Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Individual Documents
Sub-title:
The wife of veteran activist Ko Jimmy vows to make the regime pay if it carries out the death sentence.
Description:
"88 Generation leader Ko Jimmy and former National League for Democracy lawmaker Phyo Zeyar Thaw were sentenced to death by a military tribunal on Jan. 21 for violating Myanmar’s Anti-Terrorism Law. They and two other men on death row — Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw — lost appeals of their cases last week. A junta spokesperson on Tuesday rejected the possibility of a pardon in response to international and domestic condemnation of the sentences, meaning that the four men may end up being the first to be executed in Myanmar in 34 years. Speaking to RFA’s Burmese Service on Thursday, Ko Jimmy’s wife Nilar Thein vowed that the junta will not escape punishment if it proceeds with the execution of her husband.
RFA: The military council has issued an execution order for Ko Jimmy, who was sentenced to death. The junta’s spokesperson said the appeal process is complete and the Prison Department is now in charge of his case. What else do you know about the process?
Nilar Thein: Ever since Ko Jimmy’s arrest, we received no contact or information from the junta. Likewise, we didn’t get a chance to consult with an attorney to submit appeals for him. That’s why the junta’s decision must be incorrect. We never got a chance to work with the authorities for Ko Jimmy’s case.
RFA: What is your response to Ko Jimmy’s death sentence?
Nilar Thein: The junta will be held accountable for all its actions and statements at some point. They will have to take responsibility for what they did, regardless of who they did it to. This day will come.
RFA: Ko Jimmy has been charged under the counter-terrorism law. Do you think he was really involved in terrorist activities?
Nilar Thein: Everyone knows who is committing violent terrorist acts and who has become the victims of these acts. We have the right to defend ourselves from aggression and injustice … we have become the victims of the junta’s violent tactics. We are exercising our right to defend ourselves – to protect our lives, homes, and properties from these acts.
RFA: The military council has stated that they will move forward to execution in Ko Jimmy’s case. Do you believe they will carry out the execution order?
Nilar Thein: This is entirely up to them. Under the law and from the perspective of the human rights community, they should not carry out this death sentence. Death sentences have not been carried out in Myanmar for a long time. It is a blatant violation of human rights even to state that they intend to carry out the execution order, to kill a human being like killing a bird or chicken ... Regardless of what they will do, I want them to know they will be accountable for their decisions. Their acts will not be forgotten.
RFA: What are you currently working on for him? Are you engaged with any international organizations about his case?
Nilar Thein: I have contacted some international organizations, such as Amnesty International. As soon as the news came out about the execution orders for Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeyar Thaw, several international organizations and foreign diplomats contacted me and told me that they would protest the decision.
RFA: What do you want to tell Ko Jimmy?
Nilar Thein: I think he has written his history by committing to a cause he believes in. He has his duty done for the people. I want to tell him I am very proud of him.
RFA: What message do you have for the people of Myanmar?
Nilar Thein: No matter how the times have changed, the power of the people will be the deciding factor in our country’s future … Those who have participated have played important roles in the resistance and they will be part of history. Whatever comes next, I trusted in the people’s power. That’s why we all need to stay united and join hands to drive out this military regime..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-06-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders
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Description:
"Two men will be executed in Myanmar by the military junta after their death sentence appeals were denied, the junta said Saturday, in what would mark the first judicial executions in the country in decades.
"It's confirmed that Phyo Zayar Thaw and [Ko] Jimmy would be on the execution list," junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun told CNN, without giving a date.
In January 2022, veteran democracy activist Ko Jimmy and former National League of Democracy lawmaker Phyo Zayar Thaw were sentenced to death, according to a statement by Myanmar's Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services.
The junta accuses the two men of being "involved in terrorist acts such as explosion attacks, killing of civilians as informants," the junta spokesperson said.
It's unclear whether Phyo Zayar Thaw and Ko Jimmy have denied the charges levied against them. Comments from the junta made no reference to their plea.
The UN said Friday it was "deeply troubled" by the decision, calling it a "blatant violation to the right to life, liberty and security of person," spokesman for the UN Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric said in a briefing, referring to an article in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
"The Secretary-General reiterates his calls for the respect of people's rights to freedom of opinion and expression and also to drop all charges against those arrested on charges related to the exercise of their fundamental freedoms and rights," Dujarric added.
The junta accuses the two men of being "involved in terrorist acts such as explosion attacks, killing of civilians as informants," the junta spokesperson said.
It's unclear whether Phyo Zayar Thaw and Ko Jimmy have denied the charges levied against them. Comments from the junta made no reference to their plea.
The UN said Friday it was "deeply troubled" by the decision, calling it a "blatant violation to the right to life, liberty and security of person," spokesman for the UN Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric said in a briefing, referring to an article in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
"The Secretary-General reiterates his calls for the respect of people's rights to freedom of opinion and expression and also to drop all charges against those arrested on charges related to the exercise of their fundamental freedoms and rights," Dujarric added.
Amnesty International said news of the resumption of executions is "shocking." They called on authorities to "immediately" drop the plan and for the international community to step up intervention efforts.
"The death sentence has become one of many appalling ways the Myanmar military is attempting to sow fear among anyone who opposes its rule, and would add to the grave human rights violations, including lethal violence targeted at peaceful protesters and other civilians," the organization said in a post published on its verified Twitter account.
Amnesty added that since the February 2021 coup in Myanmar, the organization recorded an "alarming" increase in the number of known death sentences in the country from at least one in 2020 to at least 86 in 2021.
An Amnesty from 2021 said that the last judicial execution in Myanmar known to have taken place was in 1988. There have been numerous death sentences in Myanmar since but they've usually been "commuted through mass pardons," Amnesty says.
CNN has been unable to independently verify when the last execution by the state was carried out in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-06-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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Sub-title:
Columns of smoke seen rising from villages along 8km stretch in drone footage from country’s north amid opposition to regime
Description:
"Myanmar junta troops have torched hundreds of buildings during a three-day raid in the country’s north, local media and residents said, as the military struggles to crush resistance to its rule.
The Sagaing region has seen fierce fighting and bloody reprisals since the coup last year, with local “People’s Defence Force” (PDF) members clashing regularly with junta troops.
Analysts say the informal militia has surprised junta forces with its effectiveness, and the military has on numerous occasions called in air strikes to support its troops on the ground.
Troops torched hundreds of buildings in the villages of Kinn, Upper Kinn and Ke Taung over three days last week, locals and media reports said.
On 26 May, villagers in Kinn fled as soldiers approached and began shooting into the air, said one resident who requested anonymity.
“The next morning we saw smoke rising from our village before they left.
“Over 200 houses were burned down ... my house was totally burned down, only the concrete foundation is left.”
Drone footage purporting to show the aftermath showed columns of smoke rising into the sky from the villages, set along a roughly 8km (five-mile) stretch of the Chindwin river.
A health clinic seen in the video matched the geolocation of one in Ke Taung village.
Digital verification reporters with Agence France-Presse confirmed the footage had not appeared online before last week but could not independently verify reports from the region.
Soldiers “raided and destroyed our houses”, said Ke Taung villager Aye Tin, who requested to use a pseudonym.
“And they also burned motor boats that we use for transport and for carrying food for our village, including my boat.
“My life is ruined, as I have lost my home ... and I [have] nothing left to do for a living.”
Satellite images from Nasa showed fires in locations that matched Ke Taung and Kinn villages last week.
The junta has previously rebuffed claims its troops have torched houses, accusing “terrorist” PDF fighters of starting the fires.
In a speech on Tuesday, the junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing, said “efforts were made to minimise the casualties as much as possible in performing the counterattacks to terror acts”.
“Now, the country is in tranquillity,” he said, according to state media..."
Source/publisher:
"Agence France-Presse" (Paris) via "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-06-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Four people including ex-MP Phyo Zeya Thaw and Ko Jimmy to be put to death
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has said it will execute a former lawmaker from Aung San Suu Kyi’s party and a prominent democracy activist, both of whom were convicted of terrorism, in the country’s first judicial executions since 1990.
Four people, including the former MP Phyo Zeya Thaw and the democracy activist Kyaw Min Yu, better known as Ko Jimmy, “will be hanged according to prison procedures,” Zaw Min Tun told AFP on Friday.
The junta has sentenced dozens of anti-coup activists to death as part of its crackdown on dissent after seizing power last year, but Myanmar has not carried out an execution for decades.
Phyo Zeya Thaw, a former lawmaker from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy who was arrested in November, was sentenced to death in January for offences under anti-terrorism laws.
Ko Jimmy received the same sentence from the military tribunal.
“They continued the legal process of appealing and sending a request letter for the amendment of the sentence,” said Zaw Min Tun, a spokesperson for the junta. “But the court rejected their appeal and request. There is no other step after that.”
Two men who were convicted and sentenced to death for killing a woman they alleged was an informer for the junta in Yangon will also be executed, the spokesperson said. No date has been set for the executions, he said.
A spokesperson for Amnesty International called on the junta to “immediately drop such plans and for the international community to step up its efforts to intervene”.
Phil Robertson, a deputy director at Human Rights Watch, said the junta’s decision to “move towards executing two prominent political leaders will be like pouring gasoline on the fire of popular anti-military resistance in the country. Such a move will also lead to global condemnation and cement the junta’s reputation as among the worst of the worst human rights abusers in Asia.”
Phyo Zeya Thaw had been accused of orchestrating several attacks on regime forces, including a gun attack on a commuter train in Yangon in August that killed five police officers. A hip-hop pioneer whose subversive rhymes irked the previous junta, Phyo Zeya Thaw was jailed in 2008 for membership of an illegal organisation and possession of foreign currency.
He was elected to parliament representing Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD in the 2015 elections, which ushered in a transition to civilian rule.
The country’s military alleged voter fraud during elections in 2020 – which the NLD won by a landslide – as justification for its coup on 1 February 2021.
Aung San Suu Kyi has been detained ever since and faces a slew of charges in a junta court that could lead to her facing a prison sentence of more than 150 years.
Kyaw Min Yu, who rose to prominence during Myanmar’s 1988 student uprising against the country’s previous military regime, was arrested in an overnight raid in October. The junta issued an arrest warrant for him last year, alleging he had incited unrest with his social media posts..."
Source/publisher:
Agence France-Presse (Paris) via "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-06-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
Language:
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Description:
"အလေးထားရမည့် ဒေတာအချက်အလက်များ အမှတ် – (၂၂)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်ကနေ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မေ ၂၆ ရက်အတွင်း လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခတွေအကြား မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခံရတာအပြင် လက်နက်ကျည်တွေ ထိမှန်လို့ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှံးခဲ့ရတဲ့ နေအိမ်၊အဆောက်အအုံ (ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အအုံတွေအပါအဝင်) ၂၂,၂၉၉ လုံးထက်မနည်းရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ တနှစ်ကျော်ကာလအတွင်း ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရတဲ့ နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အအုံ ၂၂,၂၉၉ လုံးထဲမှာ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွင်းက ၁၅,၅၃၀ လုံးရှိခဲ့ပြီးတော့ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းအားဖြင့် ၆၉ ဒသမ ၇ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းရှိပါတယ်။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဟာ နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အအုံ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခံရမှု အများဆုံးရှိခဲ့တဲ့ ဒေသတစ်ခု ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒုတိယအများဆုံး မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရတဲ့ ဒေသကတော့ မကွေးတိုင်းဖြစ်ပြီး နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အအုံ ၄,၈၂၂ လုံး မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရကာ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းအားဖြင့် ၂၁ ဒသမ ၆ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ကျန်ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့တဲ့ ၁,၉၄၇ အိမ်၊ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းအားဖြင့် ၈ ဒသမ ၇ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ကတော့ မန္တလေးတိုင်း၊ တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း၊ ပဲခူးတိုင်း၊ ကယားပြည်နယ်၊ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် ကရင်ပြည်နယ်တို့ထဲက နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အုံတွေဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
တဆက်တည်းမှာပဲ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မေ ၁ ရက်ကနေ ၂၆ ရက်အတွင်း မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခံရတဲ့ နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အအုံ ၇,၆၆၂ လုံးထက်မနည်း ရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အာဏာသိမ်ပြီးနောက် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့တဲ့ လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခတွေအကြား မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရတဲ့ နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အအုံ အရေအတွက် (လအလိုက်) ထဲမှာ ယခုလအတွင်း ဖျက်ဆီးခံရတဲ့ပမာဏာကတော့ တနှစ်တာအတွင်း အများဆုံး ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒီလိုမျိုး မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရတဲ့ ၇,၆၆၂ လုံးထဲမှာ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းက ၅,၃၃၇ လုံး၊ မကွေးတိုင်းက ၂,၁၄၃ လုံး၊ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်က အလုံး ၁၁၀၊ မန္တလေးတိုင်းက အလုံး ၃၀၊ ချင်းပြည်နယ်က ၂၉ လုံး၊ ကရင်ပြည်နယ်က ၁၀ လုံးနဲ့ ကယားပြည်နယ်က ၃ လုံးတို့ ပါဝင်ပါတယ်။
၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မေ ၁၈ ရက်ကနေ ၂၅ ရက်အတွင်း စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ မြောင်မြို့နယ်က ကျေးရွာ အနည်းဆုံး ၁၈ ရွာမှာ နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အအုံ ၃၉၃ လုံးထက်မနည် မီးရှို့၊ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရပါတယ်။ မီးရှို့ခံခဲ့ရတဲ့ ကျေးရွာတွေဟာ ဒေသခံ ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့တွေ (LDF/PDF/CDSOM စသည်ဖြင့်) လှုပ်ရှားကြတဲ့ အဓိကဒေသတွေဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ မြောင်မြို့နယ်က မင်းတန်းကျေးရွာမှာ နေအိမ်၊ အဆောက်အအုံ ၁၀၀ ထက်မနည်း မီးရှို့၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရပြီးတော့ မယ်မသော်ကျေးရွာဟာ ခုနစ်ကြိမ်ထက်မနည်း မီးရှို့၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရပါတယ်။
∎ ဘာကြောင့်အလေးထားသင့်သလဲ
စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း ဖြစ်ပွားလာတဲ့ တိုက်ပွဲအခြေအနေတွေအပြင် လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခတွေနဲ့ ဆက်စပ်နေတဲ့ အခြင်းအရာတွေကို လေ့လာခြင်းအားဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲ့ ပဋိပက္ခမြေပုံအပြောင်းအလဲ နဲ့ ပဋိပက္ခရေချိန် အတက်၊အကျ စတဲ့ အကြောင်းအရာတွေကို သုတေသနပြုဖော်ထုတ်နိုင်မှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် ပဋိပက္ခနဲ့တိုက်ပွဲတွေအတွင်း စစ်ဘေးတိမ်းရှောင်နေရတဲ့ ဒုက္ခသည်ပမာဏာ၊ အရပ်သားတွေအပေါ် လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့တွေရဲ့ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုး ဖောက်မှု ကျူးလွန်တာတွေ ရှိ၊မရှိကို လေ့လာပြီး အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုဆိုင်ရာတရားမျှတမှုရှုထောင့် (Transitional Justice) ကနေ သုတေသနပြုနိုင်မှာ ဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် အလေးထားသင့်တဲ့ ဒေတာအချက်အလက်များပဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
∎ တွဲဖက်လေ့လာသင့်သည်များ
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း နိုင်ငံတဝန်းမှာ ဖြစ်ပွားလာတဲ့ လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခတွေနဲ့ အကျိုးဆက် တွေ အရပ်သားထိခိုက်သေဆုံးမှုတွေ၊ နေအိမ်မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခံရတာတွေနဲ့ စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ဒုက္ခသည်တွေရဲ့ အခြေအနေ တွေကို လွတ်လပ်တဲ့သတင်းမီဒီယာတွေ အထူးသဖြင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားသတင်းဌာနတွေရဲ့ မြေပြင် အခြေအနေ ဖော်ပြချက်တွေအပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ ညှိနှိုင်းရေးရုံး (UNOCHA Myanmar) လို ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေ အခြားလွတ်လပ်သော ပြည်တွင်း၊ပြည်ပအဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေရဲ့ မှတ်တမ်း၊ အစီရင်ခံ စာ စတာတွေနဲ့လည်း တွဲဖက်လေ့လာနိုင်ပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
Institute for Strategy and Policy - Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-06-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"Populations in Myanmar are facing crimes against humanity and war crimes perpetrated by the military following the February 2021 coup.
BACKGROUND:
On 1 February 2021 Myanmar’s (Burma) military – the Tatmadaw – led by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, overthrew the country’s civilian-led government and declared a state of emergency. Over the past 17 months, hundreds of thousands of people have participated in peaceful protests and strikes against the reimposition of military rule, while numerous civilian militias – known as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) – have also formed as part of an armed resistance. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 1,800 people have been killed by the security forces since February 2021 and over 10,400 people remain detained for resisting the coup. At least 110 people have been sentenced to death by military tribunals.
The Tatmadaw has increasingly targeted civilian areas with airstrikes, scorched earth campaigns and other attacks, particularly in Magway and Sagaing regions and Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayah and Karen states, resulting in civilian casualties and mass displacement. By the end of April 2022 the military had torched over 11,400 civilian homes across the country since the coup, with approximately 7,500 in Sagaing alone, according to the research group Data for Myanmar. Communal violence is also escalating in Myanmar with the formation of the pro-junta “Blood Comrades” militia.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, have indicated that abuses committed by the military since the coup may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. According to the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), the “security forces have carried out a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population,” and “the reports of murders, sexual assaults, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and persecution collected by the Mechanism, if substantiated, would amount to crimes against humanity.”
On 16 April 2021 a coalition of democratic opponents to military rule formed the National Unity Government (NUG), which includes members of parliament ousted by the military. The military has charged their members with high treason and pronounced that the NUG and PDFs are terrorist organizations.
An estimated 14.4 million people are in need of humanitarian aid. Nearly 700,000 people have been displaced since the coup, bringing the estimated total number of internally displaced persons to over 1 million.
In 2018 the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Myanmar concluded that senior members of the military, including General Min Aung Hlaing, should be prosecuted for genocide against the Rohingya ethnic group, as well as for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states. In 2019 the FFM also asserted that Myanmar “continues to harbor genocidal intent” toward the Rohingya.
The majority of Myanmar’s Rohingya population were forced to flee the country after the military launched “clearance operations” in Rakhine State in August 2017, bringing the total number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to over 900,000 people. The estimated 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State face severe violations of their universal human rights. The 1982 Citizenship Law rendered most Rohingya stateless.
ANALYSIS:
Myanmar’s armed forces previously ruled the country from 1962-2011, overseeing the violent repression of the democracy movement and waging war against several ethnic armed groups.
Impunity for past atrocities has enabled the military to continue committing widespread and systematic human rights violations and abuses against civilians, particularly those from ethnic minority populations. The risk of further atrocities remains extremely high as the Tatmadaw continues to target civilians and the armed resistance in what appears to be a widespread and systematic scorched earth campaign.
The coup also complicates the prospects for the safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. Given its history, the military regime is unlikely to address the denial of citizenship for the Rohingya or accountability for past atrocities.
Myanmar’s military has manifestly failed to uphold its responsibility to protect and bears responsibility for the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE:
The only formal response by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to the genocide against the Rohingya was the adoption of a Presidential Statement on 6 November 2017 that stressed the “primary responsibility of the Myanmar government to protect its population.”
Numerous mechanisms have been created to investigate and potentially hold accountable perpetrators of crimes against the Rohingya. This includes the IIMM, an investigation launched by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2019 into crimes against humanity that may have resulted in the forced deportation of the Rohingya across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, and a lawsuit filed by The Gambia in November 2019 at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Myanmar of violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention. On 26 November 2021 Argentina’s judiciary also opened a case under the principle of universal jurisdiction. In March 2022 the United States (US) government formally determined that the violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya constituted genocide and crimes against humanity.
Since the coup, the UNSC has privately met 11 times on Myanmar and adopted nine statements, but has taken no substantial action.
A number of governments have imposed targeted sanctions in response to the coup, including Canada, United Kingdom (UK), US and the European Union (EU). The EU, UK and US have also sanctioned several military-run conglomerates. The EU also suspended development funds. Oil conglomerates TotalEnergies and Chevron announced in January 2022 their withdrawal over the human rights crisis. In February the EU sanctioned the state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The Republic of Korea restricted military exports and suspended defense exchanges.
On 24 April 2021 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed to a “Five-Point Consensus,” but it has not been effectively implemented. The Tatmadaw was blocked from sending representatives to the US-ASEAN summit, held 12-13 May 2022, during which the US met with NUG representatives.
On 18 June 2021 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the immediate release of all political detainees and for all member states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar.
NECESSARY ACTION:
The UNSC should impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Myanmar and refer the situation to the ICC. China, Russia, Serbia and India must halt their weapons transfers to Myanmar’s military. All UN member states, regional organizations and the UNSC should impose economic sanctions on Myanmar’s oil and gas sector, particularly MOGE. ASEAN member states should condemn the Tatmadaw and increasingly engage with the NUG.
The military junta should not be diplomatically recognized as the legitimate representatives of Myanmar. Foreign companies should immediately divest and sever ties with all businesses linked to Myanmar’s military. The UN Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, should promptly travel to Myanmar and engage with the junta, the NUG and civil society.
General Min Aung Hlaing and other senior military leaders who bear responsibility for atrocity crimes should face international justice..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2022-06-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးညှိနှိုင်း အပေးအယူပြုလုပ်မှုများအား တရားမဝင်ကြောင်းနှင့် အသိအမှတ်ပြုလက်ခံခြင်းရှိမည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာချက်
Description:
"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို မူလပိုင်ရှင် ဖြစ်သည့် ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ မတရားသဖြင့်လုယူရန် ကြိုးစားနေသော အကြမ်းဖက် အဖွဲ့အစည်းဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ယင်းတို့ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ရာဇ၀တ်မှု၊ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုတို့အတွက် ကမ္ဘာ့တရားခွင်တွင် ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံရမည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်း လည်းဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ အဆိုပါ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ တိုက်ရိုက်ဆင်းသက် အပ်နှင်းထားသော တရားဝင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်အာဏာ (de jure power) မရှိသည့်အပြင် တိုင်းပြည်ကို လက်တွေ့ကျကျ နိုင်နင်းစွာအုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်သော အခွင့်အာဏာ (de facto power) လည်း လုံးဝမရှိသည့် တရားမဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ စစ်မှန်သောအချုပ်အခြာအာဏာသည် လွတ်လပ်၍ တရားမျှတသည့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှ တစ်ဆင့် ပြည်သူလူထုက တရားဝင်အာဏာအပ်နှင်းထားသည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ၌သာ တည်သည်။
၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား အကြမ်းဖက်မှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၇) ရက်နေ့ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၆။ ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်က ချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သော တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုရပ်စဲရေး သဘောတူ စာချုပ် (NCA) သည် ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအကြား ချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သည့် သဘောတူညီမှု ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းဖြစ်သည့် စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအလား စာချုပ်ဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးညှိနှိုင်း အပေးအယူ ပြုနိုင်ခွင့် အလျဉ်းမရှိချေ။
၇။ သို့ပါ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးညှိနှိုင်း အပေးအယူပြုလုပ်မှုမှန်သမျှ သည် တရားမဝင်ကြောင်းနှင့် ထိုဆွေးနွေးညှိနှိုင်း အပေးအယူပြုလုပ်မှုများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် ယင်းအားဆက်ခံသော မည်သည့်အစိုးရကမျှ အသိအမှတ်ပြုလက်ခံခြင်းရှိမည်မဟုတ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-06-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Since the February 1st, 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar, the country has become engulfed in a rapidly
escalating civil war as the pro-democracy movement picked up arms in conjunction with several
longstanding ethnic armed organizations to challenge the military junta’s control over the country. In
little over a year, the conflict has spread across half a dozen distinct theaters, destabilizing military
rule in many places, and resulted in widespread violence and devastation in Myanmar as the junta
deployed indiscriminate violence against its opponents. Yet, the determined anti-junta resistance gained
substantial momentum and now fields an impressive number of enthusiastic volunteers that stand
poised to continue fighting indefinitely. Challenges remain, however, most notably in the pro-democracy
forces’ lack of centralized command and equipment..."
Source/publisher:
Wilson Center, Asia Program and Tagaung Institute of Political Studies
Date of publication:
2022-05-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations
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2.12 MB
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"The people of Myanmar are resolved to defeat the military junta and establish
a genuine federal democracy. The revolution is already forming systems of local
governance to provide essential services to people, with immediate implications
for the delivery of international humanitarian assistance, says the Special Advisory
Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
A panel of esteemed representatives from key institutions within Myanmar’s
democratic revolution joined an online public event hosted by SAC-M on Thursday
26 May, to discuss the theme “Building the New Myanmar from the Ground Up.”
“We, the people of Myanmar, know we have to defeat this evil [tyrant] military
in order to [achieve] a peaceful, prosperous federal union that guarantees selfdetermination, equality and justice,” His Excellency Duwa Lashi La, Acting President
of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), told the panel. “Within one year
we’ve achieved significant success despite numerous challenges.”
“The junta has created a humanitarian crisis that threatens the stability of the
entire region. A priority of the NUG is to deliver unhindered humanitarian assistance
to the people of Myanmar,” the President explained.
Padoh Saw Taw Nee, Head of Foreign Affairs of the Karen National Union (KNU)
told the panel that the KNU, which runs 14 administrative departments in southeast
Myanmar including education, health, agriculture and transport, has expanded its
social service provision in response to rapidly escalating humanitarian needs caused
by the military’s attempted coup and subsequent attacks.
“After the coup we have been able to mobilise several administrative
departments across seven districts to accommodate tens of thousands of fleeing
politicians, lawyers, doctors, CDM-ers, activists, journalists as well as freedom
fighters,” said Padoh Saw Taw Nee. “We would like to request the international
community to please strengthen our existing humanitarian mechanisms so we can
reach our people who are most in need.”
The panel also heard from Salai Ram Kulh Cung, Chair of the Central Executive
Committee of the Chin National Front (CNF) in northwest Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-06-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters
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"၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ် ၊ မေလ ၃၁ရက်နေ့တွင်ကျရောက်သည့် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် (Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces – KNDF)တည်ထောင်ခြင်း(၁)နှစ်ပြည့််အထိမ်းအမှတ် အခမ်းအနားသို့ ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ဤသ၀ဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည် ။
၂။ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်၀ါရီလ(၁)ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကို မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်က မတရားသိမ်းယူပြီးသည့်နောက်ပိုင်းတွင် မြန်မာတနိုင်ငံလုံး လှည်းနေလှေအောင်းမြင်းဇောင်းမကျန် ခုခံ တော်လှန်နေကြသော လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ပေါင်းများစွာ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ အဆိုပါတပ်ဖွဲ့များတွင် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်(Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces – KNDF)အနေဖြင့် ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံပါ၀င်တော်လှန်နေခြင်းအတွက် မိမိတို့အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ယူ အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်း ၀မ်းမြောက်စွာပြောကြားလိုပါသည် ။
၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီမှ အတည်ပြုပြဌာန်းသည့်ဖက်ဒရယ်ပဋိညာဥ်အရ အနာဂတ်တွင် ကိုယ်ပိုင် ပြဌာန်းခွင့်အား သေချာစွာအာမခံချက်ရှိစေမည့် ကရင်နီပြည်နယ်အဖြစ်ပြန်လည်စုစည်းတည်ထောင်ရေး နှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်ပြီးအလွန်ကာလတွင် အနာဂတ်နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်အား ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ် အဖြစ်တည်ထောင်သွားနိုင်ရေး အတွက် မျှော်မှန်းထားရှိကြောင်း ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်(KNDF) တည်ထောင်သည့် (၁)နှစ်ပြည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်နေ့အခမ်းအနားမိန့်ခွန်းတွင် ထည့်သွင်းပြောကြားသွားခဲ့သည့် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်၏ ဥက္ကဌကြီး၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ သယံဇာတနှင့်ပတ်၀န်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဒုတိယ ၀န်ကြီးခွန်ဘီးထူးနှင့်ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်၏စစ်ဦးစီးချုပ် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ဘီထူးအပါအ၀င် ကရင်နီတိုင်းရင်းသား ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏သဘောထားကိုလည်း မိမိတို့အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် အထူး ဂုဏ်ယူ၀မ်းမြောက်စွာဖြင့် လှိုက်လှိုက်လှဲလှဲကြိုဆိုပါသည် ။
၅။ ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် စတင်တည်ထောင်ခဲ့သည့် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် ၊ မေလ (၃၁)ရက်နေ့မှစတင်၍ ယနေ့အထိ တော်လှန်ရေးကာလတစ်လျှောက်လုံးတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် အသက်ပေးလှူခဲ့ကြသောစစ်သည်များ၊ ပြည်သူများ၊ ပါဝင် ကူညီခဲ့သောသူများနှင့်အဖွဲ့စည်းများအားလုံးကို မိမိတို့အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်နှင့်ထပ်တူထပ်မျှလေးစား၍ အရိုသေပြုအပ်သလို ထာဝရလည်း မှတ်ကျောက်တင် ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည် ။
၆။ လက်ရှိအချိန်သည် ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုကို ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုဖွားတိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး အတူတကွ လက်တွဲတွန်းလှန်ပြီး ပြည်နယ်အလိုက် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးစုများအားလုံးအနေဖြင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့် အပေါ် သေချာစွာအာမခံချက်ရရှိစေနိုင်မည့် စစ်မှန်သောအနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုဆီသို့ ဦးတည် လျှောက်လှမ်းရန် အချိန်အခါကောင်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု မိမိတို့ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့်လည်း ဥက္ကဌခွန်ဘီးထူး၏ မိန့်ခွန်းတွင် ပြောကြားသွားခဲ့သည့်သဘောထားနှင့်ထပ်တူထပ်မျှလေးနက်စွာ ယုံကြည်ပါသည် ။
၇။ ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်တည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၁)နှစ်ပြည့်အထိမ်းအမှတ်နေ့မှသည် ကရင်နီလူမျိုးများနှင့် ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်တခုလုံး၏ဒေသခံပြည်သူများအပါအ၀င် ဘာသာပေါင်းစုံကိုးကွယ်ကျင့်သုံး နေထိုင် ကြသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုဖွား တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး၏အကျိုးစီးပွားဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ်တည်ထောင်ရေးနှင့် ထိုနိုင်ငံသစ်အား စီးပွား ဥစ္စာပိုမိုတိုးတက်ပေါကြွယ်၀သည့် နိုင်ငံသစ်တရပ်အဖြစ် ကမ္ဘာ့အလယ်၊ အာရှနှင့်အရှေ့တောင်အာရှဒေသအတွင်းတွင် ပီပြင် ခန့်ညားထည်၀ါစွာဖြစ်ပေါ်လာစေရေးအတွက် အနာဂတ်တွင် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်အနေဖြင့် အခြား ပြည်ထောင်စုဖွားတိုင်းရင်းသား ညီအကိုမောင်နှမများ အသီးသီးပါ၀င်ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေးကို လိုလားသည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအပါအ၀င် မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းတိုင်းနှင့်အတူတကွ တွဲလက်ညီညာ အတူမကွဲမကွာဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် (Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces – KNDF)ထံသို့ ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်တည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၁)နှစ်ပြည့်အထိမ်းအမှတ်နေ့အတွက် ဤသ၀ဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-06-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Post-coup military assault in Kayin and Kayah States includes war crimes and likely crimes against humanity
More than 150,000 displaced, with entire villages emptied and burned
Amnesty International interviewed almost 100 people and visited border area
Myanmar’s military has been systematically committing widespread atrocities in recent months, including unlawfully killing, arbitrarily detaining and forcibly displacing civilians in two eastern states, Amnesty International said today in a new report.
The report, “Bullets rained from the sky”: War crimes and displacement in eastern Myanmar, found that Myanmar’s military has subjected Karen and Karenni civilians to collective punishment via widespread aerial and ground attacks, arbitrary detentions that often result in torture or extrajudicial executions, and the systematic looting and burning of villages.
The violence in Kayin and Kayah States reignited in the wake of last year’s military coup and escalated from December 2021 to March 2022, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing more than 150,000 people.
“The world’s attention may have moved away from Myanmar since last year’s coup, but civilians continue to pay a high price. The military’s ongoing assault on civilians in eastern Myanmar has been widespread and systematic, likely amounting to crimes against humanity,” said Rawya Rageh, Senior Crisis Adviser at Amnesty International.
“Alarm bells should be ringing: the ongoing killing, looting and burning bear all the hallmarks of the military’s signature tactic of collective punishment, which it has repeatedly used against ethnic minorities across the country.”
Alarm bells should be ringing: the ongoing killing, looting and burning bear all the hallmarks of the military’s signature tactic of collective punishment, which it has repeatedly used against ethnic minorities across the country.
Rawya Rageh, Senior Crisis Adviser at Amnesty International
Post-coup surge in violence
For decades, ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar, including in Kayin and Kayah States, have been engaged in struggles for greater rights and autonomy. Fragile ceasefires in place in both states since 2012 broke down after the February 2021 coup, and new armed groups have emerged. In its operations, the military has relentlessly attacked civilians.
Some attacks appear to have directly targeted civilians as a form of collective punishment against those perceived to support an armed group or the wider post-coup uprising. In other cases, the military has fired indiscriminately into civilian areas where there are also military targets. Direct attacks on civilians, collective punishment, and indiscriminate attacks that kill or injure civilians violate international humanitarian law and constitute war crimes.
Attacks on a civilian population must be widespread or systematic to amount to crimes against humanity; in Kayin and Kayah States, they are both, for crimes including murder, torture, forcible transfer, and persecution on ethnic grounds.
Unlawful strikes
In its ongoing operations, Myanmar’s military has repeatedly fired explosive weapons with wide-area effects into populated civilian areas. Dozens of witnesses told Amnesty International about barrages that lasted days at a time. The organization documented 24 attacks by artillery or mortars between December 2021 and March 2022 that killed or injured civilians or that caused destruction to civilian homes, schools, health facilities, churches, and monasteries.
For example, on 5 March 2022, as families were at dinner, the military shelled Ka Law Day village, Hpapun Township, Kayin State, killing seven people, including a woman who was eight months pregnant. A close family member of four of the people who were killed said he had to sit in his house all night looking at the bodies, for fear of being injured by further shelling, before burying them in the morning.
Many people described the military’s use of fighter jets and attack helicopters as particularly terrifying. Witnesses described not being able to sleep at night out of fear of air strikes, or fleeing to seek shelter in bunkers and caves.
Amnesty International documented eight air strikes on villages and an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in eastern Myanmar in the first three months of 2022. The attacks, which killed nine civilians and injured at least nine more, destroyed civilian homes and religious buildings. In almost all documented attacks, only civilians appear to have been present.
In one case, at around 6pm on 23 February 2022, a fighter jet fired on Dung Ka Mee village, Demoso Township, Kayah State, killing two civilian men and injuring several others. Amnesty International interviewed two witnesses and a relative of one of the deceased as well as an aid worker who responded after the attack. They said there was no fighting that evening and that the nearest armed group base was a mile or more away.
A local resident, a 46-year-old farmer who witnessed the attack, said the military aircraft made three passes, firing guns and a rocket:
“When that fighter jet was flying toward us in a nose-down position, I was numb… When they fired the rocket, I got myself together and realized I had to run [to a bunker]… We were shocked to see the dust and debris come towards us… There is a two-story building… The family lives upstairs and the downstairs is a mobile phone store. This building collapsed and it was also on fire.”
Another witness, a 40-year-old farmer, saw the remains of a neighbour’s body:
“We couldn’t even put them in a coffin, we put them in a plastic bag and buried them. People had to pick up the body pieces and put them in a bag.” In another incident, the military carried out an air strike on Ree Khee Bu IDP camp at around 1am on 17 January 2022, killing a man in his 50s as well as 15- and 12-year-old sisters.
We couldn’t even put them in a coffin, we put them in a plastic bag and buried them. People had to pick up the body pieces and put them in a bag.”
A 40-year-old farmer who witnessed an air strike.
Extrajudicial executions
The report documents how Myanmar’s military carried out arbitrary detentions of civilians on the basis of their ethnicity or because they were suspected of supporting the anti-coup movement. Often, detainees were tortured, forcibly disappeared or extrajudicially executed.
In one of many cases where soldiers extrajudicially executed civilians who ventured out from displacement sites to collect food or belongings, three farmers from San Pya 6 Mile village in Kayah State went missing in January 2022. Their decomposed bodies were found in a pit latrine around two weeks later.
The brother of one of the victims said he identified the men by their clothes and the state of their teeth. Soldiers fired on him and others as they tried to retrieve the bodies; they could only return to finish the burial a month later.
In a massacre that prompted rare international condemnation, soldiers near Mo So village in Kayah State’s Hpruso Township reportedly stopped at least 35 women, men and children in multiple vehicles on 24 December 2021, and then proceeded to kill them and burn their bodies. Doctors who examined the bodies reportedly said many of the victims had been tied up and gagged, bearing wounds suggesting they were shot or stabbed.
Amnesty International maintains that the incident must be investigated as a case of extrajudicial executions. Such killings in armed conflict constitute war crimes.
Witnesses also described Myanmar’s military shooting at civilians, including those attempting to flee across a river along the border with Thailand.
Looting and burning
Following a pattern from past military operations, soldiers have systematically looted and burned large sections of villages in Kayin and Kayah States. Witnesses from six villages reported having items including jewellery, cash, vehicles and livestock stolen, before homes and other buildings were burned.
Four men who fled Wari Suplai village, on the border of Shan and Kayah States, said they watched from nearby farmland as houses went up in flames after most villagers fled on 18 February 2022. They told Amnesty International that the burning went on for days, destroying well over two-thirds of the houses there.
“It’s not a house anymore. It’s all ashes — black and charcoal… It’s my life’s savings. It was destroyed within minutes,” said a 38-year-old farmer and father of two young children.
Amnesty International’s analysis of fire data and satellite imagery shows how villages were burned, some of them multiple times, in parts of Kayah State. The burning directly tracks military operations from village to village in February and March 2022.
A defector from the military’s 66th Light Infantry Division, who was involved in operations in Kayah State until October 2021, told Amnesty International that he witnessed soldiers looting and burning homes: “They don’t have any particular reason [for burning a specific house]. They just want to put the fear in the civilians that ‘This is what we’ll do if you support [the resistance fighters].’ And another thing is to stop the supply and logistics for the local resistance forces… [Soldiers] took everything they could [from a village] and then they burned the rest.”
They don’t have any particular reason [for burning a specific house]. They just want to put the fear in the civilians that ‘This is what we’ll do if you support [the resistance fighters].’…[Soldiers] took everything they could [from a village] and then they burned the rest.
A defector from the military’s 66th Light Infantry Division.
The violence has caused the mass displacement of more than 150,000 people, including between a third and a half of Kayah State’s entire population. In some cases, entire villages have been emptied of their populations; at times, civilians have had to flee repeatedly in recent months.
Displaced people are enduring dire conditions amid food insecurity, scant health care — including for the conflict’s enormous psychosocial impact — and ongoing efforts by the military to obstruct humanitarian aid provision. Aid workers spoke of growing malnutrition and increasing difficulties in reaching displaced people due to the ongoing violence and military restrictions.
“Donors and humanitarian organizations must significantly scale up aid to civilians in eastern Myanmar, and the military must halt all restrictions on aid delivery,” said Matt Wells, Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Deputy Director – Thematic Issues.
“The military’s ongoing crimes against civilians in eastern Myanmar reflect decades-long patterns of abuse and flagrant impunity. The international community — including ASEAN and UN member states — must tackle this festering crisis now. The UN Security Council must impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Myanmar and refer the situation there to the International Criminal Court.”
“The military’s ongoing crimes against civilians in eastern Myanmar reflect decades-long patterns of abuse and flagrant impunity. The international community — including ASEAN and UN member states — must tackle this festering crisis now. The UN Security Council must impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Myanmar and refer the situation there to the International Criminal Court.
Matt Wells, Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Deputy Director – Thematic Issues
Methodology
The report is based on research carried out in March and April 2022, including two weeks on the Thailand-Myanmar border. Amnesty International interviewed 99 people, including dozens of witnesses or survivors of attacks and three defectors from Myanmar’s military.
The organization also analysed more than 100 photographs and videos related to human rights violations — showing injuries, destruction and weapon use — in addition to satellite imagery, fire data, and open-source military aircraft flight data..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-05-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar
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"Today (31/05/2022) in Yangon, there was a bomb blast in a busy bus stop on Barr Street, off Anawyahtar Road, around 3 pm in the afternoon. It was reported that at least seven civilians were injured in the initial blast, some of whom have died, and the blast was followed by subsequent explosions.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the National Unity Government has been conducting the People’s Resistance in accordance with the Code of Conduct and military ethics in order to protect the civilian population from extra-judicial torture and killings by the junta. In the Code of Conduct, it is clearly stated that threatening and targeting civilians are prohibited and that only the military and their system are legitimate targets. Training on the Code of Conduct and military ethics has been conducted. Those who violated the Code of Conduct and the ministry's ethical principles are investigated and effective actions are taken. The MOD has set the protection of the people of all ethnic groups and the safety and security of the people as a whole as prime objectives, and it continues to strive for the establishment of a federal democratic union. We strongly condemned this incident and all like it, and any and all violence against civilians.
Throughout history, the terrorist SAC has committed violent attacks and terrorist acts against civilians through extremist groups such as the Pyu Saw Htee and the so-called “blood drinkers”. And they have sought to place blame on ethnic resistance groups and revolutionary forces in similar incidents in the past. Therefore, we urge everyone to remain vigilant and cautious.
Please be informed that the relevant ministries of the National Unity Government will continue to investigate and take action to bring justice for such acts..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-31
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The use of the death penalty in Myanmar has increased at an alarming rate under military rule, with nearly 90 people sentenced to death by military tribunals since the coup last year, rights group Amnesty International said.
Based on media reports and some of the other limited number of sources available, including military-controlled state media, AI said that at least 86 death sentences have been handed down since February 2021. The majority of those were against anti-regime resistance members or people with ties to the resistance movement.
Myanmar has been in social and political turmoil since the coup due to popular resistance against the regime. The junta has responded with heavy-handed tactics.
From 2017-20 in Myanmar, during which the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government was in office, the number of death penalty cases averaged fewer than 10 per year; since the coup that number has increased by about eight times. In 2020 there was only one death penalty case.
Shortly after the coup, martial law was imposed in Hlaing Tharyar, Shwe Pyi Thar, North Okkalar, North Dagon, South Dagon and Eastern Dagon (Seikkan) townships. Most of the death sentences were imposed in these townships.
The military transferred the civilian cases to special and military tribunals through summary proceedings in which the defendant did not have the right to appeal. Most of the death sentences were imposed arbitrarily—several without the defendants being present, according to the AI statement.
“Available information indicates that the proceedings were summary, with the defendants unable to access legal representation,” the rights group said.
Those sentenced to death include a former member of Parliament from the National League for Democracy (NLD), Ko Phyo Zeyar Thaw, and 88 Generation student leader Ko Jimmy. They were arrested in Yangon last year and sentenced to death on Jan. 21, 2022 for aiding and abetting the armed resistance movement in the city.
In Myanmar, the death penalty has become “a tool for the military in the ongoing and widespread persecution, intimidation and harassment of and violence on protestors and journalists,” AI said.
Before February 2021, the death sentence in Myanmar was sporadically imposed in murder cases, and usually commuted through mass pardons.
AI said that according to reports on the sentences, at least 26 defendants were tried and convicted while not being present; at least two were teenagers at the time of the alleged offense; and one man was reported as having a severe mental (psychosocial) disability.
Since the coup on Feb. 1, 2021, about 1,085 people have been sentenced to prison in Myanmar and an estimated 1,864 people killed by the junta, according to data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, which documents fatalities and arrests at the hands of the military regime’s forces..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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"The Irrawaddy’s editor-in-chief Aung Zaw recently spoke to Bertil Lintner, a veteran journalist and author of several books on Myanmar, on the peace process in the country. Here are excerpts.
Aung Zaw: Since the coup, there are endless tragic stories in Burma, or Myanmar. And the coup has faced very strong resistance in the country; the regime still tries to consolidate their power within the country but still, they are failing. And even a year after the military staged the coup, the regime keeps facing strong resistance; people take up the form of armed-resistance known as PDF [People’s Defense Force] and we now have a government in exile.
Recently, the regime leader [Senior General] Min Aung Hlaing invited ethnic armed organizations to attend the peace talks in Naypyitaw. So, there are EAOs, ethnic armed organizations, who have decided to go there and who are not going there—they are still divided. It seems to me that many major ethnic armed groups are not going there. So, but at the same time on the ground, we see a lot of fighting taking place in Chin State, Kayah State, Karen State; and a lot of clashes in Shan and Arakan [Rakhine] states. So what is your thought? I want to pick your brain. What is your thought on this—Min Aung Hlaing’s invitation and then the ongoing, very fragile peace process in the country?
Bertil Lintner: Well, basically so far, for him, it’s for a military government’s attempt to get a legitimacy that they want to invite these armed groups for talks to discuss peace and this sort of thing. But I think we’ll have to look at the so-called “peace process” and how it began and how it’s developed. Ah, I will also argue that the whole timetable—the way the talks are being conducted—is wrong. Normally, in any kind of peace process, the government will announce its desires, the armed groups will respond, ‘OK, we are not going to fight’; you meet, you talk, you reach a political consensus about the future of the country; and you sign an agreement. That’s a normal procedure anywhere in the world. But here, the whole idea was everyone has to come and sign it—the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement [NCA]—first, before they could have a real talk. It’s like, you know, putting the cart before the horse. And of course it’s never going to work. And if you look at the groups that checked and signed the so-called NCA—we have altogether 10 by now, isn’t it?
So how many of those actually have any armies? I mean, if you take, for instance, the Pa-O [the Pa-O National Liberation Army]; there was no army before they signed the NCA, but suddenly, it’s known; for them to become more credible, they created an army. The same with the Arakan Liberation Party or the Arakan Liberation Army that’s based on the Thai border with the Karen. […] And they are not having any armed activity for years, for decades, really. And suddenly, they have become a signatory, and therefore a player. The Chin National Front was also non-existent until the so-called peace process began. You have the ABSDF [All Burma Students’ Democratic Front], which gave up the armed struggle a long time ago. You have two small Karen breakaway factions which are insignificant. And they have the Lahu, basically an NGO, based in Thailand and they don’t have any army either. So, that leaves I would say two-and-a-half armies among the so-called signatories. It’s the Shan State Army of the Restoration Council of Shan State, and they do have an army; and then it’s the Karen National Liberation Army or the Karen National Union; and then the new Mon State Party and its army; which is so-so, they lost most of their strength but still they have a small force. All the major groups in the country, like the Wa, like Kokang, like Kachin, like the Shan State Army, or the SSPP—the Shan State Progress Party; they haven’t signed this agreement. I would say that […] 80 percent of all the armed non-state actors, if I may use that term, in the country belong to groups that never signed the NCA. So, the whole thing was a joke from the very beginning.
KAZ: Why they did not sign the ceasefire [the NCA]? Those groups, the TNLA, KIA, Wa? The Wa signed an informal agreement in 1989.
BL: They wanted to see some political progress first. I mean what they want is basically a federal union. Or even in some cases, a confederate mixture of states or union of states. And before they reach that, why should they sign anything? It’s like surrender, really. And it is the way, the groups that did not sign the agreement, the way they think. And if you look at two of the major armies today which are the most active, [they] are the Arakan Army and the TNLA in the Palaung area. They’re new armies. But still they’ve grown from nothing, really, to several thousand today during this so-called peace process.
KAZ: It is estimated that the EAOs, the troops, the strengths, they have total numbers of about 80,000 fighters all over the country. And they have controlled roughly 30 percent, more than 30 percent of the country’s national territory. They have more political influence than in the past, since the coup. A lot of Burman people look up to them and there are a lot of expectations over which EAO, which ethnic groups are coming to join the fight against the military regime. But the peace process; the so-called peace process seems to create more problems than solutions. Why is that?
BL: Well, there’s a split between those who signed the agreement and those who didn’t. Even if most of the groups who signed it are small and insignificant, they are still groups that are recognized as signatories of the NCA. They get access—this is in the past—the got access to a special office in Yangon. They got lots of money from the international community to continue so-called talks about nothing really, so it gave them some kind of prestige and legitimacy. And then of course they split with the groups who said, “Wait a minute, what they’re doing here is they are not talking about the future of the country; not talking about the Constitution, about what kind of country Myanmar or Burma should be in the future.” And this created a split.
KAZ: Now after the coup, there’s more talk on, not just of a federal union, but about a confederation. AA [Arakan Army] leader Tun Myat Naing told us in 2019, he said, “We prefer a confederation of states, like Wa State, which has a larger share of power in line with the Constitution.” He said, “Confederation is better than federalism.” And then he said, “We think confederation is more appropriate to the history of Rakhine State and the hopes of Arakanese people.” What do you think?
BL: Well, if you first look at the question of splits, one of the main signatories, one of the groups that actually had an army, the Karen, they have split after the coup. Because there’s certain parts, brigades of the Karen National Liberation Army that are actively fighting the Tatmadaw [Myanmar’s military], or whatever you want to call it, and there are others that are not, and they have some kind of peace agreement or ceasefire agreement with the central authorities. So it’s even caused splits within the organizations. And many of the Burman dissident groups, dissidents who have fled […] after the coup, have sought shelter in areas controlled by the Karen rebels, who supposedly are a signatory to the so-called NCA. So it has created a lot of problems and it hasn’t solved a single one. But then the question is, this is very interesting question but, I cannot really comment before I know exactly what is meant by confederation. How should the powers be divided? But these are exactly the kind of issues that should be discussed, and that should be talked about during the peace process.
KAZ: Yeah. Tun Myat Naing said, in the same context, in the same interview in 2019, “We [would] have authority to make decisions on our own. But there will be a common defense system, there would be cooperation on market regulations and foreign affairs. To have control over our own destiny, self-determination, is an inspiration of every ethnic group. We can try.”
BL: Well again, this comes back to question of power sharing, which would be the responsibility of the central government—because after all, they would need a central government—and then the confederate states. But then another problem arises naturally. If you look at the various states, the current states of the Union of Myanmar or Burma, there’s actually no state that has only one ethnic group. Chin State is probably the most cohesive in that sense, that there are very few outsiders, but then again, the Chin speak 20-30 different languages. They don’t even understand each other and sometimes they have to use Burmese to talk to each other sometimes, right? And Arakan State has a very large Muslim minority, Rohingya in the north and Kaman Muslims elsewhere in the state, and the hill tribes in the Arakan Yoma, right? In Shan State maybe 50-60 percent are Shan, hard to say, but you have large communities, other communities, ethnic communities there: Wa, Palaung, Pa-O, and Kachin; and would they want to be part of Shan State? Wouldn’t they like their own states? If you look at Kachin State, are the Kachin even the majority there? I doubt it. I would think that there are more Shan, Shanni, and Burman, actually living in Kachin State than Kachins. Then you have the question of the Rawang and the Lisu, they don’t really feel like they are Kachin so, so they would have a separate, kind-of, status or identity. Even in Karen State, Kayah State you have a mixture of various nationalities. So how do you solve that problem? But this are exactly, precisely the kind of issues any kind of peace talks should be focusing on: power sharing between the center and the states; and how to solve the minority problems within the minority areas; and what kind of solution should be found to that problem.
KAZ: When we say ‘peace talks’, my question back to you is, peace talks with whom?
Because this current military regime lacks legitimacy. They have no public mandate or public support inside and outside the country. The military is the sole problem and cause of division in the ethnically diverse country. It’s the military that’s the source of the division in our country.
BL: Yeah, that’s the main problem. If you look at what the military has said since the beginning of the so-called peace process, it’s that they have the duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. In other words, they don’t want to change the Constitution. They don’t want to change the status of the various states or the various nationalities within the boundaries of the country. And this of course is a problem if you want to talk peace. It is a non-starter basically, and I think the whole peace process, so-called peace process, was a non-starter from the very beginning.
KAZ: I want to ask you, since the coup, there were arguments that some powerful EAOs have an advantage in terms of promoting their political agenda and their inspirations for either the federal [Union] or confederation. They also get more support from the Burmese people.
BL: If you go back to what the situation was like a year ago, in 2021, the case was very similar after the 1988 uprising. The ethnic armed organizations were very slow to react. And I talked to people from the various ethnic groups after the military intervention a year ago here. They said, it is a fight between the Burmans, it doesn’t concern us. What did the Burmans do when we were under attack up in Kachin state, for instance? But then that kind of attitude disappeared quite quickly when they realized that they do have something in common with all these urban dissidents and the people resisting the new military government […] It seems to me that the KIO, the KIA is cooperating with several of the PDFs even outside Kachin State—that’s in Mandalay and Sagaing, and so on; they even send troops there to fight.
[…] It was nothing like that in 1988. And in the Karen area, parts of the Karen area, there’s a lot of different groups from the cities and the towns – which are not based there. And they cooperate with the Karen rebels..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
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"In April last year, two months after the Myanmar military seized power in a coup, a group of lawmakers elected in the 2020 general election formed the parallel National Unity Government (NUG).
The following month the NUG formed the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), and later declared a defensive war against the military regime. The PDFs, many of whom received military training from ethnic armed organizations (EAO), are fighting the junta not only in the borderlands, but also across inland Myanmar, which has become the center of the country’s armed revolt against the regime. Since then, the NUG has formed its own parallel administration complete with a judicial system in parts of central Myanmar.
In an exclusive interview with The Irrawaddy, NUG acting president Duwa Lashi La talked about what the civilian government has achieved a year on from its establishment and how the NUG plans to restore democracy and end military dictatorship in Myanmar.
What has the NUG achieved since it was formed?
The military seized power in a coup on February 1 last year to resurrect military dictatorship. People were not happy and staged peaceful protests across the country in both rural and urban areas. And civil servants also joined the Civil Disobedience Movement to show their opposition to military rule. The regime conducted brutal crackdowns on the protesters, and the PDFs were formed on May 5 last year to protect the people. There are over 250 PDF battalions now.
In the aftermath of the coup, the PDFs did not control any areas. But now they control over 15 per cent of the country’s territory. Combined with the territories controlled by the EAOs, revolutionary forces now have control of over half of Myanmar.
On the diplomatic front, the regime has already suffered heavy defeats. It has been shunned by western countries and neighboring countries, as well as by fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The regime was also excluded from the recent ASEAN-US Summit. At the same time, the NUG can now meet government leaders formally and publicly; previously they only met us in private. Although we weren’t able to attend the ASEAN-US Summit, our foreign minister was invited to meet high-ranking officials and US senators. She also had a formal meeting with the Malaysian foreign minister. This is the success of Myanmar people.
Moreover, the NUG has established administrative and judicial mechanisms in areas controlled by PDFs, and we are delivering education, health and humanitarian aid as a government.
You said EAOs and PDFs ontrol over 50 per cent of the country. Where?
PDFs have taken control of rural areas in Sagaing and Magwe regions. So they provide security there. The EAOs already have their own territories. So combined with the territories held by PDFs, we control over half of the country. Junta troops are only present in urban areas, and they are not safe in rural areas.
The military regime refers to the NUG as a virtual government or a government in exile. What is your response?
This is what the military lobbyists will say. In fact, they have already seen that we are not a virtual government. We have carried out many attacks in Yangon. The NUG is a legitimate government that emerged from the support of the people. It is the government formed by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which represents the majority of lawmakers elected in the free and fair 2020 general election. It is the government recognized by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which includes all the political forces such as political parties, EAOs, civil society organizations and strike committees.
The NUG is making balanced efforts at home and abroad for the success of the revolution. Some officials are operating outside the country working for diplomatic recognition. But many ministers, including the chief minister and me, stay inside the country and work together with the people. I mean that most of us are operating inside the country, working together with PDFs and local people’s authorities. We have installed people’s authorities in 36 townships so far. That is testimony to the fact that we are not a virtual government. And nor are we a government in exile. We are the people’s government.
How will the NUG fulfill the demands of ethnic groups for self-determination and racial equality?
Ethnic people want and demand self-determination and racial equality as per promises made in the [1947] Panglong Agreement. The NUG was formed out of the federal democratic charter and we have publicly articulated that we will establish a federal democratic union that guarantees ethnic equality and self-determination.
Regardless of their race, all of those who are taking a lead role in this fight to uproot military dictatorship and restore democracy are trying to build a country that guarantees equality and self-determination.
Some ethnic groups like the Rakhine people are demanding a confederation. What is the NUG’s stance on that ?
The NUG was formed based on the federal democratic charter designed by the NUCC. So the NUG follows that charter as an interim constitution. We will discuss it when we adopt a new constitution after uprooting the military dictatorship. Those topics are to be discussed by the NUCC.
The NUG is assigned by the charter to eliminate military dictatorship and establish a new country that guarantees racial equality, self-determination, liberty and justice. What we can guarantee is equal opportunities for all to establish a genuine federal union. It is important that ethnic groups get the kind of self-determination system they think is suitable for them. We have plans to discuss it in detail during the transition period.
The NUG’s federal affairs ministry said recently that the right of ethnic groups to secede from the union is a radical idea. But that right is formally enshrined in the Panglong Agreement . Does the NUG really think the right to secede is a radical idea?
The NUG cabinet has not discussed it separately. But the federal affairs minister said he failed to check the statement properly before publishing it. But federalism experts say the right to secede is necessary in a federal system because only then will governments try to make themselves good governments in order to prevent secession. We haven’t discussed anything about it so far. I can’t comment because those policies need to be discussed thoroughly by the NUCC and public consultations held on the outcome.
In April, we saw a disagreement between the NUG and EAOs in Kayah State. How do the NUG and EAOs share authority on the ground?
Our home affairs ministry issued an order [to rename an administration committee in Kayah] and the Karenni side filed a complaint. We had a discussion and fixed it. We have to follow the NUCC charter in implementing administrative, legislative and judicial works. We can’t overstep it. The charter says federal states will form legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms as necessary and the union government and federal units shall consult with the NUCC regarding legislative, administrative and juidical affairs in their states.
I heard the NUG home affairs ministry issued the notice [in Kayah] based on the order on interim administration issued by the CPRH on February 22, 2021, while the NUG’s federal democracy charter was not yet in place. So we held talks with stakeholders from Kayah State and solved the issues.
We have to engage with various ethnic armed groups and there is no room for error. To prevent errors, we constantly engage with EAOs and find solutions through dialogue. I have told ministers to exercise caution.
The coup leader called for face-to-face peace talks with EAOs, but the NUG and PDFs were excluded from his invitation. What is your view on that?
Everyone with common sense can see that such dialogue will not be useful. All the people including politicians are aware of that. The junta leader did it just to see if there is still any opportunity for him to deceive people. The talks will not be successful, as they are intended to deceive people, and he is very aware of that.
To engage in dialogue with the relevant stakeholders is one of the points of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. But the regime leader has excluded us from talks. It is good that he excluded us. We would feel degraded having to talk to him. He has committed so much violence against the people. But he has called us terrorists and says he does not want to meet us. This will do us no harm. It will only harm him, and his reputation will continue to suffer.
If we are pressured by the outside world to hold talks with the regime, we will only meet and not discuss anything serious with them. I have read the outcome of the meeting between the regime and the Restoration Council of Shan State. The Junta leader said he agrees to the establishment of a federal state and will hold frequent talks with EAOs. It is their [the regime’s] strategy to buy time.
What plans does the NUG have to end military dictatorship and establish a federal union in Myanmar?
The NUG is working by various means including militarily, politically and diplomatically to wipe out military dictatorship and establish a federal democratic union. We have formed PDFs which are fighting the regime. At the same time, we are cooperating with EAOs in the military and political arenas. And we have established administrative and judicial mechanisms in our controlled areas. Diplomatically we are trying to foster ties with international organizations, neighboring countries and United Nations agencies.
We are holding political dialogue, which is the basic foundation for establishing a true federal union, with concerned political party leaders, ethnic leaders and civil society organizations. As a result, several countries have downgraded their diplomatic ties with the regime. This shows that they support our actions. Our revolution will succeed because it is a popular revolt.
We also attach great importance to military means. Some people say that dictators release their grip on power only when they die. We are aware that they [the regime] will not give up and admit their faults. So we have to escalate the fighting. But as everyone knows, we are fighting the war with funds from the people. We started with home-made guns, but now we have automatic guns and our revolt is gaining momentum.
As I say, we are engaged in both armed struggle and a non-violent approach. We are trying to win diplomatic recognition, while our PDFs are protecting the people. They have proven this with their actions. But the problem is that no country has given us arms.
It costs large sums of money to arm PDFs. As we have no income from tax revenues, we have to make do with donations from the people. So it takes time. But public morale is very high at the moment and I believe we will get the arms. We are fighting for justice and God will help those who help thmselves. I totally believe things are going to be fine..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"၁။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး(KNU) တပ်မဟာ(၆) တည်ရှိရာ ဒူးပလာယာခရိုင်၊ တောင်ပိုင်း စစ်ဒေသတွင် KNU/KNLA၊ KNDO၊ PDF နှင့် အခြားမဟာမိတ်အင်အားစုများပါဝင်သော တော်လှန်ရေး ပူးပေါင်းအဖွဲ့သည် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ (၁၅)ရက်နေ့၊ လေးကေ့ကော်တိုက်ပွဲမှ စတင်၍ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို ဆင်နွှဲလာရာ ယနေ့အထိ ရန်သူ့စခန်း(၃)ခုနှင့် ရန်သူ့လက်နက် အမြောက်အများ ကို လက်ရသိမ်းပိုက် နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
၂။ ထိုတိုက်ပွဲများအတွင်း ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ်၊ မေလ(၁၈)ရက်တွင် ရန်သူက အနှစ်(၃၀)ကျော် သိမ်းပိုက်ထားခဲ့သော သေ့ဘောဘိုးစခန်းကို ပြန်လည်သိမ်းယူနိုင်ခဲ့သည်မက ရန်သူလက်နက် မျိုးစုံ(၁၅)လက်၊ ကျည်မျိုးစုံ (၇၀၀၀)ကျော်ကိုပါ လက်ရသိမ်းဆည်းနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
၃။ စစ်အာဏာရှင် ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို ရွံ့ရွံ့ချွံချွံ ဆင်နွှဲလျက် ရှိသော KNU/KNLA၊ KNDO၊ PDF နှင့် အခြားမဟာမိတ်အင်အားစုများ ပါဝင်သော ပူးပေါင်းအဖွဲ့၏ ထူးချွန်ပြောင်မြောက်သည့် စစ်ရေးစွမ်းဆောင်မှုကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် အထူးဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"At the invitation of Her Excellency Linda Thomas-Greenfield, President of the United Nations
Security Council for May 2022, His Excellency PRAK Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in his capacity as the Special Envoy of the
ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, addressed a closed-session briefing for the Council’s Members via
videoconference on 27 May 2022 at 09:00 pm (Cambodia time) on the implementation of the
Five-point Consensus.
During the Meeting, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister shared updates on what Cambodia has done
thus far, including the outcome of his first visit as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair to
Myanmar from 21-23 March 2022, and the result of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN
Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6 May 2022.
On the outcomes of his first visit to Myanmar, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister apprised the Council
of digests from meeting the four different prominent groups in Myanmar, namely the State
Administration Council (SAC), non-SAC actors, diplomatic corps, and UN Specialized Agencies.
The meetings provided the Special Envoy and his team with opportunities to listen, discuss,
and extend the good offices to Myanmar on how ASEAN could help Myanmar to manifest more
progress in the 5PC implementation. H.E. Deputy Prime Minister highlighted that these actors
shared the same aspirations, which are for Myanmar to return to normalcy and for
humanitarian issues on the ground to be addressed, all of which are in the interest of the
people of Myanmar. He shared his view that the different political actors in Myanmar have to
be more open to constructive dialogue so as to build mutual understanding, trust, and
confidence, conducive to an inclusive and credible peace process in Myanmar. In this regard,
the Special Envoy reaffirmed Cambodia’s readiness and commitment to be a keen listener and
sincere facilitator for Myanmar.
With regard to the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6
May 2022 held in a hybrid format in Phnom Penh, the Special Envoy accentuated three key
points, namely: (1) ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework, (2)
addressing operational challenges of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and (3)
Framework for COVID-19 Vaccine Administration in Myanmar.
On ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework, the Meeting
agreed that the AHA Centre, in close consultation with the Myanmar Task Force, will
identify states and regions for the implementation of this Framework. These states and
regions include Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Saigang, Bago, Shan and Rakhine.
On the need to address the operational challenges, we obtained the agreement from
the SAC to expedite the delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitate administrative
and legal requirements. The SAC also pledged to offer full cooperation and support to
the ASEAN Monitoring Team for it to be able to fulfill its roles in accordance with the
executive paper adopted at the 54th AMM.
- Concerning the Framework for COVID-19 Vaccine Administration in Myanmar, the AHA
Centre and the Ministry of Health of Myanmar (MOH) agreed to implement the Joint
MOH-Partners Vaccination to Hard-to-Reach Areas Framework, through which the
operational teams of 50:50 distribution between the MOH and partners will be
deployed to administer vaccines in the communities in need.
The Special Envoy underlined that the immediate priority would be to roll out what has been
agreed upon at the recent Consultative Meeting, especially the effort to timely deliver
humanitarian assistance to those most in need without any discrimination.
H.E. Deputy Prime Minister also informed the Council that he and his team are now working
on the preparation for his second visit to Myanmar in order to further advance the progress
in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. During this upcoming visit, the Special
Envoy hopes to meet as many relevant stakeholders as possible in addition to those he met
during the first visit..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-05-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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pdf
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315.54 KB
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"US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell has questioned whether President Biden’s administration is willing to help Myanmar, saying the US’s role supporting the country’s struggle for democracy was “at a serious crossroads”.
The senator, who has worked across the aisle to encourage previous administrations to do more to stand with the dissidents and democrats of Myanmar, addressed senior officials from the Biden administration during Wednesday’s briefing to members of the US Senate.
Senator’s McConnell’s intervention comes at a time when the Senate is carrying out a process directed by McConnell’s bipartisan amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to support Myanmar’s democracy movement. It includes provisions such as legitimizing Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG), which was formed by lawmakers from the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its ethnic allies after the NLD government was ousted in a coup last year.
The amendment was passed by the Senate in December last year, but still requires White House officials to brief senators on the US’s policy towards Myanmar since the coup.
Senator McConnell told the Senate: “My friends (in Myanmar) are enduring a 16th month under the rule of yet another brutal military junta. Thousands of civilians have lost their lives.” The Senator was referring to the regime’s post-coup atrocities against its own people, the majority of whom have rejected junta rule.
“But Burma’s [Myanmar] struggle for democracy – and our role in support – is at a serious crossroads. And today, our colleagues expect to hear from the administration’s representatives what more it is prepared to do to help the people of Burma,” he added.
Days before the briefing, Senator McConnell met with the NUG’s foreign minister Daw Zin Mar Aung. She requested the US to bolster the legitimacy of the NUG, sanction the regime’s support system and give direct assistance to the people of Myanmar.
“I’m hopeful the representatives here today are prepared to discuss how the Biden administration is prioritizing these objectives, and its strategy to achieve each of them,” said Senator McConnell.
During the briefing on Wednesday, the Senator asked the US government what steps the administration was prepared to take to engage, support, and formally recognize the NUG and its National Unity Consultative Council, a body formed to bring together forces opposed to the regime, and the NUG’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces.
He said also that the US needs to ramp up pressure on the military regime because Myanmar dissidents were asking “what additional steps the administration will take” to target the junta’s foreign enablers and corporate affiliates, including the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. The junta-controlled enterprise runs the country’s oil and gas sector.
Lastly, the senator urged the US to find a more effective way of partnering with Myanmar’s neighbors India and Thailand to deliver direct aid assistance to the people of Myanmar, as tens of thousands of civilians nationwide have been forced to flee their homes due to junta raids and arson attacks.
“How is it [the administration] working to help document the junta’s crimes and provide cross-border humanitarian assistance for its victims?” asked the Senator.
Senator McConnell admitted that the challenges facing the Myanmar people are complicated. But he said the proposition for the US government was simple: “Are we willing to help a people committed to democracy finally realize it for themselves?”
“I look forward to hearing how the Biden administration plans to answer this call,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, USA-Burma relations
Language:
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Description:
"Relatives of Myanmar’s ousted leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on Wednesday filed a complaint before a UN watchdog against her detention following a military coup last year, their lawyers said.
Since a coup ousted her government in February 2021, plunging Myanmar into upheaval, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate has been in military custody and faces a raft of charges that could jail her for more than 150 years.
Describing the situation as a “judicial kidnapping”, human rights lawyers Francois Zimeray and Jessica Finelle said they had filed a complaint on behalf of her relatives with the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
“Her arrest was illegal, her detention is devoid of any legal basis, and her different trials violate the basic rules governing any legal procedure,” reads the complaint, seen by AFP.
“This is a kidnapping disguised as a trial, she is held incommunicado in defiance of all justice and resists with strength an unacceptable psychological torture,” it said.
In a statement, the lawyers added that “this is a tragic regression for Myanmar. Through the figure of Aung San Suu Kyi, the entire Burmese people is silenced, and its democratic aspirations are crushed.”
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 76, has been sentenced to five years in jail for corruption, and six years for incitement against the military, breaching COVID-19 rules and breaking a telecommunications law.
She faces a raft of other trials, including for allegedly violating the official secrets act, several counts of corruption and electoral fraud.
Branding them “farcical charges”, the lawyers said Daw Aung San Suu Kyi faces the prospect of more than 100 more years on 17 different charges.
Group made Assange finding
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’s five independent experts investigate cases of deprivation of liberty imposed arbitrarily or inconsistently with international standards.
They made headlines in 2016 by finding that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange was being arbitrarily detained as he sought to avoid extradition from Britain to the United States by sheltering in the Ecuadoran embassy in London.
The Working Group has already evaluated cases involving Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who under a previous junta regime spent long spells under house arrest in her family’s lakeside mansion in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city.
Both in 1991 and 2001, the experts determined she was being arbitrarily detained.
Today, she is confined in an undisclosed location in the capital Naypyitaw, with her links to the outside world limited to brief pre-trial meetings with lawyers.
“Can anyone conceive what this detention entails for a [nearly] 77-years-old woman, who has already spent 15 years of her life deprived of liberty?” Zimeray and Finelle asked.
Speaking with AFP, Zimeray said Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s current case borders on “enforced disappearance”.
“We don’t know where she is. She only reappears at her trials. It is a judicial kidnapping,” he said.
He voiced hope the Working Group, whose decisions are not binding but carry reputational weight, would “speak out firmly”.
Since the coup that ousted civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, more than 1,800 people have died in a brutal military crackdown on dissent, according to a monitoring group..."
Source/publisher:
Agence France-Presse (Paris) via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Sub-title:
If the National Unity Government wants to be taken seriously on the international stage, it needs to put forward a coherent, united, powerful vision for Myanmar’s future.
Description:
"In the contest for control of Myanmar, the rhetorical theatre is just as important as the battles on the ground – particularly when it comes to gaining international support and recognition. While the National Unity Government has achieved much in the past year, it is still struggling to gain meaningful material support from even its most sympathetic allies.
Part of the problem is that the NUG has yet to convince the world that the revolution it is leading against the junta will succeed. More than a year after the coup – and following countless meetings that its counterparts are careful to specify are informal – the NUG is yet to gain formal recognition from foreign governments. More importantly, it has been largely unable to secure meaningful financial or military aid. Though the parallel government has overwhelming support inside of Myanmar and its propaganda efforts have been fairly successful at maintaining morale for over a year, the international community remains reluctant to throw full support behind the NUG even as many countries ramp up their condemnation of the junta.
For the NUG to receive the military and financial aid it is seeking, it needs to present to the outside world a simple and compelling narrative about itself and its vision for a post-authoritarian future. It needs to convincingly sell the idea that it is the government of Myanmar leading a united nation towards prosperity and peace that would inevitably come if it were given the funds and recognition it is asking for.
Instead, the world is presented with a dizzying array of messages coming from an equally dizzying range of groups: not only the CRPH, NUCC and CDM, but also the various EAOs and the hundreds of PDFs and UGs, not to mention the civil society organisations and activists, that show how contentious its authority within the nation is even amongst its allies.
Complexity is nothing new when it comes to Myanmar, but what has changed are the stakes: the country’s future – and the lives of many of its people – are on the line.
For years, the common refrain was that foreigners were inherently incapable of understanding the country due to their foreignness, and thus should not comment on or get involved in “internal issues”. So in a way, it makes sense that the international community would err on the side of caution rather than take bold action and make commitments that could draw them into a messy internal conflict. The NUG needs to convince them that their involvement will be worth the risk.
Adding to the hesitation is uncertainty around how much authority the NUG has over armed resistance forces and territory. Even as NUG ministers make grand statements about how nearly half the country is under resistance control, news outlets and human rights groups report that junta forces are burning villages for having connections to resistance forces. Meanwhile, violations of the NUG’s own code of conduct for warfare – such as assassinations of civilians – remain fairly commonplace, suggesting a lack of control or willingness to exert control.
On top of this, while fairness is a value that many in the international community espouse, it is not what any nation seriously bases its foreign policy on. The NUG’s recent comparisons of the situations in Myanmar and Ukraine, and what it perceives as unfairness and hypocrisy, makes it seem naive – to both how the world of international politics works and the geopolitical importance of Myanmar to the countries that it is petitioning for help.
None of this is likely to inspire confidence and a lack of confidence means no serious money or arms will be forthcoming. Unless and until the NUG can convincingly demonstrate that it can win the war, no one will supply it with the resources that would help it with said war.
The comparisons to Ukraine are also amateurish. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has responded to the invasion of his country with a clear, determined and inspirational stance. He leads a united country, and a single army, against a hostile neighbour with unequivocal support from his people, the region and the global community. Myanmar finds itself in an entirely different situation.
For a country like Myanmar, which is little known globally beyond the brutal oppression by its own military, the lack of clear, visionary leadership presenting a concrete path to victory leaves the international community facing a vacuum. The NUG needs to paint a much stronger picture of unity, force and power to convince foreign governments it is a credible avenue to channel resources beyond mere humanitarian assistance..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-05-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"It has been more than a year since Ko Jack left behind the career he loved and joined the armed struggle to defend the people from the junta’s atrocities.
For about 10 years, he followed his passion for photography, working as a photojournalist for news organizations in Yangon. As he had a special interest in covering armed conflicts, Ko Jack traveled to several ethnic states where armed groups have long fought the military for greater rights and autonomy, telling their stories through his camera lens.
Today, he finds himself among them not as a journalist, but fighting back against the military that overthrew the elected civilian government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup in February last year.
Now a member of the People’s Defense Force in Karen State, the 29-year-old has taken part in five heavy battles alongside ethnic Karen forces fighting junta troops. In those clashes, more than 100 junta forces were killed and around a dozen captured.
From lens to gun
Ko Jack recalled his first battle experience in a recent interview with The Irrawaddy. He shared that despite having undergone months of military training, the first time he experienced front-line combat his old instincts returned and he immediately began mentally framing photographs of what he saw.
“Using a gun and taking pictures have something in common: you keep your index finger in a ready position. But you can’t do both [take photos and fire a gun] at the same time,” he said.
“If I started taking pictures, the gun I carry would be useless and it wouldn’t help my comrades either,” he added.
Since then, Ko Jack’s camera has been put aside and his rifle has become his top priority. And just as he relied on his strong sense of timing and focusing skills to take good photographs, he has proven to be a good shot on the battlefield.
He was even offered a promotion to section commander but turned it down, feeling he wasn’t ready for the post yet. On the front line he has become a good soldier, coordinating well with his comrades and obedient to his commander, while back at the base, he is a respected trainer among new members, sharing what he has learned with them.
The day that changed his life
For more than a month after the coup, Ko Jack put aside his personal anger at the military takeover in order to focus on his job, heading to the streets with his camera to document the anti-coup protests and the junta’s crackdown on its opponents. With his fellow journalists, he kept the world informed of the events that were unfolding in the coup-hit country and presented evidence of the violence used by the junta’s forces.
However, one day in March, witnessing the aftermath of a bloodbath committed by the junta in a suburb of Yangon convinced him that he had to take up arms.
Following the coup, numerous street protests broke out in Yangon and other cities, and junta forces responded to the peaceful protesters with lethal crackdowns and deadly shootings. Ko Jack was in Hlaing Tharyar Township one day after the military engaged in one of its worst mass killings of civilians there on March 14.
He recalls that so many bodies were taken to the cemetery that the crematorium had to work non-stop, leaving families unable to grieve properly as the funerals had to be rushed. He spent the whole day there. Some bodies were disfigured to the point of being unrecognizable with pierced heads, shattered faces or missing limbs.
The victims were protesters, bystanders and those helping the wounded, gunned down in a cold-blooded crackdown on an anti-coup demonstration in the township. During the crackdown, junta soldiers armed with assault rifles and snipers trapped protesters and shot to kill any living thing in their view. In total, the junta’s forces killed around 80 people on that day.
“I have never been able to just stand there and watch injustice unfold in front of my eyes. With the coup, and after seeing what happened on that day, I couldn’t stand and watch anymore,” he said.
A few days later he left his home in Yangon, joining thousands of young people across the country heading to rebel training camps and vowing to topple the junta, which has continued to terrorize the population with killings, arbitrary arrests, arson and bombing attacks.
His new home is a tent. He lives in a forest without any relatives nearby. More than a year on, he misses his home sometimes, especially when he is sick. He recently caught malaria while staying at a jungle camp; his biggest wish at that time was to be able to enjoy his favorite breakfast—spicy noodle salad with rice.
Same mission
But the determined revolutionary fighter said he won’t turn back until the revolution succeeds—a conviction he shares with his comrades.
A majority of the fighters in the group are aged between 20 and 30; they come from different regions and states and diverse backgrounds: workers, journalists, medics, artists, civil servants and even some striking police and soldiers. Besides graduates like Ko Jack, who completed a degree in geology, undergrads under 20 who are boycotting the junta’s education system have also joined the group.
Like Ko Jack, none of them chose to be soldiers; all felt compelled to take up arms due to the junta’s oppression of the entire population. They are among about 80,000 to 100,000 People’s Defense Force members nationwide who have taken up arms to fight back against the junta.
They all have one mission—to root out the military, which has oppressed the country for more than 60 years, and to terminate once and for all the system of dictatorship that is despised by all Myanmar people.
Some of Ko Jack’s comrades have given their lives for this mission. During one battle Ko Jack lost two fellow fighters, both of whom were much younger than him.
Their deaths could easily have left him heartbroken and demoralised; instead, they have driven him to become a stronger fighter, even more determined to achieve victory on their behalf, he said.
Like Ko Jack, all revolutionary fighters believe that their future will be bright only when the current military under Min Aung Hlaing is defeated.
Ko Jack said that while he personally loved detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as the country’s leader, the fight is not for her sake alone, but for his and his comrades’ future, and he believes other youths who have taken up arms feel the same way.
“We, the youth, are fighting to end military rule for our future and because we are the next generation,” he said.
Referring to the junta’s recent invitation of ethnic armed organizations to peace talks, Ko Jack continued that the young resistance fighters have no trust in any negotiations offered by the junta.
“We have seen their lies and don’t believe them. For us, we will continue to fight till the end, till the junta surrenders, and till they [the military] give up their place in politics,” he said.
Ko Jack and his comrades are confident of victory over the junta troops, who are dispirited and disunited.
Even now, facing shortages of arms and ammunition, the resistance groups, which comprise determined fighters across the country, pose a serious threat to the junta’s forces—once viewed as an all-powerful military—using guerrilla warfare tactics to seize junta posts.
Ko Jack said he has noticed that several junta troops who were killed or arrested by ethnic forces in their area used drugs, adding that on the front lines they are no longer obedient to their commanders.
But the inadequate arms and ammunition are holding back the resistance’s operations. For now, only half of the members of the group are armed.
With the PDFs still not fully armed, Ko Jack bought a used AK-47 rifle on his own and has raised funds to buy bullets for himself as well as for his colleagues. Other PDF members across the country have also had to raise money themselves to buy the required weapons and food.
Ko Jack said that if the resistance forces had adequate supplies of arms and ammunition, victory wouldn’t take long.
“We could also take the cities, as the people expect, in three to six months if we had full supplies of arms and ammunition. We don’t need tanks or jet fighters to win the battle, only supplies of arms and ammunition,” he said.
And the day they prevail will be the day they return home and reclaim their rights.
“When this is over, I want to return home in my uniform,” Ko Jack said. “I want to meet my parents in the battle uniform that I wore while taking part in the revolution and show them that their son did something they can be proud of.”
And yes, he will return to his camera and once again hit the shutter button instead of pulling the trigger..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
more
Description:
"U Naing Htoo Aung, permanent secretary of the National Unity Government’s (NUG) Ministry of Defense, talked recently to The Irrawaddy about Myanmar’s armed struggle against the military regime, what the NUG has been doing to step up the attack against the junta, about the availability of funds and the distribution of weapons to resistance groups, and defections from Myanmar’s military.
You have said that the NUG will step up the revolution this year. What’s your current assessment of the revolution?
We have increasingly engaged in all the means helpful to topple the military dictatorship. It is fair to say that we started from zero. We chose armed struggle not because we like it, but because we were forced to do so. Compared to the previous year, there has been a lot of progress. More than one year on from the coup, the regime still lacks legitimacy and is utterly rejected by the people. In terms of military confrontation, the regime has been suffering a lot. This is something that the military had never expected in its history. The armed struggle is one of our means of revolution and it has achieved certain progress. Other means are equally as important as the armed struggle.
You said the NUG will accelerate the armed struggle this year. What is the NUG’s strategy?
The people’s militia is the key strategy, which we will continue to implement in our armed struggle. We are fighting them [the junta] not because we have superior weapons or larger battalions, but because this is a defensive war being fought with the support of the people, and we will therefore continue to pursue the people’s militia strategy. We focused on building and learning in the first year. Now we have a certain amount of experience and stronger organizational skills. Although there are still a lot of requirements in terms of weapons, we have been armed to a certain extent. So this year there will be more attacks designed to cause heavier damage to the regime. Previously, we only waged guerilla warfare, but very soon there will be more all-out attacks carried out in a professional manner.
What will be the major differences in the war between last year and this year?
As everyone knows, we have been able to fight guerilla warfare in wider areas. In the near future, besides guerilla warfare, we will launch assaults in a professional manner. There will be an upgrade to the tactics and weaponry we use in the fighting. Resistance forces will be able to use better weapons and more weapons.
The regime has increasingly used air and artillery strikes to crush the resistance, as well as torching villages. The People’s Defense Forces (PDF) have said they are outgunned. What will the NUG do to help them?
We have been able to raise more funds lately. You can see that resistance forces are using better weapons now. It takes a few months to turn those funds into weapons and get them into the hands of resistance fighters. People have started to see the fruits of the increased funds, and they will see more fruits in the months to come.
You said that the NUG has provided more arms to PDFs compared to last year. Can you give us a figure?
In some cases, supply has yet to reach the target destinations because of logistical hurdles and communication obstacles. We always try our best to reach out to resistance groups. We have supplied arms to Bo Ngar [a prominent resistance leader from Sagaing Region who has complained of a shortage of weapons]. But it is possible that we could not provide as many as they want. We are trying to deliver the arms we have promised. But there are delays due to logistical hurdles, financial constraints, and other factors. We request understanding from the people and resistance forces. There are also delays because we are trying to systematize the supply chains.
As I said earlier, resistance forces can’t get arms overnight after we get the money. The regime has frozen bank accounts used to accept donations from the people, and also arrested account holders. We have to collect donations from numerous sources, and I hope people can understand the extent of the difficulties we are facing. The difference between last year and this year will be that we have spent huge sums on [military] training and research [on weapons production]. We don’t have to spend much on training and research this year, and the extra money will be used to arm the resistance forces.
The NUG said it has spent US$30 million on weapons. Has the NUG received more funds since that money was spent?
There are two parts regarding the use of those funds. Some items directly reach users immediately after we buy them. But for other items, we can’t give them directly and they are still on their way to users. We have used up the US$30 million. But not all the items bought with that US$30 million have been supplied to people yet.
What I can say is that the supply and production of weapons will increase greatly compared to last year. But to tell you the figures….I say it depends on the availability of funds. It costs at least US$1 million to arm a battalion. And we’re doing everything we can to raise more funds. To arm all the existing battalions, it will cost over US$100 million. While we can’t arm all the resistance forces, we are trying to make the most out of the resources we have.
So can we expect more direct attacks against the regime this year?
Yes.
You said the NUG can’t afford to supply all the resistance groups at the same time. But some people have criticized the NUG for only supplying arms to groups it is close to. What is your response?
Resources are limited anywhere and there are always management problems with the sharing of resources. So it is natural that there are complaints in managing scarce resources. We welcome those complaints. But we have to look at the overall picture. For some operations, using large resources on a single unit can guarantee better results than distributing smaller resources to several groups. Basically, we have to fulfill the basic requirements of all the groups to protect the people. And we are trying to make sure of that.
How is the NUG supplying urban guerilla groups, including those taking part in Operation Nan Htike Aung in Yangon?
Many urban guerilla groups are operating under the command of the NUG. We are supplying them based on their planned operations. We are aware that urban guerillas are facing a tougher time now. We are reviewing our supply and making plans for improvement. We have done certain things, but much remains to be done.
What can people expect from the NUG’s attacks for control of cities? NUG statements have said it is expanding its territory and that some cities are under siege.
When we design missions, we have to weigh the benefits against the costs. We have to weigh what we can achieve from the operation and what we and people can lose in the fighting. We know fighting can cause serious damage to human and other resources but, as I have said earlier, we were forced to choose the armed struggle. We aim to build a developed federal democracy in the future. We have to make use of resources in the nation-building. The lives of people and resources are priceless. So we have to think very carefully about how we can achieve our ambitions with minimum losses.
We can seize a town now and make people happy. But we have to use many resources to maintain control of it. This will seriously affect our efforts to liberate the whole country. We may seize cities when the time is appropriate. But we have to take many things into consideration. A wrong decision can cost the lives of many young people. Because we need their strength in rebuilding our country.
What is the NUG doing to help produce weapons for the PDFs?
Our defence ministry has a separate unit for weapons production. The unit provides financial, material and technical assistance for groups that produce weapons. We have achieved significant improvements after numerous failures. We have been able to spend a sizable proportion of our budget on weapons production. We have started to see the benefits of the money we spent on research and development over the last year. We attach great importance to weapons production. But I can’t disclose details of our production line as it is sensitive information. We have spent millions of dollars on weapons production and we will disclose details when the time is appropriate.
Last month, citing the example of Ukraine, the NUG foreign affairs minister called on the international community to provide arms for PDFs in Myanmar. Has the NUG received any weapons from foreign countries?
I don’t know much about foreign relations. But as far as I know no country has yet supplied us. Bur whether we receive help or not we have to keep going on the path we have chosen. We will fight until the end and if the international community give a hand, it will help reduce the damage to the Myanmar people and help restore regional stability more quickly. But if they do nothing, there will be more civilian casualties. It is shameful that the international community just stands by and does nothing when other people face injustice. They should ask themselves the question, let injustice happen or fight it?
How much more money does the NUG need to step up attacks against the regime and can it raise that cash?
As I have said earlier, we need over US$100 million. Suppose we have 100,000 resistance fighters and if we are only to equip them with a basic weapon like a rifle, we need hundreds of millions of dollars. We will have more funds this year than last year. But it will be difficult to meet our financial target. The funds we have acquired so far can only arm some ten per cent of resistance forces. It is quite a small amount compared to the billions of dollars that the Myanmar military gets annually from its defense budget. We need more funds. We have to try to increase funding. It is not impossible if we can work together with greater understanding and unity.
The NUG has formed a logistical army [which requires people to register with the NUG’s defense ministry to provide monthly contributions starting from US$20] which is part of the fund-raising program. How many people have joined the logistical army?
Well, more and more people are gradually joining. But we don’t earn millions of dollars monthly as we expected. We will reveal a detailed list soon.
People are speculating about possible morale problems in the military. What does the NUG know about the current situation inside the military?
For now, Min Aung Hlaing is struggling to convince his troops to continue fighting. For an army to fight and risk their lives, they must have faith in something, for example a cause or to protect the people. But, now, all the people in the Myanmar military have to sacrifice their lives for the betterment of a handful of people. They know if they are protecting the people or persecuting them. They can’t lie to themselves. They might have relatives in villages where they have killed people and torched houses. And the regime is also using the pretext of protecting Buddhism and Burmese people. I think many military personnel are now aware that it is ridiculous.
On the other hand, the PDFs know exactly what they are fighting for. They are fighting to end military dictatorship and establish federal democracy in Myanmar, for the stability and prosperity of Myanmar. They are fighting with the faith that they are building a country that guarantees equal opportunities for all citizens, and that is not ruled through the barrel of a gun. But junta troops do not have such faith. No army can survive long without strong faith. Their morale will decline over time. Those who remain in the military because of the benefits associated with being military personnel will not risk their lives. There are already many unhappy soldiers because of exploitation and bullying in the military. We know that many want to leave the military for the embrace of people, but the regime has taken a number of measures to discourage them from doing so.
People say the Myanmar military has over 400,000 soldiers. Does the NUG know the exact size of the military?
We don’t think the military is as big as they [the junta] say. There have been defections, but troops who defect remain on the paylist. Everyone knows why they are still on the paylist [because commanders embezzle their salaries without reporting their defections to their superiors]. Battalions are short of their standard size. Some say that there are only a few thousand junta troops. That is not true either. Not all the troops are combat troops. And we have seen that the regime has been forced to use non-combat troops in military operations. We learned that the regime has had to use female soldiers in fighting lately. Although we don’t underestimate the strength of the military, its size is much smaller than it claims.
In April, the NUG offered incentives for military personnel to defect. What else can the NUG do to encourage defections?
Soldiers might have concerns about defecting because of the uncertainties they are likely to face after defection. More soldiers have defected as we have guaranteed their lives. So we provide support for defectors to secure livelihoods. We also reward them when they defect with arms. There were difficulties initially, but we can manage more systematically now. We also plan to spend more funds for defectors. Some people have criticized us for spending money on defectors and not on the procurement of weapons. But an enemy soldier that stops fighting for the enemy or defects to us is a military achievement. We are not fighting out of a grudge. We are fighting for a political goal. We are rebelling out of love [for people]. And we keep the door open for those who have not committed serious crimes and who have chosen the people over the regime. This is also important for the revolution.
The NUG has offered US$500,000 to anyone who defects with a military plane or vessel. Has anyone done that yet?
Military personnel have contacted us [about defecting]. It is possible that they will defect [along with a plane or vessel]. We will issue a press release when the time is right..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"(Tokyo, May 23, 2022) – A Myanmar air force lieutenant colonel who received military training in Japan is deployed with forces that have been implicated in serious abuses in Myanmar’s central Magway Region, Human Rights Watch and Justice For Myanmar said today. The Japanese government should immediately halt its training program and investigate whether other program participants are involved in operations involving laws-of-war violations.Myanmar Air Force Lt. Col. Hlwan Moe received training at Japan’s Air Command and Staff College from August 2016 to March 2017, according to the All Japan Defense Association and a defense ministry document. A media outlet reported that Hlwan Moe is a deputy commander, and two well-connected sources said he is based at Magway Air Base. Heavy fighting in the Magway Region since the February 2021 coup, including armed clashes and airstrikes, has displaced over 50,000 civilians. The Myanmar military has committed summary executions, arson, and other abuses, including possible indiscriminate airstrikes in Magway, media have reported.“The Myanmar military’s long history of committing war crimes with impunity should have been enough evidence for Japan that its military training program was going to risk making Japan complicit in atrocities,” said Teppei Kasai, Asia program officer at Human Rights Watch. “The Japanese government should give up its absurd, wishful thinking that its training program can change the Myanmar military’s abusive culture.”
Hlwan Moe’s name, rank, position, and military ID 2321 are identified in a list of Myanmar air force personnel reportedly involved in airstrikes since 2021 that was leaked to Khit Thit Media, a Myanmar media group that published it in January 2022. Two sources with connections to Myanmar military personnel, who reviewed Hlwan Moe’s photograph, confirmed his name, military ID and rank.
Since 2015, the Japanese government has accepted cadets and officers from Myanmar under article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, which permits training and educating foreign nationals in Defense Ministry facilities with the defense minister’s approval. In 2021, following the coup, Japan accepted two cadets and two officers. In 2022, Japan again accepted two cadets and two officers for training.
Human Rights Watch in December 2021 called on the Japanese government to immediately suspend the training program because it risks making Japan complicit in military atrocities. At the time, a Japanese Defense Ministry official replied that the ministry did not have any information about what the cadets and officers trained in Japan were doing once back in Myanmar.
During a parliamentary committee session on security on April 26, 2022, however, a Defense Ministry official said the defense ministry “knows to a certain extent” what “positions” they currently hold, but declined to disclose any details due to Japan’s “relationship” with “the other country.” For decades, the Myanmar military has been responsible for war crimes in long-running armed conflicts with ethnic armed groups, and crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine State.Since the February 2021 coup, junta security forces have carried out serious abuses including mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The security forces have killed over 1,800 people, including at least 130 children, and arbitrarily arrested over 13,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The military has expanded abusive operations in ethnic minority areas and against anti-junta armed groups, displacing more than 550,000 people, while deliberately blocking aid to populations in need as a form of collective punishment.
The military has carried out targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages, causing loss of life and property. Accounts from displaced people and aid workers suggest that the junta has continued to use the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government weapons sales to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets were being used against civilians.Since the coup, the Japanese government has called for a restoration of democratic rule and the release of elected government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi. On March 28, 2021, Japan’s Defense Ministry issued a joint statement with 11 other countries criticizing the military’s attacks against “unarmed civilians.” The Japanese government halted new non-humanitarian Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects earlier in 2021 while allowing existing aid projects to continue. The Japanese Diet passed a resolution in June that condemned the coup and called for a “swift restoration of the democratic political system.”
“It is inexcusable for Japan to continue to train cadets from the Myanmar military, knowing that it commits atrocity crimes,” said Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar. “Japan’s cadet training program emboldens the junta and provides support to military personnel that may be used in the commission of crimes against the people of Myanmar. We call on the Japanese government to immediately halt these trainings and take concrete steps to stop the Myanmar military from committing grave violations, including ending business with the Myanmar military and its conglomerates.”
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Tokyo Should Cut Military Ties, Pressure Junta to End Atrocities
Description:
"(Tokyo) – A Myanmar air force lieutenant colonel who received military training in Japan is deployed with forces that have been implicated in serious abuses in Myanmar’s central Magway Region, Human Rights Watch and Justice For Myanmar said today. The Japanese government should immediately halt its training program and investigate whether other program participants are involved in operations involving laws-of-war violations.
Myanmar Air Force Lt. Col. Hlwan Moe received training at Japan’s Air Command and Staff College from August 2016 to March 2017, according to the All Japan Defense Association and a defense ministry document. A media outlet reported that Hlwan Moe is a deputy commander, and two well-connected sources said he is based at Magway Air Base. Heavy fighting in the Magway Region since the February 2021 coup, including armed clashes and airstrikes, has displaced over 50,000 civilians. The Myanmar military has committed summary executions, arson, and other abuses, including possible indiscriminate airstrikes in Magway, media have reported.
“The Myanmar military’s long history of committing war crimes with impunity should have been enough evidence for Japan that its military training program was going to risk making Japan complicit in atrocities,” said Teppei Kasai, Asia program officer at Human Rights Watch. “The Japanese government should give up its absurd, wishful thinking that its training program can change the Myanmar military’s abusive culture.”
Hlwan Moe’s name, rank, position, and military ID 2321 are identified in a list of Myanmar air force personnel reportedly involved in airstrikes since 2021 that was leaked to Khit Thit Media, a Myanmar media group that published it in January 2022. Two sources with connections to Myanmar military personnel, who reviewed Hlwan Moe’s photograph, confirmed his name, military ID and rank.
Since 2015, the Japanese government has accepted cadets and officers from Myanmar under article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, which permits training and educating foreign nationals in Defense Ministry facilities with the defense minister’s approval. In 2021, following the coup, Japan accepted two cadets and two officers. In 2022, Japan again accepted two cadets and two officers for training.
Human Rights Watch in December 2021 called on the Japanese government to immediately suspend the training program because it risks making Japan complicit in military atrocities. At the time, a Japanese Defense Ministry official replied that the ministry did not have any information about what the cadets and officers trained in Japan were doing once back in Myanmar.
During a parliamentary committee session on security on April 26, 2022, however, a Defense Ministry official said the defense ministry “knows to a certain extent” what “positions” they currently hold, but declined to disclose any details due to Japan’s “relationship” with “the other country.” For decades, the Myanmar military has been responsible for war crimes in long-running armed conflicts with ethnic armed groups, and crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine State.
Since the February 2021 coup, junta security forces have carried out serious abuses including mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The security forces have killed over 1,800 people, including at least 130 children, and arbitrarily arrested over 13,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The military has expanded abusive operations in ethnic minority areas and against anti-junta armed groups, displacing more than 550,000 people, while deliberately blocking aid to populations in need as a form of collective punishment.
The military has carried out targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages, causing loss of life and property. Accounts from displaced people and aid workers suggest that the junta has continued to use the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government weapons sales to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets were being used against civilians.
Since the coup, the Japanese government has called for a restoration of democratic rule and the release of elected government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi. On March 28, 2021, Japan’s Defense Ministry issued a joint statement with 11 other countries criticizing the military’s attacks against “unarmed civilians.” The Japanese government halted new non-humanitarian Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects earlier in 2021 while allowing existing aid projects to continue. The Japanese Diet passed a resolution in June that condemned the coup and called for a “swift restoration of the democratic political system.”
“It is inexcusable for Japan to continue to train cadets from the Myanmar military, knowing that it commits atrocity crimes,” said Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar. “Japan’s cadet training program emboldens the junta and provides support to military personnel that may be used in the commission of crimes against the people of Myanmar. We call on the Japanese government to immediately halt these trainings and take concrete steps to stop the Myanmar military from committing grave violations, including ending business with the Myanmar military and its conglomerates.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Watch Reports on Burma/Myanmar, Health and internal displacement/forced migration, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Sub-title:
As of March 11, army tribunals in the Yangon region have sentenced more than 150 people to death or life in prison.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta condemned seven youths to death this week in the Yangon region after a secret military tribunal found them guilty of murder, a junta newspaper reported.
The seven, all from all from Hlaingtharyar township in the country’s largest city Yangon Region, were ruled guilty of taking part in the March 6 murder of a ward official suspected of being a police informer and sentenced to death on Wednesday under Section 54 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.
As of March 11, military tribunals in the Yangon region have sentenced more than 150 people to death or life imprisonment, RFA reporting has revealed. No executions have been reported by the military regime that overthrew Myanmar’s elected government on Feb. 1, 2021.
The seven were identified as Ye Min Naing, Soe Moe, Thant Zin, Daewa, San Shay, Athay Lay and Aye Aye Min.
Another youth, Htet Myat Naing from Yangon’s North Dagon township, was sentenced on Wednesday to life in prison under Section 50(j) of the Anti-Terrorism Law for having links to and collecting money for terrorist organizations.
An underground youth activist in Yangon said the military is imposing harsh punishments on young people to discourage them from participating in resistance movements against the junta, the junta newspaper said.
"The deliberate arrests of young people and such harsh sentences are attempts to intimidate the youth not to be involved in the revolution. No matter what they do, young people are already determined to march on with this,” he told RFA.
Lawyers have argued that the sentences imposed by military tribunals handing down highest sentences on the youth are unjust and punishable.
Military spokesman Maj Gen Zaw Min Tun said the government was not targeting young people but was prosecuting violators of the law.
According to Thai-based rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma, a total of 10,707 people were arrested and 1,072 of them were imprisoned between Feb. 1, 2021 and May 19, 2022, and 72 have been sentenced to death, including 2 children. And another 41 have been sentenced to death in absentia..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Description:
"Cambodia is planning to invite the Myanmar junta’s defense minister to next month’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defense ministers meeting in Phnom Penh, according to Cambodian media.
Regime representatives were present at a recent three-day meeting of senior ASEAN defense officials from all ten member states. The junta sent Zaw Zaw Soe, the Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Defense’s Department of International Affairs. He expressed his thanks to Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense for convening the important meetings.
General Nem Sowath, Director-General of Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense’s General Department of Policy and Foreign Affairs, who chaired the meeting, said that the meeting was a preparatory event ahead of next month’s ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting.
However, the presence of a junta-appointed defense official has caused concern.
Kin Phea, director general of the Royal Academy of Cambodia’s International Relations Institute, described the regime official as a “non-political representative”.
“I think the Myanmar defense official has the right to attend meetings in Cambodia because he is not a politician, or at the political level, but at the technical level. The participation of the Myanmar delegation is important to contributing to moving the ASEAN mechanism forward,” said Kin Phea.
In March, Cambodia, the current chair of ASEAN, welcomed some of the generals overseeing the Myanmar military’s atrocities against its own people, who reject military rule.
Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, Myanmar’s Chief of Military Security Affairs, attended the 19th ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting in Phnom Penh on Tuesday, according to junta-run media. The meeting discussed the exchange of visits between ASEAN intelligence officers and the establishment of the ASEAN Military Intelligence Community.
Moreover, the regime’s Chief of the General Staff General Maung Maung Aye, Chief of Staff (Army) Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun and Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo joined the 19th ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Meeting. These key leaders of the military regime are believed to be involved in mass killings and applying scorched-earth tactics — such as the razing of entire villages — against both civilians and the growing resistance movement.
Since last year’s coup, the Myanmar military has been condemned for committing widespread and systematic abuses against civilians that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, according to a March report by the United Nations’s (UN) Human Rights Office, the first comprehensive rights report since the military takeover.
The UN warned that the military regime has shown “flagrant disregard for human life” and has deliberately targeted civilians since seizing power on 1 February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
US, Japan, India, Australia Should Address Crises Across Region
Description:
"(Tokyo) – Leaders of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia should reach agreements on new measures to address human rights crises and democratic backsliding in Asia, Human Rights Watch said today. The Quad, a security alliance of the leaders of the four countries, is meeting in Tokyo on May 22, 2022.
“The Quad needs to place Asia’s massive human rights and humanitarian crises at the heart of its discussions and decisions,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Although each has vastly different causes and features, the human rights crises in Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea, and Sri Lanka should all be high on the security agenda.”
A central purpose of the Quad alliance is to counter the rising authoritarian influence of the Chinese government in Asia. To advance that goal, the Quad needs to better promote human rights institutions, democratic governance, and the rule of law domestically and regionally, Human Rights Watch said. Quad leaders should reach common positions on addressing major human rights crises in the region and speak publicly on specific concerns.
On Myanmar, Quad leaders need to move beyond relying on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its failed “five point consensus.” Quad leaders, along with like-minded ASEAN members Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, should agree on a stronger, coordinated effort to steer the Myanmar junta toward reform, including by increasing restrictions on its foreign currency revenues and weapons purchases.
Like-minded countries should develop a clear, time-bound approach to pressure the junta to end its abuses. The approach should include imposing and better enforcing new sanctions on oil and gas revenues, as well as on human rights abusers and military entities. Quad countries should support a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing a global arms embargo on Myanmar, which purchases large amounts of weapons from both China and Russia.
On Afghanistan, Quad leaders should agree to coordinate with other governments to press the Taliban to abandon their restrictive and abusive policies and practices, including bans on women’s secondary schooling and restrictions on women’s travel, employment, and dress. Japan, India, and Australia should urge the US to reach an agreement with Taliban authorities about restrictions in place on the Afghanistan Central Bank and on World Bank-administered assistance for education and health. These restrictions are severely exacerbating the country’s economic situation and are driving its humanitarian crisis.
On North Korea, Quad leaders should agree to integrate human rights issues into diplomatic approaches and support including human rights benchmarks in any future negotiations with Kim Jong Un and the North Korean government. They should also discuss outreach to the government to offer assistance to address the gravely deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation and the new Covid-19 outbreak.
On Sri Lanka, Quad leaders should recognize that the roots of the country’s current economic and political crisis lie in longstanding corruption and a lack of transparency, and that the route to stability and economic recovery depends on increasing respect for human rights, strengthening the rule of law, and ensuring accountability. The Quad should support economic programs, including from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that seek to protect the most vulnerable from the worst effects of the economic crisis, while promoting political reforms to better protect fundamental rights and seek justice for past abuses.
Quad leaders should recognize that their credibility to speak on human rights abuses also requires addressing the many deficiencies in their own records. Human Rights Watch has extensively raised serious human rights issues for decades with the governments of the US, Japan, India, and Australia.
“The Quad should recognize that working to improve the human rights of people in Asia is consistent with addressing the authoritarianism of the Chinese government,” Sifton said. “Genuine security in the region depends on people in Asia being able to fully exercise their fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Last week in the East Asia Pacific region, fighting continued between the Myanmar military and local resistance groups in Myanmar. North Korea conducted two missile tests. In the Philippines, Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, Jr. and Sara Duterte won the national elections as president and vice-president, respectively, amid a surge in political violence and demonstrations related to the elections. In Indonesia, there were armed clashes between the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and state forces, while ethnic Papuans continued to demonstrate against the proposed creation of new provinces in Papua. In Papua New Guinea, Nomali and Aiyala clans in Enga province engaged in a shootout. In China, riots in response to stringent COVID-19 lockdowns continued in Shanghai. In Thailand, pro-democracy demonstrations continued in Bangkok. In Australia, health workers demonstrated in Western Australia and Queensland.
In Myanmar, fighting continued between the Myanmar military and local resistance groups. On 12 May in southern Shan state, the military and the Pa-Oh National Organization/Pa-Oh National Army (PNO/PNA) suffered casualties when combined forces of the Southern Shan Revolution Youth (SSRY), Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), Pekon People’s Defense Force, and Inle People’s Defense Force attacked their outpost in Hti Ri village, Nyaungshwe township. The PNO/PNA signed a ceasefire agreement with the military in 1991 and has been criticized by Pa-Oh ethnic youth groups for fighting alongside the military after the coup (Myanmar Now, 13 May 2022). While the military conducted airstrikes during the clash, the combined forces captured five soldiers, including three PNO/PNA members, and seized their weapons. Violence in Shan-South is both common and highly volatile; it is considered an area of ‘extreme risk’ by ACLED’s Volatility and Risk Predictability Index.
In northern Shan state, fighting between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) intensified across multiple townships. On 8 May, the military clashed with the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA) in three separate townships. In Hseni township, the military fought against the Northern Alliance (NA-B), which includes the MNTJP/MNDAA. In Mabein township, they fought combined forces of the MNTJP/MNDAA, Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), and an unreported local defense group, and in eastern Kutkai township, they fought the MNTJP/MNDAA on its own. The Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) also clashed with the military on 12 May, with military soldiers based in Kutkai town firing artillery rounds.
Meanwhile, the military and police tightened security in many states and regions last week. Several civilians in Yangon and Magway regions were arrested for anti-coup social media posts and claims they had connections with or were supporting People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). In Sagaing region, military troops raided Mon Taing Pin village in Ye-U township and arrested nearly three dozen civilians, including monks and young novices, beating them to death and burning their bodies between 10 and 13 May (Radio Free Asia, 17 May 2022)..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication:
2022-05-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime has stopped issuing passports to striking civil servants to prevent them leaving the country.
A striking doctor said: “Instead of arresting strikers at the airports, the regime has barred them from applying for or extending passports. I made enquiries about an extension and found a list of striking civil servants has been sent to the passport office.”
The regime has issued arrest warrants, detained and sacked striking civil servants as it tries to pressure them back to work.
A striking teacher said: “Once they saw my name, they asked me if I was a teacher. I denied it but they said my name was on a list. They said I will be arrested at the airport if they issue a passport.”
The teacher said she is trying to work abroad because of financial difficulties after being jobless for a year.
“The regime is trying various means to make us regret joining the civil disobedience movement [CDM],” she added.
The regime began stopping strikers from leaving the country in March.
A list of strikers, including their national registration numbers, has been sent to the passport office and some have been detained and questioned, a passport office source told The Irrawaddy.
Strikers have been detained at Yangon International Airport and charged with incitement, according to the media.
Schools are scheduled to reopen next month and the regime is trying to persuade teachers to return to their classrooms.
More than 200,000 civil servants joined the CDM to defy the military rule and many still refuse to work for the regime.
The regime has committed serious human rights violations against its opponents, including revoking their citizenship, sealing off their houses and taking their families, including children, as hostages..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"The National Unity Government (NUG) published an
announcement expressing its disappointment in the
outcome of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN
Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar.....(1) The NUG published an
announcement expressing deep
disappointment and concern about
the outcome of the consultative
meeting on ASEAN humanitarian
assistance to Myanmar, which was
held on May 6, 2022, in Phnom
Penh, Cambodia.
In the announcement the
NUG states that although it has
repeatedly reached out to the
ASEAN chair and the ASEAN Special
Envoy to convey its openness to
engage and discuss ways forward,
its previous communication has not
been reciprocated until now. The
announcement goes on to state that
the NUG and other crucial
stakeholders of Myanmar such as the Ethnic Revolutionary/Armed
Organisations (EROs/EAOs), and
local humanitarian organisations
have been deliberately excluded
from the consultative meeting.
The announcement added
that the current conditions on the
ground and the people's trust deficit
in the SAC will continue to hamper
the urgent and effective delivery of
humanitarian aid.....UNION MINISTER
DR. TU HKAWNG
DELIVERED HIS
CONGRATULATO
RY REMARK TO
ALL STAFF WHO
ARE JOINING THE
CDM UNDER
DIFFERENT
CHALLENGES.....(2) At a meeting with
CDM staff within the ministry,
Dr. Tu Hkawng, Minister of
Natural Resources and Envi-
ronmental Conservation
(MONREC), expressed his
sincere gratitude and
congratulations to all staff
taking part in the CDM (Civil
Disobedience Movement) and
overcoming the many hards-
hips they have faced over the
last year..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
667.09 KB
more
Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly News Bulletin (3/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
744.11 KB
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Description:
"We remain deeply concerned over the crisis in Myanmar. We highlight Myanmar’s commitment to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus during the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on 24 April 2021 and urge the timely and complete implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We will continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to facilitate a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar, including through the work of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar,in building confidence and trust with full access to all parties concerned, and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar, including those who are the most in need, without discrimination. We reiterate our commitment to peace and stability in the region and continue to call for the immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and for the release of allpolitical detainees, including foreigners. We will redouble our collective efforts towards a peaceful solution in Myanmar that also reflects a continued commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, as outlined in the ASEAN Charter. We welcome close coordination between the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar and the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar to ensure synergy in this important endeavor.
With regard to Ukraine, as for all nations, we continue to reaffirm our respect for sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. We reiterate our call for compliance with the UN Charter and international law. We underline the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities and creating an enabling environment for peaceful resolution. We support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General in the search for a peaceful solution. We also call for the facilitation of rapid, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance for those in need in Ukraine, and for the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel, and persons in vulnerable situations.
As we proceed with implementation of this ambitious agenda in the coming months and years, we look forward to reaching a new level of cooperation and partnership and task our Ministers to coordinate the implementation of this Joint Vision Statement..."
Source/publisher:
The White House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2022-05-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Zin Mar Aung has high-level meetings in Washington but still waits for the ASEAN envoy to call.
Description:
"Zin Mar Aung is the foreign minister of the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, that represents the civilian administration that was ousted in last year’s military takeover in Myanmar. The former democracy activist and political prisoner is in Washington, D.C., for meetings on the sidelines of the summit of U.S. and Southeast Asian leaders, seeking greater diplomatic recognition for the NUG. She spoke Thursday to RFA’s Managing Editor for Southeast Asia Matthew Pennington about the need for the United States to support democracy forces against the Myanmar junta, and for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to step up engagement with the NUG.
Zin Mar Aung spent 11 years as a political prisoner under a previous military regime in Myanmar, including years in solitary confinement. She was released in 2009. She was elected in 2015 as a member of the House of Representatives for Yankin township, Yangon, for the National League for Democracy – a position she lost in the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: Can I ask you first about your meetings with Biden administration officials? Do you have any more confidence now that the United States might consider giving formal diplomatic recognition to the National Unity Government?
Zin Mar Aung: Yes, I feel that because, you know, the way the Biden administration has engaged with me and the way they treat me is really very good and very much welcome and very much supportive. Very friendly discussions. This trip is really encouraging to me.
RFA: So who have you met from the administration?
ZMA: I met this morning with the Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, and (State Department Counselor) Derek Chollet and also the president's adviser for human rights.
RFA: Have you asked them directly whether they are going to recognize the National Unity Government as being the rightful government of Myanmar?
ZMA:So this trip, you know, I didn't directly address them (on this), but we usually ask them to recognize and engage and to support our struggle. So today what they have said is that by welcoming us to Washington, D.C., they are very much consistent, you know, supporting our struggles and they appreciate what the NUG is doing and and also our commitment. So they are also showing their commitment to support us.
RFA: What's the single most important thing you think for the United States to do, to support what you're trying to do in Myanmar?
ZMA: The United States as a leading, powerful and democratic country, has not just this time, but also previously, continuously supported our struggle (against military rule), whether Democrats or Republicans ... And it's very important, as by getting support from the United States, with its allies, it is very encouraging for our movement, both diplomatically and politically and in terms of, for example, economic sanctions. (The United States) has a lot of allies.
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Bloc nations were urged to sideline the junta, while US officials met with the shadow government.
Description:
"The ongoing upheaval in Myanmar took center stage on the first day of a U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Washington, as fellow bloc member Malaysia slammed the junta for refusing to engage with the country’s shadow government.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders held a lunch meeting with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers at the U.S. Capitol on Thursday to kick off two days of top-level meetings, which President Joe Biden hopes will bolster Washington’s ties with the bloc and increase its influence in the region.
Eight of ASEAN’s leaders made the trip to the U.S. for the summit, which marks the first time the White House extended an invitation to the group of nations in more than four decades. The Philippines declined to attend as it wraps up a presidential election this week, while Myanmar’s junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, was barred from the summit amid a brutal crackdown on opponents of his military’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup that rights groups say has claimed the lives of at least 1,835 civilians.
U.S. State Department officials instead met with the foreign minister of the National Unity Government, Myanmar’s shadow government of deposed leaders and other junta critics working to take back control of the country.
The lunch event on Capitol Hill was closed to the press, but the situation in Myanmar was front and center on Thursday, after Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah called out junta officials in a series of tweets for failing to honor their commitment to end violence in the country. Specifically, he referred to the military regime’s refusal to allow the United Nations special envoy to the country, Noeleen Heyzer, to attend an ASEAN meeting last week to coordinate humanitarian aid to Myanmar.
“We regret that the [junta] has not allowed the U.N. Secretary General's Special Envoy on Myanmar to participate in the processes,” Saifuddin tweeted.
“We should not allow [the junta to be] dictating who to be invited for related meetings.”
Saifuddin said he made clear at an informal meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers on Wednesday that Malaysia fully supports Prak Sokhonn, the special envoy of ASEAN Chair Cambodia, “in fulfilling his mandate on [the] 5-Point Consensus” — an agreement formed by the bloc in April 2021 that requires the junta to meet with all of Myanmar’s stakeholders to find a solution to the political crisis.
He said he called on the ASEAN envoy to “engage all stakeholders, including [shadow National Unity Government] NUG and [National Unity Consultative Council] NUCC representatives,” both of which are recognized by the junta as “terrorist groups.”
Saifuddin’s comments came a day after he told the RFA-affiliated BenarNews agency that he welcomed the idea of engaging informally with the NUG and NUCC via video conference calls and other means if the junta prohibits such meetings in-person.
The Malaysian foreign minister said he plans to meet with NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung in Washington on Saturday to solicit her opinion on how the people of Myanmar can move on.
As ASEAN leaders lunched with lawmakers on Thursday, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman held a meeting with Zin Mar Aung and other NUG representatives in Washington during which she underscored the Biden administration’s support for the people of Myanmar during the crackdown and for those working to restore the country to democracy, according to a statement by spokesperson Ned Price.
“Noting the many Southeast Asian leaders in Washington for the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, the deputy secretary highlighted that the United States would continue to work closely with ASEAN and other partners in pressing for a just and peaceful resolution to the crisis in Burma,” Price said, using the former name of Myanmar.
“They also condemned the escalating regime violence that has led to a humanitarian crisis and called for unhindered humanitarian access to assist all those in need in Burma.”
Other events
Following Thursday’s working lunch, ASEAN leaders met with Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, as well as other leaders of the business community, to discuss economic cooperation.
In the evening, they joined Biden for dinner at the White House to discuss ASEAN’s future and how the U.S. can play a part, according to media reports, which quoted senior administration officials as saying that each leader would be given time to meet with the president one-on-one.
On Friday, leaders will meet with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken for a working lunch to discuss issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the global climate, and maritime security, before meeting with Biden for a second time.
While some ASEAN leaders have been more outspoken in their condemnation of the junta, others —including Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is also the bloc’s chair — have done little to hold it to account for the situation in Myanmar.
In January, Hun Sen became the first foreign leader to visit Myanmar since the military coup — a trip widely viewed as conferring legitimacy on the junta.
Hun Sen is no stranger to global condemnation, however. The Cambodian strongman brooks no criticism at home and has jailed his opponents on what observers say are politically motivated charges in a bid to bar them from mounting a challenge his nearly 40-year rule.
This week’s summit marks Hun Sen’s fourth visit to the U.S., following trips to attend his son’s graduation from West Point in 1999, the 2016 U.S.-ASEAN Summit with President Barack Obama at the Sunnylands Retreat in California, and a meeting at the United Nations in New York in 2018. Thursday’s dinner with Biden will be his first visit to the White House.
Prior to Thursday’s dinner, during a photo session with leaders on the South Lawn, Biden committed to spending U.S. $150 million on COVID-19 prevention, security, and infrastructure in Southeast Asia as part of a package his administration hopes will contain China’s growing influence in the region.
A U.S. Coast Guard ship will also be deployed to the region to patrol waters ASEAN nations say are illegally fished by Chinese vessels.
The U.S. commitment is a drop in the bucket compared to Beijing’s spending in the region. China earmarked 10 times as much in development assistance to ASEAN nations in November alone..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The junta’s alliance with Russia has been a disaster for Myanmar’s people, fuelling a crisis that has been abetted by the international community, activist Khin Ohmar writes
Description:
"Over the past year, more military attacks have been launched against civilians in Myanmar than in Syria, Yemen, Iraq or Afghanistan, according to figures compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, which also designated the country as the world’s deadliest place to be a protester in 2021.
The Myanmar military is using helicopter gunships and jets to bomb wide swathes of the country. Schools, hospitals and places of worship have been targets of heavy shelling. The military has torched the homes of villagers, who have taken shelter in the jungle, finding caves in which to hide and spend sleepless nights. Entire villages have been incinerated. Massacres have become a form of collective punishment against a nationwide civilian resistance, unrelenting in the face of the junta’s brutality.
Some 578,200 people have fled their homes since the military junta staged an attempted coup in February 2021, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
The vicious reprisals and systematic attacks from the junta, enabled by Russian arms and equipment, are as horrific as those committed by Russian forces in Ukraine in recent months.
On Thursday and Friday, President Biden is hosting the leaders of Southeast Asian nations at a special summit in Washington DC, where the US will be looking to garner support from the regional bloc to strengthen the coalition against Moscow. A key component of his strategy should be to convince the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to change course on the Myanmar junta, one of Russia’s staunchest allies.
The administration can use the opportunity of the US-ASEAN summit to pressure the bloc to go beyond its impotent response to the junta’s flouting of international law and engage with the legitimate National Unity Government, established by and representing the peoples of Myanmar.
But Biden has a chance to go further. The President should call for a global arms embargo against the Myanmar military and direct his UN ambassador to put the matter on the agenda of the UN Security Council, which the US is chairing for the month of May.
An embargo would deliver a direct blow to Russian interests.
Russia is busy selling jet fighters, armoured vehicles, surface-to-air missiles, and mobile defence systems to the Myanmar military. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the transfer of arms by Russia “ha[s] occurred with the full knowledge that they would be used to attack civilians, in probable violation of international law.”
The Russian regime sees the Myanmar junta as a source of hard currency to sustain its autocratic rule.
Since 2018, at least 19 Russian companies have supplied arms and equipment to the Myanmar military—including the US-sanctioned state-owned arms conglomerate Rostec and its multiple subsidiaries. In April 2021, the head of Russia’s truck giant, Kamaz, visited Myanmar to hold talks with the junta about manufacturing trucks in Myanmar. Kamaz produces the vehicle that serves as the platform for the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, which the junta ordered from Russia last year.
The ties between the junta and Russia appear to be strengthening. An April 25 letter issued by the Central Bank of Myanmar revealed that junta-backed banks are forming an alliance with Russian banks, according to a recent RFA report. This would provide a back channel for the junta to purchase Russian weapons in defiance of sanctions that seek to banish Russia from the global financial system and stop the junta's procurement of arms.
The alliance has been a disaster for the Myanmar people. But the crisis has been abetted by the global community—by the ineffectual gestures of ASEAN, by the empty rhetoric of UN statements. The lack of concrete, coordinated international action is allowing Russia to establish a client state in the middle of Asia, destabilising the region while fuelling the junta’s terror.
President Biden has a chance to begin the process of severing the links between the Russian Federation and the Myanmar junta. He can take a stand against the Kremlin’s support for the ongoing campaign of mass killing, torture, sexual violence, and abuse committed by Myanmar’s military junta. The time to act is now..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-05-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Russia-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"The United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, welcomes the convening of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6 May and strongly urges ASEAN leaders and donors to prioritise principled engagement with diverse local humanitarian networks to effectively deliver aid to all communities in need.
Over the past few months, the Special Envoy has held extensive engagements with some of Myanmar’s civil society organisations and local humanitarian networks who have been at the frontline in addressing the widening crisis amid escalating violence and increasing displaced populations. These groups have called for unhindered and safe humanitarian access to facilitate delivery of assistance without discrimination. The key messages from local humanitarian networks are clear: there is a need for the utmost respect of international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles; urgently needed humanitarian aid must not be instrumentalised for political purposes; military infrastructure must not be legitimised through aid delivery; and there is a need not only for more donor funding but also for donor flexibility to support local humanitarian actors and networks with access to hard-to-reach conflict affected areas, including internally displaced people, border communities and civilians affected by conflict, including in urban areas.
In Myanmar’s currently violent, unstable and insecure context, effective delivery of humanitarian aid requires firm commitment by all aid actors to adhere to international humanitarian law. Given the complexity of Myanmar’s conflict it is imperative that humanitarian assistance is delivered through a diverse range of channels, without discrimination or favour, and reaches the most vulnerable in every part of the country. Safe and unimpeded access for all aid actors is non-negotiable. It is imperative that we build strong, effective and equal partnerships with local and informal humanitarian networks, who have unique access, local knowledge and established trust on the ground, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people, especially in the hardest-to-reach areas, including through cross border assistance.
We must recognise the current conflict has a disproportionate impact on women and children. The Special Envoy's consultations with women community leaders have highlighted the urgent need for humanitarian support and protection for women and children, capacity building to address gender-based violence and stronger connection to regional and global women leaders. The Special Envoy urges the global community to give women a key role in any humanitarian consultation, as women can help identify the most vulnerable and help monitor effective delivery along humanitarian principles. Reflective of the Secretary-General's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, we must actively engage women to fully address the humanitarian and protection needs of the people and amplify their voices for a future federal democratic union of peace, stability and shared prosperity..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s long history of civil war can be categorized as periods of alternating clashes and peace talks.
It is often said that politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed. Often, the warring sides will call for honesty for the sake of peace, before they question each other’s honesty.
In Myanmar, peace talks are a tricky business. Though both sides will struggle for a result that is favorable to them, normally the results are determined by the more powerful side.
Peace talks with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) were previously held under the civilian Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government and the military-led Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government. Those talks achieved nothing because self-determination and self-rule for ethnic people was always rejected and the existence of EAOs was never recognized, even as both the AFPFL and BSPP governments wanted EAOs to disarm and surrender. So the peace talks held between 1948 and 1988 were not successful.
In the post-1988 period, peace talks became even trickier because of drastic changes in the political landscape of the country. Myanmar was going through a political crisis following the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, and its economy was also plagued by mismanagement under the BSPP rule.
At the same time, the Communist Party of Burma, the major player in Myanmar’s civil war, split into several armed groups. They had financial constraints and lacked ammunition. And both the troops and local people were exhausted after many years of war.
Seeing those factors, the then military regime changed its policy toward EAOs. The regime, which had always called for disarmament, made peace with EAOs by recognizing ethnic parties and armed organizations and designating their controlled areas as special regions. The process started in 1989 and by 1995 all the EAOs, except the Karen National Union (KNU) and Mong Tai Army (MTA), had agreed ceasefires with the Myanmar military.
For 20 years from 1989 to 2009, the military constantly engaged in measures designed to weaken the EAOs. They included offering business concessions to the EAOs and instigating religious disputes.
The then junta was able to do this because there were no fighting outside the borderlands, as the main opposition party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) – favored peaceful struggle over armed struggle.
However, the military continued to attack the KNU and the MTA with superior numbers. Finally, the MTA was forced to surrender and the KNU, once the most powerful group among the EAOs, had become weaker. This is what the military did over the two decades of ceasefire and peace.
In 2009, the regime went a step further and forced the EAOs that had signed ceasefires to transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or people’s militias and brought them under the army’s control. Apparently, the regime thought that it could now easily control the EAOs.
But the regime broke its promise to settle ethnic issues through political dialogue. In 2005, it forced the Palaung State Liberation Organization and Shanni Nationalities Army to disarm.
EAOs that were either weakened or had attached greater importance to business interests over armed struggle were swayed by the military regime.
The New Democratic Army – Kachin led by Zahkung Ting Ying in Kachin State, a Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) splinter group led by Bai Suocheng, the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front led by Tun Kyaw, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and some splinter groups from the KNU all became BGFs.
Other armed organizations, such as the Kachin Defence Army, brigades 3 and 7 of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), the Kayan New Land Party and some Karenni National Progressive Party and KNU splinter groups, became people’s militias.
Both BGFs and people’s militias were under the command of the Myanmar military. Of them, only the Kokang splinter group led by Bai Suocheng and the PNO led by Aung Kham Hti were granted self-rule in their territories under the army-drafted 2008 Constitution. The Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization ceased to exist. This is the advantage the military was able to achieve in 20 years of peace.
In those years, the military became aware that EAOs only care about their regions and territories in the borderlands, and do not bother to challenge the central government. The regime was well aware that it could focus its energy on addressing the threat of the NLD by appeasing the EAOs.
While some EAOs collapsed or were weakened during the years of ceasefire, others grasped the opportunity to strengthen themselves. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were able to expand both their treasuries and arsenals of weapons during those years.
Later, the KNU was able to re-unify its Karen forces. The SSPP, the MNDAA and the Restoration Council of Shan State were also able to restore their strength.
The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have weakened a lot compared to 1995, when their ceasefires came into effect. But they still have a strong presence in Myanmar politics due to their long history. Meanwhile, powerful new EAOs like the Arakan Army (AA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) emerged because of their dissatisfaction with the regime’s handling of ethnic issues.
After 20 years of ceasefire, the EAOs became aware that they needed to rebuild strength, or otherwise risk collapse, and that the military was trying to break them up by any means. They realized that the military will compromise with EAOs when inland Myanmar is in crisis, but will always try to contain the EAOs otherwise.
In ten years of peace talks from 2011 to 2021, the EAOs saw that the Myanmar military has a greater say than elected governments. Moreover, the military restricted certain EAOs from participating in peace talks, and treated smaller EAOs with arrogance.
Myanmar’s military did not recognize ethnic people’s demand for self-determination and self-rule, but insisted that EAOs must join the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process under the 2008 Constitution and join the political dialogue under the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement process. The regime did not accept an all-inclusive peace process, saying instead that the peace process is “not a Taung Pyone Pwe [a popular spirit festival in Mandalay] in which everyone can participate freely.”
Last month, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing offered face-to-face peace talks with leaders of EAOs. Since last year’s coup, the generals have repeatedly tried in vain to hold talks with EAOs. This has prompted Min Aung Hlaing to make the proposal himself.
Everyone can see that Min Aung Hlaing is trying to keep the EAOs out of the fighting as his army is facing a military crisis nationwide and is desperate to find a way out.
The regime is likely to allow EAOs to have greater territorial control and to lift its restrictions on their armaments at the planned meeting. It will be interesting to see to what extent Min Aun Hlaing will compromise.
In fact, EAOs like the UWSA and the NDAA already control their territories, and all they need is legitimacy. Moreover, EAOs like the KIA, the AA, the TNLA, the MNDAA, the SSPP, the KNPP, the KNU, the NMSP and the Chin National Front that have political ambitions to control their entire states might not accept a regime offer that will only allow them to continue to control their existing territory.
It is impossible to separate the EAOs from the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) – the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG) – now. In Kachin, Chin, Karen and Kayah states, PDFs are fighting alongside the EAOs. In Sagaing and Magwe regions, PDFs work closely with EAOs.
The most important point is that the EAOs have little trust in the junta chief’s offer of peace talks due to their previous experiences with the military. Again, the PDFs are a great boost for EAOs which have fought Myanmar’s military for many years. So the majority of EAOs will continue to support the PDFs.
Many groups have refused to attend the talks saying all stakeholders, such as the NUG and PDFs, should be allowed to join them. But some small EAOs without strong principles may accept the offer of peace for their own interests while the military is making compromises. However, strong and principled EAOs are likely to shun the peace talks.
The regime is now saying EAOs don’t commit terrorist acts like the PDFs do. But for many years, they described the EAOs as insurgents and terrorist groups. But despite labelling the AA as a terrorist group, the military held talks with the AA in 2020. It previously refused to hold talks with the TNLA and MNDAA, which are allied with the AA in the Northern Alliance, but is now prepared to include them in peace talks.
Throughout Myanmar’s history, we have witnessed the military’s negative attitude towards peace. If the regime is really serious about achieving peace in the country, it must first unconditionally release all those it has unfairly detained. To discuss a ceasefire and peace, the regime needs to talk with not only EAOs but also the PDFs and all the other resistance groups waging a defensive war, as well as the NUG and its legislative body.
Clashes with PDFs and other revolutionary groups engaged in Myanmar’s Spring Revolution account for 70 per cent of fighting so far in 2022, while clashes with EAOs account for 30 per cent. Without talking to the PDFs, it is impossible to achieve peace in Myanmar. No peace talks will succeed when key players are excluded.
The intention of the junta chief’s peace offer is to keep the EAOs at bay so that he has time and energy to crush the PDFs. It is just a political ploy. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the international community have called for dialogue among all parties to solve the Myanmar crisis. But the junta is trying to deceive them by offering peace talks only to the EAOs..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"An international terrorism monitor missed the mark when it labeled a resistance attack on soldiers as terrorism, which may only serve to embolden the real terrorists in Myanmar: the military.
A defining feature of military rule in Myanmar has been the use of mass violence against civilians to cause terror for political gain.
From massacres of unarmed protesters, to late-night raids and often fatal torture sessions, to burning down entire villages where resistance forces operate and slaughtering their civilian inhabitants: every successful tactic the military has used to quash dissent has been rooted in creating fear.
It’s textbook terrorism. As the country crumbles around them, instilling terror in the hearts of the general population seems to be the only thing the junta is any good at. So it came as a surprise to many when the Institute for Economics and Peace indicated a rise in terrorism in Myanmar not due to heinous military violence, but due to resistance attacks.
Perplexingly, IEP’s 2022 Global Terrorism Index report said the “most devastating” attack of 2021 in Myanmar was when resistance forces killed 40 soldiers in Sagaing Region’s Katha Township on September 20. IEP says it uses TerrorismTracker to collect data, and it supposedly does not include “irregular or conventional” warfare. It’s hard to understand, therefore, how killing 40 enemy troops during a civil war could be classified as terrorism.
The report does not include any of the many military massacres of unarmed civilians, such as the slaughter of over 60 protesters in Hlaing Tharyar in March 2021, or the killing of more than 80 in Bago the following month. There’s no consistent definition of terrorism that could include killing soldiers in battle but not encompass massacring civilians with the intention of making the rest of the population too afraid to resist. It seems to hinge entirely on the idea that violence is the sole purview of the state.
Given the junta seized power illegally, has no representation at the United Nations, and hasn’t been officially recognised as the government of Myanmar by even one country, the Tatmadaw is closer to a rogue militant group than a professional armed force, let alone a state or government.
While TerrorismTracker also excludes deaths caused by “civil unrest”, this is an overly broad term that could apply to almost anything. It also appears IEP uses it inconsistently. In the 2017, 2019 and 2020 Global Terrorism Index reports, IEP included attacks on protesters in Afghanistan and Iraq in its list of terrorist attacks. Why would these incidents qualify, while the military’s crackdowns do not?
One explanation might be preconceived notions about what terrorism looks like. At its core, the Myanmar military is a racial and religious extremist group that often ludicrously justifies its use of violence as necessary to protect Buddhism. Swap that out for Islam and maybe IEP would have an easier time seeing it as a terrorist organisation.
There are some attacks that have been attributed to resistance groups that could qualify as terrorism. Bombing electricity offices with the intention of making civilians too afraid to pay their electricity bills, for example. These incidents could and should be included, although it seems likely that a fair accounting would show the military has committed more terrorist attacks, with higher civilian casualties, than the resistance.
If IEP wants to measure attacks on security forces or general non-state violence, then by all means include resistance attacks on soldiers and police. But don’t call it terrorism without a more consistent definition of what that actually means.
This is where it gets tricky. There is no universal, international standard for terrorism, partly because the term is so politically charged. Most definitions include acts of violence designed to intimidate a population or to influence a government or international organisation.
The terrorism label also has implications for perceptions of legitimacy. The junta has not only declared anti-coup armed groups to be terrorist organisations, but also the National Unity Government, in an attempt to discredit them. The fact is though, that the NUG was appointed by elected lawmakers, while the military junta illegally seized power after losing an election. By calling resistance attacks terrorism, but not using the term to describe the military, IEP has taken a side in the legitimacy dispute while presenting itself as neutral.
This matters because the Global Terrorism Index report could actually cause more acts of terrorism in Myanmar, by giving more fodder to the military’s propaganda machine. The junta has long justified its use of disproportionate violence by claiming that all its opponents are terrorists – even unarmed peaceful protesters.
In 2021, the BBC investigated a series of military massacres committed in July that left 40 civilians dead in Kani Township, also in Sagaing Region. Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun later justified the shocking tactics by describing resistance fighters as terrorists, and insisting the military was “using appropriate force in order to achieve a reasonable level of security”.
The IEP report did not mention these massacres – but by labelling resistance attacks as terrorism it helped bolster the military’s excuse for committing them. The risk is that if the military thinks this delusional narrative is gaining traction internationally, it will only feel emboldened to continue using outrageous violence. The result will be more deaths, more destruction and more terror in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"9 May 2022: The plans of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for humanitarian assistance to Myanmar flout fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and will advance the military objectives of the Myanmar military junta, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). The plans were announced by the current ASEAN Chair, Cambodia, following a consultative meeting on Friday.
The outcomes of the consultative meeting include plans for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) to deliver aid to areas identified by the Myanmar military junta and in coordination with the junta.
“The areas singled out for humanitarian assistance by the military junta under ASEAN’s plan are the very areas where the junta has been relentlessly attacking civilians with airstrikes and scorched-earth campaigns for months on end,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The junta has no power in those areas and its attempt to control ASEAN’s delivery of aid to them is nothing more than a strategy designed to advance its military agenda.”
“ASEAN aid personnel working in areas under attack from the junta could become unwitting ‘human-shields’ for the junta’s ulterior motives,” Marzuki Darusman added.
There are 14 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Myanmar, while an estimated 800,000 people are displaced inside the country. Most are seeking refuge from the junta’s attacks in territory along Myanmar’s borders outside the junta’s control. The junta refuses to permit cross-border aid into these areas.
“Under no circumstances should ASEAN be hailed for colluding with the junta to develop a military-controlled plan for humanitarian assistance, more than one year into the crisis, when it has failed to get support to the cross-border networks of local civil society, community and faith-based groups and ethnic service providers that have been working tirelessly to keep people alive,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “It is inhumane for ASEAN’s own member states that neighbour Myanmar to keep their borders closed just to please the junta, which is the cause of Myanmar’s suffering. “
“Myanmar’s neighbouring countries must not forget their international obligation to assist in delivering humanitarian aid through their borders,” Yanghee Lee added.
The consultative meeting was held less than a week before an important summit between the United States (US) and ASEAN, due to take place on 12 and 13 May in Washington DC. ASEAN has been criticised for failing to make any progress towards resolving the junta-made crises in Myanmar. Myanmar junta-leader Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly humiliated Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia in his misguided efforts to engage the junta.
“ASEAN’s plans for humanitarian assistance to Myanmar are clearly a vain attempt to have something to show the US. ASEAN claims to have the central role in Southeast Asia but its Five Point Failure shows its irrelevance. The outcomes of the consultative meeting are an outrage,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M.
The Cambodian Foreign Minister tried to implicate the United Nations (UN) Special Envoy to Myanmar in this plan by saying she had participated in the meeting. In fact, her attendance had been blocked by the junta. She was invited and then disinvited. At this point, ASEAN’s credibility is hanging by a thread, says SAC-M.
SAC-M is calling on ASEAN to abide by the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. ASEAN must secure the immediate opening of cross-border humanitarian corridors into Myanmar and coordinate with all relevant parties, including the National Unity Government, the National Unity Consultative Council, Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations and local actors to finally deliver the aid it promised the people of Myanmar more than one year ago. If it fails, it must get out of the way of others who are far more willing to act..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
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The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Introduction
The third wave of democratisation,[a] spanning the last quarter of the 20th century, transformed the global political landscape.[1] While the details varied across nations and regions, almost all of them shifted away from dictatorship and towards more democratic forms of governance. However, there has been rising concern about the substance of democracy in the recently transitioned countries. Studies have pointed out that while nearly 100 countries are deemed as “transitioning,” most are settling into new forms of semi-democratic yet authoritarian systems, instead of true democracy.[2] Moreover, the formal democratic institutions established in most nations, such as elections, continue to suffer serious deficits.[3]
The onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic has intensified a trend of escalating authoritarianism across the globe.[4] Several nations have slid down the democracy scale, Myanmar being the latest. A fledgling democracy,[b] Myanmar witnessed a coup in February 2021, as the armed forces, the Tatmadaw, refused to accept the results of the 2020 elections that gave the National League for Democracy (NLD) a second term.
Against this backdrop, this brief explores the challenges to democratic consolidation in Myanmar, with a focus on NLD–military relations. The first part analyses the factors that led to a change from autocratic to democratic regimes in 2011. The second part examines the dynamics between the NLD democratic leadership and the military junta, to understand how it has shaped Myanmar’s struggle for democracy in recent years. Finally, the brief considers the key factors that are weakening Myanmar’s prospects of stable democracy.
Myanmar’s Shift to Democracy: 2010–15
The Military as an Institution
Analysts have offered various explanations to Myanmar’s post-2010 democratic reforms—from the country’s military government wanting to resist the growing influence of China, to growing public demands for democracy. For the most part, political changes in Myanmar are driven by the willingness of military leaders to implement them. American political scientist Samuel Huntington, in his theory on democracy, says that the most common form of transition from a military regime to democracy is “transformation”—this occurs when the military regime itself initiates the shift.[5] Such transitions are peaceful but often transient, as military regimes have the capacity to reacquire power through non-democratic means if they disapprove of the direction of the transformation.
In most such cases, military leaders do not define themselves as the permanent rulers of the country, instead claiming to briefly assume power to “save the country” from instability. Thus, for military rulers, the return to civilian rule is always a political possibility. In Myanmar, too, the military had claimed that once the country became stable, it would leave its temporary stint and return to its previous military duties.[6] As Huntington theorised it, three factors can accelerate the military’s decision to withdraw from power: (i) a guarantee that there will be no prosecution of military officers for acts they committed while they were in power, (ii) guarantees about the preservation of the autonomy and role of the military, and (iii) the attitude of the opposition.
The democratisation process, meanwhile, is shaped by interactions between three groups of actors: (i) reformers within government; (ii) those who resist reform; and (iii) members of the opposition.[7] Within these groups, there are diverse opinions on the possibilities and prospects for reform, with the constitution of each group and the relationship between them subject to change throughout the process. For example, those within the military who oppose the reforms may come to accept democracy if their suspicions about it are not confirmed. Members of opposition groups initially opposed to government-led reforms may accept opportunities to participate if they are convinced of the intentions of the military government.
Post-2010 Reforms
Since 2010, many of these interactions have unfolded in Myanmar, as amendments were made to the election laws, the ban on the NLD was lifted, and Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest.[c] Freedom of speech was restored, and the ban on social media platforms was revoked. Consequently, both the Opposition and the general public began to accept Thein Sein as a reformer open to democratic changes.
At the same time, Thein Sein and fellow reformers reassured the military about its continuing independence and power, in keeping with the 2008 Myanmar Constitution’s emphasis on the centrality of the armed forces in the new life of the country, and the provisions relating to the non-prosecution of army officers. Thus, the 2008 Constitution is a tool designed to ensure the military’s prominence at all times, whether elected or not. Further, it acts as a roadmap to “disciplined democracy,” and dictates the parameters and extent of reforms during a regime change. Ultimately, the playing field remains heavily tilted toward the military-dominated party.
In 2011, the NLD and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, made the critical decision to accept the government’s approach to working together to attain the goal of multiparty democracy. The new government’s strongest claim to credibility, both internally and externally, was Aung San Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s path of reform and her evident faith in Thein Sein. That there was no insistence on accountability for the acts of the former military rulers indicated that the Opposition, i.e. the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi, would behave “reliably” in the transition to democracy. In the past, Suu Kyi had openly confronted the government by arranging rallies and organising campaigns for civil disobedience.[8] However, aware that such tactics could hinder the progress towards democracy and lead to a return to power by hardliners, or else a substantial increase in the power of the military, the NLD subsequently adopted policies of moderation and cooperation with the government. It also agreed to be involved as a junior partner in the process of democratic reform. This culminated in the seamless and peaceful transition to a democratic government in 2015.
Post-2016 Civil-Military Relations
Since coming to power in 2016, the NLD government has sought to maintain an amiable relationship with the junta. This was evident in the softer stance it took towards the military’s actions in the matter of the ethnic conflicts within the country.
In May 2016, the NLD government set up the “Central Committee on the Implementation of Peace, Stability, and Development of the Rakhine State”.[9] It also established an advisory commission, with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as Chair, to provide recommendations on the complex challenges facing Rakhine. However, the meetings held and studies organised to understand the situation did little to prevent the conflicts between the junta and militant groups fighting for autonomy in the Kachin and Rakhine regions, such as the Arakan Army, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The conflicts have resulted in the displacement of millions of people, severe food shortages, and loss of livelihoods. For its part, the NLD government has done little else beyond appealing to the military to practice restraint, choosing to focus on other agendas instead.
Similarly, in the ongoing case of the Rohingya ethnic cleansing, both the NLD government and Aung San Suu Kyi have not only refrained from intervening against the inhuman treatment of the stateless people, but also categorically denied wrongdoing and imposed media censorship on the issue.[d] Indeed, international spectators expressed concerns over the ex-state counsellor shielding the military’s action and calling the situation an “internal matter,” despite millions being forced to cross the border to live in neighbouring nations.[10] In the face of censure from the international community, Aung San Suu Kyi maintained her stance, standing for the junta in the International Court of Justice in 2019 and denying all accusations of genocide.[11]
Second Transition and Rising Conflict
According to theorists, a transition from military regime to democracy is often followed by a second transition—towards the effective functioning of a democratic regime.[12] During the first transition, the “military challenge” for members of the Opposition is to inaugurate a democratic government without military resistance. During the second transition, the challenge is to establish functional institutions of civilian control over the military.
Bringing the GAD under Civilian Rule
While the NLD government sought to balance its civilian-military relations, it slowly attempted to create powerful civilian positions in otherwise militarised institutions. This step was deemed essential to establishing functional units of civilian control. In a pivotal move, in 2019, the NLD sought to bring Myanmar’s main public administration body, the General Administration Department (GAD), under civilian control. The GAD has traditionally operated under the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Designated as the “bureaucratic backbone of the country,” it directly controls all state bureaucracy at the local level, including in the districts, townships, and village tracts. Its 36,000 staff members, many of whom are transferred military personnel, are responsible for issuing licenses, handling land management and disputes, and collecting taxes. Since April 2011, the GAD has also handled the increased engagement from international aid donors.
Thus, placing the GAD under the civilian Ministry of the Office of the Union Government will be an important step in breaking the military dominance. The reform is aimed at stimulating decentralisation and is necessary for any real progress towards peace and stability. To be sure, such a reform may not lead to immediate changes to local administration. However, it can allow state- and region-level civil services to emerge in the long run, beyond the exceptional municipal offices.[13]
Amending the Constitution
The 2008 Constitution is the biggest source of military power in Myanmar. In addition to granting the military a prominent role in politics, it ensures that state institutions reflect the ideology advocated by the Tatmadaw. This ideology draws from Tatmadaw’s three national clauses: the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of national unity, and the perpetuation of national sovereignty.[14] To safeguard the implementation of these clauses, the Constitution allocates 25 percent representation of unelected military officers in Myanmar’s Parliament. This provides them with veto power, as articles 436 (a) and (b) require more than 75 percent of members to vote in favour of approved amendments. The Constitution also grants sovereign powers to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces during emergencies,[e] including rights to exercise control over the executive, legislature, and judiciary. These provisions have allowed the military to maintain its position as “guardian” over a steady process of democratisation, and to protect its core ideological and private interests. Thus, any amendments to the Constitution can severely damage the Tatmadaw’s grip on the Myanmar government.
While the NLD had been vocal about the undemocratic nature of the Constitution since 2007, it took little initiative to modify it after assuming office in 2016. After losing the 2018 by-elections, however, it returned its focus to amending the Constitution. In January 2019, a parliamentary Charter Amendment Committee was set up, consisting of 149 lawmakers—50 from the military, 50 from the NLD, 26 from Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and the remainder from ethnic parties. They took part in the debate, which spanned seven days. The structure of the Parliament included the NLD holding 59 percent of the seats, the ethnic minority parties 11 percent, the USDP five percent, and the military its constitutionally mandated 25 percent.
The proposed amendments focused on reducing the military’s influence. Some of the proposals from NLD included scrapping the military’s veto over constitutional change, limiting its parliamentary seats, reducing its political leadership role, and revoking army chiefs’ right to assume power during an emergency. The NLD has proposed changing the requirement for approving a charter amendment from more than 75 percent of Parliament to “two-thirds of elected representatives,” excluding the military appointees. It also proposed gradually reducing the military’s share of seats from 25 percent to 15 percent after the 2020 election, 10 percent after 2025, and five percent after 2030. A quarter of all seats in the national and regional legislatures are occupied by unelected military officers under the Constitution’s Article 14 and related provisions. The military generals strongly objected to this proposal, with the commander-in-chief calling the amendments discriminatory and asserting that such demands could harm national unity and civilian-military relations.[15] The NLD also proposed amending Section 59 (f), which bars Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president, since her husband and sons hold British citizenship, and Section 59 (d), which requires military experience. However, these proposals failed to garner the required vote in the assembly. According to one junta official, senior positions should steer clear from any foreign influence.[16]
In total, the NLD proposed 114 amendments to the Constitution, of which only minor ones concerning changes in the language of clauses pertaining to the appointment of state and regional ministers were approved. One can argue that the NLD’s objective for attempting to introduce such a large number of changes was to improve its public image, by convincing the populace that the military and the USDP stood in the way of the party’s efforts to bring about democratic reforms.
The strategy did not go unnoticed by the army or the USDP, and to combat this narrative, the Tatmadaw and the USDP proposed amendments of their own. The military bloc proposed revising Article 261 by electing regional chief ministers through local legislatures instead of being appointed by the Central government through the president. Such an amendment primarily seeks to make the nation-state federal in structure, by distributing more powers among peripheral regions. While this contradicts the Tatmadaw’s previous stance against federalism, where it equated federalism with the disintegration of the country,[17] analysts contend that the underlying motive is to take advantage of the ethnic minorities’ growing disillusionment with the NLD.[f][18]
Persistent Obstacles to Democracy
In addition to the discontent of the military generals at the NLD’s growing intent to achieve democratic consolidation—which would result in the power shifting to the civilian government—a few other factors have affected the growth of stable democracy during NLD’s tenure.
NLD’s Centralised Character
Under the 2008 Constitution, the NLD has the right to choose the central and local governments at all levels of the legislatures. Following its 2015 victory, the NLD, instead of acknowledging nationality parties in the ethnic states, appointed its own representatives and party members as the chief ministers of all the states and regions—even where the NLD had won a minority of state seats—with no prior consultation with its once-allied ethnic parties.
The Arakan National Party (ANP) and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) are two prominent ethnic parties in Myanmar. A veteran Rakhine politician, U Aye Tha Aung, was approached to act as the vice-speaker of the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw) in the national parliament. But this decision was made without transparent discussion or agreement with the ANP.[19] Similarly, the NLD refused to grant administrative power or representation to SNLD, its former ally at the state level. Instead, party officials suggested that the SNLD consider the position of an “Ethnic Affairs Minister.” Such acts alienated ethnic groups and damaged the NLD’s image. The party’s imposition of political hegemony through ‘Burmanisation’ and the centralisation of projects further exacerbated negative sentiments amongst the ethnic groups. For example, the erection of statues of General Aung San in Kayah and other states with sizeable ethnic minority populations sparked opposition and protests, which the NLD’s local officials chose to handle in a largely violent manner. There were also protests in Mon state, when the NLD decided to change the name of a bridge in Mawlamyine to General Aung San Bridge. [20]
Disillusioned by these trends, some NLD members along with other pro-democracy leaders, formed their own parties before the 2020 elections, such as the People’s Pioneer Party, Union Betterment Party, and People’s Party.[21] The military leveraged this development against the NLD during the deliberations on the amendment of the Constitution.
Weakness of Democratic Political Leadership
Following the 2015 elections, the NLD party grew in strength. Before 2015, its membership had predominantly been symbolic and solidaristic, and the increase in party members created concerns regarding the new members—who tried to maximise their power and status—in the absence of a stable democratic ideology. Further, selecting ground leaders became a challenge, as people voted for Aung San Suu Kyi instead of specific local candidates. Consequently, leaders at the local levels were decided after the party office won the election, reflecting the disjointed power dynamics within the NLD.[22]
Since the NLD government was new and inexperienced in governance, it failed to invest in the training of party members and next-generation leaders. Of the existing leadership, few personnel are trained professionals, and the majority lack management experience. While the management styles of some party members are consistent with the democratic culture and genuine policy openness, most are concerned only with modes of behaviour and control akin to socialist centralisation.[23]
Faultlines of National Reconciliation
Throughout its rule and as the defence authority during the NLD tenure, the junta had continued to rely on a divide-and-rule tactic for monitoring the ethnic militant groups. During the 1990s, the military managed to integrate some into their force, but those who did not acquiesce remain in a state of constant war with the state. The junta orchestrates and controls the entire process by fighting against some groups while entering into ceasefire agreement with others—selectively allowing some groups to keep their arms and territory, tax their constituents, build state-like structures, and profit from legal and illegal businesses.[g] Its tactics are facilitated by the failure of the armed groups to act in unison instead of learning from each other’s experiences. Thus, using ceasefire politics, the Tatmadaw has established itself as the most powerful military, political, and economic actor in the borderlands. Furthermore, by entering into joint ventures with the local leaders or “elite groups” of ethnic minorities, the military exploits and extracts from the borderlands’ natural resources, in mining, logging, and agriculture. This has allowed the military to exercise power in areas where it had no previous influence and profit from ethnic armed groups, without ever fully meeting their demands.
To turn such a situation around would require the government’s sustained effort, driven by a vision for peace. Since the armed groups have overlapping territorial claims, and conflicting goals, and failed to successfully align their military and political strategies, the onus of peace-making must be on a representative Union government. In 2020, the International Crisis Group rightly recommended that the government engage in political dialogue and negotiations with all the country’s ethnic groups, and establish participatory institutions where each group could work for its goals. However, this could not be implemented at the time due to the shifting civil-military relations.
Misplaced Security Priorities
For the last five years, the central purpose of Myanmar’s security and justice institutions has been to defend the state either from local resistance or to maintain order while protecting their own economic interests. The criminal justice apparatus has been geared primarily towards disciplinary action against political dissidents, while non-traditional security threats, such as drug abuse and human trafficking, have only received curbs and routine punishment.[24] Moreover, since the security institutions are dominated by Bamar Buddhists, the judiciary is independent only on paper: it remains full of juries and magistrates who previously served within the military or under the former military government.[25]
To be sure, the transfer of powers from the military to civilians does not automatically create more just and peaceful outcomes. Reforms in the justice system must be carefully planned and executed, including service orientations of the military and police, skill training for enhancing tactical approach without the use of extreme violence, people-oriented mechanisms, gender inclusivity and sensitivity, rehabilitation of the prison system, and overall inclusivity. Research organisations have highlighted the three steps needed to democratise Myanmar’s autocratic system:[26]
Giving more power to elected civilians as representatives of the people
Transforming the security culture
Protecting and building civic space
So far, the civilian government has been unable to take any action, due to the reservations of the junta.
The factors discussed in this section are responsible for the lack of democratic progress in Myanmar. However, while the military leaders had hoped to capitalise on the NLD’s poor performance to garner support, the public’s trust in Aung San Suu Kyi as a protector who would act as a bulwark against the possible return of military rule remains strong, and much of the mistrust is directed at the military regime that is viewed as despotic.[27] Indeed, the USDP declined into electoral irrelevance in the 2020 polls, and the landslide victory of the NLD government substantially reduced the influence of the military over the legislative branch. Going forward, the NLD is likely to introduce more reforms to the Constitution, resulting in further erosion of the military’s influence. While this will fortify the NLD’s position,[28] an open challenge to the junta’s sovereignty as an institution may lead to another coup.
Conclusion
Scholars who study regime transitions in different parts of the world agree that the democratisation of a country depends not only on electing a new government through free, fair, and competitive elections, but also on a comprehensive political refurbishment. The new political leaders must enjoy sufficient effective power to govern. The transformation of authoritarian civil-military relations is, therefore, a key element of any regime transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule. However, since the prerequisites of this transition are set by the military rulers from a position of strength, they often continue to exercise substantial control over the process and outcomes, and the armed forces retain their acquired entitlements.
A successful democratic transition requires establishing functional institutions of civilian control over the military, which is especially difficult in countries with a strong legacy of militarism and where the military is able to secure political and institutional privileges. While international mediation can be useful in such instances, Myanmar has previously been called a “diplomatic graveyard,”[h] due to the UN’s failure to successfully intervene—from providing humanitarian assistance to facilitating national reconciliation between the junta and their democratic opponents.
Despite the progress made by the NLD in establishing democratic processes in Myanmar, the military coup of February 2021 showed that the government had failed to exercise civilian control over the junta. The coup has pushed the country and its future into uncharted territory, and how the conflict will play out will depend on the public protesters and the military’s response to them.
Sreeparna Banerjee is a Junior Fellow at ORF, Kolkata.
Endnotes
[a] A group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite directions during that period of time. According to political scientist Samuel Huntington, the third wave began from 1974 onwards.
[b] A system or an institution that is not yet developed.
[c] Giving in to domestic and international pressures, the military government called an election in 1990, which the NLD won by a landslide. The generals, however, refused to recognise the result and instead placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. They argued that the country lacked a constitution through which a proper transfer of power can be conducted.
[d] The Rohingyas are a minority Muslim community who have lived in the Rakhine State of Myanmar for centuries. In recent years, they have become a brutally oppressed, “stateless” community as the state of Myanmar continues to deny them citizenship under the country’s nationality law of 1982.
[e] In Myanmar, an emergency is defined as any situation that could lead to the nation’s disintegration, loss of sovereignty, or attempts to forcefully take power through insurgency.
[f] The ethnic minorities are reportedly unhappy with the state of affairs and the centralised approach of the NLD that goes against the spirit of federalism that the centre had promised to uphold.
[g] In 2015, eight groups signed a ”Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA) with the government, and two more joined in 2018. Five others have bilateral ceasefire agreements. However, as of October 2020, four important groups stood without any such agreement: the Arakan Army (AA); Kachin Independence Army (KIA); Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA); and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).[g] For two years, from December 2018 to November 2020, the Tatmadaw focused on fighting the AA, while mostly avoiding clashes with the others. In November 2020, right after the national elections, the Tatmadaw and AA agreed on an informal, temporary ceasefire.
[h] The six UN special envoys—starting with Japanese diplomat Sadako Ogata, who was appointed in 1990 as an independent expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights, to the Malaysian businessman Razali Ismail, the UN secretary-general’s second special envoy to the country—quit their job in deep frustration. Their missions to Myanmar were routinely rebuffed by the Junta, and at least one of the diplomats, the UN’s second special rapporteur, Mauritian Rajsoomer Lallah, wasn’t even allowed to enter the country because of his sharp criticism of the regime.
[1] Samuel Huntington, “How Countries Democratize”, Political Science Quarterly, 1991, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 579-616
[2] Carothers, Thomas (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1): 5-21. John Hopkins University Press.
[3] Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. (2010). Why Democracy Needs a Levels Playing Field. Journal of Democracy, 21(1), pp. 57-68. John Hopkins University Press.
[4] Global State of Democracy Report 2021 Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era, 2021.
[5] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize
[6] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize; Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “Democratic Transformation and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, April 1, 2013.
[7] Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “Democratic Transformation and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, April 1, 2013.
[8] Barkey, Henri J. (1990), Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition, in Armed Forces & Society, 16, 169–192.
[9] K Yhome, “Elections and civil-military relations in Myanmar”, Observer Research Foundation, August 18, 2020.
[10] Hannah Beech, “What Happened to Myanmar’s Human-Rights Icon?”, The New York Times, September 25, 2017.
[11] Sreeparna Banerjee and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, “ICJ’s judgement on the Rohingya and its challenges”, Observer Research Foundation, February 10, 2020.
[12] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize,
[13] Matthew B Arnold, “Why GAD reform matters to Myanmar”, East Asia Forum, August 24, 2019.
[14] Htet Naing ZAW, “Military Presence Still Needed in Parliament, USDP Says”, The Irrawaddy, February 27, 2019.
[15] San Yamin Aung, “Flashpoints: Myanmar’s Eight Most Hotly Contested Constitutional Amendment Proposals”, The Irrawaddy, March 7, 2020.
[16] San Yamin Aung, “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Still Barred From Presidency as Proposed Charter Change Fails”, The Irrawaddy, March 11, 2020.
[17] Annabelle Heugas, “Myanmar’s Constitution Amendment Process in the year 2020”, KAS, June 2, 2020.
[18] Annabelle Heugas, “Myanmar’s Constitution Amendment Process in the year 2020”
[19] Kyaw Lynn, “The National League for Democracy: A Party for Democracy or Federalism?”, TNI, October 2, 2020.
[20] Ye Myo Hein, “Visions of a Federal Future for Myanmar are Fading Fast-Part II”, The Irrawaddy, September 2, 2021.
[21] Yuichi Nitta, “Myanmar pro-democracy forces form new parties as elections loom”, Nikkei Asia, July 21, 2020.
[22] Richard Roewer, “Three Faces of Party Organisation in the National League for Democracy”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, February 14, 2020.
[23] Naing Ko Ko, “Democratisation in Myanmar: Glue or Gloss?”, Australian National University, 2019.
[24] Nicholas Whitridge Cheesman, “The politics of law and order in Myanmar”, January 2012.
[25] Kim Jolliffe, “Democratising Myanmar’s security sector: enduring legacies and a long road ahead”, Saferworld, November 2019.
[26] Kim Jolliffe, “Democratising Myanmar’s security sector: enduring legacies and a long road ahead”,
[27] Hannah Beach and Saw Nang, “Myanmar Election Delivers Another Decisive Win for Aung San Suu Kyi”, The New York Times, November 11, 2020.
[28] Sreeparna Banerjee, “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi Verdict and Its Aftermath”, Observer Research Foundation, December 20, 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of publication:
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Articles on the NLD
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"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia urge the United States of America and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to take the opportunity of their upcoming summit in Washington to increase their pressure on the Myanmar military junta, which staged a coup d’état in February last year and has thrown the country into a state of chaos ever since.
The leaders of ASEAN and the United States have declared that they intend to enhance their strategic partnership for the mutual benefit of the peoples of ASEAN and the United States. In that spirit, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) advises that they should take concrete steps to address the inherent threat to peace, economic development and human security in Southeast Asia posed by the crisis in Myanmar.
“Let this 45th anniversary of US-ASEAN relations be the occasion for the US and ASEAN governments to begin a new phase in their relations that truly benefits the people and puts human rights and the prevention of atrocities, in Myanmar and elsewhere, at the top of the agenda. They can no longer ignore the threat that the junta in Myanmar poses to the security of millions of people at the heart of Southeast Asia,” said Charles Santiago, Member of Parliament from Malaysia, and APHR Chairperson.
The current crisis is wholly and solely caused by the junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, which overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February 2021. The Myanmar population has valiantly resisted the coup and, in order to impose its rule on the country, the military has committed widespread atrocities. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, these may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Over the last year, Myanmar’s military has completely ignored the ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus on Myanmar, which was agreed on in April 2021 and was also supported by the US. Violence continues unabated, there is no dialogue between the junta and forces resisting military rule, and humanitarian aid is not reaching the Myanmar people.
The Special Summit provides the perfect opportunity for the allies to work on coordinated measures to make Min Aung Hlaing and his junta pay the price for their failure to abide by an agreement they claimed to accept.
“Humanity is our common thread across the Pacific and across the world. We must stand together in the face of these atrocities, Asians and Americans, as we share the same concern for the people of Myanmar. Now is the time for ASEAN and the US to make their historic alliance truly meaningful to people in desperate need,” said Mercy Barends, MP in Indonesia and an APHR Board Member.
We urge the US and ASEAN to adopt much stronger measures than those taken so far, including the suspension of Myanmar’s membership in the group, travel bans in the region for Min Aung Hlaing and his generals, and targeted sanctions against the leaders of the coup. The US has already imposed some sanctions since the coup, but it should reinforce them and include the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a state conglomerate that has given 1.5 billion dollars in gas revenues to the junta.
We also urge the US and ASEAN governments to publicly meet with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), which represents the democratically elected government and receives support from the majority of the Myanmar people.
Lastly, we call on the United States and ASEAN to work together to urgently deliver the life-saving humanitarian aid that the Myanmar people need. This aid should be channeled as much as possible through Myanmar’s community-based and civil society organizations, to effectively reach those that need it the most. The United States and ASEAN member states, especially Thailand, should also welcome the people of Myanmar who are fleeing persecution and violence, and give them asylum.
APHR stands ready to assist the US and ASEAN as they formulate and carry out their policies to address this crisis, and will remain vigilant to ensure that the steps taken by the US and ASEAN truly serve to support the Myanmar people’s aspirations for human rights, peace and democracy..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"1. The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was formed with the goal of
eliminating all forms of dictatorship, including military dictatorship, and of
building a new, federal democratic union. The NUCC’s convening of the First
People’s Assembly from 27-29th of January 2022 represents a historic milestone
toward this noble goal.
2. On that occasion, the First People’s Assembly adopted seven resolutions,
including a solemn pledge to ratify the Federal Democratic Charter.
3. The NUCC maintains a steadfast commitment to undertaking revolutionary
actions that further nationwide inclusion, equality, peace, and the building of a
Federal Democratic Union in full and equal partnership with dedicated
revolutionary organisations, many of which have been active for over seven
decades. Any actions that would serve to revitalise the undemocratic, militarydrafted 2008 Constitution - a constitution which the military terrorist junta itself
violated and which has since been abolished by the Committee Representing
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) - are fundamentally incompatible with the NUCC’s
shared goals and principles.
4. The 22 April 2022 invitation to in-person dialogue issued to ethnic
revolutionary organisations by the terrorist military dictator Min Aung Hlaing
represents just another disingenuous and hollow attempt to use the pretence of
dialogue as a mean to finding temporary relief to the political, military, diplomatic
and economic catastrophe it has brought upon itself. Legitimate political dialogue
with a military terrorist junta that continues to oppress and attack our people is
an impossibility.
5. This most recent invitation is but one in a litany of failed attempts at peace
dialogue between 2010 and 2020 - dialogues undermined by limitations
established by the now abolished 2008 Constitution. Furthermore, by seizing power
from the legitimate government under the flawed pretext of the 2008 Constitution,
the terrorist military junta has made clear that it has no genuine desire to achieve
a nationwide, sustainable peace and democracy.
6. The NUCC notes with appreciation those ethnic revolutionary organisations
who have definitively rejected the invitation issued by the terrorist military dictator
Min Aung Hlaing as of the date this statement is issued.
7. The NUCC hereby condemns the disingenuous invitation to so-called peace
talks issued by the military terrorist junta. The NUCC restates its call for all political
forces, ethnic revolutionary organisations, and people’s resistance forces to stand
with the people and resist all forms of dictatorship, including military dictatorship..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-05-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"For the Myanmar people, the junta’s promised new election is nothing more than an attempt to legitimize military rule in Myanmar, and so the people won’t accept or participate in the regime’s so-called poll even if it happens.
The people have clearly demonstrated that stand ever since last year’s coup by displaying placards during mass protests saying “Reject the coup, Respect our votes”. No one can have any trust in any election held by the military regime which rejected the outcome of the 2020 general election, robbed the people of their votes and brutalized their lives.
Yet the junta and its accomplices still believe that they can trick the people again with a sham election and so prolong their rule.
When Myanmar’s voters cast their votes in the November 2020 general election, they expected more of the new, democratic Myanmar. But their hopes and expectations were shattered when the Myanmar military seized power on February 1, 2021 claiming the poll was marred by “widespread electoral fraud”. That was despite the international and domestic election observers who said the vote was free and fair.
Soon after the putsch, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced a five-point roadmap, which included reforming the Union Election Commission (UEC) and pledging to hold a “free and fair” election and then handing over power to the winning party.
Subsequently, he packed the UEC with his own handpicked men to oversee any post-coup voting and annulled the results of the 2020 election won by the Daw Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) party in a landslide.
The junta-run UEC is now led by U Thein Soe, a former Judge Advocate-General in the military, who previously oversaw the 2010 general election, a poll that was widely regarded as rigged.
Junta spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun said last week that the regime was making strenuous efforts to hold an election soon.
“We are working to hold a general election in every part of the country,” he said, while calling on the public and stakeholders to work together with the murderous junta to make the new vote happen.
Dr. Lian Mmung Sakhong, vice chairman of the Chin National Front, one of the ethnic armed organizations which has allied with Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), responded that the regime’s plan is simply an attempt to extend its rule for as long as possible.
“An election has just been held. They annulled it as they couldn’t accept [the result] and now want to hold a new one to make people vote only for them. It is totally intolerable,” the ethnic leader, who also heads the NUG’s federal ministry, told The Irrawaddy.
The military’s proxy and allied parties suffered humiliating defeats in the 2020 general election. Those parties will contest the junta’s election and the regime will make sure that one of them, or a coalition of them, will win.
It is also widely believed that junta chief Min Aung Hlaing wants to be an “elected” president, and so will be nominated for the presidency by the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party.
The NUG knows how previous military regimes held sham elections, as in 2010, and in a cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the NUG’s acting president Duwa Lashi La warned people not to trust the junta.
“They have never kept their promises,” he said, referring to the coup leader’s promise to hold a credible poll and hand over power to the winning party.
Since the coup, the regime has also been working on disbanding the NLD, by far the country’s most popular political party, over alleged electoral violations and has jailed its leaders and senior members, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, on spurious charges.
Ko Tayzar San, one of the most prominent anti-regime protest leaders, said that no one can deny that the NLD is the party which achieves the most public support or that the 2020 election reflected the general will of the public.
The NLD has won landslide victories in every election it has contested. In the 2020 poll it won 82 per cent of all elected seats.
He said that the people see clearly that the junta’s proposed poll is a fake election designed to solidify the dictatorship and that they won’t accept or take part in it.
“We, the people, strongly oppose the coup and won’t accept any election to be held by them [the junta] at all,” said Ko Tayzar San.
He also reminded any countries who support the illegitimate junta’s plan that they are going against the will of the Myanmar people.
Late last month, the ambassadors of China and India held separate meetings with the junta-run UEC to discuss the regime’s planned new election. During the meetings, the ambassadors revealed their interest in the electoral processes of the junta’s planned poll.
“I would like to say to the two countries to stop their direct or indirect support to the terrorist military and respect the voices of Myanmar people,” Ko Tayzar San said.
Sai Leik of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), one of Myanmar’s strongest ethnic political parties, also told The Irrawaddy that the party hasn’t taken part in the junta’s organized electoral process since the coup, including meetings with the UEC.
Founded in 1988, the SNLD won the largest number of seats after the NLD in the 1990 general election, the results of which were ignored by former dictator Than Shwe. Along with the NLD, the SNLD boycotted the rigged 2010 election. In 2020, it won the third-highest number of elected seats.
Like the NLD, the SNLD has been threatened with disbandment by the junta-run UEC. Sai Leik of the SNLD said no election can be possible until the regime has been brought to justice for its brutality and violence against civilians.
Over 1,800 people, including more than a hundred children, have been killed by junta forces since the coup, while over 13,000 people have been arrested for opposing the regime.
Junta arson attacks have destroyed over 11, 000 civilian houses in an effort to terrorize the population. At the same time, the resistance movement is waging armed struggle against the regime.
Last year, Min Aung Hlaing suggested that the new election could be held sometime in 2023. But after renewing the state of emergency again in February this year for another six months, the junta chief said that the election would take place when the situation in the country was “peaceful and stable”
Political analyst U Than Soe Naing said that the junta’s planned election is less likely to happen in 2023, given the escalating armed resistance against the regime. Even if the regime makes it happen, it won’t be free and fair, he added.
“It would just become a state-sponsored fabrication plotted by the junta and its allied parties who have never won in any free and fair elections in Myanmar,” said U Than Soe Naing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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Description:
"As the National League for Democracy (NLD) was preparing to start a second term on 1 February 2021, the military seized power in Myanmar. Demonstrations erupted across the country in opposition to the coup. The military responded violently, leading to the deaths of hundreds of demonstrators. As the crackdown intensified, many communities began to take up arms to defend themselves, leading to the formation of local defense forces. Elected lawmakers ousted in the coup eventually established the National Unity Government (NUG), which subsequently declared a “defensive war” on the military in early September (Guardian, 7 September 2021).
Demonstrations in opposition to the military coup in 2021 were large-scale and widespread. ACLED records over 6,000 anti-coup demonstration events throughout the year.1 While the demonstrations remained largely peaceful, the military frequently responded with deadly violence, in many cases firing live rounds at demonstrators’ heads (Human Rights Watch, 2 December 2021). Women have played a key role in the movement (Al Jazeera, 25 April 2021), often standing on the front lines at demonstrations (Time, 31 May 2021); in turn, they have been met with targeted violence (GIWPS, 28 January 2022). According to ACLED data, Myanmar was the deadliest country in the world for demonstrators in 2021 (for more, see ACLED’s infographic: Deadly Demonstrations). Despite the crackdown, demonstrations have continued, often taking the form of flash-mob style events.
The degree of violence against civilians by state forces since the coup has been particularly severe, with a 620% increase in such events recorded in 2021 compared to 2020. Multiple cases of civilians being burned to death have been reported (Myanmar Now, 14 December 2021). On 24 December, for example, more than 30 people, including two aid workers, were burned to death by the military in Hpruso township in Kayah state. Earlier in December, in Done Taw village in Sagaing region, 11 villagers were burned to death by the military. As well, amid mass arrests of people accused of expressing opposition to the coup, the military has tortured detainees and committed acts of sexual violence against women and men (Myanmar Now, 3 January 2021).
Hundreds of local defense forces have emerged across the country in response to the ongoing military violence. Several groups were formed independently of the People’s Defense Force (PDF) under the NUG. However, the NUG has moved to consolidate the activity of local defense groups under a central command structure (Irrawaddy, 29 October 2021). Local defense groups have aimed to make the country ungovernable by the military junta. In some locations, where local defense groups have gained an advantage, such as in areas of Sagaing and Magway regions, ousted lawmakers and other activists have set up alternative governing systems (Myanmar Now, 12 November 2021). As well, many civil servants have continued the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), refusing to work for the military junta and thus further denying the military the capacity to govern at the local level.
In an effort to further threaten civilians opposed to its rule, the military junta has supported the formation of local militias called Pyu Saw Htee (Frontier Myanmar, 14 June 2021). These militias have targeted civilians and have engaged in clashes with local defense forces. In 2021, ACLED records the most activity by Pyu Saw Htee groups in Sagaing region. Aside from the formation of military-backed militias, amid defections and a paucity of new recruits, the military has also ordered family members of soldiers to attend military training (Irrawaddy, 7 December 2021).
The response of ethnic armed groups to the military coup has been mixed. Notably, though, groups like the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) and Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) have supported anti-coup activists who fled to their areas along the border. Battles in Kachin and Kayin states, which had been relatively limited in 2020, thus increased significantly in 2021. At times, troops from these groups have fought alongside local defense forces. For example, clashes between the military and the KIO/KIA have expanded into Sagaing region as the KIO/KIA has supported local defense groups. Sagaing region has been home to over one-fifth of all organized political violence recorded nationally since the coup.
What to watch for in 2022:
While the military staged its coup under the pretense of combating electoral fraud, and has since claimed it will hold new elections in 2023 (The Diplomat, 2 August 2021), it has subsequently set about systematically dismantling the NLD. NLD members have been detained on politically motivated charges. NLD offices have been destroyed, and members’ homes seized and sealed (Development Media Group, 2 December 2021). Further, the military and its militias have tortured and killed NLD members (BBC, 8 June 2021). The military looks poised to continue this campaign of violence against its main electoral opposition before holding any elections.
The military’s ongoing use of violence means that local defense forces are likely to continue to emerge in the coming year, while existing groups move towards forming alliances to strengthen their operating capacity. Alliances with ethnic armed groups are also likely to persist, despite the challenges of bringing such groups under the formal command of the NUG. The ability of local defense groups to gain and maintain control over territory – or at least prevent the military from being able to govern – will be critical to the success of the anti-coup movement. Coordination between armed and unarmed elements of the resistance movement will also be key in consolidating its gains (Myanmar Now, 21 January 2022). In 2022, resistance to the junta will continue, with the military unlikely to succeed in quelling a population so deeply opposed to its rule.
Further Reading
Deadly Demonstrations: Fatalities From State Engagement on the Rise
Myanmar’s Spring Revolution
Violence Targeting Women in Politics: 10 Countries to Watch in 2022
Glossary
Demonstrations: This term is used to refer collectively to all events coded with event type protests, as well as all events coded with sub-event type violent demonstration under the riots event type.
Disorder: This term is used to refer collectively to both political violence and demonstrations.
Event: The fundamental unit of observation in ACLED is the event. Events involve designated actors – e.g. a named rebel group, a militia or state forces. They occur at a specific named location (identified by name and geographic coordinates) and on a specific day. ACLED currently codes for six types of events and 25 types of sub-events, both violent and non-violent.
Political violence: This term is used to refer collectively to ACLED’s violence against civilians, battles, and explosions/remote violence event types, as well as the mob violence sub-event type of the riots event type. It excludes the protests event type. Political violence is defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation.
Organized political violence: This term is used to refer collectively to ACLED’s violence against civilians, battles, and explosions/remote violence event types. It excludes the protests and riots event types. Political violence is defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation. Mob violence is not included here as it is spontaneous (not organized) in nature.
Violence targeting civilians: This term is used to refer collectively to ACLED’s violence against civilians event type and the excessive force against protesters sub-event type of the protests event type, as well as specific explosions/remote violence events and riots events where civilians are directly targeted..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication:
2022-05-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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Description:
"This is the US Campaign for Burma’s fifteenth monthly On-The-Ground in Burma briefer! This month’s briefer will review the recent U.S. genocide determination and the necessary steps to turn the Rohingya genocide recognition into action, as well as share a response from leaders from the Rohingya Women’s Development Network (RWDN), Karenni National Women’s Organization (KNWO), and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG).
This month’s briefer includes:
April highlights
An in-depth analysis on the U.S. genocide determination and the necessary steps moving forward
Four major policy recommendations
Responses to the genocide determination from the RWDN, KNWO, and the KHRG
An overview of IDP issues and rights abuses in each ethnic state and central Burma
As the conflict escalates in Burma between the pro-junta militias, anti-coup forces, and the military, so has the violence and rights deprivations in ethnic regions and central Burma. Without strong tangible action, the Burmese junta will continue to commit crimes against humanity with impunity..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Campaign for Burma
Date of publication:
2022-05-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Genocide, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
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1.77 MB
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"Dr. Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong is the vice-chairman of the Chin political organization the Chin National Front as well as the federal union affairs minister for Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG). In this interview with The Irrawaddy, he dismisses the regime’s recent invitation for peace talks to the country’s ethnic armed groups, the junta’s exclusion of the NUG and its armed wing, the people’s defense forces (PDFs), from the talks as impractical and how the military has always obstructed the formation of a federal democracy union since 1962.
What is your view on Min Aung Hlaing’s call for face-to-face talks with leaders of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) for peace?
Min Aung Hlaing seized power illegally. It is a proposal made by an illegitimate military leader and the offer is therefore illegitimate. The [military-backed] government held talks with us on August 18, 2011, and signed the NCA [Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement] and we continued to engage in dialogue with the elected government from the 2015 general election.
And we implemented the peace process according to that dialogue.
All the peace process implemented in that period was based on the NCA, which is the pact between the EAOs and the elected government. It is the dialogue between the government and EAOs and thus it is legitimate. The NCA was signed with the government, not the military.
If dialogue is to be held, the NUG is the only government elected by the people.
There will be discussions and consultations between the NUG and EAOs. We have already done it. We have designed a federal charter together and adopted principles for federalism and democracy.
So what Min Aung Hlaing has done is wrong.
There is a question about if the dialogue is required considering the NCA. The NCA was signed to hold talks during a ceasefire and then to hold the Union Peace Conferences to sign a Union Accord.
The aim of signing the Union Accord was to amend the constitution. Now people no longer accept the 2008 Constitution. And elected parliamentarians have also announced that it has scrapped it.
The objective of talks at different levels is to amend the 2008 Constitution. But the constitution no longer exists and there is no point in holding talks for that purpose.
Min Aung Hlaing does not have the authority to hold any dialogue. The objective [to amend the constitution] based on the NCA no longer exists. Min Aung Hlaing has called for peace talks to deceive the people so that he can retain the power he has seized.
What is the response of the CNF to the junta chief’s proposal?
We stand by the statement released by the 10 NCA signatories on Feb. 20, 2021. The regime seized power illegally and we must suspend all peace talks under the regime. It is not the decision made alone by the CNF but a joint statement.
Is it practical to exclude the NUG and people’s defense forces [PDFs] from talks
The NUG was formed based on the mandate of the people who overwhelmingly voted [NLD] in the November 2020 election and the mandate of ethnic people who have engaged in revolution for many years. It represents both the people and the nation.
There will be no answer from talks without the NUG. The PDFs are also civilian.
They were born out of the people to protect civilians from the regime. So excluding the PDFs means excluding the people. I don’t believe Min Aung Hlaing’s proposed dialogue is intended for the interests of the people while people are not allowed to participate in the talks.
And the regime’s spokesman said threateningly that EAOs may suffer if they don’t attend the talks.
How much have the people suffered since the coup? How many lives have been lost? How many properties have been damaged? What happened to Thantlang in Chin State? How many more houses do they want to torch? How many more people do they want to kill? They have shattered so many lives. We have nothing to lose.
The whole country will only suffer more if peace talks are held to maintain Min Aung Hlaing’s grip on power.
If we join the talks, people will continue to suffer because Min Aung Hlaing’s intention in organizing the talks is to retain power.
Min Aung Hlaing and his regime will never serve the interests of the people. So we must reject the talks.
Moreover, the election that they are planning to hold to maintain their grip on power is unacceptable. A real election was held not long ago. They are holding another election because they cannot accept the votes cast by the people and they are trying to cast votes by themselves. We can’t accept that. I urge the people to continue fighting the regime until it is uprooted.
There are criticisms that previous talks were not fruitful because EAOs had to hold talks with both the NLD government and the military. But now they are invited to hold talks with the military alone. Will it work?
They said the peace process could not make progress because of frictions between the NLD and military in the previous peace talks and that the peace process will be able to progress now because the EAOs have to talk to Min Aung Hlaing and the military alone.
We need to look back at history. The intention of holding peace talks is to establish Myanmar as a genuine federal democratic union with complete self-determination in line with the 1947 Panglong Agreement. Ethnic communities demanded that the constitution be amended to make way for federalism at the Taunggyi Conference in 1961. We discussed it at a seminar on federalism the following year. Based on that discussion, we tried to establish a federal union. Who prevented it? The military prevented it. General Ne Win claimed that the military saved the union which was on the brink of collapse due to minorities demanding secession. That’s why the union system could not be established. The military has prevented it since 1962.
I was constantly engaged in dialogue from 2012 to 2022. And it was the military, not the NLD, which mostly raised objections to agreements reached.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi presented six principles for federalism on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the NCA.
Her principles were based on the demands that we have made since 1962.
So the principles presented by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and us are basically the same. However, at the last Union Peace Conference on October 19, 2019, the military opposed the agreements. Can the people who seized power throughout history because they don’t like federalism and democracy give us what we want? Throughout history, they have always opposed establishing federalism and democracy.
We asked for self-determination and equality and they have stopped us repeatedly since 2017.
Now they have seized power and destroyed the country to maintain their grip on power. So Min Aung Hlaing’s real intention behind his proposal for peace talks is to retain power.
They will never establish the democracy we want. They are trying to enslave the people under their boots.
After they have done it for so many years, we can’t trust them. They are saying a tiger can eat grass.
How do you feel about the military trying to resurrect the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee?
The committee was a roadmap being implemented under the NCA. The objective of the NCA was to amend the 2008 Constitution.
But the people have already scrapped the 2008 Constitution so it is not acceptable to resurrect the committee. It would be an insult to the people to join the committee which is intended to perpetuate the dictatorship.
I respect and value the political party leaders. If they do what they should not do, they will be like Seneca who supported the dictator Nero in the Roman empire.
Seneca was a great statesman who loved the country and the people. But he earned a bad name in history because he worked for Nero.
I urge all party leaders not to take sides with Min Aung Hlaing, but to represent the people. They will go down badly in history if they make the wrong friend.
This is not the time for peace talks.
A federal democratic charter was adopted by elected lawmakers, EAOs, civil society organizations and those who have joined the civil disobedience movement. Let’s work together to establish a federation under the agreed roadmap.
I request political parties and EAOs not to make friends with Min Aung Hlaing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"At a first glance, it seemed like a major achievement by a group of United States crime fighters. An undercover Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent posing as a narcotics and weapons trafficker had managed to secure evidence leading to the arrest of a leader of a Yakuza organized crime gang, as well as of three Thais of whom two have military backgrounds, over a plot to use drugs as payment for sophisticated US-made weaponry.
According to documents supplied by the DEA to a court in New York on January 19 and made public in April, three ethnic armies in Myanmar — the Karen National Union (KNU), the Shan State Army (SSA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — needed the weapons, including “ten FIM-92J Stinger surface-to-air-missiles”, automatic rifles and mortars for their fight against the Myanmar junta. The payment for the whole shipment would be 500 kilograms of methamphetamine and 500 kilograms of heroin or US$40 million, presumably in cash or by bank transfer. The court document also states that “the buyers would build an airstrip to receive delivery of the weapons by cargo plane.”
But to anyone familiar with the Golden Triangle drug trade, this sounds a highly unlikely story. The KNU has for more than a year been subjected to aerial attacks launched by the Myanmar Air Force, and so would need such MANPADS, or man-portable defense systems, but the group would not be able to produce any drugs to pay for them because it has never been involved in the narcotics trade, nor would it have US$40 million in its coffers.
The SSA, which here is the Shan State Army-South, the armed wing of the Thai-border based Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) [the rival SSA-North is based in northern Shan State and is the armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party], on October 15, 2015 became one of the signatories of what the Myanmar authorities call the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Thus, it is not engaged in any war with the Myanmar military.
The court document goes on to state that the UWSA needs the weapons because they are “fighting the government of Myanmar” but, as anyone following events in the country’s frontier areas knows, that is utterly incorrect. The UWSA has not signed the NCA but it has had an informal ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s central authorities since 1989. The Wa have a formidable armed force, probably as many as 20,000 or 30,000 men, but the only battles the UWSA has fought since 1989 are with the RCSS and its predecessor, the Möng Tai Army of the late druglord Khun Sa. And neither of those groups has or has had any aircraft that would have to be shot down. Although the UWSA is not fighting the Myanmar army, it keeps a vast arsenal of weapons to deter any attempt by central authorities to move into its areas along the Myanmar-China border — and that includes a significant number of Chinese-made FN-6 MANPADS. In other words, there is no reason why the Wa would want to buy expensive and more-difficult-to-use American Stingers.
Then there is the question of the airfield “the buyers” were supposed to build for the cargo plane that was going to deliver the goods to them. How on earth would that work? And how would any cargo plane loaded with heavy weapons be able to fly undetected through Thai airspace — which it would have to — then land at some clearing in the jungle and take off again? That detail alone lends credence to the suggestion by local sources in the area that this is nothing more than a cock-and-bull story. A closer look at the names mentioned in the court document also reinforces that conclusion.
The alleged “leader of the Yakuza transnational organized crime syndicate,” who was going to supply the weapons is identified as Takeshi Ebisawa and the document even has a picture of him showing one of the MANPADS at a meeting with the undercover DEA agent. But Yakuza is the common name for a wide range of minor, middle-sized and larger Japanese crime syndicates and the name of this particular group is not mentioned anywhere in the submission to the court. Regardless of the size of the group, the leader himself would in any way not be involved in such deals; that is something his underlings would do in order to give their boss plausible deniability if anyone is caught.
The question of the actual identities of the three Thai middlemen is also a mystery. One of them, Suksan “Bobby” Jullanan, is referred to as “a Thai air force general.” But the Royal Thai Air Force does not have any generals. The highest rank is that of Air Chief Marshal followed by an Air Marshal, an Air Vice Marshal and so on. The second Thai defendant, Sompak Rukrasaranee, is supposed to be “a retired Thai military officer.” But no former rank or name of the regiment he once, allegedly, belonged to are mentioned in the documents. The third, Somphop Singhasiri is identified only as “a Thai national.” And then there is a “CC-1”, or Co-Conspirator 1, who is not named but is described as “the chairman of the Restoration Council of Shan State.” That, of course, is Yawd Serk, who is not an underground figure or a fugitive from justice. He has taken part in several peace talks with the Myanmar military and traveled freely to and from Yangon as well as Naypyitaw.
Curiously, a fourth prospective buyer is also named in the documents: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group that was completely crushed by the Sri Lankan army in 2009. But the DEA seems to believe that the LTTE “continues to attract international financial support.” Apparently, Ebisawa had some contacts with an unnamed former LTTE official who — it is unclear — is either in prison in India or has been released due to efforts of the alleged Yakuza leader.
In the end, all that the DEA appears to have ended up with is the arrest of a talkative Japanese fraudster— and three Thai conmen who no one inside Myanmar seems to have heard of. That, in turn, raises the question whether pure incompetence and ignorance of the situation of the ground led to those arrests, of if there could be a more sinister agenda behind this remarkably implausible story. Could it even be the outcome of an interdepartmental feud within the US administration? That is an issue that has troubled Myanmar policymakers in Washington for decades. The US State Department has always been consistent in its support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces and opposition to autocratic, military rule. The DEA’s agents, on the other hand, have been much more willing to cooperate with the Myanmar military because they believe they are on the same side in the war on drugs — and despite that fact that much of the drug trade is carried out by local, government-recognized militias.
After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising and the massacres of demonstrators in Yangon and cities and towns all over the country, the then US ambassador Burton Levin was firm in his condemnation of the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and ordered his staff to cease regular meetings with the military authorities. The first to ignore those directives was DEA agent Gregory Korniloff, who was told to leave Yangon in December 1988 after making an unsuccessful attempt to arrange an unauthorized meeting with officials of the Myanmar military’s intelligence service. At the time, Korniloff was said to be eager to resume normal ties with the military leadership in Yangon, which he claimed had made significant headway in fighting the narcotics trade.
The controversy reached new heights in March 1991, when it was discovered that another Yangon-based DEA officer, Angelo Saladino, had authored a secret memorandum addressed to Myanmar’s powerful and ruthless intelligence chief, Major General Khin Nyunt. Dated March 15, 1991, the letter listed in detail the various ways that the Myanmar military might try to impress the US Government as well as United Nations agencies. It also provided specific suggestions on ways to “deprive many of Myanmar’s most vocal critics of some of their shopworn, yet effective weapons in the campaign to discredit [Myanmar’s] narcotics program.” Finally, Saladino recommended several options to the junta for silencing “its most biased critics.”
It took some time before Washington discovered the memorandum. When noises were made, Saladino reportedly flew back to the DEA’s headquarters in the US at his own expense. He managed to convince his superiors that he had not, after all, sent the memorandum to Khin Nyunt. A compromise was reached with the State Department: Saladino had his tour of duty in Myanmar officially curtailed but was allowed to serve out his term which only had a few more months to run.
It is too early to say whether history is repeating itself, but by dragging the KNU into this conundrum, the DEA is discrediting an ethnic group which is serving as host for hundreds of pro-democracy activists who, since last year’s February 1 coup, have sought refuge in the areas near the Thai border that the KNU controls. Many are involved in armed struggle, while others are running news and blog sites on the internet and getting support from the US government and private donors. How, and if, this court case will affect that support remains to be seen. But the DEA, eager to resume contacts with Myanmar’s military authorities, has done the pro-democracy movement a huge disservice — and on dubious grounds which will not have any impact on the flow of narcotics out of Southeast Asia.
Entrapment is illegal in most countries [but not the US] because law enforcement officers are supposed to fight crime, not encourage easily-duped individuals to commit ones. And all that the DEA has been able to produce when it comes to drugs is a photograph allegedly sent by Signal to or from Singhasiri (spelt Sanghasiri on the screengrab) showing a bag of Double UO Globe heroin which could have been taken anytime and even downloaded from the internet..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Drugs: regional and global, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"Russia’s war against Ukraine is bound to create a crisis for Myanmar’s military and its arms procurement programs. Both Russia and Ukraine have been among the main suppliers of military hardware to Myanmar, but that is bound to change. Ukraine, a country now ruled by a democratic government supported by the West, will not like to be seen as a supporter of a brutal military dictatorship in Southeast Asia. And Ukraine, too, now needs to rebuild and strengthen its arms industries in order to support and supply its own armed forces who are engaged in a war with Russia that may not end anytime soon.
That said, Ukraine’s role as an arms exporter to Myanmar was never as significant as Russia’s. However, according to the United Nations Independent Fact-finding Missions of Myanmar, since 2015 Ukrainian entities have sold BTR-4 armored personnel carriers, MMT-40 light tanks and 2SIU self-propelled howitzers to Myanmar, and have even looked into the possibility of those weapons being manufactured jointly with Myanmar’s defense industries. Ukrainian-produced BTR-4s were seen in Yangon both before and after last year’s February 1 coup.
The main suppliers, the fact-finding missions say, were Ukroboronprom and Ukrspecexport, Ukraine’s two main arms producers. Asked by the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle last year on August 27 if they would stop cooperating with the Myanmar military post-coup, a spokesperson for Ukroboronprom replied that they export war material “in accordance with Ukrainian law and international obligations” and that the military technical cooperation agreement, which was signed in 2015, was still valid under the new junta. But that agreement may end soon, and in any case there is no way Ukrainian companies would be able to ship weapons to Myanmar under present circumstances.
Russian arms imports are far more important to the Myanmar military and soared in the years before the invasion of Ukraine. The agreements with Russia were part of an effort to offset the previously heavy dependence on China, which was seen by high-ranking Myanmar military officers as a threat to the country’s sovereignty. In addition to Russia being the source of MiG-29 fighter jets, Hind Mi-35 helicopter gunships, transport helicopters, Yak-130 ground attack aircraft and light armored vehicles, over 7,000 Myanmar military officers and military-connected scientists have studied in Russia since the early 1990s. They can be found at the Omsk Armour Engineering Institute, the Air Force Engineering Academy in Moscow, the Nizhniy Novgorod Command Academy, and the Kazan Military Command Academy, while some are serving as cadets with the Russian Air Force. Days before last year’s coup, Russian Defense Minister General Sergei Shoigu paid a visit to Myanmar to finalize preparations for the delivery of Russian-made radar equipment, PantsirsS1 surface-to-air missile systems, and Orlan-10E surveillance drones.
The friendship continued even after the coup. Russia’s deputy defense minister, Alexander Fomin, had private talks with junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in late March last year and was guest of honor at the Armed Forces Day celebrations in Naypyitaw on March 27. Russia’s state-run Tass news agency quoted Fomin as saying that Myanmar was “a reliable ally and a strategic partner of Russia in Asia.” In a video shown on the Russian Defense Ministry’s Zvezda TV, Fomin was seen shaking hands with Min Aung Hlaing after having received a medal and a ceremonial sword from the coup leader.
In June, Min Aung Hlaing flew to Moscow where he did not meet Russian strongman Vladimir Putin but held talks with Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council. Reuters reported on June 21: “Defense ties between the two nations have grown in recent years with Moscow providing army training and university scholarships to thousands of soldiers, as well as selling arms to a military blacklisted by several Western countries for alleged atrocities against civilians.” During his visit to Moscow, Min Aung Hlaing also attended a religious ceremony at the Myanma Theravada Buddha Vihara Monastery in Moscow, to which he and his family are among the donors. The monastery is located 14 kilometers east of downtown Moscow and was opened on 1 July 2015 to serve Myanmar military officers undergoing training in Russia.
In early September, Min Aung Hlaing’s deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win, traveled to Moscow together with the Sitagu Sayadaw, once a well-respected Buddhist leader and now a puppet of the military. The occasion was to attend the closing ceremony of the 2021 International Army Games, an annual Russian military sports event organized by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. The 84-year-old monk stayed at the Myanma Theravada Buddha Vihara Monastery while photos published in the junta’s mouthpiece, the Global New Light of Myanmar, showed Soe Win sitting together with senior Russian military officers watching what was called “a competition of tank squads from the Russian Federation, China, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan.” Future arms deals were also most certainly on the agenda.
Given the close relationship between Moscow and Naypyitaw, it is not surprising that Myanmar’s military leaders have sided with Russia in the conflict in Ukraine, as junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun did in an interview with the Myanmar service of Voice of America on February 24: “No. 1 is that Russia has worked to consolidate its sovereignty…I think this is the right thing to do. No. 2 is to show the world that Russia is a world power.” On February 27, Myanmar Alin, the Myanmar-language version of the Global New Light of Myanmar, published a two-page commentary titled “Lessons from Ukraine for those who haven’t learned from history” by a writer using the pseudonym ‘Myint Myat’. The article referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as a “puppet of the West”, while Putin was praised as a “visionary leader” who had had the “foresight to quietly build up his country’s military and economic strength.”
But such shows of support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine may have no impact on a desired, continuous supply of military hardware from Russia. Since the invasion, Russia has become subject to economic and financial sanctions including the exclusion of several major Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging transfer system, with the only exception being payments for energy imports. Those restrictions will make it almost impossible for the Myanmar military to pay for Russian arms purchases. Nor is Russia likely to accept barter deals similar to those that the Myanmar military had with North Korea, a major arms supplier in the early 2000s: rice for guns.
Some outside observers have speculated that China will fill the gap, but Chinese arms exporters also want to get paid in cash, and hard currency is in short supply in crisis-ridden Myanmar. Chinese credits and loans may make up for that, but then there is the perennial question of dependence on China, which the Myanmar military for a long time has tried to reduce. Opening up the country and normalizing relations with the West in 2011/2012 was an outcome of that policy, and so were the efforts to diversify arms purchases by reaching out to countries such as Russia and Ukraine.
At this crucial juncture in the Ukrainian war and with Myanmar facing bankruptcy, the North Koreans are reported to have returned, and that will make it possible for the Myanmar military to, once again, use a barter system to keep the guns flowing into the country. According to well-placed inside sources, cordial relations between Pyongyang and Naypyitaw were actually revitalized as early as shortly after last year’s coup — and that relationship was made public in a curious article in the Global New Light of Myanmar on April 17 this year. The headline read “Foreign embassy families participate in Thingyan festival at Yangon Mayor’s Maha Thingyan Pandal.” But the text, and the photo, that was published under the headline, showed only one such group of “foreign embassy families”: The North Korean ambassador Jong Ho Bom and his companions who, according to the paper, were “cordially greeted” by Soe Thein, the junta-appointed Chief Minister of Yangon Region. At the time of his appointment in February this year, Soe Thein was also the deputy managing director of the military-owned conglomerate Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). He has also served as the Defence Ministry Auditor General, so he is a person well-versed in the art of striking arms deals with foreign countries.
It is still not certain exactly what shape the renewed military relationship with North Korea will take. Missile development is one area that has been suggested by sources. Relations between Myanmar and North Korea were cordial until October 1983, when North Korean agents detonated a bomb in Yangon, killing 18 visiting high-ranking South Korean officials, as well as three Myanmar citizens. Contacts between Myanmar and North Korea resumed in 1993 with a series of secret meetings between diplomats from both countries in Thailand’s capital Bangkok. In June 1999, the Director of Procurement of the Armed Forces visited Pyongyang, followed by another secret trip in November 2000. In July 2003, a group of technicians from North Korea was seen at the Monkey Point naval base in Yangon, and aircraft from North Korea’s national airline Air Koryo were observed landing at military airfields in central Myanmar.
The official re-establishment of ties came in April 2007. Confirmed arms shipments from North Korea to Myanmar were first limited to conventional weapons and technology transfers, including a major purchase of 130mm Type 59 field guns in 1999. It was also confirmed that North Korean tunnelling experts arrived in June 2006 at the new capital Naypyitaw, where the country’s military government is reported to have built an extensive underground bunker complex. In 2008, Myanmar took delivery of 30 units of 240-mm truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems from North Korea, weapons that were first used in the war in Kachin State in 2012 and later, in 2019, against the Arakan Army in Rakhine State.
In November 2008, a high-level Myanmar delegation led by General Shwe Mann, then number three in Myanmar’s military hierarchy and now an opposition politician, visited North Korea where they were taken to see defense industries and radar stations and expressed interest in buying radar systems and surface-to-air missiles, as well as more sophisticated artillery from Pyongyang. There were also, at that time, unexplained visits by North Korean freighters to Myanmar ports, which raised suspicions of potentially more sophisticated arms deliveries. It is now clear that those shipments were connected to Myanmar’s secret missile programs. Myanmar began receiving ballistic missile technology from North Korea in 2008, and over 20 Korean missile specialists were in the country until early 2015.
Most of the raw materials for the missile project were produced in Myanmar, with some parts imported from North Korea via China, and with North Korean specialists providing expertise. None of the Myanmar officers involved in the projects spoke Korean, but some of the North Koreans, who were in Myanmar for years, are said to be fluent in the Burmese language. While they always kept a low profile in Myanmar, it was not unusual to see them dining at the Pyongyang Koryo restaurant, a North Korean eatery in Yangon that was eventually closed in 2018. It is uncertain whether some of them have come back since the coup, but technology and know-how are certainly being transferred, the sources say. It is also known that 31 Myanmar military technicians were sent to North Korea for a two-month training course in 2015, well after Myanmar’s then President U Thein Sein had announced in 2012 that the country had severed relations with North Korea, so despite official assurances, military-to-military relations were never completely severed.
Myanmar’s military partnership with North Korea was one of the most important issues that prompted the United States and the West to change its Myanmar policy from that of isolation and boycotts to engagement in the early 2010s. Normal relations could only be restored if Myanmar severed its relations with North Korea — and when that was done under ex-general U Thein Sein’s presidency between 2011-2016, Myanmar changed from being an international outcast to becoming the darling of the West. Last year’s bloody coup has set the clock back to where it was during the darkest years of absolute military rule, and with it has come the imposition of new sanctions imposed by the West.
It is, as always, difficult to predict what the Myanmar military intends to do when it comes to arms purchases. There may be no doubt that China will take advantage of the military’s predicament and offer everything and anything in providing transfers and financial assistance but — given the traditional Sinophobic mindset of Myanmar’s military leaders — it is plausible to assume that they are looking for alternatives. Seen in the context of the Ukrainian war and Myanmar’s severe financial difficulties, it would make sense for the generals to turn an old trusted ally: the North Koreans. That is already happening, and we can only wait and see to what extent the generals are prepared to go in that relationship — and how the outside world is going to react to a renewed alliance between Pyongyang and Naypyitaw..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has rejected Malaysia’s proposal that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) informally engage Myanmar’s shadow government as “irresponsible and reckless”, and warned Malaysian officials against contacting or supporting what it calls a “terrorist group”.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Abdullah said on Sunday that “We are not proposing for ASEAN to recognize other governments, but such informal engagement may be conceivable, especially on how humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar who are still in their country can be delivered,” referring to the National Unity Government (NUG).
The NUG was formed after the coup by lawmakers from Myanmar’s ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) and their ethnic allies to challenge the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Many in Myanmar take the NUG as their legitimate government, while some Western countries are also informally engaging with the parallel government.
In response to the Malaysian foreign minister’s remarks, the Myanmar regime-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday strongly protested and rejected what it called the minister’s “irresponsible and reckless” remarks and proposals.
The junta ministry said such remarks could abet terrorism and violence in Myanmar, hamper the regime’s anti-terrorism efforts and infringe on international agreements on combatting terrorism.
Malaysia’s proposal that ASEAN informally engage with the NUG could be seen as a big blow to the regime, which has branded the NUG, its parliamentarian wing the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and its armed wing the People’s Defence Force (PDF) as terrorist groups.
“The Ministry cautions the government officials and parliamentarians of Malaysia against making contacts or communication as well as providing support and assistance to those terrorist groups and their representatives in future,” the regime said in the statement.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Abdullah said the proposal was made as there had been no progress by the regime on implementing ASEAN’s peace plan for Myanmar, which was drawn up last year to find a solution to the political stalemate in the country.
Myanmar has been in social and political turmoil since the military seized power from the country’s democratically elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN adopted a five-point peace plan for Myanmar in April 2021 urging the junta to immediately end the violence in the country and to hold an inclusive political dialogue, among other steps. The regime, which has killed more than 1,700 civilians so far, has failed to implement the plan.
The minister’s comment came at a time when the regional bloc’s peace plan, known as the Five-Point Consensus, is being condemned as ineffectual and ASEAN criticized for failing to fulfill its pledges or take meaningful steps toward pressing the regime to end its human rights violations. Human rights groups have also pushed ASEAN to engage with the NUG instead.
The Malaysian foreign minister said to informally engage with the NUG was one of three proposals that Malaysia would bring to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on May 5, with the other two being to double humanitarian aid for Myanmar, and to strengthen the position and function of the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar.
Both Myanmar and Malaysia are members of ASEAN.
Malaysia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that has been critical of the military regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
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"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၁/၂၀၂၂)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The already long list of governments and blocs to have appointed a special envoy to crisis-torn Myanmar has grown with the Thai Foreign Ministry’s designation of Pornpimol “Pauline” Kanchanalak, an adviser to the Thai foreign minister, as Bangkok’s special envoy for relations with Myanmar.
The move sees Thailand follow in the footsteps of China, Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the UN, the latter having named veteran diplomat Noeleen Heyzer of Singapore as its envoy.
It is still unclear what mandate the Thai special envoy has been given. Pornpimol is known to be close to Thai Foreign Affairs Minister Don Pramudwinai and to have gained his confidence and trust.
Last week, Don, who also serves as deputy prime minister, said Pornpimol was given the post in part due to her extensive knowledge of the neighboring country. It is not clear, however, whether she has visited Myanmar recently, and little is known about her knowledge of the country’s complex political situation or the web of ethnic conflicts that has long beset military-ruled Myanmar.
In the past, Pornpimol worked at the Bangkok Post, before moving to Washington to embark on a career as a lobbyist. She later became a key adviser to the Thai Foreign Ministry.
Don told the Bangkok Post that while Pornpimol has already played a key role as a ministry adviser, her ability to join discussions with high-ranking foreign officials has been limited. Her new position will lift those curbs, he said, adding that such appointments are common in the European Union,.
Thailand and its troubled neighbor share a more than 2,000-km-long border, along which hundreds of thousands of refugees live. In addition, millions of Myanmar migrant workers in the kingdom have recently been joined by newly arrived activists and other compatriots fleeing political persecution under the military junta that seized power from Myanmar’s democratically elected government in 2021.
Myanmar has closed all checkpoints along the Thai border since April 23, when a car bomb exploded near the Myanmar entrance to the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge, in Myawaddy, Karen State, opposite Thailand’s Mae Sot.
Business owners have cried foul, saying the move could cost them up to 500,000 Thai baht (nearly US$15,000) per day, and have urged the Thai government to coordinate with Myanmar authorities to solve the problem.
According to Don’s designation order, Myanmar is strategically important to Thailand in terms of geopolitics, the economy, society and national security. He said Pornpimol would closely monitor the situation in Myanmar and ensure that the ministry’s policies on the country are adhered to.
Don visited Myanmar in November but only disclosed the trip after he returned. He said he traveled to Naypyitaw to deliver humanitarian aid and to hold talks with coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
His trip to the Myanmar capital coincided with visits by special envoys from China and Japan.
At the time, Don said the Myanmar crisis was of concern to many countries, telling The Nation, “The Thai private sector is concerned about the situation in the neighboring country and has collected essential items and sent them to Myanmar.”
According to diplomatic sources, the delegation to Naypyitaw comprised five members, including a senior adviser to the deputy prime minister, his chief of staff and a counselor from his office.
Senior Thai army commanders are known to have close links with the Myanmar military, and the coup leader has visited Thailand 11 times.
In October, Thai academics held a discussion on Thai foreign policy at Chiang Mai University’s School of Public Policy. Along with former senior Foreign Ministry officials, they said that Thailand, as a frontline state, should lead, and not be led by, ASEAN in dealing with Myanmar.
Sihasak Phuangketkeow, former Thai permanent secretary for foreign affairs, said, “We have channels to the military and to the opposition. Why don’t we use them? It may not be easy, because the Myanmar military want to hold on to power, but we have to convince and apply pressure.”
Since the coup, members of ASEAN have expressed different views on the crisis. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and to a lesser extent the Philippines have sought to exert pressure on the regime, while Thailand, Cambodia and Laos have shown a willingness to work with it.
In any case, Thailand is a key neighbor of Myanmar and the appointment of Pornpimol could signal that Bangkok is looking to play along with like-minded actors on the complicated Myanmar issue. It will also be playing a key role in distributing humanitarian assistance from the US and other Western countries to Myanmar refugees on the border, as the violence continues to escalate across the frontier and Myanmar continues to descend into chaos and instability.
As it does, it appears likely from Don’s comments that he has entrusted Pornpimol to guide his ministry’s policies on Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
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Description:
"On 02 May 2022, Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo HUN SEN, Prime Minister
of the Kingdom of Cambodia, had a video call with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing,
Chairman of the State Administration Council of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
to exchange views on the way forward in expediting the implementation of the
ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus (5 PC ) .
Samdech Techo HUN SEN thanked Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for facilitating
the 1st visit to Myanmar by the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on 21-22 March
2022 and highlighted widely expressed aspiration from all quarters to see more
speedy progress on achieving three immediate priorities of the 5PC, namely, (1)
cessation of violence, (2 ) unhindered humanitarian delivery to all the people in most
need and ( 3) building trust and confidence to engender an inclusive political
dialogue..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
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Size:
87 KB 851.09 KB
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"ရန်ကုန်မြို့ ၊ အနော်ရထာလမ်းပေါ်ရှိ ဘားလမ်းကားမှတ်တိုင် လူစည်ကားရာနေရာတွင် ယနေ့ မေလ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့၊ နေ့လည်(၃)နာရီကျော်အချိန်အတွင်း အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၇) ဦးထက်မနည်း ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာ ရရှိကာ သေဆုံးမှုများရှိခဲ့သည့် ဗုံးပေါက်ကွဲမှုတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပြီး နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ပေါက်ကွဲမှုများ ထပ်မံ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သည်ဟု သိရပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် စစ်ကောင်စီက ပြည်သူလူထုကို ဥပဒေမဲ့ ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းမျဉ်းများနှင့်အညီ ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိရာ အဆိုပါ စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ် စည်းမျဉ်း (Code of Conduct) များထဲရှိ စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာပစ်မှတ်သတ်မှတ်ရာတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်၏ ယန္တရားများကိုသာချေမှုန်းရမည်၊အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအားခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း မပြုရဟု ပါရှိပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းမျဉ်းများအား စနစ်တကျ ထားရှိပို့ချ ထားရုံသာမက လိုက်နာရန် ပျက်ကွက်မှုများရှိပါကလဲ ထိရောက်စွာအရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံပြည်သူလူထုအား ကာကွယ် စောင့်ရှောက်ရေးသည် မျှော်မှန်းချက်တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ထည့်သွင်းထားပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုလုံခြုံရေးကို ရည်မှန်းချက်တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ထည့်သွင်းကာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုထူထောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကြိုးစားဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိရာ ယခုကဲ့သို့ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်ကို ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုတ်ချကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။
သမိုင်းကြောင်းတစ်လျောက် မိမိတို့အာဏာတည်မြဲရေးအတွက် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်ကို ထင်သလိုပြုမူခဲ့၊ပြုမူလျက်ရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ပျူစောထီး၊ သွေးသောက်အဖွဲ့ စသည့် အစွန်းရောက်လက်ပါးစေအဖွဲ့များ မွေးမြူကာ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်များနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများကို အပြစ်ပုံချသည့် လုပ်ရပ်များစွာ သာဓက အနေဖြင့် ရှိခဲ့သည်ဖြစ်ရာ ပြည်သူလူထုအနေဖြင့် အသိ၊ သတိရှေ့ထား၍ နေထိုင် သွားကြရန် နှိုးဆော်အပ် ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့် ယခုကဲ့သို့သော လုပ်ရပ်များအား တရားမျှတမှုပြန်လည်ရရှိစေရေးအတွက် စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးဖော်ထုတ်အရေးယူသည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်ကိုင်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"On 27 April, a court set up by the Myanmar State Administrative Council in Naypyitaw sentenced detained State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to an additional 5 years’ imprisonment. The EU’s position, as expressed on 6 December 2021 and 11 January 2022 remains that the trial was politically motivated. It represents another step towards the dismantling of the rule of law and a further blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar and yet another major setback for democracy in Myanmar since the military coup on 1 February 2021.
These proceedings are a clear attempt to exclude democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, from the inclusive dialogue process called for by ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus.
We reiterate our urgent call for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners as well as all those arbitrarily detained since the coup..."
Source/publisher:
European External Action Service
Date of publication:
2022-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Myanmar’s military regime has killed civilians, torched houses and looted valuables in resistance hot spots across the country.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by fighting and Dr. Win Myat Aye, the humanitarian affairs and disaster management minister in the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how his team is helping displaced people.
The former rector of the Magwe University of Medicine served as the social welfare, relief and resettlement minister in the National League for Democracy government before the 2021 coup.
Many people have been left homeless by junta raids. How is the NUG taking care of civil war victims?
Many places are suffering from violence and Kayah, Chin, Sagaing and Magwe have been hit hardest. We are working to ease their plight.
According to the UNHCR, around 566,100 people have been recently displaced by fighting. It is difficult for us to help all of them. So far we have reached 354,194 people.
We have provided 2.7 billion kyats (US$1.4 million) in relief aid and 62 percent of that was given to Kayah, Karen, Chin, Sagaing and Magwe. We are trying to expand our outreach and cover all the areas.
How is the NUG cooperating with residents and ethnic organizations?
Some 14.4 million people are going hungry across the country. We have only been able to help a small percentage. The NUG alone can’t handle it. The process calls for cooperation. Most of the war victims are in ethnic-minority areas and along the borders. So it is critically important for us to cooperate with ethnic organizations.
When we provide assistance, we need to reach social organizations that can work with us. There are organizations networked with ethnic revolutionary groups and ethnic organizations. We need a coordination committee to network with those organizations.
A coordination committee has been formed independently. It was not formed by the NUG and it is not operating under the NUG. All the stakeholders suggested that it will be effective if community-based organizations and civil society organizations can coordinate relief efforts. So we formed an independent coordination committee.
This committee is working out relief efforts after adopting policies and procedures. We assume that this coordination has enabled us to better serve the people over the past year.
What are the challenges? Can public donations fund the NUG’s relief efforts?
We were empty-handed after we initiated relief efforts. We need funds.
We are the government during the revolution. We rely on the people. The people only have each other. We mainly rely on expats. People have actively helped with boundless goodwill.
Some donors are helping through us and others directly help those in need. Some are helping through social organizations.
Regional countries and the United Nations have called for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through ASEAN. Will the regime listen to their calls?
We can only fulfill some of the many needs of the people so international assistance is necessary. But for now, Myanmar’s people help each other and they haven’t received international assistance. We are paving the way for the delivery of international humanitarian assistance.
ASEAN has formed a humanitarian team for Myanmar which has received huge contributions. The assistance must reach people.
The regime views civilian victims as the enemy. So assistance will not come through the regime. The international community must know how to help the people.
The international community can help through the coordination committee and the NUG. We have international agencies and non-governmental organizations partnering with us. Humanitarian assistance can be provided through them. We can also help them contact community-based civil society organizations to work with.
Financial aid will not reach the people through the regime. The international community has to take a practical approach to help the people.
Social welfare was neglected under previous military regimes but it was pushed to the fore under the NLD government. As a former social welfare minister, what is your assessment of the regime’s social welfare ministry?
There is a huge gap between the past and present. We were an elected government and we could help people in real-time when they were in trouble. We went to affected areas in person and received their recognition. We were close to the people and provided help to the displaced and ethnic minorities.
But I now realize we could not fully understand their feelings although we met them.
Though we met cordially with displaced people, we did not have a chance to have open discussions with them. It has become obvious now that it was because of military influence in the administration.
The military did not allow us to visit some displacement camps, citing security reasons. It concealed the real situation and suffering from us. This has been clearly revealed by the regime’s violence against the people.
It is difficult for the NUG to carry out relief efforts but we fully understand the feelings of displaced people.
We are very sad about how much they suffered in the past. I want to apologize to them.
The NLD government planned to largely increase the humanitarian budget.
In the past, the defense budget got the lion’s share and humanitarian assistance was underfunded and things have gone back to zero since the coup.
The NUG is helping those affected. But our assistance is very limited because we rely on donations. Our social welfare ministry does a good job but the regime’s ministry fails to provide any services.
We are working with civil society organizations, people’s authorities and people’s defense forces to provide services. There has been greater unity since the revolution started.
What else would you like to say?
Regime troops torch villages, destroyed property, loot belongings and deploy in villages. Residents are forced from their homes into forests and other villages. When junta troops leave, nothing is left.
We are trying to help people and have designed plans. But we need funds. We are holding talks with international organizations to gain funds. There will be results soon.
The most important thing is the revolution must succeed. Everything else can be handled if the revolution succeeds. We keep our eyes fixed on the success of the revolution in whatever step we take. If the revolution succeeds, power will be handed to the people and we will be able to establish the federal democracy which all the people want. We have to remain firm in this revolution and we are propping up the resistance..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG)
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"The Asia Justice Coalition is a network of organizations whose purpose is to promote justice and accountability for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law in Asia, and to contribute to the fulfillment of the rights of victims and their families.
In response to a call for input by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Asia Justice Coalition – which the Global Centre is a member of – provided its observations on the impact on the human rights of children and youth due to continuing and extensive arms transfers to Myanmar. This input covers the increase in both international arms transfers to Myanmar and the use of child soldiers in Myanmar, as well as the consequent impact on the enjoyment of human rights of children and youth in Myanmar.
Arms transfers facilitate the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in particular in the current context in Myanmar. The proliferation of arms also contributes to the rise of recruitment of child soldiers with an increase in conflict and the ready availability of arms. The submission further shows the direct and indirect impact of the arms supply on the enjoyment of both civil and political, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights by children and youth..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Justice Coalition via Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2022-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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279.32 KB (Original version) - 14 pages
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"Executive Summary:
This report explores the current socio-political developments in Myanmar and how they affect Thailand. It also investigates Thailand’s perception of the Myanmar crisis and how the Thai government’s responses. This report provides insights into the effects of the 2021 Myanmar coup and subsequent crises on Thailand and helps us better
understand Thailand’s foreign policy position and conduct. Our study is exploratory and descriptive, drawing insights
from documentary research, in-depth interviews, participation in seminars and talks, and field visits to border areas
between Thailand and Myanmar.
We recognize three significant changes in the socio-political dynamics in Myanmar since the coup:
• The perception of the Bamar people, the major ethnic group, toward minorities has become more positive.
• The military as an institution is crumbling, losing its power grip in many areas, with a growing number of defections.
• Myanmar people are united against the junta and have the new aspiration of turning their country into a federal state
Our study also found that the ongoing crisis in Myanmar has affected Thailand in five areas, namely: migration, transborder security, economic affairs, diplomacy, and geopolitics. Specifically:
• Thailand has experienced more migrants and refugees from Myanmar. We categorize them into three groups:
1) people who crossed into Thailand temporarily—mainly via the natural passes—before returning home; 2)
economic migrants who hope to integrate into Thailand’s labor forces; and 3) activists and high-profile individuals opposed to the coup, some of whom would like to get resettled in a third country.
• The 2021 Myanmar coup also posed threats to Thai nationals living along the border areas and inside Thailand.
Cross-border gunfire affect the properties of residents who live in the border area. There were also concerns
about the operations of the Myanmar military inside Thailand, the increasing drug activities, and public health
challenges.
• The ongoing Myanmar crisis disrupted cross-border trade and regular economic affairs.
• The military coup in Myanmar significantly eroded the trust that the two countries have built over the years,
leading to a new challenge of choosing who among the conflicting parties Thailand should engage with in the
trust rebuilding process.
• The Myanmar crisis led to potential geopolitical rivalry between major powers, putting Thailand in a strategic
dilemma as it faced political pressures from these powers.
In this report, we posit that Thai officials have followed the political developments in Myanmar very closely since
the 2021 coup. The ‘burden of proximity’ makes the government mainly concerned about the influx of the displaced
persons and Myanmar’s opposition parties. Thailand also acknowledges other security, economic, and international
relations impacts. Since the coup, the Thai government’s responses to the Myanmar crisis—while being shaped by
bureaucrats—are business as usual with an ad hoc feature.
Thailand’s business-as-usual foreign affairs consist of dual-track diplomacy: military-to-military and government-to-government, led by the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accordingly. Besides, local villagers also establish local mechanisms for cross-border collaboration with Myanmar people.
We argue that the application of business as usual to conduct its foreign relations makes Thailand appear to support
the junta though not announced openly. This practice puts Thailand at risk of being condemned by Myanmar people
and the international community amid the growing opposition against the Myanmar junta domestically and internationally.
Thailand has also used ASEAN as a platform to engage with Myanmar. However, the Thai government is reactive
rather than proactive in dealing with its neighbour. To respond to the immediate effects of the Myanmar crisis—especially the influx of migrants and refugees, Thai officials have adopted ad hoc measures as an add-on feature to
the business-as-usual model, including the management of the forcibly displaced and Thai civilians. This practice is
planned for a short-period implementation until the situation in Myanmar stabilises.
In conclusion, we believe that the Thai government’s policy position towards Myanmar is vague and calls on the Thai
government to be more proactive. We propose a ‘flexible approach’ for Thailand to engage with Myanmar. Our policy
recommendation consists of three core components:
2
• Assisting Myanmar refugees
We develop a ‘flexible humanitarian model’ based on the humanitarian-development nexus, allowing Thailand
to assist the forcibly displaced while protecting its national interest.
• Pursuing flexible engagement with the junta
We propose ‘flexible engagement,’ guided by the vision of the late Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN Secretary
General, in which Thailand communicates its position towards Myanmar openly and reserves the right to put
pressure on the junta. This approach also guides us to urge Thailand to be more forceful in pressuring the Nay
Pyi Taw regime using the ASEAN platform.
• Endorsing federalism in Myanmar
Amid the ongoing civil war, we strongly recommend that the Thai government engage with other stakeholders
inside Myanmar beyond the establishments, especially the National Unity Government (NUG), the National
Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), who have increasingly supported
federalism. We believe that Myanmar’s federalism should be in the interest of Thailand since it will potentially
bring lasting peace to the country..."
Source/publisher:
The University of Queensland
Date of publication:
2022-04-00
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Thailand-Burma relations
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"22 April 2022: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus reached between ASEAN leaders and the leader of the Myanmar military is a failure, with no significant progress made towards its implementation after twelve months, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
The Five-Point Consensus was reached in Jakarta on 24 April 2021, two months after the Myanmar military attempted an illegal coup and launched a subsequent attack on the population of Myanmar in response to their ongoing resistance.
The points agreed to by the leader of the military, Min Aung Hlaing, were for the immediate cessation of violence; constructive dialogue among all parties concerned; the appointment of a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair to facilitate mediation of the dialogue; provision of humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre, and a visit of the special envoy to Myanmar to meet all parties.
Since joining the consensus, Min Aung Hlaing has escalated the military’s attack on the people of Myanmar, continued to target and detain political opponents, obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance to areas most in need and prevented the special envoy of the ASEAN Chair from meeting Myanmar’s elected representatives and other stakeholders.
“The junta has not held to a single point of the Five-Point Consensus. The agreement has failed and a change of course from ASEAN is needed,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The people of Myanmar who are striving for liberation are under relentless siege from an internal occupying force that is being propped up by Russia and China. That is an unacceptable threat to the very purposes of ASEAN and the stability of the entire region.”
The junta’s forces have launched airstrikes against civilian targets, burned down villages, massacred, beaten, abducted and tortured civilians and caused the intentional deprivation of food and medical supplies to entire communities. Almost half a million people have been displaced as a result.
At the same time, the ongoing massive scale of resistance to the military demonstrates the strength of commitment amongst the peoples of Myanmar to the democratic revolution that seeks to remove the military from politics entirely and establish a federal democratic union.
Institutions established by and representing the peoples of Myanmar including the legitimate National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), state-level consultative councils and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) are already working to shape this future.
“The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus failed because ASEAN engaged with the wrong party,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “The NUG represents Myanmar and is the proper party to lead engagement with ASEAN. The NUG has demonstrated that it is the constructive partner that ASEAN needs to make any progress towards resolving the crisis.”
SAC-M calls on ASEAN to maintain permanently its rejection of the military junta from participation in ASEAN meetings as a consequence of its abrogation of the Five-Point Consensus. SAC-M calls on ASEAN to work with the NUG to develop a new roadmap towards resolving the crisis, beginning with the urgent provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance. Finally, SAC-M calls on the United Nations (UN) Security Council to take responsibility for international action in response to the growing crisis in Myanmar.
“The UN Security Council backed ASEAN and its Five-Point Consensus, but ASEAN and its consensus have failed. There is now no alternative but for the Security Council itself to take the lead and take the responsibility for meaningful action on Myanmar,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The Security Council cannot continue to ignore the cries of the people of Myanmar for international action to end the military’s violence.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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195.96 KB
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"Today marks the eighth anniversary of the death of former political prisoner, founding member of the
National League for Democracy, and Hantharwaddy journalist U Win Tin.
For his fearless behavior to free people in Burma from the military dictatorship, U Win Tin was set up
with false charges by the then military junta and given extensive prison sentences. During his time in
prison, the journalist was tormented in many ways and on constant basis, both mentally and
physically. He was evicted from his apartment. He was revoked of his right to receive pension. He
also lost all his teeth due to the torturous interrogation sessions. He was denied nourishment with hard
rice and raw soup for his teeth-less mouth.
U Win Tin developed stomach problems for which he was denied treatment for five whole years. The
prison refused to let him seek treatment for heart issues which became a chronic issue and eventually
led to his death. He documented everything he experienced inside the prison for almost 20 years, with
no one to contact, and enduring isolation inside his cell. In his autobiographical book “What’s that? A
Human Hell”, readers understand the hellish experience U Win Tin endured.
After he was released from the prison, he wore the prison uniform – blue shirt and longyi – to his
death to make a statement, campaigning for the release of all political prisoners. All domestic and
international supporters of Burma’s democratic movement symbolically adorn the blue shirt on April
21, to campaign for the release of political prisoners still inside Burma.
It has been over a year since the military junta attempted to illegally seize power in a coup d’état.
People’s resistance, in many shapes and forms, has continued for over a year. 10,271 political
prisoners, 996 of whom have been sentenced whilst 9,275 await trial, remain unlawfully detained
since the Spring Revolution. The terrorist group has been arbitrarily detaining, torturing and
imprisoning dissidents, so they can have power.
The unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners is the first step to move Burma
forward into a federal democracy. We urge international leaders like at the UN, EU, ASEAN, US,
Japan, and South Korea to put further pressure on the junta to release all political prisoners.
We also request people in Burma to remember that political prisoners remain behind bars and suffer
brutal oppression by the junta. Do not forget them or their family members who face grueling
challenges. Please help them as much you can..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2022-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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"Overview
Myanmar’s already-stalled democratic transition was completely derailed in February 2021, when the military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized control of the government, arresting dozens of senior government officials and preventing the newly elected parliament from convening. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a sweeping victory in the November 2020 elections, led a broad-based opposition to the takeover, organizing a country-wide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that continued throughout the year. Protesters were met with indiscriminate violence from military forces, and journalists, activists, and ordinary people risked criminal charges and detention for voicing dissent. Armed conflict between the military and ethnic rebel groups continued, as did the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a mostly Muslim ethnic minority.
Key Developments in 2021
Alleging fraud and irregularities in the November 2020 elections, the military carried out a coup in February, hours before the newly elected parliament was due to be seated. After taking power, the military declared a state of emergency, imposed a broad-based communications shutdown, expanded the range of laws used to punish dissent, and arrested dozens of political and cultural figures—including both President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi.
A group of ousted elected lawmakers formed the National Unity Government (NUG) in April as an alternate power base to the military regime. The widely popular NUG operated as a shadow government throughout the year, with its members in hiding or in exile.
In August, Min Aung Hlaing declared himself prime minister and head of a caretaker government that would enforce military rule until August 2023, when the military has promised to hold new elections.
The widespread CDM gathered steam in the weeks after the coup and continued throughout the year, involving multiple political parties and civil society groups. By the end of the year, more than 11,000 protesters had been arrested, almost 1,400 had been killed by military forces, and nearly 2,000 faced criminal charges handed down by the junta, while others were subjected to grave abuses, including torture, in overcrowded prisons.
Fighting between the army and ethnic minority groups in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, and Shan States intensified during the year, displacing thousands of civilians and limiting free movement. Ethnic rebel groups provided sanctuary to those seeking to escape the military regime.
Political Rights
A Electoral Process
A1 0-4 pts
Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 4
Under the 2008 military-drafted constitution, the legislature elects the president, who serves as chief of state and head of government and makes a number of key ministerial appointments. Military members of the legislature have the right to nominate one of the three presidential candidates, and the elected members of each chamber nominate the other two. The candidate with the largest number of votes in a combined parliamentary vote wins the presidency; the other two candidates become vice presidents, ensuring that a military nominee is always either president or vice president. The commander in chief of the armed forces retained broad powers under the 2008 constitution, including control over security-related cabinet ministries (home, defense, and border affairs), and is selected through an opaque process by the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council (NDSC).
A new president was set to be selected in early 2021, following the November 2020 parliamentary elections; this process was disrupted by the February 2021 military coup, which dissolved parliament and installed a military junta led by the unelected Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the armed forces. President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, de facto leader of the NLD, were both detained in the early hours of the coup, along with over one hundred other political leaders. In early December, the military regime sentenced Win Myint and Suu Kyi to four years’ imprisonment on charges of incitement; soon after, the sentences were reduced to two years. In addition, Suu Kyi has been charged with illegally importing communications equipment, violating pandemic restrictions, corruption, electoral fraud, and breaching the Official Secrets Act. The military retained control of the government throughout 2021.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the president and reelected civilian government officials were ousted in a military coup.
A2 0-4 pts
Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 4
The bicameral Assembly of the Union consists of the 440-seat lower House of Representatives and the 224-seat upper House of Nationalities. Representatives serve five-year terms. A quarter of the seats in both houses are reserved for the military and are filled through appointment by the commander in chief of the armed forces. The remainder are filled through direct elections in a first-past-the-post system.
The 2020 parliamentary elections featured significant flaws, including the exclusion of many Muslim candidates and the disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya. The Union Election Commission (UEC) canceled voting in a number of conflict-affected districts, preventing about one million people from electing new representatives. Other electoral flaws included limited access of opposition parties to state-run media during the campaign period and pandemic-related restrictions on in-person campaigning.
The NLD won a convincing majority in the overall popular vote, taking 138 of the 168 elected seats in the upper house, 258 of the 330 elected seats in the lower house, and 501 of 660 elected seats across 14 state and regional legislatures. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) refused to accept the election results, alleging widespread fraud.
In February 2021, hours before a new session of parliament was set to begin, the military seized control of the government, imposing a state of emergency, dissolving parliament, and preventing elected representatives from taking their seats. Several elected officials were detained, and hundreds more were placed under house arrest.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the military coup prevented recently elected members of parliament from convening.
A3 0-4 pts
Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies? 0 4
Various features of the electoral framework have undermined the democratic nature of recent elections. These include the military’s role in presidential nominations and appointments to both chambers of parliament, as well as rigid citizenship laws and excessive residency requirements that prevent large numbers of people from voting or standing for office.
The UEC, which is responsible for electoral administration, is empowered to adjudicate complaints against itself. Its members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the legislature, which has only limited authority to reject nominees. In 2020, UEC decisions to limit or cancel voting in several dozen townships populated by ethnic minority groups, as well as its rules surrounding access to and censorship of broadcast time allotted to political parties, were criticized as lacking sufficient transparency and disenfranchising voters.
After seizing power in February 2021, military leadership cited the USDP’s fraud allegations, flaws in electoral administration during the 2020 elections, and the NLD’s “failure” to address alleged voter list irregularities to justify rejecting the 2020 election results and deposing the elected government. The military regime also dissolved the UEC before reinstating the body with all new members, later charging a number of former UEC commissioners with electoral fraud. In July, the new UEC officially overturned the results of the November 2020 vote, and the following month, Min Aung Hlaing announced that new elections would be held in August 2023, extending the military’s initial one-year timeline.
Less than a month after taking power, the military regime proposed that the current first-past-the-post system be replaced with a proportional representation system. In October, the reconstituted UEC announced that it plans to introduce the change prior to the country’s next elections despite widespread criticism of the proposed change, which opposition parties claim is an attempt to keep the military in power.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the military effectively suspended the constitution and overturned existing electoral laws, rejecting election results that had been confirmed by the Union Election Commission.
B Political Pluralism and Participation
B1 0-4 pts
Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 1 4
Party competition in the lead-up to the 2020 elections was robust, with 7,000 candidates from more than 90 parties participating, including the NLD, the USDP, and regionally based ethnic parties. Following the February 2021 coup, political parties continued to function, despite facing considerable restrictions and harassment. A number of prominent lawmakers and nonmilitary political leaders have been arrested by the military regime, and some have been charged with criminal offenses and put on trial, including much of the NLD leadership.
Following the 2021 coup, a group of previously elected officials unseated by the military regime formed the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which claims to represent a legitimate parliament and perform the duties of an elected government. In April, the CRPH established the National Unity Government (NUG), a resistance government largely made up of ousted NLD politicians. Throughout 2021, the NUG operated as an alternate power structure with influence over small pockets of the country, and organized countrywide opposition to the coup. Shortly after the NUG was formed, Myanmar’s military leadership classified the NUG, its armed People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the CRPH as terrorist organizations, which could result in prosecution and detention for anyone who communicates with the groups’ members.
The constitution contains a requirement that political parties be loyal to the state, which carries the potential for abuse. Laws allow penalties, including deregistration, for political parties that accept support from foreign governments or religious bodies, or that are deemed to have abused religion for political purposes or disrespected the constitution. In August 2021, the UEC announced plans to conduct financial audits of political parties, which many opposition leaders fear will be used to justify dissolving certain parties.
Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 1 due to the mass arrest of political party leaders and the suspension of ordinary political activity during the military coup and state of emergency.
B2 0-4 pts
Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 1 4
The military’s constitutional prerogatives, as well as its close ties to the USDP, limit the degree to which any other force can secure control over the executive or the legislature through elections. Despite such limitations, the NLD won a convincing majority in the November 2020 elections. Following the coup in February 2021, the military announced that new elections would be held within a year; in August, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the military’s timeline had been extended, and new elections would not be held until August 2023. While there was no immediate electoral opportunity through which the opposition could gain power during 2021, the shadow NUG gained strength as an alternative power base, due in part to its ability to fundraise and form alliances.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the military’s seizure of power sharply reduced the prospects of a change in government through elections.
B3 0-4 pts
Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means? 0 4
After the NLD came to power in 2015, the military’s ability to influence electoral outcomes lessened, though it maintained considerable power over political affairs. The November 2020 elections, however, resulted in the defeat of the military’s civilian proxy party, which was widely viewed as an endorsement of Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government. The military refused to accept the election results, and in February 2021, seized control of the government. Following the coup, the military used force to contain the widespread protests against military rule that continued throughout the year—including the arrest of political leaders and civilian protestors, excessive violence and custodial abuse, and mass killings—in an attempt to secure its takeover.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 due to the military leadership’s consistent and widespread use of armed force to secure its rule and control political outcomes during and after the coup.
B4 0-4 pts
Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities? 1 4
Members of Myanmar’s Buddhist and ethnic Bamar majority hold most senior leadership positions in the country, including in major national political parties, the pre-2021 civilian government, and the military. Members of ethnic and religious minority groups face restrictions on their political rights and electoral opportunities, including through discriminatory citizenship, residency, and party registration laws.
The 1982 Citizenship Law does not allow for anyone who entered the country or is descended from someone who entered the country after 1948 to become a full citizen with political rights. Naturalization of spouses is only allowed if the spouse holds a Foreigner’s Registration Certificate from before the law’s enactment. The majority of the mainly Muslim Rohingya were rendered stateless by the 1982 Citizenship Law, which also dictates that only those who are descended from ethnic groups deemed to be native to the country prior to 1823 are considered full citizens. A 2015 presidential decree revoked the temporary identification cards that had allowed Rohingya to vote, and most of the 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Myanmar were unable to vote in the 2020 elections.
Women remain underrepresented in the government and civil service, due largely to societal biases that discourage their political participation. Notwithstanding the prominence of Aung San Suu Kyi, whose father led Myanmar’s independence struggle, few women have achieved ministerial-level appointments.
Following the February 2021 coup, the General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSCN) was formed by members of 29 ethnic groups. The GSCN was established to support antimilitary protests and present the coordinated demands of Myanmar’s minority groups, which include an end to military rule and the creation of a federal democratic union. The NUG and CRPH have also made a concerted effort to include members of Myanmar’s ethnic groups, and have formed alliances with many of the country’s Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in opposition to Tatmadaw rule.
C Functioning of Government
C1 0-4 pts
Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? 0 4
In February 2021, the military deposed the sitting government, prevented newly elected representatives from taking office, and assumed full control over all areas of government policy. The 2008 constitution allows the military to dissolve the civilian government and the parliament and rule directly if the president declares a state of emergency. The military used this provision to execute the 2021 coup; after arresting senior government leaders, military forces declared a state of emergency and assumed control of the government.
Effective governance and control over territory in some regions remains contested between the armed forces and ethnic minority rebel groups. Following the 2021 coup, many of these groups offered protection for those fleeing from military violence.
Since May 2021, the NUG, composed of previously elected representatives, has operated as a shadow government with considerable popularity and legitimacy, although it does not exercise control over state institutions or decision-making.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the military coup prevented duly elected executive and legislative representatives from taking office and determining government policy.
C2 0-4 pts
Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? 1 4
Despite government initiatives aimed at curbing official corruption, it remains rampant at both the national and local levels. An Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), established in 2014, had brought a number of cases against high-ranking officials. Following the 2021 coup, the military brought multiple corruption charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, including bribery; she has denied the charges, and no evidence was produced in trial hearings apart from witness statements. In December, the military regime brought a corruption charge against Win Myint.
Privatization of state-owned companies and other economic reforms in recent years have allegedly benefited family members and associates of military and government officials. After the February 2021 coup, the children of high-ranking military leaders allegedly attempted to use their connections to secure lucrative supply contracts and other kickbacks.
C3 0-4 pts
Does the government operate with openness and transparency? 0 4
After the Tatmadaw took power in 2021, the already limited transparency mechanisms of the previous government were dismantled; oversight by civil society groups and the media has been completely suppressed under military rule.
The military also owns an extensive network of “crony companies” whose revenues enable it to avoid accountability and public oversight and engage in human rights violations with impunity, according to a UN report released in 2019.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the military leadership further suppressed state and nonstate transparency mechanisms following the coup, including oversight by legislators, independent media, and civil society groups.
Add Q
Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group? -4
The central authorities have long used violence, displacement, and other tactics to alter the demographics of states with ethnic unrest or insurgencies. The Rohingya in Rakhine State have faced particularly harsh restrictions for decades, including limits on family size and the ability and right to marry, the denial of legal status and social services, and disenfranchisement and loss of citizenship. Human rights experts and the United Nations have labeled the abuses against the Rohingya as crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and many have argued that they constitute either genocide or a precursor to genocide.
In 2017, repression against the Rohingya escalated; military operations across the northern part of the state led to reports of torture, rape, indiscriminate killings, and the burning of villages, worsening already dire humanitarian conditions and causing 740,000 Rohingya refugees to join the 200,000 others already in Bangladesh. Aung San Suu Kyi, then head of state, did not explicitly acknowledge or condemn such organized official violence against Rohingya civilians; there has been little meaningful accountability for the atrocities. In 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that mass human rights violations had been committed against the Rohingya and ordered the government to implement emergency measures to protect the group; proceedings at the ICJ continued in 2021.
Though the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) continued to collect evidence and interview witnesses in 2021, the February 2021 coup and subsequent closure of the country limited international observers’ access to Myanmar, further frustrating efforts to hold perpetrators accountable.
Civil Liberties
D Freedom of Expression and Belief
D1 0-4 pts
Are there free and independent media? 1 4
Following the coup in 2021, the military seized control of state-owned broadcast media, took private broadcasters off the air, and severely restricted internet access, including access to social media platforms and news outlets. Licenses for several independent media organizations were rescinded in March. However, a number of independent media outlets continued to provide news coverage, operating in hiding and in exile.
In February, the military amended sections of the criminal code and the Electronic Transactions Law to include provisions criminalizing antiregime statements. Human rights groups have warned that the amendments disproportionately affect independent media outlets, and enable the regime to easily detain and prosecute journalists. Dozens of journalists have been forced to flee following the military’s crackdown on press freedoms; according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), more than 100 journalists were arrested in 2021. Though the regime released several journalists throughout the year, many of those jailed face criminal charges.
D2 0-4 pts
Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private? 1 4
The constitution provides for freedom of religion. It distinguishes Buddhism as the majority religion, but also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and animism. The government occasionally interferes with religious assemblies and attempts to control the Buddhist clergy. Authorities discriminate against minority religious groups—particularly Muslims—in practice, refusing them permission to hold gatherings and restricting educational activities, proselytization, and construction and repair of houses of worship.
Anti-Muslim hate speech and discrimination have been amplified by social media, and by some state institutions and mainstream news websites. The officially illegal Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation, formerly known as Ma Ba Tha, agitates for the protection of Buddhist privileges, urges boycotts against Muslim-run businesses, and disseminates anti-Muslim propaganda. Muslims face systematic discrimination in obtaining identity cards, and “Muslim-free” villages have been established with the complicity of officials.
D3 0-4 pts
Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination? 0 4
Political activity on university campuses is generally restricted, and universities are not autonomous. Student unions—which have historically been important advocates for human rights—are discouraged, have no formal registration mechanisms, and are viewed with suspicion by authorities. A 2018 directive from the Ministry of Education required students to submit detailed information in order to get permission to hold events on campus.
University students and staff played a key role in antimilitary protests and strikes following the February 2021 coup; in March, the military stormed dozens of universities, seizing control of the campuses and arresting hundreds of students and faculty members. In May, more than 11,000 university staff were suspended for striking in protest against the military coup, and those who were not suspended were pressured into declaring allegiance to the ruling junta.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because universities were subjected to military raids and mass staff suspensions after students and faculty expressed opposition to the coup.
D4 0-4 pts
Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution? 1 4
Private discussion and personal expression—already constrained by state surveillance and laws inhibiting online speech—became more difficult following the 2021 coup. Upon taking power, the regime enacted sweeping revisions of existing legal code, removing several key human rights protections, including those against arbitrary surveillance. The legal reforms also included amendments to the penal code that severely curtailed freedom of expression. In March, the military banned the use of circumvention tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and other communications technology in an attempt to keep people from evading surveillance.
Hundreds of people were arrested and prosecuted under the revised legal code, usually for comments made online; hundreds of others have been forced into hiding or exile to avoid arrest, and a smaller number were killed in protests or targeted for attack.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to mass arrests of social media users and new restrictions on communications technology in the wake of the coup.
E Associational and Organizational Rights
E1 0-4 pts
Is there freedom of assembly? 0 4
Freedom of assembly has been increasingly restricted in recent years. A blanket ban on protests in 11 townships of central Yangon has been in place since 2017, and in 2020, an extended internet shutdown in parts of Rakhine and Chin states severely impeded activists’ ability to organize protests. Unauthorized demonstrations are punishable with up to six months in prison under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law; a variety of other vaguely defined violations can draw lesser penalties.
After the 2021 coup, freedom of assembly was violently curtailed in response to widespread antimilitary protests. Within a week of taking power, the military banned all gatherings of more than five people, imposed a strict curfew, and began using lethal and indiscriminate force against peaceful protesters. Widespread internet restrictions were also deployed to hinder the organization of protests. Military violence in response to protests continued throughout the year, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of protesters and the arrest of thousands more.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the military’s crackdown on protests following the coup, which included curfews, mass arrests, internet shutdowns, and the extensive use of lethal force.
E2 0-4 pts
Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights– and governance-related work? 1 4
The ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to engage in human rights– and governance-related work significantly decreased after the 2021 military coup. Activists face arrest and prosecution, and many prominent activists have been forced to go into hiding or exile; in some cases, family members of activists have been arrested as a pressure tactic. In March, the regime introduced new restrictions on NGO activity, including pausing all NGO registration and renewal processes, and began to heavily monitor NGO bank activity. NGOs were increasingly subject to harassment and interference by authorities throughout the year, and a large number of NGOs effectively shut down or disbanded. Despite such limitations, a number continue to quietly monitor human rights abuses and engage in advocacy with international stakeholders.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the military increased pressure on human rights activists following the coup, in part by detaining their family members, and the broader crisis obstructed the work of humanitarian organizations.
E3 0-4 pts
Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations? 1 4
Union activity took root in Myanmar following the lifting of the ban on trade unions in 2011, despite weak legal protections for workers against abuse by employers. In 2021, unions played a leading role in organizing antimilitary protests and strikes immediately following the coup. In response, military authorities declared most unions illegal, and conducted violent raids and mass arrests in areas populated by striking union workers; the regime also threatened dozens of key leaders with arrest, causing many to flee. By June, thousands of civil servants and private sector employees had been fired for their participation in the widespread CDM.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to a wave of reprisals against unions that participated in civil disobedience actions, including bans, raids, dismissals, arrests, and extrajudicial killings.
F Rule of Law
F1 0-4 pts
Is there an independent judiciary? 0 4
The judiciary is not independent. Judges are nominated by the president, and lawmakers can reject the choice only if it is clearly proven that the nominee does not meet the legal qualifications for the post. The courts generally adjudicate cases in accordance with the government’s interests, particularly in major cases with political implications.
Following the February 2021 coup, the military regime took control of Myanmar’s judicial system.
F2 0-4 pts
Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters? 0 4
Following the 2021 military coup, revisions to the criminal code and the imposition of an indefinite state of emergency allowed the regime to remove existing safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention. In March, the Tatmadaw declared martial law in 11 townships of Yangon and Mandalay, enabling military tribunals to impose death sentences on civilians; by the end of 2021, military tribunals had sentenced more than 90 civilians to death.
The number of political prisoners rose dramatically in 2021; most were arrested while protesting, although dozens of prominent political leaders and several cultural figures were specifically targeted. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), as of December 2021, 11,296 individuals had been arrested; an additional 1,964 arrest warrants remained open.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the suspension of existing safeguards against abuse of power by security forces and the widespread use of arbitrary arrest and detention during the military coup and state of emergency.
F3 0-4 pts
Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies? 0 4
The February 2021 military coup resulted in a sharp increase in civilian exposure to violence, armed conflict, and the illegitimate use of physical force. Indiscriminate shelling and aerial attacks, the destruction of villages, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, rape, and other abuses by the military escalated during 2021. In December, 40 civilians were burned alive by military forces in Kayah State.
Long-standing armed conflicts between ethnic rebel groups and the central government continued in 2021 in Shan, Kachin, Kayin, Chin, and Rakhine States. Even ethnically Bamar areas, particularly Sagaing Region and major urban centers including Yangon and Mandalay, experienced high levels of violent conflict between Tatmadaw forces and antimilitary protesters. Military attacks on peaceful protesters, including the use of lethal force, took place across the country; in response, civilian youth across the country formed armed people’s defense forces (PDFs) that carried out guerilla attacks against military targets. After the NUG declared a “people’s war” against the military in September, it engaged in efforts to coordinate among the shadow government, the PDFs, and ethnic rebel groups.
The number of displaced civilians increased throughout the year, with those displaced by earlier rounds of fighting in ethnic areas joined by those fleeing the newly installed military regime; between February and December, more than 400,000 civilians were displaced.
Prisons in Myanmar are severely overcrowded, and conditions for inmates are sometimes life-threatening. Following the coup, prison conditions further deteriorated, as numbers of detainees rapidly increased and grave abuses that had been prevalent during previous periods of military rule resurfaced. Sanitary conditions in prisons are extremely poor, and authorities have reportedly taken few measures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 virus within the prison system; in 2021, at least 12 inmates died after contracting COVID-19, and hundreds more tested positive for the virus.
F4 0-4 pts
Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population? 0 4
Some of the country’s worst human rights abuses, commonly committed by federal military troops, are against ethnic and religious minority populations. The government’s failure to protect victims, conduct investigations, and punish perpetrators is well documented. The post-coup period in 2021 was characterized by further deterioration in the country’s human rights situation and a lack of accountability for offenders.
Ethnic minority groups such as the Shan, Mon, Chin, Karen, and Kachin, as well as non-Rohingya Muslims, also face some societal discrimination, while the ethnic Bamar, Buddhist majority retains a privileged position.
In addition to conflict-related violence, women are subject to discrimination in employment, against which there are no explicit legal protections. A number of laws create a hostile environment for LGBT+ residents. Same-sex sexual activity is criminalized, and police reportedly harass, extort, and physically and sexually abuse LGBT+ people.
G Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
G1 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education? 1 4
Prior to 2021, freedom of internal travel for Myanmar citizens was generally respected outside of conflict zones. However, after the coup in February 2021, movement was increasingly restricted across the country. The military erected road blocks and checkpoints; enforced exit controls, curfews, and residency rules for private dwellings that require reporting overnight guests; engaged in violent raids of neighborhoods and villages; and regularly responded with disproportionate force to ongoing civic action. Some high-profile dissidents were arrested as they attempted to leave Myanmar by air, while thousands more have fled to neighboring countries by land despite the dangers posed by military forces.
Additionally, Myanmar’s large population of stateless residents remain subject to significant restrictions on their movement, particularly the 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State and are confined to designated camps and villages; those who attempt to travel outside these areas are regularly arrested and detained.
G2 0-4 pts
Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors? 1 4
Disputes over land grabbing and business projects that violate human rights are common. Myanmar’s property-transfer laws prohibit transfers to or from a foreigner except in certain state-approved cases of inheritance, and require registration of foreign-owned property. Stateless residents, including the Rohingya, cannot legally buy or sell property or set up a business.
Instances of forced eviction and displacement, confiscation, lack of sufficient compensation, and direct violence against landholders by state security officials abound. Court cases are frequently brought against farmers for trespassing on land that was taken from them. The resumption of armed hostilities following the coup led to military attacks and arbitrary destruction of property—including entire villages—in 2021.
Multiple sources continued to report that Rohingya land and property have been razed, confiscated, appropriated, or built on, often with the direct involvement of the military, and sometimes under the guise of development assistance.
G3 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance? 1 4
Men and women formally enjoy equal rights on personal status issues, though there are restrictions on marriages of Buddhist women to non-Buddhist men. Laws that might protect women from domestic abuse and rape are weak and poorly enforced, and such violence is an acute and persistent problem. The army has a record of using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minority women, and security personnel typically enjoy impunity for sexual violence. Following the 2021 coup, numerous instances of gender-based violence were reported by detainees.
G4 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation? 1 4
Human trafficking, forced labor, child labor, and the recruitment of child soldiers are serious problems in Myanmar. Child soldiers are enlisted by the military and ethnic rebel groups, which also recruit civilians for forced labor. Various commercial and other interests continue to use forced labor despite a formal ban on the practice. Trafficking victims include women and girls subjected to forced sex work and domestic servitude, as well as women who are sold as brides to men in China—an expanding practice in some ethnic minority states. People displaced by ongoing conflicts are especially vulnerable to sexual and labor exploitation..."
Source/publisher:
Freedom House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Failure to stop violence one year after ASEAN’s adoption of its Five-Point Consensus
Activists inside Myanmar resorting to flash mobs and silent strikes to avoid crackdown
Plainclothes military forces disguise themselves as fruit sellers and trishaw drivers as part of the repressive surveillance system
Military retaliates against family members of activists
Myanmar’s brave activists are still pursuing peaceful protests despite grave danger and numerous challenges, Amnesty International said today, one year after the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a Five-Point Consensus that has abjectly failed to stop the violence in the country.
In recent months, Amnesty International conducted in-depth interviews with 17 people who have continued to take part in non-violent protests across five of Myanmar’s states and regions. The interviewees were from a diverse array of protest groups, including LGBTQ and women’s rights organizations.
One of the most popular methods of protesting has been “flash mobs” where activists run through the streets for a few minutes before dispersing to avoid being shot, arrested or run over by military vehicles.
The public has also held “silent strikes” across the country, during which shops and businesses shut down, roads emptied, and people stayed home to show defiance to military rule.
Across Myanmar, activists and human rights defenders have been distributing pamphlets on buses, posting messages against the military on walls with stickers or spray paint, and encouraging boycotts of goods and services with ties to the military.
“These activists urgently need the support of the international community in the form of a global arms embargo to stop the Myanmar military from using weapons of warfare to kill peaceful protesters,” said Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research.
These activists urgently need the support of the international community in the form of a global arms embargo to stop the Myanmar military from using weapons of warfare to kill peaceful protesters.
Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research
“The ASEAN must call on the Myanmar military authorities to immediately stop all violence against peaceful protestors in line with the stalled Five-Point Consensus. It should do so now to prevent the Myanmar people from further suffering.”
“It must also continue to unequivocally condemn all human rights violations in Myanmar and call for the release of all individuals who are arbitrarily detained.”
“THEY TRIED TO HIT ME”
In the days immediately following the coup, Amnesty International and many other human rights groups urged the military to stop the use of unlawful and lethal force against peaceful protesters. The violence has since prompted many to join armed resistance groups, which are active throughout the country.
Amnesty International has called on the military to exercise restraint, abide by international law, and for law enforcement duties to be fully resumed by police.
These calls have gone unheeded. More than 1,700 people have now been killed, and more than 13,000 arrested since the military took power, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
Activists and human rights defenders interviewed by Amnesty International described witnessing or experiencing abuses by military forces while demonstrating, including shootings, beatings, and attempts to ram vehicles into protests.
The brutal response of the military had an enormous impact on the nonviolent protest movement. During the latter part of 2021, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of people who joined protests in the streets.
“We went from tens of thousands to thousands, thousands to hundreds, and hundreds to around twenty,” said Thiri*, a university student in Mandalay who said she had no interest in politics before the coup but is now one of the leaders of a women’s protest group.
We went from tens of thousands to thousands, thousands to hundreds, and hundreds to around twenty.
Thiri*, university student in Mandalay
However, the reduced number of protesters taking to the streets may also be a matter of strategy. Some of the activists that Amnesty International spoke with said they were intentionally organizing the protests in smaller groups to keep everyone safe.
Rina, a university student and member of the General Strike Committee in Yangon, said that it had become “too dangerous” to protest in large groups.
She participated in a flash mob with around 20 other people on 5 December 2021 and she recounted to Amnesty International that on that day, as they gathered, a military truck drove straight into them. “As I was running, I saw some of the other people who joined in the flash mob had been hit [by the military truck]. Some of them were rolling on the pavement.”
In the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina, a university student who has been protesting with the University of Myitkyina Students’ Union, said that they usually go out in smaller groups because “if there are too many people in the protest, it is easier to get arrested.”
Zin Mar, another university student who is a protest leader in Monywa, said that although her protest group sometimes had to reduce the number of people demonstrating for security reasons, they were determined to continue. “We will always come out whenever we can,” she said.
Min Thu, a high school student who is a leading member of the Mandalay Youth Strike Committee, has witnessed unmarked vehicles which he believes to belong to the military and police accelerate into protesters during at least three instances. In October 2021, a motorcycle nearly hit him when he was about to join a protest.
“Just before we started the protest, they tried to hit me [with the vehicle] from the front,” Min Thu said. “I escaped by going to the nearest road and then they got down from their vehicle and pointed guns at me. They didn’t shoot me because they had blocked all the angles, and they thought they would arrest me.” He told Amnesty International that he dodged onto a side street and barely escaped.
In Sagaing region’s Salingyi and Yinmarbin townships, poet and engineer Yar Zar has regularly organized people across villages to protest since March of last year, and was at two protests when soldiers and police opened fire at the crowd.
To avoid encountering soldiers, he and his team carefully prepare routes along narrow, unpaved streets. He is one of several people who told Amnesty International that they also rely on volunteers to check and make sure the route is clear before they demonstrate.
“When we protest in the village, some protesters who act as lookouts escort us so we can avoid the military. Once they have passed, we start our protest again,” said Phyu, a village protest leader in Thayetchaung township, Tanintharyi region.
Protest groups have also been distributing pamphlets and using social media to call for a boycott of goods and services with ties to the military, and have been posting anti-coup messages in public spaces.
LIFE ON THE RUN
Many activists described to Amnesty International how they felt like they were constantly watched and followed by civilian informants known as dalans or by soldiers and police wearing civilian clothes and driving unmarked vehicles.
Myat Min Khant of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions said that the military and police roam streets disguised as fruit sellers or trishaw, motorcycle, or taxi drivers and embed themselves among the people to surveil anyone daring to express dissent.
There are also numerous checkpoints in towns and cities around the country. People are stopped at random, and their belongings are searched by soldiers and police. Thus, activists either leave their devices at home or delete messages and applications on devices when they go out for fear that they could be arrested.
Surveillance by the military adds to the challenges in organizing protests, according to Moe Thouk, a protest leader with the General Strike Committee in Yangon.
They use CCTV cameras to follow activists, employ dalans in every ward to gather information, and arrest activists while wearing civilian clothes, he said. “They roam around places where protests often take place. We need to carefully choose the right place [to protest] and rely on scouts for safety,” said Moe Thouk.
Most of the activists who spoke to Amnesty International said that they have left their homes for safety reasons, and several of them have not been able to be back home at all since February 2021.
“If I go back home, the military may be waiting to arrest me,” said Nan Lin of the University Students’ Union Alumni Force. “Even my family members do not know my whereabouts.”
If I go back home, the military may be waiting to arrest me…even my family members do not know my whereabouts.
Nan Lin, University Students’ Union Alumni Force
BP, a protest leader who has demonstrated on the streets of Kalay, Sagaing region every day since 7 February 2021, said that a convoy of five vehicles full of soldiers raided his family home three times in one day in September 2021. He is one of four protesters interviewed who said their homes have been raided after they have left and gone into hiding.
But while they fear going home, many of these activists said it is becoming harder and harder to find safe places to hide. BP told Amnesty International that he regularly sees strangers who he believes are plainclothes informants loitering near the vicinity where activists are staying or following them on motorbikes while carrying walkie-talkies.
U Yaw, a monk from Ayeyarwady region who has been actively protesting since the early days after the coup, had been in hiding since March 2021 when his monastery was raided. During the raid, as U Yaw hid in a toilet stall, he overheard soldiers saying that if they found him, they should “just shoot him dead and get rid of him.”
He fled to Mandalay and resumed protesting, but soldiers and police raided the monastery there where he was hiding in June. He took shelter in another monastery which was raided by soldiers and police in September 2021.
He escaped just in time, but the soldiers and police confiscated his identification documents and cash. U Yaw continued to protest despite the risks.
THREATENING FAMILY MEMBERS
In many cases, soldiers and police have taken into custody family members and loved ones of activists if they were unable to find the activists and arrest them, including a politicians’ 94-year-old mother and an activist’s four-year-old daughter, according to media reports
In April 2021, soldiers and police raided the house of Arkar, an activist who had gone into hiding.
“Because they couldn’t find me and arrest me, they arrested my mother,” he said. “I got a call from the police station and I was told that I should give myself up in exchange for the freedom of my mother.”
Arkar did not turn himself in, and his relatives were able to negotiate his mother’s release the next day by paying a bribe. Arkar’s family have since moved to a new home to avoid further reprisals. Arkar is one of four people who told Amnesty International that their families were forced to leave their homes because of safety concerns.
In November 2021, the military attempted to raid the house of another protest leader who had gone into hiding. “When they arrived, they started shooting, but they went to the wrong house. They mistakenly went to our neighbor’s house and one woman was killed because of the shooting,” the activist said.
Her family was able to escape but she has not contacted them since for fear that she would be putting their lives at further risk. She is currently moving from place to place, and said she has trouble sleeping due to fear of arrest.
“We have to be vigilant 24 hours a day. We get startled even when we just hear a cat jumping onto the roof. We worry about getting arrested when we go out, and when we are in the house, we are scared they will come in and arrest us. We have completely lost our sense of security,” she said.
We have to be vigilant 24 hours a day. We get startled even when we just hear a cat jumping onto the roof.
Protest leader
She is determined, though, to continue organizing peaceful protests. “I cannot sit quietly when I see injustice,” she told Amnesty International.
A resolve to keep protesting nonviolently is shared by many of the activists.
“Despite the immense dangers and hardships, there are still many activists and human rights defenders who choose to remain in Myanmar and who are unwavering in their commitment to continue peacefully protesting and expressing their dissent,” Amnesty’s Emerlynne Gil said.
Many of them said they continue their peaceful protests to inspire more people in the country to action and to give people hope. “The main reason I continue protesting is so that the people do not become divided or lose enthusiasm, and so that they can get strength by seeing us,” said the monk in Mandalay, U Yaw.
“Although our lives are in danger, we choose to continue. We will keep asking the world to help us because people are being killed in Myanmar,” said Zin Mar, the protest leader in Monywa.
*Note to editors: In several cases pseudonyms have been used at the request of interviewees..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Anti-coup protesters
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"ယနေ့ ဧပြီလ ၂၁ ရက်နေ့သည် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားဟောင်း၊ အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ်-နာယက၊ သတင်းစာဆရာကြီး ဟံသာဝတီဦးဝင်းတင် ကွယ်လွန်ခဲ့တာ ၈နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်သည့်နေ့ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး စစ်အာဏာရှင်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် ရဲရင့်ပြောင်မြောက်စွာ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့သည့် ဆရာကြီးအား စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့က မတရားအမှုဆင်ကာ ဖမ်းဆီးပြီး နှစ်ရှည်ထောင်ဒဏ် ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည်။ ဆရာကြီးသည် အကျဉ်းထောင်တွင်း နေထိုင်စဉ် ကာလတလျှောက်တွင်လည်း အမျိုးမျိုးသော စိတ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ၊ ရုပ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ နှိပ်စက်ညှဉ်းပန်းမှုများ တောက်လျှောက်ခံခဲ့ရသည်။ အိမ်ခန်းက ဖယ်ပေးခဲ့ရ သည်။ အငြိမ်းစားလစာ ရိက္ခာခံစားခွင့် ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည်။ ထောက်လှမ်းစစ်ကြောရေးလက်ချက်ဖြင့် သွားများ အားလုံး ပြောင်သလင်းခါခဲ့ရသည်။ ထောင်ဆန်ကြမ်းထမင်းနှင့် ထောင်ဟင်းရွက်ပြုတ်ရည်ကို မသေရုံတမယ် သွားဖုံးနှင့်မြုံခဲ့ရသည်။ အစာအိမ်ရောဂါစွဲခဲ့ရသည်။ အူကျရောဂါကို ငါးနှစ်တိတိ ကုသခွင့်မပေး၊ နှလုံးရောဂါ ကို ကုသခွင့်မပေးသည့်အတွက် သေရာပါ နာတာရှည်ဖြစ်သွားခဲ့ရသည်။ နှစ်နှစ်ဆယ်နီးနီး မည်သူနှင့်မျှ ဆက်သွယ်ခွင့်မရဘဲ တစ်ဉီးတည်း တိုက်ပိတ်ခံရသည်ကို ဆရာကြီး ကိုယ်တိုင်ရေးသားထားသည့် ဘာလဲဟဲ့ လူ့ငရဲစာအုပ်တွင် ဖေါ်ပြထားခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော်လည်း ထိုကဲ့သို့ ဆိုးရွားလှသော ငရဲခန်းကို မကြောက်မရွံ့ ရဲရင့်စွာ ကျော်ဖြတ်ခဲ့သည်ကိုလည်း ထိုစာအုပ်တွင် လေ့လာကြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
ဆရာကြီးသည် အကျဉ်းထောင်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ပြီးနောက် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ လွတ်မြောက်ရေး အတွက် လှုပ်ရှားမှုတစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် အကျဉ်းထောင် ဝတ်စုံဖြစ်သည့် အပြာရောင်အင်္ကျီနှင့် ပုဆိုးကို ကွယ်လွန် သည်အထိ ဝတ်ဆင်သွားခဲ့သည်။
ပြည်တွင်း၊ပြည်ပရှိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုကို ထောက်ခံအားပေးသူများအနေနှင့်လည်း နှစ်စဉ် ဧပြီလ ၂၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် အပြာရောင် အင်္ကျီများ ဝတ်ဆင်ခြင်း သင်္ကေတပြုကာ လှုပ်ရှားမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်အုပ်စုမှ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ မတရားအာဏာလုခဲ့သည်မှာ တစ်နှစ်ကျော်ကြာခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပြီး ယနေ့တွင် အာဏာလုမှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသဖြင့် အကျဉ်းထောင် အသီးသီး၌ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသူပေါင်း အနည်းဆုံး (ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ပြီး ၉၉၆ ဦး + ထောင်တွင်းမှတရားရင်ဆိုင်နေရသူ ၉၂၇၅ ဦး) (၁၀၂၇၁)ဦး ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။
အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာလုစစ်အုပ်စုက ၎င်းတို့အာဏာတည်မြဲရေး အတွက် ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်သူမှန်သမျှကို နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ကာ အကျဉ်းထောင်တွင်း၌ ချုပ်နှောင်ထားလျက်ရှိသည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားအားလုံး ခြွင်းချက်မရှိ ချက်ချင်းလွှတ်ရန်မှာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် တည် ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ပထမဆုံးခြေလှမ်းဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၊ ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂ၊ အာဆီယံ၊ အမေရိကန်၊ ဂျပန်နှင့် တောင်ကိုရီးယားအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာခေါင်းဆောင်များအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် အာဏာလု စစ်အုပ်စုအပေါ် လုံလောက်သော ဖိအားပေးမှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် ၎င်း၏ယန္တရားများက အကျဉ်းထောင်တွင်းရှိ နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသားများကို နည်းမျိုးစုံသုံးကာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်၊ ဖိနှိပ်လျက်ရှိသည်ကို သတိမူပြီး နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသားများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့မိသားစုများ၏ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုနှင့် ပေးဆပ်မှုများကို မမေ့လျော့ဘဲ တတ်နိုင်သမျှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီပေးပါရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2022-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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"Myanmar is now in a state of civil war. What started in February 2021 as a mass protest movement against the military coup is now an armed uprising.
The junta is under attack across the country from a loose network of civilian militias called the People’s Defence Forces.
They’re fighting to create a democratic Myanmar.
The BBC gained rare access to the rebel jungle training camps where young protesters have been turned into soldiers.
They're up against a well-trained military, armed by Russia and China, that’s willing to use brutal tactics to hold on to power.
As the death toll mounts and the world looks away, can this people’s movement win?..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2022-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Sub-title:
Opposition to the military regime is pulling adverse groups toward a new national identity tied to a federal democratic future.
Description:
"The military’s coup in Myanmar has been a tragedy in every respect but one: It is increasingly clear that the generals’ power grab and bloody repression have united Myanmar’s diverse — and often adverse — ethnic and political groups to resist a common enemy and seek a better future. Ironically, the army, which has argued since independence that it alone can hold the country together, has inadvertently spurred a revolutionary and irreversible nation-building dialogue aimed at creating a federal democratic system and more inclusive national identity. The National Unity Consultative Council, the platform for this dialogue, may be slow, complex and contentious, but its participants stay at the table for one reason: It offers the best opportunity to escape Myanmar’s vicious cycle of violence and authoritarian rule.
Since the February 1, 2021, coup, opposition to military rule has grown to include political, civil society and armed elements from every corner of the country. The resistance network that developed over the past year includes the deposed parliament and executive; state, regional and township administrators; armed organizations ranging from battled-hardened ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to newly formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs); and civil society groups providing essential services and local leadership.
Bringing them all together is the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), tasked with unifying the resistance movement and, as a dialogue platform, drafting a political roadmap to move the country toward a federal democratic union. It is a low-budget force multiplier starved for resources and more than worthy of support from pro-democracy elements of the international community.
Not surprisingly, the chaos of war has challenged these groups’ ability to communicate, collaborate and coordinate. That has led some observers to view the resistance as disunited and directionless. Such a critique, however, misses the fact that these groups are complementary even if they don’t speak with a single voice, and that in combination they have performed effectively against the overwhelming structural advantages that the junta enjoys.
Perhaps of equal importance, these actors represent the bones of a new federal system that could rise from the ashes of the military’s atrocities. Where past democratic movements in Myanmar have struggled — namely, in their ability to craft and unify around an alternative political vision — this one has shown staying power. By establishing the NUCC less than two months after the coup, the resistance demonstrated its intention to avoid past mistakes that have led to disintegration. If it continues to make visible progress and demonstrate a commitment to decentralization and a new federal structure, the NUCC can help sustain and strengthen the movement.
The Misguided Search for Elite Dialogue
The historic and transformative potential of the NUCC has not been entirely obvious to the international community. From the outset of the coup, various envoys have ignored the NUCC process and instead pursued a solution to the conflict through elite dialogue between the military and fringe opposition elements willing to return to pre-coup conditions. As the ensuing armed conflict has broadened and intensified, with gruesome videos of military atrocities emerging daily, these calls for dialogue have grown louder. Those pushing such dialogue believe that peace is brokered through elites and the benefits will trickle down. This is deeply misguided. It is a view that has informed all five previous attempts to bring peace to Myanmar — attempts that have failed.
Though perhaps well-intentioned, this strategy fails to grasp that the people of Myanmar are unwilling to go back to the system of government that existed under the 2008 military constitution. They have made clear their urgent need to embrace this historic turning point, lest the country simply settles into another unstable equilibrium characterized by continuing violence.
No Going Back
Unlike some outsiders, none of the parties to the conflict sees a return to the status quo ante as possible.
In late March, coup leader and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing vowed to annihilate all opposition in flagrant disregard of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) “Five-Point Consensus.” Whatever its original motives for the coup, the junta’s sole objective now is survival. The generals have calculated that international accountability for their brutality is unlikely and that their backers, especially China, Russia, India, Japan and some within ASEAN, will prove durable.
The resistance, too, recognizes that there is no going back — but where to head next is a point of contention. The vast majority of those within the NUG and NUCC, particularly among ethnic revolutionary organizations, protest groups and the more progressive members of civil society, have made clear that they seek nothing less than the full removal of the military from the country’s political and economic life. They view the previous system as having been unstable and exclusionary, held together through tenuous concessions to elites, and ultimately enabling the coup.
A Way Forward
Before evaluating the prospects for the NUCC, it should be stipulated that at this stage its potential remains aspirational. Its dialogues are unglamorous, fraught, complex and slow, held over bi-weekly Zoom calls at all hours.
That said, the NUCC’s inclusive dialogue processes reflect the will of the people, and there are reasons for optimism that this unique platform can help lay the groundwork for a new Myanmar.
In virtually every other political dialogue in Myanmar’s history — all of which have been controlled or sabotaged by the Burma army — participants would routinely abandon negotiations when they became contentious or seemed to be going nowhere. These dialogues were haunted by two major demons: the lack of a shared objective and the fact that the Burma army has never wanted peace (which remains the case today).
With the poisonous military excluded from the NUCC, it is at last possible to have a good-faith dialogue among parties with a shared goal of ending authoritarian military rule and establishing a peaceful federal democracy. Therefore, even when disputes become heated, as they often do, the conversations continue. Although key actors, including important political parties such as the Shan National League for Democracy and EAOs including the United Wa State Army, Arakan Army and Kachin Independence Army, have not joined the process, the NUCC has kept open the door to their future involvement and quietly consults with these groups to take into account their political ambitions.
Another positive development is the emergence of state-level Consultative Councils which were spawned by the NUCC. Some have made considerable strides toward unifying the resistance in states — often producing better outcomes than the NUCC itself. The Kayah State Consultative Council, for example, includes a diverse array of civilian, armed and civil society actors, and is nearing completion of a state constitution. It helps coordinate the armed resistance across the war-torn state and provides core governance functions, including oversight of a local police service and delivery of humanitarian aid. These state-level processes are not only a foundational exercise in federalism but could offer lessons on how to improve the NUCC.
If the NUCC can reach consensus on a plan for a federal government that makes space for Myanmar’s cultural diversity, it would put the resistance in a strong position to begin laying the foundation for negotiations with the military. It would also make the NUCC the setting for a long-term national dialogue aimed at developing an inclusive national identity as the basis for a more equitable and stable Myanmar.
Key Challenges Remain
Neither success nor failure is pre-ordained for the fractious resistance movement. Three factors will be especially critical to a successful outcome of the NUCC:
Pace and Priorities. NUCC dialogues are built upon the principle of collective leadership — a welcome departure from Myanmar’s history of rigid hierarchy centered around a Bamar Buddhist gerontocracy. But under its consensus model, the NUCC often shows little progress over long periods. The glacial pace weakens its perceived relevance among some key actors. The challenge, in part, is that the NUCC plays two roles — a policymaking body of a revolutionary administration (the National Unity Government, or NUG) and a nation-building dialogue platform. If the NUCC fails in the first role to keep pace with the revolution, it may lose the opportunity to lead in the second. Its success will depend on maintaining cohesion and adhering to leadership principles, while building momentum on core policy questions.
Action. Follow-up action is often inadequate because the NUCC, like the NUG, lacks enough working-level staff. The NUG and the Joint Coordination Committees are the primary implementing bodies of NUCC policy. While their personnel are committed, motivated and experienced, many have gone months without pay. If the international community provides stronger support for civil society actors, they can be force multipliers for the NUG and NUCC. When the NUCC establishes its Technical Secretariat team and Technical Support team in the coming months, the United States and other donors should be ready to assist.
Trust. For decades, the military has nurtured distrust among its myriad opponents. The National League for Democracy (NLD) party exacerbated these divisions while in power by implementing policies that antagonized civil society and the ethnic minorities that now make up the NUCC. Though the NLD-dominated NUG promises to build more equitable governance structures, ethnic minorities and others are wary. The NUCC needs to continue to push the NUG to demonstrate its commitment to federalism by designing and deploying governance structures that shift power from Union-level institutions like the NUCC and NUG toward sub-national institutions, including state and region-level Consultative Councils and township governance institutions (Pyithu Aochoteye a’pwe).
In a previous publication we said, the NUCC was too important to fail. This is as true now as it has ever been.
The NUCC alone will not win or lose this revolution, of course, but its success is a precondition to escaping the vicious cycle of violence and military authoritarianism. If the NUCC collapses or loses relevance, power will shift to those who seek elite and unaccountable negotiations. That will inevitably produce a myopic and unstable political outcome characterized by violence, authoritarianism and regional instability.
The best option for allies of a democratic Myanmar is to support the NUCC dialogues, which better reflect the will of the people and create the possibility for the elusive federal democratic union that Myanmar has always deserved. The search for dialogue to end this tragic conflict must first take place within the resistance before any negotiated settlement can be considered..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2022-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
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"Time for an Evaluation of Donor-Led Peace Efforts?
As recently as 2020 one of the most prominent logos on Yangon billboards, vehicles, and signs was the woven fibers of the Joint Peace Fund (JPF). The JPF arrived in Yangon in 2016, loudly proclaiming that it had pledges from nine western donors who would fund US$100 million in peacebuilding activities between 2016 and 2021.
The JPF would support the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015, a Norwegian-sponsored agreement between the quasi-civilian government of U Thein Sein and a dozen or so Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Hundreds of millions of dollars also flowed into Myanmar in the name of peace from Western embassies, United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Bank, church groups, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). All parties were convinced that they could contribute to the country’s road to peace by bringing the peacebuilding skills of the outside world to Myanmar.
International experts in peacebuilding, public health, gender, democracy, displaced peoples, education and a host of other subjects arrived. The Myanmar Police Force was even funded by the European Union to train in crowd control techniques in 2013 and 2016, all part of a scheme to assist them to become “a modern police agency that adheres to international standards, respects human rights and maintains gender awareness.”
Conferences were held in Yangon hotels, workshops in villages, and leaders jetted off to see ‘best practice’ peace efforts in places like Northern Ireland, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Mindanao in the Philippines. And then of course it all disappeared on February 1, 2021, when the Myanmar military staged their coup. What went wrong? No answers seem forthcoming.
Monitoring, Evaluation and the Coup of February 1, 2021
Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on peace and democracy efforts in Myanmar between 2016 and 2021. Myanmar’s service sector briefly flourished and rents in Yangon skyrocketed, particularly in neighborhoods favored by expatriates where houses owned by military families were snapped up. But that was OK because each dollar spent was rooted in “evidence based policy”, which meant a particular “benchmarked performance objective” pre-determined by the donor was aligned with success, however defined.
So the JPF and the donor systems hummed along, always seeming to meet those benchmarked performance indicators. The Rohingya crisis of 2017 came and went, ceasefires in Shan and Kachin States collapsed, and fighting resumed in Karen and Karenni States. The Arakan Army emerged, too. Monitoring and Evaluation officers carefully noted “roadblocks” on the “road to peace”. Ambassadors lectured Myanmar people that this was the “last chance” for peace.
But it didn’t work. The crash occurred on the day of the coup, when the elected leadership of the government was arrested and the military occupied Myanmar’s cities. Peaceful demonstrators were shot, military operations against ethnic peoples in the borderlands resumed, and resistance groups began to organize. All the efforts of the 2016-2021 peacebuilding seemed for naught. As for the evaluators, they seemed to have suddenly disappeared. For example, instead of acknowledging failure and announcing a new study in the interests of transparency, JPF’s website was scoured of all reports and effectively went blank. Or perhaps it went underground, as rumors have emerged that the JPF is now negotiating with the military government. It seems that the peacebuilding of 2016-2021 was in vain or perhaps even counter-productive.
This means, though, that it is time to ask the critical question of what went wrong. All that data- driven policy-building can be resuscitated, and the tools used to evaluate the NGOs can now be used to evaluate the overall peace process. Monitoring and Evaluation in donor-speak meant western accounting standards benchmarking every kyat and dollar. The recipients were held accountable to the stakeholders, of whom the donors were most important. This is why endless reams of the monitoring and evaluation reports were submitted to Western embassies, JPF, World Bank, and others. Receipts for tea were carefully collated with a performance objective, budget line and benchmark. Monitoring and Evaluation Officer became a new profession in Myanmar, judging by the number of job ads advertising for this particular skill.
It seems callous to ask, but isn’t the coup and the seeming collapse of the aid sector a great opportunity for a final monitoring and evaluation report? What are the lessons learned? Why did the road to peace fall off a cliff? Where did the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on peace go? Frankly were JPF still around, it seems like a perfect question for them to conduct an inquiry into.
Measuring The Technology of Peace
One problem is that the JPF and other donors reduce peace to being a technical problem. In the imported version of ‘Peaceland’, conflict, economics, and politics were reduced to metrics which are easily monitored and evaluated with numbers. Thus, violent incident reports seemed quick and precise and economic development was robustly measured in tenths of a percent growth. Election transparency was presumably measurable in the liters of purple gentian violet used to stain the fingers of voters.
The problem perhaps is that peace is not just a technical problem. Peace is complicated, because there are many forms of it and it is more than an absence of violent incidents. Indeed in peace studies, an absence of violent incidents is sometimes called “negative peace”. Myanmar people remember well “negative peace’” from the decades of military rule when fear of government violence was constant, even when there were no violent incidents to count. For negative peace to become “positive peace,” there needs to be reconciliation and the birth of a new sense of shared destiny. Peace studies scholars use mystical terms such as soul of place, cultures of peace, social cohesion, and positive peace. The point is that peace is rooted ultimately in the morality and traditions of the local society, not dollars spent, incidents counted, or even gross national product.
A Wonky Question for the Evaluators: What is Your Real Deliverable?
The monitoring and evaluation profession is about measuring progress toward a goal. Peace was the goal for the NCA but that came to mean only that violent fighting between the military and EAOs should stop, even if the reign of fear continues. Monitoring and evaluation reports, though, only asked if the shooting stopped, not if steps toward what peace studies scholars call “positive peace” were taken. The incentive presented by Western embassies and NGOs was that if you could answer ‘Yes’ that violence rates had decreased, you could get the next contract. Somehow the world of monitoring and evaluation missed the fact that assigning a cup of tea from a workshop to the correct budget category was not the point. “Positive peace” is the point, but this is unfortunately not really a deliverable that can be monitored and evaluated by simply counting violent incidents.
February 1, 2021 presents a classic monitoring and evaluation opportunity for the ‘lessons learned’ crowd. Perhaps what needs to happen is that the donors from the UN, Norway, UK and USA need to admit that the coup was a failure of their own policies, not just of the Myanmar people.
Sadly, this is not yet happening. In Thailand, where I work, USAID, Washington’s aid agency, in particular has arrived with monitoring and evaluation specialists promising dollars for programs addressing Myanmar issues. The catch is that the extensive American accountability requirements mean that the same policies and same NGOs that engineered the failure of 2016-2021 are being funded again. More importantly, the pesky goal that is “positive peace” is still missing. So NGOs spring up, monitoring and evaluation specialists are hired and villas rented in Chiangmai and Bangkok. After that is done, some money will make its way across the border to Myanmar and the rather small number of NGOs with the wherewithal and office staff to continue satisfying the technocracy of the peace industry.
What Would a Real Evaluation Look Like?
What would a real evaluation of the NCA and JPF look like? First, it might start with not just the failures in the 2015 ceasefire, but the dozens of other Myanmar ceasefires which have taken place since the 1950s. And then before that there is the poisonous legacy of British colonialism well remembered by Myanmar’s peoples. Myanmar has historians who could help with evaluating why ceasefires have been ineffective for the last 100 years or so. For example, little thought is put into why the 1950s ceasefires following the 1949 Battle of Insein failed. Nor is much written about the 1990s ceasefires with the Mon, Kachin, Wa, and others. In those failed ceasefires might be found the reason why the 2015 NCA also failed. And finally why did the Rohingya repatriations endorsed by the UN in 1978, 1992, 2012 and 2017 also fail?
If you are a foreigner scratching your head about the Battle of Insein, or other ceasefires, you are not alone. After all, what monitoring and evaluation officer created a career based on bragging about the ceasefire that did not work, even if it was one of the most important events in twentieth century Myanmar history? But I would guess that the unsuccessful endings of the Burmese Civil War of 1949-1950 tell us more about peace in Myanmar than the peace industry’s successes in Colombia, Sri Lanka, etc.
What such studies should not start with are lectures about USAID monitoring and evaluation requirements, or critiques from Western embassies about “Myanmar’s failure”. New ideas and thoughts from outside ‘Peaceland’ need to be sought. There are excellent books in English by Johan Galtung, Severine Autessere, John Paul Lederach, Thich Nhat Hanh, Elise Boulding, and others about the nature of peace and peacebuilding which are rarely noted in the reams of reports. Myanmar scholars like U Pho Hlaing’s writings about the nature of Burmese democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi’s writings about democracy and fear, Saw Aung Hla’s writings about the Karen and Maung Maung Gyi’s thoughts regarding Burmese authoritarianism, were almost universally ignored in Yangon consultancy reports, even though they are available in English. More of course must be available in Burmese, Karen, and the other languages of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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more
Description:
"A recent job posting for the international non-profit organization Search for Common Ground sought a “proactive, dynamic and experienced” person to work in their Yangon office on “Youth, Peace and Security”. The posting failed to mention the February 1 2021 military coup, but did proclaim that “Search Myanmar is at an exciting stage and has been trying to reach a new level of growth, scaling up…to support its strategy in-country to support Myanmar in its priorities of peace, development and democratic change.” I’m not sure “exciting stage” is the apt characterization for contemporary Myanmar. Search is also looking for a Conflict Analyst, a Project Director, a Gender and Diversity Consultant and several other positions.
There has been a flurry of new job postings in the international development space in Myanmar, many of which avoid mentioning the coup. When the issue does arise, it is referred to as a ‘military takeover’, likely because the Ministry of Information under the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) banned the use of the term ‘coup’, as well as the terms ‘junta’ and ‘regime’. It all contributes to a strained return to normalcy, as the United Nations (UN), international organizations, and Western embassies all contrive to rationalize the relentless bad news from around the country.
Filling jobs is prosaic way to keep busy. Nor does aid money spend itself. Although it would be a demonstration of common decency if job postings didn’t talk about “exciting opportunities” when so many potential applicants have been killed in street protests, are in prison, have gone underground to continue civil disobedience, have been exiled, or have chosen to take up arms against a brutal and illegal military system. That rather limits the pool of applicants, something which they could have acknowledged in their ‘search’ for common ground.
In the aftermath of the first anniversary of Myanmar’s putsch, there was the inevitable slew of morosely serious ‘webinars’, which blend into a distant droning sound of helplessness until one discerns the rising signals of reengagement amongst many international donors and diplomats. There are signs big and small, from the woeful visit of outgoing Australian Ambassador Andrea Faulkner to SAC head Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw in early April, obviously on instructions from the Australian government, obtuse statements from diplomats in Yangon, to continued recruitment of multiple positions that scream business as usual and the continued operations of programs that a coup would normally halt.
The UN’s most superfluous agency, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has also advertised for a new Myanmar country director. Yet the UNODC Asia Pacific Regional Director, the studiously self-promoting Jeremy Douglas with his steely Elliot Ness-like intensity, has been spouting alarmist nonsense about a post-coup explosion of crystal methamphetamine production and the perfect conditions for criminal enterprises, given that the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) is otherwise occupied suppressing dissent. The rise of meth production in northern Shan State preceded the coup by years, the MPF only arrest low-level traffickers and users, not major players protected by the military, and the UNODC hasn’t had much success in drug eradication in Myanmar in several decades.
Also, the UN’s common position doesn’t permit any interaction with the Myanmar military or police, so what exactly would the successful applicant be doing? The job posting states; “Keep abreast with the latest developments and trends in Myanmar regarding all areas under UNODC mandates and advise on possible policy and operational responses; Represent UNODC’s position and interests in Myanmar and liaise with Government’s institutions [in line with the common UN position], civil society, regional and international aid agencies and financial institutions, and the media.” So really not much of any use. Or is it the thin edge of a wedge of reengagement? UNODC permitted the attendance of an SAC official at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs several weeks after the coup, and it worked closely with the MPF on drafting the 2014 Anti-Terrorism Law, so its new country head should be watched closely.
The World Food Programme (WFP), arguably one of the the most important agencies operating given the scale of food insecurity and conflict-induced displacement, recently released its ‘2021 Highlights’, not exactly a very conflict-sensitive title. It referred not to a coup d’etat or widespread atrocities, but to a “Political Crisis…Myanmar military stages a takeover prompting near paralysis of economy and public services”, while the number of people receiving assistance increased by one million. An overall tepid description of what the WFP continues to call a ‘crisis’.
UN Secretary General Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzers efforts have also dissolved into bland formula, especially after she was pilloried for her remarks (or misstatement) on ‘power sharing’ in late January. Her April 1 visit to Cambodia resulted in a limp concoction of generalities as she pledged to: “continue to amplify the voices of the people of Myanmar and encourage international action based on an accurate assessment of the situation…continue to engage with all key stakeholders, focusing on helping articulate the bottom-lines and conditions needed for momentum towards any talks about talks in the greater interest of peace, stability and democracy.” It’s as if the coup didn’t happen, the SAC doesn’t exist, or that the military regime isn’t the primary perpetrator of the violence she hopes to quell. Stringing inoffensive words together sends clear signals for the UN inside Myanmar and others to get back to work.
The UN Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has also distributed a clear set of Joint Operating Standards (JOS) that are a model of rectitude and humanitarian impartiality. However, when one sees this contained in the JOS, “this engagement must be principled and should never be considered political legitimization, recognition of – or support to – a party of conflict”, the question is how much legitimization the UN as a whole is bestowing on the SAC as a matter of course? The appointment of the American humanitarian expert Liam Mahony to be an advisor to the UN Humanitarian Country Team in Yangon may provide answers to this. Mahony produced a number of excoriating reports on the UN and international NGO’s failures in Rakhine State, “A Slippery Slope” and in 2018 “Time to Break Old Habits”, about the massive failures of the international community to prevent the atrocities against Rohingya Muslims.
The promise of peace has been exhumed in other ways than just Search Myanmar. The 11-donor Joint Peace Fund (JPF), a US$100 million Ponzi scheme of Western donor avarice and incompetence, has staged a Lazarus-like rebirth with a new strategy: “Following the military takeover…the JPF conducted a major restructuring of its operations to support national stakeholders seeking to resolved the decades-old conflict…(a)n interim strategy was developed as a basis for JPF support to peace process stakeholders during a transition period from January to December 2022…that strengthens local conflict management mechanisms – enabling actors to mitigate the impact of violent conflict on civilians – and retains the foundations for actors to communicate and negotiate to end conflict and violence.”
In other words, we utterly failed at supporting peace between 2016 to 2021, so give us more money and during a multisided civil war sparked by a military coup we can resolve it. There is an astonishingly misplaced optimism in this interim strategy. The JPF is recruiting a Senior Conflict Analyst (meaning foreigner), National Conflict Analyst (meaning someone from Myanmar), Senior Gender Advisor, and two other National Gender Advisors. The ‘Roles and Responsibilities’ of all these positions are highly unlikely to be achieved in any meaningful way, and will contribute little beyond having lunch at the Alamanda Inn’s French restaurant in Yangon’s Golden Valley Green Zone
The central normalizer must be the European Union (EU), maintaining its massive My Justice program (justice in Myanmar?) implemented by the British Council, the Oxfam-directed Durable Peace Program, and the unfortunately mistimed Nexus Response Mechanism (NRM), a US$50 million fund to to “implement innovative, flexible, and rights-based activities at the nexus of the humanitarian, development, and peace sectors…(the) objective is to contribute to long-term peace and national reconciliation, security, stability and sustainable development by reducing the vulnerability, building the resilience, and protecting the rights of conflict and disaster affected communities across Myanmar”, which sounds like a planning document from 2016, not the Myanmar of 2022. To be continuing a project with the Orwellian title of ‘Durable Peace’ in the current carnage is surreal, if not sick. This from a donor who instituted the much derided MyPol police reform scheme, and injected 175 million euros directly into the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) education budget [out of a total grant of 221 million euros], and was a major donor to the JPF.
Compounding the EU’s post-coup cognitive dissonance, EU Ambassador Ranieri Sabatucci’s slew of snarky tweets are enraging many inside Myanmar and he seems determined to pick fights with anyone but the SAC. One of his most recent tweets stated that “#Myanmar social media is full of trollers, located abroad (sic). They judge/speculate without knowledge of the facts. Their insults and aggression discourage healthy pluralistic debates. The result, could be shrinking of democratic space on social media. They should not succeed.” If only Ambassador Sabatucci put as much effort into ensuring the SAC won’t succeed.
The EU exemplifies the two-step strategy of normalization. Back home in Brussels, impose sanctions, make strong speeches and resolutions from the EU Parliament, but in the halls of the European External Action Service (EEAS) seek ways to recover the relationship. Throwing money doesn’t work, but it makes the EU feel useful, and important.
Much of this post-coup normalization is being orchestrated by the all-enveloping efforts of the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), a benign-sounding behemoth of a project-implementing bureaucracy that has been criticized for its slow pace of adaptation to the post-coup reality, and being predisposed to accommodating authority regardless of its credentials. If the James Bond franchise ever had an UN agency as an evil nemesis, it would be UNOPS, where donors send so much bulk funding to be dispersed with the tenderness of a wood chipper.
Arrayed on the other ‘side’ of this normalizing pathology is a mirror image complex of advisors and consultants to the parallel National Unity Government, and various anti-SAC forces. They operate in twilight and obscurity far more than the worker drones of the UN, equally unaccountable and their utility rarely questioned. Who are they and what are they up to? What role did they play in supporting the military or the NLD over the past several years?
They will likely have their complicity in the deficiencies of the NLD expunged as unfortunate association. Yet in light of the recent US government designation of the Rohingya genocide, it would behoove Western donors to ensure they are not paying engorged salaries to anyone in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s former inner circle who cooperated in the attempted cover-up of major atrocities. In fact, any of the opportunists who were orbiting Naypyitaw under the NLD government should automatically be highly suspect. If for no other reason than their obscene salaries.
As feeding frenzies go, it’s perhaps not as fulsome as the early years of the ‘transition’ or the boom years of the post-2015 election when massive development funds were creating major opportunities for the moneyed classes of the international development set. Think of today’s repurposing of so much money that cannot legally be implemented inside Myanmar as a ‘decent interval’ before the West eventually downscales from the country to a pre-Cyclone Nargis mentality and funding mechanisms. This would return the country to a site of sanctions and condemnation, and funneling the bulk of aid to warehoused Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, cross-border assistance to the unremitting attrition warfare of eastern Myanmar, occasional food deliveries to the rural resistance zones of Sagaing and Magwe regions, and undulating optimism at the prospect of ‘durable solutions’ to resolve ten years of protracted displacement of 100,000 people in Kachin and northern Shan states, and the potential funding windfall it may bring to international agencies to assist.
But then anything connected to governance, peace, human rights, or the scams of social cohesion, have a markedly limited role in the current conflict. It is open to question how much genuine utility they had even before 2020, when the peace process was clearly dead and projects of governance were circumscribed by an autarkic and incompetent ruling party.
So why do so many of these actors remain engaged? Pay checks and lifestyles, is a simple explanation. By at least mid-2021 there was already an exodus of foreign technical experts to other countries, much the same as the stampede of people from Afghanistan and Cambodia into Yangon in 2014.
It is now clear that Ukraine has almost permanently distracted media and diplomatic attention away from not just Myanmar, but Yemen, Ethiopia and the Congo. Many Western donors have already calculated their post-pandemic and post-‘takeover’ priorities to resume trade with Southeast Asia, which compels the charade of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality in resolving the Myanmar crisis. As the one-year anniversary of agreeing the Five Point Consensus approaches later this month, any optimism that there will be progress any time soon is clearly strained or delusional, yet it hasn’t prohibited a movement towards ‘living with the SAC’.
It is as if an orchestra of connivance is tuning its instruments, readying itself to build to a crescendo of credible normalization that doesn’t look like the betrayal of Myanmar it really is. But every job advertisement, qualified statement, self-lobotomized tweet, call for ASEAN to take the lead, or addition to the bonfire of pointless knowledge, is actively assisting the SAC in solidifying its rule. On behalf of the people of Myanmar, who are not drowning, but waving, its craven cynicism should be challenged at every turn..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
Language:
more
Description:
"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Burma’s military overthrew the democratically elected civilian government via a coup d’etat on February 1, declaring a state of emergency and transferring all executive, legislative, and judicial authorities to the State Administration Council, an authoritarian military-run administrative organization led by armed forces commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing. The military detained key elected civilian leaders and dissolved all national and subnational legislatures, including the Union Parliament, forcing many elected members to flee their homes and offices or face potential arrest. On February 5, elected parliamentarians from the National League for Democracy and allied political parties formed the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, which subsequently declared the regime “illegitimate” and the 2008 constitution abolished before proclaiming a “National Unity Government” on April 16.
The Myanmar Police Force is primarily responsible for internal security. The Border Guard Police is administratively part of the Myanmar Police Force but operationally distinct. Both fall under the regime’s Ministry of Home Affairs, led by an active-duty military general and itself subordinate to the military command. The armed forces under the Ministry of Defense are responsible for external security but are engaged almost exclusively in internal activities, including combat against ethnic armed groups. Members of the regime security forces continued to commit numerous gross violations of human rights.
Regime security forces arrested State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other leading members of the civilian government and National League for Democracy on February 1. Nationwide prodemocracy protests following the coup and the Civil Disobedience Movement, continuing as of November, opposed and disrupted efforts by the regime to exert full administrative control over governing institutions. The regime responded with repressive tactics such as the mass arrest of its political opponents and the use of widespread lethal violence against unarmed persons, including men, women, and children. Fighting between the military and ethnic armed organizations escalated, and the National Unity Government announced on April 16 that it would establish armed People’s Defense Force groups that would cooperate with various ethnic armed organizations.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment by the regime; gender-based violence by the regime; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated reprisals against individuals in another country; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, and torture and physical abuses or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association; particularly severe restrictions on religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement; the inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats targeting members of national and ethnic minority groups; the existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although those laws were rarely enforced; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association, including violence and threats against labor activists; and the use of forced and child labor, including the worst forms of child labor.
There continued to be almost complete impunity for abuses by the regime security forces. There was no credible information that the regime took actions to prosecute or punish officials responsible for human rights abuses or corruption.
Some ethnic armed organizations and Peoples Defense Force groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse and degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person
A. ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE AND OTHER UNLAWFUL OR POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS
There were numerous reports that regime security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings of civilians, prisoners, and other persons in their power. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which noted that the actual number was likely to be much higher, there were 1,300 verified reports of persons killed by the regime as of November 22. Some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and Peoples Defense Force (PDF) groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse and degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones (see also section 1.g.). Examples include the following.
On February 9, Mya Thwate Khaing was shot in the head by police while peacefully protesting the military coup in the capital, Nay Pyi Taw. She was taken to the hospital but died of her injuries several days later. Her death was widely considered the first fatality in the protest movement that began on February 2.
On February 28, regime security forces killed as many as 26 persons in eight cities and injured scores during a day of massive nationwide demonstrations against the regime. According to multiple media reports, eyewitnesses accounts, and documentary evidence, police arrested hundreds and used tear gas, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, and live rounds in confronting demonstrators.
On March 11, regime security forces shot and killed at least 11 persons in five cities according to multiple media reports, eyewitness accounts, and photographic evidence. Regime security forces used live rounds against unarmed demonstrators in addition to the use of tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets.
On March 27, a national holiday known as Armed Forces Day, regime security forces killed more than 100, including 13 children, across the country according to media reports, eyewitness accounts, and social media posts. Regime security forces met demonstrations on March 28 with further violence, killing at least 22 more individuals.
According to media reports, in April regime security forces continued to kill demonstrators and other civilians, including, on April 9, at least 28 persons in Bago Region. The killing came as regime security forces confronted demonstrators and sought to clear residents’ makeshift barricades.
In May the Chin Human Rights Organization reported that the military cremated the bodies of two civilians who were allegedly tortured to death by regime security forces in Chin State’s capital Hakha.
In July local media reported the death of 40 civilians allegedly killed by the military in Sagaing’s Kani Township. According to a local resident who spoke with the news website Irrawaddy, “Junta troops raided our villages. We fled and found corpses when we came back to the villages.”
In July local media reported the rape and killing of a 55-year-old woman by three soldiers in Kachin State. The military acknowledged the incident after the family filed a complaint, but no action was known to have been taken against the alleged perpetrators.
In September local media reported the King Cobra civilian defense group killed an alleged regime informant in Sagaing Region. King Cobra claimed its members committed 26 other killings.
AAPP alleged that at least 100 political prisoners died due to torture inflicted by authorities between February 1 and September 9. Well-known poet Khet Thi, who wrote the line, “They shoot in the head, but they don’t know the revolution is in the heart,” was reportedly tortured to death by regime security forces. The 45-year-old was detained on May 8 and died the following day in transit to the hospital in Monywa, Magway Region.
B. DISAPPEARANCE
There were numerous reports of disappearances allegedly committed by the regime.
C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
The law prohibits torture; however, members of regime security forces reportedly tortured and otherwise abused suspects, prisoners, detainees, and others. Such incidents occurred, for example, during interrogations and were widely documented across the country. Alleged harsh interrogation techniques were designed to intimidate and disorient and included severe beatings and deprivation of food, water, and sleep. Other reported interrogation methods described in news reports included rubbing salt into wounds and depriving individuals of oxygen until they passed out.
A 19-year-old prodemocracy supporter told local media that on April 9, he was taken to a military compound on the outskirts of Bago Township, Bago Region where “the commander tied my hands from the back and used small scissors to cut my ears, the tip of my nose, my neck and my throat.”
In April media reported regime forces struck Wai Moe Naing, a high-profile Muslim protest leader and a Muslim, with an unmarked vehicle during a motorbike demonstration in Monywa.
Transgender writer Han Nwe Oo shared on social media that while in detention she was ridiculed for being transgender, sexually assaulted, and faced “atrocious” interrogation for two days at a military camp inside Mandalay Palace, Mandalay Region in September.
According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women in custody were subjected to sexual assault, gender-based violence, and verbal abuse. Police in some cases verbally abused women who reported rape. Women who reported sexual assault faced further abuse by police and the possibility of being sued for impugning the dignity of the perpetrator. On July 19, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders noted “[w]omen human rights defenders are particularly at risk in remote rural areas and are often beaten and kicked before being sent to prison where they may face torture and sexual violence with no medical care provided.”
In one case in April, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that security force members severely beat and sexually assaulted a female detainee accused of involvement in small-scale bomb attacks against regime targets in Rangoon. Her injuries were so severe she struggled to eat or urinate. Her cellmate reported similar treatment.
Also in April, local media reported that a high school student from Rangoon was arrested with her mother and described how she was “touched by a police officer who told me he could kill me and make me disappear.”
In Rangoon a journalist detained in March told media he witnessed police burn a detained female journalist with cigarettes and threaten to rape her if she did not provide information on her involvement in prodemocracy activities.
Impunity for rights abuses was pervasive for security force leaders and members. There was no credible evidence that the regime took action to investigate incidents or punish alleged perpetrators of abuses or to include human rights training as part of its overall training of regime security forces. The regime routinely denied responsibility for atrocities. For example, in April local media reported that the regime issued a blanket denial of abuses during a meeting with the UN special envoy for Burma, rejecting her allegations as “one-sided,” while denying it had killed children, among other atrocities.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Conditions in prisons, labor camps, and military detention facilities were reportedly harsh and frequently life threatening due to overcrowding; degrading and abusive treatment; and inadequate access to medical care (including COVID-19 treatment) and basic needs, including food, shelter, and hygiene.
Physical Conditions: There were 48 known prisons and 50 known labor camps in 2020. Women and men were held separately. Some prisons held pretrial detainees together with convicted prisoners. Children were sometimes held in pretrial detention with adults. More than 20,000 inmates were serving court-mandated sentences in labor camps located across the country in 2020; data were not available for the reporting year. The Associated Press reported on October 28 that the military had transformed dozens of public facilities (e.g., community halls) into interrogation centers across the country after the coup.
Several reports document poor conditions within prison facilities, including inadequate sewage systems, insufficient – and often inedible – rations, and a lack of basic necessities. Overcrowding was reportedly a serious problem in many prisons and labor camps. According to AAPP, occupancy at Insein Prison, the country’s largest, was nearly three times its intended capacity prior to the military coup.
Medical care was inadequate, and this reportedly contributed to deaths in custody. Prisons failed to adopt measures to protect prisoners from COVID-19, and there were widespread reports of COVID-19 transmission, illness, and deaths among prisoners. Despite regular regime reporting at national and subnational levels on COVID-19 cases and deaths, the regime failed to make data available on the impact of COVID-19 in prisons. According to AAPP, COVID-19 vaccinations were limited only to high-profile prisoners. In addition to COVID-19, prisoners suffered from other health problems, including malaria, heart disease, high blood pressure, tuberculosis, skin diseases, and intestinal illnesses caused or exacerbated by unhygienic conditions and spoiled food. There were also numerous reports of political prisoners being denied medical services.
Former prisoners complained of poorly maintained physical structures that provided no protection from the elements and were infested with rodents, snakes, and molds.
Conditions for women were deplorable, with a lack of access to sufficient toilets and no privacy. Prison guards denied requests for sanitary products for menstruation and other basic hygiene products. After the coup, sexual violence, gender harassment, and humiliation by officials increased.
In September human rights watchdog Just Power reported that a prominent human rights activist suffered from deteriorating health conditions as a result of her “unjust arrest and detention.” According to the report, regime security forces denied her access to health services, including to medicines provided by her family.
Administration: Prisoners and detainees could sometimes submit complaints to judicial authorities prior to the coup, but there was no clear legal or administrative protection for this right. There is no credible evidence of prisoners and detainees submitting complaints after the coup. Some prisons prevented full adherence to religiously based codes of personal conduct, ostensibly due to space restrictions and security concerns.
In April local media reported that a journalist fasting in observance of Ramadan was accused of staging a hunger strike and sent to solitary confinement at Insein Prison.
Independent Monitoring: The Department of Corrections in the Ministry of Home Affairs operated the prisons and labor camp system.
The International Committee for the Red Cross had no access to prisons, labor camps, or military detention sites during the year. After March 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs under the deposed civilian government claimed it could not allow access because of COVID-19 prevention measures. After the coup, the military continued to deny access to all prisons and detention sites.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime did not have access to prisons or labor camps and on February 1, ended cooperative capacity-building programs with the Department of Corrections. The drug and crime office continued to provide limited COVID-19-related personal protective equipment and primary basic health care assistance (e.g., infection prevention and control supplies) directly to the prisons.
D. ARBITRARY ARREST OR DETENTION
The law does not prohibit arbitrary arrest. Persons held generally did not have the right to appeal the legality of their arrest or detention either administratively or before a court. The law allows authorities to order the detention without charge or trial of anyone they believe is performing or might perform any act that endangers the sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquility.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Incommunicado detention was common. Since the coup, the regime detained politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, and Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) members and refused to confirm their locations in violation of international law, according to HRW. In August AAPP reported that an estimated 5,000 individuals listed by the regime as “under detention” were in unknown locations, accounting for approximately 82 percent of arrests since the coup. Even when the whereabouts of prisoners was known, prisoners were regularly denied access to lawyers and family members.
After the coup, the military regime suspended aspects of privacy protection law to legalize arrests and private property searches without a warrant.
Authorities may hold suspects in pretrial detention for two weeks (with a possible two-week extension) before bringing them before a judge or informing them of their charges. The regime is not, however, obliged to respect this provision of the law. There is a functioning bail system, although the courts regularly denied bail to prodemocracy supporters. There were numerous reports that authorities did not inform family members or attorneys of arrests in a timely manner, did not disclose their location, and regularly denied family visitations.
Arbitrary Arrest: There were numerous reports of arbitrary arrest, including detention by the regime in unknown locations. Since the coup, regime security forces have made at least 8,000 arrests and more than 6,500 of those individuals remain in some form of detention.
In May, HRW reported the arrest of a lawyer defending a deposed local political leader after a court hearing in Nay Pyi Taw and the arrest of lawyer defending a political prisoner in Ayeyarwady Region. In June, HRW reported the arrest of a lawyer defending more than 120 political prisoners in Kachin State.
In July, UN human rights experts expressed concern about the arbitrary arrest of human rights defenders, citing credible information of such treatment of human rights defenders, including labor rights and student activists.
According to AAPP, among those the regime detained as of September were more than 175 family members of prodemocracy supporters, including 15 children. In August, for example, a family member delivering food and medicine to a political prisoner was detained at Insein Prison for six days. In September regime security forces reportedly arrested the wife and young child of a human rights activist to coerce his surrender. The activist was charged under terrorism legislation for supporting the CDM. His wife and child were missing as of December.
According to the independent news service Myanmar Now, a 14-year-old boy was detained in Taungtha Township, Mandalay Region in September by the regime to coerce his father, a former local National League for Democracy (NLD) leader, to turn himself in to police. The boy’s mother told a reporter, “They came for my husband and took the kid, saying they needed him to show them where dad was.…I keep waiting for his release. I don’t want anything else; I just want my son back.”
Pretrial Detention: Prior to the coup, judges and police sometimes colluded to extend detentions. According to the Independent Lawyers’ Association in 2020, arbitrary and lengthy pretrial detentions resulted from lengthy, complicated legal procedures and widespread corruption. These problems continued following the coup, worsened by the regime’s ability to detain persons indefinitely without trial. For those facing trial, detention prior to and during trials sometimes equaled or exceeded the sentence after conviction. The regime amended the legal aid law in May, removing the right to legal aid services during pretrial detention. Additional amendments limited legal aid for stateless persons, asylum seekers, foreigners, and migrant workers.
Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Although habeas corpus exists in national law, regime security forces violated this law by arresting and detaining individuals without following proper procedures. Arbitrary arrest or detention was drastically increased to suppress political dissent, according to AAPP and detainees had limited ability to meaningfully challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court due to its lack of judicial independence from the regime.
E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, a protection the regime has not respected. On February 4, the regime dismissed five NLD-appointed justices of the Supreme Court and replaced them with justices who support the regime. The remaining four justices, including the chief justice, were holdovers from the previous military junta.
In February the regime declared martial law in numerous townships across the country and transferred judicial (and executive) power to regional military commanders in several cities. In martial law courts, defendants have few or no rights, including access to legal counsel and the right of appeal (except in cases involving the death penalty, which may be appealed to armed forces commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing). The hearings are abbreviated, the verdict is reached within one or two sessions, and the sentences are typically the maximum penalties allowed. According to regime public announcements, by November, 61 cases were heard in martial law courts, with 280 defendants convicted and sentenced, including at least 80 defendants sentenced to death.
Judicial corruption was a significant problem. According to NGOs, officials at all levels received illegal payments at all stages of the legal process for purposes ranging from influencing routine matters to substantive decisions, such as fixing the outcome of a case.
Trial Procedures
Although no formal changes to trial procedures in civilian courts were made following the coup, the lack of judicial independence leaves much to the interpretation of the regime. The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial but also grants broad exceptions, effectively allowing the regime to violate these rights at will. While the right to counsel remains in the law, many defense lawyers were unwilling to handle prodemocracy cases due to fear for their personal safety. According to HRW, at least six lawyers handling political cases were arrested since the coup. Defendants do not enjoy a presumption of innocence or, even when the law provides for them, the rights to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them; to be present at their trial; to free interpretation; or to receive adequate representation. There is no right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Trial procedures were also affected by COVID-19 pandemic mitigation measures.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
The regime detained and arrested politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, religious activists, and CDM members. Political prisoners were not always held separately from the prison’s general population. Many political prisoners were held incommunicado.
Many former political prisoners were subject to surveillance and restrictions following their release, including the inability to secure identity or travel documents. AAPP estimated that there were more than 6,000 political prisoners as of year’s end.
Deposed state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested on February 1 and held in an unknown location. She faced 11 separate charges for a range of offenses running from interacting with a crowd during the COVID-19 pandemic to sedition. Her trial was closed to the public and the regime placed a gag order on her attorneys so that the attorneys could not communicate with the public about her case. On December 6, she was convicted of inciting unrest and violating COVID-19 restrictions and sentenced to four years in prison. Also arrested February 1, deposed president Win Myint, was tried on the same charges and also convicted and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Just hours after the news of guilty verdicts for Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint broke on December 6, state media announced that the regime had “reduced [their] sentences…by two years.” The regime announcement also highlighted that the two would remain detained in their unknown locations, in conditions reportedly equivalent to house arrest.
Amnesty: The regime included some political prisoners among the more than 23,000 inmates released to mark Union Day on February 12. The regime released all those who met set criteria (e.g., not charged under Section 505 of the penal code, which criminalizes disseminating information that could agitate or cause security forces or state officials to mutiny), with no specific leniency for political prisoners. According to some human rights activists, the regime used the general pardon order to make space available for more political prisoners.
Amnesty was also granted to several high-profile ethnic Rakhine politicians, including Aye Maung and writer Wai Hin Aung, sentenced to long jail sentences for high treason under the deposed NLD government. In September the regime also released controversial ultranationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu, charged with sedition by the deposed government for comments he made during a 2019 promilitary rally.
Politically Motivated Reprisal against Individuals Located Outside the Country
Bilateral Pressure: There were credible reports that the regime attempted to pressure the Thai government to impose stricter control on movement across the border with Burma to undermine the ability of prodemocracy supporters from organizations, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Committee Representing the Union Parliament that created it, to depart the country.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
The law allows complainants to use provisions of the penal code and laws of civil procedure to seek civil remedies for human rights abuses. Individuals and organizations may not appeal an adverse decision to regional human rights bodies but may make complaints to the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission. After the coup, the ability of complainants to raise human rights abuses through the judicial system or the commission was limited.
Property Seizure and Restitution
Under the 2008 Constitution the state owns all land, although there is a limited amount of freehold land, and the law allows for registration and sale of private land ownership rights. Most land is held in long-term lease, meaning that while the government still owns this leasehold, private parties may lease land on a long-term basis with a general expectation that the leasehold would automatically roll over upon its expiration. The law provides for compensation when the government acquires privately held land for a public purpose; however, the postcoup situation is unclear. The government may also declare land unused or “vacant” and assign it to foreign investors or designate it for other uses. There is no judicial review of land ownership or confiscation decisions; administrative bodies subject to regime control make final decisions on land use and registration. The law does not favor recognition of traditional land tenure systems (customary tenure). There were numerous reports that the regime used its authority to seize property of prodemocracy supporters.
In March the regime reportedly seized assets worth approximately $3.8 million from staff members of a foundation accused of financially supporting the CDM.
In September the regime Anti-Terrorism Central Committee released a public notice requiring landlords to provide a list of tenants to their ward administration offices or face confiscation of the property.
As of November 15, credible media reports indicated that the regime has seized approximately 70 properties owned by NLD officials. The regime’s amendment of three laws enabled the extrajudicial seizure of property owned by defendants. The regime has also seized properties belonging to members of the Committee Representing the Union Parliament and NUG or their families.
F. ARBITRARY OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE
The law protected privacy and the security of the home, but enforcement of these rights was limited after the coup. Unannounced nighttime household checks were common. The law does not protect the privacy of correspondence or other communications. The regime regularly monitored private electronic communications through online surveillance; there were numerous reports that the regime monitored prodemocracy supporters.
On March 1, the New York Times reported that the military employed invasive dual-use surveillance, hacking, and forensic technologies to monitor and target critics and protesters. Before the coup, the military built an “electronic warfare capability” and bought surveillance technology, including cell phone-hacking tools to monitor prodemocracy activists.
In July local news outlet Frontier Myanmar reported that the regime ordered mobile phone companies to install equipment to enable them to monitor calls, text messages, and locations of selected users, flagging each time they use words such as “protest” or “revolution.” Mention of these words may trigger heavier surveillance or be used as evidence against those being watched. The regime also monitored social media use, including data from visited websites, as well as conversations in public and private chat groups. According to the magazine Frontier Myanmar, this “cybersecurity team” was based inside the police’s Special Branch, a notorious surveillance department that heavily monitored suspected dissidents in the previous era of junta rule.
G. CONFLICT-RELATED ABUSES
After the coup, escalating conflict between the regime and joint EAOs-PDF groups focused on the northwest part of the country, with frequent fighting in Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Region. Conflict was also reported in Kachin, Kayah, and Karen States and in the Mandalay, Bago, and Tanintharyi Regions. Conflict between the military and the Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State declined following the coup because of a pre-coup de facto ceasefire. In March the regime removed the Arakan Army from its designated list of terrorist organizations; however, local media reported clashes between the AA and the military on November 9 after the military entered an AA-controlled area in the border area of Maungdaw Township.
Fighting between EAOs in Shan State continued.
Reports of killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, disregard for civilian life, sexual violence, and other abuses committed by regime security forces and some EAOs and PDF groups were common.
The NUG issued a code of conduct for PDF groups in June and included a call to respect human rights in its September 7 “people’s defensive war” declaration. No data was available to measure the impact of the NUG’s efforts to prevent human rights abuses by PDF groups.
Killings: Deliberate killings and deaths due to excessive or unjustified use of force by the regime were reported. For example:
On March 3, regime security forces killed at least 24 persons across the country in confrontations with peaceful demonstrators. In one Rangoon neighborhood alone, at least seven protesters died and 17 were critically wounded in a confrontation with regime security forces. Over the March 13-14 weekend, regime security forces shot and killed demonstrators indiscriminately across the country, killing at least 42.
In May a young mother in Magway’s Salin Township reportedly died from indiscriminate military fire during a raid. According to Myanmar Now, the raid was in response to prodemocracy graffiti.
In July, NUG-designated Minister for Human Rights Aung Myo Min reported that the military killed at least 32 civilians and displaced more than 6,000 residents from 13 villages in Sagaing’s Debeyin Township during intensified military operations targeting EAO and PDF strongholds.
In September the military was suspected of killing and mutilating five civilians in Magway’s Gangaw Township. According to the Irrawaddy, the victims were shot, and in some cases mutilated or showed signs of torture.
Also in September, the Irrawaddy reported on the killing of 18 civilians in Magway’s Yaw village perpetrated by the military. One resident recalled, “Most of them were shot in the head. Their heads were broken, and their brains spilled out like a ripe papaya that has fallen from a tree.” An 86-year-old resident was found tied up, with signs that he had been beaten to death.
In late September, according to a Radio Free Asia report, security forces responding to an attack by local defense forces in Thantlang, Chin State, shot and killed Baptist pastor Cung Biak Hum as he and others tried to extinguish fires the forces set. When his body was recovered, his ring finger was cut off and the wedding ring apparently stolen.
On December 5, regime security forces violently suppressed prodemocracy protesters in Rangoon. Tactics included, according to numerous reports, ramming a police vehicle directly into a crowd, killing five and injuring another 15. Escalating violence between the military and EAOs exposed many children to violence. AAPP reported in September that 61 children were killed in military-EAO conflicts.
Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: There were reports of such abuses by EAOs and PDF forces. In December Myanmar Now reported the targeting of alleged military informants and others seen as sympathetic to the regime. In June commanders of the Karen National Defense Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union, confirmed Karen National Defense Army soldiers killed 25 alleged military spies and detained 22 others for approximately one week near Waw Lay, Myawaddy Township, Karen State.
Child Soldiers: The military and some EAOs (Kachin Independence Army, AA, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Karen National Liberation Army, Shan State Army, and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) were listed in the UN secretary-general’s 2021 Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict as perpetrators of the unlawful recruitment and use of children. There were no data on PDF groups. Meaningful use of the National Complaint Mechanism, focused on the elimination of forced labor but which also prohibits the use and recruitment of child soldiers, was limited after the coup. There was no credible evidence that the regime or EAOs prosecuted offenders.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Other Conflict-related Abuse: According to numerous local media reports, UN counterparts, and NGOs the regime restricted the passage of relief supplies, including medical supplies, and access by international humanitarian organizations to conflict-affected areas including in Kachin, Chin, Kayah, Karen, Tanintharyi, and Shan States. HRW reported on December 13 that restrictions on humanitarian assistance imposed by the regime since the coup were creating a “nationwide humanitarian catastrophe.” The United Nations estimated that the number of persons needing assistance would go from one million before the coup to 14.4 million by 2022. On November 8, the United Nations stated, “access to many people in desperate need across the country remains extremely limited due to bureaucratic impediments put in place by the armed forces.” HRW further reported that the military has seized food deliveries meant for displaced populations and arrested individuals on “suspicion of supporting aid efforts.” Visas for aid workers have also been delayed or denied. UNICEF reported in October that “the need to procure travel authorization [from the regime] remains a major access impediment and a high constraint factor for the humanitarian partners’ capacity to reach people in need.”
The regime reportedly forced civilians to act as human shields, carry supplies, or serve in other support roles. In September the Karen National Union reported to a local media outlet that approximately 300 civilians, including a number of women and children, were forced by regime security forces to perform military support duties. In September, Democratic Voice Burma reported that more than 100 soldiers abducted five local residents to act as guides for regime security forces in Kachin State.
As of September, the World Health Organization reported 260 attacks on health-care workers since the coup, representing 39 percent of such attacks globally during the year. In a February case, a doctor was arrested in Rangoon for providing first aid to prodemocracy supporters who had been shot while peacefully protesting. In July the Irrawaddy reported that the regime arrested five volunteer doctors working on COVID-19 prevention activities after luring them to a house under false pretenses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties
A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA
The 2008 Constitution provides that “every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of expressing and publishing freely their convictions and opinions,” but it contains the broad and ambiguous caveat that exercise of these rights must “not be contrary to the laws enacted for national security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility, or public order and morality.” The postcoup regime led a full-scale crackdown on freedom of expression.
Freedom of Expression: Freedom of speech was severely limited. Those who spoke openly against the regime or in favor of the NLD, NUG, or democracy more broadly risked abuse and punishment by authorities. On September 4, poet and activist Maung Saungkha was convicted under Section 19 of this law after he placed a banner over a highway during a protest marking the one-year anniversary of restrictions on mobile internet communications in parts of Rakhine and Chin States. Maung Saungkha chose to pay a fine of 30,000 kyat ($22.50) rather than serve a 15-day prison sentence.
The regime used the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of the Citizens to allow authorities to review content on individuals’ cell phones at checkpoints and during neighborhood raids. The regime reportedly employed violence and targeted killings to silence critics in civil society. Violence against persons engaged in speech deemed antiregime was allegedly used by proregime ultranationalist Buddhist groups as well as security forces and included maiming, kidnapping, and torture. The regime intimidated many prodemocracy voices among the public who previously spoke openly about politically sensitive topics. (See also “Internet Freedom,” below.)
A prodemocracy activist in Rangoon said during a media interview that regime security forces beat him as authorities transported him to a local interrogation center in February. The next morning, he was unable to eat due to injuries he had sustained during his first night in detention. He reported being tortured for days and only released after signing a statement denying the use of torture by the regime.
Freedom of Expression for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Prior to the coup, independent media outlets were active and able to operate despite many official and unofficial restrictions, economic hardship, and an uncertain business environment. After the coup, analysts reported the closure of 71 media outlets, ranging from well-known national, regional, and ethnic media to small Facebook pages. Regime crackdowns on media resulted in the arrest, detention, loss of work, and forced exile of more than 1,000 journalists, editors, and media staff – approximately 50 percent of pre-coup total. For example, two Kamayut Media journalists were arrested in March, one was released on June 15 and the other remained in detention at year’s end. In Mandalay the regime arrested and subsequently released freelance journalists. Eleven media and the Voice Daily self-censored and avoided criticism of the regime. The Myanmar Times and Union Daily have ceased publication, and Irrawaddy, Frontier, and Myanmar Now operated mostly in exile from outside the country.
In May the regime banned satellite dishes to restrict access to international news. The regime offered three public television channels – two controlled by the Ministry of Information and one controlled by the military. Two private companies that had strong links to the previous military regime continued to broadcast six free-to-air television channels. The regime and regime-linked businesspersons controlled eight FM radio stations. In August the NUG launched Radio NUG, a clandestine service that provided two 30-minute reports daily with prodemocracy content.
Violence and Harassment: The regime subjected journalists and other media workers to violence, harassment, detention, and intimidation for their reporting. According to AAPP, at least 95 journalists were unjustly arrested after February, and more than half of those remained in detention as of November. Among journalists detained by the regime were reporters from the Associated Press, the Ayeyarwady Times News, and many more outlets. In April the New York Times reported that many journalists stopped wearing helmets or vests marked with the word “PRESS,” did not publish under their own names, and avoided sleeping at home. On December 14, local media reported that freelance photojournalist and graphic designer Soe Naing died in regime custody after his arrest on December 10 while covering the “Silent Strike.” Soe Naing reportedly died after a violent interrogation, marking the first known death of a journalist while in regime custody since the coup.
Authorities arrested Polish photojournalist Robert Bociaga on March 11 in Shan State and deported him after he was held in detention for 13 days.
In April authorities detained Yuki Kitazumi, a Japanese freelance journalist, and accused him of supporting prodemocracy protests. Authorities released and deported Kitazumi in May.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: After the coup, the regime banned independent media outlets that did not self-censor reporting on the prodemocracy movement. The regime also banned using certain terminology in reporting, such as “junta,” “coup d’etat,” and “military council.” The Myanmar Times suspended publication on February 21 after many of its staff quit to protest the leadership’s decision to follow the regime order not to describe the military takeover as a “coup.” On March 8, the regime banned broadcast, online, and print media Mizzima, Democratic Voice Burma, Khit Thit Media, Myanmar Now, and 7Day News from broadcasting or reporting on any platform. Each of these media organizations had extensively covered the protests, including on their social media pages. The regime later revoked the licenses of three ethnic-minority-run outlets: Myitkyina News Journal from Kachin State, Tachileik News Agency from Shan State, and 74 other media outlets suspended their operations in response.
Libel/Slander Laws: Even before the coup, the military could and did use various legal provisions, such as a criminal defamation clause in the telecommunications law, to restrict freedom of expression. After the coup, the regime primarily relied on Section 505 of the penal code to prosecute journalists. Following his arrest on March 3 in Bago Region, a reporter covering prodemocracy protests from the radio and television company Democratic Voice Burma was the first after the coup to be charged under this section of the law. According to media reports, he was brutally beaten and seriously injured during his arrest. On May 3, he was sentenced to three years in prison. In June two other journalists were sentenced to two years in prison. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 24 journalists were facing charges under the broadened Section 505A that includes penalties for spreading “false news.”
National Security: Although the regime prosecuted some media critics using laws related to national security, in general the regime used other methods to pursue its critics. The regime designated the NUG and related prodemocracy groups as terrorist organizations but as of November had not arrested or tried any members of these on terrorist charges.
Internet Freedom
The regime surveilled and censored online content, restricted access to the internet, and prosecuted its online critics. Even before the coup, the telecommunications law included broad provisions giving the government the power to temporarily block and filter content for the “benefit of the people.” According to Freedom House, the regime, the military, and promilitary groups pressured users to remove antiregime and prodemocracy content. Myanmar law does not explicitly include provisions to force the removal of content or provide for intermediary liability, although some sections of law are so overly broad and vague that they may be used to justify forced content removal. Regime authorities instead used, or threatened to use, other criminal provisions of law to pressure internet users to remove content.
The regime limited users’ ability to communicate anonymously by requiring users to register all SIM cards. Subscribers were required to provide their name, national registration document, birthday, address, citizenship, and gender to register a SIM card; noncitizens must provide their passports. Telecommunications companies reportedly required some subscribers to include information beyond the bounds of the regulations, including their ethnicity.
Telecommunications and internet surveillance allegedly contributed to violent crackdowns on citizens, including physical assaults and enforced disappearances in retaliation for online and offline activities.
During the February protests, social media was a crucial vehicle for demonstrators and activist leaders to organize and encourage support for the prodemocracy movement. That month the regime censored social media websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, used by prodemocracy groups and protesters to resist the regime. Throughout the period since the coup, authorities allegedly arrested Facebook users found to have posted antiregime content or used profile photos with text supporting, for example, recognition of the NUG at the United Nations. Amnesty International reported in October that the regime arrested a prodemocracy supporter from his home in Rangoon for posting a picture on Facebook showing someone stepping on a photo of commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing. Authorities also reportedly arrested and detained individuals who followed Facebook, Twitter, and other pages of prodemocracy actors. Online news sites such as those of the BBC, Singapore-based CNA, and CNN were banned after the coup. Most individuals relied on virtual private networks to access independent online news.
In the days following the coup, Netblocks, a London-based service that tracks internet disruptions, reported “a near-total internet shutdown,” with connectivity falling to just 16 percent of normal levels. While internet connectivity later largely returned, occasional reports of targeted cuts across the country continued. For example, on September 15, the Irrawaddy reported that the regime cut off internet access in several townships in Sagaing and Mandalay Regions believed to be PDF strongholds.
In May media reported that the regime shared a “whitelist” of at least 1,200 approved websites with local internet service providers and telecommunications companies. The approved “whitelist” included nearly 50 companies in the banking and financial sector, more than 20 delivery services, and more than 60 entertainment sites, including Instagram, YouTube, Netflix, and Tinder. The whitelist further specified that some social media sites were permitted if “used by many customers for business purposes.”
Following the coup, the regime twice imposed nationwide internet blackouts to suppress the prodemocracy movement, followed by nightly internet blackouts for an extended period. The regime routinely used internet blackouts as a tool against its opponents including in Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Regions. These measures hampered daily business activities and consumer spending. The NGO Freedom House singled out the country for heavy criticism in its Freedom on the Net 2021 report due to the military’s shutting down the internet, blocking social media, and forcing tech companies to hand over personal data as part of its efforts to consolidate power after the coup. Freedom House documented a 14-point decline in internet freedom indicators, the largest ever recorded in its report.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The regime restricted academic freedom and cultural events. Violent crackdowns by the regime on student and teacher prodemocracy supporters affected at least 60 schools and university campuses across the country. The regime reportedly dismissed or arrested dozens of university staff, and suspended thousands more for their involvement in the CDM. In May the Irrawaddy reported that the regime Education Ministry dismissed 41 striking staff members, including 14 officials from the Higher Education Department. The Institute for International Education Scholar Rescue Fund reported receiving numerous requests for support from academic personnel targeted by the regime since the coup. The regime also targeted prominent prodemocracy cultural figures including filmmakers, writers, singers, and actors. In March organizers of the Wathan Film Festival issued a statement on behalf of visual artists, cartoonists, comedians, actors, writers, and poets, calling on the global creative community to show solidarity with the population.
In November Myanmar Now reported that a teacher from Mandalay Region participating in the CDM died hours after his arrest. A colleague of the 40-year-old high school teacher shared, “We were only told that he died during the interrogation…his body was all wrapped up with only his face exposed.”
B. FREEDOMS OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The regime curtailed the exercise of the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
In the initial days after the coup, hundreds of thousands of individuals took to the streets peacefully to protest the military takeover and demand the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. On February 8, the regime ordered curfews and restrictions on the size of gatherings that effectively banned peaceful public demonstrations across the country, although demonstrations continued, nonetheless. Regime security forces met protesters with increasing violence and lethal force. According to numerous reports in local media, small-scale prodemocracy protests continued across the country as of November despite violent intimidation and suppression by security forces.
Freedom of Association
The regime restricted the right to freedom of association. The law on registering organizations stipulates voluntary registration for local NGOs and removes punishments for noncompliance for both local and international NGOs. Prior to the coup, the government interpreted the law as requiring NGOs that received foreign funding to register with the government. After the coup, the regime required banks to report on all foreign funds received by both local and international NGOs.
C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
The law does not protect freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation. Local regulations limit the rights of citizens to settle and reside anywhere in the country. Authorized officials may require the registration of foreigners’ movements and require foreigners to register every change of address exceeding 24 hours.
In-country Movement: Regional and local orders, directives, and instructions restricted freedom of movement. The regime increased restrictions on freedom of movement after the coup. Numerous local media reports described regime security force roadblocks and the random searches of private cars and taxis. Nightly curfews in Rangoon and several other cities also restricted movement, as did a reinstated requirement that all visitors register with the local ward administrator. Local media reported that the regime harassed, including by seizing ambulances, health-care workers when medical emergencies required them to break curfew. Due to escalating conflict with the military, the NUG and EAOs warned civilians to travel only in case of an emergency. For example, the Thantlang Revolutionary Campaign informed residents in September not to go out after 7 p.m., not to go hunting or into the jungle unless absolutely necessary, and to take extra care when traveling. COVID-19 mitigation regulations also contributed to restriction of movement.
Limitations on freedom of movement for Rohingya in Rakhine State were unchanged. Rohingya may not move freely; they must obtain travel authorization to leave their township. In contrast to the pre-coup rule that Rohingya traveling without documentation could return to their homes without facing immigration charges, the regime’s General Administration Department issued a directive resuming legal actions against Rohingya traveling without permission in Sittwe and Kyauktaw.
Foreign Travel: The regime restricted foreign travel by prodemocracy supporters and expanded measures to increase oversight. According to an official order dated May 13, “The authorities have directed airlines that all bookings for departures from Myanmar must be made at least 10 days in advance of the intended departure and be shared with [the] Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” The regime also reportedly cancelled, or refused to issue, passports to prodemocracy supporters. The regime notified the diplomatic community in Thailand and India that it had taken this action against multiple prodemocracy leaders. Numerous prodemocracy supporters expressed concern for their security and safety if they tried to leave the country by air, and at least one person reported being denied boarding because she was related to an NLD member. COVID-19 mitigation efforts also restricted foreign travel.
E. STATUS AND TREATMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 296,000 recently arrived individuals were living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of December 17 due to postcoup violence in Southeast Burma, Kachin and Shan States, and Northwest Burma. A total of 666,000 persons were internally displaced in the country as of December 1. Decades of conflict between the central government and ethnic communities, exacerbated by the coup and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulted in large numbers of primarily ethnic-minority IDPs in ethnic-dominated parts of the country.
In June the United Nations estimated that more than 100,000 persons had fled their homes to escape conflict and risked starving in Kayah State alone. Myanmar Now reported on June 16 that the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force announced the temporary suspension of attacks on the military amid the growing crisis.
The regime has systematically obstructed humanitarian relief. In June local media reported that the military burned bags of rice, barrels of cooking oil, and other staples that locals from southern Shan State gathered to support those displaced from an escalation in fighting. In September, for example, amid an escalation in conflict, the military blocked humanitarian supply routes to 50,000 IDPs in Chin State, according to Radio Free Asia. According to local media, fighting erupted in Lay Kay Kaw Township, Karen State, the evening of December 14 between opposition forces and regime security, displacing at least 4,000 individuals including local residents and prodemocracy supporters seeking safe haven in the area. Democratic Voice Burma news reported that regime security forces continued to shoot at civilians as they fled for safety. HRW reported in December that the regime has imposed travel restrictions on humanitarian workers, blocked access roads and aid convoys, and destroyed nonmilitary supplies.
F. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
The regime did not always cooperate with UNHCR or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, or other persons of concern.
Access to Asylum: The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government has not established a system for providing protection to refugees. UNHCR did not register any asylum seekers during the year.
G. STATELESS PERSONS
The law defines a “national ethnic group” as a racial and ethnic group that can prove origins in the country dating back to 1823, a year prior to British colonization, and the regime officially recognized 135 “national ethnic groups” whose members are automatically granted full citizenship. The law also establishes two forms of citizenship short of full citizenship: associate and naturalized. Citizens in these two categories are unable to run for political office; form a political party; serve in the military, police, or public administration; inherit land or money; or pursue certain professional degrees, such as medicine and law. Only members of the third generation of associate or naturalized citizens are able to acquire full citizenship.
Rohingya, most of whom are Muslim, are not recognized as a “national ethnic group” and the vast majority are stateless as a result. Following the forced displacement of more than 740,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017, up to 600,000 Rohingya were estimated to remain in Rakhine State. Some Rohingya may be technically eligible for full citizenship. The process involves additional official scrutiny and was complicated by logistical difficulties, including travel restrictions and significant gaps in understanding the Burmese language. In practice this also required substantial bribes to regime officials, and even then, it did not result in equality with other full citizens. In particular, only Rohingya were required to go through an additional step of applying for the National Verification Card, through which they receive identity documents that describe them as “Bengali.” Regime officials treat Rohingya with the presumption of noncitizenship. This could lead to discrimination in access to public services and a wide range of societal discrimination.
There were also significant numbers of stateless persons and persons with undetermined nationality, including persons of Chinese, Indian, and Nepali descent. Although these latter groups did not face the same level of official and social discrimination as Rohingya, the regime granted members of these groups only the lesser rights, and imposed the greater restrictions, of associate and naturalized citizenship. The regime did not single these groups out the same way as Rohingya when obtaining citizenship.
The law does not provide any form of citizenship (or associated rights) for children born in the country whose parents are stateless.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
Prior to the coup, the constitution provided citizens a limited ability to choose their government through elections held by secret ballot. The military deposed the democratically elected parliament and dissolved the Union Election Commission (UEC), appointing a former military major general to replace the ousted UEC chairman. On July 26, the military regime UEC announced that it had annulled the results of the November 2020 general elections, which domestic and international observers assessed as largely reflective of the will of the electorate, despite some identified irregularities and local election cancellations in some ethnic areas.
On October 16, the regime UEC announced that upcoming regional elections were cancelled across most of Rakhine State and in various other ethnic areas in Kachin State, Shan State and elsewhere.
The regime used laws against terrorism to arrest and punish groups and individuals who were active in the country’s precoup political life. The regime designated the NUG, the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, and PDF groups as unlawful terrorist organizations. According to the law, anyone associated with these groups could face 10 years to life in prison, although no one had come to trial as of year’s end.
ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Recent Elections: Observers considered the 2020 national elections to be generally reflective of the will of the population, notwithstanding some structural shortcomings. The NLD, chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, won more than 80 percent of the 1,150 contested seats at the state, regional, and union levels in those elections. The NLD won 396 of 476 races for national assembly seats; a military-affiliated party won 33, and various ethnic parties took 47 seats. The 2008 constitution bars Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency due to her marriage to a British national.
Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties faced narrowing political space amid regime investigations and threats to ban them from competing in elections. Political parties not aligned with the military were denied the rights to assemble and protest peacefully. The military regime, moreover, conducted politically motivated investigations into prodemocracy political parties and their leaders, particularly the NLD. In May the UEC began investigations into the 93 registered political parties, including financial audits. In an August 27 letter, the UEC threatened that if political parties did not submit financial statements, their party registration could be suspended.
Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit the participation of women in the political process, and they did participate in elections. Laws limiting the citizenship status of many ethnic minority groups (see “Stateless Persons” above) also limited their rights to participate in political life. Women and members of historically marginalized and minority groups were underrepresented in government prior to the coup. Some policies (as opposed to laws and regulations) limited women’s participation in practice.
In the 2020 general elections, 194 women were elected to parliament.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
Since the coup, the Anti-Corruption Commission has regularly targeted deposed NLD politicians and other former civilian government leaders for prosecution under anticorruption law. As of November, the commission charged at least 45 former NLD and civilian government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi, former president Win Myint, union-level ministers, and state and region ministers appointed by the previous government. Most observers considered these charges baseless.
Corruption was widespread in all dimensions of political life, including especially the judicial system. Petty extortion by police was paralleled by more serious graft at higher levels, such as demanding bribes from victims to conduct criminal investigations.
Corruption: Although corruption was widespread, unlike the civilian government it overthrew, the regime used corruption laws almost exclusively against opponents, as noted. Such cases, which often relied on coerced testimony, did not provide an accurate picture of actual corruption.
Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
The regime did not allow domestic human rights organizations to function independently. Human rights NGOs were able to open offices and operate, but reported harassment, monitoring by authorities, and arbitrary detention. The regime, for example, sometimes pressured hotels and other venues not to host meetings organized by activists or civil society groups. Regime security forces also raided and damaged NGO offices. These restrictions went beyond standard COVID-19 mitigation efforts.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The regime systematically denied attempts by the United Nations and other international organizations and NGOs to investigate human rights abuses or to access the locations of alleged abuses. Foreign human rights activists and advocates, including representatives from international NGOs, continued to be restricted to short-term visas that required them to leave the country periodically for renewal. Several international NGOs’ local partners were repeatedly asked to show financial statements and other documents that revealed their relationship with foreign funders.
The regime refused to cooperate with or grant access to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar created by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate alleged atrocities in the country.
The regime continued to refuse entry to the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in the country. While the prior civilian government permitted the UN secretary-general’s special envoy for Burma to open an office in the country in 2019, the regime denied the envoy and her staff permission to enter the country after the coup.
Government Human Rights Bodies: The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission has the power to conduct independent inquiries, and in some cases may call for investigations into abuses. In fact the commission had limited ability to operate as a credible, independent mechanism. Before the coup, the commission investigated some incidents of human rights abuses, but no investigations took place after February 1. The commission released photos of commission members visiting prisons, labor camps, and police detention facilities between May and June. No findings from the visits were released. The NUG established a Human Rights Ministry, which pledged to document human rights abuses committed by regime security forces. The Independent Commission of Enquiry for Rakhine State has not been active since the coup.
Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses
WOMEN
Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape of women and men is illegal but remained a significant problem, and the regime did not enforce the law effectively. Rape of a woman outside of marriage carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Spousal rape is not a crime unless the wife is younger than the legal age of marriage (which may vary according to ethnicity or religion), and the penalty is a maximum of two years in prison. The law prohibits committing bodily harm against another person, but there are no laws specifically against domestic violence or spousal abuse unless the wife is younger than the legal age of marriage. Overlapping and at times contradictory legal provisions complicated implementation of these limited protections.
Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, remained a serious problem. Abuse within families was prevalent and considered socially acceptable. Spousal abuse or domestic violence was difficult to measure because the government did not maintain comprehensive statistics and survivor typically did not report it, although the government attempted to document cases, and reported cases were on the rise.
Sexual Harassment: The law prohibits sexual harassment and prescribes a maximum penalty of two years in prison if the harassment involves physical contact. Harassment is punishable by a fine or up to one year in prison. The regime did not report information on the prevalence of the problem, and many of these crimes were unreported. NGOs reported regime police investigators were not sensitive to survivors and rarely followed through with investigations or prosecutions.
Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. The law allows the government to impose coercive birth-spacing requirements – 36 months between children – if the president or national government designates “special regions” for health care based on factors such as population, migration rate, natural resources, birth rates, and food availability. In such special regions, the government may create special health-care organizations to perform various tasks, including establishing family planning regulations. The government did not designate any such special regions.
In Rakhine State, local authorities prohibited Rohingya families from having more than two children, although some Rohingya with household registration documents reportedly circumvented the law.
The law otherwise limits the right of individuals to manage their reproductive health. Access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception, for sexual violence survivors through public and private facilities was very limited and further exacerbated by the collapse of the public-health system after the coup. While September reports from Population Services International indicated that demand for oral contraceptives increased significantly in Rangoon after the coup, access to family planning was limited in rural areas. Economic hardship and security concerns in conflict-affected regions also limited access to family planning.
The Department of Social Welfare adapted gender-based violence services to COVID-19 restrictions, including expanding virtual platforms for online training.
The United Nations estimated in 2017 that the maternal mortality rate nationwide was 250 deaths per 100,000 live births. No more recent reliable data were available. The 2017 National Maternal Death Surveillance and Response Report stated that the maternal mortality ratio was highest in Shan, Chin, and Ayeyarwady States. NGOs regularly reported throughout the year that humanitarian access and movement restrictions among Rohingya limited access to health-care services and contributed to maternal mortality rates in Rakhine State being higher than the national average. Complications resulting from unsafe abortions were also a leading cause of maternal deaths.
Other major factors influencing maternal mortality included poverty; the high rate of home births (63 percent; a number that likely rose after the coup); limited availability of and access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services and information, including contraception, and maternal and newborn health services; low coverage of antenatal care visits; and the lack of access to services from appropriately trained and skilled birth attendants and other trained community health workers.
Discrimination: By law women enjoy the same legal status and rights as men, including property and inheritance rights and religious and personal status, but regime officials did not enforce the law. Communities around the country implemented customary law to address matters of marriage, property, and inheritance that differed from the provisions of statutory law and which was often discriminatory against women. The law requires equal pay for equal work, but the formal sector did not respect this requirement, and the regime did not actively enforce it. NGOs reported other forms of workplace discrimination were common (see also section 7.d.). The law restricts the ability of Buddhist women to marry non-Buddhist men by requiring public notification prior to any such marriage and allowing objections to the marriage to be raised in court. The law was rarely enforced. Poverty affected women disproportionately.
SYSTEMIC RACIAL OR ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION
Wide-ranging governmental and societal discrimination against members of minority groups persisted, including in areas such as education, housing, employment, and access to health services. Members of ethnic minority groups constituted 30 to 40 percent of the population. The seven ethnic minority states comprised approximately 60 percent of the national territory, and a significant number of minorities also resided in majority ethnic Burmese regions. Rohingya continued to face severe discrimination based on their ethnicity and religion, although conflict between the military and ethnic Rakhine populations de-escalated.
CHILDREN
Birth Registration: The law automatically confers full citizenship to children when both parents are from one of the 135 recognized national ethnic groups and to some children who meet other citizenship requirements. Second generation children may acquire full citizenship if at least one parent has full citizenship. Third generation children of associate or naturalized citizens may acquire full citizenship. Many long-term residents in the country, including Rohingya, are not among the recognized national ethnic groups, and thus their children are not automatically conferred citizenship (see also section 2.g.). There were significant rural-urban disparities in birth registration, with an informal or almost nonexistent process in small, rural villages. Birth registration is required to obtain a national identification card, and it can provide important protections for children, particularly against child labor, early marriage, and underage recruitment into the armed forces and ethnic armed groups.
Education: By law, education is compulsory, free, and universal through the fourth grade (up to age 10). This leaves children ages 10 through 13 vulnerable to child labor, since they are not required to attend school and are not legally permitted to work (the minimum age for work is 14). Burmese is the mandatory language of instruction in public schools. The national education plan does not allow for other languages of instruction, although some public schools taught ethnic languages as extra subjects. Schools were often unavailable in remote communities and conflict areas, and access to them for internally displaced and stateless children was also limited.
In June the regime ordered all primary and secondary schools to reopen, after closing in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Myanmar Teacher’s Federation, more than 90 percent of students did not return on June 2 as mandated. The teachers’ federation reported that almost one-third of teachers from the primary to university level were suspended for participating in the CDM. A suspended teacher from Rangoon told international media in May, “I’m not afraid of arrest and torture. I’m afraid of becoming a teacher who teaches the students propaganda.” In early July the regime ordered all primary and secondary schools closed due to the third wave of COVID-19; the schools reopened before year’s end.
UNICEF reported in July that the regime and prodemocracy groups conducted 180 attacks against schools and school personnel and that the military used education facilities for military purposes in at least 157 cases.
Child Abuse: The laws were neither adequate to deter child abuse nor enforced. The United Nations reported in July that hundreds of children were killed or maimed and approximately 1,000 arrested in postcoup demonstrations and clashes. The chairperson of the Child Rights Convention described children as “under siege” since the coup.
Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law stipulates different minimum ages for marriage based on religion and gender. The minimum age for Buddhists is 18, while the minimum age for non-Buddhists is 16 for boys and 15 for girls. Child marriage occurred, especially in rural areas. There were no reliable statistics on forced marriage.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT), a Bangkok-based international NGO, characterized the problem of children experiencing sexual abuse and violence as “widespread,” despite the scarcity of data. Lifetime migrants constituted 20 percent of the country’s population, and the children who accompany them faced higher risks of sexual exploitation, forced marriage, and trafficking, according to UNICEF.
The law prohibits the commercial sexual exploitation of children, including pimping; separate provisions within the penal code prohibit sex with a minor younger than 14. The penalty for the purchase and sale of commercial sex acts from a child younger than 18 is 10 years in prison. The law prohibits child pornography and specifies a minimum penalty of two years’ imprisonment and a modest fine. The law on child rights prescribes a penalty of one to seven years in prison, a substantial fine, or both, for sex trafficking and forced marriage. If a survivor is younger than 14, the law considers any sexual act to constitute statutory rape. The maximum sentence for statutory rape is two years in prison when the survivor is between ages 12 and 14, and 10 years to life in prison when the survivor is younger than 12. The law against trafficking in persons requires a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex-trafficking offense. The deposed civilian government introduced these laws. ECPAT cited a lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as well as publicly available data to ascertain the effectiveness of implementation.
Displaced Children: The United Nations estimated that as of October there were more than 589,000 IDPs, approximately 37 percent of whom were children.
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
ANTI-SEMITISM
There was one synagogue in Rangoon serving a very small and primarily expatriate Jewish population. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities. While the law requires job protection, equal access to education, and access to public transportation, there was no meaningful enforcement. According to the Eden Center for Disabled Children, children with disabilities had a lower school attendance rate than their peers. COVID-19 mitigation restrictions and the coup further limited access to services, including education and programs focused on reducing stigma and discrimination against persons with disabilities.
Military veterans with disabilities in urban areas received official benefits on a priority basis, usually a civil service job at pay equivalent to rank. Official assistance to civilians with disabilities in principle included two-thirds of pay for a maximum of one year for a temporary disability and a tax-free stipend for permanent disability.
HIV AND AIDS SOCIAL STIGMA
Official and societal violence and discrimination, including employment discrimination, against persons with HIV or AIDS, continued. Reports of abuse included verbal insults, harassment, threats, and physical assault. Significant legal, social, and financial barriers impeded access to services for persons with HIV or AIDS. These barriers included stigma, unhelpful gender norms, poor infrastructure, an entrenched drug trade, political instability, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Laws criminalizing behaviors that increased the risk of acquiring HIV or AIDS fueled stigma and discrimination against persons engaged in these behaviors and impeded their access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care services.
The regime paused most high-level efforts to address these matters due to political instability and reduced engagement with the regime by persons and groups concerned with them.
ACTS OF VIOLENCE, CRIMINALIZATION, AND OTHER ABUSES BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
Although consensual sexual activity between men remained a criminal offense, political reforms in prior years made it easier for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community to hold public events and openly participate in society. Discrimination, stigma, and a lack of acceptance among the general population persisted. Transgender persons, for example, were subject to police harassment, and their identity was not recognized. After the coup, reported violence against LGBTQI+ persons increased. As of July the NUG minister of human rights claimed at least 12 LGBTQI+ community members died and another 73 were arrested while peacefully protesting against the regime. As of November, at least 65 LGBTQI+ community members remained in detention, and 28 were either in hiding or had fled to areas not under regime control. According to Radio Free Asia, LGBTQI+ prodemocracy supporters were targeted for humiliation by regime after arrest including sexual insults, taunts, mocking of clothing, and physical abuse.
There were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment. Many LGBTQI+ individuals faced significant barriers to education and employment if they were vocal or visible about their status. LGBTQI+ persons reported facing discrimination from health-care providers, including public shaming.
A 2019 report by the British Council found mixed views on whether LGBTQI+ persons could be accepted in the culture: fifty percent of respondents rejected the idea. Overall, those polled were more willing to accept LGBTQI+ persons in the abstract but were less so when the person in question was a specific individual, such as a relative or politician.
Section 7. Worker Rights
A. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
After the military coup on February 1, the regime committed widespread abuses against organized labor, including the unlawful detention and extrajudicial killing of labor union leaders and members for exercising their fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. After the coup, labor laws often went unenforced or were enforced primarily against organized labor and labor activists and in the interests of business owners and the regime.
The military declared at least 16 labor unions illegal and issued arrest warrants for more than 85 union leaders, including 11 of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Myanmar, and many union leaders remained in prison or missing. There were numerous reported raids of trade union offices and union leaders’ homes. More than a dozen union leaders were killed.
The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes. The law permits labor organizations to demand the reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity, but it does not explicitly prohibit antiunion discrimination in the form of demotions or mandatory transfers, nor does it offer protection for workers seeking to form a union. The law does not provide adequate protection for workers from dismissal before a union is officially registered. The law prohibits civil servants and personnel of the security services and police from forming unions. The law permits workers to join unions only within their category of trade or activity, and the definition of trade or activity lacks clarity. Basic labor organizations must have a minimum of 30 workers and register through township registrars via the Chief Registrar’s Office of the regime Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population (Ministry of Labor). The law permits labor federations and confederations to affiliate with international union federations and confederations.
The law provides for voluntary registration for local NGOs, including labor NGOs working on labor matters, as long as they do not receive foreign funding. The military authorities interfered in the operations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) country office, including through the continued imposition of banking restrictions, the denial of visa extensions for ILO officials, and the denial of tax exemptions.
The law provides unions the right to represent workers, to negotiate and bargain collectively with employers, and to send representatives to a conciliation body or tribunal; however, there were reports that employers dismissed union leaders with impunity or with military support. The law stipulates that a management committee, including government and nongovernmental representatives, in the special economic zones be the first instance arbiter in disputes between employers and employees.
In March, however, the military took control and imposed martial law over two major industrial zones located in Hlain Thar Yar and Shwe Pyi Thar Townships, Rangoon Region, as well as other townships with a high concentration of industrial and manufacturing enterprises. Labor representatives alleged that some employers hired military-affiliated security guards to harass and intimidate workers, sometimes leading to fatal violence when disputes arose. On March 16 at Xing Jia shoe factory, the employer reportedly called in police to deal with a dispute with a group of workers seeking their pay. The police opened fire and killed at least six workers.
The law provides the right to strike in most sectors with significant requirements such as the permission of the relevant labor federations. The law prohibits strikes addressing problems not directly relevant to labor matters. The law does not permit strikes or lockouts in essential services such as water, electric, or health. Lockouts are permitted in public utility services (including transportation; cargo and freight; postal; sanitation; information, communication, and technology; energy; petroleum; and financial sectors), with a minimum of 14 days’ notice provided to the relevant labor organizations and conciliation body. Strikes in public utility services generally require the same measures as in other sectors, but seven days’ advance notice and negotiation between workers and management is required before the strike takes place in order to determine maintenance of minimum service levels.
The government did not effectively enforce labor laws related to freedom of association. Penalties for violations of related labor laws were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights; however, laws were enforced primarily against independent trade unions and not employers.
After the coup, strikes and collective worker action led to retaliation by the military, including workers forced to return to work at gunpoint. On February 19, shipping and jetty workers in Mandalay went on strike to support the CDM. There were reports that the military tried, at gun point, to force the workers back to work, but large crowds gathered to block and drive the military away. The military fired into the crowd, killing protesters. The military evicted striking railway worker and their families, forcing them to flee.
After a national work stoppage began on March 8, the military publicly stated that all public sector workers must return or face criminal charges. There were reports of at least 1,100 public-sector workers from various departments receiving some form of threat or discipline because of participation in the CDM.
Workers at some unionized factories negotiated leave agreements so they would be granted leave to attend the demonstrations. Employer refusal, in some cases, led to work stoppages. There are numerous reports of workers fired for participating in the CDM. Many reported postings at factories saying workers would be fired if they participated in the CDM.
Worker organizations reported that formal dispute settlement and court procedures were not effective at enforcing labor laws. After the coup, there were multiple reports of worker disputes handled with military interference.
Labor organizations also reported that local labor offices imposed unnecessary bureaucratic requirements for union registration that were inconsistent with the law.
The Confederation of Trade Unions in Myanmar reported the arrest and harassment of trade unionists by regime security forces after the coup, including the secretary general of Myanmar Infrastructure, Craft and Service who was detained in June when the regime raided the infrastructure, craft, and service union office in Mandalay. Labor sources reported the secretary general was not allowed to meet any visitors or access legal aid while in detention. In a separate case, regime authorities detained the director of the Solidarity Trade Union of Myanmar at his office in April. Labor sources reported the regime denied the director access to medicine and other necessary health care to manage her chronic illness while in detention. The regime released the director in October as part of a general amnesty and without pursuing formal charges. On October 12, a military tribunal also sentenced two union organizers, U Yen Tu Htauk and Ma Kyi Par Lay, to life in prison.
B. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR
The law prohibits most forms of forced or compulsory labor, although insufficient barriers exist for the use of forced labor by the military and penal institutions. The law also provides for the punishment of persons who impose forced labor on others. The law provides criminal penalties for forced labor violations; penalties differ depending on whether the military, the government, or a private citizen committed the violation. The penalties were commensurate with analogous serious crimes such as kidnapping. The regime did not effectively enforce the law, particularly in the areas where significant conflict was occurring.
In early 2020 the government established a forced-labor complaints mechanism under the Ministry of Labor. There were no data available on the functioning of or the number of cases reported to or processed by the mechanism since the coup. The ILO expressed profound concern over practices of the military authorities, including the use of forced labor.
The regime threatened CDM members with criminal charges if they did not return to work (see also section 7.a.).
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
C. PROHIBITION OF CHILD LABOR AND MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT
The law prohibits the worst forms of child labor, although the regime did not meaningfully enforce the law. The law sets the minimum age at 14 for work in certain sectors, including shops and factories; the law establishes special provisions for “youth employment” for those older than 14. There is, however, no minimum age for work for all sectors in which children were employed, including agriculture and informal work. The law prohibits employees younger than 16 from working in a hazardous environment, but the government did not issue a list of hazardous jobs. Some sector-specific laws identify activities that are prohibited for children younger than 18. Penalties under the Child Rights Law were analogous to other serious crimes, such as kidnapping.
Children worked mostly as street vendors, refuse collectors, restaurant and teashop attendants, garment workers, and domestic workers. Children often worked in the informal economy, in some instances exposing them to drugs and petty crime, risk of arrest, commercial sexual exploitation, HIV, AIDS, and other sexually transmitted infections (see also section 6). Children were also vulnerable to forced labor in teashops, agriculture and forestry, gem production, begging, and other fields. In rural areas children routinely worked in family agricultural activities, occasionally in situations that potentially involved forced labor. Child labor was also reported in the extraction of rubies and jade and the manufacture of rubber and bricks.
Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ and the Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods .
D. DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION
Labor laws and regulations do not prohibit employment discrimination. Restrictions against women in employment exist based on social and cultural practices and beliefs. Women remained underrepresented in most traditionally male-dominated occupations (forestry, carpentry, masonry, and fishing) and were effectively barred from them by hiring practices and cultural barriers. Women were not legally prohibited from any employment except in underground mines. The law governing hiring of civil service personnel states that nothing shall prevent the appointment of men to “positions that are suitable for men only,” with no further definition of what constitutes positions “suitable for men only.”
There were reports that government and private actors practiced discrimination that impeded Muslim-owned businesses’ operations and undercut their ability to hire and retain labor, maintain proper working standards, and secure public and private contracts. There were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, including the denial of promotions and firing of LGBTQI+ persons. Activists reported limited job opportunities for many openly gay and lesbian persons and noted a general lack of support from society. Activists reported that in addition to general societal discrimination, persons with HIV or AIDS faced employment discrimination in both the public and private sectors, including suspensions and the loss of employment following positive results from mandatory workplace HIV testing.
E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK
Wage and Hour Laws: The official minimum daily wage was above the poverty line. The minimum wage covers all sectors and industries and applies to all workers in the formal sector except those in businesses with fewer than 15 employees. The law requires the minimum wage to be revised every two years. The government also established tripartite committees in the Special Economic Zones responsible for setting wage levels and an inspector for each zone.
The workweek is 44 hours per week for factories. For shops and other establishments, it is 48 hours per week. Although the law in general states that overtime should not exceed 12 hours per work week, the law allows up to 16 hours of overtime when special matters require additional overtime. Overtime for factory workers is regulated under a separate directive that limits overtime to 20 hours per week. The law also stipulates that an employee’s total working hours cannot exceed 11 hours per day (including overtime and a one-hour break). Laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.
Occupational Safety and Health: The 2019 Occupational Safety and Health law sets standards for occupational safety, health, and welfare. The Ministry of Labor has the authority to suspend businesses operating at risk to worker health and safety until risks are remediated.
Labor unions reported instances in which workers could not remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their employment. Unions reported that workers concerned about COVID-19 positive cases in factories were nonetheless required to work.
The Ministry of Labor’s Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection Department oversees labor conditions in the private sector. Inspectors were authorized to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.
The regime did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties for wage and hour violations were commensurate with those for similar violations, but penalties for safety and health violations were not. The number of labor law inspectors and factory inspectors was insufficient to address wage, salary, overtime, occupational safety and health standards, and other matters adequately. In some sectors other ministries regulated occupational safety and health laws (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation).
Informal Sector: Observers agreed the great majority of the country’s workers were in the informal sector. Wage, hours and occupational safety and health laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.
Informal workers’ jobs were less secure during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in April 2020 the Ministry of Health ordered that no more than 50 workers could be present at a construction site. One of the largest employers of informal labor was the construction sector. The postcoup regime retained the policy.
Informal-sector jobs usually lacked basic benefits such as social and legal protections. In at-risk industries – defined as having occupational hazards, volatile payment structures, and ease in exploiting labor rights – on average, one in five workers had an informal work arrangement, although the proportion was even higher in manufacturing, construction, recreation, and personal services. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the workers in medium- to high-risk industries were employed informally..."
Source/publisher:
United States Department of State
Date of publication:
2022-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-16
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Anniversary of the formation of the government..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-04-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"ပြည်သူ့လူထုက ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသော လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စု လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ(CRPH)က အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ(NUCC) နှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းတိုင်ပင်ပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို အတည်ပြုဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် တစ်နှစ်တင်းတင်း ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ဆန္ဒကို ကိုယ်စားပြုသော၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တခုတည်းသော တရားဝင်အစိုးရဖြစ်သည်နှင့် အညီ တိုင်းပြည်၏ ကဏ္ဍကြီး (၅) ရပ်ကိုအခြေခံ၍ တစ်နှစ်အတွင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့မှုများနှင့် ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို သတင်းမီဒီယာများမှတဆင့် ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အစီရင်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။
- နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေးကဏ္ဍ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်တက်ကြွသည့် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးမူဝါဒ ကိုအခြေခံ၍ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီအား နိုင်ငံတကာ မျက်နှာစာတွင် တရားဝင်မှု မရရှိစေရေး ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို နိုင်ငံတကာ က အသိအမှတ်ပြုစေရေး နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို အားပေးထောက်ခံမှုများ ရရှိစေရေးတို့ကို ရည်မှန်းချက်ထားကာ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂတွင် သံအမတ်ကြီးဦးကျော်မိုးထွန်းသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကိုယ်စားပြုအဖြစ် ဆက်လက်တက်ရောက်လျက် ရှိပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့တာဝန်ရှိသူများ၊ ဝန်ကြီးများကလဲ မိတ်ဘက်နိုင်ငံများမှ အဆင့်မြင့်တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် လူချင်းတွေ့ဆုံ ဆွေးနွေးမှုများစွာ ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိကြပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီက ကျူးလွန်လျက် ရှိသော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို စနစ်တကျ စာရင်းပြုစုခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ကာ တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
ချက်သမ္မတနိုင်ငံ၊ ယူကေ နိုင်ငံ၊ နော်ဝေ ၊ ပြင်သစ် ၊ သြစတေးလျ ၊ တောင်ကိုရီးယား ၊ ဂျပန် ၊ တို့တွင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ ခန့်အပ် ထားရှိပြီး အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ဆက်သွယ်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် အတွက် nonresidential Representative ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိ၍ သော်လည်းကောင်း နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးရုံးမှ တိုက်ရိုက်သော်လည်းကောင်း ဆက်သွယ် ဆောင်ရွက် လျက်ရှိသည်။ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုတွင် ဆက်ဆံရေး ရုံးဖွင့်လှစ်ထားရှိရန်ပြင်ဆင် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
- လူမှုရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများနှင့် လူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာအကူအညီများကဏ္ဍ
ပြည်သူလူထုအား ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အွန်လိုင်းဝန်ဆောင်မှု များအပြင် စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေများတွင် ဆေးရုံ(၅၁) ရုံ၊ အခြေခံကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှု ဆေးခန်း (၅၅)ခု တို့ကို ဖွင်လှစ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ရွှေ့လျားဆေးခန်း (၁၆၇)ခု ဖြင့်လဲ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ သူနာပြုတက္ကသိုလ် ကို ပြန်လည်ဖွင့်လှစ်ပြီး သူနာပြုဘွဲ့များ ပေးအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အခြား ဆေးတက္ကသိုလ်များကိုလဲ ပြန်လည်ဖွင့်လှစ်နိုင်ရန် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
အခြေခံပညာ၊ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာ၊ အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းပညာတို့ကို (၂၈၆) မြို့နယ်တွင် ပညာရေးဘုတ်အဖွဲ့များ ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ အွန်လိုင်းမှတဆင့် သင်ကြားပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေအချို့တွင်လဲ မြေပြင် သင်ကြားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ စတင်ဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီဖြစ်သည်။ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီပေးရေး လုပ်ငန်းများအတွက် ရန်ပုံငွေ ကျန်(၂.၇၃) ဘီလီယံခန့် ထောက်ပံ့မှုပြုလုပ် ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများပါဝင်သော ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ၊ ပ.အ.ဖ၊ ပ.က.ဖ များ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒေသ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ဖြင့် ပူးပေါင်းကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီရေး လုပ်ငန်းများကို စနစ်တကျဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ကိုယ်ဝန်ဆောင်မိခင် ၅သောင်းကျော် ကိုလဲ ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
တော်လှန်ရေး၏အဓိကကျသော အခန်းကဏ္ဍတွင် ပါဝင်သည့် CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ၏ လူမှုဘဝ အဆင်ပြေချောမွေ့ စေရေးအတွက် နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့်ကြိုးစားကူညီပံ့ပိုးလျက်ရှိသလို CDM များအား ဂုဏ်ပြုချီးမြှင့်နိုင်ရေး ကော်မတီဖွဲ့စည်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
-စစ်ရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေး၊ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကဏ္ဍ
အဆိုပါ ကဏ္ဍအတွက် တစ်နှစ်တာအတွင်း မဟာမိတ်လက်နက်ကိုင် အင်အားစု အသီးသီးနှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းပူးပေါင်း၍ ဗဟိုကွပ်ကဲရေးနှင့်ပေါင်းစပ်ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Centeral Command and Coordination Committee) အား ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး ဗဟိုအမိန့်ပေးကွပ်ကဲမှုစနစ်အား ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ တစ်နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း PDF တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့ ရာဂဏန်း၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့(ပ.က.ဖ) ၂၅၀ ကျော် ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီးဖြစ်ကာ MOD နှင့် ချိတ်ဆက် ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည့် ဒေသတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်း(LDF) ၃၅၄ဖွဲ့ အနက် ၁၀၀ ကျော်အား ဝန်ကြီးဌာနလက်အောက် တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့များတွင် ပေါင်းစပ် ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ထားပြီးသော တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့များ အားလုံးသည် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကျင့်ဝတ်များကို တိတိကျကျ လိုက်နာ ဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ကွပ်ကဲလျက်ရှိပြီး လိုက်နာခြင်း မရှိသည့် ကိစ္စရပ်များပေါ်ပေါက်ပါကလဲ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ တစ်နှစ်တာအတွင်း အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ သန်း (၃၀) ခန့်အား ရှာဖွေစုဆောင်း သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီး ဌာန ပြည်သူကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (PDF) , ဒေသတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်း(LDF)များ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားအင်အားစု (EAOs, EROs) အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံး၏ နယ်မြေစိုးမိုးနိုင်မှုမှာ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးဧရိယာ၏ (၅၀) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းခန့်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။
ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံရေး အစီအစဉ်အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မှု ကော်မတီကို ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံလာသူများ၏ အရေးကိစ္စများကို ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိရာ ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်သို့ဝင်ရောက်လာသူ (တပ်နှင့်ရဲ) စုစုပေါင်း ၁၀,၀၀၀ ခန့်ရှိပြီး ဆက်သွယ်လာသူများကို စိစစ်ကာ CDM code များ၊ Pre CDM Code များ ထုတ်ပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များအတွက် ယနေ့အထိ ၄၄၅,၆၉၁,၀၆၀ကျပ် (ကျပ်သန်းပေါင်း လေးရာလေးဆယ့်ငါးသန်း ခြောက်သိန်း ကိုးသောင်း တထောင့်ခြောက်ဆယ် တိတိ) သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို ဖြုတ်ချနိုင်ရေး၊ အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အဆုံးသတ်နိင်ရေး စစ်ရေး၊ လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၊ လူမှုရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကိစ္စရပ်များ အပါအဝင် လူမှုရေး၊ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကိစ္စများအတွက် မဟာဗျူဟာကျကျ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး ရည်ရွယ်၍ မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေး ကော်မတီကို ဖွဲ့စည်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး လက်ရှိအချိန်အထိ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အလွတ်သဘော မိတ်ဆက် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှု များ စတင်ဆောက်ရွက် လျက်ရှိပြီး ဆက်လက် တွေ့ဆုံရန်လည်း စီစဉ်လျာထားဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
- စီးပွါးရေး၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေးကဏ္ဍ
စီးပွားရေးနှင့် ဘဏ္ဍာရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကဏ္ဍအတွက် အဓိက မူဝါဒ နှစ်ခုဖြစ်သော စစ်ကောင်စီထံစီးဝင်နေသည့် ဝင်ငွေရပေါက်ရလမ်းများကို ဖြတ်တောက်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး အတွက် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများရရှိရေးတို့ကို တစ်စိုက်မတ်မတ်စီမံဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများစွာနှင့်အတူ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဓိက ဝင်ငွေရလမ်းဖြစ်သော Total နှင့် Chevron ရေနံကုမ္ပဏီကြီးများကို စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် အဆက်ဖြတ်နိုင်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ကြပြီး တစ်ဘက်တွင်လည်း နွေဦးထီမှစ၍ ငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်ရောင်းချခြင်းများကို ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှုများဖြင့် အောင်မြင်စွာ ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၂ နှစ် မတ်လအထိ ငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်ပေါင်း ၇၂၅၈၀ အထိရောင်းချနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဆက်လက်၍ လည်း ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ စနစ်တကျဖြစ်စေရေး တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ထိရောက်စွာ အသုံးပြုနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေပါသည်။
- နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကဏ္ဍ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် တိုင်းရင်းသား အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ယုံကြည်မှု တည်ဆောက်ပြီး ညီညွတ်ရေး ရရှိရန် တစိုက်မတ်မတ် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို ဆန့်ကျင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ မဟာမိတ်များနှင့် ဆက်ဆံရေးပိုမိုခိုင်မာရန်၊ ပိုမိုပါဝင်လာမှုရှိစေရန် ၊ တူညီမျှသော အနာဂတ် တစ်ခုကို ရရှိရန် အတူတကွ လုပ်ဆောင် သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများမှ ပြည်သူလူထုကို ကာကွယ်ရန်၊ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ် နယ်မြေများ ပိုမိုထူထောင်နိုင်ရန်၊ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများတွင် ကြားကာလပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ကြားကာလတရားစီရင်ရေး နှင့်ဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများအားတိုးချဲ့ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်၊ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ ၏ စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများ အတွက် တရားမျှတမှု ပြန်လည်ဖေါ်ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် တာဝန်ခံမှု ရရှိစေရေး ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
အင်အားစု(၅)စုပါဝင်သော အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ကဦးဆောင်၍ ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ခေါ်ယူကာ အတည်ပြုခဲ့သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပဋိဉာဉ်စာတမ်းသည်သာ မိမိတို့ ရှေ့ဆက်ရမယ့် လမ်းကြောင်းတစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည်။ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကို အထိအခိုက်နည်းစွာဖြင့် အောင်မြင်ပြီးမြောက်လိုသူများအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၀၈ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေအား တရားသေကိုင်စွဲထားခြင်းကို စွန့်လွှတ်ပြီး မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးတွင် စစ်တပ်က ဘယ်သောအခါမှ ဝင်ရောက်စွက်ဖက်ခြင်းမပြုရဟူသည့်မူကို လက်ခံကာ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သူများသည်လဲ တာဝန်ယူမှုတာဝန်ခံမှု အပြည့်ဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့တရားစီရင်မှုကို လိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်မှသာလျှင် ပြည်သူလူထုလိုလားသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ သွားရောက်မည့် လမ်းကြောင်းအတွက် အဖြေတစ်ခုရရှိနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းသိစေအပ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွှတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူဆန္ဒကို အလေးအမြတ်ပြုကာ တော်လှန်ရေးအောင်မြင်သည်အထိ ဦးလည်မသုန် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-04-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-16
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Opponents of military rule in Myanmar have urged residents to boycott the country's traditional New Year celebrations, as activists and Buddhist monks defied security forces by staging small protests against last year's coup in some areas.
The country's most important holiday, known as Thingyan, runs to Saturday and is usually celebrated with prayers, ritual cleaning of Buddha images in temples and high-spirited water fights on the streets.
"I want the world to know that our country is not back to normal yet," said Zay, a 34-year-old activist from the city of Yangon, who declined to give his full name for security reasons and called on people not to participate in festivities.
Celebrations for Thingyan have been muted for the past two years. In 2020, then leader Aung San Suu Kyi barred gatherings due to the pandemic and last year's holidays were hit by protests after her government was ousted by the military.
Myanmar has been in turmoil since the coup, with security forces cracking down brutally on dissent and killing hundreds, and some protesters taking up arms to form People's Defence Forces to take on the military.
One of the main groups behind earlier protests, the General Strike Committee of Nationalities, in a poster on social media urged people to boycott celebrations.
"The blood of our comrades... who have died on the streets will not be washed away by Thingyan water," it said.
A military spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment, but military leader Min Aung Hlaing said last month Thingyan celebrations could take place due to lower numbers of COVID-19 infections.
State media also reported that extra flights had been arranged to allow more visitors from the country's main cities to vacation in beach areas.
But on Thursday photographs shared on social media showed some of the main streets in Yangon appeared deserted, with almost no spectators to watch artists perform on a stage in front of the city's town hall.
Protests also occurred in several areas, with a march in the Sagaing area, while in Mandalay monks held up placards asking people to donate money for striking state workers and displaced people, photographs showed..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
Grouping:
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Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Social and Cultural History
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Outreach to pro-democracy forces appears over as Beijing expects the war in Ukraine to curb Russian backing for the generals.
Description:
"After a year of tentative ties with Myanmar’s democratic opposition, China this month dropped all pretension of hedging its bets and ramped up support for the military regime. Beijing framed its decisive economic and political move in part as a response to the “Ukraine crisis,” hinting that Russian backing for the junta may wane on the heels of Moscow’s stumbles in Ukraine, forcing China to fill the gap. With China bringing increasing pressure on Southeast Asian states to follow its lead in legitimizing Myanmar’s dictatorship, all parties in the region, and those with interests in it, will have to rethink their Myanmar strategies.
China’s sudden shift in policy will almost certainly lead to escalating violence and instability in Myanmar. The country’s National Unity Government (NUG), established by lawmakers deposed in last year’s coup, condemned China’s moves as “deeply disrespectful and offensive” to Myanmar’s people. For the United States, China’s enhanced support for a genocidal military regime at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region represents a direct threat to long-term regional commitments identified in the February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy. But for China, it seems that open cooperation with the regime now appeared necessary to rapidly reboot plans for tens of billions of dollars of strategic investments in Myanmar.
The End of China’s Friendship with the Myanmar People?
China’s initial public response to the February 1, 2021 military coup was to pretend nothing had happened — it described the putsch as a “cabinet reshuffle” — but by last March attacks on Chinese factories and businesses across Yangon had created a crisis. Chinese officials feared that a strong show of support for the junta might further inflame anti-China sentiment. To cool the situation, Beijing crafted careful policy statements emphasizing China’s friendly relations with the National League for Democracy Party (NLD), and stressing that China-Myanmar friendship is “open to all people of Myanmar.” In the following months, the Chinese Embassy opened discreet channels of communication with the NUG, and the Chinese Communist Party re-activated its relationship with the NLD, inviting its leaders to attend a virtual gathering of South and Southeast Asian political parties.
The Chinese government also slowed economic activities in Myanmar, even freezing loans for new projects by state-owned enterprises, and warning all parties in the conflict to pay greater attention to securing Chinese investments.
Despite the overtures and hedging, as Chinese decisionmakers began to view the opposition as unlikely to win and potentially inimical to China’s interests, they leaned on China’s strategic partnership with Russia to achieve their political goals in Myanmar: counter Western sanctions and support for democracy and human rights; prevent deeper involvement by the U.N. Security Council and other international bodies in Myanmar’s periphery; and provide support to the military to weaken the democratic opposition.
By November 2021, China was alarmed that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was challenging the junta’s legitimacy and China’s regional influence by blocking Myanmar’s participation in the “ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations.” References to the NLD disappeared from official Chinese statements, and China resumed all working level exchanges with the coup regime. Beijing went so far as to have its ambassador essentially apologize to the junta for failing to persuade key ASEAN states to include the military’s representatives in the meeting.
As the ASEAN chair passed from Brunei to Cambodia, China saw a new opportunity to strengthen the junta’s position. Beijing encouraged Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to visit Myanmar, and publicly pushed for Cambodia to link ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus (an agreement between the 10 ASEAN states to end violence and seek a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Myanmar) with the military junta’s Five Point Road Map. The road map is scheme to turn over the government to a military proxy party through a fraudulent election before August of 2023.
These efforts, which involved a burst of Chinese shuttle diplomacy across Asia, did nothing to change the views of key ASEAN states including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. As such, on the eve of the Ukraine invasion, China was already rethinking its Myanmar policy.
By late March, China began to see a dramatic weakening in Russia’s ability to provide the junta with political and military support. The Chinese government stepped into the gap, inviting three ASEAN foreign ministers and the Myanmar army’s Wunna Maung Lwin, who handles “diplomacy,” to China for bilateral discussions including on the “negative impacts” of the Ukraine crisis on Southeast Asia.
Finally, on April 1, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, received Wunna at a lavish reception in China’s Annhui Province. Afterwards, China’s state-sponsored Xinhua News Agency referred to the junta’s emissary as the “counterpart” of the Chinese foreign minister, emphasizing that Wang had told Wunna that China would back the regime “no matter how the situation changes.”
Both parties announced a major increase in Chinese support for the military’s governing body, the State Administrative Council (SAC): more than $100 million in new financial assistance, a new Myanmar consulate in China, a pledge to “jointly oppose unilateral sanctions,” a commitment to advancing cooperation under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and plans for the junta to host the foreign ministers of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Forum in Myanmar (China, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Myanmar).
Economic Drivers of China’s New Policy
China’s new approach is also driven by the economic needs of its southwestern provinces and by private Chinese capital networks, which have a strong appetite for risk and an attraction to countries with weak governance.
Among China’s southwestern provinces, Yunnan is by far the most eager to resume development of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as the key engine of its economic growth. The Yunnan Provincial Government signaled this urgency in November of 2021 by appointing an academic with close ties to the Myanmar army to direct the Yunnan Department of Commerce.
Li Chenyang, one of several architects of China’s strategic natural resource corridor through Myanmar, had championed a China-Myanmar army partnership in the early 2000s as a means of curbing U.S. strategic advantage in the region. Such an alliance, he argued, would reduce Chinese dependence on the Malacca Straits for energy imports. Unsurprisingly, shortly after Li assumed his new positions he led delegations to the border to re-open China-Myanmar trade and visited key cities to reactivate cross-border industrial zones.
Meanwhile, a shady network of Chongqing-based entrepreneurs developing a casino resort island with a military-backed businessman in Myeik — located off the coast of Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region — emerged as another push factor for deeper relations with the military. From October to February, the South Asia Future Group visited almost every key ministry of the military’s ruling council, later signing a deal with the Lincang government to advance cross-border industrial zones and connectivity between Yunnan and Myanmar’s Shan State. The company also forged a relationship with Myanmar’s ambassador in Beijing, and along with a Myanmar-based network of Chinese companies, played a role in advancing the new consulate in Chongqing.
China’s Real Intentions
While strengthening ties with the junta, China has maintained, and often tightened, its traditional links with the northern ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), particularly the most powerful ones. Beijing has showered these groups with COVID-19 assistance, and in the case of Shan State, is standing with the northern EAOs near the Chinese border as they successfully press a military campaign against a rival ethnic army — the Shan State Army South. As a sign of respect for the EAOs, China sent a senior official to Shan State in late March for the funeral of a key former leader of one of these groups — Peng Jiasheng, the founder of the Kokang Army, also known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Peng had also been instrumental in the expansion of several of Myanmar’s most powerful EAOs, including the powerful Arakan Army, whose leader also attended the funeral.
In short, China is making itself critical to all of Myanmar’s most powerful military actors. The junta, dependent on China, is surrounded by well-armed EAOs in China’s orbit, all of which are gaining in influence and power as the military’s violent campaign against the pro-democracy forces continues. This has given these EAOs strong incentives to support the armed resistance against the military, and many are now training and even arming people’s defense forces.
Chinese leaders believe this web of involvements creates leverage to best advance China’s interests.
This is a dangerous strategy.
To be sure, China may pressure EAOs to stop supporting pro-democracy forces and recognize the junta. But this will prove problematic. First, this turns a blind eye to the key driver of the current crisis — decades of military oppression and attacks on the population, the most recent iteration of which has displaced more than 600,000 people since February 2021. Second, EAO constituencies have unequivocally rejected military rule, and turning to support the military will ultimately undermine their legitimacy.
In the end, China is likely to find that increased support for the junta will simply amplify anti-China sentiment, putting its hundreds of billions of dollars of strategic investment at greater risk. By propping up an illegitimate regime, China further sets the stage for protracted conflict.
Need for a Global Strategy in Support of Democracy
China’s recent moves represent a growing threat to peace and democracy at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region. While its violence and urgency may not match Russia’s assault on Ukraine, Myanmar’s democratic opposition sees the parallels. Its leaders have already started calling on the United States and other Western states to dramatically increase their support, worried that Russia’s war on Ukraine will leave their struggle, and that of their regional counterparts for peace and democracy, forgotten at a critical moment.
As Western states help Ukraine meet an existential threat, it is critical that they not ignore China’s moves in Southeast Asia. As an immediate step, the United States could encourage much higher levels of support from its QUAD partners to bolster democracy as a pillar of regional security. Another measure would be for the United States and its allies to look for more creative ways to assist the full range of opposition actors in Myanmar — especially key EAOs supporting the NUG. Finally, Washington might communicate clearly to China the dangers its strategy presents to regional stability and offer to establish high-level exchanges on the crisis to manage tensions between the two powers as efforts to restore democracy continue..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2022-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
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"There was a reported case of abducting a 4-year-old child from his kindergarten by the junta forces wearing plain-clothes on April 5th in Ahlone township since the forces seemingly fail to find his father. It is likely that the child in question was kidnapped following the junta's policy of “punishment by proxy”. Since the kidnapping, the whereabouts of the 4-year-old child remains unknown. It was reported later that the mother has been in interrogation centre while the child was kidnapped. Both the lives of mother and the child are in danger.
On Feb 21st, 2022, 20 young children were arrested in Chauk and threatened by the junta terrorists. On March 6th, 2022, another 4-year-old was brutally murdered with a spear in Pauk township by the military forces. When they cannot find the people they want, their family members, children and parents are taken or killed as a proxy. They are cowardly committing war crimes against children with alarming regularity. According to the data collected by the Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs of the National Unity Government, there were 132 people under 18 years of age killed by the junta between the beginning of the coup and April 4th, 2022, and 216 arrested until 1 April 2022. Of these 216, 2 were given the death penalty, one of them was under 15.
According to Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it states that: “Governments must do all they can to ensure that children are protected from all forms of violence, abuse, neglect and bad treatment”. The National Unity Government (NUG) recognizes the need to protect children. The National Unity Government (NUG) condemns in the strongest possible terms the killing of children, and the abduction and arrest of children as proxies to punish or torment their families. Such barbaric and inhumane acts are all too common and wide-spread among the junta and their allies. The National Unity Government (NUG) will do everything within its power to thoroughly investigate each and every case, reunite families that have been torn apart, and hold all those responsible to account. International organizations/communities are committed to ensuring the safety and well-being of all children in Myanmar. We strongly urge you to take effective actions against the Terrorist Military Council in order to ensure the safety of our children..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-04-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"ဖခင်ဖြစ်သူအား ရှာဖွေမတွေ့ရှိသဖြင့် ၄ နှစ်အရွယ်သားဖြစ်သူကို မူကြိုကျောင်းမှနေ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များက အရပ်ဝတ်များဝတ်ကာ ဓားစာခံအဖြစ် ဖမ်းဆီးခေါ်ဆောင်သွားသည့် ဖြစ်ရပ်တစ်ခု ဧပြီလ (၅) ရက်နေ့တွင် အလုံမြို့နယ်အတွင်း ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကလေးငယ်အား ဖမ်းဆီးခေါ်ဆောင်သွားချိန်မှစ၍ ယခုအချိန်အထိ မည်သည့်နေရာတွင် ထားရှိသည်ကိုလဲ မသိရှိရသေးပါ။ ကလေးငယ်၏ မိခင်အားဖမ်းဆီးထားပြီး စစ်ကြောရေး လုပ်နေစဉ်ကာလအတွင်း ကလေးငယ်အား ထပ်မံဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ကလေးငယ်နှင့် မိခင်တို့၏ အသက်အန္တရာယ်ပါ စိုးရိမ်ဖွယ်ရာ အခြေအနေဖြစ်ကြောင်းသိရှိရပါသည်။
၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၁)ရက်နေ့ ချောက်မြို့နယ်တွင် ကလေးသူငယ်(၂၀) ဦးအား ဖမ်းဆီးပြီး ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုများပြုလုပ်ခြင်း၊ မတ်လ (၆) ရက်နေ့ ပေါက်မြို့နယ်တွင် (၄) နှစ်အရွယ် ကလေးငယ်အား လှံစွပ်ဖြင့်ထိုးသတ်ခြင်း အပါအဝင် အလိုရှိသူများအား ဖမ်းဆီးနိုင်ခြင်းမရှိသောကြောင့် မိသားစုဝင်များဖြစ်သည့် ကလေးသူငယ်များ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အိုများ ကို ဓားစာခံအဖြစ်ဖမ်းဆီးသည့်လုပ်ရပ်များကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များက သူရဲဘောကြောင်စွာ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြပြီး စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိကြပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်နှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်ရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ပြုစုထားသော စာရင်းများအရ အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုကြောင့် သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသော (၁၈) နှစ်အောက် ကလေးသူငယ်ဦးရေမှာ ဧပြီလ (၄)ရက်နေ့ထိ (၁၃၂) ဦး၊ ဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသူ ဦးရေမှာ ဧပြီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့အထိ (၂၁၆) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်ဟု သိရပါသည်။ ဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသူများထဲမှ (၂) ဦးမှာ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ် ခံထားရပြီး သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရသည့် ကလေး (၂)ဦးထဲတွင် အသက် (၁၅)နှစ်အောက် တစ်ဦးပါဝင်ပါသည်။
ကလေးသူငယ်အခွင့်အရေးများဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂညီလာခံ သဘောတူစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၁၉ တွင်ပါဝင်သော “ကလေးများ ကောင်းမွန်စွာ စောင့်ရှောက်မှုခံရစေရန် နိုင်ငံအစိုးရများက စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရပါမည်။ ကလေးများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ လွဲမှားစွာပြုမူခြင်းနှင့် လျစ်လျူရှုခြင်းများကို မိဘများ သို့မဟုတ် ၄င်းတို့ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းစောင့်ရှောက်သူ မည်သူမဆို မပြုလုပ်ရန်လည်း တားဆီးကာကွယ်ပေးရပါမည်” ဟူသည့်အချက်အတိုင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အနေဖြင့် ကလေးသူငယ်များအား အကာကွယ်ပေးရမည်ဟု ခံယူပါသည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ ကလေးသူငယ်များအား သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီး ထောင်ချခြင်း၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များကို ပြန်ပေးဆွဲကာ မိဘများကို လာရောက် အဖမ်းခံခိုင်းခြင်း စသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လူမဆန်သော လုပ်ရပ်များကို ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုတ်ချပြီး အဆိုပါ ဖြစ်ရပ်တိုင်းတွင် တစ်စုံတစ်ရာပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများအားလုံးအား စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးဖော်ထုတ်ကာ ထိုက်သင့်သော တရားစီရင်မှု ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရေး အစွမ်းကုန် ကြိုးစားဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဟု သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့်လဲ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ကလေးသူငယ်များ အားလုံး၏ လုံခြုံရေး၊ အသက်ရှင်သန်နိုင်ရေး တို့ကိုငဲ့ကွက်၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ထိရောက်ပြင်းထန်သော အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ကြရန် အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-04-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-08
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Meeting with alleged war criminal a betrayal of Myanmar people that will be used as propaganda to legitimise unlawful government, critics say
Description:
"Australia’s ambassador to Myanmar met alleged war criminal and coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday, in a meeting the junta claims discussed “enhancement of cooperation” between the two countries.
Pictures published by the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper show Australia’s ambassador, Andrea Faulkner, and military attache, meeting with the coup leader in the Myanmar capital Naypyidaw.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing led the Myanmar military’s pogrom against the ethnic minority Rohingya in 2017, which killed more than 25,000 people and forced more than 700,000 to flee the country, and he engineered a military coup in February 2021, later declaring himself prime minister.
Min Aung Hlaing has been recommended by the UN for investigation and prosecution for war crimes and genocide, and personally sanctioned by the US, EU, UK and Canada, but not by Australia.
Advocates for Myanmar’s elected government argued the meeting between the coup leader and the representative of a western democracy, would be used as a propaganda tool by the junta to legitimise its unlawful control of Myanmar. Justice for Myanmar’s Yadanar Maung described Australia’s decision to take the meeting as “an act of betrayal” of the Myanmar people.
Manny Maung, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, said the meeting was “deeply unacceptable” and “only serves to lend credibility to a military junta that is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity”.
The meeting has been prominently reported by Myanmar’s state-controlled media, in Burmese, and in English for international audiences. Several pictures of the meeting have been published, including one of the Senior General presenting the ambassador with a painting as a gift.
The regime reported that Wednesday’s meeting, in the parlour of Min Aung Hlaing’s office, discussed “the further maintenance of good relations between two countries, enhancement of cooperation in various sectors between governments and peoples of both countries”.
It described the CRPH, the elected exiled Myanmar parliament, and the NUG, the exiled National Unity Government , as “terrorists”.
Before Senate estimates on Thursday, Katrina Cooper, the deputy secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was questioned by Greens senator Janet Rice over the junta’s reports that the meeting discussed “cooperation in various sectors” and “maintenance of good relations”.
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Cooper would not comment on the junta’s characterisation of the meeting, but said there were no areas of cooperation with the junta and that the ambassador “asked for a number of things”.
“She reiterated Australia’s concern about the situation in Myanmar, she urged the Myanmar military to cease violence, release arbitrary detainees, engage in dialogue and ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.”
The meeting between Australia’s ambassador, who is finishing her posting, and Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday was one of at least eight meetings or phone calls Australian diplomats and defence officials have had with junta representatives since the coup last February, estimates heard.
Rice asked if engaging with the junta risked legitimising its control of the country.
Cooper defended Australia’s position, arguing its “limited” engagement with the regime “give us an opportunity to speak directly to the regime”, including to call for an end to violence and grant humanitarian access.
“We don’t consider that the engagement we’ve had to date legitimises the current regime.”
But Yadanar Maung said the military junta was a terrorist organisation and ‘Australia’s continued engagement with it was “an act of betrayal to its own democracy”.
She said the meeting would be used to legitimise the military’s forcible seizure of control of the country.
“The latest meeting has given fodder for the junta’s domestic propaganda and is part of a pattern of complicity that stands out from Australia’s democratic allies. Australia has still failed to impose any targeted sanctions on the Myanmar junta and military businesses in response to the coup attempt and the military’s ongoing atrocities, and Australia’s Future Fund continues to invest in companies doing business with the military, including an arms supplier.”
Analysis prepared by the Australian Council for International Development (Acfid) shows the US, the UK, Canada and the EU have imposed sanctions against a total of 196 individuals and 172 entities, including subsidiaries, as of February.
The chief executive of Acfid, Marc Purcell, said Australia’s failure to impose any additional sanctions against the generals since the coup 14 months ago was “increasingly glaring” compared with actions taken by other like-minded countries.
Cooper said the government weighed up “a number of important considerations” when deciding on possible sanctions, including consular matters such as the ongoing “arbitrary detention” of the Australian academic, Prof Sean Turnell. Turnell was an economic adviser to the democratically elected Myanmar government..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-04-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Armed opposition to Myanmar’s coup is spreading, leading the junta to mobilise civilian militias that, in turn, have set off a spate of reprisals. For now, informal justice meted out by local leaders is the best means of stopping the pattern from becoming self-sustaining.
Description:
"What’s new? As anti-coup forces grow stronger in central Myanmar, the military has increasingly relied upon pro-regime networks of armed civilians commonly known as Pyusawhti. This strategy has largely failed, with the Pyusawhti facing stiff resistance and getting limited protection from overstretched security forces.
Why does it matter? Although the Pyusawhti have gained little traction, they have received military training, making them more lethal. Their involvement in regime atrocities has put them in the crosshairs of resistance groups, leading to tit-for-tat killings that risk unleashing long-term cycles of communal violence.
What should be done? With no hope of quickly restoring law and order, informal justice mechanisms may, despite obvious limitations, be the best hope for constraining escalatory communal violence and providing non-violent means of redress for victims. Preserving the possibility of international accountability through the UN-established Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar will also help.
I.
Overview
Following the Myanmar military’s February 2021 coup d’état, various forms of armed resistance have emerged, alongside peaceful responses. Some of the most persistent and tactically innovative cells are battling soldiers in what is called the Dry Zone, to the west of Mandalay in the Burman Buddhist heartland. In an attempt to quash them, the security forces have turned to networks of pro-military civilians, widely referred to as Pyusawhti, for reinforcements, intelligence and knowledge of the terrain. But this strategy has failed to constrain the resistance movements, instead bringing a wave of attacks on those suspected of pro-regime sentiments or activities, leading to Pyusawhti reprisals. The danger is that this cycle of violence becomes self-sustaining. With no hope of reversing the coup in the near or medium term, informal community justice mechanisms might be the most promising means for preventing the increasingly gruesome tit-for-tat killings by giving victims non-violent means of redress. International justice mechanisms also help by threatening future accountability for atrocities.
The Myanmar military, or Defence Services, has a long history of raising militias as part of its counter-insurgency operations, particularly in Myanmar’s uplands, where it has been fighting ethnic armed groups for more than 70 years. Over the decades, it has also mobilised irregular forces – bands of thugs whom it has recruited ad hoc and paid daily wages – to crack down on protesters and political opponents.
Following the coup, the junta attempted to use this modus operandi to quell the nationwide resistance movements. But the generals learned early on that the coup’s unpopularity made ad hoc recruiting difficult, and so the military changed its approach. In the Dry Zone and other parts of the Burman Buddhist heartland where they face stubborn and effective armed resistance, the security forces turned to pro-military Pyusawhti networks for back-up, intelligence and knowledge of local geography.
The original Pyusawhti groups arose out of a government militia-forming strategy in the 1950s, and were named after a semi-mythical warrior-king from the Burmese chronicles. The emergence of Pyusawhti militias today, however, appears to have a different backstory. Today’s groups evolved out of pre-existing local networks consisting of individuals who are ideologically pro-regime, as well as others – such as members of the military-established Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) – who fear being targeted by the resistance, whether or not they actively support the junta. Security forces are providing these networks with basic training and rudimentary weapons. While the military is stretched too thin to protect them from retaliation, it regularly launches revenge attacks when anti-coup resistance cells hit Pyusawhti groups.
The military’s attempt to use the Pyusawhti against anti-coup forces has foundered, however, due to the strength of anti-regime sentiment, the risk of reprisal against those who do sign up has increased. The pro-regime militias, if anything, may have deepened popular hatred of the regime with their involvement in reported atrocities and their campaign against the resistance. That victims of violence on both sides have neither effective state protection nor legal recourse augments their inclination to take matters into their own hands, leading to tit-for-tat reprisals and the potential for greater escalation. Myanmar’s judicial system independence was badly compromised to begin with, and following the coup broke down completely, depriving individuals of what protection they had beforehand.
Responsibility for this sad state of affairs lies squarely with the regime, not only for mounting the coup and dispensing with what existed of the rule of law, but also for unleashing horrific violence on civilians thereafter. Nonetheless, resistance forces must also take responsibility for the actions of their members, some of whom have also committed what appear to be crimes. The National Unity Government, a parallel administration created by ousted lawmakers after the coup, has issued guidance and rules of engagement for resistance fighters, but it cannot hope to police the behaviour of the many different groups spread across the country.
The best remedy for the situation – to reverse the coup and restore a modicum of law and order across the country – is not on the cards for the foreseeable future. Against this backdrop, outside actors should continue to focus on denying political legitimacy to the junta, targeting sanctions at the military and its business interests, preventing the flow of arms to the regime, and engaging closely with the National Unity Government and other legitimate representatives of Myanmar’s peoples, including the Rohingya.
Informal justice mechanisms ... which rely on the authority of community elders and religious figures, have an important role in dispute resolution and conflict mitigation in Myanmar.
As for Pyusawhti-related violence, the bodies within Myanmar that may be best positioned to make inroads are informal justice mechanisms. These structures, which rely on the authority of community elders and religious figures, have an important role in dispute resolution and conflict mitigation in Myanmar, and could help provide victims with non-violent means of redress and thus help stop cycles of revenge from spinning out of control. The turbulent post-coup environment has tended to limit the ability of these figures to constrain violence, but over time they could regain their traditional influence. International bodies such as the UN-established Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar can also assist by looking into post-coup atrocities and collecting information that enables future efforts to hold perpetrators to account.
II.
History of Irregular Forces in Myanmar
A.
Dealing with Post-independence Chaos
The Myanmar army has made use of irregular forces throughout its decades-long fight with numerous insurgencies, as well as for the purposes of protecting individual political leaders. The practice dates back to the Burma army’s earliest years, during World War II, and continued after independence from Britain in 1948. Myanmar was in tumult at the time, with three quarters of towns having fallen to various rebel groups, half of the government’s troops having mutinied and the 2,000 soldiers who remained barely able to control the capital, Yangon. The large quantity of weapons left over from World War II added to the disorder, with politicians, parliamentarians, business owners and black marketeers all raising their own teams of gunmen, known as “pocket armies”. Over the course of the 1950s, the beleaguered government authorised formation of militias across the country, known variously as “levies”, “volunteer defence forces” and “special reserves”, though these initiatives mostly just gave legal cover to the pocket armies.
One of these initiatives was the formation in 1955 of the original Pyusawhti militias. The name refers to a semi-mythical early king of Bagan, from a dynasty that began in 849 C.E. and that, at its height (around 1200 C.E.), was the first to incorporate most of what is now Myanmar. The Burmese chronicles say that Pyusawhti was a fearsome warrior, who vanquished four dangerous beasts (a giant bird, boar, tiger and flying squirrel) that were terrorising the local people. In the 1950s, the War Office (a precursor to the defence ministry) pitched the Pyusawhti militias as local forces that would similarly protect the people from the predation of insurgents and armed robbers. Authorities raised these militias in places across the country, placing them under the oversight of army field commanders in their respective areas of responsibility, with the intention that they would free the army from tedious routine security functions. In practice, the Pyusawhti, like other irregulars, were often partisan – loyal to local ruling-party politicians – and the army attempted to disarm and disband them after its 1958 coup, with mixed success.
B.
Subcontracting Conflict Management
Despite the patchy record of militias in the post-independence years, the Myanmar military continued to make use of irregulars to perform local security functions and keep insurgencies in check. Separate from the Pyusawhti, from the 1960s onward, the Defence Services offered insurgents across the country the chance to convert into military-aligned Ka Kwe Ye [“defensive”] militias, later called Border Guard Forces, allowing them to keep their arms and giving them a free hand to engage in (often illicit) business in exchange for their loyalty. The military also established hundreds of new village-level militias in insecure areas – mostly small, poorly trained and lightly armed pyithusit, or “people’s forces” – which the army used as patrolmen and in particular as informants.
These militias created by the military government, which ruled the country from 1962 to 2011, were nearly all established in the uplands, where the regime confronted insurgencies fighting for self-rule for various ethnic minorities. Such counter-insurgency tactics were not needed in the Burman-majority lowlands, where the security forces established firm control, at least in recent decades.
C.
Organised Political Violence
The military periodically mobilised irregulars in the Burman heartland as well, however, to intimidate its political opponents and crack down on protesters. These networks were known by various names, the most widely used of which was swan ar shin [literally, “masters of force”]. Members were reportedly thugs recruited by local authorities in poor peri-urban areas and paid by the day; they wore civilian clothes so that they would not be easily identifiable. The previous military regime deployed them most notoriously for the attack on the convoy escorting Aung San Suu Kyi, the dissident who became leader of Myanmar’s democratically elected government (and whom the coup deposed), through Dipeyin (Tabayin) township in 2003, as well as during the Saffron Revolution of 2007. Occasionally, swan ar shin networks were referred to as Pyusawhti groups in the Myanmar media, likely a nod to the role played by the pro-military militias in the 1950s.
In many places, it was common knowledge who had been recruited to these forces, to the extent that members were openly transported in police trucks and conducted morning drills in public areas. On occasion, they wore distinct items of clothing so that the security forces could tell them from protesters. In 2015, for example, poorly trained swan ar shin wearing red armbands were widely photographed breaking up student protests in downtown Yangon. Military authorities, however, did not publicly acknowledge that these forces existed or admit to supporting them, and the individuals involved did not usually identify themselves or disclose how they had been recruited.
The militias’ involvement in violence – and their connection to the Defence Services – is sometimes clear and sometimes not. The swan ar shin were blamed for several violent episodes, leaving the impression that they were a standing paramilitary force rather than an ad hoc mob. But many such reports were based on conjecture. For example, commentators suggested that swan ar shin instigated the wave of anti-Muslim violence that swept through Myanmar in 2012 and 2013. Yet no evidence for this assertion came to light, and contemporaneous Crisis Group investigations cast doubt on their involvement in some of the most serious violent incidents. By contrast, there did appear to be military collusion with, if not outright support for, Rakhine vigilantes who attacked Rohingya villages in October 2012. The connivance was obvious during the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2016-2017, when such vigilantes carried out killings, rapes, looting and arson with impunity, including within sight of foreign journalists. Unlike the swan ar shin, these vigilante groups formed organically but then received military support.
III.
Evolution of the Pyusawhti
A.
Tactical Challenges
In the coup’s immediate aftermath, the regime returned to its old tactics, mobilising thugs to scatter demonstrators, but these efforts mostly failed. On 25 February 2021, three days after a national strike and with protests swelling across the country, a pro-military mob of hundreds attacked demonstrators and residents in downtown Yangon with clubs and slingshots. Residents captured at least 22 of the attackers and detained them for most of the day, in a tense standoff with police that ended when residents eventually handed them over. So strong was public opposition to the coup that security forces were not easily able to protect their hired thugs anywhere in the country. In many cases, members of these mobs faced stiff resistance even in their own poor neighbourhoods, where the vast majority of residents supported the anti-regime protests.
As the regime cracked down with increasing brutality ... the security forces faced increasing difficulties recruiting non-uniformed assistance.
As the regime cracked down with increasing brutality, and demonstrations gave way to determined armed resistance, the security forces faced increasing difficulties recruiting non-uniformed assistance. While raising militias has been part and parcel of the military’s standard strategy for decades in fighting insurgencies, doing so in a context where anti-military sentiment is so widely held has been much more difficult. People who had pro-military leanings – or who thought others would suspect them of having such sympathies – were isolated to the degree that they feared being targeted by resistance forces.
Consequently, pro-military civilians began organising themselves into what were initially loose self-protection networks that the military subsequently used for its own purposes. Early reports of such mobilisation came from Mingin township in Sagaing Region, where the USDP enjoys significant support, and soon thereafter the phenomenon spread to other parts of the Dry Zone, as well as elsewhere in Myanmar.
Thus, unlike with the swan ar shin and the original Pyusawhti militias in the 1950s, the security forces do not appear to have rolled out a comprehensive militia-formation strategy after the coup. Rather, the first pro-regime militias seem to have evolved in the manner of the anti-Muslim vigilantes active in 2012-2013, or those who attacked the Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017, in the sense that they formed organically, often out of pre-existing local networks, but with the tacit acceptance – and later, active support – of the security forces. These networks included Buddhist nationalists, USDP members and army veterans who had come together ahead of the November 2020 elections in the hope of defeating Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD).
B.
Local Pyusawhti Mobilisation
Some pro-regime networks self-identify as Pyusawhti, but others do not, and the resistance movement and Myanmar independent media are using the term to refer to any group of civilians providing support to regime forces – or those with political affiliations that make them suspect, such as USDP members, nationalists or military veterans whether or not they belong to such a group. The term’s prevalence can give the impression that the Pyusawhti is a larger, more coherent organisation or group of organisations than is actually the case. Rather than a national military-established body with local branches, the Pyusawhti is more accurately described as a loosely connected set of village-level networks across the country, having widely varying characteristics and capabilities.
As suggested above, members of these networks include people who are ideologically pro-regime, as well as those – such as some USDP members, for example – who fear that the resistance will target them, whether or not they are actively backing the junta. But not all individuals assumed to be in Pyusawhti are in fact affiliated with such a network. Indeed, in some cases, USDP members have reportedly made contact with the resistance in an attempt to avoid assassination, by providing support or giving assurances that they will not oppose resistance forces or act as informants against them.
Pyusawhti militias in [the Dry Zone] area evolved out of pro-military demonstrations following the coup.
Crisis Group research in Magway Region – a resistance stronghold in the Dry Zone – indicates that Pyusawhti militias in this area evolved out of pro-military demonstrations following the coup. Those demonstrations, in March 2021, were composed mostly of USDP members and militant Buddhist nationalists, who had already come together for electoral campaigns ahead of the November 2020 polls. The USDP, which suffered an embarrassing defeat in those elections, supported the coup, echoing the military’s justification by claiming that the balloting had been marred by fraud. For their part, Buddhist nationalists have been increasingly active over the last decade, backing the USDP and strongly opposing the NLD out of fear that political reforms and modernisation threatened the traditional place of Buddhism in society.
By May 2021, some of those who had participated in the earlier pro-military demonstrations had organised themselves into village-based militias. At this time, resistance groups were arming themselves more systematically, in response to the military’s atrocities, and beginning to assassinate perceived regime sympathisers.
At first, pro-regime networks appeared confident that military backing would give them power and impunity. According to a resistance leader in Pauk township, in May 2021, members of a nascent militia circulated a pamphlet in the name of the Pyusawhti listing the names of 21 local anti-regime figures that they would capture “dead or alive”, including herself. But instead the pamphlet incurred the wrath of resistance forces, who began targeting Pyusawhti members as a priority. One pro-regime militia leader in the area told Crisis Group that the resistance tried to assassinate him at home on 12 June 2021, failing because he managed to escape through a back door.
The regime thus faces two broad challenges in rolling out a militia strategy for combating the rise of anti-coup resistance forces. First, the strength of anti-regime sentiment across much of Myanmar is such that pro-regime militias often become targets for resistance forces rather than a tool for the security forces to project power. Resistance forces have assassinated more than 1,000 allegedly pro-regime individuals since mid-2021, including almost 200 known or rumoured to be involved with pro-regime militias. The majority of these killings were in the Dry Zone and adjacent townships; resistance forces have also killed groups of militia members in clashes. In several cases, they have captured and disarmed such militias, who complain of a lack of support from the police and military.
Secondly, the military and police are overstretched in the Dry Zone theatre and face constant attacks by the resistance when on the move, particularly in rural areas. Resistance forces also hit smaller fixed bases, especially poorly-defended police stations. The security forces are thus constrained in their ability to protect or provide backup to pro-regime militias, leaving them very exposed. According to militia members and other well-informed sources, the Pyusawhti are poorly equipped, often by police who give them confiscated tumi flintlock guns and other old or unreliable weapons. Tumi guns seized from pro-regime militias by the resistance bear police markings. While police stations have limited supplies, the military has the capacity to provide more effective weaponry. Tellingly, it does not: lacking a clear understanding of who is who on the ground, it fears inadvertently arming its opponents. Weapons given to weak militias are also easily captured by resistance forces.
The parallel emergence of pro- and anti-regime armed groups of civilians has led to deep divisions in many communities.
The parallel emergence of pro- and anti-regime armed groups of civilians has led to deep divisions in many communities. In rural Myanmar, the village is the fundamental unit of social organisation. Villages are typically mono-religious and mono-ethnic, bound together by religious institutions, practices and ceremonies as well as cultural traditions. Where villages are diverse, residents will typically self-segregate along ethno-religious lines (with “upper”, “lower”, “east”, “west” or some other designator appended to the village name to distinguish the areas). But this tendency to homogeneity did not, until recently, extend to politics. Before the coup, it was not uncommon for residents of the same village to support different political parties – for example, the NLD and USDP.
That is changing. In places where the armed resistance is strongest, particularly in the northern and central parts of the Dry Zone to the west of Mandalay (see map in Appendix B), the post-coup level of distrust and violence is such that political diversity within villages is no longer viable. Most villages support the resistance. Only a small number of pro-regime villages have emerged. These are either places where most residents supported the NLD’s political opponents – for example, USDP supporters or militant nationalists – or places where the army houses veterans and their families. Everywhere, people with minority loyalties have had to go along with the majority, flee or face assassination.
It is this reality, rather than any strategy, that accounts for the emergence of most Pyusawhti-type militias. These groups, and often the villages where they operate, look to the security forces for back-up, training and equipment, and the security forces have in turn come to rely on them for intelligence, local knowledge and additional manpower. Thus, while there are reports of Pyusawhti groups forming in many parts of Myanmar, it is in the Dry Zone, where the resistance poses the greatest threat to the individuals concerned, that they have mostly taken root. This region is also the place where the military has had the biggest problems trying to consolidate control, and therefore has the greatest need for the support the Pyusawhti can provide, and the greatest incentive to back them in return. There are also multiple reports of people being pressured by the junta and its allies into joining Pyusawhti groups.
C.
The Military’s Use of Pyusawhti
In the Dry Zone, the Myanmar military has found itself fighting a very different kind of conflict than it is used to, and one that it is not well equipped for. Unlike in the ethnic areas, where the army has been battling insurgents continuously since independence, there has been no rebellion in the Burman-majority central lowlands for decades, which means that the military does not have the bases, territorial familiarity, operational intelligence or supply networks in place to support offensive operations in these areas. The Dry Zone has also long been a key recruiting ground for the military, meaning that many rank-and-file soldiers and non-commissioned officers are fighting in their native regions. As a result, morale is reportedly low, producing a steady trickle of desertions and defections.
The military is also more overstretched than it has been in decades, fighting on numerous fronts against adversaries, new and old, in Chin State, the Dry Zone and adjacent areas, parts of Shan State and Kayah State, as well as engaging in sporadic but heavy clashes elsewhere. Unlike in the past, it must also maintain sizeable forces in the main cities, where resistance groups regularly assassinate regime figures and attack patrols.
The Dry Zone Pyusawhti are … a useful ally for the regime, as their members can provide valuable intelligence.
The Dry Zone Pyusawhti are thus a useful ally for the regime, as their members can provide valuable intelligence, act as local guides or take the point position in operations, as well as serve as reinforcements. Many reports of military operations in central Myanmar indicate that armed men in civilian clothes, assumed to be Pyusawhti members, accompanied the troops. Pyusawhti members are also reported to ride along with police on missions to arrest or kill dissidents. The regime has at various points denied having any role in forming Pyusawhti groups, but it also distributes leaflets in the Dry Zone declaring that it has organised an overwhelming force of pro-regime fighters, and the Sagaing Region chief minister has reportedly claimed that the authorities have raised 77 such militias and provided them with some 2,000 weapons.
The military has sometimes given temporary shelter on its bases to people who fear being targeted by resistance forces, such as regime-appointed administrators and members of Pyusawhti networks. It has also been providing two-week military training courses to such people on an ad hoc basis, as well as to spouses of soldiers. But while these initiatives may have made Pyusawhti members better fighters, they have not altered the strategic equation on the ground, especially since the military is not arming these groups in any significant way. Rather, by bringing these civilians more clearly under its wing, the military is putting them at greater risk of resistance attack, especially since as noted above it cannot provide them reliable protection. For example, resistance forces have repeatedly attacked a village in Sagaing Region’s Pale township that has been hosting Pyusawhti training courses.
D.
Risks of Escalation
The vast majority of violence is being committed by junta troops, including the most notorious incident to be reported in the Dry Zone, when soldiers allegedly killed and incinerated eleven people, including six teenagers, in Sagaing Region’s Salingyi township on 7 December 2021, with indications that some were burned alive. At the same time, however, pro-regime militias’ proactive targeting of resistance forces has increasingly led the latter to take an eye for an eye. Militias are also embroiled in some of the regime forces’ reported atrocities, deepening the public’s hatred and ratcheting up retaliatory violence. Regime, militia and resistance forces alike engage in reprisals. Examples include the following:
In May 2021, resistance forces reportedly assassinated two perceived regime sympathisers in Pauk township: a USDP organiser, killed on 25 May, and a local government clerk, five days later. Allegedly, the military and local police, accompanied by suspected Pyusawhti members and seeking revenge for these killings, torched most of the 250 homes in a nearby village that they suspected of supporting the local resistance group, killing two elderly residents who were unable to flee and were burned alive in their homes.
A group of Pyusawhti members accompanied by three police officers allegedly abducted, tortured and killed a resistance leader in Pauk township on 14 September 2021. In response, resistance forces allegedly snatched, blindfolded and tortured a 23-year-old man accused of participating in the killing. His brutal interrogation, in which he confessed to his involvement in that murder and other violent incidents, was filmed by his captors and posted on social media.
Resistance forces reportedly killed a family in Sagaing Region’s Taze township on 22 September 2021, including an alleged Pyusawhti leader, his wife, son, one of his daughters and her five-year-old child. In apparent revenge for the killings, the man’s other daughter and her husband, both police officers, reportedly led a raid by security forces on the village the following day, burning down fifteen houses belonging to NLD members.
Tit-for-tat killings could unleash an even more dangerous cycle of vendettas in some areas.
As these incidents demonstrate, and with emotions running high given the trauma triggered by the coup and subsequent violence, tit-for-tat killings could unleash an even more dangerous cycle of vendettas in some areas. The risk that local violence will escalate has increased because the military has trained the Pyusawhti and other pro-regime militias in the use of weapons. The Pyusawhti networks’ violent and partisan actions could lead to a situation where resistance forces step up the killing of USDP members and military veterans who are not members of such networks or engaged in anti-resistance activities.
There have also been reports of cases of mistaken identity or settling of personal grudges as part of the tit-for-tat killings. For example, on 3 February 2022, a resistance group in Sagaing Region’s Ayadaw township killed a poet and prominent pro-democracy activist in front of his children, in what appears to have been an error or a crime unrelated to politics. The local group that claimed responsibility for the killing, insisted despite all evidence to the contrary that the individual was helping the regime. That group has faced sharp criticism for its actions, with sixteen local organisations, including the NLD’s township chapter, calling for the perpetrators to stand trial “when the country is back in the hands of the people”.
IV.
Conclusion: Possible Responses
The Myanmar military has unleashed brutal violence across large parts of the country as it attempts to impose its rule on a population in revolt. Determined armed resistance has emerged in many areas, including the central Dry Zone and other parts of Burman-majority heartland that have not seen conflict in decades. The military has turned to the Pyusawhti as a check on resistance forces in these areas, but its reliance on these groups has instead helped perpetuate a vicious cycle of revenge killings. The post-coup breakdown in law and order in much of Myanmar, and the lack of trust in justice systems even where they still exist, are further aggravating factors as they deprive individuals of protection and victims of formal recourse. Victims frustrated by this state of affairs may opt to take matters into their own hands as vigilantes.
Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that the situation will change dramatically in the near term. Most importantly, the military shows no sign of reversing the coup, which would be the only reliable way to put an end to the violence and restore law and order. But even if these efforts are likely to be frustrated for the foreseeable future, outside actors should continue to work toward that objective, including by denying political legitimacy to the junta, targeting sanctions at the military and its businesses, taking steps to prevent the flow of arms to the junta, and engaging closely with the National Unity Government and other legitimate representatives of Myanmar’s peoples.
Informal justice mechanisms can help prevent escalation of violence and provide non-violent means of redress.
As for the violence involving Pyusawhti militias and local resistance groups, the greatest hope for restraining it may – at least over the medium term – lie with informal community justice mechanisms. While obviously limited, informal justice mechanisms can help prevent escalation of violence and provide non-violent means of redress. These mechanisms, which rely on the authority of community elders and religious leaders, have always been important in local dispute resolution and conflict mitigation in Myanmar. They have, however, not yet fully adapted to post-coup conditions, and Crisis Group’s enquiries over the last six months suggest that many armed actors are operating beyond the constraints that elders and religious figures might normally impose. That is likely to change over time however, as society adjusts to the new realities and traditional community structures start to reassert themselves.
While responsibility for the breakdown of law and order lies squarely with the regime, resistance movements must also work harder to police their members’ actions. The National Unity Government has issued guidance and rules of engagement for resistance forces, and recently established a mechanism to investigate violations, but its influence is meagre, as even if many groups have pledged political allegiance to the parallel authorities, most remain independent. The response by local organisations to the killing of the pro-democracy activist in Ayadaw township (see above) is encouraging, but this case is extreme and the reaction unusual; other mistaken or unwarranted killings have received little pushback or attention. The National Unity Government should more decisively distance itself from such acts by resistance forces, which some local civil society groups have been quietly pushing it to do, and which international partners can also urge.
International mechanisms also play an important role in reminding local actors that there may be accountability for the various alleged crimes of international concern being committed across Myanmar, which a recent UN report says may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over crimes in Myanmar at present, other than those arising out of the anti-Rohingya rampages with a sufficient nexus to Bangladesh (an ICC party), that could change in the future and international accountability under some countries’ universal jurisdiction provisions is possible. Outside actors should therefore continue to support the UN-established Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, a body set up to collect and collate evidence of international crimes in Myanmar that is also now looking into atrocities committed since the military seized power.
The February 2021 coup has been a disaster for Myanmar, terminating its halting transition to democracy, depressing its economy, awakening dormant insurgencies, reinvigorating active ones and causing ever larger parts of the population to suffer. Even as popular resistance spreads, both peaceful and armed, the junta seems determined to stick to its hard line, of which the Pyusawhti militias are the latest manifestation. International justice may one day be of help, but in the meantime the customary dispute resolution methods of Myanmar society may well emerge as the best way to prevent Pyusawhti actions from triggering persistent cycles of communal violence..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication:
2022-04-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Myanmar’s parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG) has warned China that any effort to build a partnership with the military regime would be rejected by Myanmar’s people and could seriously damage China’s international reputation.
The warning was issued in a statement by the NUG’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his Myanmar regime-appointed counterpart Wunna Maung Lwin in Tunxi, Anhui Province on April 1. Wunna Maung Lwin was in China at Wang’s invitation.
The NUG was formed by elected lawmakers of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with their ethnic allies to challenge the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Many in Myanmar take the NUG as their legitimate government and many Western countries have shown support for it, despite their reluctance to offer official recognition.
During the meeting, the Chinese foreign minister said China was ready to work with Myanmar to deepen exchanges and cooperation in all areas, including people-to-people bonds, “no matter how the situation changes” to achieve the goal of building a China-Myanmar community with “a shared future.”
Myanmar is currently ruled by a military regime that grabbed power from the country’s democratically elected government in February last year. The coup has so far killed more than 1,700 people and caused serious social and political instability, with many observers fearing that the country is now on the verge of being a failed state.
While the regime is treated as an outcast by most Western democracies, China has been one of the few countries to engage with the junta, as it is one of Myanmar’s top investors and has a number of strategic infrastructure projects in its southern neighbor, including energy pipelines and a proposed port that would give Beijing a critical link to the Indian Ocean.
On Monday, the NUG said in a statement that the shadow government was committed to China’s goal of a shared future. But any effort by China to build that future with the regime, it said, risks serious damage to the international reputation of the People’s Republic of China.
“Equally important, the people of Myanmar will soundly reject any efforts by foreign governments to establish such a partnership with the illegitimate military regime,” it warned.
China’s failure to condemn the coup has resulted in anti-China demonstrations in Myanmar, and factories owned and run by Chinese companies have been attacked. The anti-China sentiment cooled somewhat when China urged the regime last year not to dissolve the NLD.
However, a Yangon-based observer of China-Myanmar relations said Wang’s affirmation that China was ready to work with the junta could see anti-Chinese demonstrations return, as anti-regime resistance is now at unprecedented levels and this could put Chinese gas pipeline, copper and nickel projects, among others, at risk.
“Even though they want to do it for economic purposes, China would face strong popular rejection, especially in this time of political instability,” he said.
The NUG also urged China to respect the will of the people of Myanmar and listen to the voices of the people by immediately compelling the military junta to stop all violence and restore civilian governance while working with the NUG and Myanmar’s diverse ethnic nationalities to deliver humanitarian assistance to end the suffering of the Myanmar people.
“Such a move would help China and Myanmar secure a strong and robust … shared future,” it said.
The NUG added that it was saddened to see the “pauk-phaw” (sibling) relations between China and Myanmar damaged by the regime.
“The NUG stands ready to work with the Chinese government towards repairing this damage and building a new type of ‘pauk-phaw’ [relationship] in the future,” it said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, China-Burma relations
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"Last month, Myanmar’s regime enacted the Myanmar Police Act making it compulsory for law enforcement officers to fight alongside soldiers on the front lines, while expanding their powers to restrict citizens’ liberty.
Under the law, the appointment of police officers and any structural changes to the force requires the approval of the military chief.
Legal advisor U Khin Maung Myint recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how the law will affect people.
Why has the regime made it compulsory for the police to serve in security and combat roles besides law enforcement?
The police used to be a separate entity before 1962 but since then the military has used armed organizations, including the police, as auxiliary forces.
Now this law assigns security and defense roles to the police. It has been years since security battalions were formed within the police to perform as military units. The law was enacted to assign fighting roles to the police if necessary.
Do you think officers will have to go to the frontline?
It is likely. Police battalions had to fight in the past. While officers from township police stations were engaged in law enforcement, police battalions had to fight alongside the military on the frontline.
When they gained control of an area and the troops left, police battalions stayed and reestablished security. This law means that not only police battalions but all officers will be ordered to fight.
The law grants greater powers to the police. How will it affect the freedom and security of citizens?
Laws focused on security and protection often compromise the citizenship rights, privacy and security of individuals.
Under the law, officers can arrest and search buildings, citing security and defense concerns. Residents have to hand over a layout of new homes. There can be no privacy and safety.
There is no problem if those provisions are enforced properly, respecting constitutional rights but if the powers granted by the law are abused, it is quite dangerous.
The law carries prison sentences for banging pots and pans. Is the regime trying to stop every form of protest?
The law expands officers’ powers, largely in response to the changing situation.
The resistance of the people’s defense forces and ethnic armed groups has spread from ethnic-majority states and rural areas to the cities. As resistance groups appear to be planning to launch large-scale attacks in a so-called D-day, the law aims to lift the restrictions on police so officers can take preventive measures against potential attackers.
How about the increasing penalties for certain crimes under the law?
Every regime rules with fear. It hopes increased penalties will deter potential perpetrators and reduce opposition.
But the punishment must fit the crime and only then can social order be maintained.
How do you assess the law?
By international standards, the law grants excessive power to Myanmar’s police. It will overstretch the police from their primary duty: to maintain tranquility and enforce the rule of law. They are not enforcing the law at the moment and they will be overburdened if they are also to fight. It is out of touch with reality..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
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"Since the return of military rule last year, Myanmar has been a thorn in the side of regional countries. As Myanmar is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), many countries have urged the 10-member bloc to play the role of mediator in solving the crisis caused by the coup. Plus, some neighboring and regional countries are still sitting on the fence while engaging with the regime, which has killed more than 1,700 people so far.
In this excerpt from an interview with The Irrawaddy, Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government shares her impressions of those countries.
Many countries, including the US, endorse ASEAN’s centrality. But ASEAN still cannot act. And it is mostly on good terms with the regime. The US backs ASEAN though it is aware it won’t be successful. What could Washington do?
While the US considers ASEAN as an initial step, we cannot reject it completely. But the US should think about a Plan B in case that approach does not work. We have always called for an innovative approach. The international community should not use 20th-century definitions of sovereignty and diplomatic relations to handle Myanmar in a 21st-century context.
It can no longer use old methods to approach Myanmar. It has been proven in previous decades that the old approaches were unsuccessful. And ASEAN alone cannot handle Myanmar’s crises.
ASEAN and US envoys should work together. As the EU has appointed a new envoy, we have suggested that these envoys should collaborate and take a more innovative approach.
Which countries are not helping the revolution?
I told the Indian media in an interview that some neighboring countries engage with us but they also deal with the regime. We can understand them.
Our revolution will win. I tell them to cooperate with us and when we win, we will remember who stood with us in our struggle. This is true for individuals.
We record who our friends are and who are sitting on the fence, which will shape our future relations with them.
Does that include India?
Some countries want to help but lack the strength. Others have the strength but they are too focused on their interests and fail to act decisively. If they want to protect their interests, I urged them to stand by us.
I guarantee that their interests will not suffer. The NUG has the public’s support. The day when people don’t like us will be the day we fail. Our neighbors should listen to our people, and cooperate and support the revolution.
That’s why I was critical during the Indian interview. India is the biggest democracy in the world. It should more actively and decisively back democracy in Myanmar. It is a major regional power. I was critical because India should boldly shoulder its role and take action.
What about China?
China is important. Its political situation differs from that of India. I say democracies should act like real democracies. To be pragmatic, we have to engage diplomatically with China. Both India and China are important to us. We maintain our engagement with China. We are taking a pragmatic approach.
What do you expect from China?
At least China should not legitimize the junta and its leaders and say it is a legitimate government. We have repeatedly said that and asked China not to ignore the 2020 election results. We understand China does not oppose that.
Cambodia has increased its ties with the junta and Japanese representatives have attended the regime’s events. Do these countries support the NUG?
This is a difference between Myanmar and Ukraine. EU countries stand collectively by Ukraine. This gives Ukraine many advantages. But it is different in our region. There are dictatorial states and others that favor democracy.
But they are also divided. Even democracies like Japan and South Korea are different. South Korea has been more decisive while Japan focuses on negotiations.
Japan is concerned China might fill a vacuum if it refuses to engage with the regime. It is a balancing act.
Asian countries accept the principle [of rejecting the regime]. But in reality, they do not take a tough stance and maintain ties with both the regime and us. We have to monitor their moves and engage with them.
What is your message to regional countries?
It is simple. When our revolution wins, it will contribute to long-term stability and development in the region. If our revolution fails, crises will keep happening in Myanmar and it will continue to be a troublemaker in the region.
But if the people win, Myanmar will contribute to regional stability and development as a fully established democracy. Other countries should boldly stand by us and support our revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Coup-leader Min Aung Hlaing vows to ‘annihilate’ anti-military resistance forces, snuffing out any hopes for dialog
Description:
" If anyone had thought that there could, as the UN and the outside world advocate, be a dialogue between Myanmar’s junta and the democratic opposition, those hopes were effectively dashed when the country’s military leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, gave a fiery speech on Armed Forces Day, March 27.
On the occasion, the coup leader vowed to “annihilate to the end” want he described as “terrorist groups” and also “urged” Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organizations not to support those “terrorist groups” and, instead, “live within a legal framework” (sic), which analysts interpret as sticking to a now-collapsed National Ceasefire Agreement that the military concluded with a limited number of ethnic rebel armies in 2015.
Equally important was the show of unity the armed forces displayed on March 27, dispelling all persistent but misguided notions of “power struggles” between hardliners in the military and “reformists” supposedly represented by Thein Sein, who served as president from 2011 to 2016.
No less than 25 former officers who have served in various military-appointed governments since the bloody crackdown on a pro-democracy uprising in 1988 were at the parade and other functions at the capital Naypyidaw. Among them was Thein Sein, who reportedly gave “words of advice” to Min Aung Hlaing who, in return, bowed in a show of respect to the ex-president.
It was not the first time Thein Sein had shown his true colors. In December last year, the ex-general once dubbed “Myanmar’s Gorbachev” by some Western observers for his supposedly “reformist agenda”, made donations to families of people who had been killed or wounded on suspicion of acting as military informants.
Needless to say, Thein Sein has never donated any money to the many families whose loved ones have been gunned down by the military and the police for demonstrating peacefully against last year’s coup.
According to the independent advocacy group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 1,723 unarmed protesters have been killed or tortured to death in various detention centers since the coup. More than 13,000 people, including activists, local politicians, journalists and health workers who supported the anti-junta movement have been jailed.
Those figures do not include the thousands of villagers who have been killed in airstrikes and artillery bombardment in ethnic areas, where resistance to the coup has grown strong over the past year. According to an announcement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on February 11, the number of Internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar has doubled since last year’s coup, now crossing the 800,000-mark.
While the world’s attention is now almost entirely focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, another massive tragedy is playing out in Myanmar, and very little is being done about it by the international community.
Foreign powers, among them the European Union, in a statement in October last year appear to have outsourced the Myanmar issue to ASEAN: “The European Union calls on Myanmar to engage constructively with the ASEAN Special Envoy to implement fully and completely the ASEAN Five Point Consensus. It stresses the need for the military to facilitate regular visits to Myanmar by the ASEAN Special Envoy, and for him to be able to engage freely with all he wishes to meet.”
The “five-point consensus”, which was adopted when Min Aung Hlaing paid a brief visit to Jakarta on April 24 last year, called for a cessation of violence and “a constructive dialog between all parties concerned.”
The EU statement was remarkable in the sense that the “Five Point Agreement” was already dead when the Europeans issued it. No envoys from ASEAN have been allowed to meet anybody except junta officials and the word “dialog” has never been uttered by Min Aung Hlaing and his cohorts.
During the most recent such ASEAN visit, by Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn in late March, all that the junta had to offer him was a meeting with Su Su Lwin, the wife of Htin Kyaw, president from 2016-2018 and a member of the coup-ousted National League for Democracy (NLD). Su Su Lwin, however, declined to meet the ASEAN envoy, citing “health issues.”
But that did not prevent Noeleen Hayzer, UN Secretary-General’s special envoy to Myanmar, from teaming up with not only Prak Sokonn but also Cambodia’s authoritarian ruler Hun Sen, whose country is this year’s ASEAN rotational chair.
On April 1 — and it was apparently not an April Fool’s joke — Hayzer’s office issued a statement referring to the “robust ASEAN-UN umbrella” and that “ASEAN and the broader international community have a responsibility to amplify and support the will of the people.”
Critics would say that she seems to have conveniently forgotten that ASEAN is a gathering of ten mostly undemocratic nations which has never during its now almost 55-year-long history helped solve a single problem in member states or bilateral disputes between them.
Such issues range from the conflict in East Timor and border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, cross-border insurgencies between Thailand and Malaysia, and, perhaps most crucially, a common stand on the South China Sea as China asserts its wide-reaching claims to the strategic waterway.
In fact, ASEAN’s two guiding principles — consensus and non-interference — make the bloc impotent when it comes to regional security or the promotion of peace and democracy. The only things that ASEAN can show as progress would be some trade agreements and visa exemption rules for citizens of member states.
Meanwhile, the Myanmar military is pushing ahead its brutal campaign to wipe out resistance forces and secure control over the country. Elections may or may not be held in 2023, as Mun Aung Hlaing once stated, but before that happens the military will make sure that the NLD is emasculated politically and organizationally.
The NLD has scored massive landslide victories in all the elections it has contested, first in 1990 to for a National Assembly that was never convened but replaced by the military with a constitution-drafting body that consisted of no more than 100 of 492 MPs elects and then up to 600 delegates appointed by the military.
Then, in 2015 after which the NLD was allowed to form a government and, finally, in 2020, when the military seized power before the elected assembly could meet. The generals are now busy preparing for the selection of its own election commissioners while all NLD leaders, among them President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, remain in military custody.
Since the tanks rolled into Yangon and Naypyidaw, and the protests were met with gunfire, thousands of activists have fled to the border areas where ethnic rebels have territories or organized their own resistance in parts of central Myanmar that have not seen insurgency since the 1970s.
Those forces have shown remarkable resilience and fighting spirit, but the abundance of local resistance groups, loosely lumped together as People’s Defense Forces, do not appear to coordinate their activities under a central command. There are frequent ambushes and skirmishes in various parts of the country, but no coherent strategy seems to have been developed for the anti-junta struggle.
Nor do they currently have enough weaponry to seriously challenge the mighty firepower of the Myanmar military. At the same time, junta forces are stretched thin on many fronts, making it impossible for Min Aung Hlaing to “annihilate” the resistance, as he has pledged.
With the outside world now doing next to nothing, there can only be one conclusion: The Myanmar tragedy is bound to continue for the foreseeable future with more internal turmoil, refugee flows to neighboring countries and repression of any dissent under unflinching generals for whom notions of compromise, dialog and listening to public opinion do not exist..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2022-04-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
Key Countries Should Overhaul Approach to Junta’s Atrocities
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"Southeast Asian governments should urgently revamp their response to Myanmar’s abusive junta by coordinating action with the broader international community, Human Rights Watch said today. Despite adopting a “five-point consensus” on the crisis a year ago, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has failed to fulfill its pledges or take meaningful steps toward pressing the junta to end its human rights violations.
“Myanmar’s junta has spent the past year committing atrocities in utter disregard for its commitments to ASEAN,” said Elaine Pearson, acting Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The ASEAN countries leading on Myanmar – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – should immediately alter their course to focus on protecting people’s rights and freedoms rather than helping the junta remain in power.
At a summit in Jakarta on April 24, 2021, the nine ASEAN leaders and Myanmar junta chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, agreed to five points: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and the special envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties. In the year since, Min Aung Hlaing has defied each point while overseeing a brutal nationwide crackdown aimed at suppressing the millions of people opposed to military rule.
Two days after the consensus agreement, the junta walked back its endorsement, announcing it would consider the “suggestions made by ASEAN leaders when the situation returns to stability.” Rather than halting attacks as called for, the junta ramped up its abuses. Junta violations since the coup include mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Security forces have killed over 1,700 people, including at least 130 children, and arbitrarily arrested over 13,000. The military has expanded abusive operations in ethnic minority areas, displacing more than 550,000 people. Instead of heeding the consensus by allowing aid delivery, the junta has deliberately blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching populations in need as a form of collective punishment.
The five-point consensus, meanwhile, has become a pretext for governments such as the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, and European Union member states to delay real action under the guise of waiting for ASEAN leadership, Human Rights Watch said. The junta has exploited the international community’s deference to the regional bloc, which has a long record of neglecting its responsibility to protect the people of Southeast Asia under its principles of noninterference and consensus.
ASEAN appointed Brunei’s second foreign minister, Erywan Yusof, as its special envoy to Myanmar last August. His planned visit to the country in October was canceled when the junta denied him access to Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained civilian leaders, a precondition of his visit and requirement under the consensus.
The junta has indicated it will continue to block efforts to meet with Suu Kyi and other detained individuals, or with entities it has declared “unlawful,” including the shadow civilian government, the National Unity Government (NUG).
In an unprecedented censure by the bloc, ASEAN barred Min Aung Hlaing from its biannual summit in October, with only a non-political representative invited to attend. Singapore announced it was a “difficult but necessary decision to uphold ASEAN’s credibility given the unsatisfactory and highly limited progress in the implementation of the ASEAN Leaders’ Five-Point Consensus.” The junta ultimately declined to attend.
Myanmar’s refusal to meet the consensus commitments has exposed fractures within ASEAN. Several ASEAN countries – notably Malaysia and Indonesia, often alongside Singapore and the Philippines – have publicly criticized the junta’s intransigence, calling for a continued ban on political representatives from future summits.
However, Cambodia, this year’s ASEAN chair, has renewed engagement with the junta, with Prime Minister Hun Sen visiting Myanmar in January, the first foreign leader to do so. The current special envoy, Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn, met in late March with Min Aung Hlaing and other junta officials despite their refusal to grant access to Suu Kyi.
Prak Sokhonn’s claims of “meaningful outcomes” were immediately belied when Min Aung Hlaing, in his speech on Armed Forces Day, March 27, announced that the military “will no longer take into account negotiation with the terrorist groups and their supporters,” referring to the NUG and anti-coup movement, and will seek to “annihilate them to an end.”
On January 28, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet called the international response “ineffectual,” stating that “the actions taken by the UN Security Council and by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been insufficient to convince Myanmar’s military to cease its violence.” In her March report to the Human Rights Council, Bachelet noted that despite the consensus, ASEAN leaders “have not achieved tangible results.”
Leading ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, should work closely with other governments to develop a clear, timebound approach to press Myanmar’s junta toward reform, including increasing restrictions on its foreign currency revenues and weapons purchases. ASEAN should signal its support for a UN Security Council resolution instituting a global arms embargo, referring the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
US President Joe Biden, who will host ASEAN members at a summit in May, should press Southeast Asian leaders to abandon their failed consensus approach and encourage greater cooperation with other countries promoting stronger action against the junta’s rights abuses.
Over 50,000 refugees from Myanmar have fled to Thailand and other neighboring countries since the coup. Those governments should end all forced returns of asylum seekers and instead ensure refugees receive access to aid and international protection procedures, as well as facilitate emergency cross-border aid.
“For a year, governments around the world have stalled taking action on Myanmar by standing behind ASEAN’s hollow words – and have nothing to show for it,” Pearson said. “They need to adopt strong measures to deter further atrocities and hold the military accountable, not a flimsy consensus that’s proven its futility.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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more
Description:
"On 27 Mar, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing vowed to “annihilate the opposition.” As of 31 Mar, the junta had arrested at least 13,040 civilians, including politicians, activists, and journalists, and killed at least 2,053 civilians. The junta got dirtier in its tactics. It funded paramilitary groups, enacted “legislation” allowing it to conscript police into its war, used social media channels to discredit and hunt down its opposition, and demanded that hospitals turn over patient records to undermine treatment of opponents. Cities across Burma struggled with power blackouts as electricity production fell to a quarter of the national demand. Outages disrupted water distribution and business operations, while rising fuel prices made the use of generators unsustainable..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-BURMA, Asia Democracy Network, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Burma Human Rights Network, Initiatives for International Dialogue, International Federation for Human Rights, Progressive Voice and US Campaign for Burma
Date of publication:
2022-04-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Anti-coup protesters
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"Introduction
In 2005, the United Nations member states unanimously made a commitment to protect populations from the most serious crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.1 Known as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle, or R2P, this commitment emphasises the primary responsibility by states to protect their own populations from these crimes, and the responsibility of the international community to support one another in their prevention.2 Recognising that atrocities are not random events but develop in a dynamic process and require the existence of an environment conducive to their occurrence, the United Nations Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect developed a methodological framework in 2014 that enables the identification of warning signs indicating the existence of such circumstances. The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (hereinafter ‘the framework’) sets out a series of Risk Factors and corresponding Indicators that enable stakeholders to identify high-risk developments in situations of serious human rights violations, domestic instability and crisis, pinpoint gaps in existing prevention capacities and promote necessary responses. The framework serves as a working tool for the monitoring and assessment of atrocity risks and as an early warning mechanism to support the prevention of their commission.3
The following atrocity crimes risk assessment applies the framework to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (hereinafter ‘Myanmar’). It identifies the most pressing risk factors and provides recommendation on future steps that can be taken by relevant stakeholders to address risks of atrocities being committed.
Since the last atrocity risk assessment of the situation in Myanmar conducted in 2019, there have been significant domestic developments that have reshaped the climate for the commission of atrocity crimes in Myanmar. The risk of atrocity crimes, specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, is very high and the risk of genocide remains high. The military coup d’état on 1 February 2021 has resulted in a large movement of civil disobedience, the establishment of a shadow government under the leadership of former NLD politicians and its formation of an armed resistance force. The brutal crackdown by the military in response to nationwide anti-junta protests has led many civilians to take up arms and join armed resistance forces. Renewed conflict between long-standing ethnic armed groups and the military, the emergence of new local armed militias, as well as violent clashes between the military and resistance forces have dragged the country into another civil war. The means and methods deployed by the Tatmadaw against political dissidents, civilians and members of the armed resistance already meet the threshold of crimes against humanity and war crimes but indicate the risk of further escalations of the situation.
These developments occur amidst a multi-dimensional economic and humanitarian crisis that has reached new records in unemployment rates and in the number of internally displaced people in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The global COVID-19 pandemic had severe impacts not only on an already buckling health sector, but has seen many people forced out of employment and into a state of severe food insecurity. The political unrest following the military coup, which resulted in an international response of targeted sanctions, withdrawal of foreign aid and foreign investment and an increase of unemployment across the entire country’s labour force, has caused a stagnation of Myanmar’s economy and pushed the country to the brink of an economic collapse. The large-scale disobedience movements in response to the coup, disruptions in supply chains as well as the junta’s regular shutdowns of telecommunication services, internet and power outages have paralysed essential sectors and much of the country’s infrastructure. In addition, atrocities committed against the Rohingya community during the military’s ‘clearance operations’ in Rakhine State in 2017 and 2018 remain unaddressed and have further nourished a climate of prevailing impunity and injustice. Hundreds of thousands of displaced Rohingya remain in detainment camps with restricted access of humanitarian aid delivery, while being denied freedoms of movement, access to basic goods, such as food and health care, and the right to a safe, dignified and voluntary return.
While the international community has stepped up its efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Myanmar, the UN and its member States remain divided over the political disputes over power. While the majority of States condemned the military coup and refuse to recognise the military junta as the legitimate government, international response to the military use of force has been limited to targeted sanctions against senior military leaders and the exclusion of its representatives from regional summits. A stronger engagement by key regional actors, such as ASEAN member States and their newly appointed Special Envoy, and a concerted response by international actors including the UN Security Council is required to put a halt to the excessive use of force by the military against the population, to delegitimise the military junta’s claim to power and assist the country in returning to its path towards a peaceful democratic transition that is capable of addressing past injustices and building a resilient and independent national State apparatus in conformity with international human rights standards..."
Source/publisher:
The University of Queensland
Date of publication:
2022-03-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights and international relations, Genocide, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar
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1.3 MB (Original version) - 51 pages
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Description:
"Following last year’s coup, the Myanmar military has been struggling with a growing popular armed resistance against it, as well as a rising number of defections. As of this month, the number of soldiers who have quit has risen to nearly 3,000, including some battalion commanders—the highest position among those to defect so far. Making matter worse for the regime, the Australian government has accepted defectors seeking asylum since January, prompting more troops to consider quitting the army.
Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, a Burmese-American security expert, said defections are one of three elements—along with the people’s support and international support—necessary for all successful revolutions, adding that the resistance side in Myanmar could focus on defections as a way to deprive the regime of soldiers.
“That’s why defection is a really important strategy for successful resistance,” she said.
In this interview with The Irrawaddy, the professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii discusses how a third-country incentive is important for defection; why a public relations strategy is essential, as in Ukraine, to draw attention to the revolution against the junta; and why the Myanmar issue has been overshadowed by the Ukraine war.
The Australian government’s recent granting of asylum to Myanmar army defectors has been big news in military circles. What’s your impression?
It’s not surprising. It’s really a great incentive. According to previous studies we have seen, that type of third-country incentive is really important. This is a huge development for the people’s side. Huge negative for the mitlairy side. When Australia opens themselves, other countries may open up as well, including European countries.
Do you think the third-country incentive could lure more army defectors?
I think so. I think the NUG’s [the parallel civilian National Unity Government’s] Ministry of Foreign Affairs is specifically working on this issue. So, one of their first wins is Australia and I think there are some European countries they are working with. Now they are successful with Australia. It could have a domino effect on others countries they are working on.
What do you know about the army defectors?
I don’t have contact with defectors and I don’t have the data right now, but I think I have to go with the data from People’s Embrace [a group assisting defecting soldiers], but I will interview some of them as I want to know what is the condition inside the military. When they were interviewed they said a good two-thirds of [personnel] inside the military [are] demoralized and they want to leave. It continues. I think the latest one, like the lieutenant colonel who is the battalion commander, he was saying the key [reason for defecting] is his family, and that he can’t show his face in his hometown [in Myanmar’s heartland] anymore. He is embarrassed. His family is embarrassed. So, as long as those things continue, it would create a lot of push for the military personnel to defect to the people’s side. You will have more as the majority of the military personnel were recruited from Myanmar’s heartland. Now they are bombing in the heartland of Myanmar. So, they are bombing their own relatives’ homes and they are attacking their own relatives! So, it’s not surprising that the lieutenant colonel has family members there. He may not himself directly do that but the organization he belongs to [is doing it]. Direct personal impact!
How can Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the international community be creative and encourage more army defections, especially among higher ranks?
I think there are a variety of factors. Frist, the military continues to brutalize the population. The population sees them as the enemy. Their anger towards them increases. The second is the incentive. Once they get out, safety—specifically for themselves and their families. Those are logistical pieces that the NUG and international community have to work on. Right now Australia is the first one to open up to defectors. That’s really good.
Do you have any recommendations for the NUG and the international community? Some say if there are more third-country incentives, the revolution would be 70 percent accomplished.
I don’t have any other recommendations other than keep doing it, to make sure you [are well resourced for] this strategy. We can see it could be working as we have never seen this level of defection before. Now Australia opens for them. We expect to see some other countries are opening as well. You can say the strategy is working. It can take time. We want it faster but [there are] logistical pieces to work through.
If you compare the situation with Ukraine, the Myanmar resistance against the regime has not received much international support. Any comments?
I don’t think we can say Myanmar’s revolution doesn’t have international support. They have been supporting all throughout the year like humanitarian assistance and targeted sanctions. But Ukraine’s PR team is excellent. They seemed to handle the media and PR [as part of their] military strategic communication and it’s a major part of their war strategy and their counterstrategy. They utilize it. I think some are very proud of [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky’s team because they realize that they can’t compete with Russia based on firepower. They know that communication power is something they have to really utilize. So they effectively use it. Everybody in the strategic communication or PR arena absolutely admires what President Zelensky and his team has done on PR. I would say it was because of the way they did it—that’s why they got the attention they need. It’s just part of their strategy.
What do you think of Myanmar on the PR issue?
Given the situation and limitations, I think they have done well. But I think Zelensky has a different level. He is also an actor. He came from that kind of world. He kind of understands how to utlize that. I would say Myanmar people did pretty well. But I would give them a B+ if I have to grade them and Zelensky A+. Definitely the Myanmar team, the resistance, can pick up their game, improve their game a little bit more, looking at Zelensky. I wouldn’t say they are failing. The international community did pay attention to Myanmar. But right now Zelensky did well. Then Myanmar can leverage attention on Ukraine and try to expand their connection to Ukraine. It’s not a zero-sum game. Actually, Ukraine is the European theater in the fight for democracy and against authoritarianism. Myanmar is in the Indo-Pacific theater frontline fight for democracy. In both countries, Russian bombs and bullets are killing people.
But the Myanmar resistance has been on their own so far: not a single bullet yet from outside. This is different from Ukraine.
Yes, that’s the way the problem is framed. In the international system, a country’s sovereignty is so valued that it’s quite shocking for another country to invade. When you have an internal problem, the principle is helping Ukraine but in Myanmar it becomes a little bit of a barrier or hindrance because of the value of sovereignty. So, as for military support or no support, Ukraine has a professional military that has a long relationship with the US and the neighboring countries. Myanmar’s NUG doesn’t have that kind of ready-made platform. Those are the differences. In missing those ready-made platforms, where the US and international community can step in is [that] we do have those sanction regimes. That’s why you’ve got that, and humanitarian aid. They are the differences between Ukraine and Myanmar.
This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
Editor’s Note: The opinion presented in this interview is Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd’s own assessment as an expert on the subject matter. Her opinions do not represent the positions and policies of the U.S. government or any other agencies..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political role of the Tatmadaw
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"In the early years of Myanmar’s independence, March 27 was called Resistance Day. It was held to commemorate the day in 1945 when Aung San and the soldiers of his Burma National Army turned their guns against their former Japanese allies. But perhaps in an attempt to honor the military and not offend the Japanese, it was in the mid-1950s changed to Resistance Day (Armed Forces Day), a name that was retained until the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, when it became Armed Forces Day (Resistance Day) and, under the rule of former dictator General Than Shwe, only Armed Forces Day. The crucial event in 1945 was mentioned only in passing, and, when the celebrations were held for the first time in the new capital Naypyitaw on March 27, 2006, columns of soldiers marched past newly erected, larger than life statues of the three most prominent warrior kings in Myanmar history: Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya.
That those dead kings are a living force was clear from the speech Than Shwe delivered on that day: “Our Tatmadaw [armed forces] should be a worthy heir to the traditions of the capable tatmadaws established by the noble kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya.” Democratic reforms were certainly not on his mind, a fact reflected in the name of the new capital. “Naypyitaw” means “capital” or “place of a king” in old-fashioned usage. Even “tatmadaw” literally means “royal force.”
Anawratha was the founder of the first Burmese, or Myanmar, Empire in 1044 AD, while Bayinnaung was the country’s most celebrated warrior king. During his reign, which lasted from 1551 to 1581, he conquered most of the Irrawaddy plain, parts of the Shan plateau and territories as far east as Chiang Mai in present day Thailand. Alaungpaya reigned in the 18th century and was the first king of the Konbaung Dynasty, the third and the last of the Myanmar empires. Myanmar’s military rulers have never explained why the date March 27 would bind those three kings together, but today, the armed forces as an institution, not any past resistance against the Japanese occupiers, is what matters. It could be equally important to maintain a blemish-free relationship with the Japanese right wing, which in the post-independence era—and especially after the 1962 coup—has had cordial ties with the Myanmar military.
In 1954, Myanmar signed a peace treaty with Japan and, as part of the agreement, Tokyo agreed to pay US$200 million in war reparations as well as an annual grant of US$5 million for technical assistance. That assistance continued even after democracy was abolished in 1962 and replaced by military rule. Given the economic decline that followed General Ne Win’s 1962 coup and the introduction of the so-called “Burmese [Myanmar] Way to Socialism”, many scholars argue that the Ne Win regime would have folded without it.
Tokyo’s willingness to continue economic assistance to Myanmar could be attributed to the influence of an informal lobby in Japan. For many years, it was led by Nobusuke Kishi, prime minister from 1957-60, and his private secretary and son-in-law, Shintaro Abe, foreign minister from 1983-86. Shintaro Abe’s son, Shinzo Abe, was prime minister from 2006-07 and again from 2012-20.
Another influential Japanese belonging to the Myanmar Lobby was Tadashi Ohtaka, Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar from 1987-90 and whose wife served as chairperson of the Japan-Burma Association (now renamed the Japan-Myanmar Association). During his tenure as ambassador, Ohtaka was the only diplomat given regular access to the then dictator, Ne Win. The Japan-Burma Association counted among its members 11 Japanese trading companies allowed to operate in Yangon and various companies involved in aid projects in the country.
Following years of economic decline, Myanmar’s economy took a slight turn for the better in the 1970s because of rapid expansion in agriculture and increased foreign assistance, mainly from Japan. Myanmar was the eighth-largest recipient of Japanese aid in the 1960s; by 1980, it had become the fourth-largest. Japanese aid peaked at US$244 million, or 6.3 percent of all Japanese overseas assistance. With Japanese aid pouring in for civilian projects, the dictatorship could spend more money and resources on building up the armed forces. By the time of the 1962 coup, there were about 100,000 soldiers under Ne Win’s command. In the 1980s, the number had increased to approximately 190,000. More indigenous defense industries were established, and new weapons were produced with assistance from Fritz Werner, a German company.
By the mid-1980s, a new economic crisis was looming in Myanmar. Japanese aid had kept the country afloat, but, in the end, it failed to revitalize inefficient, state-run enterprises. Worse, Myanmar’s foreign-debt level went through the ceiling. In March 1988, the Japanese decided that economic pragmatism had to take precedence over longstanding personal ties. Tun Tin, then minister of planning and finance, was told during a visit to Tokyo that Japan would reconsider its relations with Myanmar unless fundamental economic reforms were instituted. That was the first time the Japanese unilaterally demanded policy changes on the part of an aid recipient, underlining the importance Tokyo placed on its special relationship with the Myanmar government.
Japan’s new policy on aid, cut off months later in response to the killing of thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators, apparently rocked Myanmar’s generals. Japanese pressure is widely believed to be the main influence behind the then junta’s decision to scrap the “Burmese Way to Socialism” and adopt more market-friendly policies. The opportunity to restore relations came at the time of Emperor Hirohito’s funeral in February 1989. According to Myanmar expert David Steinberg: “In order to avoid having the Burmese sit beside unrecognized delegations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, a decision was made on Feb. 17 to recognize the new [military] government.”
That also opened the floodgates for more Japanese involvement. Western sanctions and boycotts had left a vacuum filled by China, which much to Tokyo’s chagrin replaced Japan as Myanmar’s closest foreign ally. In May 1990, the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s First Southeast Asia Division, Maraharu Kohno, stunned Myanmar’s pro-democracy activists and exiles in Japan by saying at a lecture in Tokyo, “Can we automatically equate military rule with human-rights repression?…I’m not sure [in any case] that repression of human rights in Myanmar is as extensive as reported in the West…because Myanmar has not yet reached the stage of democracy. National security should come first.” Japan may have refrained from funding new aid schemes, but it allowed old ones to continue and support was also provided through UN projects in the country. In 2003, the Japanese even invited Myanmar’s military intelligence chief-turned-prime minister, General Khin Nyunt, to attend the Japan-ASEAN Summit in Tokyo.
No real change took place until after the 2010 election and ex-General Thein Sein’s appointment as president in February 2011. Japan along with Western countries normalized relations with Myanmar. The informal Myanmar Lobby went to work again, and a key person all along has been Yohei Sasakawa. In 2013, the then Shinzo Abe government appointed him Special Envoy of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar, a post he has retained even after Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s ill-fated attempt to seize power on Feb. 1 last year.
Sasakawa is the son of Ryoichi Sasakawa, once a far-right politician who flew to Italy in 1939 to meet his personal hero, Benito Mussolini. Years later, he expressed regret about not meeting another European leader at that time: “Hitler sent me a cable asking me to wait for him, but unfortunately I didn’t have time.” Ryoichi Sasakawa was imprisoned by the Americans after World War II, but released in 1948 when the occupiers needed the extreme right to counter Japan’s leftist movement.
In the 1950s, Ryoichi Sasakawa managed to secure a monopoly on the only legally permitted gambling in Japan: motorboat racing. As a result, he became immensely wealthy, continued to back extreme right-wing causes, and built up a charity, now called the Nippon Foundation, which gave vast amounts of money to the World Health Organization to help eradicate leprosy. The once-Class A War Criminal in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo became a philanthropist and passed away in 1995 at the age of 96. By then, his son Yohei, after serving as chairman of the Japan Motorboat Racing Association, had become president of the Nippon Foundation.
The Nippon Foundation has been involved in several, largely unsuccessful, attempts to get some kind of peace process going between the military and Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organizations while the Japanese government has cultivated links with the military top brass. In October 2019, Min Aung Hlaing visited Japan at the invitation of Japan’s Ministry of Defense. Japan also initiated a program in which cadets from Myanmar receive combat training, which continues even after last year’s military intervention. On March 20 last year, Human Rights Watch said in a statement: “It’s mind boggling that Japan is providing military training to Myanmar cadets at the same time as its armed forces are committing crimes against humanity against Myanmar’s people.” A spokesman for the Japanese Ministry of Defense, however, told Reuters that any move to cut the partnership with Myanmar’s military could result in China winning more clout. Shinzo Abe is no longer Japan’s prime minister but his younger brother, and Nobusuke Kishi’s grandson, Nobuo Kishi, currently serves as minister of defense.
In December 2021, the 87-year-old former cabinet minister and chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Association, Hideo Watanabe, who once campaigned to bring billions of dollars of investment from some of Japan’s leading companies to Myanmar, urged Tokyo to endorse the new military regime. He caused an even bigger outrage than the Defense Ministry spokesman by saying that Min Aung Hlaing has “grown fantastically as a human being,” while praising his “democratization efforts.”
Watanabe’s son Yusuke Watanabe managed on May 26 last year to get an opinion piece published by the website The Diplomat in which he argued that “Japan must position itself as a bridge between the Tatmadaw and the United States and other democratic countries rather than blindly aligning itself with the Western policy of regime change… Leveraging its decades-long economic cooperation, Japan can now directly work with the Tatmadaw to reverse China’s geoeconomic influence.” He also wrote that he is one of the few foreigners who is “in constant contact with Myanmar’s current de facto leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing…my enduring engagement with him underscores Japan’s near century-long special relationship with Myanmar.”
That “special relationship”—when it comes to aid, investment and involvement in the so-called peace process—has so far resulted in little more than making sure that the Myanmar military remains firmly entrenched in power. Than Shwe and now Min Aung Hlaing may conveniently forget to dwell on the anti-Japanese resistance in 1945 and, instead, praise the old warrior kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya, because they know full well that it is the Japanese far-right that since 1962 has been a main benefactor and supporter of continuous military rule in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Military History
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Stronger Economic Measures, Arms Embargo Needed Against Military
Description:
" Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day on March 27, 2022, is an opportunity for foreign governments to take stronger action against the military’s widespread abuses, Human Rights Watch said today.
Concerned governments should strengthen economic sanctions against junta members and other senior military officers, as well as military-owned conglomerates. The United Nations Security Council should urgently adopt a global arms embargo against Myanmar and refer the country situation to the International Criminal Court.
“Governments joining Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day celebrations are celebrating the military’s brutal suppression of its own people,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Governments should instead participate by enacting targeted sanctions against the generals and military businesses.”
On March 26, 2021, the state MRTV news channel announced that anti-coup demonstrators “should learn from the tragedy of earlier ugly deaths that you can be in danger of getting shot to the head and back” and warned that “parents should also talk their children out of it [joining protests], let’s not waste lives for nothing.” This language was widely interpreted to signal that the security forces were planning to respond with force to planned protests on March 27.
The next day, Myanmar security forces killed as many as 163 anti-coup protesters in deadly crackdowns. It was most likely the deadliest single day since country-wide protests broke out against the February 1, 2021 military coup.
Since the coup, security forces have killed over 1,600 people and detained more than 12,000. Over 500,000 people have been internally displaced and the junta is deliberately blocking aid to populations in need as a form of collective punishment. Human Rights Watch has documented the military’s numerous abuses against the population that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
A joint report by Fortify Rights and the Schell Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School, released on March 24, 2022, identifies 61 senior military and police officials who ordered abuses or are otherwise directly implicated in crimes committed against the population in the first six months after the coup.
In recent weeks, there have been increasing reports of Myanmar military airstrikes and use of heavy weapons causing civilian loss of life and property. The UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government sales of weapons to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets were being used against civilians. More than 400 of the attacks reported occurred in Sagaing Region in northwestern Myanmar, where most civilian fatalities have recently occurred. The report identified Belarus, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, South Korea, and Ukraine as having transferred arms to Myanmar since 2018 that could be used to attack civilians.
Other countries such as Japan have not ended military ties and continue to provide training to the Myanmar military despite its long record of human rights abuses. Since 2015, Myanmar military cadets and officers have received academic and military training at Japan’s National Defense Academy and Japan Self-Defense Forces facilities. The Japanese government should immediately suspend the program and cut other military ties, or risk being complicit in the military’s atrocities.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned Myanmar security forces’ violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in a March 15 report, and said the military was deliberately targeting civilians, many of whom were shot in the head, burned to death, arbitrarily arrested, tortured, or used as human shields.
On March 21, the US government formally determined that the Myanmar military committed the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity against ethnic Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. The US and like-minded governments should seek justice for grave international crimes against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups, as well as against the anti-coup protesters, and impose stronger economic measures against the military leadership, Human Rights Watch said.
The UN Security Council – largely because of concerns of a Chinese or Russian veto – has not taken substantive action in response to the Myanmar military’s atrocities. Nevertheless, the council should impose an arms embargo on Myanmar and refer the situation in Rakhine State to the International Criminal Court.
“The UN Security Council should act to help end the suffering of Myanmar’s people,” Maung said. “UN member countries should not keep waiting for the Security Council, however, and should take all possible action at the UN General Assembly and unilaterally to promote justice for Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-03-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
အလေးထားရမည့် အကြောင်းအချက်များ အမှတ် – ၁၀
Description:
"၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင် ၁ ရက် ကနေ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ် ၂၀ ရက်အထိ ရှစ်လတာကာလအကြား တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့တွေ (EAOs) ရဲ့ နယ်မြေတွေမှာ စစ်ကောင်စီနဲ့ EAOs တွေရဲ့ အကြားတိုက်ပွဲ အကြိမ်ရေ ၂,၁၉၃ ကြိမ်ထက်မနည်း ဖြစ်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ တိုက်ပွဲတွေက ကရင်ပြည်နယ်၊ ကချင်ပြည်နယ်၊ ကယားပြည်နယ်နဲ့ ချင်းပြည်နယ်အတွင်းက EAOs နယ်မြေ တွေမှာ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့တာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဲဒီအထဲကမှ ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး (KNU) ရဲ့ နယ်မြေ အတွင်းမှာတော့ ၁,၇၇၅ ကြိမ်ထက်မနည်း တိုက်ပွဲတွေ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပါတယ်။ မတ် ၁၉ ရက်နေ့ကလည်း KNU တပ်မဟာ ၃ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေထဲက ကွီးလားကျေးရွာနဲ့ တကက်ပူကျေးရွာတို့ကို စစ်ကောင်စီက လေကြောင်းနဲ့ ဗုံး ၄ လုံး ကြဲချခဲ့တာကြောင့် စစ်ရေးတင်းမာနေတဲ့ အခြေအနေတွေ ရှိနေပါတယ်။
တဆက်တည်းမှာပဲ တိုင်းနှင့်ပြည်နယ် ဒေသအသီးသီးမှာ စစ်ကောင်စီနဲ့ ဒေသခံကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ (PDF/LDF/CDF/CNDF/KNDF)တို့ အကြား တိုက်ပွဲဖြစ်ပွားမှုတွေကလည်း ပိုမိုကျယ်ပြန့်လာပါတယ်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင် ၁ ရက်နေ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ် ၂၀ ရက်ထိ ကိုးလတာအတွင်း စစ်ကောင်စီနဲ့ ဒေသခံကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ဖွဲ့တွေအကြား တိုက်ပွဲဖြစ်ပွားမှု ၇၆၈ ကြိမ်ထက်မနည်း ရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းမှာ တိုက်ပွဲဖြစ်ပွားမှု အများဆုံး ဖြစ်ခဲ့ပြီး ၂၉၃ ကြိမ်ထက်မနည်း ရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ဒါဟာ သတင်းမီဒီယာတွေနဲ့ လွတ်လပ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေက ဖော်ပြထားတဲ့ တရားဝင် အချက်အလက်တွေ ကို စုစည်းပြီး ကောက်ယူထားတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ မြေပြင်အခြေအနေမှာတော့ အခုဖော်ပြတဲ့ ကိန်းဂဏန်း တွေထက် ပိုများနိုင်ပါတယ်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင် ၁ ရက်ကနေ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၂၈ ရက်အထိ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ် အတွင်းမှာလည်း မြောက်ပိုင်းမဟာမိတ်တပ်ဖွဲ့တွေနဲ့ သျှမ်းပြည်ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေးကောင်စီ (RCSS/SSA) တို့အကြား တိုက်ပွဲဖြစ်ပွားမှုတွေရှိခဲ့ပြီး လက်ရှိအချိန်မှာတော့ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ် တောင်ပိုင်း ရပ်စောက်မြို့နယ်နဲ့ ပင်လုံမြို့နယ်တို့မှာ အခြေအနေတွေ တင်းမာနေဆဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ထူးခြားချက်အနေနဲ့ကတော့ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် မတ် ၁ ရက်ကနေ ၂၀ ရက်အတွင်း တိုင်းရင်းသား လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့တွေအကြား ထိပ်တိုက်ရင်ဆိုင်တိုက်ပွဲဖြစ်ပွားနှုန်းကတော့ သိသိသာသာကို လျော့နည်းလာခဲ့ပါတယ်။
∎ ဘာကြောင့်အလေးထားသင့်သလဲ
စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း ဖြစ်ပွားလာတဲ့ တိုက်ပွဲ အခြေအနေ တွေကို လေ့လာခြင်းအားဖြင့်လည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲ့ ရှိရင်းစွဲ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးဖြစ်စဉ် (Peace Process) အခင်းအကျင်း ပြောင်းလဲမှု ရှိ၊ မရှိ အပေါ် သုတေသနပြု ဖော်ထုတ်နိုင်မှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် ပဋိပက္ခနဲ့ တိုက်ပွဲတွေကို စောင့်ကြည့်ပြီး ပဋိပက္ခနဲ့ တိုက်ပွဲတွေအတွင်း သေဆုံး၊ ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့ရတဲ့ အရပ်သားပြည်သူ အရေအတွက်၊ သေဆုံး ဒဏ်ရာရခဲ့ပုံ ဖြစ်စဉ်တွေနဲ့ စစ်ဘေး တိမ်းရှောင်နေရတဲ့ ဒုက္ခသည်ပမာဏကို လေ့လာခြင်း အားဖြင့် လက်နက်ကိုင် တပ်ဖွဲ့တွေရဲ့ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှု ကျူးလွန်တာတွေ ရှိ၊ မရှိဆိုတဲ့အပေါ် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှု ဆိုင်ရာ တရားမျှတမှု ရှုထောင့် (Transitional Justice) ကနေ သုတေသနပြုနိုင်မှာ ဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် အလေးထား သင့်သော ဒေတာ အချက်အလက်များပဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
∎ တွဲဖက်လေ့လာသင့်သည်များ
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း ဖြစ်ပွားလာတဲ့ တိုက်ပွဲအခြေအနေနဲ့ အကျိုးဆက်တွေ အပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားဒေသတွေမှာ ဖြစ်ပွားနေတဲ့ တိုက်ပွဲတွေ၊ အရပ်သား ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးမှုတွေနဲ့ စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ဒုက္ခသည် အခြေအနေတွေကို လွတ်လပ်တဲ့ သတင်းမီဒီယာတွေ၊ အထူးသဖြင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား သတင်းဌာနတွေရဲ့ မြေပြင် အခြေအနေ ဖော်ပြချက်တွေအပြင်၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ ညှိနှိုင်းရေးရုံး (UNOCHA Myanmar) လို ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေ၊ အခြား လွတ်လပ်သော ပြည်တွင်း ပြည်ပအဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေရဲ့ မှတ်တမ်း၊ အစီရင်ခံစာ စတာတွေနဲ့လည်း တွဲဖက် လေ့လာနိုင်ပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Non-Ceasefire Groups, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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"Tayzar San is one of the most prominent of Myanmar’s anti-regime protest leaders and a key member of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) — a body that brings forces opposed to the military regime together. A coalition of elected lawmakers, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and pro-democracy activists, the NUCC serves as a political consultative body to the parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG), and is leading the efforts to lay the groundwork for the creation of a federal democratic union.
As one of the junta’s most wanted people, Tayzar San has been on the run for many months. But while in hiding, he continues his mission to eliminate military dictatorship from his motherland.
Recently, the 33-year-old doctor turned activist talked to The Irrawaddy about the urgent need for funds for the revolution and called on the public to take the boycott and social punishment campaigns seriously.
You and other prominent opposition figures have talked about the importance of financing the revolution. How is the current funding situation?
The NUG talked about the defense budget in their six month report on the people’s defensive war. The NUG said that they have received nothing, neither cash nor any material support, from foreign counties for the revolution and depend only on public donations. In fact, finance is the essential need for the revolution and will determine its result. But the coup has plunged the country into political, social and economic turmoil. And so our people are facing hardship and their financial support for the revolution is limited.
But I want to say that to win this revolution quickly, we definitely need more funding. We have all heard and seen that our People’s Defense Forces (PDF) comrades need arms and other material items. So we all need to push and contribute more. I want to say that this revolution is not for the NUG, NUCC and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CPRH – the NUG’s parliamentary committee), but for all the people of Myanmar. If the revolution is successful, it will benefit all of us. Equally, if this revolution doesn’t succeed, all of us including future generations will suffer.
In the NUG’s six month report, the defense ministry said it has only received around US$30 million to fund the armed resistance. What do you think of that?
I was really surprised by that. I thought the amount would be more. Everyone knows that weapons and ammunition are expensive. At the same time, our enemy, the terrorist regime, is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on the military and has had 70 years to build up its infrastructure. Compared to that, spending US$30 million is like tossing sesame seeds into the mouth of an elephant. In a virtual discussion that I joined last year, one EAO leader said that, according to their calculations, if we could spend US$15 million a month on military expenses, we could bring down the regime in a short time. At least US$2-3 million is required to arm a battalion. So US$30 million is nothing. That’s not to be discouraging but to make people aware of the situation. Funding is the lifeline of the revolution, so we need to work together to push for more of it. If we can do that, we can reach our desired destination of a peaceful and flourishing country fast.
What can the NUG do to improve fundraising?
As far as I know, the NUG currently has two sources of revenue [for the resistance movement]. The first one is bond sales, which is well known. People who can afford it, buy bonds. But I think that they can organize a campaign to sell more bonds and reach the business community more. Another source of funds is the People’s Revolution Supply Family (PRF) program. We rely on it a lot. Under it, all of our people can help supply PDFs for a minimum amount of US$20 each month. But so far people have very little knowledge about the PRF. Actually, the PRF program is a great source of fundraising for the PDF members who are risking their lives in our fight for freedom. But as there’s little public awareness of the PRF, the amount of people participating is still very low. While we try to get donations from business people who can make big contributions, we should also try to do more to get the general public to contribute monthly to the PRF.
But the NUG shouldn’t just rely on those two sources of funding. They need to find innovative ways to generate more revenue and also work on how to raise taxes as a legitimate government. For international aid, the world only bets on the winning horse. We need to work to let the international community know that our revolution is moving forward, and that we will definitely win.
What will happen to the revolution if the funding doesn’t increase?
For me, the current situation is not satisfactory as there is a great need of funding but it is also not discouraging. Our [armed] resistance started with any available weapons and even under the current situation with insufficient weapons and ammunition, the PDFs can threaten the junta forces and have taken control of rural areas in Sagaing Region and Kayah State. Tactics will also play a role in battle, while the main difference between us and the terrorist regime is that our fight is spirit-based and has the full support of the people. For them [the military regime], regardless of how well-equipped they are, as soon as they leave their bases or camps, they are in enemy territory. It is certain that we will win this revolution and there is a lot of good potential. But it will depend on us to make that happen. So I would like to urge our people not to relax or be disrupted by events and don’t be disunited.
In terms of public participation in the revolution, you have also recently reminded people of the boycott and social punishment campaigns. Why have you done that?
Because now more than a year after the coup, the terrorist military council members and some of their collaborators, supporters and opportunists are starting to publicly attempt to claim that normality is returning under the regime. They didn’t dare do that before as the peoples’ campaign against them was quite strong. But now they are testing the water. This is a battle between Dharma and Adharma. We need to clarify clearly the line between our enemy and us and we shouldn’t let them get into our society. They are the ones responsible for all the social and economic consequences since the coup. We need to strongly reject all of them. The boycott campaign against any businesses and services owned or affiliated with the military is also important. It needs to apply to anyone, any organization, any product affiliated with the military or supporting the military, because the money we use to buy their products or to use their services will turn into guns and bullets that kill our people and our PDF fighters. So not a single penny should reach the military. Our people already know that. But they might overlook the importance of the boycott campaign and social punishment for the revolution. And the terrorist regime and their collaborators will take advantage of that. We can’t let them do as they want. If we do, we are stupid.
What else would you like to say?
I would like to say that the more people contribute, the faster the revolution will succeed. You shouldn’t assume that the revolution will be over without you participating. There are several ways to participate. I am not asking you to do what the PDF youths are doing: fighting on the ground and risking their lives for the revolution. Let’s push to meet the financial needs for the people’s defensive war. Let’s be a support force [to the PDFs] by joining strikes, continuing to donate, continuing the Civil Disobedience Movement, boycott campaign and social punishment. Freedom does not come for free. We all have to make whatever contribution we can..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Society and Culture, Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
UN rights office warns military has shown ‘flagrant disregard for human life’ and has deliberately targeted civilians since it seized power on 1 February 2021
Description:
"Myanmar’s military junta has committed widespread and systematic abuses against civilians that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, according to the first comprehensive report to be produced by the UN’s human rights office since last year’s coup.
The UN rights office warns the military has shown “flagrant disregard for human life” and has deliberately targeted civilians since it seized power on 1 February 2021.
The report details numerous atrocities by the military, including the bombardment of populated areas with airstrikes and heavy weapons, and a series of mass killings of civilians. It cites cases where civilians have been shot in the head, burned to death, arbitrarily arrested, tortured or used as human shields.
“The appalling breadth and scale of violations of international law suffered by the people of Myanmar demand a firm, unified, and resolute international response,” said Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations high commissioner for Human Rights.
Many western countries have imposed sanctions on members of the military and military-owned businesses, while the Association of South-east Asian Nations has led attempts at negotiations, though with virtually no progress.
At least 1,600 people have been killed by security forces in Myanmar since the coup, according to the UN, which says airstrikes, helicopter gunships, artillery, and mortars are being used indiscriminately in populated areas. The report also refers to series of massacres by the security forces, including the killing of up to 40 women, men, and children in Kayah State in December. Those who discovered the victims’ remains said some bodies were in positions that suggested they had tried to escape and had been burned alive, according to the UN.
The military junta, which is widely opposed by the people, has imposed brutal violence and repression in an attempt to maintain control of the country. Despite this, the public remains defiant in its refusal to accept military rule. Alongside a peaceful protest movement, many civilians – from poets and farmers, to IT workers and students – have taken up arms in response to military atrocities.
Raids on the homes of anyone suspected of dissent “occur with unrelenting regularity”, according to the report. At least 12,500 have been detained over the past year, with “hundreds if not thousands having been subjected to torture”.
About 325 people, including 16 children, have been killed in detention.
The report is based on interviews with more than 155 victims, witnesses, and advocates, as well as satellite imagery and video footage. The junta has previously accused the UN of bias and seeking to interfere in its domestic affairs, and has rejected past death toll estimates cited by officials. It has also accused the UN of downplaying violence by anti-coup groups.
The UN report said at least 543 people have been killed due to their perceived support for the military, but that the majority of human rights abuses it had documented were carried out by security forces.
Bachelet said the public was defiant in its demand for an end to military rule. “Throughout the tumult and violence of the past year … they remain committed to seeing a return to democracy and to institutions that reflect their will and aspirations,” she said.
“Meaningful action by the international community is urgently needed to stop yet more individuals from being stripped of their rights, their lives and their livelihoods,” said Bachelet..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"PASAY CITY 15 March 2022 – DFA Undersecretary for Bilateral Relations and ASEAN Affairs Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro met with EU Ambassador to ASEAN and Special Envoy to Myanmar H.E. Igor Driesmans on 11 March 2022 to discuss ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations, including this year’s commemoration of the 45th anniversary of the ASEAN-EU partnership.
Undersecretary Lazaro reaffirmed Philippine support for the commemorative activities for this milestone event, which includes the unveiling of the anniversary logo in Jakarta and the possible outcome documents for the proposed ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit in Brussels to be held in December. The Philippines is the current country coordinator for ASEAN-EU dialogue relations.
She said that “the Philippines is committed to working with EU to push forward cooperative partnerships under ASEAN-EU relations.” Apart from coordinating various initiatives under ASEAN-EU matters, Acting Undersecretary Lazaro also congratulated Ambassador Driesman’s appointment as the EU’s Special Envoy to Myanmar.
As country coordinator for ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations, the Philippines will work with the EU and other ASEAN Member States in moving forward cooperative partnerships on issues related to post-COVID-19 economic recovery, green agenda, economic matters, maritime cooperation and other areas under the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (POA).
Ambassador Driesmans also paid a courtesy call on Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro L. Locsin Jr.
Ambassador Driesmans was accompanied by H.E. Luc Véron, EU Ambassador to the Philippines, and Ms. Ana Isabel Sánchez Ruiz, First Counsellor of the Delegation of the European Union in the Philippines. END..."
Source/publisher:
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines
Date of publication:
2022-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
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Description:
"Veteran democracy activist Min Ko Naing has delivered a message on the importance of financially backing the revolution to topple Myanmar’s junta as a new scheme to generate funds will be launched by the parallel, civilian National Unity Government (NUG).
In a video message on Thursday, the well-known activist, who is also a key figure on the National Unity Consultative Council— the NUG’s political consultative body — said plans to fund essential weapons for revolutionary forces are underway and will be made public.
Previous fundraising efforts by the NUG, including launching lottery tickets to support striking civil servants and raffle and bond sales, have raised millions of dollars. However, the costs of bringing down the regime are significant.
“The victory of the revolution depends on finances,” Min Ko Naing said.
The 1988 uprising leader updated the public on the revolution’s progress, saying the junta is struggling on the ground and thus escalating its attempts to distract the public. He reminded people not to believe the regime’s propaganda and to help the revolution where possible.
“They are burning entire villages to threaten others who fear they might suffer the same attacks,” the activist said, regarding the rising numbers of arson attacks on civilian targets in resistance strongholds.
Min Ko Naing said regardless of threats and violence, Myanmar’s people will not surrender because they know it will end with them living under junta rule and the control of Pyu Saw Htee militias, which are trained and armed by the military.
“People understand the revolution has pushed the military to the stage where they dare not fight without air support,” Min Ko Naing said.
The increasing number of senior military officers defecting and joining revolutionary forces and the successful sale of NUG bonds to fund the revolution are positive developments, he said.
The population rejects military rule and the junta faces opposition in numerous forms, including flash-mob protests, armed resistance, economic pressure and advocacy.
The regime has killed at least 1,642 civilians and over 12,000 people have been arrested, including elected government leaders, since last year’s coup..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Title: After a year of reporting on Myanmar’s military coup, I knew my luck would eventually run out
Sub-title:
As one of the last western media journalists covering Myanmar I knew danger lurked – and there would be no James Bond to get me out
Description:
"One hot morning last March I walked into Yangon’s St Mary’s Cathedral as the best man at a wedding. The European-Burmese couple had made a swift decision to tie the knot due to uncertainty about foreign marriage rules under Myanmar’s new military regime that had seized power just weeks earlier. They were also mulling plans to get out of the country as the army embarked on a shoot to kill offensive against peaceful protesters.
Being a journalist chasing deadlines into the small hours, I complained about the early morning start to the wedding. “We want to wrap up the ceremony before we start to hear shooting,” the groom explained. A few pairs of slippers near the altar caught my attention – if soldiers raided the church the women could change out of their high heels and run, the bride told me. Her mother grimly added: “I don’t think I will make it [if soldiers break in], but hopefully my daughters can.” The risk was real as some religious buildings had provided cover for protesters.
Opposite the neo-gothic cathedral stood the old and empty offices of the Myanmar Times, formerly the nation’s only private English-language daily. Operations halted a few weeks after the 1 February 2021 coup as staff resigned and readers boycotted the newspaper over its proprietor’s editorial policies, seen as sympathetic to the regime.
Other media outlets also disappeared, some returning into exile in Thailand or operating underground, as Myanmar ended a decade of relative press freedom. By coincidence I had moved to the independent Frontier Myanmar on the day of the coup. “You’ve jinxed us all,” a colleague joked by phone as the junta cut off mobile and internet networks.
Days after the coup I relocated to a hotel beside Yangon’s Kandawgyi Lake and relied on its military-owned wifi network to circumvent restrictions and keep reporting. I covered protests until the bullets rained down, and afterwards stayed in touch with activists, politicians, diplomats and businesspeople. Some of my Burmese colleagues took refuge in border jungle areas. From my room I could see the gilded Shwedagon, the most revered pagoda in Myanmar, under the moonlight as the city was put under a night-time curfew. The hotel bar thankfully stayed open. One foreigner after another held drunken goodbye gatherings around a pool lined with palm trees as the military carried out house-to-house arrests outside.
Yangon turned from one of the safest cities in Asia to its most violent. An employee of the South Korean bank Shinhan was fatally shot in the company van. Bombs exploded across the country, including near my hotel. Over the past year an estimated 1,500-plus people have been killed by the regime. “You should read A Gentleman in Moscow,” an international non-governmental organisation leader told me over drinks, referring to the story of Count Alexander Rostov, who is ordered to live out the rest of his life under house arrest in the Russian capital’s Metropol hotel.
I am no Rostov. In late July I returned to my apartment in the outskirts of Yangon amid Covid-19’s third wave and spent the rest of the year splitting my accommodation among various places. Carrying a jute tote bag from Marks & Spencer, my disguise as an innocent Hong Kong businessman paid off when soldiers stopped and searched my taxis. For months, risks of mobile phone searches and criminalisation of free speech made me leave my iPhone behind when going out.
Activists, employees and even investors were eager to share – usually via encrypted channels – leaked information, and their own emotions and pleas to the world. But on the ground there was a genuine sense of despair and despondency, and of betrayal. As friends and colleagues lost loved ones and as Yangon residents remained defiant by the show of citywide strikes as recently as last month, the world has not offered much support beyond statements and words.
Many businesspeople who spent the last decade courting the reformist administrations of Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi have had no problem shaking hands with the new autocratic regime. Chambers of commerce from China, India, South Korea and Malaysia greeted the regime without a fuss. Comparisons with South Africa’s apartheid era came to mind.
The generals responded to the public’s mass opposition with sheer brutality. Entire villages were burnt or terrorised for supporting the resistance. They tried to control internet access, and considered developing their own digital currency while drafting a cybersecurity law to criminalise online gambling and VPN use.
Reminiscent of North Korea, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing opened an underpass and inspected chicken and duck farms during the various crises. The coup leader expressed ambitions for Myanmar to make electric cars, domestic vaccines and an underground metro in the deserted capital Naypyidaw amid growing power outages and economic collapse.
Beside Yangon’s beautiful Inya Lake I hosted an end-of-year garden party to thank readers and contacts. Diplomats and investors were among those gathering to chat and take stock of a tumultuous year. The sun painted the city sky golden red. Scotch eggs, lobster bisque, welsh rarebit were served. Life in the commercial capital went on – for some.
But there was a constant sense of danger lurking for journalists. If the regime threw me behind bars, “there won’t be a James Bond to get you out”, one ambassador warned. The junta has killed at least three Burmese journalists since December; my US colleague Danny Fenster spent six months in Insein prison. I was one of the last foreign correspondents for western media outlets left in the country. Feeling the strain after nearly a year of covering the coup and sensing I had ridden my luck as long as possible, I decided to quit. Escorted by diplomats inside the airport, I paid my visa overstay fees and rushed to my plane.
Many in Myanmar, however, are refusing to give up: journalists work in hiding, young people and formerly peaceful activists have joined new resistance forces in the jungles and ethnic communities have stepped up their decades-long struggles. The regime is inflicting heavy losses – but also incurring its own.
Thompson Chau is editor-at-large of Burmese media outlet Frontier Myanmar and covers Myanmar for the Economist. He has lived and worked in Yangon since 2016, and was formerly associate editor and chief reporter at the Myanmar Times..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders
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Description:
"The Myanmar junta has revoked the citizenship of 11 well-known opposition figures including ministers of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), which is leading the revolutionary movement against its rule, along with a veteran student leader and social media influencers.
In an announcement made on Friday night, the junta said it had terminated the citizenship of the 11 individuals under the military-drafted 1982 Citizenship Law because they have allegedly fled Myanmar and harmed the interests of the country.
Among those singled out for citizenship revocation—a move that appears to be unprecedented—are some of the most prominent faces of the NUG including its Health and Education Minister Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, Defense Minister U Yee Mon, Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung, and Home Affairs and Immigration Minister U Lwin Ko Latt.
They are joined by Minister of Human Rights U Aung Myo Min, Minister of International Cooperation Dr. Sa Sa, Minister of Communications, Information and Technology U Htin Lin Aung, and Deputy Minister of Women, Youths and Children Affairs Daw Ei Thinzar Maung.
The NUG was formed by elected lawmakers from the National League for Democracy (NLD) who were prevented from taking their seats when the military staged a coup on Feb. 1 last year, along with their ethnic allies, as the legitimate government. It seeks to challenge the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint were nominated to retain their positions in the NUG.
NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung told The Irrawaddy the law under which the group’s citizenship was revoked should be repealed and rewritten, as it was drawn up for political purposes by the military and extremist nationalists under the previous regime.
She dismissed the coup maker’s revocation of their citizenship under the repressive law as an on-paper announcement that had no real-world significance.
Veteran student leader U Min Ko Naing and social medial influencers Myo Yan Naung Thein and Ei Pencilo also had their citizenship revoked on Friday.
The junta said in its announcement that it would identify additional perpetrators and take the same action against them.
Daw Zin Mar Aung said the junta’s acts of repression would only make the revolutionary movement stronger.
“This will be the end game for them. And for us, this is a battle that we must win,” she added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"Please check against delivery
Statement by Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar at the Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Situation in Ukraine (New York, 2 March 2022)
Mr. President,
At the outset, we welcome the convening of this emergency special session. We thank the President of General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this regard. This emergency special session is timely, and it would allow all countries, small and big, to raise our voices on the serious situation Ukraine is facing and our concerns in this state of affairs of this universal organ, the United Nations.
Myanmar always adheres to and takes firm position on the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of all countries. Therefore, Myanmar condemns the invasion of Ukraine and unprovoked attacks against the people of Ukraine. These acts are flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. Myanmar calls on to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
We have been following with great concern the situation on the ground in Ukraine. It is regrettable that the situation is further escalating with intensified attacks of the Russian Federation. As a result, many people have been killed, andhundreds of thousands of people left their homes. The people are suffering even in the severe cold weather. We call on immediate cessation of hostilities and attacks on Ukraine.
Myanmar understand and share more than others the suffering that the people of Ukraine are encountering. The people of Myanmar are facing similar suffering resulted from the inhumane acts, atrocities, crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military.Due to the military’s excessive use of force and indiscriminate attacks on people as well as their inhumane and brutal acts, many houses, religious facilities, healthcare facilities, schools and farmland have been destroyed, and accordingly hundreds of thousands of people have to leave the respective places and became displaced people in addition to number of people death and injured. The displaced people and victims include people from vulnerable groups such as people with disability, elderly people, women, girls and children.
I wish to commend the neighbouring countries of Ukraine which open their borders and extend warm reception of Ukrainians and other nationals who escaped from the terrifying attacks. We also thank all member states who support Ukraine in every possible ways. I appeal them to continue to do so and do more.
Mr. President,
The UN Charter clearly begins with “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. I wish to further recall that “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”
Excellencies, dear colleagues, it is time for all of us to stand with justice and stand with the principles of the UN Charter.
Myanmar stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine. In doing so, Myanmar cosponsored the draft resolution and will vote YES.
Justice, freedom and peace must prevail all over the world..."
Source/publisher:
Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations (New York)
Date of publication:
202203-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Collected resolutions of the GA on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံအပေါ် ကျူးကျော်မှုဆိုင်ရာ (၁၁) ကြိမ်မြောက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံ အရေးပေါ်အထူးအစည်းအဝေး၌ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် စစ်တပ်၏ လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသည့် အလားတူဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့်အတွက် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူများ ကြုံတွေ့နေရသောဒုက္ခများကို တခြားသူများထက် ပိုမိုနားလည်မျှဝေခံစားနိုင်ပြီး ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ ခိုင်မာစွာရပ်တည်လျက်ရှိကာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံအပေါ်ကျူးကျော်မှုဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အဆိုမူကြမ်းအား ပူးတွဲအဆိုရှင်အဖြစ်ပါဝင်၍ ထောက်ခံမဲပေးခဲ့ (နယူးယောက်မြို့၊ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၂ ရက်)
၁။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ မြန်မာအမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ် သံအမတ်ကြီး ဦးကျော်မိုးထွန်းသည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၂ ရက်နေ့ နံနက်ပိုင်းတွင်ပြုလုပ်သော ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံ၏ ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံအပေါ် ကျူးကျော်မှုအရေးပေါ်အခြေအနေဆိုင်ရာ အထူးအစည်းအဝေးသို့ တက်ရောက်၍ မိန့်ခွန်းပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ မြန်မာအမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ မိန့်ခွန်းတွင် အောက်ဖော်ပြပါအဓိကအချက်များ ပါဝင်ပါသည်-
(က) ဤအရေးပေါ်အထူးအစည်းအဝေးခေါ်ယူခြင်းကို ကြိုဆိုပါကြောင်းနှင့် အစည်းအဝေးခေါ်ယူခြင်းနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံသဘာပတိနဲ့ ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်တို့ကို ကျေးဇူးတင် ရှိပါကြောင်း၊ ယခုအထူးအစည်းအဝေးသည် အချိန်နှင့် တစ်ပြေးညီဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ယူကရိန်းရင်ဆိုင်နေရသော ဆိုးရွားသည့်အခြေအနေများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ နိုင်ငံကြီး၊ ငယ်မဆို နိုင်ငံအားလုံး မိမိတို့၏ အသံနှင့် စိုးရိမ်ပူပန်မှုများကို ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောကြားခွင့်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း၊
(ခ) မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် နိုင်ငံတိုင်း၏ နယ်မြေစိုးမိုးရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာတို့အပေါ် အမြဲတမ်းခိုင်မာစွာ ရပ်တည်လျက်ရှိပါကြောင်း၊ ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံကို ကျူးကျော်ဝင်ရောက်ပြီး ယူကရိန်း ပြည်သူများအပေါ် တရားမျှတမှုမရှိသော တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို ရှုတ်ချပါကြောင်း၊ ယင်းလုပ်ရပ်များသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂပဋိညာဉ်စာတမ်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေများကို သိသာထင်ရှားစွာ ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊ ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံ၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာ၊ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ပိုင်နက်နယ်မြေကို လေးစားရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အနေဖြင့် တောင်းဆိုပါကြောင်း၊
(ဂ) မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ယူကရိန်း၏ မြေပြင်အခြေအနေများအပေါ် စိုးရိမ်ပူပန်ခြင်းကြီးစွာဖြင့် စောင့်ကြည့်လျက်ရှိပါကြောင်း၊ ရုရှားဖက်ဒရေးရှင်း၏ ပြင်းထန်သောတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် အခြေအနေ များ ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားလာနေခြင်းသည် ဝမ်းနည်းစရာပင်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊ ဤတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် လူအများအပြား သေဆုံးကာ သိန်းနှင့်ချီသော လူအများအပြားသည် အိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာထွက်ပြေးသွားကြရသည့်အတွက် အအေး လွန်ကဲသော ရာသီဥတုတွင် လူအများဒုက္ခရောက်နေကြပါကြောင်း၊ ယူကရိန်းအပေါ် စစ်မက်ပြုတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ချက်ချင်းရပ်တံ့ရန် တောင်းဆိုပါကြောင်း၊
(ဃ) မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ် အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသည့် အလားတူဆိုးရွားသော ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့်အတွက် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူများ ကြုံတွေ့နေရသောဒုက္ခများကို တခြားသူများထက် ပိုမို နားလည်မျှဝေခံစားနိုင်ပါကြောင်း၊
(င) မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ ပြည်သူများအပေါ် အင်အားအလွန်အကျွံသုံးစွဲ၍ ခွဲခြားဖိနှိပ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများအပြင် လူမဆန်စွာရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော လုပ်ရပ်များကြောင့် နေအိမ်များ၊ ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အအုံများ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှု အဆောက်အအုံများ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများနှင့် လယ်ယာမြေများ ပျက်စီးခဲ့ပြီး သိန်းနှင့်ချီသော ပြည်သူများသည် မိမိတို့နေရပ်များမှ စွန့်ခွာခဲ့ရသည့်အတွက် အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်ခဲ့ရကြောင်း၊ လူပေါင်းများစွာ သေဆုံးဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့ပါကြောင်း၊ ယင်းကဲ့သို့ ဆုံးရှုံးနစ်နာသူများတွင် မသန်စွမ်းသူများ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အိုများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးများ၊ မိန်းကလေးများနှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်များကဲ့သို့သော ထိခိုက်လွယ် သောအုပ်စုများ ပါဝင်ပါကြောင်း၊
(စ) တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများမှ လွတ်မြောက်အောင် ထွက်ပြေးလာကြသည့် ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံသားများနှင့် အခြားနိုင်ငံသားများအား နယ်စပ်များဖွင့်ပြီး နွေးထွေးစွာလက်ခံပေးသော ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံ၏ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံ များကို ချီးကျူးလိုပါကြောင်း၊ ထို့ပြင် ယူကရိန်းကို တတ်နိုင်သမျှ နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ပံ့ပိုးပေးသော အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံ များအားလုံးကိုလည်း ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း၊ ယခုထက်ပို၍ ဆက်လက်ပံ့ပိုးပေးရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံ ပါကြောင်း၊
(ဆ) ကုလသမဂ္ဂပဋိညာဉ်စာတမ်းကို အစချီရာတွင် “ကုလသမဂ္ဂအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများ၏ ပြည်သူများဖြစ်သည့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် မျိုးဆက်သစ်အဆက်ဆက်ကို စစ်ဘေးဒဏ်မှ ကယ်တင်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်” ဟူသော စာသားဖြင့် ရှင်းလင်းတိကျစွာ စတင်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း၊ “ကုလသမဂ္ဂအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများ၏ ပြည်သူများ ဖြစ်သည့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် နိုင်ငံတကာငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနဲ့ လုံခြုံရေးကို ထိန်းသိမ်းရန်အတွက် မိမိတို့အင်အားကို ပေါင်းစည်းရန်၊ အခြေခံသဘောတရားများကို လက်ခံရင်း၊ လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများခိုင်မာအောင် ဆောင်ရွက် ရင်း လက်နက်ကိုင်အင်အားကို အသုံးမပြုရေး၊ ဘုံအကျိုးစီးပွားကို ဖော်ဆောင်ရေးတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်” ဆိုသည့်အချက်ကို ထပ်လောင်းသတိရစေလိုပါကြောင်း၊
(ဇ) ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အားလုံးသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂပဋိညာဉ်အခြေခံမူများနှင့်အညီ ရပ်တည်ရန်၊ တရားမျှတမှုဘက် ရပ်တည်ရန်အချိန် ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း၊
(ဈ) မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ ခိုင်မာစွာရပ်တည်ပါကြောင်း၊ ထို့ကြောင့် ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံအပေါ် ကျူးကျော်မှုဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အဆိုမူကြမ်းတွင် ပူးတွဲအဆိုရှင်အဖြစ်ပါဝင်၍ ထောက်ခံမဲ ပေးမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း၊
(ည) ကမ္ဘာ့တစ်ဝှမ်းတွင် တရားမျှတမှု၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးရှိရမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း။
၃။ မြန်မာအမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ် ပြောကြားခဲ့သည့် မိန့်ခွန်းအပြည့်အစုံ (အင်္ဂလိပ်ဘာသာ) အား ပူးတွဲဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံအပေါ် ကျူးကျော်မှုဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အဆိုမူကြမ်းကို ထောက်ခံမဲ (၁၄၁) မဲ၊ ကန့်ကွက်မဲ (၅) မဲ၊ ကြားနေမဲ (၃၅) မဲ ဖြင့် ၂-၃-၂၀၂၂ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံ အရေးပေါ်အထူးအစည်းအဝေး၌ အတည်ပြုခဲ့ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၁၀၀) နီးပါးက ပူးတွဲအဆိုရှင်အဖြစ် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Collected resolutions of the GA on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Editor’s Note: This post is the fourteenth installment in an ongoing series, Chronicle of a Coup, comprised of reports written from within Myanmar by Christopher J. Walker (a pseudonym), a longtime resident, which together sketch one person’s first-hand account of the weeks and months following the February 1, 2021, military coup. A selection of his reports will be posted weekly, every Friday. A chronological archive is also available here.
Tea Circle is grateful to Christopher for sharing his personal account of life under military rule in Myanmar. Recognizing that his voice is one of many, we encourage other authors to submit their own accounts.
This morning in a neighbouring township, a small bomb went off in the offices of the oakkahta. In a previous report I mentioned that the okkahta is the highest-ranking government official in every ward or quarter, ordinarily an elected position with a five-year term. Following the coup, all such officials who would not support the military regime were thrown out and, in most cases, replaced by retired military officers.
It turns out that the bomb was merely a diversion. When the new oakkahta left his home to check on the situation, he was gunned down by a shot to the head and died immediately in the street. Although no group has claimed responsibility, I have heard on many occasions that those who accepted such appointed positions would be dealt with severely. I already know that something similar is being planned for our quarter’s oakkahta, but I have no idea what it might be and no desire whatsoever to find out.
These newly installed oakkahtas are primarily informers for the junta and do little else. In the past the elected oakkahtas had many local responsibilities, but these days, as a show of resistance, nobody goes to their offices anymore. If anyone does, his or her name is circulated within the quarter.
Many will be very happy that this military-appointed oakkahta was killed today, but I don’t understand why he had to die. There are other deterrents short of murder that could have been employed to send a grim message of admonition to all such oakkahtas. Then again, he could have been killed by the secret police for being a double agent, which would explain the execution-style murder. It’s hard to say, but head shots are the regime’s modus operandi.
There is one upside to this tragedy. A squad of 15 soldiers has now been assigned to protect the oakkahta in our quarter, and I’m sure that the same has been done in many others. If nothing else, the execution will have resulted in the redeployment of hundreds of soldiers who have been responsible for arresting, beating, torturing and shooting innocent civilians, from patrolling the streets to guard duty.
Held hostage by money | May 17, 2021
In my experience the Burmese have long distrusted banks, which is quite understandable. As the country’s experiment with quasi-democracy evolved, I once or twice broached the topic of banking with employees at my office, explaining the benefits of developing a relationship with an accredited lender in case at some future point they wanted to make a major purchase like a car or a home. I always had reservations about suggesting this, not because there might have been a coup in the future, but rather on account of my own distaste for any institution operated by the exceedingly wealthy. But to explain all of that in translation would have been an impossible task. Fortunately, no one took my advice and so none of them have money now stranded in a Burmese bank.
But there are millions of ordinary citizens who do, and consequently the wealthy few have, in a sense, become the unsuspecting adversaries of the many. Wealthy Burmese tend to diversify their savings by keeping money in both private and government accounts. Over the last five years, as the troubled democracy project unfolded, many of them leaned toward government banks because of the greater options they offered and better investment returns. These are the people who have the most money to lose.
Therefore, it is these same people who most want some semblance of government stability, believing that will give them easier access to their money. Currently there is a severe limit on how much anyone can withdraw each month, the equivalent of about US$450. We have heard that government banks will not permit greater withdrawals until at least June. Even then, online applications are required, and, if approved, customers are given an appointment and have to go into the bank to withdraw their money.
The reality is a sad one. Generation Z is not about to back down. But a return to stability will require the wealthy to surrender to the military regime. With the capitulation and compliance of the upper classes, there is a chance that some kind of stability can be restored, although at a very great cost—namely, the loss of personal freedoms and the most basic human rights. However the Generals try to package “stability,” we now know very clearly the depths of depravity to which they are quite willing to sink in order to get their way.
Unfortunately, with their money in mind, many in the upper-middle and wealthy classes will consciously or subconsciously accept whatever rosy picture the junta will attempt to paint. And once the wealthier classes join in, the poorer classes will be forced to follow because they need to eat. Generation Z will be left out on a limb.
As with so many things in this life, it all comes down to the money, which is, ultimately, the reason we are in the midst of this ghastly coup to begin with. We pray before the altar of money. Many have sold their hearts and minds for it.
The picture is bleak, yet there is no limit to what can be accomplished when people are willing, even under the harshest of conditions, to take care of one another.
All for $34 | May 18, 2021
A good friend and neighbour stopped by today for a visit. He was on his way home after trying unsuccessfully to withdraw money from an ATM at the nearby Ayeyarwady (AYA) Bank, the only one that from the earliest days of the coup actively tried to help people.
One of the problems people face with ATMs is that they never know which machines will have money, because the amount that a bank can dispense in a day is limited by the junta. In some instances, we have heard, there is a daily limit on the number of people that an ATM can serve. It’s common these days that when someone notices a machine being filled, calls go out or posts will appear on Facebook, followed by a stampede to that particular branch. And because so few machines are filled with money, there are always very long queues.
AYA is a private bank and takes a more humane approach. On its Facebook page it posts the branches throughout the city where its ATMs will be filled. Knowing this, our friend went early to the nearby branch listed. When he arrived he learned that the ATM had not yet been filled, so he went to wait in a nearby tea shop. When he returned at 9 am a long queue had already formed. He was to be customer #85. The assignment of numbers is handled by the customers themselves; bank staff do not bother. Having assigned numbers is helpful because people can wait in a shady spot until theirs is up.
There is an unspoken rule that, if you get in line with two or more debit cards, they must be for your accounts and not those of another person. Previously a group of people would hire a professional “squatter” who would wait in line with five or ten cards from different account holders. When someone’s number neared the ATM he would call the account holder who would then, essentially, jump the queue, infuriating those who had been waiting, sometimes for hours.
More than 120 people were in line. Our friend waited and waited and finally #84 was at the ATM. But his hopes were dashed when the man announced that he couldn’t get any money. The machine was empty. So, tomorrow, our friend will have to try his luck again.
This is exactly the sort of thing that people go through on a daily basis merely to withdraw their own money from a bank.
He could have gone inside the bank for his money, but doing so would have required him first to complete an online application and then, if his application were approved—meaning the bank was satisfied that he was not in any way supporting the civil disobedience movement—he might have been given an appointment to come to the bank to withdraw his money. The process typically takes some days, usually at least a week. If his application is not approved, he would not be informed.
Before the coup, customers were permitted to take from an ATM an amount equivalent to US$700-800 per day. Now? They’re allowed to withdraw from any one account a maximum of $115 per week, up to four times a month.
When my neighbour had finished relating his story I couldn’t resist asking him how much he was trying to withdraw. His answer: US$34, which was all that remained in that account. He does have other money in a government bank, but no corresponding ATM card. To withdraw his money from that bank he will have to fill out an application, but at the moment the bank is not accepting any until “sometime in June.”
Dāna | May 18, 2021
The junta is obviously, and for myriad reasons, desperate for funds, which has created havoc within the financial system. And there’s been an unforeseen cultural consequence of this.
The military regime is determined to smash all resistance. We see it in the daily upsurge in arrests, beatings, torture and murder. While much of this is an ideological battle, what has become patently clear is that it is also a struggle between those who want to provide humanitarian aid to their brothers and sisters, and those trying to put a stop to it at all costs. As I have previously noted, the simple act of handing someone a cup of rice can result in arrest, and the person receiving the gift might also be detained. Discretion, therefore, has become of utmost importance.
While it is struggling to obtain money for itself, the junta is also conducting an equally dedicated campaign to keep it out of people’s hands by, for instance, rationing withdrawals from banks and ATMs. The regime is well aware that money is changing hands between ordinary citizens and those involved in the civil disobedience movement (CDM). Sums, both large and small—some even less than US$1.00—are being donated to the CDM every day. These small amounts carry great meaning and are a joy to behold. Of course there are those who have no money to spare, but they find other ways to help.
I recently chatted with someone about raising funds to help the Burmese cause, which is, of course, essential and very much appreciated. However, because of the inherent danger, it is not only critical that every link along the chain of support remains absolutely anonymous, but any help provided must now remain unmentioned and unacknowledged—no recognition and rarely a thank-you.
Owing to the generosity of our supporters, we can direct most of our financial assistance to others, often to people whom we don’t know except by aliases and reputations; and we in turn are frequently helped by strangers who selflessly put themselves at great risk. This requisite anonymity in giving has now become the norm, although it is somewhat at odds with how the traditional culture of dāna has manifested in the past.
Giving, or dāna, has for centuries been an integral element of Burmese society. Dāna is a Pali word that connotes, especially, the virtue of giving, of unattached and unconditional generosity or charity, in which right volition plays a key role. When the volition is most pure, one gives expecting nothing in return, not even a thank-you. Dāna can be offered both materially and immaterially, as with a donation of time or participation, and is widely practised not only in support of monastic institutions, but of countless nonprofits and other good causes as well.
The public display of donors’ names is a common phenomenon in Myanmar. Years ago when I first toured the country and made donations to an organization or a monastery, someone would always insist that I have my photo taken handing over the money. To my astonishment and chagrin, when next I visited I would find that photo or my name on a plaque hanging on a wall. This left me feeling exceedingly uncomfortable, and at times I withheld donations because of it. Fortunately, over the years I have learned ways to work around such awkward situations.
In the present circumstances all of this is changing. Instead of public recognition, strict anonymity has now become the established donation practice. Still, sometimes we witness smiles or tears of gratitude. At other times we might see a cellphone video of young people at a demonstration wearing donated protective headgear and running shoes instead of flip-flops, or of doctors applying complimentary bandages to a wounded body. Or maybe thanks comes by way of a glass of sugarcane juice. Occasionally, I get a phone call in the middle of the night merely to say thank you for finding this safe place to sleep. People helping people—that is the noblest dāna of all..."
Source/publisher:
Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-03-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Military History, Military History, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"As the Russian invasion of Ukraine dominates the headlines, the deteriorating situation in neighbouring Myanmar that has been dragging on for over a year must not be forgotten. In fact, there are still major issues that need reporting, such as the movement of refugees and regional efforts to secure peace.
Mainstream media coverage of the Ukraine-Russia issue has highlighted the importance of upholding democratic principles as well as solving the problem of refugees. The public is being bombarded by news and images of destroyed buildings, troops deploying and Ukrainian civilians arming themselves to defend their country.
Every day, we hear harrowing tales about the plight of the Ukrainian people in the face of Russian aggression. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky through his savvy PR campaign has become the face of resistance against Russian President Vladimir Putin's military might, resulting in support from the United States and its European allies.
The coverage of Ukraine's conflict has been so thorough that even some people in Thailand are considering joining the fight in eastern Europe.
Recently, the government in Kyiv opened a military legion for foreign nationals to join the resistance, but it is unclear whether the Thais will fight Russian troops in Ukraine. However, the message of resistance has resonated among people in other countries. According to Kyodo, 70 Japanese nationals answered Ukraine's call to use arms against the Russian invaders.
Amid this shift in global news coverage, we must not forget about the atrocities perpetrated in our neighbourhood. As the crisis in Myanmar passed the one-year milestone, resistance towards the junta snowballed into guerrilla warfare involving civilians joining militia groups to fight the junta.
The actions of the junta have driven about 300,000 from Myanmar, with hundreds of civilians arrested, beaten, tortured, or killed by the authorities, according to the United Nations. On top of that, the UN projects that up to 25 million people of the country's more than 55 million population will fall into poverty this year.
One must surely understand that in a conflict between two sides, both parties must sit at the table for talks. Yet the Myanmar military sternly insists that it is the only legitimate governing body in Myanmar, denying access to Aung San Suu Kyi and her officials, who are sitting in detention on trumped-up election fraud charges and convictions no one believes to be true.
Myanmar's military leaders are adamant about staying in power, claiming that ousting Suu Kyi's civilian-led government was the correct response to alleged fraud in her landslide general election victory at the end of 2020.
The junta claims that new elections will be held at some point after the situation "stabilises".
For two years, bringing the junta to the table for peace talks hasn't been easy -- officials have been blocking regional efforts to stop the violence and find a resolution to the political conflict.
The junta has agreed to Asean's Five-Point Consensus peace plan "in principle" but its actions clearly show it moving in the opposite direction. Requests by Asean envoys to meet Suu Kyi were met with the cold shoulder. The junta is trying to delegitimise Suu Kyi's civilian government.
The junta even fought over who gets to represent Myanmar in the Rohingya genocide hearings at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, where Suu Kyi personally defended Myanmar's generals when the case opened in December 2019.
Now she is on house arrest and her officials are in disarray, with the world unsure of whether she will ever lead Myanmar again or whether democracy will return.
Asean has its work cut out, and more news outlets should pay attention. Regional leaders are now taking the lead to ensure the junta in Myanmar follows through on the promise it made in April to fulfil the bloc's Five-Point Consensus peace plan.
Cambodia has a chance to help return democracy to Myanmar, with Foreign Affairs Minister Prak Sokhonn's three-day visit on March 20.
Prak Sokhonn is expected to try to inch closer to finding a solution. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen previously visited Myanmar but that was considered more a mere icebreaker than an attempt to make solid progress.
The people of Myanmar need the world's attention as well as humanitarian help more than ever.
The media, mainstream or otherwise, must continue to be the eyes and ears on the ground and ensure that the plight of the Myanmar citizenry is not buried beneath other major world headlines.
After all, who will keep leaders in check if the world is looking away?..."
Source/publisher:
"Bangkok Post" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders
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Description:
"Myanmar is a country in transition in more ways than one. Since the general elections held by the State Peace and Development Council(SPDC) in November 2010, the world’s attention has focused on the startling transformations at work in the long-isolated Southeast Asian Nations..."
Source/publisher:
Academia.edu (San Francisco)
Date of publication:
2015-08-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Social studies of Burma
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320.37 KB
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"Antagonism and mutual distrust between the Burmese armed forces (or
Tatmadaw) and the civilian sphere have long characterized Myanmar’s
post-independence politics. Since the 1950s, Tatmadaw publications DQG RI¿FLDO GLVFRXUVHV KDYH URXWLQHO\ DFFXVHG FLYLOLDQ SROLWLFLDQV DQG
parliamentarians in particular, of having drawn the country from one
crisis to another (Mya Win 1992; Min Maung Maung 1993). In its own
words and propaganda works, the Tatmadaw likes to position itself
as the sole cohesive, dedicated and disciplined state institution able
to safeguard the unity of the nation, protect its integrity and bring
about political stability (Selth 2002; Callahan 2000, 2009; Kyaw Yin
Hlaing 2009; Maung Aung Myoe 2009; Nakanishi 2013). Across time
and place, the contempt for disruptive and chaotic parliamentarian
politics as well as the divisive essence of civilian affairs has long
been underscored by civil-military scholarship as a legitimate incentive
for the intervention of coup-prone or “praetorian” armies (Huntington
1957; Finer 1975; Nordlinger 1977)..."
Source/publisher:
Academia.edu (San Francisco)
Date of publication:
2015-08-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Military History, Political role of the Tatmadaw, The Military's political role, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
636.57 KB
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Description:
"Sixty years is considered an auspicious life cycle in many countries in East Asia. After weathering five rounds of 12 zodiac signs, one enters a state of revered age, with the social respect and wisdom those advanced years are supposed to bestow. It is a happy event.
On March 2, Myanmar may commemorate, but not celebrate, the 60th anniversary of the 1962 military coup that brought the Myanmar military into power it has never relinquished. The completion of that life cycle is supposed to be a celebratory event. On this occasion it is not. Through direct rule by decree, by inventing three political parties under its authority, by writing a constitution and then coercing its acceptance, by empowering itself through legal procedures under the 2008 constitution, and by manipulating electoral results, the military has remained in effective control over those societal elements it regards as essential to its interests. On the cusp of its 60th anniversary, it extended its domination through last year’s disastrous February 1 coup. The perpetuation of its influence and authority, however much disputed by the populace, will continue, forcing the state into further decline.
Six decades of military control, three generations, may set some sort of sad regional or world record for military-controlled governance. When not enforcing its self-determined mandate by direct authority, it founded three political parties to do its bidding: the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the National Unity Party, and the Union Solidarity and Development Party. None of them had even the semblance of democratic authority. All had very substantial active duty or retired military personnel in positions not only of leadership but among the ranks as well.
The year 1962, however, was not the origin of military power in Burma. It came with independence in 1948 and countering ethnic and political rebellions. The first “constitutional coup” in 1958, in which the military took power with the forced approval of the civilian government that was facing civil war within the ruling party, lasted 18 months. It was autocratic in its control but generally well-regarded, as it stemmed political and economic decline. At the close of that period, the military stepped down and allowed free elections in which its favored party lost, and U Nu ruled for about two years until the 1962 coup. That may be a unique instance of military-induced unmanaged elections.
But military rule does not mean stasis. Deterioration of the state began shortly after the 1962 coup when the “Burmese Way to Socialism” failed, as did a 1988 people’s revolution against the military. Even the military, while in control, from about 2010 began to realize the need for change and reform, and the efforts by President and former general U Thein Sein were well received both domestically and internationally. He did little, however, to placate ethnic minority rebellions and calls for a federal administrative structure, but progress was evident including broader rights for its citizens and the sharing of some power in 2016 with the elected opposition, the civilian-led National League for Democracy (NLD).
The international media has called attention to the recent worldwide waves of military coups, especially in Africa, citing Myanmar as one of a group. But to attribute Myanmar’s fourth coup in 2021, following those of 1958, 1962 and 1988, as simply an example of a worldwide trend is to misunderstand the nature of the internal problems facing the state. History tempers and shapes current dilemmas and requires analysis. Myanmar has unique issues that must be addressed.
Ethnically diverse Myanmar has been held together by the military tenaciously, and often crudely and unthinkingly, trying to control the country against the vociferous tendencies of various ethnic peoples with justified beliefs that they have been maltreated and denigrated by the ethnic Bamar majority government. The articulated primary objective of the military has always been national unity. Yet their inept actions have weakened the chance of achieving the very goals that it set for the state. There is no indication that they have changed their approach.
Ironically, the present coup has forced the NLD civilian opposition that won the November 2020 elections to expand what observers regard as their previous reluctance to pursue federal minority power. Its National Unity Government has brought more ethnic representation into its tentative opposition organization, but even if it were to assume power, how much of that would remain is questionable.
Although the military has promised a return to multi-party politics in 2023, most observers believe that whatever electoral system evolves, it will be manipulated, and whatever parties are permitted to run, it will not be a true democratic state; the military will assure that its control would continue to protect its, and what it regards as the state’s, interests. Elections alone do not a democracy make.
Foreign observers should recognize that the amelioration or solution to Myanmar’s governance problems will not come from external interventions. Humanitarian aid should be forthcoming at this dire time. But they should understand that this coup has historical roots that will affect the future, and whatever that future may be, the military will play some important role. But the Burmese peoples, including the military, must ensure that this role is appropriate for a modern state in which the people and their rights are the basis on which government and authority must be built.
David I. Steinberg is distinguished professor of Asian studies emeritus, Georgetown University. He was resident in Burma during the first and second military coups..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Military History, Political History, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more