2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Individual Documents
Description:
"Joint Statement of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management – NUG, Karenni National Progressive Party, Karen National Union and Chin National Front on ASEAN and UN Proposed Humanitarian Support to Burma/Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management - NUG , Karenn National Progressive Party, Karen National Union and Chin National Front
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, UN System humanitarian assistance, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများအား အသိအမှတ်ပြုမူဝါဒ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်
Description:
"ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများအား အသိအမှတ်ပြုမူဝါဒ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း
၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများ စတင် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသော အချိန်မှစ၍ အမြဲဂုဏ်ယူ အသိအမှတ်ပြုပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ယခု ကြေညာချက်သည် ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးယန္တရားကို တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိစေရန် မူဝါဒ (၁၁) ချက်ဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများ အသိအမှတ်ပြုရေးဆိုင်ရာမူဝါဒ (Recognition Policy) ကို ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများသည် သက်ဆိုင်ရာရပ်ကွက် (သို့မဟုတ်) ကျေးရွာရှိ ပြည်သူများကို ပညာရေးဖြင့် လူနေမှုအဆင့်အတန်း တိုးတက်စေရန်နှင့် အသိဉာဏ်ပညာမြင့်မားစေရန် သင်ယူသူတို့၏ ဆန္ဒအပေါ်တွင်အခြေခံ၍ သင်ကြားပေးသည့် ပညာရေးကျောင်းများ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်း များသည် ပညာသင်ယူခွင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများနှင့် အကာအကွယ်ပေးမှုများလည်း လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများသည် ကလေးများ၏ အတွေး အခေါ်လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်ကို ပို၍အလေးထား သင်ကြားပေးသည့် လူမှုရေးသဟဇာတဖြစ်မှုနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး မူဝါဒများကို သင်ကြားပေးရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးယန္တရား ဖော်ဆောင်နေသော ကြားကာလပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများကို အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ မူဝါဒများဖြင့် အသိအမှတ်ပြု ကြေညာပေးသွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးယန္တရားဖော်ဆောင်နေသော ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများအား အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှု မူဝါဒ
(က) ပညာသင်ယူခွင့်ဆုံးရှုံးနေသော ကလေးသူငယ်များ၏အကျိုးအတွက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို ဆန့်ကျင် သော ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးယန္တရားကို ဖော်ဆောင်သည့်ကျောင်း ဖြစ်ရမည်။
(ခ) ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပညာရေးကို ဦးတည်ရမည်။
(ဂ) အခမဲ့ပညာရေးကို ဖော်ဆောင်နေသောကျောင်း ဖြစ်ရမည်။ ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် မဟုတ်သည့် ပညာရေးကို ဖော်ဆောင်နေသောကျောင်း (Non-profit School) ဖြစ်ရမည်။ (ပညာရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ် များ ဖော်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်သော အသုံးစရိတ်နှင့် သင်ကြားရေး ဆရာ၊ ဆရာမများကို ထောက်ပံ့ရန် အတွက် ရန်ပုံငွေရှာသင့်သည်ဟု ယူဆပါက မိမိအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း ဘဏ္ဍာငွေနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်သော စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းများ (Terms of Reference) ရေးဆွဲထားပြီး ရှာဖွေထူထောင်နိုင်သည်။)
(ဃ) ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ စံနှုန်းများနှင့်အညီ မိမိတို့ဒေသ၏လိုအပ်ချက်နှင့် ကိုက်ညီသော ဒေသသင်ရိုး များ၊ မိခင်ဘာသာစကားအခြေပြုသင်ရိုးများနှင့် အခြားဖြည့်စွက်သင်ခန်းစာများကို လွတ်လပ်စွာ အသုံးပြုသင်ကြားနိုင်သည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ Bluemark အမှတ်အသားပါရှိသော Myanmar Basic Education Home Facebook Page တွင် ဖော်ပြထား သော ပြဋ္ဌာန်းချက်သင်ရိုးညွှန်းတမ်းများကိုလည်း အသုံးပြုသင်ကြားနိုင်သည်။
(င) အသက်အရွယ်အလိုက် ရှိသင့်သည့် တတ်ကျွမ်းမှုများ (Competencies) ရရှိအောင် သင်ကြားပေး ရမည်။
(စ) ပညာရေးလွတ်လပ်ခွင့်ရှိပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကို ဦးတည်ရှေးရှုသော ပညာသင်ကြားရေး ဖြစ်ရမည်။
(ဆ) ကလေးများ၏ အတွေးအခေါ်လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်ကို လေးစားအသိအမှတ်ပြုရမည်။
(ဇ) မတူကွဲပြားမှုများကို ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုမရှိဘဲ တရားမျှတမှု၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ဘုံတန်ဖိုးများကို ညှိနှိုင်းရှာဖွေကာ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ အတူယှဉ်တွဲနေထိုင်တတ်သော ယဉ်ကျေးမှု (လူမှုရေးသဟဇာတဖြစ်မှု) ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးကို ရှေးရှု၍ သင်ကြားပေးရမည်။
(ဈ) သင်ယူစဉ်စစ်ဆေးခြင်းမှတ်တမ်းများကို အသုံးပြု၍ အကဲဖြတ်စစ်ဆေးခြင်းများနှင့် အသက်အရွယ် အလိုက်လိုအပ်သည့် ကျွမ်းကျင်တတ်မြောက်မှုများ ရရှိပါက မိမိတို့ကျောင်းအတွင်း အတန်း ကူးပြောင်းသတ်မှတ်ပေးခြင်းများကို လုပ်ဆောင်ပေးနိုင်သည်။ (ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများ၏ အတန်းအဆင့်ကူးပြောင်းမှု သတ်မှတ်ချက်များသည် ကျောင်းတစ်ကျောင်းချင်းစီ၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင် သတ်မှတ်ချက်သာဖြစ်ပြီး ကြားကာလပညာရေးအတွက်သာ အကျုံးဝင်မည် ဖြစ်သည်။)
(ည) ယခုအသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုသည် ကြားကာလ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များအလိုက် ကိုယ်စားပြု ပညာရေးစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ မပေါ်လာခင်အထိ ပညာရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာနမှ ညှိနှိုင်းတာ၀န်ယူ ထားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ် ကိုယ်စားပြုနှင့် လူမျိုး/ ဒေသအခြေပြု အဖွဲ့ အစည်းများ၊ ကောင်စီများ၏ ပညာရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ညှိနှိုင်းပြီးပါက ဖက်ဒရယ်ဆိုင်ရာ လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများနှင့်အညီ၊ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ် ကိုယ်စားပြုနှင့် လူမျိုး/ ဒေသအခြေပြု အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ကောင်စီများ၏ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်များကို လေးစားလိုက်နာ၍ ညှိနှိုင်းလွှဲပြောင်း ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားပါမည်။
(ဋ) ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များအလိုက် ကိုယ်စားပြုပညာရေးစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှု အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက အခါ အားလျော်စွာထုတ်ပြန်သော ပညာရေးမူဝါဒများအတိုင်း လိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးစံနှုန်းများမှ သွေဖယ်ခြင်း၊ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းနှင့် အငြင်းပွားမှုပဋိပက္ခများ ဖြစ်ပွားခြင်းများ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာပါက လိုအပ်သည့် စစ်ဆေးမှုများပြုလုပ်ပြီး မူဝါဒများနှင့် မကိုက်ညီကြောင်းထင်ရှားပါက ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်း အား ရပ်ဆိုင်းမည်ကို လက်ခံရမည်။
၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ အသိအမှတ်ပြုလက်မှတ် လျှောက်ထား နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အထက်ဖော်ပြပါ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမူဝါဒနှင့် ကိုက်ညီသည့် ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးယန္တရားကို ဖော်ဆောင်နေသော (ကရင်နီပြည်နှင့် ချင်းပြည် အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ (EROs) ၏ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုဒေသများရှိ ပညာရေးကျောင်းများမှ လွဲ၍) ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများအားလုံးသည် [email protected] သို့ Email ပေးပို့ ဆက်သွယ်လျှောက်ထားနိုင်ပါကြောင်း အသိပေး ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ကရင်နီပြည်အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ၏ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုဒေသများရှိ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးယန္တရားကို ဖော်ဆောင်နေသော ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများသည် [email protected] သို့ Email ပေးပို့ဆက်သွယ်လျှောက်ထားနိုင်ပြီး သက်ဆိုင်ရာပြည်နယ်အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီနှင့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့ ညှိနှိုင်း၍ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၆။ ကြားကာလ ချင်းအမျိုးသားအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ၏ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုဒေသများရှိ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေး ယန္တရားကို ဖော်ဆောင်နေသော ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများသည် [email protected] သို့ Email ပေးပို့ဆက်သွယ်လျှောက်ထားနိုင်ပြီး သက်ဆိုင်ရာပြည်နယ်အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီနှင့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့ ညှိနှိုင်း၍ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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"ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင်အသိအမှတ်ပြုကတ် (OERC) ထုတ်ပေးခြင်း ဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာခြင်း
၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံအသီးသီးတွင် ရောက်ရှိ အလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင်နေသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများ (တရားဝင် နေထိုင်လုပ်ကိုင်နေသည့် အလုပ်သမားများ၊ သက်တမ်းကျော်လွန် နေထိုင်လုပ်ကိုင်နေသူများ၊ အလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင်နေသည့် အထောက်အထားမဲ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများ၊ ခိုလှုံခွင့်ဗီဇာ တစ်မျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် နေထိုင်လုပ်ကိုင်နေသူ များ) ၏ အလုပ်အကိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်ပ အလုပ်အကိုင်အသိအမှတ်ပြုကတ် (Overseas Employment Registration Card-OERC) ထုတ်ပေးခြင်းကို အောက်ပါရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်-
(က) ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများတွင် အမှန်တကယ်ရောက်ရှိလုပ်ကိုင်နေသူ ဦးရေ (ခန့်မှန်း) သိရှိနိုင်ရန် နှင့် ရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ အလုပ်အကိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအချက်အလက်များ မှတစ်ဆင့် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သည့် ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒများ ချမှတ်ရာတွင် အထောက်အကူဖြစ်စေရန်၊
( ခ) ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများတွင် ရောက်ရှိလုပ်ကိုင်နေသူများ ကြုံတွေ့နေရသည့် အခက်အခဲများကို လျင်မြန်ထိရောက်စွာ ချိတ်ဆက်ကူညီဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်ရန်၊
( ဂ) နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြားကာလအတွင်း NUG ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရအား ထောက်ခံသည့် အင်အားတစ်ရပ်အနေဖြင့် ပါဝင်နိုင်ရန်နှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး ဘဏ္ဍာရန်ပုံငွေ ရရှိရန်၊
(ဃ) ၁၉၉၉ ခုနှစ်၊ ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ ဥပဒေအရ ပြည်ပတွင် အလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင်ခွင့် အတွက် အသိအမှတ်ပြု သက်သေခံကတ်အဖြစ် ထုတ်ပေးထားသည့် Overseas Worker Identification Card-OWIC အစား Overseas Employment Registration Card-OERC အဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲထုတ်ပေးရန်၊
( င) သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံရောက် အထောက်အထားမဲ့ မြန်မာအလုပ်သမားများအတွက် မည်သူမည်ဝါဖြစ်ကြောင်း သက်သေခံလက်မှတ် (Certificate of Identification- C of I) ထုတ်ပေးရာတွင် အထောက်အထားတစ်ရပ်အနေဖြင့် အသုံးပြုနိုင်ရန်။
၂။ OERC ကတ်အတွက် လျှောက်လွှာတင်သွင်းခြင်းနှင့် စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခြင်းကို online Application Form အသုံးပြုသွားမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး Application Form တွင် ဖြည့်သွင်းထားသည့် အချက်အလက်များကို စိစစ်အတည်၍ OERC (Smart Card) ပြန်လည်ထုတ်ပေးသွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ Application Form ဖြည့်သွင်းရာတွင် အခက်အခဲရှိပါက လိုအပ်သည်များ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန်၊ OERC (Smart Card) ဖြန့်ဝေပေးရန်နှင့် မလိုလားအပ်သည့် လိမ်လည်မှု၊ မသမာမှုများမှ ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရန် သက်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံများရှိ မြန်မာ ရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားရေးရာ ကော်မတီများ (MMWCs)၊ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွား မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊ တာဝန်ယူကူညီဆောင်ရွက်ပေးမည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်း၊ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ပုဂ္ဂိုလ် အမည်များနှင့် အသေးစိတ်အစီအစဉ်ကို နိုင်ငံအလိုက် သီးခြားစီ ထပ်မံထုတ်ပြန်ပေးမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Format :
pdf
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299.01 KB
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"US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell has questioned whether President Biden’s administration is willing to help Myanmar, saying the US’s role supporting the country’s struggle for democracy was “at a serious crossroads”.
The senator, who has worked across the aisle to encourage previous administrations to do more to stand with the dissidents and democrats of Myanmar, addressed senior officials from the Biden administration during Wednesday’s briefing to members of the US Senate.
Senator’s McConnell’s intervention comes at a time when the Senate is carrying out a process directed by McConnell’s bipartisan amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to support Myanmar’s democracy movement. It includes provisions such as legitimizing Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG), which was formed by lawmakers from the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its ethnic allies after the NLD government was ousted in a coup last year.
The amendment was passed by the Senate in December last year, but still requires White House officials to brief senators on the US’s policy towards Myanmar since the coup.
Senator McConnell told the Senate: “My friends (in Myanmar) are enduring a 16th month under the rule of yet another brutal military junta. Thousands of civilians have lost their lives.” The Senator was referring to the regime’s post-coup atrocities against its own people, the majority of whom have rejected junta rule.
“But Burma’s [Myanmar] struggle for democracy – and our role in support – is at a serious crossroads. And today, our colleagues expect to hear from the administration’s representatives what more it is prepared to do to help the people of Burma,” he added.
Days before the briefing, Senator McConnell met with the NUG’s foreign minister Daw Zin Mar Aung. She requested the US to bolster the legitimacy of the NUG, sanction the regime’s support system and give direct assistance to the people of Myanmar.
“I’m hopeful the representatives here today are prepared to discuss how the Biden administration is prioritizing these objectives, and its strategy to achieve each of them,” said Senator McConnell.
During the briefing on Wednesday, the Senator asked the US government what steps the administration was prepared to take to engage, support, and formally recognize the NUG and its National Unity Consultative Council, a body formed to bring together forces opposed to the regime, and the NUG’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces.
He said also that the US needs to ramp up pressure on the military regime because Myanmar dissidents were asking “what additional steps the administration will take” to target the junta’s foreign enablers and corporate affiliates, including the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. The junta-controlled enterprise runs the country’s oil and gas sector.
Lastly, the senator urged the US to find a more effective way of partnering with Myanmar’s neighbors India and Thailand to deliver direct aid assistance to the people of Myanmar, as tens of thousands of civilians nationwide have been forced to flee their homes due to junta raids and arson attacks.
“How is it [the administration] working to help document the junta’s crimes and provide cross-border humanitarian assistance for its victims?” asked the Senator.
Senator McConnell admitted that the challenges facing the Myanmar people are complicated. But he said the proposition for the US government was simple: “Are we willing to help a people committed to democracy finally realize it for themselves?”
“I look forward to hearing how the Biden administration plans to answer this call,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, USA-Burma relations
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Local URL:
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Description:
"Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) ၏ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌကြီး ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး အင်ဘန်လ၏ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်ပြည့် မွေးနေ့အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် ကိုယ်စိတ် နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာရွှင်လန်း၍ အဖဘုရားသခင် ပေးသနားတော်မူသော ဉာဏ်ပညာနှင့်အစွမ်း သတ္တိများဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု အကျိုး အတွက် ဆထက်ထမ်းပိုး ဦးဆောင်ဦးရွက်ပြုနိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ် ပါသည်။
ဥက္ကဋ္ဌကြီး၏ ဦးဆောင်လမ်းညွန်မှုအောက်တွင် Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) နှင့်တကွ ကချင်ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ခိုင်မာပြတ်သားသော ရပ်တည်ချက်များဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက် ရေးအပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများ မျှော်မှန်းတောင့်တနေသာ လုံခြုံငြိမ်းချမ်း၍ စည်ပင်ဝပြောသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်တစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ထွန်းရရှိနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်နေမှုများကို များစွာပင် ကျေးဇူးတင် ဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူမိပါကြောင်းဖော်ပြရင်း ဤမွေးနေ့နှုတ်ခွန်းဆက် သဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
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260.65 KB
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Sub-title:
Land Lease Payments May Finance Human Rights Violations by the Myanmar Military
Description:
"Eight civil society organizations that are deeply concerned about the business relationship that Japanese companies have with the Myanmar military sent a letter dated May 24, 2022 to 101 corporate investors holding shares in Tokyo Tatemono Co., Ltd. or Daiwa House Industry Co., Ltd. Land lease payments made by the two companies in connection with a real estate development project in Yangon (commonly known as “Y Complex”), estimated to be about 2 million USD per year, and will be a source of funding for the Myanmar military.
The Myanmar military for decades has committed grave human rights violations and atrocity crimes with total impunity, and on February 1, 2021, began an attempted coup. The civil society organizations have pointed out to Tokyo Tatemono and Daiwa House on numerous occasions that they may be complicit in grave human rights violations perpetrated by the military and urged them to act in accordance with their own human rights policies and international standards. However, neither company has officially announced specific plans to avoid the risk of its activities in Myanmar abetting grave human rights violations and international crimes by the Myanmar military.
The letter requests the corporate investors in Tokyo Tatemono and Daiwa House to promptly engage with the two companies to urge them to take measures to ensure that their business activities do not benefit the Myanmar military. The letter further asks the corporate investors to consider divestment if the companies do not take sufficient measures..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Watch, Friends of the Earth Japan, Justice For Myanmar, Network Against Japan Arms Trade, ayus:Network of Buddhists Volunteers on International Cooperation, Japan International Volunteer Center, Pacific Asia Resource Center, Human Right Now
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
90.61 KB 101.54 KB
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"Relatives of Myanmar’s ousted leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on Wednesday filed a complaint before a UN watchdog against her detention following a military coup last year, their lawyers said.
Since a coup ousted her government in February 2021, plunging Myanmar into upheaval, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate has been in military custody and faces a raft of charges that could jail her for more than 150 years.
Describing the situation as a “judicial kidnapping”, human rights lawyers Francois Zimeray and Jessica Finelle said they had filed a complaint on behalf of her relatives with the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
“Her arrest was illegal, her detention is devoid of any legal basis, and her different trials violate the basic rules governing any legal procedure,” reads the complaint, seen by AFP.
“This is a kidnapping disguised as a trial, she is held incommunicado in defiance of all justice and resists with strength an unacceptable psychological torture,” it said.
In a statement, the lawyers added that “this is a tragic regression for Myanmar. Through the figure of Aung San Suu Kyi, the entire Burmese people is silenced, and its democratic aspirations are crushed.”
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 76, has been sentenced to five years in jail for corruption, and six years for incitement against the military, breaching COVID-19 rules and breaking a telecommunications law.
She faces a raft of other trials, including for allegedly violating the official secrets act, several counts of corruption and electoral fraud.
Branding them “farcical charges”, the lawyers said Daw Aung San Suu Kyi faces the prospect of more than 100 more years on 17 different charges.
Group made Assange finding
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’s five independent experts investigate cases of deprivation of liberty imposed arbitrarily or inconsistently with international standards.
They made headlines in 2016 by finding that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange was being arbitrarily detained as he sought to avoid extradition from Britain to the United States by sheltering in the Ecuadoran embassy in London.
The Working Group has already evaluated cases involving Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who under a previous junta regime spent long spells under house arrest in her family’s lakeside mansion in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city.
Both in 1991 and 2001, the experts determined she was being arbitrarily detained.
Today, she is confined in an undisclosed location in the capital Naypyitaw, with her links to the outside world limited to brief pre-trial meetings with lawyers.
“Can anyone conceive what this detention entails for a [nearly] 77-years-old woman, who has already spent 15 years of her life deprived of liberty?” Zimeray and Finelle asked.
Speaking with AFP, Zimeray said Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s current case borders on “enforced disappearance”.
“We don’t know where she is. She only reappears at her trials. It is a judicial kidnapping,” he said.
He voiced hope the Working Group, whose decisions are not binding but carry reputational weight, would “speak out firmly”.
Since the coup that ousted civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, more than 1,800 people have died in a brutal military crackdown on dissent, according to a monitoring group..."
Source/publisher:
Agence France-Presse (Paris) via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
If the National Unity Government wants to be taken seriously on the international stage, it needs to put forward a coherent, united, powerful vision for Myanmar’s future.
Description:
"In the contest for control of Myanmar, the rhetorical theatre is just as important as the battles on the ground – particularly when it comes to gaining international support and recognition. While the National Unity Government has achieved much in the past year, it is still struggling to gain meaningful material support from even its most sympathetic allies.
Part of the problem is that the NUG has yet to convince the world that the revolution it is leading against the junta will succeed. More than a year after the coup – and following countless meetings that its counterparts are careful to specify are informal – the NUG is yet to gain formal recognition from foreign governments. More importantly, it has been largely unable to secure meaningful financial or military aid. Though the parallel government has overwhelming support inside of Myanmar and its propaganda efforts have been fairly successful at maintaining morale for over a year, the international community remains reluctant to throw full support behind the NUG even as many countries ramp up their condemnation of the junta.
For the NUG to receive the military and financial aid it is seeking, it needs to present to the outside world a simple and compelling narrative about itself and its vision for a post-authoritarian future. It needs to convincingly sell the idea that it is the government of Myanmar leading a united nation towards prosperity and peace that would inevitably come if it were given the funds and recognition it is asking for.
Instead, the world is presented with a dizzying array of messages coming from an equally dizzying range of groups: not only the CRPH, NUCC and CDM, but also the various EAOs and the hundreds of PDFs and UGs, not to mention the civil society organisations and activists, that show how contentious its authority within the nation is even amongst its allies.
Complexity is nothing new when it comes to Myanmar, but what has changed are the stakes: the country’s future – and the lives of many of its people – are on the line.
For years, the common refrain was that foreigners were inherently incapable of understanding the country due to their foreignness, and thus should not comment on or get involved in “internal issues”. So in a way, it makes sense that the international community would err on the side of caution rather than take bold action and make commitments that could draw them into a messy internal conflict. The NUG needs to convince them that their involvement will be worth the risk.
Adding to the hesitation is uncertainty around how much authority the NUG has over armed resistance forces and territory. Even as NUG ministers make grand statements about how nearly half the country is under resistance control, news outlets and human rights groups report that junta forces are burning villages for having connections to resistance forces. Meanwhile, violations of the NUG’s own code of conduct for warfare – such as assassinations of civilians – remain fairly commonplace, suggesting a lack of control or willingness to exert control.
On top of this, while fairness is a value that many in the international community espouse, it is not what any nation seriously bases its foreign policy on. The NUG’s recent comparisons of the situations in Myanmar and Ukraine, and what it perceives as unfairness and hypocrisy, makes it seem naive – to both how the world of international politics works and the geopolitical importance of Myanmar to the countries that it is petitioning for help.
None of this is likely to inspire confidence and a lack of confidence means no serious money or arms will be forthcoming. Unless and until the NUG can convincingly demonstrate that it can win the war, no one will supply it with the resources that would help it with said war.
The comparisons to Ukraine are also amateurish. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has responded to the invasion of his country with a clear, determined and inspirational stance. He leads a united country, and a single army, against a hostile neighbour with unequivocal support from his people, the region and the global community. Myanmar finds itself in an entirely different situation.
For a country like Myanmar, which is little known globally beyond the brutal oppression by its own military, the lack of clear, visionary leadership presenting a concrete path to victory leaves the international community facing a vacuum. The NUG needs to paint a much stronger picture of unity, force and power to convince foreign governments it is a credible avenue to channel resources beyond mere humanitarian assistance..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"It has been more than a year since Ko Jack left behind the career he loved and joined the armed struggle to defend the people from the junta’s atrocities.
For about 10 years, he followed his passion for photography, working as a photojournalist for news organizations in Yangon. As he had a special interest in covering armed conflicts, Ko Jack traveled to several ethnic states where armed groups have long fought the military for greater rights and autonomy, telling their stories through his camera lens.
Today, he finds himself among them not as a journalist, but fighting back against the military that overthrew the elected civilian government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup in February last year.
Now a member of the People’s Defense Force in Karen State, the 29-year-old has taken part in five heavy battles alongside ethnic Karen forces fighting junta troops. In those clashes, more than 100 junta forces were killed and around a dozen captured.
From lens to gun
Ko Jack recalled his first battle experience in a recent interview with The Irrawaddy. He shared that despite having undergone months of military training, the first time he experienced front-line combat his old instincts returned and he immediately began mentally framing photographs of what he saw.
“Using a gun and taking pictures have something in common: you keep your index finger in a ready position. But you can’t do both [take photos and fire a gun] at the same time,” he said.
“If I started taking pictures, the gun I carry would be useless and it wouldn’t help my comrades either,” he added.
Since then, Ko Jack’s camera has been put aside and his rifle has become his top priority. And just as he relied on his strong sense of timing and focusing skills to take good photographs, he has proven to be a good shot on the battlefield.
He was even offered a promotion to section commander but turned it down, feeling he wasn’t ready for the post yet. On the front line he has become a good soldier, coordinating well with his comrades and obedient to his commander, while back at the base, he is a respected trainer among new members, sharing what he has learned with them.
The day that changed his life
For more than a month after the coup, Ko Jack put aside his personal anger at the military takeover in order to focus on his job, heading to the streets with his camera to document the anti-coup protests and the junta’s crackdown on its opponents. With his fellow journalists, he kept the world informed of the events that were unfolding in the coup-hit country and presented evidence of the violence used by the junta’s forces.
However, one day in March, witnessing the aftermath of a bloodbath committed by the junta in a suburb of Yangon convinced him that he had to take up arms.
Following the coup, numerous street protests broke out in Yangon and other cities, and junta forces responded to the peaceful protesters with lethal crackdowns and deadly shootings. Ko Jack was in Hlaing Tharyar Township one day after the military engaged in one of its worst mass killings of civilians there on March 14.
He recalls that so many bodies were taken to the cemetery that the crematorium had to work non-stop, leaving families unable to grieve properly as the funerals had to be rushed. He spent the whole day there. Some bodies were disfigured to the point of being unrecognizable with pierced heads, shattered faces or missing limbs.
The victims were protesters, bystanders and those helping the wounded, gunned down in a cold-blooded crackdown on an anti-coup demonstration in the township. During the crackdown, junta soldiers armed with assault rifles and snipers trapped protesters and shot to kill any living thing in their view. In total, the junta’s forces killed around 80 people on that day.
“I have never been able to just stand there and watch injustice unfold in front of my eyes. With the coup, and after seeing what happened on that day, I couldn’t stand and watch anymore,” he said.
A few days later he left his home in Yangon, joining thousands of young people across the country heading to rebel training camps and vowing to topple the junta, which has continued to terrorize the population with killings, arbitrary arrests, arson and bombing attacks.
His new home is a tent. He lives in a forest without any relatives nearby. More than a year on, he misses his home sometimes, especially when he is sick. He recently caught malaria while staying at a jungle camp; his biggest wish at that time was to be able to enjoy his favorite breakfast—spicy noodle salad with rice.
Same mission
But the determined revolutionary fighter said he won’t turn back until the revolution succeeds—a conviction he shares with his comrades.
A majority of the fighters in the group are aged between 20 and 30; they come from different regions and states and diverse backgrounds: workers, journalists, medics, artists, civil servants and even some striking police and soldiers. Besides graduates like Ko Jack, who completed a degree in geology, undergrads under 20 who are boycotting the junta’s education system have also joined the group.
Like Ko Jack, none of them chose to be soldiers; all felt compelled to take up arms due to the junta’s oppression of the entire population. They are among about 80,000 to 100,000 People’s Defense Force members nationwide who have taken up arms to fight back against the junta.
They all have one mission—to root out the military, which has oppressed the country for more than 60 years, and to terminate once and for all the system of dictatorship that is despised by all Myanmar people.
Some of Ko Jack’s comrades have given their lives for this mission. During one battle Ko Jack lost two fellow fighters, both of whom were much younger than him.
Their deaths could easily have left him heartbroken and demoralised; instead, they have driven him to become a stronger fighter, even more determined to achieve victory on their behalf, he said.
Like Ko Jack, all revolutionary fighters believe that their future will be bright only when the current military under Min Aung Hlaing is defeated.
Ko Jack said that while he personally loved detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as the country’s leader, the fight is not for her sake alone, but for his and his comrades’ future, and he believes other youths who have taken up arms feel the same way.
“We, the youth, are fighting to end military rule for our future and because we are the next generation,” he said.
Referring to the junta’s recent invitation of ethnic armed organizations to peace talks, Ko Jack continued that the young resistance fighters have no trust in any negotiations offered by the junta.
“We have seen their lies and don’t believe them. For us, we will continue to fight till the end, till the junta surrenders, and till they [the military] give up their place in politics,” he said.
Ko Jack and his comrades are confident of victory over the junta troops, who are dispirited and disunited.
Even now, facing shortages of arms and ammunition, the resistance groups, which comprise determined fighters across the country, pose a serious threat to the junta’s forces—once viewed as an all-powerful military—using guerrilla warfare tactics to seize junta posts.
Ko Jack said he has noticed that several junta troops who were killed or arrested by ethnic forces in their area used drugs, adding that on the front lines they are no longer obedient to their commanders.
But the inadequate arms and ammunition are holding back the resistance’s operations. For now, only half of the members of the group are armed.
With the PDFs still not fully armed, Ko Jack bought a used AK-47 rifle on his own and has raised funds to buy bullets for himself as well as for his colleagues. Other PDF members across the country have also had to raise money themselves to buy the required weapons and food.
Ko Jack said that if the resistance forces had adequate supplies of arms and ammunition, victory wouldn’t take long.
“We could also take the cities, as the people expect, in three to six months if we had full supplies of arms and ammunition. We don’t need tanks or jet fighters to win the battle, only supplies of arms and ammunition,” he said.
And the day they prevail will be the day they return home and reclaim their rights.
“When this is over, I want to return home in my uniform,” Ko Jack said. “I want to meet my parents in the battle uniform that I wore while taking part in the revolution and show them that their son did something they can be proud of.”
And yes, he will return to his camera and once again hit the shutter button instead of pulling the trigger..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
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Sub-title:
စစ်ကောင်စီက ဖွဲ့စည်းလျက်ရှိသော ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့ အမည်ခံ အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့များတွင် ပါဝင်ခြင်း မပြုကြရန် တားမြစ်ခြင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် (၃/၂၀၂၂)
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"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်ဝါဒကို လက်ကိုင်ထားလျက် ပြည်သူလူထုကို နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်နှိပ်စက် ညှင်းပန်းနေသော စစ်ကောင်စီသည် တစတစ အင်အားပြုန်းတီးနေသည့် ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်အား ဖာထေးထောက်ကူနိုင်ရေး နိုင်ငံတဝန်း မြို့နယ်များတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့များ တိုးချဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိရာ ယခုအခါတွင် “ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့”ဟု ၎င်းတို့ ခေါ်ဆိုသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့များကို မြို့နယ်များ၊ ရပ်ကွက်ကျေးရွာများတွင် ဖွဲ့စည်းရန် ဆောင်ရွက်လာသည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၂။ ယခင်က ပျူစောထီး၊ သွေးသောက်၊ သွေးသစ္စာ၊ စွန်ရဲ စသော အမည်အမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် အဖွဲ့များ ဖွဲ့စည်းထားခဲ့ရာမှ ယခုအခါ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူချင်း အကြမ်းဖက် ရန်ပြုစေလျက် ၎င်းအတွက် ထွက်ပေါက် ရှာဖွေရန် ရည်ရွယ်သည့် မူဝါဒတစ်ခု ချမှတ်ကာ ၎င်းကိုယ်တိုင် တိုက်ရိုက်စီမံ ကွပ်ကဲမည့်ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့ အမည်ရသော အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့ကို စစ်အုပ်စုအလိုတော်ရိ နိုင်ငံရေး ပါတီ နှင့် အသင်းအဖွဲ့များ၏ ပါဝင်မှုဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းရန် ကြိုးစားနေခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ စစ်ကောင်စီကို အကြမ်းဖက် အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ ကလည်းကောင်း၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကလည်း သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာထားပြီး ဖြစ်သဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ထောက်ကူပေးသော လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်နှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံးသည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေနှင့် ငြိစွန်းလျက်ရှိပြီး ဥပဒေ နည်းလမ်း အရဖြစ်စေ၊ စစ်ရေးနည်းလမ်းအရဖြစ်စေ အရေးယူခံရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ စစ်ကောင်စီ ပြန်ကြားရေး၏ ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောဆိုချက်များအရ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် “ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့” အပါအဝင် အရပ်သားများပါဝင်သော ကာကွယ်ရေးစနစ် တနည်း ပြည်သူကို ပြည်သူနှင့် ပြန်ရန်တိုက်ပေးသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စနစ်ကို ဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊ ပါဝင် ဆောင်ရွက်သူများအား စစ်ပညာသင်ကြားပေးခြင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်နည်းလမ်းများ ပို့ချခြင်း၊ လက်နက်တပ်ဆင်ပေးခြင်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သိရှိရပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ကာကွယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ၎င်းပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံ နှင့် ပါဝင်သည့် အသင်းအဖွဲ့များ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ် များနှင့် ပက်သက်သော သက်သေအထောက်အထားများကိုလည်း ရရှိထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ သို့ဖြစ်၍ စစ်ကောင်စီက ဖွဲ့စည်းသော “ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့ ” များနှင့် အဖွဲ့ဝင်များကို အရပ်သားအဖြစ် မှတ်ယူ၍မရတော့သည့်အတွက် “ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင် စစ်ရေးပစ်မှတ်များ ” အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကာ စစ်ရေးနည်းလမ်းအရ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၆။ “ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့” တွင် ပါဝင်ရန် အတင်းအကြပ်ဖိအားပေး ခိုင်းစေခံရသော ပြည်သူများ အနေဖြင့် ၎င်းအဖွဲ့ကိုအမြန်ဆုံးစွန့်ခွာပြီး သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့များထံ သတင်းပေးပို့၍ လက်နက်အပ်နှံ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်သည်။
၇။ ပြည်သူလူထုအနေနှင့်လည်း စစ်ကောင်စီက “ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့ ” ဟုဆိုကာ အင်အား စုဆောင်းလာမှုကို လုံးဝလက်မခံ၊ ဆန့်ကျင်ကြပါရန်နှင့် မိမိတို့ရပ်ရွာအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့ဝင် ထောက်တိုင် များအဖြစ် ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်နေမှုများကို သိရှိရပါက - တယ်လီဂရမ်(telegram) အမည်
" info2mod " သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ အီးမေးလ်(email) လိပ်စာ " [email protected] " သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ အထောက်အထားများနှင့်တကွ သတင်းပေးပို့ တိုင်ကြားနိုင်ကြရန် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာ အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
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"U Naing Htoo Aung, permanent secretary of the National Unity Government’s (NUG) Ministry of Defense, talked recently to The Irrawaddy about Myanmar’s armed struggle against the military regime, what the NUG has been doing to step up the attack against the junta, about the availability of funds and the distribution of weapons to resistance groups, and defections from Myanmar’s military.
You have said that the NUG will step up the revolution this year. What’s your current assessment of the revolution?
We have increasingly engaged in all the means helpful to topple the military dictatorship. It is fair to say that we started from zero. We chose armed struggle not because we like it, but because we were forced to do so. Compared to the previous year, there has been a lot of progress. More than one year on from the coup, the regime still lacks legitimacy and is utterly rejected by the people. In terms of military confrontation, the regime has been suffering a lot. This is something that the military had never expected in its history. The armed struggle is one of our means of revolution and it has achieved certain progress. Other means are equally as important as the armed struggle.
You said the NUG will accelerate the armed struggle this year. What is the NUG’s strategy?
The people’s militia is the key strategy, which we will continue to implement in our armed struggle. We are fighting them [the junta] not because we have superior weapons or larger battalions, but because this is a defensive war being fought with the support of the people, and we will therefore continue to pursue the people’s militia strategy. We focused on building and learning in the first year. Now we have a certain amount of experience and stronger organizational skills. Although there are still a lot of requirements in terms of weapons, we have been armed to a certain extent. So this year there will be more attacks designed to cause heavier damage to the regime. Previously, we only waged guerilla warfare, but very soon there will be more all-out attacks carried out in a professional manner.
What will be the major differences in the war between last year and this year?
As everyone knows, we have been able to fight guerilla warfare in wider areas. In the near future, besides guerilla warfare, we will launch assaults in a professional manner. There will be an upgrade to the tactics and weaponry we use in the fighting. Resistance forces will be able to use better weapons and more weapons.
The regime has increasingly used air and artillery strikes to crush the resistance, as well as torching villages. The People’s Defense Forces (PDF) have said they are outgunned. What will the NUG do to help them?
We have been able to raise more funds lately. You can see that resistance forces are using better weapons now. It takes a few months to turn those funds into weapons and get them into the hands of resistance fighters. People have started to see the fruits of the increased funds, and they will see more fruits in the months to come.
You said that the NUG has provided more arms to PDFs compared to last year. Can you give us a figure?
In some cases, supply has yet to reach the target destinations because of logistical hurdles and communication obstacles. We always try our best to reach out to resistance groups. We have supplied arms to Bo Ngar [a prominent resistance leader from Sagaing Region who has complained of a shortage of weapons]. But it is possible that we could not provide as many as they want. We are trying to deliver the arms we have promised. But there are delays due to logistical hurdles, financial constraints, and other factors. We request understanding from the people and resistance forces. There are also delays because we are trying to systematize the supply chains.
As I said earlier, resistance forces can’t get arms overnight after we get the money. The regime has frozen bank accounts used to accept donations from the people, and also arrested account holders. We have to collect donations from numerous sources, and I hope people can understand the extent of the difficulties we are facing. The difference between last year and this year will be that we have spent huge sums on [military] training and research [on weapons production]. We don’t have to spend much on training and research this year, and the extra money will be used to arm the resistance forces.
The NUG said it has spent US$30 million on weapons. Has the NUG received more funds since that money was spent?
There are two parts regarding the use of those funds. Some items directly reach users immediately after we buy them. But for other items, we can’t give them directly and they are still on their way to users. We have used up the US$30 million. But not all the items bought with that US$30 million have been supplied to people yet.
What I can say is that the supply and production of weapons will increase greatly compared to last year. But to tell you the figures….I say it depends on the availability of funds. It costs at least US$1 million to arm a battalion. And we’re doing everything we can to raise more funds. To arm all the existing battalions, it will cost over US$100 million. While we can’t arm all the resistance forces, we are trying to make the most out of the resources we have.
So can we expect more direct attacks against the regime this year?
Yes.
You said the NUG can’t afford to supply all the resistance groups at the same time. But some people have criticized the NUG for only supplying arms to groups it is close to. What is your response?
Resources are limited anywhere and there are always management problems with the sharing of resources. So it is natural that there are complaints in managing scarce resources. We welcome those complaints. But we have to look at the overall picture. For some operations, using large resources on a single unit can guarantee better results than distributing smaller resources to several groups. Basically, we have to fulfill the basic requirements of all the groups to protect the people. And we are trying to make sure of that.
How is the NUG supplying urban guerilla groups, including those taking part in Operation Nan Htike Aung in Yangon?
Many urban guerilla groups are operating under the command of the NUG. We are supplying them based on their planned operations. We are aware that urban guerillas are facing a tougher time now. We are reviewing our supply and making plans for improvement. We have done certain things, but much remains to be done.
What can people expect from the NUG’s attacks for control of cities? NUG statements have said it is expanding its territory and that some cities are under siege.
When we design missions, we have to weigh the benefits against the costs. We have to weigh what we can achieve from the operation and what we and people can lose in the fighting. We know fighting can cause serious damage to human and other resources but, as I have said earlier, we were forced to choose the armed struggle. We aim to build a developed federal democracy in the future. We have to make use of resources in the nation-building. The lives of people and resources are priceless. So we have to think very carefully about how we can achieve our ambitions with minimum losses.
We can seize a town now and make people happy. But we have to use many resources to maintain control of it. This will seriously affect our efforts to liberate the whole country. We may seize cities when the time is appropriate. But we have to take many things into consideration. A wrong decision can cost the lives of many young people. Because we need their strength in rebuilding our country.
What is the NUG doing to help produce weapons for the PDFs?
Our defence ministry has a separate unit for weapons production. The unit provides financial, material and technical assistance for groups that produce weapons. We have achieved significant improvements after numerous failures. We have been able to spend a sizable proportion of our budget on weapons production. We have started to see the benefits of the money we spent on research and development over the last year. We attach great importance to weapons production. But I can’t disclose details of our production line as it is sensitive information. We have spent millions of dollars on weapons production and we will disclose details when the time is appropriate.
Last month, citing the example of Ukraine, the NUG foreign affairs minister called on the international community to provide arms for PDFs in Myanmar. Has the NUG received any weapons from foreign countries?
I don’t know much about foreign relations. But as far as I know no country has yet supplied us. Bur whether we receive help or not we have to keep going on the path we have chosen. We will fight until the end and if the international community give a hand, it will help reduce the damage to the Myanmar people and help restore regional stability more quickly. But if they do nothing, there will be more civilian casualties. It is shameful that the international community just stands by and does nothing when other people face injustice. They should ask themselves the question, let injustice happen or fight it?
How much more money does the NUG need to step up attacks against the regime and can it raise that cash?
As I have said earlier, we need over US$100 million. Suppose we have 100,000 resistance fighters and if we are only to equip them with a basic weapon like a rifle, we need hundreds of millions of dollars. We will have more funds this year than last year. But it will be difficult to meet our financial target. The funds we have acquired so far can only arm some ten per cent of resistance forces. It is quite a small amount compared to the billions of dollars that the Myanmar military gets annually from its defense budget. We need more funds. We have to try to increase funding. It is not impossible if we can work together with greater understanding and unity.
The NUG has formed a logistical army [which requires people to register with the NUG’s defense ministry to provide monthly contributions starting from US$20] which is part of the fund-raising program. How many people have joined the logistical army?
Well, more and more people are gradually joining. But we don’t earn millions of dollars monthly as we expected. We will reveal a detailed list soon.
People are speculating about possible morale problems in the military. What does the NUG know about the current situation inside the military?
For now, Min Aung Hlaing is struggling to convince his troops to continue fighting. For an army to fight and risk their lives, they must have faith in something, for example a cause or to protect the people. But, now, all the people in the Myanmar military have to sacrifice their lives for the betterment of a handful of people. They know if they are protecting the people or persecuting them. They can’t lie to themselves. They might have relatives in villages where they have killed people and torched houses. And the regime is also using the pretext of protecting Buddhism and Burmese people. I think many military personnel are now aware that it is ridiculous.
On the other hand, the PDFs know exactly what they are fighting for. They are fighting to end military dictatorship and establish federal democracy in Myanmar, for the stability and prosperity of Myanmar. They are fighting with the faith that they are building a country that guarantees equal opportunities for all citizens, and that is not ruled through the barrel of a gun. But junta troops do not have such faith. No army can survive long without strong faith. Their morale will decline over time. Those who remain in the military because of the benefits associated with being military personnel will not risk their lives. There are already many unhappy soldiers because of exploitation and bullying in the military. We know that many want to leave the military for the embrace of people, but the regime has taken a number of measures to discourage them from doing so.
People say the Myanmar military has over 400,000 soldiers. Does the NUG know the exact size of the military?
We don’t think the military is as big as they [the junta] say. There have been defections, but troops who defect remain on the paylist. Everyone knows why they are still on the paylist [because commanders embezzle their salaries without reporting their defections to their superiors]. Battalions are short of their standard size. Some say that there are only a few thousand junta troops. That is not true either. Not all the troops are combat troops. And we have seen that the regime has been forced to use non-combat troops in military operations. We learned that the regime has had to use female soldiers in fighting lately. Although we don’t underestimate the strength of the military, its size is much smaller than it claims.
In April, the NUG offered incentives for military personnel to defect. What else can the NUG do to encourage defections?
Soldiers might have concerns about defecting because of the uncertainties they are likely to face after defection. More soldiers have defected as we have guaranteed their lives. So we provide support for defectors to secure livelihoods. We also reward them when they defect with arms. There were difficulties initially, but we can manage more systematically now. We also plan to spend more funds for defectors. Some people have criticized us for spending money on defectors and not on the procurement of weapons. But an enemy soldier that stops fighting for the enemy or defects to us is a military achievement. We are not fighting out of a grudge. We are fighting for a political goal. We are rebelling out of love [for people]. And we keep the door open for those who have not committed serious crimes and who have chosen the people over the regime. This is also important for the revolution.
The NUG has offered US$500,000 to anyone who defects with a military plane or vessel. Has anyone done that yet?
Military personnel have contacted us [about defecting]. It is possible that they will defect [along with a plane or vessel]. We will issue a press release when the time is right..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"On 1 February 2021 the Myanmar armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) seized control of the country following a general election that the National League for Democracy (NLD) party won by a landslide. The military junta that the Tatmadaw established to run the country is officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC). Over the period February–November 2021 hundreds of people, including children, were killed and many injured during nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) protests against the coup and violent SAC crackdowns on those opposing it.
Doctors and nurses were arrested for providing medical care to protesters, health workers were injured while providing care to protesters, ambulances were destroyed, and health facilities were raided. In the first few months of 2022 health care in Myanmar continued to be under attack.
By the end of 2021 what began as an urban-based protest movement had escalated into a wider conflict extending into the countryside. In September the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) declared war on the Tatmadaw. Shortly after, the Tatmadaw began a brutal offensive throughout the country, razing villages, damaging or destroying health infrastructure with artillery or air strikes, and blocking medical aid to opposition-controlled areas.
This update to the one-year report published in February has been prepared by Insecurity Insight, as part of the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC). It highlights reported incidents of violence against health workers, facilities, and transport in Myanmar between 1 January and 31 March 2022 to highlight the impact on the health system as a whole. It does not include information on violence against patients. It is drawn from credible information that is available in local, national, and international news outlets, online databases, and social media reports..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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418.12 KB
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"May 23, 2022, Washington, D.C.–This week, Chevron’s shareholders will vote on a resolution that challenges the fossil fuel company’s partnership with the Myanmar (Burma) military. The shareholders that proposed the resolution are calling on the company to use arbitration proceedings as part of a responsible divestment strategy instead of treating the junta as a recognized government and legitimate business partner.
Since seizing power in a coup in February 2021, the Myanmar military has destabilized the region, pushed millions into a humanitarian crisis, and murdered more than 1,800 people, while more than 10,000 are currently detained. Profits from the Yadana offshore gas project, in which Chevron holds a major interest, are still funding the junta and fueling its human rights atrocities, despite Chevron’s announcing plans to withdraw from the country earlier this year.
EarthRights International Director of Strategy and Campaigns Keith Slack issued the following statement:
“Revenues from Myanmar’s offshore gas projects are the military junta’s largest source of foreign revenue, funding its atrocities. Chevron’s and other oil companies’ payments go to an illegal, criminal junta that has taken control of government bank accounts and is actively misappropriating state assets in order to fuel human rights abuses.
“EarthRights urges Chevron’s shareholders to approve a resolution on doing business with governments that are complicit in human rights abuses. Multiple Chevron shareholders have acknowledged that while its contracts are with the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the entity is nothing more than a government department; we urge Chevron to acknowledge that the junta is not a recognized government. Doing so enables it to rely on contractual obligations to divert revenues from the junta as part of a planned exit from Myanmar. It would also require Chevron to respect demands from Myanmar civil society not to bring in a new operator for the Yadana gas project if it will collude with the junta. As proposed by its own shareholders, the company should initiate international arbitration rather than persisting with its strategy of ignoring Myanmar’s National Unity Government and siding with a genocidal junta.
“Chevron’s irresponsible actions in Myanmar mirror a pattern we’ve seen worldwide. In 2008, EarthRights sued Chevron for human rights abuses at a protest site in Nigeria. In 2005, Chevron acquired Unocal, a company with a long track record of human rights abuses. Chevron has the moral, legal, and financial obligation to avoid fueling genocide and crimes against humanity. Since the coup began last year, human rights organizations worldwide have urged companies, including Chevron, to stop providing financial support to the Myanmar military.
“To actually live up to its tagline of the ‘Human Energy Company,’ Chevron needs to walk its talk. Its long history of undermining human and environmental rights and its support for the Myanmar junta shows us that it’s actually the ‘Anti-Human Energy Company.’ Chevron shareholders now have an opportunity and an obligation to stop fueling human rights abuses in Myanmar.” ..."
Source/publisher:
EarthRights International
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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Local URL:
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"(Tokyo, May 23, 2022) – A Myanmar air force lieutenant colonel who received military training in Japan is deployed with forces that have been implicated in serious abuses in Myanmar’s central Magway Region, Human Rights Watch and Justice For Myanmar said today. The Japanese government should immediately halt its training program and investigate whether other program participants are involved in operations involving laws-of-war violations.Myanmar Air Force Lt. Col. Hlwan Moe received training at Japan’s Air Command and Staff College from August 2016 to March 2017, according to the All Japan Defense Association and a defense ministry document. A media outlet reported that Hlwan Moe is a deputy commander, and two well-connected sources said he is based at Magway Air Base. Heavy fighting in the Magway Region since the February 2021 coup, including armed clashes and airstrikes, has displaced over 50,000 civilians. The Myanmar military has committed summary executions, arson, and other abuses, including possible indiscriminate airstrikes in Magway, media have reported.“The Myanmar military’s long history of committing war crimes with impunity should have been enough evidence for Japan that its military training program was going to risk making Japan complicit in atrocities,” said Teppei Kasai, Asia program officer at Human Rights Watch. “The Japanese government should give up its absurd, wishful thinking that its training program can change the Myanmar military’s abusive culture.”
Hlwan Moe’s name, rank, position, and military ID 2321 are identified in a list of Myanmar air force personnel reportedly involved in airstrikes since 2021 that was leaked to Khit Thit Media, a Myanmar media group that published it in January 2022. Two sources with connections to Myanmar military personnel, who reviewed Hlwan Moe’s photograph, confirmed his name, military ID and rank.
Since 2015, the Japanese government has accepted cadets and officers from Myanmar under article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, which permits training and educating foreign nationals in Defense Ministry facilities with the defense minister’s approval. In 2021, following the coup, Japan accepted two cadets and two officers. In 2022, Japan again accepted two cadets and two officers for training.
Human Rights Watch in December 2021 called on the Japanese government to immediately suspend the training program because it risks making Japan complicit in military atrocities. At the time, a Japanese Defense Ministry official replied that the ministry did not have any information about what the cadets and officers trained in Japan were doing once back in Myanmar.
During a parliamentary committee session on security on April 26, 2022, however, a Defense Ministry official said the defense ministry “knows to a certain extent” what “positions” they currently hold, but declined to disclose any details due to Japan’s “relationship” with “the other country.” For decades, the Myanmar military has been responsible for war crimes in long-running armed conflicts with ethnic armed groups, and crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine State.Since the February 2021 coup, junta security forces have carried out serious abuses including mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The security forces have killed over 1,800 people, including at least 130 children, and arbitrarily arrested over 13,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The military has expanded abusive operations in ethnic minority areas and against anti-junta armed groups, displacing more than 550,000 people, while deliberately blocking aid to populations in need as a form of collective punishment.
The military has carried out targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages, causing loss of life and property. Accounts from displaced people and aid workers suggest that the junta has continued to use the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government weapons sales to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets were being used against civilians.Since the coup, the Japanese government has called for a restoration of democratic rule and the release of elected government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi. On March 28, 2021, Japan’s Defense Ministry issued a joint statement with 11 other countries criticizing the military’s attacks against “unarmed civilians.” The Japanese government halted new non-humanitarian Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects earlier in 2021 while allowing existing aid projects to continue. The Japanese Diet passed a resolution in June that condemned the coup and called for a “swift restoration of the democratic political system.”
“It is inexcusable for Japan to continue to train cadets from the Myanmar military, knowing that it commits atrocity crimes,” said Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar. “Japan’s cadet training program emboldens the junta and provides support to military personnel that may be used in the commission of crimes against the people of Myanmar. We call on the Japanese government to immediately halt these trainings and take concrete steps to stop the Myanmar military from committing grave violations, including ending business with the Myanmar military and its conglomerates.”
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
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Size:
79.08 KB 100.21 KB
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Sub-title:
Tokyo Should Cut Military Ties, Pressure Junta to End Atrocities
Description:
"(Tokyo) – A Myanmar air force lieutenant colonel who received military training in Japan is deployed with forces that have been implicated in serious abuses in Myanmar’s central Magway Region, Human Rights Watch and Justice For Myanmar said today. The Japanese government should immediately halt its training program and investigate whether other program participants are involved in operations involving laws-of-war violations.
Myanmar Air Force Lt. Col. Hlwan Moe received training at Japan’s Air Command and Staff College from August 2016 to March 2017, according to the All Japan Defense Association and a defense ministry document. A media outlet reported that Hlwan Moe is a deputy commander, and two well-connected sources said he is based at Magway Air Base. Heavy fighting in the Magway Region since the February 2021 coup, including armed clashes and airstrikes, has displaced over 50,000 civilians. The Myanmar military has committed summary executions, arson, and other abuses, including possible indiscriminate airstrikes in Magway, media have reported.
“The Myanmar military’s long history of committing war crimes with impunity should have been enough evidence for Japan that its military training program was going to risk making Japan complicit in atrocities,” said Teppei Kasai, Asia program officer at Human Rights Watch. “The Japanese government should give up its absurd, wishful thinking that its training program can change the Myanmar military’s abusive culture.”
Hlwan Moe’s name, rank, position, and military ID 2321 are identified in a list of Myanmar air force personnel reportedly involved in airstrikes since 2021 that was leaked to Khit Thit Media, a Myanmar media group that published it in January 2022. Two sources with connections to Myanmar military personnel, who reviewed Hlwan Moe’s photograph, confirmed his name, military ID and rank.
Since 2015, the Japanese government has accepted cadets and officers from Myanmar under article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, which permits training and educating foreign nationals in Defense Ministry facilities with the defense minister’s approval. In 2021, following the coup, Japan accepted two cadets and two officers. In 2022, Japan again accepted two cadets and two officers for training.
Human Rights Watch in December 2021 called on the Japanese government to immediately suspend the training program because it risks making Japan complicit in military atrocities. At the time, a Japanese Defense Ministry official replied that the ministry did not have any information about what the cadets and officers trained in Japan were doing once back in Myanmar.
During a parliamentary committee session on security on April 26, 2022, however, a Defense Ministry official said the defense ministry “knows to a certain extent” what “positions” they currently hold, but declined to disclose any details due to Japan’s “relationship” with “the other country.” For decades, the Myanmar military has been responsible for war crimes in long-running armed conflicts with ethnic armed groups, and crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine State.
Since the February 2021 coup, junta security forces have carried out serious abuses including mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The security forces have killed over 1,800 people, including at least 130 children, and arbitrarily arrested over 13,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The military has expanded abusive operations in ethnic minority areas and against anti-junta armed groups, displacing more than 550,000 people, while deliberately blocking aid to populations in need as a form of collective punishment.
The military has carried out targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages, causing loss of life and property. Accounts from displaced people and aid workers suggest that the junta has continued to use the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government weapons sales to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets were being used against civilians.
Since the coup, the Japanese government has called for a restoration of democratic rule and the release of elected government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi. On March 28, 2021, Japan’s Defense Ministry issued a joint statement with 11 other countries criticizing the military’s attacks against “unarmed civilians.” The Japanese government halted new non-humanitarian Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects earlier in 2021 while allowing existing aid projects to continue. The Japanese Diet passed a resolution in June that condemned the coup and called for a “swift restoration of the democratic political system.”
“It is inexcusable for Japan to continue to train cadets from the Myanmar military, knowing that it commits atrocity crimes,” said Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar. “Japan’s cadet training program emboldens the junta and provides support to military personnel that may be used in the commission of crimes against the people of Myanmar. We call on the Japanese government to immediately halt these trainings and take concrete steps to stop the Myanmar military from committing grave violations, including ending business with the Myanmar military and its conglomerates.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Watch Reports on Burma/Myanmar, Health and internal displacement/forced migration, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"20 May 2022 - London/Yangon - The Burmese military has increased its attacks on marginalised minorities throughout the country since the coup in February 2021. These incidents escalated yet again on 20 May when the Burmese army set fire to the homes and mosque in Innywa Village, Kathar District, Northern Sagaing Region. A Muslim girl (Sofia) and her uncle were shot and killed by Junta’s thugs (ThwayThaut) in Yangon in a separate event. One other person was injured in the incident. BHRN calls on all nations to heed these warnings of another potential mass atrocities in Myanmar before it happens.
“The world cannot sit idly by and allow further atrocities in Burma. What happened to the Rohingya will happen to any minority mainly Muslims and Christians minorities. The efforts by the international community so far have not altered the Junta’s course or stopped them from attacking civilians. If the world put only a fraction of the effort into Burma that they have into Ukraine, we can avert these atrocities,” said BHRN’s Executive Director, Kyaw Win.
The Burmese military frequently uses arson attacks on minority areas. The intentional killing of civilians is unacceptable and targeting anyone for their religious and ethnic background is especially atrocious. Similarly, civilians have regularly been shot arbitrarily by the military in areas where no conflict or armed groups are present.
BHRN calls on the international community to increase the severity of sanctions on Burma, emphasizing all enterprises that the military directly profits from, particularly their energy sector. All nations must establish a global arms embargo to prevent the military from resupplying weapons that they will use to harm and kill innocent civilians. The crisis in Ukraine has shown the power the world has when it chooses to act, we must be willing to do the same for Burma.
BHRN calls on the world to completely sanction all of the Burmese military’s assets and endeavours, particularly the gas and oil sector. A complete arms embargo must be launched against the Junta and they must be ostracised from the world stage. As long as the fascist military continue to exist in power the threat of mass atrocities against the religious and ethnic minorities is highly likely to take place again in Burma. Simultaneously, the National Unity Government must also recognise it as genocide and stop avoiding using the term “genocide”. The world has taken great measures to stand up to the cruelty of dictators and warlords around the world. It must finally do the same for the people of Burma.
Organisation’s Background
BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma/Myanmar working for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in the country. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders..."
Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Inter-Communal violence and discrimination - Myanmar - General articles and analysis, Discrimination against Muslims in Burma/Myanmar, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
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As of March 11, army tribunals in the Yangon region have sentenced more than 150 people to death or life in prison.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta condemned seven youths to death this week in the Yangon region after a secret military tribunal found them guilty of murder, a junta newspaper reported.
The seven, all from all from Hlaingtharyar township in the country’s largest city Yangon Region, were ruled guilty of taking part in the March 6 murder of a ward official suspected of being a police informer and sentenced to death on Wednesday under Section 54 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.
As of March 11, military tribunals in the Yangon region have sentenced more than 150 people to death or life imprisonment, RFA reporting has revealed. No executions have been reported by the military regime that overthrew Myanmar’s elected government on Feb. 1, 2021.
The seven were identified as Ye Min Naing, Soe Moe, Thant Zin, Daewa, San Shay, Athay Lay and Aye Aye Min.
Another youth, Htet Myat Naing from Yangon’s North Dagon township, was sentenced on Wednesday to life in prison under Section 50(j) of the Anti-Terrorism Law for having links to and collecting money for terrorist organizations.
An underground youth activist in Yangon said the military is imposing harsh punishments on young people to discourage them from participating in resistance movements against the junta, the junta newspaper said.
"The deliberate arrests of young people and such harsh sentences are attempts to intimidate the youth not to be involved in the revolution. No matter what they do, young people are already determined to march on with this,” he told RFA.
Lawyers have argued that the sentences imposed by military tribunals handing down highest sentences on the youth are unjust and punishable.
Military spokesman Maj Gen Zaw Min Tun said the government was not targeting young people but was prosecuting violators of the law.
According to Thai-based rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma, a total of 10,707 people were arrested and 1,072 of them were imprisoned between Feb. 1, 2021 and May 19, 2022, and 72 have been sentenced to death, including 2 children. And another 41 have been sentenced to death in absentia..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"Cambodia is planning to invite the Myanmar junta’s defense minister to next month’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defense ministers meeting in Phnom Penh, according to Cambodian media.
Regime representatives were present at a recent three-day meeting of senior ASEAN defense officials from all ten member states. The junta sent Zaw Zaw Soe, the Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Defense’s Department of International Affairs. He expressed his thanks to Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense for convening the important meetings.
General Nem Sowath, Director-General of Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense’s General Department of Policy and Foreign Affairs, who chaired the meeting, said that the meeting was a preparatory event ahead of next month’s ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting.
However, the presence of a junta-appointed defense official has caused concern.
Kin Phea, director general of the Royal Academy of Cambodia’s International Relations Institute, described the regime official as a “non-political representative”.
“I think the Myanmar defense official has the right to attend meetings in Cambodia because he is not a politician, or at the political level, but at the technical level. The participation of the Myanmar delegation is important to contributing to moving the ASEAN mechanism forward,” said Kin Phea.
In March, Cambodia, the current chair of ASEAN, welcomed some of the generals overseeing the Myanmar military’s atrocities against its own people, who reject military rule.
Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, Myanmar’s Chief of Military Security Affairs, attended the 19th ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting in Phnom Penh on Tuesday, according to junta-run media. The meeting discussed the exchange of visits between ASEAN intelligence officers and the establishment of the ASEAN Military Intelligence Community.
Moreover, the regime’s Chief of the General Staff General Maung Maung Aye, Chief of Staff (Army) Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun and Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo joined the 19th ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Meeting. These key leaders of the military regime are believed to be involved in mass killings and applying scorched-earth tactics — such as the razing of entire villages — against both civilians and the growing resistance movement.
Since last year’s coup, the Myanmar military has been condemned for committing widespread and systematic abuses against civilians that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, according to a March report by the United Nations’s (UN) Human Rights Office, the first comprehensive rights report since the military takeover.
The UN warned that the military regime has shown “flagrant disregard for human life” and has deliberately targeted civilians since seizing power on 1 February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"Last week in the East Asia Pacific region, fighting continued between the Myanmar military and local resistance groups in Myanmar. North Korea conducted two missile tests. In the Philippines, Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, Jr. and Sara Duterte won the national elections as president and vice-president, respectively, amid a surge in political violence and demonstrations related to the elections. In Indonesia, there were armed clashes between the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and state forces, while ethnic Papuans continued to demonstrate against the proposed creation of new provinces in Papua. In Papua New Guinea, Nomali and Aiyala clans in Enga province engaged in a shootout. In China, riots in response to stringent COVID-19 lockdowns continued in Shanghai. In Thailand, pro-democracy demonstrations continued in Bangkok. In Australia, health workers demonstrated in Western Australia and Queensland.
In Myanmar, fighting continued between the Myanmar military and local resistance groups. On 12 May in southern Shan state, the military and the Pa-Oh National Organization/Pa-Oh National Army (PNO/PNA) suffered casualties when combined forces of the Southern Shan Revolution Youth (SSRY), Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), Pekon People’s Defense Force, and Inle People’s Defense Force attacked their outpost in Hti Ri village, Nyaungshwe township. The PNO/PNA signed a ceasefire agreement with the military in 1991 and has been criticized by Pa-Oh ethnic youth groups for fighting alongside the military after the coup (Myanmar Now, 13 May 2022). While the military conducted airstrikes during the clash, the combined forces captured five soldiers, including three PNO/PNA members, and seized their weapons. Violence in Shan-South is both common and highly volatile; it is considered an area of ‘extreme risk’ by ACLED’s Volatility and Risk Predictability Index.
In northern Shan state, fighting between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) intensified across multiple townships. On 8 May, the military clashed with the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA) in three separate townships. In Hseni township, the military fought against the Northern Alliance (NA-B), which includes the MNTJP/MNDAA. In Mabein township, they fought combined forces of the MNTJP/MNDAA, Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), and an unreported local defense group, and in eastern Kutkai township, they fought the MNTJP/MNDAA on its own. The Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) also clashed with the military on 12 May, with military soldiers based in Kutkai town firing artillery rounds.
Meanwhile, the military and police tightened security in many states and regions last week. Several civilians in Yangon and Magway regions were arrested for anti-coup social media posts and claims they had connections with or were supporting People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). In Sagaing region, military troops raided Mon Taing Pin village in Ye-U township and arrested nearly three dozen civilians, including monks and young novices, beating them to death and burning their bodies between 10 and 13 May (Radio Free Asia, 17 May 2022)..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ မြန်မာ့ကျောက်မျက်ရတနာ ရောင်းဝယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်း၊ မြန်မာ့ပုလဲထုတ်လုပ်ရေးနှင့် ရောင်းဝယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းတို့မှ ဦးစီးကျင်းပသည့် ရတနာပြပွဲများနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် (၃/၂၀၂၂)
သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-18
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"Bangkok, May 18, 2022 – Myanmar authorities should immediately and unconditionally release journalist Maung Maung Myo and stop jailing members of the press for reporting the news, the Committee to Protect Journalists said Wednesday.
Around 6 p.m. on May 10, Maung Myo, a contributor to the local Mekong News Agency, was traveling by train to report on recent armed clashes between the military and anti-junta people’s defense forces when military authorities arrested him, according to news reports and the news agency’s editor Nyan Linn Htet, who communicated with CPJ via messaging app.
The reporter, who is also known as Myo Myint Oo, was arrested at the Salween River bridge checkpoint near the town of Hpa-an in eastern Kayin state after officials discovered he had shared Mekong News Agency reports on his personal Facebook page, according to Nyan Linn Htet, who told CPJ that the news publication had been banned by the military junta regime that seized power in the February 1, 2021 coup.
Maung Myo has since been charged under section 52(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law, which carries a maximum of seven years in prison, according to Nyan Linn Htet. Since his arrest, the journalist has been held at Hpa-an Prison.
“Myanmar authorities must free journalist Maung Maung Myo and drop any charges pending against him,” said Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s senior Southeast Asia representative. “Myanmar’s junta must cease leveling outrageous terrorism-related charges against journalists who are merely doing their jobs as reporters.”
Maung Myo has reported for Mekong News Agency since June 2020 and has covered various political topics, including Myanmar’s COVID-19 situation, anti-coup protests, and clashes between the military government and different armed resistance groups.
Nyan Linn Htet told CPJ that military authorities raided Mekong News Agency’s office and his residence on two occasions after the 2021 coup, and the publication had to close its bureau in the Shan state town of Tachiliek on April 15, 2021, due to threats from security forces.
Nyan Linn Htet added that he is in hiding from an arrest warrant issued against him on March 6, 2021, under section 505(a) of the penal code, a vague anti-state provision that penalizes incitement and the dissemination of “false news.”
Myanmar’s Ministry of Information did not reply to CPJ’s emailed request for comment on Maung Myo’s arrest and detention.
CPJ’s latest prison census published in December ranked Myanmar as the world’s second-worst jailer of journalists. Myanmar authorities have killed at least three journalists since the military seized power on February 1, 2021, according to CPJ documentation..."
Source/publisher:
Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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"With unceasing brutality by the junta, and an increasingly engaged China and India, deferring to languishing ASEAN efforts has proved ineffective to support conflict transformation in Myanmar. Australia could, but is not yet, stepping up diplomatically.
16 April 2022 marked the one-year anniversary of the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formed out of the parliamentarians elected prior to the military coup. In the international context of the NUG’s diplomatic efforts, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were significant geopolitical shifts in the IndoPacific region in 2021 which affect Myanmar. Myanmar occupies a strategic position at the heart of the Indo-Pacific and borders the globe’s two most populous nations.
One of the most influential developments in the Indo-Pacific in 2021 was the new US Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States, Japan, Australia, and India’s Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has re-awoken since the Leaders’ Summit in March 2021. In addition, the trilateral security pact of Australia, UK, and the US (AUKUS) emerged on 15 September 2021 to attempt to balance military power in the region. The United States National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) has significantly increased US commitments to Myanmar, and the US House of Representatives has also approved the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2022 (BURMA Act of 2022) to authorise humanitarian assistance and civil society support, promote democracy and human rights, and impose targeted sanctions with respect to human rights abuses in Myanmar, and other purposes.
At the same time, China is centrally engaged in Myanmar and the region. China has shifted from its neutral stance on leadership and stated it will support Myanmar’s military junta “no matter how the situation changes” in the country over the coming months and years. Despite earlier statements for openness to talks, just days before the meeting, during the Armed Forces Day ceremony on 27 March , military leader Min Aung Hlaing said he would not speak to the NUG or the government in exile (CRPH). Hlaing added that he would fight to annihilate them, a statement seemingly emboldened by open support of the Chinese government.
This shift brings into question Australia and the international community’s decision to depend on ASEAN to lead negotiations to end to the violence. NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung appealed to the Australian government for support, saying that the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Canada had led the way not only in words but in effective action. Meanwhile, Australia’s inaction was notable.
More proactive engagement and consultation with the NUG is needed to re-energise support for restoring democratic governance in Myanmar. ASEAN’s diplomatic response has been ineffective. Moreover, the ASEAN Chair and his special envoy still keep the Myanmar Taskforce led by the military council at the centre of ASEAN’s humanitarian response. They hosted a consultative meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6 May in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, but the UN Special Envoy to Myanmar, the NUG, and other crucial stakeholders were deliberately excluded. The NUG warned of the high risk of failure and politicisation in the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance that such exclusion poses.
For China, Myanmar is its only outlet to the Indian Ocean, which is vital to China’s strategy for energy security to sustain economic growth. In addition, Myanmar has rare earth minerals in abundance. China accounted for 60 percent of global production in 2021, and half of its raw materials come from Myanmar. Under the Chinese government’s foreign policy objectives, Myanmar is seen as being able to serve its national interests.
Myanmar has seemingly faded from the public eye in Australia as attention is drawn to the Solomon Islands and Ukraine. Myanmar is in the meantime experiencing shifts that will reverberate across the region. Some observers believe the sudden change in the Chinese government’s stance on Myanmar is a direct response to the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US. It is also worth considering whether, with Russia engaged in Ukraine, the Chinese government has significantly increased its support for the military junta. There are also speculations that the Myanmar junta continues its confidence in Russia and the relationship between the Myanmar junta and the Russian government is much broader than that of the Chinese government. One of Russia’s interests in Myanmar is also access to the Indian Ocean.
India, which has its own strained relations with China, is on Myanmar’s western border. Myanmar is at the heart of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Act East Policy, which emphasises defence cooperation. Today, the Indian government is paying close attention to the Myanmar military junta. Modi’s government has fostered friendly relations with the military junta since the coup. The Indian government thinks the fighting between the Myanmar military and People’s Defense Forces (PDF) along the Myanmar-India border, especially in Chin state, has compromised the Myanmar military’s support of India’s counterinsurgency efforts against Indian Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) that operate from Myanmar. This has resulted in the Indian government’s decision to partner with the military junta to attack pro-democratic PDF and EAOs in the border areas of Myanmar and India. This position goes against Quad members’ commitment to engagement in constructive dialogue, and to the early restoration of democracy in Myanmar.
Both China and India may see the junta as a stable partner despite both governments being aware of the consequences of political instability due to Myanmar’s military involvement in politics since 1962. If Myanmar can establish a true democratic federal state and the country is peaceful and stable, then the interests of China and India can be at their best. Myanmar will be an excellent neighbour to assist with a positive implementation of India’s Act East Policy, potentially assisting in the development of the North-eastern states of India. Longer-term and sustained peace, stability, and prosperity in Myanmar will help China’s energy security given its extensive assets in the country.
Given the geopolitical movements in the Indo-Pacific region which directly or indirectly affect Myanmar, Australia and the international community cannot continue to limit their efforts by relying on ASEAN. Significant results have yet to come as the five-point consensus of ASEAN leaders nears its one-year term. The junta does not seem to care about ASEAN, and it has failed to take any meaningful steps towards ending the conflict. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is chairing ASEAN this year, said he raised the issue of Myanmar but noted it would probably fall to his successor as there is no prospect of a resolution in his term. Having also recently appointed a Representative to ASEAN, the NUG welcomes revitalised ASEAN efforts.
The complex international dynamics at play in Myanmar suggest the conflict has regional implications and is not only an internal dispute. The NUG’s role in sharing its analysis and strategy with the international community is more important this year than ever. The NUG’s diplomatic efforts will need to be handled with special care to manage these dynamics and relationships, as they impact internal resistance and the ongoing dialogue and efforts of diverse groups and actors. The NUG will face its biggest challenges in 2022 as it seeks protect the lives of its people who continue to struggle for peace and pursue a future federal democratic union..."
Source/publisher:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-18
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"Myanmar’s military regime has stopped issuing passports to striking civil servants to prevent them leaving the country.
A striking doctor said: “Instead of arresting strikers at the airports, the regime has barred them from applying for or extending passports. I made enquiries about an extension and found a list of striking civil servants has been sent to the passport office.”
The regime has issued arrest warrants, detained and sacked striking civil servants as it tries to pressure them back to work.
A striking teacher said: “Once they saw my name, they asked me if I was a teacher. I denied it but they said my name was on a list. They said I will be arrested at the airport if they issue a passport.”
The teacher said she is trying to work abroad because of financial difficulties after being jobless for a year.
“The regime is trying various means to make us regret joining the civil disobedience movement [CDM],” she added.
The regime began stopping strikers from leaving the country in March.
A list of strikers, including their national registration numbers, has been sent to the passport office and some have been detained and questioned, a passport office source told The Irrawaddy.
Strikers have been detained at Yangon International Airport and charged with incitement, according to the media.
Schools are scheduled to reopen next month and the regime is trying to persuade teachers to return to their classrooms.
More than 200,000 civil servants joined the CDM to defy the military rule and many still refuse to work for the regime.
The regime has committed serious human rights violations against its opponents, including revoking their citizenship, sealing off their houses and taking their families, including children, as hostages..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Title: 17th May, International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (IDAHOBIT) Statement
Description:
"Today marks the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia
(IDAHOBIT) with the theme of "Our Bodies, Our Lives, Our Rights”. This year's theme is a
reminder that every individual as a human being has a right to live free and in dignity. Acts of
discrimination, intimidation, or harassment in any sphere, whether public or private, based on
a person's manifestation or expression of their sexual orientation, gender identity or gender
expression must be condemned.
While the world is celebrating the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia, and
Transphobia globally, LGBTIO people in Myanmar are facing sexual assault, targeted arrests,
torture, and gender-based violence perpetrated by the illegal military junta.
Following the military Coup of the 1st February 2021, the LGBTQ community marched in the
streets alongside other communities to protest against the military takeover and call for the
return o f democracy. Consequently, we suffered the loss o f many LGBTQ at the hands o f the
military. Many queer people have been unlawfully detained or were issued warrants for their
arrests by the military. Many had to flee, have been displaced or are in hiding due to being
aggressively pursued. Records show that many LGBTQ individuals, who worked in the
government sectors participate in the civil disobedience movement, the vital pail o f the
revolution.
If arrested, members o f the LGBTQ community are held in prisons that reflect their gender at
bhth - leaving them especially vulnerable to sexual abuse and verbal and physical humiliation
and discrimination by officers. Torture during interrogation is rife for all prisoners, such as
whipping, electric shocks, burning with cigarettes, guards who whip their genitalia against the
victim's faces, and rape them with guns and bottles. Transgender women in male jails are also
subjected to rape, sexual assault, and abuse by other prisoners due to their gender identity.
The Ministry of Human Rights hereby commemorates the fallen LGBTIQ heroes, who risked
then lives fighting for democracy. We hereby honour the LGBTIQ heroes who are actively
contributing to the Spring Revolution across the country.
The Ministry of Human Rights also empathizes with LGBTIQ citizens whose human rights
were violated by the military, and we memorialize then bravery for speaking out on this
International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia. We salute the LGBTIQ
community members who stood up for freedom, safety, justice, and equality throughout the
history of military regime, and those who still resist the military regime to this day.
The Ministry of Human Rights pledges to fight alongside the LGBTIQ community for the
respect of their basic human rights and support all those who aspire to build a federal
democratic Myanmar that values equality and celebrates diversity..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"A year on, the Myanmar junta has shown no willingness to implement or cooperate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s peace plan for Myanmar, known as the Five-Point Consensus, despite agreeing to it at a meeting with the leaders of the regional grouping’s member states.
Far from honoring the agreement made in April last year, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing and his associates have ramped up a brutal nationwide crackdown to suppress widespread public opposition to its rule.
The five steps the regime agreed with the ASEAN leaders are: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties concerned; the appointment of a special envoy; provision of humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and a visit by the bloc’s special envoy to Myanmar to meet with all parties.
Here is a brief summary of how the junta has disregarded its commitments to ASEAN over the past 12 months and how the plan has failed to make any progress.
Sharp rise in violence against civilians
Rather than immediately ceasing violence as called for, the junta has continued to commit atrocities across the country with further killings, bombings, mass arbitrary arrests and ongoing violence.
The number of innocent civilians killed by the junta rose to over 1,800 this month. More than 1,075 of those killings occurred after the consensus agreement was issued.
Those killed include more than 130 children, old people, youths, peaceful protesters, politicians, medics and activists.
More than 13,000 people have been detained by the junta, which in recent months has increasingly resorted to taking family members and relatives of wanted activists hostage, in order to blackmail them into turning themselves in.
Further violating the call to exercise restraint, the junta has continued its indiscriminate bombing campaign and burned civilian houses in resistance strongholds including ethnic minority areas, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee, and killing civilians including children.
According to independent research group Data for Myanmar, more than 11,000 civilian houses were burned down by junta forces from May last year to April this year.
In December, The Irrawaddy recorded some of the regime’s worst attacks against the people of Myanmar.
Call for dialogue with all parties rejected
The junta has also rejected ASEAN’s call for constructive dialogue among all parties concerned in order to seek a peaceful solution.
To the contrary, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has ruled out negotiations with regime opponents.
In a speech on Armed Forces Day in March, he vowed to annihilate all opposition to his rule. The regime has declared major resistance groups including the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) formed in the wake of the coup, and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), as terrorist organizations.
Refusing to talk to either group, Min Aung Hlaing has invited ethnic armed organizations for peace talks but the major groups, which are engaged in heavy fighting with junta troops, have rejected his offer, demanding the NUG and PDF be included in any negotiations.
Refusing access to detained elected leaders
Breaching a commitment it made under the consensus, the junta has continuously rejected all demands—not only from the regional bloc, the United Nations and the West, but also from China—to meet Myanmar’s detained leaders State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint.
A planned visit to the country by ASEAN’s first special envoy, appointed to implement the consensus commitment, was canceled when the junta denied him access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders.
Humanitarian assistance
It was only last week that ASEAN’s current chair, Cambodia, hosted a consultative meeting on ASEAN humanitarian assistance for Myanmar with the junta and international aid organizations, announcing a plan to deliver aid via the regime.
The decision has attracted widespread condemnation both locally and internationally, with critics pointing out that it breaches ASEAN’s own Five-Point Consensus.
“It was a one-sided meeting that only engaged with the regime and its outcome is meaningless. ASEAN should hold a multi-stakeholder dialogue in accordance with the Five-Point Consensus and take action according to the outcome of such dialogue. Now ASEAN itself has violated the Consensus,” said the deputy executive director of the Chin Human Rights Organization, Salai Za Uk Ling.
Engaging the wrong party
Yanghee Lee, a former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, recently pointed out that ASEAN’s consensus had failed because the bloc was engaging with the wrong party, referring to its decision to deal with the regime instead of the NUG.
The member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) also said the NUG represents Myanmar and is the proper party to lead engagement with ASEAN.
“The NUG has demonstrated that it is the constructive partner that ASEAN needs to make any progress towards resolving the crisis,” she added.
NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung also urged ASEAN member states and leaders to engage with different stakeholders in line with the Five-Point Consensus, in a recent interview with Radio Free Asia.
After a year of being ignored by the junta and seeing no willingness on its part to cooperate and abide by the consensus, some ASEAN member states have begun to engage with the NUG.
Malaysia’s foreign minister met with his counterpart from the NUG on Saturday in Washington, where ASEAN leaders were gathered for a special summit between the US and the bloc. Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah became the first minister from an ASEAN member country to personally and publicly meet a NUG minister.
In the interview, Daw Zin Mar Aung also called on ASEAN to move beyond the current non-workable solution.
“We very much support the Five-Point Consensus. It needs to be implemented. But the problem is that there is no accountability mechanism. Now it is time for ASEAN to move forward, whether the coup leaders implement it properly or not. If not, what happens next? This is the question for the ASEAN leadership,” she told RFA.
However, ASEAN and the rest of the world continue to treat the consensus, which has proved a failure for over a year, as a roadmap for Myanmar.
In a joint statement released after the summit, the US and ASEAN leaders reiterated their support for the failed consensus on the issue of Myanmar, and called for “timely and complete implementation” of the plan.
Unless this failed approach is abandoned and stronger action adopted, there will be no progress toward pressing the junta to end its violence against civilians.
And the junta’s brutality will continue unabated..."
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"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
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2022-05-17
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"More Myanmar junta victims have been found around Mone Taing Ping village in Ye-U Township, Sagaing Region, with the death toll rising to 36, according to residents.
Most of the victims were found in torched houses and bore signs of torture, they said.
Some corpses were dumped in wells. “We found the bodies while clearing debris from the fire. The bodies were disfigured. We found six bodies in a house where only two old women lived. There were pools of blood covered by shoveled earth,” said a villager.
Around 200 junta soldiers from Taze Township in the region arrived in the village on May 10. Two resistance fighters who were preparing to plant mines were shot dead and a clash followed at the bridge leading to the village.
Some villagers were shot dead by regime troops and others were abducted from neighboring villages, according to witnesses.
Villagers and people’s defense forces (PDF) fighters returned to Mone Taing Ping after junta troops left.
“Only bones were left from some bodies. Some had their hands tied,” said another resident.
Villagers said they could not identify many of the victims.
Junta troops torched 29 houses in Mone Taing Ping, which had 300 households.
“They did not torch the entire village. They only torched houses of PDF members and supporters. Military informants showed them the houses. Junta troops put the dead bodies in those houses. They held detainees overnight and killed them the next day,” said a villager.
Since May 10, junta troops have raided villages in Ye-U and Khin-U townships, torching houses and killing civilians.
An estimated 11,417 houses were razed in arson attacks by the military regime and allied militias by April 30, according to Data for Myanmar, an independent research group documenting junta atrocities..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-17
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Six years ago, army chiefs and senior members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) initiated a mission to smear National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD figures.
Their mission began after the NLD won a landslide victory in the 2015 general election. Now, following last year’s coup, the mission continues.
Ahead of the 2015 poll, military and USDP leaders deliberately inflamed religious and racial sentiments to prevent an outright NLD victory in the election. Often, the NLD was portrayed as a pro-Muslim party whose rise to power would mean the fall of Buddhism in Buddhist-majority Myanmar. Nationalist groups like the Association for Protection of Race and Religion, better known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha, engaged in campaigns to slander the NLD, amid a growing wave of Buddhist nationalism in the country.
Their actions did have some impact on the NLD, but not to the extent of undermining public trust in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, or in reducing the public’s love, respect and support for the woman who has dedicated her life to the cause of democracy. People who wanted change voted for her and the NLD in the 2015 election.
After the poll, military and USDP leaders reviewed the USDP’s defeat. They realised that people support the NLD because of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s reputation and prestige.
They have since systematically attempted to defame Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders. They believe that if they can damage the name of a politician, public trust in him or her will decline.
Army officers from the Office of Military Security Affairs and police from Special Branch were assigned with keeping an eye on cabinet ministers and NLD lawmakers. The Office of Military Security Affairs was also tasked with spreading doctored narratives and fake news, mixed with real facts about NLD ministers and lawmakers, on social media.
In cooperation with so-called Myanmar experts who had returned from foreign countries to Myanmar, military leaders spread misinformation about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD leaders among Myanmar people living overseas.
Moreover, media agencies were established for that purpose. Silent Talk media, which is headed by former military intelligence officer Ye Moe Oo, was sponsored by a pro-military businessman. Admiral Moe Aung funded The Fifth Wave media outlet and the Thayninga Institute of Strategic Studies, a think-tank formed by ex-military officers, according to those who have worked for those media outlets.
Funded by some USDP leaders, People Media and Bullet Journal, led by former military officer U Hla Swe, are well-known media outlets which primarily featured news reports and opinion pieces deemed to be defamatory to NLD leaders and lawmakers. Some reports were truthful, but some were falsified.
Those media outlets sponsored by the military and the USDP kept a low-profile under the NLD government. But since the coup, they are out in the open and asking questions in support of the military regime at junta press conferences.
Through those media outlets and Facebook, which is virtually synonymous with the internet in Myanmar, the military and the USDP spread false narratives that the peace process and the economy barely achieved progress under the NLD government.
The Office of Military Security Affairs and Special Branch searched for any information about NLD members that could do damage to the party’s reputation. They then forwarded the information to military-linked media which turned them into stories mixed with misinformation.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD leaders kept their noses clean during their tenure. Former President U Htin Kyaw handed an envelope enclosing the list of his assets to the Union Parliament when he assumed office, and he did not take it back when he stepped down so that his wealth before and after his presidency could be checked. However, USDP president U Thein Sein took back his envelope when he left office.
When making official foreign trips, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint never used money from state funds for themselves, and returned any surplus funds along with receipts and financial statements.
Under the NLD government, businessmen who usually accompanied senior government figures on visits to foreign countries under the previous government were not allowed to join government delegations.
Government officials are entitled to a quota of fuel provided monthly from state funds. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her government leaders always returned their monthly leftovers.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi exercised zero tolerance for corruption and extramarital affairs among her government ministers. Lawmakers who had affairs or were involved in sex scandals were not selected as candidates for the 2020 general election.
The NLD government also reformed the Anti-Corruption Commission and amended the Anti-Corruption Law to make it tougher on bribery and corruption. As a result, departments long known to be corrupt reported a significant increase in revenue.
The revenue from municipal works, which is a major source of income for region and state governments, increased almost three times compared to the revenue under U Thein Sein’s government. That revenue benefitted the country’s infrastructure.
In the 2020 general election, the NLD repeated its victory of 2015. But the military seized power on the pretext that the election was marred by fraud. It then made further attempts to destroy Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s reputation.
Her power is not in weapons and her wealth is not about money. The strength of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi lies in the public support and esteem for her.
The military accused her of corruption and imprisoned her so as to defame her. It also charged NLD party and government leaders under the Anti-Corruption Law and put them behind bars.
In one of the corruption cases brought against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, she was accused of accepting gold and US dollars from former Yangon Region Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein. She was sentenced to prison, even though there was no evidence. U Phyo Min Thein, who is too sick to stay in jail, was forced to testify against her. His wife reportedly took poison as she did not want to make a false statement. But she was saved by the military regime.
Army chiefs who have accused Daw Aung San Suu Kyi of corruption are some of the wealthiest people in Myanmar. Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s son and daughter are now on the list of the richest people in Myanmar following their father’s coup.
Offspring of other military leaders as well as USDP leaders are also very wealthy. But their official salaries are chicken feed compared to the value of the cheapest luxury car in their fleet of vehicles.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has only one house which she inherited from her parents. President U Win Myint does not even own a house.
But military and USDP leaders have luxury homes in Yangon, Naypyitaw and Pyin Oo Lwin, and fleets of luxury cars.
Those who have amassed material wealth through dishonest means have accused and imprisoned Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is rich only in integrity. They attempted to defame Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and undermine public trust her. But the Myanmar people do not believe their lies..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-17
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"
17th May, International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (IDAHOBIT) Statement..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-17
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National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Lebanon’s M1 Group has transferred control of Telenor Myanmar to the Myanmar military linked Shwe Byain Phyu conglomerate on Thursday, May 12, completing Telenor Group’s sale of the mobile network.
The sale has violated UK, EU and Norwegian sanctions due to the inclusion of lawful interception technology.
In the final stage of the sale, the Cayman Islands registered M1 Infrastructure Ltd transferred 310 shares in Investcom Pte Ltd, a Singapore holding company, to Shwe Byain Phyu Telecom Company Limited, according to corporate records.
Investcom Pte Ltd owns 100% of Telenor Myanmar Limited, largely through redeemable preference shares.
Shwe Byain Phyu Telecom Company Limited is a Myanmar registered company, fully owned by Shwe Byain Phyu Company Limited.
As a result of the share transfer, Shwe Byain Phyu owns 80% of Telenor Myanmar, up from its earlier 49% stake
M1 Group is owned by the family of the current Lebanese Prime Minister, Najib Mikati.
Sanctions violations
As part of the sale, M1 Group transferred a German-made Utimaco lawful interception gateway (LIG) to Shwe Byain Phyu, in breach of UK sanctions on Myanmar, which are in force in the Cayman Islands as a British Overseas Territory.
The Utimaco LIG was delivered to Myanmar and installed by Telenor in 2018. Telenor Group then transferred the LIG to M1 Group in March 2022, violating Norwegian sanctions.
When activated, the LIG will give the Myanmar military junta, a terrorist organisation, capabilities to monitor calls and SMS made over the Telenor Myanmar network in real time.
The latest transaction between M1 Group and Shwe Byain Phyu follows the first stage of the sale from Telenor Group to an M1 Group subsidiary registered in Cyprus, in violation of EU sanctions due to the transfer of the LIG.
The sale has exposed the historical call data of more than 18 million people to the junta, which it can use to identify, locate, detain, torture and kill Myanmar people. This may make Telenor Group and the Norwegian government complicit in crimes against humanity.
Telenor Group failed to do human rights due diligence on their ultimate buyer, Shwe Byain Phyu, in breach of their responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
Telenor Myanmar’s new players
Shwe Byain Phyu chair Thein Win Zaw is the chairperson of the Telenor Myanmar Limited board, and his son, Win Paing Kyaw, is the deputy CEO. Thein Win Zaw’s wife, Tin Latt Min, also sits on the board. Other Telenor Myanmar board members are Hicham Ramadan and Rana Shatila of M1 Group.
Telenor Myanmar’s new CEO, Muhammad Ziaullah Siddiqui, sits on the board of Investcom Pte Lte, along with Rana Shatila, Thein Win Zaw, Win Paing Kyaw and Benjamin Szeto Yu Hwei.
From 2007-2010, Siddiqui was CEO of the telecommunications company MTN Afghanistan, according to his Linkedin page, at a time when the company was accused of paying protection money to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
From 2010 to 2016, Siddiqui was CEO of MTN Sudan, providing a source of revenue to the genocidal al-Bashir regime.
MTN is a South African publicly listed company that acquired M1 Group’s Investcom in 2006. As part of the takeover, the Mikati family gained a 10% stake in MTN.
Justice For Myanmar calls on the UK, Cypriot and Norwegian governments to urgently investigate Telenor Group and M1 Group for violating sanctions on Myanmar.
We call on the Oslo Stock Exchange, which lists Telenor, to investigate the legality of Telenor’s Myanmar sale under Norwegian and EU law.
We call on Singapore to investigate the use of its territory by Telenor Group, M1 Group and Shwe Byain Phyu in violation of UK, EU and Norwegian sanctions, and to take concrete steps against Singapore registered businesses that are complicit in the Myanmar military’s international crimes.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is reprehensible that Telenor Group and the Norwegian government have completed the sale of Telenor Myanmar to Shwe Byain Phyu Group, wilfully ignoring sanctions regulations and their human rights responsibilities.
"The junta has weaponised telecommunications in its campaign of terror, and Telenor Myanmar is now part of its arsenal.
"We call on the UK, Norway and Cyprus to investigate sanctions breaches from the transfer of lawful interception technology from Telenor to M1 Group, and from M1 Group to Shwe Byain Phyu, and ensure accountability.
"The fact that this transaction has taken place in Singapore yet again shows how its financial system is being exploited by the Myanmar military and their associates. Singapore must take concrete action to end the use of its territory to finance and arm the Myanmar military.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
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Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Since it seized power in February 2021, Myanmar’s military regime has ignored international calls to end its use of violence, release political prisoners and negotiate with its opponents. Some Western nations have applied sanctions, while powerful neighbors India and China have largely sought to protect their own interests. Regional bloc ASEAN has been split, with some members seeking to engage the junta and others calling for contact with the shadow National Unity Government. The Irrawaddy spoke to Scot Marciel, former United States ambassador to Myanmar (2016-20) and currently a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, about the current state of regional and international efforts to tackle the Myanmar crisis.
The Irrawaddy: There have been many tragic stories in Myanmar since the coup. It is not enough to just pressure the regime to change its behavior or to make concessions. Can you talk about how the international community and regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should assist the Myanmar people?
Marciel: I would offer two thoughts. First, I don’t think you can expect ASEAN to solve this problem, certainly not by itself. The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, while it’s done with very good intentions, not only are the points not being implemented, they are actually not appropriate for the situation in Myanmar in my view. So it is a mistake to dwell on the Five-Point Consensus. I don’t really blame ASEAN too much for that because the junta is refusing to be reasonable at all and make any kind of concessions. Second, as Malaysia’s foreign minister has suggested publicly, more engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) and other figures opposed to the junta is really important. I am pleased to see that [US] Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with Zin Mar Aung [the NUG foreign minister, on Aug. 12] in Washington. I think there needs to be more engagement with the NUG and other actors, recognizing that trying to convince the generals to hold talks with those who oppose them is not really a very useful way of going about things.
The Irrawaddy: Do you think the NUG is the best option, aside from Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and other stakeholders, in terms of whom the US and ASEAN should be engaging with?
Marciel: I know some people have not been fully satisfied with the NUG. I understand that, but it’s certainly one important actor that has a lot more legitimacy than the junta for sure. I think it is useful to engage with the NUG, but also with actors who are seeking to return the country to a democratic and peaceful path.
The Irrawaddy: When we talk about ASEAN there are some criticisms, because so far the Five-Point Consensus as you said is going nowhere, but people keep talking about it. We, ourselves, have become the hostages of the consensus. Beyond ASEAN, there has also been some criticism that the US and other Western countries are outsourcing the Myanmar crisis to ASEAN. We know that ASEAN is toothless and powerless, and so far has achieved little on Myanmar. Why has the West outsourced the problem to ASEAN?
Marciel: To be fair, at least for the United States, I don’t think the United States is necessarily expecting ASEAN by itself to solve the problem. The truth is I don’t know any outside player that can solve the problem. ASEAN can help. This goes back to, among other things, the Five-Point Consensus. It’s not just that the points aren’t being implemented, they really aren’t appropriate for the situation. A ceasefire… OK If the military stops all violence and allows peaceful protests, that would be useful. But does anyone really think that is going to happen? Second, dialogue, my sense is, again I can’t speak for the Myanmar people, but it seems people aren’t interested in negotiating and compromising with the military junta. They want them out of power. And I think the international community should be supporting those efforts, rather than proposing and calling for some kind of dialogue that is completely unrealistic, at least at this time.
The Irrawaddy: In the past, the US has played a major role in promoting democracy, freedom and federal union in Myanmar. You know in 2008-09, we had Kurt Campbell, one of the key architects of the pivot to Asia and of course specific Myanmar policies of principled engagement, and the carrot-and-stick approach, where sanctions were imposed but also with the incentive that if reforms took place, the sanctions would be eased. There was very consistent and intense communication with the then regime and the opposition in Myanmar. Do you think that, in coordination with ASEAN, the US can work on Myanmar issues with the same vigor and energy as it did in the late 2000s?
Marciel: It’s a good question. It’s very clear that the US and the Biden administration remain very supportive of efforts to help the country go back to democracy and peace and federal union. But my sense is that it’s hard to figure out what they can actually do to make that happen. There’s not a lot of easy choices, whether it’s the United States or ASEAN, because the generals do not seem interested in doing anything positive, they are just holding onto power. We’ve seen what they are willing to do to their own people for the sake of holding power. And it narrows the space for diplomacy, certainly. I would have a very hard time if I were still in the government saying we should engage with the junta and try to create incentives for them because I think there is no chance, absent them feeling much more pressure, that they are willing to seriously consider changing their approach.
The Irrawaddy: Do you think there should be more sanctions, more pressure, including maybe an arms embargo? What about ASEAN and other countries like China, Thailand and India?
Marciel: There is no great option right now. I don’t believe there is, at this point at least, any opportunity for dialogue that will return the country to a democratic path or democratic federalism. I don’t think the military can restore stability and govern the country effectively. So the best possible scenario is for the military to face so much pressure, that they then begin to look for a way out. So yes, I think maximum pressure, both internally and externally, on the military whether it’s by sanctions or other means is the best chance of achieving progress, though it won’t be easy.
The Irrawaddy: We have a powerful neighbor, China, which shares a long border with Myanmar. We also have our neighbor Thailand, which is absorbing refugees and migrant workers and asylum seekers. Because of the crisis, they are also sharing the burden. Obviously, China is always supportive of those in power, whether it is the regime or a democratic government. If China and Thailand don’t make any moves, don’t apply any external pressure, it is hard to see any policy of maximizing pressure on the regime working. Do you agree?
Marciel: I agree that there are limits in terms of external pressure. That’s why there is no easy answer. It seems that China is willing to support the junta even though nearly the entire population of Myanmar opposes that. I don’t think that is likely to change. On Thailand, I hope that the Thai authorities will see that the longer the military is in power, the more problems there are going to be across the border, including refugees and instability. And the Thais, I think, will have an interest in pressing in their own way, pressing the military to look for a way out, because otherwise this crisis is going to continue and Thailand’s going to suffer from some of these cross-border challenges, including very serious humanitarian issues.
The Irrawaddy: We have heard that the regime is not happy with the idea of—the wording is quite sensitive—a humanitarian corridor. But Thailand will have to play a key role if cross-border assistance and humanitarian assistance are to reach a large number of Myanmar people. What are your thoughts on that, as the US has made at least four high-ranking official visits to Thailand since the coup? Should the Biden administration engage and cooperate with the Thai government to provide assistance?
Scot: There is a lot of discussion between the US and Thai officials on this. I don’t know the substance of those discussions. I am not sure what exactly has been said. But to me the United States and Thailand, even if we may have somewhat different views on the coup and the junta, we should try to find a way to work together at a minimum to address the serious humanitarian need right along the Thai border and just across the border. You know it is not easy for Thailand as a neighbor of Myanmar having to deal with the junta. But I think there are ways that this could be done carefully and I assume that these discussions are happening between the United States and Thailand. I hope that they lead to greater and more successful efforts to get humanitarian assistance to the border and across the border on behalf of Myanmar people.
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
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"The power shift in Myanmar and the subsequent polarization among the major powers triggered a new geopolitical flashpoint in Bangladesh’s strategic backyard, which the latter cannot afford to ignore. It seems that the USA and other western countries are taking a heavy-handed approach while other big powers, such as Russia, China, India, and Japan, have started explicitly or covertly normalizing their relations with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military).
Myanmar always gets priority in Bangladesh’s economic and security strategy. Although democratic Bangladesh has a moral dilemma in supporting the military government, it has yet to formally condemn the military coup or demand Aung San Su Kyi’s release. It underscores Dhaka’s careful support for the junta’s “one-Myanmar government policy.” So, in foreign policy circles, the immediate discussion is whether Dhaka’s stance is a “well-thought-out approach or simply a premature polarization.”
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In-depth analysis suggests that Bangladesh’s stance has stemmed from some very specific strategic considerations. First, Bangladesh is well aware that sanctions and condemnation, a typical western practice, are counterproductive in Myanmar as long as China and Russia continue to extend their diplomatic and military shields. Second, the previous NLD government failed to facilitate Dhaka’s long-expected connectivity, border security, or Rohingya crisis issues. Third, Dhaka seeks to develop cozy relations with Myanmar’s army based on a non-confrontational and non-interference approach. So, it doesn’t want to enrage the Tatmadaw by taking part in a smear campaign that would not even address the country’s core security concerns.
Given the rapidly changing geo-political dynamics, it is not strange to predict that major powers like China, India, Russia, and Japan will remain on the Myanmar military’s side, underlining their own strategic narratives. It will undoubtedly give the military a chance to consolidate its grip on the country as well as its diplomatic status and military position. With a recent resumption in diplomatic exchanges, China is warming up its historical “Pauk-Phaw” (sibling) ties with Myanmar. It has begun to normalize relations with the State Administration Council, mainly to secure its strategic infrastructure projects that would give Beijing a vital gateway to the Indian Ocean.
Despite the fact that Russia, one of Myanmar’s largest arms suppliers, has no pressing geostrategic imperatives in Myanmar, it has been trying to diversify its cooperation with the country to increase its investment portfolio. Besides, the China-Russia axis is expected to play a more active role in the centre of the Indo-Pacific to offset expanding western dominance.
Although India and Japan, two QUAD allies, feel uncomfortable doing business with a military regime, they will avoid the West-centric coercive measures and instead follow a “twin-track diplomacy” to engage with military administrations as well as pro-democracy forces. Apparently, the key strategic reason for this stance is to avoid alienating Myanmar and pushing it towards China’s lap.
In a nutshell, Bangladesh is trying to reorient its Myanmar policy in light of the regional power setting and the army’s new rule in Naypyidaw. Pursuing a multi-dimensional approach of engagement with the Myanmar govt. and convincing them to address security concerns could be a viable strategic option for Bangladesh right now.
This is how Bangladesh finds its major strategic and development allies, who wield meaningful leverage over Myanmar, are on the Tatmadaw side. So, based on a rational calculation of interests, aligning with the National Unity Government (which is in exile to boot), which holds no solid territory and no de jure recognition from any foreign government, would have negative ramifications for Burma-Bangladesh ties.
No doubt, finding an early and sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis is a “top priority” issue for Bangladesh right now. But policy analysts acknowledge that this protracted issue has become more complicated and would require a “consultative and constructive approach” between the two governments, along with international stakeholders.
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In this case, Bangladesh would have to deal with the Myanmar military even if it is governed by people’s representatives because the 2008 Constitution places the military in a central position in the government with complete authority over the ministries of defence, home, and border affairs. As a result, any attempt to solve the crisis without the active cooperation of the country’s military would be futile. It’s worth remembering that, Bangladesh has repatriated Rohingya twice, in 1978 and 1992, through dialogue and diplomacy with the military regime. So, Dhaka doesn’t see any problem with keeping its communication channels with the Burmese generals open to manoeuvre a step-by-step crisis-resolution model.
Both countries are wary of the Arakan Army’s growing control over Rakhine state, as well as the resurgence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), which has been accused of several violent attacks on Myanmar’s police outposts, as well as the murder of Mohib Ullah, an influential Rohingya community leader. ARSA is believed to have a political agenda to prevent Rohingyas from returning home, prolonging the crisis.
Furthermore, it is easy to speculate that the 270-km Bangladesh-Myanmar border would be a hotspot for cross-border insurgencies and crimes due to the persistent security crisis in Rakhine and its proximity to the Golden Triangle. As a result, Bangladesh might consider that collaborating with the military administration is the only tactical option for combating escalating drug and arms smuggling and human trafficking.
Another main strategic objective of Bangladesh is to materialize its look-east policy by connecting itself with China and the ASEAN countries via Myanmar. Bangladesh has also been eyeing joining the ASEAN bloc and the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway initiative. Therefore, Bangladesh ought to convince Myanmar’s central government to draw up plans for access to each other’s markets as well as regional markets to face the post-LDC challenges.
Despite past strained ties, Bangladesh’s military chiefs have traditionally paid goodwill visits to Myanmar, seeking to develop a more meaningful relationship from a security standpoint. What is important to note is that Bangladesh was among only eight countries that sent their defence attachés to attend the Myanmar Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyitaw in March 2021, a month after the coup, prompting Min Aung Hlaing to consider Dhaka one of his allies. Very evidently, Dhaka doesn’t want to close the door of negotiation with the new military administration.
Tatmadaw’s recent participation in ASEAN Military Intelligence and Chiefs of Defence Forces Meetings, as well as in the Indian Navy’s largest multilateral exercise, MILAN 2022, along with those of the QUAD members, may pave the way for other countries to adopt military diplomacy to address political and diplomatic concerns. Bangladesh might calculate that very intense engagement in the security domain through security dialogue and cooperation, joint exercises and training, staff-to-staff meetings, and intelligence sharing will forge meaningful ties to tackle major challenges such as the Rohingya crisis, insurgency, transnational crime, and other non-traditional security threats.
In a nutshell, Bangladesh is trying to reorient its Myanmar policy in light of the regional power setting and the army’s new rule in Naypyidaw. Pursuing a multi-dimensional approach of engagement with the Myanmar govt. and convincing them to address security concerns could be a viable strategic option for Bangladesh right now..."
Source/publisher:
Pakistan Today
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
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Description:
"The National Unity Government (NUG) published an
announcement expressing its disappointment in the
outcome of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN
Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar.....(1) The NUG published an
announcement expressing deep
disappointment and concern about
the outcome of the consultative
meeting on ASEAN humanitarian
assistance to Myanmar, which was
held on May 6, 2022, in Phnom
Penh, Cambodia.
In the announcement the
NUG states that although it has
repeatedly reached out to the
ASEAN chair and the ASEAN Special
Envoy to convey its openness to
engage and discuss ways forward,
its previous communication has not
been reciprocated until now. The
announcement goes on to state that
the NUG and other crucial
stakeholders of Myanmar such as the Ethnic Revolutionary/Armed
Organisations (EROs/EAOs), and
local humanitarian organisations
have been deliberately excluded
from the consultative meeting.
The announcement added
that the current conditions on the
ground and the people's trust deficit
in the SAC will continue to hamper
the urgent and effective delivery of
humanitarian aid.....UNION MINISTER
DR. TU HKAWNG
DELIVERED HIS
CONGRATULATO
RY REMARK TO
ALL STAFF WHO
ARE JOINING THE
CDM UNDER
DIFFERENT
CHALLENGES.....(2) At a meeting with
CDM staff within the ministry,
Dr. Tu Hkawng, Minister of
Natural Resources and Envi-
ronmental Conservation
(MONREC), expressed his
sincere gratitude and
congratulations to all staff
taking part in the CDM (Civil
Disobedience Movement) and
overcoming the many hards-
hips they have faced over the
last year..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
667.09 KB
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Description:
"The Institute for Economics & Peace responds to an open letter regarding its recent Global Terrorism report.
We have recently been contacted regarding concerns arising from Myanmar’s listing in the 2022 Global Terrorism Index. This letter is a response to your article dated 11 May 2022, titled ‘An Open Letter to the Institute for Economics & Peace.’
IEP welcomes feedback and we are open to receiving critiques of our research. This is demonstrated by our actions in the amendment of the report, and the public statement issued prior to receiving the open letter: Statement regarding Myanmar & the Global Terrorism Index – Vision of Humanity.
Having now received the open letter, we feel several of the characterisations deserve the right of reply.
IEP is an internationally respected not-for-profit organisation. Our aim is to understand the drivers and the economic benefits of peace, and our research is highly regarded by many of the leading institutions in the world. IEP’s work on peace is cited in thousands of courses, and we train many thousands each month through our online academies and in-person workshops.
Throughout IEP’s history, we have been engaged in both developmental aid and peacebuilding projects in Myanmar. IEP and its key personnel have been involved in Myanmar for over twenty years, and currently has several projects with which it is actively engaged in, including water, education and peacebuilding training.
The Global Terrorism Index
One critique of the 2022 Global Terrorism Index has been the perceived failure to address acts perpetrated by the junta. The Global Terrorism Index, since its inception, has always excluded acts of state-sponsored terror. IEP covers state-sponsored terror in its other reports.
We acknowledge that the classification of acts of terrorism is a difficult and sensitive topic. There are a variety of perceptions toward the definition of terrorism. Many acts that could be considered legitimate acts of war can become unclear, depending upon the circumstances of a particular attack. For example, attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq on US soldiers are considered terrorism under certain circumstances by sources other than IEP.
IEP’s approach to this is to draw on credible data sources, and to align with the coding of these sources. In the case of specific attacks mentioned in the open letter, these were codified as terror attacks at the time of writing. However, after constructive discussions from proactive members of the community, the decision was made to remove these from the report.
IEP’s response
When the initial concerns were raised, IEP engaged with a number of external experts who constructively worked with us to assess the issues and decide on an appropriate action. None of these individuals signed the open letter. It is from these discussions that we took the decision to amend the Global Terrorism Index and issue a public statement.
It was only after we had taken this action that we received the open letter. Given our willingness to engage, we are disappointed that we were not contacted before the letter was written. At the point of sharing, our response was public and should have been acknowledged.
Given this, we feel that the open letter process could have been conducted in a far less peaceful way. What is particularly disappointing is that out of the hundred signatories, only one individual contacted IEP prior to the publishing of the letter.
In conclusion
The issues surrounding Myanmar are deeply sensitive. We carefully considered the concerns raised and redacted Myanmar from the 2022 Global Terrorism Index.
We fail to see how this open letter has contributed towards constructive dialogue. We should surely all be working towards the same goal around these issues, and seeking to create meaningful change in the world..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economy and social justice (global), The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly News Bulletin (3/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
744.11 KB
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Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက (၉) ကြိမ်မြောက် ရက္ခိုင်အမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ပေးပို့သော ဂုဏ်ပြုသဝဏ်လွှာ
၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မေလ(၁၅)ရက်နေ့
၁။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် မေလ (၁၅) ရက်နေ့၊ သက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၄ ခုနှစ် ကဆုန်လပြည့်ကျော် (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော ရခိုင်အမျိုးသားနေ့တွင် ရခိုင်ပြည်သူအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှလုံး ကျန်းမာချမ်းသာပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ မဟာသက္ကရာဇ် (၁၂၃) ခုနှစ် ဓညဝတီပြည့်ရှင် စန္ဒသူရိယမင်းကြီးလက်ထက် မဟာမုနိရုပ်ပွားတော် မြတ်ကြီးကို သွန်းလုပ်တည်ဆောက်ပြီးစီးခဲ့သောနေ့ရက်ကို အမှတ်အသားပြုထားခြင်း ဖြစ်သည့် အတွက် ရက္ခိုင့်ဂုဏ်ဆောင် ထူးကဲမွန်မြတ်သည့်နေ့ဟု ဆိုနိုင်ပါသည်။
၃။ ရခိုင်အမျိုးသားတို့၏ နိုင်ငံရေး၊စီးပွားရေး၊လူမှုရေး၊စာပေ၊ အနုပညာ၊ယဥ်ကျေးမှုများ အခြေတင့်လျက် မြင့်မားတိုးတက်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းရင်း ဤဂုဏ်ပြုသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့ အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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pdf
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117.64 KB
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Description:
"1. National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) issued a statement followingthe
People’s Assembly held on 27-29 January 2022 with the participation of the
members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), political
parties, Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs), state/federal-unit/ethnic-
based councils, members of National Unity Government (NUG) and other
Spring revolutionary forces.
2. The announcement strongly called on the international communities including
United Nations to establish Internationally Guaranteed Civilians Protection
- Safe Zones for the civilian populations who are under the massacre
through land and air operations with excessive forces deployed by the military
junta especially in Kayin, Karenni, Chin, Magway and Sagaing.
3. In accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter, a Joint Coordination
Committee on Humanitarian Assistance was formed with the members of
National Unity Consultative Committee and National Unity Government on
29 March 2022 to coordinate and cooperate more effectively in the course of
humanitarian delivery.
4. At the present, many foreign countries are offering the humanitarian aid
channelizing the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
on Disaster Management (the AHA Centre) to Myanmar people who are suffering
internal displacement, loss of houses and properties, personal insecurity,
socio-economic hardships, loss of livelihood opportunities and many
others due to the military’s brutal repression and unlawful acts following the
illegal coup.
5. Regarding this, a consultative meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance
to Myanmar was conducted on 6 May 2022 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and
the meeting agreed that the AHA Centre in collaboration with other in-country
partner organizations will be implementing ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance
Delivery Arrangement Framework in Karenni, Kayin, Magway, Sagaing
and Bago.
6. Even though the Consultative Meeting was convened as part of the implementation
of the Five-Point Consensus, the meeting failed to consult with
other key stakeholders, and this directly contradicts the essence of Five-
Point Consensus. In addition, the Myanmar Task Force is composed of the representatives from the junta-controlled ministries and organizations, and
it is reaffirmed that the junta-led taskforce absolutely does not represent
Myanmar and Myanmar people.
7. Moreover, the Meeting also come to an agreement that the Junta led Myanmar
Task Force will work with the National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiations
Committee in delivering humanitarian assistance to communities
in Myanmar, including Ethnic Resistance Organizations areas. As such,
it is announced that the National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiations
Committee is not representing the ethnic organizations and people either.
8. In this case, the AHA Centre and in-country United Nations Organizations will
be providing humanitarian aid including COVID-10 vaccination with the approval
of the Myanma r Task Force, and this clearly ignores the military’s continued
violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws.
9. Due to the fact that international communities have relied on the reputation
and credibility of the AHA Centre, and humanitarian assistance are offered
through the AHA Centre. However, ASEAN’s decision to provide humanitarian
assistance with the control of the military, which is committing various
atrocities against the people and which Myanmar people are consistently
opposing, completely disregards the international communities as well as
Myanmar people and supports the various atrocities of the military junta
against the innocent people.
10. In reality, humanitarian aid will not be able to reach to the most needy people
without the equal treatment and wider consultation with the key stakeholders
as per Five-Point Consensus.
11. In this regard, the National Unity Consultative Council protests the decision
of ASEAN, the AHA Centre and other international organizations to implement
ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework in
collaboration with the military junta which is committing various crimes
against humanity and ruining the lives of the people with an unprecedented
scale. S ubsequently, the National Unity Consultative Counc il announces that
delivery of humanitarian provisions needs to be made only through the direct
support to the organizations that truly represent the local communities
for ensuring to reach the affected people who are in need of humanitarian
assistance in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
114.02 KB 1.45 MB
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Sub-title:
Zin Mar Aung has high-level meetings in Washington but still waits for the ASEAN envoy to call.
Description:
"Zin Mar Aung is the foreign minister of the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, that represents the civilian administration that was ousted in last year’s military takeover in Myanmar. The former democracy activist and political prisoner is in Washington, D.C., for meetings on the sidelines of the summit of U.S. and Southeast Asian leaders, seeking greater diplomatic recognition for the NUG. She spoke Thursday to RFA’s Managing Editor for Southeast Asia Matthew Pennington about the need for the United States to support democracy forces against the Myanmar junta, and for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to step up engagement with the NUG.
Zin Mar Aung spent 11 years as a political prisoner under a previous military regime in Myanmar, including years in solitary confinement. She was released in 2009. She was elected in 2015 as a member of the House of Representatives for Yankin township, Yangon, for the National League for Democracy – a position she lost in the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: Can I ask you first about your meetings with Biden administration officials? Do you have any more confidence now that the United States might consider giving formal diplomatic recognition to the National Unity Government?
Zin Mar Aung: Yes, I feel that because, you know, the way the Biden administration has engaged with me and the way they treat me is really very good and very much welcome and very much supportive. Very friendly discussions. This trip is really encouraging to me.
RFA: So who have you met from the administration?
ZMA: I met this morning with the Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, and (State Department Counselor) Derek Chollet and also the president's adviser for human rights.
RFA: Have you asked them directly whether they are going to recognize the National Unity Government as being the rightful government of Myanmar?
ZMA:So this trip, you know, I didn't directly address them (on this), but we usually ask them to recognize and engage and to support our struggle. So today what they have said is that by welcoming us to Washington, D.C., they are very much consistent, you know, supporting our struggles and they appreciate what the NUG is doing and and also our commitment. So they are also showing their commitment to support us.
RFA: What's the single most important thing you think for the United States to do, to support what you're trying to do in Myanmar?
ZMA: The United States as a leading, powerful and democratic country, has not just this time, but also previously, continuously supported our struggle (against military rule), whether Democrats or Republicans ... And it's very important, as by getting support from the United States, with its allies, it is very encouraging for our movement, both diplomatically and politically and in terms of, for example, economic sanctions. (The United States) has a lot of allies.
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Bloc nations were urged to sideline the junta, while US officials met with the shadow government.
Description:
"The ongoing upheaval in Myanmar took center stage on the first day of a U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Washington, as fellow bloc member Malaysia slammed the junta for refusing to engage with the country’s shadow government.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders held a lunch meeting with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers at the U.S. Capitol on Thursday to kick off two days of top-level meetings, which President Joe Biden hopes will bolster Washington’s ties with the bloc and increase its influence in the region.
Eight of ASEAN’s leaders made the trip to the U.S. for the summit, which marks the first time the White House extended an invitation to the group of nations in more than four decades. The Philippines declined to attend as it wraps up a presidential election this week, while Myanmar’s junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, was barred from the summit amid a brutal crackdown on opponents of his military’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup that rights groups say has claimed the lives of at least 1,835 civilians.
U.S. State Department officials instead met with the foreign minister of the National Unity Government, Myanmar’s shadow government of deposed leaders and other junta critics working to take back control of the country.
The lunch event on Capitol Hill was closed to the press, but the situation in Myanmar was front and center on Thursday, after Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah called out junta officials in a series of tweets for failing to honor their commitment to end violence in the country. Specifically, he referred to the military regime’s refusal to allow the United Nations special envoy to the country, Noeleen Heyzer, to attend an ASEAN meeting last week to coordinate humanitarian aid to Myanmar.
“We regret that the [junta] has not allowed the U.N. Secretary General's Special Envoy on Myanmar to participate in the processes,” Saifuddin tweeted.
“We should not allow [the junta to be] dictating who to be invited for related meetings.”
Saifuddin said he made clear at an informal meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers on Wednesday that Malaysia fully supports Prak Sokhonn, the special envoy of ASEAN Chair Cambodia, “in fulfilling his mandate on [the] 5-Point Consensus” — an agreement formed by the bloc in April 2021 that requires the junta to meet with all of Myanmar’s stakeholders to find a solution to the political crisis.
He said he called on the ASEAN envoy to “engage all stakeholders, including [shadow National Unity Government] NUG and [National Unity Consultative Council] NUCC representatives,” both of which are recognized by the junta as “terrorist groups.”
Saifuddin’s comments came a day after he told the RFA-affiliated BenarNews agency that he welcomed the idea of engaging informally with the NUG and NUCC via video conference calls and other means if the junta prohibits such meetings in-person.
The Malaysian foreign minister said he plans to meet with NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung in Washington on Saturday to solicit her opinion on how the people of Myanmar can move on.
As ASEAN leaders lunched with lawmakers on Thursday, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman held a meeting with Zin Mar Aung and other NUG representatives in Washington during which she underscored the Biden administration’s support for the people of Myanmar during the crackdown and for those working to restore the country to democracy, according to a statement by spokesperson Ned Price.
“Noting the many Southeast Asian leaders in Washington for the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, the deputy secretary highlighted that the United States would continue to work closely with ASEAN and other partners in pressing for a just and peaceful resolution to the crisis in Burma,” Price said, using the former name of Myanmar.
“They also condemned the escalating regime violence that has led to a humanitarian crisis and called for unhindered humanitarian access to assist all those in need in Burma.”
Other events
Following Thursday’s working lunch, ASEAN leaders met with Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, as well as other leaders of the business community, to discuss economic cooperation.
In the evening, they joined Biden for dinner at the White House to discuss ASEAN’s future and how the U.S. can play a part, according to media reports, which quoted senior administration officials as saying that each leader would be given time to meet with the president one-on-one.
On Friday, leaders will meet with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken for a working lunch to discuss issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the global climate, and maritime security, before meeting with Biden for a second time.
While some ASEAN leaders have been more outspoken in their condemnation of the junta, others —including Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is also the bloc’s chair — have done little to hold it to account for the situation in Myanmar.
In January, Hun Sen became the first foreign leader to visit Myanmar since the military coup — a trip widely viewed as conferring legitimacy on the junta.
Hun Sen is no stranger to global condemnation, however. The Cambodian strongman brooks no criticism at home and has jailed his opponents on what observers say are politically motivated charges in a bid to bar them from mounting a challenge his nearly 40-year rule.
This week’s summit marks Hun Sen’s fourth visit to the U.S., following trips to attend his son’s graduation from West Point in 1999, the 2016 U.S.-ASEAN Summit with President Barack Obama at the Sunnylands Retreat in California, and a meeting at the United Nations in New York in 2018. Thursday’s dinner with Biden will be his first visit to the White House.
Prior to Thursday’s dinner, during a photo session with leaders on the South Lawn, Biden committed to spending U.S. $150 million on COVID-19 prevention, security, and infrastructure in Southeast Asia as part of a package his administration hopes will contain China’s growing influence in the region.
A U.S. Coast Guard ship will also be deployed to the region to patrol waters ASEAN nations say are illegally fished by Chinese vessels.
The U.S. commitment is a drop in the bucket compared to Beijing’s spending in the region. China earmarked 10 times as much in development assistance to ASEAN nations in November alone..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
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Description:
"As leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meet in the United States for a two-day summit, Amnesty International urges them to spotlight the violence and human rights violations in Myanmar.
“The Five-Point Consensus is a failure and did not stop the Myanmar military from perpetrating more human rights violations against the Myanmar people following the 2021 military coup,” Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research, said.
“The ASEAN must concede that the human rights violations in Myanmar have now become a regional concern. The Myanmar military’s violence against its own people has not only made people feel unsafe but it has also led to the deterioration of the country’s economy. Right now, thousands of people are fleeing or attempting to flee to neighboring countries like Thailand and Malaysia not only to seek safety, but also to find work and feed their families.
“ASEAN Member States should formulate a more detailed blueprint to hold Myanmar’s military accountable for human rights violations and address urgent needs, including committing to non-refoulement of refugees fleeing violence, facilitating desperately needed humanitarian assistance, and adding their voices to calls for a global arms embargo. ASEAN Member States should also act bilaterally to achieve these goals if consensus within the bloc cannot be reached.
“As host of the summit, the Biden administration should center discussions on the ongoing human rights violations in Myanmar and in the region more broadly. The regional trends we’ve seen in recent years – escalating repression, constraints on civil society, and intolerance for political dissent – are antithetical to the free and open Indo-Pacific to which the US government is purportedly committed to supporting and will never be realized if human rights are ignored.”
Background:
Almost all leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are expected to attend the 12-13 May summit in Washington, which will mark 45 years of US-ASEAN relations.
Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing, who seized power in the 1 February, 2021 coup, was not invited as part of efforts to distance the bloc from the senior general, who has not implemented the Five-Point Consensus he agreed to in April 2021.
The Consensus was mainly aimed at stopping the violence against protesters, supplying humanitarian aid, and increasing dialogue. Since it was adopted, the situation in Myanmar has further spiraled out of control. Since the start of this coup, Myanmar’s military has killed more than 1,800 people, according to one monitoring group, and detained more than 10,000.
Armed resistance groups have also sprung up in response to the bloody crackdown, while peaceful protests, though much smaller than at the beginning of the coup, have continued despite grave risks.
Myanmar’s civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was ousted in the pre-dawn hours of the coup, has been hit with an array of bogus charges and convictions, as have many of her allies..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Since 1 Feb 2021, international governments have dragged their feet in responding
to the Burma crisis. The junta has been allowed to continue its destruction, and
brutality against the people of Burma, supported by international revenue flows.
During 1 Jan–22 Apr this year, there were 4,971 armed clashes and attacks on
civilians in Ukraine. While this exceeded the 3,310 in Burma over the same period,
the state of conflict in Burma has now gone on for 15 months and involved at least
10,962 clashes and attacks.
In the face of Russian aggression and atrocities in Ukraine, the international
community has used its tremendous power to dissuade Russia from continuing.
However, despite recognizing the urgency of protecting civilians, the international
community has not gone nearly far enough in responding to the Burma crisis.
The international community’s response to the invasion of Ukraine is stunning
evidence of what is possible given sufficient political will. The failure of the
international community—particularly powerful governments of the global north—
to ramp up actions to halt the junta will hurt tens of millions of people and
strengthen accusations of double standards in civilian protection. In order to stop
suffering and restore democracy in Burma:
o The US, EU, and others must act to effectively halt the flow of foreign exchange
revenue to the illegal junta, to reduce its ability to attack civilians; the junta
remains unrecognized as the government and is therefore not entitled to these
revenues. This includes sanctioning Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE),
Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB), and Myanma Investment and Commercial
Bank (MICB) to prevent the junta from using export profits to arm itself for its
crackdown on the people of Burma. There must also be a global arms embargo.
o The US, EU, and others must comprehensively address the humanitarian crisis
resulting from the junta’s violence, blocking of humanitarian aid, and gross
economic mismanagement. As a first step, work needs to begin immediately to
ensure aid is delivered to communities based along the country’s western and
eastern borders, which have been disproportionately affected.
o The US, EU, and others must take the necessary steps to ensure that the
perpetrators of atrocity crimes in Burma are held accountable, including by
referring the junta’s actions to the ICC and backing the National Unity
Government (NUG) declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the court..."
Source/publisher:
Blood Money and ALTSEAN-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
754.83 KB
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Description:
"Of the 10 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that have agreed to attend talks with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw, seven have current or former leaders who received the Wunna Kyawhtin title from the coup leader last month.
Four of the recipients are still alive and the other three were honored posthumously. Along with some other ethnic leaders, they were awarded the Wunna Kyawhtin title on April 17, which is New Year’s Day on Myanmar’s traditional lunar calendar.
All seven of the groups whose leaders were honored are signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The recipients were Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council leader Major-General Htein Maung (aka Saw Htay Maung); Khun Okkar of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO); U Khaing Soe Naing Aung of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); Yawd Serk of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS); Myaing Gyi Ngu Sayadaw U Thuzana of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); Nai Htaw Mon of the New Mon State Party (NMSP); and Kyar Khun Sar of the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU).
On April 22, five days after awarding the titles, Min Aung Hlaing called for face-to-face talks with EAO leaders, saying he sought to end the armed conflicts in Myanmar.
Coming after a year of clashes with newly formed anti-regime resistance forces that have been fighting alongside ethnic armed groups to topple his regime, Min Aung Hlaing’s offer of peace is, many believe, a pretext to persuade the armed groups to distance themselves from the resistance forces.
The peace talks plan has become a laughing stock as none of the groups that have said yes to the junta’s proposed peace talks is currently engaged in active fighting with the regime.
EAOs and other groups that are engaged in active fighting with the regime, such as the Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Army, have officially rejected the regime’s invitation, saying the proposed talks lack inclusivity.
The regime has not invited Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) or its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), which has been fighting the regime.
Many people in Myanmar see the NUG as their legitimate government and the PDF as their army.
The majority of the EAOs that are planning to attend the talks are recipients of awards given by Min Aung Hlaing; this has invited suspicions that the regime chief awarded the titles with the specific intention of persuading the EAO leaders to attend the peace talks.
A local political analyst on ethnic affairs shared that view.
“You could say that the title is a sort of incentive from Min Aung Hlaing [to persuade some ethnic leaders to join the talks],” he said.
The Wunna Kyawhtin title, which recognizes outstanding contributions to the country, was awarded to a total of 25 individuals on April 17; some 20 of the recipients are current or late ethnic leaders.
Saw Mutu Say Poe, the leader of the KNU, an NCA signatory, was among those awarded the Wunna Kyawhtin title on April 17. However, the oldest armed organization in Myanmar on Monday rejected the junta’s invitation to attend the talks, saying they will not be all-inclusive.
Two other NCA signatories, the Chin National Front and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, have also rejected the talks because of the junta’s limitation on participants.
The Brotherhood Alliance, a tripartite military coalition of the Arakan Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, said they would take a wait-and-see approach to the peace talks.
NCA non-signatories the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army, both of which have de facto control over their territories, as well as the Shan State Progress Party, will attend the talks in Naypyitaw.
Many believe the move by the regime—which is fighting a war on various fronts against multiple EAOs and PDFs—to confer titles on ethnic leaders and invite them to peace talks is intended to undermine the unity among armed revolutionary organizations..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
President Biden Should Raise Key Issues with Regional Leaders
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"(Washington, DC) – The United States-ASEAN Special Summit on May 12, 2022 will embolden autocratic leaders unless it directly confronts the region’s worsening environment for human rights and democracy, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to the summit’s host, US President Joseph Biden. Leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should also acknowledge the bloc’s failure to achieve progress in addressing the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar since the February 2021 military coup.
“The Biden administration will need to convince ASEAN’s autocrats at the summit that the alliance’s ultimate future depends on democratic reform,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “The US-ASEAN relationship needs to honestly and directly address the region’s deteriorating human rights situation and democratic backsliding.”
The growth of autocratic rule in the ASEAN region is occurring amid increasing Chinese government efforts to undermine human rights protections, Human Rights Watch said.
US officials should speak openly, forthrightly, and publicly about specific concerns in bilateral meetings with ASEAN members and in statements to the media about the summit, Human Rights Watch said. The Biden administration can do so most credibly and effectively by focusing on factual situations in each country, while acknowledging the many deficiencies in the US rights record and the US government’s efforts and challenges in taking corrective actions to address them.
Human rights abuses have increased in ASEAN countries in recent years, Human Rights Watch said. The Myanmar military has committed mass atrocities against Rohingya Muslims and other ethnic groups, and anti-coup demonstrators. Outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs” has resulted in thousands of extrajudicial executions. The one-party Vietnamese government has intensified an ongoing crackdown and imprisoned over 150 dissidents. The Cambodian authorities are conducting mass trials, many in absentia, of opposition political figures.
The US should press ASEAN members to abandon their failed “five point consensus” approach to Myanmar’s crisis. Like-minded ASEAN members, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, should join a coordinated international effort to steer the junta toward reform, including increasing restrictions on its foreign currency revenues and weapons purchases. The US and these ASEAN countries should develop a clear, time-bound approach to pressure the junta to end its abuses, including signaling support for additional sanctions on oil and gas revenues and a Security Council resolution instituting a global arms embargo.
“Discussing regional human rights concerns at the US-ASEAN summit will send the message that human rights and the promotion of democracy are critical in forging a multilateral response to the Chinese government’s assaults on the international human rights system,” Sifton said..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-11
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Individual Documents
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Description:
"Through ongoing defence and military cooperation, it is likely that ASEAN is aiding and abetting the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes, a Justice For Myanmar investigation has concluded.
ASEAN’s defence program, detailed by Justice For Myanmar, has allowed the Myanmar military to participate in meetings, training, intelligence exchanges, arms production, R&D, cyber security, and education, under the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) umbrella.
The Myanmar military’s involvement in ADMM has supported it to build its capabilities, access arms, find sources of revenue, seek international legitimacy, develop content for propaganda purposes, and forge bilateral military ties with ASEAN members and regional powers.
ASEAN has been engaging with the Myanmar military, knowing that it has repeatedly violated international human rights and humanitarian law.
Since the Myanmar military began an illegal attempted coup on February 1, 2021, ASEAN has allowed it to join defence sector activities, including as co-chair of the bloc’s ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter Terrorism with the Russian regime.
As the region’s key intergovernmental organisation, ASEAN could help prevent the Myanmar military’s commission of atrocity crimes. Yet it has not only repeatedly failed to take action, but is complicit in those crimes by providing support and legitimacy to the Myanmar military.
The central role ASEAN plays in the Indo-Pacific region has also impeded coordinated international action to stop the Myanmar military’s international crimes, and facilitated the illegitimate junta’s defence engagement with regional democracies Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and the USA, through ADMM-Plus.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “ASEAN has utterly failed to uphold international human rights and humanitarian law.
“ASEAN knows full well that the Myanmar military committed genocide against the Rohingya, continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, and staged an attempted coup.
“ASEAN cannot plead ignorance about the crimes that the military is committing, its undermining of democracy and brutal attack on the people of Myanmar.
“Yet its response has been to provide practical assistance, encouragement and support to the military as it terrorises the people of Myanmar.
“ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus has not only utterly failed to resolve Myanmar crisis but enabled the bloc’s status quo of complicity with the terrorist junta who created the crisis.
“Justice For Myanmar calls on ASEAN to immediately change course, exclude the illegal Myanmar and work with the NUG to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
“ADMM-Plus countries must stop hiding behind ASEAN and take immediate steps to end the bloc’s complicity in the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes.
“As the US hosts the US-ASEAN Special Summit, it must commit to end its multilateral engagement with the terrorist junta and demand ASEAN stop aiding and abetting the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes.
“We call on the US to boycott ASEAN events that include the illegal junta, including the defence maritime security working group that it co-chairs.”
Justice For Myanmar calls for the following urgent action:
ASEAN
Exclude the Myanmar military junta from all meetings and activities.
Recognise the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar, and work with it to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Take concrete action to end the Myanmar military’s violence against the Myanmar people.
Create an ASEAN sanctions framework, and encourage ASEAN members to impose an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on the Myanmar military and its business interests.
Cooperate with UN Member States to impose a global arms embargo on Myanmar and to refer the Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court through the UN Security Council.
ADMM-Plus countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the USA):
Call on ASEAN to exclude the Myanmar military junta from all meetings and activities, and end the Myanmar military’s violence against the Myanmar people.
Recognise and support the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar, and work with it to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Urge ASEAN to recognise the National Unity Government and work with it to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Boycott ASEAN meetings and activities that include the Myanmar military junta.
Impose an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against the Myanmar military and its business interests.
Cooperate with UN Member States to impose a global arms embargo on Myanmar and to refer the Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court through the UN Security Council..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Sub-title:
ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ပါကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပညာရေးစနစ်ပေါ်ပေါက်လာစေရန်အတွက် စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှုမှတဆင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပညာရေးကို ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက် နေပြီး သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ကဏ္ဍအလိုက်တွင် လွတ်လပ်စွာစီမံခန့်ခွဲခွင့်ကို တိုက်တွန်းအားပေး အကောင်အထည်ဖော်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၂။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် မေလ (၈) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သော နွေဦးဆရာအတတ်သင်တက္ကသိုလ်ကောင်စီ (ယာယီ) အစည်းအဝေးဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အရ ဒေါက်တာသိန်းလွင်အား နွေဦးဆရာအတတ်သင်တက္ကသိုလ်၏ အဓိပတိအဖြစ် ခန့်အပ်ခြင်းကို ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ပါကြောင်းနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ပညာရေးပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများတွင် အတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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"Myanmar’s long history of civil war can be categorized as periods of alternating clashes and peace talks.
It is often said that politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed. Often, the warring sides will call for honesty for the sake of peace, before they question each other’s honesty.
In Myanmar, peace talks are a tricky business. Though both sides will struggle for a result that is favorable to them, normally the results are determined by the more powerful side.
Peace talks with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) were previously held under the civilian Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government and the military-led Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government. Those talks achieved nothing because self-determination and self-rule for ethnic people was always rejected and the existence of EAOs was never recognized, even as both the AFPFL and BSPP governments wanted EAOs to disarm and surrender. So the peace talks held between 1948 and 1988 were not successful.
In the post-1988 period, peace talks became even trickier because of drastic changes in the political landscape of the country. Myanmar was going through a political crisis following the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, and its economy was also plagued by mismanagement under the BSPP rule.
At the same time, the Communist Party of Burma, the major player in Myanmar’s civil war, split into several armed groups. They had financial constraints and lacked ammunition. And both the troops and local people were exhausted after many years of war.
Seeing those factors, the then military regime changed its policy toward EAOs. The regime, which had always called for disarmament, made peace with EAOs by recognizing ethnic parties and armed organizations and designating their controlled areas as special regions. The process started in 1989 and by 1995 all the EAOs, except the Karen National Union (KNU) and Mong Tai Army (MTA), had agreed ceasefires with the Myanmar military.
For 20 years from 1989 to 2009, the military constantly engaged in measures designed to weaken the EAOs. They included offering business concessions to the EAOs and instigating religious disputes.
The then junta was able to do this because there were no fighting outside the borderlands, as the main opposition party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) – favored peaceful struggle over armed struggle.
However, the military continued to attack the KNU and the MTA with superior numbers. Finally, the MTA was forced to surrender and the KNU, once the most powerful group among the EAOs, had become weaker. This is what the military did over the two decades of ceasefire and peace.
In 2009, the regime went a step further and forced the EAOs that had signed ceasefires to transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or people’s militias and brought them under the army’s control. Apparently, the regime thought that it could now easily control the EAOs.
But the regime broke its promise to settle ethnic issues through political dialogue. In 2005, it forced the Palaung State Liberation Organization and Shanni Nationalities Army to disarm.
EAOs that were either weakened or had attached greater importance to business interests over armed struggle were swayed by the military regime.
The New Democratic Army – Kachin led by Zahkung Ting Ying in Kachin State, a Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) splinter group led by Bai Suocheng, the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front led by Tun Kyaw, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and some splinter groups from the KNU all became BGFs.
Other armed organizations, such as the Kachin Defence Army, brigades 3 and 7 of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), the Kayan New Land Party and some Karenni National Progressive Party and KNU splinter groups, became people’s militias.
Both BGFs and people’s militias were under the command of the Myanmar military. Of them, only the Kokang splinter group led by Bai Suocheng and the PNO led by Aung Kham Hti were granted self-rule in their territories under the army-drafted 2008 Constitution. The Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization ceased to exist. This is the advantage the military was able to achieve in 20 years of peace.
In those years, the military became aware that EAOs only care about their regions and territories in the borderlands, and do not bother to challenge the central government. The regime was well aware that it could focus its energy on addressing the threat of the NLD by appeasing the EAOs.
While some EAOs collapsed or were weakened during the years of ceasefire, others grasped the opportunity to strengthen themselves. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were able to expand both their treasuries and arsenals of weapons during those years.
Later, the KNU was able to re-unify its Karen forces. The SSPP, the MNDAA and the Restoration Council of Shan State were also able to restore their strength.
The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have weakened a lot compared to 1995, when their ceasefires came into effect. But they still have a strong presence in Myanmar politics due to their long history. Meanwhile, powerful new EAOs like the Arakan Army (AA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) emerged because of their dissatisfaction with the regime’s handling of ethnic issues.
After 20 years of ceasefire, the EAOs became aware that they needed to rebuild strength, or otherwise risk collapse, and that the military was trying to break them up by any means. They realized that the military will compromise with EAOs when inland Myanmar is in crisis, but will always try to contain the EAOs otherwise.
In ten years of peace talks from 2011 to 2021, the EAOs saw that the Myanmar military has a greater say than elected governments. Moreover, the military restricted certain EAOs from participating in peace talks, and treated smaller EAOs with arrogance.
Myanmar’s military did not recognize ethnic people’s demand for self-determination and self-rule, but insisted that EAOs must join the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process under the 2008 Constitution and join the political dialogue under the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement process. The regime did not accept an all-inclusive peace process, saying instead that the peace process is “not a Taung Pyone Pwe [a popular spirit festival in Mandalay] in which everyone can participate freely.”
Last month, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing offered face-to-face peace talks with leaders of EAOs. Since last year’s coup, the generals have repeatedly tried in vain to hold talks with EAOs. This has prompted Min Aung Hlaing to make the proposal himself.
Everyone can see that Min Aung Hlaing is trying to keep the EAOs out of the fighting as his army is facing a military crisis nationwide and is desperate to find a way out.
The regime is likely to allow EAOs to have greater territorial control and to lift its restrictions on their armaments at the planned meeting. It will be interesting to see to what extent Min Aun Hlaing will compromise.
In fact, EAOs like the UWSA and the NDAA already control their territories, and all they need is legitimacy. Moreover, EAOs like the KIA, the AA, the TNLA, the MNDAA, the SSPP, the KNPP, the KNU, the NMSP and the Chin National Front that have political ambitions to control their entire states might not accept a regime offer that will only allow them to continue to control their existing territory.
It is impossible to separate the EAOs from the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) – the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG) – now. In Kachin, Chin, Karen and Kayah states, PDFs are fighting alongside the EAOs. In Sagaing and Magwe regions, PDFs work closely with EAOs.
The most important point is that the EAOs have little trust in the junta chief’s offer of peace talks due to their previous experiences with the military. Again, the PDFs are a great boost for EAOs which have fought Myanmar’s military for many years. So the majority of EAOs will continue to support the PDFs.
Many groups have refused to attend the talks saying all stakeholders, such as the NUG and PDFs, should be allowed to join them. But some small EAOs without strong principles may accept the offer of peace for their own interests while the military is making compromises. However, strong and principled EAOs are likely to shun the peace talks.
The regime is now saying EAOs don’t commit terrorist acts like the PDFs do. But for many years, they described the EAOs as insurgents and terrorist groups. But despite labelling the AA as a terrorist group, the military held talks with the AA in 2020. It previously refused to hold talks with the TNLA and MNDAA, which are allied with the AA in the Northern Alliance, but is now prepared to include them in peace talks.
Throughout Myanmar’s history, we have witnessed the military’s negative attitude towards peace. If the regime is really serious about achieving peace in the country, it must first unconditionally release all those it has unfairly detained. To discuss a ceasefire and peace, the regime needs to talk with not only EAOs but also the PDFs and all the other resistance groups waging a defensive war, as well as the NUG and its legislative body.
Clashes with PDFs and other revolutionary groups engaged in Myanmar’s Spring Revolution account for 70 per cent of fighting so far in 2022, while clashes with EAOs account for 30 per cent. Without talking to the PDFs, it is impossible to achieve peace in Myanmar. No peace talks will succeed when key players are excluded.
The intention of the junta chief’s peace offer is to keep the EAOs at bay so that he has time and energy to crush the PDFs. It is just a political ploy. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the international community have called for dialogue among all parties to solve the Myanmar crisis. But the junta is trying to deceive them by offering peace talks only to the EAOs..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"An international terrorism monitor missed the mark when it labeled a resistance attack on soldiers as terrorism, which may only serve to embolden the real terrorists in Myanmar: the military.
A defining feature of military rule in Myanmar has been the use of mass violence against civilians to cause terror for political gain.
From massacres of unarmed protesters, to late-night raids and often fatal torture sessions, to burning down entire villages where resistance forces operate and slaughtering their civilian inhabitants: every successful tactic the military has used to quash dissent has been rooted in creating fear.
It’s textbook terrorism. As the country crumbles around them, instilling terror in the hearts of the general population seems to be the only thing the junta is any good at. So it came as a surprise to many when the Institute for Economics and Peace indicated a rise in terrorism in Myanmar not due to heinous military violence, but due to resistance attacks.
Perplexingly, IEP’s 2022 Global Terrorism Index report said the “most devastating” attack of 2021 in Myanmar was when resistance forces killed 40 soldiers in Sagaing Region’s Katha Township on September 20. IEP says it uses TerrorismTracker to collect data, and it supposedly does not include “irregular or conventional” warfare. It’s hard to understand, therefore, how killing 40 enemy troops during a civil war could be classified as terrorism.
The report does not include any of the many military massacres of unarmed civilians, such as the slaughter of over 60 protesters in Hlaing Tharyar in March 2021, or the killing of more than 80 in Bago the following month. There’s no consistent definition of terrorism that could include killing soldiers in battle but not encompass massacring civilians with the intention of making the rest of the population too afraid to resist. It seems to hinge entirely on the idea that violence is the sole purview of the state.
Given the junta seized power illegally, has no representation at the United Nations, and hasn’t been officially recognised as the government of Myanmar by even one country, the Tatmadaw is closer to a rogue militant group than a professional armed force, let alone a state or government.
While TerrorismTracker also excludes deaths caused by “civil unrest”, this is an overly broad term that could apply to almost anything. It also appears IEP uses it inconsistently. In the 2017, 2019 and 2020 Global Terrorism Index reports, IEP included attacks on protesters in Afghanistan and Iraq in its list of terrorist attacks. Why would these incidents qualify, while the military’s crackdowns do not?
One explanation might be preconceived notions about what terrorism looks like. At its core, the Myanmar military is a racial and religious extremist group that often ludicrously justifies its use of violence as necessary to protect Buddhism. Swap that out for Islam and maybe IEP would have an easier time seeing it as a terrorist organisation.
There are some attacks that have been attributed to resistance groups that could qualify as terrorism. Bombing electricity offices with the intention of making civilians too afraid to pay their electricity bills, for example. These incidents could and should be included, although it seems likely that a fair accounting would show the military has committed more terrorist attacks, with higher civilian casualties, than the resistance.
If IEP wants to measure attacks on security forces or general non-state violence, then by all means include resistance attacks on soldiers and police. But don’t call it terrorism without a more consistent definition of what that actually means.
This is where it gets tricky. There is no universal, international standard for terrorism, partly because the term is so politically charged. Most definitions include acts of violence designed to intimidate a population or to influence a government or international organisation.
The terrorism label also has implications for perceptions of legitimacy. The junta has not only declared anti-coup armed groups to be terrorist organisations, but also the National Unity Government, in an attempt to discredit them. The fact is though, that the NUG was appointed by elected lawmakers, while the military junta illegally seized power after losing an election. By calling resistance attacks terrorism, but not using the term to describe the military, IEP has taken a side in the legitimacy dispute while presenting itself as neutral.
This matters because the Global Terrorism Index report could actually cause more acts of terrorism in Myanmar, by giving more fodder to the military’s propaganda machine. The junta has long justified its use of disproportionate violence by claiming that all its opponents are terrorists – even unarmed peaceful protesters.
In 2021, the BBC investigated a series of military massacres committed in July that left 40 civilians dead in Kani Township, also in Sagaing Region. Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun later justified the shocking tactics by describing resistance fighters as terrorists, and insisting the military was “using appropriate force in order to achieve a reasonable level of security”.
The IEP report did not mention these massacres – but by labelling resistance attacks as terrorism it helped bolster the military’s excuse for committing them. The risk is that if the military thinks this delusional narrative is gaining traction internationally, it will only feel emboldened to continue using outrageous violence. The result will be more deaths, more destruction and more terror in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Amid the Ukraine war, Washington is demonstrating its commitment to ASEAN, which seeks to expand economic ties and cooperate on transnational challenges.
Description:
"The White House will host this week the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for a U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit. With the Russia-Ukraine war dominating international attention, the Biden administration has said the summit demonstrates its “enduring commitment” to ASEAN and that the Indo-Pacific region is a U.S. national security priority. China’s influence and power projection in Southeast Asia will figure prominently into the summit, but the two-day meeting also offers the opportunity to deepen economic relations with ASEAN, a bloc of 10 countries that combined make up the seventh largest economy in the world. A host of other critical issues — from COVID to climate change to the crisis in Myanmar — will also be on the table.
President Biden at a virtual U.S.-ASEAN Summit in 2021. Engagement with the bloc has been hampered by COVID, but this week’s Special Summit demonstrates the U.S. is committed to deepening ties with ASEAN. (Stefani Reynolds/The New York Times)
USIP’s Brian Harding explains how ASEAN factors into the Biden administration’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” what ASEAN countries want from Washington, and how the war in Ukraine and deteriorating situation in Myanmar will be addressed at the summit.
Where does ASEAN sit in the administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific?
The White House’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in February, states that the United States seeks to “advance a free and open Indo-Pacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.” The strategy calls an “empowered ASEAN” an important ingredient for success alongside modernized alliances like the Quad (i.e., the United States, Australia, India and Japan), renewed U.S. commitment and resources, and other means. While competition with China is at the heart of the United States’ regional strategy, support for a cohesive and resilient ASEAN is one of the critical means for advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific.
An empowered ASEAN will not be easy to achieve, however. ASEAN is an extremely diverse group of 10 countries that operates by consensus, meaning it is rarely nimble nor bold, even on its best day. With one of its members, Myanmar, in crisis, an empowered ASEAN seems more unlikely than ever.
Yet, despite their differences, including as it relates to Myanmar, one area of clear agreement among its members is that only ASEAN can be the central building block for Indo-Pacific regionalism. The United States and its allies — and China to some extent — have bought into this vision, recognizing that it is untenable for the great powers to guide the regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, it is strongly in the U.S. interest to invest in its relationship with ASEAN and to do what it can to support ASEAN’s centrality in regional affairs.
However, the United States has also been clear that bilateral — and increasingly trilateral and quadrilateral — cooperation with key allies and partners is fundamental to U.S. engagement and strength in the region. The Biden administration’s emphasis on the Quad, in particular, has brought into question the premise of whether ASEAN remains in the driver’s seat of regionalism, a role it had seemed to have consolidated only a few years ago, and what the United States means by its rhetorical support for ASEAN centrality. The Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes this sensitivity, noting that the United States “will explore opportunities for the Quad to work with ASEAN.”
During the Biden administrations’ first year, engagement with Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN as a whole proved to be unusually difficult due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions and the rupture within ASEAN caused by Myanmar’s February 2021 coup. This Special Summit seeks to help make up for lost time and clearly demonstrates the United States’ interest in and commitment to deepening ties with ASEAN and its constituent members.
What are ASEAN countries looking for from Washington? How can Washington work with the bloc to empower and strengthen ASEAN resilience?
ASEAN countries are highly alert to the fact that relations between the United States and China have important implications for themselves. Despite their diversity, ASEAN countries all want an engaged and present United States in Southeast Asia to balance China’s potentially overwhelming influence. They also seek to have Japan, India, Australia and other external powers as engaged as possible to create a balance of power in the region, or, as former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has called it more positively, a dynamic equilibrium. What they do not want is to be forced to choose between the United States and China.
Southeast Asian countries also seek Washington’s buy-in for ASEAN-based multilateral institutions, such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, which the bloc seeks to position at the center of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture.
Beyond being present, the region wants the United States to be a stronger economic partner and many members are eagerly anticipating the details of the administration’s proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. ASEAN is also looking to partner on transnational challenges ranging from climate change to pandemic preparedness to transnational crime. U.S. support for ASEAN-based multilateralism empowers the bloc and strengthens its resilience, especially in the face of Chinese efforts to divide it, which it has repeatedly done to blunt ASEAN’s ability to push back against Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.
How will the Ukraine war factor into the summit?
That President Biden is hosting the ASEAN leaders is a demonstration of its commitment to maintaining focus on the Indo-Pacific region despite the crisis in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Ukraine will be impossible to escape. First, U.S. officials will make the case that Russia’s invasion demonstrates the fragility of the international system and, second, they will highlight China’s tacit support for the invasion to make a contrast with the United States’ principled stance.
Southeast Asian countries in general would rather keep their heads down and avoid the issue rather than getting in the middle of a dispute between major powers. Singapore, however, has been an outlier with its vocal criticism and the sanctions it has enacted in coordination with the United States and Europe. While Ukraine will not be a major focus of the summit, the issue will likely come up in the context of Russia’s participation in the G-20 summit, East Asia Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders meeting to be hosted later this year in Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand, respectively.
Do you expect the Biden administration to press the bloc to do more to address the deteriorating situation in Myanmar?
While much of the summit agenda will focus on apolitical areas ripe for closer U.S.-ASEAN cooperation, such as clean energy, health security and the digital economy, the deteriorating situation in Myanmar will also be addressed. Biden will find many of his counterparts to be as frustrated with the situation as himself, but he will also find deep divisions in the lengths his ASEAN counterparts are willing to go to isolate or pressure the junta, largely due to longstanding norms within ASEAN to avoid interfering in the affairs of other members.
However, Biden will find common cause with leaders from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, who are increasingly frustrated by the junta’s intransigence and are open to isolating Myanmar’s leaders and engaging the National Unity Government. With Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, he will encounter reluctance. With the likelihood of a diplomatic breakthrough dim, Biden will likely look for incremental progress on enhancing engagement with the National Unity Government and establishing a framework for delivering humanitarian assistance to Myanmar..."
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United States Institute of Peace
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2022-05-10
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"Introduction
The third wave of democratisation,[a] spanning the last quarter of the 20th century, transformed the global political landscape.[1] While the details varied across nations and regions, almost all of them shifted away from dictatorship and towards more democratic forms of governance. However, there has been rising concern about the substance of democracy in the recently transitioned countries. Studies have pointed out that while nearly 100 countries are deemed as “transitioning,” most are settling into new forms of semi-democratic yet authoritarian systems, instead of true democracy.[2] Moreover, the formal democratic institutions established in most nations, such as elections, continue to suffer serious deficits.[3]
The onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic has intensified a trend of escalating authoritarianism across the globe.[4] Several nations have slid down the democracy scale, Myanmar being the latest. A fledgling democracy,[b] Myanmar witnessed a coup in February 2021, as the armed forces, the Tatmadaw, refused to accept the results of the 2020 elections that gave the National League for Democracy (NLD) a second term.
Against this backdrop, this brief explores the challenges to democratic consolidation in Myanmar, with a focus on NLD–military relations. The first part analyses the factors that led to a change from autocratic to democratic regimes in 2011. The second part examines the dynamics between the NLD democratic leadership and the military junta, to understand how it has shaped Myanmar’s struggle for democracy in recent years. Finally, the brief considers the key factors that are weakening Myanmar’s prospects of stable democracy.
Myanmar’s Shift to Democracy: 2010–15
The Military as an Institution
Analysts have offered various explanations to Myanmar’s post-2010 democratic reforms—from the country’s military government wanting to resist the growing influence of China, to growing public demands for democracy. For the most part, political changes in Myanmar are driven by the willingness of military leaders to implement them. American political scientist Samuel Huntington, in his theory on democracy, says that the most common form of transition from a military regime to democracy is “transformation”—this occurs when the military regime itself initiates the shift.[5] Such transitions are peaceful but often transient, as military regimes have the capacity to reacquire power through non-democratic means if they disapprove of the direction of the transformation.
In most such cases, military leaders do not define themselves as the permanent rulers of the country, instead claiming to briefly assume power to “save the country” from instability. Thus, for military rulers, the return to civilian rule is always a political possibility. In Myanmar, too, the military had claimed that once the country became stable, it would leave its temporary stint and return to its previous military duties.[6] As Huntington theorised it, three factors can accelerate the military’s decision to withdraw from power: (i) a guarantee that there will be no prosecution of military officers for acts they committed while they were in power, (ii) guarantees about the preservation of the autonomy and role of the military, and (iii) the attitude of the opposition.
The democratisation process, meanwhile, is shaped by interactions between three groups of actors: (i) reformers within government; (ii) those who resist reform; and (iii) members of the opposition.[7] Within these groups, there are diverse opinions on the possibilities and prospects for reform, with the constitution of each group and the relationship between them subject to change throughout the process. For example, those within the military who oppose the reforms may come to accept democracy if their suspicions about it are not confirmed. Members of opposition groups initially opposed to government-led reforms may accept opportunities to participate if they are convinced of the intentions of the military government.
Post-2010 Reforms
Since 2010, many of these interactions have unfolded in Myanmar, as amendments were made to the election laws, the ban on the NLD was lifted, and Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest.[c] Freedom of speech was restored, and the ban on social media platforms was revoked. Consequently, both the Opposition and the general public began to accept Thein Sein as a reformer open to democratic changes.
At the same time, Thein Sein and fellow reformers reassured the military about its continuing independence and power, in keeping with the 2008 Myanmar Constitution’s emphasis on the centrality of the armed forces in the new life of the country, and the provisions relating to the non-prosecution of army officers. Thus, the 2008 Constitution is a tool designed to ensure the military’s prominence at all times, whether elected or not. Further, it acts as a roadmap to “disciplined democracy,” and dictates the parameters and extent of reforms during a regime change. Ultimately, the playing field remains heavily tilted toward the military-dominated party.
In 2011, the NLD and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, made the critical decision to accept the government’s approach to working together to attain the goal of multiparty democracy. The new government’s strongest claim to credibility, both internally and externally, was Aung San Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s path of reform and her evident faith in Thein Sein. That there was no insistence on accountability for the acts of the former military rulers indicated that the Opposition, i.e. the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi, would behave “reliably” in the transition to democracy. In the past, Suu Kyi had openly confronted the government by arranging rallies and organising campaigns for civil disobedience.[8] However, aware that such tactics could hinder the progress towards democracy and lead to a return to power by hardliners, or else a substantial increase in the power of the military, the NLD subsequently adopted policies of moderation and cooperation with the government. It also agreed to be involved as a junior partner in the process of democratic reform. This culminated in the seamless and peaceful transition to a democratic government in 2015.
Post-2016 Civil-Military Relations
Since coming to power in 2016, the NLD government has sought to maintain an amiable relationship with the junta. This was evident in the softer stance it took towards the military’s actions in the matter of the ethnic conflicts within the country.
In May 2016, the NLD government set up the “Central Committee on the Implementation of Peace, Stability, and Development of the Rakhine State”.[9] It also established an advisory commission, with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as Chair, to provide recommendations on the complex challenges facing Rakhine. However, the meetings held and studies organised to understand the situation did little to prevent the conflicts between the junta and militant groups fighting for autonomy in the Kachin and Rakhine regions, such as the Arakan Army, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The conflicts have resulted in the displacement of millions of people, severe food shortages, and loss of livelihoods. For its part, the NLD government has done little else beyond appealing to the military to practice restraint, choosing to focus on other agendas instead.
Similarly, in the ongoing case of the Rohingya ethnic cleansing, both the NLD government and Aung San Suu Kyi have not only refrained from intervening against the inhuman treatment of the stateless people, but also categorically denied wrongdoing and imposed media censorship on the issue.[d] Indeed, international spectators expressed concerns over the ex-state counsellor shielding the military’s action and calling the situation an “internal matter,” despite millions being forced to cross the border to live in neighbouring nations.[10] In the face of censure from the international community, Aung San Suu Kyi maintained her stance, standing for the junta in the International Court of Justice in 2019 and denying all accusations of genocide.[11]
Second Transition and Rising Conflict
According to theorists, a transition from military regime to democracy is often followed by a second transition—towards the effective functioning of a democratic regime.[12] During the first transition, the “military challenge” for members of the Opposition is to inaugurate a democratic government without military resistance. During the second transition, the challenge is to establish functional institutions of civilian control over the military.
Bringing the GAD under Civilian Rule
While the NLD government sought to balance its civilian-military relations, it slowly attempted to create powerful civilian positions in otherwise militarised institutions. This step was deemed essential to establishing functional units of civilian control. In a pivotal move, in 2019, the NLD sought to bring Myanmar’s main public administration body, the General Administration Department (GAD), under civilian control. The GAD has traditionally operated under the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Designated as the “bureaucratic backbone of the country,” it directly controls all state bureaucracy at the local level, including in the districts, townships, and village tracts. Its 36,000 staff members, many of whom are transferred military personnel, are responsible for issuing licenses, handling land management and disputes, and collecting taxes. Since April 2011, the GAD has also handled the increased engagement from international aid donors.
Thus, placing the GAD under the civilian Ministry of the Office of the Union Government will be an important step in breaking the military dominance. The reform is aimed at stimulating decentralisation and is necessary for any real progress towards peace and stability. To be sure, such a reform may not lead to immediate changes to local administration. However, it can allow state- and region-level civil services to emerge in the long run, beyond the exceptional municipal offices.[13]
Amending the Constitution
The 2008 Constitution is the biggest source of military power in Myanmar. In addition to granting the military a prominent role in politics, it ensures that state institutions reflect the ideology advocated by the Tatmadaw. This ideology draws from Tatmadaw’s three national clauses: the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of national unity, and the perpetuation of national sovereignty.[14] To safeguard the implementation of these clauses, the Constitution allocates 25 percent representation of unelected military officers in Myanmar’s Parliament. This provides them with veto power, as articles 436 (a) and (b) require more than 75 percent of members to vote in favour of approved amendments. The Constitution also grants sovereign powers to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces during emergencies,[e] including rights to exercise control over the executive, legislature, and judiciary. These provisions have allowed the military to maintain its position as “guardian” over a steady process of democratisation, and to protect its core ideological and private interests. Thus, any amendments to the Constitution can severely damage the Tatmadaw’s grip on the Myanmar government.
While the NLD had been vocal about the undemocratic nature of the Constitution since 2007, it took little initiative to modify it after assuming office in 2016. After losing the 2018 by-elections, however, it returned its focus to amending the Constitution. In January 2019, a parliamentary Charter Amendment Committee was set up, consisting of 149 lawmakers—50 from the military, 50 from the NLD, 26 from Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and the remainder from ethnic parties. They took part in the debate, which spanned seven days. The structure of the Parliament included the NLD holding 59 percent of the seats, the ethnic minority parties 11 percent, the USDP five percent, and the military its constitutionally mandated 25 percent.
The proposed amendments focused on reducing the military’s influence. Some of the proposals from NLD included scrapping the military’s veto over constitutional change, limiting its parliamentary seats, reducing its political leadership role, and revoking army chiefs’ right to assume power during an emergency. The NLD has proposed changing the requirement for approving a charter amendment from more than 75 percent of Parliament to “two-thirds of elected representatives,” excluding the military appointees. It also proposed gradually reducing the military’s share of seats from 25 percent to 15 percent after the 2020 election, 10 percent after 2025, and five percent after 2030. A quarter of all seats in the national and regional legislatures are occupied by unelected military officers under the Constitution’s Article 14 and related provisions. The military generals strongly objected to this proposal, with the commander-in-chief calling the amendments discriminatory and asserting that such demands could harm national unity and civilian-military relations.[15] The NLD also proposed amending Section 59 (f), which bars Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president, since her husband and sons hold British citizenship, and Section 59 (d), which requires military experience. However, these proposals failed to garner the required vote in the assembly. According to one junta official, senior positions should steer clear from any foreign influence.[16]
In total, the NLD proposed 114 amendments to the Constitution, of which only minor ones concerning changes in the language of clauses pertaining to the appointment of state and regional ministers were approved. One can argue that the NLD’s objective for attempting to introduce such a large number of changes was to improve its public image, by convincing the populace that the military and the USDP stood in the way of the party’s efforts to bring about democratic reforms.
The strategy did not go unnoticed by the army or the USDP, and to combat this narrative, the Tatmadaw and the USDP proposed amendments of their own. The military bloc proposed revising Article 261 by electing regional chief ministers through local legislatures instead of being appointed by the Central government through the president. Such an amendment primarily seeks to make the nation-state federal in structure, by distributing more powers among peripheral regions. While this contradicts the Tatmadaw’s previous stance against federalism, where it equated federalism with the disintegration of the country,[17] analysts contend that the underlying motive is to take advantage of the ethnic minorities’ growing disillusionment with the NLD.[f][18]
Persistent Obstacles to Democracy
In addition to the discontent of the military generals at the NLD’s growing intent to achieve democratic consolidation—which would result in the power shifting to the civilian government—a few other factors have affected the growth of stable democracy during NLD’s tenure.
NLD’s Centralised Character
Under the 2008 Constitution, the NLD has the right to choose the central and local governments at all levels of the legislatures. Following its 2015 victory, the NLD, instead of acknowledging nationality parties in the ethnic states, appointed its own representatives and party members as the chief ministers of all the states and regions—even where the NLD had won a minority of state seats—with no prior consultation with its once-allied ethnic parties.
The Arakan National Party (ANP) and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) are two prominent ethnic parties in Myanmar. A veteran Rakhine politician, U Aye Tha Aung, was approached to act as the vice-speaker of the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw) in the national parliament. But this decision was made without transparent discussion or agreement with the ANP.[19] Similarly, the NLD refused to grant administrative power or representation to SNLD, its former ally at the state level. Instead, party officials suggested that the SNLD consider the position of an “Ethnic Affairs Minister.” Such acts alienated ethnic groups and damaged the NLD’s image. The party’s imposition of political hegemony through ‘Burmanisation’ and the centralisation of projects further exacerbated negative sentiments amongst the ethnic groups. For example, the erection of statues of General Aung San in Kayah and other states with sizeable ethnic minority populations sparked opposition and protests, which the NLD’s local officials chose to handle in a largely violent manner. There were also protests in Mon state, when the NLD decided to change the name of a bridge in Mawlamyine to General Aung San Bridge. [20]
Disillusioned by these trends, some NLD members along with other pro-democracy leaders, formed their own parties before the 2020 elections, such as the People’s Pioneer Party, Union Betterment Party, and People’s Party.[21] The military leveraged this development against the NLD during the deliberations on the amendment of the Constitution.
Weakness of Democratic Political Leadership
Following the 2015 elections, the NLD party grew in strength. Before 2015, its membership had predominantly been symbolic and solidaristic, and the increase in party members created concerns regarding the new members—who tried to maximise their power and status—in the absence of a stable democratic ideology. Further, selecting ground leaders became a challenge, as people voted for Aung San Suu Kyi instead of specific local candidates. Consequently, leaders at the local levels were decided after the party office won the election, reflecting the disjointed power dynamics within the NLD.[22]
Since the NLD government was new and inexperienced in governance, it failed to invest in the training of party members and next-generation leaders. Of the existing leadership, few personnel are trained professionals, and the majority lack management experience. While the management styles of some party members are consistent with the democratic culture and genuine policy openness, most are concerned only with modes of behaviour and control akin to socialist centralisation.[23]
Faultlines of National Reconciliation
Throughout its rule and as the defence authority during the NLD tenure, the junta had continued to rely on a divide-and-rule tactic for monitoring the ethnic militant groups. During the 1990s, the military managed to integrate some into their force, but those who did not acquiesce remain in a state of constant war with the state. The junta orchestrates and controls the entire process by fighting against some groups while entering into ceasefire agreement with others—selectively allowing some groups to keep their arms and territory, tax their constituents, build state-like structures, and profit from legal and illegal businesses.[g] Its tactics are facilitated by the failure of the armed groups to act in unison instead of learning from each other’s experiences. Thus, using ceasefire politics, the Tatmadaw has established itself as the most powerful military, political, and economic actor in the borderlands. Furthermore, by entering into joint ventures with the local leaders or “elite groups” of ethnic minorities, the military exploits and extracts from the borderlands’ natural resources, in mining, logging, and agriculture. This has allowed the military to exercise power in areas where it had no previous influence and profit from ethnic armed groups, without ever fully meeting their demands.
To turn such a situation around would require the government’s sustained effort, driven by a vision for peace. Since the armed groups have overlapping territorial claims, and conflicting goals, and failed to successfully align their military and political strategies, the onus of peace-making must be on a representative Union government. In 2020, the International Crisis Group rightly recommended that the government engage in political dialogue and negotiations with all the country’s ethnic groups, and establish participatory institutions where each group could work for its goals. However, this could not be implemented at the time due to the shifting civil-military relations.
Misplaced Security Priorities
For the last five years, the central purpose of Myanmar’s security and justice institutions has been to defend the state either from local resistance or to maintain order while protecting their own economic interests. The criminal justice apparatus has been geared primarily towards disciplinary action against political dissidents, while non-traditional security threats, such as drug abuse and human trafficking, have only received curbs and routine punishment.[24] Moreover, since the security institutions are dominated by Bamar Buddhists, the judiciary is independent only on paper: it remains full of juries and magistrates who previously served within the military or under the former military government.[25]
To be sure, the transfer of powers from the military to civilians does not automatically create more just and peaceful outcomes. Reforms in the justice system must be carefully planned and executed, including service orientations of the military and police, skill training for enhancing tactical approach without the use of extreme violence, people-oriented mechanisms, gender inclusivity and sensitivity, rehabilitation of the prison system, and overall inclusivity. Research organisations have highlighted the three steps needed to democratise Myanmar’s autocratic system:[26]
Giving more power to elected civilians as representatives of the people
Transforming the security culture
Protecting and building civic space
So far, the civilian government has been unable to take any action, due to the reservations of the junta.
The factors discussed in this section are responsible for the lack of democratic progress in Myanmar. However, while the military leaders had hoped to capitalise on the NLD’s poor performance to garner support, the public’s trust in Aung San Suu Kyi as a protector who would act as a bulwark against the possible return of military rule remains strong, and much of the mistrust is directed at the military regime that is viewed as despotic.[27] Indeed, the USDP declined into electoral irrelevance in the 2020 polls, and the landslide victory of the NLD government substantially reduced the influence of the military over the legislative branch. Going forward, the NLD is likely to introduce more reforms to the Constitution, resulting in further erosion of the military’s influence. While this will fortify the NLD’s position,[28] an open challenge to the junta’s sovereignty as an institution may lead to another coup.
Conclusion
Scholars who study regime transitions in different parts of the world agree that the democratisation of a country depends not only on electing a new government through free, fair, and competitive elections, but also on a comprehensive political refurbishment. The new political leaders must enjoy sufficient effective power to govern. The transformation of authoritarian civil-military relations is, therefore, a key element of any regime transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule. However, since the prerequisites of this transition are set by the military rulers from a position of strength, they often continue to exercise substantial control over the process and outcomes, and the armed forces retain their acquired entitlements.
A successful democratic transition requires establishing functional institutions of civilian control over the military, which is especially difficult in countries with a strong legacy of militarism and where the military is able to secure political and institutional privileges. While international mediation can be useful in such instances, Myanmar has previously been called a “diplomatic graveyard,”[h] due to the UN’s failure to successfully intervene—from providing humanitarian assistance to facilitating national reconciliation between the junta and their democratic opponents.
Despite the progress made by the NLD in establishing democratic processes in Myanmar, the military coup of February 2021 showed that the government had failed to exercise civilian control over the junta. The coup has pushed the country and its future into uncharted territory, and how the conflict will play out will depend on the public protesters and the military’s response to them.
Sreeparna Banerjee is a Junior Fellow at ORF, Kolkata.
Endnotes
[a] A group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite directions during that period of time. According to political scientist Samuel Huntington, the third wave began from 1974 onwards.
[b] A system or an institution that is not yet developed.
[c] Giving in to domestic and international pressures, the military government called an election in 1990, which the NLD won by a landslide. The generals, however, refused to recognise the result and instead placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. They argued that the country lacked a constitution through which a proper transfer of power can be conducted.
[d] The Rohingyas are a minority Muslim community who have lived in the Rakhine State of Myanmar for centuries. In recent years, they have become a brutally oppressed, “stateless” community as the state of Myanmar continues to deny them citizenship under the country’s nationality law of 1982.
[e] In Myanmar, an emergency is defined as any situation that could lead to the nation’s disintegration, loss of sovereignty, or attempts to forcefully take power through insurgency.
[f] The ethnic minorities are reportedly unhappy with the state of affairs and the centralised approach of the NLD that goes against the spirit of federalism that the centre had promised to uphold.
[g] In 2015, eight groups signed a ”Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA) with the government, and two more joined in 2018. Five others have bilateral ceasefire agreements. However, as of October 2020, four important groups stood without any such agreement: the Arakan Army (AA); Kachin Independence Army (KIA); Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA); and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).[g] For two years, from December 2018 to November 2020, the Tatmadaw focused on fighting the AA, while mostly avoiding clashes with the others. In November 2020, right after the national elections, the Tatmadaw and AA agreed on an informal, temporary ceasefire.
[h] The six UN special envoys—starting with Japanese diplomat Sadako Ogata, who was appointed in 1990 as an independent expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights, to the Malaysian businessman Razali Ismail, the UN secretary-general’s second special envoy to the country—quit their job in deep frustration. Their missions to Myanmar were routinely rebuffed by the Junta, and at least one of the diplomats, the UN’s second special rapporteur, Mauritian Rajsoomer Lallah, wasn’t even allowed to enter the country because of his sharp criticism of the regime.
[1] Samuel Huntington, “How Countries Democratize”, Political Science Quarterly, 1991, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 579-616
[2] Carothers, Thomas (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1): 5-21. John Hopkins University Press.
[3] Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. (2010). Why Democracy Needs a Levels Playing Field. Journal of Democracy, 21(1), pp. 57-68. John Hopkins University Press.
[4] Global State of Democracy Report 2021 Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era, 2021.
[5] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize
[6] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize; Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “Democratic Transformation and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, April 1, 2013.
[7] Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “Democratic Transformation and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, April 1, 2013.
[8] Barkey, Henri J. (1990), Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition, in Armed Forces & Society, 16, 169–192.
[9] K Yhome, “Elections and civil-military relations in Myanmar”, Observer Research Foundation, August 18, 2020.
[10] Hannah Beech, “What Happened to Myanmar’s Human-Rights Icon?”, The New York Times, September 25, 2017.
[11] Sreeparna Banerjee and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, “ICJ’s judgement on the Rohingya and its challenges”, Observer Research Foundation, February 10, 2020.
[12] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize,
[13] Matthew B Arnold, “Why GAD reform matters to Myanmar”, East Asia Forum, August 24, 2019.
[14] Htet Naing ZAW, “Military Presence Still Needed in Parliament, USDP Says”, The Irrawaddy, February 27, 2019.
[15] San Yamin Aung, “Flashpoints: Myanmar’s Eight Most Hotly Contested Constitutional Amendment Proposals”, The Irrawaddy, March 7, 2020.
[16] San Yamin Aung, “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Still Barred From Presidency as Proposed Charter Change Fails”, The Irrawaddy, March 11, 2020.
[17] Annabelle Heugas, “Myanmar’s Constitution Amendment Process in the year 2020”, KAS, June 2, 2020.
[18] Annabelle Heugas, “Myanmar’s Constitution Amendment Process in the year 2020”
[19] Kyaw Lynn, “The National League for Democracy: A Party for Democracy or Federalism?”, TNI, October 2, 2020.
[20] Ye Myo Hein, “Visions of a Federal Future for Myanmar are Fading Fast-Part II”, The Irrawaddy, September 2, 2021.
[21] Yuichi Nitta, “Myanmar pro-democracy forces form new parties as elections loom”, Nikkei Asia, July 21, 2020.
[22] Richard Roewer, “Three Faces of Party Organisation in the National League for Democracy”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, February 14, 2020.
[23] Naing Ko Ko, “Democratisation in Myanmar: Glue or Gloss?”, Australian National University, 2019.
[24] Nicholas Whitridge Cheesman, “The politics of law and order in Myanmar”, January 2012.
[25] Kim Jolliffe, “Democratising Myanmar’s security sector: enduring legacies and a long road ahead”, Saferworld, November 2019.
[26] Kim Jolliffe, “Democratising Myanmar’s security sector: enduring legacies and a long road ahead”,
[27] Hannah Beach and Saw Nang, “Myanmar Election Delivers Another Decisive Win for Aung San Suu Kyi”, The New York Times, November 11, 2020.
[28] Sreeparna Banerjee, “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi Verdict and Its Aftermath”, Observer Research Foundation, December 20, 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Articles on the NLD
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"1. We have learned of the offer to enter peace discussions conveyed to the leaders of Ethnic
Resistance Organizations by the chief of the Military Council, Min Aung Hlaing via television
broadcast on April 22, 2022.
2. We have consistently called for the resolution of the federal crisis through political negotiations,
by political means. However, to pursue such a resolution would require the inclusion of all
stakeholders, as well as the participation of representatives of the United Nations and the
international community as mediators to ensure fairness and facilitate negotiations. Only through
such political negotiation will we attain our vision of establishing the federal union.
3. Therefore, we call upon the military council immediately to halt all offensive military operations,
to hold meaningful negotiations that include the participation of all stakeholders, and allow
unfettered humanitarian access for international and local responders to deliver unrestricted
assistance to all people affected by conflict and crisis..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party and Chin National Front
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
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Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
They say the shadow government and its paramilitary group must be present for negotiations.
Description:
"Myanmar’s four most powerful ethnic armed groups have rejected an olive branch from the junta, saying there can be no peace talks until the military regime allows the country’s shadow government and the paramilitary group that fights on its behalf to take a seat at the table.
On April 22, junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, called for negotiations that he promised to personally attend and gave the ethnic armies until Monday to accept the offer. But the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF) all rejected the invitation. They said that by not offering all stakeholders the chance to participate, the junta showed it is unwilling to meet halfway.
“We recognize that political issues need to be addressed through a political dialogue,” KIA information officer, Col. Naw Bu, told RFA’s Myanmar Service, when asked about the decision not to register for the talks.
“We are not attending the meeting this time because it’s clear to us that we will not be able to reach a point at which we can discuss real political issues.”
The four ethnic armies are Myanmar’s largest, most experienced and best equipped, and together have accounted for some of the strongest resistance to military rule.
KNU spokesman Padoh Saw Tawney said that in addition to refusing to allow the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the prodemocracy People’s Defense Force (PDF) paramilitary group to attend talks, the junta had failed to honor commitments it had made to his and other ethnic armies, such as reducing its troop presence in their territories in the country’s remote border regions.
“If the talks are not held in an inclusive environment, the consequences will be indescribable for the country,” he said.
The junta has rejected requests from ethnic leaders and the international community to let the NUG and PDF participate in the talks. Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly said that the junta will not talk with “terrorists,” and vowed to continue to crack down on the groups.
Padoh Saw Tawney said that if the military has good intentions, it should “leave politics” so that the rest of Myanmar’s stakeholders can form a federal democracy and begin the process of rebuilding the country.
“We cannot go without these preconditions,” he said.
Other ethnic leaders, such as KNPP First Secretary Khu Daniel, told RFA that peace talks without the NUG and PDF would be “meaningless,” and suggested that the junta peace offer was part of a bid to create a schism within the armed opposition.
“The NUG formed political alliances with our ethnic groups,” he said. “The junta intends to separate them from these groups. But without them, there will be no solution to this problem.”
Khu Daniel acknowledged that some ethnic armies had agreed to join in negotiations but noted that they have smaller forces and hadn’t made much headway in fighting against the military.
“Our groups, which are really fighting, are not attending. So, nothing will come out of it,” he said.
Armies that accepted
In addition to the KIA, KNU, KNPP, and CNF, the other ethnic armies to reject the invitation were the All Burma Students Democratic Front and the Lahu Democratic Union — two of the 10 groups that have signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government since 2015.
The United Wa State Party, the Shan State Progressive Party, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) have said they will attend the peace talks. So have the Arakan State Liberation Party, the Shan State Rehabilitation Council, the Karen National Peace Council, the Democratic Karen Army, the New Mon State Party, and the Pa-O National Liberation Organization — all of which are members of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) of NCA signatories.
The 10 groups that signed the NCA have suggested that the deal remains in place, despite an already flailing peace process that was all but destroyed by the unpopular junta’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup. Previously, all 10 said they would not pursue talks with the military, which they view as having stolen power from the country’s democratically elected government.
PPST spokesman, Col. Saw Kyaw Nyunt, said his group decided to accept the junta invitation with the hope that it would lead to broader negotiations.
“It’s a start with the aim of finding a way to have inclusive talks,” he said. “We’ll try to determine how to create such an inclusive political environment, even though we have not yet held a political dialogue to build a federal democratic union.”
The three northern alliances — the Kokang National Democratic Alliance, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army — have said they are still negotiating among themselves over Min Aung Hlaing’s offer.
Speaking to RFA at the end of last week, junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, told RFA that “most” of the ethnic armed groups had accepted the invitation.
On Monday, he said that “a total of nine groups” had confirmed they would attend talks — NCA signatories Democratic Karen Army, Karen National Peace Council, Pa-O National Liberation Organization, New Mon State Party, Arakan State Liberation Party, and Shan State Rehabilitation Council; and non-signatories United Wa State Party, Shan State Progressive Party, and National Democratic Alliance Army.
“Some groups have issued statements saying they will not attend, and we are waiting for others to make their decision,” he said.
Zaw Min Tun said the junta is committed to pushing the peace process forward, adding that it is willing to “openly discuss the establishment of a union based on democracy and federalism.”
‘Effort to buy time’
Naing Htoo Aung, permanent secretary of the NUG’s Defense Ministry, said that 15 months after seizing power, the junta has led Myanmar to ruin, and its rule is in jeopardy.
“The junta is not doing well militarily, politically, or economically ... so, I think they are making a fake peace invitation as an effort to buy time,” he said.
“Unity among the revolutionary forces right now is unprecedented. That’s why [the military] hopes to create misunderstanding between them.”
Political analyst Sai Kyi Zin Soe called the peace talks a “failure” because the four strongest armed groups declined the junta’s invitation to attend.
“The main reason they did not take the offer was not that because they don’t want to hold talks. What they want is a dialogue that leads to real peace,” he said.
“They are not attending because they don’t believe it is an invitation with a genuine desire for peace. The trust has been shattered.”
The military has made 12 invitations to the country’s armed ethnic groups since the February 2021 coup, but the April offering marked the first time Min Aung Hlaing said he would attend..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia urge the United States of America and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to take the opportunity of their upcoming summit in Washington to increase their pressure on the Myanmar military junta, which staged a coup d’état in February last year and has thrown the country into a state of chaos ever since.
The leaders of ASEAN and the United States have declared that they intend to enhance their strategic partnership for the mutual benefit of the peoples of ASEAN and the United States. In that spirit, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) advises that they should take concrete steps to address the inherent threat to peace, economic development and human security in Southeast Asia posed by the crisis in Myanmar.
“Let this 45th anniversary of US-ASEAN relations be the occasion for the US and ASEAN governments to begin a new phase in their relations that truly benefits the people and puts human rights and the prevention of atrocities, in Myanmar and elsewhere, at the top of the agenda. They can no longer ignore the threat that the junta in Myanmar poses to the security of millions of people at the heart of Southeast Asia,” said Charles Santiago, Member of Parliament from Malaysia, and APHR Chairperson.
The current crisis is wholly and solely caused by the junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, which overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February 2021. The Myanmar population has valiantly resisted the coup and, in order to impose its rule on the country, the military has committed widespread atrocities. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, these may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Over the last year, Myanmar’s military has completely ignored the ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus on Myanmar, which was agreed on in April 2021 and was also supported by the US. Violence continues unabated, there is no dialogue between the junta and forces resisting military rule, and humanitarian aid is not reaching the Myanmar people.
The Special Summit provides the perfect opportunity for the allies to work on coordinated measures to make Min Aung Hlaing and his junta pay the price for their failure to abide by an agreement they claimed to accept.
“Humanity is our common thread across the Pacific and across the world. We must stand together in the face of these atrocities, Asians and Americans, as we share the same concern for the people of Myanmar. Now is the time for ASEAN and the US to make their historic alliance truly meaningful to people in desperate need,” said Mercy Barends, MP in Indonesia and an APHR Board Member.
We urge the US and ASEAN to adopt much stronger measures than those taken so far, including the suspension of Myanmar’s membership in the group, travel bans in the region for Min Aung Hlaing and his generals, and targeted sanctions against the leaders of the coup. The US has already imposed some sanctions since the coup, but it should reinforce them and include the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a state conglomerate that has given 1.5 billion dollars in gas revenues to the junta.
We also urge the US and ASEAN governments to publicly meet with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), which represents the democratically elected government and receives support from the majority of the Myanmar people.
Lastly, we call on the United States and ASEAN to work together to urgently deliver the life-saving humanitarian aid that the Myanmar people need. This aid should be channeled as much as possible through Myanmar’s community-based and civil society organizations, to effectively reach those that need it the most. The United States and ASEAN member states, especially Thailand, should also welcome the people of Myanmar who are fleeing persecution and violence, and give them asylum.
APHR stands ready to assist the US and ASEAN as they formulate and carry out their policies to address this crisis, and will remain vigilant to ensure that the steps taken by the US and ASEAN truly serve to support the Myanmar people’s aspirations for human rights, peace and democracy..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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140.22 KB 123.36 KB 123.65 KB 420.95 KB
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"Dearest brave mothers of Myanmar,
I thank you all from the bottom of my heart for being amazing and wonderful mothers to all of us your children. On this special occasion of Mother’s Day we pray and send our best wishes and prayers to you all, specially to our dearest Amay, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, elected leader and the State Counsellor along so many brave mothers who remain in uncommunicable conditions under the brutal and bloodstained hands of the genocidal military generals in Myanmar. They are and you are not only the light of hope but truly our heroes, you carried us in your wombs, and you nurtured all these brave and peace -freedom loving children, sons, and daughters of Myanmar.
As sons and daughters of yours, children of Myanmar, we once again made our commitment and promise you that we will do everything we can to free your beloved children the people of Myanmar from darkness to light, from injustices to justice, from un-righteousness to righteousness, from despair to hope, from hate to love, from a reign of terror to a reign of peace, from genocidal military dictatorship to a flourishing federal democracy, and from tyranny to freedom.
Dearest mothers, thank you so much indeed for holding that unshakeable hope with us that justice is coming to our people, freedom is coming to our country, light is defeating the darkness in front of us, and righteousness is wiping out un-righteousness, love is prevailing over hate, truth is defeating the lies, and peace is winning over war.
Dearest mothers, we cannot wait to celebrate a Happy Mother’s Day with you in the new Myanmar, free Myanmar, true federal Democratic Myanmar. All these tears and pain we endure today will fruit tomorrow as peace, freedom, human rights and federal democracy for ALL the people of Myanmar regardless of race, religious, culture, languages, gender, background, ethnicity and the rights of ALL will be respected, protected and promoted including the women’s rights . Today, we are weeping because of the unspeakable pain, suffering, death and destruction caused by this cruel and brutal genocidal military dictatorship, but all these tears will become joy and happiness in tomorrow’s new and free Myanmar.
Lastly, I would like to reflect with gratitude to our countries “Democratic Mother” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who has worked tirelessly to nurture our democracy into a mature force for good in our nation..."
Source/publisher:
Dr. Sasa via Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Format :
pdf
Size:
33.24 KB
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Sub-title:
အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာကဏ္ဍနှင့် သက်မွေးပညာကဏ္ဍမှ ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများအတွက် သာတူညီမျှပညာရေးအစီအစဉ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်
Description:
"၁။ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာကဏ္ဍနှင့် သက်မွေးပညာကဏ္ဍမှ ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများအတွက် ကြားကာလ ပညာရေးပြင်ဆင်နေမှုများကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် အထောက်အကူပြုရန်၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအောင်မြင်မှုကို အထောက်အကူပြုရန်၊ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ်ပညာရေးကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် နှင့် အရည်အချင်းပြည့်မီသည့် လူ့စွမ်းအားရင်းမြစ်များ မွေးထုတ်ပေးနိုင်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၂။ ဖော်ပြပါပညာရေးရည်ရွယ်ချက်များနှင့်အညီ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ လည်းကောင်း၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ရ ယာယီတက္ကသိုလ်/ဒီဂရီကောလိပ်/သိပ္ပံကျောင်း ကောင်စီ များမှလည်းကောင်း ကြားကာလ ပညာရေးအစီအစဉ်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ ထိုကြားကာလပညာရေးအစီအစဉ်များတွင် တက်ရောက်သင်ယူနေသော ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများရှိသကဲ့သို့ စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဖိနှိပ်မှုများ နှင့် အခက်အခဲအမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် ကြားကာလပညာရေး အစီအစဉ်များတွင် ပါဝင်နိုင်ခြင်း မရှိကြသည့် ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုအသီးသီးတွင် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်အနစ်နာခံ၍ ပါဝင်နေကြသော ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများလည်း ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများ အားလုံးအတွက် သာတူညီမျှရှိ၍ အာမခံချက်ပေးနိုင်သည့် ပညာရေးမူဝါဒများနှင့် အစီအစဉ်များကို သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အစုအဖွဲ့အသီးသီးနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးတိုင်ပင်ပြီး ပြုလုပ်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
Language:
Format :
pdf
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265.84 KB
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"The National Unity Government (NUG) is deeply disappointed and concerned about the outcome of the
Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on May 6, 2022, in Phnom
Pehn, Cambodia.
The NUG has repeatedly reached out to the ASEAN chair and the ASEAN Special Envoy to convey our
openness to engage and discuss ways forward; however, our previous communication has not been
reciprocated until now. The NUG and other crucial stakeholders of Myanmar such as the Ethnic
Resistance Groups (EROs) and local humanitarian organizations have been deliberately excluded from
the consultative meeting. The outcome of the meeting has put the Myanmar Taskforce led by State
Administration Council (SAC) Ko Ko Hlaing at the center of ASEAN humanitarian response. This
effectively allows SAC arbitrarily to select regions and states and implementing partners to implement
the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Framework. This process poses a high risk of failure in
the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance without discrimination, legitimizing the SAC's
infrastructure, and politicizing humanitarian response by coercing Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)
to engage with SAC's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiations Committee.
The people of Myanmar continued to reject the SAC's illegitimate authoritarian rule and continuously
called for restoring democracy and civilian government. The exclusion of the NUG, EAOs, and local
humanitarian organizations in the consultative meeting fundamentally contradicts the principle and
conditions set out in the ASEAN Five Point Consensus. The SAC troops have continuously terrorised communities leading to continuous displacement; arbitrarily detaining civilians, activists and leaders of
democracy movements; and committing atrocities and war crimes.
The conditions on the ground and the people's trust deficit in the SAC will continue to hamper urgent
and effective delivery of humanitarian aid. With this, the NUG calls on the ASEAN leaders and donors
to utilize cross-border networks to deliver humanitarian assistance urgently in a manner not dependent
on the SAC's approval. This is the only way and has been the only way deliver aid to "hard-to-reach"
areas since the failed Coup. Furthermore, the NUG calls on the ASEAN leaders and donors to reconsider
the UN Special Envoys to Myanmar's recommendation to prioritize principled engagement with diverse
local humanitarian networks to effectively deliver aid to all communities in need without discrimination..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
110.92 KB 357.73 KB
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Description:
"1. The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was formed with the goal of
eliminating all forms of dictatorship, including military dictatorship, and of
building a new, federal democratic union. The NUCC’s convening of the First
People’s Assembly from 27-29th of January 2022 represents a historic milestone
toward this noble goal.
2. On that occasion, the First People’s Assembly adopted seven resolutions,
including a solemn pledge to ratify the Federal Democratic Charter.
3. The NUCC maintains a steadfast commitment to undertaking revolutionary
actions that further nationwide inclusion, equality, peace, and the building of a
Federal Democratic Union in full and equal partnership with dedicated
revolutionary organisations, many of which have been active for over seven
decades. Any actions that would serve to revitalise the undemocratic, militarydrafted 2008 Constitution - a constitution which the military terrorist junta itself
violated and which has since been abolished by the Committee Representing
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) - are fundamentally incompatible with the NUCC’s
shared goals and principles.
4. The 22 April 2022 invitation to in-person dialogue issued to ethnic
revolutionary organisations by the terrorist military dictator Min Aung Hlaing
represents just another disingenuous and hollow attempt to use the pretence of
dialogue as a mean to finding temporary relief to the political, military, diplomatic
and economic catastrophe it has brought upon itself. Legitimate political dialogue
with a military terrorist junta that continues to oppress and attack our people is
an impossibility.
5. This most recent invitation is but one in a litany of failed attempts at peace
dialogue between 2010 and 2020 - dialogues undermined by limitations
established by the now abolished 2008 Constitution. Furthermore, by seizing power
from the legitimate government under the flawed pretext of the 2008 Constitution,
the terrorist military junta has made clear that it has no genuine desire to achieve
a nationwide, sustainable peace and democracy.
6. The NUCC notes with appreciation those ethnic revolutionary organisations
who have definitively rejected the invitation issued by the terrorist military dictator
Min Aung Hlaing as of the date this statement is issued.
7. The NUCC hereby condemns the disingenuous invitation to so-called peace
talks issued by the military terrorist junta. The NUCC restates its call for all political
forces, ethnic revolutionary organisations, and people’s resistance forces to stand
with the people and resist all forms of dictatorship, including military dictatorship..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
52.19 KB 480.17 KB
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Description:
"၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ် မေလ၆ရက်နေ့တွင် ကမ္ဘောဒီးယားနိုင်ငံ ဖနွမ်းပင်၌ ကျင်းပသည့် အာဆီယံ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီပေးနိုင်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံအစည်းအဝေး၏ ရလဒ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက အလွန် စိတ်ပျက်မိပြီး စိုးရိမ်ပူပန်မိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အာဆီယံဥက္ကဌနှင့် အာဆီယံ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့ထံသို့ ရှေ့ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်မည့် နည်းလမ်းများကို ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာစွာ ဆွေးနွေးရန်၊ အကြိမ်ကြိမ် ဆက်သွယ်ခဲ့သော်လည်း ယခုအချိန်ထိ ပြန်လည် ဆက်သွယ်မှုမရှိသေးပါ။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ (EROs)/ တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့များ(EAOs)တို့နှင့် ဒေသတွင်း လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ကဲ့သို့သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြားအရေးပါသော သက်ဆိုင်သူများအား အတိုင်ပင်ခံအစည်းအဝေးမှ တမင်ဖယ်ထုတ် ထားပြီး ထိုသို့ဖယ်ထုတ်ထားခြင်းကြောင့် ဤအစည်းအဝေးရလဒ်သည် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ကိုကိုလှိုင် ဦးဆောင်သော အဖွဲ့အား အာဆီယံ လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ တုံ့ပြန်မှုတွင် ဗဟိုချက်နေရာ ရရှိစေခဲ့သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် အာဆီယံ လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီပေးပို့မှု မူဘောင်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် တိုင်းဒေသကြီးနှင့် ပြည်နယ်များနှင့် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်သူများကို ရွေးချယ်ခန့်အပ်ရန်ကိစ္စတို့ကို စစ်ကောင်စီက ဆောင်ရွက်ရေး အားပေးရာ ရောက်ပါသည်။ ထိုလုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့် ရရှိခြင်းကြောင့် ခွဲခြားမှုမရှိဘဲ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ အရေးပေါ်ပေးပို့ခြင်းများကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်မည်မဟုတ်သည့်အပြင် စစ်ကောင်စီ ၏စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ယန္တရားကို ပိုမိုခိုင်မာလာစေနိုင်သည်။ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့ (EAOs/ERO)များအား စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အမျိုးသားစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ရေး နှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး ကော်မတီတွင် ပါဝင်လာစေရန် စစ်ကောင်စီက နိုင်ငံရေး လုပ်ကွက်အဖြစ် ဖိအားပေးလာနိုင်ပါသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများသည် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ တရားမဝင်အာဏာရှင်အုပ်စိုးမှုကိုအစဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ငြင်းဆိုခဲ့သည်။ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် အရပ်သားအစိုးရပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရန် စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် တောင်းဆိုခဲ့ကြသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ/ တိုင်းရင်းသား လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် ဒေသတွင်း လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို အတိုင်ပင်ခံအစည်းအဝေးတွင် ချန်လှပ် ထားခြင်းသည် အာဆီယံအခြေခံမူငါးချက်တွင်ဖော်ပြထားသည့်မူနှင့် အခြေအနေများကို အခြေခံအားဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်ပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲ့များသည် စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ရပ်ရွာများကို အကြမ်းဖက်ဖိနှိပ်ခြင်း၊ အရပ်သားများ၊ တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှား သူများနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုခေါင်းဆောင်များကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှု များနှင့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် ရပ်ရွာများလည်း အဆက်မပြတ် ပြောင်းရွှေ့ နေကြရပါသည်။
လက်တွေ့ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသော မြေပြင်အခြေအနေများ နှင့် စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ယုံကြည်မှု ကင်းမဲ့လာခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် အရေးပေါ် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ ထိရောက်စွာပေးပို့ခြင်းကို အဟန့်အတားဖြစ်စေပါသည်။ ယင်းကြောင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့်ပတ်သက်ခြင်းမရှိဘဲ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာအကူအညီများ အမြန်ပေးအပ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော်ကွန်ရက်များကို အသုံးပြုမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် အလှူရှင်များအား အသိပေး အကြောင်းကြား ထားပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤသည်မှာ မအောင်မြင်သောအာဏာသိမ်းမှုနောက်ပိုင်း “လက်လှမ်းမီရန် ခက်ခဲသော” ဒေသများသို့ အကူအညီများ ပေးအပ်သည့် တခုတည်းသော နည်းလမ်းလည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် အလှူရှင်များအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အထူးသံတမန်အဖွဲ့၏ အကြံပြုချက်ဖြစ်သည့် မတူကွဲပြားသောဒေသတွင်း လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုကွန်ရက်များနှင့် အခြေခံကျကျ ထိတွေ့ ဆက်ဆံမှုအား တည်ဆောက်ကာ လိုအပ်နေသော အသိုက်အဝန်းအားလုံးကို ထိထိရောက်ရောက် ပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းပါသည် ။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-07
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"Since the military coup d’état on February 1, 2021, Myanmar has fallen into a state of chaos.
The military’s crackdown on anti-coup protestors and the clashes between the military and the People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations have resulted in a devastating humanitarian crisis across the country. According to UNHCR’s latest emergency update, an estimated 268,000 people have been displaced within Myanmar and an additional 22,000 have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Furthermore, the collapse of the country’s healthcare infrastructure following the coup has severely amplified the effects of COVID-19.
The need for humanitarian aid is obvious. However, delivering resources to the most vulnerable has proven to be extraordinarily challenging with the Tatmadaw’s active effort to immobilize aid organizations. An analysis of the battle fronts and the state of territorial control, however, reveals local aid infrastructure and underutilized human resources in the borderlands, through which donors and international organizations could more effectively channel humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar.
Last year’s coup was a shock to the web of humanitarian and development efforts in the country. The largest international donors and organizations responded to the military takeover with measures to disassociate themselves with the junta. USAID, which previously worked intimately with the pre-coup civilian government, redirected $42.4 million of assistance away from government strengthening projects to initiatives to support civil society organizations. Similarly, the European Union and Japan have suspended their support for development projects to avoid financial entanglement with the military. These donors, balancing their political stance vis-à-vis the military government and the severe need for aid, have established emergency funds. For example, the government of Japan decided last July to provide an emergency grant aid of $5.8 million for humanitarian assistance to the populations in the southeast area of Myanmar. The delivery of humanitarian assistance through existing infrastructure, however, has proven to be extremely difficult.
In the months following the military takeover, the Tatmadaw imposed travel restrictions on domestic and international humanitarian workers and blocked major roads and aid convoys. Physical attacks and arbitrary arrests of humanitarian and healthcare workers, and raids of local NGO offices, have also been reported. Furthermore, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the junta destroyed emergency supplies and withheld oxygen from private clinics and charity organizations. These measures have led to severe constraints on the delivery of emergency resources to the country’s most vulnerable people, all against the backdrop of an increasingly dire banking and supply chain crisis that is resulting in severe shortages of food, medicine, and other essentials.
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An analysis of the current conflict landscape and status of territorial control can offer crucial insight into ways aid organizations can circumvent military obstructions and thereby offer better aid in Myanmar. Currently, the fighting in the country is taking places on several fronts and involves a multitude of actors. Firstly, sporadic battles are occurring across the country between the forces of the Tatmadaw and the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). The PDFs form the armed wing of the National Union Government, a parallel government formed by a group of ousted elected lawmakers and members of parliament after the coup. Soldiers in the PDFs are mostly former university students and activists. In the rural areas, the PDFs are mostly engaged in guerrilla warfare, bombing military resources and intercepting military trucks on major roads. In the urban areas, particularly in the Yangon and Mandalay regions, PDFs have organized protests and conducted operations to actively target military and police officers. The Tatmadaw has responded with the arrests and killings of PDF soldiers and their family members.
There are also ongoing clashes between the military and ethnic armed groups. Myanmar houses many ethnic groups, and several have established political and/or armed entities to represent the interest of their people. Some groups, such as the Kachin in the north, the Shan in the east and Karen in the southeast, hold significant control over their respective regions. Since the country’s independence in 1948, these armed groups have consolidated their positions by establishing government institutions that are independent from the central state and by housing powerful armies that have been intermittently engaged in battles with the military. As a result, the Tatmadaw has little control over and limited access to some borderlands as opposed to the urban Burman-dominated central regions. These ethnically controlled border regions are referred by Myanmar natives as lumyaukneimyei, or Free Regions.
The lack of military access to the Free Regions offers an opportunity for the international aid community to get around the challenges of aid delivery posed by the Tatmadaw. The harassment of aid workers and other efforts by the military to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid has occurred either in the Burman-majority central regions or on major roads that are connected to significant urban areas. Many local aid workers, along with protestors from the cities, have fled to these Free Regions due to the draconian crackdown by the military. The large exodus from the central Burman area and the battles between the Tatmadaw, PDFs, and EAOs, has increased the number of internally displaced people in the Free Regions. Aside from a shortage of food, there is a severe lack of medical supplies. Many of the refugees who have managed to reach the free regions suffer from artillery wounds inflicted by the military, while an increase in waterborne diseases has been reported in the makeshift camps.
A further review of the existing aid infrastructure in these Free Regions reveals great potential to deliver aid. Firstly, there are many local aid groups active in the ethnic states. Many have established a working relationship with their respective ethnic armed groups, which have offered them shelter from the harassment of the Tatmadaw. The majority of these local aid groups, however, are very poorly funded. International donors should divert resources to support these local organizations. Furthermore, among the people that have fled the urban areas to the Free Regions are many capable professionals, including doctors, nurses, and humanitarian workers, who were persecuted due to their participation in anti-military protests. Currently, more than 500 trained doctors and nurses have set up emergency units in the Karen region. Unfortunately, they are again functioning with highly limited resources. Supporting these emergency units would be an effective way to offer some basic health services to the many displaced people in the most vulnerable region in the country.
The humanitarian situation in Myanmar is dire. More than ever, help from the international community is needed. As part of its effort to consolidate power since the coup, the military has engaged in destructive activities to immobilize the humanitarian aid infrastructure. The analysis of territorial control however reveals a path through which international organizations can circumvent around military interventions. International organizations should focus on delivery resources in the borderlands of the country where the military has limited access. Capitalizing on local efforts by supporting the poorly funded organizations in the borderlands will be most effective in helping the most unprotected in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
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Individual Documents
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Sub-title:
Long fighting for its own independence, the Karen National Union is providing protection and training to those opposed to the military.
Description:
"When the Myanmar military seized power on February 1 last year, the country’s oldest major ethnic armed group, the Karen National Union, was also one of the first to condemn the coup.
“We cannot accept the military taking power and detaining the country’s leaders. This is a massive obstacle and challenge in transitioning to democracy,” the KNU said in a statement the day after the power grab, accusing the military of violating its own 2008 constitution.
Soon afterwards, troops from the KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army, were seen providing security to protesters in Karen state, which lies along Myanmar’s border with Thailand. Elsewhere in the country, there was no such protection. The military embarked on a campaign of brutal violence against unarmed protesters, killing hundreds of people.
A year later, those images of the KNU protecting protesters have become symbolic of its role as the backbone of Myanmar’s new age of resistance. The group has provided military training to newly formed anti-coup armed groups, protection to political dissidents and safe passage for fugitives fleeing military-controlled areas.
“KNU people are very kind and very good at guerrilla warfare,” said Htet*, a 34-year-old resistance fighter who joined a network of armed groups in Yangon known as Urban Guerillas or UGs.
Htet and all other sources interviewed for this story spoke to Al Jazeera in person from an undisclosed location.
Last year, Htet travelled from Yangon to KNU territory to receive training after watching soldiers shoot down unarmed, peaceful protesters. “The military arrested everyone and shot everyone. I needed to know how to fight back,” he said.
KNU spokesman Taw Nee says the new generation of resistance fighters are “very active and want revenge”. While he praises their motivation, he also says it has sometimes been difficult for the KNU to manage the massive influx of inexperienced fighters hailing from a hodgepodge of disorganised, nascent armed groups.
Taw Nee said that had led to some problems, like resistance fighters posting videos of battles on social media, accidentally exposing sensitive information, or doctors insisting on fighting on the front lines when they would be more useful as field medics.
“But they’ve improved a lot,” Taw Nee said, grinning like a proud father. “They have a lot of experience within a few months.”
Htet took that experience and put it to use when he returned to Yangon.
“There were 10 soldiers driving. We knew the route they usually took so we planted two bombs. After that, we heard a lot of screaming and then they start bang bang bang,” he said, describing a pipe bomb attack in Yangon’s Insein township.
In another incident, they planted multiple bombs in Hlegu township, killing about eight soldiers in the first blast. When two more came to investigate, they detonated a second, killing them as well.
When asked if he ever feels bad about killing soldiers, Htet shakes his head emphatically. “They are very bad people,” he insisted.
Protecting peaceful resistance
The KNU does not only support armed resistance but also provides support, protection and safe passage to peaceful political dissidents.
A police officer from Yangon, who deserted when ordered to use violence against protesters, told Al Jazeera that the KNU also welcomed him, despite his decision not to join the fighting.
The 25-year-old, who joined the police force when he was just 19, said he deserted on March 6 of last year as violent crackdowns began to escalate. “They ordered me to crack down on protesters and arrest people. My superior officer said to use rubber bullets and then to use real bullets,” he said.
He praised the KNU for providing him with food and a safe house, but said there were still some close calls. “The military attacked our camp and we had to run away,” he said, explaining that a few other dissidents were captured during the raid.
Prominent activist Thet Swe Win fled Yangon in March 2021, sheltering in KNU territory for about seven months. “I know myself, I wouldn’t be a good soldier, but I respect the armed struggle as a key component of the revolution,” he told Al Jazeera.
The tattoos that cover Thet Swe Win’s arms tell the story of peace but also resistance: block letters spelling HAKUNA MATATA [Swahili for ‘no trouble’ and popularised in the film The Lion King] a peace sign, a man with a hammer smashing a Nazi swastika.
Despite being one of the most vocal advocates for minority rights in Myanmar, even Thet Swe Win was not fully prepared for the reality of life for Karen people. “Our understanding before was too shallow,” he said.
Thet Swe Win says while there is a mutual animosity between the Bamar majority and the Karen, the ethnic minority are the ones who are oppressed. “The only Burmese they see are the soldiers. The ones who kill and loot and rape and burn their houses,” he said.
Thet Swe Win says in many rural areas, there are no schools or hospitals. He saw one pregnant woman being carried in a hammock up mountains through the jungle to the nearest clinic to give birth.
“Many have no proper houses, just bamboo shelters, because the soldiers always raid and burn their villages,” he said.
Karen state at war
Fighting exploded across Karen state in December of last year, when the military raided Lay Kay Kaw town. Soldiers arrested dozens of dissidents in hiding, including two elected lawmakers from the National League for Democracy, which secured a landslide victory in the country’s last elections in November 2020.
The military has cited unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in the poll in an attempt to justify its coup, but for the elected lawmakers their emphatic win is the source of their legitimacy.
They set up their own administration called the National Unity Government soon after being forced from office and a representative of the civilian government continues to hold Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations. The military, meanwhile, has declared the NUG and its anti-coup armed groups, known as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), as “terrorist” organisations.
Since the raid on Lay Kay Kaw, fighting has spread to many other parts of the state. Taw Nee says there are clashes nearly every day, with tens of thousands of civilians displaced.
Taw Nee says morale within the Myanmar military is “very, very low” and claims fighting would be over soon if the military did not have air support.
Taw Nee says most of the PDFs operating in Karen State have been brought under the umbrella of the KNLA with a mixed command structure. There’s a “joint coalition committee at every brigade level” and if a unit includes PDF soldiers, the commander comes from the KNLA while the deputy is from the PDF.
“They wear KNLA uniforms, but they don’t speak Karen,” he said, laughing.
While there was an anti-military uprising in 1988, with some choosing the path of armed resistance, it was not nearly as successful as today’s revolution. Taw Nee says back then most people accepted the military’s promise of an election in 1990 and “calmed down quickly”.
“In 2021, it was not like that, it was totally different,” he said, noting that young people have had “a lot of experience over the last 10 years in an open society” and aren’t willing to go back.
History repeats itself
But Taw Nee also worries that history could repeat itself in other ways.
After the military refused to recognise the NLD’s landslide election victory in 1990, the KNU allied itself with a similar parallel administration known as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma.
“Then when The Lady was released from house arrest, they changed everything,” he said.
The Lady is Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s overthrown civilian leader, whose reputation was tarnished internationally after she defended the military’s atrocities against the mostly Muslim Rohingya minority.
Many ethnic armed groups also felt that once Aung San Suu Kyi came to power in 2016, she sided with the military against them in peace negotiations. She is currently in military custody in an unknown location, but there is concern within the KNU that her release could create divisions within the multi-ethnic resistance.
“If the Lady is released, will you [the NUG] change your mind? They couldn’t answer right away with this,” Taw Nee said.
For now, he says the NUG and KNU are “all together” and he remains optimistic about the future. “The mind has changed a lot towards ethnic people,” since the coup, he said.
Htet, the resistance fighter, says the new generation of revolutionaries has greater respect for the KNU, which has trained them, supported them and fought by their side.
He still sees the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar and has joined them in a civilian capacity since being forced to flee Yangon. But he says the parallel government needs to do more.
“If [the NUG] gave us more guns, more weapons, we will win faster,” he said, claiming most weapons come from the KNU or donations from the general population.
Even with limited support, Htet remains confident the revolution will succeed.
“We are more and more powerful now. We can make better weapons and bombs. A lot of PDFs and UGs are learning to liberate their towns.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Al Jazeera" (Qatar)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"For the Myanmar people, the junta’s promised new election is nothing more than an attempt to legitimize military rule in Myanmar, and so the people won’t accept or participate in the regime’s so-called poll even if it happens.
The people have clearly demonstrated that stand ever since last year’s coup by displaying placards during mass protests saying “Reject the coup, Respect our votes”. No one can have any trust in any election held by the military regime which rejected the outcome of the 2020 general election, robbed the people of their votes and brutalized their lives.
Yet the junta and its accomplices still believe that they can trick the people again with a sham election and so prolong their rule.
When Myanmar’s voters cast their votes in the November 2020 general election, they expected more of the new, democratic Myanmar. But their hopes and expectations were shattered when the Myanmar military seized power on February 1, 2021 claiming the poll was marred by “widespread electoral fraud”. That was despite the international and domestic election observers who said the vote was free and fair.
Soon after the putsch, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced a five-point roadmap, which included reforming the Union Election Commission (UEC) and pledging to hold a “free and fair” election and then handing over power to the winning party.
Subsequently, he packed the UEC with his own handpicked men to oversee any post-coup voting and annulled the results of the 2020 election won by the Daw Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) party in a landslide.
The junta-run UEC is now led by U Thein Soe, a former Judge Advocate-General in the military, who previously oversaw the 2010 general election, a poll that was widely regarded as rigged.
Junta spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun said last week that the regime was making strenuous efforts to hold an election soon.
“We are working to hold a general election in every part of the country,” he said, while calling on the public and stakeholders to work together with the murderous junta to make the new vote happen.
Dr. Lian Mmung Sakhong, vice chairman of the Chin National Front, one of the ethnic armed organizations which has allied with Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), responded that the regime’s plan is simply an attempt to extend its rule for as long as possible.
“An election has just been held. They annulled it as they couldn’t accept [the result] and now want to hold a new one to make people vote only for them. It is totally intolerable,” the ethnic leader, who also heads the NUG’s federal ministry, told The Irrawaddy.
The military’s proxy and allied parties suffered humiliating defeats in the 2020 general election. Those parties will contest the junta’s election and the regime will make sure that one of them, or a coalition of them, will win.
It is also widely believed that junta chief Min Aung Hlaing wants to be an “elected” president, and so will be nominated for the presidency by the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party.
The NUG knows how previous military regimes held sham elections, as in 2010, and in a cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the NUG’s acting president Duwa Lashi La warned people not to trust the junta.
“They have never kept their promises,” he said, referring to the coup leader’s promise to hold a credible poll and hand over power to the winning party.
Since the coup, the regime has also been working on disbanding the NLD, by far the country’s most popular political party, over alleged electoral violations and has jailed its leaders and senior members, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, on spurious charges.
Ko Tayzar San, one of the most prominent anti-regime protest leaders, said that no one can deny that the NLD is the party which achieves the most public support or that the 2020 election reflected the general will of the public.
The NLD has won landslide victories in every election it has contested. In the 2020 poll it won 82 per cent of all elected seats.
He said that the people see clearly that the junta’s proposed poll is a fake election designed to solidify the dictatorship and that they won’t accept or take part in it.
“We, the people, strongly oppose the coup and won’t accept any election to be held by them [the junta] at all,” said Ko Tayzar San.
He also reminded any countries who support the illegitimate junta’s plan that they are going against the will of the Myanmar people.
Late last month, the ambassadors of China and India held separate meetings with the junta-run UEC to discuss the regime’s planned new election. During the meetings, the ambassadors revealed their interest in the electoral processes of the junta’s planned poll.
“I would like to say to the two countries to stop their direct or indirect support to the terrorist military and respect the voices of Myanmar people,” Ko Tayzar San said.
Sai Leik of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), one of Myanmar’s strongest ethnic political parties, also told The Irrawaddy that the party hasn’t taken part in the junta’s organized electoral process since the coup, including meetings with the UEC.
Founded in 1988, the SNLD won the largest number of seats after the NLD in the 1990 general election, the results of which were ignored by former dictator Than Shwe. Along with the NLD, the SNLD boycotted the rigged 2010 election. In 2020, it won the third-highest number of elected seats.
Like the NLD, the SNLD has been threatened with disbandment by the junta-run UEC. Sai Leik of the SNLD said no election can be possible until the regime has been brought to justice for its brutality and violence against civilians.
Over 1,800 people, including more than a hundred children, have been killed by junta forces since the coup, while over 13,000 people have been arrested for opposing the regime.
Junta arson attacks have destroyed over 11, 000 civilian houses in an effort to terrorize the population. At the same time, the resistance movement is waging armed struggle against the regime.
Last year, Min Aung Hlaing suggested that the new election could be held sometime in 2023. But after renewing the state of emergency again in February this year for another six months, the junta chief said that the election would take place when the situation in the country was “peaceful and stable”
Political analyst U Than Soe Naing said that the junta’s planned election is less likely to happen in 2023, given the escalating armed resistance against the regime. Even if the regime makes it happen, it won’t be free and fair, he added.
“It would just become a state-sponsored fabrication plotted by the junta and its allied parties who have never won in any free and fair elections in Myanmar,” said U Than Soe Naing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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"The volatile situation in Myanmar following the 01 February 2021 coup has increased armed conflict and subsequent population displacement both within the country and across borders, including in Thailand.
Since 17 March, 2,655 Myanmar refugees have crossed into Thailand, according to the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The refugees have sought safety in Tak province and there are 1,543 refugees remaining on the Thai side of the border according to the RTG.
Refugees are sheltered in temporary safety areas (TSA), which are placed under the general jurisdiction of the Royal Thai Army by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) established by the RTG in March 2021.
SITUATION OVERVIEW ON THE THAI MYANMAR BORDER
In Kayin State, the Tatmadaw conducted airstrikes on 10 April, targeting opposition groups as fresh fighting broke out for control of the town of Lay Kay Kaw in Myawaddy Township. The Tatmadaw is believed to be reinforcing the area with more manpower. Lay Kay Kaw has mainly been under the control of the Karen National Union (KNU) in recent months, but the Tatmadaw has at times sought to reassert control, and fighting broke out last December. The KNU reported that March had been the deadliest month for the Tatmadaw in 2022, with more than 400 soldiers killed in over 500 clashes.
On 15 and 17 April, heavy fighting took place in the area opposite Umphang District. Myanmar troops and its ally, the Border Guard Force (BGF), are in control of the regions from Lay Kay Kaw to Waw Lay. The Tatmadaw have expanded their military presence in Law Kay Kaw, Thay Baw Boe, U Kra Tha, and Kanele Tha.
They have carried out a series of airstrikes and surveillance in these areas. The offensive has resumed with both air and ground operations. Myanmar troops and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) are now stationed in strategic locations along the border opposite Mae Sot and Phop Phra districts. In the Tanintharyi region, fighting near the Thai border has been defused. On 17 and 18 April, protests against the Military occurred in Taku Village and Pulaw Township in Myeik District and Ye Phyu township - Dawei district.
As of 2 May, there have been 578,200 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar since February, of whom 236,000 are in the southeast provinces – Kayah, Shan, Kayin, Mon States, and Tanintharyi and Bago regions..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"As the National League for Democracy (NLD) was preparing to start a second term on 1 February 2021, the military seized power in Myanmar. Demonstrations erupted across the country in opposition to the coup. The military responded violently, leading to the deaths of hundreds of demonstrators. As the crackdown intensified, many communities began to take up arms to defend themselves, leading to the formation of local defense forces. Elected lawmakers ousted in the coup eventually established the National Unity Government (NUG), which subsequently declared a “defensive war” on the military in early September (Guardian, 7 September 2021).
Demonstrations in opposition to the military coup in 2021 were large-scale and widespread. ACLED records over 6,000 anti-coup demonstration events throughout the year.1 While the demonstrations remained largely peaceful, the military frequently responded with deadly violence, in many cases firing live rounds at demonstrators’ heads (Human Rights Watch, 2 December 2021). Women have played a key role in the movement (Al Jazeera, 25 April 2021), often standing on the front lines at demonstrations (Time, 31 May 2021); in turn, they have been met with targeted violence (GIWPS, 28 January 2022). According to ACLED data, Myanmar was the deadliest country in the world for demonstrators in 2021 (for more, see ACLED’s infographic: Deadly Demonstrations). Despite the crackdown, demonstrations have continued, often taking the form of flash-mob style events.
The degree of violence against civilians by state forces since the coup has been particularly severe, with a 620% increase in such events recorded in 2021 compared to 2020. Multiple cases of civilians being burned to death have been reported (Myanmar Now, 14 December 2021). On 24 December, for example, more than 30 people, including two aid workers, were burned to death by the military in Hpruso township in Kayah state. Earlier in December, in Done Taw village in Sagaing region, 11 villagers were burned to death by the military. As well, amid mass arrests of people accused of expressing opposition to the coup, the military has tortured detainees and committed acts of sexual violence against women and men (Myanmar Now, 3 January 2021).
Hundreds of local defense forces have emerged across the country in response to the ongoing military violence. Several groups were formed independently of the People’s Defense Force (PDF) under the NUG. However, the NUG has moved to consolidate the activity of local defense groups under a central command structure (Irrawaddy, 29 October 2021). Local defense groups have aimed to make the country ungovernable by the military junta. In some locations, where local defense groups have gained an advantage, such as in areas of Sagaing and Magway regions, ousted lawmakers and other activists have set up alternative governing systems (Myanmar Now, 12 November 2021). As well, many civil servants have continued the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), refusing to work for the military junta and thus further denying the military the capacity to govern at the local level.
In an effort to further threaten civilians opposed to its rule, the military junta has supported the formation of local militias called Pyu Saw Htee (Frontier Myanmar, 14 June 2021). These militias have targeted civilians and have engaged in clashes with local defense forces. In 2021, ACLED records the most activity by Pyu Saw Htee groups in Sagaing region. Aside from the formation of military-backed militias, amid defections and a paucity of new recruits, the military has also ordered family members of soldiers to attend military training (Irrawaddy, 7 December 2021).
The response of ethnic armed groups to the military coup has been mixed. Notably, though, groups like the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) and Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) have supported anti-coup activists who fled to their areas along the border. Battles in Kachin and Kayin states, which had been relatively limited in 2020, thus increased significantly in 2021. At times, troops from these groups have fought alongside local defense forces. For example, clashes between the military and the KIO/KIA have expanded into Sagaing region as the KIO/KIA has supported local defense groups. Sagaing region has been home to over one-fifth of all organized political violence recorded nationally since the coup.
What to watch for in 2022:
While the military staged its coup under the pretense of combating electoral fraud, and has since claimed it will hold new elections in 2023 (The Diplomat, 2 August 2021), it has subsequently set about systematically dismantling the NLD. NLD members have been detained on politically motivated charges. NLD offices have been destroyed, and members’ homes seized and sealed (Development Media Group, 2 December 2021). Further, the military and its militias have tortured and killed NLD members (BBC, 8 June 2021). The military looks poised to continue this campaign of violence against its main electoral opposition before holding any elections.
The military’s ongoing use of violence means that local defense forces are likely to continue to emerge in the coming year, while existing groups move towards forming alliances to strengthen their operating capacity. Alliances with ethnic armed groups are also likely to persist, despite the challenges of bringing such groups under the formal command of the NUG. The ability of local defense groups to gain and maintain control over territory – or at least prevent the military from being able to govern – will be critical to the success of the anti-coup movement. Coordination between armed and unarmed elements of the resistance movement will also be key in consolidating its gains (Myanmar Now, 21 January 2022). In 2022, resistance to the junta will continue, with the military unlikely to succeed in quelling a population so deeply opposed to its rule.
Further Reading
Deadly Demonstrations: Fatalities From State Engagement on the Rise
Myanmar’s Spring Revolution
Violence Targeting Women in Politics: 10 Countries to Watch in 2022
Glossary
Demonstrations: This term is used to refer collectively to all events coded with event type protests, as well as all events coded with sub-event type violent demonstration under the riots event type.
Disorder: This term is used to refer collectively to both political violence and demonstrations.
Event: The fundamental unit of observation in ACLED is the event. Events involve designated actors – e.g. a named rebel group, a militia or state forces. They occur at a specific named location (identified by name and geographic coordinates) and on a specific day. ACLED currently codes for six types of events and 25 types of sub-events, both violent and non-violent.
Political violence: This term is used to refer collectively to ACLED’s violence against civilians, battles, and explosions/remote violence event types, as well as the mob violence sub-event type of the riots event type. It excludes the protests event type. Political violence is defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation.
Organized political violence: This term is used to refer collectively to ACLED’s violence against civilians, battles, and explosions/remote violence event types. It excludes the protests and riots event types. Political violence is defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation. Mob violence is not included here as it is spontaneous (not organized) in nature.
Violence targeting civilians: This term is used to refer collectively to ACLED’s violence against civilians event type and the excessive force against protesters sub-event type of the protests event type, as well as specific explosions/remote violence events and riots events where civilians are directly targeted..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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Sub-title:
ပညာရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာနမှအရည်အသွေးပြည့်ဝသည့်ကြားကာလအဆင့်မြင့်နှင့်သက်မွေးပညာရေး လုပ်ငန်းများဆောင်ရွက်နေခြင်းအား အသိပေးကြေညာခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် စစ်ကျွန်ပညာရေးကို သပိတ်မှောက်ကာ ပြည်သူ့အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု(CDM) ပြုလုပ်နေကြသော အမှန်တရားကို မြတ်နိုးကျင့်သုံးနေကြသည့် ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများ အတွက် အာမခံချက်ရှိပြီး တရားမျှတသော ကြားကာလပညာရေးကို အမြဲမပြတ် အလေးပေး ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပြီး ၎င်းတို့၏ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးယန္တရားကို လည်ပတ်စေသော အသုံးချခံပညာရေးစနစ်တွင် ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်နေသူများကို Non-CDM များအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြောင်း သက်ဆိုင်ရာကျောင်းကောင်စီအသီးသီးမှ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှလည်း ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၃/၂၀၂၁)၊ (၁၁/၂၀၂၁)၊ (၂၀/၂၀၂၁) နှင့် (၄၀/၂၀၂၁) တို့ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အဓမ္မနည်းလမ်းအမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် စစ်ကျွန်ပညာရေးယန္တရားလည်ပတ်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် တက္ကသိုလ်များ ဖွင့်ရန် အားထုတ်ခြင်း၊ တက္ကသိုလ်၀င်တန်းအောင် စာမေးပွဲများ ကျင်းပခြင်း၊ တက္ကသိုလ်ပထမနှစ် ၀င်ခွင့်များ ခေါ်ယူခြင်း တို့ပြုလုပ်ကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ကြိုးစားနေရာတွင် အဆိုပါယန္တရားတွင် ပါ၀င်နေသော ကျောင်းသား၊ကျောင်းသူများအား Non-CDM ကျောင်းသား၊ကျောင်းသူများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ပါသည်။ (၂၀၂၀)ပြည့်နှစ်တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ဝင်တန်း အောင်ထားသော်လည်း စစ်ကောင်စီ၏တက္ကသိုလ်ဝင်ခွင့်ကို လျှောက်ထား ခြင်းမရှိသော ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများကို CDM ကျောင်းသား၊ကျောင်းသူများအဖြစ် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင် အပ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ဖိအားအမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် တက္ကသိုလ်၀င်ခွင့်လျှောက်ခဲ့ရပြီး ဝင်ခွင့်ရသွားသော်လည်း ကျောင်းတက်ခြင်းမပြုဘဲ စစ်ကျွန်ပညာရေးအား သပိတ်မှောက်သည့် တက္ကသိုလ်၀င်တန်း အောင်မြင်ထားသူ ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူ လူငယ်များကို သက်ဆိုင်ရာကျောင်းကောင်စီအသီးသီးမှ CDM ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများဟု မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားရှိသည်ကို ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ တော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများ ပညာသင်ယူ ခွင့်မဆုံးရှုံးစေရေး အတွက် သက်ဆိုင်ရာကျောင်း ကောင်စီ အသီးသီးမှလည်း ကြားကာလသင်ကြားရေး အစီအစဉ် များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသကဲ့သို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှလည်း Open Access Education/ Open University (OU) အား ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပပညာရှင်များ၏ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုဖြင့် ဖော်ဆောင်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် သင်ကြားရေးအစီအစဉ်များတွင် သက်မွေးနှင့်နည်းပညာဆိုင်ရာ သင်တန်းများ ကိုလည်း ထည့်သွင်း သင်ကြားသွားနိုင်ရန် စီစဉ်ထားပါသည်။
၅။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပညာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ နှင့် ရွေ့ပြောင်းကျောင်းသားပညာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်လက်တွဲ၍ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ်ပညာရေးကို ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပညာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ နှင့် ရွေ့ပြောင်းကျောင်းသားပညာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ကျင်းပသော တက္ကသိုလ်ဝင်တန်း သို့မဟုတ် အထက်တန်း (၁၀ တန်း) စာမေးပွဲများအောင်မြင်လာသော ကျောင်းသား၊ကျောင်းသူများသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပညာရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် တက္ကသိုလ်၊ဒီဂရီကောလိပ်၊သိပ္ပံများ မှ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည့် ကြားကာလ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာ၊ သက်မွေးပညာများကို သင်ယူခွင့်ရှိမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၆။ Open Access Education/ Open University (OU)တွင် အောက်ပါအစီအစဉ် (၃) ရပ်ဖြင့်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။
(က)ကိုဗစ်ကပ်ရောဂါနှင့် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကြောင့် ရပ်တန့်ခဲ့ရသော အတန်းပညာရေးများ အတွက် ဆရာဆရာမ၊ ကျောင်းသူ ကျောင်းသား သမဂ္ဂများနှင့် ကျောင်းကောင်စီများ၏ သဘောတူညီမှု ဖြင့် ဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
(ခ)(၂၀၂၀) ခုနှစ်တက္ကသိုလ်ဝင်တန်းအောင် ကျောင်းသား၊ ကျောင်းသူများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသား ဒေသကျောင်းများ နှင့်ရွှေ့ပြောင်းကျောင်းသား၊ကျောင်းသူများအတွက် တက္ကသိုလ် မရောက်မီ ၎င်းတို့သိသင့်သိထိုက်သော အသိပညာ၊ အတတ်ပညာများ ရနိုင်ရန်အတွက် Core Curriculum များကို Certificate Course (သို့မဟုတ်) Diploma သင်တန်းများအဖြစ် ပို့ချနိုင်ရန် ပြင်ဆင်နေပါသည်။
(ဂ)သတ်မှတ်ချက်နှင့် ကိုက်ညီသော စိတ်ပါဝင်စားသည့် မည်သူမဆို လွတ်လပ်စွာတက်ရောက် လေ့လာ သင်ယူနိုင်မည့် Certificate Course (သို့မဟုတ်) Diploma သင်တန်းများအဖြစ် ပို့ချနိုင်ရန် ပြင်ဆင်နေပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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Format :
pdf
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Description:
"This is the US Campaign for Burma’s fifteenth monthly On-The-Ground in Burma briefer! This month’s briefer will review the recent U.S. genocide determination and the necessary steps to turn the Rohingya genocide recognition into action, as well as share a response from leaders from the Rohingya Women’s Development Network (RWDN), Karenni National Women’s Organization (KNWO), and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG).
This month’s briefer includes:
April highlights
An in-depth analysis on the U.S. genocide determination and the necessary steps moving forward
Four major policy recommendations
Responses to the genocide determination from the RWDN, KNWO, and the KHRG
An overview of IDP issues and rights abuses in each ethnic state and central Burma
As the conflict escalates in Burma between the pro-junta militias, anti-coup forces, and the military, so has the violence and rights deprivations in ethnic regions and central Burma. Without strong tangible action, the Burmese junta will continue to commit crimes against humanity with impunity..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Campaign for Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Genocide, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.77 MB
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Description:
"Dr. Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong is the vice-chairman of the Chin political organization the Chin National Front as well as the federal union affairs minister for Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG). In this interview with The Irrawaddy, he dismisses the regime’s recent invitation for peace talks to the country’s ethnic armed groups, the junta’s exclusion of the NUG and its armed wing, the people’s defense forces (PDFs), from the talks as impractical and how the military has always obstructed the formation of a federal democracy union since 1962.
What is your view on Min Aung Hlaing’s call for face-to-face talks with leaders of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) for peace?
Min Aung Hlaing seized power illegally. It is a proposal made by an illegitimate military leader and the offer is therefore illegitimate. The [military-backed] government held talks with us on August 18, 2011, and signed the NCA [Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement] and we continued to engage in dialogue with the elected government from the 2015 general election.
And we implemented the peace process according to that dialogue.
All the peace process implemented in that period was based on the NCA, which is the pact between the EAOs and the elected government. It is the dialogue between the government and EAOs and thus it is legitimate. The NCA was signed with the government, not the military.
If dialogue is to be held, the NUG is the only government elected by the people.
There will be discussions and consultations between the NUG and EAOs. We have already done it. We have designed a federal charter together and adopted principles for federalism and democracy.
So what Min Aung Hlaing has done is wrong.
There is a question about if the dialogue is required considering the NCA. The NCA was signed to hold talks during a ceasefire and then to hold the Union Peace Conferences to sign a Union Accord.
The aim of signing the Union Accord was to amend the constitution. Now people no longer accept the 2008 Constitution. And elected parliamentarians have also announced that it has scrapped it.
The objective of talks at different levels is to amend the 2008 Constitution. But the constitution no longer exists and there is no point in holding talks for that purpose.
Min Aung Hlaing does not have the authority to hold any dialogue. The objective [to amend the constitution] based on the NCA no longer exists. Min Aung Hlaing has called for peace talks to deceive the people so that he can retain the power he has seized.
What is the response of the CNF to the junta chief’s proposal?
We stand by the statement released by the 10 NCA signatories on Feb. 20, 2021. The regime seized power illegally and we must suspend all peace talks under the regime. It is not the decision made alone by the CNF but a joint statement.
Is it practical to exclude the NUG and people’s defense forces [PDFs] from talks
The NUG was formed based on the mandate of the people who overwhelmingly voted [NLD] in the November 2020 election and the mandate of ethnic people who have engaged in revolution for many years. It represents both the people and the nation.
There will be no answer from talks without the NUG. The PDFs are also civilian.
They were born out of the people to protect civilians from the regime. So excluding the PDFs means excluding the people. I don’t believe Min Aung Hlaing’s proposed dialogue is intended for the interests of the people while people are not allowed to participate in the talks.
And the regime’s spokesman said threateningly that EAOs may suffer if they don’t attend the talks.
How much have the people suffered since the coup? How many lives have been lost? How many properties have been damaged? What happened to Thantlang in Chin State? How many more houses do they want to torch? How many more people do they want to kill? They have shattered so many lives. We have nothing to lose.
The whole country will only suffer more if peace talks are held to maintain Min Aung Hlaing’s grip on power.
If we join the talks, people will continue to suffer because Min Aung Hlaing’s intention in organizing the talks is to retain power.
Min Aung Hlaing and his regime will never serve the interests of the people. So we must reject the talks.
Moreover, the election that they are planning to hold to maintain their grip on power is unacceptable. A real election was held not long ago. They are holding another election because they cannot accept the votes cast by the people and they are trying to cast votes by themselves. We can’t accept that. I urge the people to continue fighting the regime until it is uprooted.
There are criticisms that previous talks were not fruitful because EAOs had to hold talks with both the NLD government and the military. But now they are invited to hold talks with the military alone. Will it work?
They said the peace process could not make progress because of frictions between the NLD and military in the previous peace talks and that the peace process will be able to progress now because the EAOs have to talk to Min Aung Hlaing and the military alone.
We need to look back at history. The intention of holding peace talks is to establish Myanmar as a genuine federal democratic union with complete self-determination in line with the 1947 Panglong Agreement. Ethnic communities demanded that the constitution be amended to make way for federalism at the Taunggyi Conference in 1961. We discussed it at a seminar on federalism the following year. Based on that discussion, we tried to establish a federal union. Who prevented it? The military prevented it. General Ne Win claimed that the military saved the union which was on the brink of collapse due to minorities demanding secession. That’s why the union system could not be established. The military has prevented it since 1962.
I was constantly engaged in dialogue from 2012 to 2022. And it was the military, not the NLD, which mostly raised objections to agreements reached.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi presented six principles for federalism on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the NCA.
Her principles were based on the demands that we have made since 1962.
So the principles presented by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and us are basically the same. However, at the last Union Peace Conference on October 19, 2019, the military opposed the agreements. Can the people who seized power throughout history because they don’t like federalism and democracy give us what we want? Throughout history, they have always opposed establishing federalism and democracy.
We asked for self-determination and equality and they have stopped us repeatedly since 2017.
Now they have seized power and destroyed the country to maintain their grip on power. So Min Aung Hlaing’s real intention behind his proposal for peace talks is to retain power.
They will never establish the democracy we want. They are trying to enslave the people under their boots.
After they have done it for so many years, we can’t trust them. They are saying a tiger can eat grass.
How do you feel about the military trying to resurrect the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee?
The committee was a roadmap being implemented under the NCA. The objective of the NCA was to amend the 2008 Constitution.
But the people have already scrapped the 2008 Constitution so it is not acceptable to resurrect the committee. It would be an insult to the people to join the committee which is intended to perpetuate the dictatorship.
I respect and value the political party leaders. If they do what they should not do, they will be like Seneca who supported the dictator Nero in the Roman empire.
Seneca was a great statesman who loved the country and the people. But he earned a bad name in history because he worked for Nero.
I urge all party leaders not to take sides with Min Aung Hlaing, but to represent the people. They will go down badly in history if they make the wrong friend.
This is not the time for peace talks.
A federal democratic charter was adopted by elected lawmakers, EAOs, civil society organizations and those who have joined the civil disobedience movement. Let’s work together to establish a federation under the agreed roadmap.
I request political parties and EAOs not to make friends with Min Aung Hlaing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Joseph is mourning the death of his son.
After the Myanmar military entered his village, he fled into the jungle but 13-year-old Pali Nang did not make it.
Joseph saw a photo of his son’s dead body on Facebook where it showed signs of torture.
He’s one of an estimated 40,000 Myanmar refugees who have fled to India.
Aamir Peerzada has this exclusive report from Indian border state of Mizoram.
Reporting and Editing by Aamir Peerzada
Filming by Faisal H. Bhat
Produced by Rebecca Henschke..."
Source/publisher:
BBC News (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Chin (Zo) discussion groups, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"“…due to its non-inclusive manner and lack of any genuine gesture to solve [political] crisis…this is not the right time for any negotiation with the SAC.”.....“တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး လွှမ်းခြုံသည့် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှု မဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ လက်ရှိ ဖြစ်နေသည့် နိုင်ငံ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးအကြပ်အတည်း များကို ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းဖော်ထုတ်မှု မဟုတ်သဖြင့် ဤ ဖိတ်ခေါ်မှုသည် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးရန်အတွက် အချိန်ကောင်းမဟုတ်ပေ။”..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Discrimination against the Karenni (Kayah), Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
28.96 KB 96.86 KB
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Description:
"At a first glance, it seemed like a major achievement by a group of United States crime fighters. An undercover Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent posing as a narcotics and weapons trafficker had managed to secure evidence leading to the arrest of a leader of a Yakuza organized crime gang, as well as of three Thais of whom two have military backgrounds, over a plot to use drugs as payment for sophisticated US-made weaponry.
According to documents supplied by the DEA to a court in New York on January 19 and made public in April, three ethnic armies in Myanmar — the Karen National Union (KNU), the Shan State Army (SSA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — needed the weapons, including “ten FIM-92J Stinger surface-to-air-missiles”, automatic rifles and mortars for their fight against the Myanmar junta. The payment for the whole shipment would be 500 kilograms of methamphetamine and 500 kilograms of heroin or US$40 million, presumably in cash or by bank transfer. The court document also states that “the buyers would build an airstrip to receive delivery of the weapons by cargo plane.”
But to anyone familiar with the Golden Triangle drug trade, this sounds a highly unlikely story. The KNU has for more than a year been subjected to aerial attacks launched by the Myanmar Air Force, and so would need such MANPADS, or man-portable defense systems, but the group would not be able to produce any drugs to pay for them because it has never been involved in the narcotics trade, nor would it have US$40 million in its coffers.
The SSA, which here is the Shan State Army-South, the armed wing of the Thai-border based Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) [the rival SSA-North is based in northern Shan State and is the armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party], on October 15, 2015 became one of the signatories of what the Myanmar authorities call the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Thus, it is not engaged in any war with the Myanmar military.
The court document goes on to state that the UWSA needs the weapons because they are “fighting the government of Myanmar” but, as anyone following events in the country’s frontier areas knows, that is utterly incorrect. The UWSA has not signed the NCA but it has had an informal ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s central authorities since 1989. The Wa have a formidable armed force, probably as many as 20,000 or 30,000 men, but the only battles the UWSA has fought since 1989 are with the RCSS and its predecessor, the Möng Tai Army of the late druglord Khun Sa. And neither of those groups has or has had any aircraft that would have to be shot down. Although the UWSA is not fighting the Myanmar army, it keeps a vast arsenal of weapons to deter any attempt by central authorities to move into its areas along the Myanmar-China border — and that includes a significant number of Chinese-made FN-6 MANPADS. In other words, there is no reason why the Wa would want to buy expensive and more-difficult-to-use American Stingers.
Then there is the question of the airfield “the buyers” were supposed to build for the cargo plane that was going to deliver the goods to them. How on earth would that work? And how would any cargo plane loaded with heavy weapons be able to fly undetected through Thai airspace — which it would have to — then land at some clearing in the jungle and take off again? That detail alone lends credence to the suggestion by local sources in the area that this is nothing more than a cock-and-bull story. A closer look at the names mentioned in the court document also reinforces that conclusion.
The alleged “leader of the Yakuza transnational organized crime syndicate,” who was going to supply the weapons is identified as Takeshi Ebisawa and the document even has a picture of him showing one of the MANPADS at a meeting with the undercover DEA agent. But Yakuza is the common name for a wide range of minor, middle-sized and larger Japanese crime syndicates and the name of this particular group is not mentioned anywhere in the submission to the court. Regardless of the size of the group, the leader himself would in any way not be involved in such deals; that is something his underlings would do in order to give their boss plausible deniability if anyone is caught.
The question of the actual identities of the three Thai middlemen is also a mystery. One of them, Suksan “Bobby” Jullanan, is referred to as “a Thai air force general.” But the Royal Thai Air Force does not have any generals. The highest rank is that of Air Chief Marshal followed by an Air Marshal, an Air Vice Marshal and so on. The second Thai defendant, Sompak Rukrasaranee, is supposed to be “a retired Thai military officer.” But no former rank or name of the regiment he once, allegedly, belonged to are mentioned in the documents. The third, Somphop Singhasiri is identified only as “a Thai national.” And then there is a “CC-1”, or Co-Conspirator 1, who is not named but is described as “the chairman of the Restoration Council of Shan State.” That, of course, is Yawd Serk, who is not an underground figure or a fugitive from justice. He has taken part in several peace talks with the Myanmar military and traveled freely to and from Yangon as well as Naypyitaw.
Curiously, a fourth prospective buyer is also named in the documents: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group that was completely crushed by the Sri Lankan army in 2009. But the DEA seems to believe that the LTTE “continues to attract international financial support.” Apparently, Ebisawa had some contacts with an unnamed former LTTE official who — it is unclear — is either in prison in India or has been released due to efforts of the alleged Yakuza leader.
In the end, all that the DEA appears to have ended up with is the arrest of a talkative Japanese fraudster— and three Thai conmen who no one inside Myanmar seems to have heard of. That, in turn, raises the question whether pure incompetence and ignorance of the situation of the ground led to those arrests, of if there could be a more sinister agenda behind this remarkably implausible story. Could it even be the outcome of an interdepartmental feud within the US administration? That is an issue that has troubled Myanmar policymakers in Washington for decades. The US State Department has always been consistent in its support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces and opposition to autocratic, military rule. The DEA’s agents, on the other hand, have been much more willing to cooperate with the Myanmar military because they believe they are on the same side in the war on drugs — and despite that fact that much of the drug trade is carried out by local, government-recognized militias.
After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising and the massacres of demonstrators in Yangon and cities and towns all over the country, the then US ambassador Burton Levin was firm in his condemnation of the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and ordered his staff to cease regular meetings with the military authorities. The first to ignore those directives was DEA agent Gregory Korniloff, who was told to leave Yangon in December 1988 after making an unsuccessful attempt to arrange an unauthorized meeting with officials of the Myanmar military’s intelligence service. At the time, Korniloff was said to be eager to resume normal ties with the military leadership in Yangon, which he claimed had made significant headway in fighting the narcotics trade.
The controversy reached new heights in March 1991, when it was discovered that another Yangon-based DEA officer, Angelo Saladino, had authored a secret memorandum addressed to Myanmar’s powerful and ruthless intelligence chief, Major General Khin Nyunt. Dated March 15, 1991, the letter listed in detail the various ways that the Myanmar military might try to impress the US Government as well as United Nations agencies. It also provided specific suggestions on ways to “deprive many of Myanmar’s most vocal critics of some of their shopworn, yet effective weapons in the campaign to discredit [Myanmar’s] narcotics program.” Finally, Saladino recommended several options to the junta for silencing “its most biased critics.”
It took some time before Washington discovered the memorandum. When noises were made, Saladino reportedly flew back to the DEA’s headquarters in the US at his own expense. He managed to convince his superiors that he had not, after all, sent the memorandum to Khin Nyunt. A compromise was reached with the State Department: Saladino had his tour of duty in Myanmar officially curtailed but was allowed to serve out his term which only had a few more months to run.
It is too early to say whether history is repeating itself, but by dragging the KNU into this conundrum, the DEA is discrediting an ethnic group which is serving as host for hundreds of pro-democracy activists who, since last year’s February 1 coup, have sought refuge in the areas near the Thai border that the KNU controls. Many are involved in armed struggle, while others are running news and blog sites on the internet and getting support from the US government and private donors. How, and if, this court case will affect that support remains to be seen. But the DEA, eager to resume contacts with Myanmar’s military authorities, has done the pro-democracy movement a huge disservice — and on dubious grounds which will not have any impact on the flow of narcotics out of Southeast Asia.
Entrapment is illegal in most countries [but not the US] because law enforcement officers are supposed to fight crime, not encourage easily-duped individuals to commit ones. And all that the DEA has been able to produce when it comes to drugs is a photograph allegedly sent by Signal to or from Singhasiri (spelt Sanghasiri on the screengrab) showing a bag of Double UO Globe heroin which could have been taken anytime and even downloaded from the internet..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Drugs: regional and global, Political History
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"Min Aung Hlaing has launched Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV) propaganda apps on Apple’s App Store and Alphabet’s Google Play Store, as well as a website, using Google and Apple logos as his backdrop.
The MRTV apps were developed by the US company Apps Web Social LLC, which listed them on the App Store and Play Store on behalf of the junta.
The apps are claimed to livestream broadcast content via international satellites, and distribute articles.
Apps Web Social LLC is registered in Iowa and has an office in Florida.
The Myanmar military junta uses MRTV to disseminate propaganda, disinformation and fake news, including regular content representing democratic actors as “terrorists” and publishing photos of torture victims to spread fear.
MRTV was also complicit in the 2017 genocide against the Rohingya, denying Rohingya identity, portraying Rohingya as “terrorists” and denying the military’s “clearance operations”.
MRTV operates under the junta’s Ministry of Information, led by retired Major General Maung Maung Ohn, who is sanctioned by the EU.
Maung Maung Ohn was the former Chief Minister of Rakhine State under the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party government in the lead up to the Rohingya genocide, and played a prominent role denying persecution against Rohingya.
The junta’s State Administrative Council (SAC), which has control over MRTV, is sanctioned in the US, raising questions over whether Apps Web Social has complied with US sanctions.
The junta’s former information minister, Chit Naing, was sanctioned by the US on July 2, 2021, shortly before he was replaced by Maung Maung Ohn.
The registrar for the junta’s new domain name, mrtvmedia.com, is GoDaddy.com, also a US company.
The junta’s apps carry serious privacy risks, enabling the military to track a user’s precise location, record audio and take photos and video, according to its listed Play Store permissions.
Apple and Alphabet have long allowed the Myanmar military to use their platforms, and are both listed on the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “By continuing to allow the terrorist Myanmar military junta to use their platforms, Alphabet and Apple stand complicit in the junta’s dissemination of disinformation and hate speech.
“We call on Alphabet and Apple to immediately and fully ban the Myanmar military, and all entities they control, from their app stores and service offerings.
“Alphabet, Apple, GoDaddy.com and App Web Social must take action to stop contributing to human rights violations in Myanmar, according to their responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines.
“We condemn Apps Web Social for supporting and profiting from the junta’s campaign of terror, in which MRTV is a key part of the psychological warfare that the Myanmar military is waging against the people of Myanmar.
“Apps Web Social should disclose how they are receiving payments for their work on the MRTV apps, and if they have received a licence from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
“We urge the US government to close all remaining loopholes that may allow the Myanmar military junta and its conglomerates to transact with US companies, including through further sanctions designations against MRTV, all other junta-controlled media and Maung Maung Ohn.”
Update (May 5, 2022): Apps Web Social has removed the MRTV app from the Play Store and App Store. Other Myanmar military apps remain on Alphabet and Apple platforms, and we reiterate our call for a ban..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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"၁။ အာဏာရှင် အဆုံးသတ်နိဂုံး (The End of Dictatorship-EOD) အစီအစဉ်၏ ကနဦးခြေလှမ်းအဖြစ် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်မတရားသဖြင့် ရယူထားသော နိုင်ငံတော်ပိုင် ရန်ကုန်တိုင်း၊ ကမာရွတ်မြို့နယ်၊ အင်းလျားလမ်း၊ ခြံအမှတ် (၁၄)ရှိ မြေနှင့်အဆောက်အအုံအား ကြိုတင်ရောင်းချနိုင်ရေး အတွက် ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒကောက်ယူမှု စစ်တမ်း တစ်ခု ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူမှု (၆) ရက်တာကာလအတွင်း စုစုပေါင်း ဆန္ဒပြုသူ တစ်သောင်းရှစ်ထောင်ကျော်၏ ၉၇% ကျော်က ဝယ်ယူမည်ဟု ဆန္ဒပြုခဲ့ကြပြီး ဝယ်ယူရန် အဆိုပြုပမာဏ စုစုပေါင်းမှာ ငွေကျပ် ၃၄ ဘီလီယံကျော် (အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁၇ သန်း) ခန့် ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင် မတရားသဖြင့် ရယူထားသော အဆိုပါနိုင်ငံတော်ပိုင်မြေမှာ ၁.၈၆ ဧက ကျယ်ဝန်းပြီး ကာလပေါက်ဈေးအားဖြင့် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ သန်း ၃၀ ကျော်တန်ကြေးရှိပါသည်။
၄။ ယခု ရောင်းချသည့်အခါ ကာလတန်ကြေး၏ ၃ ပုံ ၁ ပုံ၊ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁၀ သန်းသာ တန်ဘိုးဖြတ်၍ အစုရှယ်ယာ တစ်သိန်းတိတိ ရောင်းချသွားမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ရှယ်ယာတစ်စုလျှင် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁၀၀ သတ်မှတ် ထားပါသည်။
၅။ ကမ္ဘာတလွှားရှိ ဆက်သွယ်ဝယ်ယူရရှိနိုင်မည့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အမည်စာရင်းနှင့် စတင်ရောင်းချမည့်အချိန်အား သီးခြားထုတ်ပြန်ပေးသွားမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး မိမိတို့နှင့် အဆင်ပြေနီးစပ်သည့် နိုင်ငံတကာကိုယ်စားလှယ်များထံ ချိတ်ဆက်၍ ဝယ်ယူရရှိနိုင်ပါကြောင်း သတင်းကောင်းပါးအပ်ပါသည်။
၆။ ဤရောင်းချမှုအား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ၂၄-၀၂-၂၀၂၂ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ထားသည့် “အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက သိမ်းယူထားသော တပ်ပိုင်မြေဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံမူများ” အပိုဒ် ၄ နှင့် အပိုဒ် ၅ အရ စီမံဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၇။ အာဏာရှင်အဆုံးသတ်နိဂုံးအတွက် မဆုတ်မနစ်သော ဇွဲလုံ့လ၊ ခိုင်မာပြတ်သားသောသန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ဖြင့် ပူးပေါင်း ပါဝင်ဝယ်ယူကြသူအားလုံးကို လေးစားဂုဏ်ပြု ဦးညွှတ်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military
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Format :
pdf
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186.04 KB
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"တော်လှန်ရေးသည် အရေးကြီးသောအဆင့်ဖြစ်သည့် စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများ ရယူကာ ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးစနစ်များ ဖော်ဆောင်နေသည့်အဆင့်သို့ တက်လှမ်းနေပြီ ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်မှု ဖော်ဆောင် ရေး ဗဟိုကော်မတီသည် ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖော်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများကို ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ဖော်ဆောင်မှုမူဝါဒလုပ်ငန်းစီမံချက် (ယာယီ) နှင့်အညီ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းနှင့် မကွေးတိုင်းတို့တွင် စတင်အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ဒီမောဆိုမြို့နယ် ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့မှ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၁၄) ရက်နေ့တွင် ထုတ်ပြန် ခဲ့သော ကြားကာလ ရပ်ကွက်/ကျေးရွာအုပ်စု ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ ဖွဲ့စည်းရန် ထုတ်ပြန် ညွန်ကြားချက်သည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ မဖွဲ့စည်းရသေးသည့်အချိန်၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ပဋိညာဉ် မပေါ်ပေါက်သေးသည့်အချိန် ပြည်သူများမှ မိမိတို့ရပ်ရွာလုံခြုံရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို မိမိတို့ကိုယ်တိုင် ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည့်အချိန်တွင် အထောက်အကူဖြစ်စေရန် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီ (CRPH) က (၂၂.၂.၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည့် ကြားကာလ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အစီအစဉ်ကို ရည်ညွန်း၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
သို့သော် ယခုအချိန်တွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရတစ်ရပ်အား ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး ကြားကာလ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအစီအစဉ်များကို သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖယ်ဒရယ်ယူနစ် ကောင်စီများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းညှိနှိုင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖေါ်ဆောင်ရွက် နေပြီဖြစ်ရာ ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များ၏ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရကသာ တာဝန်ယူ၍ သက်ဆိုင်ရာများနှင့် ဆက်လက်ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ထို့အတွက်ကြောင့် ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များ၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်အရ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များ၏ ဥပဒေပြုရေး၊ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနှင့် တရားစီရင်ရေး ယန္တရားများကို လိုအပ်သလို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုကို သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖယ်ဒရယ်ယူနစ် များမှ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် အခန်း (၈) ပုဒ်မ ၅၂၊ ၅၃ တို့ နှင့်အညီ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အကယ်၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုနှင့် ပြည်နယ်/ဖယ်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်အကြား ဥပဒေပြုရေး၊ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး နှင့် တရားစီရင်ရေး အရေးကိစ္စများနှင့် လုပ်ငန်းများကို ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် လိုအပ်ပါက အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးမှ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ် တို့နှင့်အတူ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ(NUCC) တွင် ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ်(၄/၂၀၂၂)
၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မေလ (၄) ရက်
အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်းကြေညာခြင်း..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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"Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.
MYANMAR MILITARY ESCALATES HOSTILITIES AMIDST RISING COMMUNAL VIOLENCE
Myanmar’s (Burma) military, the Tatmadaw, has been intensifying its scorched-earth campaign in Sagaing Region – a resistance stronghold – burning over 500 houses between 25-27 April alone. The Tatmadaw launched arson attacks across five villages in the townships of Mingin, Khin Oo and Shwebo, setting houses on fire and reportedly killing people. According to residents, the military has ramped up their raids since early March, when the internet was shut down in nearly three-fourths of Sagaing’s townships.
The series of arson attacks are the latest in the Tatmadaw’s large-scale offensive in apparent retaliation for the actions of armed resistance groups. The research group Data for Myanmar estimated that by the end of April 2022, the military had torched more than 11,400 civilian houses across the country since the 1 February 2021 coup, including an estimated 7,500 houses in Sagaing alone. The Tatmadaw has burned houses across 10 states and regions, with Sagaing, Magway, Chin and Kayah the most severely impacted. The Tatmadaw’s ongoing scorched earth campaign likely amounts to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Communal violence is also escalating in Myanmar, increasing risks for tit-for-tat killings and reprisals. Last week a newly-formed pro-junta militia killed eight people in Mandalay, the country’s second largest city. All of the victims were members or supporters of the deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) party. On 21 April the militia – called the Mandalay branch of the Thway Thauk, or “Blood Comrades” – announced that it had launched “Operation Red” to “destroy” members of the NLD party and its supporters, as well as anti-junta resistance forces. The militia has also threatened to kill journalists who are critical of the Tatmadaw, as well as their families. It is unclear whether the militia has any ties to the Tatmadaw.
Savita Pawnday, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “in the year since ASEAN adopted the Five-Point Consensus, it has done little to pressure the junta to halt its assault on civilians in Myanmar. Unless the international community adopts stronger measures to hold the Tatmadaw accountable and weaken its capacity for violence, the military will continue to be emboldened to perpetrate mass atrocities around the country.” The UN Security Council must immediately attempt to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar and sanction the oil and gas sector. During next week’s Special Summit between ASEAN and the United States (US), the US government must ensure that the crisis in Myanmar is a focal point of the meeting, with the aim of moving beyond the failed Five-Point Consensus and encouraging ASEAN member states to take bilateral steps to improve the situation.
CIVILIAN DEATH TOLL IN DR CONGO NEARLY DOUBLED DURING FIRST YEAR OF “STATE OF SIEGE”
Friday, 6 May, marks one year since the “state of siege” began in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) two conflict-ridden eastern provinces, North Kivu and Ituri. President Félix Tshisekedi asserted that military control would restore peace and security in these provinces where decades of armed conflict and inter-communal violence have left thousands of people dead and forced millions to flee. Approximately 20,000 troops have been deployed to North Kivu and Ituri to combat armed groups and protect civilians.
Yet the security situation in North Kivu and Ituri has deteriorated in the past year, with armed groups intensifying their attacks against civilians. According to the Kivu Security Tracker, the civilian death toll nearly doubled from May 2021 to April 2022, with at least 2,563 civilians killed in the two provinces compared to 1,374 in the same period the prior year. The majority of attacks were perpetrated by two armed groups, the Allied Democratic Forces and the Cooperative for the Development of Congo. The UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) in the DRC has previously alleged that attacks by these groups may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Some members of the government’s armed forces (FARDC) have also been implicated in serious human rights violations and abuses in the context of the state of siege. UNJHRO documented at least 231 violations, including “attacks on protected people and places…abduction, recruitment and use of children,” as well as sexual violence and torture, perpetrated by the FARDC in Masisi territory, North Kivu Province, between 6 May 2021 and 9 February 2022. UNJHRO stated that some of the violations constitute war crimes.
Under the state of siege, civil authorities have been replaced with military officials who have been granted broad powers, including the authority to restrict people’s movements and arrest anyone for disrupting public order. According to investigations by Human Rights Watch, the military and police have suppressed peaceful demonstrations with lethal force and arbitrarily detained and prosecuted activists, journalists and political opposition members.
The situation in eastern DRC cannot be solved through military means alone. Christine Caldera, Research Analyst at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, stated that, “the state of siege has not only failed to advance the restoration of peace and security, the volume of attacks by armed groups, as well as violations by the FARDC, has left many people living in fear of the next atrocity.” The DRC government should enact measures to re-establish trust with communities, including by consulting with civilian populations and civil society about protection needs. The authorities should also implement a vetting process to identify and suspend soldiers and officers implicated in serious human rights violations.
UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING HIGHLIGHTS IMPORTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES
On 27 April the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an Arria-formula meeting on accountability for crimes in Ukraine. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet; Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Karim Khan; and President of the Clooney Foundation for Justice, Amal Clooney, briefed the Council.
High Commissioner Bachelet stated that her office has documented summary killings and executions in areas of Ukraine previously under Russian control and is working to verify reports of arbitrary arrests and conflict-related sexual violence. She also emphasized that as gross violations of international law continue unabated, the preservation of evidence of alleged violations – some of which may amount to war crimes – is crucial. A combination of pre-existing monitors – including the Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – and new mechanisms – such as the Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council on 4 March and an ICC investigation opened on 28 February – have already allowed for the gathering and preservation of evidence, as well as the identification of some perpetrators.
Despite the considerable efforts to swiftly respond to the situation in Ukraine, the international community, particularly the UNSC, has failed when responding to other atrocity situations across the world, including in facilitating justice and accountability. The UNSC has not referred a situation to the ICC in more than a decade, and in 2014 vetoed a resolution referring the situation in Syria to the Court. Even Arria-formula meetings focusing on justice and accountability are rare, with only four other such meetings held by the UNSC in the past five years. Amal Clooney emphasized that, “we have watched as perpetrators of mass human rights abuses have murdered, raped and tortured without consequence. From Darfur, to Myanmar, to Yemen. The perpetrators committed these crimes believing they would get away with it. And they were right.”
The pursuit of justice and accountability is critical to deterring future crimes and preventing recurrence, as well as for ensuring victims’ rights to justice and reparation. The international community must do more to commit to the pursuit of justice across all atrocity situations. Where possible, all states should pursue accountability for perpetrators under the principle of universal jurisdiction. All UN member states must standardize their support for the work of the ICC and drop unprincipled objections to the ICC’s jurisdiction..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Sub-title:
Myanmar photojournalist Ta Mwe describes how he evades arrest while covering protests against the Myanmar junta.
Description:
"Myanmar freelance photojournalist Ta Mwe, a pen name he uses to protect his security, the pseudonym named for his security, has won awards for his news photos of the crackdown on anti-military junta protests following the Feb 2021 coup that ousted the country’s elected civilian government. To mark World Press Freedom Day, Ye Kaung Myint Maung of RFA’s Myanmar Service spoke to Ta Mwe about his work on the conflict.
RFA: Can you tell me about the award you won?
Ta Mwe: I have won the jury’s choice for honorable mention in Southeast Asia and Oceania category of the World Press Photo awards. (I submitted) a series of 10 black and white photos about the Spring Revolution in Myanmar. My photo series covers the scenes from the early days of protests after the military coup in 2021. The contestants in this category are required to submit their ten best photos from their work that depict the story. So I picked my ten best photos taken in four months, from February to May of last year.
RFA: Can you tell me about your career as a photographer?
Ta Mwe: I started my career in photo journalism as a citizen journalist. Around 2007, I started taking photos using my phone and uploaded them anonymously to Burmese language blogs on Blogspot.com. Around 2011, I started working as a full-time photographer. I had worked as a full-time photojournalist for a local weekly journal, then became a freelance photographer.
RFA: What can you tell me about the situation of press freedom in Myanmar at the moment?
Ta Mwe: The situation has become extremely difficult for journalists now. When we cover news activities on the ground, we first need to find a route to flee from the scene and escape arrest, before we start doing anything like taking photos or interviewing people. We have to figure out how to ensure our own security before we hit the ground. As I have covered flash mob protests in Yangon, I have planned carefully which streets to run away on as soon as I finish taking photos. It has become very challenging. When I grab a taxi on my way back from the coverage, I don’t do it in the streets close to the scene. I walk a few blocks to hide the traces of my identity before I take a taxi. Before, there were several news media and several photographers working at the scene. They now have either been arrested or gone into hiding.
RFA: We have seen that informants for the military authorities are everywhere. How risky it is for the journalists to do their jobs under those circumstances?
Ta Mwe: As when I was covering the flash mob protest in Yangon, I have to be at the scene before the activities happen and check the surroundings if there are authorities in plain clothes near the scene. There could be informants at the scene. If I think it is not safe to cover the activities closely, I have to take photos from a distance. It has become very unpredictable. I think the chances of spotting the informers are 50/50. Sometimes, I can easily distinguish the informants from the crowd because of their appearance. But other times, I cannot distinguish them. I hear that sometimes they suddenly come out of a parked car to arrest people. It has become very risky for me to do the job.
RFA: Now you are at a safe location. What do you expect to do to continue your work?
Ta Mwe: I am now at a safe location. But I will keep doing the journalism work by recording the happenings in Myanmar and disseminating them to the world, because we are witnessing a historic turning point in Myanmar. For someone of my age, it is very significant. I will keep covering the news happening in Myanmar from a distance. If it is possible, I will go and cover it on the ground.
RFA: What kind of message do you want to pass to concerned leaders around the world, working to restore peace and democracy in Myanmar?
Ta Mwe: As a journalist, I am risking my life to report news about Myanmar so that the concerned leaders around the world can make the right decisions. It is their job to make an informed decision. I believe it is my job to send out the correct information, regardless of the risks. I hope they will make the right and unbiased decision based on the information received from us. I also would like to implore them to work harder to secure the release of journalists in detention. Without journalists working on the ground, the people in Myanmar will be under an information blackout, and concerned leaders around the world will have many blind spots in their decision making and they will not make the best decision. I would like to appeal them to try hard for the release of journalists in prison and support those who are in hiding or evading arrest..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Defenders
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Sub-title:
အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်
Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၅၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (က) အရ အပ်နှင်းထားသော လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကိုကျင့်သုံး၍ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဗဟိုအဖွဲ့ကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည် -
(၁) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ
ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၂) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒုတိယဥက္ကဋ္ဌ
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၃) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒုတိယဥက္ကဋ္ဌ
တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၄) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၅) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၆) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားရေးနှင့် ဘေးအန္တရာယ်ဆိုင်ရာစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၇) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
အမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်နှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်ရေးရာ ဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၈) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၉) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
ဆက်သွယ်ရေး၊ သတင်းအချက်အလက် နှင့် နည်းပညာဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၁၀) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
လျှပ်စစ်နှင့် စွမ်းအင်ဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၁၁) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
စီးပွားရေး နှင့် ကူးသန်းရောင်းဝယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၁၂) အရာရှိကြီး တစ်ဦး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၁၃) အရာရှိကြီး တစ်ဦး အဖွဲ့ဝင်
ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၁၄) ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး အတွင်းရေးမှူး
ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
(၁၅) ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးချုပ် တွဲဖက်အတွင်းရေးမှူး ၁
ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာထောက်လှမ်းရေးအဖွဲ့
(၁၆) ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးချုပ် တွဲဖက်အတွင်းရေးမှူး ၂
စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာထောက်လှမ်းရေးအဖွဲ့..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
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အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းကြေညာခြင်း
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"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများ အနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန်မထမ်းဆောင်ဘဲ ဓမ္မဘက်မှ ရပ်တည်၍ ပြည်သူနှင့်တစ်သားတည်းဖြစ်စေရန်နှင့် အမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ကြ စေရန် အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ဖိတ်ခေါ် ကမ်းလှမ်းခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ရုံးအနေဖြင့်လည်း အောက်တိုဘာလမှစတင်၍ အမိန့်အာဏာ ဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနမဖွဲ့ရသေးသော ဌာန အသီးသီးမှ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းသူရဲကောင်းများ၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေး၊ လုံခြုံဘေးကင်းရေးနှင့် ဖိအားကင်းစင် ရေးတို့အတွက် အလေးထား ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန် ထမ်းဆောင်နေပြီး CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအား ဖိအားပေးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ရာထူးမှထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း၊ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းနှင့် ဥပေဒနှင့်အညီ ပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုတော့သည့် လစာ ချေးငွေများအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်ခိုင်းခြင်းများ စသည့် အမျိုးမျိုးသော ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်နေသော “စိုက်ပျိုးရေး၊ မွေးမြူရေးနှင့် ဆည်မြောင်းဝန်ကြီးဌာန (ကျေးလက်ဒေသ ဖွံ့ဖြိုး တိုးတက်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန)၊ (မွေးမြူရေးနှင့်ကုသရေးဦးစီးဌာန)” မှ အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းသွင်းလိုက်ပြီး ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ် (Dismiss) လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
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"Russia’s war against Ukraine is bound to create a crisis for Myanmar’s military and its arms procurement programs. Both Russia and Ukraine have been among the main suppliers of military hardware to Myanmar, but that is bound to change. Ukraine, a country now ruled by a democratic government supported by the West, will not like to be seen as a supporter of a brutal military dictatorship in Southeast Asia. And Ukraine, too, now needs to rebuild and strengthen its arms industries in order to support and supply its own armed forces who are engaged in a war with Russia that may not end anytime soon.
That said, Ukraine’s role as an arms exporter to Myanmar was never as significant as Russia’s. However, according to the United Nations Independent Fact-finding Missions of Myanmar, since 2015 Ukrainian entities have sold BTR-4 armored personnel carriers, MMT-40 light tanks and 2SIU self-propelled howitzers to Myanmar, and have even looked into the possibility of those weapons being manufactured jointly with Myanmar’s defense industries. Ukrainian-produced BTR-4s were seen in Yangon both before and after last year’s February 1 coup.
The main suppliers, the fact-finding missions say, were Ukroboronprom and Ukrspecexport, Ukraine’s two main arms producers. Asked by the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle last year on August 27 if they would stop cooperating with the Myanmar military post-coup, a spokesperson for Ukroboronprom replied that they export war material “in accordance with Ukrainian law and international obligations” and that the military technical cooperation agreement, which was signed in 2015, was still valid under the new junta. But that agreement may end soon, and in any case there is no way Ukrainian companies would be able to ship weapons to Myanmar under present circumstances.
Russian arms imports are far more important to the Myanmar military and soared in the years before the invasion of Ukraine. The agreements with Russia were part of an effort to offset the previously heavy dependence on China, which was seen by high-ranking Myanmar military officers as a threat to the country’s sovereignty. In addition to Russia being the source of MiG-29 fighter jets, Hind Mi-35 helicopter gunships, transport helicopters, Yak-130 ground attack aircraft and light armored vehicles, over 7,000 Myanmar military officers and military-connected scientists have studied in Russia since the early 1990s. They can be found at the Omsk Armour Engineering Institute, the Air Force Engineering Academy in Moscow, the Nizhniy Novgorod Command Academy, and the Kazan Military Command Academy, while some are serving as cadets with the Russian Air Force. Days before last year’s coup, Russian Defense Minister General Sergei Shoigu paid a visit to Myanmar to finalize preparations for the delivery of Russian-made radar equipment, PantsirsS1 surface-to-air missile systems, and Orlan-10E surveillance drones.
The friendship continued even after the coup. Russia’s deputy defense minister, Alexander Fomin, had private talks with junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in late March last year and was guest of honor at the Armed Forces Day celebrations in Naypyitaw on March 27. Russia’s state-run Tass news agency quoted Fomin as saying that Myanmar was “a reliable ally and a strategic partner of Russia in Asia.” In a video shown on the Russian Defense Ministry’s Zvezda TV, Fomin was seen shaking hands with Min Aung Hlaing after having received a medal and a ceremonial sword from the coup leader.
In June, Min Aung Hlaing flew to Moscow where he did not meet Russian strongman Vladimir Putin but held talks with Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council. Reuters reported on June 21: “Defense ties between the two nations have grown in recent years with Moscow providing army training and university scholarships to thousands of soldiers, as well as selling arms to a military blacklisted by several Western countries for alleged atrocities against civilians.” During his visit to Moscow, Min Aung Hlaing also attended a religious ceremony at the Myanma Theravada Buddha Vihara Monastery in Moscow, to which he and his family are among the donors. The monastery is located 14 kilometers east of downtown Moscow and was opened on 1 July 2015 to serve Myanmar military officers undergoing training in Russia.
In early September, Min Aung Hlaing’s deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win, traveled to Moscow together with the Sitagu Sayadaw, once a well-respected Buddhist leader and now a puppet of the military. The occasion was to attend the closing ceremony of the 2021 International Army Games, an annual Russian military sports event organized by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. The 84-year-old monk stayed at the Myanma Theravada Buddha Vihara Monastery while photos published in the junta’s mouthpiece, the Global New Light of Myanmar, showed Soe Win sitting together with senior Russian military officers watching what was called “a competition of tank squads from the Russian Federation, China, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan.” Future arms deals were also most certainly on the agenda.
Given the close relationship between Moscow and Naypyitaw, it is not surprising that Myanmar’s military leaders have sided with Russia in the conflict in Ukraine, as junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun did in an interview with the Myanmar service of Voice of America on February 24: “No. 1 is that Russia has worked to consolidate its sovereignty…I think this is the right thing to do. No. 2 is to show the world that Russia is a world power.” On February 27, Myanmar Alin, the Myanmar-language version of the Global New Light of Myanmar, published a two-page commentary titled “Lessons from Ukraine for those who haven’t learned from history” by a writer using the pseudonym ‘Myint Myat’. The article referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as a “puppet of the West”, while Putin was praised as a “visionary leader” who had had the “foresight to quietly build up his country’s military and economic strength.”
But such shows of support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine may have no impact on a desired, continuous supply of military hardware from Russia. Since the invasion, Russia has become subject to economic and financial sanctions including the exclusion of several major Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging transfer system, with the only exception being payments for energy imports. Those restrictions will make it almost impossible for the Myanmar military to pay for Russian arms purchases. Nor is Russia likely to accept barter deals similar to those that the Myanmar military had with North Korea, a major arms supplier in the early 2000s: rice for guns.
Some outside observers have speculated that China will fill the gap, but Chinese arms exporters also want to get paid in cash, and hard currency is in short supply in crisis-ridden Myanmar. Chinese credits and loans may make up for that, but then there is the perennial question of dependence on China, which the Myanmar military for a long time has tried to reduce. Opening up the country and normalizing relations with the West in 2011/2012 was an outcome of that policy, and so were the efforts to diversify arms purchases by reaching out to countries such as Russia and Ukraine.
At this crucial juncture in the Ukrainian war and with Myanmar facing bankruptcy, the North Koreans are reported to have returned, and that will make it possible for the Myanmar military to, once again, use a barter system to keep the guns flowing into the country. According to well-placed inside sources, cordial relations between Pyongyang and Naypyitaw were actually revitalized as early as shortly after last year’s coup — and that relationship was made public in a curious article in the Global New Light of Myanmar on April 17 this year. The headline read “Foreign embassy families participate in Thingyan festival at Yangon Mayor’s Maha Thingyan Pandal.” But the text, and the photo, that was published under the headline, showed only one such group of “foreign embassy families”: The North Korean ambassador Jong Ho Bom and his companions who, according to the paper, were “cordially greeted” by Soe Thein, the junta-appointed Chief Minister of Yangon Region. At the time of his appointment in February this year, Soe Thein was also the deputy managing director of the military-owned conglomerate Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). He has also served as the Defence Ministry Auditor General, so he is a person well-versed in the art of striking arms deals with foreign countries.
It is still not certain exactly what shape the renewed military relationship with North Korea will take. Missile development is one area that has been suggested by sources. Relations between Myanmar and North Korea were cordial until October 1983, when North Korean agents detonated a bomb in Yangon, killing 18 visiting high-ranking South Korean officials, as well as three Myanmar citizens. Contacts between Myanmar and North Korea resumed in 1993 with a series of secret meetings between diplomats from both countries in Thailand’s capital Bangkok. In June 1999, the Director of Procurement of the Armed Forces visited Pyongyang, followed by another secret trip in November 2000. In July 2003, a group of technicians from North Korea was seen at the Monkey Point naval base in Yangon, and aircraft from North Korea’s national airline Air Koryo were observed landing at military airfields in central Myanmar.
The official re-establishment of ties came in April 2007. Confirmed arms shipments from North Korea to Myanmar were first limited to conventional weapons and technology transfers, including a major purchase of 130mm Type 59 field guns in 1999. It was also confirmed that North Korean tunnelling experts arrived in June 2006 at the new capital Naypyitaw, where the country’s military government is reported to have built an extensive underground bunker complex. In 2008, Myanmar took delivery of 30 units of 240-mm truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems from North Korea, weapons that were first used in the war in Kachin State in 2012 and later, in 2019, against the Arakan Army in Rakhine State.
In November 2008, a high-level Myanmar delegation led by General Shwe Mann, then number three in Myanmar’s military hierarchy and now an opposition politician, visited North Korea where they were taken to see defense industries and radar stations and expressed interest in buying radar systems and surface-to-air missiles, as well as more sophisticated artillery from Pyongyang. There were also, at that time, unexplained visits by North Korean freighters to Myanmar ports, which raised suspicions of potentially more sophisticated arms deliveries. It is now clear that those shipments were connected to Myanmar’s secret missile programs. Myanmar began receiving ballistic missile technology from North Korea in 2008, and over 20 Korean missile specialists were in the country until early 2015.
Most of the raw materials for the missile project were produced in Myanmar, with some parts imported from North Korea via China, and with North Korean specialists providing expertise. None of the Myanmar officers involved in the projects spoke Korean, but some of the North Koreans, who were in Myanmar for years, are said to be fluent in the Burmese language. While they always kept a low profile in Myanmar, it was not unusual to see them dining at the Pyongyang Koryo restaurant, a North Korean eatery in Yangon that was eventually closed in 2018. It is uncertain whether some of them have come back since the coup, but technology and know-how are certainly being transferred, the sources say. It is also known that 31 Myanmar military technicians were sent to North Korea for a two-month training course in 2015, well after Myanmar’s then President U Thein Sein had announced in 2012 that the country had severed relations with North Korea, so despite official assurances, military-to-military relations were never completely severed.
Myanmar’s military partnership with North Korea was one of the most important issues that prompted the United States and the West to change its Myanmar policy from that of isolation and boycotts to engagement in the early 2010s. Normal relations could only be restored if Myanmar severed its relations with North Korea — and when that was done under ex-general U Thein Sein’s presidency between 2011-2016, Myanmar changed from being an international outcast to becoming the darling of the West. Last year’s bloody coup has set the clock back to where it was during the darkest years of absolute military rule, and with it has come the imposition of new sanctions imposed by the West.
It is, as always, difficult to predict what the Myanmar military intends to do when it comes to arms purchases. There may be no doubt that China will take advantage of the military’s predicament and offer everything and anything in providing transfers and financial assistance but — given the traditional Sinophobic mindset of Myanmar’s military leaders — it is plausible to assume that they are looking for alternatives. Seen in the context of the Ukrainian war and Myanmar’s severe financial difficulties, it would make sense for the generals to turn an old trusted ally: the North Koreans. That is already happening, and we can only wait and see to what extent the generals are prepared to go in that relationship — and how the outside world is going to react to a renewed alliance between Pyongyang and Naypyitaw..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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"Today marks the first anniversary of the Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government of
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
The National Unity Government (NUG) is committed to Myanmar's international obligations to respect,
protect and fulfill human rights. Since its inception, the Ministry of Human Rights has been charged with
leading these efforts, which have included:
• the investigation and documentation of alleged violations and abuses of human rights, in support of
accountability and in consultation with local and international civil society
• human rights mainstreaming across NUG policies and programs
• the development and dissemination of human rights education materials, including television content
and infographics, video clips and animations shared on social media
• engagement with United Nations forums, mechanisms, agencies and experts, including the Human
Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, and the Independent Investigative Mechanism
for Myanmar
• the strengthening of diplomatic relations with States and regional organisations
• engagement with international and local journalists and media outlets in support of access to
information and press freedom.
Significantly, these activities have been implemented in the face of escalating atrocities by the illegal
military junta - atrocities that multiple senior United Nations officials have determined to likely comprise
grave human rights violations and abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The Ministry of Human Rights also partnered with other NUG ministries in developing the Government's
Policy Position on the Rohingya, the Military Code of Conduct for People's Resistance Forces, and the
Policy for Protection of Women and Children in Conflict.
The Ministry will continue to support the NUG's engagement with the International Criminal Court and
the International Court of Justice in pursuit of accountability, including for atrocity crimes directed against
the Rohingya and other minorities..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"In response to a call for input by the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (Burma), the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect provided analysis on the impact of the 1 February 2021 coup on the human rights of children in Myanmar through the lens of mass atrocity risks, atrocity prevention, and the international norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
GCR2P’S ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
Since the 1 February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – has not spared children in its ongoing violent campaign against peaceful protesters and armed resistance. Violations against children include killings, sexual violence, use of children as human shields, and the use of child soldiers. Children have also suffered as a consequence of scorched earth campaigns, forced displacement, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and lost access to medical care and education, among others. Many of the abuses in Myanmar constitute elements of the six grave violations against children in conflict and may also amount to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity.
The military’s ongoing commission of mass atrocity crimes has been facilitated by its continued access to weapons through arms transfers from China, Russia, and Serbia, as the Special Rapporteur comprehensively outlined in the February 2022 report “Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States’ Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military.” Arms transfers exacerbate conflict and can facilitate the commission of atrocity crimes, including the recruitment of child soldiers and the use of human shields, both of which constitute war crimes under international law. There are reports that the Tatmadaw has forced some children to undergo training and join the military. While the Tatmadaw appears to be the main perpetrator, some ethnic armed groups are also using child soldiers.
There are also reports that the Tatmadaw has abducted, detained, and tortured children, sometimes specifically targeting children whose parents are believed to be members of the resistance as a form of retaliation. These violations may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Myanmar’s military has manifestly failed to uphold its responsibility to protect the people of Myanmar – including children – from atrocity crimes. More concerningly, the international community has also largely failed to uphold R2P in responding to the crisis in Myanmar. The UN Security Council has notably failed to impose a global arms embargo on Myanmar or sanction the country’s oil and gas sector, where the Tatmadaw receives most of its revenue.
RECOMMENDATIONS
GCR2P welcomes that the Special Rapporteur has consistently centered much of his analysis on the crisis in Myanmar around atrocity risks and the military’s commission of atrocity crimes. GCR2P encourages the Special Rapporteur to continue focusing on atrocity risks and atrocity crimes, including with regard to the human rights of children in this upcoming report. An atrocity lens best conveys the severity and urgency of the crisis, which in turn can push international actors to take more effective action. An atrocity lens also has the most potential to hold the Tatmadaw accountable for its commission of the gravest international crimes.
GCR2P also welcomes that the Special Rapporteur has often invoked the Responsibility to Protect in urging the international community to take more substantial action to respond to the crisis in Myanmar. GCR2P encourages the Special Rapporteur to continue invoking R2P – including in this upcoming report – to push the international community to take more effective action to protect the human rights of children in Myanmar. Considering the unprecedented invocations of R2P from protesters on the ground in Myanmar, it is especially important to continue reminding states of their commitment to uphold R2P..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
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"Today, the 3rd of May 2022, is World Press Freedom day. On this day we would like to honour all professional and citizen journalists, and all the people who work in media, at home and abroad, for their tireless efforts not only in preserving the freedom of the press, and freedom of expression in Myanmar during the Spring Revolution, but indeed for the world they do around the world, ensuring the free flow of information – one of the cornerstones of human rights. For a society which values freedom and justice, freedom of information is a vital pillar. We have seen waves of hatred and oppression radiating from groups who oppose freedom, peace, and justice. Currently it is groups such as these which threaten not only the freedom of the press, but those who work to bring information to the people. Many brave reporters and journalists have been slain, imprisoned, tortured, or forced to flee, their families targeted and their homes and properties seized. It is tragic to see that incidents such as these are on the rise globally.
In Myanmar alone, since the coup in 2021, a total of 166 journalists have been arrested by the terrorist military council, according to statistics from the Myanmar Press Freedom In-Depth Group. Charges range from the infamous section 505 (a) of the criminal code (sedition against the military, state, and hate speech), to sections 114, 118, 436, and 332 of the criminal code, section 66 (d) of the communications act (misinformation), violations of various customs and immigration acts, and sections 124 (a) and (c) of the colonial era penal code (sedition against the government). Some of the unjustly detained journalists have since been released, but more than 50 remain in detention. Three journalists, Ko Soe Naing, A Sai K (aka Sai Win Aung), and Pu Tuidim died as a result of interrogation. In addition to the arrests, licenses have been revoked from 11 media outlets, and 3 have been suspended entirely.
Not only does the junta try to cut information off at the source, but they have also limited the spread of information by periodically cutting off the internet, reducing internet speed and bandwidth, limited internet access, and raising data fees. This is in addition to new laws and rules imposed by the military regarding the lawful use of the internet. As it stands, any criticism of the military or their puppet government constitutes a criminal act, and may even be considered treasonous. On the 1st of February 2021 when the terrorist cabal staged their coup, they cut off the internet from 3am to 1pm. That same week they cut the internet again on the 6th and 7th. Internet and phone lines continue to be cut off in many townships in Sagaing Region, Kachin State, Rakhine State, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, Chin State and Kayah(Karenni)State as well as areas which have seen fighting between the junta and democratic forces.
Paragraph 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and freedom of expression." We strongly urge the international community to support the Myanmar people and to hold the military terrorists accountable for their unjust arrests, persecution, killings, and war crimes. We also would like to encourage a full review and analysis of the strict rules and regulations on freedom of information and the press in ASEAN countries, and to establish a standard policy among the ASEAN community.
Heroically, despite the intense pressure and persecution from the military, professional and citizen journalists and media organizations have stood fast to preserve media freedom and the free flow of information, even at risk of their own lives. It is due to such brave work that the SAC is losing the media war. Truth will out, and the courageous men and women of Myanmar's media community are pushing back against the military propaganda and lies. A situation which has clearly frustrated the military as evidenced by their spokesmen's increasingly aggressive attitude towards journalists and media in general.
The National Unity Government is committed to providing justice to the media, informants, and professional and citizen journalists for all the injustices done them by the terrorist military. Efforts will be made in accordance with established media ethics and the lessons learned during this horrific chapter of our nation's history to establish strong safeguards to protect the freedom of the press and the people who work within it.
So on this day we rise to honour all media, journalists, and citizen journalists at home and abroad who have given their all, and continue to risk their lives for the freedom of the press, freedom of expression in Myanmar's spring revolution, and in struggles for justice around the world. In our future democratic federal union, we will fight for the rights of journalists, as journalists today are fighting for freedom and democracy. We will promote the principles of freedom of information and of the press, to unshackle truth and discourse, and take full advantage of the power of a free and liberated press..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"Myanmar’s junta has rejected Malaysia’s proposal that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) informally engage Myanmar’s shadow government as “irresponsible and reckless”, and warned Malaysian officials against contacting or supporting what it calls a “terrorist group”.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Abdullah said on Sunday that “We are not proposing for ASEAN to recognize other governments, but such informal engagement may be conceivable, especially on how humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar who are still in their country can be delivered,” referring to the National Unity Government (NUG).
The NUG was formed after the coup by lawmakers from Myanmar’s ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) and their ethnic allies to challenge the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Many in Myanmar take the NUG as their legitimate government, while some Western countries are also informally engaging with the parallel government.
In response to the Malaysian foreign minister’s remarks, the Myanmar regime-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday strongly protested and rejected what it called the minister’s “irresponsible and reckless” remarks and proposals.
The junta ministry said such remarks could abet terrorism and violence in Myanmar, hamper the regime’s anti-terrorism efforts and infringe on international agreements on combatting terrorism.
Malaysia’s proposal that ASEAN informally engage with the NUG could be seen as a big blow to the regime, which has branded the NUG, its parliamentarian wing the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and its armed wing the People’s Defence Force (PDF) as terrorist groups.
“The Ministry cautions the government officials and parliamentarians of Malaysia against making contacts or communication as well as providing support and assistance to those terrorist groups and their representatives in future,” the regime said in the statement.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Abdullah said the proposal was made as there had been no progress by the regime on implementing ASEAN’s peace plan for Myanmar, which was drawn up last year to find a solution to the political stalemate in the country.
Myanmar has been in social and political turmoil since the military seized power from the country’s democratically elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN adopted a five-point peace plan for Myanmar in April 2021 urging the junta to immediately end the violence in the country and to hold an inclusive political dialogue, among other steps. The regime, which has killed more than 1,700 civilians so far, has failed to implement the plan.
The minister’s comment came at a time when the regional bloc’s peace plan, known as the Five-Point Consensus, is being condemned as ineffectual and ASEAN criticized for failing to fulfill its pledges or take meaningful steps toward pressing the regime to end its human rights violations. Human rights groups have also pushed ASEAN to engage with the NUG instead.
The Malaysian foreign minister said to informally engage with the NUG was one of three proposals that Malaysia would bring to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on May 5, with the other two being to double humanitarian aid for Myanmar, and to strengthen the position and function of the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar.
Both Myanmar and Malaysia are members of ASEAN.
Malaysia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that has been critical of the military regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-03
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
"Statement on the First Anniversary of the Ministry of Human Rights..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-03
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"၁။ အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များ၏ တစ်လတာ ဥပုသ်သီတင်းသီလဆောက်တည်ပြီးနောက် ယနေ့ကျရောက်လာသည့် အီဒုလ်ဖိသိရ် ဝါကျွတ် အီးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့ အခါသမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်အပေါင်း ကိုယ်စိတ်နှလုံး ရွှင်လန်းချမ်းမြေ့ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ရမဒွါန် ဥပုသ်ဆောက်တည်ခြင်း၏ အနှစ်သာရများသည် သက်ဝင်ယုံကြည်သူတို့ အတွက် ခန္တီတရားဖြင့် အပြစ်ဒုစရိုက်များကို ရှောင်ရှားလိုစိတ်အား ကျင့်သုံးဆောက်တည်ရခြင်း ဖြစ်သလို လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း အပြန်အလှန် စာနာနားလည်မှု၊ ကူညီဖေးမမှု၊ ကိုယ်ချင်းစာ တရား ထွန်းကားစေခြင်းဖြင့် အောင်မြင်သော၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းသော တရားလမ်းကို ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ အာဏာလုစစ်ကောင်စီသည် လူနည်းစုဘာသာဝင်များအပေါ် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် မတရား ဖိနှိပ်ခွဲခြား ဆက်ဆံမှုများ၊ ရက်စက်ရမ်းကားမှုများ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ခြင်းများအပေါ် အမှန်တရားနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုပြန်လည် ရရှိရေးအတွက် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလပြီးနောက် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးဆိုင်ရာ တရားမျှတမှု ရှာဖွေရေး ဖော်ဆောင်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များအား ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဟု ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံကြီးက အတည်ပြုပြဋ္ဌာန်း ထုတ်ပြန်ထားသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိဉာည်အတွင်း အတိအလင်း အာမခံချက်ပေးထားပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ရပ်ကို ဇွဲသတ္တိ ခံနိုင်ရည်အားဖြင့် ဘာသာလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူလူထုကြီးမှ တိုက်ပွဲဝင် ဖြတ်သန်းနေရသည်မှာ တစ်နှစ်ကျော် ကာလအတွင်း ဝင်ရောက်လာသကဲ့သို့ အောင်မြင်မှုပန်းတိုင်သို့လဲ တဖြည်းဖြည်း ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်း သတင်းကောင်း ပါးအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော အီဒုလ်ဖိသိရ် ဝါကျွတ်အီးဒ်နေ့ အခါသမယမှစ၍ ပြည်ထောင်စု သား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များ အားလုံးအပေါ်သို့ အလ္လာရှင်မြတ်၏ မဟာဂရုဏာတော်နှင့် ကောင်းခြင်းမင်္ဂလာ အဖြာဖြာကျရောက်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ပြုရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့လိုက်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-03
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"အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များ၏ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်တစ်ရက်ဖြစ်သည့် အီဒုလ်ဖိသိရ်ဝါကျွတ်အိးဒ် ပွဲတော်နေ့အခါသမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များအားလုံး ရွှင်လန်းချမ်းမြေ့ကြစေရန် ဦးစွာဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သလိုက်ပါသည်။
အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များသည် နှစ်စဉ်နှစ်တိုင်း ရမဒွါန်လမြတ်အချိန်အခါ ကျရောက်တိုင်း ရိုဇာဥပုသ်သီလ ဆောက်တည်ခြင်း၊ အလ္လာဟ်အသျှင်မြတ်ထံတော်ပါး ဝတ်ပြုဆုတောင်းခြင်းနှင့်အတူ နွမ်းပါးသူများအား ဖေးမကူညီလှူဒါန်းခြင်းစသည့် ကောင်းမှုသီလများအား ဆောက်တည်ကြ ကြောင်းသိရသည်။ ယင်းကဲ့သို့ တစ်လတိုင်တိုင် ဥပုသ်သီလယူသူများအတွက် ဝါတွင်းကာလ ကုန်ဆုံး ပြီးနောက် ပျော်ရွှင်ချမ်းမြေ့စရာ ဝါကျွတ်ပွဲတော်ဖြစ်သည့် အီဒုလ်ဖိသိရ်အိးဒ်ပွဲတော်ကို ဆင်နွှဲကြကြောင်း သိရသည်။ အဆိုပါ အီဒုလ်ဖိသိရ်အိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ် ဘာသာဝင်များသည် စားဖွယ်ရာအစုံအလင်အား ချက်ပြုတ်၍ ဘာသာလူမျိုး မတူသူများအား ဖိတ်ခေါ်၊ ပေးပို့ ဧည့်ခံခြင်းမှာလည်း မြန်မာအစ္စလာမ်တို့၏ ချစ်စရာကောင်းလှသည့် အစဉ်အလာဓလေ့တစ်ခုဖြစ်သည်။
သို့သော် ယခုအချိန်သည် အမိမြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့က အဓမ္မအာဏာသိမ်းယူကာ ပြည်သူပြည်သားများအား အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားခြင်း၊ နိုင်ထက် စီးနင်းပြုခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိပြီး ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးမှလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား ရရာ လက်နက်စွဲကိုင်ကာ တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလလည်း ဖြစ်သည်။
ထိုပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးအတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များလည်း ပြည်သူ တစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့်အတူ ကိုယ်တိုင်ကိုယ်ကျပါဝင်ကာ တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် အသက်စွန့်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြကြောင်း သိရသည်။ ထို့အတူ ဘာသာပေါင်းစုံ၊ လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပူးပေါင်းကာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းနေသည်မှာလည်း လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူဖွယ်ရာ တွေ့မြင်ကြားသိနေရသည်။
ဆက်လက်၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အား အပြီးတိုင်တွန်းလှန်ကာ လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ၊ ဘာသာပေါင်းစုံ ခွင့်တူညီမျှပြီး ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုကင်းစင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကဏ္ဍတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့် လက်တွဲကြိုးပမ်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးလိုပါသည်။
အချုပ်မှာ အီဒုလ်ဖိသိရ်ဝါကျွတ်အိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင် များအားလုံး ကိုယ်ကျန်းမာ၊ စိတ်ချမ်းသာကြပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် ဘေးအန္တရာယ်များ ကင်းဝေးကြပါစေ ကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရမှ ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့လိုက်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-03
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Title: Justice Minister U Thein Oo Condemns Farcical “Trial” of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
Description:
"“There is no justice and no credibility when a so-called ‘trial’ takes place in secret, with no defense counsel, and a guilty verdict is declared in five minutes,” said the National Unity Government Union Minister of Justice U Thein Oo, commenting on the latest travesty perpetrated by the junta on State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
“This propaganda stunt reveals two things about this murderous junta, once again. First, that they are shameless about the farce of a legal system they have inflicted on the people of Myanmar. Second, that they are still terrified of the power of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi still has a symbol of courage in defense of democracy.”
The junta pretended that they had evidence that the nation’s most respected leader had accepted $600,000 in bars of gold as bribes. Knowing her entire life has been devoted to fighting for the freedom of the people of Myanmar, including decades in prison and under house arrest, such a claim is clearly ridiculous. She dismissed it as, “All Absurd.” This week’s trial is only the latest in a series of fake trials the junta intends to subject the Myanmar leader to.
Minister U Thein Oo declared that this type of cruel injustice will end with the restoration of democracy and the establishment of a fair and equitable justice system in a new Myanmar. The Ministry of Justice and the National Unity Government have already begun preparations to create a ‘Interim justice’ system in those territories freed from the junta’s control..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Justice - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
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"A Myanmar regime’s court in Naypyitaw did not follow legal procedures when passing a “five-year” jail sentence to the country’s ousted democratic leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for a corruption case last week, legal sources said.
Detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said she was unhappy with the verdict after a junta court sentenced her to five years in prison based on the account of her former colleague on April 27.
Her remark upset Mandalay Region High Court judge U Myint San, who delivered the verdict, according to court sources.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been on trial on a corruption charge for accepting bribes from her Yangon Region chief minister U Phyo Min Thein, who testified in October last year that he gave her seven viss (around 11.4kg) of gold and US$600,000 in 2017 and 2018.
At the trial last week, U Myint San quickly read out the verdict against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and left the court immediately, according to those present.
The verdict was due on April 26 but was postponed until the next day. He might have been waiting for an instruction from the regime.
At the hearing on the morning of April 26, the judge said the verdict would be delivered that afternoon but then it was put off until the next day.
In other cases verdicts have been postponed.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team appealed to the Supreme Court in early March against the prosecution. The Supreme Court judges ignored the appeal even though the special Naypyitaw court announced that the verdict was due on April 26.
According to judicial procedures, if the Supreme Court takes over the case, the special court in Naypyitaw cannot pass a verdict, legal sources said.
Only after the Naypyitaw court delivered the verdict on April 27, the Supreme Court said it would hear the appeal on May 4.
The verdict will be quashed if the Supreme Court decides that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should not be prosecuted.
Observers say the Supreme Court wants to avoid handling Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s case.
But her legal team will appeal against the verdict which was based only on the testimony of U Phyo Min Thein without any evidence, according to court sources.
He is the only National League for Democracy chief minister not to be jailed since the 2021 coup, apart from the Chin State chief minister, who managed to flee to India.
The regime has imposed a gagging order on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers.
She faces sentences of more than 100 years from 17 charges filed by the regime. She has so far been given 11 years in prison..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၁/၂၀၂၂)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The already long list of governments and blocs to have appointed a special envoy to crisis-torn Myanmar has grown with the Thai Foreign Ministry’s designation of Pornpimol “Pauline” Kanchanalak, an adviser to the Thai foreign minister, as Bangkok’s special envoy for relations with Myanmar.
The move sees Thailand follow in the footsteps of China, Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the UN, the latter having named veteran diplomat Noeleen Heyzer of Singapore as its envoy.
It is still unclear what mandate the Thai special envoy has been given. Pornpimol is known to be close to Thai Foreign Affairs Minister Don Pramudwinai and to have gained his confidence and trust.
Last week, Don, who also serves as deputy prime minister, said Pornpimol was given the post in part due to her extensive knowledge of the neighboring country. It is not clear, however, whether she has visited Myanmar recently, and little is known about her knowledge of the country’s complex political situation or the web of ethnic conflicts that has long beset military-ruled Myanmar.
In the past, Pornpimol worked at the Bangkok Post, before moving to Washington to embark on a career as a lobbyist. She later became a key adviser to the Thai Foreign Ministry.
Don told the Bangkok Post that while Pornpimol has already played a key role as a ministry adviser, her ability to join discussions with high-ranking foreign officials has been limited. Her new position will lift those curbs, he said, adding that such appointments are common in the European Union,.
Thailand and its troubled neighbor share a more than 2,000-km-long border, along which hundreds of thousands of refugees live. In addition, millions of Myanmar migrant workers in the kingdom have recently been joined by newly arrived activists and other compatriots fleeing political persecution under the military junta that seized power from Myanmar’s democratically elected government in 2021.
Myanmar has closed all checkpoints along the Thai border since April 23, when a car bomb exploded near the Myanmar entrance to the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge, in Myawaddy, Karen State, opposite Thailand’s Mae Sot.
Business owners have cried foul, saying the move could cost them up to 500,000 Thai baht (nearly US$15,000) per day, and have urged the Thai government to coordinate with Myanmar authorities to solve the problem.
According to Don’s designation order, Myanmar is strategically important to Thailand in terms of geopolitics, the economy, society and national security. He said Pornpimol would closely monitor the situation in Myanmar and ensure that the ministry’s policies on the country are adhered to.
Don visited Myanmar in November but only disclosed the trip after he returned. He said he traveled to Naypyitaw to deliver humanitarian aid and to hold talks with coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
His trip to the Myanmar capital coincided with visits by special envoys from China and Japan.
At the time, Don said the Myanmar crisis was of concern to many countries, telling The Nation, “The Thai private sector is concerned about the situation in the neighboring country and has collected essential items and sent them to Myanmar.”
According to diplomatic sources, the delegation to Naypyitaw comprised five members, including a senior adviser to the deputy prime minister, his chief of staff and a counselor from his office.
Senior Thai army commanders are known to have close links with the Myanmar military, and the coup leader has visited Thailand 11 times.
In October, Thai academics held a discussion on Thai foreign policy at Chiang Mai University’s School of Public Policy. Along with former senior Foreign Ministry officials, they said that Thailand, as a frontline state, should lead, and not be led by, ASEAN in dealing with Myanmar.
Sihasak Phuangketkeow, former Thai permanent secretary for foreign affairs, said, “We have channels to the military and to the opposition. Why don’t we use them? It may not be easy, because the Myanmar military want to hold on to power, but we have to convince and apply pressure.”
Since the coup, members of ASEAN have expressed different views on the crisis. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and to a lesser extent the Philippines have sought to exert pressure on the regime, while Thailand, Cambodia and Laos have shown a willingness to work with it.
In any case, Thailand is a key neighbor of Myanmar and the appointment of Pornpimol could signal that Bangkok is looking to play along with like-minded actors on the complicated Myanmar issue. It will also be playing a key role in distributing humanitarian assistance from the US and other Western countries to Myanmar refugees on the border, as the violence continues to escalate across the frontier and Myanmar continues to descend into chaos and instability.
As it does, it appears likely from Don’s comments that he has entrusted Pornpimol to guide his ministry’s policies on Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"The head of Russian truck giant Kamaz visited Myanmar last week for talks with the terrorist Myanmar military junta to produce trucks in Myanmar, and will finalise an agreement by June.
Kamaz was part of a delegation from Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, led by its president, Rustam Minnikhanov.
Russian investment will further aid and abet the junta’s atrocity crimes.
Kamaz General Manager, Sergey Kogogin, joined talks with junta head and war criminal Min Aung Hlaing, and the junta’s investment minister, Aung Naing Oo.
Sergey Kogogin has been recently sanctioned by the UK and Australia, while Kamaz has been sanctioned by Australia and the EU, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The Russian military used Kamaz trucks to invade Ukraine.
Kamaz is a supplier of the Myanmar military. It transferred seven military trucks to Myanmar in 2020 and the company manufactures the trucks used to mount the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, which the Myanmar military ordered in January 2021.
Junta head Min Aung Hlaing visited Kamaz during a trip to Tatarstan in June 2021, with a delegation of more than forty people.
Kamaz’s biggest shareholder is Russia’s state-owned arms conglomerate Rostec.
Germany’s Mercedes-Benz owns 15% of the company, on behalf of Daimler Truck.
Daimler Truck has a joint venture with Kamaz, but froze cooperation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
As investors, Mercedes-Benz and Daimler Truck must clarify the steps they have taken to end Kamaz’ business with the Myanmar military, according to their human rights responsibilities, following the Rohingya genocide and the military’s coup attempt.
Tatarstan’s President Minnikhanov has a longstanding relationship with Min Aung Hlaing, and is promoting multiple business-links with the Myanmar military.
His April trip included representatives from Rostec subsidiary Kazan Helicopters, which supplies helicopters to the Myanmar Air Force; engineering company Ker-Holding, which is involved in the Pang Pet steel plant, a project of military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation; and naval shipbuilder JSC Zelenodolsk Plant.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Minnikhanov and Kogogin’s visit to Myanmar show that the Russian regime’s links to the terrorist Myanmar junta are deepening.
“The visit comes as sanctions are rolled out against Russian businesses following the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, while the international response to the military’s coup attempt remains weak and uncoordinated.
“While it is positive that Australia has sanctioned Kamaz and Sergey Kogogin, they have not imposed any sanctions in response to the military’s illegal coup attempt.
“Developing business ties will provide future revenue and embolden the Russian regime, the Myanmar junta and their business associates.
“Increased access to military vehicles and truck manufacturing capabilities will aid the Myanmar military’s campaign of terror, as it commits mass killings, torture, rape, forced displacement and the destruction of whole villages.
“We demand urgent international action against the Myanmar military junta and its business interests, including targeted sanctions and a global arms embargo.
“Russia is committing atrocities in Ukraine, while also aiding and abetting the Myanmar military junta’s atrocities.
“We call on the international community to impose further sanctions on Russia for its complicity with the Myanmar military’s international crimes against the people of Myanmar, including against Kamaz, Rustam Minnikhanov and Sergey Kogogin.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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"နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်အပေါ် စစ်ကောင်စီက မဟုတ်မမှန် တရားစွဲဆိုမှုတွင် စွပ်စွဲခံရသူဖက်မှ ခုခံချေပခွင့်လည်းမရှိ၊ အများပြည်သူရှေ့မှောက်တွင် ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာစွာ စီရင်ခြင်းလည်း မရှိ၊ အပြစ်ရှိသည်ဟု (၅) မိနစ်အတွင်း ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် ချမှတ်သော “ဟန်ပြ” တရားခွင်သည် အများပြည်သူ ယုံကြည်လက်ခံနိုင်မှုကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း တရားမျှတမှုကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း ဆောင်ကြဉ်း နိုင်သည်မဟုတ်ပါ။
ယခုကဲ့သို့ ဝါဒဖြန့် “ဟန်ပြ” တရားခွင်သည် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ သဘောထား (၂) ချက်ကို ပိုမို ပေါ်လွင်စေသည်။ ပထမတစ်ချက် ၎င်းတို့အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ် မလျော်ကန်စွာ သက်ရောက်စေသည့် တရားစီရင်ရေး အတုအယောင်ကို အရှက်သိက္ခာကင်းမဲ့စွာ အသုံးချရန် ဝန်မလေးခြင်းနှင့် ဒုတိယတစ်ချက်အနေဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်သူ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၏ ပုံရိပ်ကို ကြောက်ရွံ့နေသေးခြင်း တို့ မှာ သိသာထင်ရှားသည်။
အများပြည်သူ ယုံကြည်လေးစားရသူ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်သည် ဒေါ်လာ (၆) သိန်းတန်ဖိုးရှိ ရွှေချောင်းများကို လာဘ်ပေးလာဘ်ယူ ပြုမူခဲ့သည့် သက်သေများရှိသည်ဟု စစ်ကောင်စီက တရားခွင်တွင် မဟုတ်မမှန် လိမ်လည် ပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။ နေအိမ်အကျယ်ချုပ်နှင့် ထောင်သွင်း အကျဉ်းချခံရခြင်းများဖြင့် သူမဘဝတစ်လျောက် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု လွတ်လပ်ရန် တစ်စိုက်မက်မက် ကြိုးစားခဲ့သော ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်အား ယခုကဲ့သို့ စွပ်စွဲချက်များသည် အခြေအမြစ်မရှိကြောင်း သိသာစေပါသည်။ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည် ကိုယ်တိုင်ကလည်း ၎င်းစွပ်စွဲချက်ကို အခြေအမြစ်မရှိကြောင်း ပြောဆိုပယ်ချခဲ့သည်။ ယခုအပတ်အတွင်း ချမှတ်သော အတုအယောင် တရားခွင်သည် စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် လူထုခေါင်းဆောင်အပေါ် စီရင်နေသော မလျော်ကန်သည့် တရားခွင်များအနက်မှ လက်တလော နောက်ဆုံး တရားခွင်တစ်ခုပင် ဖြစ်သည်။
အသစ်ပြန်လည်တည်ဆောက်မည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ် ပြန်လည် ဆောင်ကြဉ်း၍ လွတ်လပ်ပြီးတရားမျှတသော တရားစီရင်ရေးစနစ်ကို ဖော်ဆောင်ပြီး ယခုကဲ့သို့ ယုတ်မာရက်စက်သော မတရားမှုများကို အဆုံးသတ်မည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်မှ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကင်းလွတ်နေသည့် စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေများတွင် ကြားကာလ တရားစီရင်ရေးစနစ်ကို အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက စတင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။.....
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ.....
တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Justice - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
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"National Unity Government's Weekly News Bulletin (1/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
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"ရန်ကုန်မြို့ ၊ အနော်ရထာလမ်းပေါ်ရှိ ဘားလမ်းကားမှတ်တိုင် လူစည်ကားရာနေရာတွင် ယနေ့ မေလ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့၊ နေ့လည်(၃)နာရီကျော်အချိန်အတွင်း အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၇) ဦးထက်မနည်း ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာ ရရှိကာ သေဆုံးမှုများရှိခဲ့သည့် ဗုံးပေါက်ကွဲမှုတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပြီး နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ပေါက်ကွဲမှုများ ထပ်မံ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သည်ဟု သိရပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် စစ်ကောင်စီက ပြည်သူလူထုကို ဥပဒေမဲ့ ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းမျဉ်းများနှင့်အညီ ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိရာ အဆိုပါ စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ် စည်းမျဉ်း (Code of Conduct) များထဲရှိ စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာပစ်မှတ်သတ်မှတ်ရာတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်၏ ယန္တရားများကိုသာချေမှုန်းရမည်၊အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအားခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း မပြုရဟု ပါရှိပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းမျဉ်းများအား စနစ်တကျ ထားရှိပို့ချ ထားရုံသာမက လိုက်နာရန် ပျက်ကွက်မှုများရှိပါကလဲ ထိရောက်စွာအရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံပြည်သူလူထုအား ကာကွယ် စောင့်ရှောက်ရေးသည် မျှော်မှန်းချက်တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ထည့်သွင်းထားပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုလုံခြုံရေးကို ရည်မှန်းချက်တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ထည့်သွင်းကာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုထူထောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကြိုးစားဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိရာ ယခုကဲ့သို့ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်ကို ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုတ်ချကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။
သမိုင်းကြောင်းတစ်လျောက် မိမိတို့အာဏာတည်မြဲရေးအတွက် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်ကို ထင်သလိုပြုမူခဲ့၊ပြုမူလျက်ရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ပျူစောထီး၊ သွေးသောက်အဖွဲ့ စသည့် အစွန်းရောက်လက်ပါးစေအဖွဲ့များ မွေးမြူကာ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်များနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများကို အပြစ်ပုံချသည့် လုပ်ရပ်များစွာ သာဓက အနေဖြင့် ရှိခဲ့သည်ဖြစ်ရာ ပြည်သူလူထုအနေဖြင့် အသိ၊ သတိရှေ့ထား၍ နေထိုင် သွားကြရန် နှိုးဆော်အပ် ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့် ယခုကဲ့သို့သော လုပ်ရပ်များအား တရားမျှတမှုပြန်လည်ရရှိစေရေးအတွက် စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးဖော်ထုတ်အရေးယူသည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်ကိုင်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-01
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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" The Burmese military junta’s systematic and widespread escalation of violence
following its attempt to seize power on 1 February 2021, has created a humanitarian
crisis that poses a grave threat to regional human security.
During 1 Feb 2021 – 15 Apr 2022, there were 10,786 armed clashes and attacks on
civilians, more than in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, or Afghanistan in the same period. The
junta has killed at least 2,146 and arrested at least 13,282 civilians. Those killed
and/or detained include elected MPs, journalists, humanitarian workers, civil
society members, and students. In the first 41⁄2 months of 2022 alone (1 Jan - 15
Apr), there were 3,134 such incidents involving air strikes, artillery shelling and
other battlefield tactics, in every State/Region and the capital territory.
The systematic targeting of civilians, in addition to intensifying the humanitarian
crisis, also amount to atrocity crimes that continue to drive up the number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees from Burma. According to UNHCR,
614,000 people have been displaced since the coup attempt, adding to over one
million people displaced by pre-existing armed conflict and abuses. These
populations, further affected by ongoing attacks and blocks on humanitarian aid,
are in desperate need of protection, shelter, food, water, medicine, and other aid.
Humanitarian need is greatest in border regions in Burma’s southeast and west,
where conflict is particularly high relative to the population size, where the junta
continues to block or destroy aid from others.
It is imperative for ASEAN members to facilitate cross-border aid, partnering with
like-minded countries and organizations, in the interests of regional human security
and its own credibility.
The Burma military has a long history of violence
against, displacement of, and disregard for the
humanitarian needs of ethnic minority populations,
particularly at the country’s borders. This was shown
clearly in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic
during 2020, when the military continued its
widespread violence, gave minimal aid or blocked aid
to border regions, and destroyed ethnic health
checkpoints for detecting COVID.
On 1 February 2021, the military attempted to launch
a coup. It locked hundreds of parliamentarians—set to
convene parliament that day—in their lodgings; put
others under house arrest; and took others to jail. Since
that time it has only increased its detentions and other
targeting of politicians. It also responded to
nationwide peaceful resistance with shocking
violence, escalating attacks that have resulted in
nationwide conflict.
The intensity of conflict and attacks on civilians is not uniform. Although junta troops have torched
villages and towns in central Burma, raided them, and arrested civilians there, the humanitarian
implications of its onslaught have been worse in areas traditionally targeted by the military. The
following maps show (1) raw conflict numbers by State/Region and (2) adjusted for population, mindful
that the border zones already suffer a legacy of decades-long conflict and deprivation prior to the coup.
Intensifying the humanitarian emergency and impeding humanitarian assistance
The junta’s violence has had terrible consequences for Burma’s civilian population. According to the
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), as of 4 Apr 2022 there were 561,000 internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in Burma and 53,000 refugees from Burma who had been displaced after 1 Feb 2021, in addition
to hundreds of thousands of people previously displaced. In other words, as of 4 Apr, there were at least
1.89 million displaced persons in Burma and just across its borders in neighboring countries.1
These
numbers are likely significant underestimates, based on local reporting.
The junta has worked to prevent others from
providing humanitarian aid or healthcare to
vulnerable populations. In June 2021, junta
troops blocked aid for Karenni IDPs, and
destroyed an ambulance bringing humanitarian
aid to Moebye Township (Shan State). The
ambulance reportedly contained 80 sacks of rice,
medicine, and medical equipment.2
In July 2021,
the junta reportedly allowed only around 450kg
of rice to enter Mindat (Chin State) each day—
not enough to feed residents—despite a ceasefire
and humanitarian agreement.3
Junta troops have arrested volunteers for
assisting IDPs in Chin, Karen, Karenni, Shan,
Mandalay, and Sagaing States/Regions. 4
International NGOs have alerted the world that
the junta was blocking aid and using systematic
efforts to starve people and prevent them from
accessing healthcare.5
Junta troops have particularly targeted Burma’s
healthcare sector: As of 10 Jan 2022, there had
been at least 415 attacks and threats against
health workers, facilities, and transports; 30
health workers killed; 286 arrested or detained;
and 128 attacks on healthcare facilities. This
focus on the health workers stems from the
perception that they began the civil disobedience
movement.6
Junta troops have also targeted IDP camps and
their populations, killing those in need and
further preventing others from being able to
help. In January 2022 in Karenni State, staff and
patients fled a Loikaw hospital amid clashes and
junta-imposed electricity blackouts;7
and junta
planes bombed two IDP camps, killing at least
six IDPs.8
Amid conflict in Karen State, junta
planes bombed a hospital for the second time in
January, and attacked refugee camps.9
Activists and vulnerable communities from urban areas and central Burma have also fled to border
areas, where they seek refuge from the junta’s terror. These populations join those in need in border
areas, and their presence has also served as a pretext for further junta military attacks, such as those in
Lay Kay Kaw, Karen State,10 which have displaced over 10,000 people.
The scope of need – up by 1,300%
As a result of these actions, along with the junta’s mishandling of the economy and the COVID-19
pandemic, millions of people are living hand to mouth, in intense insecurity. In December 2021, the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that 14.4 million people in
Burma would need humanitarian assistance in 2022, a 1,300% increase from its prediction for 2021.11
While need is high nationwide, the severity of need is highest in border regions. According to OCHA,
by December 2021 there were 526,000 IDPs in “extreme” need, across the southeast (Southern Shan,
Karenni, Eastern Bago, Karen, Mon, and Tanintharyi), northwest (Chin, Sagaing), northeast (Kachin,
Northern Shan), as well as in Magway and Rakhine. Since that time, over 5,000 people have crossed
the border into Thailand, and many have sought shelter on either side of the Moei river, which divides
the two countries;12 the UNHCR and Thai officials estimated in April 2022 that 17,000 people had
crossed into Thailand since February 2021.13 Furthermore, the enormous number of people in need even
in areas fully under junta control demonstrates that the junta is either unwilling or unable to meet
people’s basic needs.
Numerous challenges prevent delivery of humanitarian aid within Burma. From the OCHA report:
While international and local humanitarian organizations [...] have stayed and delivered
during the recent crises, attacks on health workers and severe access constraints (particularly
in conflict areas) are resulting in unmet needs with a multiplier effect into 2022. A number of
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and International Non-Government Organizations
(INGOs) ...had their offices raided, materials confiscated and leaders arrested. Disregard for
human rights and international humanitarian law by parties to the conflict is becoming
increasingly common, and the operating environment for humanitarian workers has worsened
with continued attacks on health and education facilities and personnel [...].14
Community-based and border-based organizations part of the solution
Non-governmental health organizations already have infrastructure for healthcare delivery, and have
ably provided healthcare in border areas for decades, including emergency public health responses to
displaced persons during the pandemic. They coordinate through the Ethnic Health Committee (EHC),
comprised of independent Community-Based Health Organizations (CBHOs) and Ethnic Health
Organizations (EHOs) under the structure of ethnic organizations such as the Karen National Union
(KNU), Karenni National Peoples’ Party (KNPP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State-based,
and Burmese groups.
Ethnic health providers have already played a key role in responding to the pandemic, and are now
organizing vaccine distribution in ethnic areas. The Chin National Front started administering
Covishield vaccines on 15 Aug 2021. The New Mon State Party opened five temporary medical centers
and 18 checkpoints in the areas it controls, and is reportedly conducting a vaccination campaign. With
the help of the Chinese Red Cross, the Kachin Independence Organization has vaccinated at least 20,000
people, and the Shan State Progress Party has similarly vaccinated over 3,000 people.
Civilian and humanitarian aid groups have shown they are serious about combating COVID-19, as well
as poor healthcare generally, and could make significant progress with additional funds. The National
Unity Government (NUG)—Myanmar’s civilian government—has created a National Health
Committee and a National-Level Commission on COVID-19, and established itself as a willing liaison
between foreign donors and local communities.
ASEAN can lead the way in facilitating aid, but this must involve cross-border assistance. Otherwise,
the bloc risks undermining a multi-stakeholder approach and making its intervention dangerously
political and one-sided – aligned with the junta which has been the root cause of this threat to regional
human security.
Cross-border aid essential
In light of the desperate humanitarian situation in and outside of Burma, and conflict-related and other
junta-imposed impediments to providing in-country assistance, it is critical that foreign states and
organizations facilitate the flow of cross-border aid.
Furthermore, sole reliance on cooperation with the junta would be misguided and inexpedient, and
would exacerbate pre-existing humanitarian gaps in Burma. The military has proven time and again
that it is not a responsible steward of humanitarian aid or any other assistance for the people of Burma.
Its presence, even alongside foreign aid providers, is likely to frighten communities, and the junta is
liable to use aid as a means to further securitization and commission of atrocity crimes.15
It is notable that Adelina Kamal, former Executive Director of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance
(AHA) Centre, is among the loudest voices calling for ASEAN, Burma’s neighbors, the UN Special
Envoy on Myanmar, and other international actors to support humanitarian aid that goes through non-
state actors in Burma, such as community-based health organizations.16
Funding already exists for cross-border aid. On 10 Aug, the US Department of State announced an aid
package of more than US 50 million to provide life-saving protections, food and shelter, health care,
WASH, and support to people being persecuted and displaced in Burma.17 On 12 Aug, US Ambassador
to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield met virtually with Dr Cynthia Maung—head of the NUG’s
COVID-19 Task Force—to discuss US contributions to the COVID-19 relief effort.18
In October 2021, 397 local and allied groups co-signed a letter, calling on International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) to repurpose hundreds of millions of dollars in frozen Burma aid to support effective
COVID-19 assistance for border-based ethnic communities and prisoners in Burma.19
The first step forward towards a sustainable solution to strengthen community resilience and
significantly mitigate the crisis’ destabilizing impacts on the ASEAN region, would be to restart and
scale up cross-border aid programs that were present on that Thai-Burmese border in the 1980s – 2000s.
It is imperative that the management and implementation of such efforts be organized with the inclusion
of and implementation by community-based organizations that already have the trust and cooperation
of affected communities on the ground..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-BURMA
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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"AUNG OAK AWW
In the cold and dark winter nights, refugees sleep beside the Moei river with no shelter or blankets. Their only resources are donations from regional civil society organisations (CSOs)*: *Myanmar migrant-based community-based organisations (CBOs) in Thailand, Karen region-based CSOs and some Thailand CSOs. Thailand CSOs are sanctioned by the Royal Thai Army, and cooperate with Myanmar’s revolutionary forces such as the KNLA, People’s Defense Force (PDF), and select forces within the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The international community, on the other hand, has had no concrete plan to help Myanmar refugees and residents struggling with the effects of Tatmadaw attacks in southern Myanmar.
As conflict broke out between the Myanmar Tatmadaw (military) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) forces in “peace township” Lay Kay Kaw in December 15, 2021, serious artillery shootings and air strikes by the Tatmadaw resulted in thousands fleeing to Thailand. This conflict was only one of many effects of the ongoing armed conflict since the Myanmar coup of February 1, 2021.
What the international aid community and governments urgently need to push now is cooperation between the Thai government and ASEAN to accept new refugees in Thailand, to ensure cross-border humanitarian assistance for IDPs on the Thailand-Myanmar border. This can be achieved by cooperating with effective third sectors actors on the ground to distribute aid for those in need. In addition, Myanmar refugee and migrant-focused CSOs such as border-based charities, Myanmar migrant workers associations, and ethnic region-based CSOs must be allowed to freely operate in the border regions.
In southeast and southern Myanmar, the KNLA, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) (the armed wings of the Karen National Union) and the Karenni Army (KA) (the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party), are giving thousands of urban Burmese military training and mobilising the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces (KNDFs) and Burma People’s Liberation Army (BPLA). These two ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) control areas which are adjacent to the Thailand border, an area currently under siege by Tatmadaw offensives. Populations in these areas are facing the high risk of crimes against humanity. These offensives will likely increase in the future, resulting in further displacement as the number of refugees to Thailand increase.
Refugees fleeing armed conflict need to have safe refuge in areas far from the Tatmadaw’s air strikes and artillery; they should not be asked to return to dangerous zones as previous refugees have been forced to. After the airstrikes on March 27, 2021, residents of Mutraw (Papun) district fled to the Thai-Myanmar border, but were turned around by Thai border authorities. Similarly, refugees fleeing a Tatmadaw invasion of Lay Kay Kaw areas were turned back to Myanmar.
“We have been living between these two riverbanks for more than two months. When fighting closes in on the Myanmar side, we cross the Moei river and stay on the Thai side. We are asked to return to the Myanmar side when the artillery shelling stops,” a resident of Lay Kaw Kaw staying in Moei riverbank, shared with me.
Recent visits by the United Nations (UN) special envoy to Thailand have appealed to Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the Thai Prime Minister to provide assistance to Myanmar refugees, IDPs, and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. The two-day visit by Washington’s senior officials in the second week of October, 2021 also called for Thailand to ensure cross-border life-saving assistance along the Myanmar border. But Bangkok has no formal policy for long-term Myanmar refugees on their border.
However, as the Moso massacre in Karenni state demonstrates, provision of cross-border lifesaving assistance is not possible while the Tatmadaw continues to target civilian populations with air strikes and artillery shelling. The Tatmadaw has even cut off food and medical supplies to their operation areas.
It is imperative that the UN, US, ASEAN and neighboring member states like Thailand ensure the security of aid routes from CBOs and CSOs along the Thai-Myanmar border; these plans must include new concrete plans to aid refugees within Thailand’s borders. Yet, at the time of writing, Thailand is drafting more restrictive NGO law, which is bound to affect the humanitarian assistance available at the border.
The main concern of activists and revolutionaries within the Myanmar community so far has been the effect of international legitimacy on the junta regime’s culture of impunity; many fear that international recognition will give the military free rein to continue the perpetration of serious war crimes, kleptocracy, and the oppression of people in Myanmar.
International aid agencies in Myanmar who have tried to engage with the junta have incurred the anger of Myanmar activists and social workers, and consequently, “social punishment” on sites like Facebook. The international community needs to engage with the right local partners to provide aid effectively on the Thailand-Myanmar border.
Myanmar refugees and migrant-focused CSOs have the experience with providing aid in the border areas and social capital with the war on community. During the Lay Kay Kaw airstrikes, for example, Myanmar refugees and migrant-focused CSOs such as border-based charities, Myanmar migrant workers associations, and ethnic region-based CSOs provided aid to refugees with local funding, access which international organisations could not provide. These third sector actors are vital partners for international and long-term access and distribution to aid in Myanmar.
These partners include three key groups. First, Myanmar migrant-based CBOs, especially migrant workers associations in Thailand, are essential intermediaries––despite not being well-known as refugee aid providers. These CBOs are well-established across Thailand, particularly in cities like Mae Sot and Samut Sakhon (Mahachai). Their contributions have provided aid to people in Myanmar long before and after the coup in February 2021.
The second effective third sector actor is ethnic region-based CSOs, such as Karen and Karenni regional organisations who are also essential providers of cross-border humanitarian assistance. They have extensive experience with providing aid in the southern Myanmar, an area plagued by decades-long armed conflict since the 1990s between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups in Karen and Karenni region-based areas. These ethnic region-based CSOs have been the main service providers in healthcare and education and advocates for human rights and environmental issues.
Third, cross-border based charities and refugee camps at the Thai-Myanmar border, particularly in Mae Hong Son, Tak, and, Kanchanaburi are also familiar with international aid, and already possess good institutional support and structures to manage refugee affairs. These CSOs have the network for humanitarian assistances and cross border aid distribution. Because of their institutional capacity and background, these CSOs would be effective service providers if the Bangkok government agrees to new refugee camps at Thailand side.
Tatmadaw offensives in the last few months have not only targeted and destroyed civilian livelihoods and homes; their actions include a wide range of crimes against humanity. If international agencies are eager to provide aid, they should be careful to avoid any engagement with the junta regime, or risk eliminating humanitarian assistance for those who need it most: refugees on the Thai-Burma border in Karen and Karenni state, and IDPs in Karen and Karenni regions.
Relying upon these third-sector organisations also helps to mediate between international agencies and local humanitarian organisations, thereby avoiding engagement with the junta which would anger many in the resistance movement in Myanmar. More attention needs to be given to these border-based actors, as they are the most realistic means of distributing much-needed aid in Myanmar now.
Maung Oak Aww (pseudonym) is a researcher based on the Thailand-Myanmar border. His research specialises in the role of civil society organisations and war on populations in southern Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
New Mandala via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-29
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"France condemns in the strongest possible terms the prison sentence handed down today against State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi at the end of arbitrary court proceedings.
This decision represents a new attempt by the military junta to undermine the legitimacy of democratically elected leaders, in total contradiction with the expressed will of the Burmese people. It is another sign of the military’s contempt for the basic principles of the rule of law since the coup d’état on February 1, 2021.
As France and its EU partners have consistently emphasized, this crisis can be resolved only through a political dialogue that includes all stakeholders, and first and foremost, the democratic opposition forces. France reiterates its call for the immediate, unconditional release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners and an end to the acts of violence carried out by Burmese security forces..."
Source/publisher:
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
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"On 27 April, a court set up by the Myanmar State Administrative Council in Naypyitaw sentenced detained State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to an additional 5 years’ imprisonment. The EU’s position, as expressed on 6 December 2021 and 11 January 2022 remains that the trial was politically motivated. It represents another step towards the dismantling of the rule of law and a further blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar and yet another major setback for democracy in Myanmar since the military coup on 1 February 2021.
These proceedings are a clear attempt to exclude democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, from the inclusive dialogue process called for by ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus.
We reiterate our urgent call for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners as well as all those arbitrarily detained since the coup..."
Source/publisher:
European External Action Service
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
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Type:
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Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Myanmar’s military regime has killed civilians, torched houses and looted valuables in resistance hot spots across the country.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by fighting and Dr. Win Myat Aye, the humanitarian affairs and disaster management minister in the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how his team is helping displaced people.
The former rector of the Magwe University of Medicine served as the social welfare, relief and resettlement minister in the National League for Democracy government before the 2021 coup.
Many people have been left homeless by junta raids. How is the NUG taking care of civil war victims?
Many places are suffering from violence and Kayah, Chin, Sagaing and Magwe have been hit hardest. We are working to ease their plight.
According to the UNHCR, around 566,100 people have been recently displaced by fighting. It is difficult for us to help all of them. So far we have reached 354,194 people.
We have provided 2.7 billion kyats (US$1.4 million) in relief aid and 62 percent of that was given to Kayah, Karen, Chin, Sagaing and Magwe. We are trying to expand our outreach and cover all the areas.
How is the NUG cooperating with residents and ethnic organizations?
Some 14.4 million people are going hungry across the country. We have only been able to help a small percentage. The NUG alone can’t handle it. The process calls for cooperation. Most of the war victims are in ethnic-minority areas and along the borders. So it is critically important for us to cooperate with ethnic organizations.
When we provide assistance, we need to reach social organizations that can work with us. There are organizations networked with ethnic revolutionary groups and ethnic organizations. We need a coordination committee to network with those organizations.
A coordination committee has been formed independently. It was not formed by the NUG and it is not operating under the NUG. All the stakeholders suggested that it will be effective if community-based organizations and civil society organizations can coordinate relief efforts. So we formed an independent coordination committee.
This committee is working out relief efforts after adopting policies and procedures. We assume that this coordination has enabled us to better serve the people over the past year.
What are the challenges? Can public donations fund the NUG’s relief efforts?
We were empty-handed after we initiated relief efforts. We need funds.
We are the government during the revolution. We rely on the people. The people only have each other. We mainly rely on expats. People have actively helped with boundless goodwill.
Some donors are helping through us and others directly help those in need. Some are helping through social organizations.
Regional countries and the United Nations have called for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through ASEAN. Will the regime listen to their calls?
We can only fulfill some of the many needs of the people so international assistance is necessary. But for now, Myanmar’s people help each other and they haven’t received international assistance. We are paving the way for the delivery of international humanitarian assistance.
ASEAN has formed a humanitarian team for Myanmar which has received huge contributions. The assistance must reach people.
The regime views civilian victims as the enemy. So assistance will not come through the regime. The international community must know how to help the people.
The international community can help through the coordination committee and the NUG. We have international agencies and non-governmental organizations partnering with us. Humanitarian assistance can be provided through them. We can also help them contact community-based civil society organizations to work with.
Financial aid will not reach the people through the regime. The international community has to take a practical approach to help the people.
Social welfare was neglected under previous military regimes but it was pushed to the fore under the NLD government. As a former social welfare minister, what is your assessment of the regime’s social welfare ministry?
There is a huge gap between the past and present. We were an elected government and we could help people in real-time when they were in trouble. We went to affected areas in person and received their recognition. We were close to the people and provided help to the displaced and ethnic minorities.
But I now realize we could not fully understand their feelings although we met them.
Though we met cordially with displaced people, we did not have a chance to have open discussions with them. It has become obvious now that it was because of military influence in the administration.
The military did not allow us to visit some displacement camps, citing security reasons. It concealed the real situation and suffering from us. This has been clearly revealed by the regime’s violence against the people.
It is difficult for the NUG to carry out relief efforts but we fully understand the feelings of displaced people.
We are very sad about how much they suffered in the past. I want to apologize to them.
The NLD government planned to largely increase the humanitarian budget.
In the past, the defense budget got the lion’s share and humanitarian assistance was underfunded and things have gone back to zero since the coup.
The NUG is helping those affected. But our assistance is very limited because we rely on donations. Our social welfare ministry does a good job but the regime’s ministry fails to provide any services.
We are working with civil society organizations, people’s authorities and people’s defense forces to provide services. There has been greater unity since the revolution started.
What else would you like to say?
Regime troops torch villages, destroyed property, loot belongings and deploy in villages. Residents are forced from their homes into forests and other villages. When junta troops leave, nothing is left.
We are trying to help people and have designed plans. But we need funds. We are holding talks with international organizations to gain funds. There will be results soon.
The most important thing is the revolution must succeed. Everything else can be handled if the revolution succeeds. We keep our eyes fixed on the success of the revolution in whatever step we take. If the revolution succeeds, power will be handed to the people and we will be able to establish the federal democracy which all the people want. We have to remain firm in this revolution and we are propping up the resistance..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG)
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"Few people in the West or even in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) know who is who when it comes to the ministers of Myanmar’s junta. But one minister they should know is U Ko Ko Hlaing, as he is the military regime’s Minister for International Cooperation and the junta’s point man for dealing with the international community.
U Ko Ko Hlaing is also the chair of the Working Committee on Supervision of United Nations (UN) Agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations in Myanmar. In addition, he is the head of the Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance, meaning that the 65-year-old oversees international aid efforts in Myanmar. His recent visitors include David Carden, the deputy humanitarian coordinator for the UN in Myanmar. If those jobs were not enough, in February the former Lieutenant Colonel also led Myanmar’s defense at the International Court of Justice in the Netherlands against allegations of genocide committed by the Myanmar military.
Furthermore, he was among the few people ASEAN’s Special Envoy for Myanmar, Prak Sokhonn, met when he was in Myanmar last month. The envoy discussed humanitarian assistance issues with U Ko Ko Hlaing. He impressed the special envoy’s delegation with his friendliness and his 75-minute long discussion with the envoy was praised for being fruitful.
But what foreign visitors don’t know is that U Ko Ko Hlaing has been a staunch apologist for not only this military dictatorship but the previous one as well. He is infamous among the Myanmar people, many of whom refer to him scornfully as “Frog and Fish Catcher Ko Ko Hlaing” or “Candle Ko Ko Hlaing”. Looking back at his career, it is easy to understand why that is.
Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has appointed a number of ministers and advisors who previously served in U Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government. U Ko Ko Hlaing, who served as the chief political advisor to U Thein Sein, is one of them.
He is also a confidant of former dictator Senior General Than Shwe. U Ko Ko Hlaing graduated from the 18th intake of the Defense Services Academy, and he and two of his classmates are reportedly regular visitors to Than Shwe’s residence in the Myanmar capital Naypyitaw.
One of those classmates is U Than Htay, the current chair of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party. The other is retired Lieutenant General Wai Lwin, who served as defense minister in U Thein Sein’s administration and organized pro-military rallies in Yangon ahead of Min Aung Hlaing’s February 1, 2021 coup.
U Ko Ko Hlaing did not hold high military or civil positions in Than Shwe’s regime, unlike his two classmates, but he played an important part in the regime’s propaganda efforts as a writer and researcher. In 2004, he resigned as a Lieutenant Colonel from the research department of the defense ministry and transferred to the Information Ministry.
Under Information Minister U Kyaw Hsan in the regime’s State Peace and Development Council government, he served as an advisor to the information ministry, often publishing pro-military books as well as newspaper articles.
One of his most notorious articles concerned Cyclone Nargis, which in May 2008 swept through Ayeyarwady Region and southern Myanmar, killing over 138,000 people and destroying and damaging some 750,000 buildings. In the immediate aftermath of the worst recorded natural disaster in Myanmar’s history U Ko Ko Hlaing, writing under the pseudonym ‘Hlaing Aung’, wrote that the Shwedagon Pagoda – Myanmar’s most sacred Buddhist site – could now be seen clearly from a distance and worshipped with ease, thanks to Nargis having blown down so many trees in Yangon.
At the time, U Ko Ko Hlaing was living near Shwedagon Pagoda in Bahan Township. But while he was enjoying the view of the Shwedagon from his home, hundreds of thousands of residents in the hard-hit Ayeyarwady Region were left homeless by Nargis and were struggling without food and shelter amid the rotting corpses of humans and animals.
To make matters worse, U Ko Ko Hlaing argued in his article that as the Ayeyarwady Region is rich in fertile soil and water resources, its shattered residents could catch frogs and fish to eat along with the vegetables that grow in the region. Defending the xenophobic refusal of Than Shwe’s regime to allow international aid into Myanmar, U Ko Ko Hlaing said that the meals he suggested were tasty and nutritious and more than enough for Nargis refugees to survive on, so they had no need for chocolate bars donated by the international community.
The article was published in the regime-run English-language newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar, and attracted hordes of disparaging remarks from both local and international readers.
Despite that, U Ko Ko Hlaing continued to be favored by the generals and, in 2011, was appointed as chief political advisor to then President U Thein Sein. Later, his wife Daw Thida Tin transferred from the education ministry to the information ministry. She is currently serving as Deputy Director-General of the Information and Public Relations Department.
From being a propagandist who dared not use his real name and was told what to write by the military regime, U Ko Ko Hlaing became an important figure as a presidential advisor. But his old habit of defending the boss he served was far from over.
When Myanmar experienced long and frequent power cuts in 2014, U Ko Ko Hlaing again aroused controversy by saying: “I want to say with goodwill. Why don’t you switch off lights and light candles at your homes? Everything will be fine then.”
After U Thein Sein’s government lost the 2015 general election to the National League for Democracy (NLD), U Ko Ko Hlaing left Naypyitaw to serve as an advisor to the Myanmar Study Department of Yunnan University in Kunming, China. From there, he criticized the NLD government’s handling of Chinese investments, and was personally engaged in promoting the interests of Chinese companies in Myanmar.
He returned to Naypyitaw when Min Aung Hlaing appointed him as Minister for International Cooperation Minister. U Ko Ko Hlaing is just a year older than the coup leader, who graduated from the Defense Services Academy in 1977, a year after U Ko Ko Hlaing became a commissioned officer.
U Ko Ko Hlaing has continued his propaganda efforts for his new boss, doing his best to cover up the regime’s human rights violations. After many people died in July and August last year due to the regime’s weak handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, he wrote a number of articles blaming striking health workers and western countries for failing to provide vaccines.
“I don’t want to complain, but I have to. Western countries that have long said that Myanmar is on the verge of collapse due to COVID-19 and is in urgent need of international assistance have not yet provided a single dose of COVID-19 vaccines. The US$350 million lent by the International Monetary Fund to remedy the COVID-hit economy was part of the US$1 billion frozen by Uncle Sam. Nearly US$300 million in loans long promised by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank for the health of the people and agriculture has been stalled in the name of sanctions,” he wrote in junta-controlled newspapers.
Earlier this year in February, in another sign of the regime’s faith in him, U Ko Ko Hlaing was chosen to lead Myanmar’s defense of the Myanmar military at the International Court of Justice in the Netherlands against genocide allegations.
In short, if you mention international cooperation minister U Ko Ko Hlaing to any ordinary Myanmar people you meet, you will see puzzlement on their faces as they have no idea who he is. But if you try “Frog and Fish Catcher Ko Ko Hlaing” or “Candle Ko Ko Hlaing”, they will reply: “Yes, the regime’s stooge”.
The international community needs to be mindful, too, that the façade of ‘friendly’ minister U Ko Ko Hlaing hides a long-time apologist for military dictatorships..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Military History, Human Rights and international relations
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
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"The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
has monitored and reported on religious freedom conditions in
Afghanistan for more than two decades, but 2021 was particularly difficult. Following U.S. withdrawal from the country, the Taliban
took control on August 15, 2021. The Taliban’s victory was calamitous
for many reasons, including the detrimental effect it had on religious
freedom. USCIRF has long raised concern that the Taliban’s brutal application of its extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam violates the freedom
of religion or belief of all Afghans who do not adhere to that interpretation, including Muslims and adherents of other faiths or beliefs.
With the Taliban’s return to power, religious freedom conditions
in Afghanistan, and the overall human rights situation, significantly
deteriorated in 2021. Religious minorities faced harassment, detention,
and even death due to their faith or beliefs. The one known Jew and
most Hindus and Sikhs fled the country. Christian converts, Baha’is,
and Ahmadiyya Muslims practiced their faith in hiding due to fear of
reprisal and threats from the Taliban. Years of progress toward more
equitable access to education and representation of women and girls
disappeared. Throughout 2021, USCIRF consistently called attention
to the escalating persecution of religious minorities in the country,
including in two virtual events, two podcast episodes, and a factsheet.
Given the sharp decline in religious freedom conditions witnessed in the country in 2021, USCIRF recommends in this Annual
Report that the U.S. Department of State designate Afghanistan under
the Taliban’s de facto government as a “country of particular concern”
(CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).
The last such recommendation by USCIRF was in 2001, right before
the ousting of the previous Taliban regime that controlled most of the
country starting in 1996.
Even before its return to power, the Taliban presented a grave
threat to religious freedom, including in 2020 and the first half of 2021.
The group committed violent attacks, excluded religious minorities,
and punished residents in areas under their control in accordance
with their extreme interpretation of Islam. The government
of Afghanistan, under then
President Ashraf Ghani, faced
difficulties maintaining territorial
control and security, impacting
the safety of religious minority
communities. Given these
conditions, USCIRF in its 2021
Annual Report recommended
that the Taliban be designated
as an “entity of particular concern” (EPC) under IRFA and that Afghanistan be placed on the State
Department’s Special Watch List (SWL), a lesser category than CPC.
The State Department has designated the Taliban as an EPC every
year since its first set of EPC designations in 2018, most recently in
November 2021. The State Department caveated that this designation
was based on information analyzed as of August 15, 2021, before the
Taliban’s takeover as the de facto governing authority.
The crisis in Afghanistan should serve as a collective call to action
to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable religious communities
around the globe. Beyond Afghanistan, this report sounds the alarm
regarding the deterioration of religious freedom conditions in a range
of other countries and provides policy recommendations to the U.S.
government to respond to violations occurring in these places. This
year, these countries include the Central African Republic (CAR), which
USCIRF removed from last year’s annual report following improvements in religious freedom conditions, after previously reporting
on the country since 2015. During 2021, Central African authorities
and their partners committed egregious and ongoing violations of
religious freedom in CAR—including targeted abductions, torture,
and killings of Muslims—which led USCIRF to reinstate its recommendation to place CAR on the SWL.
USCIRF is also concerned about the potential for backsliding in
countries that did not meet the CPC or SWL standard this year, particularly Sudan, where the October 2021 military takeover threatens
recent advancements in religious freedom protections made by the
civilian-led transitional government. USCIRF continues to monitor the
situation in Sudan closely. In all contexts where the freedom of religion
or belief is violated or under threat, we urge the U.S. government
to actively promote this fundamental right and protect persecuted
religious communities.
About This Report
Created by IRFA, USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. government advisory body, separate from the U.S. Department of State, that
monitors and reports on religious freedom abroad and makes policy
recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress.
USCIRF bases these recommendations on the provisions of its
authorizing legislation and the
standards in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
other international documents.
USCIRF’s mandate and annual
reports are different from, and
complementary to, the mandate
and annual reports of the State
Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom.
USCIRF’s 2022 Annual Report assesses religious freedom
violations and progress in 27 countries during calendar year 2021
and makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findings, recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on
a year’s research by USCIRF, including hearings, meetings, and briefings, and are approved by a majority vote of Commissioners. Under
the statute, each Commissioner has the option to include a statement
with his or her own individual views. Although USCIRF was not able
to travel in 2021 to observe religious freedom conditions abroad
due to the coronavirus pandemic, USCIRF was able to meet virtually
with various stakeholders to further substantiate reports received
throughout the year.
The report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first,
those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should
designate as CPCs under IRFA, and second, those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should place on its SWL. The report
also includes USCIRF’s recommendations of nonstate actors
for designation by the State
Department as EPCs under
IRFA. In addition, the report
analyzes the U.S. government’s
implementation of IRFA during
the reporting year and provides
recommendations to bolster
overall U.S. efforts to advance
freedom of religion or belief
abroad. It also includes a section
discussing key trends and developments in religious freedom
globally during the reporting
period, including in countries that are not recommended for CPC or
SWL status. This year, that section covers topics including the COVID19 pandemic and religious freedom, blasphemy and hate speech law
enforcement, transnational repression of religious freedom, religious
intolerance in Europe, deterioration of religious freedom conditions in
South Asia, and political upheaval raising religious freedom concerns.
Finally, the report’s last section highlights key USCIRF recommendations that the U.S. government has implemented since USCIRF’s
previous annual report.
In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freedom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably
to refer to the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion or belief—including the right to nonbelief—protected under
international human rights law.
Standards for CPC, SWL, and
EPC Recommendations
IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages in
or tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. It
defines the State Department’s SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates “severe” violations of religious freedom.
Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom
mean “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including
violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges; (C)
causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine
detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of the right to
life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statute does not
specifically define severe violations of religious freedom, in making
SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations that
meet two of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing, and egregious standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic and ongoing,
systematic and egregious, or ongoing and egregious).
To meet the legal standard for designation as an EPC, a nonstate
group must engage in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined above, and must also be “a nonsovereign entity that
exercises significant political power and territorial control; is outside
the control of a sovereign government; and often employs violence
in pursuit of its objectives.”
The Annual Report highlights the countries and entities that, in
USCIRF’s view, merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; it is intended to
focus U.S. policymakers’ attention on the worst violators of religious
freedom globally. The fact that a country or nonstate group is not
covered in this report does not
mean it did not violate religious
freedom during the reporting
year. It only means that based
on the information available to
USCIRF, the conditions during
that year did not, in USCIRF’s
view, meet the high threshold—
the perpetration or toleration
of particularly severe or severe
violations of religious freedom—required to recommend
the country or nonstate group
for CPC, SWL, or EPC designation. In the case of a nonstate
group, it also could mean that the group did not meet other statutory requirements, such as exercising significant political power and
territorial control.
USCIRF monitors and has concerns about religious freedom
conditions abroad, including violations of freedom of religion or belief
perpetrated or tolerated by governments and entities not covered
in this report. The full range of USCIRF’s work on a wide variety of
countries and topics can be found at www.uscirf.gov.
USCIRF’s 2022 CPC, SWL, and
EPC Recommendations
For 2022, based on religious freedom conditions in 2021, USCIRF
recommends that the State Department:
• Redesignate as CPCs the following 10 countries: Burma, China,
Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;
• Designate as additional CPCs the following five countries:
Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, and Vietnam;
• Maintain on the SWL the following three countries: Algeria,
Cuba, and Nicaragua;
• Include on the SWL the following nine countries: Azerbaijan,
CAR, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Turkey, and
Uzbekistan;
• Redesignate as EPCs the following seven nonstate actors:
al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Houthis, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State
in West Africa Province (ISWAP) (also referred to as ISIS-West
Africa), and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).
The conditions supporting the CPC or SWL recommendation
for each country are described in the relevant country chapters of
this report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for
Boko Haram and ISWAP are described in the Nigeria chapter and for
HTS in the Syria chapter.
For al-Shabaab, the Houthis, ISGS, and JNIM, the EPC recommendations are based on the following conditions:
Although al-Shabaab’s territorial control continued to shrink, the
group actively operated in the southern and southcentral regions of
Somalia in 2021. The terrorist group carried out a series of deadly
attacks in Somalia and in neighboring Kenya against both Muslims
and non-Muslims. Reportedly, the group carried out amputations,
floggings, and executions of Muslims who disagreed with its interpretation of Sunni Islam. In Lamu County, Kenya, a priest reported that
the group attacked Christians and destroyed a church.
In 2021, the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah,
expanded its territorial holdings throughout Yemen. In March 2021,
Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi accused the United States of
“seeking to establish Baha’i, Ahmadiyya and atheist [communities] in
Yemen in order to undermine Islam.” The group forced Yemenis living
in Houthi-controlled areas to take indoctrination “trainings,” even when
these trainings were contrary to their religious beliefs. Prison officials
also forced detainees to take Islamic religious trainings as a condition
for their release, even when the detainees were not Muslim. The group’s
slogan, posted widely throughout Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen,
includes the phrase “a curse on the Jews,” and the tiny remaining
Jewish community faced ongoing and severe repression from Houthi
authorities. Houthi authorities
continued to detain Jewish prisoner of conscience Libi Marhabi
despite a court order for his
release. Houthi authorities also
continued to prosecute Baha’is
released from prison in 2020 and
blocked Baha’i bank accounts
in March 2021. Christians,
especially converts, were also
persecuted by Houthi authorities. In 2021, Houthi authorities
detained two Christian convert
priests and arrested a Christian
man on charges of apostasy and promoting Christianity.
In 2021, militant Islamist groups ISGS and JNIM continued to
control territory in parts of Mali and Niger. While reporting during the
calendar year is sparse, these groups likely continued trends of executing individuals with differing religious beliefs, restricting religious
practice and preaching, and imposing harsh punishments based on a
singular interpretation of Islamic law.
Violations of Human Rights on the Basis of Religion
USCIRF’s mission is to advance international freedom of religion or
belief (FoRB) by independently assessing and unflinchingly confronting threats to this fundamental right. Within this conception, USCIRF
is committed to addressing human rights violations perpetrated based
on the coercive enforcement of interpretations of religion and has
done so since it was created by Congress in 1998. USCIRF fulfills this
commitment through its reporting, advocacy, and policy recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress.
Some foreign governments enforce laws and policies that permit
or condone violations of human rights of minority groups and other
vulnerable communities on the basis of religion. Under international
human rights law, however, religion is not a legitimate justification for
egregiously violating individuals’ fundamental rights. As explained
by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee—the body
of independent experts charged with interpreting provisions of the
ICCPR—the existence of a state or majority religion cannot result in
the impairment of the rights of individuals under the ICCPR. International law requires states to respect FoRB and other human rights for
everyone, equally. Thus, states must not coercively enforce religious
interpretations on individuals or communities who do not adhere to
those interpretations. Individuals and religious communities enjoy
the right to hold and follow diverse views on religious precepts free
from government interference. Governments are accountable to
international human rights standards guaranteeing FoRB and other
fundamental human rights to all.
To that end, USCIRF has provided qualitative and quantitative information in its annual reports, publications, and other work
(see Appendix 4) highlighting problematic laws and policies of foreign countries that permit or condone violations of human rights
of minority groups and other vulnerable communities on the basis
of religion. Some of USCIRF’s key recent activities on this topic are
discussed below.
Throughout 2021, USCIRF published products and held public
events that provide examples of states’ abuses of human rights on the
basis of religion. USCIRF’s Country Update: Iran, released in August
2021, detailed how the Iranian
government uses religion as a
basis for violating the rights of
its citizens, including by executing members of its lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and
intersex (LGBTI) community.
USCIRF’s September 2021
Country Update: Saudi Arabia
described Saudi authorities’
enforcement of the government’s interpretation of Sunni
Islam and the country’s guardianship system, which severely
limits women’s rights. These themes were further explored in USCIRF’s
December 2021 hearing on “State-Sanctioned Religious Freedom
Violations and Coercion by Saudi Arabia and Iran.”
Additionally, USCIRF released a factsheet on Religious Minorities
in Afghanistan in October 2021, outlining the Taliban’s imposition of
its strict interpretation of Sunni Islam that violates the freedom of
religion or belief of Afghanistan’s religious minorities and others who
do not share the same religious beliefs. USCIRF further highlighted the
impact of the coercive application of these beliefs on religious minorities and other vulnerable Afghans during the “USCIRF Conversation:
Update on At-Risk Religious Communities in Afghanistan” event held
in October 2021. Also in October, USCIRF released a factsheet on
Religious Freedom Violations in the Republic of Chechnya describing
how the Chechen dictatorship maintains hegemony through the
imposition of a purported “traditional” version of Islam, including by
conducting violent purges of the LGBTI community and witch hunts
that often target elderly women. In November 2021, USCIRF published
Country Update: Malaysia addressing how the implementation of religion-based law in Malaysia’s dual court system can violate religious
freedom and related rights. In this report, USCIRF details the use of
these religious laws to target members of vulnerable groups, such as
Malaysia’s Muslim LGBTI community.
USCIRF also conducted research on the coercive enforcement
of interpretations of religion by nonstate actors, particularly EPCs. In
November 2021, USCIRF published a report on EPCs and Religious
Freedom, which outlines the human rights responsibilities of EPCs and
other armed nonstate actors. USCIRF also released reports on Violent
Islamist Groups in the Central Sahel and Violent Islamist Groups in
Northern Nigeria, which address the imposition of a strict interpretation of Shari’a by EPCs and other violent Islamist groups in these areas
and its impact on human rights.
USCIRF continued to highlight the ways in which the enforcement
of blasphemy or apostasy laws, which are based on religious interpretations, undermines human rights—including freedom of religion
or belief and freedom of expression—and often targets vulnerable
religious and other communities. Commission reports on this topic
published in 2021 include Country Update: Egypt, Factsheet on Religious Freedom Violations in Kano State, Nigeria, and Factsheet on
Ahmadiyya Muslims. At the end of 2021, USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List
showcased 73 victims targeted under blasphemy or apostasy laws.
USCIRF’s 2021 work on other problematic laws based on religious
interpretations included the March factsheet on The Use of Shari’a as
Religious Justification for Capital Punishment against LGBTI Persons
discussing how such laws violate the human dignity and rights of
LGBTI persons and embolden societal hostility, discrimination, and
violence against them.
In addition to the work described above, USCIRF also raises
awareness on these issues through its public hearings, briefings, and
other events, which seek to highlight the Commission’s research and
recommendations and showcase diverse panelists offering a variety of
perspectives. In May 2021, for example, USCIRF hosted an event with
Nasreldin Mufrih, Sudan’s then Minister of Religious Affairs, where
he provided an update on how the country’s transitional government
was addressing the previous regime’s violations of human rights
based on religion. These efforts were further discussed in USCIRF’s
Policy Update on Sudan, released in November 2021. In February, a
USCIRF event focused on ways the U.S. government can protect and
assist refugees and asylum seekers, including those fleeing the coercive enforcement of religion. During 2021, USCIRF’s podcast series,
Spotlight, offered in-depth analysis about developments that have
implications for religious freedom and other human rights. Examples
of episodes that discuss the official imposition of religious norms
include Pakistan’s Laws that Enable Islamist Extremism, Hazara Community Threatened in Afghanistan, Enforcing Blasphemy Laws Have
Dire Consequences, Religious Restrictions in Iran, and Governments
Using Shari’a to Impose Death Sentences on LGBTI Persons.
Information on all of USCIRF’s activities can be found at
https://www.uscirf.gov/..."
Source/publisher:
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Inter-Communal violence and discrimination - Myanmar - General articles and analysis, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Format :
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6.63 MB (Original Post) - 100 pages
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"Star Sapphire Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate linked to the family of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, plays a key role in brokering arms deals for the Myanmar military and operates businesses with the Myanmar military and its conglomerate, Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL).
Star Sapphire Group is controlled by Dr Tun Min Latt and his wife Dr Win Min Soe, who have a longstanding partnership with the prominent Thai businessperson Upakit Pachariyangkun, now a senator.
Leaked documents show that Tun Min Latt has brokered arms deals with major Israeli and Chinese companies, including Elbit Systems, Israel Shipyards, Israel Aerospace Industries and NORINCO, aiding and abetting the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes against the people of Myanmar.
Tun Min Latt has built his business through decades-long corrupt deals with the Myanmar military.
Tun Min Latt is the son of former air force lieutenant colonel Khin Maung Latt, who was director-general of the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism under the former military junta.
In 1999, in his role as director-general of the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism under the former military junta, Tun Min Latt’s father, Lt Col Khin Maung Latt, signed a deal to build Allure Resort, an illegal casino in Tachilek, a town bordering Thailand.
Tun Min Latt was a beneficiary of the deal, developing and operating the casino with Upakit Pachariyangkun.
In November 2017, the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, under the National League for Democracy, handed the casino to the Myanmar Army’s Office of the Quartermaster General, diverting the state’s 6% share of profits away from the Union Budget, hidden from parliamentary scrutiny.
The Allure Resort, and its connection to Star Sapphire’s wider network of business interests, raise serious money laundering and illicit financing concerns.
In 2013, under the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government, Tun Min Latt signed a build-operate-transfer deal to develop Hotel Dawei, on land owned by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Lease payments continue to provide a source of revenue to the junta’s home affairs ministry, which is responsible for the Myanmar Police Force.
Since the military’s February 2021 coup attempt, the Myanmar Polce Force has committed atrocity crimes, including deliberate killings and torture of democracy activists.
In ethnic areas of south-eastern Myanmar, Star Sapphire subsidiaries have operated mines under profit sharing arrangement with the military since 2001, helping to fund the military’s grave human rights violations and destroying the environment.
One of Star Sapphire’s mining companies, Royal Mawtaung Mining (formerly Star Thiri Investment), was co-founded by Khin Thiri Thet Mon, the daughter of junta leader and war criminal Min Aung Hlaing. No public information was found regarding its activities.
In the energy sector, Star Sapphire Group’s Myanmar Business Consultant Group is the local partner of the Hong Kong-listed company VPower Group and the Chinese state-owned firm China National Technical Import and Export Corporation (CNTIC) in a liquified natural gas project involving MEHL.
Myanmar Business Consultant Group channels funds to MEHL for the land and will transfer the facility to MEHL at the end of the lease, providing the military with a lucrative future asset.
In Tanintharyi Region, Star Sapphire is developing a 200 MW combined cycle power plant with United Power of Asia, a Thai publicly listed company associated with Tun Min Latt and Upakit Pachariyangkun.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Tun Min Latt and his associates have spent decades enriching themselves through the Myanmar military’s systemic corruption.
“They have provided the military with both revenue and arms that have fuelled atrocity crimes against the people of Myanmar, and are therefore complicit in those crimes.
“The military junta is a terrorist organisation that continues to commit international crimes with total impunity, including deliberate killings, indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, arbitrary detention and rape.
“Urgent targeted sanctions must now be imposed against Dr Tun Min Latt, Star Sapphire Group of Companies and their directors and shareholders.
“Tun Min Latt has used Thailand as a base for illicit business activities, including operating an illegal casino with Upakit Pachariyangkun and the Myanmar army, and banking with Siam Commercial Bank. This must stop.
“As a senator, Upakit Pachariyangkun's business dealings with Tun Min Latt and the Myanmar military require public scrutiny.
“We urge Thai civil society to take action and ensure Upakit is held accountable for his corrupt business dealings and complicity in the Myanmar military’s international crimes.
“Tun Min Latt's use of Thailand and Singapore for his business with the Myanmar military is yet another case of ASEAN's failed five-point consensus, one year on, continuing to enable military-linked business.
“ASEAN’s failed “consensus” has only served to block and delay effective action from the UN and international community, while conflicts of interest within ASEAN governments embolden the junta to continue its terror campaign against the people.
“The international community must stop hiding behind ASEAN and impose targeted sanctions and a global arms embargo to block the flow of arms and funds to the terrorist junta, and to support the Myanmar people's Spring Revolution.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
168.66 KB 163.98 KB
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