Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Individual Documents
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"Two years ago, in February 2021, Myanmar’s military carried out a coup, overthrowing a democratically elected government and detaining many of its leaders. Since then the junta’s security forces have engaged in a broad crackdown against opposition to military rule, committing numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes across the country, widely documented by Human Rights Watch and other groups.
France and the European Union have been vocal in condemning the military’s atrocities. The French government supported the United Nations General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council in 2021 in adopting resolutions calling on the military to end abuses and restore civilian rule. France also backed several rounds of EU economic sanctions and travel bans on senior military leaders and military-owned conglomerates that fund the military’s rule.
More recently, on December 21, France supported a UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar, denouncing the military’s rights violations since the coup. The resolution fell short of imposing a global arms embargo, but its adoption reflects the junta’s growing international isolation. The fact that Russia and China abstained instead of vetoing the resolution signals that even the junta’s few friends are losing interest in defending them.
None of this, however, has been enough to change the junta’s conduct or calculations. The military has continued to carry out mass killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual violence, and military attacks on civilians in conflict areas. Since the coup, the military has detained at least 17,000 anti-coup protesters and killed over 2,800 demonstrators and bystanders. The military still blocks humanitarian aid from reaching millions of displaced people and others at risk, and in Rakhine State—where the ethnic Rohingya have faced years of crimes against humanity, including apartheid—security forces have imposed new restrictions on movement and aid, making food and water shortages worse and paving the way for increased preventable diseases and severe malnutrition.
The junta’s leaders may appear dismissive about their international reputation, but they may be more sensitive to an increased focus on their potential criminal liability. UN members should more stridently raise the prospect of jurisdiction over crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. Thus far, such calls have been inadequate to press the Security Council to vote for an ICC referral.
Another way to get the Myanmar junta’s attention would be for key governments to more effectively target the military’s economic lifeblood, in particular, foreign currency revenues that the military obtains from exports like natural gas, metals, gemstones, and timber—funds it uses to purchase weapons, military equipment, and fuel.
The economic sanctions imposed so far by the US, EU, and UK, which were meant to curtail these revenue streams, haven’t been tough enough—or been enforced enough—to meaningfully impact the junta. Asian countries such as Singapore and Japan that could help enforce these sanctions through anti-money laundering laws, have not done so. The junta evidently has not felt compelled to change its conduct.
In the most egregious example, banks continue to process and send to military-controlled entities US dollar revenues from natural gas exports to Thailand and China. This is due in part to the fact that the US and UK have not matched EU sanctions on the natural gas revenues—which are paid in USD, not Euros. France, Germany, and other EU members need to press the US and UK to impose matching sanctions.
Enforcement also needs to be ramped up. EU and Asian banks processing US dollar and Euro transactions continue to make payments to sanctioned entities. The US and EU continue to allow imports of valuable teak wood auctioned off by sanctioned entities. Meanwhile, several Japanese, Korean, and Singaporean companies and banks—many of them with multinational operations that place them in part under US and EU legal jurisdictions—have continued to do business with military-owned entities.
France and others often point to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a means for resolving the crisis in Myanmar, even though the bloc has little power or cohesion. In April 2021, ASEAN did manage to negotiate a Five-Point Consensus with the Myanmar military, meant to lead to dialogue and de-escalation. But the military repudiated it within days and the abuses only increased. Since then, ASEAN has been unable to meaningfully impact the military’s decision making. When the junta executed four political prisoners in July 2022—Myanmar’s first use of the death penalty in over three decades—one ASEAN leader, Malaysia, called the executions a “mockery” of ASEAN’s efforts.
As China and Russia continue to shamefully block more robust multilateral action, France, together with other EU member states, should redouble efforts to coordinate with the US, EU at large and other Western and Asian parnters to ensure that sanctions are strengthened and enforced effectively. Tougher actions can stem the flow of foreign funding and curb the military’s ability to buy weapons and sustain its operations, and help ASEAN and other intermediaries convince them that they need to move away from brutality and start taking steps toward restoring democratic rule.
The status quo approach is not working. France and its European partners need to do more to stem the junta’s brutality and help the people of Myanmar, who continue to call for the international community to help..."
Source/publisher:
Mediapart via "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"It has been two years since the Myanmar military coup on February 1, 2021. Yet Australia still has not sanctioned a single member of Myanmar's military or any of their business interests for widespread human rights violations since the coup.
Australia is now an outlier among like-minded countries including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Canada, which have imposed a total of hundreds of sanctions on individuals and entities in response to the junta's abuses.
Repeated calls for Australia to follow the lead of its traditional allies have not exactly fallen on deaf ears, rather we are told targeted sanctions are still under "active" consideration. While many human rights activists and civil society groups accepted this position while the junta was holding the Australian economist Sean Turnell, this excuse no longer carries any weight following his release in November.
Myanmar's junta has been responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, widely documented by human rights groups including Human Rights Watch. The military and police are implicated in mass killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians in conflict areas including indiscriminate ground and air attacks. At least 17,000 anti-coup protesters have been arbitrarily arrested and over 2,800 killed, although the real figures are most likely much higher.
The junta has blocked desperately needed humanitarian aid from reaching millions of displaced people and others at risk, in violation of international humanitarian law. Across the country, security forces have imposed new travel restrictions and have attacked aid workers, blocked access to roads and aid convoys, destroyed non-military supplies and shut down telecommunications services. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that at least 17.6 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Fighting since the coup has displaced more than one million people internally, while another 70,000 refugees have fled into neighbouring countries.
In Myanmar's Rakhine State, new restrictions on movement and aid affecting ethnic Rohingya camps and villages have made food and water shortages worse, increasing cases of preventable diseases and severe malnutrition. Escalating hostilities between the Arakan Army armed group and the Myanmar military have resulted in Rohingya and Rakhine civilian deaths, arbitrary arrests, and displacement.
Myanmar is gripped by fear and violence. The military's execution of four political prisoners in July 2022 after egregiously unfair trials was Myanmar's first use of the death penalty in over three decades. The civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi is serving a 33-year sentence after sham military trials for corruption, incitement, breaching the Official Secrets Act, and other politically motivated charges. Every day, it becomes more dangerous for dissenters to speak out for fear of imprisonment, torture, or death.
On December 21, 2022, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on Myanmar, denouncing the military's rights violations since the coup. The resolution fell short of calls for a global arms embargo, but the fact that it passed reflects the junta's growing isolation. Russia, China, and India notably abstained, signalling that even the junta's few friends have lost interest in defending the intransigent military.
Throughout all this, people in Myanmar have remained defiant in opposing the military's abusive grip on the country. But there remains the elephant in the room: Why have some democratic countries such as Australia, which have expressed sympathy for the plight of Myanmar's people, not taken meaningful action?
In December, Foreign Minister Penny Wong announced new targeted sanctions against Russia and Iran for grave human rights violations. But Myanmar was conspicuously absent from the list.
Australia's reluctance to impose targeted sanctions on Myanmar seems to reflect an unwillingness to upset the regional status quo. No member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has imposed measures on Myanmar, and Australia does not appear willing to go out on a limb as it seeks to improve relations with its Asian neighbours. But two years after the coup, Australia's risk-averse human rights foreign policy is doing nothing to protect Myanmar people's lives.
Instead, Australia should take the regional lead in imposing concrete measures to curtail the junta's abuses. It should coordinate with ASEAN member states to impose targeted sanctions on senior military officials and their major revenue streams.
Revenue from Myanmar's business interests pays for the military's crimes. Imposing sanctions on key individuals and entities can stop the flow of foreign funding, curbing the military's ability to buy weapons and sustain its operations. Ending the junta's widespread abuses needs a global commitment, including from Australia, to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
The Canberra Times (Canberra) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Republic of the Union of Myanmar
National Unity Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Special Issue To Commemorate Second Anniversary Myanmar Spring Revolution..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-02-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Minister: Good afternoon, everyone. We have just concluded the first ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting for this year, chaired by Indonesia. I will start off by making remarks on three themes. First, on Timor-Leste; second, Myanmar; and then more specific details on the ASEAN agenda itself.
First, what made this meeting different was the participation, for the first time, of Timor-Leste as an observer. You may recall that our leaders gave in-principle approval for Timor-Leste’s (ASEAN) membership, and they are in the process of transiting through an objective, criteria-based roadmap. On a bilateral basis, I reassured the foreign minister of Timor-Leste that Singapore stands in full support. In particular, we have got an ASEAN Readiness Support package for Timor-Leste, basically to help them enhance their capability, human resource development, as well as both diplomatic and economic tools so that Timor-Leste eventually can participate fully in all the responsibilities and obligations of ASEAN membership. Their presence at this first meeting was important. I think they were very pleased to have this chance.
The next topic, which consumed a fair amount of bandwidth, obviously is the situation in Myanmar. Unfortunately, it is not getting better. In fact, our ground reports indicated that the situation may actually be worsening. Within ASEAN itself, we reaffirmed the importance (of) the centrality of the Five-Point Consensus that our leaders agreed upon, in April 2021, here in Jakarta in this very building. I think it is worth emphasising that there will be no resolution unless there is an honest to goodness attempt at national reconciliation. The violence must stop, political detainees need to be released. In particular, President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi need to be released. That is an essential prerequisite for national reconciliation to occur amongst all the stakeholders. On the part of ASEAN, Indonesia is Chair and now taking over as Special Envoy. It is committed to continue to try to engage all stakeholders. I think this is critical. Without the participation and active engagement of all stakeholders, you are not going to get peace, you are not going to get national reconciliation. So, we will have to wait and see. One key point which we all emphasised is that the rate limiting factor for progress is not ASEAN – it is really the stakeholders within Myanmar itself. So, we will have to wait and see. But on our part, ASEAN will do our best to facilitate, encourage, promote, and also in the meantime, do our best to deliver humanitarian assistance because we know that many people in Myanmar are actually suffering.
The next area that we focused on is ASEAN itself. We start first from an optimistic position. This is a bustling, dynamic region – 661 million people, (and) 60% of us in ASEAN are below the age of 35. The combined GDP is at US$ 3 trillion but in fact, it is set to double within the next two decades. If we succeed in that, ASEAN, as a whole, will become the fourth largest economy in the world. We start with great potential.
The more specific pillars which we are focusing on – first, the digital pillar. We are looking at advancing negotiations on the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework (Agreement). What this means is internally, first, enhancing digital literacy in our population. Next, improving digital connectivity between our countries. Further, to enable cross-border flows of data because that is an essential element of a digital economy. The purpose of all these ultimately, is to integrate our digital economies to enhance opportunities in an inclusive way for both big and small businesses, as well as our external partners who want to participate in harvesting the many bountiful opportunities that the digital economy provides for Southeast Asia. Ultimately, what we should see as part of digital integration is further interoperability of our systems. For instance, digital payment systems, trade facilitation, customs clearance, and all the other elements and ultimately, (to) also create within ASEAN, an atmosphere that promotes start-ups, entrepreneurship, and innovation. On digital economy, there is a lot going on, and it is an area replete with opportunities.
The next pillar that we looked at within ASEAN is the green economy. All of us need to decarbonise or at least reduce the carbon footprint of all our economies, and in particular, to help facilitate the transition towards renewable energy. One particular project, the power integration project (involving) Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, which has already begun – we really hope that this will be a pathfinder, ultimately, to an ASEAN energy grid. If we look at Southeast Asia as a whole, there is more than enough energy resources, and in particular, renewable energy. But getting the connectivity, getting policy frameworks, getting the bilateral and multilateral arrangements that will bring us across the threshold into a vibrant green economy for ASEAN – it is a very tantalising prospect.
The other area which we are looking at is what we call the blue economy. This is about the sustainable, resilient approach to using, conserving, and developing our maritime resources. This is important because so much of Southeast Asia has a great maritime heritage and resource, and developing this in an inclusive, fair, sustainable, and resilient way is crucial. It is another engine, another area replete with opportunities. So, looking at the digital, green economy and blue economy – our homework is set for us.
We of course, also reviewed developments beyond our region. In particular, the fact that the hot war in Europe, in Ukraine is still on, (and) the superpower rivalry between (the) US and China still continues. Our pitch to the larger world and to ASEAN’s external partners is – look at ASEAN, look at Southeast Asia, on our own merits and not just as another proxy arena for contest, but on our merits.
In particular, in Southeast Asia, what we are interested in is trade and investment. We hope that all our external partners that I have named: US, China, Europe and beyond look to Southeast Asia as an arena where they can invest, where they can trade and in a non-binary, non-exclusive manner; because our organising principle is overlapping circle of friends.
It has been a very useful first meeting to kick off the year. We will see how things develop. There will always be surprises in the way the events unfold.
Hariz Baharudin (ST): My question is on Timor-Leste: you mentioned it earlier, but I wanted to ask you a bit more about it. This has been the first meeting they are attending, and the first they have been attending after they have been granted observer status. Your thoughts about their presence in these ASEAN meetings and what this means for the bloc? Also, what the reaction has been from the other ASEAN ministers, your counterparts, and how Timor-Leste has added onto ASEAN?
Minister: It is significant that they are here, participating as an Observer and having full access to all the ASEAN discussions and topics of interest. Just that presence is important.
Second, in terms of reception, I think everyone is fully supportive of their full participation. We look forward ultimately to their full membership. But membership of ASEAN carries with it heavy responsibilities and obligations. I think Timor-Leste is also now getting a better and deeper appreciation of just how heavy that load of responsibilities and obligations will be. I would say that everyone is welcoming them, but we know that it is quite a steep climb up that hill. Certainly, in the case of Singapore, we are fully committed to helping Timor-Leste climb that hill, and to have the capacity to fulfill all the obligations and responsibilities.
Tan Min-Wei (Mothership): We were wanting to ask whether the crisis in Myanmar was affecting ASEAN unity, particularly with a fear that there might be different opinions on how to handle the situation, and whether blocs might emerge from that?
Minister: Let me address that head-on. I think all of us are acutely aware of the need to maintain ASEAN unity. I would start off by saying that the way the crisis unfolds in Myanmar, and the impact. For instance, if things get far worse and you get heavy flows of refugees, obviously it affects the immediate neighbours more than it affects those who are further away. To say that there are different levels of anxiety and concern is a fair statement. Having said that, and I can tell you that I can tell you that we discussed this quite directly amongst each other, (and) we also agreed that there is a need to maintain ASEAN unity and certain common purpose. What we agreed on is that that we all double down on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. We are all completely united in our calls for cessation of violence, for national reconciliation, for the need to engage all stakeholders, and on the need to continue to support people of Myanmar through the delivery of humanitarian assistance. To summarise, there may be different emphasis on concerns, but there is certainly unity, and a common purpose in affirming and in fulfilling and implementing the ASEAN leaders Five-Point Consensus.
Leong Wai Kit (CNA): You mentioned that neighbouring countries may be concerned about the overflow of refugees. And this is quite in line with what UN Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzer has said. She has been rallying for ASEAN to do something together to give them better protection. Can I ask Minister, what do you think Singapore can do in that respect? She also mentioned that within that framework, there is also a possibility of a violence monitoring system. How do you envision such a system to be such that it can reduce the violence there?
Minister: I would take a step back and say the most important thing is to stop the violence internally, to begin the process of national reconciliation, for everyone within Myanmar to sit at the same table as equals and to have sincere dialogue. Let us not lose sight of the critical importance of that. If that can be achieved, or at least make progress starting that process, I think that will lower the temperature, it will lower the level of violence and certainly lower the probability of outflow of refugees. That must still be our focus. Having said that, I do not know how long it will take before we reach that. We do need to be acutely aware of the humanitarian (aspect) and to the extent that we can deliver the assistance within Myanmar in a fair, open, transparent and inclusive way also will help to ensure that people do not need to leave Myanmar to seek safety, security and the necessities of life. These are areas in which ASEAN can help in concrete ways and we will continue to look for opportunities. But I must emphasise we do need the military authorities to cooperate in this process as well. It is an area of ongoing work.
Yun Zhou (LHZB): I would like to draw your attention to the broader region which ASEAN is situated. Just yesterday, Secretary Blinken announced that that he will be postponing his visit to Beijing after the US detected a Chinese surveillance balloon in their airspace. I would like to get your thoughts on what bearing will these developments have for Sino-US relations and for ASEAN, how does it see itself maintaining agency and centrality between the two superpowers?
Minister: I think it is a pity that this long-anticipated visit by Secretary Blinken to Beijing has been postponed. It illustrates how easy it is for unexpected incidents – in this case, it was a balloon that was drifting across continental United States – how easy it is for unexpected incidents to derail scheduled occasions for meetings and engagement. And this is why ASEAN is paying such close attention to the fraught relationship between the US and China. Speaking from a Southeast Asian perspective, the more they engage, the more they meet, the more open lines of communications, the better. It reduces misunderstanding.
Hopefully both sides exercise sufficient self-restraint and reduce the prospects of such incidents. Even as we saw in December, two aircrafts the J11 aircraft from the Chinese Air Force and the US reconnaissance – the RC135 came within 6 metres of each other. The less there are of such incidents, which bring with them risks – both known risks and unknown risks – the better. We need less of them. We hope that in the medium term, at least, the US and China can achieve a modus vivendi.
From a Southeast Asian perspective, not only do we hope that they achieve a modus vivendi, we want them to engage us on our own merits and not through the prism of rivalry between the two superpowers. Our clear and consistent message to both the US and China is that trade and investment is strategy in Southeast Asia. That is what we are looking for. Southeast Asia is replete with opportunities for more trade (and) more investments by both China and the US. This is not a zero-sum game. It is one in which, the more both sides and Europe are engaged with Southeast Asia, the more opportunities – truly a win-win formulation for everyone. That is the message which we are trying to convey, and of course, our hope that they do achieve a modus vivendi and overcome this current danger of actions – sometimes deliberate, sometimes unintended, leading into an escalatory spiral of action, reaction, and unnecessarily raising temperature.
Again, it is just a reminder that the world is not in a settled, calm condition. There are still many things that can go wrong in the course of the next year or two. We all need to be vigilant, careful, and to focus both on dealing with immediate problems, whilst also expanding opportunities for the medium and long term.
All in all, ASEAN remains relevant. ASEAN maintaining unity and centrality is crucial. I would say, from this meeting at least, the sense of the interactions with my colleagues, is that everyone recognises this, and that is positive. But bear in mind the fact that globally, we are still living in a dangerous world and there are many things that can go wrong – collisions and bumps in the night. You just need to be careful. But remember that there are great prospects for growth in Southeast Asia..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Date of publication:
2023-02-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
The military believes that time is on its side in its high-stakes struggle with the National Unity Government.
Description:
"Feb. 1 marked the second anniversary of the coup d’etat that ousted the democratically elected National League for Democracy government in Myanmar. Since then the country has descended into a multi-front civil war and lost over a decade’s worth of sustained economic growth. Over half of the population is living in poverty, driving people back into opium production, which saw 88 percent growth in 2022.
The military junta has failed to provide either security or basic social services. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 2,890 people have been killed – but that doesn’t include casualties in the border areas where fighting is fiercer. The military has detained nearly 17,500 since the 2021 coup, emptying jails of convicts to make room for political prisoners.
On the anniversary Wednesday, the military defied the constitution, and refused to hand over power to a civilian care-taker government after two extensions of its emergency decree, instead extending emergency rule for another six months. Constitutional niceties are a low priority for a blood thirsty military regime hell-bent on establishing a monopoly of power.
That they don’t have sufficient security to hand over power is telling. The opposition National Unity Government (NUG) has out-performed by every measure. The civil disobedience movement continues to stage demonstrations and flash mobs every day across the country.
The NUG led a second Feb. 1 “silent strike” to humiliate the regime. The shadow government has hundreds of affiliated people’s defense forces (PDFs), which have tied the military down. They have done so with courage and technical innovation.
The generals in Naypyidaw should be very frustrated that they have not been able to terrorize the population into submission. The NUG clearly has legitimacy that they will never enjoy.
Nonetheless, the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally known, has a five-part theory of victory, and believes that time is on its side.
First, the military will continue to wage a violent campaign across multiple fronts to wear down opposition forces through a war of attrition.
The violence will be excessive and intentionally target civilians. We have seen this play out most ferociously in Sagaing and Magway, where ethnic Bamar resistance is both new and threatens the military’s long and vulnerable supply lines.
They will take advantage of the fact that the PDFs got over-extended in the rainy season, and have gone on the offensive with superior fire power now that the dry season has arrived.
Ramping up airstrikes
The junta will increasingly rely on artillery and air power. For the latter, the regime has increased their acquisitions, including buying five FTC-2000G and the first two of six SU-30s from China and Russia, respectively.
There’s been over 360 percent increase in airstrikes over the previous year. Mostly the regime has targeted civilian communities, but recently there was an escalatory attack on Camp Victoria, the headquarters of the Chin National Front that killed five
New howitzers and multiple rocket launched systems imported from China will give the junta the ability to hit the NUG and its ethnic allies from a distance.
And of course the junta will try to terrorize the population into submission: nearly 40,000 homes have been set on fire throughout the country, 27,000 in Sagaing alone.
Second, the junta will assiduously target the shadow government’s funding and logistics.
The National Unity Government takes great pride that they have raised over $100 million through online sales of military-owned properties and crypto-bond offerings. They have used crypto currencies, tethered to the U.S. dollar to move money, and created digital wallets.
The junta has put officers in all banks to monitor any transaction over 100,000 kyat ($45), hampered mobile payments platforms, and at a more primitive level, physically inspects phones to see if they have the NUG Pay app. They have sentenced people to a decade for making token donations to the shadow government or its affiliated militias.
Third, the military will focus on the opposition’s center of gravity: their alliance with key Ethnic Resistance Organizations. This is both the shadow government’s greatest strength and greatest vulnerability. No Bamar-led government has had better ties with the ethnic forces than the NUG, whom they see as offering the best hope of establishing a democratic federal republic.
While some ethnic armies have supported the shadow government from the start, including arming and training their militias, many more have taken a wait-and-see approach. Some, particularly those in Shan State, such as the United Wa State Army, have benefitted from the status quo as they churn out record amounts of illicit narcotics.
The junta is determined to prevent more from joining the shadow government, and thereby opening up a new front. While there have been skirmishes with the Arakan Army, an all out war seemed to have been avoided, as the latter realized it gained more autonomy by not fighting.
Going after urban guerillas
Though the junta invites ethnic armies to Naypyidaw to resume the National Ceasefire talks, there are fewer takers. But this remains a line of effort. The military regime assumes that, at one point, historical mistrust will cause rifts between the NUG and the ethnic armies. Until then, it seeks to deter and induce the ethnic armies to withhold support for the National Unity Government.
Fourth, the junta will focus on decimating the urban guerrilla forces. The military was not surprised to be fighting a multifront war against the ethnic armies, even if the proliferation of people’s defense forces caught them off guard. But the attacks by the Yangon and Mandalay urban guerrillas undermined their claim to have the situation under control in the eyes of the urban middle class, whom they desperately need to win over.
Urban guerrilla groups waged a systematic campaign in 2022, but their targets were often symbolic. There were only two operations that had real importance: the attempted assassination of the then-deputy head of the Central Bank of Myanmar and the killing of the CFO of MyTel, the largest and not coincidentally military-owned telecoms firm in the country.
But their attacks proved to be costly, with the importation of Chinese CCTVs and facial recognition software.
Fifth, the junta will hold “elections” by August, in an effort to legitimize their rule, taking a page out of the playbook written by Thailand’s generals in 2019.
They have announced the establishment of proportional representation, and the military will still receive 25 percent of parliamentary seats. Districts are being gerrymandered and the military controls the voter lists. The Union Election Commission has been purged of all pro-National League for Democracy figures, and is fully controlled by the military.
Over 1,100 NLD officials are imprisoned and many have been tortured to death.
The newly announced election law cripples the political opposition and allows the Union Election Commission to dissolve parties if it is declared unlawful or it has communications with “terrorist” organizations, doesn’t have offices or run candidates in 50 percent of the 330 townships; or compete in by elections, isn’t registered and has 100,000 listed members, or doesn’t deposit 100 million kyat ($43,727) at the military-owned Myanma Economic Bank.
While not everyone in the junta is convinced about the utility of elections, including Soe Win, Min Aung Hlaing believes they are the source of the regime’s legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the international community, many of whom will view even shambolic elections as “good enough”.
The military believes that time is on its side, and given the lack of concrete international support for the National Unity Government, and they might be right. The stakes are high for both sides, as we enter year three of a conflict that continues to drag Myanmar back to amongst the poorest and most unstable countries in the world..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"Washington, DC – The International Republican Institute (IRI) released the following statement on the second anniversary of the military coup in Burma.
“Today, IRI recognizes the bravery and resilience of the Burmese people who continue to struggle for freedom and democracy despite grave risks to their safety and livelihoods. Their dedication to democratic values and building a government that respects human dignity is truly inspiring.
“IRI strongly condemns the military regime’s brutal tactics and ongoing human rights abuses as it conducts an indiscriminate and violent campaign against its citizens. This includes torturing civilians, burning villages and homes, and committing sexual and gender-based violence which only pushes the country deeper into a political and economic crisis.
“It’s time for the military junta to immediately stop these attacks and allow unimpeded humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Further, the regime’s attempt to legitimize its grip on power through a sham elections process later this year is nothing more than a smokescreen and should be firmly rejected by the international community.
“IRI remains steadfast in supporting Burma’s pro-democracy movement and their desire for a free and democratic future.”..."
Source/publisher:
International Republican Institute
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"We, the undersigned organizations specializing in election observation, electoral and democracy assistance, committed to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation1 and to upholding the integrity and credibility of such endeavours, denounce and distance ourselves from the sham “election” that the illegal and illegitimate military junta of Myanmar, the State Administrative Council (SAC), and the illegitimate “Union Election Commission” it has established, are currently planning for later this year.
We also express an urgent request to the international community to deny the SAC any technical, material, or symbolic support for such sham elections. We encourage UN Member States to join us and make their opposition to the junta’s electoral exercise widely known, including through individual and joint statements, and resolutions at the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the UN Human Rights Council.
The Myanmar junta has been systematically and massively violating the human rights of the people to such a degree that the free expression of their will cannot be ensured. It is impossible to hold a genuine election under current conditions in Myanmar, which include the arrest, detention, torture, and execution of leaders of the most widely supported political party and other politicians and civic activists; as well as the harassment, jailing and torture of journalists. Those who criticize the coup and the military junta and protect the internationally recognized valid elections of 2020 are considered criminals and are persecuted. It should also be noted that 21 officials from the legitimate Union Election Commission are still being held in detention following the coup as a result of their involvement in the 2020 elections.2 Genuine democratic elections cannot be achieved unless human rights and fundamental freedoms can be exercised, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, as was largely the case in 2020. The evidence is overwhelming that the SAC denies the exercise of any of these freedoms.
Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The SAC can make no claim to democratic legitimacy, i.e., representing the will of the people as expressed through elections.
Our organizations are committed to conducting systematic, comprehensive, and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections. We assess factors concerning the overall electoral environment. We analyze this information impartially and draw conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis. Where possible, we offer recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral processes. No recommendations that we could offer on this sham “election” could cure the falsity of the process other than for the SAC to follow the call of the United Nations General Assembly to “to respect the will of the people as freely expressed by the results of the general election of 8 November 2020, to end the state of emergency, to respect all human rights of all the people of Myanmar and to allow the sustained democratic transition of Myanmar.” The implementation of a sham “election” will not bring stability in Myanmar. It will only contribute to increasing violence and polarization, worsen the crisis caused by the military coup, and further threats to regional and international stability and security..."
Source/publisher:
Asian Network for Free Elections, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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"Today marks two years since the attempted military coup in Burma. Over the last two years, the people of Burma have bravely resisted the junta’s violent attempt to take total control of the country. In the face of mass, unwavering public resistance, the junta continues to increase its campaign of brutality and savagery as it carries out killings, torture, forced disappearances, sexual violence, and airstrikes against the civilian population throughout the country.
Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) has so far documented from 1st February 2021 to 31stDecember 2022. According to the documentation, the total number of civilians killed by the junta reached 3160 people. There were 363 people who were tortured and killed within 24 hours of their arrest by the junta. Arson attacks by the junta forces on civilian properties across the country destroyed 46,350 houses. Sagaing Division has the largest rates of all the above-mentioned crimes committed by the junta. Freedom of religion and belief was also significantly violated during the period, with hundreds of religious buildings burned and destroyed, including Churches, Buddhist monasteries, and Mosques.
While these events have garnered international attention, other forms of structural violence and human rights violations of Burma’s Muslim minorities has continued to occur largely under the radar, with particularly severe violations against the Rohingya people. Since the coup, Rohingya and other Muslim minorities have been subjected to tightened restrictions on their fundamental freedoms and are increasingly at risk of being subjected to further atrocity crimes.
Since the coup, the junta has imposed new movement restrictions and aid blockages on Rohingya camps and villages. The junta has arrested thousands of Muslims, hundreds of them children, for ‘unauthorized’ travel. Those arrested face a maximum of five years in prison. According to the Burma Human Rights Network’s (BHRN) documentation from 1 February 2021 to December 2022, at least 2,840 Rohingya were arrested and detained for traveling outside their communities without getting prior permission showing a sharp uptick in the number of arrests since the coup. BHRN has also documented 70 cases of other Muslim minorities being arbitrarily arrested.
The junta and its supporters continue to use divisive and hateful rhetoric targeting non-Buddhist religious groups to divide the resistance and deflect and divert attention from the coup. While religious oppression has been a longstanding issue in Burma, the coup emboldened the junta to further persecute, marginalize, and incite violence against the Rohingya and other Muslim minorities throughout the country. From 1 February 2021 until January 2023, BHRN has documented over 539 incidents of hate-speech targeting Muslims by junta supporters on social media including Facebook, Telegram, and junta-backed journals.
BHRN and other human rights groups have also documented cases of the junta looting, burning and destroying properties, shops, and places of worship of Muslim communities. BHRN documentation shows that more than 770 houses in Muslim villages were burned down by the junta in Sagaing region since the start of the coup. BHRN documentation shows the junta has killed at least 81 Muslims since 1 February 2021.
“Amidst all this violence and brutality, the international response to the coup has proceeded in a slow and fragmented manner, falling short of the Burma people’s expectations. The longer the international community waits to act, the more emboldened the junta will become as it continues to commit atrocities. The situation in Myanmar requires an immediate and cohesive international response”, said Kyaw Win, Executive Director of BHRN.
The Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) calls on governments worldwide to:
Redouble efforts to pursue international legal action against the junta, including by joining the Gambia’s case at the International Court of Justice and by actively pursuing investigations and prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction like those in Turkey, Argentina, and Germany.
Work together to strengthen international sanctions to cut off the Burma military from the revenue funding its abusive operations.
Increase engagement and recognize the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organizations, and leaders of the civil disobedience movement.
Additionally, BHRN calls on:
ASEAN to coordinate strong action against the junta, block the junta from all its meetings, and support UN member states in enforcing sanctions and a global arms embargo against the junta.
Neighbouring countries, including India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, to devise a comprehensive regional response to the refugee crisis, provide protection, support, and humanitarian and legal aid to all refugees fleeing Burma, and to authorize emergency cross-border aid to internally displaced persons in Burma.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) to end its inaction and refer the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court or establish a separate criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of atrocity crimes in Burma. The UNSC should also impose a binding global arms embargo including a prohibition on security assistance, the sale and transfer of arms, dual-use technology, and suspend the supply of aviation fuel.
The international community to not recognise the pseudo-election that the junta plans to conduct in August this year. There must be recognition that the same junta that overthrew a Democratically elected government does not have any credibility to conduct the election.
Organisation’s Background
BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma/Myanmar working for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in the country. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders..."
Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"1 February 2023: Two years after launching the attempted coup, the Myanmar military junta has failed to impose its political agenda on Myanmar. The international community must now step-up support for the federal democracy movement as the only way forward for Myanmar, said the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M hosted a press conference yesterday, on Tuesday 31 January 2023, to mark the two-year anniversary of the start of the military coup in Myanmar. The members of SAC-M commented on the growing regional crisis caused by the military in Myanmar, as well as recent developments in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and United Nations (UN) relevant to Myanmar.
SAC-M founding member Yanghee Lee spoke about the outright refusal of the Myanmar people to accept the military coup. “The junta cannot succeed,” said Lee. “This time the old playbook won’t work – the movement has come too far, and the people have had enough. The only path to peace and stability in Myanmar now, is through finally realising the people’s will and long-held aspirations for a genuine federal democracy.”
SAC-M founding member Marzuki Darusman discussed the challenges facing Indonesia as chair of ASEAN in 2023. “Indonesia will need to push ASEAN to finally come to terms with the reality that the situation in Myanmar is a political conflict between the junta and the democracy movement,” said Darusman. “As ASEAN Chair for one very short year, Indonesia should try to lay down the groundwork for a realistic, sound and durable political solution. It is imperative that Indonesia acknowledges the reality of the NUG and works with it, as a party to the conflict, to find a solution.”
Chris Sidoti, also a founding member of SAC-M, commented on the recent developments in the UN and international system, including the adoption of the Security Council’s first resolution on Myanmar, the continued rejection of the military junta by the General Assembly, and the ongoing investigations at the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court in relation to the Rohingya genocide. However, Sidoti explained, these steps have all been inadequate.
“We, the international system, are challenged, as we go into the third year of this attempted coup. We are challenged to respond far more adequately, far more effectively and far more actively than we have done in the past,” said Sidoti.
All three members of SAC-M dismissed the junta’s stated plan to hold elections in 2023 as yet another attempt to gain power that fails to comply even with the military’s own constitution. “The international community must recognise that whatever the military in Myanmar is doing right now has no constitutional basis,” said Lee.
However, the members of SAC-M concurred that a non-violent solution to the conflict must be found, but that the nature of that solution is not yet clear, and with Min Aung Hlaing leading the military, appears unlikely.
As the coup, and the terrible toll it is taking on the people of Myanmar, enters its third year, SAC-M calls on the international community to close in on accountability by establishing an ad hoc tribunal for Myanmar, and to finally step up, and recognise Myanmar’s National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
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"Pro-democracy activists in Myanmar are holding a "silent strike" to mark two years since a military coup that removed Aung San Suu Kyi from power.
Streets in many cities fell quiet after protesters urged people to stay indoors and asked businesses to close.
Meanwhile, the military administration in the country has extended a state of emergency for six months.
The UK, US, Canada and Australia have announced fresh sanctions against army-linked firms.
Large parts of Myanmar descended into chaos after the government's overthrow two years ago, displacing more than a million people.
The army had made allegations of widespread fraud in a vote held months earlier, in November 2020, which Ms Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won with more than 80% of the vote.
The military's claims have been dismissed as baseless by the vast majority of the international community, and plans to hold new elections to cement junta rule have been dismissed as a "sham", including by the UN.
Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a pro-democracy activist, said resistance against the military was continuing, particularly in rural areas.
"The main message of the silent strike is to honour the fallen heroes and heroines and to reclaim the public space as our own," she told the BBC, adding that the aim was to send a clear message that the military "shall never rule us".
Protesters also gathered outside Myanmar's embassies in Thailand and Japan, chanting anti-military slogans and holding portraits of Ms Suu Kyi.
A small pro-military demonstration took place in Yangon, where an estimated 200 supporters marched through the city centre escorted part of the way by soldiers, AFP news agency reported.
In-depth: Devastation from the air in Myanmar's brutal civil war
Two years after the coup, which catastrophically misread the public mood in Myanmar, the statistics tell their own, dismal story.
More than 2,900 people have been killed during the junta's crackdown on dissent, according to monitoring group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
One-and-a-half million people have been displaced, 40,000 homes have been burned down, eight million children are no longer in school, and 15 million people are judged by the UN to be dangerously short of food.
Much of the country is caught up in a brutal civil war. Yet the military is still refusing to negotiate with its opponents, as it promised to do in a meeting with neighbouring countries shortly after the coup.
Instead, it has plans for an election which would almost certainly exclude Ms Suu Kyi, who resoundingly won the last election, and much of her party, the NLD.
Those loyal to her are calling on citizens to boycott any poll organised by the military, arguing it would be illegitimate and impractical. The UN says these would be "sham elections".
The military's acknowledgement this week that it had failed to normalise the situation may force it to postpone the election - originally scheduled for August this year - having now extended the state of emergency, prolonging the grim stalemate in which Myanmar is trapped.
Western nations used Wednesday's anniversary to coordinate new rounds of sanctions against the military and its supporters.
The UK targeted, among others, companies supplying aviation fuel to the military, which it said were "enabling its barbaric air-raiding campaign in an attempt to maintain power".
British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly said the sanctions were aimed at "reducing the military's access to finance, fuel, arms and equipment".
Australia announced its first sanctions against the military, aimed at 16 individuals "responsible for egregious human rights abuses", as well as two major military-controlled conglomerates, which dominate the country's economy.
Sanctions by the US targeted the military-approved election commission, which "the regime has deployed to advance its plans for deeply flawed elections".
The National Unity Government - a parallel administration that leads opposition to the military - welcomed the sanctions, calling them "significant measures" to tackle the conflict, particularly air strikes by the military.
It called on countries to place further "aggressive, targeted sanctions" on the military regime and those who supported and supplied it.
Amnesty International's Montse Ferrer told the BBC that moves to stop the supply of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military were "an important step" but that more needed to be done.
"Other states should follow Canada's lead in suspending the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer - including transit, trans-shipment and brokering - of aviation fuel to Myanmar," she said..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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Sub-title:
Today marks the second anniversary of the murderous coup by the Myanmar military, which has killed nearly 3,000 people including dozens of children.
Description:
"In a statement released yesterday, the Council of Global Unions has called for renewed global efforts to restore democracy and for official recognition of Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG). Following the vicious military coup, the NUG was formed by members of Myanmar’s elected government to coordinate international opposition to the military coup.
The brutal repression carried out by the junta since the coup has included the killing and the arbitrary detention of trade union representatives, as highlighted in last year’s ITUC Global Rights Index.
Along with economic and diplomatic pressure on the junta itself, a key focus must be placed on the involvement of global multinational companies that continue to do business with the junta, including through supply chain inputs that feed the military’s domestic arms industry.
“This corrupt and brutal junta must feel the full weight of international pressure. The people of Myanmar need international solidarity, and the ITUC and the entire global trade union movement will continue to stand with them and their national trade union centre, the CTUM,” said ITUC Deputy General Secretary Owen Tudor.
Source/publisher:
International Trade Union Confederation
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Two years ago today, the Burma Army made clear their sinister intentions for the country’s future. Despite an overwhelming victory in the 2020 election for the National League for Democracy, the junta’s coup was a desperate bid for legitimacy. It declared fraud without evidence while hijacking the systems in place that permitted a free and fair election to take place. Their failed coup has brought nothing but destruction while making a mockery of the rule of law. The Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) rejects the junta’s tyranny and calls for immediate international intervention to hold the military Generals accountable for their mass crimes.
In Southeastern Burma, in particular, Mon State, Karen State and Tanintharyi region, the Burma Army has committed murder, torture, sexual assault and rape, arbitrary arrests and destruction of property, and many others. Innocent people have been killed in their homes, while others have been arbitrarily arrested, detained, and tortured. The regime has replaced judges with those willing to abide by its totalitarian, militarized agenda. The atrocities perpetrated are ongoing. They are systematic, widespread, and take place with impunity. Without action, the junta-backed battalions are encouraged to continue their campaign of terror.
The world must not forget about the plight of the people in Burma. Every day has become one of survival. Livelihood opportunities have been forcibly put on hold as fighting in civilian areas makes it unsafe, if not impossible, to resume their daily work. Landmines litter their villages and farms. Children are also forced to continue their learning in the jungle as the junta targets schools in air and ground strikes. Women and young girls detained in military custody are not safe. HURFOM has observed an escalation of conflict-related sexual violence since 1 February 2021. The chaos and fear-fueled environment created by the junta has led to over 100,000 civilians fleeing their homes in Southeastern Burma alone. Country-wide, there are over one million who are internally displaced.
With so much injustice regularly being enforced, the international community must intervene. A global arms embargo would end weapon access for the Burma Army, who carelessly fire their guns into villages. Sanctions on aviation fuel would stop the air strikes that killed children in their schools. Finally, a long overdue referral of the Burma Army to the International Criminal Court would set an important precedent that no one is above the law.
The military Generals and their soldiers have blood on their hands. The future of Burma belongs to those who believe that everyone is equal and deserving of their fundamental human rights. The global community must use their platforms and diplomatic will to change the course of history. This begins with measures and concrete steps that prosecute Min Aung Hlaing and end his legacy of tyranny..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Today marks the second anniversary of the brutal failed coup which gave birth to the Myanmar People’s Spring Revolution against the genocidal military dictatorship. Despite the many atrocities, horrific war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by the junta, the people of Myanmar have continued to resist bravely and stand in solidarity with their heads held high. Our people’s commitment to human rights and federal democracy remains unshakeable, as does our unwavering love of freedom and peace. It is this very struggle for freedom and peace that has been the rallying cry of every generation since independence. For over seventy years, the military generals have committed every act of terrorism in the most inhumane and barbaric ways imaginable against our people. Even just yesterday our brave Karen people marked 74 years in their fight for freedom and federal democracy against the terror of military dictatorships. In the last 2 years alone, over nine thousand terror attacks carried out against innocent Myanmar people by the terrorist military forces have been recorded, with more than 3,000 civilians brutally murdered. Our people have faced horrible beatings, rape, torture, murder and even mass immolation. Leading pro-democracy leaders and activists have been most cruelly executed, and upwards of 20,000 innocent civilians have been arrested and held in the most deplorable conditions. From the brave citizens who took to the streets in protest against the failed coup, to our President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and democratically elected members of parliament - whose only crime was daring to take the seats to which the people of Myanmar elected them, these all face unwarranted and illegal incarceration.
Homes, schools, churches and religious buildings - over 36,000 and counting, have been destroyed, leaving over 1.5 million people homeless. Forced to take shelter in the unforgiving jungles, squalid IDP shelters. and over-crowded refugee camps, many have fled to neighbouring countries in which they may also face arrest and forced deportation back to Myanmar, where imprisonment or even execution often awaits them. Moreover, the brutal junta in Myanmar, in yet another barbaric move, has escalated its campaign of terror by weaponising humanitarian assistance and even international aide itself against the more than 17 million Myanmar people who so desperately need it. The junta is forcing international donors and aid workers to channel their assistance through military controlled networks, where this aide is then seized, sold off, and the proceeds going to fund further war crimes against the very people it was designated to help. This terrorist junta has all but completely destroyed Myanmar’s economy through its terrible policies, restrictions, workforce terrorism and destruction of labour rights, forcing over half the population of 54 million into extreme poverty. Additionally, illegal activity, such as opium production, has more than doubled since the coup according to the UNODC, further adding to the afflictions of our people and neighbours.
Thus, it is important always to bear in mind that these military generals, responsible for annulling the 1990 elections, instigating the fraudulent 2008 referendum, rigging the 2010 elections, and staging a failed coup after their spectacular loss in the truly free and fair 2020 elections, have announced yet again their plans to hold an illegal sham election, the likes of which will only bring about increased violence, bloodshed, and a prolonged reign-of-terror against the people of Myanmar. The junta’s proposed sham election is a slap in the face not only to the people of Myanmar, but to democracy on an international level, and an electoral process run by the military could never be free nor fair, and most certainly not democratic. It is therefore imperative that the international community spare no efforts to condemn, denounce, and thoroughly reject this proposed illegal, fraudulent and illegitimate sham of an election. The deaths, destruction, and national instability must not be allowed to continue or to be legitimised by this husk of a sham election. Instead of accepting this farce, the international community must do everything in their power to hold the junta accountable for all of its crimes, atrocities, and genocide, and work hand- in-hand with the National Unity Government (NUG) to ensure the democratic and peaceful future of Myanmar, and stability of the region.
We, the people of Myanmar, are absolutely committed to obtaining freedom and federal democracy. We have no future under the iron fists of a genocidal military dictatorship. Our future rests with true federal democracy, and that is the future the collective “we” must give to the people of Myanmar. Every act of terrorism and attempt by the genocidal military to crush us will always be in vain, such is the strong will of the people who have once tasted the budding of freedom and democracy. Our desire for peace and freedom far outweighs the tyrannical greed of the brutal military generals, and we will never give up our right to this freedom and peace. Together we will defeat this tyranny, these loathsome oppressors, and put an end to dictatorship on our blood soaked soil once and for all. We will restore our nation and eradicate atrocities, genocides, and juntas. Together, we will thrive and flourish, and bring our best and brightest to the world stage in the pursuit of justice. Mark my words; a new Myanmar is coming - a Myanmar that will stand strong for every one of its citizens regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, gender or background; a Myanmar that will join the march to global peace and security..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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"Geneva, 1 February 2023 – Today marks exactly two years since the Myanmar military sent tanks into the streets in an effort to remove the elected government. Over this time, we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of serious international crimes systematically committed across the country. We have collected credible evidence documenting the commission of an array of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and deportation or forcible transfer. We are analyzing this evidence and preparing case files to hold perpetrators of these crimes responsible so that they will one day face justice.
There is strong evidence that thousands of people have been unlawfully imprisoned, and that they have been subject to torture and other forms of physical and mental abuse, as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence. These incidents are widespread and systematic, suggesting that they are not isolated events but rather the implementation of an organizational policy.
There is also compelling evidence of widespread crimes committed in the various armed conflicts that are ongoing in Myanmar. Civilians and civilian objects, such as residential homes, have been repeatedly and intentionally targeted or subject to indiscriminate attack. These attacks are war crimes, and they enable perpetrators to commit other serious international crimes such as forcible transfer and forcible displacement, often accompanied by the burning of civilian homes in villages considered supportive of armed groups. The Mechanism is focusing its investigations on specific incidents where the impact on victims is the most severe, and we are looking at crimes committed by both security forces and armed groups.
Through our analysis of interview statements, documentation, videos, photographs, geospatial imagery, and social media material, we are finding evidence showing who is responsible for these crimes. Our investigations are constrained by the lack of cooperation by the Myanmar military authorities who are in a position to provide highly relevant and essential information. Multiple requests to them for information and access to the country have so far gone unanswered. Nevertheless, we have collected substantial, credible and direct information from numerous sources, including survivors, eyewitnesses and defectors who have provided crucial information about the crimes and the individuals responsible. We are inspired by the Myanmar people’s courage in sharing information with us, and we have systems in place to keep their evidence and testimonies confidential and secure.
Just as we are sharing evidence with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina, we are also preparing evidence that can be shared with national, regional or international courts who will one day prosecute those responsible for crimes committed since 1 February 2021.
Perpetrators should be aware that serious international crimes have no statute of limitations. This means that there is no time limit for perpetrators to be prosecuted. The road to justice may be long, but the Mechanism is preserving and analyzing the evidence now so that it will be immediately available for use by relevant judicial authorities in the future. The cycle of impunity will end, and there will one day be accountability and justice for these heinous crimes.
Information on how to communicate securely and confidentially with the Mechanism can be found at https://iimm.un.org/contact-us/confidential-and-sensitive-communications/
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files for use in future prosecutions of those responsible in national, regional and international courts. For more information visit https://iimm.un.org/ or contact [email protected]..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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Description:
"Today marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that took place on 1 February 2021. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) continues to stand in unwavering solidarity with the people of Myanmar who have suffered greatly under the brutal regime and condemns the junta’s plan for a sham election.
We remember those who have lost their lives or freedoms in pursuit of democracy. We continue to vehemently condemn the military junta’s flagrant violations of human rights, including the use of lethal force against peaceful protesters, the arbitrary imprisonment of political leaders, activists, government officials and journalists, the infringement of fundamental freedoms, and the atrocities committed against civilians.
As the junta plans to hold a sham election this year to legitimize its rule, we categorically denounce this so-called election as illegal and illegitimate. Genuine, free, and fair democratic elections cannot take place in Myanmar unless fundamental human rights and freedoms are upheld, which is currently not the case in Myanmar. The junta holds no legitimate position nor rightful authority to conduct any elections, and any outcome from such an exercise will not represent the will of the people.
The new Political Parties Registration Law introduced by the junta in late January makes it virtually impossible for most parties to stand any chance in the sham election. All parties must re-register within two months or face immediate dissolution, and those intending to contest nationwide must recruit 100,000 members within 90 days, establish offices in at least half of the country’s 330 townships and be able to contest in half of all constituencies. It is now even more evident that the draconian conditions eliminate all chances of a democratic election.
The international community must acknowledge that any election held by the junta is nothing but a sham, and will be illegitimate and invalid. It is imperative that the international community takes further measures to restore democracy in Myanmar if no positive progress is achieved. The plight of the people in Myanmar demands the collective efforts of the international community, including ASEAN and its new chair Indonesia, to guarantee that they are able to enjoy their democratic rights and liberties without fear of repression..."
Source/publisher:
Asian Network for Free Elections
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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"၃၁.၁.၂၀၂၃ရက်နေ့၊ ၁၀၀၀ နာရီတွင် ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပဉ္စမအကြိမ် အစည်းအဝေး၌ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်သို့ အစီရင်ခံတင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ နိုင်ငံတကာလွှတ်တော်အသိုက်အဝန်းနှင့် ဆက်ဆံရေး ခိုင်မာအားကောင်းလာစေရေး ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များနှင့် တိုးတက်ဖြစ်ထွန်းမှုများအား မိဘပြည်သူများ ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ရန် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း လေးစားစွာ အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်အပ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
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Individual Documents
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"၁.၂.၂၀၂၃ရက်နေ့၊ ၁၀၀၀နာရီတွင် ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပဉ္စမ အကြိမ်အစည်းအဝေး၌ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်သို့ ဖတ်ကြားတင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် ပြည်သူ့ ရေးရာကော်မတီ၏အစီရင်ခံစာအား မိဘပြည်သူများ ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ရန် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း လေးစားစွာ အသိပေး ထုတ်ပြန်အပ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.31 MB
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Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာနသည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက် နေ့အား တရားမဝင်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ မအောင်မြင်ခဲ့သည့် နိုင်ငံတော် အာဏာသိမ်းယူမှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး ဒုတိယမြောက် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ် ပါသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် ပြီးခဲ့သည့် နှစ်နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ် တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးအပေါ် ၎င်းတို့၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်မှုနှင့် ခိုင်မာသည့်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တို့အား ထုတ်ဖော် ပြသခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ မိမိတို့၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ရပိုင်ခွင့်များနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်များကို အကြမ်းဖက် လူရမ်းကားများ၏ သေနတ်အောက်တွင် လက်မြှောက်အရှုံးပေးမည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်းကိုလည်း အတိအလင်း ကြေညာထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
ယနေ့တွင် မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ မိသားစုဝင်များအား ၎င်းတို့ ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့သော စိတ်ကူးရန်ပင် မလွယ်ကူလှသည့် စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုများအပေါ် မှတ်တမ်းတင် ဂုဏ်ပြုပါသည်။ တရားမ၀င် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ မတရားသဖြင့် ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံထားရသော ညီအကိုမောင်နှမများကိုလည်း မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဂုဏ်ပြုပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် မိမိတို့၏ တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအစ်ကို မောင်နှမများ၊ အကြမ်းမဖက် အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) နှင့် သပိတ်ကော်မတီအဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၊ လူငယ်နှင့် အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ဆေးဘက်ဆိုင်ရာ လုပ်ဖော်ကိုင်ဖက်များနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ကာကွယ်သူများ၊ ပြည်သူ့နှင့် ဒေသန္တရ ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် မိမိတို့၏ လူမှုအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းကို ကာကွယ်ရန်နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုကို ဖီဆန်သော လူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်စီတိုင်းကို မှတ်တမ်းတင် ဂုဏ်ပြုပါသည်။
ယနေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအပေါ် ပြတ်သားသော ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာခဲ့သည့် မိမိတို့နှင့် တညီတညွတ်တည်း ရပ်တည်လျက်ရှိသည်ကို ပြသခဲ့သော ကမ္ဘာတဝှမ်းရှိ မိတ်ဆွေများကိုလည်း အထူးပင် ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။
မြန်မာပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် အောင်မြင်မှုရရှိနေပြီး အခြား တစ်ဖက်တွင် လည်း ပြည်သူများ၏ ပေးဆပ်အနစ်နာခံထားရမှုများသည် ထုထည်ကြီးမားလှပါသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ပြင်းထန်သော စိတ်ဆန္ဒကို ကြောက်ရွံ့ပြီး နိုင်ငံတော်၏အာဏာကိုချုပ်ကိုင်ရန် ရှုံးနိမ့်နေသော အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုသည် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအပေါ် လူသတ်မှု၊ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှု၊ ပြည်သူ့အိုးအိမ်များ အား မီးရှို့မှု၊ ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးစေမှုနှင့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် အိုးအိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်စေမှုများကို အတားအဆီးမဲ့ ဆက်တိုက် ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ၎င်းတို့သည် ပြည်သူများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ပွဲများ ဆင်နွှဲကာ နိုင်ငံတဝန်းလုံးရှိ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနဲ့ လုံခြုံရေးအပေါ် ခြိမ်းခြောက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏ တိုင်းရင်းသား ညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများနှင့်အတူ လွတ်လပ်၍ တရားမျှတမှုရရှိစေရေးအတွက် အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲများမှတဆင့် ပြည်သူများမှ ပေးအပ်ခဲ့သော ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို လက်ကိုင်ကျင့်သုံးလျက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းမှပင် ဆက်လက် ဦးဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ မိမိတို့သည် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှု၊ တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းမှု၊ တန်းတူ ညီမျှမှု၊ တိုးတက်ပြောင်းလဲမှုနှင့် အရပ်သားအုပ်ချုပ်မှုတို့အတွက် ရပ်တည်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ တစ်ဖက်တွင် လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် သေခြင်းတရားနှင့် ကြီးမားသောဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းနည်းလမ်းများကို ဆုပ်ကိုင်ကာ နိုင်ငံအား အုပ်ချုပ်ရန် ကြိုးစားလျက်ရှိသည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် လွတ်မြောက်ခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် အကြောက်တရား၊ တရားမျှတမှု သို့မဟုတ် အပြစ်ပေးခံရမှု၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီ သို့မဟုတ် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် တို့အပေါ် ထင်ရှားပြတ်သားစွာ ရွေးချယ်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် ယခုအချိန်သည် ၎င်းတို့၏ ပိုမိုခိုင်မာသော သဘောထားနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် ရပ်တည်မှုချိန်ခွင်လျှာတို့ကို ပြတ်သားစွာ ဖော်ထုတ်ညွှန်ပြရမည့်အချိန် ကာလ လည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၊ အာဆီယံ မိတ်ဖက်နိုင်ငံများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုက်အဝန်းတို့အား မိမိတို့၏ တရားဝင် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျကျလုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ထောက်ခံအားပေးရန်နှင့် အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများမှတဆင့် သွေးစွန်းနေသော စစ်ယူနီဖောင်းများမှ အရပ်သားပုံစံ အသွင်ယူပြောင်းလဲအုပ်ချုပ်ရန် ကြိုးစားလျက်ရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဆောင်ရွက်မှုအားလုံးကို တားဆီးပိတ်ဆို့ရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
ထို့ပြင် လိုအပ်နေသူများအားလုံးထံ လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ အရေးပေါ်ပို့ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ နိုင်ငံရေးခိုလှုံခွင့် တောင်းခံသူ များနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည်များကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရေးတို့အတွက် မိမိတို့အပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့် အရပ်ဘက် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားလူနည်းစုများ အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ မိသားစုဝင်များအား တရားမျှတမှု ဖော်ဆောင်ရေးအတွက် ပြစ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူခဲ့များအပေါ် တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိစေရန် မိမိတို့၏ ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများကို အကူအညီပေးစေလိုပါသည်။
ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ ဒုတိယမြောက် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့သည် ရက်စက် ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများနှင့် ဒေသတွင်း မတည်ငြိမ်မှုများကိုသာ လိုလားတောင့်တနေသော စစ်အာဏာရှင် တစ်ဦးအတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်း၏ ပြစ်ဒဏ်မှ ထပ်မံမျက်ကွယ်ပြုထားခြင်း မရှိတော့သည့် အခိုက်အတန့်ဖြစ်စေရန် ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအပေါ် ပြင်းထန်သည့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုပြုလုပ်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး နောက်ဆုံးတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အား ထိရောက် သော အရပ်သားထိန်းချုပ်မှုအောက်သို့ အပြီးအပိုင် ယူဆောင်လာရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Spring Revolution, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Feb. 1 has become one of the most fateful days in Myanmar’s political calendar since the early-hours coup on that day in 2021. The country has never been the same since, becoming mired in social and political turmoil sparked by the takeover.
Two years on, Myanmar is still reeling from the coup. On the positive side, the popular resistance against the regime remains unwavering and has spread despite the junta’s ongoing atrocities against civilians.
To mark the second anniversary of the coup on Wednesday, The Irrawaddy spoke to democracy activists, resistance leaders and observers to get their thoughts on Myanmar’s two-year struggle under military rule, and the way ahead.
Ko Bo Kyi
Joint secretary, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma)
“Myanmar after two years under military rule is a disaster due to the coup, which shouldn’t have happened in the first place. It has also pushed the country onto a revolutionary path. It’s a huge blow for the country as we have lost educated young people in the fight against the regime. The takeover brings nothing good to the country.
“On the other hand, after two years, the fight against the regime is gaining momentum and will only get bloodier. There is no hope for the junta. It’s hopeful for the people of Myanmar and the revolutionary forces.
“Among the positive things the revolution has brought over the past two years are an understanding of ethnic people and a mindfulness of federal democracy. Such things are big steps forward for the country’s national reconciliation.”
U Kyaw Zaw
Spokesperson, Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG)
“During the two years of our fight against the regime, the NUG has made significant developments in many sectors including militarily, and in international relations and politics. We now have control over more than half of the country after our coordinated attacks with ethnic armed organizations on junta targets.
“As more areas come under our control, we are providing education and health services there, as well as administrative and judicial services. We have opened more than 4,000 schools and 55 hospitals on the ground in those areas. The NUG administration is in effect in 80 townships and we are expanding to the district level. The judicial system will follow.
“As the NUG has vowed that 2023 will be a decisive year in the fight against the junta, we are trying hard to bring change. We believe we will be victorious. At the same time, you will see more systematic administration and rule of law in 2023.”
Scot Marciel
Former US ambassador to Myanmar
“The military has reversed virtually all of the previous decade’s reforms and is waging war in a brutal, indiscriminate fashion against the Myanmar people, all to hold onto power. The Myanmar people have responded in heroic fashion, rising up against the military with incredible courage and resilience and insisting that they will not accept the military’s desire to turn the country back to the dark days of the past.
“The future is uncertain, but what is promising is that people from many different communities are now working together to defeat the coup, and in that process they are also tackling decades-old prejudices and taking important steps to build trust among themselves.
“I understand that many of you are frustrated by the lack of international attention to your plight and inadequate support you have received from the international community. All I can say is that there are many people around the world who have been inspired by your struggle and who are looking for ways every day to generate more attention and support for your effort.”
Phado Saw Taw Nee
Karen National Union communications chief
“Over the two years, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has tried to gain legitimacy but he has failed, as there is no space for him even at the regional level, in ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. He is a loser on all fronts, locally and internationally.
“The revolution against him is occurring not only in Karen State but across the whole country. It has now far passed the infantry stage. The resistance groups are now able to collaborate with each other [to lauch attacks on the junta]. That’s the most remarkable thing; we haven’t seen such a thing in the history of Myanmar’s 70 years of armed struggle.
“Min Aung Hlaing will try desperate moves, including holding an election, this year as he is running out of options. Our priority has to be how to get rid of them from this Earth! I dare to say there will be changes this year militarily and politically.”
Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd
Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
“The country was left with both economic and political uncertainties following the coup. A growing dissatisfaction and defiance of the military by the general public only further added uncertainty to the economy.
“As long as the military continues to stay in power, it is almost impossible for many sectors of the economy to become fully productive again. It is imperative that the international community continue to put pressure on the junta to restore democracy so that the civilian-led democratic government can do its part in reversing current economic woes.
“In order for the Myanmar resistance coalition to reach tipping point, faster the coalition is able to come together, faster they will be able to reach tipping point. The coalition also needs to prioritize and adequately resource intel operations and the strategic communication line of effort.”
Khun Be Du
Chairperson of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF)
“Since its formation following the coup, the KNDF has become battle-hardened. Fighting continues against regime troops in Kayah State.
“Over the two years, we have been able to collaborate with other ethnic armed groups and People’s Defense Force [PDF] groups in other areas.
“On the political front, we have decided to join other forces to build a federal union in Myanmar. We will work hard for it in 2023 either by armed struggle or popular support.”
Ma Nilar Thein
Veteran democracy activist and widow of activist Ko Jimmy, who was hanged by the regime
“It has been two years since the Myanmar military seized control of the country. The past two years saw an important shift in our country. The Civil Disobedience Movement [CDM] and Generation-Z played powerful roles to applause from the international community. The CDM proved [able] to stall junta mechanisms, and Generation-Z provided a leadership role [in the resistance movement against the regime]. People’s Defense Forces emerged as people sought to defend themselves after the Myanmar military carried out brutal crackdowns on peaceful rallies.
“Our citizens at home and abroad demonstrated strong solidarity against military rule with their hearts linked together. International diplomatic circles have not only expressed concern but started to take action regarding the Myanmar issue. So, I think if all forces are unified, things will take shape in 2023. It is crucial that democracy and federalism forces and all the ethnicities join hands in this fight.
“I vow to turn the sorrow from the deaths of all of our comrades—including Ko Jimmy and those who died behind closed doors in interrogation centers, in arson attacks on villages, and in clashes in forests—to strength and continue to fight until this revolution wins.”
Dr. Tayzar San
Anti-regime protest leader
“The military mistakenly believed their coup would succeed as they have guns. They underestimated the people. Now, two years on, they still can’t control the country as the revolution against them is in full swing. Politically, now is a time of national unity unlike any we have seen before, as the various forces against the regime have become one. I have to say it’s a very remarkable result. At the same time, the regime is losing control day by day—take Upper Myanmar for example.
“We have to work harder, as the regime won’t step down easily. We already and firmly believe we will win. The world also needs to believe it. To earn their trust, we have to be unified in voice and action in our fight against the regime in 2023.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
Language:
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Sub-title:
Foreign Governments Should Target Military Junta’s Main Revenue Sources
Description:
"(Bangkok) – Myanmar’s junta, in the two years since the military coup, has expanded its use of deadly force and repressive measures to squelch all dissent, Human Rights Watch said today. Foreign governments should coordinate increased pressure on the junta to establish fundamental freedoms and democratic civilian rule.
On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military detained the country’s elected civilian officials, including de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Since then, the junta has brutally cracked down on any opposition and severely restricted freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. At least 17,000 protesters and activists have been arrested and 2,900 killed, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a nongovernmental group. The security forces have carried out arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual violence, mass killings, and other abuses that amount to crimes against humanity.
“Myanmar’s military junta has spent the two years since the coup engaged in a worsening spiral of atrocities against the people of Myanmar that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of proceeding with inevitably bogus ‘elections’ in August, Myanmar’s generals should be facing international consequences for their crimes.”
During expanded military operations, junta forces have been responsible for attacks on civilians that amount to war crimes against ethnic minority populations in Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan States. The military has used “scorched earth” tactics, burning villages in Magway and Sagaing Regions.
The junta has blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions of displaced people and others at risk in conflict areas. In Rakhine State – where Rohingya have long faced systematic abuse and discrimination that amount to crimes against humanity, including persecution and apartheid – security forces have imposed new restrictions on movement and aid. The restrictions have worsened food and water shortages and increased the risk of preventable diseases and severe malnutrition.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that at least 17.6 million people in Myanmar are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Fighting since the coup has displaced over 1 million people internally, while another 70,000 refugees have fled to neighbouring countries.
On December 21, 2022, a landmark UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar denounced the military’s rights violations since the coup but fell short of imposing a global arms embargo or referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court. Russia and China abstained from the vote, signalling the junta’s growing international isolation. Council members should pursue follow-up action by imposing an arms embargo as well as targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
Concerned governments should more effectively target the military’s main revenue sources, particularly foreign currency revenues that the military obtains from exports like natural gas, metals, gemstones, and timber and uses to purchase weapons, military equipment, and fuel, Human Rights Watch said.
Targeted economic sanctions imposed by Canada, the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States have been limited in effectiveness because of poor enforcement. Other key governments such as Australia, Japan, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have failed to enact any targeted sanctions since the coup.
ASEAN leaders have barred Myanmar military leaders from attending high-level ASEAN meetings. In 2022, some ASEAN leaders began to criticize the junta publicly, noting the junta’s failure to implement the Five-Point Consensus plan that the junta and ASEAN agreed upon in April 2021.
In 2023, Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN will be in part measured by its ability to press the junta on its ongoing human rights violations, Human Rights Watch said. At the February 3-4 meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta, Indonesia should propose an April 2023 deadline for the junta’s progress in meeting the commitments of the Five-Point Consensus. If the junta leaders maintain their inaction on the consensus, ASEAN member countries should commit to concrete engagement with other governments and the UN to hold the junta accountable for its grave abuses.
The junta has slated fraudulent “elections” for August, passing the Parties Registration Law on January 27. The law provides for restrictions on any party that refuses to “cooperate” with the junta. Any individual or party that the junta deems to be an “insurgent,” “terrorist,” or “unlawful” association is prohibited from participating, effectively barring the shadow civilian National Unity Government and many ethnic minority parties. Foreign governments should not treat the proposed elections as legitimate, such as by sending election monitors or providing technical assistance.
“Myanmar’s junta is trying to establish a veneer of credibility by going through the motions of holding ‘elections,’ but the international community shouldn’t be fooled or browbeaten into recognizing this sham,” Pearson said. “You can’t hold a free and fair election when you deny every basic right to your people and lock up or disqualify political opponents.”
EU member states, the US, and UK should improve coordination to strengthen sanctions against senior officials and military-owned companies. Tougher actions could help stem the flow of foreign funding, curb the military’s ability to buy weapons and materials, and help ASEAN and other intermediaries press the junta to end rampant rights violations and establish civilian democratic rule.
“Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in particular should signal to the US and EU that they will support strengthening and enforcing existing sanctions against the junta,” Pearson said. “Without stronger targeted sanctions, the Myanmar military will only tighten its brutal grip on the population.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Crimes Against Humanity
Language:
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Description:
"To mark the anniversary of the military coup on Feb. 1, 2021, The Irrawaddy offers a review of developments in Myanmar’s political, economic and military spheres, as well as its international relations, over the past two years.....
Politics...
Firstly, the 2008 Constitution was nullified by the putsch. Myanmar’s people had no trust in the constitution from the beginning, fully aware that it was drafted by the military to cement its political power.
However, following unexpected reforms under the quasi-civilian government that took power in 2011, people had hoped that the constitution would provide a less bloody political solution to the country’s civil war. They also hoped it would become a blueprint for the military’s gradual retreat from politics.
When power was handed over to the National League for Democracy (NLD) after it won the 2015 election, people began to believe the constitution would pave the way for full democracy. But they were wrong. The supreme law was always a tool of the military, to bend or stretch for its own interests.
In 2021, the military ignored Section 402 of the constitution which says the Union Election Commission’s decision on election results is final. It spuriously claimed widespread fraud in the 2020 general elections as an excuse to stage a coup. The military said its takeover was in line with the constitution; in fact, it was an illegal power seizure by force of arms.
The putsch also put an end to the national reconciliation process. And when the military launched a bloody crackdown on peaceful anti-coup protesters, people lost faith in political means to solve problems. Armed conflicts quickly erupted across the country. Efforts toward national reconciliation were replaced by destruction.
Viewpoints have also changed. Between 2011 and 2020, the popular view at home and abroad was that the Myanmar military, as the strongest institution in the country, could not be excluded from politics.
That view has changed since the coup. People now view that Myanmar cannot enjoy peace, stability or development while the military is active in politics. In other words, it is impossible to negotiate with the military for reform or power-sharing.
The military regime is holding so-called peace talks with some of the country’s many ethnic armed organizations. But it is obvious that the regime is holding talks only to relieve battlefield pressure, and negotiations will lead nowhere. Over the past two years, the political landscape has changed from national reconciliation to annihilation.
On the ground, thousands of democracy supporters have been detained. Hundreds have been sentenced to death, and many more have been given long prison terms. The regime publicly hanged four democracy activists in July last year. Another 300 or so have died in military custody at interrogation centers.
Meanwhile thousands have been killed in anti-coup protests and battlegrounds.
And more than 40,000 buildings including homes, religious buildings, healthcare facilities, and schools have been torched by the junta.
On the other hand, over 500 members or supporters of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, junta-appointed administrators, militias and alleged informants were killed by anti-regime forces. Government buildings including around 500 telecom masts have been destroyed and damaged.
The crisis has gone beyond the point of negotiation. As such, calls for annihilation will continue to grow. The military is entrenched, having rejected negotiations with civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or the parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG).....Economy...The coup came as a serious blow to Myanmar’s economy, which was already plagued by COVID-19. Military rule has sent it spiraling out of control with volatile economic and financial policies. Myanmar’s post-coup economic status can be encapsulated in 10 points:
Foreign firms have pulled out; foreign investments have declined, and sizeable planned investments have stalled.
International loans are suspended.
Inflation has soared over 100 percent and the cost of living including food has doubled.
A black market emerged after the regime introduced a fixed exchange rate in place of floating rates. Prices of imported goods including essentials like fuel and pharmaceuticals have surged due to tight controls on US dollar supply. Though fuel prices are high around the world, in Myanmar the price is double what it should be due to inflation and junta mismanagement.
Wealth, capital and savings are flowing quickly out of the country due to instability and inflation.
Manufacturing has been hit by power outages.
The regime is planning to resume stated-owned factories suspended for making losses.
Human capital is declining as people leave the country for better economic prospects overseas.
The hotels and tourism industry has been hit hard by post-coup turmoil as international visitors stay away.
Myanmar’s economy is barely surviving on revenues from oil, gas and agricultural exports.
The price of gold, dollars and food skyrocketed around August before subsiding in September. However, they began rising again in early January.
So, the past two years have been characterized by economic downturn, a decline in tax revenues, soaring inflation and a cost-of-living crisis, and a budget deficit caused by heavy military expenditures and other factors. This trend looks set to continue this year.
The economic crisis will have serious impacts on Myanmar people, as well as the regime. Oil, gas, and agricultural produce are the only sources of foreign currency for the regime.....International relations...The international community is playing a significant role in Myanmar’s crisis, but ultimately it is Myanmar’s people who will decide the fate of their country.
The regime is undoubtedly losing on the diplomatic front. It has been snubbed by the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The regime is under increasing pressure to abide by ASEAN’s five-point consensus for peace, which it has so far ignored. A UN resolution adopted in December, the first on Myanmar in more than 70 years, is also a headache for the junta. China and Russia, which the regime thought it could count on as allies, chose not to veto the resolution. On the world stage, the regime is fast running out of friends.
The US’s Burma Act, passed in December, was another hammer blow to the junta. The act commits the US to helping restore civilian governance for Myanmar and to pursuing accountability for human rights violations. Notably, it also green-lights non-military assistance for anti-junta forces including ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs).
The US decision to directly engage with EAOs, PDFs and the NUG is a significant departure from its previous reform push, which was centered on the Myanmar military. This decision demonstrates that Washington no longer believes negotiation with the junta is a practical solution. Further actions on top of the Burma Act can now be expected from the US.
In yet another serious diplomatic blow, China has distanced itself from the junta in a departure from its usually close relations with Myanmar military regimes.
Beijing has reduced high-level relations with the junta over the past two years, while also suspending planned large-scale investments. Tellingly, China snubbed the junta’s invitation to the second Lancang-Mekong Cooperation meeting.
Beijing decided not to veto the UN resolution after it became clear that the regime is unable to stabilize the country, has tarnished its international reputation by committing atrocities against its own people, and has become too close to Russia. And China is well aware of the extent of the armed uprising in Myanmar.
The change in stance of its most powerful ally is putting pressure on the regime. China has suggested that regime leaders hold talks with civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a way out of the political crisis. But the junta has refused to do so.
Min Aung Hlaing’s regime does appear to retain good ties with its neighbor Thailand. But this is hardly surprising given the fact that Thailand avoided the ravages of World War II by engaging both warring sides. Today, it carries out joint military drills with both the US and China.
Similarly, Thailand provides shelter for Myanmar’s democracy forces while also maintaining friendly relations with Myanmar’s military. Bangkok’s foreign policy is a balancing act. It is unlikely to upset that delicate balance by going against the US and ASEAN over the Myanmar crisis.
Among the few countries that currently offer support to the regime are Russia, Belarus, India and Japan.
Russia and Belarus engage with the regime mainly to sell weapons. They are unlikely to make massive investments in Myanmar. And politically, Russia is likely to heed Beijing’s opinion when the UN Security Council makes decisions on Myanmar.
India and Japan cooperate more openly with the regime. Delhi has dispatched high-level delegations to Myanmar. It also turned a blind eye recently when the regime used India’s airspace to attack the headquarters of the revolutionary Chin National Front near the Indian border, resulting in bombs landing on Indian soil.
Japan is cooperating with the regime via Nippon Foundation chairman Yohei Sasakwa and former Japanese MP Hideo Watanabe, who have influence in Japanese government circles.
The main intention of both Indian and Japan, however, is to offset China’s political and economic influence in Myanmar. But the two countries have neither a veto at the UN Security Council nor influence over ASEAN. And they have only relatively small investments in military-ruled Myanmar. So, the regime can’t expect much from the two.
On the diplomatic front, democratic forces are gaining the upper hand and the regime is struggling for a foothold on the world stage.....Military...This is the deciding factor for the future of Myanmar. The 2021 coup was followed by anti-coup protests that soon expanded to a nationwide armed struggle after the military’s bloody crackdown on peaceful rallies.
The fighting has been most intense in Kachin, Chin, Kayah (Karenni), Karen and Mon states as well as in Sagaing and Magwe regions. While the pre-coup armed struggle was limited to border zones of ethnic states and rural areas, Myanmar’s military is now facing attacks in urban areas including major cities like Yangon and Mandalay.
The scale of the ongoing armed revolution is unprecedented in Myanmar. Regime forces are overstretched and exhausted, fighting on multiple fronts across the country. The military is often unable to send reinforcements when a base comes under attack. Instead, it has increasingly relied on artillery and air attacks, part of a scorched-earth strategy against civilians to dent their faith in revolution.
Over the past two years, junta forces have torched more than 40,000 buildings across the country, or an average of 55 per day. The arson campaign against civilian communities has severely tarnished the already unenviable reputation of Myanmar’s military.
Over 8,000 clashes of various size have also been recorded since the coup. That’s an average of 11 clashes per day. Hardly a day goes by without the Myanmar military suffering casualties. Unsurprisingly, it is now struggling to recruit new soldiers.
Daily clashes, casualties and exhaustion have sapped morale within the military. On the other hand, morale is rising within resistance forces.
The armed struggle that started in 2021 differs from past crises, such as the 1948 turmoil that led to civil war. In the past, armed struggle has been launched by a particular party or organization after careful preparation.
In contrast, the uprising after the 2021 coup was a popular and spontaneous movement, unexpected and unplanned. People were pushed into the war after they, their relatives or their friends were met with military firepower during street protests.
It was only after people rose up against the regime that the parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG), and its People’s Defense Force (PDFs) armed wing emerged to unify the scattered resistance. The NUG is rallying revolutionary forces and also establishing alliances with EAOs.
The NUG has so far established about 300 battalions and has links with some 400 local PDFs. A PDF battalion has around 200 troops, meaning the NUG has mustered an army of around 60,000 resistance fighters, excluding local PDFs.
Though the NUG has yet to unify all resistance forces under a single command, it has made impressive progress developing a nationwide network of resistance forces over the past two years.
Many of those resistance fighters have undergone basic military training and have gained combat experience. But arming all of its battalions, not to mention local PDFs, remains a challenge for the NUG.
However, the mob that fought the Myanmar military with rudimentary hunting rifles and homemade weapons has evolved into a regimented armed force equipped with modern automatic rifles and drones.
Its fighting force is bolstered by battle-hardened troops of EAOs, including the Kachin Independence Army, Karen National Union, Chin National Front, Chinland Defense Force, Karenni National Progressive Party, Karenni Nationalities Defense Force, and the All Burma Students Democratic Front. Their combined forces of 45,000 troops are cooperating fully with the pro-democracy Spring Revolution to topple the regime.
Although the Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army have engaged in fewer clashes with junta troops, the three groups are understood to be supporting Spring Revolution forces with weapons or equipment. They also pose a serious threat to the regime as clashes between junta troops and the three EAOs, with a combined strength of some 45,000 troops, could erupt at any time.
Three other EAOs with a combined force of about 45,000 – the United Wa State Army, National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Shan State Progress Party – barely engage with the country’s resistance forces. But neither will they fight for the regime, preferring the role of self-interested onlookers.
Two other groups, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the New Mon State Party, with a combined force of around 10,000 troops, have adopted a neutral position in the fighting but are also making deals with the regime.
Signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, namely the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Council-Peace Council, Palaung National Liberation Organization, Arakan Liberation Party, and the Lahu Democratic Union, are under the control of the regime. But they are unlikely to join the regime-friendly Border Guard Force and militias in fighting alongside junta forces.
So, it is fair to say the majority of EAOs have sided with the anti-regime forces. Revolutionary forces still have certain weaknesses, though. They are not yet fully armed, they have few weapons to counter airstrikes, they lack artillery and they are not yet under a single chain of command needed to conduct synchronized attacks.
Despite this, Myanmar’s military is in no position to crush Spring Revolution forces and their EAO allies. On the other hand, it is unlikely that revolutionary forces can oust the regime this year. More certain, though, is that Spring Revolution forces have emerged as a formidable army over the past two years..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
Language:
more
Description:
"၃၁.၁.၂၀၂၃ရက်နေ့၊ ၁၀၀၀နာရီတွင် ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပဉ္စမ အကြိမ်အစည်းအဝေး၌ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်သို့ ဖတ်ကြားတင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စု လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်ချက်အစီရင်ခံစာအား မိဘပြည်သူများ ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ရန် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း လေးစားစွာ အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်အပ်သည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ
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ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပဥ္စမအကြိမ်အစည်းအဝေးသို့ တင်သွင်းသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်ချက်အစီရင်ခံစာ
ရက်စွဲ။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃၁ ရက်
နိဒါန်း
၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ(၁)ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တစ်စုက လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ တရားမဝင်ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ပြီးနောက် လွှတ်တော်ကြီးအား အင်အားအလုံး အရင်းဖြင့် ပိတ်ဆို့ထားခဲ့ပြီး မိမိတို့ ရွေးကောက်ခံလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များကိုလည်း ဥပဒေမဲ့ ဖမ်းဆီးရန်အပါအဝင် လွှတ်တော်၏လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များ မထမ်းဆောင်စေရန် နည်းလမ်းအမျိုးအမျိုးဖြင့် ခြိမ်းခြောက်တားဆီးနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ပါသည်။ သို့သော် မိမိတို့ ရွေးကောက်ခံလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် များဟာ ပြည်သူလူထုက ယုံကြည်အားကိုးစွာဖြင့် ဆန္ဒမဲပေး ရွေးချယ်ခံရသူများပီပီ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသားရပ်တည်၍ စစ်တပ်၏ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံနှင့်မညီသော အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို ကန့်ကွက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ ထို့ပြင် စစ်တပ်၏ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုအန္တရာယ်အမျိုးမျိုးကြားမှပင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပထမအကြိမ်အစည်းအဝေးအား အရေးပေါ်ခေါ်ယူကျင်းပ၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီအား လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ၈၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကျော်၏ ထောက်ခံချက်ဖြင့် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ၊ (၅)ရက်နေ့တွင် စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီအား ၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ပါတီစုံဒီမိုကရေစီ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှာ အနိုင်ရရှိခဲ့သော ပါတီ (၄) ရပ်မှ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားပြီး ချမှတ်ထားသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးရည်မှန်းချက်များနှင့် သက်ဝင်ပီပြင်သော လွှတ်တော်တစ်ရပ်၏လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို အောင်မြင်စွာ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး လွှတ်တော်ရေးရာ ကော်မတီ(၁၂) ခုကို ဖွဲ့စည်းထားရှိပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ရေးရာကော်မတီများ၏လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များ
၃။ ယခုအခါ ရေးရာကော်မတီများအနေဖြင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာကော်မတီအလိုက် လုပ်ငန်း လမ်းညွှန်များနှင့်အညီ ကော်မတီများ၏လုပ်ငန်းများကို ဟန်ချက်ညီညီ ဆောင်ရွက်နေလျက် ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ကော်မတီနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရတို့၏ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များကို လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်တော်ကြီးများနှင့် အများ ပြည်သူများသို့ အစီရင်ခံတင်ပြနိုင်ရန် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ဒုတိယအကြိမ်အစည်းအဝေးအားလည်းကောင်း၊ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၅ ရက်နေ့တွင် တတိယ အကြိမ် အစည်းအဝေးအားလည်းကောင်း၊ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၁၈ ရက်နေ့ စတုတ္ထအကြိမ် အစည်းအဝေး ကိုလည်းကောင်း ခေါ်ယူကျင်းပပေးခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်၏ လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို တာဝန်ခံဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် ဥပဒေပြုရေး၊ ကိုယ်စားပြုရေးနှင့် အစိုးရအား ထိန်းကျောင်းစောင့်ကြည့်ခြင်းတို့ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေသကဲ့သို့ လက်ရှိနိုင်ငံရေးပဋိပက္ခအား အမြန်ဆုံးဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်တွင်းတိုင်းရင်းသား မဟာမိတ်အင်အားစုများနှင့် ဆက်ဆံရေး တည်ဆောက်ခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းတို့ ခိုင်မာ အားကောင်းလာစေရန်လည်း ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ ထို့ပြင် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၌ အနာဂတ် နိုင်ငံရေးရည်မှန်းချက်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး ပါဝင်သော နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းကြောင်းကို ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ရှင်းလင်းသောမူဝါဒ၊ လုပ်ငန်းစဥ်များ ချမှတ်ပြင်ဆင်နိုင်ရေးကိုလည်း ကျွမ်းကျင်ပညာရှင်များနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲများ ပြုလုပ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၅။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ပေးအပ်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော် ၏ လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များအတိုင်း ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဥ်အရ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ အစိုးရအဖွဲ့ဝင်များ ခန့်အပ်တာဝန်ပေးခြင်းတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ စက်တင်ဘာလ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့မှာ ဒေါက်တာငိုင်းတမ်မောင်းအား လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားရေးနှင့် ဘေးအန္တရာယ် ဆိုင်ရာ စီမံခန့်ခွဲရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး အဖြစ်လည်းကောင်း၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၆ ရက်နေ့မှာ ဒေးဗစ်ဂွမ်အောင်အား အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး အဖြစ်လည်းကောင်း ခန့်အပ်တာဝန် ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့နှင့် လုပ်ငန်းများအပေါ် ထိန်းကြောင်းခြင်းနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုတို့ တိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် တစ်လလျှင် နှစ်ကြိမ် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအား ဖိတ်ခေါ်၍ ကြားနာဆွေးနွေးမှုများကို ပြုလုပ်နေသကဲ့သို့ မေးမြန်းလိုသည်များ ရှိပါကလည်း သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများနှင့် အလျဥ်းသင့်သလို ခေါ်ယူဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၆။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် လက်ရှိအချိန်ထိ ဥပဒေ (၈) ခု ကို ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခဲ့ပြီး ဒီမိုကရေစီနှုန်းများနှင့်မညီညွတ်သည့် ၂၀၀၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေကို တရားဝင် အပြီးတိုင်ဖျက်သိမ်းခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လက်ရှိကာလတွင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစံနှုန်းများနှင့် ကိုက်ညီမှုမရှိသည့် ဥပဒေများ ဖျက်သိမ်းရေး၊ ခိုင်မာအားကောင်းသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်နှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီ စနစ်အား မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံတွင် တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေးလိုအပ်လာမည့် ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံ ဥပဒေ၊ အခြားဥပဒေနှင့်မူဝါဒများကို ဥပဒေရေးရာကော်မတီ၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ရေးရာကော်မတီနှင့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီရေးရာ ကော်မတီတို့က ဦးဆောင်လျက် လေ့လာသုံးသပ် ဆွေးနွေး ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၇။ ပြည်သူလူထုက ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် မိမိတို့ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် များအနေဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းယူမှုအပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်ခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံ တစ်ဝှမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကြောင့် အခက်အခဲကြုံတွေ့နေရသည့် အကြမ်းမဖက် အာဏာ ဖီဆန်မှုတွင် အတူတကွ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM သူရဲကောင်းများ၊ စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးနှင့်ကလေးသူငယ်များ၊ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးမှု များကြောင့် ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများဆုံးရှုံးသွားရသူများ၊ ပဋိပက္ခကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိသူများနှင့် အကျဥ်းကျခံနေရသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးသမားများ၏မိသားစုဝင်များအား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်သူ့ ရေးရာကော်မတီ၊ အမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်နှင့်ကလေးသူငယ်ရေးရာကော်မတီ၊ ပညာရေးကော်မတီ တို့က တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ကော်မတီများအနေဖြင့် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများကို ကျယ်ကျယ် ပြန့်ပြန့် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စု၊ ပြည်နယ်နှင့် တိုင်းဒေသကြီး ရွေးကောက်ခံလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ ပြင်ပ အဖွဲ့အစည်းအများ၊ အလှူရှင်များနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်၍ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၈။ ထို့ပြင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် မိမိတို့နိုင်င်ငံ၌ ဖြစ်ပေါ် နေသည့် လက်ရှိပဋိပက္ခအား အဆုံးသတ်ရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်း၏ လက်တွေ့ကျသော ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများရရှိနိုင်ရန် နိုင်ငံတကာလွှတ်တော်အသိုက်အဝန်းနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ပူးပေါင်းမှု အားကောင်း စေရေးကိုလည်း မဟာဗျူဟာချမှတ်၍ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့သို့ ဆောင်ရွက် ရာတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီတို့နှင့်လည်း လက်တွဲကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၉။ သက်ဆိုင်ရာကဏ္ဍအလိုက် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားရှိသည့် ရေးရာကော်မတီများအနေဖြင့် ရွေးကောက်ခံလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၏ ရပိုင်ခွင့်နှင့်အခွင့်အရေးများအတွက် ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ ၎င်းတို့၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုများ၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံရခြင်းများ၊ နေအိမ် အဆောက်အဦများအား မတရားဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ သိမ်းယူခြင်း၊ လေလံတင် ရောင်းချခံရခြင်းတို့နှင့် စပ်လျဥ်း၍ အချက်အလက်များပြုစုသိမ်းဆည်းထားရှိကာ နောင်တချိန်တွင် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ တရား ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ခုခံကာကွယ်ပေးသွားနိုင် ရေးတို့ကိုလည်း ကြိုးစားပြင်ဆင်ထားရှိပါသည်။
၁၀။ ယခုကဲ့သို့အချက်အလက်များ ပြုစုထားရှိမှုတွင် ရွေးကောက်ခံပြည်ထောင်စု လွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ် (၄၇၆) ဦးရှိရာ အဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူ (၄၀) ဦး၊ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၉) ဦး၊ လက်ရှိအချိန်ထိ ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသော လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် (၃၁) ဦး၊ ကွယ်လွန်သူ (၅) ဦးနှင့် ဆက်သွယ်၍ မရသူ (၉၀) ဦး ရှိပါသည်။ တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ ပြည်နယ်လွှတ်တော် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် (၆၁၃) ဦးတွင် အဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူ (၈၅) ဦး၊ ဖမ်းဆီးခံရနေရစဥ်အတွင်း ဆေးကုသခွင့်မရသဖြင့် ကွယ်လွန်သူ (၂) ဦးနှင့် ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၂၆) ဦးရှိပြီး လက်ရှိ အချိန်ထိ ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသော လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် (၅၇) ဦး၊ ဖမ်းဆီးခံရပြီး ဆေးကုသခွင့်မရသဖြင့် ကွယ်လွန်သူ (၂) ဦး၊ ရှောင်တိမ်းရင်း ကွယ်လွန်သူ (၈) ဦး၊ စုစုပေါင်း ကွယ်လွန်သူ (၁၀) ဦးရှိကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။
၁၁။ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေကြေးဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စရပ်များနှင့်စပ်လျဥ်း၍ လက်ရှိတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ပြည်သူလူထုက ထည့်ဝင်လှူဒါန်းထားသည့် ရန်ပုံငွေများကို အလေအလွင့်အနည်းဆုံးနှင့် စနစ်ကျသောဘဏ္ဍာရေးစည်းမျဥ်းများနှင့်အညီ ခွဲဝေသုံးစွဲရေးနှင့် ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာပြီး တာဝန်ခံမှု ပြည့်ဝသည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေသုံးစွဲနိုင်ရေးအတွက် စာရင်းများ စစ်ဆေးဆောင်ရွက်သွားနိုင်စေရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုစာရင်းစစ်ချုပ်ရုံးနှင့် ဆက်သွယ်ချိတ်ဆက်လျက် စာရင်းဇယားများ ပြုစုပေးပို့၍ စနစ်တကျ စီမံခန့်ခွဲ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၁၂။ လုံခြုံရေးနှင့်ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေများနှင့် စံနှုန်းများကို လေးစားလိုက်နာသော ခေတ်မီပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်တစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ပေါက်စေရန် လိုအပ်မည့် ဥပဒေ၊ မူဝါဒ အကြံပြုချက်များနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန်၊ ဒေသခံပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များအကြား ကြားခံဆက်သွယ်နိုင်ရန်သာမက ဘတ်ဂျက်ခွဲဝေသုံးစွဲမှုဆိုင်ရာ ကိစ္စရပ် များအပေါ် စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာနိုင်ရန် သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့နှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၁၃။ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာမှ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များအား အချိန်နှင့်တပြေးညီ ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် သိရှိနိုင်စေရန် CRPH ၏ ကြေညာ ချက်များ၊ သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ချက်များ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကိစ္စများ၊ CRPH ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ၏ နိုင်ငံခြားခရီးစဥ်များနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာမှကျင်းပသည့်ပွဲများသို့ တက်ရောက်ဆွေးနွေးသည့် မြန်မာ့ အရေး ဆွေးနွေးချက်များ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသား၊ လူမျိုးအသီးသီး၏ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်များနှင့် နှစ်ပတ်လည် အထိမ်းအမှတ်ပွဲများသို့ ပေးပို့သည့်သဝဏ်လွှာများနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးသည့် သတင်းများကို သတင်းမီဒီယာ Platforms တို့တွင် အချိန်နှင့်တစ်ပြေးညီ အစီရင်ခံ တင်ပြလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ဒီပဲယင်းမြို့နယ်၊ လက်ယက်ကုန်းကျေးရွာရှိ စာသင်ကျောင်း၊ ကချင်ပြည်နယ်၊ အနန့်ပါစခန်းတို့အား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက လေကြောင်းသုံး တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ အပါအဝင် အခြားသော လူမဆန်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များအပေါ် အချိန်နှင့်တစ်ပြေးညီ ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်များ ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာက သိရှိ၍ တုံ့ပြန်ပေးရေးတို့အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာလွှတ်တော် အသိုက်အဝန်း အပါအဝင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၊ အာဆီယံတို့ထံ တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးပို့ခြင်းများကိုလည်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၁၄။ ပညာရေးကဏ္ဍတွင် မြေပြင်မှတင်ပြလာသည့် လိုအပ်ချက်များနှင့် တောင်းဆိုချက်များ အား ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်၍ ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးလျက်ရှိပြီး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များ ပိုမိုအားကောင်းလျင်မြန်စေရန် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၏ ဆွေးနွေးအကြံပြုချက်များနှင့်အတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၁၅။ ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပအလုပ်သမားရေးရာကဏ္ဍတွင် ပြည်တွင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ အခွင့် အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရခြင်းကိစ္စရပ်များ၊ ရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ အခက်အခဲများကို စုံစမ်း မေးမြန်း၍ လိုအပ်သည့် ဥပဒေရေးရာအကူအညီများ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီနိုင်ရေးနှင့် အလုပ်သမား အေဂျင်စီ များ၏ ဥပဒေချိုးဖောက်မှုကိစ္စရပ်များနှင့်စပ်လျဥ်း၍ အရေးယူနိုင်ရန် သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပြီး ပြည်တွင်းအလုပ်သမား ဥပဒေများအား လေ့လာသုံးသပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့နှင့် ပြည်ပအလုပ်သမားဥပဒေများအား လေ့လာသုံးသပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့ ဟူ၍ အဖွဲ့ (၂) ခုခွဲကာ အလုပ်သမား ဥပဒေများအား လေ့လာသုံးသပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
နိဂုံး
၁၆။ နိဂုံးချုပ်အနေဖြင့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် ရှင်သန်လှုပ်ရှား နေသော လွှတ်တော်တစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် ပြည်သူများက အပ်နှင်းလိုက်သော ပြည်သူ့အာဏာအား အကျိုးရှိရှိအသုံးပြု၍ နိုင်ငံတော်၏အာဏာအား ပြည်သူ့ထံ ပြန်လည်အပ်နှင်းပြီး အနာဂတ် နိုင်ငံရေး ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများနှင့် တည်ဆောက်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ပြည်သူလူထုက ကိုယ်တိုင် ပါဝင် ဆုံးဖြတ်ပေးနိုင်ရန် အခွင့်အရေးများ ရရှိခံစားနိုင်ရေးကို ဦးထိပ်ပန်ဆင်လျက် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး စွမ်းစွမ်းတမံ ကြိုးစားထမ်းဆောင်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြုလျက် ဤအစီရင်ခံစာအား ဖတ်ကြား တင်သွင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"To mark two years since the February 1, 2021 coup by the military junta in Myanmar, Refugees International Director for Africa, Asia, and the Middle East Daniel P. Sullivan released the following statement:
“The two years of upheaval following the attempted takeover of the country by Myanmar’s military junta has left a path of devastation across the country. Myanmar’s unprecedented displacement and humanitarian need stemming from the coup is yet to plateau. Rather, as the UN predicts, fully one-third of the population is set to be in need of humanitarian assistance, and the numbers of people forced to flee their homes is set to rise precipitously from the current 1.5 million people displaced to more than 2.4 million in the year ahead. This does not count the million Rohingya refugees who were forced to flee the genocide that preceded the coup at the hands of the very same military leaders.
Two years into this nightmare, the United States and likeminded countries must step up pressure on the military junta, including through coordinated targeted sanctions on the junta and those supporting it, whether in the form of weapons, aviation fuel, or proceeds from the oil and gas sectors.
More immediately, to stem the tide of suffering unleashed by Myanmar’s military junta, it is essential that the United States and other donor countries press the junta for unfettered humanitarian access and support the local groups best placed to deliver aid throughout the country, including, vitally, across borders.
Without these measures, the people of Myanmar will be condemned to even more suffering at the hands of this regime.”..."
Source/publisher:
Refugees International
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"1 February marks second anniversary of Myanmar’s brutal military regime
Nearly 3,000 people killed, 1.5 million internally displaced, more than 13,000 detained in inhumane conditions, and at least 100 sentenced to death
‘Solidarity has never been more important….The international community cannot let another day pass before taking additional effective steps to stop the military’s atrocities ’ – Ming Yu Hah
The Myanmar military continues to arbitrarily arrest, torture and murder people with impunity two years after it seized power, Amnesty International said today, as it called for increased global action and solidarity ahead of the anniversary on 1 February.
Since the 2021 coup, nearly 3,000 people have been killed, 1.5 million have been internally displaced, more than 13,000 are still detained in inhumane conditions, and four people are known to have been executed, while at least 100 have been sentenced to death. In addition to this, 7.8 million children are not in school.
The military’s onslaught against anyone who is suspected to oppose its rule has caused widespread fear and led to grave human rights violations - including the use of air and ground attacks against civilians.
Ming Yu Hah, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Campaigns, said:
“There is no denying that the military is able to carry out its nationwide assault on human rights because of the shockingly inadequate global response to this crisis, which risks being forgotten - we can’t let that happen.
“This anniversary should highlight the need for urgent global action from countries around the world, and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations needs to protect the people of Myanmar who remain under daily siege from the military.
“Speaking up for those in Myanmar who risk lengthy jail sentences, torture and death in custody for expressing peaceful defiance is not a trivial gesture. Solidarity has never been more important, as it can raise people’s spirits and show them they are not alone in their darkest hour.
“While many governments have heeded calls to action, it is not yet enough to stop the military’s grave violations. The international community cannot let another day pass, let alone another two years, before taking additional effective steps to stop the military’s atrocities.”
Resistance continues
Despite grave danger and persecution, brave individuals within Myanmar have continued to pursue peaceful protests. In the lead up to and on the day of the anniversary, Amnesty is participating in solidarity protests, vigils and events in cities around the world, including in Bangkok and Seoul.
But the United Nations as well as governments around the world must do more than send messages of support. The recent historic UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar was welcome progress, but much more is needed from those in power, who must urgently apply pressure on the military to release all those arbitrarily detained for peacefully exercising their human rights.
The UN Security Council must also refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court and impose a comprehensive global arms embargo that covers all weapons, munitions, dual-use technology, as well as other military and security equipment, training and any additional forms of assistance.
Stop aviation fuel supply
Countries and companies need to suspend the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer - including transit, trans-shipment and brokering - of aviation fuel to Myanmar until effective mechanisms are in place to ensure it will not be used to carry out devastating air strikes and commit serious violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law.
Last November, Amnesty launched a campaign calling for a suspension of the supply of aviation fuel to prevent the Myanmar military from carrying out unlawful air strikes. The investigation also identified companies involved across the supply chain.
Since the coup on 1 February 2021, Amnesty has documented widespread human rights violations, including war crimes and possible crimes against humanity as part of the military’s crackdown on the opposition across the country. See Amnesty’s Myanmar page for more information..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
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Description:
"Ever since the military first seized power in a coup in March 1962, Myanmar has been plagued by a vicious cycle of popular protests and violent repression—and, every time the people have risen up against the dictatorship, the men in green have managed to cling on to power. The question in 2023 is whether the ruling generals will succeed this time as well. What speaks for it is the remarkable unity that the military has always managed to maintain. There have been purges among the leaders of the armed forces and signs of dissent within the ranks, but, in the end, everyone in the military down to the private soldier has carried out the orders they have been given, no matter how brutal and inhumane.
The argument that it might be different this time is based on the sheer incompetence of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and those around him. Two years after they sent their tanks and troops into Yangon, Naypyitaw, Mandalay and other major cities and towns, they have yet to establish a functioning administration to replace the one they ousted. Ambushes of army convoys, bombings of public buildings, and assassinations of suspected military informants have become daily occurrences not only in the traditonally strife-torn frontier areas, but also, for the first time since the 1970s, even in the Myanmar heartland involving the majority Burmese population.
The situation has been exacerbated by a collapsing economy marked by a deteriorating exchange rate for the kyat, shortages of goods, rising prices of daily commodities—and the flight of capital to other countries. Owners of small and medium-sized businesses are transferring their assets to Thailand while the country’s immensely wealthy cronies are placing their money in financial institutions in Singapore and Dubai. No one wants to take the risk of having to depend on the erratic economic policies of an inept military regime, and whatever new, poorly thought out rules the generals may force upon the country’s own banks, which are untrustworthy even at the best of times. Compared to previous crises, it is clearly different this time. The situation has never been as bad as now, and, therefore, the final outcome of the power games that are being played out inside Myanmar is far more difficult to predict.
In March 1962, a 17-member junta called the Revolutionary Council (RC) led by General Ne Win seized power, but it was not until July that massive protests against the coup took place. At first, many people believed that it would be no different from 1958, when the military intervened and formed a caretaker government pending new elections. But as it became evident that this time the military was there to stay, thousands of Rangoon University students demonstrated—and were shot at by the military. Officially, 15 students were killed while eyewitnesses and independent observers put the total number of deaths at several hundred. And, in the early hours of July 8, Rangoon residents were awakened by an explosion that reverberated through the city. The military had dynamited the historic Students’ Union building, where the nationalists had gathered during the anti-colonial struggle in the 1930s, reducing it to rubble.
Disagreements over Ne Win’s new, disastrous socialist policies, which had turned the country into an economic wreck, and the role the military should play in politics, led a year after the coup to the resignation from the junta of Brigadier General Aung Gyi and the dismissal of Colonel Kyi Maung, who both became prominent actors in the 1988 pro-democracy movement. Two other junta members, Colonel Chit Myaing and Colonel Khin Nyo, were dismissed in 1964 and 1965. Many student activists took to the jungles and the mountains to join the insurgent Communist Party of Burma or, if they came from the country’s many non-Burmese nationalities, their respective ethnic rebel army. But Ne Win managed to consolidate his grip on power, and in 1974 an ostensibly civilian government led by the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) and dominated by former military officers was formed after holding a fraudulent referendum on a new constitution.
Not even renewed student protests followed by labor strikes in the mid-1970s—and more massacres of civilians—had any impact on how Myanmar was being run: it remained a dictatorship with Ne Win at the helm. The regime’s brutality, however, led to an abortive coup attempt initiated by Ohn Kyaw Myint, a young captain who had managed to gather some dissenting officers around him. But plans of the plot were leaked to the military authorities, and Ohn Kyaw Myint was arrested and executed in July 1977. What became known as “the Ohn Kyaw Myint affair” led to a massive purge within the military. Real and imagined accomplices were arrested, and among those sentenced to prison was General Tin Oo, a popular former army chief and defense minister. He got seven years of hard labor, accused of having had prior knowledge of the coup attempt. That was never proven, and the charge was no doubt politically motivated; protesters had shouted “Long live General Tin Oo!” when they demonstrated against Ne Win’s iron-fisted rule. Hundreds of mostly young people were killed when the soldiers opened fire on them, and, apart from Tin Oo, several other high-ranking officers were arrested and imprisoned. Tin Oo was released during a 1980 general amnesty and became a leader of the 1988 uprising and later chairperson of the National League for Democracy (NLD).
A far-reaching purge also occurred in 1983 when another officer, also called Tin Oo but no relation to the former army chief, was arrested. This Tin Oo, who had been trained by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the US-held island of Saipan in the Pacific Ocean, began his career as a powerful military intelligence chief and was once considered Ne Win’s heir apparent. Several other former intelligence officers, among them Colonel Bo Ni, who had been trained on Saipan as the same time as Tin Oo, were also purged. Ne Win is said to have believed that “MI Tin Oo”, as he was called, and his henchmen were building up a state within a state, and as such could pose a threat to the supreme leadership. MI Tin Oo was transferred from Insein Jail to Ye Kyi Aing top-security prison during the 1988 uprising. After it had been quelled, he was moved back to Insein and released in October 1989.
No uprising has been as widespread as the one in August-September 1988, and it was also put down with unprecedented brutality. Thousands—not hundreds as some academics and historians claim—were gunned down when the military sprayed automatic rifle fire into crowds of demonstrators. On Sept. 18, the BSPP government was replaced with a new junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but the military didn’t actually stage a coup to seize power, which it already had. It felt it had to intervene forcefully to shore up a bankrupt regime overwhelmed by popular protest. Thousands of pro-democracy activists fled to the borders with Thailand, China and India, where an armed resistance was organized. Exiled politicians, including some who had won seats in a May 1990 general election but were never allowed to assume office as the outcome of that election was ignored, formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). But an effective armed uprising never really materialized and the NCGUB was never recognized by any foreign power.
In 1997, the SLORC assumed the more palatable name of State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)—and, despite all the challenges it faced, the military remained remarkably united and continued to rule the country with impunity. The military’s staying power depended to a large extent on the activities of its secret police, by this time called the Directorate of the Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), which had spies and informants all over the country. Anyone suspected of having contacts with the opposition was likely to be arrested and tortured while in custody. The DDSI also kept a watchful eye on military officers who could be suspected of not toeing the military’s political line, and on the many Myanmar exiles who were living in Thailand, Europe, North America and Australia. The head of the DDSI from 1983 to 2004, General Khin Nyunt, became known for his willingness to use extreme brutality when dealing with political prisoners, and his close DDSI associate, Air Force Colonel Thein Swe, was appointed defense attaché at the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok. While there, he sent thugs to beat up exiled pro-democracy activists and, it is alleged, also ordered murders of persons deemed to be “enemies of the state”.
But, like MI Tin Oo and his men before him, Khin Nyunt and the coterie around him also became too powerful for their own good. In August 2003 he was appointed prime minister in the SPDC-led government and began to amass wealth, while also trying to raise his regional profile by becoming more of a public figure. In October 2004, he was “permitted to retire on health grounds”, the usual euphemism in the special lingo of the Myanmar military for being sacked. He was placed under house arrest and his right-hand man Thein Swe was sent to jail along with scores of former and serving DDSI officers. They were eventually released after his successor as Secretary-1 of the SPDC and later junta prime minister General Thein Sein became president in 2011. The DDSI was subsequently disbanded and replaced by the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs, commonly referred to by its Burmese acronym sa ya pha, an entity more directly under the control of the military’s supreme command.
Meanwhile, the first SLORC chairman, General Saw Maung, had resigned in April 1992 and been replaced by General Than Shwe. But that purge was not really political in nature. Saw Maung had become increasingly erratic, some would argue he had gone insane. His public speeches were incoherent and rambling, covering subjects such as dying tomorrow and sightings of Jesus in Tibet. He had also been seen at a military golf course in Yangon screaming “I am King Kyansittha!” in a reference to one of the rulers of the ancient Bagan empire whose name means “the remaining soldier” or “the one who was left behind.” Saw Maung died in oblivion and obscurity in July 1997.
Having got rid of Saw Maung and Khin Nyunt, Than Shwe was far more successful in building up a new military leadership. The old dictator, Ne Win, had died in 2002, mourned by no one, not even the military officers whose godfather he once was. Seeking to avoid the fate of his predecessors Ne Win and Saw Maung, Than Shwe decided to appoint not one, but three successors: his prime minister, Thein Sein, would become president after a sham election that was planned for November 2010, and another general, Shwe Mann, would head the military’s own political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which was formed 12 years after the 1988 uprising and the subsequent collapse of the BSPP. A weak and less-than-competent general, Min Aung Hlaing, was designated to take over as head of the military. But the plan failed when Shwe Mann went his own way and began to reach out to the NLD and its de facto leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He was removed as head of the USDP in August 2015 and, in April 2016, was sacked from the party along with 17 senior party members. Thein Sein, for his part, after becoming president in 2011 took a number of initiatives that led to a more open society, but he never became as popular as the military top brass had expected. He and the USDP lost the 2015 and 2020 elections to the NLD in landslides that the military failed to predict. In 2016, a new government took over most duties—except the crucial ministries of Defense, Home Affairs and Border Affairs, which remained in the sole hands of the military. And so did the military itself, an autonomous entity beyond any kind of parliamentary control or even oversight.
The NLD’s second successive election victory in November 2020 led to the February 2021 coup and, once again, the military misjudged the situation. A new, politically active and aware civil society had emerged during the 2011-2021 period of relative openness. People had also had enough of direct or indirect military rule, which had been the case from the 1962 coup to the 2015 election, and hence the NLD’s massive electoral victories. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had refrained from challenging the military’s political and economic power during her first term from 2016 to 2021, but the NLD’s overwhelming election win in November 2020 gave her a strong mandate to push for real democratic change. That could, in turn, have led to the generals’ risking retribution for the many crimes they committed during their decades in power. All army officers know where the skeletons of past atrocities are buried, both in the frontier areas and also in the urban centers, home to an emerging and growing middle class. Min Aung Hlaing is widely loathed across the population for his ruthless post-coup clampdown and killings, and he and his ilk know all too well that they either maintain power at any price or land in prison—or worse. As the saying goes, if they don’t hang together they fear they will hang separately. It is a combination of those fears and deeply entrenched economic interests that hold the military so tightly together and not, as some Western analysts have suggested, some underlying sense of patriotism or because officers have been hardened through battles in the field. And that also explains why, so far, no cracks have emerged within the military despite the violent, irrational and seemingly self-defeating orders being handed down by officers and carried out by seemingly unswervingly obedient foot soldiers.
At the same time, despite the similarities, what we are seeing today is not a repeat of 1962, 1976 or 1988. The military is suffering extraordinary losses on the battlefield, and soldiers are being killed not by some ethnic rebels but by their own Burmese countrymen. Their own relatives may also be part of the resistance, or have taken part in the Civil Disobedience Movement immediately after the coup. Will they remain forever loyal? And for how much longer will the cronies, on whose support the military depends, be willing to prop up a regime that is ruining their businesses? The exact amount of money leaving the country is not known, but is believed to be massive, and that kind of capital flight is not what the business community wants. Before the coup, Myanmar’s economic potential was substantial and there were hopes of serious economic development. Foreign companies were investing in Myanmar; now many of them are gone and there are no new investors. Min Aung Hlaing and his family may be doing just fine and even be willing to associate themselves with criminals in order to preserve their lavish lifestyles. It is now widely known that they have ties to Tun Min Latt, a drug trafficker who was arrested in Thailand in September last year. On the other hand, there are many others, even within the officer corps, who are not benefiting from the post-coup order and may, in exchange for promises of amnesty, be willing to assume the roles of Ohn Kyaw Myint and his comrades. But such a development also depends on the policies and actions of the anti-junta resistance, which is unlikely to become strong enough to defeat the military on the battlefield. Without a credible amnesty policy, few if any officers would be willing to turn against Min Aung Hlaing and his cohorts. The alternative, sadly, is that Myanmar will descend further into an economic, social and political abyss from which there is no way out..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Sub-title:
Rebels say drones are effective, safe, accurate and require little manpower to operate.
Description:
"Two years into Myanmar’s civil conflict, civilian drones refitted to drop explosives on junta troops are helping turn the tide against the country’s better-equipped military, rebel groups say.
Drones were once used exclusively by the army to detect and crack down on pro-democracy protests on the streets of Myanmar’s largest city of Yangon in the days after the Feb. 1, 2021, takeover.
When the anti-junta People’s Defense Force first formed in the months following the coup, its members were forced to fight Southeast Asia’s second-largest army using only slingshots and the same crude flintlock “Tumee” rifles their forefathers used to fight British colonizers in the 1880s.
The rebel groups started using homemade landmines to target their enemy’s convoys, and about a year ago added drones to their arsenal. They have proved effective, safe, accurate and require little manpower to operate during clashes, the fighters say.
“To tell you the truth, drone strikes could end up being a decisive tool in some areas,” said a member of the Wings of the Irrawaddy, the PDF’s drone unit. “In 2023, the junta troops will be hurt [by this weapon] even more. Junta soldiers are extremely scared of our drone attacks. When they see drones coming their way, they run for cover.”
Statements recently issued by three drone units operating against the military said they had carried out a total of 642 drone attacks in Sagaing and Magway regions and in Kayin and Kayah states last year.....Difficult to defend...Thein Tun Oo, executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, which is made up of former military officers, acknowledged the threat PDF drones pose and said the military is deploying technologies to defend against the attacks.
“We can limit the number of drones entering our areas and shoot some down as well ... [using] drone guns and [frequency] jammers,” he said.
“Some of our weapons can shoot them down from a distance of 700-1,000 meters (2,300-3,300 feet),” he said. “There are many ways to defend against them.”
But Zay Thu Aung, a former Air Force captain in the military who defected to the armed resistance, told RFA that while the junta can purchase equipment to defend against drone attacks, it requires a high learning curve and is difficult to deploy effectively.
“The junta has unlimited financial resources and since some developed countries are supporting them with technology, they can buy drone protection systems,” he said.
“But its ground troops are not educated enough to operate such high-tech equipment and it’s too hard to deploy these to all the frontline battlefields throughout the country.”
The drone fleets have allowed the PDF to achieve a degree of air superiority, even without the helicopters and fighter jets available to the military, he added.....Drawbacks...Despite the success the rebel drone units had enjoyed against the military, there are still drawbacks to the equipment they have available, said the Wings of the Irrawaddy fighter.
It requires a significant number of parts to upgrade a commercial drone used to record video into an attack drone and the cost of producing one is still higher than that of one automatic rifle, he said. Other PDF members acknowledged to RFA in September that drones are also susceptible to being shot out of the sky.
PDF drone units are also limited in their operations by daylight, the Wings of the Irrawaddy fighter said, adding that the units plan to equip their aircraft with night vision cameras in 2023.
Kyaw Zaw, the spokesperson for the office of shadow National Unity Government President Duwa Lashi La, told RFA that it plans to add additional funding in 2023 for drone units through a program initiated through its ministry of defense named Project Skywalk.A Jan. 4 report released by the Falcon Wings – a PDF drone unit which operates from within territory controlled by the anti-junta ethnic Karen National Union in Kayin state – claimed that it had carried out 437 attacks in 2022, killing about 200 military soldiers.
On Jan. 9, a Falcon Wings PDF drone unit in Kayah’s Loikaw township reported that it carried out 125 drone attacks in 2022, although it did not provide numbers of military casualties.
The Wings of the Irrawaddy group claims to have carried out about 80 drone attacks last year, killing about 80-100 junta troops.
RFA was unable to independently verify the casualty numbers claimed by the drone units.
“With the resources that we have, we are working to make more high-tech drones,” he said.
“We have not yet been able to supply the full range of drones and weapons [for drones]. But you will see that we will be able to destroy the junta’s tanks as we can supply a certain number of weapons.”
A Jan. 4 report released by the Falcon Wings – a PDF drone unit which operates from within territory controlled by the anti-junta ethnic Karen National Union in Kayin state – claimed that it had carried out 437 attacks in 2022, killing about 200 military soldiers.
On Jan. 9, a Falcon Wings PDF drone unit in Kayah’s Loikaw township reported that it carried out 125 drone attacks in 2022, although it did not provide numbers of military casualties.
The Wings of the Irrawaddy group claims to have carried out about 80 drone attacks last year, killing about 80-100 junta troops.
RFA was unable to independently verify the casualty numbers claimed by the drone units.
A PDF official in Kayin state said that not only are drones effective in attacking the military, they can be relied upon as air support for paramilitaries on the ground.
“Drones have served as air support for our ground troops and are a huge threat to our enemy as well,” said the official, adding that they allow the PDF to “completely dominate the air of the enemy camp.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-01-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Sub-title:
‘Amay Kyi,’ as her activist son’s friends called her, was a mother to many caught up in the deadly cycle of violence set in motion by Myanmar’s military
Description:
"Early one morning in October of last year, Kyi Kyi Myint, 55, found herself packed in among several other women at Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison. With a bag slung over her shoulder, she was waiting to drop off some food for her son, 37-year-old activist Lin Htet Naing, including a special treat of noodles in coconut milk.
It was far from the first time she had made such a delivery. Although it had been only four months since her son’s arrest, this was just his latest stint behind bars. The first was a decade and a half ago, when he was sentenced to three years in prison for his role in the 2007 Saffron Revolution. Then came two six-month sentences, both for opposing a new education law, in 2015 and 2020—with the latter ending just days before the military seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021.
So Kyi Kyi Myint was no stranger to Myanmar’s penal system. But as the mother of a prominent activist—better known to his comrades as James—she took it all in stride and did what she could to make the ordeal more bearable for her son.
This prison visit was to be her last, however. At around 9:30am on October 19, a series of blasts triggered an even deadlier barrage of bullets, killing eight people, including the woman known to her son’s activist friends as “Amay Kyi,” or Mother Kyi.
It is unclear whether Kyi Kyi Myint was killed by one of the two parcel bombs that went off inside the prison’s delivery reception area that morning, or by gunshots fired by panicked guards. What is known, however, is that an anti-junta guerrilla group calling itself the Special Task Agency of Burma claimed responsibility for the incident, which other regime opponents were quick to denounce. Some even expressed doubts about the professed identity of the group.
The perpetrators claimed that they were targeting prison officials; instead, they killed guards and civilian visitors. Even in a country exposed to nearly two years of endless bloodshed, many were shocked by the sheer senselessness of the attack.....
A maternal presence...
For James, the loss of his loving mother under these horrific circumstances was nothing less than devastating. After he learned that she was among the dead, he immediately sought permission to attend her funeral.
“The prison authorities denied his request because they said they couldn’t provide security for him,” said Min Thway Thit, a fellow activist and one of James’ closest friends.
In fact, no one from the family was able to pay their final respects to Kyi Kyi Myint. Her husband had died in 2015, and her younger son had fled the country in the wake of the coup. And soon after James was arrested, his wife Phyoe Phyoe Aung, who is also a well-known activist, left Yangon for a liberated area under the control of an ethnic armed group.
It was a sad end, then, for a woman who had always been there for her son and others dedicated to the cause of ending military oppression in Myanmar.
“She always followed her son no matter how far away they sent him,” recalled Phyoe Phyoe Aung, who added that her mother-in-law was not particularly political, but had great faith in James’ determination to do what was right for the country.
Although it was never easy for Kyi Kyi Myint to see her son become a prisoner for his convictions, his latest incarceration was the hardest for her, according to Phyoe Phyoe Aung.
“His last arrest left her heartbroken, because she heard from the activist community about how he was treated while he was being interrogated and after he was imprisoned,” she said.
For years, members of this community had found a rare refuge in the small restaurant that Kyi Kyi Myint opened in 2006 to help support her family. It was where many went for snacks, and for the comfort of her maternal presence.
“We always took pickled bean sprouts from Amay Kyi’s shop to eat at home,” said Min Thway Thit, recalling how the shop had become a popular meeting place for politically active young people.
In the end, however, it became yet another casualty of the coup, closing soon after a power grab that has thrown the entire country into a crisis that continues to spin out of control.....The taste of love...James lost his father when he was in prison in 2015, and was separated from his wife when she was pregnant with their second child in 2020. Both times, Kyi Kyi Myint attended not only to her son’s needs, but also to those of his closest loved ones. But none who knew her ever heard her complain about the burden of having to care for others.
When James was arrested again last year after being charged with incitement for speaking out against the coup, his two-year-old son was with him. The terrified toddler was also taken into custody by the soldiers who came for his father. It took Kyi Kyi Myint two days of pleading with the authorities to win her grandson’s release. It was a relief, and a small victory, to have him back in her arms, but she still grieved for her own adult son, whose life seemed more at risk now than ever before.
Others also worried about Kyi Kyi Myint’s safety. James’s friends urged her to leave Yangon for the border, where many others had gone to escape a regime that was becoming increasingly indiscriminate in its targeting of civilians.
“At first, she said she would consider it, but in the end she decided to stay. She said she wanted to be there for her son,” said Min Thway Thit.
“The incident at the prison happened a week after she made that decision,” he added.
It was love, and not the revolution, that kept Kyi Kyi Myint in Yangon. But ultimately, it was the misguided actions of a group that took her away from those who loved her.
The bitter irony of this fact will stay with James for the rest of his life. But while he will never again taste his mother’s cooking, he will always have the memory of her noodles in coconut milk to remind him of her belief in him, and in his generation’s struggle to finally free his country from military tyranny..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2023-01-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA —
As Indonesia assumes the rotating chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for 2023, pressure is mounting on Jakarta to formalize an appropriate response to member Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – which seized power from an elected government two years ago.
Analysts said the descent into civil war had effectively annulled a much-touted ASEAN peace plan, known as the five-point consensus, but added that it had paved the way for Indonesian President Joko Widido to take a new, much stronger line against Tatmadaw chief General Min Aung Hlaing.
Ross Milosevic, director of Phnom Penh-based Risk Analysis & Resources International, said Myanmar had sorely tested the remaining nine ASEAN countries and the group’s response, led by two of the association’s smaller members – Brunei and Cambodia – since the Feb. 1, 2021, coup, had fallen short of expectations.
“ASEAN has always had that noninterference landscape in their policy, but facts are facts, and this plan has been a disaster. I don’t think ASEAN has handled the situation in a correct way,” he said.
Charles Santiago, from the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights group, agreed, saying there had been no dialogue, as stressed under the consensus, and after two years the plan has “been dead for a long time, it’s over, it’s dead, it’s completely buried.”
Myanmar was banned from annual ASEAN summits when Brunei held the chair in 2021 and again by Cambodia last year.
But both countries failed to negotiate with the opposition National Unity Government, or NUG, or its armed People’s Defense Force, or PDF.
Phnom Penh even attempted to normalize relations between the Tatmadaw and ASEAN, which outraged many but ultimately failed amid atrocities that have claimed at least 2,700 lives. Another 13,600 people are under detention and more than 1 million civilians have been displaced.
Santiago said a decision by the junta to call “promised elections” possibly for August would prove farcical because laws governing the polls would make it impossible for the NUG and other political parties to compete. It would also risk cementing a stark divide inside ASEAN.
Within ASEAN, Santiago said Thailand, Cambodia and Laos would support any result legitimizing the military’s control of a civilian government while outside the bloc Myanmar’s ruling junta leader Min Aung Hlaing could also count on support from China, Russia and India.
“Indonesia should talk to Malaysia, to Singapore and possibly Philippines and if Brunei is on the same page, to say that this election cannot go on though because it will make a fool of ASEAN and ASEAN will look like a pariah region for all over the world,” he told VOA.
Vietnam was too difficult to read given the current leadership shakeup, he added.
Indonesia, by geography, population and economic clout is the ASEAN powerhouse. It is the world’s third-largest democracy, has solid ties with the West and is part of an Islamic troika within ASEAN, alongside Brunei and Malaysia.
Jakarta has begun laying the groundwork for its year at the ASEAN helm. Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Panjaitan told Bloomberg News on the sidelines of the recent World Economic Forum that the Tatmadaw should “let someone else who is qualified manage this country.”
At the same time, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Marsudi announced she will establish an office of ASEAN special envoy on Myanmar to engage with all parties involved.
That prompted a terse statement from the junta, warning ASEAN not to “engage with any terrorist groups and unlawful associations [recognized] by the Government of Myanmar.”
Analysts said Jakarta’s options could go much further and include handing the NUG Myanmar’s seat in ASEAN, freezing all ties with the junta, global sanctions on military-owned companies, and an absolute arms embargo.
That would include aviation fuel, a no-fly zone, designated safe zones for those fleeing the conflict, and the provision of humanitarian aid that failed to materialize under the five-point consensus.
“It [Indonesia] is an effective country in the sense of the economy and it has a high engagement with the rest of the world – and this will put an incredible amount of pressure on Myanmar and the Tatmadaw,” Milosevic told VOA, adding: “This is a civil war.”
A September briefing paper by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, a prodemocracy group of experts, claimed Min Aung Hlaing and the military do not have sufficient effective control of the country to warrant engagement with the outside world.
The paper applied international standards in determining which side in the conflict best meets the criteria used to establish control of a state and found the NUG and resistance groups had “effective control” over 52% of the country.
It found the Tatmadaw is being actively contested by the PDF and other resistance forces across 23% of Myanmar’s countryside and that the military can only claim to hold stable control over 17% of the country.
There are 135 distinct ethnic groups in Myanmar. Of them, 14 alliances make up the PDF, which Milosevic said were using hit-and-run, guerrilla-type tactics used by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War and had pushed the conflict from the jungles to provincial towns.
“The PDF are taking the fight to the Tatmadaw and they’re winning on the ground but the Tatmadaw are using their airpower and making it very difficult for the PDF and the ethnic tribes and it’s going to get worse.
“The dry season has just started and the PDF, they are forcibly changing the whole strategy of the Tatmadaw – they’re being ambushed on a daily basis – and this is an effective way just like the Viet Cong did during the Vietnam War,” he said.
Santiago said Myanmar was expected to be the priority when Indonesia hosts a foreign ministers retreat on Feb. 3-4 amid “frank and open” discussions to be held behind closed doors to establish ASEAN’s foreign policy agenda for the year.
“The next meeting of the foreign ministers is going to be a very difficult one because the purpose of that meeting is supposed to iron out the mandate given to them by the heads of government in order to help facilitate the five-point consensus that was established two years ago.
“But I think recent developments have overtaken the need for such a discussion,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-01-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"While conflict continues in Myanmar in the aftermath of the military coup, the political crisis in Rakhine State is often overlooked. Here the Rohingya emergency shows no sign of ending, but the growing strength of the United League of Army/Arakan Army is changing the landscape on the ground. In the aftermath of a ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire, Kyaw Lynn analyses political trends in this commentary, examining why the ULA/AA has become an influential actor in any likely resolution of the Rohingya crisis. Inter-community approaches and understandings will be key.
While the question of Rohingya repatriation remains under grave challenge, the movement and exodus of the Rohingya population from inside and outside of Arakan (Rakhine State) has lately been increasing. According to the October report of the Burma Human Rights Network, the number of Rohingya arrested for travelling without official permission during 2022 is 2,075, which is higher than the previous year. In recent weeks, it was also reported that around 250 Rohingya people on two boats attempting to approach Malaysia were trapped in the Malacca Straits due to engine failure. The reports said that there was another boat carrying around 180 people but still missing.
The implications are clear. For Rohingya people who seek to migrate to a foreign country the dangerous sea route has become a critical alternative because they are more likely to be arrested through land routes by car or train inside Myanmar. Meanwhile the process intended to protect the rights of the Rohingya people continues at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. But this is doing little to alleviate the situation of Rohingya communities inside Arakan or in the refugee camps in Bangladesh who find less hope for their future. International actions appear to be at an impasse.
As these crises continue, new questions have arisen during the past year in finding solutions to the Rohingya crisis with the emergence of a new actor, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), in the politics of Arakan. This is especially the case in northern parts of Rakhine State bordering Bangladesh where the majority of the Rohingya population lives.
To put the situation in context: the ULA is the political wing of the Arakan Army, which was established in April 2009 under the leadership of Gen. Twan Mrat Naing in an area controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) along the China border. Since this time, the group has been consistently training and arming new members while joining the armed struggle with allied forces, notably the KIO, (Kokang) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, against the Myanmar military, mostly in Kachin and northern Shan states. The group is also said to have a military base in territories controlled by the Karen National Union near the Thailand border, which is mainly used for logistics and new recruitment.
While the first arrival of AA soldiers into the Arakan battlefield is difficult to exactly date, many observers have noted that, since 2015, AA soldiers with arms and military equipment can be found in forest areas of Paletwa township, Chin State, and bordering areas with Bangladesh and India. Subsequently, intensive and more frequent clashes against the Myanmar military in Rakhine State began in mid-2018, reaching a peak in 2019 and ending in late 2020 with a ‘de facto’ or ‘informal’ ceasefire just after the 2020 general election. The ULA/AA had emerged as a major force, with consequences that are still developing.
This ‘first’ ULA/AA ceasefire brought new changes not just in Arakan politics but also to Myanmar as a whole. For nationwide politics, it means that the armed conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organisations is no longer confined to the China and Thailand borders. The ceasefire also demonstrated the de facto acceptance by Myanmar military leaders of the existence of the AA in Arakan, a position that they had previously rejected. Equally important, the truce caused a change in the gravity of the political centre from electoral political parties to armed groups, notably the ULA/AA, which controls executive functions and administers the judiciary in large swathes of territory in rural areas of the northern and central townships in Rakhine State.
The scale of this build-up, in turn, increased tensions with an older but small, and less popular, Rakhine armed group known as the ‘Arakan Liberation Party/Army’ (ALP/ALA). A signatory of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, the ALP/ALA is mostly perceived as a force supporting the military State Administration Council (SAC) by both the ULA/AA leadership and the majority Rakhine population. In the past, there were attempts to merge the two movements together, but there have also been confrontations, including clashes on the Bangladesh and India borders. As a sign of the worsening situation, the ULA arrested at least ten ALP members during the past year, accusing them of collaborating with the SAC in surveillance activities and arresting civilians and ULA/AA members.
In the latest incident on the evening of 4 January, the ALP/ALA’s military chief and two junior colleagues were assassinated in a car in the state capital Sittwe. The ALP accused the ULA, charges which the ULA denied. Instead, the party spokesperson pointed to internal divisions within the ALP leadership or the possibility of political manipulation by a third party (possibly the SAC) which wanted to further complicate relations between them. To date, however, neither side has provided effective evidence to support their positions, while the SAC has remained surprisingly silent about these deaths.
As these events testify, Rakhine State today has ceasefires but it does not have peace. As in the rest of the country, new approaches are essential if lasting peace and justice are to be achieved.
RELATED
The Nature of Parallel Governance and Its Impact on Arakan Politics
A Myanmar Commentary by Kyaw Lynn
POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN POLITICAL TRANSITION MYANMAR COMMENTARY
Article by Kyaw Lynn
Publication date:
24 February 2022
The ‘de facto’ or ‘informal’ ceasefire
For the moment, the Sittwe assassinations are dominating the media headlines. But it has not detracted attention in Arakan from the ULA/AA’s emergence as a potential actor in solving the Rohingya crisis. In particular, a state-building and nation-building agenda, announced by the ULA Chairman Gen. Twan Mrat Naing in April 2021, raised questions about how the ULA leadership intend to handle the role of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State. This is a question that became ever more pertinent during the first 20 months of ‘informal’ ceasefire following its 2020 inception.
During this time, the ULA claimed to include the local Rohingya community in its military, judiciary and administrative sectors. The situation on the ground remained very difficult, exacerbated by the SAC coup in February 2021. But whether relations by the ULA towards the local Rohingya community were satisfying or not, some positive changes could be seen when it came to social cohesion and political inclusion with the ULA authorities in the field. This marked a new climate in inter-community affairs.
A more challenging phase, however, began when armed clashes broke out between the Myanmar military and AA near Rohingya villages in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships between August and November 2022. Unlike previous rounds of conflict, the negative impact of the fighting visibly affected not just the local Rakhine population but also the Rohingya and other minority communities. Negative consequences ranged from the blockage of trade, travel and humanitarian assistance to the displacement of villagers, civilian casualties and human rights violations.
The ULA/AA was now visibly in the front-line of the Rohingya crisis in northern Rakhine State, a position that became even clearer when a new ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire was agreed with the SAC in late November. This resulted in affirming the AA’s ground control over many parts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. In consequence, as 2023 begins, the ULA appears as one of the most responsible and visible stakeholders in any process of refugee repatriation from Bangladesh. Clearly, relations with the Rohingya community have approached a critical time. But the future path will not be easy, and there will be yet more complex scenarios ahead.
Engagement by the ULA towards the Rohingya issue
For the present, approaches by the ULA towards the Rohingya issue need to be analyzed based upon two key issues: its policy stand on the question of a repatriation process, and its governance policy toward the Rohingya community inside Arakan.
On 19 September 2022, for the first time since the 2017 ‘regional clearance’ operations by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya population in north Arakan, the ULA/AA spokesperson stated the movement’s position on refugee repatriation from Bangladesh:
"Some people consider the ULA has a responsibility for the resolution of the Rohingya crisis. If it is to be so, there shall be two things. First, the international community and Bangladesh should recognize the ULA/AA as the main stakeholder in the resolution of this crisis. Secondly, Bangladesh and other Great Powers, including the United Nations, should give full support and stand together with us."
To date, there have been few visible responses from the Rohingya population or international community on the ULA’s position. But this policy statement can be seen as a more active move by the ULA leadership regarding refugee repatriation and resolution of the Rohingya crisis as a whole. In a highly difficult landscape, ULA leaders have always regarded the issue as a political suicide that could bring them into the ‘enemy’s trap’ – a reference to the political ‘divide-and-rule’ games played by the Myanmar military.
Indeed, after the ULA statement, there were rumours of political plots in Rakhine State by the SAC involved from behind. These included the secret distribution during the night of pamphlets in markets and houses in urban areas of Mrauk-U and Sittwe asking: "Why are there Bengali people in the AA if they march in line with the “Way of Rakhita?" and ‘Do you know that the AA is supported by the OIC and Muslim countries?’ At the same time, some pro-SAC media also started to raise provocative questions like ‘Why did the AA say to receive back Bengali refugees if they are really fighting for the Rakhine people?’
As history has shown, there are no easy answers for those seeking to accelerate the finding of just solutions. The Rohingya crisis has become a complex admixture of various components, including the protection of human rights, the rights to citizenship, international investigations by the ICJ and International Criminal Court, grievances over communal violence, competing historical narratives, and perceived threats of political extremism. The outcome is a highly polarized environment and different opinions among the various actors, including between the majority Rakhine population and the Western international community, which has empathetically stood on the side of the Rohingya community regarding the rights to citizenship and human rights issues for most of the time.
Despite these difficulties, it seems that the ULA leadership have decided they have to consider their stand on the two issues of repatriation and governance policy toward the Rohingya population as a matter of necessity rather than of choice. They cannot afford to disappoint the different sides if their key political destinations are to be achieved with tangible results. Currently, the ULA leadership appears to believe that building better relations with the remaining Rohingya population inside Arakan is fundamental and more pragmatic in showing their political will in inter-community relations not just to international observers but also to the rest of the Rohingya population outside of the state.
Promoting reconciliation among the members of various communities in Arakan, as well as inclusion of Rohingya communities within local administration, are clearly essential. In this regard, the ULA authorities have been conducting two critical ‘missions’ to support the involvement of the Rohingya community in the state.
The first mission is mainly implemented through the participation of various community members in the celebration of events like football matches, traditional wrestling ‘Krin’ festivals and music ‘live-show performances’ on culturally-important days in ULA-controlled rural areas. Rohingya community, religious, and youth leaders have been invited by ULA officials and media agencies allowed to publicize these gatherings with news and photos. Following a football event in January 2022 in Kyauktaw township, a Rohingya community leader said:
"I believe that the essence of the football match held by the ULA is to achieve social cohesion and community reconciliation among the diverse groups, and we were also allowed to discuss and participate in it from the beginning."
Through these activities, it is safe to argue that social interaction between Rohingya and Rakhine communities in ULA-controlled rural areas is comparatively higher than that in SAC-controlled urban and suburban areas.
In the second mission to promote inter-community understanding, ULA governing bodies have included the local Rohingya population in various departments, including the military, police, administration, taxation and judiciary. In a well-publicized example, the ULA released a video in May 2020 in which a Rohingya soldier serving in the AA questioned some Rohingya locals in Buthidaung township regarding a criminal case in their own language. Similar confirmation can be found in the administrative sector in an interview with the Chairman of Minbya township Muslim Council who said:
"The local ULA officers recognize and respect our organization. When they make a decision, they first consult and negotiate with the village administrators, including us, and there is very little corruption. As the ULA governance came to exist in my area, there are fewer crimes like theft, murder, and criminal gang activities."
Despite these developments, there are still open questions over the extent to which the ULA leadership tolerates inclusion of the Rohingya community in decision-making processes and political representation in the longer-term. In addition, there have been accusations against AA soldiers over human rights violations during the recent clashes with the Myanmar military in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. In some cases, the ULA authorities investigated the cases and imprisoned the perpetrators with what were considered to be appropriate punishments. But challenges remain, and different perceptions continue.
The ULA leadership and Rakhine community, for example, believe that conflict negatively impacts not only on the Rohingya but also Rakhine and other nationalities who are struggling for the sake of a better future for all people of Arakan. In contrast, a large segment of the Rohingya community might still consider their situation as between a rock and a hard place where they are still uncertain of gaining tangible benefits as political instability continues in the country.
For community understandings to develop in Arakan, it is thus necessary that this difference in views over the reasons and consequences for armed struggle are reconciled with the formation of shared communication platforms in the different layers of society. Despite the current ceasefire, there are no roadmaps to peace in the territory today.
The matrix of Arakan Politics
Despite coming from various ideologies, parties and personal backgrounds, almost all the key Rakhine political leaders and actors agree on one crucial opinion when it comes to the priorities in Arakan politics. That is, they believe that the first and most fundamental issue is the lack of political self-determination; the second is the question of the Rohingya crisis; and the third is the issue of foreign investments in Arakan, especially from China and India, including resource and revenue sharing. In their thoughts, achieving the first political demand is critical for the resolution of the second and third issues. Thus, in their perception, it is essential to approach challenges from this structural perspective to resolve the Rohingya crisis.
Moving forward from this viewpoint is difficult. In a more comprehensive framework in political conceptions, the Rohingya crisis can also be viewed as the negative consequence of having ill relations between three edges of a triangle: the Myanmar State, the Rakhine community and the Rohingya community in which they have very different perceptions. Although many observers analyze the root causes of the problem based on bilateral relations between the Rohingya community and Myanmar State (or ‘Burmese’ state/community in a broader sense), further factors include the hostile relations between the central state and Rakhine community as well as the ways in which the interests of the Rakhine and Rohingya communities have historically been marginalized or downplayed. Rakhine and Rohingya relations are of vital importance.
Against this backdrop, there are two key reasons why the different dimensions to these relationships must be addressed as part of any solution to the Rohingya crisis. First, any critical development on the Rohingya issue that fails to accommodate the differences in opinion and strategy between the Myanmar State and leading Rakhine political organizations, such as the ULA/AA, will not be sustainable or achievable. In the current political climate, both the SAC and rival National Unity Government represent substitutes for the Myanmar State and, in future politics, one might endure as the only political entity. But, unlike other parts of the country, even a de facto or de jure peace agreement between the Myanmar military and Arakan Army will not be sustainable if they have disagreements or a lack of understanding regarding resolution of the Rohingya crisis.
Equally important, inter-community relations must be addressed to bring lasting peace. This leads to the second reason for promoting reconciliation and shared objectives between the different communities. Although Rakhine and Rohingya populations presently seem to have more understanding and sympathy due to common sufferings (humanitarian crises and human rights violations) and a common enemy (Myanmar military), a shared vision regarding their respective places in future Arakan society is still needed. This situation is also analyzed in a recent report conducted by the Institute for Peace and Governance, an Arakan-based non-governmental organization.*
As experiences around the world have shown, community reconciliation in a divided land like Arakan is a long-term process. It cannot be accessed without ‘forgiveness’ regarding past crimes among members of the communities in the first place. And it is also a process that includes five key steps: developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; acknowledging and dealing with the past; building positive relationships; facilitating significant cultural and attitudinal change; and, finally, enabling meaningful social, economic and political change.
For the moment, politics in Arakan have not reached such a stage. Currently, the state of reconciliation among the members of different communities varies on the basis of socio-economic interactions, political environment and existing relationships in a particular area. In general, inter-community interaction in central Arakan townships, such as Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw and Minbya, is comparatively higher than in the northernmost townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung.
Promoting community reconciliation will therefore be essential for the smooth implementation of a refugee repatriation process, and the success of this process will be the measurement of the state of reconciliation between the two communities. Equally important, recent developments in Arakan demonstrate that the role of the ULA/AA, which has both competitive power relations with the Nay Pyi Taw government as well as authority and influence over the Rakhine population, will be critical in bringing productive changes in the resolution of the Rohingya crisis.
RELATED
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LAND POLICY IN MYANMAR ETHNIC CONFLICT IN MYANMAR
Report by Martin Smith
Publication date:
18 December 2019
Conclusion
The Rohingya crisis remains challenging for all domestic and international actors, and there is no simple way of finding a magic solution. The political crisis in the country has deepened more and more since the February 2021 coup. The possibility of refugee repatriation from Bangladesh and the broader scope of resolving the Rohingya emergency are less hopeful. And the emergence of the ULA as a new actor in Arakan politics creates new questions about old problems in resolving the Rohingya crisis.
Presently, the role of the ULA in addressing the Rohingya crisis is becoming more visible. This is especially apparent after the second round of armed clashes between the Myanmar military and AA since the 2020 ceasefire recently ended, resulting in de facto control by the ULA/AA of territories along the border with Bangladesh and rural areas in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. These areas are inhabited by a majority of the Rohingya population and are the places where repatriated refugees are to be rehabilitated. Thus relations between the ULA authorities and Rohingya community will have impact not only on the lives of the local people but the wishes of the refugee population in Bangladesh.
In general, it can be summarized that there are two basic – and opposite – hypothetical viewpoints that can be taken regarding the emerging role of the ULA in addressing the Rohingya crisis. The first and more pessimistic position is that the appearance of the ULA/AA as a new actor in Arakan politics can be seen as an arming of Rakhine ethno-nationalism which is a challenge for the Rohingya people in Arakan and will only make the process of solving the crisis more complex. But the second and more optimistic view is that the emergence of the ULA as a more potent and visionary political actor – different from other Rakhine parties that seek to mobilize the people on the basis of ethno-nationalism to challenge the central government – will produce a more united landscape for all marginalized groups to work together. If this is the case, it is trusted that the new political dynamics will bring light for reconciliation between the different communities against common sufferings and the common enemy.
Important shifts in the Arakan landscape are currently underway. While challenges lie ahead in relations between the ULA and Rohingya population, there have been positive developments, especially in inter-community relations and political inclusion. For this reason, a balanced viewpoint should be taken regarding current ULA-Rohingya relations. It is still early to be too optimistic. But it is also too late to be a pessimist..."
Source/publisher:
Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of publication:
2023-01-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Since the Myanmar military’s attempted coup in February 2021, over 60 foreign governments and international organisations (including United Nations entities) have provided support for the illegal military junta, directly and indirectly supporting its campaign of terror.
The report, titled Developing a Dictatorship: How governments and international organisations are supporting the illegal Myanmar military junta - and what must be done to stop this, provides details of the organisations and the forms of support they have provided.
Key findings include:
22 foreign governments;
26 intergovernmental organisations (including 14 United Nations entities);
8 foreign financial institutions; and
8 other international organisations are implicated.
The report covers four main types of support for the military junta:
political support through diplomatic relations and actions that legitimise and enable the junta to take decisions on behalf of Myanmar in international forums;
technical cooperation that enables the transfer of knowledge and skills to the junta and those who serve their interests;
financial support that may flow through development initiatives, loan disbursements, direct purchases from, or indirect business dealings with, companies and other entities controlled by the junta, as well as the development of infrastructure that may serve the junta financially and strategically; and
renting property such as hotel rooms, office spaces and residences from military-linked businesses.
The report includes 18 detailed case studies and provides clear recommendations for what must be done to prevent the illegal military junta from gaining further funds, resources and power.
It also provides an analysis of the legal considerations and consequences for international organisations found to be supporting the military junta.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It has been two years since the Myanmar military’s attempted coup. Over 2,700 people have been killed and more than 13,600 people are still detained.
“The junta is waging a scorched earth campaign against the people of Myanmar, carrying out indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, and has caused a humanitarian catastrophe with more than 1.1 million displaced.
“So far, the international community has taken insufficient action to end the flow of funds and resources that enables the military junta’s campaign of terror.
“It’s clear that some foreign governments and international organisations are not only neglecting to help the people of Myanmar, but they are also actively supporting the military junta that is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people.
“All forms of support for the military junta are unacceptable – from inviting the military junta to represent Myanmar at international meetings to providing training to junta members and spending millions of dollars at military-linked hotels.
“The National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar needs to be invited to international meetings on behalf of Myanmar.
“All financial ties to the Myanmar military must be cut, and targeted sanctions must be imposed.
“We call on foreign governments and international organisations to take immediate action to end all forms of support for the military junta.”
Among the organisations named in the report, 13 have recently taken action towards ending their support for the military junta..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, Human Rights and international relations
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"New report exposes 60+ foreign governments & international organisations supporting military junta
Our new report, Developing a Dictatorship, details over 60 foreign governments, intergovernmental organisations (including UN entities), foreign financial institutions and other international organisations providing support for the military junta.
The report includes 18 detailed case studies illustrating these forms of support and outlines the ways in which the military junta stands to benefit politically and financially through inclusion in international decision-making forums, development assistance, technical cooperation, loans, infrastructure projects and more.
It provides clear recommendations for what must be done to prevent the illegal military junta from gaining further funds, resources and power.
Among the organisations named in the report, 13 have recently taken action towards ending their support for the military junta..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s oldest rebel group, the Karen National Union (KNU), was founded in 1947. Its armed wings, the Karen National Liberation Army and Karen National Defense Organization, are fighting the junta in Karen and Mon states and Bago and Tanintharyi regions.
Since the regime slaughtered hundreds of peaceful anti-coup demonstrators nationwide in 2021, the KNU has given military training and armed several thousand activists to fight the junta.
The KNU has revived its military campaign alongside newly formed resistance groups, including several people’s defense forces.
It says has engaged the regime more than 7,000 times, killing an estimated 5,500 regime troops and injuring around 5,000. It has reported hundreds of resistance deaths.
This month the KNU has stepped up raids on military headquarters and junta offices.
Meanwhile, it is working with the National Unity Consultative Council, a political coalition opposing the junta, and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) to establish a federal union.
The KNU’s communications chief Padoh Saw Taw Nee recently told The Irrawaddy about his hopes for 2023.
Following the coup, we displayed our clear resistance while some groups didn’t. But other groups still refuse to accept the regime in many ways.
We have no other option but to fight.
It becomes more clear with time that there is no alternative.
We are happy that other EAOs vowed in their New Year’s speeches to uproot the regime. This is welcome.
We have been openly fighting the regime.
We have engaged in more than 7,000 clashes over two years. We can’t de-escalate our revolution.
We must keep going until we win and increase efforts across military and political spheres.
What improvements can you report?
As we became used to the guerrilla tactics, there were ambushes, sniper attacks and some raids occupying junta outposts.
Now we are conducting more urban raids, like in Kawkareik.
This shows our growing confidence. We raided a military headquarters. We have never done this before. We raided three battalions at the same time. We could not do that before.
More raids like that will follow as our revolution grows in every sector.
How have you managed to conduct raids like that?
This regime and its predecessors have prepared poorly for many years. For the first time, we are receiving international support and broad domestic backing. In the past, the Bamar majority stayed away from politics and did not help.
Now people have become one flesh and blood as junta atrocities occur across the country. That is why our revolution has strengthened quickly.
Fighting is not the only way to demolish military institutions that have monopolized power for 70 years.
The institutions must be broken.
Many soldiers have joined us and there are many others inside the military who secretly support the people’s revolution in many ways.
This revolution is very different from previous movements.
We hear attacks in upper Myanmar were led by the KNU. Have you expanded beyond your traditional territory?
The dictatorship must be uprooted across the country, not just in our state. We have plans to connect with other resistance groups. There will be more joint operations.
The junta is using more airstrikes. How can you defend yourselves?
The terrorist regime is now committing unacceptable airstrikes on civilian targets. The junta is committing war crimes.
It shows the regime’s desperation.
We lack air-defense weapons so we must be aware of the threat from the air.
The terrorist junta regards both resistance forces and civilians as their enemy so we all must be alert all the time. We all need to dig bunkers.
We hope the international community will provide air-defense weapons. We are asking other countries to cut off supplies of aviation fuel for the regime.
We need anti-aircraft weapons and they need to arrive soon.
Will junta atrocities increase?
We can’t estimate how many more atrocities the junta will carry out.
[Junta leader] Min Aung Hlaing targets civilians as he has no choice. He regards the people as his enemy and he believes his enemies will be defeated if the people are destroyed.
We cannot predict how much more we will lose. We will never step away from the fight. Victory gets closer with every atrocity.
Freedom does not come for free.
Do you have a policy on the junta’s election plans?
Min Aung Hlaing has no room politically. He has failed to gain international recognition.
As a final attempt to win legitimacy, he will hold an illegal election. At that point, we will fight openly. We totally reject his fake general election.
The people must fight. No one will collaborate in his election and he won’t be able to raise his head if he can’t implement it. That is why his election must be defeated.
Does the KNU have an action plan against the election?
We announced at our public meeting on November 11 that we would oppose the junta’s election. There were Karen political parties at the meeting. This is a serious matter. Those who fail to follow our policy must be held accountable.
How much control does the KNU have in its territory?
Following the coup, the junta totally lost all administrative mechanisms in our territory.
The junta’s administrators struggle to survive in the towns.
Due to the civil disobedience movement of government employees, the regime cannot run rural schools and hospitals.
The junta can only respond militarily.
We need to consider our plans for governing after the revolution.
Has the revolution been successful?
It is hard to say how successful we have been. We can do many things politically, diplomatically and economically against the regime that we have never done in the past. We only have to strengthen our military connectivity with other groups.
Do you have a message for the people?
We have to keep pushing our revolution forward. We must remember that you get nothing for free.
Freedom comes with great difficulty and costs.
Rather than asking when we will succeed, we must think deeply about how we can all contribute to the revolution.
If we work hard together, we will succeed quickly.
I am very pleased with the people’s contribution and thank them.
We are pleased with the continuous support from our people amid suffering and crises. We will keep trying hard..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Survivors of alleged abuses at hands of military unite in universal jurisdiction case over atrocities they say amount to genocide
Description:
"A criminal complaint against individuals linked to Myanmar’s military has been filed in Germany by survivors from ethnic groups across Myanmar, in what activists say is a show of unity that once seemed unthinkable.
Sixteen survivors and witnesses of military abuses joined NGO Fortify Rights to file a criminal complaint with the federal public prosecutor general of Germany under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows the prosecution of mass atrocities in one country, even if they happened elsewhere.
“We deserve to have access to justice. We all know the impunity the military has been enjoying for so many years. This is the time to [end] the impunity,” said Nickey Diamond, a complainant in the case and a member of the board of directors at Fortify Rights.
The document is not publicly accessible, however senior Myanmar military figures are accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, according to Fortify Rights. The complaint also requests that the German authorities open a “structural investigation” into the situation in Myanmar, which could lead to the documentation of further allegations not covered by the complaint.
There are various legal cases against Myanmar’s military including one in the international court of justice case genocide against the Rohingya Muslim minority, an investigation by the international criminal court, and separate universal jurisdiction cases filed in Argentina and Turkey.
Activists say the complaint filed in Germany is unique because of the diverse range of ethnicities represented, and because it seeks accountability both for the military’s brutal crackdown against Rohingya in Rakhine state in 2016 and 2017, and for alleged crimes perpetrated by the military in other regions across the country after it ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021.
“This will be the first universal jurisdiction complaint which will talk about crimes against many ethnic groups and that is what makes this a really unique effort towards justice and accountability,” said Pavani Nagaraja Bhat, a human rights associate with Fortify Rights.
“The Myanmar military has been violating rights across the country and the evidence that we have been able to collect shows that there is a pattern of abuse and violations that have been perpetrated by the junta systematically against civilians on a very large scale,” she said of allegations in the complaint.
The complaint also reflects shifted attitudes among different ethnic groups, said Diamond. In the past there was little sympathy towards the Rohingya people among the Bamar majority, with many believing the military’s claim that it was fighting terrorism, but now there is far greater unity against the junta. “The people have truly seen [the military’s] true colour and true face,” he said.
Over the past two years the military has unleashed a campaign of terror in an attempt to crush widespread opposition to the coup, launching airstrikes, torching villages and arresting more than 17,000 people.
The complainants, who filed their case on 20 January, want the German prosecutor to open an investigation, collect and preserve evidence, and issue arrest warrants.
The complainants range from students and scholars, to farmers, human rights defenders, business peoples, former village heads and homemakers. They represent several ethnicities including Arakanese (Rakhine), Bamar, Chin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Rohingya, according to Fortify Rights. “This type of ethnic unity would have been totally unthinkable before the coup,” said the group’s director, John Quinley III.
According to the group, the complaint alleges that some members of the Myanmar military systematically killed, raped, tortured, imprisoned, disappeared, persecuted, and committed other acts that amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It includes “substantial evidence” indicating that some military figures knew about their subordinates’ actions but did not attempt to stop them, or to punish perpetrators of such crimes.
The federal prosecutor’s office, which will decide whether to proceed with the complaint, did not respond to a request for comment by Associated Press. Any resulting court case could be a lengthy process..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-01-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar’s junta has deployed Russian arms to lethal effect in an escalating civil war but is highly vulnerable to a disruption of those supplies
Description:
"CHIANG MAI – When Myanmar’s military regime drops bombs and launches air strikes on civilian populations, a rising component of its intensifying war against anti-coup and ethnic rebel groups, the aerial assaults owe largely to Russia.
In recent months, Myanmar’s Air Force has used Russia-made Yak-130 jets and Mi-35 helicopters to drop munitions in areas where resistance fighters are known to be active but that have also often hit civilian populations, indiscriminate attacks that rights groups say are tantamount to war crimes.
Myanmar is believed to have at least 20 Yak-130 jets, two-seaters designed to train pilots but commonly used for counterinsurgency operations, including six it received in December 2021.
In October, Janes Information Group reported it had received imagery showing a Russian Kamov KA-29TB assault transport helicopter in operation in the northern Sagaing region, apparently one of five of the gunships Myanmar’s military agreed to buy earlier this year.
In a more recent November delivery, Myanmar received either four or six – reports vary – Russia-made Sukhoi Su-30 multi-role fighters replete with Russian trainers and technicians. Russian military instructors have also been spotted at airfields in Myanmar, presumably to help maintain their attack helicopters but also possibly for targeting advice.
But as Myanmar’s military regime, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), escalates its air war against rebel forces highly vulnerable to aerial attacks, its dependence on Moscow for its arms, supplies and assistance is both a source of strength and weakness that could have a significant bearing on the future course of the civil war.
Russia’s war against Ukraine, by any honest measure, has been a military disaster, with Moscow losing more men and materiel than in any armed conflict since World War II. As the losses mount and conflict intensifies, it is questionable whether Russia will have enough surplus military hardware and parts for export to far-flung customers like Myanmar.
Myanmar’s junta sought to enhance its alliance with Moscow last year, seen in its frequent expressions of support for its invasion of Ukraine. On February 25, SAC spokesman Major-General Zaw Min Tun said that Russia’s military had “carried out what is justified for the sustainability of their country’s sovereignty” and that the war proved Moscow’s “position as a world power.”
Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia at least three times since seizing power in a February 1, 2021 coup. He reportedly told Russia’s defense minister in June of that year that “thanks to Russia, our army has become one of the strongest in the region.”
During Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Moscow in September last year, the general met with President Vladimir Putin and toured a plant producing fighter jets. Moscow, meanwhile, has backed the democracy-suspending junta’s bid to be recognized as Myanmar’s legitimate government by officially referring to Min Aung Hlaing as “prime minister.”
Myanmar’s special relationship with Russia began nearly three decades ago when the ruling generals sought to mitigate their heavy dependence on China for military hardware. Then, Beijing filled the gap when the country was placed under Western sanctions following the bloody suppression of a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988.
The first contacts were forged in the 1990s when Russian dignitaries began visiting the country. Moscow sold its first consignment of four MiG-29 jet fighters to Myanmar in 2001, which was followed by another ten MiGs the following year.
Russia has since sold Myanmar’s generals Hind Mi-35 helicopter gunships, Mi-17 transport helicopters, Yak-130 ground attack aircraft, light armored vehicles as well as heavy machine guns and rocket launchers.
As many as 5,000 Myanmar soldiers and scientists have studied at Russian military schools since the early 1990s, more than from any other Southeast Asian country including old Cold War ally Vietnam.
In 2007, Russia also signed an agreement to build a nuclear research reactor in Myanmar but construction was delayed due to costs and the controversial project was not apparently any longer on the drawing board before the February 2021 democracy-suspending coup.
However, Alexey Likhachev, director of the state-owned Russian firm Rosatom, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with junta science and technology minister Myo Thein Kyaw in July last year covering “cooperation in training and skills development in the field of nuclear energy and shaping positive public opinion on nuclear energy in Myanmar.”
In September, Likhachev met Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok where the two agreed to strengthen atomic energy cooperation including through the possible construction of a modular nuclear reactor in Myanmar.
Despite such big bang pronouncements, no doubt calculated to raise antenna in the West, betting on Russia rather than China as its closest security partner may not turn out as Min Aung Hlaing and his SAC members hope and expect.
If Moscow starts to falter in its military deliveries to Naypyidaw, as some analysts see as likely, Myanmar’s generals may soon be forced to swallow their pride and again go hat in hand to Beijing for military arms and related assistance in yet another hour of sanctions-induced need.
Russia, for its part, has vowed to honor arms deals signed before the coup in Myanmar, including for missile defense systems and fighter jets, but that was before the war in Ukraine took such a heavy toll on Russia’s weapons supplies.
It is no secret that Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to restore the erstwhile Soviet Union’s old glory, a drive seen in his expansionist war in Ukraine and search for new strategic allies such as Myanmar.
While China has vital strategic interests in Myanmar as the only neighboring country that provides Beijing with direct access to the Indian Ocean, Russia has always been more interested in making money from its arms sales and other commercial engagements with Myanmar.
To be sure, Myanmar is not the only Southeast Asian country to buy military equipment from Russia – others include Vietnam, Indonesia and even Malaysia – but the relationship between Moscow and Myanmar’s generals goes way beyond lucrative arms deals.
Putin’s autocracy and Myanmar’s junta share a similar disdain for Western democracies, human rights and civil liberties. Russia is trying to bomb Ukraine to literal smithereens while junta leader Min Aung Hlaing and his cohorts are doing the same in their own country.
They are, as one Asian analyst who requested anonymity put it, “birds of a feather.” Xi’s China may be in the same autocratic league but China is perceived by the generals as too close for comfort and Russia never supported the once-powerful Communist Party of Burma, which waged a bloody civil war against the government then in Yangon.
The generals have not likely forgotten that the communist rulers in Beijing provided massive military aid and support to their then-ideological comrades in Myanmar during the decade spanning 1968-78.
Moscow has been able to leverage that lingering distrust, despite its comparative lack of commercial offerings. In August last year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Myanmar to discuss what the official news agency Tass described as “security and economic issues.”
That was followed in November by a visit to Moscow by SAC minister for transport and communications, Admiral Tin Aung San, where several new cooperative agreements were concluded.
Among them, Russia vaguely pledged to help develop Myanmar’s railroads, an infrastructure area where Beijing is active through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Less strategically, the two sides announced that Myanmar International Airways will as of “early 2023” operate direct flights between Yangon and the three Far East Russian cities of Vladivostok, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk.
It is hard to imagine that there will anytime soon be an influx of tourists to Myanmar from Siberia, where those cities are located, or that Myanmar vacationers would want to spend their holidays in such frigid locales.
However, there are important military installations and training facilities in the far-flung Russian cities, meaning the flight agreement is likely more militarily than commercially motivated..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, “One Belt, One Road” initiative
Language:
more
Description:
"More than 15,000 residents from 10 villages in Katha Township, Sagaing Region have fled their homes as regime troops torch houses after conducting airstrikes on civilian targets.
Junta forces burned houses in Moetar village, Tike Kone ward on Sunday and Monday after three days of intense clashes with local resistance forces nearby, according to local residents.
“Regime forces entered Tike Kone ward on Sunday, a day after resistance forces retreated following clashes. They continued to burn house until this morning,” a representative of Katha People’s Administration Group told The Irrawaddy on Monday.
Thousands of residents have fled to Katha town while many others are thought to be sheltering in forest and farmland, he said.
Heavy fighting erupted 3 to 5 kilometers from Moetar village on Wednesday when a combined unit of the Katha-People Defense Force and All Burma Student’s Front (ABSDF) ambushed a military detachment of around 100 troops from Kachin State heading to the village.
After suffering heavy losses in the clash, regime forces sent two fighter jets from the airbase in the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina to bomb both resistance fighters and civilian targets in Moetar.
The airstrikes killed eight villagers, mostly women, and injured 30 others.
The lethal attacks prompted several thousand residents of Moetar and surrounding villages to flee their homes.
The fierce clashes continued until Friday when regime forces deployed fighter jets and helicopter gunships to attack the resistance fighters while dropping reinforcements by helicopter.
Regime aircraft bombed the villages of Moetar and Nant San, which were also targeted by a junta artillery unit based in Katha town.
The combined attack left a father and child seriously injured, according to the Katha township People Administrative Group. The airstrikes also damaged the Nant San village school.
Thirty regime personnel including a military strategist were killed in the three-day battle, according to local media, citing resistance forces that took part in the fighting.
One resistance fighter was reportedly killed and three others wounded.
The Irrawaddy was unable to confirm the reports.
The Myohla PDF local resistance group last Thursday released video showing its members using grenade launchers and mortar shells in an intense clash.
Junta jets also attacked Moetar Village a year ago on January 12, killing or severely injuring five civilians including children, and damaging six houses..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Cognyte’s technology has allegedly helped the junta target rebel groups and civilians.
Description:
"Human rights groups are criticizing a reported deal between Myanmar’s military and an Israeli tech firm for intercept spyware, accusing the company of aiding and abetting the junta in crimes against humanity.
Israel’s Cognyte Software won a tender to sell the intercept spyware to Myanmar shortly before the February 2021 coup, when the military ousted the democratically elected government, documents obtained by activist group Justice for Myanmar showed.
Intercept spyware allows governments to listen to telephone calls, read text messages and emails, and determine the whereabouts of internet users without having to go through internet and telecommunications companies.
These documents, which detailed the Myanmar military’s plan to install “lawful interception” tools on telecommunications networks, were the basis of a legal complaint in Israel, and a letter associated with the documents called for the country to ban Cognyte’s marketing and export license.
“The term ‘lawful interception’ creates a false impression of normalcy that obscures the fact that Israelis are once again aiding and abetting crimes against humanity,” Israeli human rights leader Eitay Mack, who led the effort to file the complaint.
Such a deal would violate a 2017 ban imposed by Israel's Supreme Court on defense transfers to Myanmar, the campaign for which was also headed by Mack.
Used to violate human rights
Rights groups, observers, and the shadow National Unity Government say that the junta has been using the technology to violate its citizens’ human rights.
“We can say that Israel is one of the top countries in surveillance tech. That’s why the technical support that the Myanmar military received from [Cognyte] must be really sophisticated and effective,” Kyaw Saw Han, a security analyst, told Radio Free Asia’s Burmese Service.
He said the intercept spyware will have a negative impact on civilians by further depriving them of their freedom to communicate. The junta has already imposed draconian restrictions on the internet in some parts of the country, and has blocked access to Facebook.
With the spyware, the military could listen in on people’s private conversations or even record them, Kyaw Saw Han said.
“It will especially hurt the resistance forces that are operating in this political situation,” he said, referring to armed groups opposed to the junta, many of which sprung up after the coup.
Rebel groups believe they have been compromised by the intercept technology, although they don’t have proof, Khun Daniel of the Karenni National Progressive Party told RFA.
“Their ground activities, food transportation and guerrilla operations have been hindered and many members have been arrested because of the information insecurity caused by the military’s use of such equipment,” he said.
But the technology empowers the junta not only against armed enemies. It can also use the tech against civilians, said Yadanar Maung, a Justice for Myanmar spokesperson.
Call for Israeli government to take action
He said the military can eavesdrop and intercept the phone calls of political activists, journalists and civilians that can lead to arrests, torture and even killings.
That is why Justice for Myanmar has requested that the Israeli government take action against those responsible for the reported deal between Cognyte and the military.
“If a company provides equipment to assist an organization in aggressively and cruelly torture and kill innocent civilians, or if such support is found, they are also partially complicit in these crimes, according to legal and literal point of view,” Sai Kyi Zin Soe, a political analyst, told RFA.
But Thein Tun Oo, the executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, which is made up of former military officers, told RFA that the technology is very effective in helping them with “counter-terrorism threats” – addressing security threats to the military and government leaders.
“It is no longer uncommon to violate and eavesdrop on the personal information of individuals. There have been many cases when we can prevent certain security-related threats just by such interception,” he said. “If this system can actually run at full power, it would be very beneficial.”
Thein Tun Oo said that although human rights groups are urging countries to impose an arms embargo against Myanmar, it will not be effective because large international arms companies tend to prioritize their economic interests.
RFA attempted to contact Cognyte and a spokesperson for the junta for comment on Friday, but received no reply as of Monday.
13 countries fingered, including US
According to a Jan. 16 report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, a group of independent experts working to support human rights efforts in the country, the Myanmar military is using weapons technologies and raw materials for producing weapons from companies in 13 countries including the United States, France, Australia, Japan, Germany, India, Singapore, China and Ukraine.
Kyaw Zaw, the spokesman for the president’s office of the shadow National Unity Government, told RFA that the world must stop providing the junta with military tools.
“The NUG government wants to request that governments, including Israel, order an injunction to prevent any equipment, whether it's non-weapons technology, or communication technology or any technology that supports violence, from being sold to the Myanmar military, because it is committing inhumane violence in Myanmar.”
He said that the United Nations and the international community need to sanction companies that cooperate with the Myanmar military junta.
Although the UN Security Council passed a resolution on the crisis in Myanmar on Dec. 21, the decision does not yet include a ban on arms sales to the Myanmar military. Russia and China–key suppliers of weaponry to the junta–would have veto power over such a proposal.
Yanghee Lee, a member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, said “Foreign companies are enabling Myanmar’s military to produce weapons it uses to commit daily rights atrocities against the Myanmar people.”
In order to protect the people of Myanmar, the council in its report urged UN member countries to block the support that the Myanmar military receives, including taking targeted action against arms dealers and those responsible for supplying weapons factories..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Federalism is being presented by many activists as the best option for a future democratic Myanmar – and with good reason. The formal sharing of power between a national government and regional administrations has worked well for some of the world’s most successful democracies, including Germany and Australia. It has also – and perhaps less successfully – been adopted where there is an acute division - religious, linguistic, cultural or ethnic - which needs to be addressed politically for the nation to survive. Belgium, Bosnia and Nigeria could be seen as examples.
Britain is not federal, indeed its largest constituent, England, remains one of the most highly centralised of major democracies. But it’s been heading down the devolution path in recent decades, establishing parliaments or assemblies for Scotland and Wales (and also reforming Northern Ireland’s assembly, though for different reasons). Some see that as a drift towards a federal system, which could also eventually encompass more autonomy for the poorer, largely post-industrial, English midlands and north. But a huge row over the rights of people who are trans-gender has put into question just how sincere and effective is Britain’s decentralisation of political power.
One of the main purposes of introducing regional decision making is to enable large and complex nations to accommodate diversity and so blunt separatist sentiment. That’s how it has worked in the world’s two major democracies.
Indian federalism has been a conspicuous success and an important factor in allowing a geographically, culturally and linguistically hugely diverse nation to prosper. That’s not an endorsement of the way India is governed, but a reflection of the manner in which power is divided between the Centre and the country’s constituent states. Separatist sentiment in the Kashmir Valley and in some parts of India’s north-east has led to insurgencies and brutal security crackdowns, and Delhi has been strongly criticised for failing to seek a political solution particularly in Kashmir. But broadly, federalism has kept India together.
The United States is a different story. Its political system is shaped by the legacy of a ruinous civil war in the 1860s to prevent secession by pro-slavery southern states. And it has one signal success: there is no secessionist movement of any political consequence anywhere in the US (except perhaps on the Caribbean island of Puerto Rico, which is US-ruled but whose citizens have no elected representatives in Congress).
Britain’s awkward embrace of devolution is more recent. In 1997, when Labour’s Tony Blair headed a reforming national government, the British Parliament agreed there should be referenda in Scotland and Wales to decide on whether to set up devolved assemblies there. Voters in both regions endorsed the idea and a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly (the difference in terms is important – the Welsh elected body was given less power than Scotland’s) were established the following year. The broad political consensus is that, in practical terms, devolution has worked fairly well.
Tony Blair’s devolution reforms were in part a response to increased nationalist sentiment in Scotland and Wales, and in part an attempt to forestall the growth of a powerful breakaway movement. In Scotland, that aim has failed. For the past fifteen years, Scotland’s First Minister has been a member of the Scottish National Party (SNP), a constitutional left-wing party which seeks an independent Scotland. The SNP is now by far the most popular political party in Scotland getting almost half the total vote. And it wants a referendum on independence (there was one in 2014, in which the people of Scotland voted by 55% to 45% against breaking away, but the pro-Europe SNP says Britain’s departure from the European Union requires a fresh vote).
But there’s a catch. A second referendum can only be authorised by the government and Parliament in Westminster – and there’s no prospect of that. So, there’s an uneasy stalemate between London and the Scottish capital, Edinburgh.
The political temperature is now approaching boiling point because of a row about trans rights. The Scottish Parliament has passed legislation – applicable only in Scotland – to make it easier for people who are trans-gender to get formal legal recognition of their new gender identity. The governing Conservative party in London disagrees with these reforms and argues that it conflicts with legislation passed by the Britain-wide Westminster Parliament. And for the first time since devolution was introduced a quarter of a century ago, the British government is using its reserve powers to block Scotland’s new law.
The Scottish nationalists argue that failing to respect a decision of the Edinburgh Parliament in an area where it has devolved authority is anti-democratic. The British Conservatives say that far from tearing up the devolution arrangement, London is simply exercising powers it was given under that dispensation. What started as a difference of opinion about trans rights is becoming a big constitutional bust-up.
The instinct to decentralise power and ensure that smaller regions enjoy real autonomy feels right. England has ten times the population of Scotland and almost twenty times that of Wales, and that overwhelming dominance made both smaller nations feel marginalised and ignored. But getting the balance right between centre and region is a difficult judgment. And there is the even trickier issue of how to respond when regional sentiment becomes a demand for complete separation.
This doesn’t mean that devolving power is wrong – just that it takes a lot of careful planning and even more political wisdom to make it work..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of publication:
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) – composed of former UN officials – released a 76-page report on 16 January 2023, entitled “Fatal Business: Supplying the Myanmar Military’s Weapon Production.” The report highlights that at least 13 countries in the European Union, Asia, and North America have been found to be providing support for the production of armaments by the Myanmar military council, which has been perpetrating brutal human rights abuses in Myanmar.
This issue of Burma News International (BNI) – Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM) Weekly News Review looks at the SAC-M report and other points to ponder..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Peace Monitor
Date of publication:
2023-01-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
7.41 MB 7.4 MB
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Description:
"Summary: On 5 January 2023, according to the Irrawaddy, PDF 3 Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) (under the control of Sagaing PDF 8 Light Infantry Division (LID)) alongside the Da Pa Yin Kwe PDF attacked Kywei Pon village where SAC and Pyu Saw Htee forces were camped. During the attack one Pyu Saw Htee member was shot and killed by the PDF.
Following this, SAC armed forces (reportedly the 33 LID) allegedly raided the village of Da Pa Yin Kwe (တပုရင်းကွဲ/ဒီပဲယင်းကွဲ). According to Khit Thit, from 0500 on 6 January 2023, there was a continuous exchange of fire and the use of heavy weapons by the joint Pyu Saw Htee and SAC armed forces. The SAC allegedly shot and killed four people, including Ashin Gandhasara (အရှင် ဂန္ဓသာရ), a Buddhist monk and graduate of Thitagu Buddhist University, and Ma Khaing Su Mon (မခိုင်စုမွန်), a teacher who was allegedly associated with the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Ashin Gandhasara had reportedly travelled from Mandalay to Da Pa Yin Kwe village on the evening of 5 January and was staying at the Shwe Gugyi monastery.....Myanmar Witness has been able to verify: Myanmar Witness geolocated user-generated content (UGC) showing the deceased monk and teacher to the basement of the Da Pa Yin Kwe village monastery.
Using NASA’s FIRMS and Sentinel Hub, Myanmar Witness was able to verify that a fire took place on 6 January 2023 in Da Pa Yin Kwe village.....Background: Sagaing Township, in Sagaing State, has been the site of an ongoing conflict between the PDF, the SAC, and the pro-SAC Pyu Saw Htee. Da Pa Yin Kwe is reportedly a pro-democracy village, while Kwei Pon, only 1.5 kilometres away, is a pro-SAC village.
Notable clashes have occurred between the villages. In July 2022, Mandalay Free Press reported that the SAC armed forces raided Da Pa Yin Kwe Village, allegedly setting five houses on fire. They also claimed that one individual, 37-year-old Ko Zaw Lin (ကိုဇော်လင်း), was arrested, tortured, and burnt to death. Clashes also reportedly broke out in December 2022, according to Sagaing Township True News. The events between the 5-6 January 2023, which were investigated by Myanmar Witness, represent the latest round of conflict between pro-democracy forces and the SAC and Pyu Saw Htee in this location..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.68 MB
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Description:
"WASHINGTON —
The United States believes there is no chance that proposed elections in Myanmar will be free and fair, according to Derek Chollet, a senior adviser to Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Myanmar and other issues.
In an interview at the State Department on Thursday with Khin Soe Win, acting chief of VOA’s Burmese Service, Chollet also discussed the recently passed Burma Act, which provides for humanitarian assistance and civil society support to pro-democracy factions in Myanmar and imposes targeted sanctions on elements of the ruling junta accused of human rights abuses.
Other issues discussed included Russian support for the military junta that seized power in Myanmar, also known as Burma, in February 2021, and U.S. efforts to build support for Myanmar opposition forces such as the National Unity Government and People’s Defense Forces, and among Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity.
VOA: President Biden recently signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which includes the Burma Act, which is welcomed most Burmese people, particularly the resistance groups, as well as the National Unity Government and People’s Defense Force. But how effectively and how soon can you deliver this assistance to the targeted groups?
Derek Chollet, senior adviser to Secretary of State Antony Blinken: Well, first of all, we're already working — and we have been working over the last several years — to provide nonlethal assistance to the pro-democracy opposition inside Burma. We've been very engaged with the National Unity Government as well as some of the ethnic groups within Burma, talking to them about ways we could be most helpful in their efforts to put Burma back on the path to democracy. The Burma Act that was recently signed into law is something we in the Biden administration strongly support. We worked very closely with the Congress in the development of the Burma Act. It's something we welcome, and the fact that that was put into law in a bipartisan basis with both Democrats and Republicans working together shows the depth of support here in the United States for the people of Burma. [It also shows] the strong position we have against what the junta has done.
VOA: Yes, it's about $136 million. But compared to the U.S. assistance to Ukraine, it's just peanuts. But this is an encouragement for the resistance group as well as the moral support for the Burmese people who are under the military suppression.
Chollet: Yes, absolutely. And I think it's important to note the Burma Act is not the sum total of everything we are doing for Burma. Since 2017, the United States has provided nearly $2 billion in support to Burma, Bangladesh, the areas ... afflicted by this conflict. And we're going to continue to try to find ways that we can support the people of Burma and the pro-democracy opposition there.
VOA: The junta seems not to be winning in the fight against the People's Defense Forces and ethnic armed groups on the ground and focusing on air power. There are reports of some calling to impose a no-fly zone. Is it possible for the U.S. to coordinate with the U.N. Security Council on a no-fly zone?
Chollet: Well, that's not something we're considering now. What we're trying to find is a way that we can peacefully resolve the situation inside Burma. We strongly condemn what the junta has done and is doing every day. We fully support the efforts by ASEAN in particular to stick to the five-point consensus to ensure that Burma and the junta remain isolated within ASEAN and not being able to enjoy the benefits of membership in certain ways — certainly by not having political representation at key ASEAN meetings. When we held the U.S.-ASEAN summit here in Washington and President Biden met with nine leaders of ASEAN, there was an empty chair. And that was because Burma was not welcome at a political level at that meeting.
VOA: Back to NDAA and assistance for Burma, including the nonlethal assistance for armed resistance groups. Russia might retaliate against the U.S. because the Burmese junta was the very first to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you think Russia might react?
Chollet: We have seen over the last several years that the relationship between the junta and Moscow has only grown stronger. Russia is the biggest military supporter of the junta. It has been backing the junta in very significant ways. It's something we strongly condemn. And Russia is at a point right now where it's got very few friends in the international community, and it's found that the junta is one of the more reliable friends. That said, we were able to work with our partners in the U.N. Security Council to have a significant resolution passed, the first time the U.N. Security Council had spoken to the issue of Burma since the coup. Russia allowed that Security Council resolution to go forward. And so, we've shown that we can get some things done. But the reality is Russia and the junta are very, very close. I expect they'll remain that way. But that will only cause us to redouble our efforts to support the people of Burma, to work with our like-minded allies in the region and beyond to try to bring about a resolution to this crisis.
VOA: Neighboring countries are crucial for Burma. The military leader Min Aung Hlaing today met with the Thai army chief in the beach resort in Rakhine state. Thailand's role in the Burma crisis is critical because of the exodus of migrants to Thailand. When you visited Thailand together with Secretary Blinken last year, representatives of the National Unity Government and various armed ethnic organizations were not able to meet you because they feared Thai intelligence would find their location. So how do you assess Thailand's role in this conflict?
Chollet: Thailand shares a very, very long border with Burma and is quite concerned about the spillover effects of the instability. We fully understand that Thailand has been a critical partner of us for many, many years, and working to deal with the refugee crisis in Burma and all of its manifestations over decades. Now, we are very close partners and Thailand is an ally of the United States. Thailand is a key partner within ASEAN. So we're working very hard to stay close to our Thai partners as we're working together to try to resolve the situation inside Burma. It's something that we're doing also with our other ASEAN partners, because there's many countries with a lot at stake in Burma's future. And I think the one thing we have been able to accomplish in the years since the coup is by maintaining the strong unity — seeing the unity within ASEAN and then building unity between ASEAN and countries like the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and others with an interest in a secure and peaceful and democratic Burma.
VOA: Secretary Blinken urged the international community to reject the sham elections that the junta is going to hold. And then yesterday the military spokesperson confirmed they are going to hold a National Security Council meeting at the end of this month, and they are going to set the election date. I don’t know how they are going to do it, because the military regime’s state of emergency expires at the end of this month.
Chollet: Look, our position hasn't changed. These elections have no chance of being free and fair. It's a transparent attempt to try to legitimize what the junta has done and try to create an offramp somehow for its coup. Our view is very simple. There was an election that was deemed free and fair. It was in November of 2020. The junta did not like the outcome of that election, which is why they did what they did on February 1, 2021. They don't control up to 50% of the territory right now. It's unclear how they could even hold elections. You can't have a free and fair election when you're jailing every significant opposition, when you're committing atrocities, when you're shutting down a free press. So, we should drop any pretense that if they were to hold an election— and they probably will try to hold one — that it would be free and fair..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International Bill of Human Rights
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"Three decades on from the nationwide uprising in Myanmar in 1988, the country has been shaken by another whirlwind of contention against military rule. Yet this time it has widened into a revolutionary uproar, which has not abated since the army seized control — again — in February 2021.
Almost two years after General Min Aung Hlaing’s coup d’état shut down a decade of democratic experiments, the opposition to, and resentment against, the new junta is yet to dwindle away. The peaceful — even joyful — popular protests that filled Myanmar’s urban and rural areas after the army seized government in early 2021 were quickly superseded by armed resistance against the new military government. In stark contrast with the aftermath of the 1988 coup, the resistance has withstood some of the most ruthless counterinsurgency operations ever conducted by the military, especially over the course of 2022.
The People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and local resistance groups have mushroomed and effectively engaged in guerrilla warfare up to the point of achieving a dominant position in critical areas during 2022 — in particular in the Sagaing and Magwe regions, as well as in the Chin and Kayah States. Long-standing insurgent groups such as the Kachin Independence Organisation and the Karen National Union have trained and equipped many groups in a coordinated mobilisation effort against the armed forces unseen even back in 1988.
Small flash mob rallies against the regime continue to be held on an almost daily basis in villages across the country and boycotting military-owned businesses remains a popular tool of protest. Defying the military government for the past two years, politicians lawfully elected in 2020, social activists, students and ethnic leaders have gathered around the National Unity Government (NUG) and relentlessly pushed for its international recognition. They have not yet had much success.
But small, if symbolic, victories have recently been won. At the United Nations Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun — who was appointed by former state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s government — is still holding Myanmar’s seat two years after Min Aung Hlaing’s junta sought to remove him.
In December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted its first ever resolution on Myanmar, expressing deep concerns about the ongoing violence and state of emergency. Although it was non-binding, the resolution urged for the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, who was recently sentenced by a farcical court to 33 years in prison. Strikingly, neither China nor Russia vetoed the UN initiative.
In the same month, the US House of Representatives passed new legislation allowing for non-lethal American assistance to be delivered to the NUG and other resistance groups in Myanmar. ASEAN has also proved much less accommodating towards the new junta, in stark comparison with the regional organisation’s cosy relationship with Than Shwe’s regime in the 1990s and 2000s. Several leaders in the region have already expressed scepticism about the upcoming general elections planned by Min Aung Hlaing’s government.
Yet there is still little to celebrate two years after the coup. Frustration, if not outrage, at the lack of commitment by the outside world is palpable. In light of what a Western-led coalition has offered Ukraine to defeat Russia’s assault since February 2022, activists from Myanmar have called for similar aid. The anti-junta movement has met with plenty of sympathy worldwide but with little material support apart from the backing of various diasporic communities.
Myanmar’s national economy, already battered in 2020 and 2021 by the COVID-19 pandemic, is now in disarray. Alongside Iran and North Korea, Myanmar is unenviably under international financial watch, because it is blacklisted by the influential watchdog Financial Action Task Force.
People across the country and its borderlands have returned to the informal economy and family networks for survival, while the underground and criminal worlds have blossomed. In the context of a brutal repression unabated since the coup, hundreds of thousands of young people have also sought refuge and fortune across Myanmar’s borders as a means to send money back home to their parents.
There has been an unprecedented desire for unity and change among young people and grassroots organisations since the 2021 coup. Social activists, aspiring politicians and students from sexual and ethnic minorities have mobilised in a gripping collective action grounded on common goals of equality, federalism and a future without men in uniforms running the show. This is where the battle lies.
But not everything is as thrilling as a revolutionary call. Cynicism runs deep within a fractured society at war with its soldiers for so many decades. Factional infighting within and between resistance forces, clashes over tactics and duelling visions of democracy remain salient features of anti-coup politics.
What comes next is unclear. There is no indication that the country may quickly move either away from junta rule through a swift military victory of resistance forces, or towards another version of a functioning electoral authoritarian regime guarded by a besieged military.
Across Myanmar’s postcolonial history, its people, whether farmers, students or civil servants, have grown up through cycles of repression and protests. They will, no doubt, continue to rise up in anger and hope in coming months, buoyed by the energy and moral power of legitimate protests against authoritarian rule. They will also, echoing the two decades of advocacy which followed the 1988 coup, continue to voice their impatience, if not discontent, with a dithering outside world.
Renaud Egreteau is Associate Professor with the Department of Public and International Affairs at City University of Hong Kong. He recently authored Crafting Parliament in Myanmar’s Disciplined Democracy, 2011-2021 (Oxford University Press, 2022)..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2023-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Resistance attacks on regime targets in Myanmar’s southern, eastern and central regions are likely to increase in the coming months as the country’s oldest rebel group has vowed to step up operations while saying fighting is only one way to end military rule.
“We need to speed up in both military and political affairs,” KNU communications chief Padoh Saw Taw Nee told The Irrawaddy.
The KNU was founded in 1947 and its armed wings, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and Karen National Defense Organization, are fighting the junta in Karen and Mon states and Bago and Tanintharyi regions. They are the most powerful ethnic armed organizations near the Thai border.
Fighting has already increased this year.
The KNLA and allied resistance groups attacked Battalions 32, 283 and 284 near the town of Kyainseikgyi in Karen State on January 4, while the junta was marking Myanmar’s Independence Day.
A battalion headquarters was seized and an infantry barracks, some officer’s quarters and vehicles were torched before junta airstrikes forced a retreat.
Karen forces claimed that 45 junta soldiers, including a battalion commander, were killed or wounded in the raids. Seven resistance troops were killed and 13 injured.
The KNLA and its allies raided Border Guard Force outposts along the Phayathonsu road in Kyainseikgyi Township in early January. Two outposts were seized, 90 regime soldiers died while nine resistance fighters were killed and 15 injured, the group said.
The attacks prompted junta shelling and airstrikes on civilian and resistance targets.
Since the 2021 coup and the subsequent killing of peaceful demonstrators nationwide, the KNU has trained and armed several thousand volunteers to fight the regime.
Its troops have also fought alongside newly formed resistance groups and coordinated with the civilian National Unity Government.
An estimated 5,500 regime soldiers have been killed and around 5,000 have been injured while hundreds of resistance fighters have died, Padoh Saw Taw Nee said.
Near-daily coordinated attacks by KNU forces and their resistance allies are reported across Karen, Mon, Bago and Tanintharyi.
“We need to uproot the military dictatorship not only in our state but across the country so we have plans to connect with other resistance groups,” Padoh Saw Taw Nee said.
In December the KNLA led attacked junta targets, including a district police office and an administrative office in Kawkareik. It claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties and seized weapons and ammunition.
Padoh Saw Taw Nee said: “There will be more urban attacks. We have said we will attack in various arenas.”
The KNU is also looking further afield.
The KNLA and Magwe resistance allies attacked a key junta airbase in Magwe Township using three improvised rockets.
Padoh Saw Taw Nee said at the time that three military aircraft were destroyed and at least eight regime troops killed.
Resistance fighters trained and assigned by the KNU are fighting with other groups across Magwe, Mandalay and Sagaing regions.
Meanwhile, the regime continues to kill civilians, loot and burn houses and attack civilian areas with shells and airstrikes and commit acts of sexual violence.
Since early January the regime has been escalating airstrikes in Sagaing Region and Chin, Kachin and Karen states, possibly in response to New Year’s speeches by ethnic armed organizations’ leaders vowing to uproot the dictatorship during 2023..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"JCC-CDM က ရေးသားပြုစုထားသော နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM မူဝါဒစာတမ်းကို အများပြည်သူလေ့လာနိုင်စေရန်အတွက် ထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2023-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"1. NUG urges neighbours to take serious action on SACs for using air space to massacre civilians.....2. NUG Prime Minister pledges to implement justice for the case of torturing in Pathein prison....3. NUG condemns airstrike campaign targeting civilians 12/01/2023.....4. Village defense forces and village administration committees established in over 80% of the villages in Pale Township11/01/2023.....5. SAC have murdered over a thousand of youths during spring
revolution7/01/2023.....6. SAC’s capital punishment violates UN’s Peace and Security Efforts11/01/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (3/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"One of the most unexpected developments in the struggle against Myanmar’s latest military dictatorship is the support for the resistance that has come from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). An ethnic armed organization (EAO), the MNDAA is based in Kokang in the far northeastern corner of Shan State in eastern Myanmar.
More than 90 per cent of Kokang’s population of approximately 150,000 people are ethnic Chinese of Yunnan descent, and the region’s cultural, personal and even political ties with China have always been strong. Given Beijing’s support for the junta that was installed after the February 2021 coup, it may seem surprising that the MNDAA is getting away with supporting the resistance to the regime. But, as a long-time observer of Myanmar politics, put it: “It looks to me as if the Chinese are working, as they often do, to keep a foot of some sort in all camps.”
The MNDAA has trained several groups of fighters from the pro-democracy resistance, which are loosely-banded together and known as People’s Defense Forces (PDF). Arms for the resistance have also been provided through the MNDAA and its close ally the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, a powerful EAO that is active in Palaung-inhabited areas of northern Shan State. The weapons, in turn, are Chinese-made and come from the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has had a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military since 1989, and therefore cannot be directly involved in the fight.
The flow of guns and the fact that no Chinese-made FN-6 Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), of which the UWSA has many, have been provided seems to indicate that the China is giving its tacit approval to the arms supplies, but with certain limitations. The PDFs need MANPADS urgently to protect themselves against the increasingly frequent airstrikes that the military regime has unleashed against resistance strongholds. But it wouldn’t look good if any of the Chinese-made planes in service with the Myanmar Air Force were shot down by Chinese-made MANPADS.
In this rather complicated context, it should also be remembered that this is not the first time that the MNDAA has been engaged in a conflict with the Myanmar military. The group was one of four EAOs that emerged from a mutiny among the rank-and-file of the once powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989. The others were the UWSA, the National Democratic Alliance Army in eastern Shan State, and the New Democratic Army in Kachin State. All four entered into, but did not sign, ceasefire agreements with the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but fighting broke out between the MNDAA and the Myanmar military in 2009. The MNDAA lost most of its territory, and an estimated 30,000 Kokang people fled across the border to Yunnan.
Most of them were able to return but, in February 2015, fighting resumed and between 40,000-50,000 refugees ended up in Yunnan. Massive airstrikes and artillery barrages were used. In a May 2015 article for Jane’s Defense Weekly, writer Anthony Davis described the offensive as “the largest war since Myanmar’s independence.” China cannot have been pleased with what happened in 2009 and 2015, and probably thought it wise to maintain good relations with the MNDAA. With its ethnic Chinese population, Kokang has always served as an unofficial buffer zone between China and Myanmar, as well as gateway for China’s influence in Shan State and beyond. Consequently, Kokang is of the utmost strategic importance to Beijing.
Kokang’s exact status has always been somewhat ambiguous. Prior to the arrival of the British in the then Burma, Kokang maintained a dual relationship between local chieftains and the Shan saohpa [sawbwa in Burmese] of Hsenwi to the west of the Salween River and with Chinese rulers to the east of the Salween. But under an 1894 agreement between Britain and China, Kokang was recognized as Chinese territory. However, a new agreement was reached in 1897 under which China had to cede Kokang to the British, who placed the region under the jurisdiction of North Hsenwi State and a local myosa, literally a ‘town eater’, or local tax collector, who also had other duties.
During World War II, Kokang’s status was changed again and, in 1951 it became a separate entity within the Shan States ruled by its own saohpa. His name was Yang Kyein-sai and he belonged to the Yang clan, the most powerful family in Kokang. His sister Yang Kyin-hsui, better known as Olive Yang, is perhaps the best-known of his siblings. She had her own armed militia and, in the 1950s, became involved in the opium trade, although her role in business and politics has been grossly exaggerated and even glamorized, perhaps because she was openly lesbian.
Some contemporary writers have elevated her to the status of an early LGBT activist and, even more imaginatively, as a superspy connected with various foreign intelligence agencies. In fact, Olive Yang’s main and only real claim to fame was that she was the first person to send opium in truck convoys down to the Thai border, rather than by the usual mule caravans. She traded opium with the remnants of the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces on the Thai-Shan State border, but had hardly any other significant connections with the outside world.
In 1960, Olive wanted to assume the title of saohpa of Kokang, a title still held by her brother, but she was detained by Myanmar’s central authorities from 1963 to 1968. She lived quietly in Yangon and Shan State after her release until 1989, when the then military intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt appointed her, ex-opium warlord Lo Hsing-han and Aung Gyi, a Sino-Burmese former army officer, to negotiate with the CPB mutineers in Kokang. She died in 2017 in Muse in northern Shan State.
Another Yang sibling, Yang Kyein-sein, aka Jimmy Yang, was far more important than Olive. He was elected MP for Kokang in 1950, a position he held until General Ne Win’s coup in 1962 and the end of Myanmar democracy. Jimmy Yang also founded the Burma Bank and was a prominent personality in politics and business throughout the 1950s.
He went underground after the coup and formed the Kokang Revolutionary Force which, in 1964, merged with two Shan groups to form the Shan State Army, led by Sao Nang Hearn Hkam, the widow of Myanmar’s first president Sao Shwe Thaike. But Jimmy soon broke away and served for a while as a manager of the long-gone Rincome Hotel in Chiang Mai. He later allied himself with the KMT in the opium business and with ousted Prime Minister U Nu in exile politics. Jimmy Yang left for Paris in 1973, but returned to Myanmar during a general amnesty in 1980. He died in Yangon in 1985.
Meanwhile at home in Kokang, crucial events took place which became a turning point in the modern history of the territory. In 1967, two of Jimmy Yang’s officers, Pheung Kya-shin and Pheung Kya-fu, traveled to China to ask for help. The Chinese introduced them to CPB exiles, who for several years had been planning a major push into Myanmar. On January 1, 1968, heavily-armed CPB units crossed into Myanmar at Möng Ko in northern Shan State. Five days later, the Pheung brothers and the force they commanded crossed into Kokang, which was overrun within days. Kokang and large parts of northern Shan State soon came under CPB control.
By the mid 1970s, the CPB had extended its ‘liberated area’ to encompass 20,000 square kilometers of land along Myanmar’s border with China. The problem, though, was that the CPB’s soldiers consisted almost exclusively of people from the mountains of northern and eastern Shan State, while orthodox, Maoist Bamar dominated the CPB’s political leadership. People like Pheung Kya-shin didn’t even join the CPB; he was content to be an army commander and local administrator in Kokang. Almost inevitably, this led to a mutiny, which began in Kokang in March 1989 and, in April, spread to the Wa Hills and other CPB-controlled areas.
At first it was believed that the CPB mutineers would link up with Myanmar’s other EAOs. But the SLORC was faster, and made the mutineers an offer they accepted without hesitation: keep your armies but don’t share your guns with the other EAOs, and you can also retain control over your respective areas and get involved in any kind of business. In the beginning that meant the trade in opium and its derivative heroin, but now commercial pursuits are more diversified and include tin and rare earth mining with China being the main market for exports.
Since the mutiny, Kokang has been transformed into a center for cross-border trade with China. Whereas during the CPB days there were only bamboo huts and a few bigger houses made of stone, high-rise buildings now loom over market places and shopping centers. There are even talks about building a high-speed railroad from China through the southern part of Kokang to Hsenwi, and then all the way to Mandalay and, eventually, Yangon and the port of Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State. Needless to say, Kokang’s recent development is more in tune with what the leaders in Beijing want, as China no longer exports communist revolution. Today it’s a question of trade, commerce and all kinds of influence over Myanmar’s internal affairs, be it the insurgencies and military affairs or mainstream politics and, most important, geopolitical concerns.
Pheung Kya-fu died in June 2017 at the age of 81 and Pheung Kya-shin on February 16, 2022. He was 94. With those old warlords gone, a new generation of Kokang leaders have taken over, but little is known about them. It is also not known how and when they invited PDF fighters to their area. But with Kokang commanders in charge it is certain that relations with China are bound to be strong. And will the PDFs be able to maintain their independence? Their main weakness is that the PDFs have no central command and no common strategy. They can easily end up being totally dependent on the stronger groups that train and equip them.
That means that the struggle for Myanmar’s future is as uncertain as it always has been: a never-ending civil war with more suffering for the people, who are now being bombarded by the Myanmar Air Force and ruled by an incompetent junta that has pushed the country close to an economic abyss. And much of it has to do with China’s desire to secure its control over the vital ‘Myanmar corridor’, which gives it access to the Indian Ocean and markets across the world.
As for Kokang, it will not be an easy task for anyone in power in Naypyitaw to establish some semblance of authority over that virtually autonomous territory. Like the Wa Hills to the south, it is a part of Myanmar that has never been under any effective, central governmental control — but which for a very long time has had much closer ties to China..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
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"Following the attempted coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s military1 has relied on an arsenal of weapons2 to carry out summary executions, massacres and other human rights atrocities in response to peaceful protests and growing anti-coup armed resistance in Myanmar. Analysis of witness statements and of video and photographic evidence in relation to such human rights violations shows security forces armed with a variety of locally produced firearms, including sniper rifles,3 MA-1 semi-automatic rifles,4 and Uzi-replica BA-93 and BA-94 sub-machine guns.5 In addition, analysis of images of weapons used by soldiers and the military-controlled Myanmar police force shows that much of the small arms ammunition used against peaceful protestors in 2021 carries the headstamp marking of the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries (DDI), confirming local manufacture.6
Since the late 1950s, and in particular with the coming to power of the so-called State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military junta in 1988, Myanmar’s military has invested significantly in strengthening its domestic capacity to produce weapons as a necessary means for releasing the military from a dependence on external supplies. This ambition is illustrated by:
the initial establishment of weapon production factories in Yangon and in the central, Bamar- majority parts of the country and the continuous establishment of new factories, including some that have yet to become fully operational;
the progressive increase in stockpiles of strategic raw materials to ensure adequate and uninterrupted supply for continuous in-country production of weapons;
the modernisation of auxiliary industries – such as iron and steel plants – to provide necessary materials for production;7
the continuous upgrading of existing weapons and diversification of production lines; and
the strategic diversification of sourcing bases (countries and companies) to limit the impacts of current and potential future sanctions and embargoes.
As a result, Myanmar’s military has gradually become largely self-sufficient in manufacturing a range of weapons. By way of illustration, the DDI currently has an extremely robust production capacity for small arms8 to meet its operational needs,9 which are focussed almost exclusively on the brutal internal suppression of the Myanmar population.
As its atrocities mount, the military’s need to further insulate itself from economic and external diplomatic pressure will likely lead to increased efforts aimed at the modernisation of existing weapon factories, the construction of additional factories and the development of auxiliary domestic industries for supplying the factories with necessary raw materials.
Despite robust production capabilities, however, the DDI is still reliant on international supplies, including for a variety of raw materials, parts and components and end-items, as well as machinery and technology, for the sustained production – both licensed and un-licensed10 – of the weapons in its arsenal.
This report maps out the Myanmar military’s in-country weapon production which takes place at factories commonly referred to as KaPaSa (after the Burmese name for the Directorate of Defence Industries, Karkweye Pyitsee Setyone) or, in the military’s own terms, as “Defence Industry” factories (DI). The report provides an overview of some of the critical supplies that appear to enable this production, and it identifies companies whose products are currently used by the DDI to successfully sustain its weapon manufacturing at scale.11 The report also identifies companies that enable the DDI to purchase products by brokering deals or otherwise acting as intermediaries for the DDI.12 In doing so, these companies also enable Myanmar’s military to continue to commit gross human rights violations, amounting to crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
This report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) finds that:
Some of the DDI’s production appears to be taking place under license (including expired licenses). However, the licensing situation for many of the weapons currently produced at the KaPaSa factories remains unclear. Whether licensed or unlicensed production, the DDI appears to have obtained the technology and know-how to produce a variety of its weapons through various types of transfer of technology (ToT) deals. Over the years, the types of ToT deals that the DDI has entered into with companies – including State-owned companies – from Italy and (then) West Germany, Singapore, Israel, South Korea, North Korea, China and Ukraine have included the receipt of entire weapon production plants (turn-key projects), receipt of direct support from engineers associated with the owner of the technology, joint venture agreements, and KaPaSa factory staff being trained by original license-holders. Some companies that have provided ToTs to the DDI appear to have received commercial contracts, including in Myanmar’s oil and gas sector, in exchange.
While the DDI is able to partially produce and domestically source some of the critical raw materials used for its arms production, it still imports important quantities of such materials, including from China through the China State-owned company China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO). China has also played an important role in supporting the establishment and operation of auxiliary industries, such as iron and steel plants and copper mines, that are either directly connected with weapon production factories in Myanmar or whose outputs feed the factories’ production. The DDI is currently also seeking to invest in iron and steel plants in the country, including in Pyin Oo Lwin, Mandalay Region. Consequently, foreign companies involved in the extraction and/or processing of certain raw materials in Myanmar may find themselves contributing to, or being directly linked to, sustaining the Myanmar armed forces’ arms production capabilities.
The DDI also depends on imports of parts and components ready to be used in weapons made in the KaPaSa factories, including fuses, cast boosters, detonating caps, igniters and electric detonators. Available data indicates that many of these parts and components come from companies domiciled in India and China. Information obtained by SAC-M suggests that the poor quality of many of the Chinese products upon which the DDI depends has prompted the DDI to progressively turn to other countries, including India, for critical supplies, and that the DDI is planning for other countries, including India, to play an increasingly important role for the weapon production industry in Myanmar. Several companies domiciled in India have also been identified as supplying the DDI with end-items such as optical sights to be fitted to made-in-Myanmar small arms such as sniper rifles. The military’s need to import optical sights is likely to continue as the military is moving towards the increased use of optical sights in its small arms and light weapons design and manufacture.
Automated machining is a critical step for weapon manufacturing at scale and modern Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines with turning, milling and grinding functions, as well as electro-discharge machines, play a critical role. SAC-M has identified machines manufactured by companies legally domiciled in Austria, Germany, Japan, Taiwan and the United States (US) that are currently used by the Myanmar military at its weapon production factories. SAC-M has also identified various software programmes made by companies legally domiciled in France, Israel and Germany currently being used at KaPaSa factories for operating some of the CNC machines.
Singapore functions as a strategic transit point for potentially significant volumes of items – including certain raw materials – that feed the Myanmar military’s weapon production. Companies domiciled in Singapore have been identified as brokering deals and exporting items to the DDI or to associated civilian front companies for the military in Myanmar. In addition, according to credible information received by SAC-M, Taiwan functions as an important transit point for the DDI’s purchase of high precision CNC machines, including from European manufacturers, for KaPaSa arms manufacturing. In addition, individuals formerly associated with Myanmar’s armed forces suggest that, with the assistance of Mottama Holdings Limited – a Myanmar-based conglomerate and reportedly the current intermediary between the DDI and Chinese arms industry company NORINCO – the DDI also regularly sends CNC machines from KaPaSa factories to Taiwan where they are serviced by technicians associated with the European manufacturers of the machines, after which they are shipped back to Myanmar and to the DDI. It appears as though the absence of Taiwanese sanctions on Myanmar facilitates these types of transactions and shipments to and from Myanmar for the performance of critical maintenance.
The leader of the Myanmar military, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and his top military leaders must be held accountable for the human rights violations that they have perpetrated. However, this report emphasises that concrete action must also be taken to address the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in Myanmar. This requires action both by the companies that have been identified in this report and by their home governments.
Under international human rights law, all States have a duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication. In relation to the manufacturing and export of weapons and associated items and machinery specifically, this expectation is reflected in several multilateral agreements of relevance to the arms industry, including the Arms Trade Treaty13 and dual-use goods regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement,14 the European Union (EU) Dual-Use Goods Regulation15 and current sanctions regimes that apply to Myanmar.16 For the home States of the companies that have been identified, adhering to these legal provisions requires them to apply export controls on a number of items – including sub-components, end-items and machinery and technology – that could be used for arms production.
At present, it is unclear to what extent the home States of companies have upheld this responsibility in relation to the products that have been identified in use at the Myanmar military’s weapon production factories and auxiliary industries. SAC-M recommends that the home States identified in this report investigate and, as relevant, initiate administrative and/or legal proceedings against the companies whose parts and components, end-items and machinery and technology are relied upon by the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries. States should also adopt targeted sanctions against the KaPaSa, its leadership and its network of brokers that have been identified in this report.
Companies have a responsibility to respect human rights. This means that they should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the human rights of others and to address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.17 The responsibility to respect is independent of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their human rights obligations. In practical terms, and in relation to the Myanmar military’s weapon production, meeting this responsibility means that companies are expected to apply their own due diligence in relation to the risks of potential harmful end-use of their products,18 and to put in place measures to prevent or mitigate such risks. For products that are covered by export controls, companies are not absolved of the responsibility to respect human rights by the mere fact that their home State has granted the necessary export permits. Companies identified in the report should immediately stop doing business with the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries and associated military entities and civilian front companies for the Myanmar military, and they should investigate how their products have ended up being used for the manufacturing of arms by the military in Myanmar. Beyond this, companies should also take steps to prevent future harmful end-use of their products through robust due diligence to identify, prevent, and mitigate the risk of harm associated with the sale/licensing and deployment of their products. In relation to harms that have already been suffered by civilians in Myanmar, companies should provide for, or cooperate in, the remediation of such harms, including by collaborating with any future legal or administrative proceedings.
Lastly, it should be noted that this report does not undertake the immense task of mapping out the Myanmar military’s arms production and associated value chains19 in their entirety. Undertaking such an endeavour is a key recommendation of this report. Put differently, additional, longer-term research is needed to identify additional critical supplies with a view to disrupting the Myanmar military’s weapon production. This undertaking would fill an important gap in the current research on Myanmar’s armed forces, which tends to focus on the military’s acquisition of weapons from elsewhere, rather than weapons that are made in the country. To this end, SAC-M encourages interested parties to follow-up on the present research where it has left off. To sustain such future work, SAC-M invites the submission of information, on a continuous basis, that could lead to the identification of additional companies that supply or support the Myanmar military in its manufacturing of weapons.20
PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
Since the military’s crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, arms embargoes and sanctions have been imposed on Myanmar by foreign governments. So far as arms are concerned, these types of measures have principally sought to prohibit the trade of military or dual-use goods that may be used by the Myanmar military for internal suppression. Important as they may be, these measures have not been fully effective in preventing the military from committing atrocities against the civilian population. On the one hand, this failure stems from the fact that several UN member states continue to sell weapons to the military.21 An equally important factor, however, is the fact that Myanmar’s military can produce a large variety of weapons in-country.
Weapons made in the country’s so-called KaPaSa factories have been, and continue to be, used by Myanmar’s military for widespread, systematic and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, as evidenced in publicly available reports and video/photographic evidence, and corroborated by information received by SAC-M from individuals formerly associated with the Myanmar armed forces or experts on made-in-Myanmar weapons. For example:
Post-coup military offensives in Karenni / Kayah State have involved the systematic and massive use of landmines – including locally produced M14 anti-personnel landmines – in and around villages in south-eastern Karenni / Kayah State, acts that may amount to war crimes.22 Photographs reviewed by the Land Mine and Cluster Munition Monitor indicate that antipersonnel landmines manufactured by Myanmar were captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces by non-state armed groups every month from January to September 2022 and in virtually every part of the country.23 In August 2022, antipersonnel mines manufactured by and in the possession of the Myanmar military were captured in both the northwest and southwest of the country, indicating extensive mine use by the armed forces.24
Following the 2021 attempted coup, the military and police responded to peaceful protests with in- country made weapons – including a variety of rifles25 and grenades26 – to assassinate protestors.
In March 2019, during armed conflict between the military and the Arakan Army (AA), at least five people were killed when the army opened fire on Say Taung village in northern Rahkine, using rounds and artillery produced at a KaPaSa factory.27 Throughout the two-year period of conflict with the AA, the military regularly fired into villages in Rakhine State with locally produced small arms and ammunition, injuring or killing civilians, damaging civilian houses and other structures, and causing mass displacement. Investigation into military attacks in Rakhine in 2019 also indicates that the military systematically fired explosive weapons with wide area effects, including locally produced mortars and associated projectiles, into civilian areas.28
The military’s genocidal atrocities inflicted on Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017 involved the killing of Rohingya civilians by the military and Border Guard Police using a variety of DDI-made small arms, including the MA-3 MK I and G3 rifles used during the Inn Din massacre.29
In short: weapons produced by the Myanmar military in-country at its KaPaSa factories have been used in the military’s widespread and systematic attacks against civilian targets, prior to, during and after the 2021 attempted military coup, and continue to be so.
Over a period of one year, SAC-M has mapped out the Myanmar armed forces’ in-country weapon production and the value chains that enable this production. The research has entailed open- source investigation, including review of user-generated content in Burmese and English posted on a wide variety of social media forums and discussion groups (open and closed). SAC-M has also reviewed leaked budget-related documents (2016-2021) from the Myanmar military-controlled Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the DDI as well as shipment records from subscription-based import/export databases. In addition, SAC-M has interviewed approximately 30 individuals, including former soldiers of the Myanmar armed forces as well as weapon experts and experts on the weapon manufacturing industry in Southeast Asia broadly and Myanmar specifically.31,32
SAC-M hopes that this report will contribute to a greater understanding of the Myanmar military’s weapon production and the global value chains that feed this production to ensure that more effective international action can be taken to protect the rights of the Myanmar people, including through targeted sanctions, engagement with identified companies to prevent future supplies reaching the DDI and the network of KaPaSa factories and, as necessary, targeted accountability-oriented proceedings..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya
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Sub-title:
Junta reportedly bombs Indian territory in fresh attacks on Chin Army
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"(BANGKOK, January 12, 2023)—The Government of India should prevent Myanmar-junta fighter jets from accessing Indian airspace and take measures to protect ethnic-Chin and Indian civilians in border areas, said Fortify Rights today. On Tuesday and Wednesday, the Myanmar junta air force dropped bombs on both sides of the Myanmar-India border, killing five ethnic-Chin opposition soldiers and destroying civilian structures.
“New Delhi shouldn’t tolerate the junta’s incursions on its airspace, and Indian authorities should do everything in their power to ensure the security of civilians and border areas,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer of Fortify Rights. “India should be aware of the junta’s habit of violating its neighbors’ airspaces and terrorizing civilian populations and take action accordingly.”
The attacks reportedly began on January 10 at around 3:30 p.m., targeting Camp Victoria—the headquarters of the Chin National Front (CNF), an ethnic resistance organization—located in Myanmar’s Chin State, which abuts India’s Mizoram State. The bombing reportedly destroyed civilian housing and a health facility located inside Camp Victoria and killed five CNF soldiers, including two women.
Junta forces also reportedly dropped two bombs on the Indian side of the border, near Farkawn village in Mizoram State’s Champhai District, where thousands of ethic-Chin refugees have sought protection. No one was reported injured in Farkawn.
Leaked junta documents shared by the Chin Human Rights Organization on social media in November 2022 exposed alleged plans by the Myanmar junta to launch airstrikes on Camp Victoria. One document titled “Target List of CNF Headquarter” listed dormitories of soldiers, training facilities, leaders’ houses as well as civilian residences, hospitals, churches, and schools.
Anticipating potential attacks, in November 2022, a senior-ranking official in the CNF told Fortify Rights that the CNF had requested military support from the Indian government to increase security on the Myanmar-India border.
A few months back, in 2022, the Assam Rifles—border guard forces responsible for providing ground security in India’s Mizoram and Manipur states at the Myanmar border—withdrew from its post overseeing the Tiau River, which borders Myanmar in India’s Farkawn village. The junta bombed locations near the Tiau River this week.
In recent months, incursions by the Myanmar junta air force into the sovereign air space of both Thailand and Bangladesh have been reported.
According to the Royal Thai Air Force, on June 30, 2022, Myanmar junta aircraft crossed into Thai airspace over Phop Phra District in Tak Province, which is located on the Thailand-Myanmar border. Thai authorities reportedly detected a MiG-29 fighter jet belonging to the Myanmar military in Thai airspace, more than three miles into Thai territory. Reportedly, the incursion of the fighter jet and loud explosions across the border created panic among villagers in Thailand, prompting them to shelter in bunkers. In response to the junta’s incursions, Thai authorities deployed two F-16 fighter jets. Similarly, in late August 2022, the junta air force reportedly fired two rockets that landed less than 400 feet into Bangladeshi territory.
“The Myanmar junta is a threat to peace, including to the Myanmar people and civilian populations in neighboring states,” said Matthew Smith. “India must not allow the junta to continue destabilizing the region by using Indian airspace in its attacks and should support efforts to hold the junta accountable for its crimes.”
In the first six months after the Myanmar military launched its coup d’état, Fortify Rights and the Schell Center at Yale Law School documented crimes against humanity perpetrated by the military and police in Myanmar, including murder, imprisonment, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearances.
The junta’s systematic attack against the civilian population has forced tens of thousands from Chin State in Myanmar to Mizoram State, India. Although the Indian government reportedly ordered border security forces and the chief secretaries of the four northeastern states bordering Myanmar to prevent refugee inflows from Myanmar, as of July 2022, Mizoram State continues to host more than 30,000 Chin refugees. An estimated one-third of those sheltering in Mizoram State are located in the recently bombed Champhai District.
International humanitarian law—also known as the laws of war—is applicable to the situation in Chin State, which constitutes a non-international armed conflict. The laws of war are primarily defined by the Geneva Conventions, which provide fundamental rules to regulate the conduct of armed conflict and expressly guarantee the protection of civilians “against all acts of violence.” Under the laws of war, parties involved in the conflict are required to distinguish civilians and “civilian objects,” such as homes and hospitals that are not being used for military purposes, from combatants and “military objectives.” Both direct attacks and indiscriminate attacks that strike civilians and “civilian objects” are prohibited by the laws of war. “Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population” is further considered a serious violation of international humanitarian law that may constitute a war crime.
The Myanmar junta’s nationwide attacks on civilian populations amount to serious violations of international law and should be addressed by the United Nations Security Council, said Fortify Rights.
The U.N. Security Council has recognized that military coups, mass atrocity crimes, and cross-border refugee crises can threaten international peace and security and be a context for the Security Council to invoke its authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
On December 21, 2022, the U.N. Security Council adopted a historic resolution, denouncing human rights violations by the Myanmar military since the February 1, 2021 coup d’état. This was the first Security Council resolution on Myanmar since the country became independent in 1948, and while important, it failed to mandate action.
The Security Council should invoke its authority and pass a resolution to issue a global arms embargo against the Myanmar junta and refer the situation to the International Criminal Court, said Fortify Rights.
The Government of India should coordinate with Myanmar’s neighbors and other U.N. member states to block imports of aviation fuel to Myanmar, which would help prevent the junta’s deadly air strikes on civilian populations. The Indian government should also authorize cross-border humanitarian aid for internally displaced persons in Myanmar, and deprive the Myanmar military junta of weapons, dual-use technology, revenue, and political recognition, said Fortify Rights..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of publication:
2023-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Sub-title:
From brutal murders and military parades to jailed opponents, Min Aung Hlaing is true to the tyrant’s playbook. The worldwide fight for democracy has to be fought here
Description:
"It’s a country where children are imprisoned, tortured and sexually abused. Hundreds have been killed since the military coup two years ago. In total, more than 2,600 people have been murdered and nearly 17,000 detained by a brutal regime led by a genocidal war criminal. In case you’re wondering, this isn’t Ukraine and it isn’t Vladimir Putin.
The criminal in question is Myanmar’s junta boss, Gen Min Aung Hlaing, who struts about in a uniform adorned with meaningless decorations and gaudy gold braid. As a general rule, the more medals a dictator wears, the more absurd and dangerous they are. This killer, this bigoted bomber of villages, schools and hospitals, this displacer of millions, is right up there with the worst of them.
Min Aung Hlaing “celebrated” Myanmar’s 75th independence anniversary from Britain last week with a big military parade silently boycotted by most Burmese. Days earlier, he slapped yet another prison term on Aung San Suu Kyi, the democratically elected leader he deposed. True to the tyrant’s playbook, the junta plans sham elections this year that will exclude its opponents.
Addressing a sullen nation, Min Aung Hlaing thanked countries which have declined to join the EU, US and UK in imposing sanctions. It was a roll call of shame. “We are closely working with China, India, Thailand, Laos and Bangladesh ... for border stability and development,” he said. He might have mentioned Russia, too, his main arms supplier.
What the general failed to say is the junta’s grip on power is weakening in the teeth of growing political and armed resistance from an umbrella group, the People’s Defence Force, so-called ethnic armed organisation (EAOs), and the exiled, civilian-led national unity government.
Despite regime efforts to suppress independent reporting, much of Myanmar appears to be in a state of semi-permanent insurrection, punctuated by junta atrocities. Yet to succeed, disparate resistance groups need to forge a united front, Scot Marciel, a former US ambassador, suggested.
“The junta may be able to stay in power for some time just through pure brutality, but there’s no evidence at all that [it] will be able to stabilise or effectively govern the country or gain any kind of popular support,” Marciel told the Irrawaddy news website last week. “They [the resistance] have to show ... they present a stable alternative.”
It’s plain Myanmar’s people need help. So what more should the “international community” be doing? As the former colonial power, Britain is lead country on Myanmar at the UN. Notwithstanding foreign secretary James Cleverly’s recent boasts in the Guardian, its good-faith efforts have proven largely ineffectual over the years.
As is so often the case, hopes are pinned on the US. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act authorises the Biden administration to provide non-lethal assistance and funding to opposition organisations, political prisoners and civil society groups. But it is unclear what, if anything, the White House may do next.
If the world really wants to end Myanmar’s suffering, and bring Min Aung Hlaing to heel, China – in theory – is best placed to try. Huge business and infrastructure investments afford it unmatched leverage. It cares nought for democracy, but chronic instability on its border is not in Beijing’s interest.
Self-serving calculations, not principles, explain China’s unexpected decision not to veto last month’s first-ever UN security council resolution on Myanmar, which called for an end to violence and the freeing of all political prisoners. Following Beijing’s lead, Russia also abstained. Now comes the hard part: ensuring the junta complies.
The UN, like Myanmar’s opposition, needs a united front. To work, it must also include India’s government which, as with Ukraine, puts money before morality; Bangladesh, which is struggling to cope with a million Burmese Rohingya Muslim refugees; and Thailand and other Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) members.
But Asean is split. Its “five-point consensus” peace plan has stalled. Some states fantasise the junta’s sham elections will provide genuine legitimacy. Even recent tragedies involving Rohingya boat people have left regional leaders largely unmoved.
The Burma Campaign UK pressure group complains the UN resolution does not go far enough, with no mention, for example, of a long-sought global arms embargo. “Russia, China and India are using their seats on the security council to protect their profitable dodgy arms deals with the Burmese military,” said UK director Mark Farmaner.
Trying to maintain momentum, activists want the UK and other governments to block supplies of aviation fuel, to stop the junta launching air strikes. Too many international companies still do business in Myanmar, they say. Legal action alleging a Rohingya genocide is under way at the UN’s International Court of Justice – but the process will take years.
Who else can deter the junta? Religious leaders might be expected to help. But the regime assiduously courts majority Buddhist opinion. Last week it honoured Wirathu, an ultra-nationalist monk notorious for anti-Islam rhetoric who was once dubbed the “face of Buddhist terror”.
Disappointingly, Catholic leaders feted Min Aung Hlaing at a Christmas service at Holy Trinity cathedral in Yangon. Cardinal Charles Maung Bo prayed for peace, apparently forgiving of the fact his parishioner’s stormtroopers frequently burn churches – and attacked his home village last year.
Bottom line: all concerned actors, international and domestic, must join together to dethrone the region’s worst regime since the Khmer Rouge terrorised Cambodia. “What is required is action,” Tom Andrews, UN rapporteur on Myanmar, declared last month. “Systematic, gross human rights violations, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, [are] being perpetrated daily on the people of Myanmar.”
What could be clearer? If the 21st century’s defining global struggle for democracy, justice and civil liberties is to have any hope of succeeding, it must be fought here, too..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-01-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"On January 4, the junta announced they would release a total of 7,012 prisoners in “accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 401, Sub-Section (1)”. AAPP has been monitoring the situation and understands that around 300 political prisoners from at least (19) prisons were released. Throughout the day, AAPP has been able to confirm the release of 223 identified political prisoners. The exact identities and total figures of the prisoners released remain to be verified, but AAPP will continue to monitor and document these releases as more information becomes available.
Since the February 1, 2021, military coup and the emergence of the Spring Revolution, a total of (2707) people, pro-democracy activists and other civilians have been killed through military crackdowns following pro-democracy movements.
Since the coup, a total of (13,272) people are currently under detention, (1911) of whom are serving sentences. There are a total of (100) post-coup death row prisoners as of January 6, 2023. (121) people have been sentenced in absentia, of whom (42) have been sentenced to death. This makes a total of (142) people who have been sentenced to death. (24) people have been released on bail and (3696) people have already been released. These are the numbers verified by AAPP. The actual numbers are likely much higher. We will continue to update accordingly.
According to information gathered today, on the night of January 5 political prisoners were severely tortured by prison staff and many police forces in Pathein Prison. The beatings are still continuing today. It is reported that a political prisoner Win Min Thant (aka Mae Gyi) was killed from the assault, though the death is still being confirmed. 8 political prisoners are reportedly receiving medical treatments in the new Pathein Hospital and are in life-threatening condition. Such kind of torture is a serious and blatent violation of human rights.
Among the prisoners released from Myeik Prison in Tanintharyi Region on January 4 was Dr. Min Htet Paing, a political prisoner who was sentenced to serve 3 years in prison under Penal Code Section 505 A. However, another charge was then made against Dr. Min Htet Paing and he was rearrested in front of the prison entrance. He was accused of writing false information on social media to create unrest and “terrorism”, and arrested in early April 2021 on Kyay Nan Taing Bridge in Pathaung Village Tract, Myeik Township.
AAPP will continue to inform on verified daily arrests, charges, sentences and fatalities in relation to the attempted coup, and update the lists with details of these alleged offences. If you receive any information about detentions of, or charges against, CSO leaders, activists, journalists, CDM workers, other civilians and fallen heroes in relation to the military and police crackdown on dissent, please submit to the following addresses: [email protected] [email protected].....ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ အကျဉ်းသား၊အကျဉ်းသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၇၀၁၂) အား ရာဇဝတ်ကျင့်ထုံး ဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၄၀၁၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (၁) အရ ပြန်လည် လွှတ်ပေးမည်ဟု ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့သည်။ AAPP မှ အဆိုပါ အကျဉ်းထောင်လွှတ်ပေးမှု အခြေအနေနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ စောင့်ကြည့်မှတ်တမ်းတင်လျက်ရှိရာ လက်ရှိအချိန်ထိရရှိထား သော အချက်အလက်များအရ အကျဉ်းထောင် (၁၉) ခုထက်မနည်းမှ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား (၃၀၀) ဝန်းကျင် လွတ်မြောက်လာကြောင်းသိရှိရသည်။ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့် ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း (AAPP) မှ အဆိုပါ အကျဉ်းသားလွှတ်ပေးမှုဖြစ်စဉ်မှ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသော နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား (၂၂၃) ဦးကို ယနေ့အထိ မှတ်တမ်းပြုနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေအတိအကျနှင့် အမည်စာရင်းမှာ ချက်ချင်းရရှိရန် လက်လှမ်းမမီနိုင် သည့်အတွက် အတည်ပြုရန် လိုအပ်နေဆဲဖြစ်ပြီး အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် အမည်စာရင်းများကို ဆက်လက်ဖော်ပြပေးသွား ပါမည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မတရားစစ်အာဏာလုမှုဖြစ်စဉ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသော ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများ နှင့် ပြည်သူများ၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသူ စုစုပေါင်းမှာ (၂၇၀၇) ဦး ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်နေ့ထိတိုင် ဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၃၂၇၂) ဦးရှိပြီး ၎င်းတို့အနက်မှ (၁၉၁၁) ဦးမှာ ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသည်။ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အထိ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးနှင့်ဆက်စပ်၍ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရပြီး အကျဉ်းထောင်များတွင် ထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၀၀) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မျက်ကွယ်သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ (၄၂) ဦး အပါအဝင် (၁၂၁) ဦးမှာ မျက်ကွယ်ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံ ထားရသည်။ ထိုကြောင့် သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၄၂) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အာမခံဖြင့် လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၂၄) ဦးရှိပြီး၊ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေမှာ (၃၆၉၆) ဦး ရှိသည်။
ဖော်ပြပါ ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များသည် AAPP မှ ကောက်ယူရရှိထားသည့် အရေအတွက်ဖြစ်ပြီး မြေပြင်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသည့်အချက်အလက်နှင့် ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များမှာ ယခုထက်ပိုမိုများပြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ အချက်အလက်များကို ထပ်မံကောက်ယူရရှိလာပါက ဆက်လက်ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြသွားပါမည်။
ယနေ့ရရှိသော အချက်အလက်များအရ ယမန်နေ့ (ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၅ ရက်) ညအချိန်တွင် ပုသိမ်အကျဉ်းထောင်၌ ထောင်ဝန်ထမ်းနှင့် ရဲအင်အားအများအပြားမှ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများအား ပြင်းထန်စွာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခဲ့သည်ဟု ကြားသိရသည်။
ယနေ့တွင်လည်း ဆက်လက်၍ ရိုက်နှက်နေဆဲဖြစ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားဖြစ်သူ ဝင်းမင်းထက်(ခ) မဲကြီးမှာ ရိုက်နှက်ခံရမှုကြောင့် သေဆုံးသွားကြောင်း ကြားသိရပြီး ထိုသေဆုံးမှုအား ဆက်လက်အတည်ပြုနေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ၈ ဦး မှာ ပုသိမ်ဆေးရုံအသစ်တွင် ဆေးကုသမှုခံနေရသည်ဟု သိရှိရသည်။ ဆေးကုသမှုခံနေရသူများမှာလည်း အသက်အန္တရာယ် စိုးရိမ်ဖွယ်ရာ အခြေအနေဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်းသည် အလွန်ပြင်းထန် သော လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုဖြစ်သည်။
ထို့ပြင် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့၌ တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း၊ မြိတ်အကျဉ်းထောင်မှ လွတ်မြောက်လာသူများတွင် ရာဇသတ်ကြီးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၅၀၅-က ဖြင့် ထောင်ဒဏ် သုံးနှစ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသော နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား ဒေါက်တာ မင်းထက်ပိုင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သော်လည်း ၎င်းအား အခြားအမှုကပ်ပြီး ထောင်ဘူးဝရှေ့၌ ပြန်လည် ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။ ဒေါက်တာမင်းထက်ပိုင်သည် လူမှုကွန်ရက်စာမျက်နှာပေါ်တွင် မဟုတ်မမှန်ရေးသားပြီး ဆူပူအကြမ်းဖက်မှု များဖြစ်ပေါ်လာစေရန် စည်းရုံးလှုံ့ဆော်သည်ဟု စွပ်စွဲခြင်းခံရကာ မြိတ်မြို့နယ်၊ ပသောင်းကျေးရွာအုပ်စု၊ ကြေးနန်းတိုင် တံတား၌ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလဆန်းပိုင်းတွင် ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။
အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းမှ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ အရပ်သားများ၊ တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူများ၊ သတင်းသမားများ၊ CDM လှုပ်ရှားနေသည့် ဝန်ထမ်းများစသည့် နယ်ပယ်အသီးသီးမှ မည်သူမဆို ဖမ်းဆီး၊ ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံထားရ ခြင်းများနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များကို သိရှိပါက အောက်ပါလိပ်စာ များသို့ ဆက်သွယ်၍ အသိပေး၊ အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ကျဆုံးအချက်အလက်များကို ဖော်ပြပါ [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ အဖမ်းအဆီးအချက်အလက်များကို [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးပို့၍ ဆက်သွယ်အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2023-01-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar military regime chief Min Aung Hlaing’s mania for the presidency is increasingly unchecked and, infuriatingly for the Myanmar people, grows more visible with each passing day.
In recent days, they have cringed at the sight of the coup leader dressed in presidential attire handing out decorations to those who have earned his favor, at commemorations of New Year and the country’s 75th Independence Day. Then, he attended a grand military review, putting on airs and posing as the country’s legitimate president.
In their eyes, Min Aung Hlaing has never been the country’s leader. Rather, they see him as merely a nasty impostor who grabbed power from the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government in a military takeover and began committing atrocities, including air strikes against civilians, killing more than 2,600 people so far for rejecting his rule.
Formally, Min Aung Hlaing has not yet been able to call himself Myanmar’s president—constitutionally, the holder of that position must be elected to it by the country’s parliament. In fact, he came to power via a coup that effectively abolished the legislature.
But he has long been, and remains, desperate to be the president. That’s why he staged a coup against the NLD despite party leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s offer to him of the vice presidency, or a new post as chairman of the Military Commission.
Right after the coup, he moved straight into the Presidential Residence.
Then, he tried to deceive the world by appointing himself prime minister, preferring to be regarded as a civilian leader, rather than the head of a coup, while maintaining the military chief positon. Since then he has rarely been seen in uniform. Instead, he jumped into presidential attire to greet incoming diplomats in front of the Sihasana Palin, or Lion Throne, a symbol of Myanmar’s sovereignty, in imitation of the country’s previous presidents.
His mania for the presidency moved into high gear last year when he presided over a grand military review in February, following in the footsteps of ex-president Thein Sein, a former general. In short, Min Aung Hlaing has done almost everything that Myanmar monarchs and presidents traditionally do—from his reverence for white elephants and obsession with rubies, to building and consecrating pagodas and churning out honorary titles.
During the grand military reviews and ceremonies to confer titles, he has worn the Salwel, a sash that is one of the regalia of the Myanmar president, mimicking the pose of Thein Sein when the latter was sworn in as president at the Parliament in 2011.
Min Aung Hlaing plans to hold a general election in August—a must if he is to convene the Parliament and be elected president of Myanmar.
In his speeches to mark New Year and the 75th anniversary of Independence Day, Min Aung Hlaing therefore stressed that his regime is working hard to hold the election nationwide, ignoring the fact that his regime is losing ground in many parts of the country.
Min Aung Hlaing may however push ahead with his plan and order the Union Election Commission appointed by him to postpone the voting in some electorates, citing security reasons.
Taking no chances, he has also suppressed the National League for Democracy (NLD)—which he still sees as a threat, even after imprisoning its leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—and is in the process of replacing the first-past-the-post electoral system with proportional representation to ensure there is no landslide victory for a single party.
Min Aung Hlaing also installed Khin Yi, who served as police chief under the previous regime and is known for his brutal crackdown on activists who protested against it, as chairman of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The party has been making moves to solidify its position ahead of the planned poll.
With the NLD boycotting the election, the USDP is much more likely to win a majority in the Parliament. With 25 percent of seats constitutionally reserved for the military, Min Aung Hlaing’s dream seems set to become a reality, as USDP members and military appointees would vote for him to become president.
Meanwhile, Min Aung Hlaing is required under the constitution to hand power back to the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) at the end of this month. The election must be held within six months of that date. To maintain the military’s grip on power ahead of its plan for a so-called election in August, he would form a “transition council” under his leadership.
All of which guarantees that military rule will not really end in six months, or beyond the planned election, which he will use to legitimize his presidency by any means..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Jeremy Laurence
The release of political prisoners in Myanmar is not only a relief to those unfairly detained, but also their families. Importantly, however, we take this opportunity to call for the release of the thousands of others who remain in detention for opposing military rule. Even as news emerged about the amnesty to mark the country's independence day, we continued to receive reports of people being detained for opposing military rule, many of whom have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Such detentions are not only intended to silence the junta’s critics, but are also designed to instil fear.
As we mark the 75th anniversary this year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the High Commissioner has called for an end to arbitrary detention once and for all. This week he called on governments and all detaining authorities globally to put the milestone Declaration into action by granting an amnesty, pardon or by simply releasing all those detained for exercising their rights.
The pathway out of Myanmar’s crisis is not by locking people up – it is by allowing them to freely, fully, and effectively participate in political life..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-01-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"On January 4, the junta announced they would release a total of 7,012 prisoners in “accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 401, Sub-Section (1)”. AAPP has been monitoring the situation and understands that around 300 political prisoners from at least (19) prisons were released. Throughout the day, AAPP has been able to confirm the release of 193 identified political prisoners. The exact identities and total figures of the prisoners released remain to be verified, but AAPP will continue to monitor and document these releases as more information becomes available.
Since the February 1, 2021, military coup and the emergence of the Spring Revolution, a total of (2702) people, pro-democracy activists and other civilians have been killed through military crackdowns following pro-democracy movements.
Since the coup, a total of (13,284) people are currently under detention, (1912) of whom are serving sentences. There are a total of (100) post-coup death row prisoners as of January 5, 2023. (121) people have been sentenced in absentia, of whom (42) have been sentenced to death. This makes a total of (142) people who have been sentenced to death. (24) people have been released on bail and (3667) people have already been released. These are the numbers verified by AAPP. The actual numbers are likely much higher. We will continue to update accordingly.
According to information gathered today, on January 3, at around 7:30 PM, the junta fired heavy artillery, despite no clash occurring, at Demoso Township in Kayah State. One of the artillery shells exploded on a hut near Daw Tangoo Village, resulting in the death of an internally displaced woman called Soe Myar, who was struck in the thigh.
On January 3, Aung Kyawl, NLD Township Secretary of Wakema Township in Ayeyarwady Region, was sentenced to serve 10 years imprisonment with hard labour. Aung Kwyal was charged under Counter-Terrorism Law Section 50 (j) and sentenced by the Myaungmya Prison Special Court in Ayeyarwady Region. He is over 70 years old and already spent over a year under detainment.
AAPP will continue to inform on verified daily arrests, charges, sentences and fatalities in relation to the attempted coup, and update the lists with details of these alleged offences. If you receive any information about detentions of, or charges against, CSO leaders, activists, journalists, CDM workers, other civilians and fallen heroes in relation to the military and police crackdown on dissent, please submit to the following addresses: [email protected] [email protected].....ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ အကျဉ်းသား၊အကျဉ်းသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၇၀၁၂) အား ရာဇဝတ်ကျင့်ထုံး ဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၄၀၁၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (၁) အရ ပြန်လည် လွှတ်ပေးမည်ဟု ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့သည်။ AAPP မှ အဆိုပါ အကျဉ်းထောင်လွှတ်ပေးမှု အခြေအနေနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ စောင့်ကြည့်မှတ်တမ်းတင်လျက်ရှိရာ လက်ရှိအချိန်ထိရရှိထား သော အချက်အလက်များအရ အကျဉ်းထောင် (၁၉) ခုထက်မနည်းမှ နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသား (၃၀၀) ဝန်းကျင် လွတ်မြောက်လာကြောင်းသိရှိရသည်။ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့် ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း (AAPP) မှ အဆိုပါ အကျဉ်းသားလွှတ်ပေးမှုဖြစ်စဉ်မှ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသော နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား (၁၉၃) ဦးကို ယနေ့အထိ မှတ်တမ်းပြုနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေအတိအကျနှင့် အမည်စာရင်းမှာ ချက်ချင်းရရှိရန် လက်လှမ်းမမီနိုင် သည့်အတွက် အတည်ပြုရန် လိုအပ်နေဆဲဖြစ်ပြီး အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် အမည်စာရင်းများကို ဆက်လက်ဖော်ပြပေးသွား ပါမည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မတရားစစ်အာဏာလုမှုဖြစ်စဉ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသော ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများ နှင့် ပြည်သူများ၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသူ စုစုပေါင်းမှာ (၂၇၀၂) ဦး ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၅ ရက်နေ့ထိတိုင် ဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၃၂၈၄) ဦးရှိပြီး ၎င်းတို့အနက်မှ (၁၉၁၂) ဦးမှာ ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသည်။ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၅ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အထိ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးနှင့်ဆက်စပ်၍ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရပြီး အကျဉ်းထောင်များတွင် ထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၀၀) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မျက်ကွယ်သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ (၄၂) ဦး အပါအဝင် (၁၂၁) ဦးမှာ မျက်ကွယ်ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံ ထားရသည်။ ထိုကြောင့် သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၄၂) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အာမခံဖြင့် လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၂၄) ဦးရှိပြီး၊ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေမှာ (၃၆၆၇) ဦး ရှိသည်။
ဖော်ပြပါ ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များသည် AAPP မှ ကောက်ယူရရှိထားသည့် အရေအတွက်ဖြစ်ပြီး မြေပြင်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသည့်အချက်အလက်နှင့် ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များမှာ ယခုထက်ပိုမိုများပြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ အချက်အလက်များကို ထပ်မံကောက်ယူရရှိလာပါက ဆက်လက်ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြသွားပါမည်။
ယနေ့ရရှိသော အချက်အလက်များအရ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃ ရက်နေ့၊ ည ၇ နာရီခွဲခန့်အချိန်တွင် ကယားပြည်နယ်၊ ဒီးမော့ဆိုမြို့နယ်၌ တိုက်ပွဲဖြစ်ပွားခြင်းမရှိဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏တပ်မှ လက်နက်ကြီးဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ရာ အဆိုပါလက်နက်ကြီးကျည်မှာ ဒေါတငူးကျေးရွာအနီးရှိ တဲအိမ်ပေါ်ကို ကျရောက်ပေါက်ကွဲခဲ့သောကြောင့် စစ်ရှောင် အမျိုးသမီးတစ်ဦးဖြစ်သူ စိုးမြာသည် ပေါင်ကို ထိမှန်ခဲ့ပြီး သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။
ထို့ပြင် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် ဧရာဝတီတိုင်း၊ မြောင်းမြအကျဉ်းထောင်တွင်းအထူးတရားရုံးမှ ဝါးခယ်မမြို့နယ် အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ်၏ မြို့နယ်အတွင်းရေးမှူး ဦးအောင်ကြွယ်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၅၀(ည) ဖြင့် အလုပ်ကြမ်းနှင့် ထောင်ဒဏ် ၁၀ နှစ်စီ ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည်။ ဦးအောင်ကြွယ်သည် အသက် ၇၀ ကျော်အရွယ် ရှိပြီဖြစ်ပြီး တစ်နှစ်ကျော်ကြာဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရပြီးနောက် အမိန့်ချမှတ်ခံခဲ့ရခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။
အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းမှ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ အရပ်သားများ၊ တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူများ၊ သတင်းသမားများ၊ CDM လှုပ်ရှားနေသည့် ဝန်ထမ်းများစသည့် နယ်ပယ်အသီးသီးမှ မည်သူမဆို ဖမ်းဆီး၊ ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံထားရ ခြင်းများနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များကို သိရှိပါက အောက်ပါလိပ်စာ များသို့ ဆက်သွယ်၍ အသိပေး၊ အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ကျဆုံးအချက်အလက်များကို ဖော်ပြပါ [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ အဖမ်းအဆီးအချက်အလက်များကို [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးပို့၍ ဆက်သွယ်အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2023-01-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
more
Description:
"There is no doubt that China in just a couple of decades has transformed itself from a poor Asian country into an economic, political and even military superpower. But little attention has been paid to the way in which China has also established a media and information imperium with tentacles spreading all over the world.
That would not be especially remarkable, had it not been for the way in which China’s ruling communist party is using its own media outlets, and the influence those exercise over newspaper, internet sites and blogs in some other countries, to promote its own undemocratic system as an alternative to “liberal democracy”, as well as peddling misinformation about, for instance, the situation in its ethnic minority regions of Xinjiang and Tibet.
China’s propaganda apparatus even tries to influence other countries domestic policies by planting false news and manipulating public figures. In Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World, Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), examines China’s global media offensive and how the leaders in Beijing are increasingly cooperating with their comrades in Moscow in their efforts to become global media influencers.
China has, as Kurlantzick points out, often failed to reap gains from its efforts, but it has been successful in exporting “its political and internet control models” to some like-minded regimes in Asia — among them Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. These campaigns, Kurlantzick argues, may “not only help protect the ruling Party [in China]; they may also help China build alliances with autocracies and undermine press freedoms, human rights, and democracy across the globe.” CFR may be a United States (US)-based think-tank but it is independent and non-partisan, and often publishes reports critical of Washington and its policies.
Although Kurlanzick’s study focuses on the media, it should also be mentioned in this context that Reuters, on July 11 last year, identified three Chinese companies that have supplied Myanmar with cameras with facial recognition capabilities which now are in place in cities all over the country, enabling the junta to track down and identify opponents to the dictatorship. Two of the three companies – the Shenzhen-based technology giant Huawei Technologies and Zhejiang Dahua Technology in Hangzhou in Zhejiang province – did not respond to Reuters request for comment. The third company, Hikvision, another partly state-owned company also based in Hangzhou, issued a vague and ambiguous statement saying that the company had never sold any equipment “directly to Myanmar government authorities.”
Hikvision claimed also that it had not provided Myanmar with facial recognition technology. But The Irrawaddy has learned from industry sources that Hikvision has used local Chinese and Myanmar middlemen to transfer such equipment to the junta, and that such indirect sales to Myanmar have increased dramatically over the past year. Chinese companies have also supplied the military regime with technology that makes it possible to monitor the internet, hack into independent websites, and control the flow of news from Myanmar to the outside world.
Kurlantzick quotes a speech at the United Nations (UN) by China’s then president Hu Jintao in 2005 as an early example of how Beijing has for years been trying to sell its version of authoritarianism to the outside world by stating that all states should have “respect for countries’ right to choose independently their own social systems and paths of development.” Needless to say, that is impossible in Myanmar and other dictatorships because the people in those countries have no right to elect their own governments. No one has “chosen” to be oppressed and ruled by a small group of ruthless villains who have usurped power. But the leaders in Beijing probably don’t care what ordinary people think. China’s model is fairly straight-forward: authoritarian rule, not democracy, leads to economic development. And, to some extent, that notion has been accepted by rulers and politicians in some Asian, African and South American countries.
China’s charm offensive, which began in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has, in some ways, not been that different from the so-called “soft power” efforts pursued for years by many Western countries, among them the US, France and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union. China has established Confucius Institutes in a host of foreign countries and, on the surface, they don’t seem to be that different from the United States Information Service, the British Council or Alliance Française.
But the Confucius Institutes go much further then its Western equivalents. According to Kurlantzick, the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found in a report issued on February 19, 2019, that many American universities had allowed Confucius Institutes to be set up on their campuses “with minimal oversight and little knowledge of the Chinese governance of the Confucius Institute program, even though the institutes can come with strings that compromise academic freedom.”
The decision to name its institutes after the Chinese philosopher Confucius (actually a Latinized form of Kong Fuzi, or ‘Master Kong’), who is believed to have lived from 551 to 479 BCE, could not have been an easy one to make. During the last three years of his life, 1973-76, the old Chinese dictator Mao Zedong and his wife Jiang Qing launched a campaign called “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius”. Lin was of course Lin Piao, Mao’s former heir who allegedly planned to stage a coup and then tried to escape to the Soviet Union. But the plane crashed under mysterious circumstances in Mongolia in September 1971 and, as a possible opponent to Mao, he was branded “an enemy of the people”.
Confucius, Mao and Jiang claimed, had stood for feudalism, slavery and the denigration of women. Traces of Confucian thought which still remained in the consciousness of the Chinese people in the 1970s thus hindered the country’s development, Mao and Jiang argued.
In today’s ‘reformed’ China, the Confucius Institutes are overseen by China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), a department that is directly controlled by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It is known to be gathering intelligence and managing relations with individuals and organizations inside and outside China.
UFWD operatives and local informants working for the outfit are, among other things, suspected of monitoring overseas popular protests against Beijing and its policies. That happened in Hong Kong during the pro-democracy demonstrations there in 2019-2020. Further away from China’s immediate periphery, there were demonstrations outside China’s embassy in Yangon, which must have shattered the powerholders in Beijing. China, a longtime supporter of the Myanmar military, was and has never been popular among the public at large. Hence, China’s support for the junta’s efforts to identify opponents to military rule, whether they are spotted by surveillance cameras in public, or identified through policing of the internet.
Apart from the Confucius Institutes, another major way in which the Chinese leadership is trying to influencing public opinion in foreign countries, Kurlantzick states, is “contents-sharing deals” with media in selected countries. They are offered free dispatches from the official, government-controlled news agency Xinhua and programs aired by Chinese national television in return for having some of their material appear in Chinese media. In Thailand, the Matichon Group, of which the well-respected website Khaosod is a part, announced a content-sharing deal with Xinhua in 2019.
Khaosod began running Xinhua articles for free and among the first pieces were articles on the 2019 Hong Kong protests that portrayed the demonstrators as “tools of Western agitators” and Xinjiang as a place where “equality, solidarity and harmony among ethnic groups and religions have prevailed.” People in the region were also supposed to be “enjoying peace and stability.” According to human rights groups, the Chinese authorities have detained as many as a million Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang and have perpetrated widespread sexual violence against local women.
A report from the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, released in August last year, concluded that “serious human rights violations have been committed,” including “arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups” which, it asserted, “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” When the Matichon Group was criticized by, for instance Tyler Roney writing for Foreign Policy, for striking a deal with Xinhua, the response from a Khaosod editor was that “there are two sides to a story” and “we believe in the judgment of our readers.”
Elsewhere in the region, government-controlled TV stations in Laos, Cambodia and Timor Leste have links with Chinese media firms. In Cambodia, the government has also created a new set of rules governing its domestic internet which copies China’s internet laws. In Vietnam, whose relations with China have not, to say the least, always been smooth, the authorities have emulated not only China’s model of state power but also implemented new cyberspace legislation akin to that in China.
Kurlantzick also points out that in Myanmar, “the junta government, which seized power in February 2021, quickly tried to implement new cyberspace laws and regulations similar to China’s internet laws.” Xinhua frequently quotes news material from junta mouthpieces such as The Global New Light of Myanmar and The Mirror. Chinese state media has also signed content-sharing deals with Chinese-language outlets in Myanmar, at least at some stage, while in 2012, China Radio International signed an agreement with Myanmar state TV to broadcast Chinese shows.
More controversially, in 2018 the Dehong Group in Yunnan that publishes Pauk Phaw entered into a content-sharing agreement with the Myitkyina News Journal, which before the coup was one of Kachin State’s most respected newspapers. Myitkyina News Journal’s editors stated after the deal was struck that they had hoped to get sources in China. The paper is still being published, but as a website and on Facebook. Several of its editors had to flee after the 2021 coup.
Naturally, since it examines a global media effort, Kurlantzick’s book deals with not only Southeast Asia’s media, but also the rest of the world and especially Africa, where China’s often not-so-subtle charm offensive has been easier to observe and discern. The book is a brilliant account of how Beijing’s multi-pronged campaign is unfolding, and it should be read by anyone interested in press freedom and what China’s leaders are doing to manipulate the media throughout the world, so as to control democratic forces at home and in other countries..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime has released the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government’s Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture, Thura U Aung Ko, philanthropist and writer Daw Than Myint Aung and ex-NLD information officer, writer U Htin Lin Oo, along with some detained journalists, as part of the junta’s prisoner amnesty to commemorate the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence from the UK.
The junta announced on Wednesday that 7,021 prisoners were freed from jails across the country. It is not yet clear how many political prisoners were among those released.
Family members said that former Brigadier General Thura U Aung Ko was released from Yangon’s Insein Prison on Tuesday night. The 75-year-old was arrested after the February 2021 coup and charged with alleged corruption. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison with labor in March 2021.
Relatives of Daw Than Myint Aung and U Htin Lin Oo were waiting at the gate of Insein Prison on Wednesday morning to welcome them. The pair were released Wednesday afternoon.
Daw Than Myint Aung was a member of the Yangon City Development Committee during the NLD’s time in power. She was arrested on the first day of the military takeover and sentenced to three years in prison for incitement.
Former NLD information officer U Htin Lin Oo faced the same charge as Daw Than Myint Aung, and was also sentenced to three years by the Insein Prison Court.
U Tun Kyi, the head of a political prisoners group, said that Thura U Aung Ko is known to be in poor health and that his release was a cynical ploy by the regime.
“The junta released the political prisoner hostages for its own political gain,” said U Tun Kyi, referring to international pressure on the regime to free political prisoners.
On Wednesday, Kyaw Zay Ya, the chief reporter of Mawkun Magazine, was released from Daik-U prison in Bago Region, but was then detained again by police for unknown reasons.
Family members of other detained journalists were eagerly awaiting the release of their relatives. The husband of Thuzar, a journalist arrested in September 2021 and sentenced to two years in prison under Section 505(a) of the Penal Code for spreading false news, said that she had been freed.
“I am now on my way to East Dagon Police Station to get her,” said her husband Ko Ye Ko.
Another journalist Sai Ko Ko Tun, a former reporter from the now defunct 7 Days News, was released from Dawei prison, too.
As of Tuesday, some 16,862 people have been detained by the junta since the coup, of whom 3,463 have been released, according to the rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).
The AAPP’s joint secretary Ko Bo Kyi said that with many political prisoners still locked up, the regime’s amnesty does not herald any meaningful changes for Myanmar.
“That will happen only when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Win Myint and all the other political prisoners are freed,” he added.
Both Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint were arrested on the first day of the coup. Former State Counselor Suu Kyi has been sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison, while ousted President U Win Myint has been given 12 years by the regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"France condemns in the strongest possible terms the new seven-year prison sentence imposed today on State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi following arbitrary legal proceedings that aim to discredit a democratically elected civilian political figure. This sentence is an additional indication of the military regime’s contempt for the rule of law and the will of the Burmese people, which was freely and unequivocally expressed in the general elections that took place on November 8, 2020.
France reiterates its commitment to seeing the establishment of a political dialogue that includes the democratic opposition, including the National League for Democracy and its historic leaders, which is a crucial prerequisite for any resolution to the crisis.
As was demanded by the UN Security Council in its resolution 2669, France reiterates its call for the immediate, unconditional release of all those who are being arbitrarily detained, including State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, as well as its call for an end to the violence committed by Myanmar’s security forces.
France reaffirms its support for the efforts of ASEAN and its Special Envoy as well as those of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations..."
Source/publisher:
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Date of publication:
2023-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, About Aung San Suu Kyi
Language:
more
Description:
"Since the February 1, 2021, military coup and the emergence of the Spring Revolution, a total of (2692) people, pro-democracy activists and other civilians have been killed through military crackdowns following pro-democracy movements.
Since the coup, a total of (13,375) people are currently under detention, (1947) of whom are serving sentences. There are a total of (100) post-coup death row prisoners as of January 3, 2023. (121) people have been sentenced in absentia, of whom (42) have been sentenced to death. This makes a total of (142) people who have been sentenced to death. (24) people have been released on bail and (3463) people have already been released. These are the numbers verified by AAPP. The actual numbers are likely much higher. We will continue to update accordingly.
On December 29, Nang Twal Tar Oo, Joint-Secretary of Yangon University of Education Students’ Union (ABFSU), and Yu Yu Mon, a former member of Yangon Institute of Economics Students’ Union and current Vice-Chief Statistician of Nay Pyi Taw Central Statistical Organization, were each sentenced to serve 10 years imprisonment. Yu Yu Mon had joined CDM and the pair were sentenced by Mon State Mawlamyine District Court under Counter-Terrorism Law Section 50 (j). They were arrested while evading capture in Mawlamyine Town on June 9.
On January 2, 2023, at around 9 AM, junta forces, stationed at Budalin Township in Sagaing Region, raided Shwe Taung Village in Budalin Township. The junta troops killed a couple of over 70-years-old. Military soldiers also detained a local called Nga Hmay for just wearing long pants, then tortured before killing him in a corn field outside the village.
AAPP will continue to inform on verified daily arrests, charges, sentences and fatalities in relation to the attempted coup, and update the lists with details of these alleged offenses. If you receive any information about detentions of, or charges against, CSO leaders, activists, journalists, CDM workers, other civilians and fallen heroes in relation to the military and police crackdown on dissent, please submit to the following addresses: [email protected] [email protected].....၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မတရားစစ်အာဏာလုမှုဖြစ်စဉ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသော ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများ နှင့် ပြည်သူများ၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသူ စုစုပေါင်းမှာ (၂၆၉၂) ဦး ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃ ရက်နေ့ထိတိုင် ဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၃၃၇၅) ဦးရှိပြီး ၎င်းတို့အနက်မှ (၁၉၄၇) ဦး မှာ ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသည်။ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အထိ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးနှင့်ဆက်စပ်၍ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရပြီး အကျဉ်းထောင်များတွင် ထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၀၀) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မျက်ကွယ်သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ (၄၂) ဦး အပါအဝင် (၁၂၁) ဦးမှာ မျက်ကွယ်ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံ ထားရသည်။ ထိုကြောင့် သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၄၂) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အာမခံဖြင့် လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၂၄) ဦးရှိပြီး၊ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေမှာ (၃၄၆၃) ဦး ရှိသည်။
ယနေ့ရရှိသောအချက်အလက်များအရ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၂၉ ရက်နေ့တွင် မွန်ပြည်နယ်၊ မော်လမြိုင်ခရိုင်တရားရုံးမှ ရန်ကုန်ပညာရေးတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်)၏ တွဲဖက်အတွင်းရေးမှူး နန်းတွယ်တာဦးနှင့် ရန်ကုန်စီးပွားရေးတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂအဖွဲ့ဝင်ဟောင်း၊ အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) ပြုလုပ်ထား သော နေပြည်တော် ဗဟိုစာရင်းအင်းအဖွဲ့၏ ဒု-စာရင်းအင်းမှူး မယုယုမွန်တို့ကို အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၅၀ (ည) ဖြင့် ထောင်ဒဏ် ၁၀ နှစ်စီ ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည်။ ဇွန်လ ၉ ရက်နေ့တွင် မနန်းတွယ်တာဦးနှင့် မယုယုမွန်တို့သည် မော်လမြိုင်မြို့၌ တိမ်းရှောင်နေစဉ် ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။
ထို့ပြင် ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ဧရာဝတီတိုင်း မအူပင်ခရိုင်ထောင်တွင်းအထူးတရားရုံးမှ မအူပင်နည်းပညာ တက္ကသိုလ်၏ နောက်ဆုံးနှစ်ကျောင်းသူ မရွှေခြူးဝိုင်းကို အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၅၀ (ည)ဖြင့် ထောင်ဒဏ် ဆယ်နှစ်ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည်။ မရွှေခြူးဝိုင်းသည် ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ် (မအူပင်) ၏ သတင်းနှင့် ပြန်ကြားရေး တာဝန်ခံ တစ်ဦး ဖြစ်ပြီး ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလတွင် ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။
ဖော်ပြပါ ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များသည် AAPP မှ ကောက်ယူရရှိထားသည့် အရေအတွက်ဖြစ်ပြီး မြေပြင်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသည့်အချက်အလက်နှင့် ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များမှာ ယခုထက်ပိုမိုများပြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ အချက်အလက် များကို ထပ်မံကောက်ယူရရှိလာပါက ဆက်လက်ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြသွားပါမည်။
အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းမှ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ အရပ်သားများ၊ တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူများ၊ သတင်းသမားများ၊ CDM လှုပ်ရှားနေသည့် ဝန်ထမ်းများစသည့် နယ်ပယ်အသီးသီးမှ မည်သူမဆို ဖမ်းဆီး၊ ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံထားရ ခြင်းများနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များကို သိရှိပါက အောက်ပါလိပ်စာ များသို့ ဆက်သွယ်၍ အသိပေး၊ အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ကျဆုံးအချက်အလက်များကို ဖော်ပြပါ [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ အဖမ်းအဆီးအချက်အလက်များကို [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးပို့၍ ဆက်သွယ်အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2023-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar’s junta appears determined to hold a national election this year, but the vote will be a sham, logistically difficult to pull off and will almost certainly provoke greater violence.
Description:
"Just a handful of autocrats will endorse the results. Precious money and resources will be wasted. Violence will almost certainly worsen. And yet, the junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing remains committed to holding an “election” in 2023 that few in Myanmar want.
After thousands of deaths, at least a million people displaced, a massive nationwide drop into severe poverty, war crimes on at least a weekly basis and the broad militarisation of society, the regime believes it will hold an election by August 1 this year, the legally mandated end of its emergency rule provisions.
Whatever else this theatrical undertaking turns out to be, it does not appear to be either an “exit strategy” for senior military officials or an attempt to achieve peace. Moreover, there will be no independent findings that the results represent a credible reflection of Myanmar’s electorate.
Throughout Myanmar’s post-independence history, the country’s military rulers have concocted elections on their own terms. The 2015 election remains the outlier – the only instance since General Ne Win’s 1962 coup d’état where the military lost and accepted the results. It refused to recognise the National League for Democracy’s similar landslide election victories in 1990 and 2020, while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party won amid an NLD boycott in 2010.
This next election is rooted in Min Aung Hlaing’s fabricated justification for the February 2021 coup – that the NLD led by then-State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi won the 2020 election due to massive voter fraud.
This narrative, which invokes the founding claim of the military to be the only reliable guardian of the nation, obscured what were arguably the real factors behind the takeover, such as the senior general’s personal ambition, legally required retirement in 2021 and growing rancour at Aung San Suu Kyi.
The commander-in-chief and his handpicked Union Election Commission, consisting of 15 elderly men, have appeared confident from day one of delivering what they frequently describe as a much better, cleaner and – rather improbably – more inclusive election than the NLD oversaw in 2020.
But even meeting the August 1 deadline is a challenge. Since independence in 1948, Myanmar has never held a general election in July – the middle of Buddhist Lent and peak rainy season.
May, just before the rains, is a more common month but time is running out. Before then, the UEC must compile voter lists, register and vet political parties and candidates, organise an expected shake-up of constituencies, change the electoral system from first-past-the-post to one based on proportional representation, and allow time for campaigning – rumoured to be extended from 60 days to 90 days.
The expected introduction of an entirely new voting system is clearly intended to benefit pro-military candidates, as the NLD had won more seats than its proportion of the popular vote in the winner-take-all system in 2015 and 2020, while the USDP suffered the reverse fate.
The junta may adopt what is known as the “largest remainder” system of proportional representation, with candidates running on party lists and numbers of seats assigned by quota. The administrative focal point would shift from 330 township-based constituencies to 100-plus districts. Potentially the use of a smaller number of geographically larger constituencies makes it easier for the military-appointed UEC to exert control. Presumably the army can secure a few polling stations in at least half of those districts? Maybe even all?
Combined with the constitutionally-mandated 25 percent of seats in both parliamentary chambers that are directly appointed by the commander-in-chief – along with an expected boycott by many parties and voters – Min Aung Hlaing might think he is assured victory.
But regardless of constituency size and seat allocation, compiling voter lists is fraught with difficulties and danger. Ministries have never maintained a centralised registry of citizens, leaving that kind of record-keeping to ward and village tract offices, which in theory (but rarely in practice) updated records at the township administrative office. In many parts of the country since the coup, local officials have been chased out or killed by resistance forces, and residency ledgers have been torched or blown up.
Any serious attempt at a voter list update will require on-the-ground data collection in places where anyone involved in any kind of regime project – and the election in particular – will be considered a target by anti-junta groups.
Whatever way the regime manipulates the process, the scene is set for Myanmar’s most violent election in history. Electoral violence was not unusual in the 1950s “parliamentary” era, when many politicians of the ruling Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League campaigned with so-called pocket armies (gabaik-saung tat). In 1951-52, fighting was so widespread that delayed elections were unconstitutionally held in three stages, with turnout reaching just 18pc.
Rumours have circulated that the junta is thinking of replicating this kind of staggered election, starting with a first round of polling in places it can protect from resistance attacks. There is a recent precedent of sorts: in the 2020 election, most parts of Ann Township in Rakhine State were cancelled for “security reasons”, except for the large area occupied by the Western Regional Command, where soldiers and their families voted. Afterwards, the military proposed holding supplementary elections in cancelled areas after agreeing a ceasefire with the Arakan Army, but they were never held.
Areas where the military has a strong presence, like Nay Pyi Taw, Pyin Oo Lwin, Mingaladon and Meiktila (at least around the airfield), could possibly sustain security for some campaigning and one day of voting. In other parts of the country where daily violence is occurring, there remain islands of military security. For example, Magway Region has vast areas occupied by as many as 20 military weapons factories, with possibly up to 50,000 soldiers, employees, guards and their families in massive and highly secured compounds, which could also host campaigns and polling stations.
Voting could also possibly be held in the more than 200 villages across the country controlled by pro-military Pyusawhti militias, and more than 2,000 military landholdings, garrisons, arms factories and agribusiness plantations, such as the giant oil palm and rubber concessions in Tanintharyi Region.
There is even a remote chance that first-round elections could be held in territory controlled by some ethnic armed groups that have not joined the fight against the junta, like the United Wa State Army or New Mon State Party. Other ethnic armed groups have made it clear this electoral exercise won’t be tolerated. The chairman of the Kachin Independence Organisation, a key player in the resistance, warned that any party that participates in the election is “standing with the enemy” – another hint of the violence the vote could bring.
Attempts to reach even half the number of districts will put large numbers of civilians in harm’s way. Anyone who votes, no matter who they vote for, will be considered complicit and therefore a legitimate target for radical guerrilla groups. Meanwhile, anyone who refuses to vote could find their homes raided by police – or worse, given the army’s penchant for airstrikes, artillery attacks and arson against civilians.
Given the challenges and dangers, it is possible to imagine two scenarios. In the first, the commander-in-chief runs polls in around 200 to 400 places, down from 40,000 in 2020, with heavy air and ground support. In the second, he orders a legal advisor to find a way around the August 1 deadline and postpone the election. The latter, however, would involve a significant loss of face for Min Aung Hlaing, because he is a product of a military that fetishises elections, even though it almost always loses the ones it holds.
Who will run in the election? Hundreds of high-ranking military officers have been or will be pensioned off to stand for the USDP or some other military-aligned party. A motley crew of political parties with no real support base will also be expected to contest. They include the Shan Nationalities Development Party (considered a USDP proxy in 2010) and former human rights activist Ko Ko Gyi’s People’s Party. The National Democratic Front and People’s Pioneer Party – both NLD breakaway parties – will also undoubtedly join, as both of their leaders hold senior positions in the junta.
Of more concern to the pro-democracy movement would be if credible ethnic minority parties, with grievances against the NLD, decide to contest. The Mon Unity Party has already confirmed its intention to participate, and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and Arakan National Party have both declined to rule it out (although neither have made any moves that indicate they are preparing for an election). All three had relatively strong showings in 2020 and are considered among the most influential ethnic parties.
But despite reports of a recent ham-fisted attempt to get the blessing of Aung San Suu Kyi, there seems no possible scenario in which the NLD would participate, a prerequisite for a legitimate election in Myanmar.
Finally, which countries would lend their blessing to this sham? China and Russia, providers of weapons and a diplomatic shield in the United Nations Security Council, are the most likely. India and Thailand, important neighbours with their own agendas, may also recognise the process and the results. Few other countries, though, can be expected to pay the election any regard.
Yet, regardless of its attempts to stage-manage the vote, the military has a mixed record on controlling the process and fallout of elections. The military’s political proxies lost elections in 1960 and 1990, despite the playing field being heavily tilted in their favour, forcing it to take more drastic measures to reassert control. And even when the USDP won in 2010, a small number of handpicked ex-military generals and admirals went on to hijack the implementation of the 2008 Constitution and steer it in an unexpectedly reformist direction. While the military likely hopes an election will help stabilise its rule, it may instead be unleashing something it can’t control..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2023-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Articles and reports about the NLD
Language:
more
Description:
"Two years of emergency rule declared by Myanmar’s military after seizing power from an elected civilian government will end on Jan. 31. The expiry of emergency rule prompts the question of whether the military regime will hand power back to acting president U Myint Swe.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing will no doubt make moves to maintain the military’s grip on power ahead of its plan for a so-called election in August. According to sources in Naypyitaw, the regime is likely to form a “transition council” in which U Myint Swe will play a role.
The council will be formed this month amid a reshuffle of the regime’s current administrative body, the State Administration Council (SAC), the sources add. The junta chief will lead the council while the military continues to rule the country.
Under the 2008 Constitution, the National Defense and Security Council can declare a state of emergency for one year and renew the order twice for six months each time.
Min Aung Hlaing cited the 2008 Constitution in explaining his coup and is thus responsible for telling the country what will come after emergency rule. There is little doubt he will follow previous military rulers by changing the regime’s name while ensuring the same people in uniform remain in power. The same old tune played by previous regimes is set to be reprised by Min Aung Hlaing.
Meanwhile, the SAC has been preparing for a so-called election planned for August. The regime has replaced ward and village administrators at the grassroots level with members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). It is now compiling lists of voters and contacting former election commission members. The USDP has also been reorganized, with generals taking senior positions.
Signs point to the junta rigging the proposed election just as it did in 2010. There is no hope of a free and fair vote under a military regime that has launched a brutal crackdown on the popular uprising against its illegal power seizure. The chairman of the current junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) is also notorious for rigging the 2010 poll with so-called “early voting”. The international outcry that followed was led by then-US President Barack Obama, who condemned the junta for stealing the election.
The UEC has no constitutional mandate to cancel the result of a general election, but the junta-appointed electoral body went ahead and scrapped the 2020 vote after the National League for Democracy won by a landslide. Under the 2008 Constitution and election law, the UEC can handle individual complaints but is not authorized to void the result of an entire election.
The military had already violated the 2008 Constitution by seizing power in February 2021. It also broke its promise of reform and nation-building made before the 2010 election.
These days, Myanmar’s voters are well aware that military rule remains military rule no matter what name it takes..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-12-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"1. Decisive military operations to be carried out against the SAC in 2023 – NUG President.....2. NUG Prime Minister transfers 50 weapons to Cobra Column.....3. Fire protection taskforce established in Sagaing Region.....4. NUG announces SAC atroci-ties in resulting in 10 civilians deaths.....5. NUG collects youth’s voices.....6. The Acting President of NUG said no one can defend the terror-
ist group internationally and the forces are becoming weak due to blows from all directions.....7. The Union Prime Minister of NUG promised that the federal de-mocratization policy, which is the wish of the ethnic groups, will not be changed.....8. NUCC and NUG issued a joint statement that they will fulfill transitional justice for the violations committed against ethnic people by successive dictators.....9. About 13,000 soldiers and police officers who have defected to
People’s Embrace are participating in various ways to root out the military council, NUG Union Prime Minister said.....10. The NUG announced that the military council and their associates who unjustly sentenced the president and state counsellor of the country to prison will inevitably face a public trial..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (1/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG)
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pdf
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4.46 MB
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Description:
"Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and 20 other important drivers of the broad, nationwide movement against the military junta have released an important New Year Joint Declaration on the People’s Revolution.
In it they articulate a clear vision and roadmap for how to lead Myanmar out of the current tragedy caused by the futile and criminal effort of the military junta to grab and consolidate power. Leading actors of the Spring Revolution are showing unity and mutual agreement on the principles and key steps for how and where to go to end the violence and destruction of the country and to find a solid political solution on which lasting peace and development can be built.
Myanmar’s neighbors, other relevant and concerned countries in the Indo-Pacific region and key global actors have a clear choice. The first option is to help the people of Myanmar and their legitimate representatives follow the path that is outlined in the New Year Joint Declaration – and that includes rejection of the junta and eradication of the military dictatorship.
The other option is to continue to do little or nothing, such as by engaging in futile efforts to negotiate an agreement between “all stakeholders” including the current murderous and illegitimate junta. This approach will just lead to further escalation of the junta’s war against the people, further mass atrocities, deepening instability and chaos, continued destruction of civilian infrastructure and the burning to the ground of hundreds of villages, the creation of hundreds of thousands of IDPs (internally displaced persons) and a further meltdown of the economy. At the end of this path, after years of conflict and enormous civilian suffering, we will have neither stability under consolidated military dictatorship nor negotiated compromise between “all stakeholders”. Instead, we will have a broken, fragmented country divided into territories (most likely five to seven) controlled by different armed militias with the former Myanmar army being nothing better than the worst among all predatory militias. It will be an irreparably broken country, like the current Libya or South Sudan.
This Joint Declaration, as well as a few other statements issued over the New Year period (like the statement of the Three Brotherhood Alliance and a speech given by Kachin Independence Organization chairman General N’Ban La) clearly show to international actors and neighbors of Myanmar that a dialogue and agreement between all relevant stakeholders is already present. Such dialogue and agreement is possible and already exists once one takes Min Aung Hlaing and his criminal junta out of the equation. Min Aung Hlaing’s blunder, his failed coup, is the root of all the troubles that have happened in Myanmar since February 2021. His effort to impose power through sheer brutality, murder and destruction is the only obstacle to finding a solution for the country.
Remove Min Aung Hlaing and it will be possible to relatively quickly deescalate the violence, bring back basic security, provide much-needed humanitarian assistance, resume economic activities and start political negotiations, which have a good chance of finding compromise and agreement about the founding documents of a new Federal and Democratic Union of Myanmar.
Removing Min Aung Hlaing would be much easier than it seems to international actors. He is already rejected by the people of the country and has a very shaky position within the military itself. What is holding him in the game – in addition to the brutal violence he is applying, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cynical assistance, and revenues from Myanmar’s gas fields – is the readiness of Myanmar’s neighbors to treat him as an indispensable part of the “all stakeholders negotiations”.
Start an active dialogue with all stakeholders without Min Aung Hlaing, and support the processes and actions of all stakeholders without him – and the junta will collapse in a matter of months. Once that happens, the Myanmar military without the current junta will be quick to join the political dialogue and negotiations of all stakeholders, and to join it in a constructive and productive manner.
Myanmar’s neighbors, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the UN and other relevant international actors have a clear choice and a clear opportunity to solve the deepening state failure of Myanmar. There is a realistic chance to achieve what we have not seen in decades – the possibility for lasting peace and stability.
If Myanmar’s neighbors, ASEAN, the UN and other relevant international actors miss this chance, the country will continue to fall deeper and deeper into violence, destruction and fragmentation. Putin might not care about this, but all others, including China, India and Thailand, have an interest in not allowing things to develop this way..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"Since the February 1, 2021, military coup and the emergence of the Spring Revolution, a total of (2689) people, pro-democracy activists and other civilians have been killed through military crackdowns following pro-democracy movements.
Since the coup, a total of (13,300) people are currently under detention, (1940) of whom are serving sentences. There are a total of (100) post-coup death row prisoners as of January 2, 2023. (121) people have been sentenced in absentia, of whom (42) have been sentenced to death. This makes a total of (142) people who have been sentenced to death. (24) people have been released on bail and (3463) people have already been released. These are the numbers verified by AAPP. The actual numbers are likely much higher. We will continue to update accordingly.
According to information gathered today, on December 30, an artillery shell fired by junta forces exploded in San Khar Village, Lone Khin Village Tract, Hpakant Township, Kachin State; injuring six locals. Kun Jar Naw was one of six injured locals and he died on arrival at the hospital.
On December 30, Kaung Khant Kyaw, a primary school teacher of a high school branch in Htate Pote Kone Village, Myanaung Township, Ayeyarwady Region, was given a death sentence by a special court inside Hinthada Prison. He was charged under Section 51 (a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law and Section 302 (1)(c) of the Penal Code. In August 2022, Kaung Khant Kyaw had previously been sentenced to serve 5 years in prison under Section 50 (j) of the Counter-Terrorism Law. Kaung Khant Kyaw had taken part in the Civil Disobedience Movement and he was arrested in October 2021, on suspicion of being involved in the death of junta informant Win Nyunt Aung from Thabyay Kone Village.
AAPP will continue to inform on verified daily arrests, charges, sentences and fatalities in relation to the attempted coup, and update the lists with details of these alleged offenses. If you receive any information about detentions of, or charges against, CSO leaders, activists, journalists, CDM workers, other civilians and fallen heroes in relation to the military and police crackdown on dissent, please submit to the following addresses: [email protected] [email protected].....၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မတရားစစ်အာဏာလုမှုဖြစ်စဉ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသော ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများ နှင့် ပြည်သူများ၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသူ စုစုပေါင်းမှာ (၂၆၈၉) ဦး ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၂ ရက်နေ့ထိတိုင် ဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၃၃၀၀) ဦးရှိပြီး ၎င်းတို့အနက်မှ (၁၉၄၀) ဦး မှာ ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသည်။ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၂ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အထိ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးနှင့်ဆက်စပ်၍ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရပြီး အကျဉ်းထောင်များတွင် ထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၀၀) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မျက်ကွယ်သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ (၄၂) ဦး အပါအဝင် (၁၂၁) ဦးမှာ မျက်ကွယ်ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံ ထားရသည်။ ထိုကြောင့် သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၄၂) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အာမခံဖြင့် လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၂၄) ဦးရှိပြီး၊ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေမှာ (၃၄၆၃) ဦး ရှိသည်။
ယနေ့ရရှိသောအချက်အလက်များအရ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကချင်ပြည်နယ်၊ ဖားကန့်မြို့နယ်၊ လုံးခင်း ကျေးရွာအုပ်စု၊ ဆန်ခါကျေးရွာအတွင်းကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ ပစ်ခတ်သော လက်နက်ကြီးကျည် ကျရောက် ပေါက်ကွဲခဲ့သောကြောင့် အရပ်သားခြောက်ဦး ကျည်ထိမှန်ခဲ့သည်။ ကျည်ထိမှန်ခဲ့သော အရပ်သား ခြောက်ဦးအနက် တစ်ဦးဖြစ်သော ကွန်ဂျာနော်မှာ ဆေးရုံအရောက်၌ သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။
ထို့ပြင် ဧရာဝတီတိုင်း၊ မြန်အောင်မြို့နယ်၊ ထိပ်ပုတ်ကုန်းကျေးရွာတွင်ရှိသည့် အထက်တန်းကျောင်းခွဲ၏ မူလတန်းပြ ကျောင်းဆရာတစ်ဦးဖြစ်သော ကိုကောင်းခန့်ကျော်ကို ဟင်္သာတအကျဥ်းထောင်တွင်း အထူးတရားရုံးမှ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၅၁ (က)၊ ရာဇသတ်ကြီးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၃၀၂ (၁)(ဂ) တို့ဖြင့် ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဩဂုတ်လတွင် ကိုကောင်းခန့်ကျော်သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၅၀ (ည) ဖြင့် ထောင်ဒဏ် ငါးနှစ် ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ကိုကောင်းခန့်ကျော်သည် အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင် ပါဝင်သူဖြစ်ပြီး သပြေကုန်းကျေးရွာမှ စစ်တပ်သတင်းပေး ဦးဝင်းညွန့်အောင် သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှု ဖြစ်စဥ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ သံသယဖြင့် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ အောက်တိုဘာလတွင် ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။
ဖော်ပြပါ ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များသည် AAPP မှ ကောက်ယူရရှိထားသည့် အရေအတွက်ဖြစ်ပြီး မြေပြင်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသည့်အချက်အလက်နှင့် ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များမှာ ယခုထက်ပိုမိုများပြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ အချက်အလက် များကို ထပ်မံကောက်ယူရရှိလာပါက ဆက်လက်ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြသွားပါမည်။
အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းမှ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ အရပ်သားများ၊ တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူများ၊ သတင်းသမားများ၊ CDM လှုပ်ရှားနေသည့် ဝန်ထမ်းများစသည့် နယ်ပယ်အသီးသီးမှ မည်သူမဆို ဖမ်းဆီး၊ ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံထားရ ခြင်းများနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များကို သိရှိပါက အောက်ပါလိပ်စာ များသို့ ဆက်သွယ်၍ အသိပေး၊ အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ကျဆုံးအချက်အလက်များကို ဖော်ပြပါ [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ အဖမ်းအဆီးအချက်အလက်များကို [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးပို့၍ ဆက်သွယ်အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2023-01-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Sub-title:
New Year Joint Declaration on the People’s Revolution
Description:
"1. The Spring Revolution is a noble endeavour with overwhelming support of all the peoples of Myanmar, of all nationalities, from all walks of life and all regions. With the common goal of eradicating the military dictatorship, and through united efforts of the revolutionary forces, the people seek to establish national unity and to institute a true federal democracy, thus resolving over 70 years of political strife and discord.
2. The Federal Democracy Charter embodies the common political agreement of the constituent revolutionary forces of the NUCC and the NUG. Our revolutionary forces pledge an endeavour, underpinned by collective leadership, collective responsibility and unyielding commitment in line with the political road map based on the aspirations and values espoused in the Federal Democracy Charter.
3.After eradication of the military dictatorship, our aspirant federal democratic union shall oppose any form of bigotry, guarantee the rights of ethnic nationalities and the equality and self-determination of the states or federal units. Such a union shall be constituted to protect the rights of citizens, human rights and minority rights according to democratic standards.
4.We believe that the failure to implement the commitments of the Panglong conference led to the extinguishment of democracy, discrimination, and loss of equality and right of self-determination for ethnic nationalities. Subsequent emergence of a system of central control and a military institution that is steeped in the ideology of dictatorship are the root causes that perpetuate underlying political problems of our nation.
5.We are determined to establish, from among all the ethnic nationalities, a Federal Defence Force of the future federal democratic union, that embraces the principle of civilian supremacy, refrains from involvement in the field of politics, and is concerned solely with the defence of the nation.
6.In the transitional period after the defeat of the attempted coup d’état, we will maintain the national unity that has been achieved and, in accordance with the transitional constitution, fairly apportion legislative, executive and judicial powers of transitional administration among those who hold de jure legitimacy through the elections of 2020 and those who hold de facto legitimacy through other means in our national struggle for liberation.
7.In our country, successive dictators have committed injustices, violations of human rights, and international crimes against ethnic nationalities. We will implement transitional justice to bring truth, justice and accountability for the perpetrators, and to introduce reforms to prevent similar occurrences in the futures.
8.The terrorist military junta has attempted to seize power, not only by trampling on the laws of the land, but by persecuting the people through murder, torture and destruction of property and livelihood. Such a terrorist organisation has no right to hold an election. Any ‘election’ that they hold will never be the solution to the political problems that beset Myanmar; it will only be an act of deception that does not even deserve to be dignified with the term ‘election’.
9.The terrorist military junta’s efforts are nothing more than political deception and a trap, intended to alleviate myriad crises and challenges that they face. As such, we categorically denounce and oppose their attempt to hold such an illegal sham election.
10.We honour the sacrifices made by the forces of liberation, members of the ethnic revolutionary organisations, people’s defence forces (PDF), participants of the civil disobedience movement (CDM), private sector workers, and other supporters of the revolution. Countless lives and livelihoods have been lost, and much blood and sweat been shed, over the years. After the success of the revolution, there will be recognition and recompense for those sacrifices.
11.We believe that the defeat of the military dictatorship and establishment of a true federal democratic system are crucial to achieve cessation of war, and to establish a Union that enjoys lasting peace, stability, harmony with its neighbours and the wider international community, and that enjoys sustainable development. Accordingly, we the forces of revolution will work tirelessly and in unison until the military dictatorship has been eradicated and the people’s revolution has triumphed.
12.We call on all the peoples of Myanmar to join us in this historic revolution that will determine the destiny of the nation with ardour, valour and determination..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council and National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
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Size:
103.41 KB 397.29 KB
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Sub-title:
ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ နှစ်သစ်ကူး ပူးတွဲထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာစာတမ်း
Description:
"၁။ လက်ရှိ မြန်မာ့နွေဦး ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးသည် လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ၊ လူထုလူ တန်းစား ပေါင်းစုံနှင့် ဒေသပေါင်းစုံမှ ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး၏ တစ်ခဲနက် ထောက်ခံပါဝင်မှုဖြင့် ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက် ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ်တွန်းလှန် ဖယ်ရှားပြီး နောက် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများ၏ စုစည်းညီညွတ်မှု တနည်းအားဖြင့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးကို တည်ဆောက်လျက် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ထောင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အနှစ် (၇၀) ကျော်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သော နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာ ကို အပြီးတိုင်ဖြေရှင်းရန်အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက် နေကြခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် (Federal Democracy Charter) သည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) တွင် ပါဝင်သော တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ ဘုံနိုင်ငံရေးသဘောတူညီချက် ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤပဋိညာဉ်ပါ မျှော်ရည်ချက်နှင့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို အလေးအနက်ခံယူလျက် အားလုံး သဘောတူ ချမှတ်ထားသော “နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းပြမြေပုံ”ကို NUCC နှင့် NUG တွင် ပါဝင်သော တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများက စုပေါင်း ခေါင်းဆောင်မှု၊ စုပေါင်းတာဝန်ယူမှု၊ ခိုင်မာသော ကတိကဝတ်ပြုမှုများဖြင့် တညီတညွတ်တည်း လက်တွဲပူးပေါင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်ကြရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချမှတ်ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းပြီးနောက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ မျှော်ရည်သော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုသည် မည်သည့် မဟာလူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒကိုမဆို ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ၊ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များ၏ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်ကို အပြည့်အဝအာမခံမည်ဖြစ်လျက် နိုင်ငံသား ရပိုင်ခွင့် များ၊ လူသားရပိုင်ခွင့်များ၊ လူနည်းစုအခွင့်အရေး များကို အကာအကွယ် ပေးသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီ စံနှုန်းများနှင့်အညီ ဖော်ဆောင်ကျင့်သုံးသွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ ဒီမိုကရေစီဆိတ်သုဉ်းခြင်း၊ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုများနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ လိုလားသော တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်ဆုံးရှုံးခြင်းတို့၏ အဓိက နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာ သည် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်နှင့် ကတိကဝတ်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် မျက်ကွယ်ပြုခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် အတူ နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ဖြစ်ပေါ် လာသည့် ဗဟိုဦးစီးချုပ်ကိုင်မှု လွန်ကဲသည့်စနစ်နှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်အတွေးအခေါ်ကို လက်ကိုင်ပြုသော စစ်တပ်တစ်ခု ရှိနေရခြင်းကပင် အထက် ဖော်ပြပါ မဖြေရှင်းနိုင်သည့်အရင်းခံ နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာ များအား ပိုမိုဆိုးဝါးစွာ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာ ရခြင်း၏ အရင်းခံအကြောင်းအရင်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ မှတ်ယူသည်။
၅။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ မျှော်ရည်သော အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု နိုင်ငံတော်တွင် နိုင်ငံရေးနယ်ပယ်၌ ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်မှု လုံးဝကင်းရှင်းပြီး နိုင်ငံတော်၏ ကာကွယ်ရေးတာဝန်ကိုသာ ထမ်းရွက်သော၊ အရပ်သားအစိုးရ၏ ကွပ်ကဲမှု (Civilian Supremacy) ကို လိုက်နာခံယူသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ကိုယ်စားပြုပါဝင်သော "ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုတပ်မတော်" ကို တည်ထောင်ရန်လည်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့က ခိုင်မာစွာ စိတ်ပိုင်းဖြတ်ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။
၆။ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို အောင်မြင်စွာဖယ်ရှားပြီးသည့်နောက် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကာလသို့ ရောက်ရှိချိန်တွင် ချမှတ်ထားသောလမ်းပြမြေပုံအရ ယခုရရှိထားပြီးဖြစ်သော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး ကို ဆက်လက်ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ အရှိန်မြှင့်တင်လျက် ၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှ ရရှိသော လူထုထောက်ခံမှုအရ တရားဝင်မှု (De Jure Legitimacy) ကို ကိုယ်စားပြုသော နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ မဟုတ်သော အခြားနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့်ရရှိသော လူထုထောက်ခံမှုအရ တရားဝင်မှု (De Facto Legitimacy) ကို ကိုယ်စားပြုသော နိုင်ငံရေး အင်အားစုများ၏ စုစည်းပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုဖြင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလ အစီအမံအရ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံ အခြေခံဥပဒေ နှင့်အညီ ဥပဒေပြုရေး၊ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး၊ တရားစီရင်ရေး အာဏာများကို စနစ်တကျ ခွဲဝေ ကျင့်သုံး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
၇။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် ဤနိုင်ငံ၌ အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်က တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူ လူထုအပေါ် ကျုးလွန်ချိုးဖောက်ခဲ့သည့် မတရားမှုများ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက် မှုများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာရာဇဝတ်မှု များအတွက် အမှန်တရားပေါ်ပေါက်ရန်၊ တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရန်၊ ကျူးလွန် သူများက မိမိကျုးလွန်မှုများ အတွက်တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိရန်နှင့် နောက်ထပ်အလားတူကိစ္စရပ်များ ထပ်မံ မကြုံတွေ့ရေးအတွက် ပြုပြင် ပြောင်းလဲမှု လုပ်ငန်းစဥ်များ ချမှတ်အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ရန် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလ တရားမျှတမှု (Transitional Justice) ကို ဖြည့်ဆည်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၈။ ဥပဒေအရပ်ရပ်ကို ချိုးဖောက်လျက် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို အကြမ်းဖက်လုယူရန် ကြိုးစား နေရုံသာမက ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို နေ့စဉ် သတ်ဖြတ်၊ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက် ဖျက်ဆီးနေသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကျင်းပရန် အခွင့်အာဏာလုံးဝမရှိပေ။ ၎င်းတို့က ကျင်းပမည်ဆိုသော "ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ" ဆိုသည်မှာ လက်ရှိ မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေး အကြပ်အတည်း ပြဿနာ၏ ထွက်ပေါက် အဖြေ လုံးဝမဟုတ်ရုံသာမက ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ဟူသော အသုံးအနှုန်းကို သုံးစွဲရန်ပင် ထိုက်တန်မှုမရှိသည့် အမှန်တရားကို ဖုံးကွယ်ပုံဖျက်မှု (Deception) သာ ဖြစ်ပေသည်။
၉။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ယင်းသို့ကြံစည်လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်သည် ၎င်းတို့ ရင်ဆိုင် နေရသော စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေး အထွေထွေအကြပ်အတည်းများကို လျှော့ချနိုင်ရေး အတွက် ရည်ရွယ် လုပ်ကြံသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလှည့်ကွက်၊ နိုင်ငံရေးထောင်ချောက်သာဖြစ်သဖြင့် တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ကျင်းပရန် ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်မှန်သမျှကို ကျွန်ုပ်တို့က ပြတ်ပြတ် သားသား ဆန့်ကျင်သည်။
၁၀။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် အသက်၊ သွေး၊ ချွေးနှင့် ဘဝများကို ပေးဆပ်လျက် ပြည်သူ့ တော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ပါဝင်နေကြသော အင်အားစုများ၊ မဟာမိတ်တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့များမှ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရဲဘော်များ၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (PDF) နှင့် CDM နိုင်ငံ့ ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ပုဂ္ဂလိကဝန်ထမ်းများအပါအဝင် အခြားသော နည်းလမ်း ပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် တော်လှန်နေကြသော အင်အားစု များသည် တော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်ပြီး သည့်အခါ အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှု နှင့် တာဝန်ယူမှုများကို အတူတကွ ခံစားရရှိကြရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၁၁။ ဤနိုင်ငံ၌ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ကို ကျင့်သုံးဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်မှသာ စစ်မက်ကင်းစင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်း၍ ငြိမ်းချမ်း သာယာသော၊ နိုင်ငံရေး တည်ငြိမ်မှုရှိသော၊ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းနှင့် သဟဇာတဖြစ်၍ အပြန်အလှန်အထောက်အကူပြုနိုင်သော၊ ရေရှည်ဖွံ့ဖြိုး တိုးတက်သောပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက် နိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့က ယုံကြည်သည်။ သို့ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ပြတ်၍ ပြည်သူ့ တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး အောင်ပွဲခံ သည် အထိ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ အားလုံး၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်မှုအားဖြင့် မဆုတ်မနစ် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွား ကြမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၁၂။ လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ၊ ဒေသပေါင်းစုံမှ မြန်မာပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးအနေဖြင့်လည်း တိုင်းပြည်၏ အနာဂတ်ကံကြမ္မာကို အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးမည့် သမိုင်းဝင်တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးတွင် ပြင်းပြထက်သန်သော ဇွဲ၊ သတ္တိ၊ လုံ့လ၊ ဝီရိယ၊ ဆန္ဒ၊ ဉာဏ်ပညာတို့ဖြင့် အစွမ်းကုန် ဆက်လက်ဆင်နွှဲပါဝင် ပူးပေါင်းကြစေ လိုကြောင်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ သဘောထားများကို ပူးတွဲ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council and National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"We send our year-end salutations to all people in Myanmar, in particular the resistance forces who are standing up to the murderous military regime run by bullying criminals.
One of the first things we learned in 2022 is that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing share a tendency to underestimate the public and their opponents. Ukraine did not fall to Russia and its defenders did not run away. To the surprise of the West and the international community as a whole, the Ukrainians stood and fought back. Putin was wrong.
Similarly, the people of Myanmar have refused to accept the military coup. This has been clear since last year, when thousands took to the streets to protest the illegal power grab. Using social media and other digital platforms they made it known that the coup maker can never win. Since then, Gen Z and their older compatriots have joined forces in the ethnic territories to fight the murderous regime.
In 2022 we saw jet fighters and helicopters fly over the country and conduct air raids, dropping bombs and killing anyone in their path in an effort to suppress the anti-coup movement. The brutal offensive against the civilian population and resistance forces intensified but did not succeed.
Thousands of villages were burned to the ground. Many thousands of people fled their homes and millions have lost their futures, hopes and dreams. The damage that the coup has done to the country’s economy is so extreme that Myanmar is now backsliding socially and economically into the sorry state it endured in the late 1990s, when people had electricity for a few hours a day. Lawlessness is rampant, even in the major cities including commercial hub Yangon.
For the citizens of countries across the region, it is as if they woke up one day to find that their neighbor Myanmar was on fire. A decade ago, after years of darkness, we saw “flickers of progress” in once isolated Myanmar. Once again, however, the flames signal strife and the spread of war. Southeast Asia has not seen a regime this bad since the Khmer Rouge.
Darkness has returned to Myanmar. But the people are not giving up.
Medics, artists, professors, activists and army and police officers have joined the Spring Revolution. More importantly, major ethnic forces fighting for a federal union and equality have provided refuge and assistance to the movement. Without them, it would be difficult to sustain the fight and maintain momentum.
In this movement we find a sense of hope and dynamism. Two years after the Myanmar military staged a coup to oust the elected government led by President U Win Myint and State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, its attempt to take control of the country has failed.
The Myanmar people’s resilience, fighting spirit and heroism have thwarted the will of the coup leaders, a group of thugs and criminals who act like a foreign invading force in their country of birth.
In 2022, our newsroom—now up and running offshore, like those of several independent Myanmar media outlets—was kept busy with stories of air raids, bombings, shootings of children, the hangings of activists and a lawmaker, political detainees being tortured to death in gulags, and extreme violence committed daily against regime opponents and the civilian population. Day by day throughout the year we reported Myanmar’s descent into its new status as the “Syria of Southeast Asia”. We have had little rest—our fate is linked to the political changes in Myanmar.
Myanmar people have demonstrated resilience and heroism in standing up to bullies. They have found ingenious and resourceful ways to challenge the illegitimate regime, sustain the fight and grow the resistance at home and abroad.
The international community, the UN, governments around the region, and global heavyweights China, India, the US and Russia have reacted in various ways to Myanmar’s deepening crisis and civil war.
That response has been slow, frustrating and often disappointing, but it is important to note that, for the most part, the regime’s efforts to win legitimacy and international recognition this year failed.
It is true that Russia and China continued to supply arms and hardware, and India has befriended the regime, but their decision to do so has not come without cost—all have been roundly condemned by the Myanmar people.
The US and other Western governments condemned the regime and imposed limited sanctions on the generals and their cronies but many other potential sanctions targets—some obscure, others prominent and operating in plain sight—remain at large and untouched. The message is out there, however: associating with the regime comes at a price.
In the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decided to suspend Myanmar’s participation at its annual meetings and summits. Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing and his puppet foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin have been barred from attending all such gatherings. By the standards of the regional bloc, which has historically adhered to policies of non-interference and consensus, this is relatively strong stuff. And the regime is not pleased about it, either.
The year ended with some encouraging news that has strengthened the spirit of the opposition movement.
The US Congress passed defense legislation that authorizes non-military assistance for and engagement with Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the resistance forces collectively known as the People’s Defense Force (PDF).
In short, the so-called Burma Act serves as a description of US policy toward Myanmar as the country struggles for democracy, human rights and justice. It aims to help return civilian governance to Myanmar and to pursue accountability for human rights violations, as well as to support anti-junta forces including EAOs and PDFs.
The bill also commits the US to push for greater action at the United Nations against the military regime, and calls for holding Russia and China accountable for their support of the junta.
This was followed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s adoption of a resolution in late December denouncing the regime’s rights violations since the Feb. 1, 2021 coup.
The passage of the landmark resolution with 12 yes votes and three abstentions reflects the Myanmar junta’s growing isolation due to the ongoing abuses by its security forces, which amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The resolution condemns the military’s execution of pro-democracy activists, urges the military to “immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners,” and demands an “immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country.”
But promises of support need to be followed up with action. Material support should come soon, and it should be in a form that helps the Myanmar resistance achieve its mission of bringing down the regime.
It is worth pausing for a moment and reflecting on why the Myanmar people are willing to take deadly risks to defy a regime that is murderous and armed with fighter jets. The Myanmar people have said “enough is enough”.
For decades they lived under brutal, selfish dictators and saw their country plundered and driven into bankruptcy by the military. Then, as the country began opening up in 2012, they got a taste of freedom and hope, and started to sense opportunities.
Now the future looks bleak again, with power stolen back by thugs and criminals.
If they don’t win, the Myanmar people know they will forever be slaves.
Their fight is far from over. A tough year lies ahead for the Myanmar people, but they have not given up on their dream of creating a new federal and democratic Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-12-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"Responding to the latest seven-year sentence handed down to Aung San Suu Kyi for alleged corruption, Amnesty International’s Regional Director Meg de Ronde said:
“From start to finish, the trumped-up cases against Aung San Suu Kyi have been politically motivated, unfair, and completely lacking in anything resembling transparency. The same goes for the charges against the thousands of others languishing behind bars in Myanmar’s notorious prisons and interrogation facilities across the country.
“Since seizing power almost two years ago, Myanmar’s military has turned the courts and prison system into a human rights inferno in which journalists, activists, politicians, doctors, protesters and many others are jailed for nothing more than peacefully expressing dissent.
“The fact that this verdict comes less than 10 days after a rare rebuke from the UN Security Council demanding an end to the violence and the release of arbitrarily detained prisoners shows that more pressure on the Myanmar military is needed and fast.
“The UN Security Council should impose a comprehensive arms embargo, including on aviation fuel, and targeted sanctions against military leaders. The international community can and must do more to support the people of Myanmar.”
Background:
Ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s latest conviction on corruption charges on 30 December 2022 means she faces a total of 33 years in prison, according to reports. Suu Kyi was arbitrarily detained at the start of the coup on 1 February, 2021.
Myanmar’s military has arrested more than 16,000 people since the start of the coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. It has also executed four people in its first use of the death penalty in decades..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-12-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"This Friday, a military-controlled court in Myanmar delivered its final verdicts against detained President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, concluding a series of purely politically motivated trials conducted in the course of the past thirteen months. These trials were carried forward with no respect for due legal procedure or necessary judicial guarantees and are a clear attempt to exclude democratically elected leaders from political life. Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi face a total of 12 and 33 years’ imprisonment respectively, including 3 years of hard labour, representing another blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar.
The European Union strongly condemns these trials, verdicts and the overall dismantlement of democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar. EU’s position remains that only a genuine dialogue involving Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, the National Unity Government, civil society and all other relevant stakeholders in Myanmar can lead the way out of the deep crisis in the country and restore the path towards democracy.
The EU also expresses its deep concern over the large number of persons arbitrarily detained and reiterates its urgent call for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.
As the second anniversary of the military coup of 1 February 2021 is approaching, the military regime’s actions continue to show a complete contempt for human dignity and the will of the people. The EU reiterates its full support for ASEAN efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Myanmar, including the inclusive dialogue called for by ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus..."
Source/publisher:
European External Action Service
Date of publication:
2022-12-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"1. Executive Summary
This report provides analysis of the indiscriminate aerial bombardments launched by the
Tatmadaw1 throughout the country—especially after the 2021 military coup—with a special focus on
the recent bombardments in A Nang Pa, Hpakant township, Kachin State. Despite the stated
bombardments seeming like a harbinger of death for civilian victims, they have, in turn, become the case
for the senior military commanders, led by Min Aung Hlaing, who have been providing orders from their
high command headquarters located in Nay Pyi Taw, the capital of Burma. How can it be a reality? In
that regard, this report elaborates in detail.
For over 70 years, the civil war in Burma has proved that, if the Tatmadaw continues to exist as
a major state institution, serious human rights violations amounting to the gravest crimes of international
concern will never be deterred. Continued Tatmadaw rule would also mean no genuine peace—nor
justice, freedom, or development for all ethnic nationalities—can ever be achieved. Lessons learnt from
the roughly 60 years of ostensible peace-seeking processes starting in 1963 following the 1962 military
coup vividly indicate that all so-called peace-related dialogues, including various types of ceasefires with
the Tatmadaw, have unequivocally failed due to the lack of the rule of law. As far as Burma is concerned,
the concept of institutional reform no longer suffices. This report therefore urges all stakeholders to exert
efforts that support the emergence of a new Federal Union Army to replace the position of the Tatmadaw
and ultimately uphold the rule of law.
Chapter 2 provides a general background of the country before and after the coup, focusing on
aerial attacks against civilians. Then, chapter 3 details some of the worst aerial attacks launched by the
Tatmadaw in other states/provinces and regions that have resulted in high civilian casualties. A brief
case summary of the A Nang Pa airstrike, a contextual description of the situation of the site, and the
nature of the object of the attack, which is the central focus of this report, are laid out in chapter 4.
Subsequently, chapter 5 addresses the legal issues that arose from the aerial bombings of A Nang
Pa from the three perspectives: 1) whether the geographic feature of the site effectively contributed to
military objectives, 2) whether the Tatmadaw had knowledge of the civilian presence in the vicinity, and
3) the systematic and widespread nature of the airstrike constituting crimes against humanity. While the first legal question argues the legitimacy of the site as a military object by invoking the Geneva
Conventions and customary rules of International Humanitarian Laws, the second question deals with
the mental element, the perpetrators’ behavior, and the means and methods used to carry out the
airstrikes. The last legal question deals with the prerequisite elements of the crimes against humanity
provided for in the Rome Statue of the ICC. Moreover, this chapter highlights notable previous decisions
and judgements of the international courts potentially relevant to the case of Burma.
Under the title of a common plan to keep Min Aung Hlaing in power, chapter 6 contrasts the case
of Laurent Gbagbo, the President of Ivory Coast, and the case of Min Aung Hlaing, the military coup
maker in Burma. The former was acquitted by the ICC, while the latter is currently enmeshed in the
process that leads to an ICC trial. In the case of Ivory Coast, the ICC prosecutor might have failed to
prove that President Laurent Gbagbo committed such crimes.
Chapter 7 offers a conclusive analysis of all related societal, political, and legal factors that have
influenced Burma, focusing on impunity and immunity issues from the perspective of international law.
In addition, the rationale behind Min Aung Hlaing orchestrating the illegal coup and desperately trying
to retain power to avoid criminal accountability is somewhat covered. The chapter indicates too that, to
achieve stability and long-term peace, Burma must still carefully address people’s rights to selfdetermination. Such actions will lead to the emergence of a federalism suited to Burma with the
underpinning of the rule of law. In addition, responsibility of states to comply with international law,
transitional justice related issue and national defense authorization act – NDAA, 2022, (USA) are also
scrutinized.
Chapter 8 covers the major recommendations of our LAN, inter alia, that, despite maintaining
ethnic nationalism leading to the emergence of a federalism suited to Burma, the protection of human
rights with the underpinning of the rule of law must be a prime priority. Such protection of rights must be
undertaken, at a minimum, in line with the Geneva Convention, also known as the law of war, even in a
non-international armed conflict. To this end, in connection with the 2020 election results,
constitutionalism that focuses on limited government concepts must be activated. Finally, a strong
national legal order – which is essential for a just, peaceful and prosperous society – is recommended
highlighting the core and distinguishing feature of law..."
Source/publisher:
Legal Aid Network
Date of publication:
2022-12-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"1.The election of the terrorist State Administration Council(SAC) is only a political trap to prolong the reign of power, and the Acting President urged the public to oppose it decisively.....2.NUG Acting President said that the Spring Revolution is being driven by the courage of the new generation of young people, and after the time of the revolution, it must be driven by the wisdom of the youth.....3. The terrorist act of Yangon-Dala ferry bombing has nothing to
do with NUG, NUG announced that the actual perpetrators will be identified and dealt with.....4. The Burma Act will provide assistance to the people of Burma and is expected to be signed by US President Biden, NUG announced.....5. The UN Security Council approved the draft resolution on Myanmar as a step to support the people, NUG announced.....6. NUG released that in the statement of the leaders of EU-ASEAN summit, the demands on Myanmar are nothing special and lack crucial information.....7. NUG urges neighbouring governments and labour organizations
to support the helpless migrant workers who are struggling with various forms of oppression.....8: NUG insisted that it would reward and give opportunities if the information about military were informed.....9: NUG announced that it provided over 340 million for humanitarian affairs in November.....10: Union Prime Minister of NUG insisted to review the ongoing activities and to become a government that people can rely on .....11. United Nations Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun’s answers about the fake election of terrorist army.....12. The Security Council of Myanmar issues a draft resolution as soon as possible..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"National Unity Government Weekly Press Bulletin (35/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"London, 25 December, 2022: Myanmar’s failed coup leaders have escalated their attempts to evict the Myanmar Ambassador from his residence in London by posting eviction notices on the gates of Myanmar House, the ambassadorial residence in London.
Junta representatives have been attempting to seize the property in violation of English property law but the Ambassador has refused to move.
The Myanmar Accountability Project, a UK-based human rights organization that has been campaigning against the illegal junta condemned the move.
“Any attempt to evict the Ambassador is doubly unlawful. Firstly, the junta itself is illegal as it attempted to seize power through a coup which violated their own constitution, so anything it does or says lacks legitimacy,” said MAP Director, Chris Gunness. “Secondly, the English property register lists the Union of Myanmar as the rightful owner of the ambassadorial residence in London and as the junta’s agents in London do not represent the Union of Myanmar, they have no legal claims to the property.”
Just last week, the United Nations General Assembly voted unanimously not to recognize the junta and the UN Security Council also adopted a resolution sponsored by Britain, condemning the junta’s violent suppression of the population.
According to conservative estimates, since the failed coup last year, over 2,500 have been killed and over 16,000 have been arrested or forcibly disappeared.
“The illegal junta continues to violate the laws of Myanmar and the human rights of the people. Any attempts by their agents in London to bring their thuggish and illegal behaviour to the UK will be robustly opposed,” Gunness insisted..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Accountability Project
Date of publication:
2022-12-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။ ယေရှုဘုရားသခင် မွေးဖွားသန့်စင်သောနေ့ကို ခရစ္စမတ်နေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်၍ ခရစ်ယာန်ဘာသာဝင်များ၏ ချစ်စရာဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများဖြင့် ဖော်ညွှန်းကာ ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းတွင် ကောင်းကျိုးအဖြာဖြာ ပေါ်ထွန်းလာစေရန် ဂုဏ်ပြုကျင်းပလေ့ရှိသည့် ဒီဇင်ဘာလ (၂၅)ရက်နေ့၊ ခရစ္စမတ်နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်အခါသမယတွင် ခရစ်ယာန်ဘာသာဝင် ပြည်ထောင်စုတိုင်းရင်းသားများ အားလုံးနှင့်အတူ မြန်မာပြည်သူအပေါင်း ကောင်းကျိုးအဖြာဖြာပြည့်စုံကာ ကိုယ်စိတ်နှလုံး အေးချမ်း ပျော်ရွှင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ ဥပဒေမဲ့လုပ်ရပ်များ၊ မတရားမှုများအား တွန်းလှန်ဆန့်ကျင်နေသည့် ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ခရစ်ယာန်ဘာသာဝင်များသည် အခြားဘာသာဝင်များနှင့်အတူ အမှန်တရားအား တန်ဖိုးထားကာ ကျရာအခန်းကဏ္ဍတို့တွင် တွဲလက်ညီညီ ချိတ်ဆက်ပူးပေါင်း ပါဝင်နေကြသည့်အတွက် များစွာဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ရပါသည်။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေး ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများတွင် အဓိကအခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည့် ခရစ်ယာန်လူမျိုးတို့၏ သမိုင်းသည် ယနေ့ထိတိုင် အမှတ်တရဖြစ်နေဆဲဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နောင်အနာဂတ်မျိုးဆက်သစ်တို့အတွက်သာမက နိုင်ငံတော်အတွက် မိမိတို့အားလုံး၏ တစိုက်မတ်မတ် အားထုတ်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများသည် မဝေးသော ကာလတွင် အောင်မြင်မှုအသီးအပွင့်များအဖြစ် မြင်တွေ့ခံစားကြရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ မတူကွဲပြားမှုများကို သာလွန်အင်အားအဖြစ် ထိရောက်စွာ အသုံးချကာ တည်ဆောက် ထားပြီးသည့် ညီညွတ်ခြင်းအင်အားကို ဆက်လက်ထိန်းသိမ်းလျက် ဖက်ဒရယ်စနစ်နှင့် အားလုံး ပါဝင်သော ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်တည်ဆောက်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုတွင် အတူတကွ လက်တွဲ ကြိုးပမ်းသွားကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းလျက် ပျော်ရွှင်ဖွယ် ခရစ္စမတ်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ချစ်ကြည်ရင်းနှီးစွာ ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-12-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-25
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Individual Documents
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"On 22 December 2022, His Excellency PRAK Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia attended a
ministerial Informal Consultation on the situation in Myanmar hosted by His
Excellency Don Pramudwinai, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Thailand. The Meeting was also attended by Foreign Minister of Laos PDR, and
Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam. Also present from Myanmar were Union
Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Investment
and Foreign Economic Relations.
The Consultation was very much in line with Point 14 of the ASEAN Leaders' Review
and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, that underlines
the importance of exploring other approaches that could support ASEAN's collective
efforts to help Myanmar bring about a peaceful solution to the current crisis.
The open-ended Informal Consultation provided a good opportunity for Ministers and
representative to have an open, frank and meaningful discussion, and receive
updates from Myanmar on its efforts to implement the Five-Point Consensus.
Importantly, they also exchanged views on practical approaches that could expedite
the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus including an exit strategy that could
help return normalcy and peace to Myanmar the soonest possible.
The Meeting also commended Cambodia's efforts and the works of the Special Envoy
of the ASEAN Chair in facilitating the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, in
particular the provision of humanitarian assistance to those most in need. Cambodia
will render full support to Indonesia, as the incoming ASEAN Chair, and its Special
Envoy in helping Myanmar find a peaceful political settlement and return to a democratic path for the interests of its people and ASEAN as a whole.
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-12-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar endured a second year under the military dictatorship of Min Aung Hlaing in 2022, a year marked by worsening atrocities by the junta, but also by an increasingly organized and successful resistance against it, as the civilian National Unity Government and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force, went on the diplomatic and military offensive, with help on the battlefield from of a number of the country’s oldest ethnic armed organizations. The people of Myanmar continued to draw inspiration from the courage displayed by the country’s thousands of striking civil servants and political prisoners—including four martyred activists hanged by the regime—as well as detained elected leaders U Win Myint and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the latter having been moved by the regime to solitary confinement in prison in June. While the last month of the year offered a few rays of hope in the international arena with stepped up action by the US and UN, for the most part, in 2022 the international community continued to do little more than pay lip service to the need for a return to democracy in Myanmar, as the regime continued to thumb its nose at regional bloc ASEAN while drawing practical support from India, China and, in particular, Russia.
Here, The Irrawaddy looks at some of the individuals and groups who shaped the events of 2022.....Immortal heroes who gave their flesh, bones and lives...
The events of July 23, 2022 are a dark mystery. Many Myanmar people wonder how the country’s respected and devoted democracy fighters Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw reacted as they were led up to the gallows at Insein Prison, how they responded when the ropes were placed around their necks, and what their last words were before they were hanged. The next day, two more anti-regime protesters, Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thura Zaw, faced the same fate on the same gallows.
They were killed. But they will never die. General Aung San is still alive; the 32-year-old independence leader’s assassination in 1947 ensured that he will be remembered always. Win Maw Oo is also alive, though the 16-year-old girl was shot dead by military troops during the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. Salai Tin Maung Oo lives on, though the 25-year-old ethnic Chin student leader was hanged in 1976. They are just a few of a long list of heroes who put their flesh, bones and lives in the hands of successive regimes in the interest of their country and compatriots.
Such stories of sacrifice are not new in Myanmar. Successive military regimes have openly or secretly killed countless people since their first coup in 1962. Before and after the second coup in 1988, about 3,000 pro-democracy protesters and students were killed. Since the latest putsch last year, the regime has killed more than 2,600 people, including young students, politicians and members of various professions, to date, on streets, in schools, in their own homes, in torture chambers and also in prisons. They are all national heroes, as they died great deaths.
Among these great deaths, those of veteran 88 Generation pro-democracy activist Ko Jimmy (Kyaw Min Yu), 53, former National League for Democracy lawmaker and hip-hop star Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, 41, and anti-coup protesters Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thura Zaw stand out, as they were killed by hanging in the first such executions in more than 30 years. The hangings showed once and for all that coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is even more evil than his predecessors—they, at least, refrained from hanging political activists after the execution of Salai Tin Maung Oo in 1976.
Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to execute the four activists was intended to extinguish the flame of the people’s democracy. But the act was counterproductive; their deaths have emboldened the spirit and strength of the Myanmar people to fight the military dictatorship, and those he killed have become heroes of the country. No one really died at the hands of the most evil man. They gave their flesh, bones and spirits to help build a beautiful, peaceful and prosperous country. They are all immortal......Min Aung Hlaing: The face of evil...If you want to know what evil looks like, look closely at Myanmar military junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. Since his coup last year, he has commissioned his troops to kill thousands of his countrymen simply because they reject his rule. As of December this year, troops acting on his orders have killed more than 2,600 civilians, including schoolchildren and elderly people, in artillery and air strikes. His subordinates enjoy immunity to commit extrajudicial killings of dissidents in torture chambers while locking up thousands of others. It is not just that his regime does nothing good for the country; Min Aung Hlaing is the most devious and bloodthirsty man in Myanmar today.
Under his rule, Myanmar, whose return to prosperity had been gaining momentum in the years before he seized power, has made a dramatic U-turn and is now on its way to becoming a failed state. Young people have joined the country’s established ethnic armed groups in droves to topple his regime, while others have left Myanmar in search of greener pastures. The country is now backsliding socially and economically into the sorry state it endured in the late 1990s, when people had electricity for a few hours a day. Lawlessness is rampant, even in the major cities including commercial hub Yangon.
Internationally—his increasingly cozy relations with Russia notwithstanding—Min Aung Hlaing is mostly an outcast. Even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, refuses to invite him to its summits due to his failure to cooperate with the bloc’s efforts to mediate the crisis. Under his rule, several Western democracies including the US and UK have downgraded their diplomatic relations with Myanmar.
In the coming years, historians of Myanmar will unanimously depict him as the leader of a failed coup, one whose brutality is matched only by his stupidity. He is clearly the most inept dictator the country has ever known, having failed to assert control nearly two years after the takeover, unable to contain an unwavering and unprecedented popular armed resistance against him. In desperation he has resorted to air strikes and a scorched earth policy against civilians, especially in resistance strongholds, hoping to rule through fear. Rather than forcing Myanmar’s people into submission, however, his atrocities have only turned them into more committed revolutionaries, who are dying to see him hang at any cost. In their view, there can be no sympathy for a man as devious as Min Aung Hlaing. He deserves only the worst!.....People’s Defense Force: Myanmar’s ‘People’s Army’ evolves....There has been little or no progress in people’s lives after 21 months of military rule in Myanmar, but the People’s Defense Force (PDF) offers a rare ray of light. The young and energetic folks who traded their comfortable lives to join the armed struggle against the regime have proven themselves on the battlefield—in stark contrast to their pre-coup image as a generation largely obsessed with online video games and Korean dramas—successfully engaging the Myanmar military while fighting alongside the country’s seasoned ethnic armies.
In contrast to the homemade hunting rifles they wielded in the summer of 2021, many but not all are now properly equipped with automatic assault rifles thanks to the Myanmar people’s crowdfunding support. It’s encouraging for the people to see the young PDF members, whom they affectionately call “our boys and girls,” cradling M-16s—though some are dressed in their favorite football team jersey and dusty sandals to supplement their insufficient uniforms.
One thing that hasn’t changed is their steely determination to topple the regime and fight for democracy—a quality that moved the country’s detained democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to express her pride in them.
Furthermore, they have earned respect from international observers who initially thought the PDF’s armed struggle against the regime, with its superior firepower, wouldn’t last long. The PDF groups across the country are now more organized, united under the command of the parallel National Unity Government (NUG), and using more creative tactics, such as the deployment of commercial drones for combat purposes. They are now inflicting heavy losses on junta forces daily.
As there are now over 300 PDF battalions nationwide, supplemented by township-level defense forces in 250 of the 330 townships across the country, the PDF groups in 2022 took on a more offensive role, increasingly raiding and occupying—sometimes in collaboration with ethnic armed groups—army outposts and police stations in resistance strongholds.
But this has required considerable sacrifice on the PDFs’ side. Some fighters have lost their lives in action, and others have been maimed by explosions while testing or producing improvised weapons, too impatient to wait for arms from the NUG, which has been struggling to keep all PDF members supplied.
There have been some missteps. Some PDF groups have admitted involvement in extrajudicial killings when dealing with accused junta informants. Those responsible have been severely criticized by their peers, who associate such actions with the regime. The NUG announced that those found guilty would be punished.....National Unity Government: Progress on multiple fronts despite shortcomings...Heavy blows struck this year by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) against the brutal military regime of Min Aung Hlaing—including creative and successful fundraising schemes for the revolution; battleground victories of its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), and allied ethnic armed groups (EAOs); and increased diplomatic presence, engagement and recognition on the international front—have heartened the people of Myanmar amid the ongoing shocking news stories and images of the junta’s atrocities.
Under its command, PDF groups across the country are becoming more sophisticated and organized, undergoing advanced military training and launching offensives against regime troops. NUG Minister of Planning and Finance U Tin Tun Naing has also developed a reputation as a fundraising genius, introducing innovative projects such as lotteries, bond issuances, online auctions of houses and properties acquired by regime leaders, sales of land plots, and digital payments. While some of his plans didn’t impress some observers at first, he has proven his ability to successfully reach targets within a few days with the help of his teammates across the world. To date, his ministry has raised about US$100 million, around 95 percent of which has been used for the armed struggle.
NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung has also earned well-deserved praise for her diplomatic victories over the junta. The passage of the Burma Act by the US Congress, the UN Security Council’s adoption of its first-ever resolution on Myanmar, the UN’s retention of NUG-backed U Kyaw Moe Tun as the permanent representative to the world body, the increasing treatment by ASEAN and the international community of the junta as an outcast, and fresh sanctions on the generals and related businesses are among the latest welcome developments in the international arena.
International online news magazine The Diplomat wrote in September that with the NUG increasingly acting as the government of Myanmar and providing a viable plan for Myanmar’s future, the world is fast running out of excuses for not recognizing it. However, it is still not perfect, and challenges abound, as it is still struggling to work with ethnic armed groups and collaborate effectively on building a federal union—something both the NUG and all ethnicities of Myanmar have dreamed of. Its inability to distribute arms to all of its PDF groups has also drawn complaints. Furthermore, reckless comments from some wayward ministers to the effect that victory is just around the corner have given people false hope.
Overall, the revolutionary government led by ethnic Kachin former lawyer and community leader Duwa Lashi La and comprising democratically elected lawmakers, civil society leaders and activists of various ethnicities commands loyalty and support from the vast majority of Myanmar people and international friends, and is trying its best to lead the people’s revolution to uproot the dictatorship, one of the most notorious and ruthless regimes on this planet.....The people of Myanmar...When it comes to democracy, Myanmar people don’t compromise. The nationwide popular demonstrations against military rule that erupted in the wake of the coup last year and the ongoing anti-regime resistance movement are the best examples of this focused determination to wipe out the military dictatorship. The regime has still not been able to crush the movement, and to keep it going Myanmar people contribute whatever they can, from arming the resistance forces to joining silent strikes against the regime to funding the National Unity Government (NUG), which they take as their rightful government. In other words, so far, the revolution against the regime has been sustained solely by the Myanmar people, without outside help.
However, supporting a revolution is not easy, especially when your enemy is as ruthless as the Myanmar military regime. The junta shuts down individual bank accounts of those inside the country who are accused of financing the resistance forces or who are arrested for anti-regime activities. To bypass the restrictions, resistance supporters have turned to crowdfunding with the help of likeminded Myanmar people in other countries. Among other achievements, early this year, a US$2.2-million project to arm resistance forces met its target within a few days, much to organizers’ surprise. When resistance forces continued to launch offensives, Myanmar people at home and abroad were motivated to donate more to purchase ammunition and other necessities for the front lines, and those engaged in fundraising abroad have had little sleep, as they struggle to cope with a surge in transactions.
Clearly viewing the armed struggle as the only means to root out the military dictatorship, Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore have worked extra shifts and taken additional jobs to contribute to the revolution. In resistance strongholds upcountry where the regime’s atrocities are rampant, grandmothers in their 80s have handed their golden earrings and bracelets to resistance members, saying, “Take this and fight till they [the regime] are gone.”
The Myanmar people’s solidarity and self-reliance developed of necessity after their calls for international help to topple the regime were ignored, as all eyes have been on the Ukraine war. Whenever they learn about military assistance from other countries for Ukraine, all Myanmar people can do is look on and murmur, “What we could do with just a fraction of that support!” Rather than dwelling on their disappointment, however, they have kept the revolution moving forward on their own for nearly two years. However, the passage of the so-called Burma Act (a component of the National Defense Authorization Act) by the US Congress to support Myanmar’s anti-regime movement offers some reason to be positive. Hopefully it is the light at the end of the tunnel.....The international community...Since Myanmar people embarked on their fight against the military dictatorship nearly two years ago, they have been on their own, as the international community has been good for nothing except expressing concern as the regime kills its own people, including schoolchildren, despite the people’s repeated calls for tangible assistance.
In December, the passage of the Burma Act by the US Congress to provide non-lethal support to Myanmar regime opponents, and the UN Security Council’s adoption of a resolution on Myanmar calling for an end to the military regime’s escalating repression and violence against civilians, provided some hope. Both actions are just first steps, however, and much work needs to be done if they are to bear fruit.
Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, has been completely ineffective, including its adoption of a peace plan for Myanmar, which the junta has completely ignored. The bloc has yet to even unanimously condemn the regime, as some members have ties to the junta.
China, India and Russia have consistently engaged with the regime militarily, diplomatically and economically, providing breathing space for the junta, which has been largely shunned by Western democracies. Its warming ties with China and Russia have also enabled the regime to access military assistance to use in crushing anti-regime resistance forces in Myanmar.
All in all, it’s undeniable that Myanmar’s suffering under the military regime has been made worse by the international community’s divided approach to the country, which has emboldened the regime to commit more atrocities. It’s likely that if there had been earlier and more concerted international action taken against the regime, we would be closer to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar and there would have been fewer air strikes on civilians. Such action would also have prevented the junta’s hangings of Ko Jimmy, Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw and two other democracy activists. The hell hound that is the Myanmar regime remains loose in the absence of any genuine international effort to bring it to heel.....International friends of Myanmar...While countries like Russia, China and India have made the most of their ties with Myanmar under military rule and ignored the people’s suffering, some individuals have stood along with the people of Myanmar in their fight against the regime.
The most remarkable is Sean Turnell. When he was released by the regime after 650 days in captvity, mainly for being deposed leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s adviser on economic reform in Myanmar, the Australian economist didn’t complain about having been locked up. Instead, he said bluntly, “It is a tragic and terrible thing that the nicest people I have encountered anywhere are ruled over by such knaves and fools.”
In media interviews, he warned that the coup has severely damaged Myanmar’s economy and that the regime wouldn’t give up power easily. He revealed the inhumane treatment he experienced in prison along with other political detainees such as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he met during their trial proceedings and who urged him to tell everyone the truth about Myanmar.
Toru Kubota, a Japanese filmmaker who was released after nearly four months of detention by the regime, urged his government to take a strong proactive approach to human rights violations in Myanmar by protecting people who flee authoritarian rule. He warned the world not to be fooled by the junta’s mass amnesty in which he was released, dismissing it as a mere propaganda stunt and pointing out that some 10,000 political prisoners remain locked up.
And there are others, like former US ambassador to Myanmar Scot Maricel and European human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic. With their unique understanding of the complexity of Myanmar’s politics, they have spoken the truth on behalf of the people of Myanmar. Their assessments of the country’s ongoing issues have turned out to be far closer to reality than those of some so-called native Myanmar scholars who blame the people for the country’s instability while kowtowing to the regime.....EAOs: Myanmar’s divided ethnic armed groups...Arguably, one benefit of the military coup for the Myanmar people is that it has allowed them to draw distinctions between the various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in the country.
Some of the oldest EAOs, including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Chin National Front (CNF), have shown their support for the anti-regime movement since the coup. They have not only provided shelter for those fleeing the junta’s persecution, but also provided military training and armed those fighting the regime. The KIA alone has trained more than 4,000 members of the anti-regime People Defense Force.
Furious, the regime has retaliated against the KIA with numerous air strikes, including one on an open-air concert celebrating the Kachin Independence Organization’s anniversary, killing several KIA officials and scores of civilians.
On the other hand, 10 EAOs—seven signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and three non-signatories—declined to join the anti-regime movement and agreed to attend so-called peace talks with the regime in an effort to promote their own interests.
Among the signatories are the Restoration Council of Shan State, the New Mon State Party, the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council, the Arakan Liberation Party, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization, and the Lahu Democratic Union.
The three non-signatories that joined the peace talks were the United Wa State Army, the National Democratic Alliance Army (also known as the Mongla Group), and the Shan State Progress Party.
Unlike other EAOs, the 10 groups have no tensions with the Myanmar military.
Min Aung Hlaing invited EAOs to peace talks in April 2022. Observers said he organized the talks to give his regime, which has been overwhelmed by resistance forces in many parts of the country, some breathing space and to sow discord among EAOs.
The KNU, KIA, KNPP and CNF refused to attend the junta-organized peace talks, dismissing them as a sham and not inclusive. The Arakan Army and its allies the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army also stayed away.
Min Aung Hlaing has urged ethnic leaders to stand for election in an already discredited vote he plans to organize in 2023, and to press their demands in the parliament instead of fighting. He suggested EAOs could transform into Border Guard Forces if they want to keep their arms. He also promised separate legislative power for parliaments in ethnic states, to make the so-called election more attractive.
In the 1990s, the previous regime offered incentives to some EAOs to drive a wedge between them and other ethnic armed groups. Certain EAOs exchanged their arms for lucrative concessions to run businesses, legal and otherwise, including logging, drug running and mining.
However, the Myanmar military broke its promises in 2009, reviving the vicious circle of armed conflicts.....Civil Disobedience Movement: Peaceful but strong blow to the junta...Like the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and the People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs), Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) poses a serious challenge to the regime, which is still reeling from its impact nearly two years on. While the NUG and PDF wage an armed struggle, CDM participants utilize the power of peaceful resistance. Formerly employed in the state’s medical, education, administrative and defense sectors, their refusal to work under military rule had an immediate impact from the moment the movement was launched two days after the coup, bringing the government administration to a halt.
Almost two years on, the CDM is recognized as the longest-running movement of its kind in the world, and was nominated for the 2022 Nobel Peace prize. It has turned out to be one of the pillars of the revolution against the junta, as participants continue to defy the regime while coping with many hardships as the junta targets them with threats and arrests. Some have even been beheaded and had their limbs cut off.
Striking civil servants who try to flee abroad are frequently arrested at airports. CDM teachers have been sentenced to up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a CDM police officer was sentenced to a maximum of 26 years. To evade the junta’s atrocities against them, many CDMers have gone into hiding or fled to border areas, taking jobs completely unrelated to their previous careers. Amid such hardships, they still refuse to go back to work for the government.
While some have gone back to work after facing threats from the regime, others, notably in the health and education sectors, have kept their anti-regime mission alive by joining the relevant operations of the NUG. Some run online classes for students refusing to study under the regime while others now work at community schools operating in resistance stronghold areas.
CDM health workers have also joined resistance groups as medics. When they are not at the front line, they treat internally displaced people and other civilians who need medical assistance, strongly supporting the goal of removing the junta. The same determination keeps their detained comrades, who have been unjustly thrown into jails for their anti-regime activism, alive.....Political prisoners: Jailed but unbowed...Another force that we mustn’t forget to honor for their bravery, sacrifice and commitment to the cause of democracy is Myanmar’s unbowed political prisoners. Myanmar now has the largest number of political prisoners in its history, as the junta has detained more than 16,500 people in less than two years during its harsh crackdowns against those who oppose its rule. Among the junta’s prisoners are elected leaders, state and regional chief ministers, prominent protest leaders, lawmakers, activists, students, doctors, nurses, health workers, teachers, professors, lawyers, engineers, reporters, writers, charity volunteers, company workers, filmmakers, actors and other citizens.
Despite being thrown into the junta’s deadly prisons and facing inhumane conditions, brutal punishments, torture and horrific human rights violations behind bars, brave and resilient political prisoners across the country are unbroken and their revolutionary spirit remains strong.
They continue to stage protests against the junta and maintain their defiance, despite knowing that they will be crushed brutally and face severe punishment in the form of beatings, torture, additional sentences or being put into solitary confinement, being banned from receiving family visits—their only source of food and other supplies from outside—being moved to remote prisons, or even death.
Despite these threats, they never fail to mark important political dates such as the silent strikes, the anniversaries of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising or the start of the ongoing revolution against the regime, and detained leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday, and to show solidarity with fellow anti-junta activists who are still free in denouncing the junta’s execution of political prisoners, handing down death penalties to student activists and other actions. They yell anti-regime slogans and sing revolutionary songs from behind bars, risking their lives. Political prisoners are often referred to as “chickens in the coop” by the generals. But they have proved that while the regime may imprison them physically, it is impossible to lock up their spirit, determination and bravery. And most importantly, that the regime can’t impose its rule at all, even inside prisons.....Tayzar San—‘Tayzar the extraordinary’...Among prominent individuals resisting the regime, one figure comes to mind immediately: Tayzar San—the man who led the first anti-coup protest in Mandalay three days after the coup and has since become a prominent revolutionary—is the face of the Myanmar people’s anti-regime movement and resistance. The skinny, bespectacled doctor and librarian intimidates the ruthless regime like few others. The generals have been hunting him for months for his leading role in anti-regime activities and have even offered a reward of 10 million kyats (nearly US$5,000) for information leading to his arrest.
Despite being in hiding, the physician-turned-democracy activist continues to carry out his mission of eliminating the military dictatorship from Myanmar. He challenges the junta leaders on social media almost daily, organizes protests and encourages citizens to continue the fight against military rule. He has also been traveling extensively to meet resistance groups and civilians on the ground. Last month, he even led a street protest against the military dictatorship in Upper Myanmar, marching at the front of the protest column holding a megaphone—the device has come to symbolize him since the coup—and openly defying the junta and the arrest warrant it has issued for him on an incitement charge.
Tayzar San is also involved in the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), an anti-regime coalition that offers policy guidance to the parallel National Unity Government (NUG), which is leading efforts to lay the groundwork for the creation of a federal democratic union.
His most exquisite characteristic is his friendly and cheerful smile, which never leaves his face, a reflection of his faith in the prospects of the people’s revolution.
In a personal manifesto on his Facebook account, the protest leader declared: “Whatever I need to sacrifice, including my life and body [in the revolution], I believe it is worth it. Because what we get back from this revolution is a new era, new system and new state that we wish for.”.....The people’s legitimate leaders—yet again, prisoners of a regime...They are as immoveable as a rocky mountain when it comes to their dedication to their convictions, their commitment to the mandate entrusted to them by the people, their loyalty to the people of Myanmar, their defiant defense of the truth and their resilience in the face of persecution by the ruling generals.
They are the legitimate leaders—State Counselor and President—of Myanmar. They were democratically elected by a majority of Myanmar voters, twice. The party they have dedicated most of their lives to has won every election it has contested over the past three decades, since 1990. Currently, they are prisoners of the ruthless regime—one in solitary confinement inside a prison, the other held in an unknown location, like a hostage.
The harshness of the conditions in prison and the brutality of their captors would be life threatening for anyone, let alone people of advanced age such as 77-year-old Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and 70-year-old U Win Myint. To date, the former has been sentenced to 26 years’ imprisonment and the latter to five years. The two leaders are the oldest of the 16,500 political prisoners the regime has incarcerated since its coup.
Surviving in prison is tough—physically, mentally, intellectually, even ideologically. They are not first-time prisoners. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was a long-term prisoner of the previous regime, kept under house arrest for 15 years, while U Win Myint spent several years as a political prisoner in the 1990s.
Their strong spirit and resilience in the face of their lengthy imprisonment by the regime since the coup last year shows us yet again who they are, and the strength of their commitment to the country and its citizens—to a genuine democratic federal nation.
Three days after her 77th birthday on June 19, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was transferred from house arrest in Naypyitaw to solitary confinement in a prison in the city. It’s a tougher punishment than she was subjected to in the past; she was mostly kept under house arrest under the previous regime. The new regime is harsher, but she is still the Iron Lady of Myanmar.
The people of Myanmar hailed U Win Myint when they learned of his reaction to his captors on the first day of the coup. After he refused their request that he step down as President, one of the generals asked U Win Myint to reconsider, saying he could be harmed. He said he would rather die than resign.
Recently released Australian economist and adviser to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government Sean Turnell said, “She’s strong; she remains as she always was.” A court source who saw the hostage President recently said that U Win Myint is “as fit as a fiddle.”
The regime’s harsher punishments this year have done nothing at all to diminish their mettle, their principles and their spirit. They may be beaten, but they do not bow; they do not take, but give. These are the virtues of a leader..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-12-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"Tomorrow it will be one year since 30 people, including at least one child, were killed and their bodies burnt on a road near Moso Village, Hpruso Township. For the past year, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has been actively collecting and analysing information about this and other alleged serious international crimes committed across Myanmar to help ensure that the perpetrators one day face justice.
In the year since the 24 December tragedy, we have collected and analysed evidence of an array of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Myanmar, from Rakhine state in the west to Kayah in the east, including evidence of murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and deportation or forcible transfer. The evidence concerns crimes committed over many years, including persecution of Rohingya and attacks on other minorities since 2011, to more recent events affecting almost all parts of the country. Tragically, we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of deliberate or indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian locations like schools, hospitals and churches over the course of the year. Armed attacks that target civilians or indiscriminate attacks that affect civilians are prohibited by international laws of war and can be punished as war crimes or crimes against humanity.
International justice can be a slow and painstaking process. Criminal investigation requires a long-term commitment to gathering evidence. Collecting this information while it is fresh is essential to see justice served. The evidence is not meant to gather dust in an archive, but to eventually be used in a court of law where perpetrators will be prosecuted. We are already sharing evidence, with the consent of people who gave us the information, with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.
The Mechanism is very grateful and inspired by the courage of those individuals who come forward with information concerning the crimes that they have suffered or witnessed. The testimonies of witnesses and survivors of any crimes we are investigating, or their families, friends or colleagues, are vital for us to build criminal cases. Equally important are people with knowledge of illegal orders or policies. We encourage anyone who has information about serious international crimes in Myanmar to contact us through our secure and confidential channels.
Information on how to communicate securely and confidentially with the Mechanism can be found at https://iimm.un.org/contact-us/confidential-and-sensitive-communications/
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files for use in future prosecutions of those responsible in national, regional and international courts. For more information visit https://iimm.un.org/ or contact [email protected]..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Children, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"22 December 2022: The United Nations (UN) Security Council has finally spoken on Myanmar but action is needed, not merely words. The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) welcomes the long-overdue adoption of a Resolution on Myanmar but expresses deep disappointment at the failure of the resolution to mandate urgently needed action against the Myanmar military to protect the Myanmar people.
The UN Security Council in New York voted yesterday to adopt a resolution on Myanmar, Resolution 2669 (2022). It has finally responded to the overwhelming international rejection of the Myanmar military junta and support for the democratic will of the Myanmar people. But the resolution fails to attribute responsibility to the junta for its persistent commission of human rights atrocities and includes no reference to further measures to be taken by the Security Council should the junta continue its attack on the population of Myanmar.
“We welcome the fact that, at long last, the Security Council has taken action and finally adopted a resolution on Myanmar,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “But the resolution itself remains far too weak and should have included unequivocal condemnation of the military for its assault on the Myanmar people along with measures to end human rights atrocities and secure justice and peace, through an arms embargo, sanctions and referral to the International Criminal Court.”
The Resolution requests that the UN Secretary-General report orally to the Security Council by 15 March 2023 on UN support on implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus (5PC). ASEAN called on the UN to support its efforts in implementing the 5PC last month.
“The Myanmar military is destabilising the region with the brutal campaign of terror that it continues to inflict on the people of Myanmar,” said Yanghee Lee. “Despite the efforts of several Security Council members, the resolution fails to properly address the gravity of the crisis and depth of suffering caused by Min Aung Hlaing and his military; crisis and suffering that continue to grow every day.”
Stronger action by the Security Council was obstructed by permanent members Russia and China, both of which continue to sell arms to the military junta that it uses to commit grave violations of international law.
“Fear of the veto, which is fundamentally at odds with the whole purpose and principles of the UN when it comes to gross atrocities, rendered the result of this timid action by the Security Council hollow,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The adoption of such a text is therefore no more than ineffective rhetoric. Those who brought about this outcome, that falls far short of expectations, are complicit in the suffering and death of Myanmar people.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN Security Council, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"After the UN Security Council today adopted a long-overdue resolution demanding an end to the violence and immediate release of all arbitrarily detained persons, Amnesty International Secretary-General Agnes Callamard said:
“With the adoption of this resolution, the Security Council has finally taken a small but important step to acknowledge the dire situation in Myanmar. The Council must now follow up with regular open meetings and enforce its demands with additional resolutions under Chapter VII.”
The resolution failed to include other measures urgently needed to address the situation in the country, including a comprehensive arms embargo, targeted sanctions against military leaders responsible for grave human rights violations, and a referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court.
“The military authorities must abide by the resolution, immediately end the violence and release arbitrarily detained prisoners. The Council should further proceed to impose a comprehensive arms embargo, including on aviation fuel, and targeted sanctions against military leaders,” said Callamard.
“This resolution should be a message to the Myanmar military that they cannot continue their grave human rights violations and attacks against civilians. The Council is watching.”
Background:
Amnesty International continues to call on the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as soon as possible, in order to begin to address the impunity which has prevailed for both the atrocities against the Rohingya and crimes committed since the February 2021 coup. The Council has only twice used its power to refer atrocity situations to the ICC (Sudan & Libya), and must now urgently refer the grievous situation in Myanmar.
Almost two years after the February 2021 military coup, over 1.4 million people are displaced inside Myanmar, more than 13,000 people are detained in inhumane conditions, at least 73 people remain on death row, and 7.8 million children are out of school.
The Myanmar military has killed more than 2,600 people since the coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The victims include peaceful protesters, pro-democracy activists and other civilians. The Myanmar military has flagrantly ignored calls to respect human rights, including the ASEAN five-point consensus which they agreed to implement in April 2021.
The atrocities since last year’s coup follow the brutal military campaign of crimes against humanity in 2017 that drove out more than 740,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State into Bangladesh by extrajudicial executions, arson and sexual assault. An estimated one million Rohingya refugees now live in Bangladesh, and many of their villages back in Rakhine State have been wiped from the map..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-12-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Bi-lateral pressure needed on India and Pakistan over arms sales.
Burma Campaign UK today welcomed the passing of the first ever UN Security Council Resolution on Burma as a significant moment symbolically, but warned that as it fails to deliver any practical action, it will have no practical impact.
The Resolution passed with 12 countries in favour and Russia, China and India abstaining.
Democracy and human rights activists from Burma have been calling for a UN Security Council Resolution on Burma for more than 17 years. However, the Resolution has been watered down to the point where it will have absolutely no practical impact on the ground. Instead, it must be seen as a stepping-stone towards further practical action by the UN Security Council.
“The imposition of a global arms embargo should have been a no-brainer first step by the UN Security Council, but the supply of arms doesn’t even get a mention in the Resolution,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Russia, China and India are using their seats on the Security Council to protect their profitable dodgy arms deals with the Burmese military.”
UN Security Council Members which support a global arms embargo but failed to get it passed by the UN Security Council must now step up and coordinate pressure on countries supplying arms, starting with India and Pakistan.
The new Resolution calls for the release of political prisoners, implementation of the weak and already failed ASEAN five-point consensus, and an end to violence.
Three UN Security Council members, Russia, India and China are actively arming the Burmese military while the USA, which voted in favour of the Resolution, is still allowing American companies to fund and work for the Burmese military and their businesses, including Chevron, Apple, and Google. Chevron is linked to gas revenue payments to the military and the delivery of aviation fuel.
The Resolution also takes no action to address numerous violations of international law by the Burmese military, including genocide of the Rohingya.
“As the lead country on Burma at the UN Security Council the British government must urgently convene a meeting on Burma’s non-compliance with provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice to prevent ongoing genocide of the Rohingya,” said Mark Farmaner. “The ICJ is a UN Court and it’s the responsibility of the UN Security Council to ensures its rulings are followed. The Security Council failed to act to prevent genocide of the Rohingya, failed to make a referral to the International Criminal Court and is now failing to ensure measures to prevent ongoing genocide are implemented.”
The campaign for UN Security Council action on Burma was launched in September 2005 with the publication of a report, Threat to the Peace, commissioned from DLA Piper by former Czech President Vaclav Havel and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The legal study found that the situation in Burma met the definition of a threat to international peace and security and that the UN Security Council has an obligation to intervene.
In September 2006 the UN Security Council voted to place Burma on its agenda. Veto power does not apply to placing items on the agenda, instead nine votes are required. Ten countries voted in favour with Russia, China, Qatar and Democratic Republic of Conger (DRC) voting against.
In January 2007 Russia and China vetoed a non-binding resolution calling for dialogue and reconciliation. South Africa also voted against the resolution.
The British government, as the lead country (penholder) on Burma at the UN Security Council, ensured that Burma remained on the UN Security Council agenda since then. Whilst there have been various statements over the years, they have been watered down so significantly to achieve consensus that they bore very little reality to the serious crisis situation on the ground and had no practical impact.
For decades the UN Security Council has completely failed in its legal mandated responsibilities towards Burma, allowing ongoing violations of international law, including ongoing genocide, violations of Burma’s treaty obligations, and conflict and violations of international humanitarian law, leading to ongoing regional instability. The new Resolution continues that record of failure.
“When people in Burma look at this Resolution, they will wonder why the UN Security Council bothered,” said Mark Farmaner. “At the United Nations it might be seen as a diplomatic coup to get this resolution passed but in Burma it will have no impact for people living under a military coup.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2022-12-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, UN Security Council, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
First Such Resolution Recognizes People’s Brave Calls for Democracy
Description:
"(New York) – The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on December 21, 2022, denouncing the Myanmar military’s rights violations since the February 1, 2021 coup, Human Rights Watch said today. The landmark resolution, passed with 12 yes votes and 3 abstentions, reflects the Myanmar junta’s growing isolation generated by security force abuses amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
It is the first Security Council resolution on Myanmar since the country, formerly known as Burma, acquired independence from Britain in 1948.
“The Security Council resolution is a momentous step on behalf of the people of Myanmar, opening the door toward holding Myanmar’s brutal generals to account,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The resolution should bring renewed scrutiny to the junta’s daily atrocities and recognition of the Myanmar people’s brave efforts toward democracy and freedom.”
The resolution, which the United Kingdom drafted under the UN Charter’s Chapter VI concerning “pacific settlement of disputes,” expresses deep concern at the “ongoing state of emergency imposed by the military in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 and its grave impact on the people of Myanmar.” It condemns the military’s execution of pro-democracy activists, urges the military to “immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners,” and demands an “immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country.”
The resolution includes numerous references to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which adopted a “five-point consensus” in April 2021 in response to the Myanmar coup. Junta chief Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has since defied each point of the consensus while exploiting the international community’s deference to the regional bloc, Human Rights Watch said. The secretary-general or his special envoy on Myanmar is tasked with reporting orally by March 15, 2023, to the Security Council on UN support for implementation of the five-point consensus.
All Security Council members voted for the resolution, except for China, India, and Russia, which abstained.
The junta’s widespread and systematic abuses since the coup – including extrajudicial killings, torture, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians – amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Security forces have killed over 2,600 people and arbitrarily arrested over 16,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
The military has expanded abusive operations in ethnic minority areas, displacing more than one million people, and deliberately blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching populations in need as a form of collective punishment. The resolution calls for “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access,” expressing deep concern at the “increasingly large numbers of internally displaced persons and dramatic increase in humanitarian need.”
Activists in Myanmar have pressed for a Security Council resolution on the country for decades. China and Russia vetoed a 2007 draft condemning the then-military government’s attacks on civilians and detention of political prisoners. Calls for a resolution by UN experts, human rights groups, and others in response to the atrocities against the Rohingya in 2017 went unanswered. This was largely due to China and Russia’s resistance, but also concerns on the part of Western governments of alienating the now-ousted civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been in military custody since the coup.
The Security Council has issued statements of condemnation on Myanmar in the past and received numerous briefings from UN experts and the secretary-general. Under resolutions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, the council has debated reports on abuses against children in Myanmar. This resolution represents a significant escalation of the council’s engagement on Myanmar and offers a basis for sustained future monitoring of the situation in the country, Human Rights Watch said.
This first-step resolution should be followed by close monitoring and reporting on the junta’s compliance and further action by the council. Human Rights Watch has long called on the Security Council to impose a global arms embargo, refer the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and impose targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies. The initial draft of the resolution called for an immediate end to arms sales to Myanmar, which was later removed.
“China and Russia’s abstentions signal that even the junta’s few friends have lost interest in sticking out their necks to defend its atrocities,” said Louis Charbonneau, UN director at Human Rights Watch. “The building blocks put in place with this resolution offer a starting point for reinvigorating pressure on the junta among Security Council members and governments across the globe.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-12-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, UN Security Council, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The Myanmar military has started its preparations for conducting the next general election in 2023. A pertinent question for the current political crisis is what will be the future of Myanmar’s political system in 2023 and thereafter? Since the military takeover, the opposition forces under the National United Government (NUG) view themselves as an alternative to military rule. Even the EAOs have felt alienated from the political process and have stepped up their efforts at expanding administrative and judicial control. The lack of requisite representation in the political system dominated by the Bamar majority and the slow progress of peace conferences have dwindled EAO’s faith in the National League for Democracy (the ruling party since 2015) and the military. While, on the one hand, the EAOs are demanding a federal structure, the military is for a strong centre. On the other hand, the Arakan Army in the Rakhine State is demanding a confederation.
Questions are being raised about the legitimacy and authority of the National Unity Government and the military. While NUG is being questioned for its acceptability and recognition in the current situation, the military is being questioned for its violent repression and its legitimacy for governance. The third alternative to this is the rise of EAOs, which might eventually lead to a scenario of Myanmar’s Balkanisation.
The country is facing severe economic crises, compounded by COVID-19 and the military coup. The currency has depreciated, and the foreign investments are at their lowest. Unemployment has risen in the country and there are supply-demand mismatches of goods and services. Refugees from Myanmar have increased in neighbouring countries, especially in Thailand and India, and the number of people displaced internally has reached around 1.5 million. The issue of drug trafficking and money laundering has also intensified in these unstable times.
The international sanctions imposed immediately after the military take-over has somehow failed to change the course of the military. The sanction regimes have never really been effective in Myanmar. However, China and Russia continue to deal with the military, and China has gone to the extent of calling the military the legitimate government and the coup as a mere “cabinet reshuffle”. ASEAN, since April 2021, with its Five-Point Consensus, has tried to resolve the issue through negotiations and also appointed a Special Envoy for the purpose. Cambodia has held the chair of ASEAN for 2022, and the Special Envoy visited the country twice to further negotiate with the military and ensure the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. For 2023, Indonesia will be the chair, and there are renewed hopes for a settlement between all stakeholders. However, the change in the policy of calling a non-political representative of Myanmar to ASEAN meetings has created a rift between ASEAN and the military. On the other hand, India is watching the situation as it does not want to sever ties with either the military or the civilian representatives. The situation in Myanmar is vital for India’s economic and security needs, and therefore the visits by the Foreign Secretary in 2021 and 2022 were significant for addressing India’s border management and security concerns.
In this background, the possible scenario for 2023 is that Myanmar could be heading towards either a fractured democracy or eventually towards Balkanisation. The key drivers shaping this scenario in the following years are military’s capabilities to sustain itself, NUG’s effectiveness and functionality, continuous protests and demonstrations along with increasing attacks on both sides, alienation among Ethnic minorities and the Bamar majority and finally, a worsening economic crisis. However, there are key uncertainties to watch out for in 2023. The military’s repressive and violent tactics like air strikes and executing a number of protestors could lead to its eventual decline as there are increasing defections in the military ranks. Further many countries, especially ASEAN members, are raising their concerns for Myanmar military’s non-conformity to the Five-Point Consensus. There are also fears about whether NUG will stay united in these turbulent times and gain increased legitimacy despite suppression by the military. On the other hand, the strengthening of EAOs could lead to a fractured democracy as many are expanding their administrative and judicial presence in their regions. And finally, there is also uncertainty with regard to the effectiveness of sanctions as countries like the United States, Europe, and Canada which have imposed fresh round of sanctions.
The key indicators to look out for in the year 2023 are the upcoming elections promised by the military, the continued casualties and human rights violations, cases against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other important political prisoners, economic and social implications and finally, the international reactions. Here, important partners especially bordering countries, China, Thailand and India, will likely play key roles. In addition, Russia, with its closer ties with Myanmar since the military coup, will be an important area of interest in 2023. The upcoming scenario will have implications for India, as a neighbouring country, as any instability or fractured democracy in the country will impact the northeast region. There is likely to be a further rise in the incidences of the cross-border supply of arms and drugs and influx of refugees to India.
However, one can also predict that the military might eventually postpone the elections to further cement their control. This extended time will also give space for the NUG and the other opposition forces, such as EAOs, to expand their presence. As the NUG is reaching out to international powers and setting up representative offices in some countries, the latest one being in Washington DC, its recognition and presence worldwide will have implications on its legitimacy and acceptability. There is also a possibility that the elections could take place without the participation of either NUG or many EAOs, and the military could take over the governance via its proxy party, USDP. While the military in Myanmar continues to be an important stakeholder, it is also vital that the military takes on board all the other stakeholders to work towards a stable democracy in Myanmar. The year 2023, therefore, will be a very significant due to likely scenarios that might unfold in Myanmar and their impact on South Asia as well as Southeast Asia.
Source/publisher:
Vivekananda International Foundation
Date of publication:
2022-12-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The National Unity Government (NUG) and the pro-democracy forces of Myanmar applaud passage today by the US Congress of the Burma Act as part of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (2023 NDAA). We look forward to President Biden soon signing it into law.
This important law clearly sets out United States policy to support the people of Myanmar as well as the NUG, NUCC, CRPH, CDM and our allied organizations in our struggle against the junta for democracy, human rights, and justice. It also expands authorization
for economic sanctions on the military junta, its cronies, and the energy sector and related businesses. The law authorizes greater humanitarian assistance for the people of Myanmar; technical support and non-lethal assistance to Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs); and to support programs for former members of the military. It also authorizes support for the establishment and operation of transitional
justice mechanisms. The legislation will promote steps to increase pressure on the military, including at the UN.
The Burma Act will provide much needed hope and support to the struggling people of our country. We also thank the Burmese diaspora and people of good conscience across the U.S. who worked tirelessly in support of this achievement. It is only through working together with our brothers and sisters around the world that we will bring democracy back to our people. With the passage of the Burma Act, support for our democracy movement grows ever stronger.
I again deeply thank the US Congress and all those who worked to get the Burma Act approved..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Myanmar Now asked American scholar Dr Zachary Abuza whether the BURMA Act can finally begin to provide the help that Myanmar’s people need
Description:
"New legislation passed by the US House of Representatives (US House) last week—known as the BURMA (Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability) Act—could compel significant changes in US policy towards Myanmar. The legislation, in the form of amendments to the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), is expected to become law within weeks after passing by a floor vote in the US Senate.
Although US lawmakers have referred to the NDAA amendments discussed in this interview as the “BURMA Act,” they differ in some respects from a 2021 bill introduced in the US House under the same name. The earlier bill passed in the lower legislative chamber but was never brought to a vote in the upper chamber—the US Senate—and did not become law.
The newly passed and amended BURMA Act within the NDAA purportedly serves as a green light for the US government to impose sanctions against Myanmar’s coup regime and the individuals or entities that abet its atrocities. It also authorises “non-lethal assistance” to the publicly mandated, civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and other opposition and resistance groups in Myanmar. This assistance does not include arms.
Myanmar Now recently discussed this legislation with Dr Zachary Abuza, a Southeast Asian politics and security issues expert at the National War College in Washington, DC.
While acknowledging the bill’s importance, Prof Abuza criticised the delayed response of the US and other democratic governments to Myanmar’s urgent humanitarian crisis following the 2021 coup. He outlined further international action he deemed necessary to deter atrocities in the country and support resistance groups in Myanmar, and offered an explanation for the US government’s ongoing refusal to supply weapons to the junta’s opponents.
Myanmar Now: The BURMA Act of 2022 has been added to the NDAA and was passed by the US House on December 8. Could you please explain its significance for US policy towards Myanmar/Burma?
Prof. Zachary Abuza: The BURMA Act of 2022 was included in the FY23 [Fiscal Year 2023] National Defense Authorization Act that the House of Representatives passed on December 6. Often these large spending bills have other pieces of legislation tacked on, especially if they are meant to pressure the executive branch to take some action that Congress wants. This year’s NDAA also included the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act.
In the 2022 NDAA, Congress expressed their displeasure with the Biden Administration’s policies on the Myanmar junta, considering them insufficient. The 2022 legislation called on the administration to step up their contact and relations with the NUG. We saw clear evidence of that. The NUG was represented on the sidelines of the US–ASEAN Summit; there were several high-level engagements between the National Security Council and Department of State with the NUG. In late 2022, the US allowed the NUG to open a representative office in Washington, DC to support their lobbying and coordination efforts. Perhaps the administration would have done those things on its own, but when Congress puts it into the one spending bill that is passed without exception every year, it does force the administration’s hands.
Let me be clear, even if the Biden administration does everything Congress calls on it to do in this year’s NDAA, it is insufficient to bring about the downfall of the [junta]. There is much more the US government can and should do to support the NUG, which Washington acknowledges is the lawful and legitimate government representing the people of Myanmar.
MN: The BURMA Act explicitly states that the US will provide technical support and non-lethal assistance to ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), and pro-democracy organisations ‘to strengthen communication and command and control’ as well as the coordination of international relief. Do you think that this constitutes a major US policy change? Could you unpack the term ‘non-lethal assistance’ and how that assistance could affect the armed resistance?
ZA: This is an important development. While I have long argued that the US government should be supplying lethal assistance to the NUG, it is not going to happen for four key reasons: First, Myanmar is not a national security priority for the US and you find no senior leader justifying our policy in terms of US national interests. Second, there is concern over who and what components would get the weapons, especially considering that many EAOs are involved in the burgeoning illicit narcotics market. The US government is terrified of the scandal should US weapons find their way into the hands of EAOs who are deeply involved in the production and sale of synthetic drugs. Third, the US stockpiles of arms and ammunition are being depleted by Ukraine, which the US has deemed in its national interest to support. Fourth, the actual issue of logistics of providing weapons is a challenge given that Thailand, China, India, and Bangladesh would not support it.
In sum, while I believe the NUG deserves lethal assistance, there are no strong advocates of providing them with arms within the administration. Thus, I have strongly advocated for the provision of non-lethal assistance, including encrypted communications devices, battlefield medicine, intelligence support including provision of commercially available (though expensive) satellite imagery, intelligence sharing, and training. Most importantly, the US could step up their support for the NUG’s civil administration, including public health, education and rule of law/policing. Finally, the US government could provide monetary assistance to the NGOs that facilitate the defection of military forces and provide them with subsistence funds.
“While I believe the NUG deserves lethal assistance, there are no strong advocates of providing them with arms within the administration. ”
All of this is possible, and some is even in the works. But again, there are logistical challenges to this. America’s treaty ally Thailand continues to support the [junta] and prevent large scale humanitarian access to the border. The US, itself, needs a permanent representative to the NUG. This would be all the more important because the US has announced that it is downgrading diplomatic ties with the [junta], by not replacing the prematurely departing US ambassador. But Washington really needs a point person to be a liaison with the NUG and coordinate the delivery of non-lethal assistance.
MN: Given the untold atrocities the people of Myanmar have been subjected to for almost two years, do you think that the US’s BURMA Act has come too late? The people of the country have long hoped for decisive assistance from the US to deter the reckless atrocities of the junta: do you think that the BURMA Act can fulfil that hope?
ZA: Yes, the US BURMA Act is way too little, too late, given the atrocities and human rights abuses suffered by the people of Myanmar across the country on a daily basis. The military intentionally uses war crimes as part of their military doctrine. The Four Cuts strategy is designed to terrorise the population into submission. Their reliance on indiscriminate artillery and air assaults are designed to target civilian populations. The military’s arson attacks have burnt down nearly 40,000 homes since the coup. Four people have been executed and 138 have been sentenced to death; nearly 150 have died in [junta] custody, tortured to death. Meanwhile the regime has driven the economy into the ground with their sheer incompetence, eviscerating over a decade of sustained economic growth.
The people of Myanmar deserve so much more from the US, the European Union and other democratic countries such as Japan, South Korea and Australia. There is much more that these countries can do to step up concerted economic pressure on the military regime. The sanctions regime right now is simply too piecemeal, and states like China, Russia, and India are able to violate them. While the BURMA Act spells out what the next round of sanctions should be, the act does not compel the [Biden] administration to begin sanctioning the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. The decisions to impose sanctions remain the prerogative of the Administration.
“Despite all odds, every day the people of Myanmar protest the junta, make donations to the NUG, or pick up arms to fight in PDFs, all to restore their democracy. That sustained courage and commitment should be supported.”
When Ko Jimmy, Phyo Zeya Thaw, and two others were executed [in July], it was the perfect opportunity for the international community to step up sanctions. They failed dismally. If the Biden administration is serious about advancing democracy and standing up to China’s authoritarian system that it seeks to expand throughout the world, then there is no better place for Washington to start than in Myanmar. Despite all odds, every day the people of Myanmar protest the junta, make donations to the NUG, or pick up arms to fight in PDFs, all to restore their democracy. That sustained courage and commitment should be supported.
MN: While the BURMA Act states support for amending Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution—codifying a requirement that the military exist under a civilian government and no longer hold 25 percent of parliamentary seats—the Act did not mention the Federal Charter adopted by National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). What are your thoughts on this? Are the US lawmakers’ expectations for amendments to the 2008 Constitution still realistic? How could this materialise, given the drastically altered political landscape?
ZA: The BURMA Act stated its desire for the amendment of the 2008 Constitution, unequivocally stating that the military has to be under the civilian government and it would no longer control 25 percent of seats in all parliaments. This is a well-meaning statement, but simplistic, as facts have changed on the ground. There will be no amendment to the 2008 constitution. It needs to be scrapped.
At the same time, the BURMA Act didn’t reference the NUCC’s Federal Charter. This was a mistake, but also an understandable one. The situation in Myanmar is very complex, there are a multitude of actors and processes. Myanmar is a very low priority for Congress, despite some interest on the part of some members. It is unrealistic to expect them to have a deep and nuanced understanding. Again, having an official liaison with the NUG who regularly briefed Congress would help. Now to be fair, I don’t think that the NUG has done a great job in educating their foreign interlocutors about the Federal Charter, and, from my vantage point, there has been insufficient progress in the constitutional convention. This is another area where the US and other western countries could provide significant legal expertise and support..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-12-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun discusses the UN’s response to his country’s crisis.
Description:
"Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations, will continue to serve as his country’s permanent representative to the international body in New York for another year, a position he has held since 2020. The United Nations General Assembly Credentials Committee decided to uphold his status at a meeting on Monday, though a formal announcement has yet to be made.
Myanmar’s military junta, which seized power from the elected government in a February 2021 coup, opposes the move. Its information team said in a comment on the instant-messaging software app Viber on Wednesday that Kyaw Moe Tun had been fired from his position because of his treason against the government. The junta also said he represented “terrorist groups,” such as Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government, its armed wing the People’s Defense Force, and the Burmese legislative body in exile.
Kyaw Moe Tun, who does not represent the military regime, has spoken out against the junta for its attacks on and arrests of anti-regime protesters and ordinary citizens. The Burmese diplomat spoke with reporter Khin Ei Ei of Radio Free Asia’s Burmese service about his reappointment and the U.N.’s response to the violence and rights violations in Myanmar. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: If you are appointed to the same position as the permanent representative for another year, do you see more opportunities for you to work on trying to resolve the crisis in Myanmar?
Kyaw Moe Tun: I believe that I will be able to continue striving for the good of our people and our country within the boundary of a permanent representative as usual. I do believe that I will be able to educate the international community more about the problems and issues that Myanmar people are facing and do as much as I can for them in any possible way. Like I said earlier, I am going to work for the good of the people in accordance with the values in the charter, and I believe that since I am working for the righteous desire of Myanmar people, I will be able to do more and achieve more for them.
RFA: There has been criticism that the U.N. merely issues statements expressing concern about the crisis in Myanmar without taking any effective action to help the people there. Do you see any possibility that the U.N. could give more help and assistance to the citizens of Myanmar?
Kyaw Moe Tun: The Myanmar people are suffering, physically and mentally. Over 2,500 or nearly 2,600 innocent civilians have been lawlessly tortured and killed by the military junta, and a large number of people have been detained and imprisoned. Over 16,000 people have been arrested. The number of civilians who had to flee their homes for safety has been constantly rising, up to over 1.4 million so far. About 14 million Myanmar people have been facing the problem of scarcity of food according to U.N. data. That’s why, we, the Myanmar people, both local and foreign, the National Unity Government, and other organizations have been vocal about everyday challenges such as losing lives, insufficient food and various problems.
In the same way, on the New York front, we are telling the international community about the situation in Myanmar in many different ways. However, as the Myanmar people are saying, the international community, including the United Nations have not taken decisive action, as we have called for, so far. But in the way of multilateralism, some decisions can be made within a day, but others take days or longer.
In November, the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly submitted a draft resolution on Myanmar titled “Human Rights Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar.” In that draft resolution, there are expressions that reflect the current happenings in Myanmar, although it does not cover the entire picture. The resolution was agreed to among the member countries. Also, the members of the United Nations Security Council, especially the U.K., have been working on a draft proposal for Myanmar since August, and it is close to being passed. We hear that the member countries are discussing the resolution. These are the progress.
If a resolution for Myanmar is passed in the U.N. Security Council, it is going to highlight the atrocities that the military junta is committing against innocent Myanmar people and put new pressure on the junta in some ways. That’s why I would like to request that the members of the Security Council listen carefully to the voice of the Myanmar people, to take their true aspirations and their troubles into consideration, and make decisions that will enable decisive and effective actions for their vulnerable situation.
RFA: The U.N.’s office in Yangon has suggested that the U.N. should cooperate with the military junta to help the people? What do you think of this?
Kyaw Moe Tun: The U.N. agencies in Myanmar are trying in many different ways to carry out their tasks, especially to provide effective humanitarian help to the people. What we always point out is that although we support them in giving humanitarian assistance to our people, the help should get to the actual people who are in desperate need of it. But we do not support the help that goes to those who are close to the military junta. Humanitarian help should indiscriminately reach all unfortunate people who are in need of it.
That’s why we have always suggested that the U.N. needs to connect and work with all parties involved in order to provide humanitarian assistance directly to the people who actually need it. All parties means all organizations, including the National Unity Government, ethnic revolutionary organizations, NGOs and social help groups and those on the front lines of the incidents. We always point out that these groups need to be helped indifferently and fairly with complete transparency. That’s why we continue to urge the U.N. agencies in Myanmar to listen to our suggestions and help the people only in the ways we have suggested and to reach out to those really in need and provide humanitarian assistance as soon as possible.
RFA: What can you say about the degree of recognition that the shadow National Unity Government has achieved from the international community, including the United Nations, and their relations?
Kyaw Moe Tun: If we look back on the NUG and our revolution, we started building from the ground up and after 22 months [following the military coup], the role of the NUG, ethnic revolutionary organizations, and those who are shaping the people’s revolution has become more and more crucial. This is an undeniable fact. That’s why we can’t look at the United Nations alone, which can have some delays in its decisions and actions as it is a multilateral organization that needs to take every member into account.
As Thomas Andrew, the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said, actions like coordinated and targeted sanctions are necessary because it takes a long time and effort for the U.N. to reach a common decision. Similarly, member countries have not yet come to a common decision on the crisis in Myanmar because of different opinions. It will take a certain length of time. Although some countries have not been publicly recognized, we have seen many of them connecting and working with the NUG and urging other members to do the same. That’s why, we can see the progress in the role of the NUG in the last 20 months and now. With this progress, I would like to request all members to continue and extend help together for the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-12-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Neither the EU nor ASEAN can deal with the crisis in Myanmar alone, but together they can make a difference.
Description:
"On December 14, leaders of European Union member states are meeting in Brussels with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – with one exception. Myanmar is unrepresented. Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who heads the junta put in power in Myanmar after a February 2021 military coup against a democratically elected government, was not invited.
Min Aung Hlaing and his junta security forces are responsible for countless atrocities against the opposition and ethnic minority groups amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The authorities have executed political prisoners, unlawfully killed hundreds of protesters and bystanders, and detained more than 13,000 people. The military has bombed and shelled civilians and their villages and sharply increased the use of banned antipersonnel landmines. Since the coup, the junta has effectively been at war with its own people.
The EU has imposed several rounds of sanctions on both Min Aung Hlaing and his leadership, as well as on lucrative military-controlled conglomerates and companies that provide the military with revenues it needs to maintain its rule and carry out abuses.
But so far, the impacts of EU sanctions have been limited.
Why? Because other governments, notably the U.S. and U.K., haven’t coordinated closely enough or matched the EU’s stronger sanctions – in particular, on the military’s natural gas revenues and banks that process foreign payments for the extractive sector. Absent better coordination with the U.S. and other governments, EU sanctions simply cannot impose enough economic pain on the junta to compel the military to change its conduct.
The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, acknowledged in July that “bolder and stronger attitudes” were needed and that the international community “must continue to put all its economic and political forces under pressure on this junta…we must continue to apply pressure. It is the only possible way out of this conflict.”
EU leaders have been supportive of tougher action. The EU imposed a new round of sanctions in November. The U.S. imposed a small sanctions package at the same time, but has still not matched stronger and far more important sanctions the EU imposed in February.
Regrettably, however, some EU leaders – including most recently French President Emmanuel Macron – are still placing primary responsibility on ASEAN to take the diplomatic lead on actually negotiating with the military and resolving the crisis.
But neither the EU nor ASEAN can deal with the crisis in Myanmar alone.
In April 2021, ASEAN did manage to negotiate a five-point consensus with the Myanmar military, meant to lead to dialogue and de-escalation. But the military repudiated it within days and the abuses only increased. ASEAN leaders later barred Myanmar military leaders from ASEAN meetings and in 2022 began to criticize the junta more.
After the junta executed four pro-democracy activists in July, Malaysia’s foreign minister called the executions a “mockery” of promises to ASEAN, and in September its prime minister told the U.N. General Assembly that “the ASEAN ‘Five-Point Consensus’ cannot continue any longer.”
An October European Parliament resolution reflected a similar conclusion and called on ASEAN to take new approaches. It also urged the EU to adopt tougher sanctions and redouble coordination with ASEAN and other concerned governments on pressuring the military.
EU and ASEAN leaders should work to reach a new agreement for stronger cooperation on the Myanmar crisis. And ASEAN leaders should show support for sanctions – even if it must be privately – and urge the EU to press the U.S. to match EU sanctions.
For its part, the EU should urge ASEAN members to cooperate in enforcing sanctions in ASEAN jurisdictions. While U.S. and EU law obviously do not apply in ASEAN countries, it does apply to U.S. dollar and euro transactions in the international banking system, which utilize correspondent banks in the U.S. and EU. Sanctions, if they’re properly enforced, could apply to hundreds of millions of dollars the junta regularly receives for natural gas and other extractives, much of which comes from or is deposited into banks in ASEAN countries.
The EU – and any and all ASEAN governments that are willing – should in particular urge Thailand, an ASEAN member that purchases gas from Myanmar, and Singapore, where the military has bank accounts used to receive these funds, to agree to help enforce sanctions.
The EU should also urge ASEAN to consider suspending Myanmar from ASEAN.
The EU and ASEAN leaders should signal agreement on the need for a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing a global arms embargo on Myanmar, which purchases weapons from both China and Russia. Even if a resolution cannot overcome a Security Council veto, debate on the subject will further isolate the junta and help inspire tighter embargoes by individual governments and regional blocs.
New actions by the EU, ASEAN, the U.S., and other concerned governments need to be smart, strong, sustained, and coordinated. Myanmar’s generals are not going to change their conduct unless the cumulative cost of their refusal to do so grows too great to bear..."
Source/publisher:
The Diplomat (Tokyo) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-12-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun is the permanent representative of Myanmar to the United Nations; however, the diplomat does not represent the country's ruling military junta.
Kyaw Moe Tun was appointed to his position in 2020, months before the military overthrew the elected civilian government in February 2021. The military junta tried to fire him from his post, but he refused to leave, and so far, the United Nations General Assembly Credentials Committee has refused to recognize the military's appointee. He is also backed by Myanmar's National Unity Government (NUG), established by the country's elected and now-removed legislators.
On Monday, a U.N. diplomat told VOA that the U.N. credentials committee had agreed to uphold his status as Myanmar's ambassador. The diplomat declined to speak on the record before the committee formally announces its decision.
Last week, VOA's Ingyin Naing interviewed Kyaw Moe Tun at his office in New York to discuss what it is like representing a government that rejects him and how he sees his role as diplomat.
This interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.
VOA: What do you think about the upcoming decision on Myanmar U.N. representations this year?
Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun: Since last year, two countries, namely Afghanistan and Myanmar, had competing credentials with regard to the respective delegations. So, last year, the credentials committee decided to defer the decisions on the credentials of Afghanistan and Myanmar.
How they will decide depends, of course, on the members of the Credentials Committee. Russia, China and the United States are the three members who are elected every year. [[This year the credentials committee members also include Angola, Austria, Guyana, Maldives, Uruguay and Zambia.]]
VOA: You also voted this year to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine and to suspend Russia's membership at the U.N. Human Rights Council. Do you think that your stance on those issues affects Russia's decision on the matter of who should represent Myanmar and that they might prefer the Myanmar junta's representative?
Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun: We not only voted yes but also co-sponsored the resolutions because the reason is very simple and very clear: We the people of Myanmar need to stand firm with the people of Ukraine, who are suffering like the people of Myanmar. By co-sponsoring the resolution, by voting yes on the resolution, we stand firm with the people of Ukraine. Russia will not be happy with that. So, whatever they decided regarding the representation of Myanmar here in the U.N., they will not be in favor of the permanent representative, who is appointed by the elected civilian government, who is speaking for the people of Myanmar.
VOA: What do you think about China also publicly backing the Myanmar junta?
Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun: You can compare China and Russia. But what I know is that the high-level visit from China is what we don't see during this time. But of course, the last time Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar [in July], that was only for the subregional meeting, not for the bilateral meeting.
China was making it clear that the visit was not for a bilateral visit and was for the subregional group meetings, the Lancang-Mekong meetings. So, it is clear the position of China is different from the position of Russia because Russia's foreign minister visited Myanmar on bilateral bases.
China is also our neighboring country and a permanent member of the Security Council. That is why we always value the role of China. Of course, there are other neighboring countries whose roles we value — not only China but also India, Bangladesh, Laos and Thailand.
The role of the neighboring countries is very important. The neighboring countries of Ukraine open their borders, open their arms and extend warm hospitality to the Ukrainians, who escaped from the aggression and who take refuge in the neighboring countries. We wish our neighboring countries would be like those of Ukraine.
Back to the question about the position of China, of course, it is different from the position of Russia. That is my personal point of view.
VOA: According to some news agencies, Ukraine sold weapons to the Myanmar military. Did you ask Ukraine's diplomats about selling weapons to the Myanmar military when you met them?
Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun: To be very frank, I haven't brought this issue to the Ukrainian ambassador here. But I do understand that the selling of weapons was before the military coup. I do understand that after the military coup, the government of Ukraine was not selling any kind of weapons to the military, who use these weapons to kill innocent civilians. So according to my knowledge, Ukraine as a government is not selling any kind of weapons to the Myanmar military.
VOA: You have spoken frequently in your speeches at the U.N. committee meetings about the U.N.'s failure to protect the Myanmar people who are being oppressed by the military junta. Do you have any hope for concrete action from the U.N.?
Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun: Our people are really helpless, and even they were holding the placards carrying the R2P — "responsibility to protect." Since then, in my statements at the U.N., I tried to convey the people's voices — like asking the U.N. to apply the principles of R2P to save the lives of the people of Myanmar. Even though, of course, it is very frustrating because no one ever will make the statement whenever we made the appeal. Whenever we meet, that demand does not really come out in practical terms. But on the other hand, sometimes in multilateralism, the result takes time.
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2022-12-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime has doubled down on its repression of journalists as it tightens it grip on the country following its democracy-crushing coup on February 1, 2021. After arresting scores of journalists to block coverage of its abuses and resistance to the takeover, its second year in power saw the handing down of harsh prison sentences in a bid to silence and eliminate the country’s few remaining independent media outlets.
The Committee to Protect Journalists’ annual prison census has found that at least 42 journalists were imprisoned in Myanmar for their reporting as of December 1, a repressive 40% rise on the number recorded by CPJ on the same date in 2021 and making it the world’s third-worst jailer of journalists behind Iran and China.
Nearly half of those detained were sentenced in 2022, most under Article 505(a) of the penal code, an anti-state provision that broadly penalizes “incitement” and “false news”, both ill-defined terms in law and arbitrarily interpreted by military-influenced courts to hand down two- and three-year sentences. Others were given harsher, longer sentences on terrorism and other anti-state charges, often for contacting or reporting on the activities of anti-military armed resistance groups, including newly formed “people’s defense forces”, or PDFs, which the junta deems as terrorist organizations, as well as decades-old ethnic armies fighting for autonomy and rights.
Myanmar’s figure could be much higher. Many news organizations remain reluctant to identify their detained staff and freelancers to avoid the harsher sentences often meted out to journalists, particularly those who work undercover for military-banned media or who claimed to stop working for their news organizations after the coup but continued to report secretly.
Since the coup, the regime has periodically released journalists held in pre-trial detention or serving sentences as part of broad prisoner amnesties. That included a November 17 release in which at least eight journalists were freed, including Japanese documentary filmmaker Toru Kubota, who was serving a 10-year jail sentence on sedition, immigration and other charges.
The releases, where certain news organizations’ journalists are shown lenience while others are forced to serve their full sentences in severe prison conditions, appear to be aimed strategically to obscure the number of journalists the junta held at any given time and sow divisions among independent media groups, editors at news organizations with jailed journalists said in interviews with CPJ.
“The independent media has been targeted since day one after the coup. It’s as if they prepared a list of editors and reporters to go after,” said Aung Zaw, founder and editor-in-chief of the independent The Irrawaddy. “Some were released [while] some were charged with high treason, terrorism, electronic crimes – all sorts of allegations that don’t make sense at all,” he added, noting three of his organization’s reporters were behind bars as of December 1.
Aung Zaw, a former CPJ International Press Freedom Award recipient whose publication was banned just weeks after the coup, said the regime seeks to “divide and rule” the independent media, claiming that certain news organizations are allowed to operate unperturbed in de facto exchange for publishing “pimping propaganda” and “echoing what the regime says.”
Indeed, independent news groups that report from the conflict’s frontlines have been singled out for harsh harassment. Mekong News, a Shan State-based online news outfit covering crime, politics, war, and ethnic issues, has borne the brunt of the junta’s repression with three of its journalists, namely Maung Maung Myo, Toe Aung and Htun Than Aung, now behind bars.
“Obviously, the junta’s campaign of jailing journalists aims to stop independent news reporting on its abuses and activities,” said Mekong News managing editor Nyan Linn Htet, who is currently in hiding from an arrest warrant issued in March and whose reporters now live and operate in exile or from underground inside the country. “But, in my opinion, it is not succeeding because independent reporting hasn’t stopped and has even become stronger than before the coup.”
In an early September show of solidarity, 33 independent local news groups issued a statement condemning a new press council formed since the coup, which they jointly accused of “spreading misinformation” and “propaganda messages” about Myanmar’s independent media while noting 140 journalists had by then been arrested since the military seized power.
(CPJ emailed Myanmar’s Ministry of Information for comment but did not receive a response.)
The statement, which said that 11 independent media groups have had their publishing licenses revoked since the putsch, also said: “The military council is suppressing independent media groups and journalists in Myanmar in many different ways, impeding the right to information and hinder freedom of the press and freedom of expression throughout the country.” Some have found other ways to continue publishing, from exile and underground bureaus inside the country.
Several of the statement’s signatories, CPJ’s 2022 census shows, are among the outlets that have reporters languishing behind bars or were previously held and released.
“Imprisonment is routine for military regimes [but] this action represents severe suppression of freedom of the press,” said Kanbawza Tai News editor-in-chief Zay Tai, who told CPJ two of his released reporters, both freed in early October, plan soon to resume their news reporting. “The military can try but will never be able to stop our independent journalists.”
CPJ Senior Southeast Asia Representative Shawn W. Crispin is based in Bangkok, Thailand, where he has worked as a journalist and editor for over two decades. He has led CPJ missions throughout the region and is the author of several CPJ special reports..."
Source/publisher:
Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-12-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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Description:
"Human Rights Watch says the military junta in Myanmar is waging a war against its own people.
It is calling on world governments, including Japan, to step up their response.
The group released a statement on December 10, marking international Human Rights Day. It highlighted the situation in Myanmar, describing the country as having become the "worst of the worse" among ASEAN nations for human rights abuses.
It added that military crackdowns have led to attacks on civilians, and about one hundred political prisoners have been sentenced to death. It warns the situation could get worse.
The group's Deputy Asia Director Phil Robertson says the international community needs to step up.
"We have called for, time and time again, an international arms embargo to be imposed by the UN Security Council to stop the violence," says Robertson. "We've demanded that there be targeted sanctions."
Robertson also called on Japan, which he referred to as one of Asia's oldest democracies, to do more.
"It's a country where democracy and human rights are valued, and therefore Japan should be a leader in demanding change in Myanmar," says Robertson.
Japan has a long-standing relationship with Myanmar, including a military officer training program.
But the Japanese government announced it would suspend that program from next year over Myanmar's execution of pro-democracy activists..."
Source/publisher:
NHK World - Japan
Date of publication:
2022-12-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Executive Summary: The Myanmar Interim Arrangements Research Project (MIARP)
was funded by the Joint Peace Fund (JPF)1
, and implemented
between October 2017 and October 2018. Researchers spoke
to more than 450 people in Shan, Karen/Kayin and Mon States,
Tanintharyi Region, Naypyidaw, Yangon and Thailand, including confict-affected communities, representatives of Myanmar government and Army, leaders and members of Ethnic
Armed Organisations (EAOs), civil society organisations (CSOs),
political parties, diplomats and donors, and international aid
workers and analysts.
The term “Interim Arrangements” (ၾကားကာလအတြ߾္းေࠀာ߾္ရြက္ရ
မည့္အ߿ီအ߿ဥ္မ်ား) is a contested concept, meaning different
things to different stakeholders. The MIARP adopted the following working defnition of Interim Arrangements:
“Service delivery and governance in confictaffected areas, including the relationship
between EAOs and government systems, during
the period between initial ceasefres and a
comprehensive political settlement.”
Interim Arrangement refers to EAOs’ governance functions,
administrative authority and service delivery systems. The issue of which geographic areas are covered by Interim Arrangements is problematic. The Myanmar Army has pressed to
restrict EAOs’ service delivery and governance functions to
areas under armed groups’ exclusive control (which in most
cases have not yet been demarcated); on the ground however,
EAOs’ infuence and delivery of services and governance functions extend into areas where political and military authority
is mixed, and contested with the government and Tatmadaw.
In principle, the “interim” period extends until a comprehensive political settlement has been implemented, which given
recent setbacks in the peace process may take many years to
achieve. In the meantime, recognition of Interim Arrangements
refects the government’s acknowledgement of key EAOs’ political legitimacy and administrative responsibilities - at least,
for those groups which have signed the Nationwide Ceasefre
Agreement (NCA). One of the key recommendations of this
report is to support EAOs to exercise governance and administrative authority in a responsible and accountable manner.
The only offcial text referring to Interim Arrangements is
the October 2015 NCA. However, Interim Arrangements are
relevant in areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and
furthermore the NCA text fails to cover the full range of
meanings associated with the term.
Although Interim Arrangements are about more than the
NCA, Chapter 6 (Article 25) of this agreement does recognize
the roles of signatory EAOs in the felds of health, education, development, environmental conservation and natural
resource management, preservation and promotion of ethnic
cultures and languages, security and the rule of law, and illicit
drug eradication. The NCA allows EAOs to receive international aid, in coordination with the government. However, with
no agreed mechanism for addressing these goals through the
peace process architecture, the NCA has had limited impacts
on improving confict-affected communities’ access to equitable and effective governance and services. Furthermore,
on the ground in southeast Myanmar, government offcials
seem to regard EAOs primarily as service delivery actors, and/
or private companies, rather than legitimate governance and
administrative actors.
For many years, Myanmar’s larger EAOs have taken on governance and administration roles in their areas of control, often
delivering a wide range of services in partnership with CSOs.
In the southeast, groups like the Restoration Council of Shan
State (RCSS), Karen National Union (KNU) and New Mon State
Party (NMSP) are de-facto governments in relatively small pockets of territory. They also have infuence and provide some
services in wider areas of “mixed administration”, where EAO
authority overlaps with that of the government and Myanmar
Army. Between them for example, these three EAOs administer or support more than 2,000 schools, providing ethnic
language teaching to vulnerable children who would otherwise often be denied an education. They also work with local
partners to provide health services, access to justice and other
public goods.2
Similar arrangements exist in other parts of the country, both
in ceasefre areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and
in areas of on-going armed confict. For example, across much
of Kachin and northern Shan States, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and other EAOs provide elements of
governance, and life-saving if under resourced services to Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other highly vulnerable
communities.
There are three principal rationales for supporting Interim Arrangements:
1. Effective Interim Arrangements will provide the best outcomes for vulnerable and marginalised communities in
confict-affected areas. Rather than reinventing the wheel,
existing EAO and CSO service delivery systems should
be supported on a case-by-case basis, recognising best
practice (an “appreciative inquiry” approach). Meeting the
government’s targets for school enrolment and universal
health coverage for example, will depend on the work
of EAOs and affliated civil society actors, who should be
seen as partners in meeting critical needs and achieving
development goals. Chapter 3 explores how these issues
play out in relation to specifc sectors and issues.
2. Several of Myanmar’s EAOs (including NCA signatory and
non-signatory groups) enjoy long-standing political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent.
Supporting EAO governance regimes will counter perceptions of the peace process as a vehicle for state penetration
into previously autonomous areas, displacing existing EAO
authorities and services, without consulting local stakeholders. In order to be confict-sensitive, aid should be delivered in ways that do not undermine systems associated with
EAOs, to the beneft of the government (which is a party to
the confict). Timely peace dividends can best be provided
to vulnerable and marginalized communities by working
with existing and trusted local service delivery systems.
3. Interim Arrangements could be a key element in building “federalism from below” in Myanmar, supporting
effective local governance through equitable practices of
self-determination. The administrative functions and services provided by key EAOs (and their civil society partners) should be regarded as the building blocks of federalism in Myanmar - a political solution to decades of armed
confict which key stakeholders have endorsed.
It will be very diffcult for confict-affected parts of Myanmar
to move from the current mixture of service delivery systems
and governance regimes towards a formalized (federal) system, without better coordination, and substantial political
and technical negotiations. However, given the slow pace of
the peace process since 2016, Interim Arrangements have
been given relatively little attention.
Given that the Political Dialogue element of the peace process
appears stalled, it could be useful to identify a small number of
political priorities, to help deliver on ethnic stakeholders’ key
aims. These could be negotiated by EAOs (and political parties)
in a „fast track“ manner, resulting in a Union Peace Accord
that benefts both the government and ethnic stakeholders.
Areas for possible progress include education and language
policy (recognition of and funding for EAOs’ extensive school
systems; “mother tongue” teaching in government schools);
land issues (recognition of land title documents provided by
EAOs; revision of unjust land laws; compensation and restitution for people who have had their land unfairly taken); equitable natural resource management; and addressing forced
displacement – i.e. Interim Arrangements. This would not
prevent ethnic stakeholders from continuing to campaign for
federalism, including changes to the 2008 Constitution..."
Source/publisher:
Joint Peace Fund and Covenant Consult
Date of publication:
2018-09-00
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
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"The military takeover last year fractured Myanmar’s media into three distinct groups. Needless to say, one group supports the regime while another – the country’s once mainstream but now exiled independent media that is still reporting on the country – principally opposes military rule.....The third group is media with military backgrounds.....Which group does the media outlet that you regularly read belong to? Readers might feel uncomfortable browsing this article, but sometimes it’s necessary to wash our dirty linen.....Exiled again but still independent and professional.....One of the first things military dictators do after seizing power from a democratically elected government is clamp down on independent media.
Dictators hate listening to voices criticizing their coup and the consequences of a military takeover.
Barely a month after seizing power, Myanmar’s military regime had revoked the licenses of Myanmar Now, 7 Day, Mizzima, DVB and Khit Thit.
Local media outlets Myitkyina News Journal (Kachin State), Delta News Agency (Ayeyarwady Region), Tachilek News Agency (Shan State), Zayar Times News Agency (Sagaing Region), Kantarawaddy Nes Agency (Kayah State) and Independent Mon News Agency were also banned.
Meanwhile, the offices of media including The Irrawaddy, Mizzima and Myanmar Now were raided by regime troops following their close coverage of the junta’s bloody crackdowns on peaceful anti-coup protests. The Irrawaddy office in downtown Yangon was raided twice, in a campaign of junta intimidation that is described in more detail below.
Worse still, the junta has arrested media workers for doing their jobs, turning Myanmar into the world’s second-worst jailer of journalists after China with at least 26 behind bars, according to Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2021 prison census.
The bans, raids and arrests sent a clear message to the press that there is no space for independent media under military-ruled Myanmar. Journalists went into hiding. To keep reporting on the regime’s atrocities and the junta’s impact on the day-to-day lives of Myanmar people, The Irrawaddy, Mizzima, DVB, Myanmar Now and others were forced to relocate to other countries.
For The Irrawaddy, Mizzima and DVB, this marked a return to exile for the first time since 2012. But as established independent media, they have maintained their professional journalistic standards while wrestling with financial, legal and security issues in their host countries.
On the other hand, the Burmese services of Voice of America (VOA), BBC and Radio Free Asia can still operate in military-ruled Myanmar.
Some, however, have upset their audience with controversial reports criticized for leaning towards the junta following the coup last year.
For example, a VOA Burmese report on November 7 last year claimed that thousands of people attended a junta-promoted hot air balloon festival in Mandalay’s Pyin Oo Lwin, the seat of Myanmar’s military academies. It drew condemnation from readers as there was no evidence of thousands of festivalgoers in the photos featured along with the report. The audience’s anger focused not just on the story’s accuracy but also the fact that a US government-funded broadcasting service was promoting the junta’s desperate claim that Myanmar under military rule was back to normalcy.
In another story in May, VOA Burmese reported that “at least 180 Myanmar journalists were sheltering in Thailand.” Though the figure was not disputable, the report amounted to leaking information to a regime that has detained and jailed journalists since the coup, said netizens.....Democracy activists also questioned VOA’s reporting.....“We no longer take questions from VOA as we don’t like their stance,” said a leading member of an established Myanmar rights group.
VOA is one of the few media outlets favored by junta spokesman Major-General Zaw Min Tun, who never fails to respond to its questions and offer information, while never answering phone calls from media operating outside the country.
As a consequence, its audience often find that VOA reports amount to regime propaganda despite its claim of “impartiality.” The head of VOA Burmese is currently under investigation for sexual harassment.
BBC Burmese Service is another outlet apparently favored by the regime.
In October this year, the regime vowed to file charges against The Irrawaddy and BBC over their coverage of a deadly shooting at Mon State’s Golden Rock Pagoda. But no action was taken against the BBC, and Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun continues to give interviews to the outlet as if nothing had happened while BBC reporters are still working in the country.
In contrast, the regime officially banned The Irrawaddy in the same month by revoking its publishing license after the news agency failed to parrot its official account of the Golden Rock shooting. The ban came after lawsuits, raids, arrests and other moves targeting the independent news agency since the coup last year. Regime personnel arrested The Irrawaddy’s publisher, a former photojournalist and a staff member while also raiding the home of one of its editors.....Pro-junta media: Regime-sponsored media have mushroomed since the coup. Their reporters are regulars at press conferences given by the military regime. They can also be found in private groups of the junta information team. Realizing the media’s power and influence, the military approached several outlets even before the coup with offers of incentives and business opportunities in exchange for favorable coverage.
There are now more than two-dozen pro-junta media outlets run by former military officials, members of regime-friendly political parties and ultra-nationalists. They are mostly active on social media like Facebook and post their propaganda talk shows on YouTube and Telegram.
The junta has state-owned newspapers, radio and TV stations for propaganda purposes but people rarely pick up its papers or tune into its services. So the regime is funding other media to tap Myanmar’s growing audience on digital platforms.
The purpose the funding of these so-called media is to drum up support for the junta, to undermine the anti-regime movement by spreading disinformation, and to discredit independent media coverage of the anti-regime movement – an old trick of the previous junta to “use media to attack the media.”
The most infamous pro-junta outlet is Thuriya Nay Wun, owned by Moe Hein. Despite being a member of the 88-Generation at the forefront of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, Moe Hein took sides with the dictatorship for personal interests. In return, he was handed property in Naypyitaw, a monthly allowance, and regular funding for his media house.
At junta press conferences, he calls for the crushing of the shadow government National Unity Government, its People’s Defense Force armed wing, and parliamentary Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the group of lawmakers elected in the 2020 general election.
He also spreads propaganda in his regular shows broadcast on junta mouthpiece Myawaddy TV and junta-controlled state broadcaster MRTV.
Another pro-junta media is Myanmar Hard Talk, whose chief editor Aung Min is a staunch supporter of the military and even more dogmatic than Moe Hein.
Neo Politics News Agency headed by Kyaw Myo Min, former editor-in-chief of Akone Thi media, is regime-friendly too.
The junta can also count on People Media and its chief editor Kyaw Soe Oo.
All four of these outlets have displayed support for the military regime in video clips posted on their Facebook pages.
The pro-junta Myanmar National Post is helmed by chief editor Naung Taw Lay and backed by ultranationalist group Ma Ba Tha.
NHP is led by Win Oo, who was jailed under the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government for vandalizing a new Yangon bus stop.
When US President Joe Biden called for democracy to be restored in Myanmar, Win Oo’s NHP twisted Biden’s words to claim the US was merely urging the regime to hold an election as soon as possible.
Another infamous pro-regime outlet is Bullet Journal, led by U Hla Swe. The former lawmaker from the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party and ex- lieutenant-colonel is notorious for badmouthing the ousted NLD and the anti-regime movement. He has openly admitted to helping secure arms for pro-junta militias that have joined regime troops in upper Myanmar to raid villages and loot civilian property.....Media with a military background.....Myanmar media is no stranger to military affiliations and financing. Some of these outlets still survive today.
Military involvement in today’s media dates back to 2000 and the previous junta, when then military spy chief Lt-General Khin Nyunt and his Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) masterminded the launch of the Myanmar Times. Khin Nyunt is responsible for the jailing, torturing and killing of political activists following the 1988 democracy uprising.
A pet project of the previous junta, the Myanmar Times served as the military leadership’s mouthpiece, promoting Khin Nyunt’s faction and also Myanmar as a business-friendly country that was not as bad as painted in exiled media outlets. The SASAKAWA foundation provided assistance to the Times and controversial Australian editor Ross Dunkley, who was later charged with drugs and prostitution, was hired to pump the propaganda. Certain western diplomats also backed the Times in the vain belief it could help push political change.
An influential OSS officer named Col. Thein Swe, the righthand man of Khin Nyunt, appeared to be actively involved in running the paper. When the Times was launched, Thein Swe told Asiaweek that it would be “different, more flexible” than other papers. Thein Swe’s son, Sonny Swe, who now runs Frontier Myanmar, held a 51-percent stake in the newspaper. While all other media outlets faced draconian censorship, Myanmar Times reports just went through the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) and were approved overnight.
Col Thein Swe was later promoted to brigadier-general and headed the regime’s Military Intelligence international relations department. He was a military attaché to the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok in the 1990s, when he reportedly hired thugs and informants and pushed Thai authorities to crack down on Myanmar democracy activists and journalists sheltering in the kingdom.
Bertil Linter, who is based in Thailand and has covered Myanmar since the late 1980s, said he was once on Thein Swe’s hit list for his reporting on the then junta.
“I confronted him over it when we met at a diplomatic function in Bangkok, and he fled the scene,” the veteran Swedish journalist recalled.
After Khin Nyunt was purged in 2004 during Than Shwe’s crackdown on military intelligence to maintain power, Thein Swe and his son were thrown into prison. The then regime charged Sonny Swe for breaking censorship regulations. The Myanmar Times halted operations following the coup in February last year.
Another longstanding media outlet still running inside Myanmar is Popular News, which focuses on junta-related news and ignores the resistance movement.
Popular News is owned by Daw Nan Kalyar Win, daughter of former military dictator Than Shwe’s confidant General Win Myint. Thanks to her family background, she landed an interview with Min Aung Hlaing just before the 2020 general election. The military chief hinted he was doubtful of the integrity of the poll while alleging shortcomings in election preparations.
Another outlet still tolerated by the junta is Eleven, which makes sure it avoids upsetting the regime in reports. The Standard Time runs on a similar policy.....How long before Myanmar outlets can return?.....The Irrawaddy and other media agencies that went into exile after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising returned to Myanmar under U Thein Sein’s government in 2012.
Media played an important role in national reconciliation after democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi entered Parliament in 2012.
However, with advertising revenues switching to social media, media agencies were already struggling when they were hit by the COVID-19 pandemic.
After the coup last year, independent newsrooms that promote pillars of democracy like human rights and freedom of expression were unable to operate inside the country.
After the 1988 military takeover, it took two decades before exiled media could return to Myanmar.
No one knows how long media agencies will have to wait this time after being forced out by the 2021 coup. To answer that question, we would need to know when the military dictatorship will end in Myanmar. One thing is sure, however: the media will return home when there is a democratically elected government in power in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-12-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Military History, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the Swiss Government’s decision to disinvite the illegal Myanmar military junta from the Effective Development Co-operation Summit.
As host of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) Summit, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) had sent an invite to Myanmar’s Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, which is occupied by the illegal junta.
The junta's deputy minister of investment and foreign economic relations, Dr Wah Wah Maung, was set to attend the summit virtually, along with junta representatives in Geneva.
Justice For Myanmar and other civil society groups have urged the Swiss Government to disinvite the junta and to invite the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the UN, U Kyaw Moe Tun, who has the authority to represent the people of Myanmar within the UN system.
However, while disinviting the junta, the Swiss Government has decided to exclude all government representatives from Myanmar.
SDC stated on social media that “the Summit will be open to representatives of governments accredited by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which is not yet the case for Myanmar.”
UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme which is part of GPEDC’s Joint Support Team, is required to comply with UNGA’s position on Myanmar’s State representation. The General Assembly does not recognise the illegal military junta as being the government of Myanmar, but continues to recognise the authority of detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint of the National Unity Government of Myanmar.
Therefore, members of the UN have continued to recognise U Kyaw Moe Tun as the Permanent Representative of Myanmar at the UNGA and he must be invited to represent the people of Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the Swiss Government's decision to disinvite the illegal junta from the Effective Development Co-operation Summit.
“The Myanmar junta is an illegal, terrorist organisation and should never have been invited in the first place.
“To truly stand for effective development cooperation, the Summit should invite Myanmar's Permanent Representative to the UN, Kyaw Moe Tun, and recognise and engage with the National Unity Government of Myanmar as an urgent priority.
“The international community needs to effectively cooperate with the NUG to support Myanmar’s future development in the face of its near-collapse due to the junta's illegal coup attempt and its war of terror against the people of Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
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138.13 KB
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"Switzerland has invited the illegal Myanmar military junta to the Effective Development Co-operation Summit, according to Justice For Myanmar sources and confirmed by the Swiss Government.
The Summit, scheduled for December 12-14, is an initiative of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), a multi-stakeholder network that includes representatives of development provider and recipient governments, UNDP, OECD, multilateral development banks, parliaments, business, and civil society.
The junta's deputy minister of investment and foreign economic relations, Dr Wah Wah Maung, is set to attend the summit virtually, along with junta representatives in Geneva.
Ambassador Thomas Gass, the Assistant Director General of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), invited the Myanmar military junta in his capacity as GPEDC co-chair, via Myanmar’s Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, which is occupied by the illegal junta.
Earlier this week, Switzerland’s Ambassador to Myanmar, Tim Enderlin, also met with junta minister for international cooperation, Ko Ko Hlaing, providing further legitimacy to the junta and fodder for its propaganda. The junta featured the meeting in its TV and print media.
Switzerland’s engagement with the junta comes at a peak time when the junta, a terrorist organisation, is intensifying its war of terror against the people of Myanmar.
Since the illegal coup attempt, the junta has murdered more than 2,500 people and arrested over 16,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
Last week, the junta sentenced 7 student union activists to death, after executing four activists in July.
Across Myanmar, the junta has been carrying out indiscriminate air strikes and shelling, killing men, women and children, committing rape, razing whole communities and displacing more than 1.1 million people since the military’s coup attempt.
The Swiss invitation for the junta to participate in the Summit came despite the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva having barred members of the Permanent Mission of Myanmar from participating in the Human Rights Council since 2021, as they are not legitimate representatives of the State of Myanmar.
In reply to a letter from Justice For Myanmar, Ambassador Gass responded, “Switzerland did not send an invitation to the de facto authorities of Myanmar. An invitation has, however, been sent to the Permanent Missions to the United Nations in Geneva. Heads of missions accredited to the United Nations Office in Geneva can participate in the Summit. An eventual online participation in the work of the Summit, as observer, does not imply any decision-making role.”
The junta is not the “de facto” authority of Myanmar. Far from gaining control, a recent study by former UN mandate holders found that the junta only has stable control of 17% of Myanmar territory. The junta is a terrorist organisationunder Myanmar law and definitions offered in international law.
Justice For Myanmar has appealed to Ambassador Gass to disinvite the junta from the Effective Development Co-operation Summit and invite the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the UN, U Kyaw Moe Tun. Ambassador Gass has yet to respond.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Switzerland is about to take its seat on the UN Security Council and must support the Myanmar people’s struggle for human rights and democracy.
“Instead of upholding international law and the values of democracy and human rights, the Swiss Government’s recent and impending engagement is lending legitimacy to the illegal junta, emboldening it to continue to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
“Switzerland’s bilateral and multilateral support for the junta must end now.
“If the GPEDC does not retract its invite to the junta and prevent junta representatives from participating in the Summit, GPEDC will undermine UN General Assembly Resolution 396(v), undermine the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva and breach internal UN policy on engagement with the illegal military junta.
“This would be an affront to the people of Myanmar who have resisted the junta’s brutal attempts to gain control and power for nearly two years, bravely defending their human rights and democracy.
“The Myanmar military junta must be tried in a court of law for the systematic and widespread atrocity crimes committed against the people of Myanmar, not welcomed as an observer or a participant of a reputable international forum that aims to foster multi-stakeholder development cooperation.
“We call upon the Swiss Government, GPEDC steering committee members and stakeholders to uphold decisions made by the UN General Assembly and respect the basic rights of the people of Myanmar to choose their own government by barring the junta from the Effective Development Co-operation Summit.
“GPEDC must send an invitation to the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the UN, U Kyaw Moe Tun, who has the authority to represent the people of Myanmar within the UN system.
“It is time for Switzerland to live up to its democratic values by recognising and supporting NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
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115.84 KB
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Sub-title:
Despite the Tatmadaw’s increasing viciousness, it appears unable to suppress resistance
Description:
"In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ended its decade-long, grudging tolerance of limited democracy by launching a coup, detaining Aung San Suu Kyi and other elected civilian politicians. Since then, its ruthlessness has only increased. The number of political prisoners has soared to more than 13,000. The junta has resumed executions for the first time in decades. The UN human rights chief, Volker Türk, said last Friday that the regime was using the death penalty to crush political opposition, expressing shock that 130 people have been sentenced to death by military courts behind closed doors. Many of the 1,700 people who have stood trial have been denied access to lawyers or relatives. Not one has been acquitted.
The pandemic, war in Ukraine and uprisings elsewhere have meant that the world has largely stopped paying attention to events in Myanmar, where the military is literally pursuing a scorched earth policy. It has razed villages that it accuses of supporting the opposition and has bombed hospitals, schools and even a concert. An estimated 1.3 million people are displaced and living in horrific conditions. It continues to add to the raft of convictions and prison terms for Aung San Suu Kyi. Rights groups report extrajudicial killings by soldiers and militias.
The assumption at first was that the military, long expert in suppressing stirrings of dissent and democracy, would soon reassert control. Even when some protesters took up arms – and the pro-democracy national unity government backed a “defensive war” – it seemed a hopeless endeavour, given their lack of money, equipment and training. Yet the resistance has been not only remarkably protracted but – under the circumstances – surprisingly effective. Civilian militias, working alongside some of the ethnic armed groups that were already battling the state, are carrying out attacks on military bases and in previously untouchable central areas. Soldiers are said to be quitting or defecting. The junta has also relied on Russia for much of its weaponry – though it can still count on China, India and others.
Each fresh abuse by the regime gives opponents reason to fight on – no one believes it will compromise. Elections are promised next year, but the power seizure resulted from the military’s repeated failure to win at the ballot box, and opponents are all locked up. The regime made a vague attempt at PR by releasing 6,000 or more prisoners last month, including a former British ambassador, Vicky Bowman. But some were detained again on the same day, and the total number of those held soon rebounded. The junta remains grotesquely self-serving, with its chief, Min Aung Hlaing, spending a reported $33m on honours to keep its friends on side – in the process awarding himself two titles, one of which comes with an elaborate gold and ruby medal.
Sanctions should remain carefully targeted at those in the regime and their families. Though supporters of the democracy movement praise the UK for taking the lead internationally, they believe much more must be done. They make a strong case for cutting off the supply of aviation fuel – used by the military even when it has supposedly been destined for civil flights. The junta’s increasing brutality, however, is a sign of fear as well as further evidence of its viciousness. Some of those struggling for democracy now speak not of a coup, but an attempted coup; thanks to the resistance, they say, it has not yet succeeded. They need more support to ensure that it does not..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-12-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
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Sub-title:
Proscription of Terrorist Groups
Description:
"With the consent of the Union Government, and under the powers vested by section 6( c) and
section 72(b) of the Counter-terrorism Law (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law 23/2014), the Central
Committee for Counter-Terrorism hereby issues this notification:
1. It has been ascertained that Myanma Economic Holdings Limited and Myanmar
Economic Corporation have been engaging in monopolistic business practices to generate
substantial annual revenue for the terrorist group headed by Min Aung Hlaing so as to
perpetuate their reign of terror.
2. It has also been further ascertained from financial statements of these entities that
revenues are being disbursed primarily for the benefit o f the top leadership of the terrorist
military organisation while denying ordinary rank and file soldiers their fair share of the
benefits.
3. Further, those revenues have enabled the terrorist military organisation to prosecute
their war of terror against the people, mounting attacks and committing murder daily
against innocent, defenceless civilians all over the country.
4. Myanma Economic Holdings Limited and Myanmar Economic Corporation are thus
designated and proscribed as terrorist groups.
5. All assets belonging to those entities are hereby designated as 'assets of terrorist
groups' under Section 3(d) and shall be seized and administered for public interest under
Section 6(1) of the Counter-Terrorism Law..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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pdf
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40.66 KB
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"အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၆၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ(င) နှင့် ပုဒ်မ ၇၂၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (ခ) ပါ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကျင့်သုံး၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအဖွဲ့၏ သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် ဤအမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာ ကို ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။
၁။ မြန်မာ့စီးပွားရေးဦးပိုင်လီမိတက် နှင့် မြန်မာ့စီးပွားရေးကော်ပိုရေးရှင်း တို့သည် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု သက်ဆိုးရှည်စေရန် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းပေါင်းစုံအား လက်ဝါးကြီးအုပ်ချယ်လှယ်၍ နှစ်စဉ် ဘဏ္ဍာရန်ပုံငွေများစွာ ရှာဖွေထောက်ပံ့လျက်ရှိကြောင်း စိစစ်တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၂။ အဆိုပါ ဘဏ္ဍာရန်ပုံငွေများသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ထိပ်ပိုင်းခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် အရာရှိကြီးများ အတွက်သာ အကျိုးစီးပွါးဖြစ်ထွန်းလျက်ရှိပြီး အောက်ခြေအကြပ်၊စစ်သည်များမှာ ခံစားခွင့်မရှိသလောက် နည်းပါးလျက် ရှိကြောင်းကို အမြတ်ခွဲဝေမှုဆိုင်ရာ အထောက်အထား၊ စာရွက်စာတမ်းများအရ သိရှိရသည်။
၃။ ထို့အပြင် ၎င်းအကျိုးအမြတ်များအား အသုံးပြု၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် နေ့စဉ်နှင့်အမျှ နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူများအပေါ် လူမဆန်စွာ အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၄။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ မြန်မာ့စီးပွားရေးဦးပိုင်လီမိတက် နှင့် မြန်မာ့စီးပွားရေးကော်ပိုရေးရှင်းတို့အား အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုများ အဖြစ် ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
၅။ ယင်းအကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုအားလုံးကို အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၃၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (ဃ) အရ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုပိုင် ပစ္စည်းများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်၍ အများပြည်သူအကျိုးစီးပွားအလို့ငှာ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၆၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (ဌ) နှင့်အညီ ထိန်းချုပ်စီမံခန့်ခွဲသွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
ဥက္ကဌ
အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့
အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖက်ရေးဥပဒေပါ ရည်ညွှန်းကိုးကားချက်များ
ပုဒ်မ ၃(ဃ)
အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုပိုင်ပစ္စည်းများ ဆိုသည်မှာ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကျူးလွန်ရာမှ ရရှိသည့် အကျိုးအမြတ်များ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု တစ်ရပ်ကို ကျူးလွန်ရာတွင် အသုံးပြုခဲ့သည့် သို့မဟုတ် အကျိုးပြုနေသည့် သို့မဟုတ် အသုံးပြုလိမ့်မည်ဟု ယူဆရသည့် ငွေကြေးနှင့်ပစ္စည်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်သမား သို့မဟုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုတစ်ခုက အသုံးပြုခဲ့သည့် သို့မဟုတ် အသုံးပြုနေသည့် သို့မဟုတ် အသုံးပြုလိမ့်မည်ဟု ယူဆရသည့် ငွေကြေးနှင့်ပစ္စည်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်သမား သို့မဟုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုတစ်ခု သို့မဟုတ် အဆိုပါအုပ်စု၏ ကိုယ်စား အခြားသူတစ်ဦးဦးက ပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားသည့် သို့မဟုတ် ထိန်းချုပ်ထားသည့် ငွေကြေးနှင့် ပစ္စည်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုတစ်ခုအား ထောက်ပံ့ရန် သို့မဟုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတစ်ခုအား ရန်ပုံငွေထောက်ပံ့ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ဖြင့် စုဆောင်းခဲ့သည့် ငွေကြေးနှင့် ပစ္စည်းများနှင့် အဆိုပါငွေကြေးနှင့် ပစ္စည်းများမှ ဆင့်ပွားဆင်းသက်လာသည့် ငွေကြေးနှင့် အကျိုးအမြတ်များကို ဆိုသည်။
ပုဒ်မ ၆(ဂ)
၆ ဗဟိုအဖွဲ့၏ တာဝန်နှင့် လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်များမှာ အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖြစ်သည် -
...
(ဂ) လုပ်ငန်းကော်မတီများ၊ အဖွဲ့များ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးဌာနများ၊ အစိုးရဌာန၊ အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေးအတွက် ညှိနှိုင်းပေးခြင်း၊ လမ်းညွှန်ခြင်းနှင့် ကြီးကြပ်ခြင်း၊
ပုဒ်မ ၆(ဌ)
... ပုဒ်မခွဲ (င)အရ အကြမ်းဖက်သမား သို့မဟုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်သမားအုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာ သည့်အခါ ယင်းအကြမ်းဖက်သမား သို့မဟုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုပိုင် ပစ္စည်းများနှင့် ရန်ပုံငွေ များ ကို ထိန်းချုပ်ရန် အမိန့်ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း၊
ပုဒ်မ ၇၂(ခ)
ဗဟိုအဖွဲ့နှင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးဌာနများသည် လိုအပ်သော အမိန့် ကြော်ငြာစာ၊ အမိန့်၊ ညွှန်ကြားချက်နှင့် လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများကို ထုတ်ပြန်နိုင်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Format :
pdf
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478.54 KB
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"On 7 September 2021, the National Unity Government’s (NUG) acting president Duwa Lashi La declared a people’s war against the Tatmadaw. He stated that in waging war against the junta, People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) should operate in accordance with the NUG’s Military Code of Conduct for People’s Defence Forces, which had been laid out on 21 July 2021. The NUG claimed that the Code of Conduct was established in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. However, there are some controversial areas in the Code of Conduct, which if left unaddressed, could undermine the NUG’s credibility. The political analyst Benjamin Mok has examined the Code of Conduct in an article on the Diplomat. However, there has not yet been an analysis of the Code of Conduct through the lens of International Humanitarian Law.
In this article, I will discuss some issues with how “legitimate targets” of PDF action might be defined and interpreted in the NUG’s Code of Conduct. First, I will evaluate the definition of civilians used in the NUG’s Code of Conduct and compare it with Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (1977) which applies specifically to non-international armed conflicts. In so doing, I will inquire what constitutes a legitimate military target in the Myanmar context. Then, I will highlight some contentious issues on the ground, particularly targeting alleged informants, the junta-appointed civil servants, and political opponents. Finally, I will come up with recommendations for the main actors mentioned in this article.....
Who exactly are civilians?.....
One of the major actors in the Spring Revolution is “informants”. In this article, I use informants to refer to civilians who side with the junta and reveal the whereabouts of the resistance figures to the State Administration Council (SAC). They could be the SAC-appointed administrators or regular civilians and they have been one of the main targets of the PDFs. The moral justification for killing them has been debated since the beginning of the resistance. The NUG also does not specify if the informants qualified as military targets in their Code of Conduct for PDFs.
Under the ‘Targeting’ section of the Code of Conduct, Article 1 says PDFs are to target only “mechanisms of the dictatorship”, while Article 2 reads, “Civilians shall not be targeted, threatened, and attacked”. These two articles are in line with the basic principles of the Geneva Conventions. However, a question arises if we compare Article 2 against Article 1: Who does the Code of Conduct really count as civilians? According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, “all persons who are not members of State armed forces or of organized armed groups belonging to a party to an armed conflict are civilians.” This implies that to the ICRC, informants could be classified as civilians. The ICRC continues to state that civilians, so defined, are “protected against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities”. Now, it is important to identify what constitutes “direct hostilities”.
While there’s no official definition of direct hostilities in International Law, the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance, while not legally binding, also is helpful for this matter and serves as the standard procedure for states. According to the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance,
“Persons participate directly in hostilities when they carry out acts, which aim to support one party to the conflict by directly causing harm to another party, either directly inflicting death, injury or destruction, or by directly harming the enemy’s military operations or capacity.”
By this definition, it’s hard to decide whether or not informants are partaking in direct hostilities. It may be tempting to put informants under the indirect hostility category. After all, what they are doing is simply revealing the location of their enemies. But, in this Spring Revolution, the informants do really “harm the operations” of the resistance groups. For example, informants reportedly revealed the whereabouts of Ko Phyo Zeyar Thaw and Ko Jimmy, responsible for overseeing the Yangon operations, leading to their arrests and snowball arrests of other members. A large number of arms and ammunition were also seized during the arrest.
However, I acknowledge the subjectiveness of such a matter, and one could argue targeting informants is not justified if they are only revealing the whereabouts of resistance figures under threat. This also highlights areas for improvement in international humanitarian law and such unique scenarios under the Myanmar context should be discussed more to better define “direct and indirect hostilities”....Attacks on SAC-appointed civil servants and political opponents....While informants blur the line between “direct and non-direct hostilities”, it is easier to determine whether or not civil servants working for the SAC should go under the “indirect hostility” category. The ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance says that “administrative and political support” is considered indirect participation in hostilities. Hence the ICRC views SAC-appointed civil servants as civilians that enjoy all the protections under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. However, in Myanmar, the situation on the ground could be considered not yet in line with the ICRC’s standard.
As of November 2021, about 200 SAC-appointed administrators were killed by PDFs. It’s not surprising, to some extent, if some PDFs, not affiliated with the NUG, have their own agenda and would target the civil servants working for the junta, but it becomes problematic if the NUG itself would publicly recognize such operations as legitimate. In April 2022, Yangon Regional Command (YRC) under the NUG’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) shot the Central Bank’s Deputy Governor, as part of Operation Byan Hlwar Aung, which was conducted by NUG-affiliated PDFs under the directive of the NUG’s MoD. This sort of incident is not justified by the Geneva Conventions, which the NUG claims to abide by. While the NUG could argue that targeting informants is justified due to their significant damage to the resistance, International Law does not justify for military actions against civil servants.
One of the Soldier’s Rules under the NUG’s Code of Conduct reads: “Shall not discriminate any individual based on their ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation”, but there’s no mention of non-discrimination based on “political or other opinions” as included in Additional Protocol II. While it’s possible that the NUG simply overlooked this phrase in the article, it could also be assumed that the NUG intentionally phrased the rule in a way that could somehow enable the PDFs to target the regime-friendly civil servants or even civilians politically supporting the junta without facing legal restraints. In a recent interview with BBC, the USDP (a military’s proxy party) chairman U Than Htay claimed that “over 1,500 USDP members and supporters [were] killed (since the beginning of the coup)”. While it’s possible that the USDP has inflated this number, if true it could pose a threat to the NUG’s legitimacy if there’s no clear explanation on why and how it could happen from its side.....Potential risks and recommendations.....As the NUG is still competing for representation at the UN Human Rights Council with the SAC, it should consider the consequences of targeting those considered civilians in the eyes of the international community. Some international actors like ASEAN, except countries like Malaysia, lean towards keeping their distance from the parallel civilian government. ASEAN could justify its relative inaction against the SAC based on the claim that the NUG-led resistance inflicted “civilian damage”.
While targeting alleged informants is understandable for strategic purposes, it should always be the last resort and the PDFs should make sure that their targets are heavily involved in the military operations. While engaging with the international community, the NUG should make it clear from the start why alleged informants are not the same as ordinary civilians and how they are critical to the SAC’s counterinsurgency plans. And, at the same time, the NUG, as the government, should distance itself from the killing of the informants. In other words, they should not take credit for such operations. Otherwise, the NUG risks not looking credible in the eyes of the international community, within which many assume that ground realities contradict the NUG’s Code of Conduct.
The NUG could come up with alternatives to deal with the alleged informants and the junta-appointed civil servants rather than killings. There have been some good initiatives with the NUG setting up People’s Police Forces and township courts in different regions and states. With clear policies and measures, they could establish an effective justice mechanism to impose judicial measures against pro-SAC civilians rather than resorting to armed violence. The success of such a mechanism also relies on support from the international community.
The international community should also recognize that current conditions on the ground pose limitations on what the NUG can do. After all, many PDFs and LDFs (Local Defense Forces) operating are not yet directly under its command. The NUG’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Daw Zin Mar Aung recognized this reality while meeting with the diaspora community during her visit to Washington DC when she said, “PDFs need to follow rules of engagement (ROE) but on-ground situations could be complicated sometimes.” In order for the PDF to be more compliant with the NUG’s Code of Conduct, the NUG needs to first gain leverage over them. For now, the people’s government has little leverage over the majority of the PDFs due to its lack of capacity to provide financial and weapons support, and it simply cannot command the PDFs to do this or that.
While it is clear at this point that the West would not provide arms to the NUG, other forms of non-lethal support are still feasible. By having more financial leverage over the PDFs, the NUG could have more bargaining power in requiring them to engage in warfare and operations more in line with the Code of Conduct. What the West could do in this case is provide financial support to the NUG. The US could allow the NUG to access the 1 billion USD in Myanmar assets which the US froze at the beginning of the coup. This money could assist the NUG in coordinating its resistance, so that it can follow the standards of International Law. The US could also accelerate the legislative process of the Burma Act of 2021, which once passed, would provide humanitarian aid and assistance to civil society impacted by the coup, including “participants in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and government defectors”, hence, lifting weight off the NUG, so that it could redirect more resources to the resistance.
They could also support the parallel government in setting up administrative mechanisms, building the capacity of civil servants that refuse to work for the junta, developing administrative policies, providing joint educational programs, helping set up an effective tax system, and channelling aid through the NUG-initiated programs. At the moment, ASEAN is channelling aid through the SAC’s task force but the US could use its influence over ASEAN members to be more inclusive with aid management. In order to navigate the risk of targeting non-CDM civil servants, the international community could provide financial and technical support to the people’s administrations in PDF strongholds to create more incentives for those joining CDM. I recommend that the NUG also revise the Code of Conduct and make it more concrete with a well-defined set of rules and instructions to follow. More than a year since the publication of the Code of Conduct, it is important that the NUG and the international community revisit it..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-12-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Commute Sentences; End Capital Punishment
Description:
"(New York) – The Myanmar military junta should immediately commute the death sentences recently handed down against 10 prisoners, Human Rights Watch and the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) said today. The junta should impose a moratorium on the death penalty with the aim of abolishing capital punishment in the country.
Death sentences for 10 people, including 7 university students, by military courts follow the executions of four political prisoners in July 2022 that resulted in broad international condemnation. All these convictions followed grossly unjust closed-door trials that fell far short of international fair trial standards.
“Myanmar’s junta should immediately commute the sentences of all those facing the death penalty, a cruel punishment that most of the world rejects,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “For those governments that have hesitated to impose targeted sanctions against the junta for its long list of rights violations, the new death sentences should be a clear signal to take action now.”
On November 30, a closed military court in Yangon handed down the death sentences for the seven students, all members of the Dagon University Students’ Union, under section 302 of Myanmar’s penal code. The tribunal convicted the students for involvement in a shooting that killed a former military officer in Yangon in April. Police arrested all seven in April shortly after the alleged shooting.
The students are Khant Zin Win; Thura Maung Maung; Zaw Lin Naing; Thiha Htet Zaw; Hein Htet; Thet Paing Oo; and Khant Linn Maung Maung.
A military court also sentenced Wai Zin Yan, Thu Htoo Aung, and Min Htet Thar to death under section 302 of the penal code for a separate incident in June, for allegedly shooting and killing a ward administrator in north Yangon on May 24, 2022.
Myanmar’s secretive military tribunals have long shown complete disregard for basic human rights protections and failed to uphold international due process and fair trial standards. Those on trial before military tribunals face almost certain conviction regardless of the available evidence against them. Families, the public, and foreign diplomats have no access to trials. Convictions are frequently based on confessions obtained by torture and other ill-treatment, including frequent beatings.
The new United Nations high commissioner for human rights, Volker Turk, expressed alarm at the new death sentences in a December 2 statement: “By resorting to use death sentences as a political tool to crush opposition, the military confirms its disdain for the efforts by ASEAN and the international community at large to end violence and create the conditions for a political dialogue to lead Myanmar out of a human rights crisis created by the military.”
Military tribunals in Myanmar have sentenced 138 people to death since the February 2021 military coup, including 41 in absentia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and concerned governments should press the junta to immediately commute all death sentences and release all those wrongfully imprisoned.
ASEAN member states and other concerned governments should press the UN Security Council to impose an arms embargo and refer the country situation for Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
The July 25 executions were the first death sentences carried out in Myanmar in over 30 years. The men put to death were Phyo Zeya Thaw, 41; Kyaw Min Yu, known as “Ko Jimmy,” 53; Hla Myo Aung; and Aung Thura Zaw. A military tribunal sentenced Ko Jimmy and Phyo Zeya Thaw to death on January 21 under Myanmar’s overbroad Counterterrorism Law of 2014. Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw were convicted in April 2021 for allegedly killing a military informant.
Human Rights Watch and the AAPP oppose the death penalty in all circumstances and have long called on Myanmar to ban all capital punishment. Capital punishment is unique in its cruelty and finality, and is universally plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and error.
“The Myanmar junta’s threats are aligned with military courts that have continually failed to protect any basic principles of fair trial process or to demonstrate independence and impartiality,” said Ko Bo Gyi, co-founder for the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. “Swift condemnation and concerted pressure and unified, targeted sanctions is what is necessary to end the junta’s violations.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-12-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"1. NUG strives to establish alliance with all EROs by all means.....2. NUG says SAC’s atrocities can be ended if US and EU support Myanmar as they do Ukraine.....3. Defence Ministry cautions over chemical weapons(30/11/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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pdf
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Description:
"National Unity Government weekly Press Update (32/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-12-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Format :
pdf
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"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ဒဂုံတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားလူငယ် (၇) ဦး ဖြစ်သည့် မောင်ဟိန်းထက် (ရှေးဟောင်း အထူးပြု)၊ မောင်သီဟထက်ဇော် (ပထဝီဝင် အထူးပြု)၊ မောင်သူရမောင်မောင် (မြန်မာစာအထူးပြု)၊ မောင်ခန့်လင်းမောင်မောင် (မြန်မာစာအထူးပြု)၊ မောင်ခန့်ဇင်ဝင်း၊ မောင်သက်ပိုင်ဦး၊ မောင်ဇော်လင်းနိုင်တို့ကို ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့ပြီးနောက် တရားဥပဒေဘောင်မဝင်သော ထောင်တွင်းတရားရုံးတွင် စစ်ဆေးပြီး ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ (၃၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အခြားလူငယ် လေးဦး ဖြစ်သည့် မောင်မင်းထက်သာ၊ မောင်ဝေယံဇင်၊ မောင်သူထူးအောင်၊ ကိုဖြိုး တို့ကိုလည်း သေဒဏ် ချမှတ်ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ကြောင်းသိရသည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ပြည်သူများ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ အခွင့်အရေးများကို ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း၊ လွတ်လပ်စွာ ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်ကြသည့်၊ နိုင်ငံရေးနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်ကြသည့် ပြည်သူများကို ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ပြီး ပြည်သူများ၏ နိုင်ငံရေး အခွင့်အရေးများကို ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း၊ တရားဥပဒေဘောင်မဝင်သော တရားရုံးများ မှတဆင့် စီရင်ချက်များ ချမှတ်ခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်ပြီး ပြည်သူများ၏ တရားဥပဒေဆိုင်ရာ အခွင့်အရေးများကို ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း၊ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးအနေဖြင့် သေဒဏ်များ ချမှတ်ခြင်းနှင့် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်လျက် ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်ရှင်သန်ခွင့်ကို ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းများ ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၃။ စစ်အုပ်စုသည် တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုသာဖြစ်သဖြင့် တရားစီရင်ရေးယန္တရားကို လည်ပတ်ရန် အခွင့်အာဏာမရှိပါ။ ထို့အပြင် သေဒဏ်စီရင်ခြင်းသည် နိုင်ငံတကာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးစံနှုန်းများနှင့် ကိုက်ညီခြင်း မရှိသော လုပ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများအား လွှတ်ပေးရန်အတွက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၊ အာဆီယံနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းတစ်ခုလုံးက တောင်းဆိုနေချိန်တွင် ယခုကဲ့သို ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များအား သေဒဏ် စီရင်ချက် ချမှတ်ခြင်းသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းလုံးအား စိန်ခေါ်လိုက်ခြင်းပင် ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများ၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူမျိုးသုဉ်း သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများအတွက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် တာ၀န်ယူ၊ တာ၀န်ခံရမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
၆။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ (၂၅) ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ကြိုးပေးသတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရသော ကိုဂျင်မီ၊ ကိုဖြိုးဇေယျာသော်၊ ကိုလှမျိုးအောင်၊ ကိုအောင်သူရ တို့အပါအ၀င် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဆိုးရွားသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကြောင့် ထိခိုက်နစ်နာရသော ပြည်သူလူထုအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုရနိုင်ရေးကို ရရှိနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၇။ ထိုသို့ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအနှံ့ နှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခံနေရသော အလုပ်သမား၊ လယ်သမား၊ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အတူ ရပ်တည်၍ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှု မှတ်တမ်းများကို ကောက်ယူ သိမ်းဆည်းလျက် တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိနိုင်ရေးကို အစွမ်းကုန် ကြိုးစား လုပ်ဆောင်ပြီး အရေးတော်ပုံ အောင်သည်အထိ ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဟု သံန္ဒိဌာန် ပြုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs and Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-12-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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429.52 KB
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