arendt’s framing of revolution is the notion of a “point of no return”, namely when enough of a society feel that they are “agents in a process which spells the definite end of an old order and brings about the birth of a new world.” One outcome of the preceding decade of ‘transition’ which was actually positive was that it socialized the Myanmar public, and particularly its youth, to the notion that a different future was in fact possible except for one thing. Arendt summarized this nicely when she notes that what is sought by revolution is a “citizen’s right of access to the public realm, in his share in public power.”
As Arendt notes, the concept of rage is central to revolutions, particularly “the rage of naked misfortune pitted against the rage of unmasked corruption.” These emotive, competing forces compel a society, like Myanmar’s, to rise in revolution after experiencing, at least partially, a better future. One where, at least conceivably, the military did not wrap the country’s people around its own greed, coerced through unending violence and division. As such, Myanmar’s military laid the foundation for the revolution through the decade of quasi-democracy and economic growth and then lit the flame for it through the 2021 coup.
This in turn builds upon Arendt’s emphasis on “revolutionary spirit”, which is the “the most impressive facet of modern revolutions.” Key to Arendt’s emphasis on revolutionary spirit are themes that link more closely with the English language connotations of ‘Never Cold Blooded’ but inherently sync with the ethos of Myanmar’s revolution. Uniting revolutionaries is the “notion of novelty and newness” of the endeavor. Moreover, key to this is the awareness of the agency of collective action for common good. As Arendt explained, successful revolutions only occur when a sufficient number of citizens are willing to act knowing that they may fail, but nonetheless are “eager to organize and to act together for a common purpose.” This stands in contrast to societies that prioritize personal well-being, most often in terms of affluence, at the price of public good, namely democracy and basic liberties. It is telling that Myanmar’s revolution is driven by its youth, who have risen in massive numbers to say that they want a different country for theirs and future generations.
‘Never Cold Blooded’ is in effect a declaration that indifference to the sufferings of others has been one of the country’s ‘original sins,’ most recently by widespread indifference to the Rohingya genocide. While there is still much to do, there has been more societal reckoning and reconciliation in the 20 months since the coup than in the preceding decades. That Bamar heartland regions, specifically Sagaing and Magwe, are core areas of armed resistance and are actively supported by partner ethnic armed organizations is but one example of the shifting parameters of how and who to define what is Myanmar.
Another important dynamic in this regard is the oft-stated declaration by the country’s youth that they wish to participate in the revolution precisely because it is a responsibility they must bear so that future generations do not. This is surely one of the purest meanings of ‘Never Cold Blooded’. Ending the military’s dominance is the most immediate goal of the revolution and creating a federal democracy the clear political outcome sought, but there are other major societal shifts being driven along by the churning forces raging across the country.
Revolution is a process. It is a societal reckoning. What is sought in Myanmar, to quote Arendt on modern revolutions, is “the foundation of freedom and the establishment of lasting institutions.” In simplest terms, this means a new beginning. ‘Never Cold Blooded’ is the fitting ethos of a society attempting to start anew. The revolution must be won and then a new, stable political settlement enacted around federal democracy. At its core will be a basic but fundamental notion that so exemplifies what is sought during these turbulent, violent months of revolution. As Arendt wisely summarized, we must be able “to grasp the enormous difference in power and authority between a constitution imposed by a government upon a people and the constitution by which a people constitutes its own government.”
This awareness seems self-evident to Myanmar’s revolutionaries but sorely missing amongst the international community. Outsiders who wish to support the Myanmar people in their revolution should support it as a sprawling, dynamic process rather than nitpick or over-generalize inevitable failings and challenges. It will never be as clean or obvious as anybody would want, but the international community, and especially its democracies, owes the Myanmar people real support in their just endeavor to secure a new future free of military dictatorship. To do otherwise is simply cold blooded..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Sub-title:
As UN aid agencies line up to sign deals with the junta, local groups fighting “for victory and humanity” continue to be the country’s real saviours
Description:
"The recent rush of UN agencies to sign memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with Myanmar’s military junta has raised important questions about who is really carrying the burden of humanitarian assistance in the country—international aid agencies, or local relief groups engaged in resisting the regime?
In a recent paper, Hugo Slim, a UK-based expert on the ethics of humanitarian aid, offers some valuable insight on this issue, which has been the subject of often passionate debate in Myanmar. Titled “Humanitarian resistance: Its ethical and operational importance,” this paper examines the respective roles of local civil society organisations and activist groups participating in the Spring Revolution on the one hand, and UN agencies and the INGO aid community on the other.
There is growing frustration on both sides. Those who work for international aid agencies, especially foreign nationals, feel that they are being unfairly criticised for trying to assist vulnerable populations. While they lament that this may mean making “many hard and unpleasant compromises in order to serve higher humanitarian imperatives,” as one such individual put it to me recently, they insist that this is necessary in order to function in a very complex situation.
On the other side, local activists feel that they are speaking for most in Myanmar when they say that the country has been largely abandoned by the international community—not least by the UN and its humanitarian agencies. Looking back over the past 19 months, what they see is the failure of UN agencies and INGOs to provide aid where it is needed most. Only a trickle of aid has come into the country, and it has only reached areas where the regime has allowed them to operate.
In Slim’s terminology, this is a dispute between what he calls the “local humanitarian resistance community” and the community of “conventional international humanitarian agencies.” The first term in particular is helpful in understanding the core of the disagreement, because it highlights the emergence of an alternative to more traditional thinking about the place of humanitarian relief work in the context of conflict.
Since its attempt to seize power in February of last year, Myanmar’s military has faced protests, civil disobedience and armed resistance; in response, it has unleashed harsh, indiscriminate, large-scale and systematic violence. Its sole aim is to crush dissent at any cost, and its inability to achieve this goal has only made it more brutal. Currently in control of less than 50% of the country’s territory, and vulnerable to attack even in areas where it has a strong presence, it routinely deploys jets, helicopters and ground troops to carry out “clearance operations” anywhere that it cannot impose its rule. The result has been a huge and growing humanitarian crisis.
This crisis has been created by the junta, and nobody else. As it continues to worsen day by day, week by week, the people of Myanmar have responded with an impressive display of what Slim calls “humanitarian resistance,” which doesn’t just address immediate needs, but also recognises that inflicting suffering on the civilian population is not just an unfortunate side effect of the country’s conflict, but an integral part of the military’s strategy. Thus, no amount of international aid will help as long as the regime continues with its systematic dislocation of civilians and destruction of their property and livelihoods.
Within Myanmar, local humanitarian resistance groups enjoy the trust and appreciation of the general population, while international aid agencies are increasingly regarded with frustration and even anger. Conversely, people outside of the country, who have little knowledge or recognition of the value of resistance humanitarianism, continue to hold the international agencies in high esteem, if only because these agencies have been so skillful at promoting themselves on the world stage.
There are a number of reasons that many in Myanmar take such a dim view of international agencies. One is that they are seen as remote, top-down organisations. They are also far less numerous and diverse than local, grass-roots groups. But perhaps the most important reason is that they see themselves as obliged to remain “neutral” and “non-partisan”—unlike local humanitarian resistance groups, which, according to Slim, “simultaneously [take] sides for human life and human freedom” and “combine a desire for victory and humanity.”
In his paper, Slim looks at Myanmar and Ukraine as examples of humanitarian resistance in action. In both countries, he sees evidence of how the humanitarian response to their respective political crises aims to serve “the cause of victory”:
“In Myanmar, people committed to the resistance are boycotting government institutions and have either created new associations for the rescue and relief of people suffering from the dictatorship’s violence and increasing poverty, or they are surging existing social and religious institutions for the same effect. In Ukraine, where an entire nation is fighting for survival against outside aggression, people have come together en masse as volunteer auxiliaries to dramatically expand the provision of food relief, emergency housing and education, social work, civil defence and ambulance and fire services.”
According to Slim, “All these welfare activities combine a humanitarian and a resistance purpose in the same activity. Being a resistance humanitarian in Myanmar or Ukraine means playing your part in the struggle. Working as a medic, a firefighter or an emergency teacher is experienced and understood as a valuable form of civil resistance.”
The fact that many see their humanitarian activities as part of a political struggle in no way detracts from the effectiveness of their efforts, says Slim. Indeed, he observes that humanitarian resistance has had a “significant” impact in terms of meeting people’s needs:
“Tens of thousands of people have been rescued from Ukrainian cities under Russian attack by informal groups using their own cars and covert routes in a continuous relay of rescue runs. These rescuers see their humanitarian work as part of the political struggle against the Russian invasion. In Myanmar, hundreds of thousands of people are being helped with food, healthcare and emergency education by rescue committees and relief committees formed by people from the [Civil Disobedience Movement] who have left their government jobs to work for alternative, resistance institutions.”
Unlike international aid organisations, which are relatively generously funded by donor countries, the local humanitarian resistance community is primarily financed by members of the public who are in many cases struggling with hardships of their own due to the economic fallout of the coup. An energized and self-organised diaspora is also making a contribution.
Another difference is that local humanitarian resistance work relies heavily on volunteers, whereas international aid agencies are mostly staffed by well-paid professionals. Expats employed to do international aid work typically follow a career path that takes them from one “crisis spot” to another. Most currently working “on Myanmar” do so from a safe distance—from neighbouring Thailand or even farther afield. And while they can expect to advance in their careers even under these circumstances, many humanitarian resistance workers actually inside the country have had to abandon their professions to oppose the injustice and repression of the military regime.
Needless to say, “resistance humanitarians” don’t just sacrifice their careers—they also risk their lives. On numerous occasions people providing aid have been arrested, tortured and imprisoned. Some have been killed.
Meanwhile, conventional humanitarian agencies have been struggling to respond to the suffering in Myanmar. Their mode of operations requires the explicit or implicit consent of the regime, which has hugely restricted what they can do. But beyond this, they have also been constrained by their own bureaucratic character, which makes them extremely slow and expensive, as well as prone to self-censorship.
In short, there has been an enormous disproportionality between these two very different aid communities, in terms of their cost, effectiveness, and risk. This raises the question of which side actually receives the most money from international donors. The answer, of course, is that almost all funding flows to major agencies or organisations, while virtually none reaches groups engaged in humanitarian resistance.
This is not a new situation. It has long been the case that local groups have had to operate on shoestring budgets, while international aid agencies have been far more lavishly funded. This has been a source of some resentment among local aid groups, but most have hesitated to speak out about it, as they see the international aid agencies as being at least potential allies against the real enemy—Myanmar’s repressive military.
More recently, however, many have become more outspoken about this disparity, as they watch multiple UN agencies hasten to sign MOUs with the junta. In effect, according to those who are now witnessing this spectacle from the trenches of Myanmar’s ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, these agencies have broken their long-held principle of neutrality by reaching agreements with a regime that has no legitimacy in the eyes of the country’s people.
This cannot be defended as pragmatism. A genuinely pragmatic approach would be one that involves deals with both the regime and with the National Unity Government and governing entities in liberated ethnic territories. This would enable a more fair and balanced distribution of aid into areas that are currently being served almost entirely by humanitarian resistance organisations.
At this point, there are few in Myanmar who believe that the UN agencies are primarily motivated by a desire to deliver aid more effectively. Rather, they are seen as acting mostly out of institutional self-interest. Meanwhile, resistance organisations and networks continue to do what they have been doing to save the country from the coup regime. They need to be noticed, recognised and supported by donor countries. Yangon-based UN agencies and INGOs will not provide for them.
Igor Blazevic is a prominent human rights campaigner based in the Czech Republic. He is a lecturer at Educational Initiatives, a training program for Myanmar activists, and a senior adviser with the Prague Civil Society Centre..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-08-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Description:
"DW Asia editor Rodion Ebbighausen has written an opinion piece in which he argues that “Myanmar activists are attacking the wrong target”. “Activists and civil society groups in Myanmar are increasingly attacking humanitarian aid organizations, especially the United Nations, online. They are the wrong target,” says Ebbighausen in the DW article.
Let me quickly comment on why Ebbighausen’s defense of the UN agencies is wrong and why the UN agencies are coming under deserved public scrutiny and criticism.
What Ebbighausen is overlooking is that no UN agencies have signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with the legitimate National Unity Government (NUG), which does not intentionally and systematically kill the civilian population and uproot them from the land.
However, all relevant UN agencies (OCHA, UNICEF, ICRC, FAO and IOM) have simultaneously signed MoUs with the illegitimate power-usurper, which is intentionally and systematically executing cleansing operations and terror over the civilian population.
They have signed MoUs with a force that is waging a war, not against guerrillas, but against the civilian population. They have signed an “understanding” with the same force and the same people who are actually creating a humanitarian emergency and using brutal violence to expel the population from the land.
In addition, the military junta—after 19 months in which the people have mounted a heroic self-defense operation—currently controls only about half of the country’s territory. There is a long history of the junta using a “Four Cuts” policy, which means cutting the civilian population off from food, supplies, medicines, fuel and anything else in order to blackmail the insurgency into conceding defeat through the heavy price imposed on the civilian population. The military did that for decades and is doing it now.
So once the UN agencies sign an MoU with the junta, they agree that they will not deliver aid to half of the territory where the situation is the most dramatic and urgency is the greatest. If at the same time there is not a single UN agency that has signed an agreement with the NUG and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) about delivering much-needed aid to non-junta controlled territory as well, then what we have is UN agencies assisting the brutal counterinsurgency operations of the junta.
This is a problem and this is a big problem, and that is why the UN agencies are coming under deserved public scrutiny and criticism.
Cheap, pathetic arguments about “a starving child receiving food does not starve to death” should not hide this ugly reality. There is a systematic, murderous and brutal counterinsurgency operation going on in the rural areas of the country. This is being done by the military junta. This must be stopped. This is a humanitarian imperative.
If that is too much for the UN to do, then at least the UN agencies must be on both sides of the conflict lines, and not only on the side of the aggressor.
Activists and civil society groups, as well as the people of Myanmar, are rightly outraged because the UN agencies have signed an understanding with the junta and have not made any agreement that aid will also be delivered to the NUG- and ERO-liberated territories.
Myanmar society has enough determination and strength to defend itself from the attempted military power grab. Myanmar society and its own civil society also have enough determination and capacity to keep under scrutiny what the UN agencies are doing—and what they are not doing.
The UN has a long history of failures in Myanmar. The 2019 Rosenthal Report analyzed and highlighted “systemic and structural failures” of the UN agencies during the Rohingya genocide in 2017. The same military under the same command structure that committed the crime of genocide in 2017 in Rakhine State is now applying the same cleansing operations in other parts of Myanmar. The UN agencies have obviously not learned anything from their own previous failures. The people of Myanmar have learned. They have learned enough to know that they have only one way to gain security, peace, development, rights and freedom, and that is by liberating themselves from predatory and repressive military rule.
They have also learned enough about the humanitarian neocolonialism of the UN agencies. That is why the UN agencies will get pushback from Myanmar society whenever they start to do harm. The UN agencies have started walking down the very slippery road of doing more harm than benefit.
Myanmar civil society is ringing alarm bells. The UN agencies would do well to hear those alarm bells, and not to make themselves blind and deaf, hiding behind an argument that it is fulfilling a “humanitarian commitment that can alleviate the suffering of the people”.
In places like Myanmar, where the junta (and only the junta) has weaponized humanitarian aid, it is not enough to say that one is “alleviating the suffering of the people”. One must be more precise and say where the aid is going and where the aid is not going, and why. It also matters a lot when the aid is delivered and when it is not delivered, and why. It also matters through whom the aid comes and through whom it does not come.
At this moment UN agencies have committed themselves to deliver aid where the junta wants them to send it, to deliver it when the junta allows them to send it, and to do it through structures that are affiliated with the junta—the same junta that is the sole and only source of all suffering and of the humanitarian emergency.
This is rightly criticized.
Igor Blazevic is senior adviser with the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer at the Educational Initiatives Program..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Opening statement by Nada Al- Nashif UN Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights
Description:
"Distinguished President,
Excellencies,
I welcome the opportunity to provide you with this oral update on the human rights situation in Myanmar, further to Human Rights Council resolution 49/23.
Since the last update to this Council in June, the people of Myanmar have been caught in a rapid downward spiral, with growing suffering, fear, and insecurity.
Urgent action is needed to reverse this catastrophic situation and to restore peace, democracy, and sustainable development.
The Myanmar military’s offensives throughout the country are designed not only to target its opponents but also to punish any communities it deems to be supporting them.
Military tactics increasingly involve indiscriminateattacks andweaponry. The growing use of air power and artillery during the monsoon season is significantly impacting civilians and residential areas. In Magway and Sagaing regions as well as Kachin, Shan, Kayah, and Kayin states, residential buildings – as many as 30,000 - schools and other civilian infrastructure have been burnt to the ground during military ground operations.
In an emblematic incident documented by OHCHR, on 11 August military forces attacked an armed group presence in Yin Paung Taing village in Sagaing region with jets and helicopters, and then raided the village. Over 100 villagers were arrested, alleged to have been used as human shields and porters by the military. After three days of intense fighting, villagers, including women and children, were found dead, and 20 of those arrested are still missing.
In another airstrike in Let Yet Kone village in Sagaing on 16 September the military targeted a school and a nearby monastery killing at least six children and injuring many others, including teachers. Eyewitnesses reported that 11 wounded people, including nine children and two teachers, were taken away and remain missing.
Since February 2021, at least 2.316 people (including at least 188 children) have been killed. Widespread fear and insecurity among the civilian population has forced over 1 million individuals (of whom, 45,500 into neighboring countries) to leave their homes and now live in precarious conditions without access to food, medical assistance, and other basic services. The humanitarian crisis now brings fears of starvation, with the military largely denying humanitarian access, including recent orders to halt humanitarian operations in northern and central Rakhine State.
Over 15,607 people have been arrested with some 12,464 remaining in detention. The death toll of people in custody is steadily rising. At least 273 persons have died in formal detention settings, such as prisons, detention and interrogation centers, and police stations as well as at least 266 reported deaths following raids and arrests in villages, at least 40 of whom were reportedly killed with headshots.
Family members reported seeing signs of physical abuse, ill-treatment, or suspected torture, despite being informed that the death was a result of natural causes. There are 111 reported cases of people being burned, either alive or after being executed, in what appears to be a tactic of summary executions and attempts to destroy evidence of crimes.
Myanmar’s military-controlled judicial system has also been weaponized to execute opponents. The military executed four individuals, including a former member of Parliament and a democracy activist, following a secretive military court trial, in violation of fair trial standards and rule of law principles. These executions, which are the first in about thirty years, represent an important indicator of the regression of human rights in Myanmar and the military’s complete disregard for international law.
OHCHR has also documented that the military has arrested and charged at least 10 lawyers who were defending people charged with spurious, politically motivated offences.
Since February 2021, civic space has been decimated. The military’s announced plans to create a register and impose a new tax on mobile phones will increase the risk of surveillance, further imperilling human rights defenders, journalists and members of the pro-democracy movement. It will also increase the cost of accessing the internet for ordinary people and further restrict freedom of expression and access to information. Just days ago, the military also announced that expressions of solidarity on social media to the National Unity Government and Peoples’ Defense Force, including by posting a “like” or an emoji, risked up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
Excellencies,
The relative stability experienced in Rakhine State since the start of the coup has proved very short lived. My office has received reports of killings, injuries, arbitrary detention and mass displacement of civilians resulting from clashes between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in several townships of Rakhine and Chin State and along the border, with reported cases of shelling into Bangladesh.
Minority communities especially Rohingya and Kaman Muslims are particularly vulnerable, with the military imposing new restrictions on delivery of humanitarian aid and essential goods in large areas of Rakhine.
Last month marked the fifth anniversary of the military’s 2017 campaign of violence against the Rohingya, involving the killing of thousands and pushing over 740,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh. During the former High Commissioner’s visit to the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar last month, Rohingya refugees shared their hopes of being able to return home when the conditions permit. However, conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet evident. The international community should support Bangladesh in providing protection, education and livelihood opportunities for the refugees, while continuing to pursue international accountability efforts.
Despite widespread international condemnation, Myanmar is yet to address the root causes of Rohingya persecution. Rohingya are deprived of citizenship rights and civil documentation, limiting their freedom of movement, and access to health and education services. They face daily extortion by camp authorities, village administrators, police, and military.
Most Rohingya in Rakhine live in desperate poverty, driving them, at high risk, to flee Myanmar, often paying large sums of money to human traffickers. United Nations figures indicate that informal attempts to leave and arrests for travelling without authorization doubled in 2022 compared to the previous year. Rohingya are often deprived of adequate legal representation and coerced into accepting guilt in order to avoid longer sentences.
Mr. President,
The cycle of violations must end.
Unfortunately, diplomatic efforts have so far yielded limited results. I hope the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar’s recent visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh can build momentum. ASEAN must also reinvigorate its efforts to bring humanitarian support and promote a resolution to the crisis, in consultation with the people’s representatives, and with support from regional powers.
I reiterate calls to the military to cease violence, including by imposing a moratorium on executions, to free all political prisoners, to ensure access to humanitarian aid and return Myanmar to democracy based on respect for human rights and the rule of law.
I also urge this Council to consider strengthening OHCHR’s existing documentation mandate in order to enhance monitoring of the situation and support accountability efforts, including the work of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Human Rights Council
Date of publication:
2022-09-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"Redesignation Allows Additional Eligible Burmese Nationals to Apply for TPS and Employment Authorization Documents
WASHINGTON – The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) today announced an extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Burma for an additional 18 months, from Nov. 26, 2022, through May 25, 2024, due to extraordinary and temporary conditions in Burma that prevent individuals from safely returning. In addition, DHS announced a redesignation of Burma for TPS for the same reason, allowing Burmese nationals (and individuals having no nationality who last habitually resided in Burma) residing in the United States as of September 25, 2022, to be eligible for TPS.
The February 2021 military coup d’état has led to continuing violence, large-scale human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions and the use of deadly force against unarmed individuals, mass displacement of civilians, worsened humanitarian conditions and limited access to shelter, food, water, and medical care, and spurred an economic crisis. These conditions prevent Burmese nationals and habitual residents from safely returning.
“The people of Burma are continuing to suffer a complex and deteriorating humanitarian crisis due the military coup and security forces’ brutal violence against civilians,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “Under this extension and redesignation, Burmese nationals and habitual residents will be eligible to temporarily stay in the United States until conditions in the country improve and individuals can safely return.”
The extension of TPS for Burma allows approximately 970 current beneficiaries to retain TPS through May 25, 2024, so long as they continue to meet TPS eligibility requirements. It is estimated that approximately 2,290 additional individuals may be eligible for TPS under the redesignation of Burma. This population includes nationals of Burma (and individuals without nationality who last resided in Burma) in the United States in nonimmigrant status or without lawful immigration status.
Current beneficiaries re-registering under the extension of TPS for Burma must re-register in a timely manner during the 60-day re-registration period from September 27, 2022, through November 26, 2022, to ensure they keep their TPS and work authorization without a gap. DHS recognizes that not all re-registrants may receive new Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) before their current EADs expire on Nov. 25, 2022, and is automatically extending through Nov. 25, 2023, the validity of EADs previously issued under the TPS designation of Burma.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services will continue to process pending applications filed under Burma’s initial TPS designation. Individuals with a pending Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, or a related Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, do not need to file either application again. If USCIS approves a Form I-821 or Form I-765 filed under the initial designation of TPS for Burma, USCIS will grant the individual TPS through May 25, 2024, and issue an EAD valid through May 25, 2024.
Initial, first-time applicants for TPS under the redesignation of Burma must submit Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, during the initial registration period that runs from September 27, 2022, through May 25, 2024. Burma TPS applicants may file Form I-821 online. When filing a TPS application, applicants can also request an EAD by submitting a completed Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization with their Form I-821, or separately at a later date. Applicants may also submit Form I-765 online.
The Federal Register notice (FRN) explains the eligibility criteria, timelines, and procedures necessary for current beneficiaries to re-register and renew EADs, and for new applicants to submit an initial application under the redesignation and apply for an EAD..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Date of publication:
2022-09-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Shadow government claims with ethnic army allies to control 53% of nation’s territory but West remains reluctant to provide assistance
Description:
"Just over a year ago, Myanmar’s shadow government declared a defensive war against the military junta that seized power in a February 1, 2021, democracy-suspending coup.
The junta’s unpopular rule has moved from disaster to disaster, driving the economy into ruins and sparking resistance to its rule that has spread civil war across the country to an unprecedented scale.
In a speech earlier this month, Duwa Lashi La, acting president of the anti-coup National Unity Government (NUG), stated that it and anti-military “ethnic armed organizations” (EAOs) now control more than half of Myanmar’s geography.
“Amid our territorial dominance and as our military capabilities have strengthened, the operations, territorial control and public administration of our partner EROs have significantly improved,” he stated, referring to the newly-popular and alternative acronym for the ethnic militias, “ethnic revolutionary organizations.”
A recently-released report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, a group of former UN experts, argued that the junta has effective control over less than a fifth of the country’s territory while the NUG and its allies control 53%. The rest is contested, according to the report.
Estimates on who controls what in Myanmar are complex and contested, though. Yet Western democracies are, slowly and unevenly, beginning to engage more with the NUG. Malaysia is leading the charge for greater recognition of it by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
And there are now rising calls from some in the Western establishment for either outright recognition of the NUG as Myanmar’s legitimate government or at least greater financial support.
“It needs support—and especially money—from the West. If America recognized it as the legitimate government, the NUG could claim the US$1 billion in Burmese assets that America froze after the coup,” argued a recent article in The Economist headlined “Myanmar’s shadow government deserves more help.”
But there’s still scant interest among Western democracies to open channels with some of Myanmar’s EAOs that analysts say are providing essential support to hundreds of thousands displaced by the conflict or refuge to those targeted by the junta.
The US position on the EAOs is non-recognition with no direct engagement, said Zachary Abuza, professor of Southeast Asian studies at the Washington-based National War College.
Most likely that is because some of them are involved in illicit narcotic production, although that is “short-sighted,” he said, as only a few EAOs are involved in the drug trade. Of those that are, most have sided with the junta or are not taking sides in the civil war. Almost all of them are in Shan state.
“The EAOs control vast swaths of territory. Four of the largest are now allied – or at least aligned – with the NUG,” Abuza said. “They will have a seat at the table in a future government, especially should there be a negotiated settlement that leads to a genuine federal democracy.”
The NUG, formed by members of the coup-ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) and anti-military activists, has vowed to introduce a new federal system if it is able eventually to remove the junta from power.
Representatives of eight EAOs, either as direct participants or part of local consultative councils, are part of the National Unity Consultative Council, a consultative platform between the NUG, EAOs, civilian activists and non-profit organizations.
Certain anti-military People’s Defense Forces, or PDFs, are actively working with the EAOs, which are known to provide training and security. The NUG has control over many PDFs but not all, including several fighting in fierce battles against the Tatmadaw in Sagaing Region.
According to one recent estimate, 13 of the NUG’s 26-strong cabinet are from ethnic nationalities, including the acting president, Duwa Lashi La, and Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than.
While four major EAOs are cooperating intensively with the NUG, another three or four are only quietly collaborating, according to the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar report. Around a dozen more oppose the junta but are not actively supporting the NUG.
The well-armed Arakan Army, active in Rakhine and Chin states, has not formally aligned itself with the NUG but recently clashed with the Tatmadaw after a ceasefire period and now appears to see its future best served in a federal Myanmar.
According to some observers and analysts, the coup has also altered ethnic relations in Myanmar.
“The coup has prompted a shift in how much of the Burman majority views ethnic armed groups and minorities’ demands for a fairer distribution of political power,” argued a paper by the International Crisis Group, a think tank.
“Decades of propaganda had castigated minorities as the cause of Myanmar’s political problems, but Burmans angry at the regime now view ethnic grievances much more empathetically,” it added.
Last year, the NUG and its allies published their Federal Democracy Charter, a roadmap of how they intend to rule during a transitional phase — meaning current conditions amid divided control of the country — and then once the junta is ousted.
“Some of the major EROs are also deliberating options for re-orienting their existing constitutional frameworks to the new situation, as they gain increasing autonomy and responsibilities for local populations,” stated the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar report
“Continued negotiation and implementation of the Federal Democracy Charter, widened to include other EROs and political parties, could lead to these various systems developing into a viable federal and democratic structure that would be able to assume the rights and responsibilities of the state.”
Myanmar’s numerous and long-fighting ethnic armies are far from homogenous and are warring for different demands. Indeed, some are in open conflict with one another in their states. Shan state, Myanmar’s largest by territory, is particularly rumbustious.
Many are taking a wait-and-see approach and historically have distrusted both the military and the NLD, the party of deposed and now-jailed Aung San Suu Kyi who failed to live up to democratic expectations among many EAOs.
The powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA), the country’s largest narcotics-trafficking militia with as many as 30,000 under arms, is still fence-sitting.
The Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), meanwhile, at first declared its support for the Civil Disobedience Movement, a series of anti-coup actions in early 2021, but has since held talks with the junta.
In April, ten EAOs attended peace talks with the junta. But fewer attended second-round talks last month, according to media reports. Some objected that the NUG, which the junta considers a “terrorist organization”, was not a party to the discussions.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the junta chief and coup-maker, has proposed that ethnic armies sign ceasefires and be absorbed into the national military – a rejected suggestion that has been made by military leaders since the 1980s.
In 2015, during the quasi-democratic presidency of Thein Sein, a military appointee, ten ethnic armed groups signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The larger and more relevant EAOs did not sign the deal, which was widely panned as a farce by analysts and observers.
Now, they argue that Western governments need to rethink their approach to certain EAOs because they will play a key role in a post-junta Myanmar if the NUG wins.
Scot Marciel, a former US ambassador to Myanmar, argued in an essay last month that the international community needs to “increase public and private engagement with the NUG and other key actors who are active against the junta, including the critically important ethnic armed organizations and leaders of the civil disobedience movement.”
Foreign powers, the analysts say, need a more nuanced position that allows them to engage different EAOs. That must be done on a case-by-case basis; Western capitals could even learn a few things from how China has engaged its favored EAOs, including most crucially the UWSA and to a lesser extent the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
“The Chinese arm them, but in return expect them to protect Chinese economic interests. They have a diplomatic and security flexibility that the US simply refuses to give itself,” said Abuza.
Foreign assistance has long been provided in EAO-controlled areas through local affiliates of these groups. But because few foreign governments recognize them officially, funding and support has to go through intermediaries, explained Kim Jolliffe, a researcher on Myanmar politics.
This is an increasingly problematic dynamic as the escalating civil war decimates news areas of the country previously unperturbed by conflict, including in Sagaing Region and Chin state.
Vital assistance to Myanmar’s many impoverished regions has been disrupted by the conflict, with the UN estimating in May that more than one million people have been internally displaced nationwide.
It is thus now “crucial” that greater social and humanitarian assistance is channeled to and in coordination with EAOs and the NUG, argues Jolliffe.
“This cannot continue through piecemeal grants to community-based organizations only. There need to be foreign commitments to establishing a much more comprehensive aid mechanism with direct participation of the EROs and NUG as the responsible local authorities and social service departments,” Jolliffe added.
“Foreign democracies also need to firmly back these groups politically,” he said, meaning through monetary assistance and diplomatic support to their civilian wings.
Neither a spokesperson for the US State Department nor the European Commission responded to Asia Times’ requests for comment on the issues of recognizing and funneling assistance through the NUG and EAOs.
According to Roshni Kapur, an independent researcher based in Singapore, while direct military and financial support to EAOs are for now off the table, “Western governments can reach out to these groups through unconventional ways including humanitarian assistance, capacity building and distribution of vaccines.”
“Working with rebel groups could be a better alternative to deliver the much-needed assistance,” she added, noting that many of the EAOs are key providers of education and healthcare in local communities.
Several EAOs are also willing to build better relations with the West, noted Salai Samuel Hmung, a research officer of the SEARBO project, an academic research and advocacy program.
“Since the coup, some EAOs, especially those fighting against the military, have been able to extend their influence in domestic politics with public support,” he said. “The West cannot ignore their influence and their role in shaping the course of the revolution and the country’s future.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2022-09-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"NEW YORK – A delegation of parliamentarians from Southeast Asia and Europe urged officials at the United Nations, U.S. State Department, and U.S. Congress to support the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar in its struggle against the brutal military junta established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing after the illegal coup on 1 February 2021.
The delegation traveled to New York and Washington, D.C., and presented to a variety of stakeholders the preliminary findings and recommendations of the International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar, organized by ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).
The delegation included Heidi Hautala, Vice President of the European Parliament and Chairperson of the IPI; Charles Santiago, Malaysian MP and Chairperson of APHR; and APHR Board Members Mercy Chriesty Barends, member of the Indonesian House of Representatives, U Shwe Maung, former Myanmar Member of Parliament, and Tom Villarin, former Congressman from the Philippines.
“We have impressed upon the stakeholders we have met the necessity for governments committed to supporting democracy in Myanmar to acknowledge the National Unity Government (NUG) as the legitimate authority in the country, increase and coordinate pressure on the junta, launch initiatives of capacity building for the NUG and other pro-democracy forces, and scale up humanitarian aid channeled it through civil society organizations,” said Charles Santiago.
The APHR-IPI delegation held meetings with the Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ilze Brands Kehris, as well as officials from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR). In New York, the delegation also took part in a meeting hosted by the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Dato Sri Saifuddin Abdullah, with several members of the NUG.
In Washington, the delegation met with members of Congress, including Representative Ilhan Omar, also a member of the IPI, as well as officials from the State Department.
“The United States has an important role to play in exerting pressure on the junta and supporting the pro-democracy forces. We called for the imposition of sanctions on the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), one of the main sources of funding for the Myanmar military, as the European Union has already done. We believe that those governments and international institutions that claim to support democracy in Myanmar should cut the flow of funds to the junta and do so in a coordinated and consistent manner,” said Heidi Hautala.
As the Myanmar military continues to engage in acts which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may amount to “crimes against humanity and war crimes.” It is throwing the country into chaos, and the international community’s response has fallen woefully short, despite repeated expressions of concern.
In order to analyze this failure and offer solutions to the impasse, APHR decided to launch the IPI in June. The IPI has held a total of six public hearings, as well as two special and three confidential hearings, with experts, diplomats, politicians, and activists from Myanmar and other countries. IPI committee members also conducted a fact-finding mission to the Thai-Myanmar border, where they met with over dozen civil society organizations and other stakeholders. The IPI will release a report with its full findings and recommendations in early November..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-09-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"Civilian Harm Report (Part Two): Violent civilian deaths in North-West Myanmar
During Myanmar Witness’ investigation into fires and military activity in the North-West regions of Sagaing (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း), Chin (ချင်းပြည်နယ်) and Magway (မကွေးတိုင်း), reports of civilian harm and multiple violent deaths emerged.
Following on from Myanmar Witness’ joint investigation with the BBC into killings in Kani Township, Sagaing (စစ်ကိုင်းတိ) in May 2021, Myanmar Witness has identified and analysed a number of incidents involving the discovery of significant numbers of corpses, allegedly the victims of mass killings by the Myanmar military. Each of these followed reports of anti-regime protests and clashes between the military and defence forces in the local area.
This short article provides an overview of Part Two of Myanmar Witness’ report ‘Civilian Harm: An investigation into the impact of two military operations in North-West Myanmar’. This analysed and verified evidence of multiple killings in the same areas that the military operations widely known as Anawrahta (အနော်ရထာ စစ်ဆင်ရေး) and Alaungmintayar (အလောင်းမင်းတရား စစ်ဆင်ရေး) occurred.
Part One revealed how the use of fire and destruction of villages in these North-West regions aligned closely with these military operations. To read the full report, download the PDF here.
Killings of multiple people
Myanmar Witness verified three separate incidents alleged to be mass killings committed by the Myanmar military in the north-west region:
18 people found dead in Myin Thar (မြင်သား), Gangaw (ဂန့်ဂေါ) Township, Magway (မကွေးမြို့) in September 2021 (partially verified). The dead reportedly included minors, the elderly and the physically disabled.
11 people found dead in Done Taw (ဒုံးတော), Salingyi (ဆားလင်းကြီး), Sagaing (စစ်ကိုင်းတိ) in December 2021 (fully verified). The dead reportedly included minors and an elderly women.
Six people found dead in Thit Seint Gyi (သစ်ဆိမ့်ကြီး), Wetlet (ဝက်လက်) township, Sagaing (စစ်ကိုင်းတိ) in January 2022 (fully verified).
This summary report focuses on the case study of Salingyi (ဆားလင်းကြီး) Township in the Sagaing (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း) Region. To read the other case studies, download the full report.
Salingyi Township, Sagaing - December, 2021 (fully verified)
Background
[Warning: Graphic] On 7 December 2021, Myanmar military troops reportedly raided the village of Done Taw (ဒုံးတော), Salingyi (ဆားလင်းကြီး) Township in Sagaing (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း) Region. . This was, according to a report by Myanmar Now, following a mine ambush on military vehicles on the Monywa-Pathein highway near North Yamar bridge, located about 300 metres from the village. Salingyi (ဆားလင်းကြီး) is an area which was reportedly targeted by a convoy-centred military operation in November 2021. Salingyi (ဆားလင်းကြီး) residents have reportedly engaged in anti-regime protests - one of which occurred just days before this incident.
Locals interviewed by Myanmar Now state that military soldiers entered the village from near the Pathein-Monywa road at 0800. Done Taw (ဒုံးတော) has only one entrance and exit route, through the Shwe Myin Tin farm on the bank of the Chindwin River. According to villagers and a local PDF leader (reported by Myanmar Now and The Irrawaddy), 11 villagers were reportedly captured, set on fire, and burned to death. A video uploaded to social media by various media outlets shows the aftermath of the attack, including the burnt remains of bodies (graphic footage – available on request). The video’s voiceover states: “They were shot and stabbed while forced to kneel, with their hands tied”.
Verification
Myanmar Witness can verify that the location where these bodies were found was just outside of Done Taw (ဒုံးတော) village, in farmland located at 22.142916, 95.062057 (Figure 48). However, it cannot be verified that this was the area where the people were killed, whether they had their hands tied, or whether they were dead before or after the fire started.
It’s also reported by the Irrawaddy, as well as elsewhere online, that a Done Taw (ဒုံးတော) resident, Daw Win Yi, who was over 50, was also killed by the Myanmar military in farmland outside the village. While images of a deceased elderly woman have been collected, Myanmar Witness could not verify where these particular photos were taken.
According to the official NUG twitter account, the NUG were supplied with a victim’s list by a local PDF group (Figure 49). This included f
our victims under the age of 18 : Arkar Soe (14), Hsan Min Oo (17), Than Myint Aung (17), Kyaw Thet (17). Most of the victims were unrecognisable as a result of the impact of the fire, except for 17-year-old Than Myint Aung, who was identifiable from his ear piercing, according to Myanmar Now.
To read the other two case studies, download the full report here.
Conclusion
Through a detailed investigation, this report demonstrates the grave civilian impacts of military operations in north-west Myanmar. The widespread destruction of communities along military routes represents a worrying trend. The verified reports of civilian deaths, which eye witnesses attribute to the military, indicates the precarious situation everyday citizens face across Myanmar.
Myanmar Witness is still verifying footage related to further alleged killings in the north-west and other regions. These will be documented in a forthcoming report. Many trends documented in this report have been seen across the country more broadly, for example, see Myanmar Witness’ published reports: Burning Myanmar, Moso Village Christmas Eve Killings, and Using Pamphlets for Propaganda, Misinformation, Intimidate and Division.
To read a summary of Part One of the report - on the use of fire and the destruction of civilian property - go to the reports page of the Myanmar Witness website. To read the full report, download the PDF.
Myanmar Witness continues to document and investigate evidence of possible human rights abuses in Myanmar. These findings will be made available on the Myanmar Witness website, as and when they are completed..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2022-09-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Sub-title:
Decision Opens Door for Targeted Sanctions Against Junta
Description:
"On Tuesday, September 20, Japan’s Defense Ministry announced that as of 2023 it would no longer accept new military personnel from the Myanmar military for training in Japan. The ministry cited the junta’s execution of four pro-democracy activists in July as a major factor in its decision.
“We decided it’s not appropriate to continue the military cooperation and exchange in its current form,” said Takeshi Aoki, a spokesperson for the Defense Ministry. However, two officers and nine cadets who are currently receiving training at Japan’s National Defense Academy and Japan Self-Defense Forces facilities will remain until their programs finish.
Since 2015, Japan has accepted cadets and officers from Myanmar under article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, which permits training and educating foreign nationals in Defense Ministry facilities with the defense minister’s approval. Following Myanmar military’s coup in February 2021, Japan accepted two officers and two cadets in 2021 and another two officers and two cadets in 2022.
In May, Human Rights Watch and Justice For Myanmar located Myanmar Air Force Lt. Col. Hlwan Moe, who received training at Japan’s Air Command and Staff College from August 2016 to March 2017, at Magway Air Base in Myanmar’s central Magway Region. Military units deployed at the air base have been implicated in serious abuses, including possible indiscriminate airstrikes in Magway. In August, Human Rights Watch found that Myanmar Army Brig. Gen. Tin Soe, who received training at Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force Staff College from August 2016 to March 2017, was based at Eastern Command headquarters from August 2021 to July 2022. Eastern Command oversees operations in southern Shan and Karenni (Kayah) States and its forces were responsible for a massacre of civilians and other atrocities.
The Defense Ministry’s decision to suspend the training program is critical to ensuring that Japan does not risk becoming complicit in Myanmar military abuses. It is a small and long overdue step, but one that should embolden the Japanese government to join with other democracies that are taking stronger action against the junta. Japan should publicly voice its support for the draft Myanmar resolution that Britain circulated at the United Nations Security Council. That resolution reportedly calls for a global arms embargo on Myanmar that would prohibit all military training and imposes sanctions on the junta..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-09-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"1. The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) is deeply saddened by the
death of at least (13) civilians, including (7) children, on September 16 as a
result of the heinous air and ground attacks and killings by the militaryjunta
on residents of a self-supporting school in Let Yet Kone village in Depayin
township in Sagaing region. In addition, approximately (20) injured students
and teachers have been arbitrarily arrested.
2. Children are the country's future; it is completely unacceptable that
the military terrorist group is killing, torturing, and arresting our children in
cold blood for their own benefit This is not the first time the military junta
committed atrocities. The military junta is an inhumane and ferocious
mercenary army that has targeted and murdered all religions and ethnicities
that opposed them, including children, s ince Myanmar gained independence,
through more than (70) years of civil war.
3. This is because the law grants them total impunity from all the injustices
they have committed.
4. Therefore, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) would like to make
the following request to the entire public and all the revolutionary forces:
(a) The entire public should rise up and continue to resist where it is able to
in order to prevent the injustices from continuing.
(b) With the common aim of achieving a Myanmar free from military
dictatorship, revolutionary forces should maintain its strong unity and
continue resisting together in the revolution.
(c) The international community should support the process of seeking
accountability of the military junta that has blatantly violated
international humanitarian law; it should bring justice for victims
through international legal mechanisms and help end impunity.
(d) Enforce a comprehensive arms embargo, including on the supply of jet
fuel.
(e) The international community should provide humanitarian aid.
5. The National Unity Consultative Council is deeply Condemned this brutal
attack and will continue in its efforts to ensure that all the above-mentioned
actions are implemented..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-09-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group
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30.74 KB
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Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-09-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group
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"Council Concludes General Debate on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development
Thomas Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, told the Human Rights Council this afternoon that conditions for untold numbers of innocent people in Myanmar had gone from bad to worse to horrific. Around 1.3 million people had been displaced; and the military had destroyed more than 28,000 homes, burning entire villages to the ground. The number of innocent people who had been killed or injured by landmines was rising significantly. There was a looming food crisis and a dramatic increase in childhood malnutrition; women were losing economic and social gains; and 130,000 Rohingya remained confined in de facto internment camps.
Mr. Andrews said the people of Myanmar were frustrated and angered by Member States that were working to prop up this illegal and brutal military junta with funding, trade, weapons, and a veneer of legitimacy. They were also disappointed by those nations that voiced support for them, but then failed to back up their words with action. The international response to this deepening crisis had failed. Member States needed to take stronger, more effective action to deprive the junta and its forces of revenue, weapons and legitimacy. A coalition of nations needed to be established that could build a coordinated strategy on the crisis.
Conflict was spreading throughout Myanmar, with more and more civilians taking up arms against the junta, said Mr. Andrews. Ethnic armed organizations were increasingly engaging junta forces. Clashes between the Arakan Army and junta forces were escalating. Newly formed People’s Defence Forces were now attacking the military throughout the country. The junta was deeply unpopular in every corner of Myanmar. The junta was using aid as a weapon by obstructing deliveries to displaced populations and communities that they perceived to be aligned with pro-democracy forces. Untold numbers of innocent people had been left without access to food, medicine and the means to survive.
In the ensuing discussion, speakers said that for the past five years, the human rights situation in Myanmar had been catastrophic. The illegal coup of 2021 had plunged the country into a situation in which the entire population was held hostage by the military junta. Mass atrocities continued to be committed against the entire population. Full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access was essential for all persons in need. It was necessary to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel, and to create the necessary conditions for a voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The conflict also threatened peace and stability in the region, including India and in Bangladesh, where a durable solution had not been found to the Rohingya refugee crisis.
One speaker said not listening to the State concerned ran counter to the Human Rights Council’s commitment to peaceful cooperation, and there should be understanding for the situation of Myanmar, and therefore the international community should seek means for cooperation. The unilateral coercive measures imposed on Myanmar should be lifted immediately. The Human Rights Council should cease to use politicised mandates against countries of the South, as they ran counter to the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and should tackle issues around the world in a cooperative and lasting manner.
Speaking in the interactive dialogue were Luxembourg on behalf of a group of countries, European Union, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Sweden on behalf of a group of countries, Sierra Leone, Republic of Korea, France, Australia, India, Austria, and Venezuela.
At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded its general debate on agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development.
Some speakers said that the protection and promotion of human rights was vital, and only when the right to development was guaranteed could there be guarantees of the other human rights. Economic, social and cultural rights were vital in the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, which had pushed millions into poverty and unemployment, showing the weakened public system. The impact of this crisis and the environmental crisis had shown that this was a key moment in human history. Human rights had to be integrated in all recovery processes and plans, and the international human rights framework should be used in the progress towards a more harmonious international system in harmony with the environment, ensuring the survival of humanity.
Speaking in the general debate were the following non-governmental organizations: Law Council of Australia on behalf of International Bar Association, Disability Association of Tavana, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Soka Gakkai International on behalf of Instituto de Desenvolvimento e Direitos Humanos and International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mouvement National des Jeunes Patriotes du Mali, China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS), Instituto de Desenvolvimento e Direitos Humanos, YouChange China Social Entrepreneur Foundation, International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture on behalf of Advocates for Human Rights and Ensemble contre la Peine de Mort, China Foundation for Human Rights Development, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Centre Europe - tiers monde, Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Harm Reduction Association (IHRA), Friends World Committee for Consultation, Youth Parliament for SDG, Asociacion HazteOir.org, China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetian Culture (CAPDTC), Make Mothers Matter, Edmund Rice International Limited, Shaanxi Patriotic Volunteer Association, Centre for Gender Justice and Women Empowerment, Physicians for Human Rights, Conscience and Peace Tax International (CPTI), and Association pour la défense des droits de l'homme et des revendications démocratiques/culturelles du peuple Azerbaidjanais-Iran - « ARC ».
Also speaking were Mother of Hope Cameroon Common Initiative Group, Organization for Poverty Alleviation and Development, Global Institute for Water, Environment and Health, Associazione Comunita Papa Giovanni XXIII on behalf of a group of organisations, Meezaan Center for Human Rights, Interfaith International, Association Ma'onah for Human Rights and Immigration, Peace Track Initiative, Rencontre Africaine pour la defense des droits de l'homme, Association Internationale pour l'égalité des femmes, Tumuku Development and Cultural Union (TACUDU), Beijing Guangming Charity Foundation, Il Cenacolo, Global Welfare Association, United Nations Association of China, Partners For Transparency, Al-Ayn Social Care Foundation, Jubilee Campaign, Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples, Caritas Internationalis (International Confederation of Catholic Charities), Al Baraem Association for Charitable Work, Right Livelihood Award Foundation, Africa Culture Internationale, World Muslim Congress, Istituto Internazionale Maria Ausiliatrice delle Salesiane di Don Bosco, International Muslim Women's Union, Peace Brigades International, International Union of Socialist Youth, International Commission of Jurists, CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Sikh Human Rights Group, Action Canada for Population and Development, International Humanist and Ethical Union, Medical Support Association for Underprivileged Iranian Patients, Association for Defending Victims of Terrorism, Beijing Changier Education Foundation, Promotion du Développement Economique et Social - PDES, Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy, Organisation internationale pour les pays les moins avancés (OIPMA), International Action for Peace & Sustainable Development, Global Appreciation and Skills Training Network, and iuventum e.V..
Also taking the floor were African Green Foundation International, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, Coordination des Associations et des Particuliers pour la Liberté de Conscience, Alliance Defending Freedom on behalf of Associazione Comunita Papa Giovanni XXIII, Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain Inc, Iraqi Development Organization, Alsalam Foundation, Villages Unis (United Villages), Chunhui Children's Foundation, Maat for Peace, Development and Human Rights Association, International Human Rights Association of American Minorities (IHRAAM), United Towns Agency for North-South Cooperation, PRAHAR, Anglican Consultative Council, solidarité Suisse-Guinée, Association D'Entraide Médicale Guinée, Zero Pauvre Afrique, Synergie Feminine Pour La Paix Et Le Developpement Durable, Community Human Rights and Advocacy Centre (CHRAC), and Commission africaine des promoteurs de la santé et des droits de l'homme.
Speaking in right of reply were the United States, Azerbaijan, China, Iran, and Armenia.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-first regular session can be found here.
The Council will next meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 22 September, when it will conclude the interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. This will be followed by an interactive dialogue on the report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Myanmar.
General Debate on Agenda Item Three on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development
The general debate on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, started in the previous meting and a summary can be found here.
General Debate
In the debate, many speakers said that the protection and promotion of human rights was vital, and only when the right to development was guaranteed could there be guarantees of the other human rights. States should engage civil society and recognise lacunae in their protection of human rights, and take more seriously the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals by monitoring their impact on the ground.
States had a major responsibility to create ripe conditions, at the international and national levels, to ensure the right to development, including combatting militarism and attacks on the international system. Unilateral coercive measures should not be used to implement iniquitous systems; there should be an inclusive international system based on the respect of human rights. Some Member States had not participated in the elaboration on a draft convention on the right to development, which was regretted, as it was essential for the implementation and guarantees of the right. The text should be progressive enough for the expectations for a text drafted in the modern period to be fulfilled.
The staggering challenges facing the world required international efforts to review the economic integration of countries as a priority to ensure economic balance and development, as well as food security, which was still hanging in the balance. The challenges were fundamental, and were related to the right to development as well as the need to meet environmental challenges whilst ensuring sustainable development.
Governments should respect and observe the independence of the judiciary, and ensure that proceedings were undertaken in an accountable and transparent manner. All States had obligations under international law on arms transfers, and should respect these rights, and the risk of arms being used against children should be assessed at sales.
There was concern for the situation of elderly persons living in countries under international sanctions, as there was for persons with disabilities, who found access to resources and aid limited by the sanctions. All vulnerable people and groups should be protected to a greater extent, including from economic declines. Human rights education was vital for helping those in situations of danger and vulnerability. There should be a Special Rapporteur for unilateral coercive measures.
Economic, social and cultural rights were vital in the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, which had pushed millions into poverty and unemployment, showing the weakened public system. The impact of this crisis and the environmental crisis had shown that this was a key moment in human history. Human rights had to be integrated in all recovery processes and plans, and the international human rights framework should be used in the progress towards a more harmonious international system in harmony with the environment, ensuring the survival of humanity. Economic, social and cultural rights were basic rights, which covered many rights, including access to safe housing and drinking water, and the right to development was essential for achieving these rights.
The pandemic had disproportionately affected youth, and the digital divide had excluded many from a digital education, particularly girls. The pandemic had taken a toll on the mental health of young people, leaving them unable to contribute to society. It had hindered youth volunteering. A Special Rapporteur on youth and an annual youth forum should be created to advance and mainstream youth rights, including the right to decent work. The Human Rights Council must play a driving role in ensuring the rights of young people.
The right to freedom of expression was enshrined in many international instruments, however, around the world many organizations, including those of the media, did not hesitate to insult those who asserted this right, seeking to limit the rights and freedoms of those who asserted their rights through various means, including violent ones.
The right to objection to military service was of concern, as there were still some States that did not recognise this right, forcing objectors to flee their own countries. The right deteriorated further in situations of armed conflict. Freedoms of thought, conscience and religion were non-derogable, and the work of the Council was vital for the protection of these rights, which were relevant to the right to conscientious objection to military service.
Gender and sexual violence were used against human rights defenders, and to repress opponents in various areas of the world, and many journalists faced discrimination and harassment. Tough measures should be applied to those States violating the rights of journalists and media workers. Human rights defenders found their ability to act restricted, with a lack of security and access to justice, with direct repercussions on their ability to function effectively. Human rights defenders were vital for the protection of human rights, and should be protected, as without them, there could be no achievement of rights; State legislation restricting the scope of their activities must be erased.
Other issues raised included that natural resources were being exploited, resulting in the economic deprivation of indigenous people, with concomitant effects on their health and extreme poverty. Further, a tragic reality faced migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees seeking safety in Europe, and there should be prompt, impartial and independent investigations into their deaths, as well as into the trafficking of migrants. Sexual minorities remained persecuted in many areas of the world, and they could suffer life imprisonment or even death, and the Council should examine these situations and ensure that the States involved respected the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex plus persons and groups, whilst punishing crimes committed against them. Illegal migration had a serious impact on indigenous rights, due to forced integration and assimilation, and caused great misery. The Human Rights Council should examine this issue in order to better safeguard the human rights of indigenous people. The Council should put pressure on militias to release all those in arbitrary detention.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Presentation
THOMAS ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said that conditions had gone from bad to worse to horrific for untold numbers of innocent people in Myanmar. Around 1.3 million people had been displaced; the military had destroyed more than 28,000 homes, burning entire villages to the ground. The number of innocent people who had been killed or injured by landmines was rising significantly. There was a looming food crisis and a dramatic increase in childhood malnutrition; women were losing economic and social gains; and 130,000 Rohingya remained confined in de facto internment camps.
The people of Myanmar were frustrated and angered by Member States that were working to prop up this illegal and brutal military junta with funding, trade, weapons, and a veneer of legitimacy. They were also disappointed by those nations that voiced support for them, but then failed to back up their words with action. The Myanmar military was committing war crimes and crimes against humanity daily, including sexual violence, torture, deliberate targeting of civilians, and murder. The junta was holding at least 84 political prisoners on death row; and more than 12,000, including 295 children, remained arbitrarily detained in deplorable conditions, subject to torture.
Conflict was spreading throughout the country, with more and more civilians taking up arms against the junta. Clashes between the Arakan Army and junta forces were escalating. Newly formed People’s Defence Forces were now attacking the military throughout the country. The junta was deeply unpopular in every corner of Myanmar. The junta was using aid as a weapon by obstructing deliveries to displaced populations and communities that they perceived to be aligned with pro-democracy forces. Untold numbers of innocent people had been left without access to food, medicine and the means to survive.
The international response to this deepening crisis had failed. Member States needed to take stronger, more effective action to deprive the junta and its forces of revenue, weapons and legitimacy. A coalition of nations needed to be established that could build a coordinated strategy on the crisis. The amount of humanitarian aid that was available to address the crisis was grossly inadequate. More than 80 per cent of the United Nations Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan remained unfunded. Local organizations needed strong support and flexibility from Member States and donors. The crisis was forcing many to flee Myanmar, embarking on perilous journeys across land and sea, and it was imperative that the Governments of host countries and the international community protected their human rights.
Mr. Andrews said that he had spoken with more than 100 Myanmar human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists, aid workers, youth leaders, and women’s rights advocates. He had been deeply inspired by their courage and their tireless efforts to resist the illegal military junta. These people needed the world’s support. Many in Myanmar had come to the conclusion that the world had forgotten them, or simply did not care. The people of Myanmar desperately needed all Member States to re-think status quo policies that were clearly not working, and to stand with and for them as they fought for their lives, their children, and their future.
Discussion
In the ensuing discussion, speakers said, among other things, that for the past five years, the human rights situation in Myanmar had been catastrophic. The illegal coup of 2021 had plunged the country into a situation in which the entire population was held hostage by the military junta. Mass atrocities continued to be committed against the entire population. Full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access was essential for all persons in need. It was necessary to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel and to create the necessary conditions for a voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons. All acts of violence against civilians must end, including sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against women, children, human rights defenders, religious minorities, journalists and media workers. All those arbitrarily detained must be released immediately and unconditionally. All United Nations Member States should end all supply, sale and transfer of arms to the Myanmar armed and security forces.
Some speakers said that the conflict in Myanmar also threatened peace and stability in the region, including India and in Bangladesh, where a durable solution had not been found to the Rohingya refugee crisis. There should be meaningful accountability, justice, and a permanent solution to the crisis, with an immediate end to the violations against all inhabitants of Myanmar, including the Rohingya, who should have their citizenship restored, and should be repatriated to their country immediately and without delay, in full security. The complete human rights catastrophe continued, and there should be an immediate end to all mass killings, torture, including of children, and gender- and sexually-based violence. The military should restore the de facto moratorium on the death penalty, and release all political prisoners, including minors, whilst ensuring justice and reparation for victims. Further acts of violence against unarmed civilians should cease immediately, and the country should be allowed to return to democratic rule. The international community needed to take further steps to halt the deteriorating situation.
A number of speakers said the efforts of the Association of South East Asian Nations and the United Nations Mission in Myanmar were applauded, as was the Bangladesh Government’s sustained efforts to provide for the needs of the Rohingya people it hosted. International efforts should continue to find a peaceful solution to the problem. The Special Rapporteur was commended for his work and his commitment to shedding light on the situation. The international community needed to remain committed to restoring peace and security to Myanmar. A peaceful solution involving all stakeholders was the only way forward towards resolving the humanitarian and national crisis.
One speaker said that not listening to the State concerned ran counter to the Human Rights Council’s commitment to peaceful cooperation. The report was lopsided and contained allegations that were unverifiable. Politicised mandates did nothing to advance human rights, and should be rooted out of the work of the Human Rights Council. The unilateral coercive measures imposed on Myanmar should be lifted immediately. The Human Rights Council should cease to use politicised mandates against countries of the South, as they ran counter to the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and should tackle issues around the world in a cooperative and lasting manner..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2022-09-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"21 September 2022: The United Nations (UN) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) can no longer wait to take action on the side of the Myanmar people after the Myanmar military junta committed its deadliest attack against children since the attempted coup began. Without action, then they are complicit in the junta’s crimes, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
At least 11 children were killed and 17 injured after junta air strikes against a school in a monastery in Let Yet Kone village in Tabayin Township, Sagaing Region of Myanmar on Friday, 16 September.
The assault began when two junta helicopters fired machine guns and heavy weapons into the school in sustained fire which lasted for an hour. Junta troops then entered the monastic compound where the school is located and continued firing indiscriminately. The airstrikes could not have taken place without authorisation from commanders who report to Commander-in-Chief of the military, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing through their chain of command.
“The military junta attacked and killed the Let Yet Kone school children in cold blood. Altogether, the junta has killed, tortured or taken hostage hundreds of children since the attempted coup began, and driven thousands into displacement, hunger and fear,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “The United Nations and ASEAN are allowing this to happen. Children in Myanmar will continue to suffer and die at the hands of this barbaric military until it is stopped, and its leaders finally brought to justice. How many more innocent children need to be killed for the United Nations and ASEAN to take definite action?”
For almost twelve months, the junta has waged a brutal offensive against communities in Sagaing in response to widespread popular resistance in the Region to the attempted coup. The relentless campaign has involved massacres of unarmed civilians, rape, arson, looting, destruction of food and medical supplies, and shelling of schools and places of worship.
The junta has resorted to the use of mass atrocities across the country in an effort to crush anti-coup resistance which has become entrenched nationwide.
Resistance organisations, represented by the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), control more of the territory of Myanmar than the junta and are expanding provision of services, including education, in those areas. But the resistance is yet to receive significant diplomatic, financial or humanitarian support from the international community.
“The attempted coup, which is the latest bloody manifestation of Myanmar’s military-induced crises, began twenty months ago,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “What has the United Nations done in that time, besides sending envoys and agency officials to shake hands with the junta? What has ASEAN done, besides making futile appeals to the junta? Where is the protection for the Myanmar people and their children? When the junta’s full crimes are finally accounted for, the glaring complicity of international actors will be laid bare.”
The Myanmar military has never faced justice for its decades of atrocities committed against the Myanmar people, including attacks against children. The members of SAC-M have been calling, since before the attempted coup began, for the investigation and prosecution of Min Aung Hlaing and his senior generals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Those calls grow more urgent by the day.
The NUG, as the legitimate government of Myanmar, has sought to advance accountability in Myanmar through international mechanisms. It has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in Myanmar (ICC), dating back to 2002, by lodging a declaration with the Court under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute.
“The junta’s horrific attack on Let Yet Kone school last week is consistent with the military’s 70-year history of brutality and criminality,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “Criminal accountability is needed to stop history from continuing to repeat itself. The generals fear justice – and rightly so. The ICC must act on the NUG’s article 12(3) declaration, which is now more than a year old.”
To protect the lives of the Myanmar people and bring the leaders of the military junta to justice, SAC-M is calling on:
– The UN Security Council to put to a vote a resolution on Myanmar to impose a comprehensive global arms embargo on the junta, to impose targeted financial and economic sanctions against the junta, and to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC;
– The UN General Assembly to fully accept the credentials of Myanmar’s representative to the UN, NUG appointee Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, with all the rights and privileges of any other member state, including representation in all other UN bodies and forums;
– ASEAN to engage formally with the NUG, accept the NUG as the representative of Myanmar in ASEAN meetings and forums, and use the ASEAN Summit in November to reach a new agreement on how to respond to the junta-made crises in Myanmar, developed in consultation with the NUG;
– UN officials, agencies and other humanitarian actors to cease all activities that grant legitimacy to the junta, including presenting credentials to Min Aung Hlaing and participating in photo opportunities with the generals and their collaborators, and adhere to humanitarian principles by engaging primarily with the NUG and resistance organisations;
– The ICC to accept the NUG’s article 12(3) declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction in Myanmar dating back to 2002 and urgently expand the current investigation on the basis of the declaration..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-09-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International Criminal Court
Language:
more
Description:
"ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနေ့တွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးမှတ်တမ်းကွန်ရက်- မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ (ND-Burma ) မှ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်၏ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား အဓိက ပစ်မှတ် ထားသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ချက်ခြင်းရပ်တန့်ရန် တောင်းဆိုလိုက်သည်။ ဆယ်စုနှစ် များစွာကြာ စစ်တပ်သည် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးကို ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း လျစ် လျူရှုကာ ချိုးဖောက်ခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီး သည့်နောက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ပြစ်ဒဏ် ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ဖြင့် ပို၍ ရဲရဲတင်းတင်း ကျူးလွန်လာကြသည်။ ND-Burma သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသော ဆုတ်ယုတ်မှုများနှင့် ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို ရှုတ်ချပြီး စနစ်တကျ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထား သော စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို ချက်ခြင်း စုံစမ်းစစ် ဆေးရန် တောင်းဆိုလိုက်သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးသည် စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီးများ၏ လက်ချက်ဖြင့် ခံစားနေကြရသော ပြည်သူ များ၏ အသံကို စတင်နားထောင်၍ နိုင်ငံသားများ၏ ကောင်းကျိုးချမ်းသာကို ဖော်ဆောင်ရမည့်အစား မိမိတို့၏ အကျိုးစီးပွား တိုးပွားစေခြင်းကိုသာ ပိုမိုအလေးထား ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည်။
“ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးဆိုသည်မှာ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ကို ဆိုလိုခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအရာများသည် လူသားတိုင်းအတွက် မရှိမဖြစ်တန်ဖိုးများဖြစ်သည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်မှု အကြောင်း ပြောသည့်အခါ ဖယ်ဒရယ်စနစ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကဲ့သို့သော နိုင်ငံအတွက် တစ်ခုတည်းသော လမ်းကြောင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကို ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုနှင့် ယုံ ကြည်မှုတည်ဆောက်ရေးတို့ လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ဤနေရာတွင် တစ်ဦးနှင့်တစ်ဦး နားလည်မှု၊ စာနာမှုများ မျှ ဝေခြင်းသည် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကို တိုးတက်စေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အဓိကပြဿနာမှာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့တွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်ရာ၌ မရှိမဖြစ်လိုအပ်သော အဆိုပါတန်ဖိုးများ ကင်းမဲ့နေခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်” ဟု
နိုင်အဲမွန်- မွန်ပြည်လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ဖောင်ဒေးရှင်း (HURFOM) မှ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ပြောဆိုခဲ့သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုသမိုင်းကြောင်းတွင် အမျိုးသမီးတို့၏ အသံကို ဖယ်ထုတ် ထားပြီး ၎င်းတို့၏ ဖြည့်သွင်းတင်ပြချက်များကို လျော့ပါးစေရန် လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည်။ အမျိုးသမီးများ သည် လူဦးရေ၏ ထက်ဝက်ကို လွှမ်းခြုံထားပြီး စစ်တပ်၏ မအောင်မြင်သော ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး ညှိနှိုင်းမှု များ၏ နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ပဋိပက္ခများတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို ခံနေရသည်။ အမျိုးသမီးများ ပါဝင်လာ သည့်အခါ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး စေ့စပ်ညှိနှိုင်းမှု အောင်မြင်ရန် အလားအလာ ပိုများသည်ဟု အထောက်အထား များ အခိုင်အမာ ရှိနေပါသည်။
“အမျိုးသမီးထုရဲ့ အသံမပါတဲ့ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးဟာ ဘယ်တော့မှ မတည်မြဲနိုင်ဘူး၊ စစ်မှန်ပြီး ရေရှည်တည် တံ့တဲ့ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးဖြစ်ဖို့ဆိုရင် အမျိုးသမီးထုရဲ့ အသံတွေ ပါဝင်မှုတွေကို မဖြစ်မနေ ထည့်သွင်းရပါ မယ်။ ရှုထောင့်စုံကအသံကို လေးစားစွာနားထောင်ပြီ: ထည့်သွင်းခြင်းက ဖယ်ဒရယ်နိုင်ငံ တည်ဆောက် ရေးမှာဘဲဖြစ်ဖြစ် စစ်မှန်ပြီးတည်ငြိမ်တဲ့ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကို ဖော်ဆောင်တဲ့အခါမှာဘဲဖြစ်ဖြစ် ကောင်းမွန် တဲ့ ရလဒ်ကို ပိုင်ဆိုင်နိုင်မှာဖြစ်တယ်” လွေးပိုးကမေဲးခြိုဝ်း
– တအာင်းအမျိုးသမီးအဖွဲ့ အစည်း (TWO)
မြန်မာစစ်အာဏာရှင်သည် ၎င်းတို့၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကို မြှင့်တင်ရန်သာ စိတ်ပါဝင်စားကြောင်း တစိုက် မတ်မတ်သက်သေပြခဲ့သည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးအတွက် အဓိပ္ပါယ်ပြည့်ဝသော ဆွေးနွေးပွဲများသည် စစ်အစိုး ရဦးဆောင်သည့် စေ့စပ်ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကြောင့် စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ကျရှုံးခဲ့သည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက ၎င်းတို့ ပြည်သူများ၏ အခွင့်အရေးကို ကာကွယ်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းစဉ် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်၏ရှည်လျားပြီး နက်ရှိုင်းသော အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲရေးပျက်ပြားမှု၊ တာဝန်များနှင့် ကတိကဝတ် များကို လိုက်နာရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့သည့် သမိုင်းကြောင်းကြောင့် စစ်တပ်၏ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များကို ထုံးစံ အတိုင်း မေးခွန်းထုတ်စေခဲ့သည်။ တပ်မတော်၏ ‘ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး’ လမ်းကြောင်းသည် လိမ်လည်လှည့် ဖြားမှုနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများဖြင့်သာ ခင်းကျင်းထားသည်။
“မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးခရီးအတွက် အဓိကစိန်ခေါ်မှုတစ်ရပ်မှာ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ် ချုပ်ခွင့်ရ မျှော်မှန်းချက်များကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးသည့် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုတည် ဆောက်ရေးအစီအစဉ်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကဲ့သို့သော ယဉ်ကျေးမှုပေါင်းစုံရှိသည့် လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်း အတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၏ အကြီးကျယ်ဆုံး စမ်းသပ်မှုမှာ အစိုးရသည် တိုင်းရင်းသား လူနည်းစုများအား လူများစုနည်းတူ တန်းတူ ဆက်ဆံခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။”
ကိုအောင်ဇော်ဦး -လူ့အခွင့် အရေး ကာကွယ် မြှင့်တင်သူများအဖွဲ့ (HRDP)
ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးထိန်းသိမ်းမှုကို ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် အခြေခံမှ လုပ်ဆောင်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အရပ် ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်သူများ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) တို့သည် နိုင်ငံတကာ တာဝန်ခံမှု ယန္တရားများမှတဆင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့အား တာဝန်ခံရန် ခြေလှမ်းများလှမ်းခဲ့ကြသည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ မြေပြင်မှ ပြည်သူတို့၏ အသံကို ကြားနိုင် ရန်အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေပြုအဖွဲ့များ ပါ၀င်မှုကို တိုးမြှင့်ရန် ND-Burma မှ တိုက်တွန်းတောင်း ဆိုလိုက်သည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်သည် လမ်းကြောင်းလွဲကာ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးအလားအလာအားလုံးကို ဖျက် စီးပစ်ရုံမှတပါး မည်သည့်အရာကိုမျှ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ခြင်းမရှိသောကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး ဖော် ဆောင်မှုတွင် နေရာမရှိပါ။..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma
Date of publication:
2022-09-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Country’s military has deployed brutal violence to crush dissent since taking power in a 2021 coup but resistance is growing
Description:
"On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military took power in a coup, abruptly halting the country’s fragile transition towards democracy.
It justified the coup by alleging widespread fraud in the 2020 election – which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won by a landslide. Independent observers have rejected such claims.
In the weeks following the coup, huge numbers of people took to the streets for mass protests. The military responded with deadly violence and imposed a campaign of terror, raiding homes and arresting anyone suspected of supporting democracy.
More than 15,500 people have been arrested as of September 2022 – a number that continues to rise. Reports of torture in prisons are common.
Many resorted to taking up arms to oppose the military, forming people’s defence forces. In some cases anti-coup groups are supported by established ethnic armed organisations that have fought against the military for decades.
Faced with defiant and widespread resistance, the military has been unable to consolidate its control of the country. It has deployed increasing brutal violence to try to crush dissent.
The UN’s human rights office said earlier this year that the military’s actions might amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Almost 700,000 people have been forced to flee their homes due to conflict since the coup, meaning more than 1.2 million are currently displaced. The economy is in crisis, and public services have collapsed.
Aung San Suu Kyi has been detained since the coup and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Further cases against her, which could lead to decades more prison time, are ongoing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-09-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
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Sub-title:
A freelance television presenter who worked for the BBC's charity branch has been sentenced to three years hard labour in Myanmar.
Description:
"Htet Htet Khine, the presenter of a programme produced by BBC Media Action for local audiences, was arrested in August 2021.
Many journalists and activists have been jailed since the military seized power in a coup in February 2021.
BBC Media Action's director of programmes said the move was alarming.
"This, and other detentions of media workers in the country, runs counter to basic principles of human rights and freedom of expression," Richard Lace said.
The authorities said Htet Htet Khine's reporting amounted to incitement and illegal association, charges her family said were unjust.
Her contact with family and access to legal representation has been limited since her arrest, BBC Media Action says.
Since the coup, 12 media outlets have been forcibly shut and 142 journalists arrested, according to the independent Myanmar Now website.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which keeps a toll of those killed, jailed or detained by the military, says that more than 14,000 people have been arrested, with an estimated 2,114 killed by military forces.
Htet Htet Khine became well known in the country as the face of Khan Sar Kyi, described by the charity as a national television peace programme.
She had travelled across the country showing the impact of internal conflicts.
BBC Media action is an independent charity that operates separately from BBC News. It follows the corporation's editorial standards but is distinct from BBC News Burmese language news programmes..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2022-09-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
Language:
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Sub-title:
General Assembly’s High-Level Week Should Focus on Most Pressing Rights Issues
Description:
"World leaders gathering at the United Nations General Assembly in New York City should commit to ensuring accountability for grave human rights violations by the Chinese and Russian governments and other major offenders, Human Rights Watch said. The UN General Assembly’s annual General Debate, attended by dozens of heads of state and government, will be held from September 20 to 26, 2022.
The General Debate is an important opportunity for world leaders to address the most urgent human rights issues, including following up on a UN report detailing possible crimes against humanity in the Xinjiang region of China; Russian atrocities in Ukraine; war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Syria; and the blanket oppression of women and girls in Afghanistan. They should discuss plans of action for feeding the world’s hungry and tackling the devastating impacts of climate change.
“World leaders should use the UN General Assembly’s global stage to direct the spotlight on the countless crimes by Chinese and Russian authorities,” said Louis Charbonneau, UN director at Human Rights Watch. “Countries that seek to bring major powers to justice will open the door to addressing the broad range of human rights violations being committed around the globe.”
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the week of speeches in the General Assembly Hall will be the first since 2019 that will be almost entirely in person. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is planning to speak via video, will be an exception.
US President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron are among those slated to speak. They should condemn grave abuses by allied governments as well as authoritarian adversaries and promote rights-respecting approaches to the economic crisis, such as universal social protection. They and other leaders should commit to ensuring accountability for grave international crimes regardless of where the crimes occurred.
African leaders should urge the African Union and the three African UN Security Council members – Ghana, Gabon, and Kenya – to drop their resistance to the Security Council adding the nearly two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia to its formal agenda. Security Council involvement is critical given the failure of AU mediation to end the atrocities and the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia.
In addressing climate change, world leaders should highlight the urgency to mitigate and pre-empt its impacts, as evident by the recent devastating floods in Pakistan and Bangladesh that have affected millions of people. They should commit to prioritizing the well-being of older people, children, people with disabilities, and other marginalized and at-risk groups in rescue, relief, and rehabilitation processes related to extreme weather events. Leaders of countries historically most responsible for climate change, including top emitters in Europe and North America, should support vulnerable countries’ efforts to adapt to the growing toll of climate change.
Much of the activity during the General Assembly’s busiest week of the year takes place at side events and special meetings. The UN secretariat has an unnecessary and counterproductive practice of barring nongovernmental organizations from UN headquarters during the week. While there are exceptions for isolated events, the default exclusion of civil society groups prevents them from fully contributing during a key time in the UN calendar. UN member states should insist on including human rights and other groups in the week’s discussions and side events, Human Rights Watch said.
The issue of accountability for war crimes and other serious violations of international law will be discussed at a ministerial Security Council meeting, organized by France, the current council president, on ending impunity for war crimes in Ukraine. Denmark, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Germany are organizing a meeting on the same topic for the majority of UN member countries. Meetings are also expected about accountability for sexual violence in armed conflict and on Myanmar’s persecution of ethnic Rohingya Muslims.
Delegations will also hold sessions on food security and hunger, already a global problem before the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Discussions are expected on the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and conflict zones such as Yemen and Ethiopia, where there have been concerns that hunger has been used as a weapon of war. Delegations should discuss ways of addressing the underlying flaws in global food systems that lead to volatility and rising food prices.
The UN will host the Transforming Education Summit on September 19. World leaders should use the summit to call for an expansion of the right to education in international law, and to commit to recognizing a right of every child to at least one year of free preprimary education and to free secondary education.
“World leaders should kick off the next 12 months of the UN General Assembly with a call to action on human rights and accountability, ending hunger and poverty, and mitigating the effects climate change,” Charbonneau said. “These leaders should ensure that the outsize attention given the UN General Debate is deserved.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-09-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
Language:
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Description:
"This submission outlines the dangerous and rapidly deteriorating on-the-ground situation faced by
women and girls following the coup by the Burma/Myanmar military (the military or Tatmadaw) on
February 1, 2021. Since the coup, women and girls have faced direct and imminent threats to their
health, welfare and safety and have lost hard-won gains in political, social and economic rights. This
precarious situation demands immediate attention and action by the United Nations (UN) and the
international community at large.
Women and girls face significant and escalating security threats
The military has committed atrocities in ethnic areas for over 70 years. Since the coup, the Tatmadaw
and its proxies have expanded these brutal campaigns in ethnic areas, such as Chin and Karenni/Kayah
states, and extended their reign of terror to urban and “dry zone” areas dominated by the Bamar
majority, such as Sagaing and Magway. Civilians and aid workers have been targeted with systematic
and widespread indiscriminate and disproportionate violence, including mass and arbitrary arrests and
killings, air raids, artillery strikes, sexual violence and arson.3 These unrelenting attacks fully meet the
definition of terror under international and national law and amount to violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights laws. The UN has concluded these atrocities amount to crimes
against humanity and, potentially, war crimes.
While there has been a massive deterioration of safety and security for all civilians since the coup,
women and girls face disproportionate threats and risks from security forces. Women have been
victims of escalating sexual violence crimes, with recent qualitative research presenting a troubling
snapshot of security force-perpetrated rape, gang rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment, including in detention. These cases are only the tip of the iceberg given the low level of reporting, and
dovetail with other research demonstrating that security forces have for decades carried out brutal
campaigns of violence, including sexual violence, as part of armed conflict in ethnic areas, including
massive genocidal clearance operations against the Rohingya.
Women have actively and bravely participated in and led the civil resistance movement, facing
great personal risks to put an end to a brutal military junta. An estimated 3,100 women have been
arrested and detained since February 1, 2021, with over 2,400 still in custody.4 Women have
reported widespread violence in detention settings, including sexual abuse, torture and sexual
harassment. Female detainees have also been denied medical treatment, including maternal
healthcare, and access to potable water.5
Currently, there are nine women human rights defenders (WHRD) on death row whose lives are
in grave danger given the military junta’s recent execution of four democracy activists, the first
such executions in 30 years. All WHRDs were convicted after closed trials in a military court that
fell far short of international standards.
At a societal level, women have been hit hard by the economic downturn caused by foreign
divestment and factory shutdowns. This economic hardship and lack of security resulting from
the coup have pushed women and young women to fall victim to trafficking gangs and to agree
to slave-like labour conditions or prostitution. Moreover, the level of societal gender-based
violence has increased since the coup, as civilians have taken advantage of the violent chaos
engulfing the country.
Since the coup, women have lost the economic, social and political gains that they fought for with
increasing political activism and participation over the past decade. Women now face massive
protection needs to secure their welfare, sustain gender equality progress and support women’s
leadership. As the UN has noted, women are “starting to see their future disappear” and the UN
and international community must act with urgency and purpose.6
Burma/Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis has had a devastating impact on women
The military has caused a devastating humanitarian crisis through its Four-Cuts Strategy of cutting off
telecommunication, food, money, and intelligence in Karen/Kayin, Karenni/Kayah and Chin states, and
the Sagaing and Magway regions. These brutal, scorched earth campaigns include air strikes, military
offensives and burning of villages, which has destroyed over 28,000 homes thus far.7 As a result, over
one million people have been displaced – amounting to one in every ten people.8
Civilians have had to travel deep into the jungle on a moment’s notice to avoid military attacks.
Displaced persons, including women and girls, must deal with health risks, food scarcity, lack of shelter
and inadequate medical care, especially during the current rainy season.9 Malaria, dengue fever and
other waterborne diseases are rampant and poisonous snakes are a scourge. Drought, water shortages
and poor water quality have resulted in not being able to meet basic hygienic needs and illness. Dry
goods and food items are being depleted and food insecurity is acute. Women face particular health
challenges, including a lack of sexual and reproductive health services which has led to an increase in
premature births, underweight births and increased infant mortality.10 This dire situation presents
formidable challenges to the health and safety of women and girls and requires targeted assistance,
such as women’s dignity and delivery kits, lactating mothers’ support and sexual and reproductive
health assistance, such as birth control and HIV drugs which are no longer available.
Service delivery to those in need, already limited by decades of ethnic strife and chronic underfunding,
has completely broken down. Humanitarian aid workers cannot access those in greatest need, and
efforts by international and regional agencies to deliver humanitarian aid are woefully inadequate.11
Given this dire situation, brave volunteers from women’s groups, civil society organisations,
communities, Ethnic Health Organisations (EHOs) and Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) have stepped in to help despite security risks. The military targets these courageous individuals and groups,
leading to regular harassment, arrest and murder.12
Current humanitarian aid delivery efforts focus on partnering with the military which is completely
illadvised and counterproductive. The military has caused the crisis and is not to be trusted with aid
delivery to areas that it is currently attacking. Civilians will not accept humanitarian aid distribution
through any military-affiliated channel as they are afraid of backlash and there is a risk that the military
will instrumentalize aid. Instead, the international community must build channels for providing
humanitarian assistance by collaborating only with, and dramatically increasing support to, women’s
groups, civil society organisations, communities, EHOs and EROs. In particular, women’s groups that
have stepped in to fill service gaps have not experienced an increase in funding to support the increased
burdens on the ground, highlighting an urgent priority for the international community.13
No avenues for justice exist
Ample evidence exists to show that the military and its proxies have for decades committed heinous
crimes, including murder, rape and genocide. These crimes have been widespread and systematic, part
of a deliberate strategy to intimidate, terrorise and punish local populations. Since the coup, the
patterns of abuse and violence seen in ethnic areas have been extended throughout the country,
indicating that no group is immune from the security force abuses that ethnic groups have experienced
for more than 70 years. The military has long enjoyed impunity for its actions, which has directly
contributed to the current crisis.
The coup has further proven the military’s disdain for the rule of law and its firmly-held belief in its
omnipotence, including its perceived entitlement to commit human rights abuses without
consequence. Survivors of security force abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), are
unable to access any justice in the current context as the legal system has been eviscerated and no
trust exists between civilians and law authorities, which are under the aegis of the military. With no
chance of domestic accountability, international and regional justice and accountability mechanism are
crucial.
The international community has not adequately responded to the crisis
The international community, including the UN Security Council, have a mandate to secure
international peace and security as well as to protect women in conflict settings in accordance with
multiple directives in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. Yet, the international community
has ceded to ASEAN the responsibility for finding a solution to the crisis. ASEAN’s efforts have failed, in
part due to continued engagement with a recalcitrant military which has repeatedly thumbed its nose
at the toothless “Five Point Consensus.” This failed strategy has prolonged the crisis and obstructed
necessary protections for civilians, including women, who face massive security and humanitarian
needs.
The international community must abandon reliance on ASEAN and instead take bold action to resolve
this dangerous situation and build trust with the people of Burma/Myanmar. As the 12 July 2022 report
of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar acknowledged, interactions with civilians
“…to build trust and increase confidence in the Mechanism’s ability to contribute to international
criminal accountability processes are critical…”.14 Yet, trust can never be built as long as the UN,
including its in-country teams, international agencies and regional actors work and engage with the
military and the military-appointed State Administration Council (SAC).
Recommendations
The international community must collectively raise their voices to secure the human rights,
safety and welfare of women and girls in Burma/Myanmar and expeditiously take the following
actions:
§ Dispatch a well-equipped monitoring and intervention mission to secure the
immediate and unconditional cessation of the military’s violent terror campaign
against the people to prevent further atrocities.
§ Impose a comprehensive global arms embargo, with robust monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms, to end the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer of
all weapons and other equipment that may be used for training, intelligence and
military assistance.
§ Impose targeted sanctions against the military and its proxies to effectively cut off
financial flows and endeavor to cut off supplies of aviation fuel to the military.
§ Support and stand with the people by refusing to engage with the military, its
proxies or the SAC and work with the National Unity Government, as the legitimate representative of the people, and other groups working to build a truly democratic
federal union.
§ Condemn the military for killing civilians and executing human rights defenders in the
strongest terms, take effective action to stop further executions and atrocities and
secure the immediate release of political prisoners, including human rights defenders
and WHRDs.
§ Work and collaborate only with local actors, including women’s groups, as described
above, to provide humanitarian aid and avoid any contact and cooperation with the
military or its proxies; mediate with neighboring countries, such as Thailand and India,
to open a humanitarian corridor to provide assistance to local aid actors; protect aid
workers, including women first responders, from harm and harassment; urgently
address country-wide food shortages; streamline aid procedures and delivery to be
flexible and user-friendly to eliminate administrative burdens; and find innovative and
alternative ways, using existing reliable social networks, to distribute aid outside of
military channels.
§ Provide targeted, long-term and specific resources to women’s groups to support
service delivery and the gender equality movement.
§ Ensure impartial and independent investigations so that perpetrators are held
accountable for their crimes; fully and unequivocally support all efforts to ensure
justice, including by: referring the situation to the International Criminal Court;
instituting a special or regional accountability mechanism; supporting and intervening
in international accountability efforts, such as those already underway at the
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court; and initiating
domestic proceedings via universal jurisdiction.
§ Protect those fighting for democracy and justice, especially women, and develop a
comprehensive protection plan in accordance with WPS mandates to provide a safe
haven for CRSV survivors, WHRDs and women peacebuilders; ensure that any
resolution to the crisis includes the meaningful participation of women and has a clear
mandate for justice and accountability for CRSV survivors.
§ Establish a Task Force on Myanmar and conduct an exceptional inquiry into the
situation of women and girls in Myanmar, as the CEDAW Committee has done for
Afghanistan and for Myanmar in 2019..."
Source/publisher:
Women’s Advocacy Coalition - Myanmar and Women’s League of Burma
Date of publication:
2022-09-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Burmese women's organisations, Women's rights
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Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-09-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-09-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"Myanmar’s junta added a charge that carries a death sentence against jailed protest leader Ko Wai Moe Naing for his role in the protest movement against military rule.
The 27-year-old pro-democracy activist has been held in Monywa Prison, Sagaing Region, since his arrest in April last year during an anti-regime rally. He has already faced several charges and was given a 10-year sentence in five incitement cases last month.
On August 26 the junta filed a fresh case against him under Article 122 of the Penal Code for leading protests in Monywa and for affiliating with the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw of deposed lawmakers, which the junta has declared an unlawful organization, his mother told The Irrawaddy.
Article 122 enforces a death sentence or life in prison for high treason.
Ko Wai Moe Naing defended himself in court as neither of his lawyers was able to attend court. One lawyer was detained and the other has been in hiding for over a month after the junta issued an arrest warrant.
He also faces charges of murder, wrongful confinement, defamation and under the Natural Disaster Management Law.
A hearing for the latest charge is scheduled for September 22.
The regime, which has killed at least 2,273 people since the February 2021 coup, has used the death penalty to intimidate opponents as it struggles to control the country.
It carried out Myanmar’s first execution in nearly four decades in July by hanging four detainees, including veteran democracy activist Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, a former National League for Democracy lawmaker, who were sentenced to death in January.
The other two victims were Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thura Zaw, who were accused of murdering a woman they believed to be a junta informant.
Many other political prisoners now face death sentences issued by junta courts..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Anti-coup protesters
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"Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing said the prospect of a new election slated to be held next year depends largely on whether there is peace and economic recovery plus political stability in the country, in an interview with Russian news agency RIA.
His remark is viewed as implying that the election slated for August 2023 is not certain, considering that Myanmar’s economy is spiraling downward and the armed clashes in many parts of the country are expected to escalate once the rainy season is over.
When asked about the possibility of the election being delayed during the interview, which was published in junta-controlled newspapers, Min Aung Hlaing replied, “It is too early to discuss it because it is around five months [until emergency rule expires], and a decision has to be made depending on the situation.”
Under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution, the chief of the armed forces can impose emergency rule for one year, and renew it twice for six months each. Emergency rule has already been renewed twice, and will expire on Feb. 1 next year. The election must be held within six months of that date, under the Constitution.
Holding an election is also part of the junta’s five-point roadmap released after the bloody military coup. To prepare for it, the regime has been amending electoral laws and taking steps to replace the current first-past-the-post electoral system with the proportional representation (PR) system—a move that would overwhelmingly favor the military and its allied political parties.
Whether the election can be held as planned is open to question as the junta leadership including Min Aung Hlaing himself have repeatedly set out unrealistic preconditions for a free and fair election to take place, including that there must not be “pressure” on people, that it must be able to hold the election across the country, and that the armed conflicts must end before a vote is held.
Renowned political analyst U Than Soe Naing told The Irrawaddy he believes Min Aung Hlaing will hold the election no matter what in order to achieve his dream of becoming president.
“They will hold the fraudulent election in areas they can control, to prolong their rule—unless they are removed before it,” he said.
The junta’s planned PR system is designed to prevent the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) or any other democratic party from winning a landslide victory like the NLD did in the 1990, 2015 and 2020 general elections.
As the military already holds 25 percent of seats in the parliament under the Constitution, the PR system will enable Min Aung Hlaing to fulfill his presidential dream, as it will ensure the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and its allied parties win enough seats to officially put Min Aung Hlaing into the presidential residence. Smaller parties allied with the USDP did not win a single seat in the 2020 election.
According to the analyst U Than Soe Naing, even if the election can’t be held, Min Aung Hlaing might follow in the footsteps of his predecessor as dictator, Than Shwe, and scrap the 2008 Constitution and write a new one in order to cling to power..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"His most recent visit to Russia has made it increasingly clear that junta chief and militarist Min Aung Hlaing is chasing the unrealized dream of his predecessor as military dictator, Than Shwe: to possess a nuclear weapon.
Some two decades ago, revealing his desire for an atom bomb as a deterrent against external threats and provocations, Than Shwe told his confidant, then Science and Technology Minister U Thaung, “Ko Thaung, if possible, do make an atom bomb, [I don’t mind] even if it is just the size of a bael fruit.” The military dictator said this during a regular informal evening meeting of generals at the War Office, according to a military official who was in attendance. U Thaung was also a former military officer.
Min Aung Hlaing, who was handpicked by Than Shwe, has inherited this dream.
During his trip to Russia last week, Min Aung Hlaing again met Alexey Likhachev, director general of Russian state energy company Rosatom. The junta chief previously met him during a weeklong “personal” visit to Russia in July, his second since last year’s coup.
On that occasion, the two sides signed memorandums of understanding to cooperate on skills development in nuclear energy in Myanmar, Rosatom said in a release.
Last week’s visit saw the regime sign an initial agreement with Russia’s atomic energy agency on the possible implementation of a modular reactor project in Myanmar.
Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun told the press that the project was aimed solely at developing nuclear energy for peaceful use in Myanmar.
But it is not the first time the Myanmar military and Rosatom have announced plans to work together on a nuclear project.
In 2007 the then military regime led by Than Shwe struck a deal with Rosatom to build a nuclear research center in Myanmar, which Rosatom said would be under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. But construction never moved forward amid pushback from the U.S. and other countries.
In his speeches, Than Shwe constantly invoked the need for a proper defense capability that would ensure total protection of the country, and to apply science and technology to modernize the military.
This perceived need led Than Shwe to approach Russia and North Korea about acquiring technology to produce nuclear energy. Russian and North Korean experts arrived in Myanmar under his rule, and hundreds of Myanmar military officers left for Russian academies to study nuclear science and missile technology.
The regime defended its actions by saying the nuclear energy would used for peaceful purposes in the interests of the people—the same justification offered by Min Aung Hlaing’s current regime.
The No. 3 man in Than Shwe’s regime, General Shwe Mann, and other military leaders made a secret visit to Pyongyang in 2008 and signed agreements on defense cooperation. In 2012, Shwe Mann, by that time the Speaker of Myanmar’s Lower House under U Thein Sein’s government, said the visit was only intended to study air defense systems, and that only a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the countries’ militaries was signed during the visit.
In 2010, however, Major Sai Thein Win, an engineer in the Myanmar military’s Science and Technology Workshop (known locally as the “nuclear unit”) who received a doctorate in atomic energy in Russia, publicly disclosed information, including photos, showing that the military regime was conducting research, with technological help from North Korea, on possessing nuclear weapons.
The nuclear research program was abandoned under U Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government when the country embarked on its purported “democratic transition” in 2011.
Myanmar signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 2016 under the democratically elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy.
But since the military coup last year, the two countries have grown closer, with Moscow backing the putsch and Naypyitaw supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as both become increasingly isolated internationally under US and European sanctions. Russia has become the regime’s major arms supplier, selling to the regime weapons to crush the resistance movement.
Though Min Aung Hlaing publicly says he intends to use nuclear energy peacefully for the socio-economic development of the Myanmar people, it is clear that his real intentions aren’t that simple.
He surely feels irritated that the world has shunned him for his coup and subsequent bloody crackdowns on civilians. He may wonder whether possessing militarized nuclear technology would make a difference in that regard—a strategy adopted by North Korea. At the very least, as a military dictator who has demonstrated his total lack of concern for the wellbeing of the people, Min Aung Hlaing’s promise that such technology would be used for peaceful purposes in health and electricity generation is highly suspicious. He clearly believes possessing a nuclear weapon has the potential to guarantee his position as dictator for life..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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Description:
"Britain has not invited representatives from Russia, Belarus and Myanmar to attend Queen Elizabeth's state funeral due to be held next Monday, a Whitehall source said on Tuesday.
Britain, along with its Western allies, has sought to isolate Russia and its ally Belarus on the world stage with economic sanctions and other measures in response to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.
Myanmar and its military have also been the subject of British sanctions as London steps up support for the Southeast Asian country's Rohingya community.
About 500 foreign dignitaries are expected to attend Queen Elizabeth's funeral in London, with invites having been sent to the heads of state of most countries with which Britain has diplomatic relations, the BBC said.
A host of world leaders from U.S. President Joe Biden and First Lady Jill Biden, to the prime ministers of Canada, Australia and New Zealand have all confirmed attendance for the event, likely to be one of Britain's largest diplomatic gatherings in years..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-09-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Human Rights and international relations
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"In January and February last year, the Myanmar Armed Forces launched two attacks in Arakan State. But the result was not good. 19 soldiers of the Myanmar army were killed by the Arakan forces. The Myanmar forces were forced to retreat after being chased. Myanmar also fired two mortar shells along the Thai border. The Thai government has not responded but is monitoring the matter.
A few days ago, Myanmar fired mortar shells on the Bangladesh border. Bangladesh government protested strongly on two occasions. Let’s talk about Arakan. AA is an insurgent group based in Rakhine State (Arakan). Established on 10 April 2009, the AA is the military wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA). It is currently led by Commander in Chief Major General Toan Marat Naing and Vice Deputy Commander Brigadier General Neo Toan Aung. In the Kachin conflict, the AA fought alongside the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) against the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces).
Most AA soldiers were originally trained at the KIA Military Academy. Since 2014, AA has established its own training camp in Rakhine state. According to Myanmar Peace Monitor, the AA had more than 1,500 troops in 2014, including personnel stationed in Rakhine state near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh.
Irrawaddy said in September 2015 that the civilian wing of the AA has more than 2,500 soldiers and 10,000 personnel. In January 2020, the AA chief claimed that the group had more than 30,000 soldiers. 14 The Arakan Army (AA) was formed on 10 April 2009 with its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA). It describes Kachin State as the ‘temporary headquarters’ of Laizai.
After training the young Arakan Army troops on 11 December 2011, the group planned to return to Arakan State and fight for self-determination. However, the outbreak of war in Kachin State in June 2011 rendered them incapacitated. As a result, with the support of the KIA, they took up arms against the Myanmar army. In 2014, AA launched another operation in Rakhine state near the Bangladesh border and another near the Thai-Myanmar border. As a result, it has become much stronger and its combat capabilities have been positively affected.
In February 2015, the AA fought the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic armed group, and its ally, the Taeng National Liberation Army (TNLA), in their clash with the Myanmar Army. Hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers are reported to have been killed in the clash. On August 27, 2015, clashes broke out between the AA and the Bangladesh Border Guard Force.
Both sides exchanged fire near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border in Bara Modak area of Thanchi in Bandarban district. On August 20, 2015, the Arakan Army Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) clashed. Ten of their horses were then seized by the BGB.
The Arakan Army ostensibly advocates self-determination for the multi-ethnic Arakanese population, the protection and promotion of the national identity and cultural heritage of the Arakan people, and the ‘national dignity’ and best interests of the Arakan people. In an interview with Arakha Media (AKK) conducted in August 2021, the Commander-in-Chief of the Arakan Army clearly stated that the political objective of the armed revolution is to restore the sovereignty of Arakan. There has been no bargaining and there won’t be in the future. This is about Arakan
Myanmar is an unstable country. There have been repeated military coups. Democracy has been blocked. The image of the military junta’s seizure of power has been written on Myanmar’s chest again and again. The history of persecution of minorities is also old in Myanmar. Since 1990, several countries including China, Russia and Ukraine started providing military support to Myanmar. China sells huge number of weapons to Myanmar to keep India under pressure.
“Stockholm International Peace Research Institute” and “Global Firepower.com” sources say that the size of the Myanmar army is 516,000, including 46,000 regular and 1,10,000 reserve soldiers. In addition, Myanmar has a total of 264 military aircraft including 127 warplanes, 86 helicopters including 9 attack helicopters, 886 sophisticated tanks, 4 thousand 212 different types of missiles, 1 thousand 200 armored military vehicles, at least 200 missiles in air defense, 392 gun systems, 1200 anti-tank weapons, A total of 155 warships including 27 naval frigates, 40 patrol craft.
Since the 1990s, Myanmar has focused on arms procurement. Even after signing the disarmament agreement, they have not stopped buying arms. On the contrary, it has become easier for Myanmar to buy weapons since 2012. In the meantime, Russia, China, Israel, Ukraine, India, Belarus, Belgium, Switzerland, Poland and other countries have sold a large number of weapons to them.
China has already given Myanmar the most cooperation in the purchase of military equipment. They have sold the most warplanes, warships and ammunition to Myanmar. Russia and Ukraine are not far behind. Russia sold land-launched missiles to Myanmar. Ukraine has sold warships. On the other hand, Israel has sold tanks and armored personnel carriers. Al Jazeera published a news about it.
According to their data, Myanmar bought the most aircrafts from China 120, Russia 64 and Poland 35. Russia (2971), China (1029) and Belarus (102) sold the most missiles to Myanmar. China (21), India (3) and the former Yugoslavia (3) have sold naval warships to Myanmar. China (125), Serbia (120) and Russia (100) sold various types of ammunition, artillery. Armored vehicles and tanks were sold by China (696), Israel (120) and Ukraine (50).
Although Myanmar has a radical attitude, its military tactics are of poor quality. The power base is also weak. Many say Myanmar is playing war games. Wants to participate in this game with Bangladesh. But Bangladesh is a peaceful country. Bangladesh does not want to engage in war with any country. Bangladesh policy is to maintain friendship with everyone. Therefore, it is not right to think of Bangladesh as weak. Bangladesh armed forces are now world class. Bangladesh’s infantry is so advanced that it is one of the top nations in the world. It would be extremely foolish for Myanmar to think that the armed forces of Bangladesh are weak..."
Source/publisher:
Eurasia Review
Date of publication:
2022-09-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Bangladesh-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"London 12 September 2022: The Myanmar Accountability Project, MAP, has called on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to accept the credentials of the incumbent Ambassador of the National Unity Government (NUG), Kyaw Moe Tun. In a report published today, MAP also calls on the UN to resolve the chaotic situation of Myanmar’s representation across the UN system.
Speaking on the eve of the 77th session of the UNGA this week in New York, Chris Gunness, Director of MAP said, “the Assembly must explicitly accept Kyaw Moe Tun’s credentials as the NUG’s Ambassador, rather than defer its decision, as it did last year.”
Gunness said “the deferral has led to massive inconsistencies across the UN system. In the International Court of Justice, the junta’s agents are representing Myanmar, in the Human Rights Council (HRC) and other UN bodies Myanmar’s seat has been left empty, whereas at the UNGA in New York the NUG represents Myanmar. Clearly,” said Gunness, “the NUG, elected by a landslide, should be able to represent Myanmar across the UN system because of democratic legitimacy and its human rights record.”
“For the seat to be left empty in the HRC when the country is going through one if its most severe human rights crises since independence is a disgrace,” he added.
Over two thousand people have been killed since the failed coup in February last year, according to conservative estimates, 15,000 have been detained or have disappeared, 1.2 million people have been displaced and over 14 million are in urgent need of humanitarian aid.
MAP’s Director of Protection, Damian Lilly, said “the weak signal sent by the UNGA has also led to anomalies on the ground in Myanmar. Although the UNGA has clearly rejected the junta’s credentials, at least four UN agencies (FAO, IMO, Unicef, UNOCHA) have very publicly presented papers to the junta – in breach of the UN’s principles of engagement which require its agencies to distance themselves from the junta. It has rightly led to outrage among the UN’s civil society partners who feel the world body has abandoned them in their time of need.”
“The United Kingdom, as the penholder on Myanmar at the UN Security Council, is failing some 55 million people in Myanmar whose democratic choice must be respected across the UN system. By not tabling a resolution for the Security Council to take firm action against the murderous junta it is only allowing it to act further with impunity and commit crimes against its own people.”..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Accountability Project
Date of publication:
2022-09-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Ministries and other administrative bodies (under construction), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"စာစောင်မှာပါဝင်တဲ့ အကြောင်းအရာများကို page မှာဝင်ရောက်ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်သလို စာစောင်အပြည့်အစုံကို အောက်ပါ link ကနေ ဝင်ရောက်ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ပါတယ်..."
Source/publisher:
Women Alliance Burma
Date of publication:
2022-09-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Burmese women's organisations, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Women's rights, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"He must be the least known president in the world, tasked with the most difficult mission, one that other heads of the state around world aren’t faced with: Leading a revolutionary government that has vowed to uproot the ruling military dictatorship in Myanmar—one of the most notorious and ruthless regimes on this planet.
Officially, he is an acting president. But he can’t live in a presidential palace; he can’t work in a presidential office, either. Myanmar people have no idea where their president is. He was not elected through a vote but appointed by a legitimate, elected parliamentary body. He was also unknown to most of his fellow countrymen until recently, but they respect him and have embraced him as their head of state.
The government he leads is mostly made up of elected lawmakers from the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, whose government was ousted by the military coup last year, and their ethnic allies. While commanding support from a vast majority of Myanmar people, the government he leads challenges the legitimacy of Myanmar’s ruling military junta, which has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against the country’s entire population of more than 54 million people.
Meet Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG).
Who is Duwa Lashi La?
Duwa Lashi La, 72, is ethnic Kachin and a Christian. He was a one-time teacher at a public school in his native Mung Ji Village, northern Shan State. He studied law at Yangon University and worked as a prosecutor and law officer for 18 years. He speaks English, Chinese, Burmese and Shan, in addition to his mother tongue Kachin, and is also well-versed in other Kachin tribal languages.
Since the early 1990s, the father of four has taken the lead in diverse social enterprises and civil society organizations working for community development, education, healthcare, relief and social rehabilitation in conflict-torn areas in Shan and Kachin States.
He served as chairman of the Kachin National Consultative Assembly (also known as WMR), which is reportedly the most authoritative political body in Kachin State, till January 2021. And also for the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team (KPICT), which was formed by domestic and international Kachin organizations to advocate on behalf of the Kachin people in the wake of the coup.
Taking on the biggest task
Of the various leading roles Duwa Lashi La has played, the biggest of his life—serving as the country’s head of state—was also the most sudden.
It came at a regular meeting held between KPICT and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) in early April last year, two months after the coup.
At that time, the CRPH, the legislative body formed by elected representatives to the coup-dissolved parliament, was holding a series of meetings with the country’s ethnic groups and preparing to set up the NUG—an interim coalition government of democratic forces set up to challenge the regime.
The CRPH asked for three nominees for ministerial posts from KPICT at the meeting, and as they continued their discussion on the formation of the new government, the then KPICT chairman Duwa Lashi La gave his opinion on a draft proposal to keep Henry Van Thio, a retired major and vice president of the NLD government, as vice president in the NUG.
Henry Van Thio was reportedly detained during the coup along with other senior members of the ousted civilian government and placed under house arrest but the junta has not filed any charges against him.
Duwa Lashi La’s personal secretary, who requested not to be named, recalled to The Irrawaddy the meeting at which Duwa Lashi La responded, “Since we are making the revolution to bring down tyranny and build a new era, it is good not to include people who were involved in the military, and instead better to choose those with a vision of reform towards democracy and federalism.”
The CRPH agreed on this point and requested that he accept the position instead. The sudden offer was also overwhelmingly backed by KPICT members.
Duwa Lashi La made a phone call to his family telling them to be prepared for the upcoming situation and quickly accepted the offer.
“For him, accepting the role is bearing the responsibility that fell on his shoulders in this revolutionary time,” said his personal secretary, who has known him for years.
The personal secretary also shared that it is Duwa Lashi La’s determination that led him to make the decision immediately. Seeing the third coup in his lifetime, the 72-year-old is determined to free his country of military dictatorship.
Duwa Lashi La was appointed vice president on April 16 but is serving as acting president since Myanmar’s elected president, the NLD’s U Win Myint, has been in junta custody since the first day of the coup.
It was unexpected for many, including Ma May Sabe Phyu, a well-known ethnic Kachin human rights defender. She said she was surprised when she first found out that Duwa Lashi La was the acting president. More significantly, it also marked the first time in the country’s history that a member of the Kachin ethnic minority had taken the highest state position.
But as someone who already knew him, she believed he was the right choice. The people of Myanmar have also warmed to him and rallied around the NUG, which he heads, as their legitimate government.
Duwa Lashi La has also proven himself as a true leader forged in a perilous time for the nation.
He has proved his leadership by uniting the ministries of the NUG, which gathered people from diverse and inclusive backgrounds; keeping the cabinet functioning with a very limited budget; coordinating with armed resistance groups and ethnic armed groups; and challenging the regime on the diplomatic front.
The most secret President’s Office
What has surprised many is that he is operating the NUG, which is repelling Min Aung Hlaing’s regime, from inside the country.
Duwa Lashi La remains in the country knowing that he is the number one target of Min Aung Hlaing’s troops. His family, who are also on the targeted list, remain with him. After his appointment, large numbers of regime troops ransacked his family’s house in Lashio, Shan State in September last year in search of him and his family members. After failing to find them, they sealed off the property.
He and his team are based at an undisclosed location in a liberated area. His personal secretary, who is also the permanent secretary of the President’s Office, has observed after working closely with him for more than one and a half years that the hard-working president never complains or delays his tasks, despite never taking weekends or holidays off and maintaining a tight daily schedule.
Duwa Lashi La’s daily schedule starts at 5 a.m. The 72-year-old runs every morning to boost his stamina and concentration for the tasks that await him and which take up the whole day including cabinet meetings, consultations with more than 300 revolutionary forces under the NUG, engagements with international diplomats and reading reports on the situation inside the country and in the rest of the world, including the war in Ukarine.
He is not confined to his office. In May, he visited a frontline camp of a People’s Defense Force (PDF), the NUG’s armed wing, to hear the PDF fighters’ voices personally and better understand their needs.
A young PDF member based in the country’s western Chin State told The Irrawaddy that he felt encouraged to see the images of the acting president together with other PDFs.
“Seeing him together with our comrades was uplifting. I hope the President will visit our camp one day as well,” he said.
The appearance of Duwa Lashi La wearing a military helmet and vest and holding a friendly meeting with frontline resistance fighters contrasted sharply with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, who hasn’t even made one such visit to his frontline troops, who are giving their lives to satisfy his greed for power and wealth.
Furthermore, when he appears on air giving speeches to the nation, mostly in his Kachin attire, the acting president’s determination and belief in his mission to wipe out the military dictatorship is palpable, not to mention his words. With his stoic and resolute appearance, the stout Duwa Lashi La resembles a boulder—a stark contrast to regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, who appears on air with a shaky voice, looking desperate and restless.
Ko Tayzar San, one of the most prominent of Myanmar’s anti-regime protest leaders, also wrote on his Facebook account that, “Since I have seen the President on broadcasts, I have felt a sense of closeness as with my own uncle, and respect, admire and trust him.”
One of the most remarkable speeches Duwa Lashi La has made was the long-awaited declaration of a people’s defensive war on Sept. 7, 2021, calling on people to “revolt against the rule of the military terrorists led by Min Aung Hlaing in every corner of the country.”
“We will remove Min Aung Hlaing and uproot dictatorship from Myanmar for good,” he said, “and be able to establish a peaceful federal democratic union that fully safeguards equality and is long-aspired by all the citizens.”
The majority of Myanmar’s people, who have endured the regime’s atrocities, heartily embraced the announcement.
Much of Myanmar has already been in revolt since the military coup in February last year. The regime’s deadly crackdowns on protesters have forced many young people to take up arms. Even the regime has admitted that the declaration of war accelerated the ongoing armed struggle against it, with fighting intensifying across the country.
Now the regime has lost control of at least half the country to the NUG’s PDF groups and allied ethnic armed organizations, said the acting president in his state of the union speech on Wednesday, marking the first anniversary of the declaration of war against the junta. His statement was supported by the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar (SAC-M) a group of former UN experts on Myanmar. Their recent analysis finds that the NUG and resistance organizations have effective control over 52 percent of the territory of Myanmar.
“The National Unity Government is not a shadow government or a government in exile. It is the representative of the people’s revolution and resistance to the military junta, the combined forces of which control the majority of the country,” said Yanghee Lee of the SAC-M.
However, facing off against a well-equipped military using heavy weapons and air strikes against the civilian population, the people of Myanmar need physical assistance—and not just moral support.
Unlike Ukraine, which has received weapons and aid from a number of countries including the US and the UK to combat the Russian military, Myanmar’s armed resistance has received no material assistance from the international community and solely depends on people’s donations. As a result, the NUG is still struggling to fully arm all of its resistance forces across the country.
“I earnestly request technical support, arms and ammunition and finance for the people of Myanmar who are sacrificing their lives to fight against the fascist dictatorship,” Duwa Lashi La told the international community in his speech, while stressing the urgency of his appeal.
Prominent PDF leader Bo Nagar from Sagaing’s Pale Township told The Irrawaddy that he supports the president and NUG leadership and believes they are trying their best to overcome the obstacles they face, such as in providing arms to anti-regime resistance forces.
“One thing for sure is that the President and our government, the NUG, stood up when we were like orphans, and thus we accept their leadership,” he said.
Many elected lawmakers, ant-regime activists, resistance fighters and his compatriots at home and abroad share this positive assessment of Duwa Lashi La.
Prominent protest leader Ko Tayzar San wrote that the “People’s revolution led by people’s president must prevail.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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"The Chin National Front (CNF), a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, is fighting the military regime in western Myanmar’s Chin State alongside the resistance groups that have sprung up since last year’s coup.
It is also cooperating with the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) on both the political and military fronts. The CNF has been fighting the junta since a few months before the NUG declared a defensive war against the regime on September 7, 2021.
CNF spokesman Salai Htet Ni talked recently to The Irrawaddy about how the political and military situation in Chin State has changed over the past 18 months.
How has the CNF’s military strategy changed since it started fighting regime forces?
We now better understand their tactics and also better comprehend that collective strength is the key to victory. As for weapons, previously we had only rudimentary hunting rifles, but we now have better weapons such as automatic rifles. The chain of command has also improved. And our side has suffered fewer casualties, but junta casualties have increased.
Is the CNF now going on the attack against junta troops?
Clashes are occurring in various parts [of Chin State]. With better weapons, we are well-equipped to seize their [regime] outposts in the Chin Hills. But we mainly carry out guerilla attacks, ambushing them when they travel from one place to another. We fight by a combination of attack and defense.
How has the regime’s strategy changed over the past year?
Previously, junta forces attacked simultaneously in two or three places. They traveled along the Pakokku-Matupi Road to the Matupi headquarters [of the Myanmar military], while another column traveled the Kale-Gangaw Road to the military’s Hakha headquarters. But now they are fighting on only one front with large numbers of troops.
Why do you think the regime’s strategy has changed?
It is possible that they are now too undermanned to spread their forces out. And the junta troops that have come from other regions have little knowledge about the terrain in the Chin Hills. Previously, the military attempted to crush resistance groups one by one. But we fought back with combined forces.
There have been fresh clashes between the Arakan Army (AA) and the junta on the border of Rakhine and Chin states. How will that affect the revolution in Chin State?
The AA is one of the powerful ethnic armed organizations (EAO) in Myanmar. It appears that the regime will have to fight on a new exhausting front there. So the AA’s involvement in the fighting is a shot in the arm for our Spring Revolution, but a blow to the regime.
How much of Chin State does the CNF now control?
We can say that we – local resistance groups and civilians – now control over 70 per cent of the territory in Chin State. The regime has control only over towns and some main roads. We have assumed the responsibility for providing public services, including health and education, in the areas we control.
How is the relationship between the CNF and the NUG?
We maintain regular discussions with the NUG, and have been cooperating with it militarily and politically. We have been cooperating militarily under the Central Command and Coordination Committee [which includes leaders from the NUG and EAOs and engages with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) across the country]. There are some delays, but I can say that we are making progress.
The regime said it plans to hold an election next year. What is the CNF’s view on that?
The regime believes that holding an election is a way out of the political crisis it is facing. It is just to deceive the international community and to try and make the rule of the Myanmar military last forever. If the election takes place, all the efforts of civilians, EAOs and resistance forces will be in vain. So we totally denounce and oppose any new election staged by the regime.
We are fighting the regime to end the military’s role in Myanmar’s politics. We are not alone in working towards that end. This is the reason that people have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement and students have left the towns. It’s not just the election, we have to oppose whatever the regime does.
What do you want to tell the Myanmar people?
All the groups fighting the regime including EAOs, the NUG and PDFs have to continue to accelerate their efforts. We have to strengthen ourselves every new day and work together. I urge the people to continue to stay strong..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Sub-title:
Many of the victims were tortured to death, according to the director of the UK-based Burma Human Rights Network
Description:
"More than 200 people have died in regime custody since last year’s coup, according to the head of a UK-based human rights watchdog group.
Kyaw Win, the director of the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), said that the group’s records show that a total of 217 people have been killed during interrogations over the past year and a half.
Most of the victims were members or supporters of the ousted ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), or of People’s Defence Force (PDF) groups formed in the wake of crackdowns on anti-coup protests, he said.
“Some of the PDF members were killed on arrival, while many NLD members were killed after a period of torture,” he told Myanmar Now.
“The actual numbers could be higher than our list indicates,” he added.
Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government, which also tracks abuses by the junta that seized power in February of last year, had similar findings, according to its minister for human rights, Aung Myo Min.
“More than 200 have been killed after being tortured in interrogation centres. Many of the victims faced extreme physical, mental and sexual abuse before they died,” he said.
He added that most of the victims were under the age of 35, and that NLD lawmakers were among those subjected to torture.
One MP who had been arrested during the Saffron Revolution in 2007 said that human rights violations were routine in military custody.
“I was blindfolded, day and night, for three days and made to sit in a very high chair so that my feet couldn’t touch the ground. Sometimes they kicked me with their boots. I was also forced to kneel on pebbles and small, sharp objects,” he said, recalling his own experience.
According to data compiled by BHRN, more than 80 of those killed in custody since the military takeover died in Sagaing Region, making it the deadliest state or region for political prisoners.
This includes 28 who were killed in the region in July alone, according to the group’s director.
“Some were killed two or three days of their arrest, but most were dead within 24 hours. In some cases, the bodies of detainees arrested the night before were handed over the next morning. Some families didn’t even get the bodies back,” said Kyaw Win.
According to a woman involved in efforts to assist civilians displaced by the junta’s ongoing military operations in Sagaing, many of the victims are not even involved in the conflict.
“Most of the people killed during interrogation were PDF members, but some are just locals accused of multiple things. Most of them were youths,” she said.
One of the more notorious cases of death in custody occurred a little more than a month after the regime overthrew Myanmar’s elected NLD government on February 1, 2021.
Just hours after Khin Maung Latt, an NLD-appointed ward administrator from Yangon’s Pabedan Township, was arrested on March 6, his family received a call from police telling them to come collect his body.
Sithu Maung, the NLD MP for Pabedan Township, recalled that the police could not explain the cause of death, even though an autopsy had been performed.
“The military arrested Khin Maung Latt, but the police either wouldn’t disclose what happened to him, or didn’t know. But there were signs of torture on his body,” he said.
A day later, Zaw Myat Lin, an NLD member who ran a vocational school in Yangon’s Shwepyithar Township, also died under similar circumstances less than a day after his arrest.
His body was so badly disfigured by his injuries that the junta threatened to take “severe action” against anyone who suggested he had been tortured.
Since then, many others have met a similar fate. In the case of those who belonged to urban guerrilla groups, even the identities of many of the victims could not be confirmed, said Sithu Maung.
“We don’t even know the names of some of the victims, as we only know the aliases they adopted when they joined the revolution. We don’t know who their families are or where they live. This is occurring more frequently recently,” he said.
On Tuesday, the leader of a PDF group based in southern Shan State became the latest regime opponent to die of injuries inflicted during interrogation.
According to the latest figures released by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 12,000 people arrested for anti-regime activities remain behind bars in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-09-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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Description:
"Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) has said that its People’s Defense Forces (PDF) and allied ethnic revolutionary organizations (ERO)) have effective control of more than half the country after a year of waging a people’s defensive war against the military regime.
In a speech on Wednesday marking the one-year anniversary of the declaration of a people’s defensive war against the junta, the NUG’s acting president Duwa Lashi La said that the regime has lost control of at least half the country, as the territorial dominance and military capabilities of PDFs and EROs has significantly strengthened and improved.
The acting president said that the NUG has formed over 300 PDF battalions nationwide, while other township public defense forces have been formed in 250 townships out of 330 across the country over the last year.
Public administration and judicial systems of the NUG have been established in 24 townships which are completely controlled by resistance forces. Education, health, municipal and social services have also been established by the NUG in the townships, the president said.
“Amid our territorial dominance and as our military capabilities have strengthened, the operations, territorial control and public administration of our partner EROs have significantly improved,” said Duwa Lashi La.
He added: “After one year of defensive war, the fascist terrorist military council no longer control half of the country’s territory.”
On Monday, the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), an independent group of prominent former United Nations (UN) human rights experts, said that their analysis has found that the NUG and resistance organizations have effective control over 52 per cent of Myanmar’s territory.
SAC-M said also that the Myanmar military can only claim to have stable control over 17 per cent of the country, as its rule is being actively contested elsewhere.
The group noted also that the regime is unable to govern and is reduced to being an occupying military force in a diminishing amount of territory.
Meanwhile, resistance organizations including the NUG, EROs, people’s administrative bodies, the Civil Disobedience Movement and other civil institutions are administering an increasing range of government functions and delivering services to millions of people.
“The world needs to wake up to the reality that a new Myanmar is already taking shape,” said SAC-M member Yanghee Lee, the former UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar.
She added: “The NUG is not a shadow government or government in exile. It is the representative of the people’s revolution and resistance to military junta, the combined forces of which control the majority of the country.”
Since the declaration of the defensive war against the junta last September 7, PDFs and EROs have escalated their attacks targeting junta forces and regime administrations across the country, including major cities.
Over 20,150 junta soldiers have been killed and another 7,000 wounded, while 1,500 resistance fighters have died in the clashes, said Duwa Lashi La. An increasing number of regime troops are also defecting.
Amid daily attacks from PDFs and EROs, the regime has stepped up its atrocities including the arbitrary torture and killing of civilians, massacres and burning people alive, extrajudicial killings of resistance detainees, using civilians as human shields, air and artillery strikes on residential areas, looting and burning houses, and acts of sexual violence.
As of Tuesday, 2,267 people have been killed by the junta and 15,416 people including democratically-elected government leaders have been arrested or detained since last year’s coup, said the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
Acting president Duwa Lashi La said that one of the NUG’s most important tasks is to hold the regime accountable for all the war crimes it has committed.
“The terrorist group must be punished for their crimes. We will definitely deliver truth and justice,” he said.
He also urged the international community and organizations to provide the necessary technical, military, financial and humanitarian support to the Myanmar people fighting for their freedom, democracy and equal rights.
Duwa Lashi La also urged the international community to cut off military and financial support to the junta..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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more
Sub-title:
The opposition movement enjoys popular legitimacy and has a viable plan for Myanmar’s future. The world is running out of excuses for not recognizing it.
Description:
"Observers are slowly coming around to the realization that the once mighty Myanmar military, or Sit-tat, can be beaten by the forces opposing Myanmar’s military coup of 2021. The junta’s governance record is appalling, and it is losing control of ever larger parts of the country. The influential Economist newspaper now advocates for the recognition of Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG): “Myanmar’s shadow government deserves more help… International recognition – and the money it would bring – would be a good first step.”
But can the NUG actually govern? I led a team that mapped the NUG’s capacities and needs for International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization dedicated to strengthening democracy, which has been aiding Myanmar’s democratic institutions following the coup. The views expressed here are mine, and not necessarily International IDEA’s.
For our assessment, we reviewed a number of NUG strategic documents, engaged with most of its ministries, spoken to its ethnic nationality allies, and looked at life in communities. My verdict is: Yes, the NUG can govern, if it maintains its unity and coherence and receives more support from outside.
Let us take a step back. What must a government do to be worthy of recognition? If we still lived in the 19th century the answer would be: control your territory, have a population that’s yours, and impose your will on them – by force, if necessary. Add to that the protection of basic human rights as per the United Nations Charter, and what we can call performance legitimacy: the provision of services like education, electricity, and basic healthcare. In the early 21st century, the international community established the responsibility to protect, the principle that a government needs to (be able to) protect its people from harm in order to be legitimate.
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Now, not even the junta’s apologists claim that they really do any of this. But neither can anyone else in Myanmar, according to some. So such apologists claim that like it or not, there is no viable alternative to the junta. I have looked into that claim and found it to be false.
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The NUG now controls significant territory, commands the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of its people, and provides security and justice in the areas under its control.
The NUG is the executive government for Myanmar’s democratic interim institutions, representing a nation-wide coalition of political and military actors. These institutions include the union parliament, or Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, which was elected in 2020, and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), a sort of coalition council that defines the NUG’s overall objectives and strategy.
When we say that the NUG “controls territory” we mean that it effectively governs this territory, polices it, and has the cooperation of its residents, not that they can keep the military out when its personnel move in with overwhelming force. The NUG now has a local administration policy and uniform structures in place to govern a number of areas of Myanmar. This administration is a hybrid thing: NUG-loyal local administrations govern in the center and allied ethnic resistance organizations control their traditional territories in the border areas through their own often decades-old structures. Coordination between the center and the border areas is achieved through the NUCC. We have here the nucleus of the future federal structure of Myanmar.
In the center, there is reporting and accountability from the local administrations to the NUG’s Ministry of Home Affairs. Resources are authorized by and sometimes provided by the center. The NUG is also building a police force that focuses on the prevention and investigation of major crimes. A community court system is being established under the direction of the NUG’s Ministry of Justice. Local security and defense groups, separate from the NUG’s military forces, do what they can to protect communities from murderous junta raids.
The NUG provides services in areas its controls – and beyond.
The NUG and its ethnic nationality allies provide services, including in-person and distance education, in-person and mobile healthcare, electricity, and humanitarian assistance for displaced communities. Service delivery is planned and coordinated from the center, by the NUG’s line ministries. For instance, the NUG’s Ministry of Education has developed, together with the NUCC, a federal education policy. This policy guides schooling in NUG-administered and ethnic nationality organization-administered schools. Teachers in NUG schools are civil servants loyal to the NUG and administered by the Ministry. What limited resources the ministry can mobilize are used to pay living allowances for these teachers. The NUG-administered schools report regularly to the Ministry of Education. Coordination with ethnic resistance organizations is again achieved via the NUCC.
The NUG conducts effective central coordination, manages public resources, and conducts foreign policy.
This stuff is more technical but equally important. The NUG’s cabinet, the members of which are situated both inside and outside Myanmar, hold cabinet meetings weekly and virtually. The NUG has a center of government around the offices of the prime minister and the president that design policy, assign funding to programs, and receive narrative and financial reports from the NUG ministries. The NUG analyzes this information and reviews and adapts policy in response. The NUG’s Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Investment collects taxes – a voluntary business tax – and has issued sovereign bonds. Revenue collection and expenditure is decentralized, a necessity in a country whose financial system remains tightly controlled by the junta.
But all revenue and expenditure is planned in the NUG’s budget and reported through monthly financial reports to the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Investment. The ministry has established public financial management structures, including a treasury account overseas that it will be able to use as soon as recognition is forthcoming.
The NUG has its own foreign policy, a foreign ministry, and representative offices in about a dozen strategically important third countries. In a few friendly countries, notably in Europe, the NUG’s foreign ministry manages consular affairs for Myanmar citizens. Until recognition is forthcoming, these offices will handle relations ad interim.
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There is accountability around what is being done, spent, and delivered.
In the current circumstances, accountability is not perfect, but the NUG is trying. Its auditor general has begun rudimentary financial audits. The legislature, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, which meets roughly quarterly, receives the NUG’s activity reports and its committees have started looking into the performance of the ministries. The rudimentary local justice system is during the current transition period not independent but at least there is civilian justice.
Of course, challenges abound for the NUG. The quality of reporting is mixed. Service delivery is not harmonized across the country and there is of course too little of it. The NUG is cash-strapped. Its tax base is minuscule, and the NUG relies on financing from the diaspora. Ministers receive no salaries or stipends. The staff of NUG ministries are essentially volunteers – both the political appointees at the top and its hundreds of thousands loyal civil servants. Staff rely on the willing but impoverished communities to host and feed them. Each ministry raises money to try and sustain its civil servants. Pregnant women and young families are prioritized for stipends. Most go without support. Modest financial support that is predictable and stable would go a long way in addressing all this.
The NUG is advancing a difficult transition to federal democracy that has a chance to succeed.
The future of Myanmar is taking shape while the world dithers. The NUG and NUCC are developing a transitional federal constitution that will lay the path to turn Myanmar into a highly decentralized liberal democracy with a separation of powers and guarantees for fundamental rights and freedoms. At the end of the path will stand a new federal Constitution worked out by a Constituent Assembly.
The new federal government will do only what is needed – defense, monetary policy, and foreign relations – and leave most powers to the subnational level. This is a constitutional model many of Myanmar’s already de facto independent statelets – Wa State and Kokang, and increasingly southwestern Rakhine State – could find space in.
Of course, this transition will not be entirely smooth. There is a tension between the NUG’s role as the interim “federal government” with what should be its limited role in subnational governance, and its performance of overseeing local administration in central Myanmar. Ethnic nationality allies grumble at the “centralizing tendencies” of the NUG. The NUG rightly insists it now needs to govern in the most effective way. These tensions need to be resolved within the coalition, through the NUCC, and that process could be improved.
To summarize, the NUG is ready to govern, but is the world ready to accept it?
The NUG already acts as a government, fulfilling all the criteria the international community asks of a government: control of parts of Myanmar’s territory, legitimacy, provision of services and security. Why is the world not acting? The war in Ukraine is one factor but I do not believe it is the main one. Rather it is the building confrontation between the United States and China. This need not be an obstacle. Myanmar’s democratic National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government was a friend to China and no Western stooge. The NUG has re-affirmed the NLD’s independent foreign policy. China maintains relations with the NLD but refuses to deal with the NUG. That could change if the U.S. and China were to come to some sort of agreement that it would be in everybody’s interest to have a stable, unified Myanmar that is beholden to no one.
For those countries for whom recognition of the NUG is still a step too far, pragmatic financial and practical support is an option. Countries can set up joint development initiatives with the NUG or affiliated organizations to fund service delivery, starting with one-off projects, if necessary. The NUG is willing and able to do it. It has the required management and control mechanisms to reduce fiduciary risks if development partners exhibit just a little flexibility. The NUG should be invited to all international intergovernmental meetings and consultations and should receive massive financial and capacity building support, including staff professional development. International mediators and envoys should proactively engage with the NUG and the NUCC, so as to avoid being seen as legitimizing the military junta.
With the NUG increasingly acting as the government of Myanmar, and the only actor with enough legitimacy and a viable plan that could prevent the balkanization of Myanmar, the world is fast running out of excuses for not recognizing it..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2022-09-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"1. NUG designates civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
mansion as an interim national heritage site...2. NUG taking steps for safe return of Rohingya 29/08/2022...3. NUG blacklists 177 staff from the SAC-controlled Ministry of Re-
ligious Affairs and Culture 01/09/2022...4. NUG encourages civilians to report unlawful killings by SAC 29/08/2022...5. NUG condemns workplace discrimination aimed against those engaged in revolution 27/08/2022...6. NUG Foreign Minister meets with Czech Counterpart..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-09-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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1.4 MB
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (19/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-09-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
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4.93 MB
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