2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Individual Documents
Sub-title:
အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းကြေညာခြင်
Description:
"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများ အနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန်မထမ်းဆောင်ပဲ ဓမ္မဘက်မှရပ်တည်၍ ပြည်သူနှင့်တသားတည်းဖြစ် စေရန်နှင့် အမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ကြစေရန် အကြိမ် ကြိမ်ဖိတ်ခေါ် ကမ်းလှမ်းခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ် ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ရုံးအနေဖြင့်လည်း အောက်တိုဘာလမှစတင်၍ အမိန့်အာဏာ ဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနမဖွဲ့ရသေးသော ဌာနအသီးသီးမှ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း သူရဲကောင်းများ၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေး၊ လုံခြုံဘေးကင်းရေးနှင့် ဖိအားကင်းစင်ရေး တို့အတွက် အလေးထား ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန် ထမ်းဆောင်နေ ပြီး CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအား ဖိအားပေးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ရာထူးမှထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း၊ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှထုတ် ပစ်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းနှင့် ဥပေဒနှင့်အညီ ပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုတော့သည့် လစာချေးငွေများအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်ခိုင်းခြင်းများ စသည့် အမျိုးမျိုးသောဖိနှိပ်မှုများကိုကျူးလွန်နေသော “သာသနာရေးနှင့် ယဉ်ကျေးမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန (သာသနာရေးဦးစီးဌာန)” မှ အောက်ဖေါပြပါ ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းသွင်းလိုက်ပြီး ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ် (Dismiss) လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.18 MB
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Description:
"မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် ဆယ်စုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ တိုင်းရင်းသား လူမျိုးစုများအပေါ် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ဆိုးရွားစွာ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့်အပြင် ပြည်တွင်းစစ်များတွင် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်သည်အထိ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြောင်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့် ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပ သုတေသနမှတ်တမ်းများအရ သိရှိရသည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာနှင့် မွတ်စလင်များကိုလည်း စစ်တပ်သည် မူဝါဒချမှတ်၍ စနစ်တကျ မဟာဗျူဟာမြောက် နည်းလမ်းများသုံးပြီး Genocide ကို အဆင့်ဆင့်ကျူးလွန်နေကြောင်း BHRN က မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသော သုတေသန အချက်အလက်များအရ လည်းကောင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အမေရိကန် နိုင်ငံခြားရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန က ထုတ်ပြန်ထားသော မှတ်တမ်းများအရ လည်းကောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၎င်း ရိုဟင်ဂျာနှင့် မွတ်စလင်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး မူဝါဒများကို အလွယ်တကူ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ရန်နှင့် အဆင့်ဆင့် အောင်မြင်အောင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ရန် အစ္စလာမ်မိုဖိုးဘီးယား အစ္စလာမ်ကြောက် ရောဂါကို မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြားသို့ ဆယ်စုနှစ်များစွာကတည်းက ဖြန့်ကျက်ထားသည်။ မွတ်စလင်များသည် တိုင်းပြည်၏အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို တိုက်ရိုက်ထိပါးနေသော အန္တရာယ်အဖြစ် လည်းကောင်း၊ အမျိုး၊ ဘာသာ၊ သာသနာကို ဖျက်ဆီးမည့် ဓမ္မန္တရာယ်အဖြစ်လည်းကောင်း၊ အမုန်းစကားများကို နိုင်ငံတဝန်းရှိ ပြည်သူများသို့ နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံ အသုံးပြု၍ လှည်းနေလှေအောင်း၊ မြင်းဇောင်းမကျန် ပျံ့နှံ့စေခဲ့သည်။ မျိုးဆက်နှင့်ချီ၍ ဖြန့်ဝေခဲ့သော အမုန်းတရားများသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ရင်ထဲ၊ အသည်းထဲတွင် စွဲမြဲစွာ ကိန်းအောင်း လာချိန်တွင် အမျိုးမပျောက်စေရန် ကာကွယ်ရန် နည်းလမ်းများဟူ၍ လူထုလှု့ံဆော်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ယင်းနောက် ဘာသာရေးအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ၊ နယ်မြေရှင်းလင်းရေးများအထိ ပြုလုပ်လာခဲ့ပြီး ယင်းလုပ် ဆောင်ချက်များသည် တိုင်းပြည်လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် အမျိုးဘာသာသာသနာအတွက် ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်၍ တရားကြောင်း ပြည်သူလူထုအား လှည့်စားခဲ့သည်။
အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သော စစ်ကောင်စီသည် လူထုတော်လှန်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကြောင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးယန္တရား မလည်ပတ်နိုင်ဘဲ ပိုမိုကြပ်တည်းသောအခြေအနေများဖြင့်သာ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုမရှိဘဲ အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အဖြစ်သာ နိုင်ငံတကာ မျက်နှာစာတွင် သတ်မှတ်ခံထားရသည်။ အရက်စက်အကြမ်းကြုတ်ဆုံးနည်းများသုံး၍ ပြည်သူလူထုအား အကြောက်တရားဖြင့် ထိန်းချုပ်သော်လည်း အများပြည်သူလူထုမှာ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင် ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုများကို ပိုမိုထောက်ခံအားပေးနေသောကြောင့် စစ်ကောင်စီမှာ အုပ်ချုပ် ရေးယန္တရားပင် မလည်ပတ်နိုင်ဘဲ ကဏ္ဍအသီးသီးတွင် အထွေထွေအကြပ်အတည်းနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်က ၂၀၁၇ ခုနှစ်တွင် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးသုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှု ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြောင်း အမေရိကန်အစိုးရက ကြေညာခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာက ပိတ်စို့အရေးယူမှုများကြောင့်လည်း စစ်ကောင်စီသည် အဖက်ဖက်မှ ထွက်ပေါက်ပိတ်လာခဲ့သည်။
ထိုသို့သော အခြေအနေတွင် မွတ်စလင်လူထုကို ဥပဒေဘောင်ပြင်ပမှ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်များပေး၍ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ယန္တရားများ လည်ပတ်စေရန် လုပ်ဆောင်လာသည်များကိုလည်း ဝမ်းနည်းစွာ တွေ့ရှိရသည်။ ဘာသာရေးလွတ်လပ်ခွင့်နှင့် ကန့်သတ်ထားမှုများ ဖြေလျော့သယောင် သွားလာလှုပ်ရှားမှုများကို ခွင့်ပြုပေးပြီး ဗလီဝတ်ကျောင်းတော်တွင်း ဥပုသ်ကာလ စုပေါင်းဝါဖြေမှုများတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီ တိုင်းမှူးများလာရောက်၍ ဗလီ ဝတ်ကျောင်းတော်ပိုင် စားဖွယ်ပစ္စည်းများကို စစ်ကောင်စီက ၄င်းတို့ အလှုပစ္စည်းများ သွားရောက်ဝေငှသည်ဟု မီဒီယာများတွင် အရှက်မဲ့စွာ လိမ်လည်ဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်။
စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ယင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များသည် လူထုအတွင်း ပုံမှန်လည်ပတ်နေသည်ဟု ထင်ယောင်ထင်မှားဖြစ်စေရန် လိမ်လည်လှည့်စားမှု တစ်ရပ်အဖြစ်လည်းကောင်း၊ ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးမှ ၎င်းတို့အာဏာသိမ်းမှုအား ဆန့်ကျင်လှုပ်ရှားမှုများ ပြုလုပ်နေချိန် မွတ်စလင်များ ပုံမှန်လည်ပတ်နေသည်ဟု ယုံမှားစေရန် ဖန်တီးလုပ်ဆောင်မှုများအဖြစ် BHRN က ရှုမြင်သည်။
၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်တွင် ကိုဗစ်ကပ်ရောဂါကြောင့် လည်းကောင်း၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်တွင် အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်ကောင်စီ ၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကြောင့် လည်းကောင်း၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူများမှာ သမိုင်းတလျှောက်တွင် မကြုံခဲ့ဖူး သော ခက်ခဲကြပ်တည်း ကြမ်းတမ်းသော ကာလကို ဖြတ်သန်းခဲ့ရသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက် အာဏာသိမ်းမှုနောက်ပိုင်းတွင် နိုင်ငံတဝန်း စစ်အာဏာရှင် တော်လှန်ရေး လူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုများ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ရာ ဒေသအသီးသီးက မွတ်စလင်ကျောင်းသား လူငယ်များသည်လည်း ကဏ္ဍအသီးသီးက ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၎င်းတို့သည် မည်သည့် ဘာသာရေး လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်း၏ အားပေး လှုံ့ဆော်မှုကြောင့် မဟုတ်ဘဲ စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ မတရား ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ် ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို မိမိတို့၏ နိုင်ငံရေးခံယူချက်အလျောက် အသက်စွန့်၍ တွန်းကန်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်၊ တွန်းကန်တော်လှန်နေကြသည်။ ပြည်နယ်နှင့် တိုင်းအသီးသီးရှိ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်မျာတွင်လည်း တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လျက် ရှိကြောင်း လေ့လာတွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၂၀၂၂ တွင်လည်း တော်လှန်ရေး မြှင့်တင်လာမှုကြောင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ရက်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ပြည်သူများ ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံဆက်လက် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည်။ မွတ်စလင် (၆၂) ဦးအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူ(၂၀၂၉)ဦး မတရား သတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရပြီး AAPP စာရင်းအရ ပြည်သူပေါင်း (၁၀၂၉၀) ဦးကျော် ဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်အနှံ့ အိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာ ပြည်သူလူထုမှာလည်း တစ်သန်းကျော် ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။
ယခုကဲ့သို့ တိုင်းပြည်အမှောင်အတိ ကျရောက်နေချိန်တွင် လူများစု ဗုဒ္ဓဘာသာဝင်များသည် ၄င်းတို့၏ ၁၂ ရာသီ ပွဲလမ်းသဘင်များကို လည်းကောင်း၊ အထွတ်အမြတ်ထားရာ သင်္ကြန်နှင့် နှစ်သစ်ကူးပွဲလမ်း သဘင်များကိုလည်းကောင်း ကျင်းပခြင်းမပြုလုပ်ကြကြောင်း တွေ့ရသည်။ ခရစ်ယာန်ဘာသာဝင်များ သည်လည်း ခရစ်စမတ်အပါအဝင် မည်သည့်ပွဲလမ်းသဘင်များမှ မကျင်းပဘဲ ဝတ်ပြုဆုတောင်းမှုများသာ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ဟိန္ဒူနှင့် အခြားသော ကိုးကွယ်ယုံကြည်မှုများသည်လည်း ထိုနည်းလည်းကောင်း ပြုမူခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ရသည်။
မကြာခင်ကျရောက်မည့် အီးဒ်ပွဲတော်ကာလတွင်လည်း မွတ်စလင်ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် အခြား ဘာသာဝင်ညီနောင်များနှင့်အတူ ညီညွတ်စွာရပ်တည်ပြီး ပွဲလမ်းသဘင်များကို ရှောင်ရှားကာ ဝတ်ပြုဆုတောင်းမှုများကိုသာ ပြုလုပ်ပေးကြပါရန် BHRN က မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။
အဖွဲ့အစည်းနောက်ခံ
+++++++++++
BHRN သည် ၂၀၁၂ ခုနှစ်တွင် တည်ထောင်ခဲ့ပြီး ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်မှစတင်ကာ လူနည်းစုများအပေါ် ဖိနှိပ်ခွဲခြား ဆက်ဆံမှုများ၊ လူ့အခွင့်ရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုများ၊ ဘာသာရေးလွတ်လပ်ခွင့်ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများနှင့် စစ်တပ်၏ ညှင်းပမ်းဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာမှတ်တမ်းတင်ခြင်း၊ သုတေသနတွေ့ရှိချက်များကို နိုင်ငံတကာ အစိုးရများနှင့် အဖွဲ့စည်းများထံသို့ တင်ပြပြီး စစ်တပ်ကိုထိရောက်စွာအရေးယူရန် နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့် လှုပ်ရှားနေသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Inter-Communal violence and discrimination - Myanmar - General articles and analysis
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
888.11 KB
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Sub-title:
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ CDM မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအား မီးသတ်ဦးစီးဌာနအဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လိုခြင်းမရှိသော မီးသတ်ဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများကို စုစည်း၍ CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ၏ အရေးကိစ္စများနှင့် ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့်လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ မြေပြင်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနှင့်လုံခြုံရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကိစ္စရပ်များတွင် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် (၁၃-၁၀-၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် အမိန့်အမှတ်(၅/၂၀၂၁)ဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ CDM မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အား ဖွဲ့စည်းတာဝန် ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေများနှင့် ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများ၌ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လစ်လပ်သွားသော အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးယန္တရားတွင် အစားထိုးဝင်ရောက်၍ မီးဘေး လုံခြုံရေး၊ သဘာဝဘေးအန္တရာယ် ကာကွယ်ရေး၊ အရေးပေါ်ရှာဖွေကယ်ဆယ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အကျိုးပြုလုပ်ငန်းများ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်နှင့် ပြည်နယ်ကောင်စီများ၏ ဒေသန္တရအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များတွင် ကူညီပံ့ပိုး ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ CDM မီးသတ်ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အား မီးသတ်ဦးစီးဌာန အဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
171.78 KB
more
Sub-title:
လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီအား လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန အဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁)ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို အကြမ်းဖက် လုယူသိမ်းပိုက်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လိုခြင်း မရှိသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအရပ်ရပ်ရှိ လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အင်အား ဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ အား ဆက်သွယ်ချိတ်ဆက် စုစည်း၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုအောက်တွင် လိုက်ပါဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး အတွက် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအား ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ (၃၀ - ၁၀- ၂၀၂၁) ရက်စွဲပါ အမိန့်အမှတ်၊ (၈/ ၂၀၂၁) ဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေများနှင့် ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများ၌ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လစ်လပ်သွားသော မိမိဌာနလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် အစားဝင်ရောက်၍ ကြားကာလ အစိုးရ ယန္တရားများ ပိုမိုပီပြင်စွာ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်စေရေး၊ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ မူဝါဒများ၊ လုပ်ငန်းလမ်းညွှန်မှုများနှင့်အညီ စနစ်တကျ အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင် ရေးအတွက် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အား (၂၃- ၄- ၂၀၂၂) ရက်နေ့မှ စ၍ လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဦးစီးဌာန အဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲ ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
100.73 KB
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Sub-title:
အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကော်မတီအား ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာနအဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁)ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို အကြမ်းဖက် လုယူသိမ်းပိုက်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လိုခြင်း မရှိသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအရပ်ရပ်ရှိ လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အင်အား ဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ အား ဆက်သွယ်ချိတ်ဆက် စုစည်း၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုအောက်တွင် လိုက်ပါဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး အတွက် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအား ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ (၃၀ - ၁၀- ၂၀၂၁) ရက်စွဲပါ အမိန့်အမှတ်၊ (၈/ ၂၀၂၁) ဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေများနှင့် ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများ၌ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လစ်လပ်သွားသော မိမိဌာနလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် အစားဝင်ရောက်၍ ကြားကာလ အစိုးရ ယန္တရားများ ပိုမိုပီပြင်စွာ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်စေရေး၊ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ မူဝါဒများ၊ လုပ်ငန်းလမ်းညွှန်မှုများနှင့်အညီ စနစ်တကျ အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင် ရေးအတွက် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာန CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အား (၂၃- ၄- ၂၀၂၂) ရက်နေ့မှ စ၍ လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဦးစီးဌာန အဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲ ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-24
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"Your Excellencies,
It has been a year since a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar was reached at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting between all ASEAN leaders and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to address the deteriorating political and humanitarian crisis triggered by his illegal coup d’état.
In this year, Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing has totally failed to implement any of the Five Point Consensus. Given this failure, it is time for ASEAN to move on to sanctioning him for the continued suffering he is inflicting on the people of Myanmar and his blatant disregard for his regional partners.
Over this period, the Myanmar military has unleashed an all-out war over its people which according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights consists of “systematic and widespread human rights violations and abuses” that may amount to “war crimes and crimes against humanity.” These crimes include the arbitrary arrests of thousands of anti-junta activists and their family members; the routine torture of detainees, often with lethal consequences; the shooting of unarmed protesters, air strikes against civilians in Myanmar’s ethnic areas, the burning of whole villagers, and extrajudicial killings.
In the face of these atrocities, ASEAN must now accept the fact, repeatedly demonstrated over the last months, that Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, has no intention whatsoever of abiding by the Consensus unless he feels a strong pressure to do so.
In APHR’s original joint response we offered suggestions and support to ensure that the implementation of the Five Point Consensus makes a positive contribution to improve the situation on the ground. It is in the same spirit that we now urge you to take the following steps, in order to stop the Myanmar military’s atrocities, hold the perpetrators accountable, and initiate a real process towards peace and democratization.
First, ASEAN must thoroughly re-consider the role and appointment mechanism of the Special Envoy to Myanmar, in view of the poor record of the previous and current holder of this admittedly difficult position.
As it stands now, the Special Envoy does not represent ASEAN as such, but the group’s Chair, and thus changes every year, making it extremely difficult to maintain a coherent policy over time. Also, both of the Special Envoys appointed so far have been high officials in their respective ministries of foreign affairs, for whom their missions as special envoys was not their only, or even top, priority.
In order to make the position more effective, the Special Envoy should be exclusively dedicated to this mission, appointed on a long-term basis, and respond to ASEAN as a whole, rather than the rotating Chair position. ASEAN members should establish clear and comprehensive terms of reference that make explicit the tasks, mandate and authority entailed by the role of Special Envoy; as well as allocate the necessary resources to carry out the mission.
Second, when the Five-Point Consensus was agreed last year, APHR pointed out that the lack of a timeframe and enforcement mechanisms rendered it virtually toothless. Given that atrocities continued to be committed, unabated by the State Administration Council over the past year, it is high time for the junta to face real consequences for their criminal actions. Such consequences should include the suspension of Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN; travel bans for Min Aung Hlaing and the members of his State Administration Council (SAC) in the region; targeted sanctions against the leaders of the coup, those responsible for committing crimes against humanity and their economic interests.
Third, the Consensus calls for “a constructive dialogue among all parties” in order “to seek a peaceful solution” to the conflict unleashed by the military, and gives the ASEAN Special Envoy the mission to facilitate such a dialogue. One year later, neither of the Special Envoys have made any progress on this, having only met representatives of the military, and not a single representative of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), which represents the democratically elected government and receives support from the majority of the Myanmar people.
Therefore, we urge ASEAN to immediately and publicly meet with the NUG. Representatives of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) must also be included in further dialogue to ensure that all voices are heard.
Finally, the coup has triggered an economic catastrophe on the 54 million inhabitants of Myanmar. More than half are now in poverty, while the country’s economy has shrunk by a staggering 18%, according to the World Bank. Provision and distribution of aid is now a matter of the utmost urgency and necessity.
ASEAN’s plan to deliver aid through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) has not only been insufficient but has also manifestly not reached out to the people in need. Instead, ASEAN should immediately begin to work with Myanmar’s local community-based and civil society organisations, as well as relevant international agencies, to effectively provide aid directly to the people in need. Given the scale of the aid required and the military’s history of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid, collaboration with agencies experienced in running humanitarian operations in Myanmar will help ensure that ASEAN’s intervention abides by the “do no harm” principle.
We also urge neighboring countries, particularly ASEAN member, Thailand, to allow those fleeing persecution and violence to cross its borders, to seek asylum and receive humanitarian aid.
Lastly, we urge ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners and the wider international community to support ASEAN in ensuring it can take up the regional leadership role required to respond to a situation of this gravity, including by supporting the implementation of the above recommendations.
The question to ASEAN leaders now is: will you allow the military to continue committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and threaten the human security and economic development of the region for another year?
ASEAN’s credibility depends on its ability to act in accordance with the reality of the situation in Myanmar. The group cannot expect the military to abide by the terms of the Five-Point Consensus or to any international or humanitarian norm for that matter. It is imperative that the member states escalate measures to put real pressure on the military to stop it from brutalizing its own population and turning the country into a failed state, and do all they can to work towards the fulfillment of the Myanmar people’s aspirations for peace and democracy.
Sincerely,
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
CC: ASEAN Dialogue Partners..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-24
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
"1. On 17th April 2022, Maung Zwe Mahn Aung (27 year), Public Health Supervisor-2 (PHS-2) of Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) from Chaung U township, Sagaing Region together with Private Min Thant Kyaw, Private Yazar Htun, Private Naing Wunna and Private Minn Khant @ Moe Dee of Chaung U Township People’s Defence Force (CHUPDF) have fallen in action while on sentinel duty to provide security for the main route of the Monywa peaceful demonstration, as they were abducted and killed by the terrorist military council’s soldiers and their Pyusawhti lackeys from Taw Pu village tract, Monywa township. The fallen CDM healthcare worker Maung Zwe Mahn Aung is survived by his wife and two young children.
2. From the day the coup d’etat took place on 1st February 2021 to this present day, the terrorist military council has committed the following atrocious crimes on the healthcare workers and in the healthcare sector:
- 40 healthcare workers killed, 362 healthcare workers arbitrarily detained, 81 healthcare workers assaulted and injured.
- A large number of healthcare workers are hiding and evading arbitrary detention.
- 38 hospitals/clinics destroyed and damaged, 129 clinics/hospitals raided and pillaged, 67 were belligerently occupied.
- 34 emergency ambulances and patient transport vehicles were destroyed and damaged, 11 such vehicles were stolen or highjacked illegally.
3. The Ministry of Health of the National Unity Government stands together with and conveys our deepest condolences to the families of CDM healthcare worker Maung Zwe Mahn Aung and other fallen healthcare workers and shares their pain and sorrow. We pay homage and deem Maung Zwe Mahn Aung and other fallen healthcare workers as our heroes and martyrs.
4. The Ministry of Health condemns and strongly denounces the actions of the terrorist military council targeting the healthcare sector and the healthcare workers. The Ministry reaffirms its pledge and will do its utmost together with the public to uproot the military dictatorship and strive towards a Federal Democratic Union..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Health, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-23
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Type:
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Description:
"၁။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ ချောင်းဦးမြို့နယ်မှ CDM ပြုလုပ်ထားသော ပြည်သူ့ကျန်းမာရေး ကြီးကြပ်-၂ ဖြစ်သူ မောင်ဇွဲမာန်အောင်၊ အသက် (၂၇) နှစ်သည် ချောင်းဦးမြို့နယ် ပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ (CHUPDF) မှ ရဲဘော် မင်းသန့်ကျော်၊ ရဲဘော် ရာဇာထွန်း၊ ရဲဘော် နိုင်ဝဏ္ဏနှင့် ရဲဘော် မင်းခန့် (ခ) မိုးဒီတို့နှင့်အတူ (၁၇-၄-၂၀၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြုလုပ်သော မုံရွာ ပင်မသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်းလုံခြုံရေးအတွက် ပွိုင့်ကင်းတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်နေစဉ် မုံရွာမြို့နယ်၊ တောပုကျေးရွာမှ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သားများနှင့် စစ်ကောင်စီလက်ကိုင်တုတ် ပျူစောထီးများ၏ အရှင်ဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းခံရသဖြင့် ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ကျဆုံးခဲ့သော CDM ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်း မောင်ဇွဲမာန်အောင်တွင် ဇနီးနှင့် လူမမယ်ရင်သွေး (၂) ဦး ကျန်ရစ်ခဲ့ကြောင်းလည်း သိရှိရပါသည်။
၂။ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းသည့် (၁-၂-၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့မှ ယနေ့အထိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးကဏ္ဍအပေါ် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်-
- ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သား (၄၀) ဦးကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ (၃၆၂) ဦးကို ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ (၈၁) ဦး ကို ဒဏ်ရာရစေခြင်းနှင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း၊
- ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်း ဦးရေများစွာ ပုန်းရှောင်နေရခြင်း၊
- ဆေးရုံ/ဆေးခန်း (၃၈) ခုကို ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ (၁၂၉) ခုကို ဝင်ရောက်စီးနင်းလုယက်ခြင်း၊ (၆၇) ခုတွင် တပ်စွဲသိမ်းပိုက်ခြင်း၊
- အရေးပေါ်နှင့် လူနာတင်ယာဉ် (၃၄) စီးကို ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ (၁၁) စီးကို ခိုးယူအပိုင်စီးခြင်း။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသော CDM ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်း မောင်ဇွဲမာန်အောင်အပါအဝင် ကျဆုံးကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများ၏ မိသားစုများနှင့် ထပ်တူ ကြေကွဲဝမ်းနည်းရပြီး မောင်ဇွဲမာန်အောင်အပါအဝင် ကျဆုံးကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများ အားလုံးကို အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြု မှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးကဏ္ဍအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လုပ်ရပ်များအပေါ် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြင်းထန်စွာ ကန့်ကွက်ရှုတ်ချကြောင်းနှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ကျရှုံးပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး ပေါ်ပေါက်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့် လက်တွဲ၍ အစွမ်းကုန် ကြိုးပမ်းတိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Health, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-23
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-23
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"Intro:
In three short months, the situation on the ground in Karenni state continues to
deteriorate at an alarming rate. The Burmese military is intensifying its attack under
the pretense of eliminating any and all opposition, such as the local ethnic armed
organizations (EAO) and the Karenni Defense Force, or associates with ties to the
exiled civilian government, the National Unity Government. However, unarmed
civilians have become one of the top targets of the Burmese military. About 200,000
civilians are displaced, which is more than 1/3 of the state’s estimated 300,000
population. About 200 Karenni have been killed by the Burmese military since the
start of the coup. As junta forces continue to attack villages and cities, their campaign
has expanded to include internally displaced person (IDP) camps. Assaults on IDP
camps force constant movement of IDPs in the state, as well as a significant number of
displaced to flee to neighboring states and regions. Due to the junta’s blocking of
humanitarian aid, IDPs in Karenni state are forced to face starvation and, ultimately,
death as access to food, clean water, medicines, and other necessary supplies continue
to dwindle. This is not a problem that will solve itself with the current noninterference policy most countries are adopting. The Burmese junta is systematically
killing the Karenni people in order to maintain control of an already precarious
situation.
For this quarterly briefer report, the Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG)
painstakingly collected the raw data found in Tables 1.1 through 3.4 to present
accurate information that is typically distorted by the Burmese junta in order to hide
their criminal activity.
Human Rights Violations
In order to take and maintain control of the country,
the Burmese military is intensifying their attacks on
civilians, including the Karenni people. It has become
clear that the Burmese junta aims to remove opposition
in Karenni state by any means necessary with complete
and utter disregard to the safety and security of the
Karenni. Over the last three months, 52 Karenni were
killed. As indicated in the data, many Karenni were
killed due to mortar shells and airstrikes, but the
majority were arbitrarily arrested and detained before
they were ultimately killed by the Burmese military.
Arrested, Detained, & Missing: There are a total of 42
Karenni that are documented as arrested, detained,
and/or missing after detention. In January alone, there
were 21 Karenni detained and/or missing. According to
reports, there were eight Karenni taken from Loikaw
and three taken from Six Mile village. Junta forces also
targeted traveling Karenni. As civilians flee from their
homes, there is a noticeable migration of Karenni IDPs
to southern Shan state. At least eight Karenni civilians
were reported to be taken as they traveled from Loikaw and/or missing. At least 10 were taken from Warree Su Palain Village. Again, the junta
forces targeted traveling Karenni. Four were taken while traveling to Hoe Pon village,
southern Shan state and two were reportedly taken after returning home to Zee Phye
Gone after staying in an IDP camp (Table 2.1). During the month of March, the
number of detained and/or missing decreased tremendously with only five Karenni
reportedly taken by junta forces (Table 3.1).
Arrested, Tortured, & Killed: While the previous section discussed the number of
Karenni that were arrested, detained, and/or missing, this section will look at
confirmed number of Karenni that were arrested, tortured, and killed by junta forces.
Almost half of the 52 Karenni killed during the 3-
month period were first arbitrarily arrested and
detained by Burmese troops. Upon discovery of
the bodies, evidence of torture was clearly visible.
The junta denied use of any kind of torture
during the victims’ detention. At least 1/3 of the
30 total number of deaths in January were
arrested, tortured, and killed (Table 1.2). In
February, four Karenni were reported to be
arrested and detained by junta forces in Six Mile
village, Deemaw Soe township and Warree Su
Palain village in Phe Khone township (Table 2.2).
These four Karenni were subsequently killed. In
March, nine Karenni were arrested and detained
in Six Mile village and Sin Taung village in
Deemaw Soe Township and Nan Pae village in
Bawlake township. Just like the four cases in
February, the nine Karenni were killed by junta
forces during their detainment (Table 3.2).
Mortar Shells and Airstrikes: Since the beginning of the year, junta forces have been
firing hundreds of shells every day. Shelling has reached at least 5km outside of
conflict zones forcing thousands to flee from their homes in neighboring areas. Over a
three-month period, about 1/4 of those who died were killed by mortar shells. At least
eight were killed by mortar shells launched during armed conflict in Loikaw during
January (Table 1.2). Another 10 were reportedly injured. In March, three children, one
woman, and one elderly woman were killed by mortar shells in Lah Htun village in
Loikaw Township and Daw Taw Kue village in Deemaw Soe Township. The usage of
mortar shells also prevents local civilians from accessing emergency healthcare. Four
elderly women died of heart attacks when shelling was launched near their homes
(Table 3.2).
As junta forces continue their assault on the Karenni people, the military is also
including airstrikes in its arsenal. The junta suffered huge losses with its ground
troops due to the armed conflict with local anti-junta opposition. To offset these
losses, the junta is supplementing their attacks with airstrikes to effectively eliminate
the PDF and local EAOs; however, the Karenni people are also suffering from the
onslaught of airstrikes. From January to March, more than 1/8 of Karenni killed were
killed by airstrikes. In January, five Karenni were killed, including two young females
(Table 1.2).
In February, Karenni civilians were targeted by airstrikes three times. From these
airstrikes, two Karenni were killed in Sele Done village in Deemaw Soe Township
(Table 2.2). The number of airstrikes increased in March to five reported airstrikes
targeting civilian areas. Fortunately, there were no recorded deaths linked to these
attacks.
Outliers (Shot/Killed, Killed/Burned, Unidentifiable): While the majority of Karenni
were killed while detained or from mortar shells and airstrikes launched by junta
forces, there were Karenni killed that fell outside the common documentation. In
January, three bodies of Karenni were discovered; however, the cause of death is
unidentifiable (Table 1.2). Even though the cause of death cannot be confirmed, it is
believed that the Burmese military is responsible for the deaths of the three Karenni.
In February, there were two confirmed kills by the junta forces in Daw Mukla village
in Loikaw township. Using a favorite tactic in efforts to remove evidence, the Burmese
troops then burned the bodies of the two Karenni (Table 2.2). The last unique death
was the killing of a young female in Mine Long Ward in Loikaw City. She was shot and
killed by Burmese troops in March (Table 3.2).
Destruction of Property
Since the beginning of the year, the Burmese military has been systematically
destroying entire villages and homes in order to drive the Karenni people out. In three
months, KnHRG documented a total of 348 structures that were burned or sustained
damage, of which more than half were burned to the ground. In January, a total of 85
structures were burned or sustained damage in Karenni state. More than half of the
documented structures in January were burned to the ground. Two religious buildings
were included in the total number for January. Both religious buildings were shelled
by the Burmese military, but only one was documented as burned to the ground
(Table 1.4).
In February, there were a total of 80 structures that
were reported as burned or sustained damage. A
significant amount, an estimated 75%, of structures
were intentionally burned to the ground by junta
forces in Warree Su Palain village, Wee Thel Ku
village, and Six Mile village in Deemaw Soe Township.
Two religious buildings were reportedly damaged by
shells launched by the Burmese troops (Table 2.4).
There was a significant increase of structures that
were burned or damaged by junta forces in March. A
total of 183 structures were documented by KnHRG
as burned or sustained damage. While almost half of
the total structures were intentionally burned down
by Burmese troops, they targeted several locations: Ce
Lie Done village, Pue Par village, Tay Hsoe Leh
village, Twe Due Bilar village, Hsaung Dular Ywe Tit
village, Sin Taung village, and Five Mile village in
Deemaw Soe Township as well as Nan Pae village in
Bawlake Township. Four religious buildings were
damaged by mortar shells and airstrikes, as well as
one health clinic damaged by mortar shells launched
by the Burmese military (Table 3.4)..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Discrimination against the Karenni (Kayah), Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Internal displacement/forced migration of Karenni villagers
Language:
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
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Description:
"Executive Summary:
This report explores the current socio-political developments in Myanmar and how they affect Thailand. It also investigates Thailand’s perception of the Myanmar crisis and how the Thai government’s responses. This report provides insights into the effects of the 2021 Myanmar coup and subsequent crises on Thailand and helps us better
understand Thailand’s foreign policy position and conduct. Our study is exploratory and descriptive, drawing insights
from documentary research, in-depth interviews, participation in seminars and talks, and field visits to border areas
between Thailand and Myanmar.
We recognize three significant changes in the socio-political dynamics in Myanmar since the coup:
• The perception of the Bamar people, the major ethnic group, toward minorities has become more positive.
• The military as an institution is crumbling, losing its power grip in many areas, with a growing number of defections.
• Myanmar people are united against the junta and have the new aspiration of turning their country into a federal state
Our study also found that the ongoing crisis in Myanmar has affected Thailand in five areas, namely: migration, transborder security, economic affairs, diplomacy, and geopolitics. Specifically:
• Thailand has experienced more migrants and refugees from Myanmar. We categorize them into three groups:
1) people who crossed into Thailand temporarily—mainly via the natural passes—before returning home; 2)
economic migrants who hope to integrate into Thailand’s labor forces; and 3) activists and high-profile individuals opposed to the coup, some of whom would like to get resettled in a third country.
• The 2021 Myanmar coup also posed threats to Thai nationals living along the border areas and inside Thailand.
Cross-border gunfire affect the properties of residents who live in the border area. There were also concerns
about the operations of the Myanmar military inside Thailand, the increasing drug activities, and public health
challenges.
• The ongoing Myanmar crisis disrupted cross-border trade and regular economic affairs.
• The military coup in Myanmar significantly eroded the trust that the two countries have built over the years,
leading to a new challenge of choosing who among the conflicting parties Thailand should engage with in the
trust rebuilding process.
• The Myanmar crisis led to potential geopolitical rivalry between major powers, putting Thailand in a strategic
dilemma as it faced political pressures from these powers.
In this report, we posit that Thai officials have followed the political developments in Myanmar very closely since
the 2021 coup. The ‘burden of proximity’ makes the government mainly concerned about the influx of the displaced
persons and Myanmar’s opposition parties. Thailand also acknowledges other security, economic, and international
relations impacts. Since the coup, the Thai government’s responses to the Myanmar crisis—while being shaped by
bureaucrats—are business as usual with an ad hoc feature.
Thailand’s business-as-usual foreign affairs consist of dual-track diplomacy: military-to-military and government-to-government, led by the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accordingly. Besides, local villagers also establish local mechanisms for cross-border collaboration with Myanmar people.
We argue that the application of business as usual to conduct its foreign relations makes Thailand appear to support
the junta though not announced openly. This practice puts Thailand at risk of being condemned by Myanmar people
and the international community amid the growing opposition against the Myanmar junta domestically and internationally.
Thailand has also used ASEAN as a platform to engage with Myanmar. However, the Thai government is reactive
rather than proactive in dealing with its neighbour. To respond to the immediate effects of the Myanmar crisis—especially the influx of migrants and refugees, Thai officials have adopted ad hoc measures as an add-on feature to
the business-as-usual model, including the management of the forcibly displaced and Thai civilians. This practice is
planned for a short-period implementation until the situation in Myanmar stabilises.
In conclusion, we believe that the Thai government’s policy position towards Myanmar is vague and calls on the Thai
government to be more proactive. We propose a ‘flexible approach’ for Thailand to engage with Myanmar. Our policy
recommendation consists of three core components:
2
• Assisting Myanmar refugees
We develop a ‘flexible humanitarian model’ based on the humanitarian-development nexus, allowing Thailand
to assist the forcibly displaced while protecting its national interest.
• Pursuing flexible engagement with the junta
We propose ‘flexible engagement,’ guided by the vision of the late Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN Secretary
General, in which Thailand communicates its position towards Myanmar openly and reserves the right to put
pressure on the junta. This approach also guides us to urge Thailand to be more forceful in pressuring the Nay
Pyi Taw regime using the ASEAN platform.
• Endorsing federalism in Myanmar
Amid the ongoing civil war, we strongly recommend that the Thai government engage with other stakeholders
inside Myanmar beyond the establishments, especially the National Unity Government (NUG), the National
Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), who have increasingly supported
federalism. We believe that Myanmar’s federalism should be in the interest of Thailand since it will potentially
bring lasting peace to the country..."
Source/publisher:
The University of Queensland
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Thailand-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
976.57 KB
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Description:
"The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management of the National Unity
Government has been implementing the following humanitarian activities in accordance with
the policies, strategies and action plans spending the total budget of (2.73) billion MMK from
16th April 2021 to 10th April 2022;
Sr. No. Activities MMK (Million)
1. Internally displaced population and Armed conflict
affected population 1334.20.....
2. Food security for local communities and local defence
forces 803.90.....3 Families with the fallen heroes and the injured 113.72.....4 Civil Servants who joined Civil Disobedience Movement 228.99.....5.Vulnerable people and their families 82.39.....6. Political prisoners and their family members 44.25.....7. Natural Disaster affected communities 10.62.....8. General Support for humanitarian measures 113.49 Of all the support delivered, the highest amount, almost half of the funding has been spent on
the humanitarian delivery for internally displaced people. As per the latest report issued by UNHCR on 6th April 2022, there are over (500,000) internally displaced people since the military coup, and the Ministry has provided humanitarian aid to about (100,000) IDPs in every
month covering about 20% of the total population affected by armed conflict in Myanmar. According to the statistics, humanitarian assistances were delivered to the following States and Regions depending on the needs, and Kayin, Sagaing, Karenni, Chin and Magway had received
the highest amount of contributions..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, UN System humanitarian assistance, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
223.01 KB 385.89 KB
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Description:
"The Archbishop of Mandalay, his staff, and approximately 20 diocesan priests were placed under incommunicado house arrest on 8 April after an estimated 40 soldiers from the Myanmar/Burma army forcibly occupied the Sacred Heart Cathedral where they were holding a Lenten prayer service.
Soldiers reportedly entered the church at 2.30pm on 8 April and detained the congregation for approximately three hours. On 9 April the Catholic News Agency reported that Archbishop Marco Win Tin, Vicar General Mgr Domenic Kyo Du and their staff, together with around 20 diocesan priests, were still being held in the cathedral compound.
Thirty soldiers remained in the cathedral overnight, claiming that they were searching for weapons after an informant alleged that Archbishop Win Tin was supplying weapons to rebels throughout the country. However, no weapons were found on the premises.
CSW’s Senior Analyst for East Asia Benedict Rogers said: “This appalling raid on the Sacred Heart Cathedral in Mandalay is one of the latest indicators of the continued antagonism of the Myanmar army towards religious groups in the country. We call on the army to release all those currently held in the cathedral compound, and to cease its harassment of religious communities and other civilians. CSW continues to call for the urgent restoration of democracy in Myanmar, and for the immediate and unconditional release of all religious and political prisoners.”..."
Source/publisher:
Christian Solidarity Worldwide
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"22 April 2022: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus reached between ASEAN leaders and the leader of the Myanmar military is a failure, with no significant progress made towards its implementation after twelve months, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
The Five-Point Consensus was reached in Jakarta on 24 April 2021, two months after the Myanmar military attempted an illegal coup and launched a subsequent attack on the population of Myanmar in response to their ongoing resistance.
The points agreed to by the leader of the military, Min Aung Hlaing, were for the immediate cessation of violence; constructive dialogue among all parties concerned; the appointment of a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair to facilitate mediation of the dialogue; provision of humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre, and a visit of the special envoy to Myanmar to meet all parties.
Since joining the consensus, Min Aung Hlaing has escalated the military’s attack on the people of Myanmar, continued to target and detain political opponents, obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance to areas most in need and prevented the special envoy of the ASEAN Chair from meeting Myanmar’s elected representatives and other stakeholders.
“The junta has not held to a single point of the Five-Point Consensus. The agreement has failed and a change of course from ASEAN is needed,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The people of Myanmar who are striving for liberation are under relentless siege from an internal occupying force that is being propped up by Russia and China. That is an unacceptable threat to the very purposes of ASEAN and the stability of the entire region.”
The junta’s forces have launched airstrikes against civilian targets, burned down villages, massacred, beaten, abducted and tortured civilians and caused the intentional deprivation of food and medical supplies to entire communities. Almost half a million people have been displaced as a result.
At the same time, the ongoing massive scale of resistance to the military demonstrates the strength of commitment amongst the peoples of Myanmar to the democratic revolution that seeks to remove the military from politics entirely and establish a federal democratic union.
Institutions established by and representing the peoples of Myanmar including the legitimate National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), state-level consultative councils and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) are already working to shape this future.
“The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus failed because ASEAN engaged with the wrong party,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “The NUG represents Myanmar and is the proper party to lead engagement with ASEAN. The NUG has demonstrated that it is the constructive partner that ASEAN needs to make any progress towards resolving the crisis.”
SAC-M calls on ASEAN to maintain permanently its rejection of the military junta from participation in ASEAN meetings as a consequence of its abrogation of the Five-Point Consensus. SAC-M calls on ASEAN to work with the NUG to develop a new roadmap towards resolving the crisis, beginning with the urgent provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance. Finally, SAC-M calls on the United Nations (UN) Security Council to take responsibility for international action in response to the growing crisis in Myanmar.
“The UN Security Council backed ASEAN and its Five-Point Consensus, but ASEAN and its consensus have failed. There is now no alternative but for the Security Council itself to take the lead and take the responsibility for meaningful action on Myanmar,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The Security Council cannot continue to ignore the cries of the people of Myanmar for international action to end the military’s violence.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
195.96 KB
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
The upcoming U.S.-ASEAN special summit stands in jarring juxtaposition to last year’s “Summit for Democracy” — to which most ASEAN states didn’t merit an invitation.
Description:
"The Biden administration on April 16 announced that the White House will host a special summit with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on May 12.
Invitees include Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, an unrepentant and undiplomatic architect of mass killings in the name of a “war on drugs” under investigation by the International Criminal Court. (“I don’t care about human rights,” he said last year.) A bevy of other autocratic leaders are also invited, including Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge commander turned kleptocrat who has been in power for over 36 years. The invitation was first made by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a December 14 speech in Jakarta, but dates were not finalized until now.
The summit stands in jarring juxtaposition to last year’s “Summit for Democracy,” and the administration’s rhetoric about human rights and democracy, including in Blinken’s speech inviting ASEAN to the United States.
“Freedom is about the ability to write your future and have a say in what happens in your community and your country, no matter who you are or who you know,” Blinken said in December. The administration is hoping to foster a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
ASEAN countries are neither free nor open.
Myanmar is led by a coup-installed junta and a military with a long track record of unfettered brutality. While the U.S. and other ASEAN members have decided the country can only send a “non-political” representative, the invitation is still a stunning twist coming only weeks after the administration formally determined that the military committed crimes against humanity and genocide against Muslim Rohingya. It has only been a little over a year since the military’s February 2021 coup and jailing of Aung San Suu Kyi and other civilian officials. The country’s senior military leadership and much of its military-owned industries are under U.S. sanctions.
Vietnam, a one-party authoritarian state, does not hold democratic elections and has imprisoned hundreds of critics, dissidents, and journalists. Laos is a similarly repressive one-party state. Brunei’s absolute monarch, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, exercises exclusive and unchecked authority and has been in power since 1967. The country has no elections, free media, or meaningful rights protections.
Thailand, once a genuine democracy, suffered a military coup in 2014 led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, which led to rule by a junta, then the adoption of a new constitution entrenching military rule and allowing engineered elections in 2019 that Prayut, predictably, won. Authorities have arrested democracy activists and critics of the monarchy, dissolved a major opposition party, and suppressed youth-led democracy protests, often violently. There have been numerous cases of torture as well as enforced disappearances.
Cambodia’s leader, Hun Sen, who has manipulated or stolen outright every election since 1993, has now largely eliminated the political opposition and independent media. Over 60 political prisoners are jailed on bogus criminal charges.
Singapore, too, has an overwhelmingly repressive government. (The Biden administration did not invite them to the Summit for Democracy.) Citizens face severe restrictions on free expression, association, and peaceful assembly through overly broad criminal laws and regulations, including aggressive internet content laws, that are regularly enforced.
And even Indonesia and Malaysia, the standout ASEAN democracies, are seeing worsening conditions for women, religious minorities, and LGBTQ people, and increasing use of overbroad criminal defamation, sedition, and other laws to prosecute critics.
The Biden administration needs to adopt more coherent principles for supporting nations in Asia without sacrificing the promotion of human rights. A key problem in the Biden administration’s Asia rhetoric is that it too often conflates human freedoms and rights with the “freedoms” and “rights” of governments not to be coerced by other governments (i.e., by the Chinese government). When Blinken in December cited a “rules-based order” in Asia meant to “protect the right of all countries to choose their own path, free from coercion, free from intimidation,” he was not talking about human freedoms. He was dressing up “countering the Chinese government” in the language of liberty.
During the summit in May, the president should speak publicly about human rights and freedoms — including by noting the United States’ own poor record — and he and other U.S. officials should prominently raise key rights concerns with attendees during informal bilateral meetings at the summit, known as “pull asides.”
On Myanmar, Biden should press ASEAN members to abandon their failed ASEAN “consensus” approach to diplomacy with the junta and instead join a coordinated international effort to increase pressure to convince the junta to steer toward reform, including by increasing restrictions on the junta’s foreign currency revenues and capacities to purchase weapons. Biden should also encourage stronger bilateral diplomatic efforts by individual ASEAN members who can most effectively communicate with the junta: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
Human rights, justice, rule of law, and individual freedoms are forces which, as much as alliances and partnerships, serve as bulwarks to the increasingly repressive forces of the Chinese and Russian governments. Overlooking abuses by supposed allies only undermines the international human rights system further and makes the world less safe..."
Source/publisher:
The Diplomat (Tokyo) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Testimonials from activists reveal a range of non-violent protests across Myanmar
Thousands have been killed and arrested since the military took power
Military forces disguise themselves as fruit sellers and trishaw drivers as part of the repressive surveillance system
‘Although our lives are in danger, we choose to continue. We will keep asking the world to help us because people are being killed in Myanmar’ - Zin Mar, protest leader
Myanmar’s activists continue to protest the regime’s human rights abuses despite facing serious danger, Amnesty International revealed today while marking one year since the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a Five-Point Consensus, which has failed to stop the regime’s violence in the country.
Amnesty conducted in-depth interviews over several months with people who have continued to take part in non-violent protests across five of Myanmar’s states and regions. The 17 interviewees were from a diverse array of protest groups, including LGBTQ and women’s rights organisations.
Across the country protests include ‘flash mobs’ in which activists run through the streets for a few minutes before dispersing to avoid being shot, arrested or run over by military vehicles. There are ‘silent strikes’ during which shops and businesses shut, roads are empty and people stay at home to demonstrate defiance to military rule.
Activists also distribute pamphlets on buses, post messages against the military on walls with stickers or spray paint, and encourage boycotts of goods and services with ties to the military.
Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research, said:
“These activists urgently need the support of the international community in the form of a global arms embargo to stop the Myanmar military from using weapons of warfare to kill peaceful protesters.
“Despite the immense dangers and hardships, there are still many activists and human rights defenders who choose to remain in Myanmar and are unwavering in their commitment to continue peacefully protesting and expressing their dissent.
“ASEAN must call on the Myanmar military authorities to immediately stop all violence against peaceful protestors in line with the stalled Five-Point Consensus. It also needs to continue to condemn all human rights violations in Myanmar and call for the release of all people who are being arbitrarily detained.
“It needs to do this now to prevent the Myanmar people from further suffering.”
Lethal force against protesters
In the days immediately following the coup, Amnesty and many other human rights groups urged the military to stop the use of unlawful and lethal force against peaceful protesters. The violence has prompted many to join armed resistance groups, which are active throughout the country.
Amnesty has called on the military to exercise restraint, abide by international law, and for law enforcement duties to be fully resumed by police.
These calls have gone unheeded. More than 1,700 people have been killed, and more than 13,000 arrested since the military took power, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
Activists and human rights defenders interviewed by Amnesty described witnessing or experiencing abuses by military forces while demonstrating, including shootings, beatings, and attempts to ram vehicles into protests.
Towards the end of last year, there was a noticeable fall in the number of people who joined protests in the streets.
Thiri*, a university student in Mandalay who said she had no interest in politics before the coup but is now one of the leaders of a women’s protest group, said:
“We went from tens of thousands to thousands, thousands to hundreds, and hundreds to around 20.”
According to some of the activists Amnesty spoke to, this drop in numbers was part of a deliberate strategy to keep everyone safe by protesting in smaller groups.
Rina, a university student and member of the General Strike Committee in Yangon, said that it had become “too dangerous” to protest in large groups.
She participated in a flash mob with around 20 other people on 5 December 2021, and told Amnesty that on that day, a military truck drove straight into them.
“As I was running, I saw some of the other people who joined in the flash mob had been hit [by the military truck]. Some of them were rolling on the pavement.”
In the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina, a university student who has been protesting with the University of Myitkyina Students’ Union, said that they usually go out in smaller groups because “if there are too many people in the protest, it is easier to get arrested”.
Zin Mar, another university student who is a protest leader in Monywa, said that although her protest group sometimes had to reduce the number of people demonstrating for security reasons, they were determined to continue. She said:
“We will always come out whenever we can."
Min Thu, a high school student who is a leading member of the Mandalay Youth Strike Committee, has witnessed at least three times unmarked vehicles that he believes belong to the military and police drive into protesters. In October last year, a motorcycle nearly hit him when he was about to join a protest. Min Thu said:
“Just before we started the protest, they tried to hit me [with the vehicle] from the front. I escaped by going to the nearest road and then they got down from their vehicle and pointed guns at me. They didn’t shoot me because they had blocked all the angles, and they thought they would arrest me.”
He told Amnesty that he dodged onto a side street and barely escaped.
In Sagaing region’s Salingyi and Yinmarbin townships, poet and engineer Yar Zar has regularly organised people across villages to protest since March 2021, and was at two protests when soldiers and police opened fire at the crowd.
To avoid encountering soldiers, he and his team carefully prepare routes along narrow, unpaved streets. He is one of several people who told Amnesty that they also rely on volunteers to check and make sure the route is clear before they demonstrate.
Phyu, a village protest leader in Thayetchaung township, Tanintharyi region said:
“When we protest in the village, some protesters who act as lookouts escort us so we can avoid the military. Once they have passed, we start our protest again.”
Life on the run
Many activists described how they felt they were being constantly watched and followed by civilian informants known as dala or by soldiers and police wearing civilian clothes and driving unmarked vehicles.
Myat Min Khant of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions said that the military and police roam streets disguised as fruit sellers or trishaw, motorcycle, or taxi drivers and embed themselves among the people to identify anyone daring to express dissent.
There are numerous checkpoints in towns and cities around the country where people are stopped at random, and their belongings are searched by soldiers and police.
Most of the activists who spoke to Amnesty said that they have left their homes fearing for their safety, with several not being able to return since February 2021.
Nan Lin of the University Students’ Union Alumni Force said:
“If I go back home, the military may be waiting to arrest me. Even my family members do not know my whereabouts.”
BP, a protest leader who has demonstrated on the streets of Kalay, Sagaing region every day since 7 February 2021, said that a convoy of five vehicles full of soldiers raided his family home three times in one day in September 2021. He is one of four protesters interviewed who said their homes have been raided since going into hiding.
Many said it is becoming increasingly difficult to find safe places to hide. BP said he regularly sees strangers who he believes are plainclothes informants loitering near where activists are staying or following them on motorbikes while carrying walkie-talkies.
U Yaw, a monk from Ayeyarwady region who has been actively protesting since the early days after the coup, had been in hiding since March 2021 when his monastery was raided. During the raid, as U Yaw hid in a toilet stall, he overheard soldiers saying that if they found him, they should “just shoot him dead and get rid of him”.
He fled to Mandalay where he continued his protests, but soldiers and police raided the monastery there where he was hiding in June. He took shelter in another monastery, which was raided by soldiers and police in September 2021. He escaped just in time, but the soldiers and police confiscated his identification documents and cash. U Yaw continued to protest despite the risks.
Threatening family members
In many cases, soldiers and police arrest activists’ family members and loved ones when they can’t find the activists. According to media reports, this includes a politician’s 94-year-old mother who was arrested and an activist’s four-year-old daughter.
In November last year, the military attempted to raid the house of another protest leader who had gone into hiding. The activist said:
“When they arrived, they started shooting, but they went to the wrong house. They mistakenly went to our neighbour’s house and one woman was killed in the shooting.
In spite of this, she is determined to continue organising peaceful protests.
“I cannot sit quietly when I see injustice,” she said.
Zin Mar, protest leader in Monywa said:
“Although our lives are in danger, we choose to continue. We will keep asking the world to help us because people are being killed in Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"Overview
Myanmar’s already-stalled democratic transition was completely derailed in February 2021, when the military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized control of the government, arresting dozens of senior government officials and preventing the newly elected parliament from convening. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a sweeping victory in the November 2020 elections, led a broad-based opposition to the takeover, organizing a country-wide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that continued throughout the year. Protesters were met with indiscriminate violence from military forces, and journalists, activists, and ordinary people risked criminal charges and detention for voicing dissent. Armed conflict between the military and ethnic rebel groups continued, as did the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a mostly Muslim ethnic minority.
Key Developments in 2021
Alleging fraud and irregularities in the November 2020 elections, the military carried out a coup in February, hours before the newly elected parliament was due to be seated. After taking power, the military declared a state of emergency, imposed a broad-based communications shutdown, expanded the range of laws used to punish dissent, and arrested dozens of political and cultural figures—including both President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi.
A group of ousted elected lawmakers formed the National Unity Government (NUG) in April as an alternate power base to the military regime. The widely popular NUG operated as a shadow government throughout the year, with its members in hiding or in exile.
In August, Min Aung Hlaing declared himself prime minister and head of a caretaker government that would enforce military rule until August 2023, when the military has promised to hold new elections.
The widespread CDM gathered steam in the weeks after the coup and continued throughout the year, involving multiple political parties and civil society groups. By the end of the year, more than 11,000 protesters had been arrested, almost 1,400 had been killed by military forces, and nearly 2,000 faced criminal charges handed down by the junta, while others were subjected to grave abuses, including torture, in overcrowded prisons.
Fighting between the army and ethnic minority groups in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, and Shan States intensified during the year, displacing thousands of civilians and limiting free movement. Ethnic rebel groups provided sanctuary to those seeking to escape the military regime.
Political Rights
A Electoral Process
A1 0-4 pts
Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 4
Under the 2008 military-drafted constitution, the legislature elects the president, who serves as chief of state and head of government and makes a number of key ministerial appointments. Military members of the legislature have the right to nominate one of the three presidential candidates, and the elected members of each chamber nominate the other two. The candidate with the largest number of votes in a combined parliamentary vote wins the presidency; the other two candidates become vice presidents, ensuring that a military nominee is always either president or vice president. The commander in chief of the armed forces retained broad powers under the 2008 constitution, including control over security-related cabinet ministries (home, defense, and border affairs), and is selected through an opaque process by the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council (NDSC).
A new president was set to be selected in early 2021, following the November 2020 parliamentary elections; this process was disrupted by the February 2021 military coup, which dissolved parliament and installed a military junta led by the unelected Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the armed forces. President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, de facto leader of the NLD, were both detained in the early hours of the coup, along with over one hundred other political leaders. In early December, the military regime sentenced Win Myint and Suu Kyi to four years’ imprisonment on charges of incitement; soon after, the sentences were reduced to two years. In addition, Suu Kyi has been charged with illegally importing communications equipment, violating pandemic restrictions, corruption, electoral fraud, and breaching the Official Secrets Act. The military retained control of the government throughout 2021.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the president and reelected civilian government officials were ousted in a military coup.
A2 0-4 pts
Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 4
The bicameral Assembly of the Union consists of the 440-seat lower House of Representatives and the 224-seat upper House of Nationalities. Representatives serve five-year terms. A quarter of the seats in both houses are reserved for the military and are filled through appointment by the commander in chief of the armed forces. The remainder are filled through direct elections in a first-past-the-post system.
The 2020 parliamentary elections featured significant flaws, including the exclusion of many Muslim candidates and the disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya. The Union Election Commission (UEC) canceled voting in a number of conflict-affected districts, preventing about one million people from electing new representatives. Other electoral flaws included limited access of opposition parties to state-run media during the campaign period and pandemic-related restrictions on in-person campaigning.
The NLD won a convincing majority in the overall popular vote, taking 138 of the 168 elected seats in the upper house, 258 of the 330 elected seats in the lower house, and 501 of 660 elected seats across 14 state and regional legislatures. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) refused to accept the election results, alleging widespread fraud.
In February 2021, hours before a new session of parliament was set to begin, the military seized control of the government, imposing a state of emergency, dissolving parliament, and preventing elected representatives from taking their seats. Several elected officials were detained, and hundreds more were placed under house arrest.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the military coup prevented recently elected members of parliament from convening.
A3 0-4 pts
Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies? 0 4
Various features of the electoral framework have undermined the democratic nature of recent elections. These include the military’s role in presidential nominations and appointments to both chambers of parliament, as well as rigid citizenship laws and excessive residency requirements that prevent large numbers of people from voting or standing for office.
The UEC, which is responsible for electoral administration, is empowered to adjudicate complaints against itself. Its members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the legislature, which has only limited authority to reject nominees. In 2020, UEC decisions to limit or cancel voting in several dozen townships populated by ethnic minority groups, as well as its rules surrounding access to and censorship of broadcast time allotted to political parties, were criticized as lacking sufficient transparency and disenfranchising voters.
After seizing power in February 2021, military leadership cited the USDP’s fraud allegations, flaws in electoral administration during the 2020 elections, and the NLD’s “failure” to address alleged voter list irregularities to justify rejecting the 2020 election results and deposing the elected government. The military regime also dissolved the UEC before reinstating the body with all new members, later charging a number of former UEC commissioners with electoral fraud. In July, the new UEC officially overturned the results of the November 2020 vote, and the following month, Min Aung Hlaing announced that new elections would be held in August 2023, extending the military’s initial one-year timeline.
Less than a month after taking power, the military regime proposed that the current first-past-the-post system be replaced with a proportional representation system. In October, the reconstituted UEC announced that it plans to introduce the change prior to the country’s next elections despite widespread criticism of the proposed change, which opposition parties claim is an attempt to keep the military in power.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the military effectively suspended the constitution and overturned existing electoral laws, rejecting election results that had been confirmed by the Union Election Commission.
B Political Pluralism and Participation
B1 0-4 pts
Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 1 4
Party competition in the lead-up to the 2020 elections was robust, with 7,000 candidates from more than 90 parties participating, including the NLD, the USDP, and regionally based ethnic parties. Following the February 2021 coup, political parties continued to function, despite facing considerable restrictions and harassment. A number of prominent lawmakers and nonmilitary political leaders have been arrested by the military regime, and some have been charged with criminal offenses and put on trial, including much of the NLD leadership.
Following the 2021 coup, a group of previously elected officials unseated by the military regime formed the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which claims to represent a legitimate parliament and perform the duties of an elected government. In April, the CRPH established the National Unity Government (NUG), a resistance government largely made up of ousted NLD politicians. Throughout 2021, the NUG operated as an alternate power structure with influence over small pockets of the country, and organized countrywide opposition to the coup. Shortly after the NUG was formed, Myanmar’s military leadership classified the NUG, its armed People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the CRPH as terrorist organizations, which could result in prosecution and detention for anyone who communicates with the groups’ members.
The constitution contains a requirement that political parties be loyal to the state, which carries the potential for abuse. Laws allow penalties, including deregistration, for political parties that accept support from foreign governments or religious bodies, or that are deemed to have abused religion for political purposes or disrespected the constitution. In August 2021, the UEC announced plans to conduct financial audits of political parties, which many opposition leaders fear will be used to justify dissolving certain parties.
Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 1 due to the mass arrest of political party leaders and the suspension of ordinary political activity during the military coup and state of emergency.
B2 0-4 pts
Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 1 4
The military’s constitutional prerogatives, as well as its close ties to the USDP, limit the degree to which any other force can secure control over the executive or the legislature through elections. Despite such limitations, the NLD won a convincing majority in the November 2020 elections. Following the coup in February 2021, the military announced that new elections would be held within a year; in August, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the military’s timeline had been extended, and new elections would not be held until August 2023. While there was no immediate electoral opportunity through which the opposition could gain power during 2021, the shadow NUG gained strength as an alternative power base, due in part to its ability to fundraise and form alliances.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the military’s seizure of power sharply reduced the prospects of a change in government through elections.
B3 0-4 pts
Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means? 0 4
After the NLD came to power in 2015, the military’s ability to influence electoral outcomes lessened, though it maintained considerable power over political affairs. The November 2020 elections, however, resulted in the defeat of the military’s civilian proxy party, which was widely viewed as an endorsement of Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government. The military refused to accept the election results, and in February 2021, seized control of the government. Following the coup, the military used force to contain the widespread protests against military rule that continued throughout the year—including the arrest of political leaders and civilian protestors, excessive violence and custodial abuse, and mass killings—in an attempt to secure its takeover.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 due to the military leadership’s consistent and widespread use of armed force to secure its rule and control political outcomes during and after the coup.
B4 0-4 pts
Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities? 1 4
Members of Myanmar’s Buddhist and ethnic Bamar majority hold most senior leadership positions in the country, including in major national political parties, the pre-2021 civilian government, and the military. Members of ethnic and religious minority groups face restrictions on their political rights and electoral opportunities, including through discriminatory citizenship, residency, and party registration laws.
The 1982 Citizenship Law does not allow for anyone who entered the country or is descended from someone who entered the country after 1948 to become a full citizen with political rights. Naturalization of spouses is only allowed if the spouse holds a Foreigner’s Registration Certificate from before the law’s enactment. The majority of the mainly Muslim Rohingya were rendered stateless by the 1982 Citizenship Law, which also dictates that only those who are descended from ethnic groups deemed to be native to the country prior to 1823 are considered full citizens. A 2015 presidential decree revoked the temporary identification cards that had allowed Rohingya to vote, and most of the 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Myanmar were unable to vote in the 2020 elections.
Women remain underrepresented in the government and civil service, due largely to societal biases that discourage their political participation. Notwithstanding the prominence of Aung San Suu Kyi, whose father led Myanmar’s independence struggle, few women have achieved ministerial-level appointments.
Following the February 2021 coup, the General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSCN) was formed by members of 29 ethnic groups. The GSCN was established to support antimilitary protests and present the coordinated demands of Myanmar’s minority groups, which include an end to military rule and the creation of a federal democratic union. The NUG and CRPH have also made a concerted effort to include members of Myanmar’s ethnic groups, and have formed alliances with many of the country’s Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in opposition to Tatmadaw rule.
C Functioning of Government
C1 0-4 pts
Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? 0 4
In February 2021, the military deposed the sitting government, prevented newly elected representatives from taking office, and assumed full control over all areas of government policy. The 2008 constitution allows the military to dissolve the civilian government and the parliament and rule directly if the president declares a state of emergency. The military used this provision to execute the 2021 coup; after arresting senior government leaders, military forces declared a state of emergency and assumed control of the government.
Effective governance and control over territory in some regions remains contested between the armed forces and ethnic minority rebel groups. Following the 2021 coup, many of these groups offered protection for those fleeing from military violence.
Since May 2021, the NUG, composed of previously elected representatives, has operated as a shadow government with considerable popularity and legitimacy, although it does not exercise control over state institutions or decision-making.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the military coup prevented duly elected executive and legislative representatives from taking office and determining government policy.
C2 0-4 pts
Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? 1 4
Despite government initiatives aimed at curbing official corruption, it remains rampant at both the national and local levels. An Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), established in 2014, had brought a number of cases against high-ranking officials. Following the 2021 coup, the military brought multiple corruption charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, including bribery; she has denied the charges, and no evidence was produced in trial hearings apart from witness statements. In December, the military regime brought a corruption charge against Win Myint.
Privatization of state-owned companies and other economic reforms in recent years have allegedly benefited family members and associates of military and government officials. After the February 2021 coup, the children of high-ranking military leaders allegedly attempted to use their connections to secure lucrative supply contracts and other kickbacks.
C3 0-4 pts
Does the government operate with openness and transparency? 0 4
After the Tatmadaw took power in 2021, the already limited transparency mechanisms of the previous government were dismantled; oversight by civil society groups and the media has been completely suppressed under military rule.
The military also owns an extensive network of “crony companies” whose revenues enable it to avoid accountability and public oversight and engage in human rights violations with impunity, according to a UN report released in 2019.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the military leadership further suppressed state and nonstate transparency mechanisms following the coup, including oversight by legislators, independent media, and civil society groups.
Add Q
Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group? -4
The central authorities have long used violence, displacement, and other tactics to alter the demographics of states with ethnic unrest or insurgencies. The Rohingya in Rakhine State have faced particularly harsh restrictions for decades, including limits on family size and the ability and right to marry, the denial of legal status and social services, and disenfranchisement and loss of citizenship. Human rights experts and the United Nations have labeled the abuses against the Rohingya as crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and many have argued that they constitute either genocide or a precursor to genocide.
In 2017, repression against the Rohingya escalated; military operations across the northern part of the state led to reports of torture, rape, indiscriminate killings, and the burning of villages, worsening already dire humanitarian conditions and causing 740,000 Rohingya refugees to join the 200,000 others already in Bangladesh. Aung San Suu Kyi, then head of state, did not explicitly acknowledge or condemn such organized official violence against Rohingya civilians; there has been little meaningful accountability for the atrocities. In 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that mass human rights violations had been committed against the Rohingya and ordered the government to implement emergency measures to protect the group; proceedings at the ICJ continued in 2021.
Though the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) continued to collect evidence and interview witnesses in 2021, the February 2021 coup and subsequent closure of the country limited international observers’ access to Myanmar, further frustrating efforts to hold perpetrators accountable.
Civil Liberties
D Freedom of Expression and Belief
D1 0-4 pts
Are there free and independent media? 1 4
Following the coup in 2021, the military seized control of state-owned broadcast media, took private broadcasters off the air, and severely restricted internet access, including access to social media platforms and news outlets. Licenses for several independent media organizations were rescinded in March. However, a number of independent media outlets continued to provide news coverage, operating in hiding and in exile.
In February, the military amended sections of the criminal code and the Electronic Transactions Law to include provisions criminalizing antiregime statements. Human rights groups have warned that the amendments disproportionately affect independent media outlets, and enable the regime to easily detain and prosecute journalists. Dozens of journalists have been forced to flee following the military’s crackdown on press freedoms; according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), more than 100 journalists were arrested in 2021. Though the regime released several journalists throughout the year, many of those jailed face criminal charges.
D2 0-4 pts
Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private? 1 4
The constitution provides for freedom of religion. It distinguishes Buddhism as the majority religion, but also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and animism. The government occasionally interferes with religious assemblies and attempts to control the Buddhist clergy. Authorities discriminate against minority religious groups—particularly Muslims—in practice, refusing them permission to hold gatherings and restricting educational activities, proselytization, and construction and repair of houses of worship.
Anti-Muslim hate speech and discrimination have been amplified by social media, and by some state institutions and mainstream news websites. The officially illegal Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation, formerly known as Ma Ba Tha, agitates for the protection of Buddhist privileges, urges boycotts against Muslim-run businesses, and disseminates anti-Muslim propaganda. Muslims face systematic discrimination in obtaining identity cards, and “Muslim-free” villages have been established with the complicity of officials.
D3 0-4 pts
Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination? 0 4
Political activity on university campuses is generally restricted, and universities are not autonomous. Student unions—which have historically been important advocates for human rights—are discouraged, have no formal registration mechanisms, and are viewed with suspicion by authorities. A 2018 directive from the Ministry of Education required students to submit detailed information in order to get permission to hold events on campus.
University students and staff played a key role in antimilitary protests and strikes following the February 2021 coup; in March, the military stormed dozens of universities, seizing control of the campuses and arresting hundreds of students and faculty members. In May, more than 11,000 university staff were suspended for striking in protest against the military coup, and those who were not suspended were pressured into declaring allegiance to the ruling junta.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because universities were subjected to military raids and mass staff suspensions after students and faculty expressed opposition to the coup.
D4 0-4 pts
Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution? 1 4
Private discussion and personal expression—already constrained by state surveillance and laws inhibiting online speech—became more difficult following the 2021 coup. Upon taking power, the regime enacted sweeping revisions of existing legal code, removing several key human rights protections, including those against arbitrary surveillance. The legal reforms also included amendments to the penal code that severely curtailed freedom of expression. In March, the military banned the use of circumvention tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and other communications technology in an attempt to keep people from evading surveillance.
Hundreds of people were arrested and prosecuted under the revised legal code, usually for comments made online; hundreds of others have been forced into hiding or exile to avoid arrest, and a smaller number were killed in protests or targeted for attack.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to mass arrests of social media users and new restrictions on communications technology in the wake of the coup.
E Associational and Organizational Rights
E1 0-4 pts
Is there freedom of assembly? 0 4
Freedom of assembly has been increasingly restricted in recent years. A blanket ban on protests in 11 townships of central Yangon has been in place since 2017, and in 2020, an extended internet shutdown in parts of Rakhine and Chin states severely impeded activists’ ability to organize protests. Unauthorized demonstrations are punishable with up to six months in prison under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law; a variety of other vaguely defined violations can draw lesser penalties.
After the 2021 coup, freedom of assembly was violently curtailed in response to widespread antimilitary protests. Within a week of taking power, the military banned all gatherings of more than five people, imposed a strict curfew, and began using lethal and indiscriminate force against peaceful protesters. Widespread internet restrictions were also deployed to hinder the organization of protests. Military violence in response to protests continued throughout the year, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of protesters and the arrest of thousands more.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the military’s crackdown on protests following the coup, which included curfews, mass arrests, internet shutdowns, and the extensive use of lethal force.
E2 0-4 pts
Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights– and governance-related work? 1 4
The ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to engage in human rights– and governance-related work significantly decreased after the 2021 military coup. Activists face arrest and prosecution, and many prominent activists have been forced to go into hiding or exile; in some cases, family members of activists have been arrested as a pressure tactic. In March, the regime introduced new restrictions on NGO activity, including pausing all NGO registration and renewal processes, and began to heavily monitor NGO bank activity. NGOs were increasingly subject to harassment and interference by authorities throughout the year, and a large number of NGOs effectively shut down or disbanded. Despite such limitations, a number continue to quietly monitor human rights abuses and engage in advocacy with international stakeholders.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the military increased pressure on human rights activists following the coup, in part by detaining their family members, and the broader crisis obstructed the work of humanitarian organizations.
E3 0-4 pts
Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations? 1 4
Union activity took root in Myanmar following the lifting of the ban on trade unions in 2011, despite weak legal protections for workers against abuse by employers. In 2021, unions played a leading role in organizing antimilitary protests and strikes immediately following the coup. In response, military authorities declared most unions illegal, and conducted violent raids and mass arrests in areas populated by striking union workers; the regime also threatened dozens of key leaders with arrest, causing many to flee. By June, thousands of civil servants and private sector employees had been fired for their participation in the widespread CDM.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to a wave of reprisals against unions that participated in civil disobedience actions, including bans, raids, dismissals, arrests, and extrajudicial killings.
F Rule of Law
F1 0-4 pts
Is there an independent judiciary? 0 4
The judiciary is not independent. Judges are nominated by the president, and lawmakers can reject the choice only if it is clearly proven that the nominee does not meet the legal qualifications for the post. The courts generally adjudicate cases in accordance with the government’s interests, particularly in major cases with political implications.
Following the February 2021 coup, the military regime took control of Myanmar’s judicial system.
F2 0-4 pts
Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters? 0 4
Following the 2021 military coup, revisions to the criminal code and the imposition of an indefinite state of emergency allowed the regime to remove existing safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention. In March, the Tatmadaw declared martial law in 11 townships of Yangon and Mandalay, enabling military tribunals to impose death sentences on civilians; by the end of 2021, military tribunals had sentenced more than 90 civilians to death.
The number of political prisoners rose dramatically in 2021; most were arrested while protesting, although dozens of prominent political leaders and several cultural figures were specifically targeted. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), as of December 2021, 11,296 individuals had been arrested; an additional 1,964 arrest warrants remained open.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the suspension of existing safeguards against abuse of power by security forces and the widespread use of arbitrary arrest and detention during the military coup and state of emergency.
F3 0-4 pts
Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies? 0 4
The February 2021 military coup resulted in a sharp increase in civilian exposure to violence, armed conflict, and the illegitimate use of physical force. Indiscriminate shelling and aerial attacks, the destruction of villages, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, rape, and other abuses by the military escalated during 2021. In December, 40 civilians were burned alive by military forces in Kayah State.
Long-standing armed conflicts between ethnic rebel groups and the central government continued in 2021 in Shan, Kachin, Kayin, Chin, and Rakhine States. Even ethnically Bamar areas, particularly Sagaing Region and major urban centers including Yangon and Mandalay, experienced high levels of violent conflict between Tatmadaw forces and antimilitary protesters. Military attacks on peaceful protesters, including the use of lethal force, took place across the country; in response, civilian youth across the country formed armed people’s defense forces (PDFs) that carried out guerilla attacks against military targets. After the NUG declared a “people’s war” against the military in September, it engaged in efforts to coordinate among the shadow government, the PDFs, and ethnic rebel groups.
The number of displaced civilians increased throughout the year, with those displaced by earlier rounds of fighting in ethnic areas joined by those fleeing the newly installed military regime; between February and December, more than 400,000 civilians were displaced.
Prisons in Myanmar are severely overcrowded, and conditions for inmates are sometimes life-threatening. Following the coup, prison conditions further deteriorated, as numbers of detainees rapidly increased and grave abuses that had been prevalent during previous periods of military rule resurfaced. Sanitary conditions in prisons are extremely poor, and authorities have reportedly taken few measures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 virus within the prison system; in 2021, at least 12 inmates died after contracting COVID-19, and hundreds more tested positive for the virus.
F4 0-4 pts
Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population? 0 4
Some of the country’s worst human rights abuses, commonly committed by federal military troops, are against ethnic and religious minority populations. The government’s failure to protect victims, conduct investigations, and punish perpetrators is well documented. The post-coup period in 2021 was characterized by further deterioration in the country’s human rights situation and a lack of accountability for offenders.
Ethnic minority groups such as the Shan, Mon, Chin, Karen, and Kachin, as well as non-Rohingya Muslims, also face some societal discrimination, while the ethnic Bamar, Buddhist majority retains a privileged position.
In addition to conflict-related violence, women are subject to discrimination in employment, against which there are no explicit legal protections. A number of laws create a hostile environment for LGBT+ residents. Same-sex sexual activity is criminalized, and police reportedly harass, extort, and physically and sexually abuse LGBT+ people.
G Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
G1 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education? 1 4
Prior to 2021, freedom of internal travel for Myanmar citizens was generally respected outside of conflict zones. However, after the coup in February 2021, movement was increasingly restricted across the country. The military erected road blocks and checkpoints; enforced exit controls, curfews, and residency rules for private dwellings that require reporting overnight guests; engaged in violent raids of neighborhoods and villages; and regularly responded with disproportionate force to ongoing civic action. Some high-profile dissidents were arrested as they attempted to leave Myanmar by air, while thousands more have fled to neighboring countries by land despite the dangers posed by military forces.
Additionally, Myanmar’s large population of stateless residents remain subject to significant restrictions on their movement, particularly the 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State and are confined to designated camps and villages; those who attempt to travel outside these areas are regularly arrested and detained.
G2 0-4 pts
Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors? 1 4
Disputes over land grabbing and business projects that violate human rights are common. Myanmar’s property-transfer laws prohibit transfers to or from a foreigner except in certain state-approved cases of inheritance, and require registration of foreign-owned property. Stateless residents, including the Rohingya, cannot legally buy or sell property or set up a business.
Instances of forced eviction and displacement, confiscation, lack of sufficient compensation, and direct violence against landholders by state security officials abound. Court cases are frequently brought against farmers for trespassing on land that was taken from them. The resumption of armed hostilities following the coup led to military attacks and arbitrary destruction of property—including entire villages—in 2021.
Multiple sources continued to report that Rohingya land and property have been razed, confiscated, appropriated, or built on, often with the direct involvement of the military, and sometimes under the guise of development assistance.
G3 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance? 1 4
Men and women formally enjoy equal rights on personal status issues, though there are restrictions on marriages of Buddhist women to non-Buddhist men. Laws that might protect women from domestic abuse and rape are weak and poorly enforced, and such violence is an acute and persistent problem. The army has a record of using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minority women, and security personnel typically enjoy impunity for sexual violence. Following the 2021 coup, numerous instances of gender-based violence were reported by detainees.
G4 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation? 1 4
Human trafficking, forced labor, child labor, and the recruitment of child soldiers are serious problems in Myanmar. Child soldiers are enlisted by the military and ethnic rebel groups, which also recruit civilians for forced labor. Various commercial and other interests continue to use forced labor despite a formal ban on the practice. Trafficking victims include women and girls subjected to forced sex work and domestic servitude, as well as women who are sold as brides to men in China—an expanding practice in some ethnic minority states. People displaced by ongoing conflicts are especially vulnerable to sexual and labor exploitation..."
Source/publisher:
Freedom House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Failure to stop violence one year after ASEAN’s adoption of its Five-Point Consensus
Activists inside Myanmar resorting to flash mobs and silent strikes to avoid crackdown
Plainclothes military forces disguise themselves as fruit sellers and trishaw drivers as part of the repressive surveillance system
Military retaliates against family members of activists
Myanmar’s brave activists are still pursuing peaceful protests despite grave danger and numerous challenges, Amnesty International said today, one year after the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a Five-Point Consensus that has abjectly failed to stop the violence in the country.
In recent months, Amnesty International conducted in-depth interviews with 17 people who have continued to take part in non-violent protests across five of Myanmar’s states and regions. The interviewees were from a diverse array of protest groups, including LGBTQ and women’s rights organizations.
One of the most popular methods of protesting has been “flash mobs” where activists run through the streets for a few minutes before dispersing to avoid being shot, arrested or run over by military vehicles.
The public has also held “silent strikes” across the country, during which shops and businesses shut down, roads emptied, and people stayed home to show defiance to military rule.
Across Myanmar, activists and human rights defenders have been distributing pamphlets on buses, posting messages against the military on walls with stickers or spray paint, and encouraging boycotts of goods and services with ties to the military.
“These activists urgently need the support of the international community in the form of a global arms embargo to stop the Myanmar military from using weapons of warfare to kill peaceful protesters,” said Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research.
These activists urgently need the support of the international community in the form of a global arms embargo to stop the Myanmar military from using weapons of warfare to kill peaceful protesters.
Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research
“The ASEAN must call on the Myanmar military authorities to immediately stop all violence against peaceful protestors in line with the stalled Five-Point Consensus. It should do so now to prevent the Myanmar people from further suffering.”
“It must also continue to unequivocally condemn all human rights violations in Myanmar and call for the release of all individuals who are arbitrarily detained.”
“THEY TRIED TO HIT ME”
In the days immediately following the coup, Amnesty International and many other human rights groups urged the military to stop the use of unlawful and lethal force against peaceful protesters. The violence has since prompted many to join armed resistance groups, which are active throughout the country.
Amnesty International has called on the military to exercise restraint, abide by international law, and for law enforcement duties to be fully resumed by police.
These calls have gone unheeded. More than 1,700 people have now been killed, and more than 13,000 arrested since the military took power, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
Activists and human rights defenders interviewed by Amnesty International described witnessing or experiencing abuses by military forces while demonstrating, including shootings, beatings, and attempts to ram vehicles into protests.
The brutal response of the military had an enormous impact on the nonviolent protest movement. During the latter part of 2021, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of people who joined protests in the streets.
“We went from tens of thousands to thousands, thousands to hundreds, and hundreds to around twenty,” said Thiri*, a university student in Mandalay who said she had no interest in politics before the coup but is now one of the leaders of a women’s protest group.
We went from tens of thousands to thousands, thousands to hundreds, and hundreds to around twenty.
Thiri*, university student in Mandalay
However, the reduced number of protesters taking to the streets may also be a matter of strategy. Some of the activists that Amnesty International spoke with said they were intentionally organizing the protests in smaller groups to keep everyone safe.
Rina, a university student and member of the General Strike Committee in Yangon, said that it had become “too dangerous” to protest in large groups.
She participated in a flash mob with around 20 other people on 5 December 2021 and she recounted to Amnesty International that on that day, as they gathered, a military truck drove straight into them. “As I was running, I saw some of the other people who joined in the flash mob had been hit [by the military truck]. Some of them were rolling on the pavement.”
In the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina, a university student who has been protesting with the University of Myitkyina Students’ Union, said that they usually go out in smaller groups because “if there are too many people in the protest, it is easier to get arrested.”
Zin Mar, another university student who is a protest leader in Monywa, said that although her protest group sometimes had to reduce the number of people demonstrating for security reasons, they were determined to continue. “We will always come out whenever we can,” she said.
Min Thu, a high school student who is a leading member of the Mandalay Youth Strike Committee, has witnessed unmarked vehicles which he believes to belong to the military and police accelerate into protesters during at least three instances. In October 2021, a motorcycle nearly hit him when he was about to join a protest.
“Just before we started the protest, they tried to hit me [with the vehicle] from the front,” Min Thu said. “I escaped by going to the nearest road and then they got down from their vehicle and pointed guns at me. They didn’t shoot me because they had blocked all the angles, and they thought they would arrest me.” He told Amnesty International that he dodged onto a side street and barely escaped.
In Sagaing region’s Salingyi and Yinmarbin townships, poet and engineer Yar Zar has regularly organized people across villages to protest since March of last year, and was at two protests when soldiers and police opened fire at the crowd.
To avoid encountering soldiers, he and his team carefully prepare routes along narrow, unpaved streets. He is one of several people who told Amnesty International that they also rely on volunteers to check and make sure the route is clear before they demonstrate.
“When we protest in the village, some protesters who act as lookouts escort us so we can avoid the military. Once they have passed, we start our protest again,” said Phyu, a village protest leader in Thayetchaung township, Tanintharyi region.
Protest groups have also been distributing pamphlets and using social media to call for a boycott of goods and services with ties to the military, and have been posting anti-coup messages in public spaces.
LIFE ON THE RUN
Many activists described to Amnesty International how they felt like they were constantly watched and followed by civilian informants known as dalans or by soldiers and police wearing civilian clothes and driving unmarked vehicles.
Myat Min Khant of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions said that the military and police roam streets disguised as fruit sellers or trishaw, motorcycle, or taxi drivers and embed themselves among the people to surveil anyone daring to express dissent.
There are also numerous checkpoints in towns and cities around the country. People are stopped at random, and their belongings are searched by soldiers and police. Thus, activists either leave their devices at home or delete messages and applications on devices when they go out for fear that they could be arrested.
Surveillance by the military adds to the challenges in organizing protests, according to Moe Thouk, a protest leader with the General Strike Committee in Yangon.
They use CCTV cameras to follow activists, employ dalans in every ward to gather information, and arrest activists while wearing civilian clothes, he said. “They roam around places where protests often take place. We need to carefully choose the right place [to protest] and rely on scouts for safety,” said Moe Thouk.
Most of the activists who spoke to Amnesty International said that they have left their homes for safety reasons, and several of them have not been able to be back home at all since February 2021.
“If I go back home, the military may be waiting to arrest me,” said Nan Lin of the University Students’ Union Alumni Force. “Even my family members do not know my whereabouts.”
If I go back home, the military may be waiting to arrest me…even my family members do not know my whereabouts.
Nan Lin, University Students’ Union Alumni Force
BP, a protest leader who has demonstrated on the streets of Kalay, Sagaing region every day since 7 February 2021, said that a convoy of five vehicles full of soldiers raided his family home three times in one day in September 2021. He is one of four protesters interviewed who said their homes have been raided after they have left and gone into hiding.
But while they fear going home, many of these activists said it is becoming harder and harder to find safe places to hide. BP told Amnesty International that he regularly sees strangers who he believes are plainclothes informants loitering near the vicinity where activists are staying or following them on motorbikes while carrying walkie-talkies.
U Yaw, a monk from Ayeyarwady region who has been actively protesting since the early days after the coup, had been in hiding since March 2021 when his monastery was raided. During the raid, as U Yaw hid in a toilet stall, he overheard soldiers saying that if they found him, they should “just shoot him dead and get rid of him.”
He fled to Mandalay and resumed protesting, but soldiers and police raided the monastery there where he was hiding in June. He took shelter in another monastery which was raided by soldiers and police in September 2021.
He escaped just in time, but the soldiers and police confiscated his identification documents and cash. U Yaw continued to protest despite the risks.
THREATENING FAMILY MEMBERS
In many cases, soldiers and police have taken into custody family members and loved ones of activists if they were unable to find the activists and arrest them, including a politicians’ 94-year-old mother and an activist’s four-year-old daughter, according to media reports
In April 2021, soldiers and police raided the house of Arkar, an activist who had gone into hiding.
“Because they couldn’t find me and arrest me, they arrested my mother,” he said. “I got a call from the police station and I was told that I should give myself up in exchange for the freedom of my mother.”
Arkar did not turn himself in, and his relatives were able to negotiate his mother’s release the next day by paying a bribe. Arkar’s family have since moved to a new home to avoid further reprisals. Arkar is one of four people who told Amnesty International that their families were forced to leave their homes because of safety concerns.
In November 2021, the military attempted to raid the house of another protest leader who had gone into hiding. “When they arrived, they started shooting, but they went to the wrong house. They mistakenly went to our neighbor’s house and one woman was killed because of the shooting,” the activist said.
Her family was able to escape but she has not contacted them since for fear that she would be putting their lives at further risk. She is currently moving from place to place, and said she has trouble sleeping due to fear of arrest.
“We have to be vigilant 24 hours a day. We get startled even when we just hear a cat jumping onto the roof. We worry about getting arrested when we go out, and when we are in the house, we are scared they will come in and arrest us. We have completely lost our sense of security,” she said.
We have to be vigilant 24 hours a day. We get startled even when we just hear a cat jumping onto the roof.
Protest leader
She is determined, though, to continue organizing peaceful protests. “I cannot sit quietly when I see injustice,” she told Amnesty International.
A resolve to keep protesting nonviolently is shared by many of the activists.
“Despite the immense dangers and hardships, there are still many activists and human rights defenders who choose to remain in Myanmar and who are unwavering in their commitment to continue peacefully protesting and expressing their dissent,” Amnesty’s Emerlynne Gil said.
Many of them said they continue their peaceful protests to inspire more people in the country to action and to give people hope. “The main reason I continue protesting is so that the people do not become divided or lose enthusiasm, and so that they can get strength by seeing us,” said the monk in Mandalay, U Yaw.
“Although our lives are in danger, we choose to continue. We will keep asking the world to help us because people are being killed in Myanmar,” said Zin Mar, the protest leader in Monywa.
*Note to editors: In several cases pseudonyms have been used at the request of interviewees..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
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"On March 9, 2022, human rights advocacy groups Inclusive Development International (IDI) and
ALTSEAN-Burma published a report titled “The Myanmar ESG Files: How ‘responsible investment’ is
enabling a military dictatorship.” The report documents how hundreds of funds carrying the ESG
(Environmental, Social and Governance) label hold at least $13.4 billion worth of shares in 33
corporations linked with the Myanmar military.
According to the report, the 33 companies including Japanese companies have armed and funded the
Myanmar military. Data compiled by IDI show that ESG-labeled funds continued to hold shares in these
companies even after the genocide against the Rohingya in 2017 and the crackdown following last
year’s coup. Mekong Watch reiterates its concern over these Japanese companies continuing their
businesses in Myanmar despite the risk of providing financial support to the Myanmar military's
international crimes and grave human rights violations, including murder, arbitrary detention, sexual
violence, forced disappearances, and torture.
The following Japanese companies are listed in the report. The description of each company is drawn
from the report unless otherwise noted.
Daiwa House Industry
A Daiwa House Industry subsidiary, Fujita Corporation, entered into a real estate joint venture
to develop a project called the Y Complex in Myanmar. Rent payments for this project flows to
the Quartermaster General, which oversees procurement for the Myanmar military. In an email
response to Inclusive Development International, Daiwa House Industry did not dispute these
findings, but said that it had suspended development of the project on the day of the coup.
KDDI Corp
KDDI Corporation and Sumitomo Corporation founded a telecommunication subsidiary in
Myanmar which jointly operates the state-owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT). MPT collaborates with the military’s domestic surveillance program, according to a 2022
U.S. State Department report. That surveillance program allows the military to search and seize
people’s belongings and intercept phone data without a warrant.
Kirin Holdings
Kirin Holdings jointly owns Myanmar Brewery with the military-controlled Myanmar Economic
Holdings Limited. In addition, according to the 2019 U.N. fact-finding report, Kirin Holdings Pte
Ltd., provided financial support to the military for “clearance operations” against the Rohingya.
Marubeni Group
According to the Burma Campaign UK, the company is involved in the development of the
Shweli 3 dam in Northern Shan State, which is in a conflict zone and is opposed by local
residents. Marubeni is also a developer of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone. Marubeni
remains on the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List.
Sumitomo Corp
Sumitomo Corporation and KDDI Corporation, founded a telecommunication subsidiary in
Myanmar which jointly operates the state-owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT). MPT collaborates with the military’s domestic surveillance program, according to a 2022
U.S. State Department report. That surveillance program allows the military to search and seize
people’s belongings and intercept phone data without a warrant.
* Note by Mekong Watch: Sumitomo Corporation is also a developer of the Thilawa Special
Economic Zone along with Marubeni.
Tokyo Tatemono
Tokyo Tatemono entered into a real estate joint venture to develop a project called the Y
Complex in Myanmar. Rent payments for this project flows to the Quartermaster General, which
oversees procurement for the Myanmar military. In an email response to Inclusive Development
International, Tokyo Tatemono said that it did not believe its money was flowing to the military
and that it had not paid any fees since the coup.
Toshiba Corp
According to the Burma Campaign UK, a subsidiary supplies turbines for the controversial
Upper Yeywa dam in Shan State. Security forces protecting the investment allegedly committed
serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings and torture. Toshiba remains on
the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List.
In addition to the seven companies above, we have pointed out that Japan’s JX Nippon Oil & Gas
Exploration (a part of the ENEOS Group), Yokogawa Bridge Corporation (wholly-owned subsidiary of
Yokogawa Bridge Holdings), and Mitsubishi Corporation have ties to the Myanmar military. JX and
Mitsubishi have shares in the Yetagun gas field which is an important source of revenue for the military.
Yokogawa Bridge is working in cooperation with the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic
Corporation (MEC) on the Bago River Bridge Construction project, which is backed by Japan’s Official
Development Assistance. Further, in addition to the Yetagun gas project, Mitsubishi Corporation is a
developer of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone along with Marubeni and Sumitomo, two of the
Japanese companies listed in the report by IDI and Altsean. In terms of ESG investing, ENEOS,
Yokogawa Electric Corporation (major shareholder of Yokogawa Bridge Holdings), and Mitsubishi are
listed in the “FTSE Blossom Japan Index” created by FTSE Russell, which is one of the ESG indexes
for Japanese companies adopted by Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF).
ESG investing is supposed to encourage corporate respect for human rights, but it is clear that in
Myanmar, investment by ESG-labeled funds has little to do with how much consideration corporations
are actually giving to human rights. Yuka Kiguchi, Executive Director of Mekong Watch, stated: "ESG
investing is becoming increasingly popular in Japan, but not enough analysis is being done on what
exactly such investment is supporting. Regarding companies operating in Myanmar, individual projects
should be examined to ensure that funds do not flow to the military and that human rights and
environmental impacts are avoided.”..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Watch
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
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Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
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"The number of Myanmar people displaced by fighting between resistance forces and the Myanmar military in anti-regime strongholds in the west and northwest of the country has exceeded 300,000 ‘for the first time’ since last year’s coup.
The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said in its latest humanitarian update on Myanmar that, as of April 11, 346,000 of the 566,100 people displaced since the military takeover are from Chin State and Sagaing and Magwe regions in the west and northwest of Myanmar.
“For the first time, displacement in the northwest has exceeded 300,000 people,” the OCHA report said.
Since mid-2021, resistance groups have flourished in Chin, Sagaing and Magwe, inflicting severe casualties on military regime forces.
The junta continues to struggle to control those regions, with several dozen People’s Defense Forces attacking military outposts, convoys, police stations and collaborators on a daily basis.
In response, regime troops have torched villages, accusing their residents of sheltering resistance fighters. At least 8,262 houses and other civilian properties, including churches, monasteries, schools and markets have reportedly been either burned down or destroyed, mainly in Sagaing and Magwe regions and Chin and Kayah states, the report said.
OCHA added that the regime’s use of heavy weapons, including airstrikes and artillery, as well as landmines and the presence of unexploded ordinance, continues to claim lives and pose risks to the safety and security of the civilian population.
“Since the military takeover, at least 1,600 people, including over 100 children, have been killed, and thousands injured or maimed,” the report stated.
Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children have fled their homes for safety since the February 2021 coup, with many of them forced to move multiple times, exposing them to grave protection risks.
As of 11 April, 2022, the total number of displaced people in Myanmar reached 912,700, according to UN figures.
In addition, it is estimated that 34,500 Myanmar people are displaced in India and another 1,600 are displaced in Thailand..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
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Description:
"India must also stop Rohingya refugee deportations
As Boris Johnson arrives in India for a trade promotion visit, Burma Campaign UK called on the Prime Minister to call on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to stop arms sales to the Burmese military, and to end deportations of Rohingya refugees.
India has been a longstanding supplier of arms and military equipment to the Burmese military, and was listed as an arms supplier in a recent report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur.
United Nations investigators have concluded that the Burmese military have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Countries supplying arms to the Burmese military are complicit in these crimes.
Since the attempted military coup on 1st February 2021, more than 1,700 people have been killed, more than 13,000 arrested and more than 550,000 people forced to flee their homes.
India abstained on a UN General Assembly Resolution last year condemning the military coup in February 2021. India has continued to promote business with the Burmese military and refuses to impose an arms embargo.
Hasina Begum, a Rohingya refugee registered with the UNHCR, was deported by the Indian government in March, after being held in detention for a year. Her husband and three children remain in India.
“Modi supplies arms to the Burmese military knowing that they are likely to be used against civilians,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Boris Johnson must call on Modi to stop arming the Burmese military, and to stop deporting Rohingya refugees.”
Several Indian companies are on the ‘Dirty List’ published by Burma Campaign UK, including Tata Group, which has supplied vehicles to the Burmese military. In the UK Tata is best known for its Tetley brand of tea..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, India-Burma relations
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Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has sentenced Dr. Htar Htar Lin, who led Myanmar’s COVID-19 vaccine rollout under the ousted civilian government, to three years in prison with hard labor on corruption charges because she denied the regime international COVID-19 grants.
Junta-controlled newspapers reported on Thursday that the director of the national immunization program defied ministerial orders by returning a Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization’s Health System Strengthening grant of 168 million kyats (US$91,000) from Unicef and the World Health Organization on Feb. 10, 2021, shortly after the coup.
The return of the grant depleted governmental assets and she was found guilty under the Anti-Corruption Law, the junta’s media reported.
Since June last year, the well-respected director was charged with three more charges, including high treason and incitement and under the Unlawful Association Act for allegedly assisting the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), which the junta has designated as a terrorist group. The charges carry up to 20 years in prison.
An arrest warrant was issued for Dr. Htar Htar Lin shortly after the coup and she was arrested in June last year in Yangon. Her seven-year-old son, husband, friend and her daughter were also detained at the same time. The regime raided her home and seized her belongings.
In early February last year, Dr. Htar Htar Lin emailed colleagues to say she would probably face accusations that she misused funds as the dictatorship would try to steal from the vaccination program.
The email said: “We can’t let military dictators use COVID vaccinations as a weapon. I may still be free or detained by the military when you read this. But I will never surrender.”
On Wednesday, the junta also sentenced Dr. Soe Oo, who chaired the external aid committee which was overseeing the COVID-19 grant, on the same corruption charges for failing to stop Dr. Htar Htar Lin from returning the grants. He was sentenced to two years with hard labor on Wednesday.
Both high-profile doctors refused to work under the regime and they took part in the civil disobedience movement (CDM) after the coup.
The CDM was launched by medics on Feb. 3 in protest against the coup and was followed by other government staff nationwide.
The junta said last year that Dr. Htar Htar Lin confessed to communicating with Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, the NUG’s health minister, through the applications Signal and Zoom. She helped write speeches and NUG health-care policy documents and helped prepare for Zoom meetings and plan to implement the NUG health-care programs, including estimating the required drugs and costs, the state media stated.
It made the same accusation against 26 other doctors, who it said had accepted NUG public health, health administration and clinical roles. Among those accused was Dr. Maung Maung Nyein Tun, 45, a lecturer at the Department of Surgery at the Mandalay University, who died in junta detention with COVID-19 in August last year.
According to Physicians for Human Rights, 286 health staff have been detained since the Feb. 1 coup. The junta had raided at least 128 clinics and hospitals and killed at least 30 health staff by Jan. 10, the group reported..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar, Anti-coup protesters
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Local URL:
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Description:
"Myanmar is now in a state of civil war. What started in February 2021 as a mass protest movement against the military coup is now an armed uprising.
The junta is under attack across the country from a loose network of civilian militias called the People’s Defence Forces.
They’re fighting to create a democratic Myanmar.
The BBC gained rare access to the rebel jungle training camps where young protesters have been turned into soldiers.
They're up against a well-trained military, armed by Russia and China, that’s willing to use brutal tactics to hold on to power.
As the death toll mounts and the world looks away, can this people’s movement win?..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
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Sub-title:
Opposition to the military regime is pulling adverse groups toward a new national identity tied to a federal democratic future.
Description:
"The military’s coup in Myanmar has been a tragedy in every respect but one: It is increasingly clear that the generals’ power grab and bloody repression have united Myanmar’s diverse — and often adverse — ethnic and political groups to resist a common enemy and seek a better future. Ironically, the army, which has argued since independence that it alone can hold the country together, has inadvertently spurred a revolutionary and irreversible nation-building dialogue aimed at creating a federal democratic system and more inclusive national identity. The National Unity Consultative Council, the platform for this dialogue, may be slow, complex and contentious, but its participants stay at the table for one reason: It offers the best opportunity to escape Myanmar’s vicious cycle of violence and authoritarian rule.
Since the February 1, 2021, coup, opposition to military rule has grown to include political, civil society and armed elements from every corner of the country. The resistance network that developed over the past year includes the deposed parliament and executive; state, regional and township administrators; armed organizations ranging from battled-hardened ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to newly formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs); and civil society groups providing essential services and local leadership.
Bringing them all together is the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), tasked with unifying the resistance movement and, as a dialogue platform, drafting a political roadmap to move the country toward a federal democratic union. It is a low-budget force multiplier starved for resources and more than worthy of support from pro-democracy elements of the international community.
Not surprisingly, the chaos of war has challenged these groups’ ability to communicate, collaborate and coordinate. That has led some observers to view the resistance as disunited and directionless. Such a critique, however, misses the fact that these groups are complementary even if they don’t speak with a single voice, and that in combination they have performed effectively against the overwhelming structural advantages that the junta enjoys.
Perhaps of equal importance, these actors represent the bones of a new federal system that could rise from the ashes of the military’s atrocities. Where past democratic movements in Myanmar have struggled — namely, in their ability to craft and unify around an alternative political vision — this one has shown staying power. By establishing the NUCC less than two months after the coup, the resistance demonstrated its intention to avoid past mistakes that have led to disintegration. If it continues to make visible progress and demonstrate a commitment to decentralization and a new federal structure, the NUCC can help sustain and strengthen the movement.
The Misguided Search for Elite Dialogue
The historic and transformative potential of the NUCC has not been entirely obvious to the international community. From the outset of the coup, various envoys have ignored the NUCC process and instead pursued a solution to the conflict through elite dialogue between the military and fringe opposition elements willing to return to pre-coup conditions. As the ensuing armed conflict has broadened and intensified, with gruesome videos of military atrocities emerging daily, these calls for dialogue have grown louder. Those pushing such dialogue believe that peace is brokered through elites and the benefits will trickle down. This is deeply misguided. It is a view that has informed all five previous attempts to bring peace to Myanmar — attempts that have failed.
Though perhaps well-intentioned, this strategy fails to grasp that the people of Myanmar are unwilling to go back to the system of government that existed under the 2008 military constitution. They have made clear their urgent need to embrace this historic turning point, lest the country simply settles into another unstable equilibrium characterized by continuing violence.
No Going Back
Unlike some outsiders, none of the parties to the conflict sees a return to the status quo ante as possible.
In late March, coup leader and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing vowed to annihilate all opposition in flagrant disregard of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) “Five-Point Consensus.” Whatever its original motives for the coup, the junta’s sole objective now is survival. The generals have calculated that international accountability for their brutality is unlikely and that their backers, especially China, Russia, India, Japan and some within ASEAN, will prove durable.
The resistance, too, recognizes that there is no going back — but where to head next is a point of contention. The vast majority of those within the NUG and NUCC, particularly among ethnic revolutionary organizations, protest groups and the more progressive members of civil society, have made clear that they seek nothing less than the full removal of the military from the country’s political and economic life. They view the previous system as having been unstable and exclusionary, held together through tenuous concessions to elites, and ultimately enabling the coup.
A Way Forward
Before evaluating the prospects for the NUCC, it should be stipulated that at this stage its potential remains aspirational. Its dialogues are unglamorous, fraught, complex and slow, held over bi-weekly Zoom calls at all hours.
That said, the NUCC’s inclusive dialogue processes reflect the will of the people, and there are reasons for optimism that this unique platform can help lay the groundwork for a new Myanmar.
In virtually every other political dialogue in Myanmar’s history — all of which have been controlled or sabotaged by the Burma army — participants would routinely abandon negotiations when they became contentious or seemed to be going nowhere. These dialogues were haunted by two major demons: the lack of a shared objective and the fact that the Burma army has never wanted peace (which remains the case today).
With the poisonous military excluded from the NUCC, it is at last possible to have a good-faith dialogue among parties with a shared goal of ending authoritarian military rule and establishing a peaceful federal democracy. Therefore, even when disputes become heated, as they often do, the conversations continue. Although key actors, including important political parties such as the Shan National League for Democracy and EAOs including the United Wa State Army, Arakan Army and Kachin Independence Army, have not joined the process, the NUCC has kept open the door to their future involvement and quietly consults with these groups to take into account their political ambitions.
Another positive development is the emergence of state-level Consultative Councils which were spawned by the NUCC. Some have made considerable strides toward unifying the resistance in states — often producing better outcomes than the NUCC itself. The Kayah State Consultative Council, for example, includes a diverse array of civilian, armed and civil society actors, and is nearing completion of a state constitution. It helps coordinate the armed resistance across the war-torn state and provides core governance functions, including oversight of a local police service and delivery of humanitarian aid. These state-level processes are not only a foundational exercise in federalism but could offer lessons on how to improve the NUCC.
If the NUCC can reach consensus on a plan for a federal government that makes space for Myanmar’s cultural diversity, it would put the resistance in a strong position to begin laying the foundation for negotiations with the military. It would also make the NUCC the setting for a long-term national dialogue aimed at developing an inclusive national identity as the basis for a more equitable and stable Myanmar.
Key Challenges Remain
Neither success nor failure is pre-ordained for the fractious resistance movement. Three factors will be especially critical to a successful outcome of the NUCC:
Pace and Priorities. NUCC dialogues are built upon the principle of collective leadership — a welcome departure from Myanmar’s history of rigid hierarchy centered around a Bamar Buddhist gerontocracy. But under its consensus model, the NUCC often shows little progress over long periods. The glacial pace weakens its perceived relevance among some key actors. The challenge, in part, is that the NUCC plays two roles — a policymaking body of a revolutionary administration (the National Unity Government, or NUG) and a nation-building dialogue platform. If the NUCC fails in the first role to keep pace with the revolution, it may lose the opportunity to lead in the second. Its success will depend on maintaining cohesion and adhering to leadership principles, while building momentum on core policy questions.
Action. Follow-up action is often inadequate because the NUCC, like the NUG, lacks enough working-level staff. The NUG and the Joint Coordination Committees are the primary implementing bodies of NUCC policy. While their personnel are committed, motivated and experienced, many have gone months without pay. If the international community provides stronger support for civil society actors, they can be force multipliers for the NUG and NUCC. When the NUCC establishes its Technical Secretariat team and Technical Support team in the coming months, the United States and other donors should be ready to assist.
Trust. For decades, the military has nurtured distrust among its myriad opponents. The National League for Democracy (NLD) party exacerbated these divisions while in power by implementing policies that antagonized civil society and the ethnic minorities that now make up the NUCC. Though the NLD-dominated NUG promises to build more equitable governance structures, ethnic minorities and others are wary. The NUCC needs to continue to push the NUG to demonstrate its commitment to federalism by designing and deploying governance structures that shift power from Union-level institutions like the NUCC and NUG toward sub-national institutions, including state and region-level Consultative Councils and township governance institutions (Pyithu Aochoteye a’pwe).
In a previous publication we said, the NUCC was too important to fail. This is as true now as it has ever been.
The NUCC alone will not win or lose this revolution, of course, but its success is a precondition to escaping the vicious cycle of violence and military authoritarianism. If the NUCC collapses or loses relevance, power will shift to those who seek elite and unaccountable negotiations. That will inevitably produce a myopic and unstable political outcome characterized by violence, authoritarianism and regional instability.
The best option for allies of a democratic Myanmar is to support the NUCC dialogues, which better reflect the will of the people and create the possibility for the elusive federal democratic union that Myanmar has always deserved. The search for dialogue to end this tragic conflict must first take place within the resistance before any negotiated settlement can be considered..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
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"Finnish technology giant Wärtsilä Corporation has won bids for two tenders from the illegitimate military-controlled Electric Power Generation Enterprise (EPGE), for the construction and operation of two hybrid gas and solar power plants in Myingyan and Magway.
The tender was announced by EPGE in December 2021, with a February 2022 deadline. EPGE is based in Naypyidaw, under the Ministry of Electricity and Energy.
Wärtsilä won both tenders as part of a consortium with the Chinese corporation Dongfang Electric International Corporation and Myanmar Chemical and Machinery (MCM).
MCM is a major arms dealer that is also involved in the production of weapons in Myanmar, in partnership with the Directorate of Defence Industries.
On March 25, 2022, MCM was sanctioned by Canada, the UK and US. In its sanctions announcement, the UK government described MCM as “a key source of weapons and commercial support for the junta” and MCM Managing Director, Aung Hlaing Oo, as “an associate of Commander-in-Chief and coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing”
Within the tender, MCM is represented by its Singapore subsidiary MCM Pacific Pte. Ltd. and a Myanmar subsidiary, MCM Energy Ptd. Ltd.
Days after the sanctions announcement, MCM Energy changed its name to Malikha Energy, which may be an attempt to circumvent sanctions.
Aung Hlaing Oo left the company in December 2021, after JFM published an investigation on his involvement in the arms trade.
Malikha Energy continues to use the MCM Group email as its registered contact.
Aung Hlaing Oo remains director and controlling shareholder of the Singapore company.
Following the imposition of sanctions on MCM, a spokesperson from Wärtsilä Corporation told Justice For Myanmar, “we have ceased with immediate effect all business activity or partnership involving MCM and its affiliates. In line with the rest of the international community, Wärtsilä remains committed to the reliable and affordable development of electrification of Myanmar. In this respect, we will maintain our engagement with EPGE provided that EPGE remains free from sanctions as it is today.”
Wärtsilä refused to explain how they were able to remove MCM from the consortium for the Myingyan and Magway power projects. The corporation also refused to respond to questions regarding human rights due diligence in Myanmar, and whether they had sought advice from the Finnish government regarding their participation in junta tenders.
Since its illegal attempted coup, the junta has targeted Myingyan and Magway with indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, and troops have committed mass killings and rape.
Wärtsilä Corporation is listed on the Finnish stock exchange, Nasdaq Helsinki. Its biggest shareholder is Sweden’s Wallenberg family.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Wärtsilä is seeking profits from the junta that carries out atrocity crimes with total impunity.
The Myanmar junta is a terrorist organisation that is using the electricity supply as a strategic tool in its attempt to take full control over the country.
Power cuts have been imposed as a collective punishment and masses of people continue their defiance against the military by refusing to pay their electricity bills.
While Wärtsilä has responded to the sanctioning of their partner MCM by ending their business relationship, we remain concerned that they are not disclosing how they have cut out their sanctioned business partner, immediately after winning two tenders with them.
The fact that Wärtsilä entered into a business partnership with a major Myanmar military arms dealer in the first place raises serious concerns about their human rights due diligence.
We call on Wärtsilä to be transparent, fulfil their human rights responsibilities, follow the guidance of the National Unity Government and withdraw from the Myingyan and Magwe power projects, without providing a windfall to MCM or the junta.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
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New measure barring local possession of foreign currency threatens to alienate the few foreign investors left in the benighted nation
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"After a year of political, social and economic self-destruction, Myanmar’s coup-installed junta appears now to be committing financial suicide.
On April 3, Myanmar’s central bank issued a directive requiring all Myanmar citizens to change their foreign currency holdings and transmittances from overseas into Myanmar kyats at state-licensed banks. The directive, published in state media and branded by critics as a desperate money grab, said the transfer must be done within “one working day.”
It is still unclear how the crude measure will be enforced and implemented but follow-up guidance has said that US dollars must be changed at a rate of 1,850 kyats to the greenback, yielding the central bank a windfall on the exchange at the prevailing market rate of 2,015 kyats to the dollar.
Other currencies will be calculated at similar, most likely unfavorable, rates dictated by the central bank. According to the World Bank, Myanmar’s foreign reserves stood at a mere US$7.8 billion as of December 2020, just over a month before the February 2021 coup and the last reliable public data on the country’s reserve position.
Myanmar’s foreign debt is estimated at between $10 and $11 billion. Western sanctions imposed in punitive response to the military’s seizure of power from Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected administration have targeted the military’s key economic interests and certain top personages.
According to the central bank’s first statement on the new measures, all transfers of foreign currency “must be carried out through [authorized] banks with the permission of the Foreign Exchange Supervisory Committee.”
All foreign currency account holders will also be forced to convert holdings acquired before April 3 into kyats, with a vague option to apply for an exemption to the new rules. It was also announced that some foreign currency may be kept in approved banks following approval by relevant authorities, including the Myanmar Investment Commission.
The foreign investment community is understandably up in arms over the surprise and draconian order.
On April 4, the Japanese Embassy sent a letter to the junta saying “Japanese companies operating in Myanmar will face serious challenges in following the new regulation, which will cause difficulties in continuing their businesses in the country. It will also be detrimental to the function of the Embassy of Japan and other official organizations.”
Two days later, the Singaporean Embassy issued an almost identical statement that merely changed “Japanese companies” to “Singapore companies.” Both embassies requested exemptions for companies from their respective countries, which are among Myanmar’s top providers of foreign investment.
On April 8, a dozen business groups — among them the French Myanmar Chamber of Commerce, AustCham Myanmar, EuroCham Myanmar, the British Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar, and the German Myanmar Business Chamber — issued a joint statement saying that the new foreign currency rule “needlessly lowers the living standards of the Myanmar people, halts foreign business activity, stops the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), and creates trade tensions with other countries.”
Restriction on the use of foreign currencies, the statement noted, “disconnects Myanmar from the global economy and global financial system.”
According to well-placed sources in Yangon, not even local banks seem to know what the new rules actually mean, how they will be enforced by military authorities, and what will happen if the banks are deemed to have violated them.
Analysts and observers believe there are three main reasons behind what many see as a desperate move to gain access to foreign currency at a time the local economy has nearly collapsed due to the military’s February 2021 coup and the nationwide unrest that has followed.
The first and most obvious motivation stems from the fact the junta has nearly depleted its foreign reserves and desperately needs a way to earn, or in this instance, take foreign currency to avoid defaulting on foreign debts.
Another reason may be to control, and possibly strangle, money flows from foreign donors and exiled groups to anti-junta activists and civil society groups inside the country. The new measure will effectively make it illegal to hold foreign funds, making it easier for authorities to track and check transfers to such groups.
Only entities registered with authorities will be allowed to receive funds from abroad — and then that money would in any case have to be changed into kyats unless they have acquired an exemption from that rule.
But holders of kyat accounts may withdraw only 500,000, or the equivalent of less than US$250, per week under the military junta rules. That, of course, has raised the question of whether the central bank actually has enough kyat reserves to cover the conversion of all foreign holdings into local currency.
The third reason for the move became clear when the Japanese and Singaporean embassies issued their statements requesting exemptions from the new rules.
Inadvertently, perhaps, the pleas were made to the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar” and thus amounted to de facto official recognition of the coup-installed government that has otherwise been shunned and sanctioned by the West.
Whatever the case, the economic and diplomatic benefits the junta may derive from the new rules are bound to be dwarfed by the negative consequences of such an ill-conceived measure to assert more military control over the economy.
It’s unclear if the Japanese and Singaporean companies that are still in the country since the coup will consider uprooting if not given the exemptions they have requested. The rules will also likely deter other foreign companies from investing in the country, which was already a tough sell amid the post-coup political upheavals and devastation caused by Covid-19.
But Myanmar needs more, not less, foreign investment to revive the economy.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) stated in a January 2022 report that Myanmar is on brink of economic collapse one year after the coup. According to the ILO, the country’s employment losses in 2021 amounted to 8% of the workforce, or 1.6 million lost jobs. It said Myanmar’s construction, garment, tourism and hospitality industries were among the hardest hit, as were rural farmers.
Similarly, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) issued a statement in December 2021 that estimated “by early 2022, nearly half of Myanmar’s 55 million population — some 25 million people — will be living below the national poverty line. There now appears little doubt that the country’s poverty headcount is likely to return to levels not seen since 2005, effectively erasing 15 years of pre-pandemic economic growth.”
Kanni Wignaraja, director of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, was quoted as saying: “A slide into poverty of this scale could mean the disappearance of the middle class – a bad omen for any rapid recovery from this crisis,” she noted.
In many ways, Myanmar’s broad economy, especially foreign-exposed sectors like tourism, was until now a dollar-based economy, with many transactions conducted in foreign rather than local currency.
Trying to eliminate that economy overnight, analysts and observers predict, is bound to put more strain on an already fragile economy that contracted 18% in the year ended September 2021. The World Bank predicted a paltry 1% growth on that contraction in 2022, though the projection was made before the de-dollarization measure was announced.
But Myanmar’s increasingly isolated generals may not care, particularly if they think sympathetic allies like China will turn the other cheek on the foreign currency measure and bail them out if the economy slips deeper into crisis.
The junta’s lurch towards de-dollarization might thus give rise to a new yuan-based financial order – and even greater dependence on Beijing..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
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Banking, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန်မထမ်းဆောင်ပဲ ဓမ္မဘက်မှရပ်တည်၍ ပြည်သူနှင့်တသားတည်းဖြစ် စေရန်နှင့် အမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ကြစေရန် အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ဖိတ်ခေါ် ကမ်းလှမ်းခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ရုံးအနေဖြင့်လည်း အောက်တိုဘာလမှစတင်၍ အမိန့်အာဏာ ဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနမဖွဲ့ရသေးသောဌာနအသီးသီးမှ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း သူရဲကောင်းများ၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေး၊ လုံခြုံဘေးကင်းရေးနှင့် ဖိအားကင်းစင်ရေး တို့အတွက် အလေးထား ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်နေ ပြီး CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအား ဖိအားပေးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ရာထူးမှထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း၊ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှထုတ် ပစ်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းနှင့် ဥပေဒနှင့်အညီပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုတော့သည့် လစာချေးငွေများအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်ခိုင်းခြင်းများ စသည့် အမျိုးမျိုးသောဖိနှိပ်မှုများကိုကျူးလွန်နေသော စိုက်ပျိုးရေး၊ မွေးမြူရေးနှင့် ဆည်မြောင်းဝန်ကြီးဌာန စိုက်ပျိုးရေးဉီးစီးဌာန မှ အောက်ဖေါ်ပြပါဝန်ထမ်းများအား အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းသွင်းလိုက်ပြီး ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ် (Dismiss) လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the Prime Minister of the Union - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
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"Time for an Evaluation of Donor-Led Peace Efforts?
As recently as 2020 one of the most prominent logos on Yangon billboards, vehicles, and signs was the woven fibers of the Joint Peace Fund (JPF). The JPF arrived in Yangon in 2016, loudly proclaiming that it had pledges from nine western donors who would fund US$100 million in peacebuilding activities between 2016 and 2021.
The JPF would support the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015, a Norwegian-sponsored agreement between the quasi-civilian government of U Thein Sein and a dozen or so Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Hundreds of millions of dollars also flowed into Myanmar in the name of peace from Western embassies, United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Bank, church groups, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). All parties were convinced that they could contribute to the country’s road to peace by bringing the peacebuilding skills of the outside world to Myanmar.
International experts in peacebuilding, public health, gender, democracy, displaced peoples, education and a host of other subjects arrived. The Myanmar Police Force was even funded by the European Union to train in crowd control techniques in 2013 and 2016, all part of a scheme to assist them to become “a modern police agency that adheres to international standards, respects human rights and maintains gender awareness.”
Conferences were held in Yangon hotels, workshops in villages, and leaders jetted off to see ‘best practice’ peace efforts in places like Northern Ireland, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Mindanao in the Philippines. And then of course it all disappeared on February 1, 2021, when the Myanmar military staged their coup. What went wrong? No answers seem forthcoming.
Monitoring, Evaluation and the Coup of February 1, 2021
Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on peace and democracy efforts in Myanmar between 2016 and 2021. Myanmar’s service sector briefly flourished and rents in Yangon skyrocketed, particularly in neighborhoods favored by expatriates where houses owned by military families were snapped up. But that was OK because each dollar spent was rooted in “evidence based policy”, which meant a particular “benchmarked performance objective” pre-determined by the donor was aligned with success, however defined.
So the JPF and the donor systems hummed along, always seeming to meet those benchmarked performance indicators. The Rohingya crisis of 2017 came and went, ceasefires in Shan and Kachin States collapsed, and fighting resumed in Karen and Karenni States. The Arakan Army emerged, too. Monitoring and Evaluation officers carefully noted “roadblocks” on the “road to peace”. Ambassadors lectured Myanmar people that this was the “last chance” for peace.
But it didn’t work. The crash occurred on the day of the coup, when the elected leadership of the government was arrested and the military occupied Myanmar’s cities. Peaceful demonstrators were shot, military operations against ethnic peoples in the borderlands resumed, and resistance groups began to organize. All the efforts of the 2016-2021 peacebuilding seemed for naught. As for the evaluators, they seemed to have suddenly disappeared. For example, instead of acknowledging failure and announcing a new study in the interests of transparency, JPF’s website was scoured of all reports and effectively went blank. Or perhaps it went underground, as rumors have emerged that the JPF is now negotiating with the military government. It seems that the peacebuilding of 2016-2021 was in vain or perhaps even counter-productive.
This means, though, that it is time to ask the critical question of what went wrong. All that data- driven policy-building can be resuscitated, and the tools used to evaluate the NGOs can now be used to evaluate the overall peace process. Monitoring and Evaluation in donor-speak meant western accounting standards benchmarking every kyat and dollar. The recipients were held accountable to the stakeholders, of whom the donors were most important. This is why endless reams of the monitoring and evaluation reports were submitted to Western embassies, JPF, World Bank, and others. Receipts for tea were carefully collated with a performance objective, budget line and benchmark. Monitoring and Evaluation Officer became a new profession in Myanmar, judging by the number of job ads advertising for this particular skill.
It seems callous to ask, but isn’t the coup and the seeming collapse of the aid sector a great opportunity for a final monitoring and evaluation report? What are the lessons learned? Why did the road to peace fall off a cliff? Where did the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on peace go? Frankly were JPF still around, it seems like a perfect question for them to conduct an inquiry into.
Measuring The Technology of Peace
One problem is that the JPF and other donors reduce peace to being a technical problem. In the imported version of ‘Peaceland’, conflict, economics, and politics were reduced to metrics which are easily monitored and evaluated with numbers. Thus, violent incident reports seemed quick and precise and economic development was robustly measured in tenths of a percent growth. Election transparency was presumably measurable in the liters of purple gentian violet used to stain the fingers of voters.
The problem perhaps is that peace is not just a technical problem. Peace is complicated, because there are many forms of it and it is more than an absence of violent incidents. Indeed in peace studies, an absence of violent incidents is sometimes called “negative peace”. Myanmar people remember well “negative peace’” from the decades of military rule when fear of government violence was constant, even when there were no violent incidents to count. For negative peace to become “positive peace,” there needs to be reconciliation and the birth of a new sense of shared destiny. Peace studies scholars use mystical terms such as soul of place, cultures of peace, social cohesion, and positive peace. The point is that peace is rooted ultimately in the morality and traditions of the local society, not dollars spent, incidents counted, or even gross national product.
A Wonky Question for the Evaluators: What is Your Real Deliverable?
The monitoring and evaluation profession is about measuring progress toward a goal. Peace was the goal for the NCA but that came to mean only that violent fighting between the military and EAOs should stop, even if the reign of fear continues. Monitoring and evaluation reports, though, only asked if the shooting stopped, not if steps toward what peace studies scholars call “positive peace” were taken. The incentive presented by Western embassies and NGOs was that if you could answer ‘Yes’ that violence rates had decreased, you could get the next contract. Somehow the world of monitoring and evaluation missed the fact that assigning a cup of tea from a workshop to the correct budget category was not the point. “Positive peace” is the point, but this is unfortunately not really a deliverable that can be monitored and evaluated by simply counting violent incidents.
February 1, 2021 presents a classic monitoring and evaluation opportunity for the ‘lessons learned’ crowd. Perhaps what needs to happen is that the donors from the UN, Norway, UK and USA need to admit that the coup was a failure of their own policies, not just of the Myanmar people.
Sadly, this is not yet happening. In Thailand, where I work, USAID, Washington’s aid agency, in particular has arrived with monitoring and evaluation specialists promising dollars for programs addressing Myanmar issues. The catch is that the extensive American accountability requirements mean that the same policies and same NGOs that engineered the failure of 2016-2021 are being funded again. More importantly, the pesky goal that is “positive peace” is still missing. So NGOs spring up, monitoring and evaluation specialists are hired and villas rented in Chiangmai and Bangkok. After that is done, some money will make its way across the border to Myanmar and the rather small number of NGOs with the wherewithal and office staff to continue satisfying the technocracy of the peace industry.
What Would a Real Evaluation Look Like?
What would a real evaluation of the NCA and JPF look like? First, it might start with not just the failures in the 2015 ceasefire, but the dozens of other Myanmar ceasefires which have taken place since the 1950s. And then before that there is the poisonous legacy of British colonialism well remembered by Myanmar’s peoples. Myanmar has historians who could help with evaluating why ceasefires have been ineffective for the last 100 years or so. For example, little thought is put into why the 1950s ceasefires following the 1949 Battle of Insein failed. Nor is much written about the 1990s ceasefires with the Mon, Kachin, Wa, and others. In those failed ceasefires might be found the reason why the 2015 NCA also failed. And finally why did the Rohingya repatriations endorsed by the UN in 1978, 1992, 2012 and 2017 also fail?
If you are a foreigner scratching your head about the Battle of Insein, or other ceasefires, you are not alone. After all, what monitoring and evaluation officer created a career based on bragging about the ceasefire that did not work, even if it was one of the most important events in twentieth century Myanmar history? But I would guess that the unsuccessful endings of the Burmese Civil War of 1949-1950 tell us more about peace in Myanmar than the peace industry’s successes in Colombia, Sri Lanka, etc.
What such studies should not start with are lectures about USAID monitoring and evaluation requirements, or critiques from Western embassies about “Myanmar’s failure”. New ideas and thoughts from outside ‘Peaceland’ need to be sought. There are excellent books in English by Johan Galtung, Severine Autessere, John Paul Lederach, Thich Nhat Hanh, Elise Boulding, and others about the nature of peace and peacebuilding which are rarely noted in the reams of reports. Myanmar scholars like U Pho Hlaing’s writings about the nature of Burmese democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi’s writings about democracy and fear, Saw Aung Hla’s writings about the Karen and Maung Maung Gyi’s thoughts regarding Burmese authoritarianism, were almost universally ignored in Yangon consultancy reports, even though they are available in English. More of course must be available in Burmese, Karen, and the other languages of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
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"A recent job posting for the international non-profit organization Search for Common Ground sought a “proactive, dynamic and experienced” person to work in their Yangon office on “Youth, Peace and Security”. The posting failed to mention the February 1 2021 military coup, but did proclaim that “Search Myanmar is at an exciting stage and has been trying to reach a new level of growth, scaling up…to support its strategy in-country to support Myanmar in its priorities of peace, development and democratic change.” I’m not sure “exciting stage” is the apt characterization for contemporary Myanmar. Search is also looking for a Conflict Analyst, a Project Director, a Gender and Diversity Consultant and several other positions.
There has been a flurry of new job postings in the international development space in Myanmar, many of which avoid mentioning the coup. When the issue does arise, it is referred to as a ‘military takeover’, likely because the Ministry of Information under the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) banned the use of the term ‘coup’, as well as the terms ‘junta’ and ‘regime’. It all contributes to a strained return to normalcy, as the United Nations (UN), international organizations, and Western embassies all contrive to rationalize the relentless bad news from around the country.
Filling jobs is prosaic way to keep busy. Nor does aid money spend itself. Although it would be a demonstration of common decency if job postings didn’t talk about “exciting opportunities” when so many potential applicants have been killed in street protests, are in prison, have gone underground to continue civil disobedience, have been exiled, or have chosen to take up arms against a brutal and illegal military system. That rather limits the pool of applicants, something which they could have acknowledged in their ‘search’ for common ground.
In the aftermath of the first anniversary of Myanmar’s putsch, there was the inevitable slew of morosely serious ‘webinars’, which blend into a distant droning sound of helplessness until one discerns the rising signals of reengagement amongst many international donors and diplomats. There are signs big and small, from the woeful visit of outgoing Australian Ambassador Andrea Faulkner to SAC head Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw in early April, obviously on instructions from the Australian government, obtuse statements from diplomats in Yangon, to continued recruitment of multiple positions that scream business as usual and the continued operations of programs that a coup would normally halt.
The UN’s most superfluous agency, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has also advertised for a new Myanmar country director. Yet the UNODC Asia Pacific Regional Director, the studiously self-promoting Jeremy Douglas with his steely Elliot Ness-like intensity, has been spouting alarmist nonsense about a post-coup explosion of crystal methamphetamine production and the perfect conditions for criminal enterprises, given that the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) is otherwise occupied suppressing dissent. The rise of meth production in northern Shan State preceded the coup by years, the MPF only arrest low-level traffickers and users, not major players protected by the military, and the UNODC hasn’t had much success in drug eradication in Myanmar in several decades.
Also, the UN’s common position doesn’t permit any interaction with the Myanmar military or police, so what exactly would the successful applicant be doing? The job posting states; “Keep abreast with the latest developments and trends in Myanmar regarding all areas under UNODC mandates and advise on possible policy and operational responses; Represent UNODC’s position and interests in Myanmar and liaise with Government’s institutions [in line with the common UN position], civil society, regional and international aid agencies and financial institutions, and the media.” So really not much of any use. Or is it the thin edge of a wedge of reengagement? UNODC permitted the attendance of an SAC official at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs several weeks after the coup, and it worked closely with the MPF on drafting the 2014 Anti-Terrorism Law, so its new country head should be watched closely.
The World Food Programme (WFP), arguably one of the the most important agencies operating given the scale of food insecurity and conflict-induced displacement, recently released its ‘2021 Highlights’, not exactly a very conflict-sensitive title. It referred not to a coup d’etat or widespread atrocities, but to a “Political Crisis…Myanmar military stages a takeover prompting near paralysis of economy and public services”, while the number of people receiving assistance increased by one million. An overall tepid description of what the WFP continues to call a ‘crisis’.
UN Secretary General Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzers efforts have also dissolved into bland formula, especially after she was pilloried for her remarks (or misstatement) on ‘power sharing’ in late January. Her April 1 visit to Cambodia resulted in a limp concoction of generalities as she pledged to: “continue to amplify the voices of the people of Myanmar and encourage international action based on an accurate assessment of the situation…continue to engage with all key stakeholders, focusing on helping articulate the bottom-lines and conditions needed for momentum towards any talks about talks in the greater interest of peace, stability and democracy.” It’s as if the coup didn’t happen, the SAC doesn’t exist, or that the military regime isn’t the primary perpetrator of the violence she hopes to quell. Stringing inoffensive words together sends clear signals for the UN inside Myanmar and others to get back to work.
The UN Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has also distributed a clear set of Joint Operating Standards (JOS) that are a model of rectitude and humanitarian impartiality. However, when one sees this contained in the JOS, “this engagement must be principled and should never be considered political legitimization, recognition of – or support to – a party of conflict”, the question is how much legitimization the UN as a whole is bestowing on the SAC as a matter of course? The appointment of the American humanitarian expert Liam Mahony to be an advisor to the UN Humanitarian Country Team in Yangon may provide answers to this. Mahony produced a number of excoriating reports on the UN and international NGO’s failures in Rakhine State, “A Slippery Slope” and in 2018 “Time to Break Old Habits”, about the massive failures of the international community to prevent the atrocities against Rohingya Muslims.
The promise of peace has been exhumed in other ways than just Search Myanmar. The 11-donor Joint Peace Fund (JPF), a US$100 million Ponzi scheme of Western donor avarice and incompetence, has staged a Lazarus-like rebirth with a new strategy: “Following the military takeover…the JPF conducted a major restructuring of its operations to support national stakeholders seeking to resolved the decades-old conflict…(a)n interim strategy was developed as a basis for JPF support to peace process stakeholders during a transition period from January to December 2022…that strengthens local conflict management mechanisms – enabling actors to mitigate the impact of violent conflict on civilians – and retains the foundations for actors to communicate and negotiate to end conflict and violence.”
In other words, we utterly failed at supporting peace between 2016 to 2021, so give us more money and during a multisided civil war sparked by a military coup we can resolve it. There is an astonishingly misplaced optimism in this interim strategy. The JPF is recruiting a Senior Conflict Analyst (meaning foreigner), National Conflict Analyst (meaning someone from Myanmar), Senior Gender Advisor, and two other National Gender Advisors. The ‘Roles and Responsibilities’ of all these positions are highly unlikely to be achieved in any meaningful way, and will contribute little beyond having lunch at the Alamanda Inn’s French restaurant in Yangon’s Golden Valley Green Zone
The central normalizer must be the European Union (EU), maintaining its massive My Justice program (justice in Myanmar?) implemented by the British Council, the Oxfam-directed Durable Peace Program, and the unfortunately mistimed Nexus Response Mechanism (NRM), a US$50 million fund to to “implement innovative, flexible, and rights-based activities at the nexus of the humanitarian, development, and peace sectors…(the) objective is to contribute to long-term peace and national reconciliation, security, stability and sustainable development by reducing the vulnerability, building the resilience, and protecting the rights of conflict and disaster affected communities across Myanmar”, which sounds like a planning document from 2016, not the Myanmar of 2022. To be continuing a project with the Orwellian title of ‘Durable Peace’ in the current carnage is surreal, if not sick. This from a donor who instituted the much derided MyPol police reform scheme, and injected 175 million euros directly into the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) education budget [out of a total grant of 221 million euros], and was a major donor to the JPF.
Compounding the EU’s post-coup cognitive dissonance, EU Ambassador Ranieri Sabatucci’s slew of snarky tweets are enraging many inside Myanmar and he seems determined to pick fights with anyone but the SAC. One of his most recent tweets stated that “#Myanmar social media is full of trollers, located abroad (sic). They judge/speculate without knowledge of the facts. Their insults and aggression discourage healthy pluralistic debates. The result, could be shrinking of democratic space on social media. They should not succeed.” If only Ambassador Sabatucci put as much effort into ensuring the SAC won’t succeed.
The EU exemplifies the two-step strategy of normalization. Back home in Brussels, impose sanctions, make strong speeches and resolutions from the EU Parliament, but in the halls of the European External Action Service (EEAS) seek ways to recover the relationship. Throwing money doesn’t work, but it makes the EU feel useful, and important.
Much of this post-coup normalization is being orchestrated by the all-enveloping efforts of the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), a benign-sounding behemoth of a project-implementing bureaucracy that has been criticized for its slow pace of adaptation to the post-coup reality, and being predisposed to accommodating authority regardless of its credentials. If the James Bond franchise ever had an UN agency as an evil nemesis, it would be UNOPS, where donors send so much bulk funding to be dispersed with the tenderness of a wood chipper.
Arrayed on the other ‘side’ of this normalizing pathology is a mirror image complex of advisors and consultants to the parallel National Unity Government, and various anti-SAC forces. They operate in twilight and obscurity far more than the worker drones of the UN, equally unaccountable and their utility rarely questioned. Who are they and what are they up to? What role did they play in supporting the military or the NLD over the past several years?
They will likely have their complicity in the deficiencies of the NLD expunged as unfortunate association. Yet in light of the recent US government designation of the Rohingya genocide, it would behoove Western donors to ensure they are not paying engorged salaries to anyone in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s former inner circle who cooperated in the attempted cover-up of major atrocities. In fact, any of the opportunists who were orbiting Naypyitaw under the NLD government should automatically be highly suspect. If for no other reason than their obscene salaries.
As feeding frenzies go, it’s perhaps not as fulsome as the early years of the ‘transition’ or the boom years of the post-2015 election when massive development funds were creating major opportunities for the moneyed classes of the international development set. Think of today’s repurposing of so much money that cannot legally be implemented inside Myanmar as a ‘decent interval’ before the West eventually downscales from the country to a pre-Cyclone Nargis mentality and funding mechanisms. This would return the country to a site of sanctions and condemnation, and funneling the bulk of aid to warehoused Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, cross-border assistance to the unremitting attrition warfare of eastern Myanmar, occasional food deliveries to the rural resistance zones of Sagaing and Magwe regions, and undulating optimism at the prospect of ‘durable solutions’ to resolve ten years of protracted displacement of 100,000 people in Kachin and northern Shan states, and the potential funding windfall it may bring to international agencies to assist.
But then anything connected to governance, peace, human rights, or the scams of social cohesion, have a markedly limited role in the current conflict. It is open to question how much genuine utility they had even before 2020, when the peace process was clearly dead and projects of governance were circumscribed by an autarkic and incompetent ruling party.
So why do so many of these actors remain engaged? Pay checks and lifestyles, is a simple explanation. By at least mid-2021 there was already an exodus of foreign technical experts to other countries, much the same as the stampede of people from Afghanistan and Cambodia into Yangon in 2014.
It is now clear that Ukraine has almost permanently distracted media and diplomatic attention away from not just Myanmar, but Yemen, Ethiopia and the Congo. Many Western donors have already calculated their post-pandemic and post-‘takeover’ priorities to resume trade with Southeast Asia, which compels the charade of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality in resolving the Myanmar crisis. As the one-year anniversary of agreeing the Five Point Consensus approaches later this month, any optimism that there will be progress any time soon is clearly strained or delusional, yet it hasn’t prohibited a movement towards ‘living with the SAC’.
It is as if an orchestra of connivance is tuning its instruments, readying itself to build to a crescendo of credible normalization that doesn’t look like the betrayal of Myanmar it really is. But every job advertisement, qualified statement, self-lobotomized tweet, call for ASEAN to take the lead, or addition to the bonfire of pointless knowledge, is actively assisting the SAC in solidifying its rule. On behalf of the people of Myanmar, who are not drowning, but waving, its craven cynicism should be challenged at every turn..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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"At the end of March 2022, over 100 villagers from Nawng Hee tract in Namzarng township, southern Shan State, were forced by SAC troops to build a new military outpost, about one mile from a large new coal mining operation planned by a subsidiary of Mandalay-based Ngwe Yi Pale company.
On March 29 and 30, 106 residents of Nam Mo village went to build the outpost north of Koong Di village in Nawng Hee tract, about 15 miles northeast of Namzarng town. The villagers were forced to dig bunkers, cut bamboo and erect fencing.
The outpost has been built on farmland belonging to a Nam Mo villager called Loong Hsa. He was not informed in advance that his land would be seized, and has received no compensation.
On March 23, about 35 SAC troops from LIB 553, based in Mong Karn, under the Triangle Regional Command in Kengtung, eastern Shan State, came from the Kho Lam-Namzarng main road and entered Koon Hsai village in Nawng Hee tract. The troops camped at Koon Hsai school for several nights, then moved to Tue Leng village, where they spent one night before arriving in Nam Mo village on March 28. The SAC troops camped in Nam Mo temple and that evening at 6 pm summoned the village head and asked to see the village household list. There are 63 households in Nam Mo village, and the troops ordered one person from each household to go and build the outpost for three days, but the villagers decided to send 106 people each day in order to finish the work in two days.
On March 31, the SAC troops moved from Nam Mo temple to stay at the new outpost, which is located about 20 miles from the SAC’s Central Eastern Region Command headquarters at Kho Lam. Local villagers fear that this new military expansion will worsen the human rights situation in their area.
In the list of countrywide mining permits released by the SAC Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) in November 2021, there are five coal mining concessions in Nawng Hee tract of Namzarng, totalling 500 acres. All have been granted to Mandalay Distribution and Mining Company, a subsidiary of Ngwe Yi Pale.
According to local villagers, company representatives informed Namzarng township authorities last month that coal surveying would begin soon in Nawng Hee.
This is a source of great concern for local farmers, as the planned coal mining area is located on lands where they plant corn as their main source of income.
According to the SAC MONREC website, Ngwe Yi Pale is currently the largest producer of coal in northern Shan State, where its mines in Hsipaw, Tangyan and Mong Yai have caused serious damage to the environment, health and livelihoods of local communities.
Mandalay Distribution and Mining Company currently operates another coal mine in Lawksawk in southern Shan State..."
Source/publisher:
Shan Human Rights Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Armed conflict in Shan State - general articles, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
312.79 KB 322.72 KB 348.89 KB
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"Myanmar’s junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, whose regime has killed more than 1,700 civilians, has awarded himself two honorary titles which are traditionally given to those who make huge contributions to the country.
On Sunday, to mark Myanmar’s new year, the regime announced its honorary titles and medals for outstanding work for the country during the 75 years since independence.
Min Aung Hlaing gave himself the two highest titles — Sadoe Thiri Thudhamma and Sadoe Maha Thray Sithu.
The list was dominated by dictatorial figures.
Ne Win, the first military dictator who led the 1962 coup, was posthumously named Agga Maha Thray Sithu, the second-highest honor. Former military dictator Than Shwe, who picked Min Aung Hlaing as his successor as commander-in-chief, was given the same title.
Former president and general U Thein Sein was not mentioned as he already had the Agga Maha Thray Sithu.
Former brigadier general Kyaw Zaw, a central figure in the independence struggle and establishment of the armed forces, has previously only received a lower Thray Sithu honor. He was one of the 30 comrades who led the struggle against British colonial rule and the Kuomintang invasion.
Former prime ministers U Nu and U San Yu and the leader of the 1988 military reshuffle Senior General Saw Maung were awarded the Agga Maha Thiri Thudhamma and Agga Maha Thray Sithu on Sunday.
However, former military intelligence general Khin Nyunt, who was purged by Than Shwe in 2004 and now suffers from Alzheimer’s, was overlooked.
Former lieutenant generals Aye Ko and Tun Yi, who were Ne Win’s deputies, were both awarded the Maha Thray Sithu. Former vice-senior general Maung Aye, Than Shwe’s deputy, received no award on Sunday.
The current junta’s acting president, U Myint Swe, was awarded the Sadoe Thiri Thudhamma.
Late influential Buddhist monk Myaing Gyi Ngu Sayadaw U Thuzana, Karen National Union chairman Saw Mutu Say Poe, Restoration Council of Shan State leader Yawd Serk and some other leaders of ethnic armed groups were given Wunna Kyawhtin medals for their outstanding performances, which is normally given to leading artistic and literary figures.
U Hla Maung Shwe, a former adviser to the Myanmar Peace Center, was given the Wunna Kyawhtin medal. Many artists, including some from the colonial era, were given posthumous medals.
The regime also awarded honorary titles on March 27, Armed Forces Day, which marks the anniversary of armed resistance against Japanese occupation..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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"Today, the Peace Corps announced that the agency will close its post in Myanmar. Peace Corps Chief Executive Officer Carol Spahn issued the following statement in response:
“Due to continued instability, unrest and armed conflict created by the military coup in Myanmar, the Peace Corps is unable to plan for the safe return of Volunteers. After careful consideration, we will now begin the process of closing our Peace Corps/Myanmar post.
“We are grateful for the support of the Embassy in Yangon, the State Department and all of our partners. And, we are incredibly thankful for our staff and the people of Myanmar, especially those who joined us as we worked together towards our shared goals. Our work and the relationships will live on in the enduring bonds that have been formed in the name of world peace and friendship.
“While we are unable to send Volunteers back to Myanmar in the foreseeable future, we are hard at work sending Volunteers back to posts worldwide as health and safety conditions permit. We stand ready to reengage with Myanmar when the conditions would allow for a safe return.”
A total of 87 Volunteers served Myanmar communities to support English education, between the post opening in 2016 and the global evacuation in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
About the Peace Corps: The Peace Corps is an international service network of volunteers, community members, host country partners and staff who are driven by the agency’s mission of world peace and friendship. At the invitation of governments around the world, Peace Corps volunteers work alongside community members on locally-prioritized projects in the areas of education, health, environment, agriculture, community economic development and youth development. Through service, members of the Peace Corps network develop transferable skills and hone intercultural competencies that position them to be the next generation of global leaders. Since President John F. Kennedy established the Peace Corps in 1961, more than 240,000 Americans have served in 142 countries worldwide. For more information, visit peacecorps.gov and follow us on Facebook..."
Source/publisher:
Peace Corps (Washington, D.C.)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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"The Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government of the Republic
of the Union of Myanmar was established on 3 May 2021 under the leadership of Union
Minister U Aung Myo Min and Deputy Minister Khun Baham Htan.
Since its inception, the Ministry of Human Rights has implemented a series of
responsibilities, including:
• the investigation and documentation of alleged violations and abuses of
human rights, in support of accountability and in consultation with local and
international civil society
• human rights mainstreaming across National Unity Government (NUG) policies
and programs
• development and dissemination of human rights education materials, including
infographics, video clips and animations through social media
• engagement with United Nations forums, mechanisms, agencies and experts,
including the Human Rights Council and the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar.
Significantly, the Ministry of Human Rights partnered with relevant ministries in
developing the NUG's Policy Position on the Rohingya, the Military Code of Conduct
for People’s Resistance Forces, and the Policy for Protection of Women and Children
in Conflict.
The Ministry has also advocated for international recognition of the NUG, and
for concrete actions to starve the illegal military junta of cash and weapons including
through targeted economic sanctions and arms embargoes. Furthermore, the Ministry has supported the NUG’s engagement with the International Criminal Court and the
International Court of Justice in pursuit of accountability, including for atrocity crimes
directed against the Rohingya and other minorities.
The Ministry of Human Rights will continue to strengthen the NUG’s compliance
with its obligations under international human rights law and international
humanitarian law. Guided by the NUG’s leadership, the National Unity Consultative
Council and the Committee Representating Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, it will also advance
implementation of the Federal Democracy Charter, which commits to a Union founded
on rights, equality, peace and justice..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
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Size:
44.89 KB 149.91 KB
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"As the world’s eyes fall on Ukraine, a human rights catastrophe
continues to unfold in Burma/ Myanmar. Decades of impunity have
fueled a regime that knows no bounds when it comes to violence
in the pursuit of power. In its first broad human rights report since
the coup, the United Nations found the Burmese army has engaged
in systematic human rights violations, amounting to war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Civilians are not being caught in the
crossfire, they are being deliberately targeted by the Burmese army.
The US State Department’s determination that the Burmese army
committed crimes against humanity and genocide against the
Rohingya people in 2017 is welcomed, but long overdue. As each day
passes, the junta’s policy of systematic violence continues to cause
insurmountable suffering across the entire country, specifically in
ethnic regions. Over the February and March period, the junta’s violent
actions demonstrate its continued disregard for the life and dignity of
the people
During a raid of Pauk Township in the Magway Region on March 6, the
junta raped and killed a 42-year-old woman, Daw Aye Aye Win, and
then stabbed her three-year-old daughter to death. The junta troops
detained 29 villagers, including nine children to use as potential
human shields. Among the detainees was Daw Aye Aye Win’s 11-yearold daughter, who was found dead three days later.
The use of civilians as human shields is not an isolated incident, but
rather a systematic practice of the junta. In late February, the junta
detained 80 primary schoolchildren to use as human shields during
a raid in Sagaing Region’s Yinmabin Township. There are at least 85
reported incidents where the junta has forced individuals to perform
labour and act as human shields. This constitutes serious violations of
international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes.
Arson is a hallmark of the Burmese army’s operation, burning
townships, food stocks, essential provisions for displaced people,
and even their victims. As of March 3, 2022, the junta has torched at
least 6,158 civilian homes, mainly in Chin and Karenni/Kayah states
and Sagaing and Magway regions.
Injuries and death from landmines and other explosive remnants of
war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are increasing as the
number of displaced people move through conflict areas. In 2021, 88
civilians, including 19 women and 19 children, were killed and another
196 people, including 33 women and 55 children, were injured from
landmines and ERW.
The Burmese army continues to bomb civilian villages almost every
day, deliberately targeting civilians and Internally Displaced People
(IDP) camps. Many homes and livelihoods have been burned down or
destroyed, leaving thousands unable to go home. The number of IDPs
continues to increase at alarming rates. As of February 28, the number
of IDPs reached 519,500, this is up from 451,000 people since WLB’s
December-January 2022 update.
Access constraints and inadequate humanitarian aid funding have
prevented aid relief for millions of people across Burma/Myanmar. Crossborder assistance is the only way to reach people in need, and local
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are doing most of the heavy lifting,
by delivering food, water, shelters, health care, and sanitary packs for
women. An increase in international humanitarian relief is critical, as
food, clean water, and medical supplies are quickly running out. Women
have been disproportionately affected by the impact the coup has had
on the economy, which has left half of the population in poverty.
Across the country, frequent electricity power outages have tripled the
cost of alternative fuel sources, such as candles, coal, and firewood. The
cuts to electricity have significantly impacted the supply of water, forcing
people to return to old ways of manually pumping water. In an attempt
to curb dissent and pro-democracy organizing, the junta tripled the
corporate tax rate for mobile and internet providers which has doubled
the price of internet data. The disruption to essential services, coupled
with rising levels of poverty, has disproportionately impacted women, as
they struggle to provide for their families and face an increased risk of
domestic violence.
WLB members report that women are not just experiencing an increase
in domestic violence, but gender-based violence more broadly. On March
7, three men entered a clothing store in North Okkalarpa Township,
Yangon, and attacked a woman, binding her hands and mouth, and
holding a knife to her neck. On March 24 in Myitkyina, Kachin State
capital, a woman selling small pieces of iron and bottles was murdered
by a group of men when she refused to hand over her money.
Despite the Burmese army’s efforts to terrorize civilians by stripping
people of their homes, livelihoods, and safety, the resistance movement
continues to grow. Eleven days after losing their homes and seeing their
village burn down, women in Sagaing Region’s Pale Township have bravely
stood up to protest against the junta. Having lost everything, these women
are fighting with a rare determination and bravery that is at the core of the
women’s resistance movement..."
Source/publisher:
Women's League of Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
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Size:
932.56 KB
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
346.85 KB
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"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံတော်ယာယီသမ္မတ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ၊ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ဝင် ဝန်ကြီး၊ ဒုဝန်ကြီးများ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ ဖိတ်ကြားထားသော ဧည့်သည်တော်များအားလုံးကို မင်္ဂလာအပေါင်း ခညောင်း တဲ့ ပြည်သူ့အောင်ပွဲနှစ်သစ် ဖြစ်ပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာပထမ ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါတယ်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ကြီးများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ ကိုယ်စား တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်နှစ်တာ အောင်မြင်မှုများ၊ အခက်အခဲများနှင့် ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို တင်ပြခွင့်ရသည့်အတွက်လည်း များစွာကျေးဇူးတင်မိပါတယ်။
ကျွန်တော်တို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် အပိုင်း (၁) အရ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၁၆) ရက်နေ့တွင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့တာ ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် ယခုဆိုရင် တစ်နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တော်လှန်ရေးအစိုးရတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည့် အားလျော်စွာ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် သာမန်အစိုးရများနှင့်မတူ အခက်အခဲပေါင်းများစွာကို ပြည်သူနှင့်အတူ ရင်ဆိုင်ဖြတ်သန်းရင်း အောင်မြင်မှုတွေ ရရှိအောင်လည်း ကြိုးစားခဲ့ကြပါတယ်။ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရနှင့် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးဟာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အမျိုးမျိုးသော ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို အတူတကွရင်ဆိုင်ကြရင်း သာမန်အချိန်ကာလမျိုးမှာ မရရှိနိုင်တဲ့ အင်မတန်နီးကပ်တဲ့ စာနာမှု၊ နားလည်မှု၊ အားပေးကူညီ ဖေးမမှုတွေနဲ့ ဖြတ်သန်းခဲ့ကြတာ သမိုင်းမှတ်တမ်းဝင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် ဒီနေ့မှာတော့ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်မှုများကို အစီရင်ခံရင်း၊ အခက်အခဲများ၊ ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ကျနော်တို့အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အနေနှင့် စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ လူမှုရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးဟူ၍ တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်တိုင်ကြီး (၅) ခုသတ်မှတ်ပြီး လေးလေးနက်နက် စီမံ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိသည်များကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
ပထမဦးစွာ စစ်ရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စရပ်များကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အရေးအကြီးဆုံး အလှည့်အပြောင်းတစ်ခုလို့ ပြောလို့ရနိုင် သည့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် People Defence Force (PDF) ကို အစိုးရဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး တစ်လမပြည့်မီ မေလ (၅) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒများနှင့်အညီ စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်း တည်ထောင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ စစ်တပ်၏ရာစုနှစ် တစ်ခုနီးပါးအကြာမျှ အနိုင်ကျင့်ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို အကြမ်း မဖက်နည်းဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြရာမှ နောက်ဆုံးမဖြစ်မနေ မိမိကိုယ်ကိုယ် ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေး အတွက် ခုခံကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေးနည်းလမ်းကို ရွေးချယ်ခဲ့ကြခြင်းသာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တစ်နည်းအားဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှမှုတို့ကို အကြမ်းမဖက် နည်းလမ်းဖြင့် အေးချမ်းစွာ တောင်းဆိုနေသည့် ပြည်သူလူထုသည် စစ်တပ်၏ တဖက်သတ် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ကာကွယ်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြခြင်းသာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
ယခုအခါ တန်းတူညီမျှရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်အရေးနှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်နှင့် လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒ ဆန့်ကျင် ရေးတို့အတွက် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်လျက်ရှိကြသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသား အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အသစ်ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသည့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်များ လက်တွဲညီညီ ပူးပေါင်းနိုင်ကြပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဗဟိုကွပ်ကဲရေးနှင့် ပေါင်းစပ်ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Central Command and Coordination Committee) ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး စစ်ဒေသကြီး (၃) ခုဖွဲ့စည်းကာ လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုအသစ်များနှင့် ရှိနှင့်ပြီးတပ်မတော်များ ပူးပေါင်းကာ စစ်ဆင်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာများ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက် နေပါတယ်။ ထို့အတူ ပြည်သူ့ စစ်မဟာဗျူဟာတပ်ဖွဲ့များဖြစ်တဲ့ ပ.က.ဖ များကိုလည်း နိုင်ငံအဝှမ်းဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ အဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် အခြားရှိနှင့်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှု ဖြင့် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး၏ ၁၅ % ခန့်လွှမ်းမိုးထားနိုင်နေပြီ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး မဟာမိတ်များသည်လည်း နိုင်ငံ၏ ၃၀ % စိုးမိုးထားသဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေမှာ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး၏ တစ်ဝက်စွန်းစွန်းသာ ကျန်ရှိပါတယ်။ မိမိတို့၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများတွင် မဟာမိတ် များနှင့်အတူ မူဝါဒများချမှတ်ကာ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့များ ပ.အ.ဖ နှင့် ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့များ တိုးချဲ့ဖွဲ့စည်းလျက်ရှိပြီး ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်များ ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေး၊ တရားဥပဒေ စိုးမိုးရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို ကော်မတီများ စနစ်တကျဖွဲ့စည်းကာ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိနေပါတယ်။
အခက်အခဲများအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်အတွက် လက်နက်အပြည့်အစုံ တပ်ဆင်နိုင်ရေးမှာ စိန်ခေါ်မှုတစ်ရပ်အနေနဲ့ ရှိနေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် မြောက်များလှစွာ သော LDF များနှင့် စနစ်တကျချိတ်ဆက် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် စီမံတဲ့အခါမှာလည်း အခက်အခဲတွေကတော့ ရှိနေဆဲဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခက်အခဲတွေ စိန်ခေါ်မှုတွေကို ကျွန်တော်တို့အနေနဲ့ မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် တက်ညီလက်ညီ ပူးပေါင်းရင်း ကျော်ဖြတ်နေကြောင်း လည်း အသိပေးတင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
တစ်ဖက်မှာလည်း ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ကော်မတီကိုဖွဲ့စည်းကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များ လက်အောက်မှာ ဆက်လက်အမှုမထမ်းလို၊ ပြည်သူကို မသတ်ဖြတ်လိုတော့တဲ့ တပ်မတော်သားများ နှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များကိုလည်း ဘေးလွတ်ရာသို့ စီမံဆောင်ရွက်ပေးပြီး ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နေပါတယ်။ ယခုအခါ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံလာသူ (၁၀၀၀၀) နီးပါး ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သလို အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် အပြင်ထွက်မလာနိုင်ဘဲ အတွင်းထဲကနေ ချိတ်ဆက်တော်လှန်နေကြတဲ့ သူတွေလည်း များစွာရှိနေပြီး ၎င်းတို့ဆီကနေလည်း တန်ဖိုးရှိတဲ့ သတင်းအချက်အလက်တွေ ရရှိနေ ပါတယ်။ လက်ရှိအချိန်မှာလဲ ပြည်သူကိုသတ်ဖို့ စေလွှတ်ခံရတဲ့ တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့တွေဟာ အမှန်တရား ကို သိမြင်ပြီး နီးစပ်ရာတိုင်းရင်းသားနယ်မြေတွေ၊ PDF တပ်စခန်းတွေမှာ လက်နက်ချခိုလှုံတဲ့ အဖြစ်အပျက်တွေလည်း များစွာပေါ်ပေါက်နေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
ဒုတိယ ထောက်တိုင်ကြီးတစ်ခုဖြစ်တဲ့ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ရေးကဏ္ဍများကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။ ဒီကဏ္ဍဟာ မိမိတို့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်မှု အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာမှ အသိအမှတ်ပြု ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှုများ ရရှိရေးအတွက် အသက်သွေးကြော တမျှ အရေးကြီးပါတယ်။ အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအများစု၏ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုကို တရားဝင်ရရှိခြင်းမရှိသေးပါ။ မိမိတို့အောင်မြင်မှုအနေဖြင့် NUG အစိုးရကို ကိုယ်စားပြုလျက်ရှိသည့် ယခင် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရ၏ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်သည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား ဆက်လက်ကိုယ်စားပြုခွင့်ကို ရရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အလားတူ ဥရောပပါလီမန်၊ ပြင်သစ်ပါလီမန်တို့မှ NUG အစိုးရကို တရားဝင် အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်း ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပြီး သက်ဆိုင်ရာအစိုးရအဖွဲ့များအနေနဲ့လည်း NUG အား တစ်ခုတည်းသော အစိုးရ အဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုရန် တိုက်တွန်းခဲ့ကြသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၇) နိုင်ငံတွင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိကာ ကျန်နိုင်ငံများတွင်လည်း ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိနိုင်ရေး ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်လည်း အာဆီယံဆိုင်ရာကိုယ်စားလှယ်ကို ထားရှိဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှု အပါအဝင် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအားလုံးကို နိုင်ငံတကာမှ အရေးယူနိုင်ရေးအတွက်လည်း ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်အတူ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ အခြား ဆက်စပ်လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကြီးများဖြစ်တဲ့ စစ်ကောင်စီကို စီးပွားရေး ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူနိုင်ရေး၊ ကိုဗစ်ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ ရယူနိုင်ရေး၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် လိုအပ်သည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေရှာဖွေရေးများကိုလည်း ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအကြား နီးကပ်စွာပူးပေါင်းချိတ်ဆက် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
အခက်အခဲများအနေဖြင့် ကမ္ဘာ့ရေးရာများ အထူးသဖြင့် ယူကရိန်းစစ်ပွဲ၏ ရိုက်ခက်မှုများ ကြောင့် အရှေ့နှင့်အနောက်နိုင်ငံများ အားပြိုင်မှုများအကြားတွင် မြန်မာ့တော်လှန်ရေးအပေါ် အာရုံစိုက်မှုများ လျော့နည်းလာသည်ကို တွေ့ကြုံနေရပါတယ်။ စစ်ကောင်စီကို နိုင်ငံတကာ ဆက်ဆံရေး ဖိအားပေးနိုင်ရေးများ ဆောင်ရွက်ရာမှာ ယခင်ထက်ပိုမို ခက်ခဲလာသည့်အတွက် အခွင့်အလမ်းများကိုလည်း စေ့စပ်သေချာစွာ ရှာဖွေလုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည်ကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
တော်လှန်ရေး၏ တတိယထောက်တိုင်ကြီး တစ်ခုဖြစ်တဲ့ စီးပွားရေး၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ပြန်လည် ထူထောင်ရေးကဏ္ဍကို ဆက်လက်တင်ပြခွင့်ပြုစေလိုပါတယ်။ စီးပွားရေးကဏ္ဍဟာလည်း ပြည်သူလူထု၏ တခဲနက် ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီ ထောက်ပံ့မှုကြောင့် အောင်မြင်မှုများရရှိနေတဲ့ ကဏ္ဍ တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စစ်ကောင်စီကို စီးဝင်နေသည့် ဝင်ငွေရပေါက်ရလမ်းများကို ဖြတ်တောက် နိုင်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ရရှိရေးတို့အတွက် မူဝါဒများ၊ လုပ်ငန်းများ ချမှတ်ကာ စီးပွားရေးနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများနှင့်အတူ စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်မှု ကော်မတီများမှလည်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
ပထမဦးစွာ စစ်တပ်နှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည့် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ၊ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များကို ဥရောပ သမဂ္ဂနှင့် အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံတို့မှ အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့စေခဲ့ပါတယ်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဓိက ဝင်ငွေရပေါက် ရလမ်းဖြစ်တဲ့ ရေနံနှင့် သဘာဝဓါတ်ငွေ့မှ ရရှိနေသည့် ဝင်ငွေများ မရရှိနိုင်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး Total နှင့် Chevron ရေနံကုမ္ပဏီကြီးများ စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် အဆက်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပါတယ်။ အလားတူ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ပြည်တွင်းရှိ ဆက်သွယ်ရေး၊ လူသုံးကုန်နှင့် ဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများကို အသုံးမပြုစေ ခြင်းဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်မှုဖြင့် ထိုးနှက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အခွန်၊ မီတာခများ မပေးဆောင်ရေးနှင့် စစ်တပ်ထုတ်ကုန်များ သပိတ်မှောက်ရေး တို့ကိုလည်း အားသွန် ခွန်စိုက်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ မိမိတို့၏ စီးပွားရေးဖိအားပေးမှုသာမက စစ်ကောင်စီကိုယ်တိုင်၏ စီးပွားရေးမူဝါဒအမှားများကြောင့် ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်း၊ မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေနှင့် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေလည်ပတ်မှု များနှင့် ကုန်သွယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ ထိခိုက်လျက်ရှိရာ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအခြေအနေမှာ များစွာချိနဲ့ နေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
ပြည်သူလူထု၏ တော်လှန်ရေးအပေါ် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ဖြင့် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများကြောင့် နွေဦးထီမှစ၍ ငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်များ ရောင်းချခြင်းအပါအဝင် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများမှ အခွန်ငွေများ ပေးဆောင်ခြင်းကြောင့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ဒေါ်လာသန်းချီ၍ တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ရရှိအသုံးပြုနိုင်ခဲ့ပါ တယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေဖြစ်သည့် အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံတွင် ထားရှိသည့် အရံဘဏ္ဍာငွေ ဒေါ်လာ (၁) ဘီလျံကို ပြည်သူလူထုအတွက် အသုံးပြုနိုင်ရေးကိုလည်း အားစိုက် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါတယ်။
မူဝါဒများအနေဖြင့်လည်း တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိသော ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှု များကို လမ်းညွှန်ပေးခြင်းများ၊ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများ ရုတ်သိမ်းခြင်းဆိုင်ရာမူဝါဒများ၊ ပြည်သူပိုင်မြေများ တပ်မှသိမ်းယူထားမှုများကို ပြန်လည်ရယူခြင်းဆိုင်ရာမူဝါဒများ စသည်ဖြင့် ချမှတ် အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် ပြည်တွင်းမှ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာအကူအညီများရယူရာတွင် တာဝန်ခံမှု၊ ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာမှု ရှိစေရန် ဘဏ္ဍာရေးဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒ များကိုလည်း ချမှတ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေ များတွင်လည်း အခွန်ကောက်ခံမှုများ စနစ်တကျ ဖြစ်စေရန်ဆောက်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
အခက်အခဲများအနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီကို ယခုထက် ပိုမို ကြပ်တည်းစေရန်ဆောင်ရွက်ရာမှာ နိုင်ငံတကာ၏ အကူအညီများ ဆက်လက်လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ စနစ်တကျဖြစ်စေရေး၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ထိရောက်စွာ အသုံးပြုနိုင်ရေး၊ CDM ၊ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူများ ထောက်ပံ့နိုင်ရေးတို့အတွက် အကူအညီများ များစွာ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသေးတယ်။
နောက်ထပ်စတုတ္ထထောက်တိုင်ကြီး တစ်ခုဖြစ်တဲ့ လူမှုရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်း များနှင့် လူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများကဏ္ဍကို ဆက်လက် အစီရင်ခံပါရစေ။ မိမိတို့မှာ ပြည်သူ့ အစိုးရဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ ပြည်သူနှင့်အတူ ဒုက္ခဆင်းရဲများကို အတူတကွခံစားရုံတင်မကဘဲ ပြည်သူ အားကူညီဖေးမရန်လည်း ကြီးမားသည့် တာဝန်တစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် ခံယူထားပါတယ်။ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူများ၊ နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာရသူများ၊ CDM များ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများနှင့် စစ်ကောင်စီကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ကျဆုံးရသည့် မိသားစုများကို အခက်အခဲများကြားကပင် ကျပ်ငွေ ၂.၇၆ ဘီလျံ ထောက်ပံ့နိုင် ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုအနေနဲ့လည်း Covid-19 ကပ်ရောဂါကာကွယ်ရေး အပါအဝင် အခြေခံကျန်းမာရေးကိစ္စရပ်များကို လွတ်မြောက်နယ်မြေများတွင် မဟာမိတ် EHO များနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေး မူဝါဒများ ရေးဆွဲခြင်း၊ WHO ၊ အခြား နိုင်ငံတကာ INGO နှင့် ပြည်တွင်း NGO များ၊ CSO များ၊ EHO များနှင့်ပူးပေါင်း ချိတ်ဆက်ကာ နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများ ပေးနိုင်ရေး၊ ဆေးဝါးနှင့် ဆေးပစ္စည်းများ ထောက်ပံ့နိုင်ရေးတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
ပညာရေးအနေဖြင့်လည်း Online မှ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် လုပ်ဆောင်ပေးမှုများအပြင် ယခုအခါ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်ထားနိုင်တဲ့ ဒေသများတွင် မြေပြင်အထိ သင်ကြားရေး လုပ်ငန်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်နေနိုင်ပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
ပဉ္စမ ထောက်တိုင်ကြီးဖြစ်တဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကဏ္ဍကို အရေးအကြီးဆုံး တစ်ခုအနေနှင့် တင်ပြခွင့်ပြုပါ။ နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍမှာ အဓိကလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အားဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီကို ဖြုတ်ချနိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ထောင်ရေးဟူ၍ ချမှတ် ထားပါတယ်။ လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အားဖြင့် နှစ်ခုပင်ဖြစ်သော်လည်း အသေးစိတ်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်များမှာ အင်မတန်မှ အရေးကြီးပြီး ကျယ်ပြန့်တဲ့လုပ်ငန်းများဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့အနေနဲ့ ယခုလက်ရှိ တွင်လည်း အထက်ဖော်ပြပါ စစ်ရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများပေးရေးများ အားလုံးကို မဟာမိတ်များ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားအဖွဲ့အစည်းနှင့်အတူ နိုင်ငံရေး သဘောတူညီမှုများဖြင့် နက်နက်ရှိုင်းရှိုင်း ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး စတင်ပြီး ယခု တစ်နှစ်ကျော်လာသည့်တိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးအရှိန်အဟုန် အားကောင်း နေခြင်းမှာလည်း နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍအောင်မြင်မှု၏ ပြယုဂ်ကြီးပင် ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍတွင် ပြည်သူလူထုသည် ပါဝင်မှု မျှသာမဟုတ်ဘဲ ၎င်းတို့၏ ဦးဆောင်မှု၊ အားပေးမှုတို့ကြောင့်သာ မိမိတို့အစိုးရ အပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု အားလုံးတို့ဟာ အင်အား အပြည့်နဲ့ ရှေ့ဆက်နိုင်ကြတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများမှ ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ် များ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ သပိတ်ကော်မတီများ၊ လူထုအခြေပြုအဖွဲ့များ၊ လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ ပါတီများနှင့် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ အားလုံးပါဝင်သော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး NUCC ၏ ညှိနှိုင်း ဆွေးနွေးသဘောတူညီမှုဖြင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ချာတာအရ မိမိတို့အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရကို ဖွဲ့စည်း ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ထိုအချိန်မှစ၍ မိမိတို့ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် NUCC နှင့် CRPH တို့၏ ထိန်းကျောင်းမှု များနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးဆွေးနွေးမှုများ သဘောတူညီမှုများ ရရှိရေးတို့ကို အားလုံးသော အင်အားစုများနှင့် အတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။
အဆိုပါ စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု အင်အားမှ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာတဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးသဘောတူညီမှုများနှင့် စစ်ရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးနှင့် လူထုဝန်ဆောင်မှုများကို မဟာမိတ်များအားလုံးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်လာတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ NUG အနေဖြင့် ပြည်တွင်းတွင် မဟာမိတ်များနှင့် ယုံကြည်မှု များကို တစ်နေ့တခြား ပိုမိုတည်ဆောက်နိုင်လာနေပြီဖြစ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုများ ရရှိနိုင်ရန် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးစား ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
ထို့အတူ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ပြုတ်ကျရေးသာမက မည်သည့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မျိုးမှ မပေါ်ပေါက် စေရေး၊ စစ်မှန်၍ ခွင့်တူညီမျှသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရေးအတွက်တို့လည်း အားထုတ်ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
တက်ရောက်လာကြသော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံတော်ယာယီသမ္မတနှင့် အစိုးရ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များနှင့် ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီး များခင်ဗျာ...
ကျွန်တော်တို့ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရဟာ တိုးတောင်းလှတဲ့ တစ်နှစ်အတွင်းမှာ အသက်အန္တရာယ် ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုများနှင့် အခက်အခဲပေါင်းစုံကြားမှပင် သမိုင်းတွင်မည့် တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ရပ်ကို ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စား ပါဝင်ဦးဆောင်ခွင့်ရနေတာ အင်မတန်မှ ဂုဏ်ယူစရာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ယခုအချိန်မှာ ဆိုလျှင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအချင်းချင်းသာမက အစိုးရနှင့် ပြည်သူများအကြား အပြန်အလှန် နားလည်စာနာမှုဟာ အမြင့်ဆုံးအခြေအနေမှာရှိနေပါတယ်။ တစ်ဖက်မှာလည်း တော်လှန်ရေးအစိုးရ ဖြစ်သည့်အားလျော်စွာ မိမိတို့အစိုးရ၏ မူဝါဒများ၊ လုပ်ငန်းများ၊ ဦးစားပေးမှုများဟာ သာမန် အချိန်မှာလိုမဟုတ်ဘဲ ကြီးမားတဲ့ အကျိုးဆက်များ ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် မိမိတို့အနေနှင့် ကိစ္စရပ်တိုင်းကို အဖက်ဖက်မှ အပြန်ပြန်အလှန်လှန် ဆွေးနွေးသုံးသပ်ကာ မူဝါဒနှင့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ ချမှတ်လျက်ရှိကြောင်းကို အသိပေးတင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
မိမိတို့အစိုးရအပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများဟာ အချိန်ကြာလာသော်လည်း အားပျော့သွားခြင်းမရှိဘဲ အင်တိုက်အားတိုက် ဆက်လက်မောင်းနှင်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ စစ်အာဏာရှင် ပြုတ်ကျရေး သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ဟာလည်း တစ်နေ့ထက်တစ်နေ့ ပိုမိုအားကောင်းလျက် ရှိပါတယ်။ ထို့အတူ တပ်မတော်တစ်ခုရဲ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာကို စွန့်ပယ်ကာ အာဏာရှင်တွေရဲ့ လက်ပါးစေ ဖြစ်နေတဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီဟာလည်း တစ်နေ့တခြား အင်အားနည်းပါးလာပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် မိမိတို့ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဟာ ယခုနှစ် နှစ်သစ်မှစ၍ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်အတွင်းတွင် တော်လှန်ရေး၏ ကြီးမားတဲ့အချိုးအကွေ့ အောင်မြင်မှုတစ်ခုကို မလွဲမသွေ ရောက်ရှိလာတော့မှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့်လည်း အစိုးရအနေနှင့် ယခင်ထက်ပိုမိုအားစိုက်ပြီး ကြုံလာမယ့် အခွင့်အလမ်း ကောင်းများကို အမိအရဆုပ်ကိုင်ကာ အခက်အခဲများကို ပြည်သူနှင့်အတူ ကျော်လွှားသွားကြဖို့ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရရဲ့ တစ်နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည့် အားနည်းချက် အားသာချက်များကို စေ့စပ်သေချာစွာသုံးသပ်ကာ ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမှာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဟာ သမိုင်းတစ်လျှောက် တော်လှန်ရေးများနှင့် မတူတဲ့ ထူးခြားတဲ့ သမိုင်းဝင်တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ပြုတ်ကျရေးသာမကဘဲ ပြည်သူ တစ်ရပ်လုံးက နိုင်ငံသားအချင်းချင်း လူမျိုးဘာသာမရွေး စာနာနားလည်နေကြပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ် ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ထောင်ရန် အချိန်အခါ ရင့်မှည့်နေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒီအချက်ကို အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီကလည်း သိရှိပြီးဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် အိမ်နီးချင်းများက မည်သို့ပင် စောင့်ကြည့်နေစေကာမူ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို အတိုင်းအဆမရှိ လူမဆန်စွာ ကျူးလွန်နေတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ၎င်းတို့အနေနှင့် ပြန်လမ်းမရှိသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းကြောင်းကို ရွေးချယ်ကာ ပြည်သူ လူထု၏ ၎င်းတို့အပေါ်ဖြစ်တည်နေသည့် အမုန်းတရားများကို အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ၊အကြောက်တရား တို့နှင့် ဖိနှိပ်ရန်သာ ထွက်ပေါက်ရှာနေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထုကိုပါ အသိပေးလိုတာ က စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဆတိုးအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများဟာ ကျနော်တို့ အားလုံးကို အပြင်းအထန် ထိခိုက် နေပေမယ့်လည်း ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုင်းဟာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့ကိုယ်တိုင် ၎င်းတို့ အသက်ရှင် ရပ်တည်ရေး ထောက်တိုင်များကို တစ်ခုချင်း ဖြိုချနေကြတာဖြစ်ပြီး အဆုံးမှာ မလွဲမသွေ ပြိုကျ ပျက်စီးသွားမှာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
အရေးအကြီးဆုံးအချက်မှာ ယခု သမိုင်းတွင်မယ့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဟာ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အဓိက ပါဝင်ဦးဆောင်မှုဖြင့် ရှင်သန်အားကောင်းနေတာ ဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် မိမိတို့အစိုးရအနေနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒများကို ထင်ဟပ်နိုင်ရေးကို အလေးပေးကာ ပြည်သူ၏ ထိန်းကျောင်းမှုကိုလည်း အပြည့်အဝခံယူလျက်ရှိပါကြောင်း အသိပေးရင်း နိဂုံးချုပ်အပ်ပါတယ်။
“အရေးတော်ပုံ မုချအောင်မြင်နေပါပြီ”..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Source/publisher:
Women's League of Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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182.82 KB
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Description:
"Message from the Karenni National Defense Force on the occasion of the BPLA 1st Anniversary Day..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Nationalities Defense Force
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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125.75 KB
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Description:
"Congratulatory message from the three fraternal allies on the occasion of BPLA Anniversary Day..."
Source/publisher:
The Three Brotherhood Alliance
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Format :
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199.13 KB
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Format :
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378.3 KB
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"၁။ နှစ်ဟောင်းကုန်၍ နှစ်သစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းသော အချိန်ကာလတွင် မကောင်းသော အညစ်အကြေးများအား ဆေးကြောကြသည့် အယူအဆနှင့် သင်္ကြန်ရေပက်ဖြန်း၍ ရေသဘင်ပွဲ ကျင်းပသည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် မြန်မာတို့၏နှစ်သစ်ကူးနေ့တွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအားလုံး ကျန်းမာသောကိုယ် ရွှင်လန်းသောစိတ်နှလုံးဖြင့် ဘေးအပေါင်းကင်းဝေးပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်း မေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ "သင်္ကြန်"ဟူသော ဝေါဟာရသည် ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းဟု အနက်အဓိပ္ပာယ်ရသည်နှင့်အညီ မြန်မာလူမျိုးတို့သည် မြန်မာနှစ်တစ်နှစ် ကုန်ဆုံးကာ နှစ်သစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းသောကာလတွင် သင်္ကြန်ရေဖြင့် နှစ်ဟောင်း၏အညစ်အကြေးများကို ဆေးကြောသန့်စင်စေရန် အတာရေ သဘင်ပွဲတော်ကို ကျင်းပကြကာ အေးချမ်းစွာ နှစ်သစ်ကို ကြိုဆိုလေ့ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် သင်္ကြန်ပွဲတော်သည် အစည်ကားဆုံးနှင့် အခမ်းနားဆုံး နှစ်သစ်ကူးပွဲ တော်တစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့၏ဘဝများကို ဖျက်ဆီးကာ အကျည်းတန်ရုပ်ဆိုးစေသည့် ယခုကဲ့သို့အချိန်ကာလတွင် ၎င်းတို့ကိုယ်တိုင် နိုင်ငံတကာသို့ နိုင်ငံတော်သည် အေးချမ်းနေသယောင် လိမ်လည်ပြသရန် ကြိုးစား၍ ရေသဘင် ပွဲတော် အခမ်းအနားများ ပြုလုပ်ကျင်းပရာ ပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးသည် ပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲခြင်း မရှိဘဲ တော်လှန်သင်္ကြန် ရေမစို သင်္ကြန် အဖြစ်သာ တသားတည်း ရပ်တည်ကြသည့်အတွက် အထူးပင် ဝမ်းသာဂုဏ်ယူမိပါသည်။
၄။ ပြည်သူလူထုသည် အခက်အခဲပေါင်းစုံကို တွေ့ကြုံခံစားကြရပြီး အသက်ကိုပင် ပဓာနမထားဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို တိုက်ဖျက်ရင်း နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး တိုက်ပွဲအား ဆင်နွှဲလာခဲ့သည်မှာ တစ်နှစ်ကျော်ကာလသို့ ရောက်ရှိလာပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အရှိန်ကောင်းလာသော တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးနှင့်အတူ ကျရာအခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ပေးအပ်သောတာဝန်ကို ကျေပွန်အောင် ထမ်းရွက်နေကြသော ပြည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်ချင်းစီ၏ ပြင်းပြသော ဆန္ဒ၊ ဇွဲ၊ သတ္တိတို့သည် သမိုင်းတွင် ထင်ကျန်နေမည့် ပုံရိပ်ကောင်းများ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ လွှတ်တော်နှင့်ပြည်သူ တသားတည်းဖြစ်ကာ အစိုးရတစ်ရပ်အား ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ခဲ့ ကြပြီး ရရှိထားသည့် အခြေအနေများပေါ်တွင် အကောင်းဆုံး ကြိုးစားရုန်းကန်၍ ပြည်တွင်းမှ သာမက နိုင်ငံတကာမှ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ကူညီမှုများကိုလည်း ကြိုဆိုလက်ခံပြီး ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၆။ တွေ့ကြုံခဲ့ကြရသော နှစ်ဟောင်း၏ ဘေးအန္တရာယ်များ၊ အခက်အခဲများ၊ စိန်ခေါ်မှုများကို ရင်ဆိုင်ကျော်လွှားကြကာ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် မြန်မာနှစ်သစ်ကူးနေ့တွင် တော်လှန်သင်္ကြန်မှသည် အောင်ပွဲဆီသို့ တက်ညီလက်ညီ အရောက်သွားရင်း မိဘပြည်သူများ အားလုံး ဆန္ဒရှိသော မျှော်မှန်းထားသည့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို အားအင်သစ်များဖြင့် ကြိုးစားတည်ဆောက်ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Social and Cultural History
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"ဗမာပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်တော်(BPLA) တည်ထောင်မှု တစ်နှစ်ပြည့် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့ကို အခုလို သဝဏ်လွှာပါးခွင့်ရတဲ့အတွက် အထူးဂုဏ်ယူကြောင်း ပြောလိုတယ်။
ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်အမြစ်ဖြတ်ဖို့ ပြတ်သားတဲ့ သန္နိဌာန်နဲ့တပ်တစ်ခု တည်ထောင်ခဲ့ကြတဲ့ နွေဦးမျိုးဆက်တွေရဲ့ စွမ်းပကားကိုလည်း ဂုဏ်ပြုလိုတယ်။
ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များ ဖွဲ့စည်းထူထောင်တဲ့နေရာမှာ လေ့ကျင့်မှုအပါအဝင်လိုအပ်တဲ့ ကူညီရိုင်းပင်းမှုများ ပြုခဲ့ကြတဲ့ ညီနောင်မဟာမိတ်တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ အားလုံးရဲ့ ကျေးဇူးကိုလည်း ကျွန်တော်တို့ မမေ့မလျော့ ရှိရမှာဖြစ်တယ်။
ဒီနေ့တိုင်းပြည်ရဲ့လိုအပ်ချက်၊ ပြည်သူရဲ့တောင်းဆိုချက်က ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်တစ်ရပ်နဲ့တပ်မတော်သစ် တစ်ခု တည်ထောင်ဖို့ ဖြစ်တယ်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ဟာ စစ်မှန်တဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်အပေါ်မှာ အခြေပြုတယ်။ တပ်မတော်သစ်ကတော့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ကို လက်ခံယုံကြည်ပြီး ပြည်ထောင်စုသားတိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးပါဝင်တဲ့ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုကို အမှန်တကယ်ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်နိုင်စွမ်းရှိတဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု တပ်မတော်ပဲ ဖြစ်တယ်။
တစ်နှစ်ပြည့် BPLA အနေနဲ့ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးတိုက်ပွဲမှာ ညီနောင်မဟာမိတ် ရဲဘော်များ၊ ညီနောင် PDF ရဲဘော်များနဲ့လက်တွဲပြီး အရှိန်မြှင့်ဆင်နွှဲလိမ့်မယ်လို့ ယုံကြည်သလို တချိန်မှာ ဖက်ဒရယ် ပြည်ထောင်စု တပ်မတော်ရဲ့ အရေးကြီးတဲ့ အစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်လာဖို့လည်း မျှော်လင့် တယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
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"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Burma’s military overthrew the democratically elected civilian government via a coup d’etat on February 1, declaring a state of emergency and transferring all executive, legislative, and judicial authorities to the State Administration Council, an authoritarian military-run administrative organization led by armed forces commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing. The military detained key elected civilian leaders and dissolved all national and subnational legislatures, including the Union Parliament, forcing many elected members to flee their homes and offices or face potential arrest. On February 5, elected parliamentarians from the National League for Democracy and allied political parties formed the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, which subsequently declared the regime “illegitimate” and the 2008 constitution abolished before proclaiming a “National Unity Government” on April 16.
The Myanmar Police Force is primarily responsible for internal security. The Border Guard Police is administratively part of the Myanmar Police Force but operationally distinct. Both fall under the regime’s Ministry of Home Affairs, led by an active-duty military general and itself subordinate to the military command. The armed forces under the Ministry of Defense are responsible for external security but are engaged almost exclusively in internal activities, including combat against ethnic armed groups. Members of the regime security forces continued to commit numerous gross violations of human rights.
Regime security forces arrested State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other leading members of the civilian government and National League for Democracy on February 1. Nationwide prodemocracy protests following the coup and the Civil Disobedience Movement, continuing as of November, opposed and disrupted efforts by the regime to exert full administrative control over governing institutions. The regime responded with repressive tactics such as the mass arrest of its political opponents and the use of widespread lethal violence against unarmed persons, including men, women, and children. Fighting between the military and ethnic armed organizations escalated, and the National Unity Government announced on April 16 that it would establish armed People’s Defense Force groups that would cooperate with various ethnic armed organizations.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment by the regime; gender-based violence by the regime; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated reprisals against individuals in another country; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, and torture and physical abuses or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association; particularly severe restrictions on religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement; the inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats targeting members of national and ethnic minority groups; the existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although those laws were rarely enforced; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association, including violence and threats against labor activists; and the use of forced and child labor, including the worst forms of child labor.
There continued to be almost complete impunity for abuses by the regime security forces. There was no credible information that the regime took actions to prosecute or punish officials responsible for human rights abuses or corruption.
Some ethnic armed organizations and Peoples Defense Force groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse and degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person
A. ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE AND OTHER UNLAWFUL OR POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS
There were numerous reports that regime security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings of civilians, prisoners, and other persons in their power. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which noted that the actual number was likely to be much higher, there were 1,300 verified reports of persons killed by the regime as of November 22. Some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and Peoples Defense Force (PDF) groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse and degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones (see also section 1.g.). Examples include the following.
On February 9, Mya Thwate Khaing was shot in the head by police while peacefully protesting the military coup in the capital, Nay Pyi Taw. She was taken to the hospital but died of her injuries several days later. Her death was widely considered the first fatality in the protest movement that began on February 2.
On February 28, regime security forces killed as many as 26 persons in eight cities and injured scores during a day of massive nationwide demonstrations against the regime. According to multiple media reports, eyewitnesses accounts, and documentary evidence, police arrested hundreds and used tear gas, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, and live rounds in confronting demonstrators.
On March 11, regime security forces shot and killed at least 11 persons in five cities according to multiple media reports, eyewitness accounts, and photographic evidence. Regime security forces used live rounds against unarmed demonstrators in addition to the use of tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets.
On March 27, a national holiday known as Armed Forces Day, regime security forces killed more than 100, including 13 children, across the country according to media reports, eyewitness accounts, and social media posts. Regime security forces met demonstrations on March 28 with further violence, killing at least 22 more individuals.
According to media reports, in April regime security forces continued to kill demonstrators and other civilians, including, on April 9, at least 28 persons in Bago Region. The killing came as regime security forces confronted demonstrators and sought to clear residents’ makeshift barricades.
In May the Chin Human Rights Organization reported that the military cremated the bodies of two civilians who were allegedly tortured to death by regime security forces in Chin State’s capital Hakha.
In July local media reported the death of 40 civilians allegedly killed by the military in Sagaing’s Kani Township. According to a local resident who spoke with the news website Irrawaddy, “Junta troops raided our villages. We fled and found corpses when we came back to the villages.”
In July local media reported the rape and killing of a 55-year-old woman by three soldiers in Kachin State. The military acknowledged the incident after the family filed a complaint, but no action was known to have been taken against the alleged perpetrators.
In September local media reported the King Cobra civilian defense group killed an alleged regime informant in Sagaing Region. King Cobra claimed its members committed 26 other killings.
AAPP alleged that at least 100 political prisoners died due to torture inflicted by authorities between February 1 and September 9. Well-known poet Khet Thi, who wrote the line, “They shoot in the head, but they don’t know the revolution is in the heart,” was reportedly tortured to death by regime security forces. The 45-year-old was detained on May 8 and died the following day in transit to the hospital in Monywa, Magway Region.
B. DISAPPEARANCE
There were numerous reports of disappearances allegedly committed by the regime.
C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
The law prohibits torture; however, members of regime security forces reportedly tortured and otherwise abused suspects, prisoners, detainees, and others. Such incidents occurred, for example, during interrogations and were widely documented across the country. Alleged harsh interrogation techniques were designed to intimidate and disorient and included severe beatings and deprivation of food, water, and sleep. Other reported interrogation methods described in news reports included rubbing salt into wounds and depriving individuals of oxygen until they passed out.
A 19-year-old prodemocracy supporter told local media that on April 9, he was taken to a military compound on the outskirts of Bago Township, Bago Region where “the commander tied my hands from the back and used small scissors to cut my ears, the tip of my nose, my neck and my throat.”
In April media reported regime forces struck Wai Moe Naing, a high-profile Muslim protest leader and a Muslim, with an unmarked vehicle during a motorbike demonstration in Monywa.
Transgender writer Han Nwe Oo shared on social media that while in detention she was ridiculed for being transgender, sexually assaulted, and faced “atrocious” interrogation for two days at a military camp inside Mandalay Palace, Mandalay Region in September.
According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women in custody were subjected to sexual assault, gender-based violence, and verbal abuse. Police in some cases verbally abused women who reported rape. Women who reported sexual assault faced further abuse by police and the possibility of being sued for impugning the dignity of the perpetrator. On July 19, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders noted “[w]omen human rights defenders are particularly at risk in remote rural areas and are often beaten and kicked before being sent to prison where they may face torture and sexual violence with no medical care provided.”
In one case in April, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that security force members severely beat and sexually assaulted a female detainee accused of involvement in small-scale bomb attacks against regime targets in Rangoon. Her injuries were so severe she struggled to eat or urinate. Her cellmate reported similar treatment.
Also in April, local media reported that a high school student from Rangoon was arrested with her mother and described how she was “touched by a police officer who told me he could kill me and make me disappear.”
In Rangoon a journalist detained in March told media he witnessed police burn a detained female journalist with cigarettes and threaten to rape her if she did not provide information on her involvement in prodemocracy activities.
Impunity for rights abuses was pervasive for security force leaders and members. There was no credible evidence that the regime took action to investigate incidents or punish alleged perpetrators of abuses or to include human rights training as part of its overall training of regime security forces. The regime routinely denied responsibility for atrocities. For example, in April local media reported that the regime issued a blanket denial of abuses during a meeting with the UN special envoy for Burma, rejecting her allegations as “one-sided,” while denying it had killed children, among other atrocities.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Conditions in prisons, labor camps, and military detention facilities were reportedly harsh and frequently life threatening due to overcrowding; degrading and abusive treatment; and inadequate access to medical care (including COVID-19 treatment) and basic needs, including food, shelter, and hygiene.
Physical Conditions: There were 48 known prisons and 50 known labor camps in 2020. Women and men were held separately. Some prisons held pretrial detainees together with convicted prisoners. Children were sometimes held in pretrial detention with adults. More than 20,000 inmates were serving court-mandated sentences in labor camps located across the country in 2020; data were not available for the reporting year. The Associated Press reported on October 28 that the military had transformed dozens of public facilities (e.g., community halls) into interrogation centers across the country after the coup.
Several reports document poor conditions within prison facilities, including inadequate sewage systems, insufficient – and often inedible – rations, and a lack of basic necessities. Overcrowding was reportedly a serious problem in many prisons and labor camps. According to AAPP, occupancy at Insein Prison, the country’s largest, was nearly three times its intended capacity prior to the military coup.
Medical care was inadequate, and this reportedly contributed to deaths in custody. Prisons failed to adopt measures to protect prisoners from COVID-19, and there were widespread reports of COVID-19 transmission, illness, and deaths among prisoners. Despite regular regime reporting at national and subnational levels on COVID-19 cases and deaths, the regime failed to make data available on the impact of COVID-19 in prisons. According to AAPP, COVID-19 vaccinations were limited only to high-profile prisoners. In addition to COVID-19, prisoners suffered from other health problems, including malaria, heart disease, high blood pressure, tuberculosis, skin diseases, and intestinal illnesses caused or exacerbated by unhygienic conditions and spoiled food. There were also numerous reports of political prisoners being denied medical services.
Former prisoners complained of poorly maintained physical structures that provided no protection from the elements and were infested with rodents, snakes, and molds.
Conditions for women were deplorable, with a lack of access to sufficient toilets and no privacy. Prison guards denied requests for sanitary products for menstruation and other basic hygiene products. After the coup, sexual violence, gender harassment, and humiliation by officials increased.
In September human rights watchdog Just Power reported that a prominent human rights activist suffered from deteriorating health conditions as a result of her “unjust arrest and detention.” According to the report, regime security forces denied her access to health services, including to medicines provided by her family.
Administration: Prisoners and detainees could sometimes submit complaints to judicial authorities prior to the coup, but there was no clear legal or administrative protection for this right. There is no credible evidence of prisoners and detainees submitting complaints after the coup. Some prisons prevented full adherence to religiously based codes of personal conduct, ostensibly due to space restrictions and security concerns.
In April local media reported that a journalist fasting in observance of Ramadan was accused of staging a hunger strike and sent to solitary confinement at Insein Prison.
Independent Monitoring: The Department of Corrections in the Ministry of Home Affairs operated the prisons and labor camp system.
The International Committee for the Red Cross had no access to prisons, labor camps, or military detention sites during the year. After March 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs under the deposed civilian government claimed it could not allow access because of COVID-19 prevention measures. After the coup, the military continued to deny access to all prisons and detention sites.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime did not have access to prisons or labor camps and on February 1, ended cooperative capacity-building programs with the Department of Corrections. The drug and crime office continued to provide limited COVID-19-related personal protective equipment and primary basic health care assistance (e.g., infection prevention and control supplies) directly to the prisons.
D. ARBITRARY ARREST OR DETENTION
The law does not prohibit arbitrary arrest. Persons held generally did not have the right to appeal the legality of their arrest or detention either administratively or before a court. The law allows authorities to order the detention without charge or trial of anyone they believe is performing or might perform any act that endangers the sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquility.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Incommunicado detention was common. Since the coup, the regime detained politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, and Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) members and refused to confirm their locations in violation of international law, according to HRW. In August AAPP reported that an estimated 5,000 individuals listed by the regime as “under detention” were in unknown locations, accounting for approximately 82 percent of arrests since the coup. Even when the whereabouts of prisoners was known, prisoners were regularly denied access to lawyers and family members.
After the coup, the military regime suspended aspects of privacy protection law to legalize arrests and private property searches without a warrant.
Authorities may hold suspects in pretrial detention for two weeks (with a possible two-week extension) before bringing them before a judge or informing them of their charges. The regime is not, however, obliged to respect this provision of the law. There is a functioning bail system, although the courts regularly denied bail to prodemocracy supporters. There were numerous reports that authorities did not inform family members or attorneys of arrests in a timely manner, did not disclose their location, and regularly denied family visitations.
Arbitrary Arrest: There were numerous reports of arbitrary arrest, including detention by the regime in unknown locations. Since the coup, regime security forces have made at least 8,000 arrests and more than 6,500 of those individuals remain in some form of detention.
In May, HRW reported the arrest of a lawyer defending a deposed local political leader after a court hearing in Nay Pyi Taw and the arrest of lawyer defending a political prisoner in Ayeyarwady Region. In June, HRW reported the arrest of a lawyer defending more than 120 political prisoners in Kachin State.
In July, UN human rights experts expressed concern about the arbitrary arrest of human rights defenders, citing credible information of such treatment of human rights defenders, including labor rights and student activists.
According to AAPP, among those the regime detained as of September were more than 175 family members of prodemocracy supporters, including 15 children. In August, for example, a family member delivering food and medicine to a political prisoner was detained at Insein Prison for six days. In September regime security forces reportedly arrested the wife and young child of a human rights activist to coerce his surrender. The activist was charged under terrorism legislation for supporting the CDM. His wife and child were missing as of December.
According to the independent news service Myanmar Now, a 14-year-old boy was detained in Taungtha Township, Mandalay Region in September by the regime to coerce his father, a former local National League for Democracy (NLD) leader, to turn himself in to police. The boy’s mother told a reporter, “They came for my husband and took the kid, saying they needed him to show them where dad was.…I keep waiting for his release. I don’t want anything else; I just want my son back.”
Pretrial Detention: Prior to the coup, judges and police sometimes colluded to extend detentions. According to the Independent Lawyers’ Association in 2020, arbitrary and lengthy pretrial detentions resulted from lengthy, complicated legal procedures and widespread corruption. These problems continued following the coup, worsened by the regime’s ability to detain persons indefinitely without trial. For those facing trial, detention prior to and during trials sometimes equaled or exceeded the sentence after conviction. The regime amended the legal aid law in May, removing the right to legal aid services during pretrial detention. Additional amendments limited legal aid for stateless persons, asylum seekers, foreigners, and migrant workers.
Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Although habeas corpus exists in national law, regime security forces violated this law by arresting and detaining individuals without following proper procedures. Arbitrary arrest or detention was drastically increased to suppress political dissent, according to AAPP and detainees had limited ability to meaningfully challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court due to its lack of judicial independence from the regime.
E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, a protection the regime has not respected. On February 4, the regime dismissed five NLD-appointed justices of the Supreme Court and replaced them with justices who support the regime. The remaining four justices, including the chief justice, were holdovers from the previous military junta.
In February the regime declared martial law in numerous townships across the country and transferred judicial (and executive) power to regional military commanders in several cities. In martial law courts, defendants have few or no rights, including access to legal counsel and the right of appeal (except in cases involving the death penalty, which may be appealed to armed forces commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing). The hearings are abbreviated, the verdict is reached within one or two sessions, and the sentences are typically the maximum penalties allowed. According to regime public announcements, by November, 61 cases were heard in martial law courts, with 280 defendants convicted and sentenced, including at least 80 defendants sentenced to death.
Judicial corruption was a significant problem. According to NGOs, officials at all levels received illegal payments at all stages of the legal process for purposes ranging from influencing routine matters to substantive decisions, such as fixing the outcome of a case.
Trial Procedures
Although no formal changes to trial procedures in civilian courts were made following the coup, the lack of judicial independence leaves much to the interpretation of the regime. The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial but also grants broad exceptions, effectively allowing the regime to violate these rights at will. While the right to counsel remains in the law, many defense lawyers were unwilling to handle prodemocracy cases due to fear for their personal safety. According to HRW, at least six lawyers handling political cases were arrested since the coup. Defendants do not enjoy a presumption of innocence or, even when the law provides for them, the rights to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them; to be present at their trial; to free interpretation; or to receive adequate representation. There is no right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Trial procedures were also affected by COVID-19 pandemic mitigation measures.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
The regime detained and arrested politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, religious activists, and CDM members. Political prisoners were not always held separately from the prison’s general population. Many political prisoners were held incommunicado.
Many former political prisoners were subject to surveillance and restrictions following their release, including the inability to secure identity or travel documents. AAPP estimated that there were more than 6,000 political prisoners as of year’s end.
Deposed state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested on February 1 and held in an unknown location. She faced 11 separate charges for a range of offenses running from interacting with a crowd during the COVID-19 pandemic to sedition. Her trial was closed to the public and the regime placed a gag order on her attorneys so that the attorneys could not communicate with the public about her case. On December 6, she was convicted of inciting unrest and violating COVID-19 restrictions and sentenced to four years in prison. Also arrested February 1, deposed president Win Myint, was tried on the same charges and also convicted and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Just hours after the news of guilty verdicts for Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint broke on December 6, state media announced that the regime had “reduced [their] sentences…by two years.” The regime announcement also highlighted that the two would remain detained in their unknown locations, in conditions reportedly equivalent to house arrest.
Amnesty: The regime included some political prisoners among the more than 23,000 inmates released to mark Union Day on February 12. The regime released all those who met set criteria (e.g., not charged under Section 505 of the penal code, which criminalizes disseminating information that could agitate or cause security forces or state officials to mutiny), with no specific leniency for political prisoners. According to some human rights activists, the regime used the general pardon order to make space available for more political prisoners.
Amnesty was also granted to several high-profile ethnic Rakhine politicians, including Aye Maung and writer Wai Hin Aung, sentenced to long jail sentences for high treason under the deposed NLD government. In September the regime also released controversial ultranationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu, charged with sedition by the deposed government for comments he made during a 2019 promilitary rally.
Politically Motivated Reprisal against Individuals Located Outside the Country
Bilateral Pressure: There were credible reports that the regime attempted to pressure the Thai government to impose stricter control on movement across the border with Burma to undermine the ability of prodemocracy supporters from organizations, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Committee Representing the Union Parliament that created it, to depart the country.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
The law allows complainants to use provisions of the penal code and laws of civil procedure to seek civil remedies for human rights abuses. Individuals and organizations may not appeal an adverse decision to regional human rights bodies but may make complaints to the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission. After the coup, the ability of complainants to raise human rights abuses through the judicial system or the commission was limited.
Property Seizure and Restitution
Under the 2008 Constitution the state owns all land, although there is a limited amount of freehold land, and the law allows for registration and sale of private land ownership rights. Most land is held in long-term lease, meaning that while the government still owns this leasehold, private parties may lease land on a long-term basis with a general expectation that the leasehold would automatically roll over upon its expiration. The law provides for compensation when the government acquires privately held land for a public purpose; however, the postcoup situation is unclear. The government may also declare land unused or “vacant” and assign it to foreign investors or designate it for other uses. There is no judicial review of land ownership or confiscation decisions; administrative bodies subject to regime control make final decisions on land use and registration. The law does not favor recognition of traditional land tenure systems (customary tenure). There were numerous reports that the regime used its authority to seize property of prodemocracy supporters.
In March the regime reportedly seized assets worth approximately $3.8 million from staff members of a foundation accused of financially supporting the CDM.
In September the regime Anti-Terrorism Central Committee released a public notice requiring landlords to provide a list of tenants to their ward administration offices or face confiscation of the property.
As of November 15, credible media reports indicated that the regime has seized approximately 70 properties owned by NLD officials. The regime’s amendment of three laws enabled the extrajudicial seizure of property owned by defendants. The regime has also seized properties belonging to members of the Committee Representing the Union Parliament and NUG or their families.
F. ARBITRARY OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE
The law protected privacy and the security of the home, but enforcement of these rights was limited after the coup. Unannounced nighttime household checks were common. The law does not protect the privacy of correspondence or other communications. The regime regularly monitored private electronic communications through online surveillance; there were numerous reports that the regime monitored prodemocracy supporters.
On March 1, the New York Times reported that the military employed invasive dual-use surveillance, hacking, and forensic technologies to monitor and target critics and protesters. Before the coup, the military built an “electronic warfare capability” and bought surveillance technology, including cell phone-hacking tools to monitor prodemocracy activists.
In July local news outlet Frontier Myanmar reported that the regime ordered mobile phone companies to install equipment to enable them to monitor calls, text messages, and locations of selected users, flagging each time they use words such as “protest” or “revolution.” Mention of these words may trigger heavier surveillance or be used as evidence against those being watched. The regime also monitored social media use, including data from visited websites, as well as conversations in public and private chat groups. According to the magazine Frontier Myanmar, this “cybersecurity team” was based inside the police’s Special Branch, a notorious surveillance department that heavily monitored suspected dissidents in the previous era of junta rule.
G. CONFLICT-RELATED ABUSES
After the coup, escalating conflict between the regime and joint EAOs-PDF groups focused on the northwest part of the country, with frequent fighting in Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Region. Conflict was also reported in Kachin, Kayah, and Karen States and in the Mandalay, Bago, and Tanintharyi Regions. Conflict between the military and the Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State declined following the coup because of a pre-coup de facto ceasefire. In March the regime removed the Arakan Army from its designated list of terrorist organizations; however, local media reported clashes between the AA and the military on November 9 after the military entered an AA-controlled area in the border area of Maungdaw Township.
Fighting between EAOs in Shan State continued.
Reports of killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, disregard for civilian life, sexual violence, and other abuses committed by regime security forces and some EAOs and PDF groups were common.
The NUG issued a code of conduct for PDF groups in June and included a call to respect human rights in its September 7 “people’s defensive war” declaration. No data was available to measure the impact of the NUG’s efforts to prevent human rights abuses by PDF groups.
Killings: Deliberate killings and deaths due to excessive or unjustified use of force by the regime were reported. For example:
On March 3, regime security forces killed at least 24 persons across the country in confrontations with peaceful demonstrators. In one Rangoon neighborhood alone, at least seven protesters died and 17 were critically wounded in a confrontation with regime security forces. Over the March 13-14 weekend, regime security forces shot and killed demonstrators indiscriminately across the country, killing at least 42.
In May a young mother in Magway’s Salin Township reportedly died from indiscriminate military fire during a raid. According to Myanmar Now, the raid was in response to prodemocracy graffiti.
In July, NUG-designated Minister for Human Rights Aung Myo Min reported that the military killed at least 32 civilians and displaced more than 6,000 residents from 13 villages in Sagaing’s Debeyin Township during intensified military operations targeting EAO and PDF strongholds.
In September the military was suspected of killing and mutilating five civilians in Magway’s Gangaw Township. According to the Irrawaddy, the victims were shot, and in some cases mutilated or showed signs of torture.
Also in September, the Irrawaddy reported on the killing of 18 civilians in Magway’s Yaw village perpetrated by the military. One resident recalled, “Most of them were shot in the head. Their heads were broken, and their brains spilled out like a ripe papaya that has fallen from a tree.” An 86-year-old resident was found tied up, with signs that he had been beaten to death.
In late September, according to a Radio Free Asia report, security forces responding to an attack by local defense forces in Thantlang, Chin State, shot and killed Baptist pastor Cung Biak Hum as he and others tried to extinguish fires the forces set. When his body was recovered, his ring finger was cut off and the wedding ring apparently stolen.
On December 5, regime security forces violently suppressed prodemocracy protesters in Rangoon. Tactics included, according to numerous reports, ramming a police vehicle directly into a crowd, killing five and injuring another 15. Escalating violence between the military and EAOs exposed many children to violence. AAPP reported in September that 61 children were killed in military-EAO conflicts.
Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: There were reports of such abuses by EAOs and PDF forces. In December Myanmar Now reported the targeting of alleged military informants and others seen as sympathetic to the regime. In June commanders of the Karen National Defense Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union, confirmed Karen National Defense Army soldiers killed 25 alleged military spies and detained 22 others for approximately one week near Waw Lay, Myawaddy Township, Karen State.
Child Soldiers: The military and some EAOs (Kachin Independence Army, AA, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Karen National Liberation Army, Shan State Army, and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) were listed in the UN secretary-general’s 2021 Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict as perpetrators of the unlawful recruitment and use of children. There were no data on PDF groups. Meaningful use of the National Complaint Mechanism, focused on the elimination of forced labor but which also prohibits the use and recruitment of child soldiers, was limited after the coup. There was no credible evidence that the regime or EAOs prosecuted offenders.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Other Conflict-related Abuse: According to numerous local media reports, UN counterparts, and NGOs the regime restricted the passage of relief supplies, including medical supplies, and access by international humanitarian organizations to conflict-affected areas including in Kachin, Chin, Kayah, Karen, Tanintharyi, and Shan States. HRW reported on December 13 that restrictions on humanitarian assistance imposed by the regime since the coup were creating a “nationwide humanitarian catastrophe.” The United Nations estimated that the number of persons needing assistance would go from one million before the coup to 14.4 million by 2022. On November 8, the United Nations stated, “access to many people in desperate need across the country remains extremely limited due to bureaucratic impediments put in place by the armed forces.” HRW further reported that the military has seized food deliveries meant for displaced populations and arrested individuals on “suspicion of supporting aid efforts.” Visas for aid workers have also been delayed or denied. UNICEF reported in October that “the need to procure travel authorization [from the regime] remains a major access impediment and a high constraint factor for the humanitarian partners’ capacity to reach people in need.”
The regime reportedly forced civilians to act as human shields, carry supplies, or serve in other support roles. In September the Karen National Union reported to a local media outlet that approximately 300 civilians, including a number of women and children, were forced by regime security forces to perform military support duties. In September, Democratic Voice Burma reported that more than 100 soldiers abducted five local residents to act as guides for regime security forces in Kachin State.
As of September, the World Health Organization reported 260 attacks on health-care workers since the coup, representing 39 percent of such attacks globally during the year. In a February case, a doctor was arrested in Rangoon for providing first aid to prodemocracy supporters who had been shot while peacefully protesting. In July the Irrawaddy reported that the regime arrested five volunteer doctors working on COVID-19 prevention activities after luring them to a house under false pretenses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties
A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA
The 2008 Constitution provides that “every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of expressing and publishing freely their convictions and opinions,” but it contains the broad and ambiguous caveat that exercise of these rights must “not be contrary to the laws enacted for national security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility, or public order and morality.” The postcoup regime led a full-scale crackdown on freedom of expression.
Freedom of Expression: Freedom of speech was severely limited. Those who spoke openly against the regime or in favor of the NLD, NUG, or democracy more broadly risked abuse and punishment by authorities. On September 4, poet and activist Maung Saungkha was convicted under Section 19 of this law after he placed a banner over a highway during a protest marking the one-year anniversary of restrictions on mobile internet communications in parts of Rakhine and Chin States. Maung Saungkha chose to pay a fine of 30,000 kyat ($22.50) rather than serve a 15-day prison sentence.
The regime used the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of the Citizens to allow authorities to review content on individuals’ cell phones at checkpoints and during neighborhood raids. The regime reportedly employed violence and targeted killings to silence critics in civil society. Violence against persons engaged in speech deemed antiregime was allegedly used by proregime ultranationalist Buddhist groups as well as security forces and included maiming, kidnapping, and torture. The regime intimidated many prodemocracy voices among the public who previously spoke openly about politically sensitive topics. (See also “Internet Freedom,” below.)
A prodemocracy activist in Rangoon said during a media interview that regime security forces beat him as authorities transported him to a local interrogation center in February. The next morning, he was unable to eat due to injuries he had sustained during his first night in detention. He reported being tortured for days and only released after signing a statement denying the use of torture by the regime.
Freedom of Expression for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Prior to the coup, independent media outlets were active and able to operate despite many official and unofficial restrictions, economic hardship, and an uncertain business environment. After the coup, analysts reported the closure of 71 media outlets, ranging from well-known national, regional, and ethnic media to small Facebook pages. Regime crackdowns on media resulted in the arrest, detention, loss of work, and forced exile of more than 1,000 journalists, editors, and media staff – approximately 50 percent of pre-coup total. For example, two Kamayut Media journalists were arrested in March, one was released on June 15 and the other remained in detention at year’s end. In Mandalay the regime arrested and subsequently released freelance journalists. Eleven media and the Voice Daily self-censored and avoided criticism of the regime. The Myanmar Times and Union Daily have ceased publication, and Irrawaddy, Frontier, and Myanmar Now operated mostly in exile from outside the country.
In May the regime banned satellite dishes to restrict access to international news. The regime offered three public television channels – two controlled by the Ministry of Information and one controlled by the military. Two private companies that had strong links to the previous military regime continued to broadcast six free-to-air television channels. The regime and regime-linked businesspersons controlled eight FM radio stations. In August the NUG launched Radio NUG, a clandestine service that provided two 30-minute reports daily with prodemocracy content.
Violence and Harassment: The regime subjected journalists and other media workers to violence, harassment, detention, and intimidation for their reporting. According to AAPP, at least 95 journalists were unjustly arrested after February, and more than half of those remained in detention as of November. Among journalists detained by the regime were reporters from the Associated Press, the Ayeyarwady Times News, and many more outlets. In April the New York Times reported that many journalists stopped wearing helmets or vests marked with the word “PRESS,” did not publish under their own names, and avoided sleeping at home. On December 14, local media reported that freelance photojournalist and graphic designer Soe Naing died in regime custody after his arrest on December 10 while covering the “Silent Strike.” Soe Naing reportedly died after a violent interrogation, marking the first known death of a journalist while in regime custody since the coup.
Authorities arrested Polish photojournalist Robert Bociaga on March 11 in Shan State and deported him after he was held in detention for 13 days.
In April authorities detained Yuki Kitazumi, a Japanese freelance journalist, and accused him of supporting prodemocracy protests. Authorities released and deported Kitazumi in May.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: After the coup, the regime banned independent media outlets that did not self-censor reporting on the prodemocracy movement. The regime also banned using certain terminology in reporting, such as “junta,” “coup d’etat,” and “military council.” The Myanmar Times suspended publication on February 21 after many of its staff quit to protest the leadership’s decision to follow the regime order not to describe the military takeover as a “coup.” On March 8, the regime banned broadcast, online, and print media Mizzima, Democratic Voice Burma, Khit Thit Media, Myanmar Now, and 7Day News from broadcasting or reporting on any platform. Each of these media organizations had extensively covered the protests, including on their social media pages. The regime later revoked the licenses of three ethnic-minority-run outlets: Myitkyina News Journal from Kachin State, Tachileik News Agency from Shan State, and 74 other media outlets suspended their operations in response.
Libel/Slander Laws: Even before the coup, the military could and did use various legal provisions, such as a criminal defamation clause in the telecommunications law, to restrict freedom of expression. After the coup, the regime primarily relied on Section 505 of the penal code to prosecute journalists. Following his arrest on March 3 in Bago Region, a reporter covering prodemocracy protests from the radio and television company Democratic Voice Burma was the first after the coup to be charged under this section of the law. According to media reports, he was brutally beaten and seriously injured during his arrest. On May 3, he was sentenced to three years in prison. In June two other journalists were sentenced to two years in prison. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 24 journalists were facing charges under the broadened Section 505A that includes penalties for spreading “false news.”
National Security: Although the regime prosecuted some media critics using laws related to national security, in general the regime used other methods to pursue its critics. The regime designated the NUG and related prodemocracy groups as terrorist organizations but as of November had not arrested or tried any members of these on terrorist charges.
Internet Freedom
The regime surveilled and censored online content, restricted access to the internet, and prosecuted its online critics. Even before the coup, the telecommunications law included broad provisions giving the government the power to temporarily block and filter content for the “benefit of the people.” According to Freedom House, the regime, the military, and promilitary groups pressured users to remove antiregime and prodemocracy content. Myanmar law does not explicitly include provisions to force the removal of content or provide for intermediary liability, although some sections of law are so overly broad and vague that they may be used to justify forced content removal. Regime authorities instead used, or threatened to use, other criminal provisions of law to pressure internet users to remove content.
The regime limited users’ ability to communicate anonymously by requiring users to register all SIM cards. Subscribers were required to provide their name, national registration document, birthday, address, citizenship, and gender to register a SIM card; noncitizens must provide their passports. Telecommunications companies reportedly required some subscribers to include information beyond the bounds of the regulations, including their ethnicity.
Telecommunications and internet surveillance allegedly contributed to violent crackdowns on citizens, including physical assaults and enforced disappearances in retaliation for online and offline activities.
During the February protests, social media was a crucial vehicle for demonstrators and activist leaders to organize and encourage support for the prodemocracy movement. That month the regime censored social media websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, used by prodemocracy groups and protesters to resist the regime. Throughout the period since the coup, authorities allegedly arrested Facebook users found to have posted antiregime content or used profile photos with text supporting, for example, recognition of the NUG at the United Nations. Amnesty International reported in October that the regime arrested a prodemocracy supporter from his home in Rangoon for posting a picture on Facebook showing someone stepping on a photo of commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing. Authorities also reportedly arrested and detained individuals who followed Facebook, Twitter, and other pages of prodemocracy actors. Online news sites such as those of the BBC, Singapore-based CNA, and CNN were banned after the coup. Most individuals relied on virtual private networks to access independent online news.
In the days following the coup, Netblocks, a London-based service that tracks internet disruptions, reported “a near-total internet shutdown,” with connectivity falling to just 16 percent of normal levels. While internet connectivity later largely returned, occasional reports of targeted cuts across the country continued. For example, on September 15, the Irrawaddy reported that the regime cut off internet access in several townships in Sagaing and Mandalay Regions believed to be PDF strongholds.
In May media reported that the regime shared a “whitelist” of at least 1,200 approved websites with local internet service providers and telecommunications companies. The approved “whitelist” included nearly 50 companies in the banking and financial sector, more than 20 delivery services, and more than 60 entertainment sites, including Instagram, YouTube, Netflix, and Tinder. The whitelist further specified that some social media sites were permitted if “used by many customers for business purposes.”
Following the coup, the regime twice imposed nationwide internet blackouts to suppress the prodemocracy movement, followed by nightly internet blackouts for an extended period. The regime routinely used internet blackouts as a tool against its opponents including in Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Regions. These measures hampered daily business activities and consumer spending. The NGO Freedom House singled out the country for heavy criticism in its Freedom on the Net 2021 report due to the military’s shutting down the internet, blocking social media, and forcing tech companies to hand over personal data as part of its efforts to consolidate power after the coup. Freedom House documented a 14-point decline in internet freedom indicators, the largest ever recorded in its report.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The regime restricted academic freedom and cultural events. Violent crackdowns by the regime on student and teacher prodemocracy supporters affected at least 60 schools and university campuses across the country. The regime reportedly dismissed or arrested dozens of university staff, and suspended thousands more for their involvement in the CDM. In May the Irrawaddy reported that the regime Education Ministry dismissed 41 striking staff members, including 14 officials from the Higher Education Department. The Institute for International Education Scholar Rescue Fund reported receiving numerous requests for support from academic personnel targeted by the regime since the coup. The regime also targeted prominent prodemocracy cultural figures including filmmakers, writers, singers, and actors. In March organizers of the Wathan Film Festival issued a statement on behalf of visual artists, cartoonists, comedians, actors, writers, and poets, calling on the global creative community to show solidarity with the population.
In November Myanmar Now reported that a teacher from Mandalay Region participating in the CDM died hours after his arrest. A colleague of the 40-year-old high school teacher shared, “We were only told that he died during the interrogation…his body was all wrapped up with only his face exposed.”
B. FREEDOMS OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The regime curtailed the exercise of the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
In the initial days after the coup, hundreds of thousands of individuals took to the streets peacefully to protest the military takeover and demand the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. On February 8, the regime ordered curfews and restrictions on the size of gatherings that effectively banned peaceful public demonstrations across the country, although demonstrations continued, nonetheless. Regime security forces met protesters with increasing violence and lethal force. According to numerous reports in local media, small-scale prodemocracy protests continued across the country as of November despite violent intimidation and suppression by security forces.
Freedom of Association
The regime restricted the right to freedom of association. The law on registering organizations stipulates voluntary registration for local NGOs and removes punishments for noncompliance for both local and international NGOs. Prior to the coup, the government interpreted the law as requiring NGOs that received foreign funding to register with the government. After the coup, the regime required banks to report on all foreign funds received by both local and international NGOs.
C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
The law does not protect freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation. Local regulations limit the rights of citizens to settle and reside anywhere in the country. Authorized officials may require the registration of foreigners’ movements and require foreigners to register every change of address exceeding 24 hours.
In-country Movement: Regional and local orders, directives, and instructions restricted freedom of movement. The regime increased restrictions on freedom of movement after the coup. Numerous local media reports described regime security force roadblocks and the random searches of private cars and taxis. Nightly curfews in Rangoon and several other cities also restricted movement, as did a reinstated requirement that all visitors register with the local ward administrator. Local media reported that the regime harassed, including by seizing ambulances, health-care workers when medical emergencies required them to break curfew. Due to escalating conflict with the military, the NUG and EAOs warned civilians to travel only in case of an emergency. For example, the Thantlang Revolutionary Campaign informed residents in September not to go out after 7 p.m., not to go hunting or into the jungle unless absolutely necessary, and to take extra care when traveling. COVID-19 mitigation regulations also contributed to restriction of movement.
Limitations on freedom of movement for Rohingya in Rakhine State were unchanged. Rohingya may not move freely; they must obtain travel authorization to leave their township. In contrast to the pre-coup rule that Rohingya traveling without documentation could return to their homes without facing immigration charges, the regime’s General Administration Department issued a directive resuming legal actions against Rohingya traveling without permission in Sittwe and Kyauktaw.
Foreign Travel: The regime restricted foreign travel by prodemocracy supporters and expanded measures to increase oversight. According to an official order dated May 13, “The authorities have directed airlines that all bookings for departures from Myanmar must be made at least 10 days in advance of the intended departure and be shared with [the] Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” The regime also reportedly cancelled, or refused to issue, passports to prodemocracy supporters. The regime notified the diplomatic community in Thailand and India that it had taken this action against multiple prodemocracy leaders. Numerous prodemocracy supporters expressed concern for their security and safety if they tried to leave the country by air, and at least one person reported being denied boarding because she was related to an NLD member. COVID-19 mitigation efforts also restricted foreign travel.
E. STATUS AND TREATMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 296,000 recently arrived individuals were living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of December 17 due to postcoup violence in Southeast Burma, Kachin and Shan States, and Northwest Burma. A total of 666,000 persons were internally displaced in the country as of December 1. Decades of conflict between the central government and ethnic communities, exacerbated by the coup and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulted in large numbers of primarily ethnic-minority IDPs in ethnic-dominated parts of the country.
In June the United Nations estimated that more than 100,000 persons had fled their homes to escape conflict and risked starving in Kayah State alone. Myanmar Now reported on June 16 that the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force announced the temporary suspension of attacks on the military amid the growing crisis.
The regime has systematically obstructed humanitarian relief. In June local media reported that the military burned bags of rice, barrels of cooking oil, and other staples that locals from southern Shan State gathered to support those displaced from an escalation in fighting. In September, for example, amid an escalation in conflict, the military blocked humanitarian supply routes to 50,000 IDPs in Chin State, according to Radio Free Asia. According to local media, fighting erupted in Lay Kay Kaw Township, Karen State, the evening of December 14 between opposition forces and regime security, displacing at least 4,000 individuals including local residents and prodemocracy supporters seeking safe haven in the area. Democratic Voice Burma news reported that regime security forces continued to shoot at civilians as they fled for safety. HRW reported in December that the regime has imposed travel restrictions on humanitarian workers, blocked access roads and aid convoys, and destroyed nonmilitary supplies.
F. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
The regime did not always cooperate with UNHCR or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, or other persons of concern.
Access to Asylum: The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government has not established a system for providing protection to refugees. UNHCR did not register any asylum seekers during the year.
G. STATELESS PERSONS
The law defines a “national ethnic group” as a racial and ethnic group that can prove origins in the country dating back to 1823, a year prior to British colonization, and the regime officially recognized 135 “national ethnic groups” whose members are automatically granted full citizenship. The law also establishes two forms of citizenship short of full citizenship: associate and naturalized. Citizens in these two categories are unable to run for political office; form a political party; serve in the military, police, or public administration; inherit land or money; or pursue certain professional degrees, such as medicine and law. Only members of the third generation of associate or naturalized citizens are able to acquire full citizenship.
Rohingya, most of whom are Muslim, are not recognized as a “national ethnic group” and the vast majority are stateless as a result. Following the forced displacement of more than 740,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017, up to 600,000 Rohingya were estimated to remain in Rakhine State. Some Rohingya may be technically eligible for full citizenship. The process involves additional official scrutiny and was complicated by logistical difficulties, including travel restrictions and significant gaps in understanding the Burmese language. In practice this also required substantial bribes to regime officials, and even then, it did not result in equality with other full citizens. In particular, only Rohingya were required to go through an additional step of applying for the National Verification Card, through which they receive identity documents that describe them as “Bengali.” Regime officials treat Rohingya with the presumption of noncitizenship. This could lead to discrimination in access to public services and a wide range of societal discrimination.
There were also significant numbers of stateless persons and persons with undetermined nationality, including persons of Chinese, Indian, and Nepali descent. Although these latter groups did not face the same level of official and social discrimination as Rohingya, the regime granted members of these groups only the lesser rights, and imposed the greater restrictions, of associate and naturalized citizenship. The regime did not single these groups out the same way as Rohingya when obtaining citizenship.
The law does not provide any form of citizenship (or associated rights) for children born in the country whose parents are stateless.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
Prior to the coup, the constitution provided citizens a limited ability to choose their government through elections held by secret ballot. The military deposed the democratically elected parliament and dissolved the Union Election Commission (UEC), appointing a former military major general to replace the ousted UEC chairman. On July 26, the military regime UEC announced that it had annulled the results of the November 2020 general elections, which domestic and international observers assessed as largely reflective of the will of the electorate, despite some identified irregularities and local election cancellations in some ethnic areas.
On October 16, the regime UEC announced that upcoming regional elections were cancelled across most of Rakhine State and in various other ethnic areas in Kachin State, Shan State and elsewhere.
The regime used laws against terrorism to arrest and punish groups and individuals who were active in the country’s precoup political life. The regime designated the NUG, the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, and PDF groups as unlawful terrorist organizations. According to the law, anyone associated with these groups could face 10 years to life in prison, although no one had come to trial as of year’s end.
ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Recent Elections: Observers considered the 2020 national elections to be generally reflective of the will of the population, notwithstanding some structural shortcomings. The NLD, chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, won more than 80 percent of the 1,150 contested seats at the state, regional, and union levels in those elections. The NLD won 396 of 476 races for national assembly seats; a military-affiliated party won 33, and various ethnic parties took 47 seats. The 2008 constitution bars Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency due to her marriage to a British national.
Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties faced narrowing political space amid regime investigations and threats to ban them from competing in elections. Political parties not aligned with the military were denied the rights to assemble and protest peacefully. The military regime, moreover, conducted politically motivated investigations into prodemocracy political parties and their leaders, particularly the NLD. In May the UEC began investigations into the 93 registered political parties, including financial audits. In an August 27 letter, the UEC threatened that if political parties did not submit financial statements, their party registration could be suspended.
Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit the participation of women in the political process, and they did participate in elections. Laws limiting the citizenship status of many ethnic minority groups (see “Stateless Persons” above) also limited their rights to participate in political life. Women and members of historically marginalized and minority groups were underrepresented in government prior to the coup. Some policies (as opposed to laws and regulations) limited women’s participation in practice.
In the 2020 general elections, 194 women were elected to parliament.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
Since the coup, the Anti-Corruption Commission has regularly targeted deposed NLD politicians and other former civilian government leaders for prosecution under anticorruption law. As of November, the commission charged at least 45 former NLD and civilian government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi, former president Win Myint, union-level ministers, and state and region ministers appointed by the previous government. Most observers considered these charges baseless.
Corruption was widespread in all dimensions of political life, including especially the judicial system. Petty extortion by police was paralleled by more serious graft at higher levels, such as demanding bribes from victims to conduct criminal investigations.
Corruption: Although corruption was widespread, unlike the civilian government it overthrew, the regime used corruption laws almost exclusively against opponents, as noted. Such cases, which often relied on coerced testimony, did not provide an accurate picture of actual corruption.
Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
The regime did not allow domestic human rights organizations to function independently. Human rights NGOs were able to open offices and operate, but reported harassment, monitoring by authorities, and arbitrary detention. The regime, for example, sometimes pressured hotels and other venues not to host meetings organized by activists or civil society groups. Regime security forces also raided and damaged NGO offices. These restrictions went beyond standard COVID-19 mitigation efforts.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The regime systematically denied attempts by the United Nations and other international organizations and NGOs to investigate human rights abuses or to access the locations of alleged abuses. Foreign human rights activists and advocates, including representatives from international NGOs, continued to be restricted to short-term visas that required them to leave the country periodically for renewal. Several international NGOs’ local partners were repeatedly asked to show financial statements and other documents that revealed their relationship with foreign funders.
The regime refused to cooperate with or grant access to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar created by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate alleged atrocities in the country.
The regime continued to refuse entry to the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in the country. While the prior civilian government permitted the UN secretary-general’s special envoy for Burma to open an office in the country in 2019, the regime denied the envoy and her staff permission to enter the country after the coup.
Government Human Rights Bodies: The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission has the power to conduct independent inquiries, and in some cases may call for investigations into abuses. In fact the commission had limited ability to operate as a credible, independent mechanism. Before the coup, the commission investigated some incidents of human rights abuses, but no investigations took place after February 1. The commission released photos of commission members visiting prisons, labor camps, and police detention facilities between May and June. No findings from the visits were released. The NUG established a Human Rights Ministry, which pledged to document human rights abuses committed by regime security forces. The Independent Commission of Enquiry for Rakhine State has not been active since the coup.
Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses
WOMEN
Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape of women and men is illegal but remained a significant problem, and the regime did not enforce the law effectively. Rape of a woman outside of marriage carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Spousal rape is not a crime unless the wife is younger than the legal age of marriage (which may vary according to ethnicity or religion), and the penalty is a maximum of two years in prison. The law prohibits committing bodily harm against another person, but there are no laws specifically against domestic violence or spousal abuse unless the wife is younger than the legal age of marriage. Overlapping and at times contradictory legal provisions complicated implementation of these limited protections.
Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, remained a serious problem. Abuse within families was prevalent and considered socially acceptable. Spousal abuse or domestic violence was difficult to measure because the government did not maintain comprehensive statistics and survivor typically did not report it, although the government attempted to document cases, and reported cases were on the rise.
Sexual Harassment: The law prohibits sexual harassment and prescribes a maximum penalty of two years in prison if the harassment involves physical contact. Harassment is punishable by a fine or up to one year in prison. The regime did not report information on the prevalence of the problem, and many of these crimes were unreported. NGOs reported regime police investigators were not sensitive to survivors and rarely followed through with investigations or prosecutions.
Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. The law allows the government to impose coercive birth-spacing requirements – 36 months between children – if the president or national government designates “special regions” for health care based on factors such as population, migration rate, natural resources, birth rates, and food availability. In such special regions, the government may create special health-care organizations to perform various tasks, including establishing family planning regulations. The government did not designate any such special regions.
In Rakhine State, local authorities prohibited Rohingya families from having more than two children, although some Rohingya with household registration documents reportedly circumvented the law.
The law otherwise limits the right of individuals to manage their reproductive health. Access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception, for sexual violence survivors through public and private facilities was very limited and further exacerbated by the collapse of the public-health system after the coup. While September reports from Population Services International indicated that demand for oral contraceptives increased significantly in Rangoon after the coup, access to family planning was limited in rural areas. Economic hardship and security concerns in conflict-affected regions also limited access to family planning.
The Department of Social Welfare adapted gender-based violence services to COVID-19 restrictions, including expanding virtual platforms for online training.
The United Nations estimated in 2017 that the maternal mortality rate nationwide was 250 deaths per 100,000 live births. No more recent reliable data were available. The 2017 National Maternal Death Surveillance and Response Report stated that the maternal mortality ratio was highest in Shan, Chin, and Ayeyarwady States. NGOs regularly reported throughout the year that humanitarian access and movement restrictions among Rohingya limited access to health-care services and contributed to maternal mortality rates in Rakhine State being higher than the national average. Complications resulting from unsafe abortions were also a leading cause of maternal deaths.
Other major factors influencing maternal mortality included poverty; the high rate of home births (63 percent; a number that likely rose after the coup); limited availability of and access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services and information, including contraception, and maternal and newborn health services; low coverage of antenatal care visits; and the lack of access to services from appropriately trained and skilled birth attendants and other trained community health workers.
Discrimination: By law women enjoy the same legal status and rights as men, including property and inheritance rights and religious and personal status, but regime officials did not enforce the law. Communities around the country implemented customary law to address matters of marriage, property, and inheritance that differed from the provisions of statutory law and which was often discriminatory against women. The law requires equal pay for equal work, but the formal sector did not respect this requirement, and the regime did not actively enforce it. NGOs reported other forms of workplace discrimination were common (see also section 7.d.). The law restricts the ability of Buddhist women to marry non-Buddhist men by requiring public notification prior to any such marriage and allowing objections to the marriage to be raised in court. The law was rarely enforced. Poverty affected women disproportionately.
SYSTEMIC RACIAL OR ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION
Wide-ranging governmental and societal discrimination against members of minority groups persisted, including in areas such as education, housing, employment, and access to health services. Members of ethnic minority groups constituted 30 to 40 percent of the population. The seven ethnic minority states comprised approximately 60 percent of the national territory, and a significant number of minorities also resided in majority ethnic Burmese regions. Rohingya continued to face severe discrimination based on their ethnicity and religion, although conflict between the military and ethnic Rakhine populations de-escalated.
CHILDREN
Birth Registration: The law automatically confers full citizenship to children when both parents are from one of the 135 recognized national ethnic groups and to some children who meet other citizenship requirements. Second generation children may acquire full citizenship if at least one parent has full citizenship. Third generation children of associate or naturalized citizens may acquire full citizenship. Many long-term residents in the country, including Rohingya, are not among the recognized national ethnic groups, and thus their children are not automatically conferred citizenship (see also section 2.g.). There were significant rural-urban disparities in birth registration, with an informal or almost nonexistent process in small, rural villages. Birth registration is required to obtain a national identification card, and it can provide important protections for children, particularly against child labor, early marriage, and underage recruitment into the armed forces and ethnic armed groups.
Education: By law, education is compulsory, free, and universal through the fourth grade (up to age 10). This leaves children ages 10 through 13 vulnerable to child labor, since they are not required to attend school and are not legally permitted to work (the minimum age for work is 14). Burmese is the mandatory language of instruction in public schools. The national education plan does not allow for other languages of instruction, although some public schools taught ethnic languages as extra subjects. Schools were often unavailable in remote communities and conflict areas, and access to them for internally displaced and stateless children was also limited.
In June the regime ordered all primary and secondary schools to reopen, after closing in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Myanmar Teacher’s Federation, more than 90 percent of students did not return on June 2 as mandated. The teachers’ federation reported that almost one-third of teachers from the primary to university level were suspended for participating in the CDM. A suspended teacher from Rangoon told international media in May, “I’m not afraid of arrest and torture. I’m afraid of becoming a teacher who teaches the students propaganda.” In early July the regime ordered all primary and secondary schools closed due to the third wave of COVID-19; the schools reopened before year’s end.
UNICEF reported in July that the regime and prodemocracy groups conducted 180 attacks against schools and school personnel and that the military used education facilities for military purposes in at least 157 cases.
Child Abuse: The laws were neither adequate to deter child abuse nor enforced. The United Nations reported in July that hundreds of children were killed or maimed and approximately 1,000 arrested in postcoup demonstrations and clashes. The chairperson of the Child Rights Convention described children as “under siege” since the coup.
Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law stipulates different minimum ages for marriage based on religion and gender. The minimum age for Buddhists is 18, while the minimum age for non-Buddhists is 16 for boys and 15 for girls. Child marriage occurred, especially in rural areas. There were no reliable statistics on forced marriage.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT), a Bangkok-based international NGO, characterized the problem of children experiencing sexual abuse and violence as “widespread,” despite the scarcity of data. Lifetime migrants constituted 20 percent of the country’s population, and the children who accompany them faced higher risks of sexual exploitation, forced marriage, and trafficking, according to UNICEF.
The law prohibits the commercial sexual exploitation of children, including pimping; separate provisions within the penal code prohibit sex with a minor younger than 14. The penalty for the purchase and sale of commercial sex acts from a child younger than 18 is 10 years in prison. The law prohibits child pornography and specifies a minimum penalty of two years’ imprisonment and a modest fine. The law on child rights prescribes a penalty of one to seven years in prison, a substantial fine, or both, for sex trafficking and forced marriage. If a survivor is younger than 14, the law considers any sexual act to constitute statutory rape. The maximum sentence for statutory rape is two years in prison when the survivor is between ages 12 and 14, and 10 years to life in prison when the survivor is younger than 12. The law against trafficking in persons requires a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex-trafficking offense. The deposed civilian government introduced these laws. ECPAT cited a lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as well as publicly available data to ascertain the effectiveness of implementation.
Displaced Children: The United Nations estimated that as of October there were more than 589,000 IDPs, approximately 37 percent of whom were children.
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
ANTI-SEMITISM
There was one synagogue in Rangoon serving a very small and primarily expatriate Jewish population. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities. While the law requires job protection, equal access to education, and access to public transportation, there was no meaningful enforcement. According to the Eden Center for Disabled Children, children with disabilities had a lower school attendance rate than their peers. COVID-19 mitigation restrictions and the coup further limited access to services, including education and programs focused on reducing stigma and discrimination against persons with disabilities.
Military veterans with disabilities in urban areas received official benefits on a priority basis, usually a civil service job at pay equivalent to rank. Official assistance to civilians with disabilities in principle included two-thirds of pay for a maximum of one year for a temporary disability and a tax-free stipend for permanent disability.
HIV AND AIDS SOCIAL STIGMA
Official and societal violence and discrimination, including employment discrimination, against persons with HIV or AIDS, continued. Reports of abuse included verbal insults, harassment, threats, and physical assault. Significant legal, social, and financial barriers impeded access to services for persons with HIV or AIDS. These barriers included stigma, unhelpful gender norms, poor infrastructure, an entrenched drug trade, political instability, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Laws criminalizing behaviors that increased the risk of acquiring HIV or AIDS fueled stigma and discrimination against persons engaged in these behaviors and impeded their access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care services.
The regime paused most high-level efforts to address these matters due to political instability and reduced engagement with the regime by persons and groups concerned with them.
ACTS OF VIOLENCE, CRIMINALIZATION, AND OTHER ABUSES BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
Although consensual sexual activity between men remained a criminal offense, political reforms in prior years made it easier for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community to hold public events and openly participate in society. Discrimination, stigma, and a lack of acceptance among the general population persisted. Transgender persons, for example, were subject to police harassment, and their identity was not recognized. After the coup, reported violence against LGBTQI+ persons increased. As of July the NUG minister of human rights claimed at least 12 LGBTQI+ community members died and another 73 were arrested while peacefully protesting against the regime. As of November, at least 65 LGBTQI+ community members remained in detention, and 28 were either in hiding or had fled to areas not under regime control. According to Radio Free Asia, LGBTQI+ prodemocracy supporters were targeted for humiliation by regime after arrest including sexual insults, taunts, mocking of clothing, and physical abuse.
There were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment. Many LGBTQI+ individuals faced significant barriers to education and employment if they were vocal or visible about their status. LGBTQI+ persons reported facing discrimination from health-care providers, including public shaming.
A 2019 report by the British Council found mixed views on whether LGBTQI+ persons could be accepted in the culture: fifty percent of respondents rejected the idea. Overall, those polled were more willing to accept LGBTQI+ persons in the abstract but were less so when the person in question was a specific individual, such as a relative or politician.
Section 7. Worker Rights
A. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
After the military coup on February 1, the regime committed widespread abuses against organized labor, including the unlawful detention and extrajudicial killing of labor union leaders and members for exercising their fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. After the coup, labor laws often went unenforced or were enforced primarily against organized labor and labor activists and in the interests of business owners and the regime.
The military declared at least 16 labor unions illegal and issued arrest warrants for more than 85 union leaders, including 11 of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Myanmar, and many union leaders remained in prison or missing. There were numerous reported raids of trade union offices and union leaders’ homes. More than a dozen union leaders were killed.
The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes. The law permits labor organizations to demand the reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity, but it does not explicitly prohibit antiunion discrimination in the form of demotions or mandatory transfers, nor does it offer protection for workers seeking to form a union. The law does not provide adequate protection for workers from dismissal before a union is officially registered. The law prohibits civil servants and personnel of the security services and police from forming unions. The law permits workers to join unions only within their category of trade or activity, and the definition of trade or activity lacks clarity. Basic labor organizations must have a minimum of 30 workers and register through township registrars via the Chief Registrar’s Office of the regime Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population (Ministry of Labor). The law permits labor federations and confederations to affiliate with international union federations and confederations.
The law provides for voluntary registration for local NGOs, including labor NGOs working on labor matters, as long as they do not receive foreign funding. The military authorities interfered in the operations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) country office, including through the continued imposition of banking restrictions, the denial of visa extensions for ILO officials, and the denial of tax exemptions.
The law provides unions the right to represent workers, to negotiate and bargain collectively with employers, and to send representatives to a conciliation body or tribunal; however, there were reports that employers dismissed union leaders with impunity or with military support. The law stipulates that a management committee, including government and nongovernmental representatives, in the special economic zones be the first instance arbiter in disputes between employers and employees.
In March, however, the military took control and imposed martial law over two major industrial zones located in Hlain Thar Yar and Shwe Pyi Thar Townships, Rangoon Region, as well as other townships with a high concentration of industrial and manufacturing enterprises. Labor representatives alleged that some employers hired military-affiliated security guards to harass and intimidate workers, sometimes leading to fatal violence when disputes arose. On March 16 at Xing Jia shoe factory, the employer reportedly called in police to deal with a dispute with a group of workers seeking their pay. The police opened fire and killed at least six workers.
The law provides the right to strike in most sectors with significant requirements such as the permission of the relevant labor federations. The law prohibits strikes addressing problems not directly relevant to labor matters. The law does not permit strikes or lockouts in essential services such as water, electric, or health. Lockouts are permitted in public utility services (including transportation; cargo and freight; postal; sanitation; information, communication, and technology; energy; petroleum; and financial sectors), with a minimum of 14 days’ notice provided to the relevant labor organizations and conciliation body. Strikes in public utility services generally require the same measures as in other sectors, but seven days’ advance notice and negotiation between workers and management is required before the strike takes place in order to determine maintenance of minimum service levels.
The government did not effectively enforce labor laws related to freedom of association. Penalties for violations of related labor laws were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights; however, laws were enforced primarily against independent trade unions and not employers.
After the coup, strikes and collective worker action led to retaliation by the military, including workers forced to return to work at gunpoint. On February 19, shipping and jetty workers in Mandalay went on strike to support the CDM. There were reports that the military tried, at gun point, to force the workers back to work, but large crowds gathered to block and drive the military away. The military fired into the crowd, killing protesters. The military evicted striking railway worker and their families, forcing them to flee.
After a national work stoppage began on March 8, the military publicly stated that all public sector workers must return or face criminal charges. There were reports of at least 1,100 public-sector workers from various departments receiving some form of threat or discipline because of participation in the CDM.
Workers at some unionized factories negotiated leave agreements so they would be granted leave to attend the demonstrations. Employer refusal, in some cases, led to work stoppages. There are numerous reports of workers fired for participating in the CDM. Many reported postings at factories saying workers would be fired if they participated in the CDM.
Worker organizations reported that formal dispute settlement and court procedures were not effective at enforcing labor laws. After the coup, there were multiple reports of worker disputes handled with military interference.
Labor organizations also reported that local labor offices imposed unnecessary bureaucratic requirements for union registration that were inconsistent with the law.
The Confederation of Trade Unions in Myanmar reported the arrest and harassment of trade unionists by regime security forces after the coup, including the secretary general of Myanmar Infrastructure, Craft and Service who was detained in June when the regime raided the infrastructure, craft, and service union office in Mandalay. Labor sources reported the secretary general was not allowed to meet any visitors or access legal aid while in detention. In a separate case, regime authorities detained the director of the Solidarity Trade Union of Myanmar at his office in April. Labor sources reported the regime denied the director access to medicine and other necessary health care to manage her chronic illness while in detention. The regime released the director in October as part of a general amnesty and without pursuing formal charges. On October 12, a military tribunal also sentenced two union organizers, U Yen Tu Htauk and Ma Kyi Par Lay, to life in prison.
B. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR
The law prohibits most forms of forced or compulsory labor, although insufficient barriers exist for the use of forced labor by the military and penal institutions. The law also provides for the punishment of persons who impose forced labor on others. The law provides criminal penalties for forced labor violations; penalties differ depending on whether the military, the government, or a private citizen committed the violation. The penalties were commensurate with analogous serious crimes such as kidnapping. The regime did not effectively enforce the law, particularly in the areas where significant conflict was occurring.
In early 2020 the government established a forced-labor complaints mechanism under the Ministry of Labor. There were no data available on the functioning of or the number of cases reported to or processed by the mechanism since the coup. The ILO expressed profound concern over practices of the military authorities, including the use of forced labor.
The regime threatened CDM members with criminal charges if they did not return to work (see also section 7.a.).
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
C. PROHIBITION OF CHILD LABOR AND MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT
The law prohibits the worst forms of child labor, although the regime did not meaningfully enforce the law. The law sets the minimum age at 14 for work in certain sectors, including shops and factories; the law establishes special provisions for “youth employment” for those older than 14. There is, however, no minimum age for work for all sectors in which children were employed, including agriculture and informal work. The law prohibits employees younger than 16 from working in a hazardous environment, but the government did not issue a list of hazardous jobs. Some sector-specific laws identify activities that are prohibited for children younger than 18. Penalties under the Child Rights Law were analogous to other serious crimes, such as kidnapping.
Children worked mostly as street vendors, refuse collectors, restaurant and teashop attendants, garment workers, and domestic workers. Children often worked in the informal economy, in some instances exposing them to drugs and petty crime, risk of arrest, commercial sexual exploitation, HIV, AIDS, and other sexually transmitted infections (see also section 6). Children were also vulnerable to forced labor in teashops, agriculture and forestry, gem production, begging, and other fields. In rural areas children routinely worked in family agricultural activities, occasionally in situations that potentially involved forced labor. Child labor was also reported in the extraction of rubies and jade and the manufacture of rubber and bricks.
Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ and the Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods .
D. DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION
Labor laws and regulations do not prohibit employment discrimination. Restrictions against women in employment exist based on social and cultural practices and beliefs. Women remained underrepresented in most traditionally male-dominated occupations (forestry, carpentry, masonry, and fishing) and were effectively barred from them by hiring practices and cultural barriers. Women were not legally prohibited from any employment except in underground mines. The law governing hiring of civil service personnel states that nothing shall prevent the appointment of men to “positions that are suitable for men only,” with no further definition of what constitutes positions “suitable for men only.”
There were reports that government and private actors practiced discrimination that impeded Muslim-owned businesses’ operations and undercut their ability to hire and retain labor, maintain proper working standards, and secure public and private contracts. There were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, including the denial of promotions and firing of LGBTQI+ persons. Activists reported limited job opportunities for many openly gay and lesbian persons and noted a general lack of support from society. Activists reported that in addition to general societal discrimination, persons with HIV or AIDS faced employment discrimination in both the public and private sectors, including suspensions and the loss of employment following positive results from mandatory workplace HIV testing.
E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK
Wage and Hour Laws: The official minimum daily wage was above the poverty line. The minimum wage covers all sectors and industries and applies to all workers in the formal sector except those in businesses with fewer than 15 employees. The law requires the minimum wage to be revised every two years. The government also established tripartite committees in the Special Economic Zones responsible for setting wage levels and an inspector for each zone.
The workweek is 44 hours per week for factories. For shops and other establishments, it is 48 hours per week. Although the law in general states that overtime should not exceed 12 hours per work week, the law allows up to 16 hours of overtime when special matters require additional overtime. Overtime for factory workers is regulated under a separate directive that limits overtime to 20 hours per week. The law also stipulates that an employee’s total working hours cannot exceed 11 hours per day (including overtime and a one-hour break). Laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.
Occupational Safety and Health: The 2019 Occupational Safety and Health law sets standards for occupational safety, health, and welfare. The Ministry of Labor has the authority to suspend businesses operating at risk to worker health and safety until risks are remediated.
Labor unions reported instances in which workers could not remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their employment. Unions reported that workers concerned about COVID-19 positive cases in factories were nonetheless required to work.
The Ministry of Labor’s Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection Department oversees labor conditions in the private sector. Inspectors were authorized to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.
The regime did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties for wage and hour violations were commensurate with those for similar violations, but penalties for safety and health violations were not. The number of labor law inspectors and factory inspectors was insufficient to address wage, salary, overtime, occupational safety and health standards, and other matters adequately. In some sectors other ministries regulated occupational safety and health laws (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation).
Informal Sector: Observers agreed the great majority of the country’s workers were in the informal sector. Wage, hours and occupational safety and health laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.
Informal workers’ jobs were less secure during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in April 2020 the Ministry of Health ordered that no more than 50 workers could be present at a construction site. One of the largest employers of informal labor was the construction sector. The postcoup regime retained the policy.
Informal-sector jobs usually lacked basic benefits such as social and legal protections. In at-risk industries – defined as having occupational hazards, volatile payment structures, and ease in exploiting labor rights – on average, one in five workers had an informal work arrangement, although the proportion was even higher in manufacturing, construction, recreation, and personal services. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the workers in medium- to high-risk industries were employed informally..."
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United States Department of State
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2022-04-16
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2022-04-16
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"ပြည်သူ့လူထုက ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသော လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စု လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ(CRPH)က အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ(NUCC) နှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းတိုင်ပင်ပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို အတည်ပြုဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် တစ်နှစ်တင်းတင်း ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ဆန္ဒကို ကိုယ်စားပြုသော၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တခုတည်းသော တရားဝင်အစိုးရဖြစ်သည်နှင့် အညီ တိုင်းပြည်၏ ကဏ္ဍကြီး (၅) ရပ်ကိုအခြေခံ၍ တစ်နှစ်အတွင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့မှုများနှင့် ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို သတင်းမီဒီယာများမှတဆင့် ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အစီရင်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။
- နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေးကဏ္ဍ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်တက်ကြွသည့် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးမူဝါဒ ကိုအခြေခံ၍ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီအား နိုင်ငံတကာ မျက်နှာစာတွင် တရားဝင်မှု မရရှိစေရေး ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို နိုင်ငံတကာ က အသိအမှတ်ပြုစေရေး နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို အားပေးထောက်ခံမှုများ ရရှိစေရေးတို့ကို ရည်မှန်းချက်ထားကာ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂတွင် သံအမတ်ကြီးဦးကျော်မိုးထွန်းသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကိုယ်စားပြုအဖြစ် ဆက်လက်တက်ရောက်လျက် ရှိပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့တာဝန်ရှိသူများ၊ ဝန်ကြီးများကလဲ မိတ်ဘက်နိုင်ငံများမှ အဆင့်မြင့်တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် လူချင်းတွေ့ဆုံ ဆွေးနွေးမှုများစွာ ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိကြပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီက ကျူးလွန်လျက် ရှိသော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို စနစ်တကျ စာရင်းပြုစုခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ကာ တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
ချက်သမ္မတနိုင်ငံ၊ ယူကေ နိုင်ငံ၊ နော်ဝေ ၊ ပြင်သစ် ၊ သြစတေးလျ ၊ တောင်ကိုရီးယား ၊ ဂျပန် ၊ တို့တွင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ ခန့်အပ် ထားရှိပြီး အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ဆက်သွယ်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် အတွက် nonresidential Representative ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိ၍ သော်လည်းကောင်း နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးရုံးမှ တိုက်ရိုက်သော်လည်းကောင်း ဆက်သွယ် ဆောင်ရွက် လျက်ရှိသည်။ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုတွင် ဆက်ဆံရေး ရုံးဖွင့်လှစ်ထားရှိရန်ပြင်ဆင် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
- လူမှုရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများနှင့် လူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာအကူအညီများကဏ္ဍ
ပြည်သူလူထုအား ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အွန်လိုင်းဝန်ဆောင်မှု များအပြင် စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေများတွင် ဆေးရုံ(၅၁) ရုံ၊ အခြေခံကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှု ဆေးခန်း (၅၅)ခု တို့ကို ဖွင်လှစ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ရွှေ့လျားဆေးခန်း (၁၆၇)ခု ဖြင့်လဲ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ သူနာပြုတက္ကသိုလ် ကို ပြန်လည်ဖွင့်လှစ်ပြီး သူနာပြုဘွဲ့များ ပေးအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အခြား ဆေးတက္ကသိုလ်များကိုလဲ ပြန်လည်ဖွင့်လှစ်နိုင်ရန် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
အခြေခံပညာ၊ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာ၊ အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းပညာတို့ကို (၂၈၆) မြို့နယ်တွင် ပညာရေးဘုတ်အဖွဲ့များ ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ အွန်လိုင်းမှတဆင့် သင်ကြားပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေအချို့တွင်လဲ မြေပြင် သင်ကြားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ စတင်ဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီဖြစ်သည်။ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီပေးရေး လုပ်ငန်းများအတွက် ရန်ပုံငွေ ကျန်(၂.၇၃) ဘီလီယံခန့် ထောက်ပံ့မှုပြုလုပ် ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများပါဝင်သော ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ၊ ပ.အ.ဖ၊ ပ.က.ဖ များ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒေသ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ဖြင့် ပူးပေါင်းကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီရေး လုပ်ငန်းများကို စနစ်တကျဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ကိုယ်ဝန်ဆောင်မိခင် ၅သောင်းကျော် ကိုလဲ ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
တော်လှန်ရေး၏အဓိကကျသော အခန်းကဏ္ဍတွင် ပါဝင်သည့် CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ၏ လူမှုဘဝ အဆင်ပြေချောမွေ့ စေရေးအတွက် နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့်ကြိုးစားကူညီပံ့ပိုးလျက်ရှိသလို CDM များအား ဂုဏ်ပြုချီးမြှင့်နိုင်ရေး ကော်မတီဖွဲ့စည်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
-စစ်ရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေး၊ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကဏ္ဍ
အဆိုပါ ကဏ္ဍအတွက် တစ်နှစ်တာအတွင်း မဟာမိတ်လက်နက်ကိုင် အင်အားစု အသီးသီးနှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းပူးပေါင်း၍ ဗဟိုကွပ်ကဲရေးနှင့်ပေါင်းစပ်ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Centeral Command and Coordination Committee) အား ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး ဗဟိုအမိန့်ပေးကွပ်ကဲမှုစနစ်အား ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ တစ်နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း PDF တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့ ရာဂဏန်း၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့(ပ.က.ဖ) ၂၅၀ ကျော် ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီးဖြစ်ကာ MOD နှင့် ချိတ်ဆက် ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည့် ဒေသတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်း(LDF) ၃၅၄ဖွဲ့ အနက် ၁၀၀ ကျော်အား ဝန်ကြီးဌာနလက်အောက် တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့များတွင် ပေါင်းစပ် ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ထားပြီးသော တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့များ အားလုံးသည် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကျင့်ဝတ်များကို တိတိကျကျ လိုက်နာ ဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ကွပ်ကဲလျက်ရှိပြီး လိုက်နာခြင်း မရှိသည့် ကိစ္စရပ်များပေါ်ပေါက်ပါကလဲ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ တစ်နှစ်တာအတွင်း အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ သန်း (၃၀) ခန့်အား ရှာဖွေစုဆောင်း သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီး ဌာန ပြည်သူကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (PDF) , ဒေသတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်း(LDF)များ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားအင်အားစု (EAOs, EROs) အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံး၏ နယ်မြေစိုးမိုးနိုင်မှုမှာ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးဧရိယာ၏ (၅၀) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းခန့်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။
ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံရေး အစီအစဉ်အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မှု ကော်မတီကို ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံလာသူများ၏ အရေးကိစ္စများကို ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိရာ ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်သို့ဝင်ရောက်လာသူ (တပ်နှင့်ရဲ) စုစုပေါင်း ၁၀,၀၀၀ ခန့်ရှိပြီး ဆက်သွယ်လာသူများကို စိစစ်ကာ CDM code များ၊ Pre CDM Code များ ထုတ်ပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များအတွက် ယနေ့အထိ ၄၄၅,၆၉၁,၀၆၀ကျပ် (ကျပ်သန်းပေါင်း လေးရာလေးဆယ့်ငါးသန်း ခြောက်သိန်း ကိုးသောင်း တထောင့်ခြောက်ဆယ် တိတိ) သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို ဖြုတ်ချနိုင်ရေး၊ အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အဆုံးသတ်နိင်ရေး စစ်ရေး၊ လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၊ လူမှုရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကိစ္စရပ်များ အပါအဝင် လူမှုရေး၊ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကိစ္စများအတွက် မဟာဗျူဟာကျကျ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး ရည်ရွယ်၍ မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေး ကော်မတီကို ဖွဲ့စည်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး လက်ရှိအချိန်အထိ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အလွတ်သဘော မိတ်ဆက် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှု များ စတင်ဆောက်ရွက် လျက်ရှိပြီး ဆက်လက် တွေ့ဆုံရန်လည်း စီစဉ်လျာထားဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
- စီးပွါးရေး၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေးကဏ္ဍ
စီးပွားရေးနှင့် ဘဏ္ဍာရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကဏ္ဍအတွက် အဓိက မူဝါဒ နှစ်ခုဖြစ်သော စစ်ကောင်စီထံစီးဝင်နေသည့် ဝင်ငွေရပေါက်ရလမ်းများကို ဖြတ်တောက်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး အတွက် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများရရှိရေးတို့ကို တစ်စိုက်မတ်မတ်စီမံဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများစွာနှင့်အတူ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဓိက ဝင်ငွေရလမ်းဖြစ်သော Total နှင့် Chevron ရေနံကုမ္ပဏီကြီးများကို စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် အဆက်ဖြတ်နိုင်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ကြပြီး တစ်ဘက်တွင်လည်း နွေဦးထီမှစ၍ ငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်ရောင်းချခြင်းများကို ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှုများဖြင့် အောင်မြင်စွာ ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၂ နှစ် မတ်လအထိ ငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်ပေါင်း ၇၂၅၈၀ အထိရောင်းချနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဆက်လက်၍ လည်း ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ စနစ်တကျဖြစ်စေရေး တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ထိရောက်စွာ အသုံးပြုနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေပါသည်။
- နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကဏ္ဍ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် တိုင်းရင်းသား အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ယုံကြည်မှု တည်ဆောက်ပြီး ညီညွတ်ရေး ရရှိရန် တစိုက်မတ်မတ် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို ဆန့်ကျင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ မဟာမိတ်များနှင့် ဆက်ဆံရေးပိုမိုခိုင်မာရန်၊ ပိုမိုပါဝင်လာမှုရှိစေရန် ၊ တူညီမျှသော အနာဂတ် တစ်ခုကို ရရှိရန် အတူတကွ လုပ်ဆောင် သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများမှ ပြည်သူလူထုကို ကာကွယ်ရန်၊ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ် နယ်မြေများ ပိုမိုထူထောင်နိုင်ရန်၊ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများတွင် ကြားကာလပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ကြားကာလတရားစီရင်ရေး နှင့်ဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများအားတိုးချဲ့ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်၊ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ ၏ စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများ အတွက် တရားမျှတမှု ပြန်လည်ဖေါ်ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် တာဝန်ခံမှု ရရှိစေရေး ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
အင်အားစု(၅)စုပါဝင်သော အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ကဦးဆောင်၍ ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ခေါ်ယူကာ အတည်ပြုခဲ့သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပဋိဉာဉ်စာတမ်းသည်သာ မိမိတို့ ရှေ့ဆက်ရမယ့် လမ်းကြောင်းတစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည်။ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကို အထိအခိုက်နည်းစွာဖြင့် အောင်မြင်ပြီးမြောက်လိုသူများအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၀၈ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေအား တရားသေကိုင်စွဲထားခြင်းကို စွန့်လွှတ်ပြီး မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးတွင် စစ်တပ်က ဘယ်သောအခါမှ ဝင်ရောက်စွက်ဖက်ခြင်းမပြုရဟူသည့်မူကို လက်ခံကာ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သူများသည်လဲ တာဝန်ယူမှုတာဝန်ခံမှု အပြည့်ဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့တရားစီရင်မှုကို လိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်မှသာလျှင် ပြည်သူလူထုလိုလားသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ သွားရောက်မည့် လမ်းကြောင်းအတွက် အဖြေတစ်ခုရရှိနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းသိစေအပ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွှတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူဆန္ဒကို အလေးအမြတ်ပြုကာ တော်လှန်ရေးအောင်မြင်သည်အထိ ဦးလည်မသုန် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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pdf
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"The massive scale of nationwide strikes held in Myanmar over Thingyan sends a powerful message that democratic resistance to the military coup will continue into the New Year. Even under sustained attack, the resistance is holding its ground against the military junta and laying the foundations of a future federal democracy, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
Myanmar’s streets have been emptied for days when they would usually be packed with people joining water festivities for Thingyan, to wash away sins of the previous year and celebrate the New Year in Myanmar. The New Year itself falls on Sunday 17 April.
The empty streets are an act of nationwide resistance to the military junta, which attempted to seize power in a coup last year and is trying to create a perception that the situation in Myanmar is normalising. The junta is reported to have forced its own employees to take part in official Thingyan festivities in a vain attempt to bolster participation.
“The massive New Year strikes in Myanmar send a powerful message that the people’s commitment to democratic resistance continues,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The military wants to present the situation as normalising – with these strikes the people of Myanmar are demonstrating very clearly that it is not.”
In early April alone, junta forces are reported to have set fire to hundreds of homes across townships in Magway, Mandalay and Sagaing regions. Junta forces have waged a months-long campaign of arson across central and northwest Myanmar in an attempt to crush strong local resistance to the coup there.
Days before Thingyan, junta forces launched deadly airstrikes and artillery against civilian targets in the Karen State town of Lay Kay Kaw in Karen National Union territory, as part of a sustained and devasting campaign of aerial bombardment against allied democratic resistance forces in the southeast.
The military junta’s forces have repeatedly committed mass atrocities in deliberate acts of terror as part of a sustained, widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population since it launched the coup last year. The attack has devastated lives but has not resulted in the military gaining greater control over the country.
“The democratic resistance in Myanmar has held its ground against the military junta over the past year. Indeed, there is now less territory in Myanmar under the control of the military than there was twelve months ago,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The junta had expected to subdue the people within days of its ill-fated February coup of last year, in the manner of a similar case in Ukraine. That seems to be a fatal mistake.”
The one-year anniversary of the appointment of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw also falls over Thingyan, on Saturday 16 April. Along with Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs), the National Unity Consultative Council, political parties and protest groups, these institutions are working to shape a future Myanmar pursuant to the Federal Democracy Charter, albeit while under constant attack from the junta.
“The National Unity Government formed one year ago. Since then, it has taken vital steps to lay the foundations of a future federal democracy in Myanmar, such as accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to end the impunity that has devasted Myanmar for so long,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “What is missing in this picture is the international support for the people of Myanmar. Where is it?”
As Myanmar enters a New Year, a time of renewed hope, SAC-M is calling on the international community to finally step up and recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar. The NUG is deserving of recognition as the government of Myanmar, according to internationally accepted criteria. States must increase political and financial support to the NUG, including by granting the NUG access to US$1 billion of Myanmar assets frozen by the United States Government after the coup.
States must massively increase cross-border assistance to Myanmar through the NUG and EROs, with supply lines coming from neighbouring countries, in order to effectively address the junta-made humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.
Finally, SAC-M is calling for a global three cuts strategy against the junta through the imposition and enforcement of a comprehensive global arms embargo against Myanmar, targeted economic sanctions against senior junta members and military aligned businesses, and referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-15
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, International Criminal Court, Human Rights and international relations
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"Fight intensifies in Loikaw, Demoso, Pruso and BawleKhe townships due to SAC terrorist force
impose extensive military campaign in the areas. SAC terrorist force commits atrocity such as
killing civilians, torching houses, planting landmine in the residents and launching mortar attack
to the villages. Terrorist SAC conducted air strikes more than (10) times in Demoso on April 12.
Fight escalated as Karenni Coalition forces conducted multiples attacks on SAC terrorist ground
troops stationed in Leho, Sin Taung, Daw Ka Mee, Pu Phar, Naung Pale, Ukuri, Ngwe Taung and
Htolwiebelar in Demoso. There were battles between SAC troops and Karenni Coalition Force in
Daw Nyage Khu, Kan Ni and Htar Lel Villages in Pruso Township. Moreover, Fights broke out in
Kyut Pin Khone, and Mae Sa long Mountain, near Nan Phe, in Bawlekhel twonship.
On April 14, the fight broke out in Chi Kel, Hta ta ma in Loikaw, SAC uses armors cars and tanks
during the battle.
(48) soldiers of SAC force have died in the battles occurred in the designated townships in second
week of April. One military vehicle and one Excavator has been destroyed during the attack of
SAC convoy in Pruso. Karenni Coalition force sized some fire arms and ammunitions from the
battles.
Ten Comrades of Karenni Coalition forces has fallen during the battles. KNDF honors the
comrades as National heroes and Martyrs, those whose has fallen in the combats against Military
dictatorship..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Nationalities Defense Force
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-15
[field_licence]
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23.35 KB
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"Press release on battles in second week of April..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Nationalities Defense Force
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-15
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Individual Documents
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"Myanmar’s military has terrorized the country with systematic and widespread human rights violations and abuses, since staging a coup in February 2021. The military junta, also called Tatmadaw, has killed some 1,700 people, displaced half a million people, and hunger levels are growing. This humanitarian crisis must be addressed by the international community: the people of Myanmar need to be supported.
The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned Myanmar security forces’ violations of international human rights in a March 15, 2022 report, stating, “The military and security forces have shown a flagrant disregard for human life, bombarding populated areas with airstrikes and heavy weapons and deliberately targeting civilians, many of whom have been shot in the head, burned to death, arbitrarily arrested, tortured or used as human shields.”
The crisis in Myanmar requires urgent action, and the people need immediate assistance. The civilians have been unable to receive necessary aid, food, shelter, or healthcare due to the military blockades for over a year now. The Human Rights Council should call for U.N. member states to halt the flow of weapons into Myanmar, while imposing stronger sanctions. The international community should be more urgent in their response. They can assist local groups that are trying to bring aid to trapped communities within the country: a collective effort has the potential to be more substantial and sustainable.
The military took over in Myanmar last February, the day before the Parliament of Myanmar was due to swear in the 2020 elected officials, thereby preventing this from occurring. As peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations commenced in the country, the ruthless military responded with firing rocket launchers and burning down homes to put down the movement. According to The New York Times, Myanmar protestors believe that they should fight the Tatmadaw on its own terms, so they are training with firearms and hand grenades in the jungles. This could lead to a civil war. Since February 2021, the crisis has escalated: the military is blocking humanitarian aid in an effort to curb the anti-coup movement and force the population into submission. The U.N. estimates that the number of people needing assistance has grown from one million before the coup to 14.4 million now, including more than five million children. So far, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have imposed sanctions on military officials.
The Tatmadaw has committed serious human rights violations and abuses, some of which may be considered war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Myanmar population is in dire need of assistance as they have been deprived of the necessary means to survive. The United Nations should call for more critical action to protect the civilians and halt this crisis..."
Source/publisher:
The Organization for World Peace
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The UN and Burma - news and commentary, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
The Bush Institute welcomes the launch of US-ASEAN Business Council Institute’s Myanmar Scholarship Fund.
Description:
"More than one year after the unlawful coup in Burma that disregarded the will of the people and overthrew the democratically elected civilian government, we at the George W. Bush Institute remain deeply saddened and concerned by the plight and suffering of the Burmese people.
Challenges to freedom in places like Burma remind us that what happens around the world matters to us here at home. Tyrants who trample the rights of their own people will not hesitate to trample those of their neighbors. They will spread violence, chaos, and corruption across sovereign borders and cyberspace.
That’s why it’s incumbent upon free societies to stand against the threat posed by authoritarian regimes. Governments, individual citizens, civil society, and businesses all have roles in supporting democracy worldwide. That commitment creates a more peaceful and prosperous world benefiting all of us.
Even though the situation in Burma may look dark now, the desire for liberty continues to burn. We must remain committed to supporting the brave Burmese people. At the Bush Institute, we have invested in developing young leaders in Burma, and we’re proud to see others like the US-ASEAN Business Council Institute (USABCI) doing the same.
USABCI’s Myanmar Scholarship Fund demonstrates the innovative approach that is needed to support the Burmese people today while also looking toward tomorrow. This program allows a new generation of Burmese youth to get a top tier education and develop the skills needed to lead. It also demonstrates the crucial role of American engagement in uplifting those struggling for freedom.
And we remain confident that the fruits of such efforts will ultimately be the restoration of a free and democratic Burma..."
Source/publisher:
George W. Bush Presidential Center
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, USA-Burma relations
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-14
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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394.56 KB
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
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Individual Documents
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Sub-title:
Exclusive: Junta detained at least 26 intellectuals last year as it sought to suppress opposition
Description:
"Myanmar jailed more writers and public intellectuals in crackdowns last year than any other country, according to a freedom of expression advocacy group.
PEN America’s annual census of detained writers, the Freedom to Write Index, found Myanmar’s junta detained at least 26 writers in 2021 as it sought to suppress opposition after seizing power from the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi.
According to PEN’s study, in total, Myanmar detains the third-highest number of writers and public intellectuals globally (26), behind only Saudi Arabia (29) and China (85). Many of those held in Saudi Arabia and China are serving long-term sentences and had been arrested in previous years.
Across the world, at least 277 writers in 36 countries were jailed last year in connection with their writing or for exercising free expression, PEN said.
Karin Deutsch Karlekar, the director of PEN America’s “free expression at risk” programmes, described the figures as intolerably high. “In Myanmar and in countries across the globe, writers and public intellectuals are being imprisoned for the ‘crime’ of exercising their freedom of expression and, in many cases, for using the power of the written word to fight back against authoritarianism,” she said.
After the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, many poets and authors used their writing to express outrage and grief at military atrocities and inspire dissent.
Of the 26 detained in Myanmar in 2021, the majority are held in prisons but have not yet been charged, according to PEN.
Many have continued to write while in hiding or temporary exile, sharing work on Facebook or private apps where they feel it is safe to do so, said Karlekar. Others have been forced to self-censor due to the security risks. Reports of mistreatment and torture in Myanmar’s detention facilities are widespread.
The writers represent only a fraction of those imprisoned by Myanmar’s junta, which has arrested those suspected of opposing its rule – from student protesters to teachers and doctors who have refused to work in junta-controlled facilities. More than 10,183 people are in detention, according to estimates by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma, an advocacy group that tracks arrests and killings.
The Freedom to Write Index is based on PEN’s internal research as well as news reports, data from other rights groups and information provided by the relatives of people who are detained. The index includes any instance where a writer was targeted because of their work, and jailed for more than 48 hours during 2021.
PEN’s report raised particular concern about the oppression of writers in Iran, where 21 people were imprisoned, and pointed to a deteriorating situation in Belarus, where many writers were arrested during crackdowns in 2020 and 10 were detained last year.
One in five of those detained globally were serving sentences of 10 or more years in prison, it said. Four writers and academics who were recorded in PEN’s 2021 Index died in custody. This includes the Iranian poet and film-maker Baktash Abtin who died of Covid in January 2022..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"Opponents of military rule in Myanmar have urged residents to boycott the country's traditional New Year celebrations, as activists and Buddhist monks defied security forces by staging small protests against last year's coup in some areas.
The country's most important holiday, known as Thingyan, runs to Saturday and is usually celebrated with prayers, ritual cleaning of Buddha images in temples and high-spirited water fights on the streets.
"I want the world to know that our country is not back to normal yet," said Zay, a 34-year-old activist from the city of Yangon, who declined to give his full name for security reasons and called on people not to participate in festivities.
Celebrations for Thingyan have been muted for the past two years. In 2020, then leader Aung San Suu Kyi barred gatherings due to the pandemic and last year's holidays were hit by protests after her government was ousted by the military.
Myanmar has been in turmoil since the coup, with security forces cracking down brutally on dissent and killing hundreds, and some protesters taking up arms to form People's Defence Forces to take on the military.
One of the main groups behind earlier protests, the General Strike Committee of Nationalities, in a poster on social media urged people to boycott celebrations.
"The blood of our comrades... who have died on the streets will not be washed away by Thingyan water," it said.
A military spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment, but military leader Min Aung Hlaing said last month Thingyan celebrations could take place due to lower numbers of COVID-19 infections.
State media also reported that extra flights had been arranged to allow more visitors from the country's main cities to vacation in beach areas.
But on Thursday photographs shared on social media showed some of the main streets in Yangon appeared deserted, with almost no spectators to watch artists perform on a stage in front of the city's town hall.
Protests also occurred in several areas, with a march in the Sagaing area, while in Mandalay monks held up placards asking people to donate money for striking state workers and displaced people, photographs showed..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Social and Cultural History
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Description:
"On 6th April the U.S. House of Representatives finally passed the BURMA Act (H.R.5497), which calls for action on justice and accountability, increased aid to IDPs, activists and others, and more sanctions to target revenue to the military. The BURMA Act received bipartisan support.
The passing of the BURMA Act came after significant lobbying by members of communities from Burma in the USA, and US and international civil society organisations.
Since the attempted military coup on 1st February 2021, the USA has shown a lack of leadership in mobilising international action to promote human rights and democracy in Burma. The pace of implementation of sanctions has been too slow and too limited, and there has been insufficient support for cross-border aid. Despite a recent determination of genocide against the Rohingya, no practical action on accountability has followed. The USA has not used its diplomatic weight internationally to persuade more countries to adopt arms embargoes.
The USA has taken no action to stop the flow of gas revenue to the Burmese military, one of the biggest sources of revenue to the military. While the European Union has taken action by sanctioning MOGE, the Biden administration seems more concerned about Chevron’s profits and not inconveniencing Thailand than taking effective action to cut funding to a military which is committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
The BURMA Act (S.2937) now faces an uncertain future in the Senate due to the lack of support from key Republicans, in particular Senator Mitch McConnell, and Senator Todd Young. It is not clear why these two Senators are refusing to support the BURMA Act and ensure it is voted on in the Senate. The lack of bipartisan support as a result of their actions is protecting the Burmese military from effective action which could cut the flow of revenue and arms and help saves lives.
“In the UN Security Council, Russia and China use their veto power to block action against the Burmese military. Senators McConnell and Young are the Russia and China of the US Senate, protecting the Burmese military against action to cut their supply of money and arms,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “At the present time American companies can’t sell arms to the Burmese military but they can provide the military with revenue which they use to buy arms from Russia. No-one in the Biden administration has explained why they think this policy makes sense.”
Burma Campaign UK is calling on its supporters and members of the public worldwide to email the two Senators calling on them to stop blocking the BURMA Act..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, USA-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Outreach to pro-democracy forces appears over as Beijing expects the war in Ukraine to curb Russian backing for the generals.
Description:
"After a year of tentative ties with Myanmar’s democratic opposition, China this month dropped all pretension of hedging its bets and ramped up support for the military regime. Beijing framed its decisive economic and political move in part as a response to the “Ukraine crisis,” hinting that Russian backing for the junta may wane on the heels of Moscow’s stumbles in Ukraine, forcing China to fill the gap. With China bringing increasing pressure on Southeast Asian states to follow its lead in legitimizing Myanmar’s dictatorship, all parties in the region, and those with interests in it, will have to rethink their Myanmar strategies.
China’s sudden shift in policy will almost certainly lead to escalating violence and instability in Myanmar. The country’s National Unity Government (NUG), established by lawmakers deposed in last year’s coup, condemned China’s moves as “deeply disrespectful and offensive” to Myanmar’s people. For the United States, China’s enhanced support for a genocidal military regime at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region represents a direct threat to long-term regional commitments identified in the February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy. But for China, it seems that open cooperation with the regime now appeared necessary to rapidly reboot plans for tens of billions of dollars of strategic investments in Myanmar.
The End of China’s Friendship with the Myanmar People?
China’s initial public response to the February 1, 2021 military coup was to pretend nothing had happened — it described the putsch as a “cabinet reshuffle” — but by last March attacks on Chinese factories and businesses across Yangon had created a crisis. Chinese officials feared that a strong show of support for the junta might further inflame anti-China sentiment. To cool the situation, Beijing crafted careful policy statements emphasizing China’s friendly relations with the National League for Democracy Party (NLD), and stressing that China-Myanmar friendship is “open to all people of Myanmar.” In the following months, the Chinese Embassy opened discreet channels of communication with the NUG, and the Chinese Communist Party re-activated its relationship with the NLD, inviting its leaders to attend a virtual gathering of South and Southeast Asian political parties.
The Chinese government also slowed economic activities in Myanmar, even freezing loans for new projects by state-owned enterprises, and warning all parties in the conflict to pay greater attention to securing Chinese investments.
Despite the overtures and hedging, as Chinese decisionmakers began to view the opposition as unlikely to win and potentially inimical to China’s interests, they leaned on China’s strategic partnership with Russia to achieve their political goals in Myanmar: counter Western sanctions and support for democracy and human rights; prevent deeper involvement by the U.N. Security Council and other international bodies in Myanmar’s periphery; and provide support to the military to weaken the democratic opposition.
By November 2021, China was alarmed that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was challenging the junta’s legitimacy and China’s regional influence by blocking Myanmar’s participation in the “ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations.” References to the NLD disappeared from official Chinese statements, and China resumed all working level exchanges with the coup regime. Beijing went so far as to have its ambassador essentially apologize to the junta for failing to persuade key ASEAN states to include the military’s representatives in the meeting.
As the ASEAN chair passed from Brunei to Cambodia, China saw a new opportunity to strengthen the junta’s position. Beijing encouraged Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to visit Myanmar, and publicly pushed for Cambodia to link ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus (an agreement between the 10 ASEAN states to end violence and seek a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Myanmar) with the military junta’s Five Point Road Map. The road map is scheme to turn over the government to a military proxy party through a fraudulent election before August of 2023.
These efforts, which involved a burst of Chinese shuttle diplomacy across Asia, did nothing to change the views of key ASEAN states including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. As such, on the eve of the Ukraine invasion, China was already rethinking its Myanmar policy.
By late March, China began to see a dramatic weakening in Russia’s ability to provide the junta with political and military support. The Chinese government stepped into the gap, inviting three ASEAN foreign ministers and the Myanmar army’s Wunna Maung Lwin, who handles “diplomacy,” to China for bilateral discussions including on the “negative impacts” of the Ukraine crisis on Southeast Asia.
Finally, on April 1, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, received Wunna at a lavish reception in China’s Annhui Province. Afterwards, China’s state-sponsored Xinhua News Agency referred to the junta’s emissary as the “counterpart” of the Chinese foreign minister, emphasizing that Wang had told Wunna that China would back the regime “no matter how the situation changes.”
Both parties announced a major increase in Chinese support for the military’s governing body, the State Administrative Council (SAC): more than $100 million in new financial assistance, a new Myanmar consulate in China, a pledge to “jointly oppose unilateral sanctions,” a commitment to advancing cooperation under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and plans for the junta to host the foreign ministers of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Forum in Myanmar (China, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Myanmar).
Economic Drivers of China’s New Policy
China’s new approach is also driven by the economic needs of its southwestern provinces and by private Chinese capital networks, which have a strong appetite for risk and an attraction to countries with weak governance.
Among China’s southwestern provinces, Yunnan is by far the most eager to resume development of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as the key engine of its economic growth. The Yunnan Provincial Government signaled this urgency in November of 2021 by appointing an academic with close ties to the Myanmar army to direct the Yunnan Department of Commerce.
Li Chenyang, one of several architects of China’s strategic natural resource corridor through Myanmar, had championed a China-Myanmar army partnership in the early 2000s as a means of curbing U.S. strategic advantage in the region. Such an alliance, he argued, would reduce Chinese dependence on the Malacca Straits for energy imports. Unsurprisingly, shortly after Li assumed his new positions he led delegations to the border to re-open China-Myanmar trade and visited key cities to reactivate cross-border industrial zones.
Meanwhile, a shady network of Chongqing-based entrepreneurs developing a casino resort island with a military-backed businessman in Myeik — located off the coast of Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region — emerged as another push factor for deeper relations with the military. From October to February, the South Asia Future Group visited almost every key ministry of the military’s ruling council, later signing a deal with the Lincang government to advance cross-border industrial zones and connectivity between Yunnan and Myanmar’s Shan State. The company also forged a relationship with Myanmar’s ambassador in Beijing, and along with a Myanmar-based network of Chinese companies, played a role in advancing the new consulate in Chongqing.
China’s Real Intentions
While strengthening ties with the junta, China has maintained, and often tightened, its traditional links with the northern ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), particularly the most powerful ones. Beijing has showered these groups with COVID-19 assistance, and in the case of Shan State, is standing with the northern EAOs near the Chinese border as they successfully press a military campaign against a rival ethnic army — the Shan State Army South. As a sign of respect for the EAOs, China sent a senior official to Shan State in late March for the funeral of a key former leader of one of these groups — Peng Jiasheng, the founder of the Kokang Army, also known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Peng had also been instrumental in the expansion of several of Myanmar’s most powerful EAOs, including the powerful Arakan Army, whose leader also attended the funeral.
In short, China is making itself critical to all of Myanmar’s most powerful military actors. The junta, dependent on China, is surrounded by well-armed EAOs in China’s orbit, all of which are gaining in influence and power as the military’s violent campaign against the pro-democracy forces continues. This has given these EAOs strong incentives to support the armed resistance against the military, and many are now training and even arming people’s defense forces.
Chinese leaders believe this web of involvements creates leverage to best advance China’s interests.
This is a dangerous strategy.
To be sure, China may pressure EAOs to stop supporting pro-democracy forces and recognize the junta. But this will prove problematic. First, this turns a blind eye to the key driver of the current crisis — decades of military oppression and attacks on the population, the most recent iteration of which has displaced more than 600,000 people since February 2021. Second, EAO constituencies have unequivocally rejected military rule, and turning to support the military will ultimately undermine their legitimacy.
In the end, China is likely to find that increased support for the junta will simply amplify anti-China sentiment, putting its hundreds of billions of dollars of strategic investment at greater risk. By propping up an illegitimate regime, China further sets the stage for protracted conflict.
Need for a Global Strategy in Support of Democracy
China’s recent moves represent a growing threat to peace and democracy at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region. While its violence and urgency may not match Russia’s assault on Ukraine, Myanmar’s democratic opposition sees the parallels. Its leaders have already started calling on the United States and other Western states to dramatically increase their support, worried that Russia’s war on Ukraine will leave their struggle, and that of their regional counterparts for peace and democracy, forgotten at a critical moment.
As Western states help Ukraine meet an existential threat, it is critical that they not ignore China’s moves in Southeast Asia. As an immediate step, the United States could encourage much higher levels of support from its QUAD partners to bolster democracy as a pillar of regional security. Another measure would be for the United States and its allies to look for more creative ways to assist the full range of opposition actors in Myanmar — especially key EAOs supporting the NUG. Finally, Washington might communicate clearly to China the dangers its strategy presents to regional stability and offer to establish high-level exchanges on the crisis to manage tensions between the two powers as efforts to restore democracy continue..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-12
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Individual Documents
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499.21 KB
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"12 April 2022: Australian, Indian and Saudi Arabian Ambassadors should be deeply ashamed of holding meetings with the leader of the illegal military junta in Myanmar while his forces beat civilians to death, burned villages to the ground and abducted children, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
The people of Myanmar have been resisting a violent attempt by the Myanmar military to seize power over their country since it launched a coup in February 2021. Civil disobedience, strikes, protests and armed resistance prevented the coup from succeeding, while vast areas of the country are under the territorial and administrative control of groups that recognise the authority of the legitimate National Unity Government of Myanmar.
Despite this, Ambassadors to Myanmar, including the Australian and Indian Ambassadors, prematurely held meetings with the leader of the junta, Min Aung Hlaing. The official engagements were used as propaganda by the junta leader in his ongoing attempt to gain domestic legitimacy. India, Australia and Saudi Arabia have resisted calls to impose personal sanctions on Min Aung Hlaing and other junta leaders like those imposed by the UK, US, EU and Canada. The members of SAC-M have been calling for Min Aung Hlaing to be prosecuted for genocide since 2018.
“The Myanmar people are engaged in an all-out struggle to defend themselves and their democracy from an internal occupying force that is intent on forcing them to succumb to authoritarianism,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “Foreign Ambassadors and other government representatives that choose to meet with the leader of that occupying force as if he is leader of Myanmar, might as well turn their backs on the Myanmar people altogether.”
Untold sacrifices have been made by the Myanmar people in their struggle. Thousands have been murdered and almost half a million people displaced as junta forces continue to wage a brutal campaign of terror involving mass murder, torture, arson, sexual and gender-based violence, enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention.
The junta continues to launch devastating airstrikes on civilian targets including displacement camps, schools, hospitals and places of worship while on the ground its troops commit regular massacres of unarmed civilians that have included the burning alive of children.
“The junta is waging a war against the people. The atrocities are not side effects of the conflict but part of a deliberate assault on the population,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “If the world truly stands for the rule of law, the principles of humanity and the fundamental right of all peoples to determine their own future, then equal action must be taken to defend those values wherever they are under threat – not hypocritical complicity with the very villains that would seek to stamp them out.”
The National Unity Government should be recognised as the legitimate government of Myanmar, according to internationally accepted criteria. SAC-M is calling for the international community to recognise the National Unity Government and work with it to end the crisis in Myanmar, to cut the supply of arms and cash to the illegal military junta and to refer the situation in Myanmar to International Criminal Court.
“The people of Myanmar will succeed in this fight for their country and their freedom,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The question is, how will history judge the rest of the world when the records of these years are written?”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Business and the Military, Sanctions, Human Rights Defenders
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pdf
Size:
99.49 KB
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"Statement of the National Unity Consultative Council on Atar Thingyan 1384..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
361.82 KB
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
596.41 KB
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Sub-title:
Supporting Business for Socially Responsible Disengagement
Description:
"It has been more than a year since the military junta seized power illegally in Myanmar. Our nation is facing one of its darkest moments. Just as the excesses of the junta against its own people have deterred ethical and responsible businesses from investing anew in Myanmar, it has become increasingly difficult for businesses to continue their operations. Businesses have been forced to consider whether their continued presence in the country is consistent with their own values in business ethics and social responsibility. Many have simply decided to disengage and divest.
The National Unity Government (NUG) values the contribution made by investors in the development of our country. During the now lost decade of relative freedom, foreign investors have created jobs and lifted masses from poverty. Whether they decide to divest or not under the present hostile environment is an active business decision. As with any business decision, due diligence must be exercised in deciding to divest.
While the people of Myanmar are resisting oppression by a murderous military regime, guilty of crimes against humanity and genocide, the businesses need must assess whether their actions risk harming the people or helping their oppressors.
The NUG published our ‘three-pillar framework’ guidance on responsible investment in July 2021. We are now issuing the government’s policy on socially responsible divestment.
In this document, we provide an ethical framework, alongside practical guidance on when and how to consider divestment and the process of doing so. It is our intention that this document will articulate overarching principle. Detailed guidance will be available from the ministry on a case-by-case or sector-by-sector basis, recognising the nuances in applying these principles into practice.
Our policies are consistent with the principles set out by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations guiding principles. How responsible businesses act in Myanmar will become the benchmark against which future divestment decisions are judged. The NUG recognises the dilemmas faced by responsible businesses in trying to make right decisions. We stand ready to assist businesses which try to make decisions that help the people of Myanmar.
In any struggle for life and liberty, the right side will always prevail. Soon, in a representative federal democratic union, we look forward to welcome back businesses that had the interests of the Myanmar people at heart..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Economy and social justice (global)
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Format :
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Sub-title:
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာကောင်စီ နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာ အသင်းချုပ်တို့ လက်ရှိသက်တမ်းများ ရပ်ဆိုင်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ နိုင်ငံတည်ဆောက်ရေးနှင့် အများပြည်သူများ ဘေးအန္တရာယ်ကင်းရှင်းရေးကို ကာကွယ်၍ တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရမည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများဖြစ်သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာကောင်စီ နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာအသင်းချုပ်တို့သည် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို အန္တရာယ်ပြုဖျက်ဆီးနေသော အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိနေသည်။
၂။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာကောင်စီသည် လိုင်စင်ကြေးများ ကို အဓမ္မကောက်ခံပြီး ယင်းငွေကြေးများအား ဆောက်လုပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသို့ ပေးအပ်၍ အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လုပ်ငန်းများတွင် တတပ်တအားပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနေသည်ကို အထောက်အထား ခိုင်လုံစွာဖြင့် သိရှိရပါသည်။
၃။ အဆိုပါ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာကောင်စီနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာအသင်းချုပ်တို့ကို တာဝန်ယူထိန်းကြောင်းဆောင်ရွက်နေသော နာယကများ၊ ကောင်စီဝင်များ၊ ဗဟိုကော်မတီဝင်များ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဆက်စပ်ကော်မတီဝင်များ အားလုံး၏ လက်ရှိသက်တမ်း အားဖျက်သိမ်းပြီး တာဝန်မှ ရပ်ဆိုင်းကြောင်း ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
၄။ အဆိုပါတာဝန်မှ ရပ်ဆိုင်းခံရသူအားလုံး၏ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများအားလုံးကို တရားဝင်မှု မရှိကြောင်း သတ်မှတ်လိုက်သည်။
၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာကောင်စီ နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအင်ဂျင်နီယာအသင်းချုပ်တို့၏ သက်တမ်း အသစ်ဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်းများအားလုံးကို နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတရုံးမှ နောက်ထပ်အမိန့်တစုံတရာ ထပ်မံထုတ်ပြန်သည့်အထိ ရပ်ဆိုင်းထားရမည်။
(ဒူဝါလရှီးလ)
နိုင်ငံတော်ယာယီသမ္မတ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်..."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Format :
pdf
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222.77 KB
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Description:
"1. Introductio n
Good morning.
I am honoured to attend the United Stales Holocaust Memorial Museum today, and I am
grateful to have been guided through its exhibitions.
The contents o f the Museum are devastating. The horrors that humanity has inflicted on groups
o f persons because o f their ethnic, racial or religious identity would be unthinkable were they
not recorded here and in similar institutions.
That makes this Museum essential it forces us to confront what we have collectively
committed, what we have allowed to occur, and what we are cursed to re live If we do not
correct course.
Yet the lessons o f history seem lost on us. As the Museum's case studies document, the
Holocaust was followed by atrocities and acts o f genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
Cambodia, and in Rwanda to name o n ly a few places. As I speak, reports are emerging o f
Ukrainian streets strewn with civilian bodies, and o f the unearthing o f mass graves.
2. M y a nm a r
As these cases show, atrocities can occur anywhere. No region has been spared. And it is with
terrible shame that Myanmar now features in the Museum’s collection in an exhibition entitled
Burma 's Path to Genocide.
On the 2 V o f March o f this year. Secretary o f Slate Anthony Blinken announced that after
careful, rigorous investigation and scrutiny, the United S tates Government had determined that
the Myanmar military' s 2 0 17 attacks against the Rohingya in Rakhine State amounted to
genocide and to crimes against humanity.
In a single wave o f atrocities in 2 0 17, thousands o f Rohingya were killed and disappeared and
close to a million were forcibly displaced. Rape and sexual v iolence, including mass gang rape,
were used as part o f a deliberate strategy to intimidate, terrorise o r punish the Rohingya as a
tactic o f war. Hundreds o f villages were razed.
Years later, hundreds o f thousands o f Rohingya remain displaced not only from their villages
and homes, but from the country to which they belong.
1
The U.S. Government' s determination followed longstanding calls by independent experts
including the United Nations (UN) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar - for Myanmar' s military leadership to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Rohingya.
Nor were these crimes limited to the Rohingya and Rakhine State. As the UN Fact-Finding
Mission found, military atrocities were also directed against ethnic groups in Kachin and Shan
States.
Today, the historic impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military has enabled its leadership to
commit now countrywide atrocities at the helm of an illegal military junta. The targeted few
have become the many.
3. The National Unity Government
The National Unity Government of Myanmar acknowledges with great shame that historic
exclusionary and discriminatory policies, practices and rhetoric against the Rohingya laid the
ground for atrocities. Over the course of decades, these atrocities recurred in waves. The
Holocaust Museum captures this in a section of the Burma exhibition entitled 'a history o f
persecution'. That is, a history of dehumanisation.
In June 2020, the National Unity Government issued a Policy Position on the Rohingya in
Rakhine State. This Policy acknowledged that grave crimes and atrocities had been committed
against the Rohingya by the military. It also made clear that the National Unity Government
would pursue accountability.
The U.S. Government' s determination of genocide is timely given that the International Court
of Justice the World Court is hearing a case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar
under the Genocide Convention. It is our hope that the U.S.’s determination will be instructive
to the Court and its deliberations.
The National Unity Government continues to extend every offer of support, including
evidence, to the Court. We remain determined to represent Myanmar in the case by displacing
the present representatives of the military junta, and we will accept and fully comply with
whatever the Court decides.
Furthermore, the National Unity Government has lodged an Article 12(3) Declaration with the
Registrar of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on behalf of Myanmar, accepting the ICC' s
jurisdiction with respect to international crimes - including genocide - committed in the
country since 1 July 2002. We stand ready to provide the ICC with evidence and, in the interim,
continue to share evidence and corroborative materials with the UN's Independent
Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
In my meetings with senior government officials over the coming days, I will strongly
encourage the U.S. to use its permanent membership of the UN Security Council to refer the
situation in Myanmar to the ICC.
4. Practical steps
The legal determination of atrocity crimes and of genocide would be of great significance in
recognising the horrors occasioned against the Rohingya and other Myanmar communities,
and, crucially, in securing accountability.
Judicial decisions, however, must be joined by practical steps. The National Unity
Government's Policy Position on the Rohingya commits to the safe, voluntary, dignified, and
sustainable returns of all Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. It also commits
2
to comprehensive legislative and policy reform on citizenship, and to ensuring equality of
rights and opportunity for all.
5. Conclusion
Myanmar' s Federal Democracy Charter envisages a nation founded on peace, justice, equality,
human rights, and the protection of minorities.
For now. this remains a vision. Since its failed coup d ' etat of 1 February 2021, the illegal
military junta has escalated its atrocities and acts of terror to levels unprecedented in modern
Myanmar.
Peaceful protestors have been shot dead in the streets by snipers. Children have been murdered
in their homes. Young people have been disappeared. Thousands more remain arbitrarily
detained, with corresponding reports of torture, rape and sexual violence. Civilians have been
burned alive. Air strikes and shelling are targeting villages. Yet again, homes have been razed
and hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced.
But the people will prevail. We have formed a rights-based resistance based on democratic
values and fundamental freedoms. We have deployed civil disobedience. We have gathered in
peaceful protests. We are acting in self-defence to protect our communities.
And once we do prevail, once our vision becomes our lived reality, it will remain the duty of
this Museum and of the international community to ensure that Myanmar never forgets the
atrocities and horrors that it committed against its own people.
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
698.19 KB 782.99 KB
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Description:
"- ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ ၄၉ ကြိမ်မြောက် ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေးတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဦးအောင်မျိုးမင်း တင်ပြခဲ့သည့် တောင်းဆိုချက်များ
- ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ ၄၉ ကြိမ်မြောက် ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေးတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး အခြေအနေများဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်နှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေငြာချက်
- စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွင်း ဖမ်းဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုများ
- မန္တလေးတိုင်းအတွင်း ဖမ်းဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုများ
- မကွေးတိုင်းအတွင်း ဖမ်းဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုများ
- နိုင်ငံတဝန်းရှိ ဖမ်းဆီး၊ သတ်ဖြတ်၊ ဖိနှိပ်နေမှုများ
"လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းလွှာအား နှစ်ပတ်တစ်ကြိမ်ထုတ်ပြန်ပါမည်။"..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.58 MB
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
960.81 KB
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Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၂၂) နှစ်မြောက် ကယန်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ၌ရောက်ရှိနေထိုင်နေကြသော ကယန်းအမျိုးသမီး၊ အမျိုးသားများအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ် နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာလုံခြုံ၍ ဘေးရန်အပေါင်းမှ ကင်းကွာကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလိုက်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကယန်းလူမျိုးသည် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားအုပ်စုတွင်ပါဝင်သည့် လူမျိုးတစ်မျိုးဖြစ်သည်။ ကယန်းလူမျိုး အပါအဝင်ဖြစ်သော ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားအုပ်စုသည် ကရင်အမျိုးသားအုပ်စု၊ ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားအုပ်စုတို့နှင့်အတူ လူမျိုးတူစုဖြစ်ပြီး ဘာသာစကားရင်းအရ (၇၅) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကျော်တူညီကြောင်းသိရှိရသည်။ ထို့အတူ ကယန်း လူမျိုးများအနေဖြင့် ခရစ်နှစ် ၁၀၅၇ တွင် ကရင်နီပြည်အဖြစ် စတင်ထူထောင်ကြရာ၌ လည်းကောင်း၊ ၁၈၇၅ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ဗြိတိသျှအစိုးရနှင့် မင်းတုန်းမင်းတို့က ကရင်နီပြည်ကို သီးခြားလွတ်လပ်သော ပြည်အဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုလာခဲ့ပြီးနောက်တွင်လည်းကောင်း အခြားသော ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားအုပ်စုဝင် လူမျိုး များနှင့်အတူတကွ အေးအတူပူအမျှ နေထိုင်လာခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။ ခရစ်နှစ် ၂၀၀၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၈-၁၀) ရက်များအတွင်း ကရင်ပြည်နယ်၊ ကယားပြည်နယ်၊ ရှမ်း ပြည်နယ်နှင့် မန္တလေးတိုင်းတို့တွင်နေထိုင်သည့် ကယန်းလူမျိုးခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ ကယန်းလူမျိုးနွယ်စု (၄) မျိုး ဖြစ်သော ကယန်းကငန်၊ ကယန်းကဲဒေါ့၊ ကယန်းလထာနှင့် ကယန်းကခေါင်းတို့မှ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ ဘာသာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ကယန်းလူမျိုးဆရာတော်ကြီးများ၊ လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်း ခေါင်းဆောင်များစုဝေးကာ ကယန်းလူမျိုးအတွက် အရေးကြီးသည့်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၃) ရပ်ဖြစ်သော လက်တင် အက္ခရာဖြင့်အသုံးပြုထားသည့်စာကို ပြုပြင်မွမ်းမံ၍ ကယန်းအမျိုးသားစာပေအဖြစ် အတည်ပြုခြင်း၊ ကယန်း ကငန်၊ ကယန်းကဲဒေါ့၊ ကယန်းလထာနှင့် ကယန်းကခေါင်းဟူသည့် မျိုးနွယ်စုများသည် ကယန်းအမျိုးသား တစ်ခုတည်းအဖြစ် ခံယူအတည်ပြုခြင်းနှင့် ကယန်းအမျိုးသားအလံတော်ကို အတည်ပြုခြင်းတို့ဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းနှစ် ဧပြီလ (၁၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကယန်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ကို ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်စတင်ကျင်းပလာခဲ့ပြီး ယခု အခါ (၂၂) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်ပြီဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ ကယန်းလူမျိုးတို့၏ အန္တိမရည်မှန်းချက်မှာ အာဏာရှင်ဟူသမျှချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးနှင့် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားဖြစ်သော ကယန်းလူမျိုးတို့ နေထိုင်ရာဒေသသည် ကရင်နီပြည်အတွင်း ပြန်လည်စုစည်းရောက်ရှိရေးဖြစ်ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။ ယင်းအတွက် ကယန်းပြည်သစ် ပါတီအပါအဝင် ကယန်းနိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုများက ဦးစီးဦးဆောင်ပြု ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသည်ကိုလည်း တွေ့ရ ပေသည်။
၅။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် တပ်မတော်က နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို ထပ်မံလုယူ သိမ်းပိုက်ရန် ကြိုးစားလာခဲ့သောအခါ ကယန်းလူမျိုးများစွာက လက်မခံဘဲ ဆန့်ကျင့်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ယခုအခါ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှကို ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်လိုကြသည့် ကယန်းလူမျိုးများအနေဖြင့် လက်တွေ့ ကျသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအခင်းအကျင်းထဲသို့ ဝင်ရောက်ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသည်ကို တွေ့ရသည့်အတွက်လည်း များစွာ ဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူမိပါသည်။
၆။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၂၂) နှစ်မြောက် ကယန်းအမျိုးသားနေ့မှစ၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ကယန်းအမျိုးသမီး၊ အမျိုးသား များပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသော လွတ်မြောက်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ လျင်မြန်စွာ ပြီးမြောက် အောင်မြင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-10
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Format :
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538.85 KB
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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"There was a reported case of abducting a 4-year-old child from his kindergarten by the junta forces wearing plain-clothes on April 5th in Ahlone township since the forces seemingly fail to find his father. It is likely that the child in question was kidnapped following the junta's policy of “punishment by proxy”. Since the kidnapping, the whereabouts of the 4-year-old child remains unknown. It was reported later that the mother has been in interrogation centre while the child was kidnapped. Both the lives of mother and the child are in danger.
On Feb 21st, 2022, 20 young children were arrested in Chauk and threatened by the junta terrorists. On March 6th, 2022, another 4-year-old was brutally murdered with a spear in Pauk township by the military forces. When they cannot find the people they want, their family members, children and parents are taken or killed as a proxy. They are cowardly committing war crimes against children with alarming regularity. According to the data collected by the Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs of the National Unity Government, there were 132 people under 18 years of age killed by the junta between the beginning of the coup and April 4th, 2022, and 216 arrested until 1 April 2022. Of these 216, 2 were given the death penalty, one of them was under 15.
According to Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it states that: “Governments must do all they can to ensure that children are protected from all forms of violence, abuse, neglect and bad treatment”. The National Unity Government (NUG) recognizes the need to protect children. The National Unity Government (NUG) condemns in the strongest possible terms the killing of children, and the abduction and arrest of children as proxies to punish or torment their families. Such barbaric and inhumane acts are all too common and wide-spread among the junta and their allies. The National Unity Government (NUG) will do everything within its power to thoroughly investigate each and every case, reunite families that have been torn apart, and hold all those responsible to account. International organizations/communities are committed to ensuring the safety and well-being of all children in Myanmar. We strongly urge you to take effective actions against the Terrorist Military Council in order to ensure the safety of our children..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
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71.2 KB 310.2 KB
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"ဖခင်ဖြစ်သူအား ရှာဖွေမတွေ့ရှိသဖြင့် ၄ နှစ်အရွယ်သားဖြစ်သူကို မူကြိုကျောင်းမှနေ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များက အရပ်ဝတ်များဝတ်ကာ ဓားစာခံအဖြစ် ဖမ်းဆီးခေါ်ဆောင်သွားသည့် ဖြစ်ရပ်တစ်ခု ဧပြီလ (၅) ရက်နေ့တွင် အလုံမြို့နယ်အတွင်း ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကလေးငယ်အား ဖမ်းဆီးခေါ်ဆောင်သွားချိန်မှစ၍ ယခုအချိန်အထိ မည်သည့်နေရာတွင် ထားရှိသည်ကိုလဲ မသိရှိရသေးပါ။ ကလေးငယ်၏ မိခင်အားဖမ်းဆီးထားပြီး စစ်ကြောရေး လုပ်နေစဉ်ကာလအတွင်း ကလေးငယ်အား ထပ်မံဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ကလေးငယ်နှင့် မိခင်တို့၏ အသက်အန္တရာယ်ပါ စိုးရိမ်ဖွယ်ရာ အခြေအနေဖြစ်ကြောင်းသိရှိရပါသည်။
၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၁)ရက်နေ့ ချောက်မြို့နယ်တွင် ကလေးသူငယ်(၂၀) ဦးအား ဖမ်းဆီးပြီး ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုများပြုလုပ်ခြင်း၊ မတ်လ (၆) ရက်နေ့ ပေါက်မြို့နယ်တွင် (၄) နှစ်အရွယ် ကလေးငယ်အား လှံစွပ်ဖြင့်ထိုးသတ်ခြင်း အပါအဝင် အလိုရှိသူများအား ဖမ်းဆီးနိုင်ခြင်းမရှိသောကြောင့် မိသားစုဝင်များဖြစ်သည့် ကလေးသူငယ်များ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အိုများ ကို ဓားစာခံအဖြစ်ဖမ်းဆီးသည့်လုပ်ရပ်များကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များက သူရဲဘောကြောင်စွာ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြပြီး စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိကြပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်နှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်ရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ပြုစုထားသော စာရင်းများအရ အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုကြောင့် သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသော (၁၈) နှစ်အောက် ကလေးသူငယ်ဦးရေမှာ ဧပြီလ (၄)ရက်နေ့ထိ (၁၃၂) ဦး၊ ဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသူ ဦးရေမှာ ဧပြီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့အထိ (၂၁၆) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်ဟု သိရပါသည်။ ဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသူများထဲမှ (၂) ဦးမှာ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ် ခံထားရပြီး သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရသည့် ကလေး (၂)ဦးထဲတွင် အသက် (၁၅)နှစ်အောက် တစ်ဦးပါဝင်ပါသည်။
ကလေးသူငယ်အခွင့်အရေးများဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂညီလာခံ သဘောတူစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၁၉ တွင်ပါဝင်သော “ကလေးများ ကောင်းမွန်စွာ စောင့်ရှောက်မှုခံရစေရန် နိုင်ငံအစိုးရများက စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရပါမည်။ ကလေးများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ လွဲမှားစွာပြုမူခြင်းနှင့် လျစ်လျူရှုခြင်းများကို မိဘများ သို့မဟုတ် ၄င်းတို့ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းစောင့်ရှောက်သူ မည်သူမဆို မပြုလုပ်ရန်လည်း တားဆီးကာကွယ်ပေးရပါမည်” ဟူသည့်အချက်အတိုင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အနေဖြင့် ကလေးသူငယ်များအား အကာကွယ်ပေးရမည်ဟု ခံယူပါသည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ ကလေးသူငယ်များအား သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီး ထောင်ချခြင်း၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များကို ပြန်ပေးဆွဲကာ မိဘများကို လာရောက် အဖမ်းခံခိုင်းခြင်း စသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လူမဆန်သော လုပ်ရပ်များကို ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုတ်ချပြီး အဆိုပါ ဖြစ်ရပ်တိုင်းတွင် တစ်စုံတစ်ရာပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများအားလုံးအား စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးဖော်ထုတ်ကာ ထိုက်သင့်သော တရားစီရင်မှု ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရေး အစွမ်းကုန် ကြိုးစားဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဟု သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့်လဲ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ကလေးသူငယ်များ အားလုံး၏ လုံခြုံရေး၊ အသက်ရှင်သန်နိုင်ရေး တို့ကိုငဲ့ကွက်၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ထိရောက်ပြင်းထန်သော အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ကြရန် အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-08
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Meeting with alleged war criminal a betrayal of Myanmar people that will be used as propaganda to legitimise unlawful government, critics say
Description:
"Australia’s ambassador to Myanmar met alleged war criminal and coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday, in a meeting the junta claims discussed “enhancement of cooperation” between the two countries.
Pictures published by the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper show Australia’s ambassador, Andrea Faulkner, and military attache, meeting with the coup leader in the Myanmar capital Naypyidaw.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing led the Myanmar military’s pogrom against the ethnic minority Rohingya in 2017, which killed more than 25,000 people and forced more than 700,000 to flee the country, and he engineered a military coup in February 2021, later declaring himself prime minister.
Min Aung Hlaing has been recommended by the UN for investigation and prosecution for war crimes and genocide, and personally sanctioned by the US, EU, UK and Canada, but not by Australia.
Advocates for Myanmar’s elected government argued the meeting between the coup leader and the representative of a western democracy, would be used as a propaganda tool by the junta to legitimise its unlawful control of Myanmar. Justice for Myanmar’s Yadanar Maung described Australia’s decision to take the meeting as “an act of betrayal” of the Myanmar people.
Manny Maung, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, said the meeting was “deeply unacceptable” and “only serves to lend credibility to a military junta that is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity”.
The meeting has been prominently reported by Myanmar’s state-controlled media, in Burmese, and in English for international audiences. Several pictures of the meeting have been published, including one of the Senior General presenting the ambassador with a painting as a gift.
The regime reported that Wednesday’s meeting, in the parlour of Min Aung Hlaing’s office, discussed “the further maintenance of good relations between two countries, enhancement of cooperation in various sectors between governments and peoples of both countries”.
It described the CRPH, the elected exiled Myanmar parliament, and the NUG, the exiled National Unity Government , as “terrorists”.
Before Senate estimates on Thursday, Katrina Cooper, the deputy secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was questioned by Greens senator Janet Rice over the junta’s reports that the meeting discussed “cooperation in various sectors” and “maintenance of good relations”.
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Cooper would not comment on the junta’s characterisation of the meeting, but said there were no areas of cooperation with the junta and that the ambassador “asked for a number of things”.
“She reiterated Australia’s concern about the situation in Myanmar, she urged the Myanmar military to cease violence, release arbitrary detainees, engage in dialogue and ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.”
The meeting between Australia’s ambassador, who is finishing her posting, and Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday was one of at least eight meetings or phone calls Australian diplomats and defence officials have had with junta representatives since the coup last February, estimates heard.
Rice asked if engaging with the junta risked legitimising its control of the country.
Cooper defended Australia’s position, arguing its “limited” engagement with the regime “give us an opportunity to speak directly to the regime”, including to call for an end to violence and grant humanitarian access.
“We don’t consider that the engagement we’ve had to date legitimises the current regime.”
But Yadanar Maung said the military junta was a terrorist organisation and ‘Australia’s continued engagement with it was “an act of betrayal to its own democracy”.
She said the meeting would be used to legitimise the military’s forcible seizure of control of the country.
“The latest meeting has given fodder for the junta’s domestic propaganda and is part of a pattern of complicity that stands out from Australia’s democratic allies. Australia has still failed to impose any targeted sanctions on the Myanmar junta and military businesses in response to the coup attempt and the military’s ongoing atrocities, and Australia’s Future Fund continues to invest in companies doing business with the military, including an arms supplier.”
Analysis prepared by the Australian Council for International Development (Acfid) shows the US, the UK, Canada and the EU have imposed sanctions against a total of 196 individuals and 172 entities, including subsidiaries, as of February.
The chief executive of Acfid, Marc Purcell, said Australia’s failure to impose any additional sanctions against the generals since the coup 14 months ago was “increasingly glaring” compared with actions taken by other like-minded countries.
Cooper said the government weighed up “a number of important considerations” when deciding on possible sanctions, including consular matters such as the ongoing “arbitrary detention” of the Australian academic, Prof Sean Turnell. Turnell was an economic adviser to the democratically elected Myanmar government..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Local URL:
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Sub-title:
“အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် အသုံးပြုလျက်ရှိသော လေယာဉ်၊ ရေယာဉ်၊ ရဟတ်ယာဉ်၊ စက်ယာဉ်ယန္တယားတို့နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ဆုငွေချီးမြှင့်ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်”
Description:
"၁) အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်လျက်ရှိသည့် ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် အဆုံးစွန်၊ ရက်စက်သော နည်းလမ်းဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်က လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ၊ မြေပြင်ထိုးစစ်၊ ရေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ နေ့စဉ် ပြုလုပ် လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၂) အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထုအား ဝေဟင်၊ ရေပြင်၊ မြေပြင်မှ တိုက်ခိုက်ရာတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် အသုံးပြုလျက်ရှိသည့် တိုက်လေယာဉ်၊ ရဟတ်ယာဉ်၊ ထောက်ပို့လေယာဉ်၊ တိုက်ရေယာဉ်၊ တင့်ကား၊ သံချပ်ကာယာဉ်စသည့် စက်ယာဉ်ယန္တရားများသည် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်အား ကာကွယ်မှုပေးနိုင်ရန် ပြည်သူ့အခွန်ဘဏ္ဍာငွေဖြင့် ဝယ်ယူထားသော ပြည်သူပိုင်ပစ္စည်းများသာ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃) ယခုအခါ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်မှုမပေးသည့်အပြင် အဆိုပါ စက်ယာဉ်ယန္တရားများ အသုံးပြု၍ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များအား ရက်ရက် စက်စက် တိုက်ခိုက်ဖျက်ဆီးလျက်ရှိသည်မှာ လုံးဝခွင့်လွှတ်နိုင်ဖွယ်မရှိသော လုပ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည်။
၄) သို့ပါ၍ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ၊ ရေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ၊ မြေပြင်ထိုးစစ်များမှ ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရန်အလို့ငှာ အောက်ပါ ဆုငွေချီးမြှင့် ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာအမိန့်အား ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
မည်သူမဆို-
(က) ပြည်သူလူထုအား ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှု အလျဉ်းမပြုလုပ်ဘဲ၊ လေယာဉ်၊ ရဟတ်ယာဉ်၊ တိုက်ရေယာဉ်နှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်သို့ ခိုလှုံလာလျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၅ သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၁၀,၀၀၀။
(ခ) တိုက်လေယာဉ်၊ ရဟတ်ယာဉ်၊ ထောက်ပို့လေယာဉ်၊ တိုက်ရေယာဉ်များအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် အခြေစိုက်စခန်းတွင် ရပ်နားထားစဉ် အကြီးစားပျက်စီးမှု ဖြစ်သည့်အထိ ဖျက်ဆီးနိုင်လျှင် တစ်စီးလျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၃ သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၆,၀၀၀။
(ဂ) အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ရန် ပျံသန်း/ထွက်ခွါလာစဉ် လမ်းခုလတ်၌ တနည်းနည်းဖြင့် ပျက်စီးစေရန် စွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်လျှင် တစ်စီးလျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၃ သိန်း(သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၆,၀၀၀။
(ဃ) ပစ်မှတ်သို့ ရောက်ရှိအောင် ပျံသန်းလာပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုအား ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်မှုမပြုလုပ်ဘဲ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ထိုးစိုက်ပျက်ကျအောင် စွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်လျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၃ သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၆,၀၀၀။
(င) လေယာဉ်၊ ရဟတ်ယာဉ်၊ ထောက်ပို့လေယာဉ်၊ တိုက်ရေယာဉ်များအား အကြီးစား ပျက်စီးသည်အထိ ပစ်ခတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်လျှင် တစ်စီးလျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၃သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၆,၀၀၀။
(စ) တိုက်လေယာဉ်ဆီ သိုလှောင်ကန်များအား ထိရောက်စွာ ဖောက်ထုတ်၊ ဖျက်ဆီးနိုင်လျှင် တစ်ကန်လျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁ သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၂,၀၀၀။
(ဆ) အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လက်နက်တိုက်၊ လက်နက်စက်ရုံများအား ဖောက်ခွဲဖျက်ဆီး နိုင်လျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁ သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၂,၀၀၀။
(ဇ) မြေပြင်ထိုးစစ်တွင် အသုံးပြုသော တင့်ကား၊ သံချပ်ကာယာဉ်များနှင့်အတူ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင် သို့ ခိုလှုံလာလျှင် တစ်စီးလျှင် ဆုငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁ သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၂,၀၀၀။
(ဈ) တင့်ကား၊ သံချပ်ကာယာဉ်များအား လုံးဝပြန်လည်အသုံးပြု၍ မရသည်အထိ ပစ်ခတ် ချေမှုန်းနိုင်လျှင် တစ်စီးလျှင် ဆုငွေအမေရိကန် ဒေါ်လာ ၁ သိန်း (သို့) မြန်မာ ကျပ်ငွေ သိန်း ၂,၀၀၀။
(၅) ဆုချီးမြှင့်ငွေများအား အချက်အလက် ခိုင်လုံစွာ တင်ပြနိုင်သည့် အစုအဖွဲ့လိုက်ဖြစ်စေ၊ တစ်ဦးချင်းဖြစ်စေ ခံစားခွင့် ရှိသည်။
(၆) ဤအမိန့်အရ ချီးမြှင့်သည့် ဆုကြေးငွေများလက်ခံရယူခြင်းနှင့် ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များအား The Public Property Protection Act-1947 အရ တရားစွဲဆို၊ အရေးယူ၊ အပြစ်ပေးခံရခြင်း မရှိစေရ။
(၇) ဤအမိန့်အား The Public Property Protection Act-1947, Section 3(b)ပါ ပြဌာန်းချက်နှင့်အညီ ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
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"The human rights situation in Myanmar is becoming increasingly unstable. Hundreds of thousands have been forcibly displaced. Among those trying to help injured civilians, protesters and combatants from the People’s Defense Forces are medical professionals. They too have been targeted by the Myanmar junta who have used their weapons to destroy clinics and confiscate medicine. In the midst of a pandemic, these actions are increasingly volatile.
Doctors and nurses, who have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have been forced into hiding. Despite mass arrest warrants issued, many are still providing treatment and care in secret. Their will and spirit cannot be marred by the junta.
The war that the Myanmar military is waging in their cruel pursuit for power has destabilized the country beyond repair. The health care sector is one of many which has been obliterated. Health care services are now largely beyond reach of every day civilians who are struggling to survive on the bare minimum as conflict wreaks havoc across the country.
On World Health Day, the Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma recognizes the many injustices perpetrated against health care workers by the soldiers of the Myanmar Army. We condemn these unlawful attacks and call for their immediate protection, as well as for those arrested and detained to be released and all charges dropped..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Health Workers Strike, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"In one drawing, dozens of men sit crammed into a single room, hunched with their knees together, every inch of space occupied. In another, they lie back to back on the floor, their faces straining with discomfort.
Fourteen sketches smuggled out of Myanmar's Insein Prison and interviews with eight former prisoners offer a rare glimpse inside the country's most notorious jail, where thousands of political prisoners have been sent since last year's military coup and communication with the outside world is sharply limited.
The rough, blue-ink sketches show daily life for groups of male prisoners in their dormitories, queuing for water from a trough to wash, talking or lying on the floor in the tropical heat.
Beyond those depictions, the eight recently released inmates told Reuters the colonial-era facility in Yangon is infested with rats, a place where bribes are common, prisoners pay for sleeping space on the floor and widespread illness goes untreated.
"We're no longer humans behind bars," said Nyi Nyi Htwe, 24, who smuggled the sketches out of the prison when he was released in October, after spending several months for a defamation conviction, on charges he denies, in connection with joining protests against the coup.
Reuters could not independently verify the accounts provided by the former inmates.
Myanmar's junta, which seized power from the elected government of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, and prison administration did not respond to multiple requests for comment on conditions shown in the sketches and described by the former inmates.
Humanitarian groups including the International Committee of the Red Cross told Reuters they have been denied access to the jail.
Built by the British in 1871, Insein is Myanmar's largest prison, housing many people arrested for opposing the junta.
Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, convicted of breaking Myanmar's Official Secrets Act in 2017, spent most of their 511 days behind bars in Insein. They were released in a 2019 amnesty, before the latest coup.
PRISON POPULATION SWELLS
The artist drew the prison sketches between April and July of last year. Later released, he declined to be interviewed or identified, telling Nyi Nyi Htwe he feared rearrest.
Nyi Nyi Htwe, who met the artist in prison, said he sketched prisoners if asked and drew prison scenes wherever he went, saying he felt more relaxed while drawing. He gave Nyi Nyi Htwe the sketches as a birthday present.
Nyi Nyi Htwe said he smuggled them out on his release to show friends, family and others the conditions inside.
Since the coup, 10,072 people have been detained in the Southeast Asian country, including Suu Kyi and most of her cabinet, and over 1,730 people have been killed, according to the nonprofit Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, whose tallies are widely cited. The junta has said AAPP's figures are exaggerated.
Many of those detained have been sent to Insein.
Built to incarcerate around 5,000 people, the prison has seen inmate numbers swell to over 10,000 since the coup, said a spokesperson for the AAPP. Reuters could not confirm the figures.
The sketches reflect the increase in the months after the coup, said Nyi Nyi Htwe.
In one from late April, a few prisoners sit apart in their dorm, some reading books. A picture from June shows about 60 people in the same room - many lying in tight rows down the centre, the rest hunched against the walls.
Nyi Nyi Htwe said he and as many as 100 others were packed well beyond capacity into a room where they "slept a finger-width apart," and that he watched prison officers beat inmates with batons and had to pay bribes to send messages to family that they told him often did not arrive.
'LUCKY NOT TO DIE'
With the overcrowding came water shortages, disease, fatigue, fighting between prisoners and flourishing bribery, said people released in recent months.
"Rats ran around in the room. The toilets were filthy. The food was mixed with flies. Those who couldn't pay a bribe had to sleep next to the toilet bucket," said Sandar Win, a 42-year-old social worker jailed at Insein for several months for defamation after protesting against the junta.
She was released under an amnesty while awaiting sentencing for the charges, which she denies. She has since fled Myanmar.
Access to outdoor latrines was limited, forcing prisoners to defecate in buckets in their rooms, three women former inmates said. These unsanitary conditions allowed skin and bowel diseases to spread, and there was little medical help, they said.
A handwritten note by a group of anonymous Insein inmates, smuggled out to a prominent human rights activist in February, alleges several instances of medical negligence, including failure to treat people beaten unconscious and a person who had suffered a stroke and was paralysed.
"These cases are happening right in front of us," said the note, which was shown to Reuters by the activist, Nan Lin. "We request urgent help from international organisations and local organisations."
Reuters could not independently verify the note's authenticity, but several former inmates said they had witnessed or suffered beatings by guards and there was little medical support.
Despite a COVID-19 vaccination drive at Insein last summer that was publicised on state media, former inmates said the coronavirus thrived in the crowded prison. At least 10 prisoners are suspected to have died from the disease, according to the AAPP. read more
Nyi Nyi Htwe, who has joined an armed rebel group, said nearly two-thirds of his dormitory were sick with COVID symptoms last summer.
"They put all the sick people in our room — high fever, coughing and ill," he said. "I was lucky enough not to die."
A set of smuggled notes shown to Reuters by an aid group show an exchange between a father, held on defamation charges, and his young son.
"Behaving well, Papa. I miss you. I'd like to have a toy boat," wrote the boy.
"My little son," came the reply, including a tiny boat the father fashioned from instant coffee wrappers. "I love you so much, my sweetheart. Please listen to your grandma."..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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"မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေမှာ ပို၍ မတည်မငြိမ်ဖြစ်လျှက်ရှိသည်။ သိန်းနှင့်ချီသည့် ပြည်သူလူထု မှာ မဖြစ်မနေ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်နေရသည်။ ဒဏ်ရာရ ပြည်သူများ၊ ဆန္ဒပြသူများနှင့် PDFs တပ်သားများအား ကြိုးစား ကုသပေးနေသူများမှာ ဆေးဘက်ဆိုင်ရာကျွမ်းကျင်သူများဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဆေးရုံ၊ ဆေးခန်းများအား ဖျက်ဆီး၍ဆေးဝါးများ မတရားသိမ်းဆည်းနေသည့် မြန်မာစစ်အာဏာရှင်တပ် များ၏ ပစ်မှတ်ထားခြင်းခံနေရသည်။ကမ္ဘာ့ကပ်ရောဂါ ဖြစ်ပွားနေချိန်တွင် ထိုသို့လုပ်ဆောင်မှုကြောင့် ကျန်းမာရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပြဿနာများကို ပို၍ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေသည်။
CDM တွင် ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်သည့် ဆရာဝန်နှင့် သူနာပြုများသည် တိမ်းရှောင်နေကြရသည်။ ဖမ်းဝရမ်းများ အထုတ်ခံထားကြရသော်လည်း ဆရာဝန်နှင့် သူနာပြုများက တိတ်တဆိတ် ကုသ၍ ကျန်းမာရေး စောင့်ရှောက်ပေးကြသည်။ ၎င်းတို့၏ စိတ်ဓာတ်နှင့် ဆန္ဒကို စစ်အာဏာရှင်များမှ ရိုက်ချိုး၍ မရပေ။ အာဏာကို ငန်းငန်းတက် လိုချင်၍ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဆင်နွှဲနေသည့် စစ်ပွဲသည် ထိန်းချုပ် ပြုပြင်၍ မရလောက်အောင် မတည်မငြိမ်ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေသည်။ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှု ကဏ္ဌသည် ဖျက်ဆီးခံရသည့် ကဏ္ဌများထဲမှ တခုဖြစ်သည်။ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုသည် နိုင်ငံတဝှန်း ပဋိပက္ခများကြောင့် အကြီးအကျယ်ထိခိုက်ကသောင်းကနင်း ဖြစ်နေပြီး အနိမ့်ဆုံးအဆင့်ဝင်ငွေဖြင့် အသက်ရှင်သန်ရန် ရုန်းကန်နေရသည့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ လက်လှမ်းမမီနိုင်သည့် အခြေအနေတွင် ရှိနေသည်။
ကမ္ဘာ့ကျန်းမာရေးနေ့တွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ စစ်သားများက ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများအပေါ် မတရားမှုများကျူးလွန်နေသည်ကို မိမိတို့ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးမှတ်တမ်းကွန်ရက် (မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ) (ND-Burma) မှ သိရှိနားလည်သဘောပေါက်ပါသည်။ ယခုလို မတရား တိုက်ခိုက်နေမှုများကို ပြစ်တင်ရှုံ့ချပြီး ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများအား အလျင်အမြန် အကာအကွယ်ပေးရန်နှင့် ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်း ခံထားရသူများအားလည်း အမှုများမှ ရုပ် သိမ်း၍ အမြန်ဆုံးလွှတ်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Health Workers Strike, Anti-coup protesters, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Statement by The International Karen Organisation
The International Karen Organisation condemns the Burmese military’s airstrikes and heavy artillery strikes in Kawthoolei (Karen State) on Myanmar Armed Forces Day (also known as Burma Revolution Day) on 27th March. The airstrikes took place once in Mutraw and twice in Dooplaya Districts.
On Sunday 27 March 2022, at around 2am, 2 fighter jets from the Burmese military dropped 4 bombs in Day Bu Noh village, Lu Thaw Township, Mutraw District damaging some houses and buildings. This is the same village that faced Burmese military airstrikes on the same day last year, which were the first airstrikes in Karen State in 25 years.
On the same day, the Burmese military conducted 2 rounds of airstrikes in Dooplaya at around 1:30pm and 5:10pm, around Bler Doh village near Thay Baw Boe, in Kawtaree (Kawkareik) Township. The day before, the Burmese military launched airstrikes in Oo Gray Kee area, destroying villagers’ houses. The Burmese military is also using heavy artillery and indiscriminately bombing civilian villages in the area, causing more displacement and a humanitarian crisis.
The Burmese military’s indiscriminate bombings of civilian targets are violations of international law, constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity, and there must be accountability for their international crimes.
Currently, we estimate there are around 150,000 displaced civilians in Karen State alone and they are in desperate need of food, medicine and shelter. The majority are displaced because of airstrikes or can’t return home because of the threat of airstrikes.
We appeal to the international community to provide more humanitarian aid for the displaced civilians and for international NGOs to work with local Karen organisations for aid delivery through cross-border assistance, and to relax unreasonable sourcing and reporting requirements, which are impossible to meet when delivering cross border aid to a conflict zone.
We welcome new sanctions targeting the Burmese air force imposed last week by the UK, USA and Canada. We call on them and the European Union to help stop Burmese military airstrikes by imposing sanctions to stop aviation fuel supplies to Burma. If the jets can’t fly, they can’t bomb.
We are also calling for sanctions on Burmese companies involved in the supply of aviation fuel to the Burmese military and sanctions to stop international companies being involved in any aspect of the supply of aviation fuel to the Burmese military. Those companies involved in the supply of aviation fuel to the Burmese military are complicit in the bombing of civilians and violations of international law.
We call on the Royal Thai government to stop pushing refugees back to conflict zones in Burma and allow them to stay in Thailand until it is safe for them to return home..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"We welcome today’s news that the United States House of Representatives has passed the BURMA Act of 2021. This bill, first introduced last October, is the result of months of negotiations between Republicans and Democrats in the House. The bill’s provisions bring together the four primary threads of US policy towards Myanmar: targeting military revenues through sanctions, supporting the pro-democracy movement, authorizing humanitarian assistance, and pursuing accountability for the military’s atrocities.
“This bill is a big step forward in the US response to the coup in Myanmar,” said Hanna Hindstrom, Senior Myanmar Campaigner Global Witness. “The fact that the House could come together and pass this bill in a bipartisan manner demonstrates that the situation in Myanmar remains firmly on the US agenda.”
The BURMA Act’s key elements include authorizing over $450 million in humanitarian aid and support for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar over five years, expanding sanctions authorisations, and creating a coordinator position to oversee Myanmar policy in the US. The bill also calls for the US to support international justice mechanisms in response to the military’s targeted campaign against the Rohingya people in 2017, which the the U.S. recognized last month as genocide.
“The bill provides desperately needed aid to the people of Myanmar while also strengthening the sanctions tools available to the US,” added Hindstrom. “The US should continue to use these tools to place pressure on Myanmar’s military regime, especially by targeting Myanmar’s offshore gas industry, which is the largest source of revenue for the junta.”
To this end, the bill calls for a comprehensive report on how sanctions on Myanmar’s state-owned oil and gas company, MOGE, would support US interests and the people of Myanmar. This will place additional pressure on President Biden’s administration to follow the EU’s lead and finally sanction MOGE. The US has so far resisted calls to impose sanctions on Myanmar’s gas industry from the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar, including hundreds of civil society organizations and the Myanmar National Unity Government. Even Total, the largest oil and gas multinational operating in Myanmar, began calling for the industry to be sanctioned in January before announcing that it would begin its withdrawal from the country.
The passage of the BURMA Act marks important progress, but additional hurdles remain. The Senate must also pass the BURMA Act - a process currently being held up by Senator Todd Young of Indiana.
“We call on the Senate to move quickly to resolve its differences and move this bill forward,” said Hindstrom. “The future of Myanmar is on the line and the time for gamesmanship is over.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Global Witness" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Description:
"U.S. Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) issued the following statement after meeting yesterday with Thomas Vajda, U.S. Ambassador to Burma:
“I appreciated the opportunity to meet with Ambassador Vajda and discuss the United States’ support for the people of Burma. Since last year’s military coup, the Tatmadaw has taken increasingly violent measures to suppress dissent. They continue to detain thousands of political prisoners, including my friend Aung San Suu Kyi and the Australian economist Sean Turnell.
“I was proud to include language in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act that will help lay the groundwork to push back against the junta’s repression, support democratic actors like the National Unity Government and National Unity Consultative Council, and provide humanitarian support that bypasses the Tatmadaw. The Ambassador and I discussed ways the United States and our partners in the region can build on these efforts moving forward.
“The people of Burma deserve our full support in their long struggle toward self-government and democracy. Along with Kentucky’s vibrant communities from Burma, I will continue to fight for that goal.”..."
Source/publisher:
Mitch McConnell Republican leader
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, USA-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Local URL:
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Description:
"Washington, DC – Today, Representative Gregory W. Meeks, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued the following statement regarding the passage of his legislation, the “Burma Unified Through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2021”, or BURMA Act, by the U.S. House of Representatives.
“Today’s passage of my BURMA Act sends a clear message to the Burmese military that there will be accountability for their brutal and illegal February 1st 2021 coup, and for its subsequent crimes against humanity and human rights atrocities that have cost over 1,700 lives and displaced nearly half a million people. Together with last month’s formal determination by the Biden Administration that the Burmese military committed a genocide against Rohingya, the passage of the BURMA Act reaffirms the United States’ leadership to protect human rights and democratic values and ensure accountability and justice. I am proud to stand with the Burmese people who are fighting for their freedom.”
A PDF of the BURMA Act can be found here, and key provisions include:
Authorization to impose sanctions on individuals and entities who helped stage the February 1, 2021 coup d’état and are responsible for the subsequent repression of fundamental freedoms, human rights abuses, use of indiscriminate violence towards civilians, and other gross atrocities.
Authorization for a new position at the State Department, a Special Coordinator for Burmese Democracy, to promote an international effort to impose and enforce multilateral sanctions on Burma and coordinate United States Government interagency efforts on Burma.
Authorization for support to civil society and for humanitarian assistance in Burma, Bangladesh, Thailand, and the surrounding region.
Call for the United States to pressure the United Nations to take more decisive action with regards to Burma.
A report on the military’s genocide, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities against Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in Burma..."
Source/publisher:
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Genocide, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
Size:
157.44 KB (Original version) - 56 pages
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"Nine young activists belonging to an anti-coup protest group in Mandalay were detained on Monday evening, according to their colleagues in Mandalay’s Pyigyitagun Township.
U Aggavumsa, the leading organizer of anti-coup protests in Pyigyitagun, said: “After we lost contact with them, we issued an alert so that others involved could flee. We can now confirm that they have been detained. Two safe houses were raided and six men and three women were detained.”
Another organizer of anti-coup protests in Mandalay said the young activists were detained in Amarapura Township when safe houses were raided after one protester was arrested on a street.
“We had contact with one protester, and we noticed from his words that something was wrong. So, we assumed that he had been detained, and we issued an alert,” he said.
The whereabouts of the detained activists are still unknown, and family members still can’t contact them.
U Aggavumsa said he is concerned that the detainees might have been tortured during the raid and during interrogation. “As they [the regime] haven’t issued a press release about their detention, it appears that they are searching for other people involved.”
More than one year after the coup, more than a dozen groups of anti-coup protesters continue to stage flash mob protests against the military regime in Mandalay despite crackdowns and arrests.
The regime has also stepped up its arrest of anti-coup protesters and urban guerilla resistance fighters and is holding them incommunicado, according to anti-coup protesters.
Ko Philips, an anti-coup protester, was beaten in public and detained by junta security forces on March 27. His whereabouts is still unknown.
On March 2, two university students including the chairman of the Mandalay District Students’ Union and a striking teacher were detained during a junta raid in Amarapura Township.
At least 17 young people were detained when around 500 junta security forces combed wards and villages in Patheingyi Township on March 22-23.
In Yangon, an urban guerilla resistance fighter died and six others from resistance group Free Tiger Ranger were arrested when junta soldiers raided their apartments in Kyimyindaing Township on March 26. Junta security forces fired shots as they raided the apartments, the resistance group said.
Four men and two women aged between 18 and 35 were detained and are being held for interrogation at the Myanmar military’s Division 44 in Shwepyithar Township, according to the Free Tiger Ranger.
Junta soldiers did not return the body of the resistance fighter who was shot dead during the raid.
Free Tiger Ranger is an urban guerilla resistance group that targets military informants, military-linked businesses and the junta administrative mechanism in Yangon. In their latest attack, the group said it killed a local administrator in Hlaing Tharyar Township on March 24..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Strapped for hard currency, the Myanmar junta has moved to seize foreign currencies in the country by ordering that foreign exchange earned by locals must be converted into the local currency at the “official rate” within “one working day.”
Financial experts and the business community voiced concern that the order would not only hurt the country’s US dollar-dependent export-import industry, but also worsen inflation, adding to the already severe burden on the people of Myanmar, whose economy has been in a downward spiral since the military coup in February last year.
In a notice dated April 3, the junta-controlled Central Bank of Myanmar said foreign currencies must be deposited in accounts at licensed banks and exchanged for the local currency within 24 hours. It said the new directive would also apply to foreign currency that came into the country before April 3.
Those who fail to comply would face legal action under the Foreign Exchange Management Law, it said.
The central bank’s official exchange rate is currently 1,850 kyats per US dollar. However, the rate is around 2,050 in the market, meaning exporters and foreign currency account holders will be hurt by the new policy.
The regime didn’t offer any reason for the order.
However, financial experts suggested the new policy showed the regime is suffering a dollar deficit and is desperate for hard currency to pay its debts—estimated to amount to at least US$10 billion—and purchase key supplies such as oil, gas and weapons, mainly to combat the growing armed resistance in the country.
Myanmar’s military regime has been hit hard by a series of international sanctions over the coup it staged against the democratically elected government last year, and its subsequent brutal crackdown on protesters. So far the junta has killed more than 1,700 people. The takeover also prompted the departure of foreign investment from industries ranging from brewing to the energy sector, leaving the country’s economy in disarray. International assistance programs have also been put on hold since the coup.
“They cannot get loans from the World Bank, ADB [Asian Development Bank] and JICA [Japan’s development agency] and the exemption period to pay back loans due to COVID-19 will end soon. So, they need to repay the loans. That’s why they want to control the US dollars in the country,” a local observer said.
The central bank has not imposed restrictions on dollar transactions since 2012; anyone in the country had been able to buy and sell dollars freely since then.
“But now, once you deposit the foreign currency at the bank, it is automatically bought at 1,850 kyats per dollar. You have no choice,” said local businessman Dr. Soe Tun.
One economist who asked for anonymity said the move could see the country’s exports grind to a halt, and may ultimately affect agricultural produce growers, who depend on imported fertilizer.
“Not only exporters, but also local farmers that grow export items will be hit as a result. How much foreign currency does the central bank still have? And can the bank manage it? It appears that the bank can’t. Its new policy will only worsen the situation. As far as I know, they are still holding one meeting after another on how to proceed with its policy,” he told The Irrawaddy.
Furthermore, Myanmar’s banking sector has been in chaos following the coup. Shortly after the coup, the central bank limited cash withdrawals from banks and automated teller machines, restricting the cash flow as many customers rushed to take out their money fearing the possible economic consequences of the takeover. The bank has eased restrictions over the past year, but still, individuals, unable to withdraw as much money as they want from their savings accounts in banks, have to pay around 3 percent to mobile money agents in order to withdraw cash from their mobile wallets. In the early days after the coup, they were paying at least 7 to 10 percent.
A local financial expert said the central bank’s new policy would push dollar exchange transactions into the black market, as the bank cannot sell all the US dollars that import companies need.
“The importers will have to struggle to get US dollars on the black market at a higher price. As a result, the cost of their products will be high and inflation will rise,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Banking, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Business and the Military
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Local URL:
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Description:
"The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) condemns in the strongest possible terms the abuse of the nation’s citizenship law, in an attempt to threaten members of the NUG and prominent democracy allies of Myanmar. The junta’s effort to punish Ministers of the only legitimate government of Myanmar and prominent supporters with this cheap stunt, is not only illegal under international law, it is also forbidden under Myanmar law.
Their effort to create a facade of legitimacy for this political attack is similarly illegitimate and illegal. They cite the one provision of Myanmar’s citizenship law (Article 16) that may, under narrowly defined circumstances, be used to revoke a citizen’s passport and citizenship. That case involves those who have taken up citizenship in another country permanently.
NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La, commenting on the preposterous claim by the junta said, “The only basis in law under which this attack could be defended, as it says in Article 16 and 17, is if a Myanmar citizen takes citizenship and permanent residence elsewhere. The people of our nation know that every member of my government did not seek or obtain citizenship and residence elsewhere will return to our country at the moment of victory over this blood-stained gang, the illegitimate military council they installed in an attempted coup.”
Minister of Justice U Thein Oo, himself an expert on constitutional law, said, “No more obvious sign of this junta’s desperation, as they suffer setback after setback on the battlefield, could there be but this kind of nonsense. They know it is illegal. Article 17 states quite clearly that citizenship and permanent residence in another country is the only basis for such a step: It says explicitly: “NO other reason can be used for revoking citizenship.”
He continued, "We will replace current citizenship law with a fairer new citizenship law."
“They may be deluded into thinking this attack will demoralize me and my colleagues. It will not, and when we return to bring freedom, peace and justice to a new Myanmar, we will not attempt to revoke the junta members' citizenship. We will, however, put them on trial for their war crimes and atrocities,” he concluded..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Justice
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
37.96 KB 141.32 KB
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"To: Members of the U.S. Congress :
Subject: Pass the B.U.R.M.A. Act, Open Letter Signed by the Diaspora of Burma in America and Endorsed by the CSOs and CBOs inside Burma and Global Solidarity Organization to the United State Congress to Pass the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability (BURMA) Act of 2021
Dear United States Representatives and Senators,
We, the diaspora with our roots from all various regions of Burma residing in the United States, with the endorsement by civil society organizations and community-based organizations inside Burma and global solidarity organizations, write to express our support for the BURMA Act and request its expedited passage into law. Since October 6th, 2021, when 242 Burmese diaspora, local CSOs inside Burma, community-based organizations, and civil society organizations signed an open letter to the United States Congress to support the BURMA Act of 2021, the situation on the ground has only worsened.
As of March 26th, 2022, the military junta had killed 1,707 civilians and arbitrarily arrested 12,970 people according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners AAPP (Burma). Moreover, the military-perpetrated ongoing airstrikes and heavy artillery launches in ethnic areas had resulted in 1.2 million persons of concern, including 810,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 600,000 stateless Rohingyas being forced to flee homes for their lives according to the latest UNHCR report.
We welcome the latest set of actions by the United States to reaffirm its ongoing support for Burma’s democracy in particular through Senator McConnell-led amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2022, additional treasury sanctions on March 25, 2022, a letter of support for Burmese democracy signed by 14 Senators and Members of Congress urging Secretary Blinken and State Department to take actions, the passage of S. Res 35 in the Senate, and US Government’s Rohingya Genocide Determination. We thank Representative Meeks, Representative Bera, and Representative Chabot for their joint statement on the one-year anniversary, and their continued demonstration of support for the democracy and freedom of the people in Burma. We also recognize the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s show of bipartisan support for the BURMA Act on October 21, 2021, and 102 cosponsors from both the House and Senate.
The humanitarian and democracy aid authorized in the BURMA Act are sorely needed, as is the investigation into the oil and gas industry, the accountability for the military’s ongoing war crimes, Rohingya genocide and atrocity crimes against ethnic minorities, and a special coordinator position to make sure it all gets done. The sanction language of the Burma Act targets the junta’s finances in ways that can hurt the regime while sparing the people from additional suffering.
We, the undersigned, urgently request the United States Congress to pass the BURMA Act of 2021 in consideration of the countless lives taken away by the murderous military junta and the dangers that the authoritarian regime imposes on human rights and democracy. We acknowledge the bipartisan support we have received from the House of Representatives and we call for the same unified support by our Senators. As Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”, we look forward to our democratically-elected Congress taking swift, concrete actions in holding the junta accountable for their crimes and supporting the civilian’s efforts in building Burma’s path to democracy..."
Source/publisher:
58 diaspora organizations in the United States and endorsed by 87 Civil Societies inside Burma and across the globe
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Genocide, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Sub-title:
Armed opposition to Myanmar’s coup is spreading, leading the junta to mobilise civilian militias that, in turn, have set off a spate of reprisals. For now, informal justice meted out by local leaders is the best means of stopping the pattern from becoming self-sustaining.
Description:
"What’s new? As anti-coup forces grow stronger in central Myanmar, the military has increasingly relied upon pro-regime networks of armed civilians commonly known as Pyusawhti. This strategy has largely failed, with the Pyusawhti facing stiff resistance and getting limited protection from overstretched security forces.
Why does it matter? Although the Pyusawhti have gained little traction, they have received military training, making them more lethal. Their involvement in regime atrocities has put them in the crosshairs of resistance groups, leading to tit-for-tat killings that risk unleashing long-term cycles of communal violence.
What should be done? With no hope of quickly restoring law and order, informal justice mechanisms may, despite obvious limitations, be the best hope for constraining escalatory communal violence and providing non-violent means of redress for victims. Preserving the possibility of international accountability through the UN-established Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar will also help.
I.
Overview
Following the Myanmar military’s February 2021 coup d’état, various forms of armed resistance have emerged, alongside peaceful responses. Some of the most persistent and tactically innovative cells are battling soldiers in what is called the Dry Zone, to the west of Mandalay in the Burman Buddhist heartland. In an attempt to quash them, the security forces have turned to networks of pro-military civilians, widely referred to as Pyusawhti, for reinforcements, intelligence and knowledge of the terrain. But this strategy has failed to constrain the resistance movements, instead bringing a wave of attacks on those suspected of pro-regime sentiments or activities, leading to Pyusawhti reprisals. The danger is that this cycle of violence becomes self-sustaining. With no hope of reversing the coup in the near or medium term, informal community justice mechanisms might be the most promising means for preventing the increasingly gruesome tit-for-tat killings by giving victims non-violent means of redress. International justice mechanisms also help by threatening future accountability for atrocities.
The Myanmar military, or Defence Services, has a long history of raising militias as part of its counter-insurgency operations, particularly in Myanmar’s uplands, where it has been fighting ethnic armed groups for more than 70 years. Over the decades, it has also mobilised irregular forces – bands of thugs whom it has recruited ad hoc and paid daily wages – to crack down on protesters and political opponents.
Following the coup, the junta attempted to use this modus operandi to quell the nationwide resistance movements. But the generals learned early on that the coup’s unpopularity made ad hoc recruiting difficult, and so the military changed its approach. In the Dry Zone and other parts of the Burman Buddhist heartland where they face stubborn and effective armed resistance, the security forces turned to pro-military Pyusawhti networks for back-up, intelligence and knowledge of local geography.
The original Pyusawhti groups arose out of a government militia-forming strategy in the 1950s, and were named after a semi-mythical warrior-king from the Burmese chronicles. The emergence of Pyusawhti militias today, however, appears to have a different backstory. Today’s groups evolved out of pre-existing local networks consisting of individuals who are ideologically pro-regime, as well as others – such as members of the military-established Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) – who fear being targeted by the resistance, whether or not they actively support the junta. Security forces are providing these networks with basic training and rudimentary weapons. While the military is stretched too thin to protect them from retaliation, it regularly launches revenge attacks when anti-coup resistance cells hit Pyusawhti groups.
The military’s attempt to use the Pyusawhti against anti-coup forces has foundered, however, due to the strength of anti-regime sentiment, the risk of reprisal against those who do sign up has increased. The pro-regime militias, if anything, may have deepened popular hatred of the regime with their involvement in reported atrocities and their campaign against the resistance. That victims of violence on both sides have neither effective state protection nor legal recourse augments their inclination to take matters into their own hands, leading to tit-for-tat reprisals and the potential for greater escalation. Myanmar’s judicial system independence was badly compromised to begin with, and following the coup broke down completely, depriving individuals of what protection they had beforehand.
Responsibility for this sad state of affairs lies squarely with the regime, not only for mounting the coup and dispensing with what existed of the rule of law, but also for unleashing horrific violence on civilians thereafter. Nonetheless, resistance forces must also take responsibility for the actions of their members, some of whom have also committed what appear to be crimes. The National Unity Government, a parallel administration created by ousted lawmakers after the coup, has issued guidance and rules of engagement for resistance fighters, but it cannot hope to police the behaviour of the many different groups spread across the country.
The best remedy for the situation – to reverse the coup and restore a modicum of law and order across the country – is not on the cards for the foreseeable future. Against this backdrop, outside actors should continue to focus on denying political legitimacy to the junta, targeting sanctions at the military and its business interests, preventing the flow of arms to the regime, and engaging closely with the National Unity Government and other legitimate representatives of Myanmar’s peoples, including the Rohingya.
Informal justice mechanisms ... which rely on the authority of community elders and religious figures, have an important role in dispute resolution and conflict mitigation in Myanmar.
As for Pyusawhti-related violence, the bodies within Myanmar that may be best positioned to make inroads are informal justice mechanisms. These structures, which rely on the authority of community elders and religious figures, have an important role in dispute resolution and conflict mitigation in Myanmar, and could help provide victims with non-violent means of redress and thus help stop cycles of revenge from spinning out of control. The turbulent post-coup environment has tended to limit the ability of these figures to constrain violence, but over time they could regain their traditional influence. International bodies such as the UN-established Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar can also assist by looking into post-coup atrocities and collecting information that enables future efforts to hold perpetrators to account.
II.
History of Irregular Forces in Myanmar
A.
Dealing with Post-independence Chaos
The Myanmar army has made use of irregular forces throughout its decades-long fight with numerous insurgencies, as well as for the purposes of protecting individual political leaders. The practice dates back to the Burma army’s earliest years, during World War II, and continued after independence from Britain in 1948. Myanmar was in tumult at the time, with three quarters of towns having fallen to various rebel groups, half of the government’s troops having mutinied and the 2,000 soldiers who remained barely able to control the capital, Yangon. The large quantity of weapons left over from World War II added to the disorder, with politicians, parliamentarians, business owners and black marketeers all raising their own teams of gunmen, known as “pocket armies”. Over the course of the 1950s, the beleaguered government authorised formation of militias across the country, known variously as “levies”, “volunteer defence forces” and “special reserves”, though these initiatives mostly just gave legal cover to the pocket armies.
One of these initiatives was the formation in 1955 of the original Pyusawhti militias. The name refers to a semi-mythical early king of Bagan, from a dynasty that began in 849 C.E. and that, at its height (around 1200 C.E.), was the first to incorporate most of what is now Myanmar. The Burmese chronicles say that Pyusawhti was a fearsome warrior, who vanquished four dangerous beasts (a giant bird, boar, tiger and flying squirrel) that were terrorising the local people. In the 1950s, the War Office (a precursor to the defence ministry) pitched the Pyusawhti militias as local forces that would similarly protect the people from the predation of insurgents and armed robbers. Authorities raised these militias in places across the country, placing them under the oversight of army field commanders in their respective areas of responsibility, with the intention that they would free the army from tedious routine security functions. In practice, the Pyusawhti, like other irregulars, were often partisan – loyal to local ruling-party politicians – and the army attempted to disarm and disband them after its 1958 coup, with mixed success.
B.
Subcontracting Conflict Management
Despite the patchy record of militias in the post-independence years, the Myanmar military continued to make use of irregulars to perform local security functions and keep insurgencies in check. Separate from the Pyusawhti, from the 1960s onward, the Defence Services offered insurgents across the country the chance to convert into military-aligned Ka Kwe Ye [“defensive”] militias, later called Border Guard Forces, allowing them to keep their arms and giving them a free hand to engage in (often illicit) business in exchange for their loyalty. The military also established hundreds of new village-level militias in insecure areas – mostly small, poorly trained and lightly armed pyithusit, or “people’s forces” – which the army used as patrolmen and in particular as informants.
These militias created by the military government, which ruled the country from 1962 to 2011, were nearly all established in the uplands, where the regime confronted insurgencies fighting for self-rule for various ethnic minorities. Such counter-insurgency tactics were not needed in the Burman-majority lowlands, where the security forces established firm control, at least in recent decades.
C.
Organised Political Violence
The military periodically mobilised irregulars in the Burman heartland as well, however, to intimidate its political opponents and crack down on protesters. These networks were known by various names, the most widely used of which was swan ar shin [literally, “masters of force”]. Members were reportedly thugs recruited by local authorities in poor peri-urban areas and paid by the day; they wore civilian clothes so that they would not be easily identifiable. The previous military regime deployed them most notoriously for the attack on the convoy escorting Aung San Suu Kyi, the dissident who became leader of Myanmar’s democratically elected government (and whom the coup deposed), through Dipeyin (Tabayin) township in 2003, as well as during the Saffron Revolution of 2007. Occasionally, swan ar shin networks were referred to as Pyusawhti groups in the Myanmar media, likely a nod to the role played by the pro-military militias in the 1950s.
In many places, it was common knowledge who had been recruited to these forces, to the extent that members were openly transported in police trucks and conducted morning drills in public areas. On occasion, they wore distinct items of clothing so that the security forces could tell them from protesters. In 2015, for example, poorly trained swan ar shin wearing red armbands were widely photographed breaking up student protests in downtown Yangon. Military authorities, however, did not publicly acknowledge that these forces existed or admit to supporting them, and the individuals involved did not usually identify themselves or disclose how they had been recruited.
The militias’ involvement in violence – and their connection to the Defence Services – is sometimes clear and sometimes not. The swan ar shin were blamed for several violent episodes, leaving the impression that they were a standing paramilitary force rather than an ad hoc mob. But many such reports were based on conjecture. For example, commentators suggested that swan ar shin instigated the wave of anti-Muslim violence that swept through Myanmar in 2012 and 2013. Yet no evidence for this assertion came to light, and contemporaneous Crisis Group investigations cast doubt on their involvement in some of the most serious violent incidents. By contrast, there did appear to be military collusion with, if not outright support for, Rakhine vigilantes who attacked Rohingya villages in October 2012. The connivance was obvious during the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2016-2017, when such vigilantes carried out killings, rapes, looting and arson with impunity, including within sight of foreign journalists. Unlike the swan ar shin, these vigilante groups formed organically but then received military support.
III.
Evolution of the Pyusawhti
A.
Tactical Challenges
In the coup’s immediate aftermath, the regime returned to its old tactics, mobilising thugs to scatter demonstrators, but these efforts mostly failed. On 25 February 2021, three days after a national strike and with protests swelling across the country, a pro-military mob of hundreds attacked demonstrators and residents in downtown Yangon with clubs and slingshots. Residents captured at least 22 of the attackers and detained them for most of the day, in a tense standoff with police that ended when residents eventually handed them over. So strong was public opposition to the coup that security forces were not easily able to protect their hired thugs anywhere in the country. In many cases, members of these mobs faced stiff resistance even in their own poor neighbourhoods, where the vast majority of residents supported the anti-regime protests.
As the regime cracked down with increasing brutality ... the security forces faced increasing difficulties recruiting non-uniformed assistance.
As the regime cracked down with increasing brutality, and demonstrations gave way to determined armed resistance, the security forces faced increasing difficulties recruiting non-uniformed assistance. While raising militias has been part and parcel of the military’s standard strategy for decades in fighting insurgencies, doing so in a context where anti-military sentiment is so widely held has been much more difficult. People who had pro-military leanings – or who thought others would suspect them of having such sympathies – were isolated to the degree that they feared being targeted by resistance forces.
Consequently, pro-military civilians began organising themselves into what were initially loose self-protection networks that the military subsequently used for its own purposes. Early reports of such mobilisation came from Mingin township in Sagaing Region, where the USDP enjoys significant support, and soon thereafter the phenomenon spread to other parts of the Dry Zone, as well as elsewhere in Myanmar.
Thus, unlike with the swan ar shin and the original Pyusawhti militias in the 1950s, the security forces do not appear to have rolled out a comprehensive militia-formation strategy after the coup. Rather, the first pro-regime militias seem to have evolved in the manner of the anti-Muslim vigilantes active in 2012-2013, or those who attacked the Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017, in the sense that they formed organically, often out of pre-existing local networks, but with the tacit acceptance – and later, active support – of the security forces. These networks included Buddhist nationalists, USDP members and army veterans who had come together ahead of the November 2020 elections in the hope of defeating Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD).
B.
Local Pyusawhti Mobilisation
Some pro-regime networks self-identify as Pyusawhti, but others do not, and the resistance movement and Myanmar independent media are using the term to refer to any group of civilians providing support to regime forces – or those with political affiliations that make them suspect, such as USDP members, nationalists or military veterans whether or not they belong to such a group. The term’s prevalence can give the impression that the Pyusawhti is a larger, more coherent organisation or group of organisations than is actually the case. Rather than a national military-established body with local branches, the Pyusawhti is more accurately described as a loosely connected set of village-level networks across the country, having widely varying characteristics and capabilities.
As suggested above, members of these networks include people who are ideologically pro-regime, as well as those – such as some USDP members, for example – who fear that the resistance will target them, whether or not they are actively backing the junta. But not all individuals assumed to be in Pyusawhti are in fact affiliated with such a network. Indeed, in some cases, USDP members have reportedly made contact with the resistance in an attempt to avoid assassination, by providing support or giving assurances that they will not oppose resistance forces or act as informants against them.
Pyusawhti militias in [the Dry Zone] area evolved out of pro-military demonstrations following the coup.
Crisis Group research in Magway Region – a resistance stronghold in the Dry Zone – indicates that Pyusawhti militias in this area evolved out of pro-military demonstrations following the coup. Those demonstrations, in March 2021, were composed mostly of USDP members and militant Buddhist nationalists, who had already come together for electoral campaigns ahead of the November 2020 polls. The USDP, which suffered an embarrassing defeat in those elections, supported the coup, echoing the military’s justification by claiming that the balloting had been marred by fraud. For their part, Buddhist nationalists have been increasingly active over the last decade, backing the USDP and strongly opposing the NLD out of fear that political reforms and modernisation threatened the traditional place of Buddhism in society.
By May 2021, some of those who had participated in the earlier pro-military demonstrations had organised themselves into village-based militias. At this time, resistance groups were arming themselves more systematically, in response to the military’s atrocities, and beginning to assassinate perceived regime sympathisers.
At first, pro-regime networks appeared confident that military backing would give them power and impunity. According to a resistance leader in Pauk township, in May 2021, members of a nascent militia circulated a pamphlet in the name of the Pyusawhti listing the names of 21 local anti-regime figures that they would capture “dead or alive”, including herself. But instead the pamphlet incurred the wrath of resistance forces, who began targeting Pyusawhti members as a priority. One pro-regime militia leader in the area told Crisis Group that the resistance tried to assassinate him at home on 12 June 2021, failing because he managed to escape through a back door.
The regime thus faces two broad challenges in rolling out a militia strategy for combating the rise of anti-coup resistance forces. First, the strength of anti-regime sentiment across much of Myanmar is such that pro-regime militias often become targets for resistance forces rather than a tool for the security forces to project power. Resistance forces have assassinated more than 1,000 allegedly pro-regime individuals since mid-2021, including almost 200 known or rumoured to be involved with pro-regime militias. The majority of these killings were in the Dry Zone and adjacent townships; resistance forces have also killed groups of militia members in clashes. In several cases, they have captured and disarmed such militias, who complain of a lack of support from the police and military.
Secondly, the military and police are overstretched in the Dry Zone theatre and face constant attacks by the resistance when on the move, particularly in rural areas. Resistance forces also hit smaller fixed bases, especially poorly-defended police stations. The security forces are thus constrained in their ability to protect or provide backup to pro-regime militias, leaving them very exposed. According to militia members and other well-informed sources, the Pyusawhti are poorly equipped, often by police who give them confiscated tumi flintlock guns and other old or unreliable weapons. Tumi guns seized from pro-regime militias by the resistance bear police markings. While police stations have limited supplies, the military has the capacity to provide more effective weaponry. Tellingly, it does not: lacking a clear understanding of who is who on the ground, it fears inadvertently arming its opponents. Weapons given to weak militias are also easily captured by resistance forces.
The parallel emergence of pro- and anti-regime armed groups of civilians has led to deep divisions in many communities.
The parallel emergence of pro- and anti-regime armed groups of civilians has led to deep divisions in many communities. In rural Myanmar, the village is the fundamental unit of social organisation. Villages are typically mono-religious and mono-ethnic, bound together by religious institutions, practices and ceremonies as well as cultural traditions. Where villages are diverse, residents will typically self-segregate along ethno-religious lines (with “upper”, “lower”, “east”, “west” or some other designator appended to the village name to distinguish the areas). But this tendency to homogeneity did not, until recently, extend to politics. Before the coup, it was not uncommon for residents of the same village to support different political parties – for example, the NLD and USDP.
That is changing. In places where the armed resistance is strongest, particularly in the northern and central parts of the Dry Zone to the west of Mandalay (see map in Appendix B), the post-coup level of distrust and violence is such that political diversity within villages is no longer viable. Most villages support the resistance. Only a small number of pro-regime villages have emerged. These are either places where most residents supported the NLD’s political opponents – for example, USDP supporters or militant nationalists – or places where the army houses veterans and their families. Everywhere, people with minority loyalties have had to go along with the majority, flee or face assassination.
It is this reality, rather than any strategy, that accounts for the emergence of most Pyusawhti-type militias. These groups, and often the villages where they operate, look to the security forces for back-up, training and equipment, and the security forces have in turn come to rely on them for intelligence, local knowledge and additional manpower. Thus, while there are reports of Pyusawhti groups forming in many parts of Myanmar, it is in the Dry Zone, where the resistance poses the greatest threat to the individuals concerned, that they have mostly taken root. This region is also the place where the military has had the biggest problems trying to consolidate control, and therefore has the greatest need for the support the Pyusawhti can provide, and the greatest incentive to back them in return. There are also multiple reports of people being pressured by the junta and its allies into joining Pyusawhti groups.
C.
The Military’s Use of Pyusawhti
In the Dry Zone, the Myanmar military has found itself fighting a very different kind of conflict than it is used to, and one that it is not well equipped for. Unlike in the ethnic areas, where the army has been battling insurgents continuously since independence, there has been no rebellion in the Burman-majority central lowlands for decades, which means that the military does not have the bases, territorial familiarity, operational intelligence or supply networks in place to support offensive operations in these areas. The Dry Zone has also long been a key recruiting ground for the military, meaning that many rank-and-file soldiers and non-commissioned officers are fighting in their native regions. As a result, morale is reportedly low, producing a steady trickle of desertions and defections.
The military is also more overstretched than it has been in decades, fighting on numerous fronts against adversaries, new and old, in Chin State, the Dry Zone and adjacent areas, parts of Shan State and Kayah State, as well as engaging in sporadic but heavy clashes elsewhere. Unlike in the past, it must also maintain sizeable forces in the main cities, where resistance groups regularly assassinate regime figures and attack patrols.
The Dry Zone Pyusawhti are … a useful ally for the regime, as their members can provide valuable intelligence.
The Dry Zone Pyusawhti are thus a useful ally for the regime, as their members can provide valuable intelligence, act as local guides or take the point position in operations, as well as serve as reinforcements. Many reports of military operations in central Myanmar indicate that armed men in civilian clothes, assumed to be Pyusawhti members, accompanied the troops. Pyusawhti members are also reported to ride along with police on missions to arrest or kill dissidents. The regime has at various points denied having any role in forming Pyusawhti groups, but it also distributes leaflets in the Dry Zone declaring that it has organised an overwhelming force of pro-regime fighters, and the Sagaing Region chief minister has reportedly claimed that the authorities have raised 77 such militias and provided them with some 2,000 weapons.
The military has sometimes given temporary shelter on its bases to people who fear being targeted by resistance forces, such as regime-appointed administrators and members of Pyusawhti networks. It has also been providing two-week military training courses to such people on an ad hoc basis, as well as to spouses of soldiers. But while these initiatives may have made Pyusawhti members better fighters, they have not altered the strategic equation on the ground, especially since the military is not arming these groups in any significant way. Rather, by bringing these civilians more clearly under its wing, the military is putting them at greater risk of resistance attack, especially since as noted above it cannot provide them reliable protection. For example, resistance forces have repeatedly attacked a village in Sagaing Region’s Pale township that has been hosting Pyusawhti training courses.
D.
Risks of Escalation
The vast majority of violence is being committed by junta troops, including the most notorious incident to be reported in the Dry Zone, when soldiers allegedly killed and incinerated eleven people, including six teenagers, in Sagaing Region’s Salingyi township on 7 December 2021, with indications that some were burned alive. At the same time, however, pro-regime militias’ proactive targeting of resistance forces has increasingly led the latter to take an eye for an eye. Militias are also embroiled in some of the regime forces’ reported atrocities, deepening the public’s hatred and ratcheting up retaliatory violence. Regime, militia and resistance forces alike engage in reprisals. Examples include the following:
In May 2021, resistance forces reportedly assassinated two perceived regime sympathisers in Pauk township: a USDP organiser, killed on 25 May, and a local government clerk, five days later. Allegedly, the military and local police, accompanied by suspected Pyusawhti members and seeking revenge for these killings, torched most of the 250 homes in a nearby village that they suspected of supporting the local resistance group, killing two elderly residents who were unable to flee and were burned alive in their homes.
A group of Pyusawhti members accompanied by three police officers allegedly abducted, tortured and killed a resistance leader in Pauk township on 14 September 2021. In response, resistance forces allegedly snatched, blindfolded and tortured a 23-year-old man accused of participating in the killing. His brutal interrogation, in which he confessed to his involvement in that murder and other violent incidents, was filmed by his captors and posted on social media.
Resistance forces reportedly killed a family in Sagaing Region’s Taze township on 22 September 2021, including an alleged Pyusawhti leader, his wife, son, one of his daughters and her five-year-old child. In apparent revenge for the killings, the man’s other daughter and her husband, both police officers, reportedly led a raid by security forces on the village the following day, burning down fifteen houses belonging to NLD members.
Tit-for-tat killings could unleash an even more dangerous cycle of vendettas in some areas.
As these incidents demonstrate, and with emotions running high given the trauma triggered by the coup and subsequent violence, tit-for-tat killings could unleash an even more dangerous cycle of vendettas in some areas. The risk that local violence will escalate has increased because the military has trained the Pyusawhti and other pro-regime militias in the use of weapons. The Pyusawhti networks’ violent and partisan actions could lead to a situation where resistance forces step up the killing of USDP members and military veterans who are not members of such networks or engaged in anti-resistance activities.
There have also been reports of cases of mistaken identity or settling of personal grudges as part of the tit-for-tat killings. For example, on 3 February 2022, a resistance group in Sagaing Region’s Ayadaw township killed a poet and prominent pro-democracy activist in front of his children, in what appears to have been an error or a crime unrelated to politics. The local group that claimed responsibility for the killing, insisted despite all evidence to the contrary that the individual was helping the regime. That group has faced sharp criticism for its actions, with sixteen local organisations, including the NLD’s township chapter, calling for the perpetrators to stand trial “when the country is back in the hands of the people”.
IV.
Conclusion: Possible Responses
The Myanmar military has unleashed brutal violence across large parts of the country as it attempts to impose its rule on a population in revolt. Determined armed resistance has emerged in many areas, including the central Dry Zone and other parts of Burman-majority heartland that have not seen conflict in decades. The military has turned to the Pyusawhti as a check on resistance forces in these areas, but its reliance on these groups has instead helped perpetuate a vicious cycle of revenge killings. The post-coup breakdown in law and order in much of Myanmar, and the lack of trust in justice systems even where they still exist, are further aggravating factors as they deprive individuals of protection and victims of formal recourse. Victims frustrated by this state of affairs may opt to take matters into their own hands as vigilantes.
Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that the situation will change dramatically in the near term. Most importantly, the military shows no sign of reversing the coup, which would be the only reliable way to put an end to the violence and restore law and order. But even if these efforts are likely to be frustrated for the foreseeable future, outside actors should continue to work toward that objective, including by denying political legitimacy to the junta, targeting sanctions at the military and its businesses, taking steps to prevent the flow of arms to the junta, and engaging closely with the National Unity Government and other legitimate representatives of Myanmar’s peoples.
Informal justice mechanisms can help prevent escalation of violence and provide non-violent means of redress.
As for the violence involving Pyusawhti militias and local resistance groups, the greatest hope for restraining it may – at least over the medium term – lie with informal community justice mechanisms. While obviously limited, informal justice mechanisms can help prevent escalation of violence and provide non-violent means of redress. These mechanisms, which rely on the authority of community elders and religious leaders, have always been important in local dispute resolution and conflict mitigation in Myanmar. They have, however, not yet fully adapted to post-coup conditions, and Crisis Group’s enquiries over the last six months suggest that many armed actors are operating beyond the constraints that elders and religious figures might normally impose. That is likely to change over time however, as society adjusts to the new realities and traditional community structures start to reassert themselves.
While responsibility for the breakdown of law and order lies squarely with the regime, resistance movements must also work harder to police their members’ actions. The National Unity Government has issued guidance and rules of engagement for resistance forces, and recently established a mechanism to investigate violations, but its influence is meagre, as even if many groups have pledged political allegiance to the parallel authorities, most remain independent. The response by local organisations to the killing of the pro-democracy activist in Ayadaw township (see above) is encouraging, but this case is extreme and the reaction unusual; other mistaken or unwarranted killings have received little pushback or attention. The National Unity Government should more decisively distance itself from such acts by resistance forces, which some local civil society groups have been quietly pushing it to do, and which international partners can also urge.
International mechanisms also play an important role in reminding local actors that there may be accountability for the various alleged crimes of international concern being committed across Myanmar, which a recent UN report says may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over crimes in Myanmar at present, other than those arising out of the anti-Rohingya rampages with a sufficient nexus to Bangladesh (an ICC party), that could change in the future and international accountability under some countries’ universal jurisdiction provisions is possible. Outside actors should therefore continue to support the UN-established Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, a body set up to collect and collate evidence of international crimes in Myanmar that is also now looking into atrocities committed since the military seized power.
The February 2021 coup has been a disaster for Myanmar, terminating its halting transition to democracy, depressing its economy, awakening dormant insurgencies, reinvigorating active ones and causing ever larger parts of the population to suffer. Even as popular resistance spreads, both peaceful and armed, the junta seems determined to stick to its hard line, of which the Pyusawhti militias are the latest manifestation. International justice may one day be of help, but in the meantime the customary dispute resolution methods of Myanmar society may well emerge as the best way to prevent Pyusawhti actions from triggering persistent cycles of communal violence..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
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"Myanmar’s parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG) has warned China that any effort to build a partnership with the military regime would be rejected by Myanmar’s people and could seriously damage China’s international reputation.
The warning was issued in a statement by the NUG’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his Myanmar regime-appointed counterpart Wunna Maung Lwin in Tunxi, Anhui Province on April 1. Wunna Maung Lwin was in China at Wang’s invitation.
The NUG was formed by elected lawmakers of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with their ethnic allies to challenge the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Many in Myanmar take the NUG as their legitimate government and many Western countries have shown support for it, despite their reluctance to offer official recognition.
During the meeting, the Chinese foreign minister said China was ready to work with Myanmar to deepen exchanges and cooperation in all areas, including people-to-people bonds, “no matter how the situation changes” to achieve the goal of building a China-Myanmar community with “a shared future.”
Myanmar is currently ruled by a military regime that grabbed power from the country’s democratically elected government in February last year. The coup has so far killed more than 1,700 people and caused serious social and political instability, with many observers fearing that the country is now on the verge of being a failed state.
While the regime is treated as an outcast by most Western democracies, China has been one of the few countries to engage with the junta, as it is one of Myanmar’s top investors and has a number of strategic infrastructure projects in its southern neighbor, including energy pipelines and a proposed port that would give Beijing a critical link to the Indian Ocean.
On Monday, the NUG said in a statement that the shadow government was committed to China’s goal of a shared future. But any effort by China to build that future with the regime, it said, risks serious damage to the international reputation of the People’s Republic of China.
“Equally important, the people of Myanmar will soundly reject any efforts by foreign governments to establish such a partnership with the illegitimate military regime,” it warned.
China’s failure to condemn the coup has resulted in anti-China demonstrations in Myanmar, and factories owned and run by Chinese companies have been attacked. The anti-China sentiment cooled somewhat when China urged the regime last year not to dissolve the NLD.
However, a Yangon-based observer of China-Myanmar relations said Wang’s affirmation that China was ready to work with the junta could see anti-Chinese demonstrations return, as anti-regime resistance is now at unprecedented levels and this could put Chinese gas pipeline, copper and nickel projects, among others, at risk.
“Even though they want to do it for economic purposes, China would face strong popular rejection, especially in this time of political instability,” he said.
The NUG also urged China to respect the will of the people of Myanmar and listen to the voices of the people by immediately compelling the military junta to stop all violence and restore civilian governance while working with the NUG and Myanmar’s diverse ethnic nationalities to deliver humanitarian assistance to end the suffering of the Myanmar people.
“Such a move would help China and Myanmar secure a strong and robust … shared future,” it said.
The NUG added that it was saddened to see the “pauk-phaw” (sibling) relations between China and Myanmar damaged by the regime.
“The NUG stands ready to work with the Chinese government towards repairing this damage and building a new type of ‘pauk-phaw’ [relationship] in the future,” it said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
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"The Myanmar military regime’s recent order halting all jade mining in Kachin State was issued with the aim of putting pressure on the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), according to Colonel Naw Bu, the ethnic armed group’s information officer.
Myanma Gems Enterprise, a state-owned company under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, announced in the March 31 issues of the regime’s newspapers that jade mining in Lone Khin, Hpakant, Maw Lu and Maw Han will no longer be allowed so that, it said, the country’s precious resources can be conserved for succeeding generations, and the environment and the safety of jade miners can be protected.
The KIA is still considering how to respond to the jade mining ban in Kachin. In the meantime, it will wait and see what the regime does to companies that fail to comply with the order.
“We will wait and see. Many people from across Myanmar make a living in Hpakant. So, their order will only hurt the people, and we will see if miners follow their instruction. I think the ban will further aggravate the problem,” Col. Naw Bu said, referring to the adverse consequences on the hundreds of thousands of people working there, and the many more engaged in the jade industry.
A jade miner in Kachin State said most of the jade mining companies in Kachin State pay tax to the KIA.
“Most of the jade mines here are under the control of the KIA. Even the military-linked companies have to pay tax to the armed group. So, [the regime] does not want others to benefit from [mining] while it can’t. It assumes that the profits from jade mines will go to the resistance movement and is therefore trying to disrupt the business,” he said.
Jade is the main source of income for the KIA, which is fighting for greater autonomy in Kachin State. The trade is also responsible for decades-long tensions between the KIA and Myanmar’s military, which battle for control of jade revenues.
The armed group has publicly opposed the military regime since its coup last year, and also trained and armed local resistance groups, collectively known as the People’s Defense Force (PDF), which are fighting the regime.
A political analyst said the regime imposed the ban to stretch the finances of the KIA and the PDF.
“As all the companies have to pay tax to the KIA in their transactions, [the regime has imposed the ban] to cut the cash flow to the KIA and PDF,” he said.
“But in Hpakant alone, there are nearly 500,000 prospectors. And it is not an easy task for the military to drive all of them out of the mines. As a result, illegal mining and the illegal market will re-emerge, as in the past,” he added.
A source close to jade miners shared the view that the ban will only create an illegal market.
“If jade mining is criminalized, it will create problems for scavengers. They can be arrested for illegal possession of stones,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
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"Last month, Myanmar’s regime enacted the Myanmar Police Act making it compulsory for law enforcement officers to fight alongside soldiers on the front lines, while expanding their powers to restrict citizens’ liberty.
Under the law, the appointment of police officers and any structural changes to the force requires the approval of the military chief.
Legal advisor U Khin Maung Myint recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how the law will affect people.
Why has the regime made it compulsory for the police to serve in security and combat roles besides law enforcement?
The police used to be a separate entity before 1962 but since then the military has used armed organizations, including the police, as auxiliary forces.
Now this law assigns security and defense roles to the police. It has been years since security battalions were formed within the police to perform as military units. The law was enacted to assign fighting roles to the police if necessary.
Do you think officers will have to go to the frontline?
It is likely. Police battalions had to fight in the past. While officers from township police stations were engaged in law enforcement, police battalions had to fight alongside the military on the frontline.
When they gained control of an area and the troops left, police battalions stayed and reestablished security. This law means that not only police battalions but all officers will be ordered to fight.
The law grants greater powers to the police. How will it affect the freedom and security of citizens?
Laws focused on security and protection often compromise the citizenship rights, privacy and security of individuals.
Under the law, officers can arrest and search buildings, citing security and defense concerns. Residents have to hand over a layout of new homes. There can be no privacy and safety.
There is no problem if those provisions are enforced properly, respecting constitutional rights but if the powers granted by the law are abused, it is quite dangerous.
The law carries prison sentences for banging pots and pans. Is the regime trying to stop every form of protest?
The law expands officers’ powers, largely in response to the changing situation.
The resistance of the people’s defense forces and ethnic armed groups has spread from ethnic-majority states and rural areas to the cities. As resistance groups appear to be planning to launch large-scale attacks in a so-called D-day, the law aims to lift the restrictions on police so officers can take preventive measures against potential attackers.
How about the increasing penalties for certain crimes under the law?
Every regime rules with fear. It hopes increased penalties will deter potential perpetrators and reduce opposition.
But the punishment must fit the crime and only then can social order be maintained.
How do you assess the law?
By international standards, the law grants excessive power to Myanmar’s police. It will overstretch the police from their primary duty: to maintain tranquility and enforce the rule of law. They are not enforcing the law at the moment and they will be overburdened if they are also to fight. It is out of touch with reality..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
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"Statement on the Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
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"Since the return of military rule last year, Myanmar has been a thorn in the side of regional countries. As Myanmar is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), many countries have urged the 10-member bloc to play the role of mediator in solving the crisis caused by the coup. Plus, some neighboring and regional countries are still sitting on the fence while engaging with the regime, which has killed more than 1,700 people so far.
In this excerpt from an interview with The Irrawaddy, Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government shares her impressions of those countries.
Many countries, including the US, endorse ASEAN’s centrality. But ASEAN still cannot act. And it is mostly on good terms with the regime. The US backs ASEAN though it is aware it won’t be successful. What could Washington do?
While the US considers ASEAN as an initial step, we cannot reject it completely. But the US should think about a Plan B in case that approach does not work. We have always called for an innovative approach. The international community should not use 20th-century definitions of sovereignty and diplomatic relations to handle Myanmar in a 21st-century context.
It can no longer use old methods to approach Myanmar. It has been proven in previous decades that the old approaches were unsuccessful. And ASEAN alone cannot handle Myanmar’s crises.
ASEAN and US envoys should work together. As the EU has appointed a new envoy, we have suggested that these envoys should collaborate and take a more innovative approach.
Which countries are not helping the revolution?
I told the Indian media in an interview that some neighboring countries engage with us but they also deal with the regime. We can understand them.
Our revolution will win. I tell them to cooperate with us and when we win, we will remember who stood with us in our struggle. This is true for individuals.
We record who our friends are and who are sitting on the fence, which will shape our future relations with them.
Does that include India?
Some countries want to help but lack the strength. Others have the strength but they are too focused on their interests and fail to act decisively. If they want to protect their interests, I urged them to stand by us.
I guarantee that their interests will not suffer. The NUG has the public’s support. The day when people don’t like us will be the day we fail. Our neighbors should listen to our people, and cooperate and support the revolution.
That’s why I was critical during the Indian interview. India is the biggest democracy in the world. It should more actively and decisively back democracy in Myanmar. It is a major regional power. I was critical because India should boldly shoulder its role and take action.
What about China?
China is important. Its political situation differs from that of India. I say democracies should act like real democracies. To be pragmatic, we have to engage diplomatically with China. Both India and China are important to us. We maintain our engagement with China. We are taking a pragmatic approach.
What do you expect from China?
At least China should not legitimize the junta and its leaders and say it is a legitimate government. We have repeatedly said that and asked China not to ignore the 2020 election results. We understand China does not oppose that.
Cambodia has increased its ties with the junta and Japanese representatives have attended the regime’s events. Do these countries support the NUG?
This is a difference between Myanmar and Ukraine. EU countries stand collectively by Ukraine. This gives Ukraine many advantages. But it is different in our region. There are dictatorial states and others that favor democracy.
But they are also divided. Even democracies like Japan and South Korea are different. South Korea has been more decisive while Japan focuses on negotiations.
Japan is concerned China might fill a vacuum if it refuses to engage with the regime. It is a balancing act.
Asian countries accept the principle [of rejecting the regime]. But in reality, they do not take a tough stance and maintain ties with both the regime and us. We have to monitor their moves and engage with them.
What is your message to regional countries?
It is simple. When our revolution wins, it will contribute to long-term stability and development in the region. If our revolution fails, crises will keep happening in Myanmar and it will continue to be a troublemaker in the region.
But if the people win, Myanmar will contribute to regional stability and development as a fully established democracy. Other countries should boldly stand by us and support our revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
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Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations
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Travel agents and aid workers raise issues of safety and note that tourism dollars will only benefit the ruling military
Description:
"Foreign tourists have been urged to avoid visiting Myanmar after the junta signalled plans to open up the country despite widespread ongoing rights abuses and violence including kidnappings and killings by the military, as well as food shortages and regular blackouts.
More than a year after it seized power and ousted Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s military has announced it plans to reopen for tourism and resume international flights on 17 April.
“I would not suggest anyone travels there,” said Michael Isherwood, chair of the Burma Humanitarian Mission and program director of charity Backpack Medics. “If Burma reopens to tourists, it’s primarily to benefit the junta,” which is oppressing the population.
When there were murmurs of a reopening late last year, Tin Tun Naing, the minister for planning, finance and investment for Myanmar’s ousted National Unity Government told The Straits Times it wasn’t a time for sightseeing and urged people not to visit.
Myanmar closed its borders, like many countries, to prevent the spread of Covid-19 in early 2020. At that time, an elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi ruled the country but a military coup in February 2021 saw that power ceded. Resistance groups emerged and since then the south-east Asian country has been racked with violence, protests and economic collapse.
UN high commissioner Michelle Bachelet said last month Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis continues to expand amid systematic brutality by security forces. “The economy is on the brink of collapse. Over 14.4 million individuals are now assessed as being in humanitarian need,” she said, predicting that “food scarcity will sharply increase over the coming months”.
The UK government currently “advises against all but essential travel to Myanmar”, stating the risk of being arbitrarily detained or arrested.
Opening to tourism could signal a return to normalcy when “Burma is anything but normal these days,” said Isherwood, citing random arrests, the burning of villages, rape and extrajudicial killings in the ethnic and border areas.
According to the United Nations Human Rights Council, more than 1,600 people have died at the hands of security forces, 12,500 have been detained, 44,000 have been displaced, and 14 million require humanitarian assistance. Hundreds of children are also being held for ransom in unknown locations.
Last year, the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) attempted to broker a peace plan with the junta government although little progress has been made on moving that forward.
Reopening to tourism was “an effort to promote a narrative of control and globalisation … an effort to establish the de facto authorities as being in control of the country, being legitimate”, said one aid worker living in Myanmar, who requested anonymity for safety reasons.
Tourists signify stability, said Bertie Alexander Lawson, CEO of Myanmar-based boutique travel agency Sampan Travel, and an image of stability is likely one the authorities want to project, he added. The security risk is higher now compared with a couple of years ago, said Lawson, but safe travel was possible “if you’re going with an operator that is taking the risk seriously”.
Visitors should, however, be informed of the context they’re coming into and calculate whether they’re going to have a positive impact on Myanmar communities, he said.
Jochen Meissner, founder and director of Yangon-based travel agency Uncharted Horizons Myanmar, advised against travel. “Even here [in Yangon], every day there are bomb attacks or assassinations, [and] a lot of army on the streets.”
While the junta government will likely make sure the main tourist attractions are safe, Meissner said he wouldn’t encourage anyone to visit for a holiday.
Only those vaccinated against Covid-19 will be able to enter the country before having to do a week-long quarantine with two PCR tests. Other challenges tourists will face include a lack of access to cash, following the buckling of the banking system, and power blackouts. “There are big parts of Yangon that are in total darkness on an evening so I’m not sure it’ll be very conducive for tourist travel,” said the aid worker.
Some parts of the country, including Kayah state and Chin state, formerly popular with tourists, will also be off limits, Lawson said. In such areas, there are reports of worsening living conditions with limited water, electricity, and internet access.
Meissner said: “Everything is not OK here.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Tourism in Burma - articles and studies, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
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Sub-title:
Coup-leader Min Aung Hlaing vows to ‘annihilate’ anti-military resistance forces, snuffing out any hopes for dialog
Description:
" If anyone had thought that there could, as the UN and the outside world advocate, be a dialogue between Myanmar’s junta and the democratic opposition, those hopes were effectively dashed when the country’s military leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, gave a fiery speech on Armed Forces Day, March 27.
On the occasion, the coup leader vowed to “annihilate to the end” want he described as “terrorist groups” and also “urged” Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organizations not to support those “terrorist groups” and, instead, “live within a legal framework” (sic), which analysts interpret as sticking to a now-collapsed National Ceasefire Agreement that the military concluded with a limited number of ethnic rebel armies in 2015.
Equally important was the show of unity the armed forces displayed on March 27, dispelling all persistent but misguided notions of “power struggles” between hardliners in the military and “reformists” supposedly represented by Thein Sein, who served as president from 2011 to 2016.
No less than 25 former officers who have served in various military-appointed governments since the bloody crackdown on a pro-democracy uprising in 1988 were at the parade and other functions at the capital Naypyidaw. Among them was Thein Sein, who reportedly gave “words of advice” to Min Aung Hlaing who, in return, bowed in a show of respect to the ex-president.
It was not the first time Thein Sein had shown his true colors. In December last year, the ex-general once dubbed “Myanmar’s Gorbachev” by some Western observers for his supposedly “reformist agenda”, made donations to families of people who had been killed or wounded on suspicion of acting as military informants.
Needless to say, Thein Sein has never donated any money to the many families whose loved ones have been gunned down by the military and the police for demonstrating peacefully against last year’s coup.
According to the independent advocacy group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 1,723 unarmed protesters have been killed or tortured to death in various detention centers since the coup. More than 13,000 people, including activists, local politicians, journalists and health workers who supported the anti-junta movement have been jailed.
Those figures do not include the thousands of villagers who have been killed in airstrikes and artillery bombardment in ethnic areas, where resistance to the coup has grown strong over the past year. According to an announcement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on February 11, the number of Internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar has doubled since last year’s coup, now crossing the 800,000-mark.
While the world’s attention is now almost entirely focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, another massive tragedy is playing out in Myanmar, and very little is being done about it by the international community.
Foreign powers, among them the European Union, in a statement in October last year appear to have outsourced the Myanmar issue to ASEAN: “The European Union calls on Myanmar to engage constructively with the ASEAN Special Envoy to implement fully and completely the ASEAN Five Point Consensus. It stresses the need for the military to facilitate regular visits to Myanmar by the ASEAN Special Envoy, and for him to be able to engage freely with all he wishes to meet.”
The “five-point consensus”, which was adopted when Min Aung Hlaing paid a brief visit to Jakarta on April 24 last year, called for a cessation of violence and “a constructive dialog between all parties concerned.”
The EU statement was remarkable in the sense that the “Five Point Agreement” was already dead when the Europeans issued it. No envoys from ASEAN have been allowed to meet anybody except junta officials and the word “dialog” has never been uttered by Min Aung Hlaing and his cohorts.
During the most recent such ASEAN visit, by Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn in late March, all that the junta had to offer him was a meeting with Su Su Lwin, the wife of Htin Kyaw, president from 2016-2018 and a member of the coup-ousted National League for Democracy (NLD). Su Su Lwin, however, declined to meet the ASEAN envoy, citing “health issues.”
But that did not prevent Noeleen Hayzer, UN Secretary-General’s special envoy to Myanmar, from teaming up with not only Prak Sokonn but also Cambodia’s authoritarian ruler Hun Sen, whose country is this year’s ASEAN rotational chair.
On April 1 — and it was apparently not an April Fool’s joke — Hayzer’s office issued a statement referring to the “robust ASEAN-UN umbrella” and that “ASEAN and the broader international community have a responsibility to amplify and support the will of the people.”
Critics would say that she seems to have conveniently forgotten that ASEAN is a gathering of ten mostly undemocratic nations which has never during its now almost 55-year-long history helped solve a single problem in member states or bilateral disputes between them.
Such issues range from the conflict in East Timor and border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, cross-border insurgencies between Thailand and Malaysia, and, perhaps most crucially, a common stand on the South China Sea as China asserts its wide-reaching claims to the strategic waterway.
In fact, ASEAN’s two guiding principles — consensus and non-interference — make the bloc impotent when it comes to regional security or the promotion of peace and democracy. The only things that ASEAN can show as progress would be some trade agreements and visa exemption rules for citizens of member states.
Meanwhile, the Myanmar military is pushing ahead its brutal campaign to wipe out resistance forces and secure control over the country. Elections may or may not be held in 2023, as Mun Aung Hlaing once stated, but before that happens the military will make sure that the NLD is emasculated politically and organizationally.
The NLD has scored massive landslide victories in all the elections it has contested, first in 1990 to for a National Assembly that was never convened but replaced by the military with a constitution-drafting body that consisted of no more than 100 of 492 MPs elects and then up to 600 delegates appointed by the military.
Then, in 2015 after which the NLD was allowed to form a government and, finally, in 2020, when the military seized power before the elected assembly could meet. The generals are now busy preparing for the selection of its own election commissioners while all NLD leaders, among them President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, remain in military custody.
Since the tanks rolled into Yangon and Naypyidaw, and the protests were met with gunfire, thousands of activists have fled to the border areas where ethnic rebels have territories or organized their own resistance in parts of central Myanmar that have not seen insurgency since the 1970s.
Those forces have shown remarkable resilience and fighting spirit, but the abundance of local resistance groups, loosely lumped together as People’s Defense Forces, do not appear to coordinate their activities under a central command. There are frequent ambushes and skirmishes in various parts of the country, but no coherent strategy seems to have been developed for the anti-junta struggle.
Nor do they currently have enough weaponry to seriously challenge the mighty firepower of the Myanmar military. At the same time, junta forces are stretched thin on many fronts, making it impossible for Min Aung Hlaing to “annihilate” the resistance, as he has pledged.
With the outside world now doing next to nothing, there can only be one conclusion: The Myanmar tragedy is bound to continue for the foreseeable future with more internal turmoil, refugee flows to neighboring countries and repression of any dissent under unflinching generals for whom notions of compromise, dialog and listening to public opinion do not exist..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ထင်ရှားကျော်ကြားသော မြန်မာ့ဒီမိုကရေစီ ဘက်တော်သားများကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်ရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားဥပဒေကို အလွဲသုံးစားပြုခြင်းအပေါ် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရမှ ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုံ့ချသည်။ စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော တရားဝင်အစိုးရ ဖြစ်သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးများ နှင့်ထင်ရှားကျော်ကြားသော ဝန်းရံသူများကို ဤကဲ့သို့ ယုတ်ညံ့စွာ ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူခြင်းသည် နိုင်ငံတကာ ဥပဒေများအရ သော်လည်းကောင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား ဥပဒေအရ သော်လည်းကောင်း အကျုံးမဝင်ပါ။
ယခုကဲ့သို့ နိုင်ငံရေး တိုက်ခိုက်မှုပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့တရားဝင်မှုရရှိအောင် ကြိုးပမ်း အားထုတ်ခြင်းသည် တရားဝင်မှု မရှိသလို ဥပဒေနှင့်လည်း ဆန့်ကျင်နေပါသည်။ စစ်အုပ်စုမှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားဥပဒေ၏ ပုဒ်မ ၁၆ ကို ကျဉ်းမြောင်းသော အဓိပ္ပါယ် သတ်မှတ်ကန့်သက်မှု အခြေအနေတွင်သာ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုနှင့် နိုင်ငံကူး လက်မှတ်ရုပ်သိမ်းပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကိုးကားထားပါသည်။ ဖော်ပြပါအခြေအနေအရ အခြားနိုင်ငံတစ်ခုတွင် ရာသက်ပန် နိုင်ငံသားခံယူမှုသာ ပါဝင်အကြုံးဝင်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ လက်ရှိသမ္မတကြီး ဒူဝါလရှီးလမှ စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အခြေအမြစ် မရှိသော စွပ်စွဲချက်အပေါ် ပြန်လည်ပြောကြားသည်မှာ - “နိုင်ငံသားဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၁၆ နှင့် ၁၇မှ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်မှာ မြန်မာနိင်ငံသား တစ်ဦးသည် အခြားနိုင်ငံတစ်ခုတွင် နိုင်ငံသားခံယူပြီး အခြေချ နေထိုင်မှသာ အကျုံးဝင်မည် ဖြစ်သည်။ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအားလုံးသည် တရားမဝင် အာဏာကို လုယူထားသော လူသတ်အဖွဲ့အား အနိုင်ယူပြီးပါက နိုင်ငံတော်သို့ ပြန်လည်ကာ တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ကြမည်ကို ကျွန်ုပ်တို့နိုင်ငံသားအားလုံးမှ နားလည် သဘောပေါက်ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။”
ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံ ဥပဒေ ကျွမ်းကျင်သူလည်း ဖြစ်သော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ တရားရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဦးသိန်းဦး မှလည်း - “အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် မြေပြင် တိုက်ပွဲများတွင် အကြိမ်ကြိမ် ထိခိုက်နစ်နာနေရသဖြင့် ယခုကဲ့သို့လုံး၀အခြေအမြစ်မရှိသည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်ဖြင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်မှာ သိသာထင်ရှားလျှက်ရှိသည်။ ယခုကဲ့သို့တိုက်ခိုက်မူသည် မည်သို့မျှ တရားမဝင်ကြောင်းကိုလည်း စစ်အုပ်စုမှသိရှိပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၁၇ ပြဌာန်းချက်မှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားတဦးတယောက်သည် အခြားနိုင်ငံခြား တိုင်းပြည် တခုခုတွင် နိုင်ငံသားအဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲခံယူပြီး၊ အခြေချနေထိုင်မှသာလျှင် ယခုကဲ့သို့ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မူကို ရုပ်သိမ်းပိုင်ခွင့်ရှိခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ အခြားအကြောင်း တစုံတရာဖြင့် နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မူကို ရပ်စဲရုပ်သိမ်းပိုင်ခွင့် လုံး၀မရှိကြောင်း ဥပဒေတွင် အတိအလင်းပြဌာန်းထားသည်”- ဟုပြောကြားလိုက်သည်။
ဆက်လက်၍ တရားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဦးသိန်းဦးမှ-
လက်ရှိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားဥပဒေကို ပယ်ဖျက်ပြီး၊ အသစ်ပြန်လည်ရေးဆွဲသွားမည်ဟု တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးက ပြောကြားလိုက်သည်။
ထို့အပြင် ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးက “ကျွန်တော်နှင့် ကျွန်တော်၏ လုပ်ဖော်ကိုင်ဖက်များကို ယခုကဲ့သို့ အဓိပ္ပါယ်မဲ့ တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းဖြင့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ စိတ်ဓါတ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ ထိခိုက်သွားစေမည်ဟု စစ်အုပ်စုမှ တွေးထင်နေခြင်းသည် သာလျှင် ၎င်းတို့အနေဖြင့် မည်မျှထင်ယောင်ထင်မှား ဖြစ်နေသည်ကို သိသာစေပါသည်။ ၎င်းတို့တွေးထင်နေသလို မဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကြီးဆီသို့ ငြိမ်းချမ်းမူနှင့် တရားမျှတမူ ယူဆောင်လာသည့်အခါ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့မှ စစ်အုပ်စုအဖွဲ့ဝင်များအား နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မူကို ရုပ်သိမ်းမည် မဟုတ်သော်လည်း၊ စစ်အုပ်စု ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သမျှ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မူများနှင့် ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမူများအား ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူ အပြစ်ပေးနိုင်မည့် တရားစီရင်မူကို ပြုလုပ်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်” -ဟု ပြောကြားလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Justice
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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"April 4, 2022
Since the failed coup, the military junta has been terrorizing, repressing, and plundering the lives and livelihoods of the civilian population in escalatory attacks with each passing day.
The military junta’s intensification of so-called military operations has resorted to instilling a climate of fear. Inhumane tactics detailed below further demonstrate the military’s intent to return Burma to harsh authoritarian rule.
According to documentation collected by Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), since the coup and as of March 31, 2022, more than (547) households and buildings have been seized by the military junta.
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
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Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
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Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"1. The National Unity Government (NUG) acknowledges the visit of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, H.E. Prak Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Cambodia, to Myanmar on 21-23 March 2022.
2. The NUG reiterates its commitment to engage with and support the Special Envoy’s mandate to facilitate the implementation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC). However, it is deeply disappointed that the Special Envoy failed to meet with all parties concerned, as required by the 5PC. As the Special Envoy has himself conceded, this approach risks lending legitimacy to the illegal military junta. It also threatens ASEAN’s adherence to the principle of impartiality, and hampers its ability to bring informed and inclusive approaches to ‘concrete, tangible and visible’ 5PC implementation.
3. ASEAN’s exclusion of junta representatives from its 2021 Summits and its 2022 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting were a clear and principled response to the illegal military junta’s contemptuous treatment of the 5PC. There has been no improvement since. Across two early visits, the movements, meetings and messages of the new ASEAN Chair and his Special Envoy have been manipulated by the junta. The Special Envoy’s claim to ‘move things piece by piece, and with patience’ has so far seen him moved like a chess piece by the junta.
4. With his first working visit concluded, the NUG urges the Special Envoy to act on his commitment to meet with all parties concerned. This must include engagement with:
• President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
• The NUG
• The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
• The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC)
• Ethnic Resistance Organizations
• Civil society representatives, community leaders, and humanitarian organizations operating on the ground.
5. The NUG provides the following responses to the next steps proposed by the Special Envoy in his press briefing:
a. Conducting a Consultative Meeting at the end of April 2022 to listen and exchange views with different stakeholders on effective, non-discriminatory, and unhampered delivery of humanitarian assistance to those most in need.
The NUG and humanitarian partners must participate in the proposed Consultative Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance.
The NUG supports the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to all communities and persons in need including the escalating number of internally displaced persons. To secure such access, it is essential that the Special Envoy engages with the NUG, civil society, community-based humanitarian organizations, and other local stakeholders. Existing cross-border assistance mechanisms must also be utilized to save lives.
b. Intensification of discussion with the SAC and relevant stakeholders on the Troika, the Friends of Myanmar, and the Humanitarian Corridor arrangements.
The NUG urges the Special Envoy to confirm that it and other parties concerned identified above (see point 4) are included within the "relevant stakeholders" with whom he will ‘intensify discussion’. Their inclusion, as the representatives of the people, is essential to progressing ‘a peaceful solution in the interests of the people’, consistent with the 5PC .
The NUG offers its in principle support to the proposed ASEAN Troika mechanism.
Further, the NUG seeks clarity on the proposed roles and composition of the “Friends of Myanmar” group on humanitarian assistance. Any associated arrangement of a humanitarian corridor must, as earlier set out, involve the NUG, civil society, and local, community-based and cross-border humanitarian organizations already supporting the humanitarian response.
c. Determine the schedule, substance, and possible outcomes of the next visit of the Special Envoy, after briefing key stakeholders on the result of this visit and listen to their feedback and recommendations for the ways forward.
The NUG urges the Special Envoy to confirm at the earliest opportunity his upcoming schedule and planned meetings with the NUG and other parties concerned. The NUG included proposed meeting modalities in its 22 February 2022 correspondence to the ASEAN Chair and the Special Envoy.
6. The NUG supports the Special Envoy’s calls for ‘utmost restraint on the use of military forces’ but is dumbfounded by the Special Envoy’s inclusion of the attribution to junta-leader Min Aung Hlaing that “nothing is more important than people’s life”. Min Aung Hlaing and his junta are singularly responsible for the political, economic, humanitarian and human rights crises enveloping Myanmar and for associated atrocity crimes and acts of terror. Their actions comprise war crimes and crimes against humanity, and constitute a grave threat to regional security and to the interests of ASEAN Members and their populations.
7. The Special Envoy recognizes that the current conflict has long historic roots: "… I would like to inform that the fighting did not take place just last year or a few years ago. Resistance and fighting between the military group and the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) have been going on since Myanmar's independence in 1948, meaning more than 70 years already."
The NUG welcomes this recognition by ASEAN that the military’s atrocities are decades old and that past failures of accountability have perpetuated current crimes. Now is ASEAN’s opportunity to correct historic missteps by genuinely supporting the will and interests of the Myanmar people.
8. The NUG is committed to inclusive democracy, long-term stability, and sustainable peace and development. It is engaged in genuine dialogue with Myanmar’s manifold peoples and communities, including through the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), to implement the Federal Democracy Charter.....၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် ကမ္ဘောဒီးယားနိုင်ငံ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးချုပ်နှင့် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး H.E. Prak Sokhonn ၏ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ ၂၁ ရက်မှ ၂၃ ရက်အထိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ လာရောက်သည့်ခရီးစဥ်ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) မှ အသိအမှတ်ပြုသည်။
၂။ အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ရပ် ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရာတွင် လွယ်ကူချောမွေ့စေရန် အထူးသံတမန်၏ လုပ်ဆောင်ပိုင်ခွင့်အား ကူညီပံ့ပိုးရန်နှင့်ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG)၏ ကတိကဝတ်ပြုမှုကို ထပ်လောင်းပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ သို့သော်လည်း အထူးသံတမန်သည် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ရပ်၏ လိုအပ်ချက်ဖြစ်သော သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံးနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံရန်ပျက်ကွက်သည့်အတွက် အလွန်စိတ်ပျက်မိပါသည်။ အထူးသံတမန်ကိုယ်တိုင် ဝန်ခံခဲ့သလိုပင် ဤချဉ်းကပ်မှုသည် တရားမ၀င်စစ်အုပ်စုအား တရားဝင်မှုပေးရာရောက်သည့်အန္တရာယ်ပင်ရှိနေပါသည်။ ထိုအခြေအနေသည် ဘက်မလိုက်ရေးမူအား အာဆီယံ၏ လိုက်နာမှုကိုလည်း ခြိမ်းခြောက်နေပြီး “လက်ဆုပ်လက်ကိုင်ပြနိုင်ပြီး၊ မြင်သာထင်သာရှိရှိ နှင့် လက်တွေ့မြင်နိုင်သည့်” အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ရပ်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မှုတွင် အားလုံးသိသာမြင်သာမှု နှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ချဉ်းကပ်မှုများအား ဆောင်ကျဉ်းလာနိုင်စေရန် အာဆီယံ၏စွမ်းဆောင်ရည်ကို အဟန့်အတားဖြစ်စေပါသည်။
၃။ အာဆီယံ၏ ၂၀၂၁ ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးများနှင့် ၎င်း၏ ၂၀၂၂ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး ဝန်ကြီးများ အစည်းအဝေးများတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များကို မတက်ရောက်စေဘဲ ချန်လှပ်ထားခြင်းသည် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ရပ်အား တရားမဝင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ မထီမဲ့မြင်ပြုမှုအပေါ် ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်း နှင့် မူအရပြတ်သားသော တုံ့ပြန်မှု ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုစဥ်ကတည်းကပင် တိုးတက်မှုများ မရှိခဲ့ပါ။ အစောပိုင်း ခရီးစဥ်နှစ်ကြိမ်တွင်လည်း အာဆီယံသဘာပတိသစ်နှင့် ၎င်း၏ အထူးသံတမန်၏ လှုပ်ရှားမှုများ၊ အစည်းအဝေးများနှင့် သတင်းစကားများကို စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့ကလိုသလို ကြိုးကိုင်ချယ်လှယ်ခဲ့သည်။ အထူးသံတမန်၏ 'စိတ်ရှည်သည်းခံပြီး အခြေအနေများကို တထစ်ချင်းရွှေ့ရန်' ပြောဆိုချက်သည် စစ်အစိုးရ၏ စစ်တုရင်အရုပ်ကဲ့သို့ ရွေ့သွားသည်ကို ယခုအချိန်တွင်တွေ့မြင်နေရပြီဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG)မှ ပထမဆုံး အလုပ်ခရီးစဉ် ပြီးဆုံးပြီးသည့် အထူးသံတမန်အား သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံရန် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားသည့်အတိုင်း လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းသည်။
ထိုသို့ တွေ့ဆုံဆောင်ရွက်မှုတွင်
• သမ္မတဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်
• အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG)
• ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH)၊
• အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC)၊
• တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ
• အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ ရပ်ရွာခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် မြေပြင်တွင် လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်နေသော လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ပါ၀င်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ သတင်းစာရှင်းလင်းပွဲတွင် အထူးသံတမန် အဆိုပြုသည့် နောက်အဆင့်များအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) သည်အောက်ပါ တုံ့ပြန်ချက်များကို ပေးပါသည်။
(က) 2022 ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလကုန်တွင် အတိုင်ပင်ခံအစည်းအဝေးတစ်ခုကျင်းပပြီး လိုအပ်နေသူများအား လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများ ထိရောက်စွာ၊ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုမရှိဘဲ အဟန့်အတားမရှိ ပေးပို့နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူများနှင့် ကွဲပြားသောအမြင်များ ဖလှယ်ရန်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) နှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ မိတ်ဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုအကူအညီဆိုင်ရာ အဆိုပြုထားသော အတိုင်ပင်ခံအစည်းအဝေးတွင် ပါဝင်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) သည် ပြည်တွင်းရွှေ့ပြောင်းနေထိုင်သူဦးရေ တိုးမြင့်လာမှုအပါအဝင် လူမှုအသိုက်အဝန်းများနှင့် လိုအပ်နေသူများထံ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများကို အရေးပေါ်ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထိုသို့သောထောက်ပံ့ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများလုံခြုံနေစေရန် အထူးသံတမန်သည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) ၊ အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ရပ်ရွာအခြေပြု လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အခြားဒေသခံအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် မဖြစ်မနေလိုအပ်ပါသည်။ လက်ရှိ နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် အကူအညီပေးရေး ယန္တရားများကိုလည်း အသုံးချ၍ အသက်များကို ကယ်တင်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
(ခ) Troika (မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏မိတ်ဆွေများ) အစီအစဥ် နှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုစင်္ကြံဆိုင်ရာ အစီအစဉ်များနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ စစ်ကောင်စီ နှင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူများနှင့် အပြင်းအထန် ဆွေးနွေးခြင်း။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) သည် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အား သူ 'အပြင်းအထန်ဆွေးနွေးမှုပြုလုပ်မည့်' သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူများ' တွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) နှင့် ယခုထုတ်ပြန်ကြေငြာချက်၏ အချက် ၄ တွင် ဖော်ပြထားသော သက်ဆိုင်သူများ ပါဝင်ကြောင်း အတည်ပြုရန်တိုက်တွန်းသည်။
အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ရပ်နှင့် အညီ 'ပြည်သူတို့၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသော ဖြေရှင်းနည်း' ကို တိုးတက်စေရေးဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် တရား၀င်ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၏ ပါဝင်မှုသည် မရှိမဖြစ် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ(NUG)သည်အဆိုပြုထားသောအာဆီယံTroika(မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏မိတ်ဆွေများ) အစီအစဥ်ကို မူအားဖြင့် ထောက်ခံပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) သည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီဆိုင်ရာ "မြန်မာ့မိတ်ဆွေများ" အဖွဲ့၏ အဆိုပြုထားသော အခန်းကဏ္ဍများနှင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းမှုဆိုင်ရာ ရှင်းလင်းချက်များကို ရှာဖွေနေပါသည်။ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုစင်္ကြံ၏ ဆက်စပ်အစီအစဉ်တိုင်းတွင် အစောပိုင်းတွင် ဖော်ပြသတ်မှတ်ထားသည့်အတိုင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) ၊ အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ဒေသဆိုင်ရာ၊ ရပ်ရွာအခြေပြုနှင့် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာအကူအညီများ ပံ့ပိုးပေးလျက်ရှိသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများပါဝင်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
ဂ။ ယခုခရီးစဉ်၏ ရလဒ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အဓိက သက်ဆိုင်သူများကို ရှင်းလင်းတင်ပြပြီး ရှေ့ဆက်ရမည့် နည်းလမ်းများအတွက် ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြံပြုချက်များနှင့် အကြံပြုချက်များကို နားထောင်ပြီးအထူးသံတမန်၏ နောက်လာမည့် ခရီးစဉ်၏ အချိန်ဇယား၊ အကြောင်းအရာနှင့် ဖြစ်နိုင်ခြေရှိသော ရလဒ်များကို ဆုံးဖြတ်ခြင်း။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) သည် အထူးသံတမန်အား ၎င်း၏နောက်လာရောက်မည့်အချိန်ဇယားနှင့် NUG နှင့် အခြားအစုအဖွဲ့များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံရန် စီစဉ်ထားမှုကို အစောဆုံး အတည်ပြုရန် တိုက်တွန်းသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) မှ အာဆီယံဥက္ကဌ နှင့် အထူးသံတမန်ထံသို့ ၂၂ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၂၀၂၂ ရက်နေ့ပေးစာတွင် အဆိုပြုထားသော အစည်းအဝေးပုံစံများ ပါဝင်သည်။
၆။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) သည် အထူးသံတမန်၏ 'စစ်အင်အားအသုံးပြုမှုကို အစွမ်းကုန် ထိန်းထိန်းသိမ်းသိမ်း' ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တောင်းဆိုချက်ကို ထောက်ခံသော်လည်း၊ "ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်ထက် ဘာမှ ပိုအရေးမကြီး" ဟု အာဏာရှင်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်အား ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြသည့် အထူးသံတမန်၏ ဆောင်ရွက်မှုကြောင့် အံ့အားသင့် စိတ်ပျက်မိပါသည်။ မင်းအောင်လှိုင်နှင့် ၎င်း၏ စစ်အုပ်စုသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသော နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ အကျပ်အတည်းများနှင့် ဆက်နွှယ်သည့် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များအတွက် တစ်ဦးချင်း တာဝန်ရှိပါသည်။ ၎င်းတို့၏ လုပ်ရပ်များတွင် စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများ ပါ၀င်ပြီး၊ ဒေသတွင်း လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် အာဆီယံအဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ပြည်သူများ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ကြီးမားသော ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်လာသည်။
၇။ လက်ရှိပဋိပက္ခသည် ရှည်လျားသော သမိုင်းဝင်အခြေခံအကြောင်းအရင်းများရှိကြောင်း အထူးသံတမန်က အသိအမှတ်ပြုသည်။ “....တိုက်ပွဲများသည် မနှစ်က သို့မဟုတ် လွန်ခဲ့သော နှစ်အနည်းငယ်ကမှ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ခြင်း မဟုတ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးလိုပါသည်။ စစ်အုပ်စု နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့များကြား ခုခံတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးရပြီးစ (၁၉၄၈)ခုနှစ်မှစတင်ခဲ့ပြီး နှစ် ၇၀ ကျော်ကြာမြင့်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။”
စစ်တပ်၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှုများသည် ဆယ်စုနှစ်များစွာ သက်တမ်းရှိပြီဖြစ်ပြီး ယခင်က တာဝန်ခံရန်ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းများသည် လက်ရှိရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို ဆက်လက်ဖြစ်လာစေကြောင်း အာဆီယံ၏ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG)မှ ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ယခုအချိန်သည် မြန်မာလူထု၏ ဆန္ဒနှင့် အကျိုးစီးပွားကို စစ်မှန်စွာ ထောက်ခံခြင်းဖြင့် သမိုင်းဝင်အမှားများကို ပြင်ဆင်ရန် အာဆီယံ၏ အခွင့်အရေးဖြစ်သည်။
၈။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) သည် အားလုံးပါဝင်နိုင်သော ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ရေရှည်တည်ငြိမ်ရေးနှင့် ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲသော ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးတို့အတွက် ကတိပြုသည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပဋိညာဉ်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ နယ်ပယ်စုံမှ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ် များ၊လူမှုအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းများနှင့်စစ်မှန်သောတွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှုတွင်ပါဝင်ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
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"Ten alleged Yangon activists, who were detained in April last year and charged with involvement in bombings, were sentenced to seven years in prison with labor, according to their lawyers.
A court in Insein Prison on March 31 handed down the maximum sentences for illegal weapons possession and their detention period will be deducted from the sentence. The 10 still face charges Article 436 of the Penal Code which could extend their terms by 20 years.
“The arson trial under Article 436 is ongoing. The maximum penalty under 436 is 20 years,” said a lawyer.
They were detained in night raids on April 17 last year following three blasts that killed at least one soldier and wounded several others at the General Administration Office in Yankin Township, where troops were based.
The following day, the regime’s Myawaddy TV announced suspects had been arrested in the township with bomb-making equipment after a tipoff. The accused showed signs of severe torture in the junta’s pictures.
The face of Ma Khin Nyein Thu, 31, was visibly swollen and she was reportedly sexually harassed during the interrogation.
A family member said Ma Khin Nyein Thus is now in good health.
Since the coup, many activists have been given lengthy jail terms or death sentences for alleged attacks and for having ties to the civilian National Unity Government or its armed people’s defense forces (PDFs). Recently several individuals were given 10-year sentences for allegedly donating cash to PDFs.
Those who are tried by court-martial are given harsher penalties and denied citizenship and human and legal rights, including the right to counsel, said lawyers.
U Khin Maung Myint, a lawyer, said: “There are two separate types of court, one for courts-martial in townships where direct military rule is imposed. Lawyers are not allowed to represent the accused in those courts. No one tried at those courts has been released and they are all given maximum sentences.”
No detainees tried at prison courts have been released, he added.
More than 10,007 people remain under detention since the February 2021 coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Around 905 detainees have been given prison sentences, including 59 death sentences. Two children have received death sentences. At least 41 other suspects in hiding have been given death sentences in absentia..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
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"၄-ဧပြီ-၂၀၂၂
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် အာဏာကိုမတရားလုယူချိန်ကတည်းက နေ့စဉ်နှင့်အမျှ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက် အိုးအိမ်၊ စည်းစိမ်ကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်၊ အနိုင်ကျင့်၊ ဖျက်ဆီးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်နေခဲ့ရာ လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင် အကြမ်းဖက် မှုများမှာ ပိုမိုအရှိန်မြှင့် ဆိုးရွားရက်စက်လာလျက်ရှိသည်။
စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် နယ်မြေစိုးမိုးရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ဟု အကြောင်းပြကာ အဆမတန် အင်အားသုံး၍ စစ်ရေးအရှိန် မြှင့်တင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသလို တစ်ဖက်တွင်လည်း ပြည်သူများကို အကြောက်တရားလွှမ်းခြုံနေစေရေး အတွက် လူမဆန်သောနည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံအသုံးပြုလျက်ရှိသည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း (AAPP) မှ လက်လှမ်းမီသမျှ ကောက်ယူရရှိထား သော အချက်အလက်များအရ မတရားအာဏာလုရန်ကြိုးပမ်းချိန်ကတည်းက မတ်လ (၃၁)၊ ၂၀၂၂ အထိ နေအိမ်၊အဆောက်အအုံ စုစုပေါင်း (၅၄၇) ထက်မနည်း စစ်အုပ်စုက ချိပ်ပိတ်သိမ်းဆည်းခဲ့သည်။
နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
973.22 KB
Local URL:
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