Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Individual Documents
Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
https://nugmyanmar.org
“(၈၂) နှစ်မြောက် ဆရာတော် ဦးဥတ္တမနေ့ တွင် ပေးပို့သော သဝဏ်လွှာ”
စက်တင်ဘာ (၉) ရက် ၊၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်
• မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေး အတွက်သာမက အာရှတိုက် တစ်ခုလုံး လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် စွမ်းစွမ်းတမံ ဦးဆောင်လမ်းပြခဲ့သူ “ရခိုင့်သူရဲကောင်း ၊ မြန်မာ့သူရဲကောင်းအဖြစ်သာမက အာရှနေဝန်းနီ အဖြစ်တင်စားခဲ့ရသည့် ဆရာတော်ဦးဥတ္တမ၏ သတ္တိဂုဏ်တို့ကို အထူးအောက်မေ့လျက် သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့ ပါသည်။
• နယ်ချဲ့ဝါဒ မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရန်နှင့် တရားမျှတခြင်း၊ တန်းတူညီမှျခြင်းတို့ အတွက် ဆရာတော် ဦးဥတ္တမ အပါအဝင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များ နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ရုန်းကန်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
• ယနေ့မျက်မှောက်ကာလတွင်လည်း အချူပ်အခြာအာဏာ၏ မူလပိုင်ရှင် ပြည်သူတို့ မျှော်ရည်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးနှင့် အခြေခံ လွတ်လပ်ခြင်း ၊ မျှတခြင်း ၊ တန်းတူညီမျှခြင်းနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်တို့ကို အာမခံနိုင်မည့် နိုင်ငံရေးစနစ်တစ်ရပ် ထူထောင်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းရုန်းကန်နေရဆဲဖြစ်သည်။
• နယ်ချဲ့စနစ်သည် နိုင်ငံများ၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေး တန်းတူညီမှျရေးအတွက် ဘုံအန္တရာယ် အတားအဆီးဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ဟူသမျှသည်လည်း ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ တည်ဆောင်ရေး အတွက် အဓိက ဘုံအန္တရာယ်အတားအဆီးပင်ဖြစ်သည်။
• လက်နက်အားကိုး စစ်အာဏာရှင် ဓလေ့စရိုက်တို့ ဖြင့် နိုင်ငံရေး ၊ လူမှုရေး ၊ စီးပွားရေး အစရှိသည် ကဏ္ဍစုံတွင် ဗိုလ်ကျစိုးမိုးလျက် ပြည်ထောင်စုသားတို့အား ဖိနှိပ်လျက်ရှိသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အား အမြစ်ဖြတ် ချေမှုန်းရေးသည် မျက်မှောက်ခေတ် ၏ နိုင်ငံရေး တာဝန်တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ပေသည်။
• အဆိုပါတာဝန်ကို ထမ်းဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ဆရာတော် အသျှင်ဥတ္တမ ၏ ရဲ့ရင့်မှု ၊ ဉာဏ်ပညာတို့ နှင့် ပြည့်စုံသည် သတ္တိဂုဏ် တို့ကိုပြန်လည် အမှတ်ရလျက် ယနေ့ စက်တင်ဘာလ ၉ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၈၂) နှစ်မြောက် အာရှနေဝန်းလွတ်လပ်ရေးမီးရှူးတန်ဆောင် ဆရာတော် အသျှင်ဥတ္တမနေ့ကို ဂုဏ်ပြု လိုက်ရပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Format :
pdf
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297.44 KB
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Description:
"Fellow Karenni, Leaders and Service Members o f Karenni Resistance
Today is the 73rd Anniversary o f Karenni Martyrs’ Day. Every year on this day, we
gather to honor and remember our fallen heroes. It is an auspicious day to commemorate the
brutal killing o f Karenni resistance leader and chairman o f Karenni National Organization Gobi
Turee by the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League government o f the newly independent
Burma on September 8, 1948.
Seventy three years have passed but we cannot forget. On this day we remember a ll o f
our martyrs who have given their lives - from the beginning o f Karenni resistance to regain
our independence from the expansionist Anti-Fascist People' s Freedom League government to
the current struggle for equality, democracy, and self-determination. We remember the
countless Karenni who have sacrificed in so many ways along with our resistance fighters for
the liberation o f Karenni people throughout the course o f our struggle.
But a mere remembrance will not do our martyrs and their sacrifices justice. As long as
we are still denied to possess our righteous and fundamental rights that our martyrs have paid
for in blood, we must continue the fight and fulfill their dreams. In light o f the current political
unfolding in Burma, all Karenni must particularly unite to uproot all forms o f dictatorship and
earn our political dreams. Our unity must be unbreakable for the sake o f our long term national
and state’s interests.
Though our fight may have started as a fight to regain our independence and selfdetermination,
the Karenni struggle was never solely for Karenni. Generation after generation,
we have w'orked with our fellow oppressed nationalities in Burma for democracy, equality, and
self-determination for all. As such, we must capitalize on the strong political and revolutionary
spirits we arc witnessing nationwide and step up our fight to liberate Burma from tyranny.
An oppressive system may make unity hard to achieve. Unity may be a thing easier said
than done. However, if we stand on the values that all human beings are free and equal, and
pursue a just political cause, we will overcome the challenges posed by disunity. We will be
able to withstand the harsh conditions and punishing tests o f a resistance, and come out
victorious. And we will do so all by the strength o f unity.
In a resistance struggle for liberation, we all may have sacrificed more or less. But no
sacrifice is greater and more honorable than those made by our fallen. Therefore, let us honor
our martyrs with our dedication and hard work from w herever we are and whatever role w e are
in. Only then will we be able to prove our work worthy o f the blood our heroes shed. This
resistance journey has been long. But one day we will reach our destination. And on that day,
we will cmbrace what is righteously ours; build a new, peaceful, and harmonious union with
all nationalities across the nation; and fulfill the dreams o f our martyrs.
8 September 2021
Headquarters
Karenni National Progressive Party..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Karenni history, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
52.21 KB 213.83 KB
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Sub-title:
Acting president of self-declared government calls on civilian armed groups to target military that seized power in February coup
Description:
"Myanmar’s self-declared parallel government, which was set up by pro-democracy politicians, has announced a “defensive war” against the junta, calling for civilian armed groups to target the military and its assets.
Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of the National Unity Government (NUG), said Tuesday marked the beginning of a nationwide revolt. He warned people to avoid unnecessary travel and stock up on essentials.
Over recent months, grassroots forces have emerged across Myanmar to oppose the military, which seized power in a coup in February and has inflicted deadly violence on anyone who protests against its rule.
The groups, which have carried out guerrilla-style attacks on military targets, appear to operate independently at a local level, and vary in their resources and training. In some cases they are supported by ethnic armed organisations, which have fought the army for decades, demanding greater autonomy.
Duwa Lashi La called upon such groups to target “the military junta and its assets in your respective areas”, “carefully protect the lives and properties of the people”, and observe codes of conduct. The groups were urged to immediately target the junta’s leader, Min Aung Hlaing, and the military council in different ways, and to maintain control of their areas.
Duwa Lashi La also said soldiers, police and civil servants should resign from their posts and join the revolt. “From today onward, all the civil servants under the military council, we warn and forbid you from going to the office,” he said. The public, he said, should assist the armed groups and their allies.
The statement comes ahead of the opening of the United Nations general assembly next week in New York, where it is expected that a decision will be made on who should represent Myanmar – a member of the junta or a representative of the NUG, which was set up by ousted lawmakers and opponents of military rule. The junta previously said it had dismissed Kyaw Moe Tun from his post as Myanmar’s UN ambassador, after he voiced support for the pro-democracy opposition. However, Kyaw Moe Tun has continued to serve at the UN.
Diplomatic efforts to end the crisis have been led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), but there has been little progress. The group’s envoy to Myanmar, Erywan Yusof, told the Kyodo news agency this week that the military had accepted his proposal for a ceasefire until the end of the year to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The military’s opponents, however, were skeptical.
Following the NUG’s announcement on Tuesday, local media reported fighting in border areas between the army and its opponents. Clashes broke out in Sagaing, in the north-west, between junta forces and the Kachin Independence Army, which has fought for greater autonomy for the Kachin people for decades, and has backed anti-coup protesters.
In the southern Tanintharyi region, fighting occurred between the junta forces and Karen National Union, one of the country’s oldest ethnic armed organisations.
In the Magway region, an armed force said it had attacked five military targets.
In Myanmar’s largest city, Yangon, the streets reportedly remained calm, though there was an increased military presence. Many residents rushed to shops to stock up on supplies.
Duwa Lashi La said he believed the international community would understand the reasons for his statement. “I believe that our neighbouring countries, Asean countries, the United Nations, and all other countries around the world understand that we do it [declare a revolt] out of necessity based on the country’s current situation,” he said.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma, which has tracked arrests and deaths following the coup, 1046 civilians have been killed and 6,230 are currently detained.
Medics, journalists, activists and elected politicians are among those who have been arrested since February..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Local URL:
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Description:
"The acting president of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) expressed confidence that the international community would back the NUG’s declaration of war on the country’s military regime, as it was a necessary step.
The NUG declared war on the regime on Tuesday, with acting President Duwa Lashila calling on citizens to “revolt against the rule of military terrorists led by [coup leader] Min Aung Hlaing in every corner of the country” while setting out dos and don’ts for everyone concerned.
“I believe that our neighboring countries, ASEAN countries, the United Nations and all other countries in the world understand that we do it out of necessity based on the country’s current situation,” he said in a speech to the country.
The announcement came one week before the opening of this year’s session of the UN General Assembly in New York, and several days after regional bloc ASEAN’s special envoy called for a four-month ceasefire to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid in the country.
Formed in April largely by elected lawmakers from the ousted National League for Democracy government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and their ethnic allies, the parallel government has enjoyed popular support at home and abroad. Many Myanmar people see it as their legitimate government, while the regime has branded it a terrorist organization.
The NUG’s Tuesday call for armed struggle nationwide will go down in history as Myanmar’s “Second Resistance Day”; the first marks the start of the country’s armed resistance to Japanese fascists in 1945. This time the people of Myanmar are being called to revolt against the generals who have been oppressing and killing their own citizens—the very people whom they are supposed to protect.
Much of Myanmar has already been in revolt since the military coup in February. The regime’s deadly crackdowns on its protesters forced many young people to take up arms. The shadow government’s declaration of war on Tuesday could accelerate the ongoing armed struggle against the junta to another level, with fighting expected to intensify across the country.
In his speech to the country on Tuesday, the acting president urged members of the civilian armed groups known as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to “target to control the military junta and its assets in their respective areas.”
The call to arms could make things significantly more difficult for the regime’s forces, who until now have mainly been faced with resistance from the country’s ethnic armed groups, mostly in far-flung areas. Now their battlefields will be in both urban and rural areas, as the PDFs, who have received weapons training from ethnic armed groups, are scattered across the country. The regime’s soldiers were already detested by the people for their brutality against civilians, and will now be extremely vulnerable to all kinds of deadly attacks by civilians as soon as they step outside the gates of their regiments.
Acting President Duwa Lashila also instructed PDF members to carefully protect the lives and properties of the people while strictly following orders, as well as rules of engagement, in contrast to regime soldiers, who have rampaged through civilian areas and committed crimes like arbitrary killings and arrests during their raids.
In addition to instructing the PDF members, the acting president issued general instructions covering the safety of the people.
“All citizens should avoid unnecessary travel and mind your personal safety. Save necessary supplies and medications. Assist the PDFs and their allies,” he said.
Mindful of the importance of collaborating with the country’s ethnic armed organizations—Kachin and Karen groups have been attacking regime troops in solidarity with the anti-regime movement—Duwa Lashila, who is himself an ethnic Kachin, called on all ethnic armed organizations to immediately launch attacks on the regime’s troops by any means, while maintaining full control in their areas. He also called on ethnic armed forces that are allied with the regime, like the Border Guard Forces and people’s militias, to join with the people and attack the people’s enemy.
“This revolution is a just revolution, a necessary revolution for building a peaceful country and a federal Union,” he said.
In his speech, the acting president also urged all civil servants working for the regime not to go to their offices, and called on all soldiers and police to join the PDFs immediately and report to the NUG.
He did not forget to address one group that has been among the PDFs’ most common targets—the various levels of regime-appointed local administrators. In his speech he urged that “all the military-appointed administrators at different levels of administration immediately leave your positions.”
Since the regime began cracking down on protesters, the administrators and their offices at the village and ward level—the primary elements of the government administrative system in Myanmar—have been killed, torched and bombed. So far, several dozen local officials at least have been killed and the attacks continue.
The acting president also said the NUG would recognize all those who sacrifice their lives and possessions in this revolution as national heroes and heroines.
“Based on the people’s unity, creativity, intelligence, passion and persistence, the revolution period will [be] shorter,” he said.
Following the NUG’s call for war on Tuesday, some PDF groups, student organizations and ethnic armed groups supported the announcement, while clashes between regime troops and ethnic armed groups as well as resistance groups were reported here and there across the country..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
“ရက်အကန့်အသတ်မရှိ အလုပ်ပိတ်ရက်အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြောင်း အမိန့်ညွှန်ကြားချက်ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း”
Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
https://nugmyanmar.org
အမိန့်ညွှန်ကြားချက် အမှတ်(၁/၂၀၂၁)
၇ စက်တင်ဘာလ ၂၀၂၁
“ရက်အကန့်အသတ်မရှိ အလုပ်ပိတ်ရက်အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြောင်း အမိန့်ညွှန်ကြားချက်ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း”
၁။ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်တွင် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်မှ စတင်၍ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အဓမ္မ လုယုသိမ်းပိုက်ထားရုံမက ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို ထိပါး အကြမ်းဖက် အန္တရာယ်ပြုလျက်ရှိခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူများကလည်း နည်းလမ်းစုံဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်အုပ်စိုးမှုအား ခုခံတွန်းလှန်လျက် ရှိခြင်း၊ ယခုအခါ တရားမဝင် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ယန္တရား တစ်ခုလုံးကို အပြီးတိုင် ဖျက်သိမ်းပစ်ရန် လိုအပ်လာခြင်း ဟူသော ဖြစ်ပေါ်ပြောင်းလဲလျက်ရှိသည့် အခြေအနေ အရပ်ရပ်ကြောင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာလ ၇ ရက်မှ စတင်၍ နိုင်ငံတော်အား အရေးပေါ်အခြေအနေ အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြောင်း အမိန့်ကြေညာချက် ထုတ်ပြန်ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အရေးပေါ်အခြေအနေတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်ခံ ဖြစ်လျက်ရှိသော အရပ်ဘက် ရုံးဌာနအားလုံးကို ယနေ့မှ စတင်၍ ရက်အကန့်အသတ်မရှိ အလုပ်ပိတ်ရက်အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြောင်းနှင့် အလုပ်ဆင်းရန် မလိုအပ်ကြောင်း ညွှန်ကြားလိုက်သည်။
မန်းဝင်းခိုင်သန်း
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးချုပ်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
241.8 KB
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Sub-title:
“အရေးပေါ်အခြေအနေ ကြေညာခြင်း”
Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
https://nugmyanmar.org
အမိန့်ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁/၂၀၂၁)
၇ စက်တင်ဘာလ ၂၀၂၁
“အရေးပေါ်အခြေအနေ ကြေညာခြင်း”
၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်တွင် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်မှ စတင်၍ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အဓမ္မလုယူသိမ်းပိုက်ထားရုံမက ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို ထိပါး အကြမ်းဖက် အန္တရာယ်ပြုလျက်ရှိခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူများကလည်း နည်းလမ်းစုံဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်အုပ်စိုးမှုအား ခုခံတွန်းလှန်လျက်ရှိခြင်း၊ ယခုအခါ တရားမဝင် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ယန္တရား တစ်ခုလုံးကို အပြီးတိုင် ဖျက်သိမ်းပစ်ရန် လိုအပ်လာခြင်း ဟူသော ဖြစ်ပေါ်ပြောင်းလဲလျက်ရှိသည့် အခြေအနေ အရပ်ရပ်ကြောင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာလ ၇ ရက်မှ စတင်၍ နိုင်ငံတော်အား အရေးပေါ် အခြေအနေအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြောင်း ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
၂။ အရေးပေါ်အခြေအနေ သက်ရောက်သည့်နယ်မြေသည် ပြည်ထောင်စုနိုင်ငံတော်တစ်ဝန်းလုံး ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အချိန်ကာလအားဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအာဏာ ပြန်လည် ထူထောင်နိုင်သည့် အချိန်အထိ သတ်မှတ်သည်။
ဒူဝါလရှီးလ
ယာယီသမ္မတ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
Myanmar Now speaks with stakeholders about what it means to go to war with the coup regime
Description:
"Following Tuesday morning’s declaration of war against the junta by the National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar Now spoke to members and allies of the anti-dictatorship movement about what could await the resistance forces in confronting a military that both outnumbers and outguns them.
The NUG’s announcement came seven days and seven months after Myanmar’s February 1 coup, during which time the military council killed more than 1,000 people and jailed several thousand opponents and dissidents.
The declaration was also made one week before the opening of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 14. The UN Credentials Committee is expected to be asked to make a decision regarding who will occupy Myanmar’s seat at the General Assembly—NUG-allied Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, who was appointed by the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government, or a junta-appointed representative.
Junta spokesperson Gen Zaw Min Tun told the pro-military People Media on Tuesday that he believed the NUG’s announcement was intended to coincide with the opening of the General Assembly.
He dismissed the NUG’s call to arms, referring to them as “extremists.”
“They are inciting [others] to commit more violence and for the public to become terrified and for instability,” the general was quoted as saying, telling the public that they “do not need to worry.”
The NUG was formed in April with the support of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, which is made up of elected lawmakers who were unable to take their seats in parliament.
Recognising the NUG as Myanmar’s legitimate government, many members of the Myanmar public showed support for the administration’s call to war against the junta, which they aim to topple.
Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, retired US army officer
“Between firepower and the people power, the latter has proven to be more important during a battle,” Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, a Burmese-American retired lieutenant colonel who served nearly three decades in the US army, told Myanmar Now.
She speculated that the Myanmar military, despite possessing advanced weaponry, is struggling due to the momentum brought on by the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), including the securing of public trust, new recruits, and international support.
“People are already questioning the integrity of the military leaders. This factor is very important in this war. It would be very hard for them to get anything done because no one is believing anything they say,” Dr. Byrd continued.
While rumours of Tuesday’s NUG announcement had been circulating online for weeks, Dr. Miemie Win Byrd said that the resistance would need to be tight-lipped about its plans regarding the revolution in order for their actions to have maximum impact.
“We should be very careful so as not to reveal our plans to the opponent, as it would do nothing but make them more prepared to retaliate against our attacks,” she said. “When the weak goes against the strong, their best chance is to ambush them when the opponent is not expecting it. If information leaks [online], it would help prepare the enemy to respond to the ambush.”
Cpn Lin Htet Aung, Myanmar military defector
Cpn Lin Htet Aung, a Myanmar army officer who took part in the CDM by defecting and joined the resistance, told Myanmar Now that he believes many soldiers still serving in the junta’s armed forces are opposed to the coup, and more will defect when the war begins.
“It is now high time that the junta soldiers pick the side of the people and disobey the dictators. Failing to do so will bring nothing but misfortune to their lives,” he said. “It has now become clear what’s right and what’s wrong. Be on the right side of history. Come to the people’s side in whatever way that you can.”
Col Naw Bu, KIA
Col Naw Bu, the spokesperson for the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)—which has been engaging in clashes with the junta’s armed forces in the northern part of the country—welcomed the NUG’s call to arms, noting that Kachin forces had already been fighting against the military for 60 years.
“The people need to take responsibility and contribute however they can if we want to end the dictatorship led by Min Aung Hlaing. We also need to be very careful regarding our own security. These are the two responsibilities of the people,” the colonel said.
Col Naw Bu declined to comment on the extent of communication between the KIA and the NUG.
Khu Daniel, KNPP
Khu Daniel, Secretary (1) of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)—whose armed wing, the Karenni Army, has been fighting against the junta forces in ethnic Karenni territory—said that Tuesday’s declaration signified the start of more intensified resistance to the military council by the NUG and their allied forces.
“Now that the official announcement is here, everyone needs to actually participate in the process. Everyone, including the civil servants that are still going to work. This can end only if everyone takes part in it,” he said.
Political analyst, Yangon
A Yangon-based political analyst pointed out that because of the sacrifices they have made, the public have high expectations of the NUG and its forces and expect the complete overthrow of the military dictatorship.
“If they don’t manage to give us a strong start, the people will start losing trust in the NUG and this could lead to a decrease in the people’s support in the future,” the analyst said..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Anti-coup protesters
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Local URL:
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Description:
"(Author’s note: The dates and locations (except for Shwe Pyi Thar and Insein) have been modified for security reasons. This letter was written mid-June 2021.)
May 2nd 2021, at 4 pm, is the last time I spoke to you. The following day, while I was having my first coffee of the day, I received a message from a friend in Yangon asking me if I knew – “If I knew what?” – The fact that you had been arrested by the military at 2 am in the apartment in which you had taken refuge in recent days. And that since then, no one knows where you have been taken to nor what happened to you.
In another life, I wish I had known on May 2nd what would happen that night. I hesitated to offer to speak directly to you since you seemed to have a good internet connection for once. I really wanted to swap our instant messaging habits for an actual face to face moment with you. I’m not sure why I didn’t suggest it to you. It might be because you told me that you now have a good connection available, that you no longer need to connect from the internet cafes in the city center to send news, and that we therefore, have time. Yes, we had, in short, a life ahead of us to talk to each other. Until that life was stolen from us overnight.
Since February 1, the day of the Coup, you have resumed your pace of political activism that you had decided to put aside to invest time in a green space outside of Yangon. You had even started growing organic vegetables. I liked to think that you had reconnected with nature, and I suspect that it did you good. Seeing pictures of you in a hammock by a small river appearing on my Facebook wall from time to time was soothing. I also noticed that you reconnected with your oldteam in your new environment, as if fate had started knocking on your door at the end of January. A few days later, the blow came, and it was together with them that you decided to continue the path of resistance, resuming the rhythm of underground activities. Our messages/photos of fresh tomatoes and cucumbers disappeared, the rhythm of our exchanges intensified, we were in touch every time you had access to the internet.
We are an encounter out of time and space, one that can be qualified as unexpected – where two very different worlds create a symbiosis: electric, at times explosive, but above all, full of compassion. With the news of the coup, I saw myself promoted to new functions: I became your database, your hard drive, your search browser, and your buddy; I knew if you were okay and when you were not. I followed the events in Myanmar by our exchanges: I walked with you in the streets of Yangon alongside thousands of peaceful demonstrators in February, and I walked a few months later in these same streets in fire and blood. I ran with you under fire from the soldiers. I felt the loneliness of those apartments where you lived, alone, where you were hiding. I experienced the sadness that sometimes assailed you when you saw the fate of some of your comrades. I feared the worst that night in April in your hideout in North Okkalapa; there was gun fire and soldiers right in front of your hiding place. It was all through you, ako, as in reality, I wasn’t there. You were in this mythology alongside thousands of others, face to face with fate, in a standoff with the inhumanity and injustice of the junta. You made your courage, and that of thousands of others in Myanmar, the light intending to burst the darkness. But darkness has this indescribable way of sticking to the surface; far from impossible, it requires persistence to be removed. And that perseverance you have all proven to possess.
Not to lie to you, but your fate began to worry me early on. You have always loved taking care of the young people you taught in recent years, and many have approached you asking for your support – which you gave. Make no mistake: Burmese youth need people like you, like the team right now. And fortunately, there is this solidarity and compassion that exists, among other things. However, connecting with many people and many different groups can slowly become a threat in an environment full of informers. And indeed, there was a mole. You had given me warnings; not about the mole which you did not know about, but the rest. You told me several times that you were ready to give your life for this revolution, for the Truth. Not that long ago, you told me again that you would continue until you would be arrested. I knew I was no match for you when trying to encourage you to leave the country, when arguing how much your safety depended on that move. Who was I to interfere with the plans you and the stars had agreed upon? You are a former political prisoner who had already been locked up for several years, and a new arrest would be brutal for you and your loved ones, of which today I am a part.
Then, on May 2nd, we lost track of you. You lost your new hiding place with wifi, and you have – frankly speaking – lost all your freedom and slipped into this other world. This dematerialized world makes one shiver down the spine. It’s silly, but habits are hard to change, and I thought several times about sending you a message to ask where you were and if you were holding on, before reminding myself that my message would certainly be read by the fools, the tormentors in green uniforms and boots. We didn’t know where you were; we didn’t even know if you were still alive. To replay your arrest in the middle of the night made me nauseous. However, I have replayed it so many times that I started wondering about the details; in particular – are activists arrested in their pajamas? I think these nonsensical thoughts kept me from overthinking about the distress you must have felt when you heard them smash in the apartment door at 2am.
So, we began those endless days searching for you – looking for a needle in a haystack. In contact with those in Yangon, and indirectly your family, we have tried to contact the groups of people who seem to be in the best position to obtain, in the long term – perhaps – information on your whereabouts. They managed to contract a lawyer who told us that you are most likely in Shwe Pyi Thar being interrogated. Pause – Fright. The words are chilling.
So, ako, you too were taken there. And I know that you already had experiences of physical and psychic miseries during your first imprisonment. We weren’t 100% sure if you were there, that was a guess – like many others. No one can go there, and no lawyer has access to the place. You are very sadly at the mercy of the boots, tortured to get information from you – we knew you too would never kneel down no matter how difficult it was and how unbearable the situation had become. Two weeks later, your family received a phone call from an unidentified source, who told them you had been injured during interrogation. Finally, we had found you, in what state? – we did not know – but you were still breathing ako.
Days later, you were finally transferred to Insein prison. And at that moment, we all felt a kind of relief. With this feeling, one can realize the human and destructive madness of what is happening in Burma. Insein has a dirty reputation and is described by former political prisoners as hell on earth. But now, it’s better than the worst of the worst. And you have a lawyer who can come and see you sometimes, he sure won’t be able to do much, but in a way, at least there is someone who is trying their very best. The fate of prisoners is now defined by an improvised courtyard in the corridors of Insein prison. Your sentence will be announced in a couple of weeks, or maybe months. And we suspect they won’t make it easy. They don’t have that reputation.
I don’t know how you fit within these walls or what you do to pass the time. I imagine you: sometimes meditating, sometimes contemplating the rain. I wish for you to have the company of other political prisoners as peacefully passionate as you are, and exchanges that allow your flame to remain alight. There are many political prisoners in Burma, and today some of them have become prominent figures of the opposition to the junta. Their journeys and the people they have become are a source of strength and hope to color the uncertainty of the future. Many of you in there are claiming this destiny and embodying the struggle for freedom. And we respect you all so very much for that. Ako, whatever they say, and you know it already – holding the light of freedom truly makes a difference. Your sacrifices are not in vain, and the sparkling lights are breaking through thick darkness.
… Take care of yourself. I ask it to the moon. On the other side of those grey walls, the revolution continues, and we are waiting for you. And even though we are disconnected for a while, we continue to share the same starry sky; and if we know how to listen, I was told the stars could also pass on messages. Until soon, ako. Nyima..."
Source/publisher:
Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s regime has intensified arrests of striking civil servants, including teachers, medics and administrators, who joined the civil disobedience movement (CDM) as it undermines the junta’s ability to govern.
At least two teachers in Myaung Township, Sagaing Region, were detained on Sunday.
According to residents, junta forces raided Daw Zarchi Lin’s home on Sunday and, after failing to find the teacher, her father and brother were beaten and taken instead.
She later turned herself in in exchange for the release of her father and brother.
Another teacher, Daw Tu Tu Khin, was detained on Sunday, according to the Civilian Defense and Security Organization in Myaung.
At least seven teachers were also detained in Kalay, Depayin and Shwebo townships in Sagaing Region last month.
In Pauk Township, Magwe Region, junta forces detained a striking civil servant from the Land Statistics Department and at least four other civilians on Sunday.
Since the February I coup, government employees, including directors, police, soldiers and staff at the military-controlled home affairs and defense ministries, have refused to work for the regime, preventing the junta from running the country properly. Many striking civil servants have been sacked or threatened with arrest. Many are in hiding.
During last month alone, at least 21 civil servants, including eight teachers, five medics, five administrators, two public servants and a police officer, were arrested, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
The National Unity Government (NUG), which was formed by elected lawmakers from the ousted National League for Democracy and its ethnic allies, is trying to pay salaries for striking civil servants, especially junior staff.
Over 400,000 civil servants have been on strike since February, according to the NUG..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG)
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Local URL:
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Description:
"In Part 1 of a 3-part special series by Real Stories Not Tales (RSNT), Hpare Salum (pseudonym) decides it is time to go back home.
Editor’s note: This is part 2 of a 3-part special feature of stories from a report by Real Stories Not Tales. Access to the full report will be available in Part 3 of this series.
This story tells the journey of a Kachin youth based in Yangon who chooses to go back to Lai Zar and join the KIA post-Coup. Hpare Salum recently finished an internship after having graduated in Yangon. He was interviewed on April 17 in Kachin State.
"I had already experienced something similar in the past, so I knew this was happening for real. I felt hopeless. I felt destroyed. I felt as if my future had been stolen from me." - Hpare Salum
When the coup happened, I was staying with my school‘s] seniors in Hlaing Township, Yangon. One of them was going to attend his first day at work and while he was getting ready, the leader of his organization called him and informed him about the coup. That’s how we found out that the military had seized power and cut all networks. I had already experienced something similar in the past, so I knew this was happening for real. I felt hopeless. I felt destroyed. I felt as if my future had been stolen from me.
Just before the coup, I had gotten a job in Yangon, and was planning to gain more work experience in preparation for my studies abroad. But I knew this wouldn’t be possible under a military regime, so I decided to go back to Kachin State. Most of my school comrades chose to stay and participate in the protest movement in Yangon, but honestly, I had no intention of doing that. I was certain that the military would do anything to stop the protests. I know this military junta and I know that they are capable of committing the worst atrocities. In 2011, they shot a friend of mine and a relative, and I didn’t want to live through anything like that again.
We, the Kachin people, have been bullied since we were born, never receiving any support from the central government and even less so from the military. When the ceasefire between the KIA and the Myanmar military collapsed, I was in Grade 9. On June 22nd, 2011, the military came to our village. It was a devastating experience: we had to flee and stay in the jungle on the Chinese border for days. In the end, this place became a camp for IDPs, including me and my family.
The camp leaders managed to build a school with the very few resources available, which is how I was able to carry on with my education. Most young people and adults were asked to join the KIA, and so my father became a soldier. I lived with my mother, my younger brother, and two sisters in the camp. My three other siblings stayed in Myitkyina. In 2016, we had to flee again, because the military engaged in mortar shelling of an area nearby. Having fled civil war twice in my life, I don’t like the military junta at all—to put it mildly. I think non-violence works in some parts of the world, but it doesn’t work in Myanmar.
Now I’m staying in a new city-state on the Chinese border called Laiza, where the headquarters of the KIO are. The city is in a valley, and you only need to cross a river to get into the Chinese territory. Everything you need can be found in Laiza: hotels, restaurants, shops, schools (providing free education), and hospitals (providing free health care). You can use both Myanmar kyats and Chinese yuan here. It’s a safe place. There is no CDM in this area, but many CDM people from the rest of the country are coming to find refuge here or to join basic military training. I heard most of the training is given in Burmese. There are also many young Kachin people coming to Laiza, some to serve the KPICT.
My personal hope for the future is still to study abroad, but it has been a real struggle, and I am tired of trying. Right now, I need to help my people. If I need to engage in combat, I will; I can’t avoid it. Many Kachins have become actively involved in the KIO or its army. Having an independent state is the dream of Kachin people and I wish to be a part of the generation that will see this dream come true. We need to stand for what we believe in; we have that responsibility. I know there will be many challenges on this journey to freedom, but we will fight until we achieve independence. I believe that the KIO will be one of the leaders of real political change in Myanmar.
Speaking to the international community, I would like to ask them to recognize Myanmar’s EAOs and the systems of governance they have established in their respective states and regions, including the education systems. I wish the world would cooperate with the EAOs, since Myanmar’s ethnic people see them as their legitimate governments. In reality, these EAOs represent the voice of ethnic people.
Read Part 2 and Part 3 here. (Links will be live on August 19 and 23 respectively).
Real Stories Not Tales (RSNT) is a dedicated team in and out of Myanmar that aims to bring awareness to the reality of young people’s lives since the Myanmar military staged a coup on February 1st, 2021. Stories are collected through interviews with each protagonist by the team, either in Burmese or in English. Each character is drawn by a professional illustrator bringing a visual context to the story. The RSNT report also proposes some tips on how it is possible to support Myanmar these days. They are pleased to share selections from their first report and are now in the process of collecting more stories all around the country..."
Source/publisher:
Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Maung Moe Thu, a prominent writer, director and former political prisoner who worked closely with detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the founding of the National League for Democracy (NLD), died peacefully aged 85 at his Yangon home on Wednesday.
He took an active part in the pro-democracy movement in 1988 as the secretary of the writers’ union together with former major and well-known writer Maung Thaw Ka and journalist Hanthawaddy U Win Tin. He was a member of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s inner circle during the founding of the NLD.
He actively worked for the party, collecting donations to rent an office, finding artists to draw the party’s flag and accompanying Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in her campaigns.
When she was put under house arrest for the first time on July 19, 1989, Maung Moe Thu was taken to Insein Prison for the first time together with journalist Maung Wuntha and U Win Htein because of the party slogan: “Let’s always defy any law that oppresses the people.”
He was released in 1992 but the military regime barred him from engaging in any form of artistic expression. As a supporter of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, he was detained for a second time under Article 5 of the Emergency Provision Act in 1996 and spent four years in prison. He was allowed to attend his wife’s funeral in December 1999.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told him at the funeral: “Neither of us has been dutiful to our spouses.”
Some eight months earlier, her husband, Michael Aris, died in England. Aris repeatedly tried to visit before he died but was denied a visa.
After his release from prison in 2000, Maung Moe Thu worked as an editor and columnist for magazines and painted. He was affectionately referred to as Bagyi Moe or Uncle Moe while staying involved in literature, movies, art, sculpture, music and politics. He served as consultant editor for the D-Wave Journal published by the NLD and patron of the Hanthawaddy U Win Tin Foundation.
He directed numerous films and videos and wrote scripts. He wrote many poems, novels and translated books with Leon Uris’ 1958 bestseller Exodus his most popular translation..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Articles on the NLD, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
The shadow government and other opposition groups are encouraging defections.
Description:
"Nearly 2,500 soldiers and police in Myanmar have broken with the military junta to join the resistance movement since the Feb. 1 coup that ousted the country’s democratically elected government, defector groups said on Thursday.
Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government made of former lawmakers ousted in the coup, as well as several armed ethnic groups, last month issued calls on members of the military and police to switch sides.
The security forces that have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that sprang up to resist the coup with protests and widespread work stoppages are represented by two groups. The CDM Myanmar Police Channel says 1,000 police have joined the movement, while People’s Embrace says about 1,500 members of the military have switched sides, and both groups say their numbers are growing.
To date, the highest-ranked defector has been an army colonel, the groups said on Facebook.
The NUG’s defense minister, Ye Mon, told RFA’s Myanmar Service that the appeal to the military is part of the shadow government’s plan to overthrow the military dictatorship.
"We understand that there are intelligent people among the military and the police. Especially those who know what is right or wrong, what is justice and what is injustice,” said Ye Mon.
“We believe there are many people who know which side they should choose. We expect this directive to have a major impact on most members of the police force and military personnel, except for the handful of the junta’s leaders and minions who have committed a series of war crimes," he said.
Myanmar’s military overthrew the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government on Feb. 1, claiming the party had stolen the country’s November 2020 ballot through voter fraud. The junta has yet to provide evidence of its claims and has violently repressed anti-coup protests, killing at least 1,043 people and arresting 6,132 others, according to the Bangkok-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).
Ye Mon said the skills and expertise of security forces who defect would be extremely useful in helping the people regain control of the country. In addition, he said the NUG would provide for the safety and well-being of their families.
Captain Lin Htet Aung, who recently joined the CDM, told RFA that the NUG’s outreach had been effective and many soldiers and police officers still serving the junta have contacted his group to learn more about how they can defect.
“One of the reasons that people are not leaving the army is because they are thinking about their current rank and position, as well as their own security,” said Lin Htet Aung.
“The NUG is giving guarantees for that. Many in the armed forces are aware of this statement and have contacted us,” he said.
Current members of the military can be divided into three groups: those who support the junta, those who do not trust the junta, and a neutral group, Lin Htet Aung said. The defection of the latter two groups would spell doom for the junta, he added.
The NUG’s defense ministry last week urged police and soldiers to stop obeying junta orders and to stop arresting, torturing and killing civilians and destroying public property.
The ministry also called on them to stop attacking the people’s defense forces (PDF), the hundreds of militia groups formed by citizens opposed to the coup, some of which are receiving training and support from armed ethnic groups that have been fighting with the military for decades.
The NUG also told security forces how to contact the NUG if they wish to join the resistance.
A former police officer from Myingyan, in the country’s central region, told RFA that the messages from the NUG are encouraging to other police officers because there are many who want to leave but do not know how.
“There were people who wanted to leave their posts from the very beginning. It is encouraging for them to see such a statement that welcomes them,” Thet Naing Oo said.
“It was not only that they didn’t approve of the coup. They were unhappy that most of the higher positions in the police force were given to former army officers instead of those among them who had loyally served as officers for years. It was a slap in the face,” he said.
The Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF) and the Chin Regional Defense Force (CDF), two of the armed ethnic groups that control territory in the country and have been fighting the military for years, told RFA they are trying to encourage members of the security forces to switch sides.
"The military coup was an unjust and coercive process. Only an insane person would say the actions of the junta are fair,” a KNDF spokesman told RFA.
He said it was common in Myanmar’s history for power hungry generals to exploit lower ranking soldiers for their own benefit, so these soldiers should stop serving the junta as soon as possible.
“There is still time for those in the army and police force as well as those who are working in support of the junta to engage with the people,” he said.
The KNDF said on Aug. 20 that it would work with the people to uproot the military dictatorship and would welcome those who join the movement with special security guarantees as well as monetary support from public donations.
The CDF, which launched the first civilian armed uprising after the coup, announced on Aug. 10 that it would pay each member of the military who joins the opposition force 5 million kyat (U.S. $3,037) and guarantee their safety.
CDF officials would not disclose to RFA where the money was coming from, but a spokesman for the group said that they expected the announcement to entice soldiers to defect.
"Wouldn’t it be better if there is one less gun pointing at ordinary people?” he said.
“We released the statement as an incentive for police and soldiers who are confused, those who do not want to die for nothing in the jungle and those who dislike the military council," said the spokesman.
The stepped up defection enticement effort came as branches of the PDF militias from a dozen regions in Myanmar announced an alliance to collectively take on the country’s junta. The groups are mostly based in embattled Sagaing region and Chin state, but are also located in of Mandalay and Magway regions, as well as Kachin and other ethnic states.
The junta said last week that the NUG and other groups are trying to disrupt government business and are carrying out terror attacks daily to intimidate the public. The military also offered rewards to whistleblowers and informants who help make arrests of people associated with anti-junta groups.
The military has not yet commented on soldier or police defection to the CDM or other resistance groups.
Local media outlets have quoted military sources as saying that the number of soldiers and officers leaving their posts to join the CDM is rising daily, prompting the junta to consider releasing the country’s ousted leader, Aung San Suu Kyi and holding national elections.
According to the CIA’s World Factbook, there are about 400,000 soldiers in Myanmar’s military, making it one of the largest in Southeast Asia..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
Current Position of PPST members
Description:
"Some troops of the KNU, Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed group, restarted fighting with the Myanmar military prior to the coup, but this intensified after February 1. The KNU has offered sanctuary and military training to anti-coup activists and overrun army bases in their areas of operation to demonstrate its solidarity with the anti-coup movement. The CNF has also actively collaborated with locally-formed People’s Defense Forces to resist the military’s brutal assault on the pro-democracy protests in Chin state. That has provoked a brutal reaction from the junta, which has ferociously retaliated with airstrikes.
The internal political dynamics inside the signatory bloc are profoundly complex. The RCSS/SSA-S, one of the largest groups among the NCA signatories, has been reluctant to stand decisively with one side – whether the junta or the anti-coup movement – although its leader, Yawd Serk, has vocally protested the coup and supported the anti-coup movement since February 1. Myanmar analyst David Scott Mathieson pointed out that “it is more likely that Yawd Serk is prevaricating, waiting to see which side will prevail so he can cut a deal with them”. In the six months since the military takeover, the RCSS/SSA-S has focused more on fighting other ethnic groups, such as the TNLA and SSPP/SSA-N, than with the junta as it seeks greater control of territory and resources.
Meanwhile, other groups in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), the coordinating body of the NCA signatories, are tentatively working with the regime or have remained silent on the coup. The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Karen National Liberation Army/Peace Council (KNLA/PC) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) met with the junta’s council in April, while the Arakan Liberation Party together with KNLA/PC attended the Armed Forces Day parade on March 27. Recently, Naing Hong Sa, the chairman of the NMSP changed the tone to call for unity between the ethnic armed groups and the Bamar people fighting the military dictatorship but it is not clear yet what the NMPS’s attitude will be going forward. The All Burma Student’s Democratic Front, Pa-O National Liberation Army and Lahu Democratic Union have remained quiet on the coup. As a bloc, the PPST officially declared the temporary cessation of the NCA implementation and peace negotiations with the junta on July 7. Moreover, Yawd Serk stepped down as the head of the PPST.
In its latest statement issued on 5th August, however, the PPST did not even mention the phrase federal democratic union despite typically – albeit feebly – having recited that mantra in all its past statements. The KNU and some smaller groups may still believe in the federal vision. Padoh Saw Taw Nee, the KNU’s foreign affairs head, told the author that “the KNU leadership still firmly believes in federalism as they know historically and empirically that it is the best way for the country”. But he admitted that even some Karen people are suspicious as to whether federalism will be the best option for them. Some ethnic armed groups, especially smaller ones, in the signatory bloc have been struggling for their survival instead of thinking about the political future of the country, and some have become disillusioned with the concept of federalism in the current tumultuous period.
This point is obviously reflected in the response of the ethnic armed organizations (EAO’s) to the federal democracy charter drafted by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw formed by the deposed parliamentary members of the NLD. The federal democracy charter released on March 31 received muted and reserved approval from the EAO’s. PPST spokesperson Colonel Khun Oakkar said “NCA signatory EAO’s welcome the federal democracy charter, but need time to examine the finer details” immediately after its release. So far, there have been no official endorsement from those EAO’s. AA chief Maj. Gen. Tun Myat Naing was more open in his response to the federal promises made by the Bamar politicians, saying that “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people but, after they came to power, they didn’t keep their promise”.
Myanmar and Federal Discourse
The failure of the NLD to keep that promise is one of the key reasons for the suspicions of the ethnic minorities about the federal goal, and one of the main obstacles to forging an inter-ethnic alliance in the current anti-coup struggle. The word ‘federalism’ has been politically taboo in Myanmar since the 1962 coup, with the then coup leader General Ne Win justifying the military takeover by citing the risk of Myanmar disintegrating or fragmenting territorially due to the federal proposals of the ethnic minorities. Under military rule, the use of the word ‘federalism’ could lead to a lengthy term of imprisonment. The word was only revived as a dominant political discourse following the political opening up of 2011, especially in peace negotiations with the EAO’s. The Myanmar military, which has long been inimical to the concept of federalism, eventually agreed to establish a federal system in the country but the military’s interpretation of federalism is within the framework of the 2008 constitution. In the first 21st century Panglong conference held in August-September 2016, the military tried to assert that the 2008 constitution was written with federal characteristics, and took a firm stand on its position to uphold the military-drafted constitution.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD, reiterated federalism as a political solution to Myanmar’s longstanding ethnic conflicts after her party’s entry into parliament in 2012. However, the NLD’s position on federalism is very general and vague and its leaders have rarely articulated any detailed policy on this controversial political concept. U Tun Myint (Taung Gyi), a veteran politician who attended the 1948 Panglong Conference, once wrote a letter criticizing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for her failure to articulate the NLD’s policy on federalism. When he asked her during a meeting in 1989 “whether the new union that your party’s statement talks about building up in the future is federal or unitary”, she retorted, “We just referred to the Union. Federal or unitary systems are theory and they are different from practice. Now, I could not say exactly what type of Union it will be. It will be negotiated in the national conference and I will accept what everyone else agrees to”. U Tun Myint suggested that the NLD, as a leading party of Myanmar, should have a detailed policy on how the future union will be formed instead of accepting and following agreements of others. [U Tun Myint (Taung Gyi), “A piece of brick and a grain of sand of a Shan politician”, pp. 533-542]
The NLD’s lack of a detailed policy on federalism was echoed by other analysts two decades later. In its 2015 manifesto, the NLD stated its goals as “the establishment of a federal democratic union based on the principles of freedom, equal rights and self-determination … through solidarity with all ethnic groups”. In two speeches during a campaign tour for the 2015 election to the Pa-O autonomous zone in Shan State, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi reportedly referred to a “federal Union” no fewer than 31 times. But after the NLD came to power, it failed to take the necessary steps to advance the federal future. The NLD government in 2015 surprised many by appointing its representatives and party members as the chief ministers of all the states and regions, even where the NLD had won a minority of state seats, without consultation with its once-allied ethnic parties. Ethnic political leaders have been critical of the NLD’s policy of going it alone, saying it does not augur well for the move towards a federal Union.
That was exacerbated by the deteriorating relations between the NLD and the ethnic minorities due to the NLD’s missteps to impose its political hegemony through Burmanization and centralization projects. The NLD tried to impose its political hegemony in ethnic regions by erecting statues of General Aung San, father of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and a key political symbol of the NLD, in Kayah State and other states with sizeable ethnic minority populations. The plan to erect the statue sparked opposition and protests in Kayah and the NLD’s local officials made the situation worse by violently cracking down on the demonstrations. There were also protests in Mon State when the NLD decided to change the name of a bridge in Mawlamyine to the General Aung San Bridge. During the NLD’s reign in power, its intentional silence about, and sometimes tacit endorsement, of the military’s brutal offensives in ethnic regions also triggered resentment among the ethnic minorities toward the NLD’s promises of federalism. It is fair to say that the AA and the Rakhine people have become disillusioned with the idea of federalism since the NLD’s time in power.
On the other hand, the diverse ethnic political forces have not delivered much thought to the precise institutional arrangement of any federalist state. Most of the EAOs prefer a more decentralized federal union, in which the ethnic states have a high degree of autonomy and self-determination consistent with the 1947 Panglong agreement. However, as the veteran analyst Bertil Lintner once wrote, they need to answer the questions of “What kind of federal union would they (EAO’s) want? How should power be divided between the states and the central government? What exactly is the ‘federal army’ some of the groups have talked about?” In the political and academic spheres, different federal systems such as the territorial, ethnic, symmetric, asymmetric, dual, cooperative and creative have been proposed and discussed, but so far no consensus has been reached. The multi-ethnic inhabitants of the states and the recent initiatives by certain groups such as AA in favor of confederation have complicated the issue even more, and now the coup has further aggravated the situation.
Ultimately, the military’s coup has put the country on a path towards becoming a failed state running the risk of disintegration and territorial fragmentation. Without political solidarity among the diverse political and ethnic groups or a shared political vision, the anti-coup movement is highly unlikely to overcome the current political crisis of the country.
Federalism has been much anticipated as a shared political vision to forge political solidarity between the pro-democracy and federal proponents. However, at this crucial moment, the attraction of federalism has been woefully diminishing even among its former champions and there are obviously growing tendencies toward confederation and separate states. The coup has definitely put Myanmar into a political black hole, but the future of the country looks even bleaker, particularly due to the lack of consensus among the anti-junta political stakeholders on the vision they are striving for and on the future country they are trying to build up. Myanmar will continue to head only in a dire direction if the shared vision on the future of the country is not revamped and re-envisioned soon.
Ye Myo Hein is the executive director of the Tagaung Institute of Political Studies and a fellow with the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-03
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Type:
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Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Political History
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"လက်ရှိမြန်မာပြည်အတွင်း တပ်မတော်မှအဓမ္မစစ်အာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းအပေါ် KNU Concerned Group မှ သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်"
Source/publisher:
KNU Concerned Group
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karen (cultural, historical, political)
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Sub-title:
The Spring Revolution signifies a ‘knockout fight’ between the people and the military, says Mahn Johnny, who, at nearly 80 years old is still committed to winning
Description:
"Former Ayeyarwady Region Chief Minister Mahn Johnny represented the National League for Democracy (NLD) in four elections, from 1990 until 2020. He won a parliamentary seat every time.
On Saturday, the Dawkalu Network Facebook page published photos of Mahn Johnny wearing army fatigues and holding a loaded rifle, stating that he had joined others across the country in taking up arms against the junta that seized power in the February 1 military coup.
Myanmar Now spoke with the nearly 80-year-old ethnic Karen politician about his thoughts on the anti-dictatorship movement. Following this interview and the earlier release of the photos, Mahn Johnny’s home was raided on Sunday by around 20 junta soldiers, who briefly detained his son and allegedly seized property including a car.
Myanmar Now: Almost seven months after the military coup, we are seeing a photo of you holding a gun. What is your role in the movement?
Mahn Johnny: We cannot accept the coup because it is a heinous crime. I will openly and boldly say that I will continue fighting against this injustice, because that is what I believe in.
MN: Do you believe the movement will succeed?
MJ: I believe that we will achieve 100 percent success, because we are on the right side. They have seized power unjustly.
Since the day of the military coup, the people have been protesting to express how much they are suffering, but the junta shot them dead. In the past, the 1988 pro-democracy uprising ended in failure because people could not see video footage of the crackdowns until one or two weeks after it had happened. Now we can see it almost immediately.
I am a representative of the Upper House, elected by the citizens. I am 80 years old now. I cannot betray our people at this age. Even if the military does not kill me, I will die. I always meditate on the fact that I could die at any time. They [the military leaders] will also die—they are mortal, too. If they earned the people’s respect, adoration and love, they might be elected to government, too.
MN: How do you keep up your morale at this age?
MJ: It's strange. I was not in good enough health in February to go to Parliament [as planned]. At that time, people had to help me even to get out of bed. When I arrived in Naypyitaw [before the coup], I needed to fill out a form, but I could not even hold a pen. Yet now, because I exercise regularly, I can run again. All of those previous illnesses seem to be gone. I do not know what happened. I am not even taking any medication.
During my tenure as Chief Minister, I was in three car accidents, but I did not die. I suffered from one disease after another. Now I am very healthy. I can run—anyone who is the same age as me who wants to race me can come and try!
MN: PDFs—People's Defence Forces—have been formed. We have heard that they have links to ethnic armed organisations. How connected are these revolutionary forces in their struggle to overthrow the military dictatorship?
MJ: The links between groups are not new. The connections have been established since the [anti-coup] strike began.
I will continue my fight whether we win or lose. Even if they do not kill us, many people have died from Covid-19, suffering. Some people will die in battle. Every mortal will die. So we have to work for the people every day. Now, I am 80, so it is near the end of my life. I have already chosen how I will live during the last days of my life. I will never betray the people because it is the people who have elected me.
MN: The NLD often spoke of the principle of national reconciliation, but the military staged a coup. Has national reconciliation been damaged?
MJ: There must be an army, but we do not want a military dictatorship. We must get rid of it. Frankly, this is a knockout fight. They will attack us and we will attack them. If they win, they will take it all. If we win, we will take it. They have one of the most powerful armies in Southeast Asia. But the people are revolting against that powerful army. Are they able to control us now? Have they won? Think about it.
Who gave birth to these soldiers? Farmers and workers—the citizens gave birth to them. So, why are they killing their people? That’s what we cannot accept.
MN: Is the coup going to lead to an unfortunate end for the military leaders? As a veteran politician and former chief minister, what do you think?
MJ: That's a very good question. The people need to be involved. If the people are involved, we will be able to get rid of [the junta]. They are shooting at anyone, so the people now feel that they are just unruly gunmen. They can no longer win the hearts of the people. They are losing.
The military should treat the citizens as if the citizens were their father and mother. If they would accept that they must serve the people, everything would be all right. But now we are in a boxing ring. We will have to knock them out.
MN: What would you like to say about the pretext of electoral fraud that the military coup was based on?
MJ: We do not accept it at all. In the electoral commissions, there are a lot of people from [the military’s] side, including secretaries. They told us to check the voter lists. We checked the voter lists three times, carefully. If they were not satisfied with the lists, they could have cancelled the voter lists [before the election]. They could have called off the election by saying that some areas were unstable. But they did not. Only when we had won the election did they seize power and say it was because the voter lists were incorrect.
After the election results were announced to the world, it was ridiculous to say that the election was rigged.
MN: What message do you want to give to the people involved in the Spring Revolution?
MJ: I was a student who participated in the July 7 Uprising [in 1962]. In 1988, I was an assistant township education officer. Looking back on all of this, were my 80 years of life full of thorns? We can see clearly who planted those thorns, so I will continue doing what I need to do. Citizens, please support us because we will continue working for you. We must win.
MN: Is there anything else you would like to say?
MJ: I want to tell the citizens that with their cooperation, we can win it all. They have a key role. They are our father and mother. If the citizens are involved [in the pro-democracy movement], we will win. This is a knockout fight. If [the military] does not lose, we will lose. If we do not lose, they will lose.
This interview was edited for clarity and brevity..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-01
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Individual Documents
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Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"With a record-breaking number of defections unmatched in nearly six decades and brewing discontent among the ranks against their superiors, Myanmar’s more than 300,000-strong military is now at risk of splitting, according to some ex-army officers who have deserted their units recently.
Currently, around 2,000 soldiers and police have joined the country’s Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a nationwide boycott by Myanmar civil servants against the regime following their takeover in February. Many more are in the pipeline and out of the current 2,000 defectors, one-third are military personnel, said the officers who have joined the CDM as they are not pleased with the country’s military regime.
Though the number of defections is small for now, it is unprecedented in Myanmar’s military history going back to 1962 when the then dictator Ne Win staged a coup and consolidated the country’s armed forces. Some soldiers protested against the army during pro-democracy uprisings in 1988 but the number at the time was far less significant.
So, it’s worth asking why so many are doing so now.
“[Under the regime] people are ashamed to be soldiers, to attend the Defense Services Academy or to join the military. This is a very sad thing for the future of the military” said one of the officers, Captain Nyi Thuta.
After graduating in 2010 from the 52th Intake of the Defence Services Academy, he served at his base in Naypyitaw until the coup. When he learned about the takeover, he felt Myanmar was heading into a dark age. When the junta escalated its nationwide deadly crackdowns on peaceful protesters who were against their rule in March, the captain left his unit. He said “You can’t kill people who express their views.”
The regime’s brutality has shocked the world. They shot dead more than 100 people in a single day in March. They have sprayed bullets in residential areas. During raids, they have indiscriminately killed people, including children as young as 6. Arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings by the soldiers persist. As of Thursday, the junta had killed 1,019 people during their crackdowns, raids, arrests, interrogations, arbitrary killings and random shootings, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which is compiling the deaths and arrests since Feb. 1 coup.
Another defector, Captain Lin Htet Aung, said what his fellow soldiers did during the crackdowns were totally contradictory to the codes of conduct they were supposed to follow.
“They have changed into thugs with guns,” he said.
As a result, people detested the military so much that it demoralized the men in uniform like never before. The regime’s atrocities against protesters became an immediate push factor for some military personnel to join the CDM as they have become more aware of the true colors of the military junta, which has been committing atrocities and murdering its own people.
Sergeant Yin Lei Lei Tun used to be proud of being a soldier. But her faith in the armed forces she joined in 2016 was lost with the coup when she saw the junta’s atrocities against peaceful anti-regime protesters. So she joined the CDM in April after defecting from her military base in Yangon Region.
“After the coup, I feel insecure about being a soldier, as people hate the military. Our military is also doing the wrong thing” said the sergeant.
Currently, about 5 to 10 junta soldiers have been defecting from the military daily, according to the People’s Soldier group, a Facebook page co-founded by Captain Nyi Thuta to provide assistance to striking soldiers and to persuade more military personnel to leave their barracks to join the CDM.
Most of the soldiers who have joined the CDM are privates and sergeants. Officers ranking from lieutenants to majors account for around 100.
The Myanmar military has been notorious for attacking its own people rather than protecting them. Its atrocities like arbitrary killings, arrests and looting in ethnic areas are internationally well known. The coup in 2021 and follow-up atrocities have worsened its already tarnished reputation while pushing its leadership into a corner, as they are facing growing armed resistance in both urban and rural areas, forcing coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to admit he couldn’t fully control the country yet. Then they face another big blow: defections by their subordinates who detest their bosses’ actions.
Captain Nyi Thuta said the image of the military is now the worst in history, as more military personnel are realizing that the reputation of the military and soldiers have been totally shattered.
“So, this momentum [of defections] is going to grow. The sure thing is that the time has come for the people and people’s soldiers to unite,” he said.
Cracks in the military
Everyone familiar with Myanmar politics knows it is hard to imagine that change in Myanmar can come about without the involvement of some men within the military, which has remained the country’s most powerful institution since 1962.
Now with defections growing like never before, Captian Nyit Thuta said the military has potential to split into two groups: those who want to inherit the bad legacy of the military and others who don’t want to do so.
“Anyone defecting said they want to be people’s soldiers—professionals who protect the people. They don’t want to hand over the institution’s bad legacy to their juniors,” he said.
Another defecting military official, Captain Lin Htet Aung, also realized they were working for the coup leaders who put their personal benefits before the country or the military institution itself.
The captain, who graduated from the 54th Intake of the Defense Services Academy, left the military barracks in Shan State a few months after the February coup after seeing the regime’s atrocities against unarmed peaceful anti-coup demonstrators and civilians. Later he formed the People’s Embrace group to help military personnel who want to defect.
“We are seeing cracks in the military. There are many injustices in posting and other human rights violations that create discontent among the ranks against their superiors. So, the military could face a split,” said Captain Lin Htet Aung.
For examples, he explained, some military troops have been unfairly posted on the frontline for years while others who have good connections with people upstairs are being posted in safe areas like Naypyitaw, he added.
International and local observers are convinced that the military institution must split up in order to restore the path to democracy in Myanmar, as there is a lack of effective actions by the UN and international organizations and neither the armed resistance of the people nor the ethnic armed groups can defeat the junta.
Captian Lin Htet Aung also agreed with the point that without the split within the military, it’s unlikely democracy will be restored.
“Years-long bad habits [like corruption] and systems [like oppression] are deeply rooted in the military. We also need to fight to force those ingrained bad habits out in order to restore democracy. So, the institution needs to split up” he added.
In an attempt to encourage more defections, Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG) on Monday issued a statement urging military personnel to join the CDM by promising to keep not only their original positions and pension allowances, but also their safety.
It also said that security forces personnel who left the military barracks can join the federal union army and police forces reformed by the NUG.
Meanwhile, people’s reception of defecting soldiers has been quite encouraging, Captain Nyi Thuta said. Both the People’s Soldiers and People’s Embrace groups are now able to support the striking soldiers due to donations made by the public.
“They now realize that people just hate soldiers who support the institution that oppresses them with guns. They know now that you will be showered with love once you are no longer affiliated with them,” he said.
For most defectors from the military, they believe that only a split within the military itself will bring about a radical change for the armed forces to become the people’s military.
Captain Lin Htet Aung said the armed forces can’t be changed even with the death of coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, as another would take his place.
“To wipe out the deeply rooted bad habits and systems of the military, reform is the only way. It can only happen when it splits,” he said.
“It could happen if we are more united.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role
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Sub-title:
Despite enjoying broad public support, the National Unity Government is still struggling to manage sharp internal differences between the NLD’s “old guard” and those fighting for more radical change.
Description:
"Since February 1, youth activist and civil society leader Naw Thaboe has supported the National Unity Government steadfastly as it abolished the 2008 Constitution and recognised the Rohingya.
These revolutionary acts convinced Thaboe that the NUG was different from the NLD administration that the Tatmadaw removed from office on February 1. Lately, though, she said the NUG’s bold reforms have seemed to come to a halt.
“In the revolution, people need revolutionary leaders,” said Thaboe, who asked that her real name not be used. “Myanmar needs drastic change, the NUG or any political leaders need to be more proactive and take more radical action against the junta.”
Thaboe echoes the feelings of a growing number in Myanmar who, despite their support for the parallel government, are feeling increasingly frustrated with its lack of progress in establishing itself as a genuine rival administration to the military regime, let alone removing the Tatmadaw from power.
The COVID-19 outbreak has only increased the pressure on the NUG. Although most blame the military regime for the tens of thousands of COVID-19 deaths in recent months, they are also looking to the NUG for leadership to mitigate the health crisis.
The NUG’s struggles stem in part from deep internal divisions between long-time members of the National League for Democracy and more progressive individuals in cabinet. While the NUG was formed in mid-April by a diverse group that included community and ethnic leaders, the parallel government nominally led by acting president Duwa Lashi La remains dominated by NLD loyalists.
The NUG has “repeatedly stated that it is a revolutionary government first and foremost and has achieved a great deal given the pressure it has been under,” but some activists on the ground increasingly feel like the NUG senior leaders are focused on releasing statements, said Mr Kim Joliffe, a researcher on Myanmar politics and conflict.
“Most revolutionary forces aimed at defeating the incumbent power don’t start off operating like a government,” he said, noting that this strategy was seen as necessary in order to gain international recognition.
“Months ago the NUG had a lot of momentum and it has managed to sustain enough pressure to deny the SAC full control or recognition globally. But it has become increasingly clear that the battle to take full control one way or another will likely be a long and drawn out war, as neither side has the capacity or resources to fully defeat the other yet.”
On August 1, the military regime formed a caretaker government and junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, who appointed himself prime minister, said he expected Myanmar’s state of emergency to run until August 2023, when elections are planned.
Although the military is overwhelmingly unpopular, time might not be on the NUG’s side. If history is a guide, the parallel government faces a growing risk of sliding into irrelevance as time passes. With its iconic leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in detention, a lack of support from neighbouring countries and historic tensions with ethnic minority groups, the NUG will likely need to regain its early momentum if it is to make any major progress.
Unity in name only
This government of “national unity” is yet to be united. Sources within the NUG and those engaged with it say the cabinet has been and remains deeply divided over critical issues ranging from the response to COVID-19, its approach to the economy and cooperation with ethnic communities.
One cabinet member who is not from the NLD told Frontier that trust was “a big challenge” between NLD and non-NLD officials.
“We are still weak in [terms of] collaboration [with] each other,” the minister said, adding that there had been only “very limited talk” among cabinet members on issues such as humanitarian aid and the economy.
The minister’s assessment was echoed by an NLD-aligned official inside the NUG.
“Decades of distrust are not easily overcome in months,” he said.
Ma Phyo, an analyst of ethnic policy who asked that her real name not be used, said there are clearly divisions within the NUG.
“Although there are people from civil society, ethnic people, and activists doing the groundwork and pushing them[NUG officials], sometimes I wonder why it is taking this much to move forward,” she said.
“From my own connections and what I’ve heard, the reality of NLD veterans calling the shots doesn’t seem to have changed within the NUG,” she said.
Ma Phyo also worries that the NUG seems to be overconfident about its ability to prevail over the Tatmadaw, and that popular support could wane if it doesn’t show concrete results.
“It is not helping that NUG ministers are being stubborn, and what’s crazy is that they are so confident that the people will [always] support them because they believe that they are on the moral high ground,” she said.
Exploiting the pandemic
While the junta has tried to exploit the pandemic to cement its control and legitimise its rule, activists and businesspeople in Yangon told Frontier they were worried the NUG was losing touch with the key issues on the ground.
With more than 10,000 officially recorded deaths since the start of June and one of the highest rates of positive tests in the world – at times last month it was above 40 percent – the COVID-19 third wave has inflicted massive suffering in Myanmar. Although the NUG established a COVID-19 Task Force with ethnic health groups on July 21 – a move welcomed by civil society – it has yet to unveil or even outline a policy on the provision of humanitarian aid. This has put international donors and aid agencies in a difficult position, because it is not yet clear what form of assistance is politically acceptable.
The task force has said it plans to focus on bringing vaccines into the country, an approach supported by civil society groups in Myanmar, such as Progressive Voice. The task force has also said ASEAN and the rest of the international community should provide aid through the task force as well as through cross-border channels, community humanitarian networks, and ethnic health service providers. It is unclear if this is advocating for bypassing the junta entirely. Frontier contacted the task force but did not receive a reply.
This policy confusion stems from a lack of agreement within the cabinet, according to a senior official. Some NUG ministers favour allowing donors and social welfare groups to work with junta-controlled local officials as long as they also engage with the parallel government and meet transparency requirements. Others have taken a more hardline attitude, insisting that no aid should go through junta officials.
An ethnic politician and human rights activist, whose name Frontier withheld for security reasons, acknowledged that the NUG was trying its best despite “limited space and opportunity”, but said it still had a lot of room for improvement.
“What people need are two things: the first is political leadership and the second is services,” she said. “The political leadership is very confusing and unclear, with ministers making statements here and there without consulting the others. As for services, they face constraints in their capacity to deliver.”
The lack of consultation is possibly illustrated by a July announcement by the Ministry of Communications, Information and Technology, which said the NUG would accept cryptocurrency donations. The cabinet apparently had not been collectively consulted over the move and concerns over financial transparency were raised, a senior official said.
Whatever the NUG’s capacity, the junta appears to feel threatened by its popularity. On May 5, its Ministry of Transport and Communications imposed a national one-hour internet blackout without warning, seemingly aimed at preventing the public from watching an NUG press conference. It has also frozen bank accounts that have been detected sending money to the NUG and other opposition groups.
Regional powers are less convinced of the parallel government’s influence. China and Russia are sceptical about the NUG’s prospects and have not actively engaged with it, and ASEAN has only engaged publicly with the junta.
A symbol of the past
Aung San Suu Kyi is another factor complicating efforts towards unity within the NUG. She remains a divisive figure among the more diverse cabinet drawn together by the resistance movement in an effort to unite the country, including its powerful but disparate ethnic armed groups, against the military.
When Aung San Suu Kyi was in power, she chastised ethnic armed groups and supported military campaigns against them, defended the Tatmadaw at the International Court of Justice against accusations that it had committed genocide against Rohingya Muslims, and supported an internet blackout that affected more than one million people in Rakhine and Chin states.
“If Daw Suu is released tomorrow and dismisses all the work the NUG has done, it could kill off the democracy movement,” said Ma Ei Ei, a CDM supporter in Yangon who asked to be identified by a pseudonym.
Although Ei Ei sympathises with Aung San Suu Kyi due to her many sacrifices in the struggle for democracy, she said the detained leader had quickly become a symbol of the past after February 1.
“Things have moved very quickly. Daw Suu would face a huge public backlash if she walks out tomorrow and calls the Tatmadaw ‘my father’s army’,” Ei Ei said.
The coup d’etat has also led to an unprecedented reckoning among the Myanmar people. In particular, the deadly force unleashed by the Tatmadaw against peaceful protesters has changed attitudes about the Tatmadaw’s “clearance operation” against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine in 2017.
In an attempt to establish military alliances with ethnic armed groups and seek support from ethnic communities, the NUG has presented itself as a more minority-friendly administration than the NLD’s cabinet and central executive committee, which were for decades dominated by older Bamar men.
Although the NUG has made overtures to minorities, such as the Rohingya policy, the NLD’s track record on minority rights means there is still scepticism from ethnic communities as to whether the NUG represents a real break with the past.
Dr Sasa, who joined the NLD relatively recently and hails from Chin State, is not one of the “old guard” who dominated the party, according to one senior diplomat in Myanmar. The source added that the more conservative, NLD-aligned elements in the NUG were not impressed by Sasa’s progressive politics. Sasa though has a unique position and leverage in the cabinet because he is seen as a part of the NLD and not an outsider, and also because he has built up a public following domestically and internationally since the coup.
Sasa said he would resist any attempt to reverse the stand taken by the NUG to recognise the Rohingya, observing that the military had used divide and rule tactics based on race and religion to create splits in society.
“Our voice matters. They [Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained leaders] cannot just push us into a corner [upon being freed],” he said. Sweeping the NUG’s progressive politics aside and returning to the policies of the past would amount to “political suicide” for any leader, he warned. “I am ready to stand up for what I believe in.”
In a dramatic reversal of Aung San Suu Kyi’s infamous defence of the Tatmadaw at the International Court of Justice in December 2019, the NUG said in late June that it was gathering evidence of Tatmadaw atrocities and was preparing to file a lawsuit for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court.
In another departure from the former civilian government’s shunning of the Rohingya, this week saw the first appointment of a member of the Rohingya ethnic group to the parallel government. U Aung Kyaw Moe, the founder and executive director of the Center for Social Integrity, is known in Myanmar for his humanitarian and peace-building work, and was appointed as an adviser to the human rights ministry, Sasa told Frontier.
Differences on policy
Policy disagreements have not been limited to ethnic rights. The NUG’s first budget has been delayed for weeks due to differences of opinion within the cabinet over how spending should be prioritised.
Although the exact nature of these debates is unclear, sources said the forthcoming budget is likely to prioritise aid over defence and spending on the response to a growing humanitarian emergency.
Minister for Planning, Finance and Investment U Tin Tun Naing said supporting the Civil Disobedience Movement would be a top spending priority. “Civil disobedience is an effective weapon that the people of Myanmar can wield in good conscience. It is also the weapon that the military junta fears the most. Equally important is humanitarian support.”
There are clearer differences of opinion within cabinet over foreign investment and how businesses should operate under the military regime.
“There are ideologues who want to take a hard line against businesses that cooperate with the military,” one NUG source said.
But part of the cabinet has a more realistic approach to companies that are in Myanmar and trying to behave responsibly. Tu Hkawng, the NUG’s environmental conservation and natural resources minister, told Nikkei Asia in May that the NUG acknowledged the dilemmas companies operating in Myanmar face if they wish to support human rights. Referring to Norwegian mobile operator Telenor, he said the NUG would not push the company “into a corner”.
Frontier understands Tin Tun Naing also wanted the NUG to take an approach that recognises the difficult position responsible foreign investors now find themselves in, a source in the finance ministry said.
In late July, the NUG finance ministry published a framework for investment in which it said it would not “recognise or honour investment agreements or approvals” made with the military regime since the coup. Those who had invested in the country over the past decade, though, would be treated differently.
“Companies such as Total Energy and Chevron generate a lot of revenue for the military and the NUG has called for steps to limit the revenue flow from them. Telenor has to pay its dues to the military but also does a lot of good for the people,” an NUG source said.
Some large foreign investors are already carefully considering their operations in Myanmar. A few have decided to leave, including Telenor, which announced in early July it was selling its Myanmar operation to Lebanese investment firm, M1 Group, for US$105 million, implying an overall value of around $500 million. The sale represented a significant loss for the Norwegian telco, which had invested more than $1 billion in Myanmar since being licensed by President U Thein Sein’s quasi-military government in 2013.
The hasty sale was widely seen as a desperate move by Telenor to leave Myanmar amid pressure from the junta to use surveillance technology that would allow the authorities to monitor users, said telecoms industry executives.
Tin Tun Naing told Frontier that the NUG regretted Telenor’s departure, but said it reflected the fact the junta had created an increasingly hostile environment for ethical businesses.
“We know that Telenor resisted the military’s pressure to install intercept and surveillance software and share users’ data, unlike the military-controlled operators MPT and Mytel. The company has tried to protect human rights in Myanmar as best it could,” he said.
The Lebanese M1 Group is a controversial buyer, given both its track record working in countries such as Sudan, Syria and Yemen and its links to the Tatmadaw through shares in Irrawaddy Green Towers, a company that builds telecom towers for military-run Mytel. Concerns over how M1 would run the business prompted 45 civil society organisations, including Justice for Myanmar, Free Expression Myanmar and Global Witness, to write to Telenor and the Norwegian government this month urging them to stop the sale.
“The NUG’s position on foreign investment is clear. There should be no new investment as long as the junta is in place. Existing investors should stay only if they are doing more good than harm,” Tin Tun Naing said.
The people strike back
The creation of the People’s Defence Force as the NUG’s armed wing in May has also sparked internal debates over the prospects for a united armed insurgency against the junta. Tin Tun Naing declined to say how much funding the NUG was allocating to the PDF, but stressed that its role was to protect civilians and safeguard communities.
“We are not raising a conventional army to wage an all-out war. Our victory will come from the fact that the people support us. Our priority therefore has to be on supporting the people. We will not buy guns if we cannot feed our people,” the finance minister said.
Another cabinet minister admitted that the goal of unifying all ethnic armed groups into a federal army would be extremely difficult. For the foreseeable future, the minister said, the priority was for the PDF to form a federal alliance with other armed groups.
Myanmar analyst Mr David Mathieson says it is too early to predict what direction the new insurgency of the NUG or PDF will take as the situation evolves. But he branded the idea of an alliance between the NUG and ethnic armed groups as a “chimera”.
“Why should they all be under unified command? That is such an NLD mania to control everything and subordinate ethnic grievances to their political agenda: that is partly why the country is in such a mess,” he said.
Not all PDFs are under the command of the NUG, either. While some local PDFs have pledged allegiance to the parallel government, they essentially operate on their own, without assistance from the NUG. Mr Mathieson warned that this could result in a “fragmented” security situation and even a “nightmare scenario” in which “many anti-SAC PDF’s through desperation … engag[e] in various acts of criminality to finance armed resistance … [and] overburden local communities and retard economic growth”.
Defence minister U Yee Mon in early August told Myanmar Now that the NUG plans to unify civilian defence forces throughout the country under one command, and again parroted the “D-Day” narrative, a term hyped up by the NUG in anticipation of an all-out offensive against the Tatmadaw at some future date.
U Kyaw Win, the pseudonym of a Yangon-based political commentator and activist, said the NUG’s constant talk and lack of action about a military offensive was creating frustration..
“The NUG needs to remember that without a controlled territory, there would not be any form of recognition from foreign governments,” he said. But despite a plethora of challenges confronting the NUG, Kyaw Win stressed the NUG is “still the hope for the people, even if we are disappointed in some of their performances”.
“As long as the revolution is not finished,” he said, “the NUG shall have to continue as the frontline political organisation of our revolution.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-24
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), Human Rights and international relations
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"ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၈/၂၀၂၁)
၂၃ ဩဂုတ် ၂၀၂၁
“ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်သားများ၊ ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် မူဝါဒ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း”
၁။ ယနေ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် “အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ”သည် ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒနှင့်အညီ ပေါ်ပေါက် လာသည့် “တရားဝင်” ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရ ဖြစ်သည်ဟုလည်းကောင်း၊ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒကို မျက်ကွယ်ပြု၍ “တရားမဝင်” အာဏာသိမ်းယူထားရုံသာမက ပြည်သူကိုဖိနှိပ် ညှင်းပမ်းသတ်ဖြတ်နေသော “အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု” ဖြစ်သည်ဟုလည်းကောင်း မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့် သက်သေ အထောက်အထားဖြစ်စဉ်များက ဆုံးဖြတ်သတ်မှတ်ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ယခုအခြေအနေတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏အမိန့်အာဏာကို မလွန်ဆန်နိုင်၍ ၎င်း၏ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်ရပ်တည်နေကြသော တပ်မတော်သားများနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ခါးပိုက်ဆောင်နှင့်လက်ကိုင်တုတ်အဖြစ် ဆက်လက်ရပ်တည်မည့်အစား အမှန်တရားနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်သို့ ခိုလှုံရပ်တည်ကာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုကို ခံယူရေးအတွက် မိမိတို့၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်အသိဉာဏ်ဖြင့် ယှဉ်လျက် ရွေးချယ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ကြရန် လိုအပ်လာသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ လက်ကိုင်တုတ်များအဖြစ် ရပ်တည်နေခြင်းသည် အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို အလွဲသုံးစားပြုခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူကို ပုန်ကန်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် ပြည်သူ၏ အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်မှုကို မလွဲမသွေခံယူကြရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို လေးလေးနက်နက် သတိပြုအပ်သည်။
၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် တရားမဝင်အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ကိုခိုလှုံကာ ပြည်သူနှင့်ပူးပေါင်းမည့် တပ်မတော်သားများနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့များ၏ ရပ်တည် ချက်မှန်ကန်မှု၊ ဉာဏ်အမြှော်အမြင်ရှိမှုကို လေးစားအသိအမှတ်ပြုလျက် ၎င်းတို့အတွက် လိုအပ်သော တာဝန်ယူမှုနှင့် ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများ ဖြည့်ဆည်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် အောက်ပါ မူဝါဒများကို ချမှတ်လိုက်သည်-
(က) တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် လမ်းခွဲလျက် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင် ခိုလှုံရန် ဝန်ခံကတိပြုသော တပ်မတော်သားများနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအား “ပြည်သူ့သားကောင်းများ” အဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုမည်။
(ခ) ၎င်းတပ်မတော်သားများနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၏ လုပ်သက်၊ ရာထူး နှင့် ပင်စင်တို့အား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက ဆက်လက်တာဝန်ယူမည်။
(ဂ) ၎င်းတို့ လတ်တလောလိုအပ်သော အသက်လုံခြုံမှု၊ မိသားစုဘဝလုံခြုံမှုနှင့် ဘဝရပ်တည်မှုတို့ကို အာမခံနိုင်သော ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်မည့်အစီအမံများ ချမှတ် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
(ဃ) ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံမည့် တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့များ၊ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအားတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း၊ ဒဏ် ခတ်အရေးယူခြင်း မပြုလုပ်ရန် "ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်" ကိုလည်းကောင်း၊ မဟာမိတ်များကို လည်းကောင်း၊ ပြည်သူများကိုလည်းကောင်း အသိပေးညှိုနှိုင်း အကြောင်းကြားထားမည်။
(င) အဆိုပါ တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့များ၊ တပ်မတော်သားများ၊ ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များသည် အသစ်ပြန်လည် ဖွဲ့စည်းမည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု တပ်မတော်နှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့တွင် အရေးကြီးသော အခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ဆက်လက်ပါဝင် ပူးပေါင်းနိုင်ရန် အစီအစဉ်များ ချမှတ်ထားရှိမည်။
၅။ အထက်ပါ မူဝါဒများနှင့်အညီ လိုအပ်သောလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များ ချမှတ်အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်သားများ၊ ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအား ကြိုဆိုလက်ခံရေးနှင့် တပ်များ ပေါင်းစည်းရေးအတွက် ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးချုပ် ဦးဆောင်ပါဝင်သော အထူးကော်မတီတစ်ရပ်ကို အမျိုး သားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက ဖွဲ့စည်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေး ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။
ဒူဝါလရှီးလ
ယာယီသမ္မတ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"In Part 3 of a 3-part series by Real Stories Not Tales (RSNT), Khin Thandar (pseudonym) tells her story post-coup that highlights a different reality and involvement than the rest of the country.
Editor’s note: This is part 3 of a 3-part special feature of stories from a report by Real Stories Not Tales. Read Part 1 and Part 2. Access to the full report is available at the end of this post.
Khin Thandar comes from a small village in Rakhine State. She is actively involved with a number of Arakan civil society organizations and youth groups. She was interviewed on May 2.
What I feel sad about though is that most young people in Myanmar do not have the opportunity to study at all at the moment—whether online or offline—which means they are basically losing their future.
I was in Yangon when the coup happened. I had a lot of missed calls from my friends and activists I work with that night, and when I finally answered one at around 4:30 a.m., I found out there had been a military coup. Actually, I wasn’t that shocked. I had suspected the coup would happen. My first thought was that, based on our experience in Rakhine State, people needed to prepare for an internet shutdown and for not being able to communicate with their loved ones. So, I began to calmly spread this message with my network.
In contrast to many of my friends, I never really thought of going out into the streets to protest against the coup. You know, while people in Yangon and NLD supporters—mostly from the Bamar majority—were experiencing the so-called ‘democratic transition’ in recent years, we in Rakhine State continued to live and suffer under a military dictatorship. After the coup, these very same groups began calling for unity of all of Myanmar, but where were they when our ethnic people were dying in communal and armed conflicts? It is unfair and very painful. Actually, many people in Rakhine State feel as much distrust and even hatred towards the Bamar majority as they do towards the military.
Because of this, I felt a little out of place in Yangon after the coup, so I decided to go back to my home state. When I arrived, I met with some youth who were thinking of organizing a protest. We discussed it for a while, especially the high risk of getting arrested or even killed since the military presence in Rakhine State is much bigger than in Yangon. We asked ourselves: Who is it exactly we would be protesting for? And do we deserve to get jailed or killed for that? In the end, we decided against it. That is why Rakhine State is ‘silent’ now: we don’t talk about the military, and there is no CDM here.
What affected my life post-coup the most have been the progressive internet shutdowns. I had to cancel many of my plans, like an online civic education course for university students that I had been preparing together with some of my seniors. I was also unable to move abroad for my master’s studies as I had originally planned since my flight got cancelled in part due to the coup here and in part due to a Covid-19 outbreak over there. Luckily, I can study online, but I’ve had to move a couple of times in order to secure a stable internet connection. What I feel sad about though is that most young people in Myanmar do not have the opportunity to study at all at the moment—whether online or offline—which means they are basically losing their future.
Of course, the coup has also affected me and everyone around me psychologically. The constant stream of bad news is heart-breaking. When I get too stressed, I spend time alone, go for walks on the beach, listen to music, or exercise. Sometimes, I write down my thoughts and feelings about what’s going on in the country.
In my family there are different opinions on the current events, so it has become a very sensitive topic for us. For the first few weeks after the coup, we couldn’t even discuss it. I experienced something similar with my personal network as well. First, I was sharing my opinions about the political situation very openly, both online and offline. But then this led to fights with friends and other activists, and people began accusing me of being selfish. So in the end, I decided to stay silent.
I feel like everyone wants to get media attention nowadays, but I would say that the world needs to listen to the unheard voices in Myanmar before it overgeneralizes the situation in the country. I’m personally worried about my state, because in contrast to the past when there was a lot of discussion, Rakhine State is now silent. It feels scary and I worry there will be more fighting in the future.
Real Stories Not Tales (RSNT) is a dedicated team in and out of Myanmar that aims to bring awareness to the reality of young people’s lives since the Myanmar military staged a coup on February 1st, 2021. Stories are collected through interviews with each protagonist by the team, either in Burmese or in English. Each character is drawn by a professional illustrator bringing a visual context to the story. The RSNT report also proposes some tips on how it is possible to support Myanmar these days. They are pleased to share selections from their first report and are now in the process of collecting more stories all around the country..."
Source/publisher:
Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.29 MB
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Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
www.nugmyanmar.org
သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၁၃/၂၀၂၁)
၂၀ ဩဂုတ် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်
၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရရဲ့ ထီစနစ်ဖြစ်တဲ့ "အောင်လံလွှင့်ချီ နွေဦးထီ" ကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဩဂုတ်လ ၁၅ ရက်နေ့တွင် စတင်ရောင်းချခဲ့သည်။ “အောင်လံလွှင့်ချီ နွေဦးထီ” ကို တရားဝင်လူမှုကွန်ယက်စာမျက်နှာ https://www.facebook.com/nuglottery မှတဆင့် ဝယ်ယူနိုင်ပါသည်။ ထီထိုးသော ငွေများထဲမှ ၇၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကို CDM များအား ထောက်ပံ့ရာတွင် အသုံးပြုသွားမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ၃၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းအား ဆုကြေးငွေတွေအဖြစ် ထီဖွင့်ပေးသွားမှာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ထီပေါက်သူများက ဆုကြေးငွေကို ပြန်လည်လှူဒါန်းနိုင်ပြီး အဆိုပါ လှူဒါန်းငွေကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ အရေးကြီးသော လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များတွင် အသုံးပြုသွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ လျှပ်စစ်နှင့်စွမ်းအင်ဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် စွမ်းအင်ကဏ္ဍ၏ မြန်မာ့ရေနံဓာတုဗေဒလုပ်ငန်းရှိ CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများကို ဖိနှိပ်ခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ရာထူးမှ ထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း၊ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ ဝန်ထမ်းအိမ်ရာများမှ နှင်ထုတ်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရက ပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုဟု ထုတ်ပြန်ထားသည့် ၂ လစာ ချေးငွေများ ပြန်လည်တောင်းခံခြင်းတို့ကို ကျူးလွန်နေသည့် တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်ခံ အရာရှိ (၆၉) ဦးအားအမည်ပျက်စာရင်းဝင်သူများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာလိုက်ပြီး ၄င်းတို့အားလုံးကို နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ် (dismiss) ပြီး ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဩဂုတ်လ ၁၆ရက်စွဲပါ အမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာအမှတ် (၁၀/၂၀၂၁)၁ ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားကျန်းမာရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသော အမျိုးသားကျန်းမာရေးညီလာခံ၏ ရလဒ်အဖြစ် အမျိုးသားကျန်းမာရေး ကော်မတီ (National Health Committee) ကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဩဂုတ်လ (၅) ရက်နေ့တွင် ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး အမျိုးသားကျန်းမာရေးကော်မတီက ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁/ လိုက်သည်။ အဆိုပါ အမျိုးသားကျန်းမာရေးကော်မတီတွင် ဥက္ကဋ္ဌအဖြစ် ဖဒိုမန်းမန်း၊ ဒုဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ၁ အဖြစ် ဒေါက်တာဇော်ဝေစိုး၊ ဒုဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ၂ အဖြစ် ခူးပလူးရယ်၊ အတွင်းရေးမှူးအဖြစ် ဒေါက်တာ ဥက္ကာ၊ တွဲဘက်အတွင်းရေးမှူး ၁ အဖြစ်စောနေထူး၊ တွဲဘက်အတွင်းရေးမှူး ၂ အဖြစ် နန်းစနိုး တို့ပါဝင်ပြီး အဖွဲ့ဝင် (၁၇) ဦးပါဝင်ပါဝင်ပါသည်။ အတိုင်ပင်ခံ ၁၀ ဦး ပါဝင်သည်။ အမျိုးသားကျန်းမာရေးကော်မတီ(NHC) ၏ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များမှာ
(က) ဖက်ဒရယ် ပြည်ထောင်စု ကျန်းမာရေး မူဝါဒ (National Health Policy) ရေးဆွဲချမှတ်သွားရန်၊
(ခ) တိုင်းရင်းသားနယ်မြေ/ပြည်ထောင်စုအဖွဲ့ဝင် ပြည်နယ်များ၏ ကျန်းမာရေးဆိုင်ရာ လုပ်ငန်းစီမံချက်များကို ဆက်စပ်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန်၊
(ဂ) နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားနိုင်ရန်၊
(ဃ) ဘေးဒဏ်ကပ်ဆိုး အန္တရာယ်အမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာနိုင်သော အခြေအနေများကို အသင့်ပြင်ဆင်မှု ရှိရန်၊ လျင်မြန်စွာ တုန့်ပြန်နိုင်ရန် တို့ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားကျန်းမာရေးကော်မတီ(NHC) ၏ လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များမှာ
(က)ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု ကျန်းမာရေးမူဝါဒအပေါ် အခြေခံပြီး ကျန်းမာရေးစနစ် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်၊
(ခ) ကျန်းမာရေးသတင်းအချက်အလက် ပြုစုရေးစနစ်ကို ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်လာရေး အဆင့်မြင်တင်ရန်၊
(ဂ) နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနဲ့ ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး နည်းဗျုဟာများ ချမှတ်ကျင့်သုံးရန်၊
(ဃ) ဆေးပညာသင်တန်းများ ပို့ချနိုင်ရေးနှင့် သင်ရိုးညွှန်းတမ်းများ ရေးဆွဲနိုင်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်၊
(င) Covid 19 ရောဂါထိန်းချုပ်ရေး လျှော့ချရေးတို့နှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ နည်းဗျုဟာများ ချမှတ်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်
၄။ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားရေးနှင့် ဘေးအန္တရာယ်ဆိုင်ရာ စီမံခန့်ခွဲရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် သဘာဝဘေးအန္တရာယ် ကြုံတွေ့ရသည့် ဒေသများရှိ ပြည်သူများအတွက် လိုအပ်သော ထောက်ပံ့မှုများ ပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မန္တလေးတိုင်း မိုးကုတ်မြို့နယ် တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော မြေပြို၊ ရေဘေး ကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ခံခဲ့ရပြီး ထောက်ပံ့မှုလိုအပ်နေသော ပြည်သူများအတွက် ငွေကျပ် ၁၀သိန်း ကို ၁၃.၀၈.၂၀၂၁တွင် ပေးပို့ထောက်ပံ့ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့အတူ ရေဘေးသင့်ခဲ့ရသော ကချင်ပြည်နယ် မဂါ့ယန် စစ်ရှောင်စခန်းအတွက် ဆန်ရိက္ခာဖိုး ငွေကျပ်၁၈သိန်း၊ မြေပြိုမှုကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသောမိသားစုအတွက် ငွေကျပ် ၁သိန်း နှင့် ဘေးဒဏ်ကြောင့် နေအိမ်ပျက်စီးခဲ့ခြင်းများအတွက် ငွေကျပ် ၅သိန်း စုစုပေါင်း ငွေကျပ်၂၄သိန်းကို ၁၅.၀၈.၂၀၂၁တွင် ထောက်ပံ့ခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အကျဉ်းသားများနှင့် ၄င်းတို့မိသားစုများအတွက်လိုအပ်ချက်များကို လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများ ပံ့ပိုးနိုင်ရန် ငွေကျပ် ၁၅သိန်း ကိုလည်း ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးတင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အဆက်အသွယ်မပြတ်ရှိနေစေရန်နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ အရေးကြီးသော သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို အချိန်နှင့်တပြေးညီ ပြည်သူသို့ အသိပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် Radio ထုတ်လွှင့်ရန် ပြင်ဆင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိရာ မကြာမီ အချိန်တွင် စမ်းသပ်ထုတ်လွှင့်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဩဂုတ်လ ၂၀ ရက်နေ့ မနက် ၈ နာရီတစ်ကြိမ် ည ၈ နာရီတစ်ကြိမ် စမ်းသပ်ထုတ်လွှင့်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် လှိုင်းတိုမီတာ ၁၆ / မက်ဂါဟဇ် ၁၇ဒသမ ၇၁ တွင် ဖမ်းယူနားဆင်နိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။
အသေးစိတ်သိရှိလိုပါက လေ့လာရန် လင့်ခ်များ
၁။ https://www.facebook.com/NUGmyanmar/posts/170686425151997
၂။ https://www.facebook.com/NUGmyanmar/posts/171327885087851
Republic of the Union of Myanmar
National Unity Government
www.nugmyanmar.org
Press Release (13/2021)
20 August 2021
1. The National Unity Government (NUG) has started selling its Aung Lan Hlwint Chi Spring Lottery on 15 August 2021. People can buy lottery tickets at the official page https://www.facebook.com/nuglottery. The NUG will use 70% of the revenue from lottery sales to support those participating in the civil disobedience movement (CDM) and 30% for prizes. Lottery winners can donate their winnings back to the NUG, and these donations will be used in the crucial work of the NUG.
2. The NUG Ministry of Electricity and Energy has issued an announcement (10/2021) dated 16 August 2021 to declare that 69 officers who have been working for the military junta are blacklisted and dismissed for their roles in oppressing the employees of Myanma Petrochemical Enterprise (MPE). These officers threatened and dismissed the employees of MPE who have been participating in the civil disobedience movement, removed them from staff accommodation and demanded that they repay two months’ advance salary.
3. As an outcome of the National Health Conference convened by the NUG Ministry of Health and ethnic health organisations, the National Health Committee (NHC) has been formed on 5 August 2021 and released its first statement (1/2021). Padoh Mahn Mahn is Chair of the Committee, Dr Zaw Wai Soe is Vice-Chair (1), Khu Plueh is Vice-Chair (2), Dr Oakar is Secretary, Saw Nay Htoo is Joint Secretary (1), Nan Snow is Joint Secretary (2). There are 17 members and 10 consultants.
The objectives of the National Health Committee (NHC) are:
(a) To formulate the National Health Policy of the future federal union;
(b) To collaborate implementation of health programmes and projects of ethnic areas/states of the union;
(c) To cooperate with international organizations; and
(d) To prepare for possible dire situations caused by various crises, including infectious diseases and natural disasters, and respond promptly and effectively
The Ways forward of the National Health Committee (NHC) are:
(a) To carry out the Health System Development based on the Federal Health Policy;
(b) To Strengthen the Health information system;
(c) To build a well-coordinated communication mechanism with the international partners;
(d) To accelerate the medical trainings and develop the necessary curriculums; and
(e) To endorse effective strategies for control and mitigation of the COVID-19 Pandemic.
4. The NUG Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management is working hard to provide necessary assistance for the people in disaster areas. The ministry has donated one million kyats to those affected by landslides and flash floods in Mogok Township, Mandalay Region. It has also donated 1.8 million kyats to the Maga Yang IDP camp affected by flash floods (camp residents can buy rice with this donation), 100,000 kyats to a family affected by landslides, and 500,000 kyats to households for damaged properties in Kachin State. The ministry has donated 2.4 million kyats in total on 15 August. The ministry also donated 1.5 million kyats to prisoners and their families to ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided to fulfil their needs.
5. The NUG is making necessary preparations to create a radio station so that it remans in touch with the people and communicates real-time and important information from the NUG to the public. A trial run will start at 8.00 am and 8.00 pm on 20 August and people can tune to SW 16/17.71 MHz.
For further information
1. https://www.facebook.com/NUGmyanmar/posts/170686425151997
2. https://www.facebook.com/NUGmyanmar/posts/171327885087851 ..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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‘If anyone who wanted to could desert right now, there would only be the commander-in-chief and the flagpole left in the barracks,’ said one captain
Description:
"Around 1,500 soldiers have now defected from the Myanmar military to join the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against the junta, a former Tatmadaw captain who is helping fellow deserters told Myanmar Now.
The new figures from Lin Htet Aung, who abandoned his post at the 528th Light Infantry Battalion in eastern Shan State in April, indicate that soldiers are now defecting faster and in greater numbers than before.
The number of deserters has almost doubled in a little over two months. In early June, four months after the military seized power, around 800 soldiers had defected.
Among the defectors, about 1,000 hold ranks ranging from private to sergeant while hundreds more are majors, Lin Htet Aung told Myanmar Now.
Most have arrived in areas controlled by rebel groups but have yet to fully earn the trust of others involved in the movement against the junta, he said.
“We’re still in the process of monitoring and assessing them, so we can’t go on the offensive now,” he added, referring to plans for defected soldiers to wage war against the junta.
“But many are found to be enthusiastic about taking part in whatever role possible once we go on the offensive,” said the soldier, who graduated with the 54th batch of the Defence Services Academy (DSA).
Lin Htet Aung has been making introductions between defectors and the National Unity Government (NUG) while reaching out to soldiers within the army to encourage more defections.
Potential defectors contact Lin Htet Aung every day, he said, and are in constant danger of being discovered.
Pro-junta soldiers, he added, refer to would-be deserters as “watermelons” because they see them as green on the outside and red on the inside; a reference to the colours of the military and the National League for Democracy party.
“Many do not want to work for the military council anymore as more and more soldiers lose faith in their leaders,” Lin Htet Aung said.
Lin Htet Aung and another captain who has not defected told Myanmar Now that the military had recently restricted the movements of soldiers and their families. Senior officers claim this is a bid to curb the spread of Covid-19 but it is in fact meant to prevent defections, they said.
“If anyone who wanted to could desert right now, there would only be the commander-in-chief and the flagpole left in the barracks,” said the second captain.
Lin Htet Aung agreed that large numbers of soldiers want to leave. “If it was approved that anyone could resign, even a new soldier who just graduated from the DSA would leave,” he said.
In an interview with Myanmar Now earlier this month, NUG defence minister Yee Mon urged junta soldiers to defect.
“You don’t have much longer to decide whether you’re going to be on the people’s side or not,” he said. “So join the people’s defence force if you can. If you can’t, stop taking orders from the military council. Stop oppressing the people.” .....
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime, which has dubbed itself the State Administration Council since the February 1 coup, recently proclaimed that it was inaugurating a caretaker government which will step down after cleaning up the mess left behind by what the junta regards as an incompetent and corrupt National League for Democracy (NLD) administration. An election is supposed to follow sometime in 2023 and a new government will then be inaugurated.
The term ‘caretaker government’ invokes remembrance of times past and the first of four military interventions following independence. Between 1958 and 1960, a highly successful, if authoritarian and dictatorial, military administration governed. It was formed on the basis of a “constitutional coup”, as military control seemed inevitable but was in fact approved by the legislature. Following that interregnum, the military held free elections, in which its preferred party lost, and the military retired [temporarily], returning the government to the then Prime Minister U Nu.
In 1960, the military proclaimed its outstanding success. On terminating its ruling role, it specifically likened its accomplishments to Hercules cleaning out the Augean Stables. Its Ministry of Information acclaimed its deeds in the volume: Is Trust Vindicated? A Chronicle of a Trust, Striving, and Triumph. Being an Account of the Accomplishments of the Government of the Union of Burma, November 1, 1958-February 1, 1960. In the estimations of today’s internal or external observers, will this present caretaker regime succeed as the first caretaker government did in 1958-60? As Eliza Doolittle said in My Fair Lady, “Not bloody likely”.
The origins and conditions of both coups are different. In 1958, the politically ubiquitous Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League was split by personal rivalries and civil war was feared by the military, which was already fighting two communist insurgencies and a Karen rebellion. It was a peaceful transfer of power, with little overt dissent, at least among the majority Bamar people, because of the blatantly ineffective civilian administration.
The military substituted army officers in critical positions throughout the government and they were uncorrupt and effective, if demanding and insensitive to local feelings. But there were no political arrests and no one was killed. What was a loss for democratic governance was compensated for by a string of successful economic, political and even international measures.
Prices were forcibly lowered in the bazaars, the military efficiently ran an extensive series of economic ventures, some 170,000 squatters were removed to the outskirts of Rangoon, the legal prerogatives of the Shan sawbwas were terminated, education was improved and a Burmese Oxford professor became vice-chancellor of Rangoon University, while a border agreement was negotiated with China. This period may have provided both the rationale and belief for the military that it could effectively run the country for a longer period. History has proven this to have been an illusion.
Present conditions are counter to those of 1958. The NLD’s sweeping victory in the November 2020 election may not have been an endorsement of the rather ineffective Daw Aung San Suu Kyi government, although it probably was an endorsement of her personally, but it evidently reflected the widespread distrust of another potential administration influenced or controlled by the military. The extensive nationwide violence against the subsequent coup, whose opponents straddle all classes and regions, is an indication that the fairly extensive reforms of freedom over the previous decade have inoculated the population against repression. The military has responded with over 900 civilian deaths and more than 5,000 arrests and the people are equally vehement in their rejection of the coup. The deaths, violence, and unrest associated with the current state of play in Myanmar will not go unremembered in the future.
In 1958, the military was uncorrupt, vigorous and motivated by a sense of patriotism in saving the state from unprincipled civilian politicians it regarded as bent on their own aggrandizement or, in the case of Prime Minister U Nu, adhering to his unrealistic Buddhist-based sense of governance. The same cannot be said today, with the generals in control of much of the economy and retired members of the military and their cohorts ensconced in positions of economic advantage. Shared poverty was once a national characteristic. It isn’t now.
Today’s resistance to the military is unprecedented in modern Burmese history, surpassing the failed people’s revolution in 1988. Then, the slaughter by the military was far greater but resistance was not founded on violence. Today, the widespread opposition has discarded Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s former insistence on non-violence. Death tolls on all sides continue to climb. As hostilities on both sides continue, the purist moral position of the opposition will probably suffer.
Some talk of the beginnings of civil war or a Syrian-style debacle. These seem extreme views but, even if the military were able to prevail until their supposed departure from office in 2023, public acquiescence is far more difficult. The exposure to freedoms built over the previous decade vaccinates against easy compliance with any new government the military would be willing to tolerate. Its objective is evidently to destroy the NLD and render Daw Aung San Suu Kyi politically demolished for her remaining vital years either in jail, under house arrest or under legal and political restrictions that the military will enact.
The next two years, whatever the outcome, will be difficult and destructive. The caretaker government concept is more akin to a warden monitoring the activities of the state’s confined inmates, alas, than the nurturing of the needy.
David I. Steinberg is distinguished professor of Asian studies emeritus, Georgetown University..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
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The junta’s clumsy attempts to exploit COVID-19 and strengthen its control at the grassroots level by appointing compliant local officials are being thwarted by resistance that ranges from non-cooperation to assassinations.
Description:
"Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing marked the six-month anniversary of his putsch on August 1 by announcing the formation of a provisional government with himself as prime minister – a move seen by many as an effort to strengthen and legitimise his rule.
As the junta consolidates its power at the top, it is also moving to strengthen its administrative reach at the grassroots level, partly through policy decisions involving the fight against COVID-19, which has spread rapidly throughout the country over the past month.
In a speech on July 12, Min Aung Hlaing had warned his opponents not to exploit the shortage of oxygen needed by those with the most serious cases of COVID-19. Yet the regime has done exactly that – it has sought to take political advantage from the most recent wave of infections by granting junta-appointed local authorities powers over oxygen distribution and movement restrictions.
Min Aung Hlaing’s speech came two days after the military council introduced informal restrictions on the sale of oxygen. In Yangon, it followed that up on July 20 by further strengthening grassroots administration through the creation of township and ward-level “oxygen support committees” to issue recommendation letters to the public for buying oxygen and managing supplies. Township committees are headed by the township administrator and comprise other officials, community leaders and representatives of social welfare groups.
Since forming the committees, the junta has also introduced restrictions on private oxygen plants in Yangon Region, banning them from filling cylinders unless the customer has a recommendation letter from the local authorities.
Wishful thinking vs reality
On July 24, U Hla Soe, the chair of Yangon Region Administrative Council – appointed by the provisional government as the regional chief minister on August 1 – wrote on his social media page that the township oxygen support teams were formed in collaboration with local authorities and charity groups.
“Anyone can ask at township general administration department offices about receiving oxygen free of charge. They do not need a recommendation letter (from their ward or village tract administrator) or to pay money. They can get oxygen easily by filling in the patient’s name, address and telephone number on the request form,” Hla Soe wrote.
Authorities said the main reason for forming the committees was to reduce the number of outlets selling oxygen and ensure there was enough for patients in need.
However, a ward administrator in Yangon Region’s Mayangone Township, who asked not to be identified, said the situation described by Hla Soe bears little resemblance to reality.
The administrator said he is being overwhelmed with requests for oxygen that he can’t satisfy, because the township oxygen distribution committee is only allocating his ward one 40-litre cylinder a day. There are also some days when he receives nothing.
“How can I meet demand with a 40-litre cylinder a day?” he asked, adding that he was receiving requests to refill up to 25 cylinders daily. “I have to ask my friends and other sources if they can provide oxygen,” he said.
According to the administrator, all the requests he receives are to refill cylinders and he has yet to be asked to provide a recommendation letter to buy from a private outlet.
“If I can’t help with oxygen, I refer them to charity groups,” he said, adding that one of the most reliable sources in Yangon is a social welfare group called Seitta Arrman.
“Volunteers from this group go around Yangon to find oxygen. When they do, they share it with the needy,” he said.
A village tract official in Yangon Region’s outer northern Hmawbi Township said he has not been allocated any oxygen by the township committee and has been issuing recommendation letters to volunteers or charity groups on request.
“I am yet to be asked by a resident for a recommendation letter. They ask for oxygen, but I can’t help. So I refer them to local charity groups,” said the official, who requested anonymity.
Even before all the new restrictions, it was extremely difficult to get oxygen tanks refilled because of the high demand during this third wave of infections. Occasional attacks by the junta’s forces on people lining up at oxygen plants have also been reported.
Rather than effectively addressing the oxygen shortage, the formation of the township oxygen support teams has been criticised for making it more difficult for individuals and charity groups to acquire urgently needed medical oxygen.
Charity groups told Frontier that some factories refuse to sell oxygen without a recommendation letter from township administration committees. They are also often told by the factories that they must have a letter from a township doctor or local official to show that they have a genuine need for oxygen. On the other hand, some factories are selling oxygen to those without recommendation letters, but prioritising those with letters. The unpredictability of the situation is leading to even more resistance to working with the oxygen committees.
In Mayangone Township, Ko Aung Aung Oo and a group of friends are helping to provide oxygen to those in need and say demand is very high because of the junta’s incompetence and the limited supply being allocated to the junta-appointed township oxygen distribution committees.
However, even those with recommendation letters from local authorities still find themselves having to queue for hours to receive oxygen from a plant, Aung Aung Oo said. Even many of the charity groups that have allied with township committees have to queue to get oxygen due to the high demand. So some, like Aung Aung Oo, don’t bother with going through the process to get a recommendation letter.
“They just want to flex their power. If we can get oxygen without queuing just by showing a recommendation letter, we don’t hesitate. It’s just a piece of paper and it does not help to acquire oxygen. So, why should we waste time getting the letter,” said Aung Aung Oo.
It’s a similar situation outside of Yangon. U Kyaw Ko Ko, the leader in Mandalay Region’s southern Meiktila Township of the Myosatthit Myat Parami Social Welfare Association, which is providing treatment to COVID-19 patients, said it makes its own arrangements to acquire oxygen. “We have not received help from the local authorities. We do everything ourselves, including acquiring oxygen,” he told Frontier.
Factories under pressure
On July 28, township General Administration Departments ordered factories in Yangon Region to provide oxygen only to those with a recommendation letter from local authorities. Queues largely disappeared at oxygen plants after the order was issued. Some oxygen plants in Insein and South Okkalapa townships posted signs saying that anyone wanting to refill cylinders must have a recommendation from ward administrators.
The junta’s apparent strategy of using oxygen distribution to regain control over local administration has created difficulties for some private oxygen factories. Previously, there were no formal restrictions applied on sales of oxygen, only informal directives to stop selling to individuals.
Factories owners told Frontier that their respective township administrative councils have told them that they must prioritise requests for oxygen from those affiliated with the SAC, including oxygen support committees, state-owned hospitals and quarantine centers.
After the township oxygen distribution committees were established, they allocated quotas based on the production capacity of the factories in their township. In addition to quotas, some factory owners were told by their township administrative council that the first priority for sales were government hospitals, followed in order by COVID-19 treatment centres, and sales to social welfare groups and individuals. Factories were also prohibited from selling outside their region or state.
With factory owners feeling the pressure from the soaring demand and the junta’s rules and regulations, confusion reigns.
Some owners say there is no ban on the sale of oxygen to the public without a ward endorsement, but will require a doctor’s recommendation for emergency cases that want to jump the queue ahead of those on the SAC’s list of priorities.
“Some people say factories will not sell if they do not have a recommendation letter from a ward administrator, but that’s not true,” said an oxygen factory owner in Yangon who asked not to be named.
“We have to do it first for them [SAC’s list of priority institutions],” he said, “We have to show evidence for why we paused providing oxygen to them and refilled emergency oxygen cylinders instead. So people should bring medical documents if the situation is an emergency.”
The Mate Sate oxygen plant in Yangon’s South Dagon Industrial Zone has the capacity to produce enough to fill 700 small cylinders (between 5 litres and 20 litres capacity) and 120 40-litre cylinders a day. It is supplying nearly 500 small cylinders to the oxygen distribution committees in six Yangon Region townships. It is also filling 40-litre cylinders for hospitals and COVID-19 treatment centres.
However, the factory’s managing director, U Tin Aung Lwin, said the township distribution teams and their affiliated social welfare groups were unable to take the oxygen reserved for their use because they do not have enough cylinders to hold the oxygen.
“They are only able to refill about 350 cylinders a day, so we sell the rest to people who need it,” he told Frontier on August 3.
Tin Aung Lwin said he was in a difficult position as a factory owner because he has to coordinate with junta-appointed authorities to facilitate the demands of both the military and the public.
“Factories are operating under their administration,” he said, referring to the junta-appointed bodies. “We have to coordinate and negotiate with them for the welfare of the people. Sometimes we have to do as they say. We also sell to everyone without discrimination,” he said. “In an emergency, it’s better to have a doctor’s recommendation of medical documents.”
Although the junta is restricting the operations of private oxygen plants, it is selling oxygen from a military-owned plant in Yangon’s Mingaladon Township without buyers having to show recommendation letters. State-run media has reported that the “Mindama Air Separation Oxygen Plant” owned by the Tatmadaw’s Myanmar Economic Corporation is selling oxygen to the public.
In an interview with Tatmadaw-run Myawaddy Television on July 14, the head of the factory said anyone wanting oxygen needed to bring a cylinder but there was “no need to bring letters of recommendation”. The factory was selling oxygen for 10-litre and 20-litre cylinders between 9am to 6pm to buyers who needed to show a Citizenship Scrutiny Card. Customers said the factory was selling oxygen refills for 5-litre and 10-litre cylinders for K2,000 and was not filling up 40 litre cylinders.
“We can buy oxygen cheaply here and many people are relying on the factory,” said Ma Moe, 50, who was in a queue of about 100 people waiting to buy at the factory on August 2.
However, when asked many people do not know who owns the factory.
Restricting movement
Controlling access to oxygen is not the regime’s only strategy for strengthening the power of its appointees at the community level. COVID-19 prevention is also being used to impose restrictions on freedom of movement.
In some townships throughout the country, residents need cards issued by junta-appointed ward or village tract officials for permission to travel. In those townships, residents have to show the card to gain entry to wards or village tracts and are only allowed to leave their home for limited periods. All shops except pharmacies must close at noon, after which time residents need a recommendation letter from a junta-appointed ward or village tract official to leave the area where they live.
These restrictions do not apply throughout the country, but only in areas where the ward or village tract administrators have been appointed by the junta. One such area is Yangon’s outer northern Hmawbi Township, where the population includes a large number of military personnel. The travel card system is also reported to have been introduced in some townships in Bago and Mandalay regions, as well as Shan State. But people living in downtown Yangon say officials have not tried to introduce it there.
A junta-appointed ward administrator in Mandalay city’s Aung Myay Thar Zan Township said the card system was being used to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. He said no action has been taken against residents who do not follow the rules.
“People are critical of whatever we do,” he said. “But we are doing our best to prevent an epidemic. Oxygen is also being distributed through local social welfare groups. They get oxygen faster with my letter of recommendation.”
Distrust and even hostility towards junta-appointed local officials is affecting the COVID-19 vaccination rollout as well. Many do not want vaccines if they are provided by the junta and their officials. On top of this, residents wanting to be inoculated are required to provide their CSC and household registration list.
“We have to give them our names to be vaccinated, so I decided not to be vaccinated under the military regime, and so has my mother. We have no reason to have anything to do with people working for the military,” said a woman who owns a restaurant in Yangon’s Ahlone Township, who asked not to be identified.
Terror and resignations
The junta’s efforts to spread its tentacles of power and control over everyday people have been frustrated by the mass resignations of local administrators who fear joining a growing list of assassination victims.
One of the most significant such events occurred on July 4 in Sagaing Region’s Kawlin Township when at least 10 village tract administrators and township General Administration Department officials resigned en masse in messages posted on social media.
The latest fear-driven resignations have included those of nine village heads in Sagaing Region’s Pale Township who resigned in early August after receiving a warning from the People’s Defence Force-Pale. It warned that they would be attacked for “betraying the people” if they continued to serve the regime.
In Butalin Township, also in Sagaing Region, five village tract administrators quit on August 1, saying they had received death threats.
Regime spokesperson General Zaw Min Tun told a news conference on July 12 that 173 ward and village tract administrators, USDP members and people accused of being military informers had been killed as of the end of June.
He admitted that the regime cannot provide full security for local officials and suggested they inform the relevant authorities when they travel and not travel alone. He said unarmed security groups were being established in wards and villages to provide information and warnings ahead of the violence, and that the groups had already been established in almost half of the country.
Elected officials purged
After it seized power on February 1, the regime council terminated the appointment of about 16,800 village tract and ward administrators who had been elected by their communities under reforms spearheaded by the NLD government in 2016 and 2017.
Some of them were reappointed but most were replaced by supporters of either the Tatmadaw or its proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party. The appointments were met with widespread public opposition, which resulted in many of the appointees resigning within days of being appointed. As a result, some townships do not have ward or village tract administrators.
Regime-appointed administrators now receive a monthly salary of K50,000 plus K20,000 for office costs. They are required to submit detailed reports to township GAD offices, including on suspected resistance activists in their areas.
“Underground revolutionary activists are hiding in urban areas. The military does not have the capacity to get intelligence on their activities so it relies on administrators to gather information. We have to eliminate the administrators who are working as dalan,” a member of a Yangon-based PDF told Frontier, using the Burmese term for informers.
The trust and cooperation that elected administrators had enjoyed in their communities was destroyed when they were replaced by junta appointees. This contributed to the military’s flailing response to the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic: one of the reasons the response to the first and second waves was more effective was because local officials had the strong support of the public.
A plea for understanding
A ward administrator in Mayangone Township who was reappointed after the coup admitted that he could not work as effectively as he had under the NLD government. “Some people want to help me but are afraid of being criticised by others and accused of working for the military if they help us,” he said. “I am helping as much as I can. No matter what anyone says, I hope [residents] understand me.”
It is clear that despite the efforts of the regime, it has failed to secure complete control over local administration since it seized power. Many local administrators seem to be taking care not to create problems for residents of their communities out of fear for their lives. The situation means that many 100-household and 10-household community officials are having to assume the responsibilities of administrators. Meanwhile, the regime is having difficulty filling vacant administrative roles.
It is also having to provide extra security for some administrators, especially known military supporters.
A ward administrator in Mandalay’s Aung Myay Thar Zan Township who is known to enjoy good relations with the military told Frontier he is guarded at his office by 10 soldiers.
“We are doing good work, but no matter how good we are, there will always be those who want to attack us. So it is better to have security,” said the administrator, who served previous military regimes but resigned in 2016 when the NLD introduced elections for local officials. He was reappointed by the regime in mid-February.
On July 27, an official in a sub-ward under his administration was shot and injured by a man who visited his office on the pretence of needing a recommendation letter.
“I have not yet received any death threat, but I’m very worried about my security after the shooting on July 27,” said the administrator. “Anything can happen at any time.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Description:
"Dear Patriotic Karen National Leaders, Comrades, Karen Nationals and the People,
Today, August 12, 2021 is the 71st Anniversary of the Karen National Martyrs Day.
It is the Karen National Martyrs Day designated for commemoration of President Saw Ba
U Gyi and Karen national leaders, soldiers and the entire Karen people, who have
sacrificed their lives for freedom of the Karen people from subjugation and oppression.
For the Karen people, today is a day of sorrow, as well as a day to feel pride in the
knowledge that there are patriotic leaders, soldiers and the Karen people, who would
readily sacrifice their lives, limbs, time, money, comfort and material riches for attainment
of the Karen national aspirations and goals.
Dear Patriotic Karen National Leaders, Comrades, Karen Nationals and the People,
Everything has its price. The martyrs' sacrifices, the shedding of blood and
accepting the losses, and participation in the struggle for national cause have paid for the
cost for national freedom. On such an occasion, I feel proud of the Karen martyrs, who
stood up firmly for the national aspirations and political goals, in accordance with
conviction, until the end of their lives.
In the successive eras, our national leaders have striven, by various means, for the
fulfillment of our Karen national aspirations and political goals. Inevitably, they have had
to resort to armed resistance in the defense of the lives and homes of the Karen people.
At the same time, effort has been made to resolve the political problems by political
means. However, the seizing of power on February 1, 2021, has been a political setback,
causing terror, atrocities and killing of the people to spread to areas of large cities and
human centers. Terror, atrocities and killing of the people are ongoing without end, up to
this day. So long as there is no political will for dialogue to resolve the political problems,
it is impossible to place our hope on political dialogue. For that reason, we have to act in
defense of our land, and the lives, homes and properties of our people while keeping the
door open for the political dialogue. I would like to urge our own nationals to uphold and
act in accordance with the Four Principles of President Saw Ba U Gyi.
1
nationals, there are weaknesses among the leaders due to lack of political knowledge,
educational training, skills and funds. These problems have adversely impacted selfconfidence and trust among ourselves, in addition to our unity and cooperation. Whatever
it may be, for the Karen nationals, there are still our national leaders and patriotic soldiers,
and additionally there are our people, heroes who will toil on and sacrifice their lives,
sweat and blood until the end. At home, we have our national leaders, patriot soldiers and,
in addition to our people, there are those who have gone to live in various countries and
who are loyal to our nation and stand firmly for our conviction and national goals. There
are leaders, soldiers and the people, who are struggling and holding hands with us, in spite
of poverty and difficulties. The patriot leaders at home and abroad who are true to our
conviction and our national goals, the soldiers and all the masses are our genuine and
main strength, and they are the patriots, who will uphold the convictions and fulfil
successfully the goals of our national martyrs.
Dear Patriotic Karen National Leaders, Comrades, Karen Nationals and the People,
The Karen people are a nationality having their own history, culture, customs and
traditions. They have the right and duty to protect their history, culture, customs and
traditions, and resist every attempt to harm, impede or ruin them. They have to defend
their peace, properties and development, and overthrow any move to upset them. They
have the absolute right to defend the lives of our Karen nationals and regions. I would like
to urge our Karen nationals on their part to strive on until the end, with unity and
steadfastness, for achievement of the goals of our nation and the Karen martyrs..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karen National Union (KNU), Karen history, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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Local URL:
2021-08-12-KNU-president-Gen.Mutu-Sae-Poe's-Letter-sent-on-71st-Anniversary-of-Karen-National-Martyrs-Day-tu-en.pdf- 2021-08-12-KNU-president-Gen.Mutu-Sae-Poe's-Letter-sent-on-71st-Anniversary-of-Karen-National-Martyrs-Day-pio-bu.pdf
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Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဩဂုတ်လ (၁၂) ရက်နေ့တွင်ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၁ )နှစ်မြောက်
“ကရင့်အမျိုးသားအာဇာနည်နေ့သို့ ပေးပို့သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သဝဏ်လွှာ”
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဩဂုတ်လ (၁၂)ရက်
၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူမျိုးအသီးသီးတွင် မိမိလူမျိုးများအတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေး ရရှိရေးတို့သာမက ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုထူထောင်ရေးတို့အတွက် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်အနစ်နာခံကာ သက်စွန့်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများ အများအပြားရှိကြပါသည်။
၂။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားများ အဖိနှိပ်ခံဘဝမှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် အသက်ပေးလှူခဲ့ကြသော ဥက္ကဋ္ဌကြီး စောဘဦးကြီးနှင့်တကွ ကရင့်အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ စစ်သည်တော်များနှင့် ကရင်ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးကို အောက်မေ့ဂုဏ်ပြုရန် ဩဂုတ်လ (၁၂)နေ့ကို ကရင့်အမျိုးသားအာဇာနည်နေ့အဖြစ် ကျင်းပခဲ့ကြသည်မှာ (၇၁) နှစ် မြောက်ရှိခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကရင့်အမျိုးသားအာဇာနည်နေ့သည် ကရင်အမျိုးသားများအတွက် ဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲဖွယ်ရာ နေ့တစ်နေ့ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ မိမိတို့ယုံကြည်ချက်နှင့် ရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ရောက်ရှိရေးအတွက် အသက်ခန္ဓာများကို ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသော မျိုးချစ် ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ စစ်သည်တော်များနှင့် ကရင်ပြည်သူလူထုများရှိနေခြင်းကြောင့် ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ရသည့် နေ့တစ်နေ့ဖြစ်မည်ဟုယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
၃။ (၁၂-၈-၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင်ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၁) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင့်အမျိုးသားအာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ် ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့်ကျဆုံးလေပြီးသော ကရင်အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများကို သတိရအောက်မေ့ ကြောင်းနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်သမိုင်း၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှု၊ ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများရှိနေသော ကရင်လူမျိုးများ၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင် ဖြစ်သော ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်ရရှိရေး၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ပေါ်ထွန်းလာရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်များ အောင်မြင်ပါစေကြောင်း လေးနက်စွာဆန္ဒပြုလျက် သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Karen history, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
Sources say the hilly town of Mindat has only two weeks of food left.
Description:
"The military junta has cut all supply routes to a hilly town in western Myanmar’s Chin state, putting as many as 50,000 refugees from months of fighting under siege with only two weeks supply of food, sources in the embattled region told RFA.
Junta forces have blocked all entrances and exits to Mindat and shut down supply routes to neighboring regions in Chin state, a hotbed of resistance to the Feb. 1 military takeover, where fighting between troops loyal to the junta and local militias from March through May killed scores of regime soldiers and civilians.
“All the roads have been blocked…The authorities stop, arrest or interrogate all the young men entering the town, and confiscate their mobile phones. Nobody dares to enter,” a refugee in Mindat who requested anonymity for security reasons told RFA’s Myanmar Service.
The junta’s move to cut off access to Mindat came at a time when Mindat’s transportation situation was already complicated by heavy rains over the past month that had caused mudslides that had made some roads impassible, even by motorcycle.
“The landslides west and south of Mindat cut off the roads there… We will run out of food in two weeks,” a refugee the refugee told RFA’s Myanmar Service.
Mindat, with a population of 10,000-15,000 people, including its suburbs, is battling a COVID-19 outbreak, part of a third wave that has overrun the entire country.
“Many goods cannot be purchased here in Mindat anymore, or the prices are up exponentially. No one is selling what we need. The military council’s forces have blocked access roads to the Yaw region, where all our supplies come from,” the refugee said.
Refugees and others living outside of Mindat are too afraid to come into the town for grocery shopping, according to the refugee.
An additional 7,000 refugees have been displaced by fighting since fighting resumed July 21, according to the Chin Defense Force (CDF), a local militia group founded after the military ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government and seized power February 1.
The CDF is a network of volunteers that formed in April to protect the people of Chin and has enjoyed relative success facing the military—the second largest in Southeast Asia—with slingshots and the same crude flintlock “Tumee” rifles their forefathers used to fight off British colonizers in the 1880s. The CDF said it had killed some 100 junta troops between March and May.
The CDF keeps records of refugees displaced in the conflict, but estimated that in Mindat there are many more than it had the capacity to confirm.
“In the villages there are between 30,000 and 50,000 IDPs, but in our IDP camps, we have around 15,000 to 20,000 on record. This is for the first record taken at the end of May, but fighting resumed in early June,” the information officer of the Mindat CDF told RFA.
“Many IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] fled to nearby Htilin and Pakkoku townships and the Yaw region. Some have fled to the inner parts of Mindat township and the Matupi and Palatwa townships in Chin state. We don’t know the exact numbers of all IDPs, but we have been able to gather info on the IDPs in the vicinity of the fighting, numbering around 6,000 to 7,000,” the information officer said.
The junta has also prevented the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) from delivering aid that would have helped around 5,000 IDPs , but they were allowed to aid 60 households last month. The rest of the aid package, which included truckloads of food, medicines and necessities like tarps, had to be left at a local monastery.
They stockpiled all the aid… at the monastery and won’t allow it to be distributed to nearby areas like the UNHCR wants,” a resident of Mindat told RFA.
“The UNHCR cannot take it back, but they don’t want to leave it here because they don’t want the military forces to steal it. So they put it at the monastery with the caretaker,” said he resident, who declined to be named.
When asked to comment on having to leave the aid at the monastery, Reuben Wende, information officer of UNHCR office in Yangon, told RFA July 23 that authorities should cooperate with efforts to distribute aid in Chin state, but made no direct mention of the incident.
According to the United Nations and aid groups, conflict in Myanmar’s remote border regions has displaced an estimated 230,000 residents since the junta coup.
They join more than 500,000 refugees from decades of conflict between the military and ethnic armies who were already counted as IDPs at the end of 2020, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, a Norwegian NGO.
Troops loyal to Myanmar’s junta have killed more than 80 ethnic Chins in the country since the military took power during the Feb. 1 coup, including two infants and a 15-year-old rape victim, a Chin watchdog group said last month.
The military killed at least 51 ethnic Chin in Chin state, two in Kachin state, 23 in the Sagaing region, one in Mandalay, one in Yangon, and three in Magwe region, according to a statement issued by the Institute of Chin Affairs (ICA)
Amid nationwide turmoil, the military has stepped up offensives in remote parts of the country of 54 million that have led to fierce battles with several local militias..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Internal displacement/forced migration in Chin State, UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"The Spring Revolution Interfaith Network, was formed on 7th August 2021 by religious leaders and
civil society leaders from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, who are actively opposing and
fighting against the military dictatorship. The Spring Revolution Interfaith Network has the following
objectives:
1. To end the military dictatorship
2. To establish a federal democratic union that holds values of freedom, justice, and equality
by working together with different religious groups
3. To build a new society that guarantees the right to freedom of religion and practice, and
eliminates discrimination among people of different ethnicities and between different
religions
Our network hereby issues the following statement in honour of the 33rd Anniversary of the 8.8.88
Revolution.
1. We pay tribute to the martyrs and people of all religions and ethnicities who have sacrificed
their lives in various pro-democracy movements, including but not limited to, the Myanmar Spring
Revolution.
2. The military junta must follow continuous calls for the unconditional release of all the unjustly
detained political prisoners, including the President and the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
3. We do not recognize the military junta - who staged the coup to seize power from the elected
civilian government - as a legitimate government. We only recognize the National Unity
Government (NUG), which was formed under the Federal Charter, as a legitimate government.
4. We strongly urge the United Nations and the international community not to recognize and
work with the military junta, but to recognize and cooperate with the NUG which has received the
support of the majority of the people of Myanmar.
5. We strongly condemn the weaponization of the Covid-19 pandemic for political gains by the
military junta, and we call for the United Nations and the international community to intervene as
soon as possible to address this humanitarian crisis.
6. We will support and coordinate with other pro-democracy forces from different backgrounds
in order to establish a federal democratic union in accordance with our values and objectives..."
Source/publisher:
The Spring Revolution Interfaith Network
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Spring Revolution, Military History
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Description:
"Non-democratic regimes often – but not always – seek to institutionalize their
political domination and immunity through the enactment of a specifically
designed constitutional document (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Military
regimes, in particular, can use constitutional texts to strengthen the foundations of
the political intervention of the armed forces (Feit 1972; Finer 1975; Stepan
1988). Likewise, when military juntas ultimately set in motion a transition from
direct military rule to a civilian one, the armed forces are often tempted to control
the constitution-drafting process and secure key legal prerogatives for the military
institution under a new hybrid “post-junta” regime (Barros 2002, Croissant and
Kamerling 2013; Chambers 2014; Negretto 2014). Myanmar2
offers a case of a
dominant military institution using a constitutional drafting process and a new
supreme law for its own corporate interests. Indeed, the constitution adopted in
2008 confers high levels of policy prerogatives upon the Burmese armed forces –
or Tatmadaw – and embeds “praetorianism”3
in Myanmar’s polity in a way that
the country’s two previous post-independence constitutions had not. Since it won
its freedom from the British in 1948, Myanmar has produced three constitutions.
The first postcolonial constitutional text was adopted in 1947, but its provisions
were suspended after the coup d’état staged by General Ne Win in March 1962.
A second constitution drafted by Ne Win’s military administration was passed in
1974, but was abrogated in September 1988 following a further coup d’état
orchestrated by the Tatmadaw leadership. The third and latest constitutional document was promulgated in 2008 after a controversial drafting process that lasted
15 years. All three constitutional texts which Myanmar adopted in 1947, 1974,
and 2008 were quite different in content and spirit. They were framed in different
political contexts and under the supervision of different leaderships with divergent political agendas. Above all, they made very different references (if at all) to
the role of the Tatmadaw as a major state institution and potential policy-maker.
The texts adopted in 1947 and 1974 indeed aimed to neither entrench military
rule nor institutionalize the political intervention of the armed forces.
This chapter seeks to understand how and why the Tatmadaw has chosen to
formulate its own constitutional vision in the early 1990s and thereafter establish a legal political system, which I define as “constitutional praetorianism.”
Drawing on the extant literature on postcolonial Myanmar politics, this chapter
first provides a comparative overview of the first two postcolonial constitutions
of the country and examines why both documents bestowed a marginal role upon
the Burmese military. The study then focuses on the country’s third constitution,
which was adopted following a controversial referendum in 2008. It argues that
the constitutional text embeds and institutionalizes praetorianism. As the literature on civil–military relations demonstrates, there are different levels of political intervention by the armed forces: they range from direct military rule to
hybrid systems led by civilians, but in which the armed forces remain a powerful
lobby (Egreteau and Jagan 2013; Bünte 2014). Building on this scholarship as
well as on a series of interviews with Burmese parliamentarians and party
leaders carried out in both Yangon and Naypyitaw (2013–2014), this chapter
argues that the 2008 constitution serves three clear purposes for the Burmese
armed forces. First, it manifests the Tatmadaw’s view of itself as a legitimate
political and policy-making state actor following 60 years of regular and pervasive intrusion into Burmese postcolonial politics and public affairs.
Second, it provides the military with legal instruments for a long-term policy
intervention and influence. Third, it offers the armed forces and their personnel a
form of self-insurance protecting soldiers from any form of prosecution and
securing a much sought-after immunity for the leaders of the 1988 coup d’état.
As long as this unhealthy policy influence of the army institution prevails, constitutionalism will not emerge in Myanmar. A thorough revision of the 2008
constitution remains highly unlikely. Despite the formation of a joint parliamentary committee tasked specifically to propose potential amendments, the
first-ever attempt at reviewing the constitutional text was vetoed by the militaryappointed representatives in June 2015. Given the country’s historical and political legacies of military intervention, ethnic separatist insurgency, and political
instability, I conclude this chapter with the bleak prospects for swift constitutional reform unless the Tatmadaw decides otherwise.
Army and constitutions in Myanmar: a background
A civilian supremacy in the 1947 constitution
The 1947 constitution4
was designed to ensure a smooth – but quick – transfer of
power from British colonial rule to an independent and, above all, legitimate
Burmese civilian administration (Steinberg 2006: 199). Despite flaws, the constitution envisioned a federal state structure and a multi-party parliamentary system
with competitive and regular elections to be held once independence was granted
on January 4, 1948 (Inlow 1948; Maung Maung 1959). There were no nonmilitary functions assigned to the Burmese armed forces, nor any specific prerogative for the wider security forces enshrined in the document. The weakness
of the Burmese military forces in the last months of colonial rule may explain
this lack of involvement in constitutional drafting. Since the early 1940s, the
Soldiers, state, and constitutions in Myanmar 119
driving force behind the Burmese independence struggle had been the Burma
Independence (and, from 1943, National) Army (BIA/BNA) under the aegis of a
young military officer, Aung San. Yet, despite the glory inherited from several
years of anti-colonial and then anti-Japanese fighting, it was not the nascent Tatmadaw that was asked to frame the first charter of the country after the end of
the war in 1945. Rather, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) – a
loose coalition of political parties, charismatic politicians, and pre-war student
activists – took up the task. At that time, the Tatmadaw was a fragile body, illequipped to form a powerful policy lobby. It also had to face myriad rival private
armies and ethnic militias operating throughout the country (Callahan 2003:
115–116). Therefore, its senior officers, themselves bogged down in inter-ethnic
dissension, could not ensure a crucial role for the military in shaping the new
state structures.
A civilian committee of legal, political, and academic experts gathered in
1946 to draft a new constitution. A constituent assembly was elected in April
1947. It discussed several drafts prepared by the committee. The final one was
eventually adopted on September 24, 1947 – two months after Aung San’s assassination. Despite shortcomings and flaws, the constitutional text provided legitimacy to the newly created state, but interestingly not to the actors who
participated in the independence struggle – the Tatmadaw in particular. This
underscored some initial efforts by the AFPFL to keep the military out of politics. Aung San himself had relinquished his own military positions early on.
This was not without debate, though. As highlighted by Maung Maung (1959:
146–147), in one of the first constitutional drafts submitted to the Constituent
Assembly in June 1947, one article proposed the creation of a special “Defence
Council.” Through this non-elected body the President of the Union would have
exercised “the supreme command of the armed forces.” But the proposal was
dropped at Aung San’s own suggestion. Thus, in the final text, the Burmese
armed forces were not granted any special place: they had to remain subordinate
to the post-independence elected civilian authorities. Besides, to avoid the maintenance of competing private armies, the right to raise and maintain national
military forces was then vested exclusively in the elected Parliament seated in
Rangoon (Article 97 of the 1947 constitution).
The first post-independence constitutional framework lasted less than 15
years. During the 1950s, the raging civil war between Myanmar’s central government and myriad ethnic and communist insurgencies propelled a more cohesive Tatmadaw into broader non-military policy roles. Under the charismatic
leadership of General Ne Win, uncontested army chief from 1949, the Tatmadaw
soon transformed itself into a disciplined and unified corporate institution,
increasingly willing to discuss policy issues and civilian affairs (Callahan 2003).
Above all, it started to openly highlight its legitimate role as guardian of the
nation and its institutions against an array of centrifugal insurgencies, but also
external threats – a common trend observed among coup-prone armed forces in
the rapidly decolonizing world at that time. A mere decade after the country’s
independence, Maung Maung indeed noted: “the role of the [Defense] Services 120 R. Egreteau
as a guardian of the constitution and servant of the people has [now] been clearly
defined and deeply impressed on all officers and men by General Ne Win”
(Maung Maung 1959: 146).
The 1974 constitution: drafted by, but not for, the Tatmadaw
A first political intervention of the Tatmadaw was staged in September 1958.
General Ne Win then formed a caretaker military administration at the invitation
of U Nu, leader of the civilian government since February 1957. Sanctioned by
Parliament a month later, this caretaker government – a perfect example of a
short-lived praetorian intrusion into politics – lasted a year and a half. The
military hierarchy kept its initial promises to hold national elections, and then
withdrew to its barracks in April 1960 (Butwell 1961). However, a full-fledged
military coup was ultimately staged by Ne Win on March 2, 1962. Less than two
years after the caretaker administration was disbanded, the Tatmadaw clearly
stepped in – this time without any invitation from the civilian authorities. The
1947 constitution was not abrogated per se, but gradually all its fundamentals
were nullified. Unlike in 1958, Parliament was dissolved a day after the coup,
and the Supreme Court and the High Courts of the country were disbanded. A
socialist revolution was then imposed, one that could not be defined by a constitution, but rather by well-oiled propaganda and ad hoc legislation enacted by the
military rulers (Badgley 1962; Cady 1965). The 17-member Revolutionary
Council formed by Ne Win in March 1962 began to shape the new state institutions and ideology through the release of various official documents and policy
statements.5
These included the “Burmese Way to Socialism” (April 1962) and
the “The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment” (January 1963),
which both outlined the official ideology of the Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP). The core objective of this newly formed legitimate political party
was to mobilize and educate the Burmese population about the revolution and to
pave the way for a socialist democracy under the monitoring of the Revolutionary Council (BSPP 1963; Taylor 2009: 298–300). According to the original
Revolutionary Council’s statements this had to be fulfilled during a “transitional
period.” Once the socialist revolution was deemed secure, the civilianization of
the regime, installed in 1962, could be initiated, and the disbanding of the
Revolutionary Council prepared – but not before.
For that, conditions were deemed more favorable by Ne Win – then Chair of
the BSPP – in the late 1960s. An observer of the time, Jon A. Wiant, argued that
the BSPP could not long remain the sole instrument of the Tatmadaw or of its
core leadership gathered in the Revolutionary Council (Wiant 1973: 182). Progressively, the need for the institutionalization of a civilian power and the withdrawal of the armed forces from the front scene – and therefore a new
constitution – appeared obvious to the military top brass and to Ne Win himself.
During a BSPP party meeting in 1965, Ne Win made his first public speech
about the need for transition to civilian rule (Nakanishi 2013: 112). Therefore, a
constitution-making process which claimed to involve the Burmese people was Soldiers, state, and constitutions in Myanmar 121
gradually initiated. In 1969, Ne Win asked a panel of civilian experts to make
recommendations on new state institutions. For the first time since the 1962
coup, the regime openly hinted at a possible termination of the revolutionary
moment imposed by the army seven years before.
In September 1971, a 97-member committee convened. Its aim was to draft
the new constitutional text (Moscotti 1977: 7). The process, however, was still
heavily influenced by the military leadership. Indeed, one-third of the committee
comprised high-ranking officers. Fifteen subcommittees were formed but all
were headed by a member of the still active Revolutionary Council. Yet, the
latter was openly looking for a way to bestow some sort of legitimacy upon the
whole process. Ne Win, as well as the members of the 15 subcommittees, toured
the country for months between 1971 and 1973, coordinating thousands of meetings with representatives of the people, the peasantry, the workers, and the
armed forces in their barracks (Arumugam 1975: 41). The well-orchestrated
organization of mass meetings and public consultations aimed to enlist people’s
suggestions on each successive constitutional draft which had been prepared by
the committee. In fact, it was a ritualistic and theatrical exercise purported to
confer upon the document the necessary popular legitimacy that Ne Win was
seeking for the post-Revolutionary Council regime (Steinberg 2006: 183). Ne
Win and other army leaders had long considered the 1947 constitution to be the
product of a handful of elite lawyers, foreign legal experts, and Burmese politicians (Moscotti 1977: 4). By involving mass consultations of the people or at
least giving the impression that the Burmese population had been involved in the
constitutional process, Ne Win sought a broader legitimacy for the new state
institutions.
The fourth constitutional draft was eventually submitted to a national referendum in December 1973. It was claimed that over 90 percent of Burma’s eligible
voters approved the constitutional draft in a tightly controlled vote. The new
constitution6
was then promulgated on the twenty-sixth anniversary of the country’s independence, namely January 4, 1974. A month later national elections
were held, as the new constitutional text envisioned a (single-party) parliamentary system. Once the unicameral People’s Assembly (or Pyithu Hluttaw)
was convened, a few weeks after the elections the transfer of power from the
military-run Revolutionary Council to a civilian government dominated by the
sole BSPP became effective. Ne Win was elected president, and on March 4 he
nominated the new members of his Cabinet, all civilians.7
As long-time Burma
watcher Josef Silverstein then noted, Burma entered a new phase of “constitutional dictatorship” (Silverstein 1977: 35). The 1974 constitution indeed offered
the military-run Revolutionary Council and the armed forces a tool to withdraw
from the direct policy-making process by institutionalizing the authoritarian rule
of a single and trusted political party, the BSPP (Silverstein 1974). The text
allowed the concentration of power in the sole hands of party members and their
local representatives. Nonetheless, in the late 1970s, most of them happened to
be active Tatmadaw officers seconded to the party bureaucracy or retired military
officers (Nakanishi 2013: 108–109)..."
Source/publisher:
Politics and Constitutions in Southeast Asia
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Military History, Political History
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Sub-title:
Brave activists in Myanmar are still resisting the coup -- at great cost. An international campaign to ban arms sales and target gas sales could help.
Description:
"Six months after the Myanmar military’s February 1 coup, some things are now clear. Most apparent is that there is no limit on the violence and repression the military under the commander-in-chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, is willing to use to hold onto power and destroy its opponents.
This, of course, is nothing new for an institution that ran one of the world’s most brutal dictatorships for 50 years, that in 2017 committed what a United Nations-backed international fact-finding mission called genocide against the ethnic Rohingya, that carried out rampant war crimes for decades against other ethnic groups, and that has never taken responsibility for the corruption and poverty that makes Myanmar one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia.
When the junta arrested political leaders such as State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and members of parliament, it also effectively nullified the results of the November 2020 elections and implicitly acknowledged that its experiment with “managed democracy” had failed.
The military then resorted to what it knows best: the use of force.
Yet it appears to have misjudged the public response. People quickly poured onto the streets in a massive display of resistance that swiftly coalesced into what is called the “Civil Disobedience Movement.” Faced with the threat of people power, security forces have killed over 900 demonstrators and bystanders, including an estimated 75 children, and injured thousands more.
The junta has arbitrarily detained thousands of protesters, activists, journalists, lawyers, doctors and nurses. Many have been tortured, while all risk falling ill with COVID-19 in the country’s squalid and already overcrowded prisons.
The junta has shut down hospitals and targeted medical professionals, leading to a collapse of the health system as COVID-19 surges across the country. They have arrested journalists reporting on the crackdown, closed independent media, and effectively shut down the internet and phone service after almost daily images appeared showing soldiers and police firing into peaceful crowds.
What is also abundantly clear is that the Myanmar people have no plans to back down. As a friend told me from hiding:
“We have experienced dictatorships for 50 years, coups, annulling the 1990 election, massacres of student protesters, killing of Buddhist monks and nuns in the [2007] Saffron Revolution. Millions of people have marched in spite of soldiers who we know will shoot us. Civil servants have stopped working in protest. People have refused to have anything to do with the state. Many have stopped paying income and sales tax, utility bills, and fees since February 1. We are scared but we are not going to give in to these thugs and let them take away our future.”
Another thing that is very clear is that while some international organizations and governments have talked a good game, the response has gone from inadequate to dismal.
While some leaders have issued strong statements denouncing the coup and announced targeted sanctions against junta officials, they also have cynically decided to hide behind the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a club dominated by dictators whose chief principle is “non-interference in the internal affairs” of other members. True to form, when ASEAN held a special meeting on Myanmar in April it couldn’t even agree to call for the release of all political prisoners.
The main outcome was a plan to appoint a special envoy, but more than three months later none has been appointed. Knowing that there was no chance that ASEAN would come together to exert significant pressure on one of its own members, the U.S., U.K., E.U., Japan, and Australia nevertheless issued statements suggesting that ASEAN should take the lead in resolving the crisis. The reality is that ASEAN is serving as the perfect foil for the junta, trying to run the clock out in hopes the world loses interest or another crisis explodes elsewhere.
The world needs to end this diplomatic charade. While the U.K., the lead country on Myanmar issues at the UN Security Council, is concerned that China and Russia would use their veto, it should follow the lead of the General Assembly and circulate a binding resolution to ban arms sales. It should also call for the sanctioning of entities that provide the funds that keep the junta afloat. The U.K., U.S., France, and other Security Council members should make it clear that, if Beijing and Moscow do use their veto, they will submit the same resolution over and over again until they relent.
Until then, they should announce a coalition of states that will engage in “maximum, coordinated sanctions” that would block payments to the junta and state-owned enterprises from foreign-financed oil and gas projects, such as those operated by Thailand’s PTT, France’s Total, and the U.S. behemoth Chevron. Gas revenues are the military’s largest source of foreign currency income, adding up to an estimated $1 billion annually in duties, taxes, royalties, fees, tariffs, and other profits. This is the lifeblood of the junta, without which it cannot survive..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
The Writer Says That Asean Must Deliver Humanitarian Aid Directly To The People Of Myanmar Without Waiting For The Junta's Consent.
Description:
"Three months have passed since Asean agreed to a five-point consensus plan on how to respond to the crisis in Myanmar. During this time, the situation in Myanmar has drastically deteriorated.
Yet, the five-point plan remains little more than a piece of paper, with few signs to date of any steps towards implementation.
Meanwhile, the bodies are still, quite literally, piling up on the streets of Myanmar. Earlier this year, the police and soldiers massacred hundreds who joined peaceful protests against the military coup. These days, it is the junta's deadly weaponising of a third wave of the coronavirus that is filling up morgues and causing untold destruction.
The pandemic is wreaking havoc across the country. Acute oxygen shortages and a collapsed healthcare system mean that very few people are getting the treatment they need. The five-point consensus included an agreement that Asean would provide humanitarian assistance to Myanmar. That has still not materialised, even as the need for life-saving aid has become ever-more desperate.
This week, Brunei will host the 54th Asean Foreign Minister's Meeting. It is expected that the long-overdue appointment of the Asean special envoy to Myanmar - also agreed to as part of the five-point consensus - will be announced.
But the announcement of the special envoy, meant to lead regional efforts to end the crisis, will be irrelevant if there is still no clear idea of what Asean will do next.
What should happen next? The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, of which I am a founding member, has outlined a way forward. Supply lines must be opened across Myanmar's borders to allow life-saving assistance into the country. Asean plays a key political role in this, with Asean member states neighbouring Myanmar.
Asean must engage with local health and other service providers already on the ground. The National Unity Government has established a joint Covid-19 task force with Ethnic Health Organisations.
It is led by highly respected humanitarian leaders who have decades of experience getting emergency services to people fleeing from the Myanmar military. They know how to deliver assistance safely and securely, and Asean must support them.
There is no more time to waste. With every day that passes, Asean's complacency moves closer to complicity in the junta's brutal assault on the people of Myanmar.
The leader of the junta, General Min Aung Hlaing, stated last week that he is seeking the release of Covid-19 funds from Asean, making a mockery of regional efforts to combat the virus.
After launching his coup in February, he abandoned Myanmar's testing and vaccination programme and decimated the country's healthcare system, his soldiers are using hospitals as military bases and targeting medical professionals, forcing thousands into hiding.
In recent weeks, his forces have opened fire on crowds of people anxiously waiting to refill oxygen cylinders, and then seized what scarce supplies of oxygen there are left. They have looted and destroyed medical supplies, including personal protective equipment, and continued to abduct doctors and nurses who are working undercover to treat patients, all the while in fear for their own lives.
Asean member states would be fools to give Covid-19 relief money to the junta. As I stated in 2018 as chair of a United Nations (UN) fact-finding mission on Myanmar, General Min Aung Hlaing should be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The only way for humanitarian assistance to reach the Myanmar people is for it to be delivered directly to them. In 1948, the Berlin Airlift overcame a Soviet blockade to see food, water and medicine reach the people of besieged West Berlin. There are no excuses.
It is unacceptable for Asean to wait for the junta's consent to begin implementing any part of the five-point consensus. If the special envoy cannot be appointed, the Asean chair and secretary-general must take the lead.
At this week's ministerial meeting, Asean must finally start acting in the interest of the principles enshrined in the Asean Charter; respect for fundamental freedoms, promotion and protection of human rights and the promotion of social justice, as well as peace, security and stability in the region.
People in Myanmar are struggling to breathe. But in the struggle for relevancy, this could be Asean's last gasp.
The writer is a founding member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
South Asia Monitor
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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Description:
"ASEAN is expected to name its special envoy to Myanmar at the regional grouping’s ongoing foreign ministerial meeting this week. Originally scheduled for Monday, the announcement has been delayed after a last-minute objection from Myanmar torpedoed the group’s consensus choice. The Irrawaddy has interviewed various sources across ASEAN to find out what has been going on behind the scenes.
ASEAN Secretary General Dato Lim Jock Hoi and Bruneian Second Foreign Minister Erywan Yusof visited Naypyitaw on June 5-6 to discuss the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy and a group of advisers. (Brunei currently holds ASEAN’s rotating chair position.) A list of candidates drafted by the ASEAN members was presented for consideration. Of the candidates, two emerged as favorites for consideration: former Indonesian foreign minister Hasan Wirayuda and former Thai vice foreign minister Virasak Futrakul.
While the ASEAN chair remained tight-lipped, news reports surfaced in Singapore following the Naypyitaw trip that Myanmar preferred Virasak as the special envoy, given his experience and expertise. He served as Thai ambassador to Yangon in the mid-1990s. The news raised eyebrows in Jakarta, which was backing Hasan.
When the ASEAN foreign ministers discussed the Myanmar situation on the sidelines of the ASEAN-China special meeting in Chongqing, China on June 8, the junta’s foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, said Naypyitaw still backed Virasak as the envoy. However, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi continued to push for Hasan’s leadership. According to various ASEAN sources, Malaysia further muddied the waters by suddenly throwing the name of veteran Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail—a former special envoy to Myanmar—into the ring.
Also on the sidelines of the meeting, the earlier Thai idea that the ASEAN “special envoy” should not be a single individual but rather a group of diplomats working on different tasks was first officially put to Myanmar and formally discussed. Wunna Maung Lwin told the meeting that as a new proposal, it would need to be vetted by the military junta before a decision could be made. This further delayed the decision on the special envoy, as the ASEAN chair had to ponder once again who would be the most suitable candidate. In the end, there was no consensus on how to proceed.
The Chongqing meeting set the stage for a prolonged tussle—both between ASEAN and Naypyitaw and among ASEAN members—over the choice of envoy. Throughout the envoy saga, the ASEAN chair has been reluctant to preempt any ASEAN member’s judgement on the issue, despite its prerogative to do so, which is one of the reasons the selection process has dragged on.
Further complicating the process was the fact that in late June and early July, the ASEAN chair had to attend a few G7 and G20-related meetings, while also observing end-of-Ramadan rites.
On July 13, the ASEAN foreign ministers met again, on the sidelines of the ASEAN-US special ministerial meeting. The choice of ASEAN special envoy was once again discussed, this time without the participation of Myanmar. They now agreed that Erywan would take up the position as the ASEAN special envoy.
According to a highly placed source, Thailand decided at this meeting to withdraw Virasak’s name to make it easier for the ASEAN chair to act. With the consensus now solidifying around Erywan, Retno finally yielded and the Bruneian was suddenly put forward as a candidate to head an envoy team, with Hasan, Virasak and Razali serving as advisers. The three readily agreed to the proposal. Additionally, a senior diplomat from Cambodia, the upcoming ASEAN chair, would be included.
Two days before the ASEAN meeting this week, however, Myanmar junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing asserted his preference for Virasak, adding that ASEAN’s new proposal made it impossible to move ahead. This is an interesting development, to say the least, as Myanmar had known for some time that Erywan would be the head of ASEAN team. Myanmar now insists it will have to consider the proposal to make Erywan the head of the team.
At the meeting on Monday, Myanmar adopted a hardline attitude towards ASEAN, especially over the draft Joint Communique that was scheduled to be released on the day, only to be delayed. Some ASEAN members want a commitment from Myanmar to release all political prisoners including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as foreigners detained since the coup. In addition, there has been a strong appeal to include a sentence in the statement calling for swift and full implementation of ASEAN’s five-point consensus, reached in April, on solving the crisis in Myanmar.
After six months of engagement with the Myanmar junta, it is clear that the ASEAN chair wants to earn the trust of all stakeholders, and, accordingly, is proceeding with the appropriate caution needed to reach a decision. The sources expressed disappointment with Naypyitaw’s response to ASEAN’s effort to end the current stalemate. At one point, they said, the chair even threatened to add a paragraph disowning Naypyitaw.
The ASEAN foreign ministers expected Myanmar to quickly approve Erywan’s leadership and move forward with the implementation of its five-point consensus, especially the immediate deployment of an ASEAN team on the ground to help with the humanitarian crisis in the country, which is being worsened by the collapse of the health system amid a raging COVID-19 outbreak..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
If Myanmar becomes a failed state it will only be because the outside world failed to come to the country’s aid.
Description:
"Since the military coup in Myanmar in February of this year, fears have grown that the country is becoming a failed state, or even sliding into all-out anarchy. While the murderous junta has certainly tried its best to drive the country to the brink of ruin, the fact is that it has not been able to do so. Myanmar is not a failed state, but a failed coup – thanks to the resourceful and resilient people of the country.
Across Myanmar, an almost parallel state has emerged, comprised of a broad coalition of democratic forces. This network provides healthcare, safety, and other vital services in the vacuum left by the illegal junta over the past six months. With a deadly wave of COVID-19 ravaging the country, it is crucial that the international community works with the National Unity Government (NUG) and other actors who are trying to save lives.
The global attention on Myanmar since the coup has been welcome, including headlines highlighting how at least 936 people have been killed by the junta and many thousands detained arbitrarily. Myanmar is now faced with a spiraling third wave of COVID-19, which the junta has weaponized by hoarding medical supplies for itself and its cronies and denying treatment to those who do not support it.
This is where Myanmar’s brave pro-democracy movement has stepped in. This movement has blossomed from workers’ strikes, peaceful protests, and boycotts of military-owned businesses into de facto state organs serving the people where the Tatmadaw will not.
What has emerged is a decentralized web of local responders, ethnic service providers, civil society organizations, humanitarian actors and groups aligned with the NUG and Civil Disobedience Movement. This network, held together by the common thread of building a democratic, inclusive Myanmar, is fighting to ensure the provision of vital services and life-saving humanitarian aid for millions of people.
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Committed residents have formed their own local administrative committees, shutting out the junta and planting the seeds of a new democracy. These parallel civilian structures operate in many important ways: former government health workers have volunteered at mobile and underground clinics, at the risk of their lives, while ethnic administrations are enrolling new students in primary schools. They are also distributing aid to the displaced in Chin, Karenni, Kachin, Shan, and other states.
We should not underestimate the scale of the problems. Millions face food shortages and hundreds of thousands have fled the junta’s brutality, cut off from food, water and medical supplies in the mountains and jungles. Others have sought refuge across Myanmar’s borders. In this context, the third wave of COVID-19 is bringing the country to its knees.
However, despite the damage already done, it is wrong to assume that is only a matter of time before Myanmar joins the wretched list of failed states. If Myanmar becomes a failed state it will only be because the international community failed to come to its aid.
The international community has a significant role to play, not least in ensuring that Myanmar does not become a forgotten crisis. Last week the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, of which we are the founding members, called for an urgent humanitarian intervention, mandated by the United Nations Security Council, to support the desperate battle against COVID-19.
The international community must recognize the NUG as the legitimate representatives of the people of Myanmar and work with it to get medical supplies and health professionals to the areas most in need. The Tatmadaw has hoarded medical supplies, underreported case numbers, and even seized the oxygen that the sick and vulnerable need to breathe. Their impunity must end, and they must be held to account for decades of atrocities – and certainly not allowed to lead any COVID-19 response.
The world must support the democratic movement holding the country together. The NUG and ethnic health organizations have formed a COVID-19 Task Force, with which the international community must now engage. For decades, ethnic service providers, civil society groups, and humanitarian actors have used their own well-established systems in the border states to get life-saving humanitarian aid to people who need it. Food, water, cash, medical supplies, and COVID-19 vaccines must be directed through the COVID-19 Task Force to these networks.
The cooperation of neighboring States – Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and Thailand – will be essential to enable humanitarian supplies to cross their borders into Myanmar. That is the kind of international help that is needed, not the sale of more arms by Russia to the junta.
Another important moment will come in September, when the U.N.’s credentialing committee will decide on who will represent Myanmar at the body. The current ambassador to the U.N., Kyaw Moe Tun, has emerged as a powerful pro-democracy voice on the world stage since the coup. The U.N. must recognize the NUG as the legitimate representatives of the people of Myanmar before the U.N. General Assembly meets. Opting for a junta-appointed representative would be a betrayal to the people of Myanmar and legitimize military horror.
We strongly believe that when Myanmar’s history is written, it will be not of a failed state, but of a failed coup. The world must now do everything to make this a reality..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG), The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, COVID-19 (Coronavirus)
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Sub-title:
The leader of a Tatmadaw-controlled Border Guard Force in a remote region of Kachin State has emerged as a key player in the global rare earth trade, and has turned the territory under his de facto control into a mining hub at a high environmental cost.
Description:
"In mountainous areas of Kachin State bordering China’s Yunnan province, the land is rich in rare earth – elements that are used worldwide in everything from cellphones and laptops to precision-guided weapons.
Rare earth mining in Kachin has turned Myanmar into the world’s third-largest official exporter in just a few years.
Multiple sources told Frontier and Danwatch, a Danish investigative outlet that collaborated on this investigation, that the rare earth mined in Kachin is extracted illegally by Chinese or Chinese-backed companies in areas of Chipwi Township under the de facto control of an armed group and militia led by Kachin warlord Zahkung Ting Ying.
A former officer with the Kachin Independence Organization, Zahkung Ting Ying led a breakaway unit in 1968 that merged with the Communist Party of Burma. When the CPB dissolved in 1989, he established the New Democratic Army-Kachin, and in 2009 the NDA-K became the first ethnic armed group to transition into a Border Guard Force (BGF) under the Tatmadaw. Zahkung Ting Ying also heads a Tatmadaw-aligned militia in the same region, sources told Frontier.
“As a BGF, Zakhung Ting Ying and his former NDA-K are also part of the Tatmadaw chain of command, meaning it is technically a Tatmadaw unit engaged in this rampant illegal mining,” said Ms Clare Hammond, Myanmar researcher with London-based environmental watchdog Global Witness.
Outsourcing environmental costs
As early as 1987, the then leader of China, Mr Deng Xiaoping, predicted that rare earth elements would be crucial to the modern economy. “The Middle East has the oil, but China has the rare earths,” he said during a visit to a production site in Inner Mongolia, a Chinese province.
A group of 17 metals, rare earth elements are actually widely distributed over the earth’s surface but are often not concentrated enough to make extraction financially viable. Mining is also environmentally costly: wastewater and tailings ponds can leak acids, heavy metals and radioactive elements into soil and groundwater, while deforestation leads to erosion and destroys ecosystems.
China has long been the world’s dominant player in rare earth mining, accounting for 95 percent of all official extraction in 2010, according to the United States Geological Survey.
But rising demand for products containing rare earth elements – including in the permanent magnets used in wind turbine generators and electric car motors, as well as for use in the LED screens in our mobile phones and computers – has prompted efforts to diversify production. Rare earths’ utility in military technology, such as drones, has also boosted their global demand and strategic value, including for the US army.
At the same time, China has tightened export laws and introduced comprehensive environmental regulations that have curtailed its own official extraction, particularly since 2015.
Sources familiar with the industry told Frontier and Danwatch that China’s tightening regulations have pushed the extraction of rare earth elements – and particularly a subset known as heavy rare earths, which are in high demand for their use in high-tech weapons, among other products – across the border into Myanmar.
“China has either closed or suspended most of its extraction of heavy rare earths and replaced it with imports from Myanmar,” said David Merriman, a specialist in rare earth elements at the international consulting firm Roskill Information Services, which deals with supply chains of critical raw materials.
China’s official trade data shows that from 2014 to 2020 its imports of rare earth elements from Myanmar jumped from just 300 tonnes to 35,500, with the latter worth US$388 million. By 2019, Myanmar had surpassed Australia to become the world’s third-largest official producer of rare earth elements after China and the United States. Last year, 94 percent of rare earth elements officially imported by China came from Myanmar.
Hammond of Global Witness told Frontier that official trade data may only offer a glimpse into the scale of Kachin’s rare earth mining industry, given its “illegal nature” and because the Kachin State-China border is “highly porous”.
Zahkung Ting Ying appears to have seized the opportunity to make a profit from these trends, with sources telling Frontier that rare earth elements are extracted from territories under the control of his BGF and militia before being driven across the border for processing.
Due to the illegal nature of rare earth mining and its occurrence in territory controlled by Zahkung Ting Ying’s armed groups, it is difficult to track the companies or individuals which are actively engaged in the industry, but local activists and mine workers told Frontier that the bosses and senior workers on the sites are Chinese and that the companies are of Chinese origin. Similar patterns have emerged in other industries in Kachin State, including in the jade mines of Hpakant township and tissue-culture banana plantations across Waingmaw township, where Chinese-backed companies have partnered with Myanmar-registered companies or entered the state illegally in order to skirt regulations when conducting business.
Dr Hkalen Tu Hkawng, a Kachin activist and the minister for natural resources and environmental conservation in the parallel National Unity Government, said that local authorities under the Tatmadaw and armed actors like Zahkung Ting Ying’s BGF might also take taxes or bribes from Chinese businessmen in exchange for permission to mine rare earth – a practice that he said is also common among opium poppy farmers in areas of Waingmaw township under the control of Zahkung Ting Ying’s BGF. “The [former] NDA-K and Tatmadaw know what is happening where, and if they didn’t get anything from it, they wouldn’t stay quiet,” he said.
Cross-border collaboration
The history of rare earth mining in Kachin is murky. Several knowledgeable sources told Frontier that they believed some of the first rare earth mining in the state occurred in areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization in the years leading up to the collapse of a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw in 2011, but that mining has now mostly or entirely stopped in KIO-controlled areas.
KIO information department head Colonel Naw Bu told Frontier that the KIO is not officially engaged in rare earth mining, but has allowed exploration in an area of its eastern district known by the Kachin name of Mung Hkawng Pa, in the Mai Ja Yang region. Col Naw Bu said he was not authorised to answer further questions related to rare earth mining in KIO-controlled areas.
Google Earth satellite images show four clusters of pools in a mountainous area northwest of Mai Ja Yang town. The pools look identical to those in photographs given to Frontier by people who worked on rare earth mining sites in Chipwi Township, as well as photos and videos taken by several media who visited rare earth mining sites in Chipwi Township in 2019.
But the number of apparent rare earth mining sites in the Mai Ja Yang region pales in comparison to the mining in Zahkung Ting Ying’s BGF and militia-controlled territory.
Six knowledgeable people interviewed by Frontier said that nearly all rare earth mining in Kachin takes place in areas under control of Zahkung Ting Ying’s BGF and militia, particularly in the area around the border town of Pangwa, alternately spelled Pangwar or Panwar.
Several sources told Frontier that rare earth mining started picking up in this area around 2014 or 2015. Satellite images of the border area show around 100 sites in the region with the pools characteristic of rare earth mining.
The sources said that the mining was happening with impunity.
“Even though there are complaints from local people, rare earth mining is controlled by the BGF, which has weapons, power and money, so they don’t listen to local voices,” said an activist based in Myitkyina.
A representative from the Transparency and Accountability Network Kachin State (TANKS), a local civil society group, told Frontier that land seizures are among many problems which locals face as a result of rare earth mining.
“The [former] NDA-K and rare earth companies forcibly grab local people’s farmland and give compensation without any negotiation. If local people don’t accept, they won’t offer anymore; maybe they will offer less than before. Local villagers have no chance to complain,” said the source, who asked not to be named.
Impunity is nothing new in territory under control of Zahkung Ting Ying’s armed groups, local activists told Frontier. Although the NLD and civil society groups tried to monitor rare earth mining, enforcing the law was almost impossible, said the TANKS representative, whose organisation focuses on monitoring natural resource governance. Tatmadaw personnel would typically accompany assessment teams made up of NLD and civil society representatives on mining site visits, they said, and when the teams arrived, the mining would stop temporarily.
“When they went back to Myitkyina, [rare earth mining] resumed. The NLD government tried to regulate rare earth mining as much as they could … but the main implementers are armed groups, so it wasn’t possible … [The NLD] could only say, ‘stop illegal mining’, but it wasn’t really effective on the groups holding weapons.”
Frontier’s calls to Tatmadaw spokesperson Major-General Zaw Min Tun went unanswered.
Frontier was also unable to reach Zahkung Ting Ying for comment, and his son, politician and former NDA-K senior commander Zahkung Ying Sau, declined an interview request. An official from the New Democracy Party (Kachin), a political party led by Zahkung Ying Sau, who was elected to the state hluttaw in 2020, said the party was not involved in rare earth mining and refused to comment further.
A web of permits
Myanmar mining permit records show that dozens of exploration permits have been issued to mining companies in the stretch of Kachin State’s border with China under control of Zahkung Ting Ying’s armed groups.
Since 2014-15, Myanmar has published records for mining permits as part of its commitments under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which was developed to promote the open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources. The EITI Global Standard requires governments and companies in these sectors to disclose a range of information, including revenues, fees and licences.
Myanmar EITI records for 2016-17 show that of the 148 mining permits issued for Kachin State, more than half were in areas of Chipwi and Tsawlaw townships either within or close to territory controlled by Zahkung Ting Ying’s armed groups. None of the permits listed were for rare earth mining exploration or production, however. Most were issued on a “first come first served” basis for exploration of other materials, such as iron, tin, tungsten, marble, lead and zinc.
Many of the permits were issued to companies that do not appear to have ever been registered with Myanmar’s Directorate of Investment and Company Administration, the country’s repository of corporate records. In the Pangwa area of Chipwi township, where the BGF is headquartered, permits were issued to several firms without a DICA registration record, such as “Chain Yein Taung Mining”, which held 15 licences overall, and “Lan Chaw Pwan Development”, which had three permits.
DICA records also show that Zakhung Ting Ying and his son are directors of several registered companies that hold a large number of the permits. One such company, Myanmar Myo Ko Ko Medical Instrument Co Ltd, held 11 permits in total, all for iron production on a “first come first served” basis in the Pangwa area. Issued in 2016, the permits were due to expire in March 2021 and it is unclear whether they have been extended.
Zakhung Ting Ying is also a director together with Zahkung Ying Sau and two other sons, Zahkung Ying Ting and Zahkung Ying Chan, of San Lin International Import and Export Co Ltd, which has held several permits in the Pangwa area of Chipwi township. Myanmar Myo Ko Ko and San Lin companies also share directors with other permit holding firms, including Bawm Myang Co Ltd, and Sin Kyaing Co Ltd.
Myanmar EITI mining permit records for 2017-18, available through the OneMap portal, show that Bawm Myang, San Lin and Lan Chaw Pwan Development held permits around Pangwa that year.
However, the TANKS representative told Frontier in May of this year that Myanmar Myo Ko Ko was the only company officially involved in rare earth mining under the NLD. They said the company was granted a one-year mining exploration licence by the union-level Ministry of Mines in 2018. Radio Free Asia reported in 2019 that according to the Kachin State Ministry of Mines, Myanmar Myo Ko Ko had been licensed to explore five mining sites totaling 114 acres, while the Kachin State Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation at the time, Dashi La Seng, confirmed to RFA that most rare earth mining was happening illegally in the area.
Frontier tried calling Myanmar Myo Ko Ko, but of all the listed numbers, only one number worked and Frontier was told it was a wrong number.
‘Nothing can live there’
As rare earth mining has shifted from China across the border into Myanmar, the environmental consequences appear to have followed. According to Hammond of Global Witness, the “relatively weak rule of law” in the area means that rare earth mining often doesn’t meet even “basic environmental standards.”
Frontier’s interviews, along with other media reports, have revealed concerns about contaminated soil and water sources as well as erosion, which local activists and mine workers told Frontier was causing landslides as well as sediment build-up in the Chipwi River. They also said that little heed was paid to worker safety.
Seng Awng, the pseudonym for a 30-year-old Kachin from a village near Myitkyina, began working for a mining company whose name he does not know in September 2019. Sut Hting, the pseudonym for a 60-year-old Kachin who lives in a displaced person camp in Myitkyina township, also worked for a company whose name he did not know from December 2017 to May 2018.
The two workers said they knew little about the chemicals used in the mining process. Seng Awng described the powders he worked with as similar to salt, while Sut Hting said that the chemical liquids and powders were stored in containers with lettering in Chinese. “Most local workers don’t understand what’s written on those containers, and no one comes to explain,” he said.
Sut Hting avoided work which involved handling chemicals, even though it paid better, because workers said the chemicals harmed their health. “Most workers didn’t want those jobs. They just did it for one or two months,” he said. “They said those chemical liquids and powders harmed their health. Some workers even got sick. The company didn’t provide proper safety equipment.”
Seng Awng, who was among workers who handled chemicals, said he wore gloves but the few times he touched the powder or liquid, he felt a slight burning sensation.
He said workers avoided using local water sources for drinking or bathing and that forests in the area had been destroyed. “There’s nothing left there, not even trees. They cut the trees and burn them. In the working area, there is not a single animal,” he said.
‘Mining can happen more freely than before’
Those interviewed by Frontier and Danwatch believed that rare earth mining had picked up speed since the February 1 military coup.
“Since the coup we’ve seen an increase in rare earth mining in Kachin State and we expect the lawless environment to be conducive to the business interests of militia groups more broadly,” said Hammond of Global Witness. “Illegal activity thrives in anarchic conditions, and the post-coup chaos has created a perfect opportunity for bad actors to take advantage by pillaging Myanmar’s natural resources.”
Hkalen Tu Hkawng of the National Unity Government also forecast rare earth mining to increase. “When the public and activists don’t have the freedom to advocate for the rule of law and law enforcement, and when their ability to monitor becomes weak, rare earth mining can happen more freely than before,” he said.
As the buyer of rare earth from Myanmar, China has a significant amount of leverage to tackle the rampant illegal mining of rare earths in Kachin State – if it chooses to do so.
In January, China introduced draft policies for regulating the rare earth industry chain, which include prohibiting the purchase and sale of products extracted illegally and establishing a tracking system for rare earth.Hammond called on China to do more to stop the illicit cross-border rare earth industry, pointing out that it provided no benefit to communities, who only see the destruction of their land. “Rare earth mining in Kachin is benefitting militia leaders who answer to Myanmar’s military, and who provide support to the military in exchange for being allowed to pursue illicit business interests,” she said. “Cutting off sources of funding to these groups will in turn put pressure on the military.” – Additional reporting by Jaw Tu Hkawng
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-03
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"Fears are growing in Myanmar that the country is facing another decades-long dictatorship, as coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has taken on the role of prime minister in his newly formed...
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"Fears are growing in Myanmar that the country is facing another decades-long dictatorship, as coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has taken on the role of prime minister in his newly formed caretaker government, following in the footsteps of former dictator Ne Win, who ruled the country for 26 years.
Min Aung Hlaing’s self-appointment to the position and the formation of the new government were announced on Sunday as the Southeast Asian country marked sixth months under military rule imposed by his State Administration Council (SAC). On the same day, he said elections would be held by 2023.
Since the military seized power from the democratically elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in February, Myanmar has been in turmoil economically, socially and politically. The regime has been struggling to rule the country in the face of popular protest and civil armed resistance. Currently, highly contagious new variants of the coronavirus are battering the country.
The caretaker government is nothing new to Myanmar. In 1958 when the then ruling Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) was divided by faction and intrigue, then Prime Minister U Nu handed state power to then military chief General Ne Win after securing a promise from the general that an election would be held in six months. Ne Win agreed and formed a caretaker government, in which he was the prime minister.
However, the election was not held until 1960. Ne Win handed power back to U Nu’s party after its victory at the polls. Two years later, however, the general seized power back through a coup, claiming that the Union of Burma (Myanmar’s former name) was in danger of disintegration under the U Nu government.
After the takeover in 1962, Ne Win held power for 26 years as the supreme leader of the country. He turned what had been Southeast Asia’s most prosperous nation into a poor socialist state, isolating the country from the outside world and pushing it into the ranks of the poorest nations, with Burma earning the UN’s Least Developed Country (LCD) designation in 1987. Ne Win’s dictatorship was toppled by a nationwide popular uprising in 1988, but the protests were brutally cracked down on by the army, paving the way for another period of direct military rule until early 2011.
Given this historical context, the regime’s announcement on Sunday of the caretaker government and its promise to hold elections in two years were met with skepticism.
“The military is back in absolute power for the long haul,” said Bertil Lintner, a Swedish journalist who has been covering Asia for decades.
He said if anyone had any doubts about Min Aung Hlaing’s intentions when he ousted the democratically elected government in Feb. 1, it should now be clear to all that the military grabbed absolute power in order to crush any attempts to establish genuine civilian rule, which was the aim of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s ousted National League for Democracy government.
A Yangon-based political analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue said the regime appeared set on holding power for as long as it can. He said that by forming the caretaker government the junta was merely playing another card in its game of misleading the international community into believing that it is not a regime, but rather a government that is holding power temporarily.
“They won’t give it back and it will be really bad for the country,” he said.
Min Aung Hlaing earlier promised he would hand over power to whichever party won the next election. On Sunday, he said the polls would be held in 2023 after the state of emergency period was over.
Last week, the regime officially annulled the 2020 election results, which saw the NLD win a landslide victory, claiming the NLD violated the constitution and election laws. The regime has also been working on disbanding the NLD over the alleged violations.
Given the existing situation, it’s doubtful the NLD will survive to see the election Min Aung Hlaing has promised.
Myanmar’s recent history also shows that the generals rarely keep their promises and are not reliable when it comes to polls.
When the NLD won the general election in 1990, the then military regime didn’t honor the results. They organized an election in 2010 that saw its proxy party win but the polls were internationally dismissed as a sham.
For the 2023 election—if it happens—one possible scenario is that a regime-backed party will have the upper hand with the demise of the NLD.
Lintner said it’s “criminally naïve” to believe that the military will hand over power to a democratically elected, civilian government.
Echoing Lintner, the Yangon-based analyst said parties backed by the regime will contest the vote, with one of them eventually forming a government.
“The regime will make sure that one of them will win,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-02
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Military History, The Military's political role
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The Chinland Defence Force says it is waiting for the signal from the National Unity Government to join a full-scale war against the junta
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"Anti-junta resistance forces in Chin State say they are expecting intense clashes in the conflict-hit township of Mindat after their fighters killed a Tatmadaw battalion commander last week.
A spokesperson for the Chinland Defence Force (CDF) said the commander, a lieutenant colonel, died during a clash along the Mindat-Matupi highway early on Friday morning.
Military-controlled newspaper The Mirror announced on Saturday that lieutenant colonel Zaw Zaw Soe, 48, died at around 6.15am while on duty, though it did not give details of where or how he died.
Zaw Zaw Soe was among 10 junta soldiers killed in Friday’s battle, according to the CDF. Since that clash, the situation in Mindat has become more tense, the group’s spokesperson said.
“The military has been sending reinforcements. I think they’ve already sent around three columns of their troops,” he told Myanmar Now. “After the battle… around 80 reinforcement troops arrived from Matupi. It looks like the battle will become more serious.”
Fighting along the mountainous highway started on July 21 when the junta’s forces launched an attack, according to the Mindat People’s Administration Team.
Twenty six junta troops and 15 CDF fighters have died in the two weeks since then, the CDF spokesperson said. There are also unconfirmed reports that civilians have been forced to flee their homes.
On July 24, the CDF said it seized control of a police station in the remote town of M’kuiimnu without firing a shot after six police and soldiers surrendered and agreed to join the resistance.
Mindat has become a stronghold of armed resistance to the junta since civilians took up arms there in April, using traditional hunting rifles and later seizing more advanced weapons from the military.
During the latest clashes, the Chin National Front, an armed group that was largely inactive before the coup, has fought alongside the CDF, as have chapters of the People’s Defence Force from different areas of Chin State, the CDF spokesperson said.
The CDF says it plans to continue attacks even as it waits for the underground National Unity Government (NUG) to give the signal for full-scale nationwide attacks against junta forces, the spokesperson said.
“Right now, we’re planning to continue the battles as we prepare for the upcoming war. There’s no way to stop the battles if they’re going to keep trespassing on the areas we are operating in,” he said.
The NUG's defence minister Yee Mon told RFA last month that about 8,000 PDF fighters will finish combat training by the end of July. He urged resistance fighters across the country to wait for its signal to launch a coordinated offensive.
“During this preparation period, I urge our revolution comrades to prepare for their own individual safety, health and morale,” Yee Mon told the broadcaster.
Last month a spokesperson for the eastern Yangon chapter of the PDF, which has been coordinating closely with the NUG, told Myanmar Now that an “all-out” conflict was on its way.
“I promise we will arrive at your door very soon,” he said. “We are currently engaging in guerrilla warfare, but please know that it won’t be long before we begin an all-out battle.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-02
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Chin history, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political
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Six months after seizing power, Min Aung Hlaing extends coup with promise of elections in 2023
Description:
"Myanmar’s military leader has declared himself prime minister and said he will lead the country under the nation’s state of emergency until elections are held in two years’ time – vastly extending the timeline given when the military deposed Aung San Suu Kyi six months ago.
“We must create conditions to hold a free and fair multiparty general election,” Gen Min Aung Hlaing said on Sunday during a recorded televised address. “We have to make preparations. I pledge to hold the multiparty general election without fail.”
He said the state of emergency would achieve its objectives by August 2023. In a separate announcement, the military government named itself “the caretaker government” and Min Aung Hlaing the prime minister.
The general’s announcement would place Myanmar in the military’s grip for nearly two-and-a-half years, instead of the initial one year the junta announced days after the coup.
The state of emergency was declared when troops moved against the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February, a move the generals said was permitted under the military-authored 2008 constitution. The military claimed her landslide victory in last year’s national elections was achieved through massive voter fraud but offered no credible evidence.
The military government officially annulled the election results last Tuesday and appointed a new election commission to take charge of the polls.
The military takeover was met with massive public protests, resulting in a deadly crackdown by security forces who routinely fire live ammunition into crowds. As of Sunday, at least 939 people had been killed by the authorities since 1 February, according to a tally kept by the independent Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Casualties are also rising among the military and police as armed resistance grows in urban and rural areas.
Moves by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to broker a dialogue between the military government and its opponents have stalled after an agreement at an April summit in Jakarta to appoint a special envoy for Myanmar.
Min Aung Hlaing said that among the three nominees, Thailand’s former deputy foreign minister Virasakdi Futrakul was selected as the envoy. “But for various reasons, new proposals were released and we could not keep moving onwards,” he said. “I would like to say that Myanmar is ready to work on Asean cooperation within the Asean framework, including the dialogue with the Asean special envoy in Myanmar,” he said.
Asean foreign ministers were expected to discuss Myanmar in virtual meetings this week hosted by Brunei, the current chair of the 10-nation bloc.
Myanmar is also struggling with its worst Covid-19 outbreak, which has overwhelmed its already crippled healthcare system. Limitations on oxygen sales have led to widespread allegations that the military is directing supplies to government supporters and military-run hospitals.
At the same time, medical workers have been targeted by authorities after spearheading a civil disobedience movement that urged professionals and civil servants not to cooperate with the government.
Min Aung Hlaing blamed the public’s mistrust in the military’s efforts to control the outbreak on “fake news and misinformation via social networks” and accused those behind it of using Covid-19 “as a tool of bioterrorism”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
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Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Description:
"Myanmar's military ruler Min Aung Hlaing has taken on a new title as prime minister of a newly formed caretaker government, state media reported on Sunday, six months after the army seized power from a civilian government.
Min Aung Hlaing has chaired the military-backed State Administration Council (SAC) that has run Myanmar since it was formed just after the Feb. 1 coup, and the caretaker government will replace it.
“In order to perform the country’s duties fast, easily and effectively , the state administration council has been reformed as caretaker government of Myanmar,” a newsreader on state Myawaddy television said..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2021-08-01
[field_licence]
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Military History
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"Renowned Myanmar architect U Bo Gyi, who designed the mausoleum for Daw Khin Kyi, the wife of independence hero General Aung San and the mother of detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, passed away of old age at 89 in Yangon on July 27.
U Bo Gyi was pressured by the previous military regime to resign as a civil servant for designing the mausoleum. He joined the monkhood some 19 years ago and died as a monk.
As an assistant of Oswald Negla, a lecturer in architecture at Yangon University (then Rangoon University), he was involved in the construction of the university’s Recreation Center while still an architecture student at the university in 1959. He later won first prize in Myanmar’s first architectural competition, a contest to design the clinic of the Burmah Oil Company (BOC) in Yangon’s Thanlyin.
He was one of the founders of the Architects Incorporated Firm (AI), which became a leading architecture company in Myanmar. The AI was not just a thriving business, but a place for artists, sculptors, writers, musicians and entertainers to rendezvous and debate modern art, until military dictator General Ne Win seized power in 1962.
All businesses were nationalized at that time, and the AI was not spared. U Bo Gyi found himself an employee of the junta’s Housing and Public Works Ministry.
When Myanmar’s first female ambassador, Daw Khin Kyi, passed away in December 1988, U Bo Gyi was approached by Myo Myint Nyein from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and his brother Sonny Nyein about designing the mausoleum for Daw Khin Kyi.
The NLD had initially planned to assign the project to seasoned architect and party member U Kyaw Min, who designed the mausoleum of Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing, a poet laureate and the father of nationalist movements in Myanmar. But U Kyaw Min, a US-educated architect who was U Bo Gyi’s teacher at university, was on a trip at the time.
U Bo Gyi was asked to design the mausoleum for Daw Khin Kyi with the approval of her daughter Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and another member of the NLD leadership, U Kyi Maung.
Daw Khin Kyi used to sit on a chair under the portico of the family residence facing Inya Lake in Yangon, counting prayer beads and babysitting her two grandsons, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told U Bo Gyi, asking him to model the mausoleum after the portico.
The Housing Department planned to punish U Bo Gyi for his involvement in the project, but he was spared after Daw Aung San Suu Kyi intervened and made a phone call to Major General Myo Nyunt, the head of the Myanmar military’s Yangon Command.
The mausoleum was open roofed with a portico. Two curved walls shield the tomb, signifying a pair of hands covering the light Daw Khin Kyi shed on the country, and the sacrifices she made as a wife and mother.
U Bo Gyi designed and personally built the mausoleum for Daw Khin Kyi, which stands alongside those of Queen Supayalat, the chief consort of Myanmar’s last monarch King Thibaw; Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing; and United Nations Secretary-General U Thant.
One year after he volunteered his services for the mausoleum project, circumstances forced him to retire from the job he had done for the previous 26 years, just three years before he was eligible for a pension. But he could no longer cope with the pressures of the workplace, as the regime always tried to find fault with him.
In their books, NLD leaders Hanthawaddy U Win Tin, Thura U Tin Oo and U Win Htein failed to credit U Bo Gyi as the architect of Daw Khin Kyi’s mausoleum. People mistakenly credited U Kyaw Min, because U Bo Gyi worked at U Kyaw Myin’s office on Sule Pagoda Road at the time of the project and put the name of his former teacher before his own on his design sheets.
After resigning as a government employee, he worked for a number of private architecture companies. He joined the monkhood in 2003, taking the monastic name U Pandita.
“I am most satisfied with Daw Khin Kyi’s mausoleum, of all the architectural projects done in my life. The mausoleum was built by the Garrison Engineers of Myanmar [the engineers of the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military],” the monk said.
U Bo Gyi also designed Independence Monument in Yangon, the City Hall and Square in Pyin Oo Lwin, the People’s Department Store in Yangon’s Pansodan (now Ruby Mart), and many government-run factories, public hospitals and private buildings..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Society and Culture, Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Pro-military Facebook accounts are seeking to drive a wedge between ethnic armed groups and civilian resistance with disinformation, but are struggling to break the unity of the anti-coup opposition.
Description:
"As pro-democracy activists embrace armed revolution to remove the Myanmar military from power, alliances with ethnic armed groups have emerged as key to any potential long-term success. Groups like the Kachin Independence Army, Karenni Army and Karen National Liberation Army have sheltered dissidents, trained would-be revolutionaries, and even fought alongside civilian militias against the junta.
Reflecting the importance of these partnerships, pro-military social media users have responded by spreading disinformation in an apparent attempt to cause rifts between the groups or discourage other prospective trainees from entering ethnic-controlled territory. Many Facebook posts viewed by Frontier have accused ethnic armed organisations of killing or in some way mistreating civilian trainees. The posts provide no evidence to support the allegations, and both People’s Defence Forces trained by armed groups and the armed groups themselves have denied the incidents.
A wave of disinformation
The posts began proliferating around the same time in late June, suggesting a coordinated campaign.
On June 28, a Facebook user who claims to be a doctor in Mandalay posted that members of the overthrown National League for Democracy had asked the military to help rescue “Gen Z” members – a term many use to refer to protesters and members of newly formed armed resistance groups regardless of their actual age – who were trying to flee from training camps in KIA territory.
According to Tu Hkawng, an ethnic Kachin member of the parallel National Unity Government, this post was later also shared by a pro-military social media influencer named Shwe Yupar Oo. Screenshots posted by Tu Hkawng show that Shwe Yupar Oo’s post received over 5,200 reactions.
Frontier was unable to independently verify these posts, as the Shwe Yupar Oo account has since been deleted. But a new account under the same name was created in early July and encouraged followers to join a Telegram channel, where the person controlling the account continues to post disinformation, including claims of KIA members killing PDF trainees.
On June 27, a video of soldiers in the woods beating civilians to death began circulating online. Pro-military users claimed it showed members of the Karen National Defence Organisation killing PDF trainees.
The KNDO, which is part of the Karen National Union, has been accused of massacring construction workers in late May and early June; it did not deny the killings, but claimed they were Tatmadaw soldiers disguised as construction workers. The KNU is investigating the incident.
This video was also shared by the Shwe Yupar Oo account, according to Tu Hkawng’s Facebook post. Frontier could not verify the authenticity of the video, or the identity of either the perpetrators or victims.
Also on June 27, a user named Kwee Kyaw posted that the KNDO killed three civilian fighters and the KIA killed 15. The post received over 1,100 reactions and was later copied and pasted by other pro-military users, like Hnin Maung, who has nearly 5,000 followers and often shares content from the ultra-nationalist Myanmar National Post.
Another post, by a pro-military user with more than 10,000 followers, claimed on June 29 that there was “video evidence” that Gen Z members are being killed by the KNU and KIA, but did not link to any video.
“They worshiped NUG and CRPH as gods. They danced when the media promoted them. Now that they are being brutally killed in the jungle, what do you see NUG saying?” he wrote, questioning why the media and the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners did not report these deaths. This post received over 1,400 reactions and was shared more than 500 times.
These claims have also been shared in a closed pro-military group called National Force, which has over 31,000 members. On June 30, a member named Kal Gyin repeated the unsubstantiated claims of ethnic armed groups killing trainees.
While state media has not yet adopted these narratives, it urges youth who have gone to ethnic-controlled areas to return home. The notice, which is posted in Global New Light of Myanmar nearly every day, notes that some people have fled to ethnic rebel territory due to “incitements and intimidation” by the NLD and its “extremist followers”. It says these youths “face no security guarantee” and “wish to return to their native lands”.
‘A unity that has never been achieved before’
A spokesperson for the Mandalay PDF said that no civilian trainees had been killed or mistreated by ethnic armed groups, and accused the military and its supporters of trying to cause a “blood feud” between the two sides.
“The young people and the EAOs have a unity that has never been achieved before,” he said, explaining that the time spent with ethnic armed groups has led them to “understand each other more and more, overcoming difficulties together, regardless of age or religion”.
He dismissed the disinformation campaign as toothless. “The Mandalay PDF and EAOs laugh at their conspiracy theories,” he said, adding that he doesn’t think it will deter trainees from heading to ethnic territory in the future.
While the PDF fighter might not fear disinformation, those behind the disinformation campaign may be seeking to capitalise on a series of dark events that followed the 1988 uprising, when hundreds of young people fled to ethnic territory to fight the military regime. Calling themselves the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, that civilian armed group also received training from and fought alongside both the KNU and KIA.
The group was marred by ignominy when leaders of its Kachin branch, apparently fearing they had been infiltrated by Military Intelligence, detained 106 of their own members. Many were tortured and at least 35 executed on suspicion that they were government spies.
But resistance fighters claim this time is different.
A man who works as a recruiter for civilian defence forces also denied that any trainees have been killed, tried to flee, or been influenced by the disinformation. “There are no consequences. The young people who went to the armed areas have already reached an understanding with their parents,” he said. The man has helped send new recruits to train with ethnic armed groups after which they have served in the Chinland Defence Force, the Mandalay PDF and the Tanintharyi PDF.
“No one fled from the KIA or KNU. However, there are some who had to return due to ill health,” he added.
KNU spokesman Padoh Saw Taw Nee likewise dismissed the rumours, saying the “terrorist military council” is trying to “mislead and undermine trust among those who are fighting the common enemy of the military dictatorship”.
Taw Nee appeared to be more concerned by the threat of divisive disinformation than the PDF member, though, repeatedly saying “we have to be careful”. His caution stems from experiences under previous military dictatorships.
“Not so long ago, in 1994 and 1995, General Khin Nyunt and others, who were so dirty and filthy, incited religious divisions” among the Karen people, he said, referring to the former junta’s spymaster. Taw Nee was referring to an old schism within the armed group, when Buddhist fighters split from the predominantly Christian-led KNU and formed the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army in late 1994. The DKBA subsequently fought alongside the Tatmadaw and helped capture the KNU’s headquarters.
Taw Nee said the disinformation campaign reflects the junta’s fear of an alliance between PDFs and armed groups, which is why they are “working full time to create problems between us and our friends who came to seek refuge”.
The Mandalay PDF member refused to say where he trained or with which ethnic armed group, but given the geographic proximity and other reports, the Mandalay PDF is likely supported by the KIA.
He said he trained for two-and-a-half months in rebel territory before returning to Mandalay.
“We received a full basic military training course as well as small arms and light weapons,” he said. “I had to study urban guerilla warfare with specific courses. In addition, we learned about jungle battles.”
While life in the training camps was rough, he remembered it fondly.
“We were tired there, but it was fun. Every day we eat tofu. For two and a half months, we ate only eggplant curry. We were very happy with that curry,” he said. At the end of a training course, the instructors rewarded their trainees with a roast pig.
“The training period was tiring, but for all of us, the memories were lovely. There are so many things to miss. We used bamboo sticks to drink water. We built our own tent. We dug a bomb shelter. We dug our own toilet … Our instructors trained us to keep our guns ready. Even if we went to the toilet, we would not leave without a gun. If we left the gun, we had to do some jumping for punishment when the teacher found it.”
He called the instructors “very lovable”, saying they were like “a brother” to him. Trainees even cried when some instructors were deployed or reassigned to another camp, he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Ethnic conflict has dominated the political landscape of Burma (Myanmar) since
independence from Great Britain in 1948. In the process, countless lives have been lost,
many communities dislocated from their homes, and a country that was deemed to have
the brightest future of any of its Asian neighbors at independence has stagnated to
become one of the world’s poorest. In such state failures, tragedy is interwoven with
irony. Burma, indeed, is the land where the anthropologist Edmund Leach carried out his
ground-breaking studies into patterns of cultural inter-change among peoples. In essence,
Leach concluded that ethnic and political identities are neither innate nor inflexible, but
develop on the basis of understandings and cultural exchanges between different societies.
Since this time, ethnic field research in Burma has come to a virtual halt. The world of
Asian studies thus owes a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Josef Silverstein. Since the
1950s, his writings on ethnic questions have stood out as a persistent – and often lone –
beacon of concerned but independent analysis. At the beginning of the 21st century, his
works are as pertinent as when he first began. Not only has he crystallized complex issues
in understandable form, but he has done this in a language that has become common
currency in many international understandings of the country and its challenges.
A particular issue in Burmese politics over the past 60 years has been the lack of common
forums or platforms where different parties and nationalities might equally work together.
As Prof. Silverstein has described, underpinning these failures is the ‘dilemma of national
unity’.1 Important ethnic questions date back to the pre-colonial past. But, in general, the
modern roots of many problems can be found in the political divisions of Burma, under a
diarchic system, between ‘Ministerial Burma’ and the ethnic minority ‘Frontier Areas
Administration’ during British rule. Inter-communal relations were then exacerbated by
conflict during the Second World War, and the challenge of national unity has remained
evident in all political eras since Burma’s independence in 1948..."
Source/publisher:
The Burma Studies Group, Association of Asian Studies Conference (Washington D.C.)
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Various groups, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Several Groups
Language:
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pdf
Size:
39.22 KB (10 pages)
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Description:
"June 29th 2020 marks 25 years since the New Mon State Party
(NMSP) agreed a ceasefire with the then State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) military government in Burma
(as the country was officially called until 1989). The essays
collected here reflect on the experiences of Mon communities
and the NMSP, before and after the ceasefire.
The NMSP and the (ex-Communist Party of Burma) United
Wa State Army are among the few “ceasefire groups” of
the 1990s which still have ceasefires. Other ethnic armed
organisations (EAOs) were either forced in 2010 to become
Myanmar Army-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGFs: e.g.
most units of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) or Peoples
Militias (pyithusit: e.g. the Pa-O National Organisation), or
ceasefires broke down amid recrimination and return to largescale state violence against ethnic nationality communities (e.g.
the Kachin Independence Organisation, whose 1994 ceasefire
broke down after 17 years, in 2011). In contrast, other groups
like the Karen National Union (KNU) continued the armed
struggle for self-determination through the 1990s and 2000s,
before agreeing a ceasefire with the U Thein Sein government
in 2012.
The NMSP ceasefire effectively broke down in 2010 under
military government pressure to become a BGF. However,
despite considerable tensions at the time, fighting did not
break out again. The NMSP resisted pressure to transform into
a BGF, and eventually confirmed a new bilateral ceasefire with
the government in February 2012. Both the KNU (in 2015) and
NMSP (in 2018) signed the multilateral Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA).
Unfortunately, the NCA has largely failed. The hoped-for
“Political Dialogue” has stalled, with the Myanmar government
and armed forces (Tatmadaw) unwilling to allow necessary
sub-national (ethnic community) consultations, or to accept
EAO demands for meaningful federalism. Security elements of
the NCA (the Joint Monitoring Committee) have been largely
dysfunctional and/or dominated by the Tatmadaw. While key
EAOs (including the NMSP) continue to deliver governance
administration and services (e.g. health and education)
in their areas of control and authority, the peace process has yet to provide a credible vehicle for delivering “Interim
Arrangements”, despite these being mandated by the NCA
(Chapter 6, Article 25).
The four essays collected here discuss different aspects of the
NMSP’s long struggle for Mon self-determination in the context
of the 1995 ceasefire. Martin Smith and Ashley South are
writers and analysts, who have studied Mon history and society
since before the ceasefire. Martin offers a historical-cultural and
political account of the Mon armed struggle, which frames the
essays to follow. Ashley presents an assessment of the NMSP’s
achievements and challenges since the ceasefire.
Nai Kasauh Mon and Nai Banya Hongsar are civil society activists
and authors. Nai Kasauh Mon provides a critical analysis of the
ceasefire years, highlighting both successes and failures. And
Nai Banya Hongsar discusses the challenges that the NMSP and
Mon movement continue to face in a country still entrapped
within a cycle of conflict and ceasefire..."
Source/publisher:
Covenant Institute via Myanmar Information Management Unit
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Mon New State Party (MNSP), Various groups, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Statistics, profiles, general information etc. on Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
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Size:
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Description:
"Two senior detained members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) have been moved from Insein Prison to Yangon General Hospital, according to their lawyers.
NLD legal adviser U Kyaw Ho was taken to hospital on Wednesday with difficulty breathing. He tested negative for coronavirus and is likely to be tested again next week, said U Kyaw Ho’s lawyer.
“He had heart surgery and needed hospital treatment and is still on oxygen support as he is out of breath,” said his lawyer.
U Kyaw Ho has been detained since early February by Myanmar’s regime.
U Han Thar Myint, another NLD central executive committee member, was infected with coronavirus in Insein Prison and taken to hospital last week.
“His oxygen level keeps falling. His oxygen saturation drops to 80 once oxygen is disconnected. He needs oxygen support at all times. His condition is poor,” said U Han Thar Myint’s lawyer.
The military regime has detained senior NLD leaders, including older members. While most of them are on medication for health problems, they were denied bail and forced to remain in crowded prisons as the country is gripped by a fresh wave of COVID-19.
NLD’s CEC member and State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s long-time personal lawyer U Nyan Win died of COVID-19 on Tuesday, while detained. The 79-year-old was arrested on the morning of the Feb.1 coup and held in Insein Prison, where he caught coronavirus.
NLD government’s Yangon Region chief minister U Phyo Min Thein and his wife have also been reportedly been infected with coronavirus while being detained at a military interrogation center in Mingaladon Township, Yangon. He was taken to a military hospital after he lost consciousness on July 17.
There were also reports that the NLD’s Yangon region minister U Naing Ngan Lin and Dr. Htar Htar Lin, who pushed for Myanmar to receive COVID-19 vaccines under the NLD government, have also caught the virus in Insein Prison. The Correctional Department has denied the two were infected.
While COVID-19 deaths are increasing across the country, many political prisoners are sick and displaying COVID-19 and flu symptoms, said lawyers and recently released inmates.
On Friday morning, inmates staged a protest inside Insein Prison, complaining about overcrowding, COVID-19 infections and a lack of proper protection and treatment of the virus.
Inmates at Shwe Bo Prison in Sagaing Region and Obo Prison in Mandalay Region have also protested, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
The Australian, Canadian, European Union, French, German, US and nine other embassies issued a joint statement urging the junta to respect the basic right to proper healthcare for all prisoners.
The shadow National Unity Government (NUG) formed to rival the military regime accused the junta of using COVID-19 as a weapon to persecute political prisoners. The military regime will be held responsible for COVID-19 deaths in prisons, warned the NUG.
The military regime, however, is keeping political prisoners locked up and has released numerous criminals jailed for drug dealing, theft and illegal logging..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
COVID-19 (Coronavirus), Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"(၇၄)နှစ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် သဝဏ်လွှာ
======================
ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၉ ရက် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်။
--------------------------------------------
၁။ ယနေ့အခါသမယသည် လက်နက်အားကိုးပြီး မိုက်ရူးရဲဆန်သည့် လူတစ်စု၏ အမြော်အမြင် ကင်းမဲ့စွာ လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့မှုကြောင့် အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီး ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းအပါအဝင် မြန်မာ့လွတ်လပ်ရေး အတွက် အသက်စွန့်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ ဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲဖွယ်ရာ ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရ သည့် ၇၄ နှစ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့ အခါသမယဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ တိုင်းပြည်အသီးအသီး လူမျိုးအသီးသီးတွင် မိမိနိုင်ငံ မိမိလူမျိုးအတွက် မိမိ၏ အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို မငဲ့ကွက်ဘဲ ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့် အနစ်နာခံကာ စွန့်လွှတ်စွန့်စား ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကြသည့် အာဇာနည်ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ထူး ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်မြတ် များ အသီးသီးရှိကြပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်လည်း သမိုင်းကြောင်းတစ်လျှောက် နိုင်ငံနှင့် လူမျိုးအတွက် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်အနစ်နာခံကာ သက်စွန့်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ယင်းသို့သော အာဇာနည်ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ထူး ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်မြတ်များစွာ ရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ လွတ်လပ်ရေးရရှိပြီး နောက်ပိုင်းတွင်လည်း ၁၉၆၂ ခုနှစ်မှ စတင်ကာ စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအောက်သို့ ကျရောက်ခဲ့ရပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ မတရားဖိနှိပ် အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကို နှစ်ပေါင်း ၆၀ နီးပါး ခါးစည်းခံခဲ့ရပါသည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအပေါင်း တို့သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင် တို့၏ တရားမဲ့ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကို နည်းလမ်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံရင်ဆိုင် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ခဲ့ကြပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင် တော်လှန်ရေး ခရီးတစ်လျောက်တွင်လည်း သက်စွန့်ကြိုးပမ်း ထမ်းဆောင်ရင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ကြရသည့် အာဇာနည် သူရဲကောင်းများ များစွာရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။
၄။ ယခုအချိန်တွင်လည်း အာဏာလောဘရမ္မက်ကြီးလွန်းလှပြီး အမြော်အမြင် နည်းပါးသောစစ် အာဏာရှင် တစ်စုက ပြည်သူလူထုရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ပြီး အပ်နှင်းထားသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုး ကာ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရထံမှ မတရားရယူသိမ်းပိုက်လျက် မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို ဥပဒေမဲ့ နိုင့်ထက်စီးနင်းဖိနှိပ် အုပ်ချုပ်လျက်ရှိသည်ကို မခံမရပ်နိုင်ကြသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံးမှ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများသည် မိမိတို့ ကျရာနယ်ပယ်ကဏ္ဍအသီးသီးမှ ရရာနည်းဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို ခုခံဆန့်ကျင်တွန်းလှန် နေကြပါသည်။
၅။ ယင်းသို့ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုးအကျိုးအတွက် မိမိတို့၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်ကို မငဲ့ကွက်ဘဲ ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်အနစ်နာခံကာ သက်စွန့်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်း အပေါင်းတို့အား ယခုကဲ့သို့သော၇၄ နှစ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် အခါသမယတွင် ဦးညွှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြု အလေးပြုလျက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အမြစ်ဖျက်ချေမှုန်းကာ ငြိမ်းချမ်း သာယာဝပြောသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး အမြန်ဆုံး ပေါ်ထွန်းလာစေရေးအတွက် မိမိတို့ကိုယ်စွမ်းဉာဏ်စွမ်းရှိသရွေ့ မဆုတ်မနစ်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွား ပါမည်ဟု လေးနက်ခိုင်မာစွာကတိသစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော္မတီ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
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Size:
410.81 KB
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Sub-title:
A new drafting committee for a “hate speech” “law” that includes much broader political “crimes” is another sign of the military’s intention to restrict freedom of expression in the long term.
Description:
"According to information received, on 21 May 2021 the military established a new drafting committee with a mandate to change an old draft “hate speech” bill first developed by the USDP government and then re-written by the NLD. The military’s internal notification includes a deeply concerning order that the scope of a new “law” should include not only religious and ethnic “hate speech”, but also political and social “hate speech”.
“Hate speech” is best defined as an expression of discriminatory hate towards people. “Hate speech” laws, where they conform to democratic standards, are intended to protect the safety and social equality of marginalised groups with “protected characteristics”, including for example, women, ethnic minorities, members of religious groups, or the disabled. “Hate speech” is best addressed through educational and social programmes promoting values of tolerance, with criminal laws only used against severe hate speech such as incitement or targeted threats.
There is no such thing as political “hate speech”. Political expression is an expression of a political opinion, often against a political opposition, and is a fundamental democratic act. Sometimes political expression can be heated or even offensive to the political interests involved, but it is about changing politics and the decisions that control people’s lives. In a democracy, leaders must accept that they are going to be criticised, sometimes unduly, and those who try to prevent political expression should be regarded as dictators.
Including political “hate speech” within the scope of the law is clearly intended to criminalise opposition to the coup.
Both the USDP and NLD governments developed a series of drafts of a “hate speech” law, which many have been demanding in order to address discrimination. Each of those drafts was seriously flawed, focusing mainly on punitive punishments rather than promoting tolerance and inclusion. Although political “hate speech” was not included in previous drafts, FEM and other organisations raised serious concerns that those drafts did include vague definitions which meant that if adopted the law could be misused to censor political expression. The NLD also issued an internal directive on “hate speech” which was also seriously flawed.
Since the coup began, the military has already undermined the rule of law, created new crimes to restrict the right to freedom of expression, and violently punished opposition voices. Given that the military is already detaining people arbitrarily, and already has a wide range of undemocratic laws to punish their opposition with, the adoption of yet another “law” may indicate a much longer term intention to embed censorship.
This statement does not include recommendations that would indirectly legitimise any unlawful authority. Nevertheless, all stakeholders should act where possible to raise awareness of and address the military’s further attacks on freedom of expression..."
Source/publisher:
Free Expression Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် - ၇ / ၂၀၂၁
နေ့စွဲ - ၇ / ၇ / ၂၀၂၁
ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၇ ရက်နေ့သည် ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်မှ ဦးဆောင်၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ပြတ်သားစွာ ဆန့်ကျင်ဖွင့်ချ တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သော ၅၉ နှစ်မြောက် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဆဲဗင်း ဂျူလိုင် (၇၊ ၇၊ ၁၉၆၂) အရေးတော်ပုံကြီးသည် ဗမာပြည်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ပထမဦးဆုံး စတင်တိုက်ပွဲဆင်ခဲ့သည့် အရေးတော်ပုံ ဖြစ်သည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် စစ်အုပ်စုမှ တိုင်းပြည်အာဏာကို အဓမ္မနည်းဖြင့် တကျော့ပြန် ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် သိမ်းပိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ စီးပွားရေး၊ လူမှုရေး၊ ပညာရေး များသည် ယခင်ကထက် နိမ့်ကျခဲ့ရပြီး ဒီမိုကရေစီ အခွင့်အရေးများလည်း ဆိတ်သုဉ်းခဲ့ရသည်။ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်နှင့် လက်ပါးစေများမှ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်၍ နေ့စဉ် ထိပါး စော်ကား သတ်ဖြတ်နေသည်။
စစ်အစိုးရ၊ စစ်အုပ်စု၊ စစ်ဗျူရိုကရေစီယန္တရား (စစ်သုံးစစ်) ကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်း သုတ်သင်ရန်မှာ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ဖိနှိပ်ခံလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ အဓိက တာဝန်တရပ်ဖြစ်သည်။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ သွေးများဖြင့် စွန်းပေနေသော ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်ကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းပြီး လူထုအာဏာတည်ဆောက်ရမည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် စစ်သုံးစစ်ကို အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူလူထု တရပ်လုံးက ထိရောက်မှန်ကန်သည့် နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် အုံကြွဆန့်ကျင် တော်လှန်ကြပါရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်က တိုက်တွန်းနှိုးဆော်အပ်ပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်သည်လည်း အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးနှင့်အတူ စစ်သုံးစစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်သည်အထိ ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
ဆဲဗင်းဂျူလိုင်စိတ်ဓာတ် ကိုင်စွဲတိုက်ပွဲဝင်ကြ
စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ရရာနည်းနဲ့ အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းကြ
ဗဟိုအမှုဆောင်အဖွဲ့
ဗမာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်..."
Source/publisher:
All Burma Federation of Student Unions
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Education rights: reports of violations in Burma, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
185.85 KB
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Description:
"အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် နှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်အပေါင်းအပါ အားလုံးကို သျှမ်းပြည်ဖယ်ဒရယ်တပ်ဦး(SSLP/SSFF)က စစ်ကြေညာ..."
Source/publisher:
Shan State Front for Federal
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Shan (cultural, historical, political) articles, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
607.21 KB
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Description:
"Burma is a country of great ethnic diversity, in which over one hundred different
languages and dialects have been identified (Smith, 1991b). The country is wedged
between Thailand and Laos to the East, India and Bangladesh to the West, and Tibet and
China to the North. The central plains of the Irrawaddy Delta are ringed by mountains
that are home to a variety of ethnic peoples. Ethnic statistics in Burma are generally
unavailable, and contentious when they are, since there has been no attempt to take a
count of the population since the British census in 1931 (Smith, 1991a). The 1974
Constitution identifies seven divisions and seven ethnic states – Chin, Kachin, Karen,
Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan. There are several other large
minority groups in the country as well, such as the Lahu, the Nagas, the Pa-O and the
Wa, and there are many Chinese, Tamils, Bengalis and others of Indian origin living in
the country.
Burma was annexed by Britain in three stages between 1824 and 1886, and was
governed at first as a province of India. The British divided its administration in Burma
into two divisions – Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas, in which the ethnic
nationalities were given autonomy to govern themselves. The British also used a divideand-conquer strategy by employing ethnic minority men to help control the Burmans,
who were agitating for independence in central Burma. During World War II, the
Burmans fought with the Japanese against the Allies while the hill peoples such as the
Karens and Kachins stayed loyal to the British. The British exacerbated existing tensions
between the various groups by using ethnic minority soldiers to police the Burmans, who were pushing for independence.
After independence in 1948, Burma experienced only a few years of civilian rule
before General Ne Win took over in a coup that brought the military into power in 1962.
While there has been reshuffling of personnel over the years, the military has remained in
power. In December 1987, Burma was accorded Least Developed Country (LDC) status
at the UN, which recognized that after years of economic decline, Burma was one of the
world’s ten poorest nations. This was so embarrassing that the government in power at
the time, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), waited for four months to
announce this news to its own people (Smith, 1991a). And so, while Ne Win instituted
his plan for the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” the country languished in isolation. As
conditions throughout the country worsened for the central regime, territories were
designated as white, brown or black areas, corresponding with the degree of control the
government had over that area. White areas were entirely under the government’s
control, brown areas were partially government-controlled, and black areas were under
the control of ethnic nationalist groups. Visitors to Burma were generally restricted to all
but the white areas.
Scholarly work in Burma has also been severely restricted by the country’s
isolationist policies, and there are few works that examine the development of media and
communications technology use since Burma’s independence. The few descriptions that
do exist make clear that historically, Burma was a highly literate country with “proud
educational traditions” (Smith, 1991a, p. 17). Western-style newspapers were introduced
into the country during the colonial period, and a host of locally-produced magazines and newspapers appeared soon afterwards (Smith, 1991a). This diversity of outlets continued
after independence in 1948, and the Burmese press during the 1950s was recognized as
among the freest in Asia, with more than 30 daily newspapers in several languages and
representing a wide variety of political viewpoints (Hollstein, 1961; Smith, 1991a).
While many of these papers were sympathetic to particular political parties, they
remained relatively free of government control, and there was no serious attempt at
censorship or harassment of journalists or writers (Allott, 1993; Smith, 1991a; Smith,
1999c)..."
Source/publisher:
Academia.edu (San Francisco)
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
279.24 KB (66 pages)
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Description:
"''မှတ်တမ်းတင်ကျေးဇူးတင်လွှာ''
======================
ချစ်ခင်လေးစားရပါသော NUG Support Team မှ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး မိတ်ဆွေများနှင့် မြန်မာ့ဖက်ဒရယ်
ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးအတွက် အားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုဖွား ညီအစ်ကို၊ မောင်နှမများခင်ဗျား...
မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်တွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် လုံးဝချုပ်ငြိမ်း ပျောက်ကွယ်စေရေးအတွက် အရေးပါသော လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို အခွန်မဆောင်ရေးနှင့် NUG ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရ၏ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင် တာများ ပိုမိုထိရောက်အောင်မြင်စေရန် "ငါတို့ အစိုးရ ငါတို့ အခွန်ဆောင်ကြစို့" ကြွေးကြော်သံနှင့်အတူ စည်းရုံးလှုံ့ဆော်ရေးတွင် တဘက်တလမ်းမှ အင်းတိုက်အားတိုက် ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက် အားဖြည့်ပေးနေကြသော NUG Support Team မှ တစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်ချင်းစီအား ကျေးဇူးအထူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွှတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာ ရေးနှင့်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့်လည်း NUG Support Team ၏ စည်းရုံးရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ၊ ရှေ့ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်မည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ် လိုအပ်ချက်များနှင့် အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် လိုအပ်သည်များကို ပံ့ပိုးကူညီသွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
NUG Support Team အနေဖြင့်လည်း "ငါတို့ အစိုးရ ငါတို့ အခွန်ဆောင်ကြစို့" လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်၏ အရေးပါမှုနှင့် အကျိုးကျေးဇူး ရလဒ်များကို အခွန်ထမ်းပြည်သူများထံသို့ တိကျရှင်းလင်းစွာ သတင်းစကားပါးရင်း ထိရောက်စွာ စည်းရုံးလှုံ့ ဆော်နိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
66.22 KB
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Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
www.nugmyanmar.org
၇ ဇူလိုင် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်
(၅၉) နှစ်မြောက် ဆဲဗင်း ဇူလိုင် အခမ်းအနားများသို့ ပေးပို့သော သဝဏ်လွှာ
၁။ ယနေ့ ဇူလိုင်လ ၇ ရက်နေ့သည် ဗမာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများအဖွဲ့ချုပ် အပါအဝင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို တပ်ဦးမှ တော်လှန်ခဲ့သော ကျောင်းသားလူငယ် သူရဲကောင်းတို့၏ ၇.၇.၁၉၆၂ တွင် သွေးမြေခခဲ့ရသည့် အောက်မေ့ဖွယ်အထိမ်းအမှတ်၊ (၅၉) နှစ်မြောက် အခါသမယ ဖြစ်သည်။ အမှန်တရားနှင့် တရားမျှတ လွတ်လပ်ခြင်းအတွက် ထိုကဲ့သို့ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ဘဝနှင့်အသက်ကိုပေးဆပ်ကာ လက်ဆင့်ကမ်း တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ် တော်လှန်ရေးရဲဘော်အပေါင်းအား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက လေးစားစွာ ဦးညွှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတစ်ဝန်းရှိ အနယ်နယ်အရပ်ရပ်မှ တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံပါဝင်သော လူငယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသည့် ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများသည် ကိုလိုနီစနစ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ရာတွင် ရှေ့တန်းမှ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ မြန်မာ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ထောင်ရာတွင် အဓိကအခန်းကဏ္ဍက ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည့် ခေါင်းဆောင် များစွာကိုလည်း မွေးထုတ်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ယင်းကဲ့သို့ သမိုင်းအဆက်ဆက် မတရားမှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ရာတွင် အစဉ်အလာရှိခဲ့သည့်အတိုင်း ၁၉၆၂ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ ၂ ရက်နေ့၌ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်နေဝင်းဦးဆောင်သည့် တော်လှန်ရေးကောင်စီက အာဏာသိမ်းပြီး ၂ ရက်အကြာ မတ်လ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများက ကန့်ကွက် ကြောင်း ပူးတွဲကြေညာချက် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည်။ အမှန်တရားနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုဘက်မှ ခိုင်မာစွာ ရပ်တည်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များကို စစ်အာဏာရှင် တော်လှန်ရေးကောင်စီက ဇူလိုင် ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် ရက်စက်စွာ သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ရာ အပြစ်မဲ့သည့် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ် ရာနှင့်ချီ၍ ကျဆုံးခဲ့သည်။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ကျောင်းသား နိုင်ငံရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုများ၏ အထိမ်းအမှတ်သင်္ကေတဖြစ်သည့် သမဂ္ဂအဆောက်အဦကိုပါ ဗုံးခွဲဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့သည်။
၃။ အလားတူ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင်လည်း ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက အဓမ္မသိမ်းယူခဲ့ပြန်သည်။ ထိုအာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို ရက်ပိုင်းအတွင်း ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များက စတင်ကာ နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝန်းရှိ ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးက ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန့်ကျင်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၁၉၆၂ ခုနှစ် မှ ယခု ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်တိုင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်သည် ထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာသော လက်နက်မဲ့၊ အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူများကို စစ်အင်အားသုံးကာ ရက်စက်စွာ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူပေါင်း သိန်းဂဏန်းချီ၍ ဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်း၊ သန်းနှင့်ချီသော တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများ၏ ဘဝပေါင်းများစွာကို အတိဒုက္ခရောက်စေခြင်း၊ လူငယ်များ၏ မျှော်လင့်ချက်များနှင့် အနာဂတ်များကို စနစ်တကျဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းတို့ကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၄။ ထိုသို့ စစ်အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်၏ နှစ်ပေါင်း ၆၀၊ မျိုးဆက် ၃ ခု ကြာမျှ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်အနိုင်ကျင့်ကာ ဘဝနှင့် အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များကို ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသော်လည်း အတိတ်သမိုင်းမှ ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များ၏ အမှန်တရားကို ချစ်မြတ်နိုးသည့်စိတ်ဓါတ်၊ မတရားမှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန် ရဲသည့် သတ္တိတို့သည် ယနေ့တိုင် ဆက်လက်ရှင်သန်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုလက်ရှိ စစ်အာဏာရှင် ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုများကိုလည်း လက်ဆင့်ကမ်း ဆက်လက်စေ့ဆော်ပေးလျက်ရှိသည်။ လူငယ်များ၏ တရားမျှတသော၊ တန်းတူညီမျှသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု စိတ်ကူးအိပ်မက်အား ကျောင်းသားလူငယ် အားလုံး၏ သမဂ္ဂစိတ်ဓါတ်၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏အင်အား၊ တိုင်းရင်းသား လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံမှ ခေါင်းဆောင်အားလုံး၏ အတွေ့အကြုံနှင့် ပေါင်းစပ်ကာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်သွားနိုင်မည်ဟု မုချယုံကြည်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Military History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
576.75 KB
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Sub-title:
The role of transnational activism in promoting political reform
Description:
"Introduction: On a remote stretch of the Salween River, between the proposed Dar Gwin and
Wei Gyi hydropower dam sites and where it forms the border between Thailand
and Myanmar (Burma), 1 sits the Ei Tu Hta camp for ethnic Karen internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Karen National Union (KNU) controlled Myanmar.
The family of Hsiplopo, the leader of this camp, live three hours walk away but
he is unable to visit them because the tatmadaw, the Myanmar military with
which the KNU has been engaged in the world's longest running civil war, have
camps that are only two hours walk away. The camp is also built on steep hillsides, denuding the forest cover in the limited area available, and is unable to
grow its own rice, relying instead on regular donations from the UN and other
NGOs shipped upriver by longtail boat. 2 This type of human and environmental
insecurity colours the daily existence of both the Karen people in this camp and
many other ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Nevertheless, despite these conditions, Hsiplopo's commitment to a campaign against the proposed nearby
dams is resolute: 'We don't want dams ... the military cannot build the dams
because the KNU will not let them while the people do not want them.' 3
This stance reflects the opposition to the dams of many environmental activists and groups who inhabit the nebulous and dangerous borderlands regions of
eastern Myanmar. It also represents a form of activated citizenship although the
concept of citizenship for ethnic minorities in Myanmar is itself problematic as
their relationship to the Myanmar state is often little more than one of oppression
and conflict. Despite the civil conflict in these areas, and perhaps because of it,
these activists often operate beyond the remit of the tatmadaw undertaking perilous work with the KNU to promote human and environmental security for ethnic
minorities. As an activist from the Karen Environmental and Social Action
Network (KESAN) explains: 'KESAN's programs are in the KNU area [in
Myanmar] so we have a close relationship with the KNU leaders. '
4 It can be
difficult for environmental activists in the North, for whom this precarious existence is entirely foreign, to fully comprehend the existential struggle that
dictates much environmental activism in the South, particularly under authoritarian regimes such as that of Myanmar, which has been dominated by the military since 1962. As a result, many Northern environment movements, and the
American environment movement in particular, have been historically apolitical
with the issues of 'human health, shelter, and food security' traditionally absent
from their agendas (Doyle 2005, 26).
This lack of political analysis on the issues of central importance to survival
in the South and the movements they spawn is also reflected within many academic writings on environmental politics. Despite an increased focus on the
environment in the last two decades, most approaches to environmental politics
still examine predominantly ecological issues or regulatory regimes and focus
particularly on the affluent states of the North (Howes 2005; Kutting 2000;
Paehlke and Torgerson 2005). Although there has been increased attention on
environmental movements in recent years, much of the material also focuses primarily on movements within the North (Carter 2007; Doherty 2002; Doyle 2000;
Dryzek et al. 2003; Gottlieb 2005; Hutton and Connors 1999; Rootes 2007;
Sandler and Pezzullo 2007; Shabecoff 1993). There has been some analysis of
environn1ent movements in the South (Doherty 2006; Doherty and Doyle 2006;
Doyle 2005; Duffy 2006; Dwivedi 1997, 2001 ), and various studies of transnational activism more generally ( della P01ta et al. 2006; Eschle and Maiguashca
2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reitan 2007; Routledge et al. 2006; Rupert 2000),
but only limited studies on how authoritarianism in the South specifically
impacts on enviromnental activism (Doyle and Simpson 2006) or policy (Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007). There are numerous studies that examine civil
society under authoritarianism more broadly but these tend to focus on more traditional and formalised civil society organisations (Jamal 2007; Liverani 2008;
Sater 2007). This chapter adds to this literature by delving more deeply into
enviromnental politics under the military in Myanmar and examines the transnational campaigns against several proposed hydroelectric dams on the Salween
River in eastern Myanmar. As transnational projects these dams are being undertaken by governments and transnational corporations (TNCs) but, as with most
large energy projects in Myamnar, they are designed to export most of their electricity to either Thailand or China.
Despite national elections in November 2010 that returned Myanmar to nominally civilian rule the 2008 constitution, on which the elections were based, provides for a continuing central role for the military in the country's governance
(Holliday 2008). Although the election process was flawed, fraudulent and
tightly controlled, with many generals from the former military regime, the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC),
5 merely stepping out of their uniforms
to take up senior positions in the new government, there is little doubt that incremental change towards civilian rule is occurring and the potential for political
discourse in Myamnar may well in1prove over time. While many exiled or
human rights groups rightly point out that civil conflict and human rights abuses,
particularly in the eastern border regions, continue,6 some analysts, such as the former International Labour Organization (ILO) Liaison Officer in Myanmar,
Richard Horsey, are more optimistic about the 'new level of scrutiny' (Horsey
2011, 4) that has accompanied the new parliament. The current Liaison Officer,
Steve Marshall, who is possibly more intimately involved with the new government than any other W estemer likewise argues that 'there is no doubt that the
political landscape has changed' .
7
This top down political change has accompanied a less visible but nonetheless significant increase in domestic civil society activism in recent years and
particularly since Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Sabandar 2010; South 2004). The
main beneficiaries of this opening have been humanitarian NGOs that have
focused on emergency relief to natural disasters such as Nargis and Cyclone Giri
in 2010,
8 but there has also been increased activity by environmental groups and
NGOs. These groups, as with all those actors who wish to avoid sanction or
imprisonment in Myanmar, engage in a certain amount of self-censorship to
avoid overtly political critiques of the government but there is increasing space
available for pursuing third sector environmental governance. This increased
domestic activism has improved the prospects of collaboration between domestic
and exiled groups with prominent domestic environmentalists running trainings
on the border or in Thailand for exiled groups such as KESAN. 9 Regardless of
recent changes, however, after five decades of authoritarian rule the local environmental movement remains embtyonic with significant limitations in experience and expertise. It has, therefore, been the transnational environment
movement occupying Myanmar's borderlands that has provided the most fertile
and important outlet for environmental activism and governance of large-scale
hydropower projects in Myanmar. 10
This case study therefore suggests that, whereas hybrid regimes offer
domestic spaces for political competition and therefore foster domestic civil
society (Diamond 2002; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; Levitsky and Way 2002),
traditional authoritarian regimes such as that which has afflicted Myanmar are
more likely to create an activist diaspora, a dynamic transnational community of
expatriates who engage in environmental activism in borderland regions or
neighbouring countries. As this case study demonstrates, an activist diaspora
tends to transcend ethnic divisions and therefore provides a multi-ethnic cohesion which is often absent from the broader exile community. As 'divide and
conquer' has been one of the tatmadaw's main strategies in neutralising opposition by ethnic minorities, Myanmar's activist diaspora may contribute to more
potent domestic social movements that promote democracy, human rights and
environmental security in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Adam Simpson
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Assessment of hydropower projects in Burma/Myanmar, Dams and other projects on rivers in Burma/Myanmar (countrywide), Several Groups, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"The recent pictures of the charred bodies of an elderly couple in their 80s in a village in central Myanmar have shocked the world. They were found by their family when they returned to their village of Kin Ma in Magway Region. Villagers had been chased out of their homes when fighting broke out nearby between the Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw) and local resistance fighters who are supporters of the parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG).
The family of the elderly couple told local media they decided to leave their parents in the village because they were too frail to take with them. After three days hiding in the jungle, the villagers returned and were dismayed to find their entire village razed to the ground.
Eyewitnesses said the security forces ransacked the houses before setting them on fire. The blaze was so large it was recorded by NASA’s satellite fire-tracking system at 15:22 GMT (Greenwich Mean Time) on Tuesday June 15, according to Reuters. A total of 200 houses out of 240 in the village were burned down.
This shocking incident happened a few days after more than a dozen unidentified bodies were found in a village in Demoso Township in Kayah State in eastern Myanmar.
The corpses were found in Ngwe Taung when the villagers returned. They had fled in fear of their lives when intense fighting broke out between the army and the combined forces of the ethnic Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and a newly organized militia, the People’s Defence Force (PDF).
The KNDF is a combined force of civilian fighters from the Karenni territories and other ethnic armed organizations.
Most of the corpses found were barely recognizable and some had been partially eaten by dogs, according to those who helped cremate the bodies. Some of the victims had their hands tied behind their backs and some had headshot wounds.
Kayah State has experienced violent clashes between the military and local militias, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, especially for the Myanmar military. According to the KNDF, the Tatmadaw lost nearly 200 troops. The military retaliated by using helicopters and heavy artillery to strike the resistance forces in the Karenni area.
Myanmar is witnessing attacks on innocent civilians by the military on an unprecedented scale. They are not restricted to areas where the army and the militias clash, but are also occurring in towns and cities.
Attacks on individuals are escalating across the country. In recent weeks, local administrators appointed by the military have been killed by unidentified assailants. They were accused of passing on information to the authorities about local residents suspected of opposing military rule. According to local media, in the month of June alone, more than two dozen local administrators were either gunned down or stabbed by assailants.
The coup makers claim the violent attacks were spearheaded by members of the PDF, a citizens’ militia formed by young protesters collectively known as Gen Z.
On June 22, a lieutenant colonel and another military officer were killed when security forces raided the hideout of PDF members in Mandalay. This was the first time a senior officer had been killed in an armed clash between the two forces. The security forces responded with heavy weapons in a bid to capture the PDF members holed up in the building. State media claimed four militia members died and eight were captured. This figure was hotly disputed by the PDF, which claimed it lost two of their fighters with six being captured.
Following the arrests of the PDF members in Mandalay, the military confiscated a large cache of arms and ammunition on a truck bound for Mandalay in Thabeikkyin Township. The weapons seizure indicates that the PDF, who have received military training in areas controlled by ethnic non-state armies, are better armed than previously thought. This could be a sign that more deadly armed resistance from the militias is to be expected.
The NUG has endorsed the PDF, but does not command or control it. Such loosely formed, shadowy armed groups are emerging in several areas of the country and appear to be actively involved in clandestine attacks on local administrators suspected of being military informants, and related facilities across the country.
The most spectacular attack took place on June 18 when a parked military truck with soldiers on board was bombed in east central Yangon. The truck was parked in front of an office of the junta’s proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party. State media have yet to report on the incident.
Myanmar Now reported that PDF fighters claimed these daring assaults on military facilities were only possible because of the support and help they got from army soldiers. Major Hein Thaw Oo, a Myanmar military officer who broke ranks and joined the anti-junta Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), insisted there were many people like him who would like to join the CDM if given the chance.
Some may argue that using the tactics of assassinations and bombings to achieve political ends will put militias at risk of engaging in terrorism, but to most citizens, resorting to violence is the only option left as the international community has failed to intervene to stop the atrocities committed by the regime. This notion is shared by the NUG.
However, the International Crisis Group in a June 28 report, “Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup”, urged the NUG to strengthen its military code of conduct.
“The NUG, even if it does not have command and control of these groups, should continue strengthening its military code of conduct, ensure that this code is widely disseminated, carry on publicly signaling the priority it gives to the document and use its influence to press all resistance elements to adhere to the provisions,” the group said in the report.
The report also pointed out that the diverse nature of the militias and communication problems present significant challenges to putting in place a unified chain of command.
Confronting the new citizen militias in many different locations, especially in towns and cities, will be a major challenge for the Tatmadaw, even as it faces a renewed escalation of fighting with non-state armies along the border.
With the overwhelming support the militias are receiving from within the country and abroad, it is highly likely that they will become much stronger, better armed and more structured. Evidence shows that the resistance force members are ready to give their lives to bring down the military dictatorship..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Anti-coup protesters, National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Myanmar has entered a Great Depression. It must be spelled with a capital G and D, reflecting the real mood of the people of this country.
This Great Depression began with the coup staged by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on Feb. 1, which in turn triggered political, social and economic upheavals that continue to this day. This Myanmar version of the Great Depression differs from the severe worldwide economic depression of the 1930s, though.
The trauma of a coup d’état—or even the prospect of one—is familiar to the people of Myanmar, who suffered through three previous coups, and the total breakdowns in order that resulted, over the past six decades, in 1958, 1962 and 1988.
However, the latest coup has been a particularly serious blow, not only politically, socially and economically, but also psychologically, for the whole population.
Since the coup, all people in the country—rich and poor, educated and uneducated, employers and employees, civil servants and private company staff, parents and children, adults and kids, teachers and students, men and women, doctors and patients, villagers and city dwellers, farmers and traders, Buddhists and Christians, Hindus and Muslims, members of the ethnic majority and minorities, locals and foreigners—have been plunged into misery.
Almost everyone I meet and speak to these days has shared with me their deep despair, anger and fear, without even being asked. They all feel lost, and we can all relate to this feeling; there is no need to elaborate.
I tend to express my own feelings back to them with this observation: “This is the era in which everyone in our country, from beggars to the president, are experiencing the worst kind of suffering.”
Shattered expectations
One especially cruel aspect of this Great Depression was that it was thrust upon the country at a time when people had such great expectations. The people were in a delighted mood after November’s election, in which the National League for Democracy won a landslide victory, and were waiting to witness the rare spectacle of an elected government returning to power in order to entrench the country’s fledgling democracy, building on the freedoms, rights and economic opportunities that had been initiated over the previous decade.
Actually, their great expectations were largely confined to practical improvements in their lives; they were not overly concerned with idealistic notions, given their country’s complex political situation, in which the military already enjoyed undemocratic privileges.
But one man alone—an unprofessional general greedy for power—destroyed at a stroke their expectations and dreams of a brighter future. Because of his greed, the entire population now exists in this Great Depression.
Since the coup, the country has endured four months of grief. Not a single day has passed without arbitrary killings, arrests or abductions in one place or another in Myanmar.
So far, the regime’s forces have killed about 880 people, including many children, and have detained more than 5,000 protesters across the country. Hundreds of thousands of people have lost their jobs over the past few months. The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has warned that up to 3.4 million citizens could go hungry this year amid rising food prices and the loss of manufacturing, construction and service jobs. The coup has driven the economy into a state of rapid deterioration, and it is only expected to worsen in the near future.
A third wave of COVID-19 infections has recently hit the country, but the regime’s response to the deadly virus has been to do almost nothing. Many people recall the systematic measures implemented by the previous civilian government to handle the first and second waves of COVID-19 last year.
These are just the tip of the iceberg of the problems we face in this depression era. The whole situation on the ground is an indescribable catastrophe created by the coup leader and his regime. Min Aung Hlaing’s persecution of hundreds of doctors, teachers and striking civil servants has resulted in family separations as those on the wanted list have either gone into hiding or fled the country. His soldiers’ indiscriminate response to civilian resistance fighters in some urban areas has taken a great toll on people there. In Kayah State, residents returned to their homes to see they had been burned to ashes. Parents mourn their children who have died from pneumonia in rain-soaked forests after being forced to flee heavy-handed raids on their villages by thuggish soldiers.
But this is not the first time for Myanmar. In this country, every generation has its own dark memories. The generations of our fathers and grandfathers suffered similar feelings of despair under successive generals whose decisions destroyed their dreams and their lives too. The older generation felt this despair under the rule of the late dictator General Ne Win for 26 years from 1962 to 1988, while the younger generation felt it under Ne Win’s successors, senior generals Saw Maung and Than Shwe, for the next 23 years from 1988 to 2011. These periods under military dictatorship were an ordeal—earlier examples of the Great Depression endured by the people of Myanmar.
Dragged into a dark past
In the past, however, when Ne Win staged a coup and introduced his autocratic rule to the country, authoritarianism was not peculiar to Myanmar. During the Cold War it was somewhat of a global political trend, existing in countries in Africa, Latin America, East Asia and the Middle East. Myanmar and its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia were not exceptional in this.
In reality, it is not surprising that the rule of such great sinners should bring this kind of Great Depression. One only has to look at the world around us.
Other countries have encountered worse experiences. Just look at the Holocaust, in which Nazi Germany and its collaborators systematically killed some 6 million Jews—two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe—during World War II. Think about the feelings of Jewish communities across the world; Myanmar people can’t compare their current situation to those Jewish victims.
Cambodia, one of Myanmar’s neighboring countries, suffered such a Great Depression when the Khmer people endured the Khmer Rouge regime’s persecution of its perceived opponents, as well as minorities, causing up to 2 million deaths in the 1970s.
They all suffered deeply, experiencing their own forms of Great Depression during such terrible periods. It is a phenomenon that has afflicted the whole world throughout human history with inexpressible suffering. But all those that experienced it had to overcome these ordeals.
Nowadays, however, far fewer countries find themselves in this situation—for most nations, the most recent examples occurred decades ago. That’s why this latest coup in Myanmar feels so much worse to people than previous military takeovers.
But it shall be overcome. How? One simple and fundamental quality is enough: simply, the will to never give up. In previous Great Depression eras, the people of Myanmar didn’t give up; each time, they continued to struggle until they were able to bounce back. That’s what they are doing now, and every single person needs to keep doing their part through their respective callings. That’s why we’re seeing so many people in Myanmar rejecting the coup in so many different ways, to restore the democracy they expected..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, WFP (World Food Programme), Political History, Military History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Before the coup, mental health was a neglected issue in Myanmar. Now, the situation is even worse. In this article, I look at the financial, legislative, structural and cultural challenges that have limited the provision of mental health services in Myanmar in the past – and how the coup continues to create shocks within this landscape.
Mental health in Myanmar is a critical issue. It is an unstable country, both in terms of political and economic factors. Decades of protracted conflict – the longest-running civil war in the world – combined, more recently with the economic impact of COVID-19, which according to a study in October 2020, saw the proportion of the population living in poverty rising from 16% to 63% over the past 8 months.
Moreover, since the February 2021 coup, violent crackdowns have already had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on citizens’ mental wellbeing. Senior UN officials warn of an ‘impending humanitarian crisis’ and have also argued that ‘Myanmar is spiralling into becoming something like a failed state’ with ‘potentially massive humanitarian ramifications’.
As Myanmar continues to exhibit more characteristics of a failed state, there will be serious ramifications for its population’s mental wellbeing. These ramifications can be seen in other conflict afflicted countries. According to a global WHO synthesis of 129 studies done in numerous conflict-affected contexts, ‘one in five people in conflict-affected populations have mental health conditions’. Conditions identified among these populations include depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. The report concludes that, ‘given the large numbers of people in need and the humanitarian imperative to reduce suffering, there is an urgent need to implement scalable mental health interventions to address this burden.’
In Myanmar, the mental health burden is being placed on an extremely strained system. A 2019 HelpAge International study further demonstrated the seriousness of mental health issues in Myanmar with the following findings: legally, ‘There is, [effectively], no mental health policy in Myanmar; preventing access to professional support through the primary healthcare system.’ While, as we shall see, some care is given through the private sector, this is limited in scope. Regarding state mental health provision, including funding, staff and infrastructure, the HelpAge study found that ‘staff are not adequately trained and there is little infrastructure to facilitate these services, particularly in rural areas’. As we shall see, much of this stems from a chronic lack of sufficient funding. Finally, the study pointed out that stigma and cultural understanding are also key issues: ‘while there is no data in Myanmar on how stigma impacts mental health, studies from other, similar countries suggest it has serious consequences.’
Going forward, the key challenges facing Myanmar’s mental health landscape are a lack of legislative support, a lack of funding, and misunderstandings about the nature of mental health. I shall explore these issues below.....
Legislation and funding:
Myanmar’s mental health legislation is outdated, to say the least. The nation’s mental health policy — I’m not making this up — is legislated by The Lunacy Act, dating from 1912. Violate this law at your peril – you’ll face a fine of 50 Indian rupees – a currency that has been obsolete since 1952. That Myanmar’s current mental health law focuses on criminalising ‘lunatics’ who pose a danger to society through incarceration at asylums goes a long way to explain the stigma that mental health currently has in the country, as we shall see later. To give an interesting parallel example, The Lunacy Act was also used in India, yet was replaced in 1987 by the Mental Health Act (where, among other changes, lunatics were referred to as mentally ill persons, and asylums as psychiatric hospitals), and then again in 2017 by the Mental Healthcare Act, which explicitly stated the need to implement ‘programmes to reduce stigma associated with mental illness’, along with more generally empowering those affected by mental health issues – which it was felt that the 1987 act failed to do. In Myanmar, a new bill has ‘been discussed by relevant ministries and agencies [The Ministry of Health and the WHO] since 2013 but has not reached parliament,’ according to the Myanmar Times.
Myanmar’s mental health landscape is also shaped by its Mental Health Policy, which is part of its National Health Policy. Last revised in 2006, the National Health Policy sees 0.3%of total health care expenditures spent on mental health, versus a global median of 2% – in other words, mental health in Myanmar is woefully underfunded. Especially once you consider that up until 2012, Myanmar had one of the lowest rates of healthcare spending in the world. While spending since then has risen significantly, Myanmar’s national healthcare expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the lowest in the ASEAN region, and outside of Africa, remains one of the lowest in the world. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind how badly funded and managed healthcare was in Myanmar for so many years. According to DFID: ‘even with the increase, a much larger injection of funds is necessary to reverse decades of neglect and mismanagement.’
How the ongoing Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and the junta’s approach to healthcare governance will affect the healthcare system is yet to be seen, though it the impact of these shocks is unlikely to be positive. As we have seen, military rule in the past has coincided with chronic government underspending on healthcare, and their recent behaviour against any health workers who are deemed to be threatening the stability of the government does not bode well. As of early May, at least 97 healthcare workers have been arrested and 10 killed since the coup, while arrest warrants have been issued for 400 health workers participating in CDM. Thousands continue to strike, bringing the country’s public health system – which accounts for 80% of the hospitals and clinics in the country – to its knees. Striking doctors have set up their own clandestine clinics, yet these are overloaded and face the risk of arrest if discovered.
‘The public health system is near collapse,’ Dr Mitchell Sangma, who is on the ground for humanitarian organisation Medicins San Frontiers told the BBC. “It’s a grim situation”. Those who cannot afford private care, simply are going without any healthcare. Though no research is currently available, given how limited the public provision of mental health support is at the best of times, now, when even life-saving care is unavailable, it must be close to non-existent.....
(Mis)understandings of mental health:
Public understandings of mental health are also an issue of concern. I recently spoke to Nay Chi Soe (pseudonym), a student who graduated with a BA in Psychology from East Yangon University a few years ago, about mental health. Two things stood out. Firstly, how unpopular the course was: of approximately 4,000 students who graduated from the university in her year, she had three other course mates. It was the least popular course in her year. Even Library and Information Studies had around 10 students, while more popular courses such as Engineering and Law had hundreds of graduates.
The second thing that stood out from our conversation was the reaction from friends, extended family members and even fellow students when she told them what she studied; ‘Oh do you want to go to a Ywa Thar Gyii?’ (Yangon mental hospital).’ ‘So can you tell me, were the crows black or white originally?’ (a Burmese equivalent of whether the chicken or the egg came first). These comments go some way to show how misunderstood the subject is. Indeed the crow comment is a philosophical question: the chicken/egg or white crow/black crow is a philosophical paradox about the nature of causality that has nothing to do with psychology at all. And even when people don’t confuse psychology with another subject, they tend to associate psychology with extreme mental illness. The subject is deeply misunderstood.....
Promising signs:
There are, however, more promising signs, most notably in the private sector provision of mental health. One of the most active groups in the mental health field in Myanmar is the Yangon-based, UNFPA-funded Mental Health Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) Working Group, which has half a dozen suppliers in its list of available services.
Aung Min Thein, the founder of Counselling Corner, a private mental health CSO based in Yangon, explained how they address the problems facing the provision of mental health services in Myanmar.
According to him, ‘we have found that Myanmar people are not very familiar with counselling and generally don’t want to burden the system. This is the result of two main factors, the lack of information and stigma that mental health currently has in the country, and arr nar dal – the feeling of not wanting to impose oneself. It is therefore vital that we take a pro-active approach to mental health provision – while passive techniques have an important role to play, real results require real and meaningful interaction between the target groups and mental healthcare professionals. We have found that interactive workshops offer the best environment for therapy as they encourage people to talk freely in small groups about themselves – often realising that they share the same emotions, feelings and experiences.....
Mental health in the wake of the coup:
Looking forward, addressing these financial, legislative, structural, and cultural changes will take time, particularly given the current political situation. The junta government has made it clear that it will not accept any criticism of its rule, which causes a problem for any mental health campaign. While mental health was certainly an issue in Myanmar before, it is an issue that has wholly been exacerbated by the military coup and the subsequent, and ongoing, destruction that has followed. Even for those who have not directly experienced extreme traumatic experiences (like being imprisoned, physically attacked etc.), anyone with a Facebook account will have been exposed to content that poses severe mental health risks. Factor in stresses related to the severe economic implications of the coup, such as mass unemployment and financial insecurity, may also act as triggers on top of the previous existing challenges caused by Covid-19, past traumas, or even the normal difficulties in a person’s life.
The coup puts mental health at an impasse: many of the mental health issues people will be experiencing will be caused directly by the coup, yet any treatment likely cannot explore these issues or place any blame, lest they run the risk of censorship – or worse. However, as Aung Min Thein tells me, the importance of therapy is not about placing the blame on somebody or something, rather about working on one’s own issues. His approach is to focus on the feelings of the individuals rather than the stimuli that caused them. This strategy does not legitimise the coup, but rather a recognition that the resilience people require to resist the regime depends on their mental wellbeing.
While the situation seems bleak, the first step at least is clear: we need to deal with the stigma associated with mental health in Myanmar, and to help people realise that asking for mental health support is both completely normal and healthy. Only then can mental health issues in Myanmar be truly addressed.....
Resources:
A number of both national and international volunteer-based counselling groups have sprung up since the coup. Readers may also refer to MHPSS’s list of available services.
Charlie moved to Yangon in 2014 to work at UNODC. After winning the war on drugs, he worked at BRAC. Then he realised he didn’t like working for INGOs and started running music events. Fast-forward 2 years, he started a record label with local artists. Now, he works with celebrities and influencers in social media campaigns that communicate socially beneficial messages. He speaks pretty good Burmese. He also runs a watch company. Charlie has written on Microfinance and the Ultra-poor, the War on Drugs , Suu Kyi and Islamophobia, and the hip hop scene in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Mental health, Anti-coup protesters, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"It is hardly surprising that the ethnic rebellions in states like those inhabited by the Kachin and Karen have flared anew since the military seized absolute power in Myanmar on Feb. 1, and that Bamar dissidents from cities and towns have sought refuge in areas controlled by ethnic rebels in the north and east. That happened after the military crushed a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988 as well. But this time, the sound of gunfire and bomb blasts can be heard in Yangon, Mandalay and other cities and towns in the country’s heartland. And, in the ethnic areas, some of the heaviest fighting has raged in Chin and Kayah states, which for decades have not seen any widespread insurgencies.
Even there, it is a new type of rebellion. Myanmar’s older ethnic rebel armies, who have been battling for self-rule and autonomy for decades, are dressed up in uniforms with insignia, the officers have ranks, they are based in camps and are organized along the lines of regular armies anywhere in the world. The “new rebels” in Chin and Kayah states have none of that, and, unlike the ethnic rebel armies, are not equipped with automatic rifles but hunting guns, homemade weapons and bombs they have assembled themselves.
Even so, if reports on social media sites are to be believed, they have managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. Dozens of soldiers have been killed in ambushes and by roadside bombs—which, in turn, has provoked a massive and brutal response from the Tatmadaw. Heavy artillery and airpower have been used, but since the Tatmadaw is facing a largely invisible enemy, the firing into villages suspected of harboring the rebels has been indiscriminate, houses have been torched and even places of worship, like churches in predominantly Christian areas of Kayah State, have been damaged.
As a result, according to a June 24 statement by Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for UN Secretary General António Guterres, “an estimated 230,000 people have been displaced because of violence, fights and insecurity.” According to local sources in Demoso, Kayah State quoted by The Irrawaddy, Tatmadaw troops have also looted shops and entered homes and taken whatever they feel like. With all of that comes widespread anger at central military authorities—and the possibility of strengthening older, centrifugal forces on the periphery, which would be a challenge to anyone who wants to keep the country together.
Kayah State is inhabited by several ethnic groups of whom the Karenni, or Kayah, are the predominant among the state’s population of approximately 286,000. Originally Animist, many of them were converted to Christianity, mainly by Baptist missionaries, in the 19th century. But the Mong Pai (Mobye in Burmese) area on the Shan State border—where more than a dozen Tatmadaw soldiers were killed by local rebels in May—is where the Kayan, or Padaung, people live. They are predominantly Roman Catholic and their women are famous for wearing brass neck rings, which make their necks seem longer.
There is an old rebel army in Kayah State, the Karenni Army (KA), which is the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) but has been engaged only in sporadic fighting since it was formed in the 1970s. But Kayah State has a very different administrative history from other Myanmar states. Although Animist or Christian, its people adopted at an early stage in history Shan political culture and established their own principalities. Following the advent of British colonial power in the 19th century, central Burma, as it was then called, became a colony, while the 40-or-so Shan states achieved a status similar to that of being protectorates.
The Karenni states, on the other hand, were recognized as “independent” under an agreement signed in 1875 by T.D. Forsyth for the British crown and Kinwun Mingyi U Kaung, the representative of the king in Mandalay: “It is hereby agreed that the Burmese and British Governments that the states of Western Karenni shall remain separate and independent and that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be claimed or exercised over that State.” Consequently, the Karenni states of Kyebogyi, Kantarawaddy and Bawlake were marked as “independent” on maps throughout the colonial era although, in reality, they enjoyed the same status as the Shan principalities. But British presence was light, and there was little interference in the internal affairs of the Karenni states.
The Karenni and Shan states were the only states which, according to the 1947 constitution, had the right to secede from the then proposed Union of Burma after 10 years of independence. The Kachin and Karen states, which were to be formed after independence, did not have that right. But the Karenni rose in rebellion as early as 1946 in anticipation of the formation of the Union. The United Karenni Independent States were proclaimed to safeguard the “independence” of the area. An armed wing called the United Karenni States Independence Army was formed in 1948 but the rebellion petered out after the arrest of the main leader, Saw Maw Reh, in 1949. He was released in 1953 and was among those who formed the KNPP in 1957. The KA was set up in 1974, but like its mother organization the KNPP, it was based mainly on the Thai border opposite Mae Hong Son, where it benefited from the black-market trade between the two countries. A smaller faction broke away and formed an alliance with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), but its presence in Kayah State was very limited. When Saw Maw Reh died in 1994, the KNPP/KA lost most of its remaining strength and the movement slipped more or less into oblivion—until now.
The Kayan formed their own organization called the Kayan Newland Party (KNLP). Set up in 1964, it was for years led by Shwe Aye, aka Naing Hlu Ta, a former university student, who allied the movement with the CPB. In 1994, the KNLP was one of many rebel groups that made peace with the then military government. Local conflicts with rival groups and government demands for total surrender have decimated the group and it is now no longer active. The recent surge of fighting in Kayah State, therefore, appears to be unconnected with older insurrections.
The Chin, like the other hill peoples, including their distant relatives the Kachin, were also Animists before the arrival of the Christian missionaries. But unlike the Kachin they never managed to establish a formidable rebel army. One reason is that—again unlike the Kachin, among whom the Jinghpaw dialect became the lingua franca—the Chin remained divided by more than 30 (according to some counts, 44) different, mutually unintelligible dialects. In the 1970s, the Kachin Independence Army made an attempt to raise an allied force in Chin State—the Chin Independence Army, with the unfortunate abbreviation of CIA—but it soon vanished from the scene.
The Chin are more closely related to the Mizo (or Lushai, as they were called during the colonial era) of northeastern India, and cross-border contacts have always been strong and frequent. The establishment of Mizoram, a separate state for the Mizo, in India in 1987 also had repercussions in Chin State. Much to the embarrassment of the Indian government, the Indian flag was hoisted in several towns in Chin State in 1988. It was followed by a demand by local leaders that Chin State should secede from Myanmar and join newly formed Mizoram.
A smaller rebel group called the Chin National Front (CNF) with the Chin National Army (CNA) as its armed wing was formed when a number of Chin students went underground after the 1988 uprising. They did get some support from across the border in India, where the Research and Analysis Wing (India’s external intelligence agency) used them to collect intelligence. They were also unofficially allowed to set up a base in a remote part of southern Mizoram. It was known as the Victoria Camp and named after Mount Victoria (Nat Ma Taung in Burmese), the highest mountain in Chin State. But it was abandoned in 2005 and the CNF remained an insignificant group—until ex-general U Thein Sein launched his so-called “peace process” after assuming the presidency in 2011.
In 2015 the CNF became one of the eight original signatories of U Thein Sein’s “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement”, but it was then so small and insignificant that it was awarded an area in Chin State where it could set up a headquarters, also called Victoria Camp. It was seen as important that the so-called “signatories” were credible forces, although only two of them, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Karen National Union, had any actual armed forces. Photos of uniformed CNA troops began to appear on social media sites, but their weaponry seems to consist almost exclusively of wooden cutouts.
The CNA does not appear to have taken an active role in the recent fighting in Chin State, where in May a local force calling itself the Chinland Defense Force (CDF) seized control of a town called Mindat and, according to local sources, killed more than 30 Tatmadaw soldiers before being forced out after heavy bombardment from the air and by artillery fire. The CDF has also launched attacks near the Chin State capital Hakha and other places in the area. But on May 28, the CNF, perhaps because it did not want to be overtaken by events, declared that it had forged an alliance with the National Unity Government (NUG), which consists of elected MPs who were ousted on Feb. 1 and other pro-democracy individuals. It is also worth noting that the main spokesman of the NUG, Dr. Sasa, is a Chin who is among the thousands of Chin who fled to India after the coup and the subsequent flare-up of fighting in the home areas. Some sources put the number of refugees in India at more than 20,000, nearly all of them from Chin State and adjacent lowland areas. A smaller number of refugees are in Manipur, the Indian state north of Mizoram.
It is too early to say whether the new rebellions that the coup has ignited will have any significant, long-term impact. The initial success of their ambushes could not have been carried out without widespread popular support, but in order to fight an insurgency, they would need more sophisticated weaponry than they presently have at their disposal. In the past, Thailand had a huge gray weapons market where many Myanmar rebel armies bought their guns. But that is no longer the case and China, the only other possible source of military hardware, would provide only the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and, indirectly, the allied forces of that group with weapons. None of the new rebel armies would fall into that category. The UWSA has also shown through its inactivity that it wants to be aloof of the post-coup anti-Tatmadaw movement, and will remain uninvolved.
It is also not possible that the new rebels will have access to safe havens in neighboring countries, which they would need in order to survive and expand. The Thais are not even willing to let the thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Myanmar cross the border, and those who did manage to escape to Mizoram can, at most, expect humanitarian assistance from their fellow Mizo.
And then there is the issue of ethnic identity. Is there any coordination between the new rebel groups in ethnic areas and urban guerrillas carrying out attacks in cities and towns? Will the new armies in ethnic areas, in the end, join kindred rebels fighting for autonomy or, in some cases, secession from an oppressive, Bamar-dominated central power? The only thing that can be said with certainty is that junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing probably had no idea of the forces he and his henchmen would unleash when, nearly five months ago, they decided to launch a coup, a move that has thrown the country into turmoil, causing immense suffering and tearing the country apart..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-28
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Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political, The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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A new brand of militant is throwing bombs, torching targets and killing junta officials in the name of restoring democracy
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"Five months after the military coup in Myanmar, resistance to the anti-democratic takeover is evolving and intensifying.
In the old capital Yangon, groups of mostly young people appear for brief moments in the streets, shouting slogans and flashing the three-finger salute, the symbol of the pro-democratic struggle. They then disperse as quickly as they had appeared to avoid arrest.
Upcountry, people are also showing their anger at Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s power grab, with most protests taking place in Mandalay, Sagaing and Tanintharyi Regions. Demonstrators from across the country have expressed solidarity with each other.
When clashes occurred between protesters and security forces in urban areas in Mandalay in early June, people in Yangon staged a demonstration chanting “Stay strong Mandalay, we, Yangon will be with you.”
More militant elements have taken to throwing low-grade bombs and grenades at government buildings on a near-daily basis, while police, suspected military informants and leading members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party are being targeted for assassination.
Moreover, a loose alliance of local resistance forces known as the People’s Defense Force (PDF) was formed in May in response to the coup. Officially, it is the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), which is made up of MPs who were deposed in the February 1 coup and other anti-junta activists.
The evident aim is to topple Min Aung Hlaing’s government by military means.
Judging from what happened in February, when millions of people in virtually every city, town and major village across the country marched against the coup, it is plausible to assume the NUG and PDF may have widespread popular support and getting recruits would not be a major problem.
But more than that will be needed in order to wage a successful armed struggle. The first would be access to weapons, then fall-back areas and, preferable, safe havens across the borders of a neighboring nation from where supplies could be sent to forces inside the country. It will also need money to sustain its activities.
On the surface, the PDF doesn’t appear to have any of the above.
According to a May 23 Myanmar-language NUG announcement, the PDF is made up of five divisions, each having at least three brigades. Each brigade consists of five battalions which, in turn, are divided into four companies, the announcement said.
That sounds like a formidable military force but, in reality, it’s so far only on paper. Groups of urban dissidents have taken refuge in areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Union (KNU) ethnic armed organizations.
Reports from inside sources indicate that the urban guerrilla warfare that Myanmar is now experiencing is an outcome of that alliance. Indeed, the well-planned attacks have been daring and dramatic.
On June 18, for instance, an army truck with regime soldiers on board was blown up in Yangon’s Tamwe township. The Irrawaddy cited witnesses who said they saw soldiers on board the truck, which was parked outside an office of the USDP. The blast also occurred within walking distance of the township’s police station, the Irrawaddy reported.
Both the KIA and elements of the KNU, which disagree with their leaders’ signing of an earlier, ineffectual Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), have since the coup also carried out widespread attacks in their areas of operation. The KIA in particular has hit Tatmadaw targets all over Kachin state.
But elsewhere in Myanmar, armed resistance appears to have been launched by local groups which may or may not have any links to the NUG and the PDF. That is especially true in now restive Chin and Kayah states, parts of the country that have not seen any large-scale insurgency for decades.
The PDF’s prospects look initially bleak. Decades of experience show that neither side in Myanmar’s many, mainly ethnicity-based civil wars can win solely by military means.
The Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has been unable to defeat the rebels and none of the ethnic armed groups has had enough strength to force any central government to agree to their demands for self-rule or autonomy.
The International Crisis Group sums it up as such in a June 28 report on Myanmar’s new emerging armed struggle:
“The resistance has taken on an increasingly revolutionary character, with most dissidents no longer aiming for restoration of the status quo ante, but for the Tatmadaw’s disbandment and its replacement by a new armed force that is not dominated by the Burman ethnic majority.”
That, the ICG concludes, would require the “Tatmadaw’s defeat or capitulation” – a remote possibility in today’s Myanmar.
The most recent attempt at finding an alternative, political solution to the civil wars was made by Thein Sein, a former Tatmadaw general, shortly after his appointment as president in 2011.
Talks between his government, the Tatmadaw and a variety of ethnic armed groups were held and resulted in eight of them signing the NCA in October 2015.
The problem, however, was that only two of those groups — the KNU and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) — had any armed forces to be reckoned with. The rest were tiny, largely irrelevant groups whose signatures were required to solidity the credibility of the NCA.
None of the major groups, among them the KIA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army or the United Wa State Army (UWSA) which, along with their respective allies, represent more than 80% of all armed rebels in the country.
The PDF will add to the Tatmadaw’s troubles. Unable to identify the new rebels, who unlike other ethnic insurgents are not dressed in uniforms with insignia showing the name of their army and their ranks, the Tatmadaw has resorted to firing indiscriminately into villages, causing widespread destruction of civilian homes and properties.
As a result, an estimated 230,000 people have been displaced in Myanmar because of violence, fights and insecurity, according to a June 24 statement by Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.
Myanmar’s “new rebels”, with or without collaboration with older, ethnic armies, may be able to inflict heavy casualties on the Tatmadaw. But even the older armies are facing similar problems as the new ones.
In the past, Thailand’s grey weapons market was a treasure trove for any group looking for weapons, but, as relations between the Thai military and Tatmadaw have improved, that is no longer the case.
Informed sources say they are struggling to keep even their own soldiers with guns and sufficient ammunition. And Myanmar’s largest and best-equipped ethnic armed group, the UWSA, has shown no interest in arming or even sheltering urban dissidents and other pro-democracy activists.
That could be explained in the context of the UWSA’s close relationship with China’s security services on the other side of the border. While democratic countries all over the world have condemned the coup, China, along with Russia, have come out in support of Min Aung Hlaing’s junta.
The future for Myanmar thus looks bleak, with only a split within the Tatmadaw likely able to bring about fundamental change. But there are no signs yet of that happening as Myanmar’s resistance shifts from peaceful protests to more violent means.
The most the “new rebels”, alone or together with ethnic allies, may be able to achieve would be to disrupt its efforts to consolidate its grip on the country. In other words, Myanmar is back to square one in the history of its decades-long civil wars where neither side can win.
That can only mean more suffering for the people with villages being torched and civilians killed — and refugees gathering in the jungles and mountains or trying to escape to neighboring countries. Myanmar will remain a source of instability in an otherwise relatively prosperous part of the world..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG), Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Across Myanmar, militias are forming to counter deadly repression of demonstrations against the 1 February coup. In response, the military has deliberately targeted civilians, displacing tens of thousands. Outside actors should press the regime to respect international law and allow humanitarian aid to the displaced.
Description:
"What’s new? Following Myanmar’s 1 February coup, newly organised militias have launched attacks in several parts of the country in response to regime killings of demonstrators. These lightly armed bands have inflicted significant casualties on the security forces, who have struck back with heavy weapons and bombardment of residential areas.
Why does it matter? The regime’s heavy-handed, indiscriminate retaliation has displaced tens of thousands of men, women and children. Local networks and humanitarian agencies are unable to adequately assist these people, due to security and access restrictions, including military arrests, confiscation of supplies, and killings of those trying to deliver aid.
What should be done? International actors – including in the UN Security Council – should press Myanmar’s regime to respect its legal obligations regarding the principles of proportionality and distinction, which its counter-insurgency strategy deliberately violates, and allow humanitarian access to all displaced people. Newly created militias must also refrain from abuses, particularly killing detainees..."
I.
Overview
The Myanmar junta’s crackdown on protesters and the broader civilian population after the 1 February coup d’état has triggered violent resistance, including the formation of militias in parts of the country. Some such militias, armed with hunting rifles and other makeshift weapons, have used their numbers and knowledge of local terrain to inflict serious casualties on Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw. Security forces have responded with indiscriminate attacks on populated areas, using artillery, airstrikes and helicopter gunships. Tens of thousands of men, women and children have fled to the forest, with the regime blocking relief from reaching them. The Tatmadaw must meet its international obligations to respect the proportional use of force, distinguish between combatants and civilians, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access to those displaced. Outside actors have a responsibility, including in the UN Security Council, to ensure the regime faces consequences for international law violations. The militias, for their part, should not take the Tatmadaw’s grave abuses as an excuse to commit their own.
Citizens in many parts of Myanmar watched in dismay as the regime unleashed deadly violence against protesters and residents in major cities from late February. Determined to continue demonstrating against the coup, but also concerned that they faced the same threat from security forces, they began forming militias to defend themselves. Such groups have emerged in several areas of the country, responding to the security forces’ attacks with determined campaigns of armed resistance. They have been most effective in places with existing militias or ethnic armed groups, or strong traditions of hunting – where many men have access to weapons and know the terrain intimately. Many of these areas have seen no active conflict in years or decades, meaning the Tatmadaw has little established military and intelligence capability there.
With ground troops proving to be easy targets for ambushes, [the military] has unleashed long-range artillery, airstrikes and airborne assaults on populated areas.
Facing rising casualties, the military has responded with overwhelming force. With ground troops proving to be easy targets for ambushes, it has unleashed long-range artillery, airstrikes and airborne assaults on populated areas, such as the towns of Mindat (in Chin State) and Demoso (in Kayah State). The Tatmadaw is using its long-established “four cuts” counter-insurgency strategy in these areas, a cruel approach that deliberately targets civilians in an effort to deprive insurgents of food, funds, recruits and intelligence on troop movements (hence the four cuts). Attacks on populated areas are an integral part of this strategy, along with the looting of food stores and denial of relief supplies, in clear violation of international humanitarian law.
The fast emergence of these militias, and their capacity to evolve from loosely coordinated groups of local people into more structured, better armed and sustainably funded forces, likely marks a new phase of Myanmar’s decades-old civil war. Given the deep grievances in areas such as Chin and Kayah States – about the coup, but also over decades of neglect, ethnic discrimination and denial of rights – these militias are unlikely to simply disband or quickly fade away. They constitute new fronts for the Tatmadaw, which will probably keep blindly lashing out at civilians, as it has done repeatedly in the past when fighting many of the country’s ethnic armed groups. While these militias generally express support for the National Unity Government (NUG), the civilian body that has emerged to contest the junta’s claim to rule, they are not under its command or control.
In a context of national economic collapse and local penury, these new militias will have privileged access to resources and rent-seeking opportunities, such as other armed actors in the political economy of Myanmar’s conflict have long secured. Experience from other parts of the country shows that such groups can provide protection for residents but can also become a source of insecurity for them, as well as an economic burden.
Addressing these conflict dynamics and their impact on non-combatants is difficult without a return to more democratic and accountable civilian government, which the regime appears determined to prevent. Nevertheless, some steps can be taken now that would help meaningfully improve the situation:
The Tatmadaw must cease attacks on civilians in line with its international legal obligation to respect the principles of proportionality and distinction. The security forces must also stop impeding humanitarian access to displaced populations.
Outside actors should do what they can to ensure that the regime is held accountable for its violations of international law. UN Security Council members inclined to act could request that the UN secretary-general report in more detail on the extent of violence and any obstruction of aid in Myanmar, thus ensuring that the Council discusses these issues. All countries should stop the supply of weapons to the regime.
Humanitarian agencies and donors should use all available channels to press the regime for timely access to displaced people. Asian countries, which are likely to have the most influence, should also advocate for expeditious humanitarian aid as a matter of priority.
The militias likewise have an obligation to refrain from committing abuses, including killing of detainees and attacks on civilians and civilian property. All parts of the resistance must refrain in particular from targeting schools and medical facilities.
Even if it does not have command and control of these groups, the NUG should take steps to strengthen and further disseminate its military code of conduct, continue to publicly signal the priority it gives to this code and press all elements of the resistance to adhere to the provisions.
II.
Opposition to the Coup Takes a Revolutionary Turn
The military regime has responded to the anti-coup resistance with extreme violence, killing more than 870 people and detaining more than 6,000. The dead include protesters – many of whom were shot in the head – bystanders, random civilians shot in their houses and others tortured during interrogations. The crackdown has been effective in clearing the streets of the mass protests seen in the coup’s immediate aftermath, but it has provoked greater anger toward the regime. Mass protests have been replaced with flash mobs, which disperse before security forces can intervene, and strikes, boycotts and other forms of civil disobedience continue on a large scale.
The anti-regime resistance as a whole is diverse, organic and organised locally by professional groups (such as medical workers, engineers and teachers), pre-existing civil society networks, labour unions and others. Some of the members of parliament elected in the November 2020 polls, who were due to take their seats on the day of the coup, have come together to form a legislative body, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). It is composed mainly of members of Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) who are now in hiding, either in areas of the country controlled by ethnic armed groups or in exile. On 16 April, the CRPH established an executive body, the National Unity Government, with a diverse ethnic composition, especially at the deputy minister level.
The resistance has taken on an increasingly revolutionary character, with most dissidents no longer aiming for restoration of the status quo ante, but for the Tatmadaw’s disbandment and its replacement by a new armed force that is not dominated by the Burman ethnic majority. The CRPH/NUG has articulated its wish to create a “federal army”, under civilian control, with a more diverse ethnic composition and without the Tatmadaw’s institutional culture of violence against civilians. On 1 March, the CRPH went as far as to declare the regime a terrorist group, and the NUG did the same on 7 June.
This revolutionary agenda requires the Tatmadaw’s defeat or capitulation. The NUG first endorsed violent self-defence on 14 March and then announced the formation of its own armed wing, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), on 5 May. This step represents a decisive break with the policy of non-violence that the NLD adopted in its long years of opposition to military rule (1988-2011), which was a defining principle espoused by Aung San Suu Kyi herself. The regime responded on 8 May by declaring the CRPH, NUG and PDF to be “terrorist groups” under the Counter-terrorism Law.
The PDF is still a work in progress, with an aspirational structure on paper. Some young people, whom the NUG hopes to bring under its command, are being trained by ethnic fighters and some Tatmadaw deserters in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups. So far, three separate strands have emerged in the efforts at armed resistance:
First, the NUG attempted to convince existing ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar to join forces to fight the Tatmadaw under the banner of a new federal army. While several armed groups have expressed their support for the resistance and NUG, and in some cases provided sanctuary to fleeing dissidents, none has so far been willing to enter into a military alliance.
Secondly, the NUG announced the PDF, a tacit acknowledgement that it had been unable to form an alliance with ethnic armed groups and would instead form its own fighting force de novo. The challenges involved are enormous, however. The NUG does not control territory, and it is unlikely that ethnic armed groups would allow it to operate autonomously from places they control – for chain-of-command reasons, and because of likely regime retaliation; the Kachin Independence Organisation, for instance, has already said it will not do so. Although ethnic armed groups are providing military training to hundreds of young dissidents who have fled to areas under their control for sanctuary, these groups are not organised by the NUG and are not under its command, although they may share its objectives.
Thirdly, locally organised militias have been forming spontaneously in many places across Myanmar, in response to Tatmadaw violence. Groups such as the Chinland Defence Force (in Chin State), Kalay Civil Army (in Sagaing Region) and Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (in Kayah State) have clashed with the security forces – both repelling Tatmadaw attacks and going on the offensive to take control of towns or rural areas. The NUG’s announcement of the PDF was intended in part to unify these various local groups under its umbrella. But while many of them are supportive of the NUG and some have pledged allegiance to it, they are not under its command. Some of the largest groups have had no contact at all with the NUG (see Section III.C below).
In addition to organised militias, networks of civilians have responded to the regime’s use of brutal violence with asymmetric attacks on government and other targets in Yangon, Mandalay and elsewhere – including with improvised explosive devices, arson and killings of administrative officials and suspected regime informants. These networks include some people who have been trained in ethnic armed group areas and have subsequently returned to the cities. Since early April, there have been hundreds of explosions in various parts of the country, with the largest concentration in Yangon.
Bomb and arson attacks have struck educational institutions, local administration offices, the homes of regime-appointed officials, police and military personnel and installations, and banks. Schools have been particularly hard-hit, with dozens across the country targeted in an apparent effort to deter parents from registering their children ahead of the new school year starting 1 June, which anti-coup forces have called upon the population to boycott. On 26 May, the NUG issued a set of ethical rules for resistance forces, inter alia prohibiting attacks on schools, medical facilities and other civilian targets. Since then, attacks on schools have declined but not stopped.
III.
The New Armed Resistance
As the regime began to use increasingly deadly violence against protesters and the broader civilian population from late February, city residents began to take measures to protect themselves from the security forces and deter their night-time raids. They barricaded access roads, appointed nightwatchmen to give early warning of the security forces’ incursions and formed defence groups made up of mostly young men and women armed with makeshift weapons and shields.
As the military deployed front-line troops to force residents of Yangon, Mandalay and other towns to remove these roadblocks over the month of March, many members of these improvised defence forces either went underground or fled to ethnic armed group-controlled areas seeking weapons and training. Some of these underground cells, and networks of people who have now returned to the cities after receiving limited training, have begun carrying out opportunistic attacks, including bombings.
In other parts of the country, the situation has evolved differently. With the regime focused on quashing dissent in the main cities, people in many provincial towns and rural areas were able to continue demonstrating without facing violent crackdowns. As they saw the death toll mounting in other areas, however, some of these communities began organising themselves to resist the security forces. When protesters began to be arrested or shot in their areas, they were ready to retaliate.
A.
The Battle for Mindat
On 4 April, resistance cells from all nine townships of Chin State came together to form the Chinland Defence Force (CDF). Located in the country’s north west, bordering India, the mountainous state is Myanmar’s poorest. On 24 April, CDF members in the southern town of Mindat clashed with the security forces for the first time, after officers refused to release seven people, three men and four women, detained for putting up anti-regime stickers in town. Residents said the detentions violated an informal agreement between security forces and the townspeople that troops would take no action against protesters as long as they remained peaceful. Protesters had gathered in the town centre to demand the detainees’ release, and when a police officer fired into the crowd, the defence force retaliated, reportedly shooting dead three members of the security forces.
The situation escalated rapidly from there. The army attempted to bring in troops by road to reinforce the overwhelmed local battalion in Mindat. On 26 and 27 April, CDF fighters ambushed military convoys on the roads leading to the town, reportedly killing more than 30 troops, destroying army trucks and looting weapons. Although the CDF fighters were only lightly armed with traditional flintlock rifles, they were experienced at using these for hunting, had intimate knowledge of the terrain and outnumbered their targets – amassing hundreds of fighters to strike the convoys.
Seemingly taken aback by the level of resistance it was facing, on 27 April the military initially tried to negotiate with Mindat town elders, seeking an agreement that attacks on troops would end in return for the release of detained demonstrators; the truce broke down after a few hours when the security forces failed to release all the seven detainees. Further negotiations were held on 1 May and 9 May, aiming to reach agreement on the withdrawal of fighters from both sides from the downtown area, the withdrawal of troops from outside medical facilities and banks, permission for CDF fighters to return home with no retaliation, and the release of five remaining detainees. Discussions broke down on 12 May, with the military still refusing to release one of the detainees.
The military was able, however, to negotiate safe passage for a convoy of troops through Mindat, on 7 May, in order to resupply its bases in Paletwa township further south. Paletwa had been the site of some of the most intense conflict between government forces and the Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine rebel force, from January 2019 until the informal ceasefire in November 2020. Chin people were caught in the crossfire of that conflict, and were at times targeted by the Arakan Army, so the CDF may have had some interest in allowing the convoy to proceed.
After negotiations collapsed on 12 May, CDF fighters attacked soldiers posted outside a bank in the downtown area. The following day, the regime declared martial law in Mindat and began shelling the town. On 13 and 14 May, the military sent two convoys of reinforcements, which were again ambushed by the CDF. Tatmadaw troops fled, and CDF fighters seized large quantities of weapons from the trucks before destroying nine of them.
With the CDF controlling all roads into Mindat, on 15 May the military launched an airborne offensive, first shelling the town, then flying in several hundred troops by helicopter to seize control. The CDF retreated into the surrounding hills, and most townspeople also fled; thousands remain in makeshift settlements in the forest. The military now controls the town, but clashes continue in the surrounding areas, including Tatmadaw attacks in areas that civilians have fled to. The CDF told Crisis Group it is regrouping and preparing for new attacks, but in order to protect civilians, it will no longer base itself in urban areas..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-28
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, National Unity Government (NUG), Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Nearly five months after the coup, the junta has begun the trial of the leaders of NLD. Ousted State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi appeared in a special court in Naypyitaw on 14 June to hear three cases for possession of illegally imported walkie-talkies, violations of the Telecommunications Law and Natural Disaster Management Law.
Furthermore, the junta has charged Ye Min Oo, a former Naypyitaw Mayor with article 409 of Penal Code (criminal breach of trust by a public servant) and violation of the Anti-Corruption law as he allegedly misused his power to allow the “La Yaung Taw” project of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi under Daw Khin Kyi’s foundation. A detained Mandalay region MP from the National League for Democracy (NLD) also has been sentenced to three years in prison by the junta without a trial according to his family members that media reported this week.
UNHCR reported that more than 680,000 people are currently internally displaced in Myanmar, including more than 200,000 in the last four months. Most of the recent IDPs are from the states of Kayah and Kayin, where ethnic groups and the Myanmar military engaged in fighting. The reports also revealed more than 100,000 people have been displaced by the fighting in Kayah State, with Demoso Township having the highest number of IDPs. It also mentioned that food and medicines run out faster. Dry food, medicine, and water are the major needs. IDPs in southern Shan State also reported due to the heavy fighting between The Shan Nationalities Progressive Party (SSPP/SSA) and the Shan State Reconstruction Council (RCSS/SSA). People are in dire need of emergency medical treatment, according to a relief team.
Strong winds destroyed around 600 houses in refugee camps in Rakhine state making it more difficult for refugees to live, according to the Rakhine Nationalities Association. People face food shortages and international organizations are no longer able to provide assistance due to political instability. More than 100,000 refugees are still reluctant to return to their homes although no fighting in Rakhine for about eight months.
The junta-controlled Ministry of Health and Sports (MOHS) announced that three “highly transmissible and more severe” coronavirus variants have been detected in Myanmar. With more than 600 COVID-19 cases reported in Yangon in the last two weeks, the second highest coronavirus hotspot after Sagaing Region. The junta has been struggling to maintain COVID-19 prevention, control and treatment as thousands of government medical staff and numerous volunteers have refused to work for the junta.
Two elderly civilians were burned to death alive after junta troops set the whole Kin Ma village on fire and burnt it to ashes in Pauk Township of Magway Region. On June 20, the junta condemned the actions of local/foreign media outlets and organizations spreading false information on the Kinma Village fire case that further the state media accused People Defense Forces (PDF) for setting fire to the house of U Kyaw Htay, who did not support the PDF which spread to other houses due to the wind.
The junta’s propaganda newspapers published an article on neighboring Thailand’s proportional representation (PR) system of elections and parliaments crafted by the Thai military after the 2014 coup, an indicator that the Myanmar junta is considering enacting a similar system in future elections.
Frontier Myanmar’s managing editor arrested by the junta at the Yangon International Airport is facing a charge under section 505-A of Penal Code, which carries a potential three-year prison term while a DVB reporter, was sentenced to 3-year imprisonment with 505-A of Penal Code in Minhla, Bago Region. There are four reporters arrested by the junta in the Bago region, and among them two have been sentenced to 3-year imprisonment. Ye Chan Naing, editor-in-chief of the DVB in Burma is selected for the International Press Freedom Award for 2021.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution with the support of 119 countries to call for a stop to the flow of arms to Myanmar and urge the junta to respect November election results & release political detainees, including leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Belarus requested the text be put to a vote and was the only country to oppose it, while 36 abstained, including China and Russia with Thailand, Cambodia, Brunei and Laos from the ASEAN regional block.
The junta chief arrived in Moscow on 20 June by a special international Myanmar Airlines flight to attend a security conference, marking his second known trip abroad since he seized power in a coup. Junta appointed Deputy Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade U Than Aung Kyaw, Nay Pyi Taw Council chairman Dr Maung Maung Naing, Directors-General from various government departments and senior military officers joined the trip.
The protests continued in different parts of Myanmar despite the crackdown by the junta. The clashes between the junta forces and the civil resistance fighters or Ethnic Armed Organizations also emerged in several places in Myanmar, such as in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Shan, Mandalay, Magway and Yangon States/Regions.
According to the information compiled by ANFREL, at least 56 bomb blasts happened across Myanmar in the past week. It was reported that at least 19 people were injured and at least 4 died.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), as of 20 June, 872 people were killed by the junta. 5,033 people are currently under detention and 196 are sentenced. 1,950 warrants have been issued. 31 were sentenced to death, 14 people to three years, 39 people to 20 years, 18 people to 7 years imprisonment..."
Source/publisher:
Asian Network for Free Elections (Bangkok)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-23
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Type:
Individual Documents
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Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"A year after the National League for Democracy’s 2015 election victory, as I was wandering about the massive Tatmadaw Museum in Naypyitaw, I could not help but be awed by the scale of the Myanmar military’s gratuitous ode to itself. It sprawls across numerous caverns covering the minutiae of its history. Hiding in its bulk is one room dedicated to the Tatmadaw’s “victories”. What it claims as historic triumphs are battles to control hilltops. While important in terms of individual counterinsurgency campaigns, this presentation masks a reality.
The Tatmadaw does not win wars. It may win some battles but ultimately it draws and seeks ceasefires.
It has been argued in some recent analyses that resistance to junta rule is difficult, nay nearly impossible, because the Tatmadaw has approximately 350,000 troops. Using this number is a gross oversimplification and gives a false impression that the Tatmadaw is in an inherently strong position. This could not be further from the truth, for one reason: The generals managed to provoke a nationwide uprising against the Tatmadaw. There are few comparable examples of such an event since World War II and the period of anti-colonial wars. There is nothing pre-determined about what will happen in Myanmar, certainly not the Tatmadaw’s survival. The coup was a historic shift in the country and a strategic blunder of existential proportions by the generals.
A more apt number to focus on is that Myanmar has a population of over 52 million, nearly all of whom viscerally hate the Tatmadaw. It is this context that confronts the generals. They have reduced their military to essentially being a foreign occupying force desperately trying to suppress nearly the entire Myanmar population. Wherever their soldiers look, they see hostility. Other than its immediate proxies, notably the police and the Union Solidarity and Development Party, there are no significant chunks of the public that are supportive.
The Tatmadaw’s response to this uprising has been predictable. Its tactics of violence, deprivation and cooption have been honed over decades of dictatorship. There is a calculus within the Tatmadaw that it can outlast the public’s anger, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and a collapsing economy, while isolating whatever revolts emerge. The Tatmadaw believes it has a longer window of perseverance than that of the resistance. The generals will attempt to split the public from the National Unity Government (NUG), the CDM and the country’s most ardent democracy activists. They will endeavor to sow discord between ethnic groups, keep ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and prevent the defection of proxy militias. They will sell the country cheaply to China.
Whatever successes the Tatmadaw might claim are achieved at high cost in terms of soldiers and resources. That it has not been able to dislodge the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) from strategic gains made in March or decisively quell escalating revolts in Sagaing, Chin and Kayah are signs of weakness. Isolated in its purpose-built capital, hiding in schools in the cities, and having to move in large convoys through the Bamar heartland, the Tatmadaw would be foolish to feel it is presently in a good position. Its troops are harried to quell revolts before they spread, all the while fearing its lacky militias will desert and its ceasefires will collapse when the time is ripe.
Essentially a light infantry force, the Tatmadaw is dispersed across the country in numerous small bases. In the context of a national uprising, this could arguably be a strength if the Tatmadaw was well resourced with good logistics chains and strong mobile units. Poor and under-equipped, it has neither of these. Individual units are increasingly feeling pressure as their resupply is stretched and local populations harass them. Logistics will be further pressed over the rainy season and Tatmadaw rank-and-file will be demoralized as millions openly cheer their battlefield losses on social media.
Having long espoused a “people’s war” doctrine of relying on the population to help repel foreign invasion, it is the Tatmadaw that now faces numerous local self-defense militias. Many of these are the People’s Defense Force (PDF) militias instigated by the NUG, but there are others, such as the Chinland Defense Force, that are local collectives formed to provide security for threatened communities. This trend will escalate.
To accurately assess the prospects of the resistance, it is most pertinent to focus on the military balance in terms of its trajectory. The anti-junta movement should not be judged on its composition at any snapshot in time, but rather on the speed at which it is advancing.
Revolutions never start with a resistance that is well armed, fully staffed and professionally competent. Successful ones have a steep learning curve in terms of effective leadership, developing tactics and making all due haste in acquiring weapons. From this perspective, events are not moving in the junta’s favor. It is facing pressure across the country, including in areas that have not produced sustained revolt in living memory, such as southern Sagaing, but increasingly in other regions all the way down to Ayeyarwady as new PDFs emerge.
The Tatmadaw must increasingly feel like it is a foreign occupying force amongst a hostile population. Its soldiers must fear envelopment across a range of threats—local attack, constricted resupply and suffocating social ostracization. They must be forced to spread themselves even thinner. Increasingly fatigued, they can be harassed and fragmented through countless small attacks.
The Tatmadaw can always win the tactical firefights it chooses to prioritize but will struggle to design a viable strategy against a national uprising. This would be hard for any military facing near universal revolt. Key to the resistance’s success is unity. Battlefield successes against the Tatmadaw will do more to catalyze national solidarity than anything else. Kani, Mindat and Demoso must be precedents for wider collective action, while the whole country owes gratitude to the KIA for its undaunted assaults on State Administration Council forces and to the Karen National Union for providing safe havens.
If the nature of the conflict can be maintained as a national uprising, the military balance favors revolution by sheer force of numbers and willpower. Many analysts have noted the durability of military rule in Myanmar. Such defeatist attitudes serve the status quo of domestic vested interests seeking to wait for others to bear the costs of ousting the Tatmadaw or cynical foreign observers who fail to see how much the Tatmadaw is loathed. Many have also subtly upheld the Tatmadaw’s claim that it is holding the country together, despite years of the military having divided local-level armed groups into competing factions and a complete refusal to meaningfully include leaders from outside its circle in political decision-making, stoking resistance generation after generation.
Lessons are also clearly being learned from the country’s experience during 1988 and afterwards. The NUG sees itself as a revolutionary movement rather than a “government in exile” and has made clear efforts to build a national coalition based on federal democracy. These efforts are still nascent and must be furthered.
Moreover, it is vital that armed resistance is not borne only by ethnic minorities but fundamentally includes the Bamar majority. It is critical that resistance includes the regions and cities. Resistance here greatly threatens the Tatmadaw’s viability. The generals would love to return to the “normalcy” of only fighting EAOs. Nascent “tag teams” between EAOs and PDFs in Chin, Sagaing and Kayah show how potent they could be. The NUG’s ominous warnings of a looming “D-Day” of national action should scare the military more than anything else.
When walking out of the Tatmadaw Museum, one is left with the sense that such a massive complex is intended to hide what is actually an inferiority complex. This is a military desperately trying to show it is central to keeping the country together, ever the benevolent guardian. Any notions of this being accepted by the public are long gone, as the country has risen in revolt. The Tatmadaw is now widely recognized as the barbaric national disgrace it is. Fundamentally this is a crisis that only Myanmar can solve. International action will be distinctly secondary. The Myanmar people should take solace knowing that they have the means and moral right to overthrow a military that has for too long destroyed the country..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Civil Disobedience Movement: In early March, we learned that people involved in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)[2] were fleeing to Dooplaya District to escape from the SAC military’s[3] torture and killing. Many people who joined the CDM came to these townships. They are teachers and doctors. They have to flee because SAC soldiers are trying to arrest them and kill them. They fled to the Karen revolutionary areas [to the areas controlled by the Karen National Union - KNU].[4] More and more people involved in the CDM are coming every day.
As of March 7th 2021, 1,310 government staff involved in the CDM had sought refuge in the KNU areas of Dooplaya District. They are from Ayeyarwady Region, Kawkareik, Mawlamyine and Hpa-an. They used to work for the following agencies: Ministry of Health and Sports, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation, Ministry of Internal Affairs (Myanmar Police Force, Fire Service Department), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Electricity and Energy, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Social Welfare and Resettlement, Ministry of Defence (SAC military), Ministry of Justice, and Myanmar Economic Bank. There are also municipal employees, Township-level staff and village administrators [General Administration Department].
[There could be even more people involved in the CDM in KNU areas]. Some name lists have not been sent [by local administrators] to the [KNU] Township and District [authorities] yet [local authorities must report new arrivals of people involved in the CDM to the KNU]. Some of them [people involved in the CDM] are hiding in villages and the village heads have not sent their names yet [to the KNU authorities]. We are not sure whether more people involved in the CDM will come to our areas.....Military activity: The SAC military cut down bamboo in A--- village, Pone Yay village tract,[5] Kaw T’Ree Township to strengthen their army camp [KHRG was not able to establish the exact date]. The local villagers told them that SAC soldiers were not allowed to trespass into the restricted areas.[6] [The soldiers did not threaten or do anything to the local villagers but they did not listen to them and trespassed anyway]. Their commanding officer was Aung Zaw Lin, a deputy company commander from Infantry Battalion (IB)[7] #13, Column #1.
The SAC military is stepping up its activities in the local areas. Since the military coup,[8] the local villagers have been seeing more SAC soldiers in the jungle or bushes around the villages, including in Kheh Hkoh [a place where villagers go to collect T’La Aw leaves], between B--- and C--- villages, Kyauk Hkee village tract, Kawkareik Township. Therefore, the local villagers are now afraid to go and collect Ta La Aw leaves.
Since the protests against the military coup started, it has not been easy for patients to go to the hospital [because healthcare staff is participating in the CDM]. They have to buy medicine from outside [at the pharmacy]. One of the children from D--- village, Waw Loo village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township had a motorbike accident. He was sent to the hospital, but there was no one to look after him, give him medicine and clean his wounds. [KHRG was not able to establish the exact date of this incident].
The students who attend Myanmar government schools could not go to school this year. Since the first wave of Covid-19, they have to work instead. However, Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD)[9] schools are still open. Local villagers/civilians are concerned that fighting [between the SAC military and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[10]] might break out. They have to live in fear now. Some of them are getting ready and storing food such as rice because they worry the situation might go back to what it was the past [before the 2012 preliminary ceasefire].[11]
We realised that the SAC military had been stepping up its activities since March 7th 2021. They patrol at night, but we are not sure whether they are trying to find and arrest people who joined the protests; or if they are trying to find KNLA soldiers and shoot them. It creates concerns among local villagers. The SAC military also sent drones to KNU-controlled areas. SAC soldiers are now checking people on the main roads. They check people who go to Seikkyi Town, and sometimes they even check their phones. This is not happening every day, but they conduct surprise checks.
On March 19th 2021 at midnight, SAC soldiers from IB #32 shot at a group of Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)[12] soldiers in Kyainseikgyi Town. The DKBA soldiers were in the streets after 9 pm despite the curfew. They [SAC soldiers] could not kill any of them but they arrested one of them. We do not know what they did to him. The SAC military declared a curfew. No one can go out after 9 pm since March [but not everyone knows about the curfew]. These are just some of the SAC military activities this month [in March].....Anti-coup protests : In reaction to the military coup, protests were organised and held in every township of Dooplaya District. The demands of the protesters are: 1) Restore democracy; 2) Abolish the military dictatorship; 3) Free the detained people; 4) Abolish the 2008 constitution; 5) Establish a federal Union; 6) We do not want influential nationalism [Burmanisation]; and 7) All ethnic groups should be united.
On March 9th 2021, around 500 villagers from Thay Baw Boe, Maw Hkee and Su Klee village tracts, Kawkareik Township planned to hold a protest against the military coup in Myawaddy. However, they were stopped by DKBA and SAC soldiers on their way [to the city], so they could not hold the protest in Myawaddy. On the same day, local villagers from Aw Hpa Hpa Doh village tract, Kawkareik Township held a protest against the military on the Asia highway.
The local villagers from Kawkareik Township and Kruh Tuh Township held a protest on March 22nd 2021, and they plan to hold more protests in the future. They are going to hold protests in each of those townships on March 25th 2021. We heard that the SAC soldiers do not want the local villagers to hold protests. Therefore, we do not know what the situation will be on the days of the protests and we will have to monitor it. There are ongoing protests against the military because the local villagers are against military rule..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"The beginning of 2021 has been a devastating moment for civilians living in Myanmar. The military (led by Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services Min Aung Hlaing) forcibly seized power from the National League for Democracy (NLD) vice-president U Myint Swe on February 1st 2021.[2] Since the coup,[3] NLD government officials and [anti-coup] protestors have been detained [by security forces].
Since the military coup, civilians living in Myanmar who do not want the dictatorship have protested against the military coup. People living all throughout Myanmar have participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)[4] by banging metal boxes and metal barrels to express their disapproval. The [CDM] protests were started by healthcare workers and have gradually been growing with protests occurring in both Hpapun and K’Ma Maung towns. On February 5th 2021, healthcare workers from the public hospital in K’Ma Maung Town participated [began participating] in the CDM. On February 6th 2021, healthcare workers from the hospital in Hpapun Town (a 100-bed-hospital) also participated [began participating] in the CDM.
On February 8th 2021, local people who live in Hpapun Town and K’Ma Maung Town protested against the military coup because they do not accept the dictatorship. On February 9th 2021, they held another protest which included around 200 people, starting from [the area between] the Hpapun Basic Education High School and the (100-bed) hospital in Hpapun Town. From there, they marched to Section (1) of Hpapun Town. People who took part in the protest in Hpapun Town circled twice around Hpapun Town, before returning to the Hpapun Government Basic Education High School at 10:30 am. The protest was successfully finished [ended without incident].
Likewise, on February 9th 2021, there were around 600 people from K’Ma Maung Town who held a protest starting from the government kindergarten school and marching to the public hospital. The protest finished at 11:30 am. The slogans used in the protest were: 1. Release the detained NLD government officials and protesters; 2. May Aung San Suu Kyi be healthy. The protests were held by different ethnic groups and staff from different [government] departments.
On February 13th 2021, another protest was held in K’Ma Maung Town. The protest started at 9:00 am and ended at 11:00 am. Around 200 people, of different ethnic groups, participated in the protest. The protesters started marching from the football [soccer] field at K’Ma Maung Basic Education High School and circled once around the town. Then they returned and gathered at the school. No protests were held in K’Ma Maung on February 15th 2021.
Similarly, on February 13th and February 15th 2021, there were no protests in Hpapun Town.
Civilians protested in Hpapun Town on March 5th 2021. The protest was held in the western part of Hpapun Town located in K’law Hta village tract,[5] Lu Thaw Township, Mu Traw District. The protest was held with the people from the eastern and western parts of town, who gathered to protest against the military coup.
Village heads and elders took part as organisers and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[6] soldiers stood guard as security during the protest. Villages such as Nah Khoh Hkee, Nah Khoh Hta, Maw Taw Hta, Ta Ghaw Kyoh, Day Baw Khaw, Dwe Lo, Baw Thay Hkee, Ta Hkoo Doe and K’Law Day, Htee Boh Kah Hta, Day Law, Baw Hta, Hpa Hee Kaung, Pyin Ma, Nga Ein Su, Ma Htaw and many more took part. There were villagers from 100 villages in total that took part in the protest.
As for the village tracts: Meh K’Law, Meh Nyoo, Meh Hkoo, Meh Mawe, Meh P’Lee, Day Wah, Htee Th’Daw Hta, Ma Htaw, Htee Th’Blut Hta, Lay Boe Hta, and K’Taing Tee village tracts were included. [With such large numbers] the protesters split into two groups to hold the protest. One group held a protest in Hpapun Town and the other group held a protest in Way Mone village.
In Hpapun, the villagers held the protest in front of the army camp of Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[7] #642 and then they circled twice around Hpapun. The protest, which was held on March 5th 2021, [started] at 8:00 am and finished at 12:00 pm. The protesters gathered at the football [soccer] field at Hpapun High School [prior to going to the army camp]; they chanted slogans and sang their national hymn. The protest ended without incident.
The slogans used in the protest were: 1. Release the detained NLD government officials and protestors; 2. The Burma Army must withdraw their army camps from our territory; 3. Burmanisation and military dictatorship must end; 4. Abolish the 2008 Constitution; 5. Establish a federal democratic state; 6. Give us equality and self-determination; 7. The United Nations and the international community must not work with the Burma Army. Local people living in Hpapun Town provided food, water and juice for the protesters.
Even though there were no blockades to stop the villagers from protesting in Hpapun Town, villagers who participated in the protest in Way Mone were stopped for about one hour by Tatmadaw[8] LIB #434 at their gate near the southern part of their army camp. The protest organisers and officials from LIB #434 negotiated and the gate was later opened, so villagers were able to continue their protest in Hpapun Town.
Even though the protesters were confronted with obstacles, there were no casualties as a result of the protest. They were able to finish the protest at 12:00 pm without incident. No one was apprehended [by security forces] after the protest..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"In the aftermath of the November general election the intense fighting between the national armed forces (Tatmadaw) and the Arakan Army came to an unexpected halt. Since the February coup of the State Administration Council, the situation has remained delicately poised. Political sentiment is very high. But Rakhine nationalism is presently on a different cycle to political movements in other parts of the country. In this commentary Kyaw Lynn outlines why the coming months will remain a time of high tension and uncertainty in Arakan politics.
When political analysts in Myanmar and beyond discuss the role of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in the struggle against the military coup in February, the Arakan Army (AA) becomes one of the key political forces in shaping their dialogue and perceptions. The AA, the military wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), is the only armed group that can challenge the power of the national armed forces (Tatmadaw) on Myanmar’s western frontiers. This became especially evident during the 2018-20 period when the ULA-AA demonstrated its sharp resistance against the power of the centralised Myanmar state. Behind the ULA rise, there were three key features: popular support among the Rakhine population, well-trained soldiers, and a younger leadership that read the evolving mood and political situation in the country perceptively well.
Since the February coup of the State Administration Council (SAC), the situation has begun to change. Many searching questions are being asked, a challenge that is facing communities in every part of the country. In particular, intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and AA came to an unexpected halt in the aftermath of the November general election when voting was cancelled in a majority of townships in Rakhine State (Arakan). As the history books will show, this cessation in hostilities was three months in advance of the military takeover, causing many people to question the political stand of the ULA in the current crisis. Indeed some have even accused the ULA-AA of cooperating with the military SAC in seeking to control civil society and pro-democracy political movements in Rakhine State and adjoining territories in Chin State.
It is important to stress, then, that the crisis is hardly black and white, and there are many local complexities with their roots in Arakan politics and Myanmar history. From what many would regard as a “realist perspective” among local leaders, the present military coup represents more of a clash and division between the central powers among the ethnic Bamar-majority in the country: in this case, between the armed forces of the Tatmadaw and National League for Democracy (NLD). In the post-coup context, some analysts believe that the political instability in central Myanmar (Burma Proper) will provide greater leverage for the ULA-AA to advance its “Way of Rakhita” philosophy in order to achieve its “Arakan Dream”.
Many cautions nevertheless remain, and it is incorrect to argue that the ULA-AA is simply practising a policy of isolationism and neutralism while it waits to see how the current crisis unfolds. The situation is highly fraught, with new challenges emerging every day. The present unilateral ceasefires are informal; AA soldiers are participating in fighting against the Tatmadaw with EAO allies in other parts of the country; and, at the same time, ULA leaders have refrained from participating in the National Unity Government (NUG), formed by NLD MPs-elect and other anti-SAC actors to challenge the legitimacy of the SAC. In a complex and fast-changing landscape, few of the political choices are easy.
There is also a further reason to consider why the ULA-AA may wish to abstain from the current political turmoil: the membership of the electoral Arakan National Party (ANP), which has won a majority of votes in the past two elections, in the SAC. For the present, the ULA-AA leadership has not made any remark on this issue publicly. But for the majority Rakhine population this is a very controversial issue.
First, the ANP’s membership in the military council is different from that of participation in – or cooperation with – a coalition government after a general election. This is because the votes that the public gave in the polls are taken away as a consequence of the military coup. Thus it is very difficult to say that the ANP is a member of the council with the mandate of the Rakhine State electorate.
And second, it is clear that ANP participation in the military council will not imminently bring about the political autonomy and economic self-development that Arakan’s peoples have long desired. Instead, if the unilateral ceasefires break down and human rights violations recur due to a resumption of conflict, ANP membership of the SAC will be challenged by a majority among the Rakhine population. In short, ANP participation in the SAC will not reflect the will of the ULA-AA but also the Rakhine public and other nationality groups in the state.
The situation is delicately poised. As in other parts of the country, the coming months will remain a time of high tension and uncertainty in Arakan politics.
The Way of Rakhita and the Arakan Dream
The “Way of Rakhita” means to complete the end-goal of the “Arakan Dream”. In linguistic terms, it is difficult to agree a common and exact definition on these two concepts. But the general understanding is that the way of Rakhita – the Arakanese way or action of the Arakanese – signifies the achievement of a long-held political vision in Arakan: the restoration of Arakan sovereignty that was taken away, by conquest, with the ending of the Mrauk-U era in the 18th century. Equally important, both the Way of Rakhita and Arakan Dream are intended to be more inclusive for all ethnic and religious groups in Arakan compared to a more conservative Rakhine tradition in which ethno-nationalism is regarded the key to political autonomy.
It needs to be added, too, that the emergence of ULA-AA movement in Arakan politics has caused the political motivation of a majority of people in Rakhine State to move more decisively towards supporting the demand for an autonomous Arakan state. Various nationalist movements have emerged to try and restore the political status of Arakan since the fall of Arakan Kingdom. But, during the following decades, none of those movements was able to bring the hope of success to the general population.
Now, however, after two years of an intensification in armed struggle, it is not just the political elites but the general population who have become more confident in their calls for autonomy in Arakan. Presently, the Arakan political movement has reached its most prominent peak. This was recognised by the ULA-AA leader Gen. Twan Mrat Naing on the 12th anniversary of the part’s founding on 10 April 2021:
“If we are to speak the reality, it can be clearly seen that it is our generation which is fighting effectively with the strongest leadership and unity among revolutionary movements since the fall of Arakan sovereignty in 1784. From this situation, let us endeavour to improve and continuously fight to achieve the highest destination with the devotion of both mental and physical strength.”
Following these remarks, Twan Mrat Naing moved on to the questions of state building and nation building in Arakan. It is therefore interesting to look at these issues in relation to the modern-day Rakhine State. In general, it is difficult to identify the territory of Arakan based upon the “white”, “brown” or “black” colour categorisations in line with government definitions.* But it is now commonly said that that the majority of areas in northern Rakhine State, apart from urban Sittwe, are now under the influence of the ULA-AA, and the de facto administrative mechanisms are regulated on the basis of ULA-AA policies. This marks a significant change in the political landscape during the past five years, raising many questions about the potential course of events in the territory.
According to Professor Redie Bereketeab, head of the “Conflict and State Building in the Horn of Africa” project, state building includes three main elements: institutionalization, bureaucratization and democratization. In definition, institutionalization refers to the enforcement of state authority over society through specifically-created political structures and organisations. Bureaucratization is associated with a process leading to a system of rule by administrative office. And democratization denotes the construction of institutions of divided power, providing the processes by which a system of democratic governance is set in motion.
Out of these three processes, the first two are the most prominent tasks that ULA-AA authorities have been building up during the past two years. These include setting out an Arakan Authority, a judiciary system, local administrative structures and divisions (which are different from Myanmar government settings), and regulating taxation, health, education and other social issues. In term of legitimacy, however, it is hard to define ULA-AA administration as the legal-rational authority because it is mixed with other important elements, including charismatic leadership, nationalism and military-political performance. As a result, to move on to the next stage of democratization, the ULA-AA – as a revolutionary movement – still has many limitations, both at the individual level and in the division of power among leadership structures.
Another main area of Twan Mrat Naing’s speech concerned nation building. Although there is no common definition, nation building is mostly defined as the task of constructing or structuring a national identity, using the power of the state as well as the participation of civil society actors. As modern history shows, this is an especially pertinent issue in Rakhine State at present.
In a multi-ethnic land such as Arakan, national identity needs to be “supra-ethnic”, based upon political values and principles rather than cultural ones. But this task has become much more complicated during the past decade, with the exodus of over a million Rohingya people into Bangladesh and the displacement in Tatmadaw operations of over 200,000 Rakhine, Chin, Mro and other peoples in Rakhine State and the Chin State borderlands. It is vital that all groups participate in the challenges creating a national identity and making decisions on the future of Arakan society. But, in these processes, much may depend on how ULA-AA administration is perceived in handling inter-ethnic relations in areas where it is the dominant authority. It will also be important to see how political and civil society organisations react among the different communities towards the objective of agreeing national goals through consensus and shared inter-communication.
For the moment, the impartiality, decisiveness and results-oriented manner, in most cases, of the current ULA judiciary system has been generally welcomed within minority communities, including the Rohingya, where its authority reaches. At least, ULA administration is not regarded as worse than Myanmar government practices. Nevertheless Arakan nation building will need to move on from the present situation of peaceful coexistence to an ethnically harmonious society which enjoys and celebrates cultural diversity of all kinds. There is still a long way to go.
In summary, to sustain legitimacy and authority in pursuit of the Arakan Dream, much will depend on how effectively the ULA can change its administrative structures from the culture of a revolutionary liberation movement to one of civic governance in which all citizens are treated on the basis of transparent and equitably-defined rules and regulations.
The Nature of Arakan Politics
In 21st century society, there are two main political pulling forces that have evolved from Arakan’s past. The first has developed since the fall of Mrauk-U and continued for over two hundred years. The ultimate goal of this political force is to build power-seeking structures and institutions, such as the creation of an independent and autonomous Arakan state, and the means to carry this out are the combined forces of nationalism and collectivism. In the modern era, this movement is mainly represented by the ULA-AA as well as some smaller political organisations among the Rakhine population.
The second force, in contrast, is quite new, developing since the second half of 20th century. But currently, following ten years of democratization, manifestations of this trend are extensive and intensive. The ultimate aim of this force is to create power-restraining institutions in the creation of an Arakan society that embraces democratic accountability and the rule of law, and the means to achieve this is liberal individualism. This grouping is broader and generally expressed by civil society organisations and individual activists, reformers and scholars.
It should be mentioned, though, that the two forces should not be regarded as distinct. ULA leaders have expressed the pro-democracy values of the second force, while political actors among the second group support the nationalist values of the first force. As a result, Arakan society is presently seen to be more united and organised than during previous governmental eras in modern history. At the same time, it needs to be qualified that the key audience for the second trend in Arakan politics are the younger generation, whereas the majority of the Arakan population are in favour of the more overt nationalism of the first force.
From this, two conclusions can be drawn. The consolidation of liberal individualism will face limitations until its supporters achieve recognisable rights and influence on the political stage. And, looking to the current trends and principles in Arakan politics and society, the politics of realism will be more impactful than those of political liberalism.
* “White” refers to government-controlled, “brown” to mixed areas, and “black” to those controlled by EAOs. Arakan was historically a territory of much greater size than the present-day Rakhine State. Since Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the Arakan Hill Tracts, where the ULA-AA is also active, have been included under the administration of what has become the modern-day Chin State.
Kyaw Lynn is a post-graduate student mastering in Political Science at the University of Yangon. He is also a freelance political analyst in Yangon as well as one of the founders of the Institute for Peace and Governance..."
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The Transnational Institute (TNI)
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2021-06-12
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Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Karen State - general articles and reports, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Burma's ethnic opposition, Rakhine (Arakanese) - cultural, political
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"Following the February coup, the violence used by the security forces against civilian protestors in Myanmar’s towns and cities has shocked public opinion around the world. But, as Naw Hsa Moo and Dominique Dillabough-Lefebvre explain in this commentary, such tactics have long been used by the Myanmar armed forces in military operations in the country’s ethnic states and regions. Awareness is now building and, as they argue, the military coup has brought new understanding and sympathy between pro-democracy and ethnic nationality movements.
Since the seizure of power by the military State Administration Council (SAC) on 1 February, mass protests have swept towns and cities in every state and region in Myanmar. As the days have passed by, civilians have faced the brunt of an increasingly aggressive response from the national armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, whose indiscriminate use of force has now led to over 70 killed, countless injured, and more than 2000 people detained. And yet, despite the heightened use of military force, the general public throughout the country continue to stand in defiance, leading creative protests, with people of diverse ethnicities and backgrounds joining strikes and the civil disobedience movement.
All nationality peoples are being impacted. For lowland Bamar (Burman) people, the majority ethnic group, the current repression against civilians carries terrifying reverberations of past violent state-led responses towards demonstrators, most notably during the 1988 pro-democracy protests. However, for those living in many non-Bamar areas, the militarisation and pervasive sense of fear accompanying current events are sadly all too familiar. For many decades, they have been regular features of daily life, notably in the Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan States.
Karen State in Myanmar’s Southeast is a poignant example of such struggles. Home to what is often considered the world’s longest-running civil war, conflict has escalated between the Tatmadaw and the armed opposition Karen National Union (KNU), with over 6,000 civilians displaced from their villages since the Tatmadaw intensified military operations in December 2020. The majority people living here identify as Karen, one of the country’s largest nationality groups, and are largely farming communities living in forested hills and winding valleys that run down the Thailand border. In response to the twin threats of military incursions and the SAC coup, villagers across Kler Lwee Htu (Nyaunglebin) and Mutraw (Hpapun) Districts have been regularly demonstrating, demanding the removal of the Tatmadaw from their lands and expressing solidarity with the protest movement across the country.
Whether in conditions of war or peace, Karen communities have faced the same challenges in every era of government since the country’s independence in 1948. A ceasefire was agreed between the government and the KNU in 2012 but, to date, this has not brought about a significant reduction in militarisation in many areas. Rather, the patterns of conflict and Tatmadaw encroachment have continued. In particular, the recent increase in Tatmadaw activity is linked to road-building, the expansion of a network of military roads in northern Karen State that first began during offensives in the 1990s.
The detrimental consequences for local villagers are profound. Naw Ghay Hai is the principal of Keh Der school in Kler Lwee Htu District in the KNU 3rd Brigade area. But, as she explained, there is no benefit to the local population: only an increase in land loss and fear:
“The road being built crosses through the paddy fields of local farmers, destroying the irrigation systems in the fields, seriously affecting the livelihoods of local people. They [Tatmadaw troops] build camps nearby that are causing the displacement of local villagers, and they are shelling around nearby villages. When local people hear the sound of guns and mortars, they obviously flee out of fear, and don’t dare to return.”
The latest military incursions are now compounding a worsening pattern of land loss and displacement that has built up among the local population over several decades. According to the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People, approximately 30,000 people have been displaced in the local area since Tatmadaw “regional clearance” operations were initiated in the 1990s. Military offensives and continuing clashes have caused a loss of shelter, a lack of access to healthcare and difficulties in delivering food supplies to displaced villagers, putting children and elderly people especially at risk. Displaced villagers now live scattered in different locations in several townships across northern Karen State.
For many communities, this is not their first experience of flight. Villagers in Keh Der village tract recently explained to staff members from KESAN, a Karen civil society organisation, that they had started to hear the distant sound of gunshots and shelling from 12 December last year. Although this initially appeared to be occurring some way from their village, everyone was worried. Then, on 11 February – ten days after the coup, Tatmadaw forces moved closer to the village and people started to flee. As the troops moved in, they destroyed the food stores of displaced farmers, seized their livestock, burnt down their houses and, in nearby areas, forced villagers to act as porters to carry supplies for them as they continued their military sweep.
For the local peoples, this latest displacement brought back many memories of sufferings in the past. Constant insecurity and the arbitrary use of force have long been a mainstay in the lives of local people in this region. Saw Lo Wah, head of Keh Der village tract, remembered first fleeing from the Tatmadaw as a child in the 1960s. Those who were captured were forced by the soldiers to work as porters, an especially pervasive and egregious abuse of human rights. As he explained:
“Many people were injured or killed when they worked as porters for the military. For example, my father stepped on a landmine when he was a porter for the Tatmadaw. This was the case for many people as the Tatmadaw used Karen villagers to sweep the area for landmines, usually at gunpoint.”
Such experiences continued into adulthood, with Saw Lo Wah describing the situation as having grown “increasingly worse” during the late 1990s:
“When the military came, one family had to flee so quickly that they were unable to take their two children from their home, and the Burmese military burnt down their house. When the family returned, the children were gone.”
This was by no means the end of local suffering. For his part, Saw Lo Wah had to build his own home on three subsequent occasions, but each time Tatmadaw troops burned it down again, with all of his family’s possessions inside.
After six decades of military-dominated rule and a new regime in power, Saw Lo Wah’s assessment is stark. But he is expressing a view of the latest military takeover that can be frequently heard among communities in different parts of the country today:
“This is the root cause of our poverty. The Tatmadaw doesn’t care if you are young or old, male or female, they will kill everybody. They spare nobody.”.....A backdrop of conflict: militarisation as a way of life: Internal military conflicts have long been central to the nation-building ambitions of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar. In a country where national identity has long been linked to a particularly “racialised” vision of ethnicity, the national armed forces have been engaged in protracted warfare with a wide range of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), amongst them the KNU, since independence from Great Britain in 1948. During these years, a simplistic vision of national politics has often pervaded popular imagination and discourse. In recent decades, this vision has been marked by the country’s democratic hero, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), who – it was hoped – were gradually leading the country on a path away from state failure and international isolationism towards democratisation and respect for human rights.
These expectations reached a pinnacle when the NLD won the 2015 general election, assuming government office the following year. Yet amidst the period of economic liberalisation that followed the 2011 shift to a nominally civilian system of government, armed conflicts have persisted in ethnic nationality areas outside of the Bamar-dominated heartlands in the centre of the country. While the army's blood-stained campaign against the Rohingya population in 2017 was the subject of much international media coverage, the Tatmadaw has also continued to carry out “anti-insurgency” campaigns against EAOs among several other nationality groups, including the Buddhist Rakhine people who also hail from Rakhine State. The cycles of conflict within the country are yet to be ended.
Many nationality peoples have been affected. Following the expulsion of over 750,000 Rohingya people, the Tatmadaw became locked in an increasingly bloody conflict with an emergent Rakhine force known as the United League of Army-Arakan Army (ULA-AA). But, after the NLD’s accession to office, the Tatmadaw also escalated military “clearance operations” forcibly displacing local populations in the Kachin, Karen and Shan States as well, severely impacting on the security and livelihoods of farming communities who depend on land for their survival.
Accurate humanitarian statistics are difficult to assemble from different parts of the country. But up to 10,000 people are believed to have died during Tatmadaw operations in the past five years, while over a million civilians are currently displaced from their homes, either living as refugees in neighbouring countries or in displacement camps in the hills. The evidence of a pervasive culture of human rights violations is deeply troubling. Today Tatmadaw actions during the events of the past few years are the focus of ongoing human rights investigations for potential war crimes by the International Criminal Court, International Court of Justice and UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
Finding a political language, though, that unites peoples and addresses the conflict challenges in inclusive ways has historically proven difficult. Distinctions between “state” and “non-state” actors have often been opaque within the geographic boundaries of Myanmar. Shifting alliances between the Tatmadaw, ethnic nationality forces, government-backed militias and local military strongmen have been one of the most persistent realities in defining the functioning of “State” in many parts of the country. Today over 20 EAOs remain active in different nationality lands, from Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal to the Tanintharyi Region in Myanmar’s far south.
In this context, projections of national unity become a reflection of the complex relationship between the Tatmadaw at the political centre and the peripheries where diverse nationality peoples live in uplands surrounding the Ayeyarwady plains. Over the decades, continued exploitation of the wealth of the resource-rich borderlands has been central to the development of Myanmar state, much in the same way that the plunder of native lands, slavery and a western expansionism was central in the shaping of the American national imaginary. Much of this economy is secretive and under-reported, but Myanmar’s ethnic states are home to large mineral reserves, illicit drug production and lucrative cross-border trades from which powerful elites and outside interests – not local peoples – mostly profit.
Compounding the marginalisation of local peoples, there is often a large knowledge gap in the outside world about the harsh living conditions in the country’s conflict zones. Such a lack of understanding is a constant source of frustration for ethnic nationality peoples trying to make common cause with their fellow countryman, yet find themselves stymied by urban-rural differences as well as ethnic, religious and linguistic divides. Even many well-informed urban Burmese only have a limited grasp of what is happening in the hills. The same lack of awareness exists in the international community, where the confusing array of armed groups poses significant barriers for foreign journalists, policy-makers and other outside actors who seek to understand some of the longest-running conflicts in modern Asian history.
For this reason, the failure of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership to address conflict and the grievances of non-Bamar peoples remains one of the party’s most notable failures during its time in government office. The 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which the NLD-led administration inherited from its quasi-civilian predecessor, was a cornerstone in a faltering peace process that not only failed to include a majority of the strongest EAOs in the country but was also one in which the none of three words in its title could be said to be true: i.e. it was not nationwide, a ceasefire or an agreement.
To try and pick up the political momentum, the NLD inaugurated a 21st Century Panglong Conference in August 2016 with a promise to re-energise the peace process. But the government never acknowledged the NCA’s many failings. The NCA’s largest signatories in terms of EAO combatants – the KNU and Restoration Council of Shan State – could hardly be seen to be representative of the entire country and both continued to clash with the Tatmadaw. At the same time, most of the eight other EAOs that signed the NCA were significantly smaller, some of which had never seriously fought with the government while others, notably the Chin National Front, had not had protracted clashes with the Tatmadaw since the early 1990s.
Equally damaging to the credibility of the NCA, there were powerful and well-organised EAOs in the north of the country that were either not allowed by the Tatmadaw to join the accord or decided to boycott the process altogether. Pre-eminent EAOs which never joined the NCA include the United Wa State Party and Shan State Progress Party which have formal ceasefires with the government, and the Kachin Independence Organisation, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and ULA-AA that do not.
The ethno-political landscape is now highly uncertain. Following the coup, the NCA EAO-signatories collectively issued a statement on 20 February refusing to recognise the new regime as a legitimate power, and leading to a cessation of further talks. This represents a de facto breakdown in a ceasefire which, since its inception, had given little assurances to NCA signatories that the Myanmar armed forces would hold true to their word. For ceasefire EAOs, this represents a dilemma. According to Lt-Col. Saw La Shwe Hai from the KNU’s armed wing, Tatmadaw officers claim to follow the NCA codes of conduct and that they will try to resolve issues through political dialogue, but they do not follow through in practice:
“Instead they try and control more territory, build roads and further infrastructure and keep sending more reinforcements… They are trying to gradually control our area, bit by bit, but pretend they are following agreements… they couldn’t be lying any more”.
For ethnic nationality communities in the conflict-zones, such experiences are hardly new. But there is evidence that the scale of human rights violations across the country since the SAC’s seizure of power is bringing about a change in attitudes among the Bamar-majority population as well. Amidst the protests in the cities, incidents are being documented that the Myanmar military has been looting shops and houses, stealing food from street vendors and taking livestock from markets. Understanding the reality of such violence from the perspective of those living in the ethnic states and borderlands sheds light on the nature of the ethnocratic state-building policies of governments since independence and the ideology of the Tatmadaw.
Echoing this, a vocal minority of Bamar people have begun apologising for failing to stand behind ethnic peoples as they faced persecution. A female activist, who asked to remain anonymous, explained that “the intimidation, harassment and violence by the police and soldiers are nothing new” but that the “the violence and oppression has now been extended to the cities”. She continued:
“We are not even experiencing the brutality of the military yet in the cities, like those people in Rakhine experienced every day and every night. Those in Kachin. Those in Karen. Those in Shan. Now we too have to defend ourselves.”.....Conclusion: As the military coup enters its second month, people across the country are increasingly faced with the striking parallels between the ongoing indiscriminate use of force, intimidation and suppression against anti-coup protestors and civilians in the towns and the military’s historical and ongoing systematic brutality in Myanmar’s ethnically diverse borderlands. For populations in these areas, this has long been part of their lived experience. But for many young Bamar people in the cities, a growing awareness of this offers important lessons for a country coming to grips with the reinstatement of a military dictatorship amidst longstanding ethnic strife.
Such sentiments are not only rising in urban areas. Much of Myanmar’s largely rural population have also long faced the brunt of military-enabled land confiscations and repressive practices, keeping the majority of the population in poverty. As journalist and author Carlos Sardiña Galache succinctly put it:
“The Tatmadaw has always portrayed itself as the only institution capable of preserving Burma's unity, and this coup is proving the point in an unintended way: virtually the whole country seems to be united in rejecting the coup and the Tatmadaw itself.”
Now that these diverse groups are coming together, new alliances are beginning to emerge amidst the chaos. Although Myanmar’s future remains far from certain, the coup has created circumstances through which people in towns and cities across the country can better empathise with the long-suffering plight of residents of the war-torn lands inhabited by the Karens and other ethnic nationality peoples.
Written in collaboration with members of the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) conducting on the ground interviews..."
Source/publisher:
The Transnational Institute (TNI)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-12
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, TNI-BCN Project on Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Anti-coup protesters, Political History
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According to a timeline announced on Monday, verdicts in the cases against the state counsellor must be reached by mid-August
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"The ongoing trial against state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi must be completed within 180 days, a judge in Naypyitaw declared on Monday.
Zabuthiri Township judge Maung Maung Lwin made the remark during Suu Kyi’s second in-person hearing since she and members of her cabinet were first charged on February 16.
Suu Kyi, who is 75, faces a total of six charges—five in Naypyitaw and one in Yangon—and a prison sentence of up to 26 years. She has been in military custody since her government was ousted from power in a coup on February 1.
The timeline announced on Monday applies to the cases being tried in Naypyitaw and means that the court there will have to issue its verdicts before the middle of August.
Monday’s hearing was held at an “exclusive court” specially designed for the trials of Suu Kyi and two other detained cabinet members—president Win Myint and Myo Aung, the chair of the Naypyitaw Council.
Starting next week, hearings will take place every Monday and Tuesday, with the court completing its questioning of the plaintiff by June 28, the judge said at the hearing.
Suu Kyi has been accused of incitement and violating the Official Secrets Act and the Telecommunications Law. She has also been charged with illegally importing walkie-talkies and faces two charges of breaching Covid-19 protocols during last year’s election campaign.
Hearings for the incitement case will take place every Monday together with Win Myint and Myo Aung, who are being tried for the same offence, according to lawyer Khin Maung Zaw, the head of her defence team.
Suu Kyi learned for the first time on Monday that the Supreme Court in Naypyitaw had taken over the case filed against her under the Official Secrets Act, her lawyer said.
That case, which also applies to three of her cabinet ministers and her economic advisor Sean Turnell, was originally filed at the Yangon Eastern District Court in late March.
The Supreme Court announced on May 31 that the next hearing in the case would be held on June 23. It also stated that the defendants would be representing themselves.
However, her lawyer said that these decisions were made without Suu Kyi’s consent.
“She said she didn’t know about the changes. She also didn’t say she would represent herself. She wants her lawyers to represent her in all of her cases,” Khin Maung Zaw told Myanmar Now.
Before the hour-long hearing, Suu Kyi met with her defence team for about 30 minutes, according to her lawyer.
During the meeting, he said, Suu Kyi asked for help in finding a way to meet expenses that she has incurred during her detention.
Suu Kyi has been detained at an undisclosed location together with eight other individuals and her pet dog Taichido, according to her defence team.
“She’s spending her own money, without anyone’s support, month by month. So she asked us to see how we can help with this,” said Khin Maung Zaw.
“The family living with her is running out of money. The military council has said they would provide her with the medicine she needs biweekly, but she doesn’t want that,” said Min Min Soe, another lawyer on her legal team.
The lawyers said they need to negotiate with the junta to provide an emergency budget for the detained state counsellor and those living with her.
Otherwise, they said, Suu Kyi seemed to be faring fairly well under the circumstances.
“She’s generally healthy,” said Khin Maung Zaw..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-08
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About Aung San Suu Kyi, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Myanmar’s military regime on Monday sentenced the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s detained Magwe Region chief minister, Dr. Aung Moe Nyo, who is also the party’s secretary, to two years in prison on an incitement charge.
He is the first head of a state or region to be sentenced to a prison term by the regime since the Feb. 1 coup.
Dr. Aung Moe Nyo sits on the NLD’s secretariat board. He was charged under Article 505(b) of the Penal Code, accused of publishing statements declaring the junta’s State Administrative Council to be unlawful.
A regime court on Monday handed down the maximum penalty to the deposed chief minister, who has been detained for more than four months, an NLD member in Magwe Region said.
In addition to the case in which he was sentenced, Dr. Aung Moe Nyo faces an additional charge brought by the regime under the Natural Disaster Management Law, the party member said. If found guilty, he would likely face an additional three-year prison sentence.
The chief minister was reelected in his constituency in Magwe Region in the 2020 general election.
All 14 state and regional chief ministers appointed by the NLD were detained on Feb. 1 when the military staged a coup. Only the Chin State chief minister has been released; the 13 others are still in military custody or prison, or under house arrest.
Four other chief ministers have also been charged with incitement under Article 505(b).
The same charge was also brought by the regime against NLD chairwoman Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and vice chairs U Win Myint and Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, who were also arrested on Feb. 1..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-08
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles on the NLD, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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CDF fighters claim to have killed some 100 junta soldiers with handmade guns since late April.
Description:
"The volunteer militiamen of Myanmar’s Chin state have outgunned their better-equipped antagonists in the military in recent weeks of fighting with little more than decades-old rifles and say their hunting traditions and natural “spirit of resistance” will lead them to victory over the junta.
Members of the Chinland Defense Force (CDF), based in the poorest of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions, have squared off with troops loyal to the regime since late April in response to brutal military repression of peaceful protests that erupted soon after the Feb. 1 coup d’état that toppled national leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government.
The network of ragtag fighters has reported killing some 100 junta soldiers and torching at least 10 military vehicles since then, shocking observers with their record of success against Southeast Asia’s second largest army using only slingshots and the same crude flintlock “Tumee” rifles their forefathers used to fight off British colonizers in the 1880s.
And while the military in mid-May occupied the CDF stronghold of Mindat with a force of some 1,000 soldiers reportedly using local residents as human shields, bringing an end to daily fighting in the region, militiamen recently told RFA’s Myanmar Service that they have what it takes to protect their homeland and help remove the junta from power.
A CDF member from Mindat, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisal, said that the militia’s comparatively crude equipment is more than capable of matching the military’s heavy artillery and air strikes, citing the number of casualties the group has inflicted.
“We Chin are born with a spirit of resistance and a natural hatred of the military regime,” he said of the junta, which he condemned for overthrowing civilian rule after free and fair elections during the coronavirus pandemic.
“Our people became outraged and now they have exploded. We began gathering guns as soon as we heard about the shooting and killing of protesters in lower Myanmar ... and we intend to fight back if they start doing the same in Chin state,” he added.
“I have seen the people in lower Myanmar fighting back using catapults and other small guns. We will not remain quiet as we have Tumee rifles in almost every household in Chin state.”.....Rifle traditions: The British empire granted the Chin the right to use Tumee rifles for hunting bears, wild boars, deer, tigers and other wildlife during its 1824-1948 colonial rule of Myanmar, then called Burma.
The rifles, which traditionally used gunpowder produced from animal dung and the leaves of toxic plants, were meticulously maintained and duplicated through the years, and eventually used to resist British rule during the First and Second World Wars.
While Tumee rifles are found in most Chin households, few are registered with the government. The more modern versions are powered with ammunition produced with materials easily found in the marketplace.
With a range of between 50 and 100 feet, the weapons are reloaded by filling the barrel with gunpowder—a process that can take around three minutes.
Another CDF member in Mindat, who also declined to be named, said that after clashes erupted with the military in April, “at least 20 or so people from between 40 and 60 villages” grabbed their weapons to join the fight.
“All of them are hunters, so they don’t need any military training,” he said. “They know these mountains and jungles. They can navigate well. They go straight to where the gunfire comes from and can easily shoot everyone who is wearing a uniform.”
He compared firing at troops to shooting “animals running in the forest,” adding that a lack of a formal strategy had helped the CDF to outwit its military opponents.
“There is no centralized organizing through which we gather and march toward the battle, but no one in our ranks will retreat,” he said.
“We march forward as we shoot … and we fire one gunshot at a time. We have to refill our ammunition to shoot again, and that’s why we have to aim very carefully. We cannot afford to waste bullets.”
Inspiring rebellion
The success of the CDF has inspired resistance against the military in neighboring Sagaing region’s Kalay township as well as other townships in northern Chin state, where ethnic Chin communities are seeing similar results with their own Tumee rifle rebellions.
“In our Chin mountains, there are traditional laws that have been applied since ancient times,” a resident told RFA when asked about the odds of overcoming a military campaign conducted by well-supplied and trained soldiers.
“We have traditional rules and regulations applied to the local people. These lands are ours. We have our own culture. So, we will not allow to the military regime to invade us.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-05
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Individual Documents
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Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political, Chin discussion groups, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Daw May Thu is not proud to serve under the military regime. Quite the opposite: she despises it and fervently prays it will fall. Yet while she seethes with resentment and shame, she continues to serve in her position at the Ministry of Home Affairs in Nay Pyi Taw.
“It’s not wrong to think of me as a coward, because many people are so determined and made bold decisions to join [the Civil Disobedience Movement],” said May Thu. Along with others interviewed for this report, she is given a pseudonym to avoid reprisals.
“Sometimes when I see [social media] posts that criticise non-CDM people, I start to sweat. My whole body becomes warm and I feel so ashamed,” she said.
Since the February coup, hundreds of thousands of civil servants have gone on strike throughout the country. The strike is one element of the CDM, which includes boycotts of military-linked companies and their products, and other activities aimed at disrupting the junta’s efforts to consolidate control over the country. The CDM has caused serious disruption to healthcare, education, banking and transport services, and cracks are also showing in the police, local administration and other sectors.
As the regime suspends contracts, issues arrest warrants, evicts the families of public servants and hunts down those refusing to report to work, CDM participants have earned strong support domestically and internationally. Underground funding networks have raised hundreds of thousands of dollars to support striking workers, and in March, the CDM was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.
The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, comprised of lawmakers ousted by the coup, endorsed the movement within weeks of the first strikes, and in March said it would guarantee that people who joined the CDM could return to their posts under a future civilian government. The following month, the CRPH-appointed interim National Unity Government, which is serving in parallel to the regime, announced that it would use funds donated to the CRPH to pay the salaries of striking civil servants.
Meanwhile, those who have stayed in their posts have faced social punishment, a strategy of naming and shaming people connected with the military or supporting the regime. As the military’s acts of terror have increased in frequency and violence, hostility towards those who are not participating in the CDM has only grown.
At times, anger towards these individuals has turned violent. On May 4, Myanmar Now reported a series of explosions at a court, education office, and public hospital compound in Magway Region’s Myaing Township, with residents attributing the blasts to CDM supporters, and on June 2, Democratic Voice of Burma reported that a bomb exploded at the house of a non-CDM teacher in the town of Mogok in Mandalay Region.
Frontier interviewed five civil servants who chose not to join the CDM. All said they had opposed the coup and contemplated joining the movement, but had decided to stay at their posts for reasons ranging from concern for their families, fears for their safety and loyalty to like-minded colleagues. Some also thought they could do more to help the people by continuing to work rather than going on strike or resigning.
May Thu said that if, as she expects, the junta eventually falls, she and other non-striking colleagues will be prepared to accept any censure or punishment for their choice.
“When the [civilian] government wins, if CDM people point their fingers and laugh, we will happily leave our office,” she said. “All I want is for the coup to fail and the CRPH to win.”
“If they ask us to leave in humiliation … we will not hesitate to do so.”
‘Becoming like Pyongyang’
On the day of the coup, May Thu and her colleagues were called to a meeting and told that as civil servants they must continue to do their duties regardless of who was in power.
“The majority of my colleagues, maybe two-thirds, were disappointed to learn about the coup. On that day, we weren’t motivated to work anymore,” said May Thu.
For a few weeks, however, some hope lingered that the protests would succeed and military rule would be short-lived. May Thu and like-minded colleagues joined the nationwide evening ritual of banging pots and pans to symbolically “drive out evil”.
They also watched with excitement and admiration as others left their posts. Most did this by resigning rather than going on strike, due to fear of arrest, although May Thu said this has become less common in recent weeks because the regime has started denying resignation requests.
“Many of my colleagues couldn’t stand it anymore and decided to resign not long after the coup … We just watched them and respected them for their decisions,” she said.
But as the days passed, her optimism faded. Shots were fired at an apartment where people were banging pots and pans, and the practice gradually stopped in her compound. May Thu watched as the CDM’s momentum in her office also fizzled out. “At first, it seemed like the CDM was going to succeed, and many people were planning to leave, but for so many reasons, some of us changed our minds,” she said.
Life for civil servants in Nay Pyi Taw has also grown increasingly regimented. “They started to order us to do things that we didn’t want to do,” May Thu said. She and her colleagues are required to inform the authorities about visitors to their dormitories, for example, and now have to sign in twice a day at the office. They have even been ordered to buy “low quality” cloth for their uniforms at a “high price” from a military-run enterprise and sew them according to detailed specifications. “It starts from how many buttons we can sew and if we change it a bit, it can cause problems,” May Thu said. “We must follow their instructions exactly.”
“We joke among ourselves that our place is becoming like Pyongyang,” she added, referring to the capital of North Korea, a totalitarian dictatorship.
Camaraderie with her colleagues has helped her cope with the situation, but despondency often overwhelms May Thu.
“We don’t feel like doing anything at the office. Every day, we have to sit and read [the regime’s] orders. We know they will bring nothing good for the country … We just want to cry.”
May Thu reached a breaking point during the Thingyan holiday in mid-April, when she and her colleagues were required to participate in traditional Myanmar dancing on a stage at a military-run event.
Some feigned stomach aches, but the ruse was unsuccessful because they were unable to present a doctor’s certificate. “You could count with one hand those who really enjoyed celebrating Thingyan,” said May Thu, who broke into tears when describing the experience. “We had to dance, despite our sadness.”
After Thingyan, she called her parents and told them she was coming home, but changed her mind after speaking with female colleagues. “We all live together as a family,” she said. “I don’t want to break our relationship.”
May Thu also believes that leaving her post could do more harm than good. “If we joined the CDM and left the office, military staff would surely replace us,” she said.
“I know that there are many people who will say, ‘You decided to stay, so why are you complaining?’ … If I were them, I might say the same thing to non-CDM people. Nonetheless, I still hope there’s some people who’ll understand our choice and sympathise with us.”
Safeguarding families
Family considerations are a powerful reason why some civil servants have not joined the CDM. “[My mother] worked really hard so I could become a doctor,” said Dr Paing Htoo, who works at a public hospital in Kayin State. He supports his single mother and a younger sibling, who would have no income if he were detained.
More than 150 health workers have so far been arrested for joining the CDM, and the junta has issued arrest warrants for 400 striking doctors, according to the Humanitarian Data Exchange. “I consider my family more than myself,” said Paing Htoo. “I’m worried that if I join the CDM, I might get arrested and it would break my mother’s heart.”
Paing Htoo also believes he can help his community by continuing to serve patients, especially the elderly and poor.
“I completely agree that the coup is an injustice,” he said, “but most people here depend on the services [my hospital] provides. By continuing to work here, I can give a little help to those in need.”
Although he worries about facing harassment or threats for his decision not to join the CDM, he hopes his integrity will protect him. “According to my [Buddhist] religion, if you do good things, merit can save you from danger,” he said.
High CDM participation in the education sector prompted the regime to suspend more than 125,000 CDM teachers throughout the country in May, but some in the profession have felt unable to join the mass strike. Although Roi Ja, a primary school teacher and single mother in Kachin State, was upset about the coup, she decided not to join the CDM because of her family responsibilities. “Of course, I would prefer to work under the previous government than the military,” she said. “I really wish the coup would fail. I would definitely join the CDM if I had another secure job and received enough to support my children.”
With arrest warrants out for more than 200 teachers, fear of arrest also deterred Roi Ja from going on strike. “I would have to be alert all the time,” she said, adding, “I couldn’t easily relocate [and go into hiding], since I have a big family and other responsibilities.”
Fearing social punishment, however, she has hidden her decision from her colleagues who are in the CDM . “I feel guilty and ashamed,” she said.
U Kaung Myat, an election official who asked that his location not be revealed, became the sole income-earner for his family of four after his wife joined the CDM. He worries about being dismissed from his post should he also join the CDM, but also fears being promoted should he stay in his role. “If I am offered [a promotion], it will be the hardest decision … I will hesitate because many people have given their lives,” he said.
Like many Union Election Commission staff across the country, he was detained shortly after the coup when the junta pressured election officials to back its unsubstantiated voting fraud claims, in an effort to discredit the National League for Democracy’s victory in November’s election.
Having spent more than a month in custody, Kaung Myat fears being arrested again. “I was abducted once. I don’t want to experience it twice,” he said.. “If I was single, I could run and hide somewhere, but I have two children and my wife is pregnant.”
Fighting from inside
U Kyaw Kyaw, a police officer in Chin State, said his work had become more dangerous since the coup but he had resolved to remain in his job. “I don’t feel safe, because people’s reactions to us before and after the coup have changed,” he said. “I am especially worried about being attacked or shot when I go outside.”
Civilians in cities and towns across the country have been arming themselves since late March to defend their communities from regime forces, and recently, unknown assailants fired tumi hunting rifles at the police station where Kyaw Kyaw works.
Although Kyaw Kyaw initially contemplated joining the CDM, the news that one of his colleagues who had joined the movement was arrested while trying to cross the border to India has deterred him, as has a sense of obligation to the oath he took when joining the police force. “Personally, I don’t like the military dictatorship, but this is politics and I [have to] step aside from politics,” he said. “We took an oath to the country under Myanmar’s flag when we started working in the police force … We are just civil servants and we have to carry out our duties.”
Ko Thu Rain, a CDM organiser who focuses on police defectors, said he had had to try new tactics when seeking to support holdouts like Kyaw Kyaw in resisting the regime
The CRPH declared March 31 as the deadline for civil servants to join the CDM, and whether or not this was decisive, Thu Rain acknowledged that the rate of people joining from within the police force was slowing. Although he estimated that 95 percent of police officers were opposed to the coup, he said many of those left felt too fearful to leave their post.
“All the risk-takers have already become CDM,” Thu Rain said. “ Now I cannot convince people to join the CDM.” Instead, his support network is focusing on encouraging police who remained at their posts to fight the system from within, by using their authority to help people through acts of leniency.
“[Previously], people got involved in the CDM by running away from the office. Now, non-CDM people will get involved in a different way,” he said.
Thu Rain hopes that this covert strategy need only be temporary, until ethnic armed groups and newly-formed People’s Defence Forces take control of cities and towns that could serve as safe havens for defecting police and other civil servants. Once this begins, he predicts that a domino effect will follow.
“If one very strong police station [or force] goes against the military, then every police force in Myanmar will [rise up],” he said. “They are waiting for that time, but they don’t know who is going to do that … They cannot take the risk if it is not a good time. They only have one [chance]”
Thu Rain said that every move from now on will need to be weighed carefully, and that past practises in the movement must be re-thought.
“The CDM people did their best [but] it is time to change the strategy,” he said. “We have to approach it in a clever way; [only] then we can win this fight.” ..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"After Myanmar’s grabbed power on February 1, they immediately faced strong resistance from citizens seeking to restore civilian rule. This resistance grew into a nationwide movement that attracted global support. The three-month anniversary of the coup was in fact marked by protests across the world which came to be known as “Global Myanmar Spring Revolution Day”.
Myanmar’s “Spring Revolution” aims to unite the country’s citizens in strong rejection of the coup and a call for the return of democratic rule. It encompasses all forms of resistance, including the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), community actions, social media protests, and even the use of guerilla tactics and armed resistance against attacks by security forces.
The Spring Revolution follows the tradition of previous anti-junta movements such as the “’88 Pro-Democracy Uprising” in 1988, and the “Saffron Revolution” led by Buddhist monks in 2007. Today’s Spring Revolution has maximized the creative use of digital tools in coordinating protests and promoting the goals of the democracy movement. It has also striven to be more inclusive, challenging gender and racial prejudices and seeking to build solidarity across Myanmar’s many ethnic communities.
Since day one of the coup, Global Voices has documented the resistance movement in Myanmar, partnering with independent media groups and relying on reports by local researchers and citizen journalists highlighting the situation across Myanmar’s communities.
This special coverage section continues our special coverage, focusing on the coup’s social impact and the ongoing defiance of Myanmar’s citizens as they challenge the actions and legitimacy of the military regime..
We were deeply inspired by the words a citizen journalist shared with us during a webinar we hosted in April about the situation in Myanmar:
The military junta could only terrorize our country, but they can’t rule. They could shoot, kill and arrest our young heroes called “Spring flowers” but they can’t avoid Burma’s Spring..."
Source/publisher:
"Global Voices"
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Spring Revolution, Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Description:
"Myanmar’s coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has renamed a controversial bridge in Mon State whose naming caused friction between the National League for Democracy (NLD) government and local residents four years ago.
Originally named the General Aung San Bridge (Belu Island), the bridge was retitled the Thanlwin Bridge (Chaungzon) by the junta on Tuesday. The bridge spans the Salween River linking Mawlamyine and Chaungzon Townships.
Local residents in Mon State strongly opposed the NLD government’s 2017 decision to name the bridge after independence hero Gen Aung San, preferring names like Chaungzon Bridge or Yarmanya, which means ‘Mon State’ in the Mon language spoken in the region.
Snr. Gen Min Aung Hlaing attended the renaming ceremony on Tuesday morning, along with his wife Daw Kyu Kyu Hla, two military council members: Mahn Nyein Maung and Dr. Banyar Aung Moe, who is also a central executive committee member of the Mon Unity Party (MUP).
The MUP had requested that the bridge be renamed Yarmanya but the junta chose Thanlwin Bridge (Chaungzon), likely for political reasons as it tries to gain support in Mon State. The regime also changed the background color of the bridge’s nameplate from red to green.
However, local residents said that they do not have any strong feelings over the bridge’s name since they were only concerned with ending military rule, which is the enemy of the people.
Dr. Aung Naing Oo, a former leading member of the central executive committee of the MUP and a former deputy speaker of the Mon State Parliament said on his Facebook page on Monday that the goal of the Mon people was not the renaming of the bridge.
“In building a country, there needs to emerge a reliable and good political system for all ethnic people that shows respect and understanding for each other” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Police, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Description:
"On this day in 2008, less than one month after over 100,000 people were killed by Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, military dictator Senior General Than Shwe announced the promulgation of the 2008 Constitution.
Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar on the evening of May 2, 2008, smashing almost all the buildings in the Irrawaddy delta and affecting millions of people, especially in Yangon and Bago regions and Mon and Karen states.
The junta, however, decided to proceed with the vote, holding the constitutional referendum in most of Myanmar on May 10 and in the more severely affected areas on May 24, 2008.
While people were still in desperate trouble, the regime reported a heavy turnout and said 98.12 percent of eligible voters took part and 92.48 percent voted in favor. The constitution thus earned the satirical name, the Nargis constitution.
After refusing to recognize the results of the 1990 general election, which brought a landslide victory to the National League for Democracy (NLD), the military regime took 14 years from 1993 to 2007 to design the constitution which guarantees its political leadership and bars NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president.
The first general election since the 1990 poll was held in 2010 based on the 2008 Constitution, which saw the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party winning the vote and taking the office. However, no significant changes could be introduced under both the USDP and NLD, which came to power at the 2015 general election.
Military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who was handpicked by his predecessor Than Shwe, seized power from the NLD government in February after the party repeated its electoral victory in the November 2020 general election.
Constitutions were scrapped when military chief General Ne Win seized power in 1962 and Gen Saw Maung took power in 1988. However, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing said he would act in line with the 2008 Constitution..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National constitutions, draft constitutions, amendments and announcements (texts), Rule of Law - global and regional, Military History, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"“Kabarmakyaybu” was the revolutionary anthem of the 1988 pro-democracy movement and it becomes to be our chanting anthem to fight for our democracy once again in 2021 Feb. The English translation of the lyrics was done by the E-major students (YUFL) and we give full respect and credit to the original creators of the graphics and music. We created this ENG lyrics video so that world knows the meaning of our revolutionary anthem. It has been a week they overtook the country, and rallies of young & old came out of the street to protest peacefully and face their fears and fight for their rights today. We are so proud of our people. Let the world know we are resisting the group of narcissistic psychopath abusive Juntas who like to stay in power..."
Source/publisher:
GenZrevolutionMM
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"While most media attention continues to focus on the domestic political problems that have engulfed the country since the 1 February military takeover, little has been said about continuing inter-ethnic
fighting in Shan State between the Restoration Council Shan State (RCSS) the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and its ally the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). A large part of the current discourse in relation to the military takeover suggests that armed ethnic
organisations will be able to come together in a ‘Federal Army’ to free the people in the cities. But if there is one thing the continuous fighting in Shan State suggests is that there remains much discord
between ethnic actors themselves. Clashes between the two Shan factions have been a constant and have also heavily involved the
Ta’ang National Liberaion Army (TNLA) which has sided with the SSPP. In large part the increase in fighting was exacerbated in 2015 after the RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(NCA). After the NCA was signed, the RCSS established bases in Namtu, Hsipaw and Kyaukme townships. The move sparked fighting between the RCSS and the Shan State Progress Party, which
controlled some areas outside of major towns there, and the TNLA. Similarly, the SSPP also allied itself not only with the TNLA, but also the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA),
and the then Kachin based Arakan Army (AA).
Politically, the SSPP/SSA had no particular objective and instead sought guidance in such matters from the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). However since the emergence of the
TNLA, the SSPP seems to have allowed the Ta’ang group to hold major influence over the SSPP in its current strategy making processes. It also appears the TNLA’s territorial ambitions are perhaps
driving, or at least adding to current hostilities with the RCSS in which the SSPP is playing a part. In 2018, media reported that the RCSS claimed it had the right to operate wherever there are ethnic
Shan while the SSPP and TNLA say it belongs in the south of Shan State only. However, according to one individual close to the RCSS it had said that it will operate in every township outside the SelfAdministered Zones (SAZs) and Self-Administered Division (SAD). Meaning the TNLA should not operate outside the 2008 constitutionally mandated Namhsan and Mantong. If it wants to, it must be in agreement with the RCSS.1 The RCSS/SSA has maintained control in the north through its Brigade-701 in Muse District, Namkham Township. The claims to have set up Task Force 701 in 2006 after the PSLA was disarmed and SSA 3rd Brigade was ordered to move south of LashioMandalay Road.
The TNLA claims the RCSS used its membership in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the central government as justification for stationing fighters in the north of Shan State.
2 A claim the RCSS has vehemently denied.The TNLA has also accused it of not consulting them on territory
demarcation or joint operations, obstructing established administrative structures of TNLA and SSPP and forced conscription on pretext of combating drug addiction. 3 For its part, the RCSS claims
that local ethnic Shan in Northern Shan State invited them to set up bases in the area to protect them against TNLA oppression, which the SSPP allegedly failed to do due to its alliance with the TNLA against the Tatmadaw.4 Most recently, it has been suggested that one of the main reasons for the continuing conflict is the fact that Northern Shan State has become a key point for border trade between Myanmar and
China, especially with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China has plans to build a railway link to Myanmar. It has therefore been posited that the underlying reasons for continuing ethnic conflict is
related now more to business interests and securing territorial gains rather than previous grievencies or ideological issues.5..."
Source/publisher:
Euro Burma Office
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Various groups, Euro Burma Office, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Format :
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200.62 KB
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Sub-title:
Toppled democratic leader makes clear in a military court appearance that she and her party represent Myanmar's agitated people
Description:
"Myanmar’s deposed and detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi appeared in court on Monday, her first public appearance since a February 1 military coup toppled her elected government and set off waves of popular dissent and resistance.
Although it was only a first 30-minute hearing, the legal process could lead to her eventual imprisonment and the dissolution of her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Suu Kyi stands accused by the military of several charges ranging from possession of illegally imported walkie-talkies to violating the 1923 colonial-era Official Secrets Act.
But the reality, most Myanmar observers say, is that the top brass wants to punish the government she led since 2016 and nullify the outcome of the November 2020 election where the NLD scored yet another landslide victory, as it did in 2015 and 1990.
The military’s accusations of electoral fraud are not what independent, international election observers saw when they monitored the poll last year.
With the military now firmly in charge of the country’s central institutions since the coup, the eventual outcome of the court cases against Suu Kyi is not in doubt – she will inevitably be found guilty and banned from politics. That, in turn, could set the stage for new elections rigged in favor of the military and without the participation of the NLD.
Those verdicts, whenever they are handed down, will surely spark more furious unrest in a country that has descended into chaos and anarchy since the military made the fateful decision to seize power on the day a newly elected parliament was scheduled to meet for the first time in Naypyitaw.
The coup has also restored Myanmar to pariah status internationally, with Western criticism and sanctions heaped on the coup makers.
At the same time, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is coming under fire from within the military — not because of the power grab as such, but for his inability to consolidate it. Internally, he has reportedly been mocked as only being good at making donations to pagodas and for being “the prince of bangs and pots”, a reference to the way people across the country are venting their anger at the coup by banging pots and pans.
The coup was immediately met by massive demonstrations all over Myanmar, with pro-democracy protesters often waving Suu Kyi’s image on banners and signs, and has been followed by a fierce response from the military. More than 800 protesters and bystanders have been killed and about 4,000 people detained since the putsch. And the violence and persecution are far from over.
What began as peaceful protests have morphed into violent clashes between the military, the police and anti-coup activists who in some places have organized their own armed bands. In Kayah state in the east armed partisans overran and burned down a police station on May 23.
According to the Kantarawaddy Times, a local website, at least 15 policemen were killed in the raid and four captured alive. Twenty-six Myanmar army soldiers have reportedly been killed elsewhere in Kayah state over the past few days. The same news source reported that one resistance fighter was killed and five wounded during the clash.
In Mindat in the west, resistance fighters armed with hunting rifles and homemade guns took over the town before the military responded with heavy artillery and fire from helicopters. Elsewhere in Myanmar, bombings are becoming daily occurrences and the targets are military-controlled banks, companies and local governmental offices.
A huge fire raged at a government building in the northern city of Myitkyina in Kachin state on May 23. On the same day, a bomb exploded in front of the municipal office and explosions as well as gunfire could be heard in Sanchaung in the country’s largest city and commercial capital Yangon.
Apart from igniting armed resistance by locally raised and previously unknown forces, the war between ethnic armed groups in Kayin and Kachin states and the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has flared anew.
In Kayin state, more than 20,000 people have had to flee the fighting while the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has overrun a number of army positions and police stations, most recently in Hkamti in northern Sagaing Division on May 22.
Airbases in Meiktila, Magwe and Toungoo have come under rocket attacks in what appears to be ethnic rebels working with urban dissidents.
Among those arrested by junta forces are journalists, activists, health workers and teachers who have taken part in protests against the coup. According to a May 23 Reuters report quoting an official of the teachers’ federation who declined to give his name for fear of reprisals, 125,000 school teachers of the country’s total of 430,000 have been suspended.
The number of doctors and nurses who have lost their jobs is not known, but is thought to be considerable. Many educated people, fearing arrests, have managed to leave the country leading to yet another brain drain, similar to those after the first military takeover in 1962 and the crushing of a pro-democracy uprising in 1988.
The country could tilt towards further anomie without a circuit breaker. Banks are not functioning and the economy is in a shambles amid countrywide strikes and unrest. There are rising reports of soldiers and police seemingly at random breaking into people’s homes, destroying furniture and stealing whatever they can lay their hands on.
Other reports indicate that soldiers and policemen have been given methamphetamine pills to jack them up before being deployed to crack down on protesters, which could explain their often erratic and wildly violent behavior.
The only statement that came out of the May 24 court hearing was that a defiant Suu Kyi said that the NLD “was established by the people so the party will be there as long as the people are.” It’s impossible to predict how that short utterance from the country’s iconic democratic leader will impact or ignite an already volatile situation on the ground.
What is clear, however, is that she acknowledged her followers are now pitted against the military, an institution she had tried to accommodate and work with while in power.
It’s also clear that whatever sympathy and support the public may have had for the Tatmadaw are long gone as soldiers rampage, kill and loot with increasingly reckless abandon – a point that some say may be forming schisms in the military.
If Min Aung Hlaing is eventually replaced, which is still far from certain, it doesn’t mean his successor would take a more conciliatory approach to the country’s civilian leaders, including Suu Kyi, and her affiliated pro-democracy movement.
But as long as he remains in place and Suu Kyi is in the dock on trumped-up charges, Myanmar’s people-versus-the military struggle will likely accelerate and spread..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
About Aung San Suu Kyi, Various groups, Articles on the NLD, Armed conflict in Kachin State - general articles, Political role of the Tatmadaw, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
Senior leaders of the pro-democracy party say the move was inconsistent with its stance on the military takeover
Description:
"A decision by People’s Party chair Ko Ko Gyi to attend a meeting convened by a junta-appointed election body on Friday has cost the party more than a third of its senior leaders.
Seven of the party’s 20 central executive committee members have resigned over the move, according to co-founder Ye Naing Aung, who was among those who stepped down.
The two men, who have known each other since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, were divided over whether to accept an invitation from the Union Election Commission (UEC) to attend the meeting.
“I expressed the view that we shouldn’t accept, because it wasn’t in line with the will, desires, or expectations of the people,” Ye Naing Aung told Myanmar Now.
“However, a majority decided to attend the meeting. Since I couldn’t accept that decision, I resigned as the party’s secretary,” he said.
Aye Aye Khaing, another CEC member, confirmed that she also resigned for the same reason.
“Some members of our party have been arrested. Some of my friends have lost their children. I could not turn my back on them and meet with election officials appointed by this junta,” she said.
According to Ye Naing Aung, there were also many resignations from the party’s more than 80 township-level branch offices, especially in Mandalay Region.
Myo Aung, the secretary of the party’s office in Kayin State’s Myawaddy Township, told Myanmar Now that he simply could not accept Ko Ko Gyi’s justification for the decision.
“It is impossible to form a federal union just by cooperating [with the junta]. What they did was unacceptable to the entire country and very evil,” he said, noting that the regime has killed more than 800 people since seizing power on February 1.
He added that regional party officials were not given an opportunity to express their views on the subject or even informed about the decision.
The meeting on Friday was the second convened by the UEC since the regime replaced all of its members with its own appointees soon after the coup.
The People's Party rejected an invitation to the first meeting, held in late February, because the newly formed UEC “did not try to resolve issues related to the results of the 2020 multi-party democratic general election in accordance with the law,” the party said at the time.
Ko Ko Gyi acknowledged that party’s current stance was “more dangerous”.
"The path we have chosen now is more arduous and more dangerous. We have to act with political courage and political faith,” he told Myanmar Now.
He reiterated that a majority of the party’s CEC members were behind the decision to attend Friday’s meeting and added that it would not compromise the party's pro-democracy principles.
Ko Ko Gyi did not comment on the resignations of the members, but said that many party members expressed their support on social media.
“With other like-minded people, a political party must continue,” he said.
Formed in 2018, the People's Party has about 100,000 members. In addition to its township-level branch offices, it has around 400 quarter/village-level offices.
The party fielded more than 150 candidates in the 2020 general election but did not win any seats.
Ko Ko Gyi contested a lower house seat representing Yangon’s South Okkalapa Township, but was defeated by a candidate from the National League for Democracy (NLD).
The NLD went on to win a landslide victory in the election, but was ousted by military before it could begin its second term in power.
The military used unfounded allegations of electoral fraud as a pretext for overthrowing the NLD government.
Soon after seizing power, the regime reorganized the UEC and appointed former military judge advocate-general Thein Soe to act as its chair.
Thein Soe previously served as chair of the UEC during the 2010 election, which most observers regarded as rigged in favour of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
The NLD boycotted that election, but soundly defeated the incumbent USDP government five years later. It performed even more strongly in last year’s election..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Burma/Myanmar's political parties, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
The Tatmadaw, Myanmar's powerful army, controls every aspect of its soldiers' lives. And those who leave pay a heavy price. DW spoke to three defectors.
Description:
"As he witnessed the brutal crackdown on unarmed civilians protesting the army's takeover, the young lieutenant felt increasingly disgusted. Soon after, he left without saying goodbye to his parents, fleeing the country first on motorbike and then on foot, aided across the border by local villagers.
Along the way, he stuck to smaller roads, carefully avoiding checkpoints and detection.
For if caught, he knew he would pay a heavy price for his desertion: In Myanmar, army defectors are usually sentenced to death — which is then commuted to life in prison, as the death penalty has not been carried out in over three decades.
That could, however, change as the army faces opposition within its ranks to its power grab.....Rare insight into Myanmar's military: The lieutenant is one of three defectors DW has spoken to in recent weeks, exchanging almost daily messages with them. The man, who peppers his messages with laughing emojis, is in hiding in India. The other two, both high-ranking officers, are on the run in Myanmar, moving from one safe house to the next. Their accounts provide rare insight into an otherwise opaque institution that is known for committing gross human rights violations against its own citizens — and shows the army's stranglehold on soldiers' lives, minds and, DW has learned, also finances.
The interviews were conducted via messenger apps, including patchy video and audio calls, given that the army's ongoing internet crackdown hampers most communication with the outside world.
DW has not been able to independently verify their accounts, but the interviews corroborate each other in key aspects. In two cases, military identification cards were shown.
Their identities are not disclosed in this report due to fears for the defectors and their families' safety.....'Every move monitored': The three men describe a cloistered, strictly controlled life, based on a stringent, overarching hierarchy. Soldiers, they say, are required to live on army bases and are only allowed to leave if granted permission by superiors. The army dictates what soldiers and their families "wear, say and believe in, even how to decorate your home," one man said. "They can check your house at any moment," he added.
The wives of soldiers, he explains, are not allowed to wear the color red, which is associated with Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), or spout any other political symbols.
"Everything is monitored," says another defector, who was deliberate with each word used to recount his experience. "They want to turn people into robots, who don't think (for themselves)."
A monitoring team within the army using Facebook, all three sources say, watches over soldiers and their families' activities, scrutinizing every single like, share and post. Soldiers, one defector says, have to hand over their log-in details for Facebook, including sign-up phone numbers.
"If people post political things, they can be arrested and put in jail for three or four weeks," one defector tells DW. Another says that soldiers have been denied promotions after sharing social media posts criticizing the leadership of the Tatmadaw — as Myanmar's military is known — or voicing support for the NLD party.
One man recalls taking part in a training course a few years ago, where officers were shown how to tap into CCTV and intercept phone calls using Russian and Chinese technology — although he did not know the extent of surveillance.
Low-ranking soldiers, one defector says, were treated "like slaves," with their wives forced to clean high-ranking officers' homes without pay. Another said he had witnessed a superior asking the wife of a low-ranking soldier to give him a massage. He says the woman acquiesced, knowing that refusing could have negative repercussions for her husband.....Anti-Muslim propaganda: According to DW's three sources, soldiers are fed a steady stream of propaganda that views the Tatmadaw as the guardian of the embattled Buddhist nation of Myanmar. The enemies, according to this propaganda, are made up of a shadowy cabal of Muslims, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party, who are bent on destroying the Buddhist country.
It's an ideology that has been forged in a decades-long, at times brutal battle against a myriad of ethnic insurgencies that have been fighting for independence from the Burmese majority and, at times, each other.
In Myanmar, a state with 135 different ethnic groups, where roughly 90% of the population adheres to Buddhism, politics and religion are closely interwoven. Generals have long built pagodas, erected Buddha statues, and paid homage to influential monks to legitimize their claim to power as a unifying force. Anti-Muslim sentiments are widespread, which the Tatmadaw is adept at exploiting for political capital.
And this anti-Muslim, Buddhism-first propaganda is instilled into soldiers of all ranks. Soldiers, one source says, are being "brainwashed" into buying the army's worldview. Another said while he did not believe the propaganda, he did not speak out against it, for fear of being punished. One defector recalled how he had been verbally abused when he dared to question the narrative that Rohingya — a Muslim minority long denied full citizenship rights — were "terrorists" bent on destroying the country and that they had no place in Myanmar.
One of the men, who, like many officers hails from a military family and had grown up on an army base, said that he had long believed the Tatmadaw's propaganda: When friends dared to question the army, he would defend the military, recalling his anger at anyone who spoke negatively of the institution he had been taught to revere.
His views, he said, only changed following the coup when he witnessed the army's crackdown on peaceful protesters — unarmed men, women and children that the army labels "terrorists.".....Myanmar army is a state within the state: The Tatmadaw's outsized role is intertwined within Myanmar's political and economic life — a lucrative advantage that succeeded colonial rule.
Following independence from Britain in 1948, a military junta took control in 1962, ushering in a prolonged period of iron-fisted rule characterized by strict censorship, imprisonment of opponents and international isolation.
While in power, the army — as well as individual officers and their families — amassed great wealth. This included land, economic and financial assets.
The generals only eased their grip on power in 2010, which culminated in elections that allowed for Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party to form a government.
Even after ceding some control to elected politicians, it continues to play a vast role in both the political and economic field: The constitution guarantees the military 25% of parliament seats, meaning that the army can block any constitutional amendments it dislikes.
It also retains control of important ministries, including defense and home affairs.
Likewise, it continues to own and run a myriad of lucrative business interests without any independent oversight. The Tatmadaw runs its own schools, universities, hospitals and court system.
In short: The army has established what is basically a powerful state within the state. And, since the coup, it is now formally back in power.
In absolute terms, this professional army is the 11th largest in the world, with some 406,000 soldiers in active duty as of 2019, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.....Economic exploitation: The Tatmadaw not only tries to control soldiers' ways of thinking — but also their finances. Military personnel of all ranks, DW has learned, are forced to support military-owned companies through two mandatory schemes: This includes, the three defectors say, requiring soldiers to sign up for a life insurance policy with Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance Company Ltd. The policy, which they are forced to select, renews automatically every five years — with no way for soldiers to opt-out.
The company is an alleged subsidiary of one of the military's two conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Holding (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holding Limited (MEHL), according to a 2019 UN report. These conglomerates, benefit both the Tatmadaw and high-ranking individual officers and their families.
The company did not respond to DW's requests for comment.
Soldiers are also forced to make mandatory payments into MEC and MEHL, which are converted into shares. In return, soldiers receive a small dividend every year, defectors say.
It is likely a way to both generate revenues for the military and individual generals — whilst buying loyalty. Many high-ranking officers upon retirement are often awarded posts in the two holdings, their subsidiaries and affiliated companies. Others are given posts in the civilian administration.
The army does not respond kindly to those who attempt to leave its fold. One of the defectors tells DW that soldiers "cannot leave the army."
In theory, another explained, soldiers can submit a letter of resignation after 10 years. "But that is only in the law," he explained drily. "In practice, it is not easy and it takes three to four years to submit the process (of leaving the army)." And even then, he added, it was not a given that the army would let the soldier go.
He says he regrets his decision to join the army in the first place.
The Myanmar Embassy in Berlin did not respond to DW's request for comment.....Tatmadaw hunting down defectors?: All three men are aware of the Tatmadaw's reach, as the army pursues defectors. One man says he had heard from a contact in the Tatmadaw's headquarters that it had compiled a list of some 300 defectors and was going after them and their families. It was, he says, "a manhunt."
DW cannot verify the claim, however, given that the authorities have compiled a wanted list of activists and journalists that is broadcast every night on state television, it's likely that the same is happening with army defectors.
One man describes how his family receives threatening phone calls. "They said: Where is your son? If you support him, you will get arrested." Soon after, he severed all communication with his family, fearing for their safety.
Another source refuses to acknowledge whether he is still in contact with his family, fearing it would risk their safety.
Despite all the high risks, one defector has no regrets. Life on the run and hiding in a different house each night to keep safe is, for him, a consequence of maintaining integrity. He stands by his decision to leave the army he had served for so many years, saying he did not want his future children to "think I did nothing to stop this illegal coup."..."
Source/publisher:
"DW News" (Germany)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-22
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Political role of the Tatmadaw, The Military's political role, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Human Rights and international relations, Military History, Political History, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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A directive reveals that the coup leader indefinitely extended his tenure as commander-in-chief days after seizing power
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"Days after overthrowing Myanmar’s elected government, Senior General Min Aun Hlaing also pulled off another coup: making himself the country’s de facto military leader for life.
That was revealed in documents that have put his motives for throwing the country into turmoil into sharper focus.
On February 4, the newly installed junta issued a directive that effectively allowed Min Aung Hlaing to stay on as top general for as long as he sees fit.
The directive, which has only recently come to light, removes an age restriction that would have required the senior general to step down later this year.
The issue first came up five years ago, when he acknowledged that under existing rules, he would have to retire once he reached the age of 65.
“The duty of commander-in-chief is not unlimited. There is an age limit that cannot be extended,” he told reporters in June 2016, when he was 60 years old.
Now less than two months away from his 65th birthday, Min Aung Hlaing should be making his way to the exit. Instead, he spends his days cementing his hold on power.
In a recent interview with the BBC’s Burmese-language service, Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun, the regime’s deputy information minister and military spokesperson, confirmed the move.
The new directive allows both the commander-in-chief and the deputy commander-in-chief to remain in their positions for as long as the situation requires, he said without elaborating.
“It was changed because they are performing state duties,” he added, referring to the military’s resumption of direct control over the country since ousting its elected leaders.
Even before the coup, there were signs that Min Aung Hlaing was positioning himself to remain as the military’s unchallenged supremo, according to observers.
One sign, they said, was his appointment of officers many years his junior to senior military posts, side-lining any prospective rivals from among those closer to him in age and influence.
Many of the military’s most powerful commanders are now relatively young men in their fifties or even forties, all of whom are beholden to Min Aung Hlaing for their rapid rise to the highest echelons of power.
The current air force chief is Gen Maung Maung Kyaw, who graduated from the 26th intake of the elite Defence Services Academy (DSA), seven years behind Min Aung Hlaing (DSA 19). His navy counterpart, Gen Moe Aung, is an even younger DSA alumnus from the 28th intake.
Younger still is Lt-Gen Moe Myint Tun (DSA 30), a Min Aung Hlaing favourite who now serves as army chief of staff. He is also a member of the ruling military council and, since the coup, the new chair of the Myanmar Investment Commission.
Lt-Gen Myo Zaw Thein, a DSA 28 graduate who is also closely linked to Min Aung Hlaing, was appointed adjutant general in July 2019, while DSA 35 graduate Lt-Gen Kyaw Swar Linn was named quartermaster general in May of last year, when he was just 49 years old. (He is also the youngest member of the Myanmar military ever to hold his current rank.)
Junta joint secretary Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo, who is also chief of military security affairs, and Lt-Gen Than Hlaing, the deputy home affairs minister and newly appointed police chief, are also at least 10 years younger than Min Aung Hlaing.
Maj Hein Thaw Oo, who served in the military for nearly 20 years before defecting in late March, said the senior general’s choices reflect his obsession with holding onto power.
“It’s madness. He just doesn’t want to transfer power to any of his peers. There are outstanding officers under him, but he doesn’t want anyone else to have power,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-22
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Political role of the Tatmadaw, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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While one party courted controversy by deciding to attend, others said they didn’t even consider taking part
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"Leaders of most of Myanmar’s major political parties have decided not to attend a meeting with the country’s junta-appointed election body on Friday.
The meeting will be just the second held since the military appointed all new members to the Union Election Commission (UEC) in the wake of its February 1 coup, which it staged on the pretext of alleged irregularities in last year’s election.
The first meeting, held in late February, was attended by 53 political parties, only 10 of which had won any seats in the November 2020 general election.
Major ethnic parties such as the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), the Arakan National Party (ANP), and the Kachin State People's Party (KSPP) are among those that will not be in attendance on Friday.
Also absent will be the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS), formed in 1988, and the United Nationalities Democracy Party (UNDP), which was founded in 2019 by former members of the National League for Democracy (NLD).
The NLD, which won last year’s election by a landslide, was due to form a new government when it was ousted by the coup. Most of its leaders are now in detention or in hiding.
Aung Moe Zaw, the chair of the DPNS, said in a video uploaded to the party’s Facebook page on Wednesday that his party refused to attend the Friday meeting because it rejected the coup regime’s “illegitimate” actions. It also boycotted the previous meeting.
“We are a political party that always says we are working for the public. They are killing and arresting members of the public on a daily basis and even threatening us with arrest. I myself have been charged with incitement. I don’t think we should attend the meeting for any reason,” he said.
The longtime pro-democracy activist added that the party would continue to boycott the regime until the path to democracy is restored in the country. He also called on other political parties to stand together with the people.
The chair of the SNLD, Sai Nyunt Lwin, told Myanmar Now that his party—which won 42 seats in last year’s election—did not even consider attending the meeting on Friday.
The SNLD, which is the largest ethnic party in the country, is more concerned with ongoing clashes and the Covid-19 pandemic, he said.
The party was also absent from the first junta-led UEC meeting in February.
The KSPP and the ANP, which both joined the February meeting, said they decided against attending this time around for a number of reasons.
“We were busy with Covid-19 issues and with our plans to relocate our party headquarters,” said KSPP central executive member Jan Hkung, adding that there was no discussion in the party about whether to accept the invitation of the military council’s UEC.
Tun Aung Kyaw, the joint secretary of the ANP, said that his party did discuss the possibility of attending the meeting, but decided against it on security grounds.
“As we all know, even administrators have been shot in the head. And there have also been explosions,” he said.
Naw Ohn Hla, the prominent rights activist who is also vice-chair of the UNDP, declined to comment on the party’s decision not to attend, apart from noting that it made the same choice in February.
Most of the parties that attended the last meeting were allied with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, although a handful of ethnic parties also took part.
During that meeting, the junta-appointed UEC chairman announced that the results of last year’s election had been annulled over allegations of voter fraud.
In its final report on the election, however, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) said that “the results of the 2020 elections were, by and large, representative of the will of the people of Myanmar.”
The regime has said that it will hold elections again at an unspecified time, but few observers believe that they will be free or fair.
“The junta that staged the coup appointed the people who will run the election. How can we trust them to hold a fair election?” said the leader of an ethnic party who spoke to Myanmar Now on condition of anonymity.
One of the few parties not directly connected to the military that decided to attend the meeting was the People’s Party, whose chair, Ko Ko Gyi, has been a well-known political figure since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising.
Ko Ko Gyi declined to speak to Myanmar Now about the decision, but in a recent interview with the BBC, he said that most of the party’s members agreed with the move.
“The majority of members think we should attend the meeting to officially express the party’s political stance and our views,” he said.
However, a number of senior party members, including the party’s general secretary and Ko Ko Gyi’s longtime associate Ye Naing Aung, have resigned over the decision.
The party did not send representatives to the UEC meeting in February..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's political parties, The Military's political role, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Myanmar's junta-appointed election commission will dissolve Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy Party (NLD) because of what it said was fraud in a November election, news outlet Myanmar Now said on Friday, citing a commissioner.
Myanmar Now said the decision was made during a meeting with political parties that was boycotted by many parties including the NLD.
The election fraud conducted by the NLD was illegal "so we will have to dissolve the party's registration", the chairman of the junta-backed Union Election Commission (UEC), Thein Soe, was cited in the report as saying. "Those who did that will be considered as traitors and we will take action," said Thein Soe.
A spokesman for the junta and for a pro-democracy national unity government, which includes ousted members of the NLD, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
A spokesman for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party said it had representatives at the meeting, which was still going on, and he was not aware of the outcome.
Myanmar's army took power alleging fraud in a November election that was swept by the party of Suu Kyi, who fought for democracy for decades before tentative reforms began a decade ago. The electoral commission at the time had rejected the army's complaints.
The security forces have killed more than 800 people since a wave of protests broke out after coup, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners activist group says.
Fighting has also flared between the security forces and ethnic minority guerrilla groups.
The turmoil has alarmed Myanmar's neigbours and the broader international community, but the generals have shown no sign of any intention of seeking a compromise with the pro-democracy movement.
Since her arrest hours before a Feb. 1 coup, Suu Kyi has been held in detention and faces numerous charges filed in two courts, the most serious under a colonial-era official secrets act, punishable by 14 years in prison.
Suu Kyi, 75, has been permitted to speak with lawyers only via a video link in the presence of security personnel. Her co-defendant is Win Myint, the ousted president.
Opponents of the military have formed a National Unity Government, which operates under cover or through members based abroad. It has announced it is setting up of a People's Defence Force to challenge the junta.
Japan, a major donor to Myanmar, will have to rethink its aid provision to Myanmar if the situation in the Southeast Asian nation does not improve, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said in Tokyo..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Burma/Myanmar's political parties, Articles on the NLD, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Michael Lidauer explores electoral politics in Myanmar: The Tatmadaw sought to legitimise the 1 February 2021 coup d’état – which occurred hours before the newly elected parliament was about to convene – with one key narrative: that the November 2020 elections were marred by widespread fraud.[1] To counter this argument, twelve civil society organisations released a statement four days prior to the coup, declaring that “the elections were credible and reflected the will of the majority voters” (PACE 2021). Indeed, no evidence has become available that any electoral materials were tampered with.....The electoral narrative of the coup: The Tatmadaw has commented on weaknesses in the electoral process at several times before and even more so after the elections, referring inter alia to the question of organising elections under the conditions of Covid-19 and inconsistencies in the voter lists. Before the electoral campaign period, in August 2020, the Commander-in-Chief discussed with a delegation of political parties their concerns (The Irrawaddy, 15 August 2020). Although accepting the election results immediately after election day, the military fielded numerous objections regarding the elections and rejected the results during the weeks leading to the coup, and recapitulate this in their public communications (cf. Tea Circle Oxford, 9 March 2021). It ultimately blamed the government, not only the election administration, for shortcomings.[2]
Apart from the President, the State Counsellor and other governmental protagonists, the Union Election Commission (UEC) Chairman and members were arrested, and a new commission was appointed few days after the coup. In fact, the UEC became the single-most targeted institution with arrests and interrogations (AAPP 2021). Since then, the newly appointed UEC – headed by the same Chairman who was in charge of organising the 2010 elections – appears to build a body of evidence to substantiate the military’s claims of electoral fraud with publications about voter list data and ballots used in the 2020 elections in the Global New Light of Myanmar which yet await a closer analysis.
Given the unfolding dramatic events of civilian resistance, heavy-handed responses by the security apparatus, and the struggle for international recognition of legitimate actors, this appears of a lesser significance in the current situation. However, the underlying electoral narrative is likely to become reinvigorated if the Tatmadaw keeps to the idea of organising fresh elections, as announced in the Five-Point Road Map of the State Administration Council, coupled with proposals to change the electoral system.
This article seeks to look beyond claims of manipulation and provide more nuanced perspectives. While the elections have generated credible results, there were nevertheless a number of challenges related to long-standing weaknesses in the legal framework, political competition, and the dynamics generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, all of which are important to keep in mind for a more comprehensive understanding of the recent electoral process.
What is more, the organisation of elections reveals frictions in civil-military relations among Burmese elites from which ethnic minorities suffer as a consequence. As Myanmar people on all fronts oppose a new military regime and as the armed forces exercise their powers against the population, this article aims to recollect some elements of the electoral process preceding the coup, in the hopes of contributing to an understanding of the ongoing situation and of gathering lessons learned for times when elections in Myanmar will again be under scrutiny.
One such element is the cancellation of elections in parts of the country, a complex phenomenon that defies a simplistic explanation. Its analysis helps to understand majority-minority as well as civil-military relations even beyond the electoral process. Ahead of election day, on 8 November 2020, the polls were locally cancelled in many more locations than during previous elections, which resulted in disenfranchisement, political controversies, and diminished trust in the election administration (cf. ANFREL 2021: 45-51). However, while disenfranchisement was much debated, it was not a new phenomenon.....Varieties of disenfranchisement: In Myanmar, electoral disenfranchisement pertains to multiple processes of exclusion from the ballot, affecting people in various ways. These systemic deficiencies have been part of the electoral legal framework since long and were no novelty to the 2020 elections. Disenfranchisement extends inter alia to voters who are not at their place of residence at the time of the elections but elsewhere in the country or abroad. This may concern the diaspora, refugees, migrant workers, students or other travellers, although procedures exist for those who are temporarily registered at a new place and could therefore “transfer” their ballot. Persons who are forcibly displaced by conflict (namely internally displaced persons, or IDPs) often cannot take part in the polls, as authorities repeatedly failed to develop and implement a consistent and effective policy for IDP inclusion at the ballot box.
Voting for IDPs was discussed ahead of the 2015 general elections, but was largely overlooked by national and international audiences, whose attention focused on the overall success of the election and its result, leading to a peaceful transition of power to a government led by the National League for Democracy. More debated – but not significantly tainting the perceptions of an overall well-run process at that time either – was the legal disenfranchisement of predominantly Muslim voters and candidates, preceding the mass exodus of the Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017. The highly contentious Rakhine State politics during the last term ultimately altered how Myanmar was seen in the world.
The recently published article “Boundary Making in Myanmar’s Electoral Process: Where elections do not take place” discusses both the processes of “legal denial” for Muslim voters and candidates as well as the lack of voting opportunities for IDPs during the 2015 elections. It is part of the forthcoming Modern Asian Studies Special Issue on “Border Governance: Reframing Political Transition in Myanmar and Beyond”, edited by Kirsten McConnachie, Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Helene Kyed. The article also discusses election cancellations, which occurred ahead of the general elections in 2010 and 2015, but did not stir much controversy at that time. Despite affecting approximately half a million voters in 2015 – the phenomenon of election cancellations remained little understood. However, without further specifications in the legal framework and without transparent criteria for cancelling or postponing the polls, election cancellations occurred again in 2020, but this time attracted much more attention and controversial debates.....Election cancellations in 2020: Myanmar’s legislation allows for localised election postponements due to risk of violence or natural disasters. While such decisions are usually informed by state institutions in the security sector and by election sub-commissions, the ultimate authority to cancel and postpone elections lies with the Union Election Commission.[3] The UEC is the constitutionally mandated body tasked with organising and overseeing elections. The UEC Chairperson and commissioners are appointed by the President. In addition to a permanent secretariat in Nay Pyi Taw, there are sub-commissions at state/region, district and township level. At the local level, the UEC relies strongly on personnel from other state institutions including from the General Administration Department (GAD) which until 2019 was under the authority of the military-led Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and only then became part of the Ministry of the Union Government under civilian administration (cf. Lidauer and Saphy 2014; Renshaw and Lidauer forthcoming).
The cancellation or postponement of elections has different electoral consequences, depending on the size of the administrative unit concerned. Vacant seats in the legislature occur only where elections are cancelled for entire constituencies; in this case the need for by-elections arises. Conversely, the partial cancellation of elections in a number of wards or village tracts smaller than a constituency does not translate into vacant seats, but leads to the disenfranchisement of voters residing in the cancelled areas, as the election goes ahead regardless of their participation (Lidauer 2021). Vacant seats in the hluttaws at national level proportionally increase the voting powers of military representatives for whom 25 per cent of the seats are reserved.[4]
On 16 October, the UEC announced the cancellation of elections in a number of electoral constituencies where “free and fair elections cannot be held” (UEC Announcement 192/2020). While this timing and reasoning followed the pattern of similar announcements in 2015, the scale of these cancellations was unprecedented. Elections were cancelled for nine entire townships in Rakhine State and six entire townships in Shan State, as well as for 581 additional wards and village tracts in these States together with Kachin, Kayin and Mon States and Bago Region.[5]
The cancellations resulted in 15 vacant seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (nine in Rakhine, six in Shan), seven vacant seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (all Rakhine), as well as 32 vacant seats in states’ legislatures (20 in Rakhine, 12 in Shan). Based on data shared by the UEC, over 1.2 to 1.3 million voters did not have the opportunity to vote as a result of the cancellations, and 189 candidates (who had already started campaigning) lost the possibility to contest these elections.....Reasons and reactions: These decisions caused strong reactions among political parties and civil society organisations, with allegations of gerrymandering in Rakhine State. Several parties questioned the UEC’s impartiality in this process, demanded more transparency and consultations, called for ethnic voting rights to be protected, and for the decisions to be reconsidered. On 27 October, eleven days after the first announcement, the UEC made further cancellations public, notably for Paletwa township in Chin State[6] – raising the overall number of constituencies without elections to 54 – and revoked some of the earlier decisions. These additional announcements did not help to improve perceptions and trust in the UEC, but hardened the belief that its decisions would favour the incumbent.
The UEC decisions were criticised both for cancelling elections in some areas and for going ahead in others. In various areas, elections were in fact cancelled for different reasons, although on the same legal basis. The cancellation of four entire townships that form part of the Wa Self-administered Zone, and its ally in Mongla township – resulting in five vacant Pyithu Hluttaw seats and ten vacant State Hluttaw seats respectively – had been expected, as elections did also not take place there in 2010 and 2015. These are areas without any Myanmar governmental administration to prepare for elections, where a voter list had not been established, and no candidates had been enlisted.
The cancelled areas in Kachin State, Karen State and Eastern Bago Region (including one village tract of Mon State) followed a similar logic, as all these areas pertained to ceasefire areas under full or mixed control of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and have changed little since 2015, but did not result in vacant seats in any hluttaw. In Kachin State, elections were cancelled in fewer village tracts than in 2015 in a number of townships. In Kayin State, unlike in 2015, no elections were cancelled in Hlaingbwe township, and the cancelled areas were significantly reduced in Kyainseikgyi township. This was reportedly a result of negotiations between candidates and the election administration.
Partial election cancellations also occurred across Shan State. In southern Shan State, elections were cancelled entirely for Mongkaing township, where several EAOs are present. In northern Shan State, partial cancellations coincided with locations where armed conflict or tensions between the Tatmadaw, EAOs, and local militia had occurred. Kyaukme and Tangyan townships stood out with new cancelled areas while others were similar to 2015. In eastern Shan State, the cancelled areas corresponded to territories where the government has historically a weak presence.
In Rakhine State, where election cancellations were new, they were all argued for on the basis of security threats resulting from ongoing armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA). This included entire townships that ethnic parties and candidates considered safe, such as Pauktaw and Ponnagyun, and partial cancellations in other townships where only voters in small urban areas remained eligible to elect their respective representatives, such as in Taungup, Kyauk Phyu and Ann townships.[7] Widely held assumptions that all these cancellations would result in electoral outcomes favouring the NLD proved incorrect; in fact, ethnic parties secured the majority of elected seats in the Rakhine State Hluttaw despite the cancellations. The partial election cancellations in Paletwa township in Chin State, affecting a total of five electoral constituencies,[8] were also contentious.....High-level public disputes over the election cancellations: The UEC’s decision-making process regarding the election cancellations became a public point of controversy at a high political level, involving the Office of the President and the Tatmadaw, and resulting in mutual accusations of shortcomings between the military and civilian leadership. The UEC stated that several governmental offices, including MoHA and the Ministry of Defence, were consulted to arrive at the decisions where elections should be postponed. The Tatmadaw, while maintaining that the UEC is the only authority to decide whether to hold elections or not, outlined that the UEC’s announcements did not reflect the military’s advice (Eleven, 20 October 2020).
In fact, this issue – touching upon civilian administrative authority but also upon questions of security, the Tatmadaw’s domain – was not the first point in time that saw military discontent with the electoral process, but brought tensions between the civilian government and the armed forces in particular to the fore. These discussions exacerbated ethnic parties’ frustrations about the exclusion of their voters from the elections.....Impact on Rakhine State: In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the AA and Tatmadaw became unlikely allies in demanding that the cancelled polls should take place before the formation of the new hluttaws. In mid-December, this demand was supported by the President, and the Rakhine State sub-commission reportedly started preparations for by-elections (Radio Free Asia, 15 December 2020). For the AA, this was an opportunity to broaden their bargaining powers and increase their legitimacy. On the side of the Tatmadaw, the push for elections in Rakhine State was also interpreted as part of larger efforts to discredit the overall electoral process (The Irrawaddy, 20 January 2021). It was nevertheless unlikely that these elections would have taken place in the immediate aftermath, since, following amendments to the electoral laws in 2016 and 2019, by-elections for vacant seats cannot take place one year after and one year before general elections. In that context, by-elections seemed unlikely to happen before April-May 2022.
In the interim, the postponement of elections in Rakhine State appeared to generate an unexpected opportunity for a truce between the Tatmadaw and the AA (ICG, 23 December 2020); fighting ceased and tens of thousands were reportedly able to return home. In mid-January, the Rakhine State Hluttaw passed a proposal to urge the government to remove the “terrorist” designation of the AA. This designation, in place since March 2020, had been seen as an impediment to ceasefire negotiations. With an unusual expression of solidarity, Rakhine and Rohingya communities issued a joint declaration of mutual respect that emphasized not only elections for those areas where they were cancelled, but also for the Rohingya (Rohingya Today, 18 January 2021).....Reflecting on the elections in the light of the coup: All interpretations about reasons for the cancellations and effects of vacant seats as well as speculations about early by-elections and any opportunities that may have come from this situation were overtaken by the coup d’état of 1 February. Portraying itself as the guardian of electoral democracy, the military leadership deployed a narrative of electoral fraud to justify its takeover. The public controversies around the election cancellations were one element in a longer process of discrediting the 2020 elections.
The issue of election cancellations demonstrates that the 2020 electoral process has seen a number of challenges, inter alia related to decision making process in the state administration. Although the final decision about election cancellations remains with the UEC, sub-national offices charged with informing these decisions were reporting within different hierarchies in the context of electoral security, turning decisions on localised election cancellations into an area of civil-military co-ownership and co-dependency. The process of election cancellations in 2020 illustrates the problematic nature of this co-ownership, which did not occur as such in 2015 when the leadership of the election management body had more direct communication channels with the security apparatus. As a consequence, the situation resulted in opportunities to criticize the UEC, despite the fact that similar cancellations had occurred in previous elections albeit at different scale.
The cancellations shed light on loopholes in the system – here, the lack of clear procedures for postponing the polls – that were present both in the 2015 and the 2020 elections, and show how weaknesses in the regulatory framework for elections amplified the opposition between the civilian and military parts of the State ahead of the coup d’état, with detrimental effects on ethnic minorities.
Now is not the time to strive for electoral reforms, but debates about elections and suffrage rights in Myanmar are essential and will eventually return. At that time, the transparency and process of any necessary election cancellations should be enhanced with clear communications and consistent criteria for such decisions, alongside other issues pertaining to electoral integrity, accountability and inclusion that will be important to address..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Several Groups, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Various groups, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"On Feb. 1, 2021, the Myanmar military – the Tatmadaw – shattered the all too brief effort to transition to democracy in Myanmar. Over the past two and a half months, the Tatmadaw has continued its illegitimate effort to undermine the democratic elections from last year and prevent the elected government from taking power. In the face of mass popular opposition and international condemnation, the military has only escalated its use of violence against its own population – systematically stripping away rights and violently attacking protestors and dissidents, reportedly killing over 700 civilians as of Apr. 20, 2021, and detaining more than 3,000.
Despite the continued threats and extreme violence, the people of Myanmar have stood their ground and refused to be silenced. On Apr. 16, opponents of the coup from across the political spectrum announced the formation of a National Unity Government (NUG) to resist the military. Just as importantly, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a grassroots movement aimed at disrupting state functions and crippling the economy in order to undermine the military’s attempt to rule, has been hugely successful in galvanizing collective action since early February. In addition to the tens of thousands of CDM participants walking out of their private and public sector positions, protests across the country have seen massive youth engagement on a scale not seen in a generation. The organizing power has been impressive. Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok have been used to spread awareness and coordinate protests, strikes, and other forms of peaceful resistance. The military has taken notice of the CDM’s power, issuing threats against young people protesting and shooting indiscriminately at protestors of all ages, including children. Parallel movements have arisen in areas like neighboring Thailand, with Thai youth protesting their own authoritarian government in solidarity with activists from Myanmar.
Today we launch a Just Security series that will take a deep dive into the situation in Myanmar. The series will provide insights that put the coup and civilian response into historical and modern context, deepen unexplored angles on the current crises, and survey possibilities and ways forward over the next six months to a year. This series also aims to elevate policy discussions on a number of issues, ranging from peace and accountability to religion and democracy, asking: What is happening now and why?
Within the series, contributions from authors from Myanmar and others working closely on the situation will explore topics such as youth leadership in the CDM and protests, domestic and international solidarity, environmental concerns, the dissolution of rule of law in Myanmar, and what the coup means for ongoing international accountability efforts. Below, we offer an overview of the major themes of the series, along with a timeline of the struggle for democracy in Myanmar. The current uprising against military rule must be understood in the context of these decades-long struggles for peace, democracy, accountability, and justice..."
Source/publisher:
Just Security (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, violations of, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Discrimination against the Rohingya, International Criminal Court, Several Groups, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - General, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Various groups, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် ၁/၂၀၂၁
ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် ဖွဲ့စည်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် မေလ ၅ ရက်
၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ် အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများက အပ်နှင်းသော အခွင့်အာဏာကို ကျင့်သုံးလျက် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကဏ္ဍကို ဦးဆောင် တာဝန်ယူလျက်ရှိသည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် တရားဝင် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရထံမှ နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို အဓမ္မလုယက်ပြီး အစိုးရခေါင်းဆောင်များကို ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းထားရုံသာမက၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သော ပြည်သူများအား အကြမ်းဖက် နှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ထောင်သွင်းအကျဉ်းချခြင်း၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသော တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် ပြည်သူများအပေါ် လေကြောင်းစစ်ဆင်မှု အပါအဝင် အင်အားအလွန်အကျွံအသုံးပြုကာ တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကဲ့သို့သော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့များသည် အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာ တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ လူသားလုံခြုံရေး၊ လူသားဖြစ်တည်မှုအပေါ် တန်ဖိုးထားလေးစားရေးတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းမရှိဘဲ၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို ထိပါးနှောင့်ယှက် ဖျက်ဆီးလျက်ရှိသည့်အပြင်၊ တိုင်းပြည်၏ နိုင်ငံရေးဉီးတည်ချက်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကိုလည်း အဟန့်အတား ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၄။ ယင်းသို့သော အခြေအနေတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူများအပေါ် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ၊ စစ်ရေးအရ ရန်လိုတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို ထိန်းချုပ်အဆုံးသတ်ခြင်းဖြင့် နှစ်ပေါင်း ခုနစ်ဆယ်ကျော် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော ပြည်တွင်းစစ် ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ ထိရောက်သော လုံခြုံရေးကဏ္ဍ ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုတပ်မတော် ဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ရေးတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တာဝန်ရှိလာသည်။
၅။ သို့ဖြစ်ရာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုတပ်မတော်၏ ရှေ့ပြေးအမြုတေအဖြစ် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (People's Defence Force) ကို ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာမူဝါဒနှင့်အညီ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ မေလ ၅ ရက် တွင် တရားဝင် ဖွဲ့စည်းထူထောင်လိုက်သည်။
ပုံ
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးချုပ်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
Contact – [email protected]..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"With a vast ethnic and cultural diversity,1 as well as high
levels of poverty, Myanmar has witnessed the emergence
of a myriad of armed non-state actors (ANSAs), which have
splintered and morphed over time, and has subnational
tensions arising from tremendous distinctive dynamics.
The majority of such actors, known as ethnic armed
organizations (EAOs), have primarily pursued a high level
of autonomy along with the recognition of identity and
rights. These claims have been ongoing since before the
colonial period, intensifying after independence in 1948
and still persisting in 2017. The 1980s and 90s saw important progress towards peace, with several ceasefire deals and the creation of the Border Guard Forces (BGFs) following plans for demobilization. Yet, these deals have all failed and have, therefore, generated
the proliferation of ANSAs. It was not until 2015 that the
government of Aung San Suu Kyi achieved the signing
of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA); however,
this process has failed to be inclusive, leaving aside key
actors after the government imposed restrictions for its signature and as a result, have maintained their armed confrontation.
Myanmar is composed of seven states, seven regions, six selfadministered zones (or divisions) and one union territory.2
One of the seven states, Rakhine (situated on the west coast of the country), is the site of ongoing tensions between the Myanmar armed
forces and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).
Violence escalated sharply from October 2016, when ARSA
first attacked, and continued to spiral, with the last military
crackdown on 25 August 2017. Thus, in order to understand the complex setting in Myanmar, it is crucial to outline the dynamics of these longterm tensions, while focusing on the latest developments in
Rakhine state and the challenges these give rise to..."
Source/publisher:
Geneva Academy Of International Humanitarian Law And Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Various groups, Political role of the Tatmadaw, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Summary:
"Myanmar’s people have lost their rights and freedoms since the military coup on Feb. 1 and the numbers having their fundamental rights violated by the regime is increasing.
Meanwhile, the...
Description:
"Myanmar’s people have lost their rights and freedoms since the military coup on Feb. 1 and the numbers having their fundamental rights violated by the regime is increasing.
Meanwhile, the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow administration formed to rival the military junta, has set up its Human Rights Ministry and appointed prominent rights activist U Aung Myo Min as minister.
U Aung Myo Min recently talked to The Irrawaddy about what action he will take to address the regime’s rights violations.
What will be your first step as Myanmar’s first human rights minister?
There was only the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission in the past in Myanmar. A separate ministry is meant to do more about human rights issues. As the first step, I will work with the people to record rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes in ethnic areas so that the truth can be established.
We are already working on this. And we are seeking public cooperation because we want to assure people that they can rely on the ministry and secure justice for themselves.
We will be recording the crimes to file complaints at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other courts. We must have records if are to bring the perpetrators to justice either at the ICC or other courts. Those records might look dismal and depressing now but they give solid evidence to bring the perpetrators to justice in the future.
The military council is violating international law. We will take action to make sure the perpetrators are held accountable and justice is done for the victims.
Though the human rights violations by the military regime have drawn attention from the international community, no punitive action has been taken. How confident are you as the human rights minister about being able to address it?
Given the situation, we are not yet in a position to take punitive action. We have to fix our collapsing judicial system, reconstitute the Human Rights Commission as it is not functioning and replace those who are not working.
The international community pays attention to the human rights situation in Myanmar. There are, however, not many mechanisms to establish truth and find justice for human rights violations and crimes. I will focus on bringing perpetrators into the international judicial mechanisms.
The ministry is unprecedented. How will it impact the country’s politics and its foreign policy?
The Human Rights Ministry will not defend the government. It represents the people and will promote and defend their rights.
The military-controlled media has been harshly criticizing the NUG, saying it is capable of nothing. What do you say?
We are in the revolutionary period and the NUG cannot function properly as a government. But we have transparency and we don’t just represent a party but all groups. This is our strength. Everyone in the NUG wants to fight the dictatorship with unwavering spirit and they have different expertise. Even though the NUG is not based in Naypyitaw, it will respect, defend and fulfill human rights, as a government.
Records of human rights violations by the regime are widely available on social media. What evidence is the NUG collecting?
We have gathered records of what has happened, especially arbitrary killings, crackdowns on peaceful protests and deaths in violent crackdowns. Another aspect is about torture during detention, interrogation and in prison. Another is airstrikes in ethnic minority areas, bombing villages and displacing civilians and their lack of access to humanitarian aid. We have also collected evidence about how rights violations affect women and children..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
Unclaimed attacks on military airbases signal a possible spread of civil war from remote frontier areas to urban centers
Description:
"No group has yet claimed responsibility for several, almost simultaneous attacks on military targets in central Myanmar, including air bases recently used to target ethnic armed groups in the nation’s frontier areas.
Security analysts, however, believe the shadowy attacks are likely the work of an alliance between ethnic rebels and urban-based pro-democracy dissidents, with the former providing the explosives and the latter knowledge of local conditions in the Myanmar heartland.
If that assessment is accurate and the hits were not isolated incidents, it could mean that Myanmar’s long-running, low-intensity civil wars are spreading from ethnic minority areas in the nation’s periphery to major cities and towns.
Three months after top generals seized power from a popularly elected government and despite the fact that military and police have gunned down over 750 and arrested well over 4,000 protesters, people are still bravely taking to the streets to vent their anger with the coup.
The ongoing popular resistance underscores what is by now widely seen as perhaps the most unsuccessful coup in modern Asian history. That could yet spell ill for coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who has stuck stubbornly to his guns amid rising international condemnation that is deeply isolating the country.
There are certain indications provided confidentially to Asia Times by military insiders that veterans of previous ruling juntas, namely the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), are growing wary of Min Aung Hlaing’s perceived as ineffective and polarizing actions and tactics.
Recent developments, including the attacks on military airbases, have opened a Pandora’s box of possibilities and scenarios that were largely unforeseen when the tanks rolled into the main city of Yangon three months ago and scores of elected MPs and other politicians were arrested and detained in the capital Naypyitaw.
Those include a wider civil war in the nation’s central region heartland, including near the generals’ bunker-like capital at Naypyidaw. On April 29, unidentified militants fired rockets at air force bases in Magwe and Meiktila in central Myanmar.
Another explosion detonated at a Myanmar Army weapons storage facility near Bago city, about 70 kilometers north of Yangon. Those attacks came after intense fighting between the Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw, and ethnic rebels from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) on the border with Thailand.
The shadowy unclaimed attacks on airbases also coincided with intensified battles with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the country’s far north, where many pro-democracy activists have sought refuge after bloody crackdowns in urban areas.
The Tatmadaw’s attacks have been marked by airstrikes on rebel targets which have included civilian villages. That’s caused the recent displacement of more than 25,000 villagers in Kayin state and at least 5,000 in Kachin state. That adds to the tens of thousands who fled their homes amid earlier fighting in the areas.
Long-time observers of Myanmar’s politics have privately drawn parallels between current events and what happened after an even bloodier coup in 1988, when thousands of dissidents also took to the hills and jungles after the Tatmadaw crushed another nationwide, pro-democracy uprising.
But, they note, there are fundamental differences between the events of 1988 and current developments. In 1988, young urban dissidents formed the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), donned uniforms and fought alongside ethnic rebels in the frontier areas.
At that time, it was much easier to acquire weapons from grey Thai arms markets and dissident groups had ready sanctuaries — and even offices — in neighboring Thailand. However, improved relations between the Thai and Myanmar militaries coupled with severe entry restrictions into Thailand caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have at least so far kept the dissidents on the Myanmar side of the border.
The old ABSDF exists now only in name as most of its cadres have either surrendered or been resettled in third countries. The ABSDF’s ultimately failed uprising could explain why the new ethnic-urban alliance has taken on a different and potentially more explosive form.
Indeed, recent developments seem to signal the beginning of hitherto unseen urban warfare, which the Tatmadaw is ill-equipped to handle. Apart from the obvious alliances between informal groups of pro-democracy activists and ethnic rebels, local resistance forces have already emerged in Sagaing Region and Chin state. Reports indicate similar forces are coalescing in Mon state and Mandalay Region.
Social media posts show those local partisans are equipped with hunting rifles and homemade explosives but have nonetheless been able to inflict significant casualties on the police and military, including in Kalay in Sagaing Region. In nearby Chin state, a new force called the Chinland Defense Force reportedly killed 15 junta troops in their area.
Shadowy bomb and Molotov cocktail attacks have been reported against police stations in Yangon, Mandalay and Monywa.
At the same time, the Tatmadaw must contend with battle-hardened ethnic armies. In the country’s far north, there have been over 50 clashes since Kachin rebels overran and captured a Tatmadaw outpost on the strategic Alawbum mountain near the Chinese border on March 25.
Airstrikes have failed to dislodge the KIA, which has carried out subsequent attacks near the Hpakant jade mines in western Kachin state and north of Sumprabum in the state’s north.
In Kayin State, the Free Burma Rangers nongovernmental organization reports daily fights between the Tatmadaw and KNLA, despite the fact the two sides entered a ceasefire agreement in October 2015.
That agreement, which included the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and eight smaller, rather insignificant groups, was termed a “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA), although it was neither nationwide nor led to even a semblance of peace in frontier areas.
Although the KNLA and the KIA have sided openly with Myanmar’s until now peaceful Civil Disobedience Movement, other ethnic groups have been less supportive. In a March 27 interview with Reuters, RCSS chairman Yawd Serk said his group would not stand by idly if the junta’s forces continue to kill protesters but his vow hasn’t been followed up with any clear action.
On the contrary, the RCSS has been fighting a rival Shan group, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party and its ethnic Palaung allies in the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) for control of areas in northern Shan state.
Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army, the 20,000-30,000 strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), has remained conspicuously silent since the coup. Not all Wa agree with the stance: Ten Wa civil society organizations signed on March 25 a written, urgent plea to the UWSA and its political wing the United Wa State Party to say something.
That hasn’t happened though, probably because the UWSA is so closely allied with China’s security services, which do not want to get involved with Myanmar’s anti-coup movement. Protesters have targeted Beijing’s perceived support of the regime at the United Nations. Several Chinese factories were torched in Yangon in one spasm of violence.
The 7,000-strong Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine state, one of Myanmar’s most powerful rebel armies, which has killed hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers in recent fighting, has taken a more surprising stance. It entered into ceasefire talks with the Tatmadaw in November last year and was taken off its list of “terrorist” organizations soon after the February 1 coup.
Its leader, Twan Mrat Naing, said on April 16 at the UWSA’s Panghsang headquarters that the ousted National League for Democracy government claimed that it would create a federal union with equal rights for all nationalities but failed to deliver on the promise. With that view, it’s doubtful the AA will join any grand alliance between urban dissidents and ethnic armies.
Even without a unified ethnic resistance, there is still a chance that the Tatmadaw’s old guard could move to break the stalemate by pressuring or even trying to overthrow Min Aung Hlaing and his top deputies before the situation deteriorates further.
The SLORC and SPDC were likewise brutal outfits and no friends of democracy, but former junta chief and commander-in-chief Senior General Than Shwe did initiate liberal reforms that led to a more open society and vastly improved relations with the West and wider world before stepping aside in 2010.
Than Shwe is now in his late 80s and political analysts in Myanmar believe that the current chaos is hardly the kind of legacy he would want to leave behind. Whether the aging general has the wherewithal, influence or inclination to try to rein in Min Aung Hlaing is unknown, but the anarchy unleashed by his coup is clearly not in the military establishment’s short or long-term interests..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Various groups, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Political role of the Tatmadaw, History of the Tatmadaw, Several Groups, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Summary:
"ABSTRACT: The changes that have swept rural Myanmar, transforming
landscapes and affecting livelihoods, have ignited rural politics
and civil society and grassroot organizations’ strategies to...
Description:
"ABSTRACT: The changes that have swept rural Myanmar, transforming
landscapes and affecting livelihoods, have ignited rural politics
and civil society and grassroot organizations’ strategies to
counter, resist, negotiate and adapt to these changes. Rural
politics have centred on broad calls for agrarian and
environmental rights and social justice that do not address
women’s rights, gender and generational justice explicitly. Based
on fieldwork carried out in Myanmar’s Taninthary region, and
engagement with grassroots organizations, I examine how
gender and generational power dynamics play out, transform and
are transformed in processes of agrarian and environmental
change and rural politics.....Introduction: In Myanmar, land and natural resources have been historically the focus of extractivist
initiatives that benefited colonial administrations, central states, the military and powerful elites and deprived small farmers, fishers and forest-dependent groups, including ethnic groups, particularly women and girls, of access to natural resources, shelter and livelihoods (Karen Human Rights Group 2006, 2015; Tavoyan Women’s Union 2015; Barbesgaard 2019; see also Kramer forthcoming; Sekine forthcoming, this collection). Starting in 2012 the neoliberal orientation of recent civilian governments, discursively legitimized by agendas for economic growth, sustainable development and climate
change mitigation and adaptation, has bolstered this tendency. Since 2011, legal reforms in the areas of land use, land conversion, and investments have facilitated the entrance and operations of international capital and investors in the country. In addition,
the 2012 preliminary ceasefire between the Union Government (UG) and several Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) has enabled access of domestic and foreign capital to once secluded areas, including Tanintharyi region in the South, which had long been a
hotspot of conflict and ethnic insurgency and had thus remained relatively isolated (Bryant 1994; Malseed 2009; Woods 2015a, 2015b).
The surge of extractive and infrastructure development initiatives, combined with conservation plans to restrict access to protected and designated areas, have accelerated the transformation of Myanmar’s rural landscapes and livelihoods. This, in turn, has sparked civil society and grassroots organizations’ strategies and actions to resist,
negotiate and adapt to these changes. Members of affected communities, often with support from grassroots and local civil society organizations, have resisted, mobilized and strategized on ways to advance their own counter-visions of development (Park
2019). Coupled with opportunities to engage in ‘contentious politics’ (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 2002, 2004) as noted in the introductory article of this Special Issue, the mobilization from below has expanded the repertoire of ‘contentious performances’ that are
being developed dynamically and in conversation with the political, social and economic context (Tilly 2002, 2004). In Myanmar, just like in other countries in the region, women and men, young and old, have taken active part in these political struggles; women, notably, have been at the forefront of protests and diverse forms of activism,
often at the cost of their bodily integrity and the breakdown in family relations. Research from other countries confirms that women, including older women, participated in protests often as a strategy to curb violent repression and retaliation by the military and the police, to protect their sons and husbands, and in some cases as activists in their own right (see for example, Brickell 2014; Lamb et al. 2017; Park and Maffii 2017; Tavoyan Women’s Union 2015; Morgan 2017).
While these changes affect different people, including their political agency, in ways that are mediated by gender, age, ethnicity and other social and power differences, the urgency and fluidity of the issues on the ground requires cohesion in mobilization and swift action. Partly because of this, rural politics have tended to centre on broad calls
for agrarian and environmental rights and social justice that do not address women’s rights, gender equality and generational justice explicitly. Women’s groups have also been often side-lined; whereas youth have been engaged by environmental and ethnic
grassroots groups within the frame of well-defined scripts that do not challenge power, gender and age hierarchies. The exclusion of women’s groups and gender equality from agrarian and environmental justice movements, and the reasons underlying it, have been highlighted by many feminist scholars (see for example, Harris 2015; Park 2018; Deere 2003; Stephen 2006; Krishna 2015) who have called for urgent convergence to avoid the risk that movements for social justice could be void of gender and generational justice. Krishna (2015), for example, notes that in India some of the larger movements that have led to state formation have failed to recognize women’s claims for gender justice in spite of their conspicuous participation and even leadership. In the Andes, Harris (2015, 171) highlights the disconnect between feminist and indigenous and other movements and calls for a better articulation of ‘feminist analytics and organizing’, advocating for going beyond women’s engagement towards adoption of a feminist agenda that questions power structures. The fight against patriarchy has also been central to the demands of peasant women in international movements such as La Via Campesina. This article explores the potential of rural politics to be catalytic of change that promotes gender and generational justice and contributes to making the case for the need for not one but multiple convergences – feminist political ecology with feminist political economy, agrarian and environmental movements with feminist movements. Based
on fieldwork conducted in Tanintharyi between 2014 and 2018 and engagement with local grassroots organizations, I examine how gender and generational power dynamics play out, transform and are transformed in processes of agrarian and environmental
change and rural politics. I look at the conditions that support a (re)negotiation of gender roles and relations and how these could be conducive to gender-transformative rural politics, that is, politics that fosters gender equality and generational justice as a
key dimension of social change and social justice (Cornwall 2014)..."
Source/publisher:
The Journal of Peasant Studies via Routledge (London)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Land rights, Law and policy on land in Burma/Myanmar, Land research including land grabbing - global and regional, Discrimination/violence against women: reports of violations in Burma, Women's rights, Burmese women's organisations, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Summary:
"Myanmar is in a dangerous and uncertain moment following the
military coup on 1 February 2021. The articles in this Special
Forum provide timely contextual analysis. Written before the
coup, the...
Description:
"Myanmar is in a dangerous and uncertain moment following the
military coup on 1 February 2021. The articles in this Special
Forum provide timely contextual analysis. Written before the
coup, the articles delve into the politics of agrarian
transformation in the context of (what was then) an ongoing (but
fragile) opening up of political space. This introduction outlines
three themes that connect the articles and now also shed some
light on what the future may hold: (1) the limited character of the
2010–2021 ‘democratic transition’; (2) the struggles around land
and natural resources amidst a social reproduction crisis and (3)
the responses of rural working peoples. This Special Forum on Myanmar’s agrarian transformation concludes at a moment of great
danger and deep uncertainty resulting from the military coup that took place on 1 February 2021. All the articles were written before the coup, and all the authors were keen to engage
explicitly on the politics of agrarian transformation in the context of (what was at that time) a still ongoing (fragile) opening up of political space and the social-political challenges of working in such a context, including examining the changing political agency of the implicated differentiated rural peoples (along lines of class, gender, generation and in Myanmar the all-important question of ethnicity). Reading their analyses now may thus help to dampen any temptation to romanticize about what life and politics was like for many people before the coup. And it will put under a critical spotlight the call by some segments
of the resistance movement for a return to where everyone/everything was before the coup, that is, to restore the NLD government to power under the military-crafted 2008 Constitution. Most of the authors who contributed insights and analysis to the six articles constituting this special forum are long-time social activists who have been working for many years outside the spotlight and under the radar, alongside many other veteran activists, grassroots organizations, issue-based associations and ethnic communities. In the years before and since the national political cycle that began with the March 2011 handover of government by the military-run SPDC to the quasi-civilian Thein Sein administration, they have been in the trenches, so to speak, along with many others,accompanying ordinary people in doing the everyday politics of regime transition. Such efforts have involved the crucial but often intangible work of feeling for openings, testing limits, deploying razor-sharp political humour, calculating risks, calibrating interventions, reaching out and ratcheting up, building bridges, stepping up and stepping back, pushing with restraint, articulating hopes, managing fears, calling bluffs, etc. It’s worth mentioning here too that this has also necessarily involved working to ensure the material conditions needed to enable these dynamics of activism to survive and thrive, despite increasingly bureaucratized and periodically politicized relationships with both government
donors and international non-governmental donor agencies. While for various reasons and at various times government donors and donor agencies could become quite allergic to activism – especially activism taking extra-parliamentary form – this was not always the
case, and despite what may have been risks involved in supporting social change activism during the post-2011 opening, some of these actors supported this work anyway. Much of what the bulk of ordinary people actively trying to shape the transition underway have been doing has remained invisible and in the shadow of a still fairly draconian ‘rule of law’, while the international media spotlight has tended to focus on increasing space for elite politics and elite-driven economic reform, as if these were all that mattered
in the regime transition underway. It was important that these ‘invisible’ politics remained so at times, in order to protect and shelter them, and at other times, it was critical that they surface, in order to try to propel more central political processes in a more radical direction.
But while much of the social activism for meaningful agrarian change has resurrected and unfurled in the lingering shadows cast by past coups, past waves of resource grabbing, and past ‘high politics’ turning points, at the same time, a fairly clear set of major neoliberaloriented economic reforms have been initiated and steadily pushed since 2011 as part and parcel of a ‘rule of law’ reform agenda aimed at creating the ‘positive enabling environment’ for big Asian, US and EU-based business interests itching to enter or do more
business in Myanmar. Hitherto, earlier rounds of market liberalization following the thenmilitary regime’s response to political and economic crises in the late 1980s had mainly benefitted regional (especially Chinese and Thai) and local capitalists (with the exception of two
infamous gas projects – one led by Total, one led by UNOCAL – see ERI 1996). The consequences of these reforms have been hitting the ground hard, yet affecting different groups of people differently depending on class, ethnicity, gender, generation,
and geographic region. And so here is one crux of the matter for many of the hardest hit people today: as huge masses of people from all walks of life spill currently into the streets to protest the military coup – how and to what extent will the broad anti-coup resistance
movement be able to take on 1. the contradictions emerging from capitalist development and 2. the growing aspiration for a democratic federal union? Capitalism is not tied exclusively to any particular kind of political system: it can exist under outright militarized
authoritarian conditions, and also under still-militarized, semi-authoritarian political conditions where participation in decision making is open to some segments of society to some degree, but many (if not most) remain excluded more or less completely (e.g.
more akin to what the country had been experiencing in the decade prior to the coup). Since 2011, capitalist development has wrought a new configuration of winners and losers, where a wider range of people found opportunities and breathing room to
accumulate and have seen their living conditions improve, while many others have seen their situation deteriorate significantly. The ranks of those engaged in ‘3D’ migrant labour work abroad (e.g. dirty, difficult, dangerous) and the importance of migrant worker
remittances to the national economy, for example, have increased dramatically since 2011 as a result partly of the new laws and policies put in place by the quasi-military Thein Sein government but then continued and even deepened by the ‘democratically-elected’ NLDled government (Borras et al. 2020). The agrarian crisis that is pushing many people, from different walks of life (both ethnic Bamar and non-Bamar), further toward or deeper into landlessness and precarious labour conditions, has been deepening throughout the
country. But its precise character has varied, shaped by complex social-historical and political-economic particularities, including politicized geographies of race/ethnicity, obtaining in different regions and subregions. To be sure, however, regions and subregions where various non-Bamar ‘ethnic nationalities’ (a term increasingly preferred nowadays by non-Bamar activists themselves, in a bid to put the term ‘ethnic minorities’ firmly into the past) are most concentrated, have been clearly targeted for ‘accumulation by dispossession’ via outright extra-economic coercion, in tandem with and alongside
processes of commodification, as discussed below. The increasingly organized, multiethnic demand for abolition of the 2008 Constitution and building of a democratic federal union is therefore very much underpinned by the intensely racialized/ethnicised
character of Myanmar political-economy historically..."
Source/publisher:
Routledge (London)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, violations of, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political role of the Tatmadaw, Military History, Political History
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Size:
1.83 MB
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Summary:
"ABSTRACT: The transition from military dictatorship to an electoral regime has opened limited political spaces for social activism in Myanmar. Some have called the unfolding situation a ‘transition...
Description:
"ABSTRACT: The transition from military dictatorship to an electoral regime has opened limited political spaces for social activism in Myanmar. Some have called the unfolding situation a ‘transition to
democracy’. But this is far from the reality for some, if not most,
of Myanmar’s ‘rural working people’. This paper explores the
trajectory of the national land network called Land in Our Hands
(LIOH or Doe Myay), which came into formal existence in 2014.
This paper attempts to lay out a more comprehensive account of
the historical legacies and internal and external pressures that
have been shaping LIOH as a movement building initiative, and
in relation to three key dimensions: its identity politics; its
ideology and class base; and its political work.....Introduction: The transition from military dictatorship to an electoral regime has opened limited political spaces for social activism in Myanmar. Today’s electoral regime is still a largely elite-controlled political situation, with relatively more competitive elections but under unevenly
restrictive conditions, including continued restricted access to basic democratic rights for much of the population especially outside the main urban areas. This goes hand in hand with a centrally controlled economic opening and continuing armed conflict in parts of the country. While the political space (such as it is) may be new, social movement in Myanmar is not. Social movements of different forms and scales continued to exist occupying non-traditional political spaces, especially local spaces, throughout the dark ages of
military rule beginning from 1962. In the remote ethnic states, rural villagers have been using everyday forms of resistance such as ‘hiding resources, ignoring orders, packing road embankments with sticks during forced labour, informing human rights groups but
not the military’ in order to protect their territories and communities (Malseed 2009, 380), which as a whole formed a grassroots movement (Malseed 2008). Some movements such as the Ba Ka Tha (All Burma Federation of Student Union) went underground after the brutal crackdown of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising to continue training student activists in leftwing political ideology. Others, including students and ethnic-based democracy movements, transformed into armed struggles along the Chinese, Thai and Indian borders. Diaspora-driven human rights coalitions sprang up in Western countries, exposing violations and atrocities committed by the military regime and lobbying for support for the democratic forces working inside and outside the country. Some have called the unfolding situation a ‘transition to democracy’ (Sein 2017). But
this is far from the reality for some, if not most, of Myanmar’s ‘rural working people’. In this paper, we draw on Shivji’s (2017) conception of ‘working people’ to encompass a diverse constituency of people currently struggling to reproduce themselves and their households under contemporary political-economic conditions in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
The Journal of Peasant Studies via Routledge (London)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Rural development in Burma/Myanmar, Land research including land grabbing - global and regional, International resources on land rights and tenure, Land use in Burma, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
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Size:
2.22 MB
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Sub-title:
While the world gasps at the Myanmar military's brutal crackdown, there is little hope for a soldier-led mutiny or countercoup
Description:
"A military coup that overthrows a democratically elected government and sparks three months of nationwide protests and strikes. More than 700 people including children as young as five shot and killed as security forces fire into crowds of anti-military demonstrators.
Thousands of people, among them not only politicians, activists and journalists but also some of the nation’s best-known singers, movie stars and celebrities arrested on various trumped-up charges. An economy on its knees with non-performing banks and foreign investors running for the exits.
Such a litany would normally be enough to bring down any coup-installed government through a counter-coup or some other action by a military’s top brass who could see the self-defeatism of trying to cling to power when nearly the entire population is opposed to your takeover and rule.
But not in Myanmar. Instead, the military and its controlled police seem prepared to do whatever it takes to preserve its democracy-suspending power grab.
So far, there have been no signs of substantial cracks or divisions within the security establishment apart from a handful of policemen who have fled to rebel-held territories near the Thai border or across the border into neighboring northeastern India.
But is Myanmar’s military truly full of spineless, mindless yes-men, or is there something else that holds the institution together in the face of massive local resistance and rising international condemnation?
The simplistic explanation, put forth mostly by foreign security analysts, is that the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, is a battle-hardened force that has been fighting against an array of political and ethnic rebels continuously for more than 70 years.
Myanmar’s civil wars broke out shortly after independence was achieved from Britain in 1948. Before that, an army founded by independence hero Aung San had fought alongside the Japanese military against the British and then, at the end of World War II, allied themselves with the British and turned against the Japanese.
Consequently, the Tatmadaw sees itself as the true defender of the nation’s independence and the only force that can hold the ethnically diverse and politically divided country together.
But that analysis misses the enigma of military power in Myanmar. Although Aung San’s daughter and coup-toppled democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi once referred to the Tatmadaw as “my father’s army”, the military force which fought during World War II had little in common with the army that emerged after independence.
Because of post-war agreements with the British, most of the old fighters were demobilized and turned into a militia known as the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO) which, in turn, resorted to armed struggle against the government because it saw independence as a sham that perpetuated colonial rule.
By then, Aung San had been assassinated and of the legendary “Thirty Comrades” who had followed him to Japan to receive military training before the Japanese invasion of Myanmar in 1942, only three remained in the Tatmadaw in the 1950s, including army chief General Ne Win, who eventually seized power in a 1962 coup, the first absolute military-takeover in Myanmar, then known as Burma.
By the 1950s, Myanmar’s civil wars were more or less over, with the rebel Karen National Union (KNU) and Communist Party of Burma (CPB) pushed back into remote areas. Persistent internal political turmoil, though, led to the formation of a caretaker government led by Ne Win, which was in power from 1958 to 1960.
Rather than fighting the rebels, Ne Win and his 4th Burma Rifles spent the latter part of the 1950s building up a power base — and a business empire that in many ways endures today — centered around their regiment.
In 1958, it published a document called “The National Ideology of the Defense Services” which strikingly resembles the dwifungsi, or dual function, doctrine of the Indonesian army that stated that the military has both a defense and social-political role.
Ne Win also established an entity called the Defense Services Institute. (DSI), which soon controlled vital sectors of Myanmar’s economy. It had its own retail stores in Yangon and elsewhere it controlled the lucrative importation of coal for the railroads, electric supplies and inland water transport.
DSI even established an external shipping line, the Five Star Line, and took over an English-owned bank and renamed it the Ava Bank. A newspaper, the Guardian, and a publishing house were also controlled by DSI. Meanwhile, the once-tiny Myanmar Army, perhaps as few as 2,000 men in 1949, grew steadily in strength and importance. By the late 1950s, Ne Win had more than 40,000 soldiers under his command.
The army was becoming a state within the state, but few Myanmars, the vast majority of whom had faith in the nation’s then democratic system, constitution and rule of law, paid much attention until New Win seized power in 1962.
Significantly, the junta that overthrew a democratically elected government introduced a new economic system called “the Burmese Way to Socialism.” But rather than establishing a socialist regime reminiscent of those in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or China, Ne Win’s rendition meant that everything was nationalized and taken over by 23 military-run state corporations.
Military coups were not uncommon in Asia at that time, but the difference in Myanmar was that the military seized not only political but also economic power. While the economies of Thailand and Indonesia, for instance, blossomed because the military entered into marriages of convenience with indigenous plutocracies, Ne Win took Myanmar in a completely different direction.
The old business community, which was mainly of Indian and Chinese origin, had their properties and assets seized by the military, driving hundreds of thousands out of Myanmar into India, Southeast Asia or Taiwan.
But if the 1962 coup had been meant to squash what was left of the insurgents, it turned out to be counterproductive. A rebellion broke out among the Kachin in 1961 in areas of northern Shan state. After 1962, it spread to Kachin state and the Kachin Independence Army took over most of the state.
An even smaller rebellion among the Shan, which broke out in 1958, escalated into full-scale war as several bands grouped together to form the Shan State Army in 1964. The Burmese Way to Socialism had, hardly surprisingly, led to economic collapse — and a flourishing black market with neighboring Thailand.
The KNU, which controlled the border areas, collected taxes on that trade, and was able to buy modern guns from the Thai black market. And, most devastatingly, China decided to give all-out support to the CPB, including modern, sophisticated weaponry of kinds that the old forces in central Myanmar never possessed.
Thus, the new power structure that emerged in Myanmar after 1962 had more to do with preserving an order that hugely privileged the military in an otherwise collapsing society than the fact that officers had seen fierce combat.
That new order had a very narrow base, consisting of men from Ne Win’s own regiment, the 4th Burma Rifles. And Ne Win himself was probably the least battle-hardened senior officer in the Tatmadaw as he arguably spent more time gambling at horse races than on the battlefield.
Actually, the country’s most battle-hardened officers – among them the popular Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, who was purged in the late 1950s, later joined the CPB and ended his life in exile in China, and General Tin Oo, who fought in several frontier areas and in 1988 became one of the leaders of the then newly-established National League for Democracy (NLD) – did not become killers of civilians.
Rather, it was Ne Win loyalists who opened fire on demonstrating students in 1962, on students and workers in the mid-1970s, and then the massacres in 1988, when thousands of pro-democracy protesters were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere.
Ne Win and his men from the 4th Burma Rifles remained in power until after the events of 1988, when somewhat younger officers took over. Ne Win’s legacy was finally dismantled in 2002, when he died and his relatives were purged allegedly for plotting against the then-military government. But the system he created lives on today.
The military became the ruling class, which enjoyed privileges denied ordinary citizens. It had its own schools and hospitals and it was rare for someone who did not come from a military family to get a job in the government.
The new army that emerged after 1962 also included a series of Light Infantry Divisions, which became notorious for their brutality when fighting rebels and suppressing civil movements in urban areas, as they did in 1988 and are doing once again in the wake of the February 1 coup.
The Burmese Way to Socialism was abolished after the 1988 uprising, but the military retained an important role in the semi-capitalist system that succeeded it. While Ne Win had his DSI, Myanmar’s new military leaders established powerful companies like the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, which currently have vast holdings across the economy.
As such, the very concept of the 1958 declaration and the 1962 coup has not been abandoned but rather reshaped: the military should have a defense function as well as playing social, political and economic roles.
Whether Suu Kyi and her NLD aimed to roll back those roles and holdings in a second elected term is an open and important question.
Suu Kyi largely refrained from challenging the Tatmadaw’s political and economic power in her first term, but the NLD’s overwhelming election win last November – which coup-makers claim without evidence was fraudulent – gave her a strong mandate to push for more democratic change.
Top brass leaders also likely feared the risk of retribution for their many crimes. All senior Tatmadaw officers know where the skeletons are buried of past atrocities, both in ethnic minority areas and now also in urban centers home to the middle class.
The current commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is now widely loathed across the population for his regime’s ruthless post-coup clampdown. He and his associates know by now that they either maintain power or land in prison — or worse.
But it is a combination of those fears, deeply entrenched economic interests and a dual-function ideology that holds the Tatmadaw so tightly together, not some underlying sense of patriotism or because officers have been hardened through battles in the field.
And that explains why no cracks have or are likely to emerge in the Tatmadaw, despite the brutal, irrational and seemingly self-defeating orders being handed down by officers and carried out by unswervingly obedient foot soldiers..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Political History, The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Various groups
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452.72 KB
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Description:
"At the end of August 2018, as this book was about to go to press,the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) released its
report summarizing the main findings and recommendations of its
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. Thereport outlines serious human rights violations and abuses in Kachin,Shan and Rakhine States. It recommends that six senior military
figures be investigated for genocide against the Rohingya, including
Myanmar’s armed forces commander-in-chief Senior General MinAung Hlaing, and that the case be taken up by the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC), or alternatively that an ad hoc internationalcriminal tribunal be created (Human Rights Council 2018).
1
The
report notes that “The role of social media is significant. Facebook has
been a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate, in a contextwhere for most users Facebook
is
the internet. Although improved inrecent months, Facebook’s response has been slow and ineffective”
Reproduced from
Myanmar Media in Transition: Legacies, Challenges and Change,
edited by Lisa Brooten, Jane Madlyn McElhone and Gayathry Venkiteswaran (Singapore: ISEAS Ð Yusof IshakInstitute, 2019). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is notinfringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of ISEAS Publishing.Individual chapters are available at .
2
Brooten, McElhone and Venkiteswaran
(p. 74). Facebook quickly responded to the report’s release byremoving the accounts of eighteen high-profile army figures in
Myanmar, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and fifty-two
Facebook pages, which had a combined total following of close totwelve million users (Facebook 2018).A few days later, two Reuters journalists, Wa Lone and Kyaw
Soe Oo, were sentenced to seven years in prison under the Official
Secrets Act over accusations of holding secret government documentsthat they intended to share with international media and the ethnicarmed group Arakan Army (Sithu Aung Myint 2018). The two werearrested in December 2017 after investigating a massacre of Rohingyamen and boys in the coastal town of Inn Din in northern Rakhine
State. After responding to a call from police officers, who met them in
a restaurant and handed them documents, the journalists were arrestedfor having the documents in their possession. As they were beingtaken away from the court after the sentencing, Wa Lone was quotedas saying, “We know we did nothing wrong. I have no fear. I believein justice, democracy and freedom” (Shoon Naing and Aye Min Thant2018, ¶22). The arrest and subsequent sentencing were met with nationaland international condemnation, as was the rejection of their appealin early 2019. At a public protest to call for their release, organizer Ei Ei Moe, from the pro-democracy youth movement Generation Wave,described their jailing as “blocking the eyes and blinding the ears ofthe public” (Dunant and Su Myat Mon 2018, ¶15).
These events underscore the complexities of Myanmar’s muchlauded “transition”. Celebrated early on for the release of imprisoned journalists and the end of pre-publication censorship, hopes forincreased freedom of expression and media freedom were tempered by the crackdown that followed. Much has happened in the mediasector since the controversial elections in 2010 organized by themilitary junta and boycotted by Aung San Suu Kyi and the NationalLeague for Democracy (NLD), including reforms to laws that hadrepressed the media for decades. Some argue that these changes area continuation of the military government’s Seven Step Roadmap toDisciplined Democracy, announced in 2003 (see the interview withThiha Saw, this volume; Lall 2016; Rogers 2012)..."
Source/publisher:
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"On 8 November 2020, Myanmar had its third general election since 2010. The electorate overwhelmingly voted for the National League for Democracy (NLD). On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw staged a coup, alleging that the NLD had taken power by fraudulent means. President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with most senior NLD leaders, were immediately arrested. The remaining senior NLD leaders urged people to protest, before being arrested themselves. The people have risen to the occasion, and have sacrificed much to challenge the coup. The fate of the revolution lies in the hands of political entities and ethnic armed organizations, who must support the people before it is too late......People’s Response to the Military Coup: Under the banner of the “Spring Revolution”, Myanmar’s anti-military coup movement has generated an unprecedented level of national unity – overcoming ethnic, religious, and class boundaries. Since early February, protesters have drummed pots and pans every day at 8pm in response to the coup. They have come out to streets, turning major roads into seas of people, remaining peaceful despite the violence they endure at the hands of the military. Civil servants and private sector workers have established a national civil disobedience movement (CDM) in an unmatched attempt to cripple the military’s administrative mechanism. In response to brutal crackdowns from security forces, demonstrations are now smaller to aid escape. The protesters have also used road blockages to hinder the advancement of security forces. However, security forces have now forcefully cleared blockades at most protest sites. In some places, security forces have reportedly forced local residents (especially men) to clear them.
Protesters have also started social punishment campaigns against military families and their associates, and have called for a boycott of products produced by military’s companies. These tactics have already had significant effects. For instance, many restaurants and bars no longer sell Myanmar Beer. There are also reports of people boycotting MyTel, a mobile operator jointly owned by the Tatmadaw and the Vietnamese military.
One could argue that the public has done their part to the best of their capacities and it would be unrealistic to expect more from them. The best they could possibly do would be to continue the social punishment campaign against military leaders, their families and associates, as well as to sustain their boycott of products and services provided by the military’s companies.
Therefore, at this point, the outcome of the Myanmar Spring Revolution largely depends on the capacity of institutional leaders to consolidate various opposition forces. The elected members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), mostly from the NLD, are attempting to provide the institutional leadership by forming the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). Thus, the outcome of the Myanmar Spring Revolution depends on the political decisions and leadership of the CRPH.....The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH): The elected NLD members believe that their victory in the 2020 general election provides a mandate to form the CRPH, which was established so that they could perform the necessary activities and duties of an elected government. These include appointing and forming a government and making laws.....Political Visions of the CRPH: On 5 March 2021, the CRPH announced its political vision, declaring their commitment to the following: to end military dictatorship; to ensure the unconditional release of all unlawful detainees including President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; to achieve full-fledged democracy; and to rescind the 2008 Constitution and write a new Constitution based on the federal system.
The CRPH also states that it will steadfastly work hand-in-hand with all ethnic nationalities and strive for the full realization of this vision. To pave the way for broader participation in the Spring Revolution, the CRPH removed all the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) from the ‘unlawful organization list’ while designating the Tatmadaw as a ‘terrorist organization.’
It seems that most of the ethnic minorities welcome the political visions of the CRPH. However, many ethnic minorities also feel that the CRPH’s vision statement is only the first step. The CRPH must further show a concrete roadmap for including diverse voices within their vision. For example, the former joint secretary of the Karen National Union (KNU), Padoh Mahn Mahn, states that the political visions of the CRPH are only the beginning and that the CRPH must provide a workable plan for establishing a genuine federal union and a federal army. Likewise, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy also points out that CRPH must declare the abolishment of the 2008 Constitution if ethnic minorities are to come onboard.
At that point, the status of the 2008 Constitution was unclear because its abolishment was only positioned as a ‘political vision.’ However, on 31 March 2021, the CRPH has declared abolishment of the 2008 Constitution and announced Federal Democracy Charter. The Charter provides further details on how the CRPH might seek to translate its visions into reality, for instance by declaring the duties of an interim National Unity Government (NUG). The list of individuals appointed to the NUG was released on 16 April 2021.....Progress of the political talks between the CRPH and the EAOs: The stated political visions of CRPH appear to have won the hearts and minds of some ethnic minority political parties and armed organizations. Since its formation, the CRPH has reportedly been negotiating with EAOs on the terms of creating a federal union. Among those involved in the talks are the Karen National Union, the Restoration Council for Shan State, and the Kachin Independence Army, as well as other groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. By March 2021, the political talks are about 80% complete, according to Zin Mar Aung, the Acting Foreign Minister of the CRPH. These political talks contributed to the aforementioned Federal Democracy Charter and the appointment of the NUG.
According to the Charter, the interim NUG is formed with these roles: President, State Counsellor, Vice President 1, Vice President 2, ministers and deputy ministers. The NUG appointed by the CRPH shows that President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remain in their posts despite being in detention. The NUG is perhaps the most diverse government in terms of ethnicities the country has ever had.
As an aside, it is interesting to ask why the CRPH decided to keep Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor instead of appointing her as the President. Some might beg an answer for the rationale of keeping the post of “State Counsellor”. The post was created to circumvent the 2008 Constitution, which bars people married to foreigners from becoming the president. One wonders why the CRPH has decided to retain the “State Counsellor” post even after declaring the abolishment of the 2008 Constitution.....Doubts over the CRPH: Ethnic minorities have two major concerns over the capacity of the CRPH to uphold the agreements and understandings that the CRPH has reached with them. The first concern relates to ethnic minorities’ perception that Bama political leaders and the majority of Bama ethnic people do not have a strong political will for federalism. This is because a delegation of power to State governments (i.e., ethnic minorities) would mean less power to the Union (Central) Government (i.e., Bama). In other words, federalism is not the top priority of the NLD and (most) Bama ethnic people.
Federalism has never been the top priority of the NLD[1] and the Tatmadaw. In the last Union Peace Conference in August 2020, they (Bama leaders) did not even agree over the terminology of “State Law” (insisted on by Bama leaders) and “State Constitution” (insisted on by NCA-signatories). Subsequently no agreement has been reached on how write a constitution or a mother law governing the ethnic states.
This time, the CRPH announced its political visions and the Federal Democracy Charter while some members of the NLD’s 21-member Central Executive Committee were still in detention. Thus, the concern is whether the CRPH will be able to convince freed NLD leaders to support and honor the agreement (i.e., political roadmap) reached with the ethnic minorities.
Another concern is whether the CRPH can convince the Bama public that federalism is the best way to address the long-standing civil war. From the start of public protests, the priorities of Bama ethnic group and non-Bama ethnic groups have been quite different. For example, the key demands of Bama protesters, who rally behind the NLD flag, have been: (1) the release of mother Suu (State Counsellor), President Win Myint and all other detainees; (2) respect the 2020 election result; (3) restoration of democracy and eradication of military dictatorship.
On the other hand, the key demands of ethnic minorities and (some groups of) Generation Z have been: (1) the eradication of the military dictatorship; (2) abolishment of the 2008 Constitution; (3) establishment of genuine federal democratic union; and (4) release of all detainees including the President and State Counsellor.
It took the CRPH a whole month to announce its ‘political visions’ statement above. It is understandable that the CRPH has hesitated to make the political decisions in the absence of all members of the NLD’s 21-member Central Executive Committee. The decision-makers of the CRPH must have worried about whether freed NLD leaders would support any political understanding or agreement reached between the CRPH and the EAOs. This author has learned that the ethnic minorities who chose to cooperate with the CRPH have the same concern.
Padoh Mahn Mahn of KNU states that if the NLD or CRPH were to betray the ethnic minorities when they regain power, that would be the end of the ethnic minorities’ aspirations to remain in the union. This would force the minorities to choose a different political path. In his interview with Voice of Myanmar, KPICT spokesperson Nsang Gum San also echoes that for the Kachin, this could be seen as the final attempt to establish a federal union, which ethnic minorities have demanded for many decades.
However, Arakan National Party (ANP) and Mon Unity Party (MUP)—two opposition political parties seeking to represent the respective ethnic groups—have decided to join the military regime’s State Administrative Council (SAC). This is clearly not helpful for the anti-coup movement as the military could argue that not all ethnic minorities are against the military’s takeover......Defeating the Coup Requires Faster Decision Making: The CRPH’s announcement on 31 March 2021 – which declared the abolishment of the 2008 Constitution and announced the Federal Democracy Charter – was certainly a huge milestone for achieving federalism in Myanmar. Ethnic minorities had been urging the CRPH to show a clear and concrete roadmap. In his interview with Irrawaddy, CRPH spokesperson said that the Charter was consulted and agreed on by at least four political organizations, although he could not name them for security reasons. It remains to be seen if the Charter is able to rally all major ethnic armed organizations.
However, since the Charter is only a general roadmap, there might be issues that require mutually understanding clarification or definition. Both sides – that is, the CRPH and EAO leaders – have to work out such issues and cooperate quickly to resolve them. Time is of the essence.
Without full cooperation from at least the major EAOs, the Spring Revolution will seem unwinnable to the public and international community. Needless to say, it is of the utmost importance that people do not lose faith in the revolution. Currently, the international community is on the side of the CRPH as they condemn the coup d’état and violent crackdowns on the unarmed and peaceful protesters. No government — not even China and ASEAN members — has publicly recognized the military junta. However, this could change if the international community begins to think that Myanmar Spring Revolution is unlikely to succeed. Therefore, having a concrete agreement between the CRPH and EAOs is key..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Ethnic groups in Burma: agreements and statements, Ethnic groups in Burma: general studies and articles, Several Groups, National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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322.62 KB
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Description:
"Announcement of Min Ko Naing, on behalf of the National Unity Consultative Council on formation of the National Unity Government. (With English Subtitles.)..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources, Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"21 April 2021 is the seventh anniversary of the death of U Win Tin – journalist, democracy activist, founding member of the National League for Democracy, and one of Burma’s most high profile and respected political prisoners. He spent over 19 years in prison.
People around the world will be wearing a blue shirt or blue clothing to raise awareness about Burma’s growing political prisoner population, and in solidarity with those activists in jail for supporting human rights and democracy.
When U Win Tin was eventually released in 2008, he refused to hand back his blue prison shirt, and vowed to wear a blue shirt every day until all political prisoners were released, saying: “If there are no political prisoners … I will take off my shirt, but up until now I haven’t seen good indications.”
Arrest, torture and forced disappearances are taking place daily in Burma since the military staged a coup on 1 February. There are now more than 3200 political prisoners, who are being imprisoned for peacefully protesting and speaking out against the military. This figure does not include people who have been arrested or simply disappeared in very remote ethnic areas.
Please join Blue Shirt Day on Wednesday 21st April. Wear blue, post pictures on social media, and tell the world that there is a growing number of political prisoners in Burma, and that they must be freed immediately..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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pdf
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160.31 KB
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Title: Formation of the National Unity Government of Myanmar - အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်း
Description:
"The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw(CRPH), with the authority bestowed by the
people’s mandate resultant of all parties’ democratic election held in 2020 has formed the National
Unity Government with following cabinet members, in accordance with the Federal Democracy
Charter (Statement: 19/2021), published on the 31st of March 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
62.7 KB 249 KB
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Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Union Prime Minister Mann Win Khaing Than Myanmar New Year's Speech..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Myanmar New Year's Opening Speech by Vice President Duwa Lashi Lawith..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
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Summary:
"Myanmar’s ousted lawmakers formed a parallel government on Friday in an attempt to defy and discredit the country’s ruling military regime, restore civilian rule and establish a federal union....
Description:
"Myanmar’s ousted lawmakers formed a parallel government on Friday in an attempt to defy and discredit the country’s ruling military regime, restore civilian rule and establish a federal union.
The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), established by ousted lawmakers in the wake of the military coup in February, said in a statement that it had formed a National Unity Government (NUG) based on the mandate bestowed on it by the people in the 2020 general election, which the National League for Democracy won by a landslide. Despite being outlawed by the regime, the CRPH enjoys popular support at home and abroad.
The new government is a coalition of democratic forces in Myanmar, including stakeholders from the country’s ethnic groups, formed under the terms of the Federal Democracy Charter, which the CRPH made public in March. The charter guarantees the formation of a federal union, something the country’s ethnicities have long sought.
In the new government, Mahn Win Khaing Than, an ethnic Karen and former House Speaker under the NLD government, is the country’s prime minister, while President U Win Myint and State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who were ousted by the coup and have been detained since February, retain their positions.
The vice president is lawyer Duwa Lashi La, president of the Kachin National Consultative Assembly, politically the most authoritative body in Kachin State.
For the time being the 15-member cabinet will be led by the vice president and prime minister. The CRPH has created three new ministries: the ministries of the Prime Minister; Federal Union Affairs; and Women, Youth and Children’s Affairs. Six of the federal ministers are ethnic Kachin, Karen or Chin, while no representatives of other ethnic nationalities have yet been appointed. However, with important ministries like Agriculture, Transport, and Energy yet to be filled, they will likely be added soon.
In the NUG’s cabinet, four elected NLD lawmakers—Daw Zin Mar Aung, U Lwin Ko Latt, U Yee Mon and U Tin Tun Naing—have been appointed as the ministers for foreign affairs; home affairs and immigration; defense; and planning, finance and investment, respectively. U Yee Mon is somewhat of a surprise appointment as defense minister and brings some unusual qualifications to the portfolio, being a poet.
Dr. Sa Sa, an ethnic Chin and the international envoy for the CRPH, has been appointed international cooperation minister. He will also serve as the NUG’s spokesperson. Dr. Win Myat Aye, who served as social welfare, relief and resettlement minister under the NLD government until the coup, will serve as minister of humanitarian affairs and disaster management in the new government.
Another ethnic Chin minister in the new government is Dr. Lian Hmung Sakhong. With a mandate from the Chin Consultative Assembly, a politically authoritative umbrella organization among Chin ethnic people, the vice chair of the Chin National Front (CNF), a Chin armed group that has been lobbying for autonomy and federalism in Chin State, is now federal union affairs minister.
Dr. Tu Hkawng, an ethnic Kachin with a postgraduate degree in social science and community development, is natural resources and environmental conservation minister in the NUG, while elected NLD lawmaker Naw Susanna Hla Hla Soe, an ethnic Karen, is the minister for women, youth and children’s affairs.
Another new face in the cabinet is Dr. Zaw Wai Soe. The orthopedic surgeon, who earned renown for his COVID-19 containment strategies in Yangon before the coup, as well as for his involvement in the Civil Disobedience Movement against the junta, has been named minister for both education and, unsurprisingly, health.
In his statement on the formation of the NUG, spokesperson Dr. Sa Sa said the government members will serve the people of Myanmar regardless of their race, religion, community of origin or walk of life.
“All will have a vitally important role to play in the great cause of liberating our nation from the scourge of this murderous military junta, and all will have equal rights as citizens of Myanmar,” he said.
The spokesperson added that the NUG will bring all ethnic nationalities on board “so that it represents the great diversity and strength of this great nation of Myanmar.”
The NUG also appointed 12 deputy ministers, six of whom are ethnic Kachin, Karen, Mon, Kayan, Karenni and Ta’ang. Many of them are young, politically active and well-educated.
The announcement of the NUG’s formation was heartily welcomed by Myanmar’s people on Friday.
On the CRPH’s Facebook page, the announcement earned 149,000 shares within two hours.
One supporter simply said: “Our legitimate government and we support NUG!”
Unsurprisingly, most of the other comments expressed similar sentiments.
On Friday, the NUG’s Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung wrote in The New York Times that the people of Myanmar are ready to take great risks and pay a great price for their rights and freedom.
“We ask the international community to support them, with coordinated political, financial and security measures,” she said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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341.9 KB
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Description:
"Did migration processes into colonial Burma – from India and elsewhere – amount to a “transfer of civilians” into an occupied territory, a practice prohibited by international law today? Should the international community reconsider such colonial-era population movements as a “colonial wrong”, conceding that a historical injustice has been committed by European colonialism, in order to make contemporary Myanmar political and military actors more ready to accept accountability for the severe human rights violations committed against the Rohingya? These questions, based on problematic assumptions about history and with potentially dangerous political implications, were discussed at a meeting of international lawyers in Yangon, the proceedings of which were recently published online (Morten Bergsmo, Wolfgang Kaleck and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (eds.): Colonial Wrongs and Access to International Law; Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 9 November 2020).
International criminal justice faces a crisis of legitimacy. The International Criminal Court (ICC, constituted by the Rome Statute and operative since 2002) especially stands accused of applying what Wolfgang Kaleck has called “double standards”. Its prosecution of severe human rights violators focuses on persons from countries with little power in global politics, many of them in Sub-Saharan Africa so far. At the same time, the Court finds it virtually impossible to prosecute perpetrators protected by major powers in the international system, especially the United States. The argument of “double standards” can be extended by giving it a postcolonial pitch: international criminal law is unable to address “colonial wrongs” – crimes committed by colonial powers – and thus cannot deal with the history behind current governance failures and violent conflicts that contributed to the very human rights violations it tries to prosecute.
In order to address such questions, senior international law specialists and academics met for a conference in Yangon in November 2019. Myanmar constituted a very conscious choice of location for the conference and provided the backdrop to discuss questions such as: Did the migration of substantial non-indigenous populations (primarily from India) into colonial Burma constitute a “transfer of civilians” into an occupied territory – a practice that is regarded as a crime against humanity under today’s international criminal law? And if so, how should this be taken into account as a “colonial wrong” when prosecuting perpetrators of severe human rights violations, especially those perpetrated against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State in 2016-7? (The conference volume includes papers on systematic legal aspects and a few other country case studies, especially on the fate of indigenous populations in European settler colonies. However, it does not include studies on other historical examples of colonial-era population movements that could have put the Burma case into a broader historical perspective.)
The decision by the Yangon conference organizers to discuss their agenda through the lens of Burmese history (and, of course, to hold it in Myanmar itself) could be seen as courageous; one may regard it as hazardous as well. The hazard is likely obvious to students of Myanmar history and contemporary politics: Does this “transfer of civilians into occupied territory” line of argument really do justice to Burma’s actual colonial history? And does it not risk undermining the citizenship rights of people whose ancestors migrated into Myanmar a century or more ago – and whose very citizenship rights are already severely embattled in Myanmar today?
The organizers of the Yangon conference were of course aware they were entering a particularly difficult territory. They did so for good reason. In his concept paper laying the groundwork for the conference (first published in August 2019), Morten Bergsmo observes an “unusually polarised climate” in Myanmar around the issue of human rights violations in Rakhine. The official Myanmar narrative frames the issue primarily as one of “illegal migration” and “suppression of terrorism”. By contrast, a major strand in the international narrative (in reality mostly that of Western countries, U.N. institutions and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) discusses “the Rohingya genocide” and calls for prosecution under international criminal law. Bergsmo suggests that a recognition of “colonial wrongs”, especially the destruction of the sovereignty of the precolonial Burmese kingdom and the following mass migration of people from India into Burma, enabled by the British, may help to create a bridge, enabling a more fruitful dialogue.
I certainly agree with Bergsmo’s observation on the “unusually polarized climate” around Myanmar today that currently makes meaningful dialogue about severe human rights violations very difficult, if not impossible. However, I very much doubt that the acceptance of what may be called a “postcolonial guilt theory” of acknowledging “colonial wrongs” in Burma will contribute to any greater degree of acceptance for ICC proceedings in Myanmar. I doubt this not merely because the argument is based on weak legal and misleading historical foundations. Even worse, such a line of reasoning – if it ever enters mainstream political debate – obviously risks strengthening the militant exclusionary nationalism in Myanmar that stands at the root of the Rohingya crisis. And it risks doing so for all the wrong reasons.
To be sure, Bergsmo and the other international lawyers involved in this project do not want to trade responsibilities: In their view, this is not about downplaying or relativising responsibility for killings and other human rights violations against the Rohingya or others. It is about creating a dialogue that may lead to greater acceptance of international judicial proceedings on these violations. The book itself includes an explicit warning by the only Myanmar contributor and editor, Kyaw Yin Hlaing of the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony in Yangon. In his chapter, he reviews how contemporaries perceived the migration of Indians, and especially Indian Muslims, into colonial Burma as a result of the colonial situation, stoking fears of indigenous people being overwhelmed, of indigenous men losing their land and their women to foreigners; he also recalls how these sentiments were systematically fuelled further by military rulers as part of anti-colonial narratives since the 1960s. Kyaw Yin Hlaing cautions that, within this context, legal arguments about historical wrongs run a high risk of being misused to undermine peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups today: “Promoting accountability and the legitimacy of international law are valid considerations, but are less important than the lives and well-being of the populations (of all kinds) living in former colonies” (362). The remainder of the volume, however, does not take much notice of this warning. Instead, rather than reflecting the concrete historical and social context that their legal arguments about “colonial wrongs” may meet in Myanmar today, the contributors proceed, with what they appear to think of as their righteous “postcolonial” approach, into very treacherous legal and historical territory.
On the legal side, the limitations of the argument are obvious and even acknowledged accordingly by contributors. The “transfer of civilians” into “occupied territory” constitutes an international crime only since the (Fourth) Geneva Convention of 1949. The Convention explicitly outlawed such a practice informed by the experiences of Nazi Germany’s exterminatory policies in occupied Eastern Europe. (In more recent decades, the concept has usually been applied to legally attack Israeli settlement policies in the West Bank, though not for example, against Moroccan population settlement policies in the former Western Sahara). “Transfer of civilians” was reaffirmed as a “crime against humanity” and “war crime” under the Rome Statute that created the ICC. Legally, therefore, any “transfers” before 1949 – including nearly all population movements under European colonial rule in Africa and Asia – are not covered under these prohibitions. Nonetheless, various contributors to the volume set out to develop lines of argument designed to describe actions by European colonial states as legally relevant “colonial wrongs” or “grievances” that may have led to atrocities later on. Not being a lawyer myself, I am not in a position to judge whether and how any such arguments have a potential to become part of relevant international law; the authors are surely committed to this. Beyond the immanent logic of these legal arguments, however, we also need to ask whether they make sense in the concrete case of the history of colonial Burma.
It is one thing to assert historical and political responsibility of former colonial powers for obvious atrocities committed during their rule, such as the 1904-8 genocide of the Herero and Nama people in what was then German South West Africa (Namibia), or the issue of British capital punishment practices in colonial Kenya during the Mau Mau war in the 1950s. It is an entirely different – and very wrong – matter to group British migration policies in colonial Burma into the same (or a similar) class of “colonial wrongs”.
The volume under review includes two contributions, by Jacques Leider and Derek Tonkin, which document the history of migration into Arakan / Rakhine in great detail. While there has been a presence of Muslim communities in Arakan for centuries, they show specifically that labour-related cross-border migration from the Chittagong area of Bengal began even before British colonial rule and expanded rapidly under it, especially in the latter years of the 19th and the early 20th century. Labour needs of local ethnic Rakhine landlords were a major factor; settlement and land acquisition by the migrants followed. Over time this led to a concentration of Muslim agriculturalists in Northern Rakhine who later acquired the Rohingya ethnonym (a fact disputed by Rohingya nationalists who claim a much earlier origin of the term). Until 1937, all this happened within the single territory of British India of which Burma was a part, without any internal border controls. Migration into colonial Arakan, with no force by the colonial power involved, was driven by economic needs and interests, and it was pursued by local individual and group agency. To categorize this process as a “colonial wrong” constitutes an ahistorical narrative which in effect denies agency to any colonial subjects.
Likewise, Indian migration into the mainland and the urban centres of colonial Burma, especially Rangoon, was driven by the economic interest and agency of those who migrated, mostly from other parts of British India (while some came from China as well). Again, no forced labour was involved here. British policies played a stronger role than in Rakhine, in so far as the colonial state and the colonial economy created a demand for business professionals, traders and urban workers from India to move to Burma. In addition, civil servants and soldiers were temporarily transferred into colonial Burma, and some of them may have decided to settle there later on. For all of these groups, the colonial state made movement and long-term settlement possible, for example by creating an enabling environment of transport systems and urban facilities. All this led to social tension and instances of violence by the 1930s and contributed to the prominent anti-Indian streak within Burmese anti-colonial nationalism.
However, the policies and incentives employed by the British in Burma were pretty much standard practices of “development policy”, as conceptualized by colonial powers in the first half of the 20th century; some of them were even continued after independence. To describe resulting migration processes under colonial rule as a “transfer of civilians” into an “occupied territory” (with the connotation that they were designed to overwhelm, drive out or exterminate the local Burmese population) does not only constitute a severe category error. It risks feeding into the “anti-foreigner”, xenophobic narrative within Burmese (and Rakhine) nationalism that has its historical roots in the late colonial period but has become ever more extreme under military rule since 1962. In effect, this narrative culminated in the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law and contributed to the perception of the Rohingya as “illegal aliens”, leading to violence and ultimately resulting in their flight and expulsion, in 2017.
Of course, the experts advancing the “colonial wrongs” argument who contributed to the volume under review do not intend to condone any such discrimination or violence. But they appear to underestimate the fact that a core element of the very narrative they are proposing in order to increase global acceptance for international criminal law – that colonialism committed a crime by bringing in “foreigners” – is in fact already a core element of the exclusionary narrative of Burmese nationalism. It has been in use for decades, has been worsening over time, and it has already led to extreme marginalization and violence.
Does all this matter? Clearly, a more balanced approach – one that does not just let powerful perpetrators off the hook while prosecuting only those who are already out of power – is very necessary in order to secure the very legitimacy of the international criminal law system. However, the Myanmar example shows that an inappropriate application of a simplistic, if not outright wrong postcolonial narrative is risky. Defenders of the Myanmar official position on the Rohingya issue hardly need international lawyers to remind them that “Indians”, “Bengalis” or other foreigners who migrated into the country in colonial times came in as a result of a “colonial wrong”. They have been making this point all along, but now they can do so with innovative phrasing and the international academic and legal legitimation provided by this volume.
Disturbingly, they appear to do so already: Derek Tonkin (281-2, and email communication, 18.11.2020) documents the first two instances of the verbatim use of the “transfer of civilians” argument employed by high-ranking Myanmar officials in U.N. contexts, within weeks after the publication of Morten Bergsmo’s concept paper. It is difficult to think of this as a mere coincidence.
The military coup of February 1st, 2021, has led the country into a massive crisis. The outcome is anything but clear at this point in time, and Myanmar may face an extended period of military rule, violent conflict, economic decline and even state failure. But the broad resistance against the military takeover and the political dynamics since the coup also have a potential to do away with long-established, outdated ideas and institutions in Myanmar’s political and legal system, in order to create a true break with the past.
Many in Myanmar and internationally no longer see the Myanmar military as a legitimate partner in any substantive discussion about the political future of the country; in their view, the Tatmadaw has to return to the barracks without claiming special political prerogatives, or it has to disappear as an institution. A Rohingya voice has been emerging in the protests against the regime, and there is hope that the community will gain broader acceptance among the Burmese majority population.
The declaration of the Federal Democracy Charter and the intent to abolish the 2008 constitution by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) on March 31st, 2021, imply an outright rejection of fundamental political ideas and institutions imposed by the Tatmadaw over decades. This could and should include a rejection of the very concept of belonging represented by the idea of “national races” (taingyinthar), and of the system of graded citizenship rights, based on an individual’s real or putative migratory background. Instead, Myanmar should acquire a new citizenship law that follows globally accepted standards, is inclusive and provides equal rights to everyone living in the country, not subject to political or bureaucratic manipulation.
I have shown in this article that arguments about real or imagined “colonial wrongs” in the debate and legal discourse about contemporary human rights violations, when applied to Burma/Myanmar, were highly problematic even before the coup. Now and in any future processes of transitional justice, however, they deserve to be discarded in their entirety, as a misguided attempt of appeasing perpetrators of human rights violations on a grand scale and their political allies.
Dr. Axel Harneit-Sievers, a historian by professional background, has been the country director of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung’s Myanmar office in Yangon from 2018 until May 2021. Opinions expressed here are personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political History, Atrocities Against Groups, International Criminal Court, Genocide, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
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The cabinet includes 11 ministries and 26 members
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"Myanmar’s acting vice-president was appointed interim prime minister on Friday by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a body formed of elected lawmakers from Myanmar’s ousted civilian government.
Mahn Win Khaing Than served as the speaker of the Upper House until the Aung San Suu Kyi-led civilian government was forced out in the February 1 military coup.
The CRPH announced the lineup of its interim cabinet members at an online press event on Friday. It includes a president, state counsellor, vice president, prime minister and 11 ministers for 12 ministries. There are also 12 deputy ministers appointed by the CRPH.
Of the 26 total cabinet members, 13 belong to ethnic nationalities, and eight are women.
Ousted president Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi retained their previous positions, but were still detained in military custody at the time of reporting.
Duwa Lashi La was appointed Vice President.
CRPH spokesperson Yee Mon, also known as Maung Tin Thit, has been named the defence minister with his deputies revealed as Khin Ma Ma Myo, the founder of the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security Studies, and Nai Kao Rot, an ethnic Mon politician.
Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, who has been the acting minister for three cabinet positions (labour, immigration, and population; education; and health and sports) has become the interim head of two ministries: education and health.
Zin Mar Aung, an elected lawmaker and member of the CRPH was appointed foreign affairs minister.
Naw Susanna Hla Hla Soe, the elected Karen ethnic affairs minister for Yangon Region, was appointed Minister of Women, Youth and Children’s Affairs. Her deputy is Ei Thinzar Maung, who competed in the 2020 elections as a Lower House candidate for Yangon’s Pabedan Township.
At 26 years old, Ei Thinzar Maung is the youngest interim cabinet member. She is a well known protest leader in the anti-coup resistance movement and a former member of the Democratic Party for a New Society.
Dr. Sasa, a member of the CRPH and Myanmar’s Special Envoy to the United Nations, has been appointed the Minister for International Cooperation.
The CRPH consists mainly of parliamentarians from the National League for Democracy (NLD) who were elected in Myanmar’s 2020 general election but were unable to take their seats in the legislature due to the February 1 military coup.
A CRPH member, who spoke to Myanmar Now on the condition of anonymity, said on Thursday that the cabinet was formed with the agreement of multiple ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and would be in accordance with the political roadmap outlined in the Federal Democracy Charter.
The Federal Democracy Charter was published by the CRPH on March 31, the same day it announced that it had abolished the military-drafted 2008 Constitution.
The two-part charter lays out a plan to form an “interim national unity government,” the duties of which include working to “weaken the governance mechanisms” of the military regime, support the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and make arrangements for “national defence.”
According to the political roadmap described in the first part of the charter, legislative and judicial bodies will be created after the formation of a national unity government. The charter also includes plans to establish a national convention to draft a new constitution, which would be approved only after a national referendum is held.
The charter states that the national unity government will govern under a parliamentary system and will include a prime minister, president, state counsellor and a vice-president.
Under the charter, there are also plans to establish a National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) to coordinate cooperation among federal democracy forces. The NUCC will include representatives of the CRPH, political parties, EAOs, civil society organisations and CDM groups.
Dr. Lian Hmung Sakhong, the appointed minister of federal union affairs, said at an online press conference on Friday afternoon that members of the NUCC would be announced within one week, although the council was originally supposed to have been formed at the same time as the interim cabinet.
He said that the members were trying to ensure that the council would be as inclusive as possible.
The interim cabinet was formed following a series of meetings between current CRPH members and the leaders of several EAOs and ethnic political parties, held after the previous NLD-led administration’s term officially expired on March 31.
The 20-page Federal Democracy Charter is based on an interim constitution drafted between 1990 and 2008 by NLD lawmakers elected in 1990 and ethnic armed forces in Myanmar’s border areas. This is the first time it has been unveiled to the public..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar
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"On 1 February 2021, military television channel Myawaddy told the people of Myanmar that a state of emergency had been declared. President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, both senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), had been arrested.
Former vice president Myint Swe — now serving as President — used his constitutional authority to declare the state of emergency, then transferred state power to the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), Min Aung Hlaing.
The Tatmadaw claimed that widespread election fraud in the November 2020 elections resulted in the NLD landslide victory. On 2 February 2021, they announced that a new State Administrative Council had been formed to take over all state legislative, judicial and executive functions. This has been called a coup by most Western media.
After 10 years of varying levels of cooperation between the Tatmadaw and the NLD, the democratic transition has taken a serious U-turn. But given the strained relations between the Tatmadaw and the NLD — and given the fragility of all democratic transitions — the potential for such a reversal was always there, lingering in the shadows.
Most Western governments and media outlets were quick to denounce and condemn the Tatmadaw and tried to draw attention to what they saw as a slow and weak response from the Japanese government. Certainly, Japan was not included in the 15 February statement by ambassadors to Myanmar that called for the military to show restraint and condemned the detention of political leaders.
But Japan was a signatory to the G7 Foreign Minister’s statement on 3 February, ‘condemning the military coup’. On 21 February and again on 28 February, the Japanese government said it ‘strongly condemned’ the situation in Myanmar. In the same statement it said, ‘the government of Japan once again strongly urges the Myanmar military to release those who are detained … and swiftly restore Myanmar’s democratic political system’.
Leaving aside Western governments’ failures to facilitate positive change in Myanmar — and ignoring the high probability that they are merely appealing to domestic activist stakeholders at a relatively low political cost — Japan’s different approach to the coup in Myanmar does raise questions.
The day after the Tatmadaw took power, Japan’s State Minister of Defence Yasuhide Nakayama told Reuters, ‘If we do not approach this well, Myanmar could grow further away from politically free democratic nations and join the league of China’. This reveals the Japanese government’s understanding of the geostrategic significance of Myanmar in the region.
China’s increasing influence in Myanmar has long been a concern for Japanese leaders. Fear over increasing dependence on China was one of the factors that led to the Tatmadaw deciding to initiate political reforms and open up Myanmar in 2011. The government of Japan was instrumental in this process, facilitating re-engagement between the international community and the government of Myanmar.
On the condition that democratisation proceeded, Japan cancelled much of Myanmar’s outstanding debt in 2012. But more importantly perhaps, Japan provided a bridge loan to Myanmar to enable it to clear its arrears with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in the same year. This allowed these financial institutions to begin development aid and support the democratic transition of then-president Thein Sein.
Japan’s diplomacy should also be viewed within the framework of relations with ASEAN, a key strategic partner for Japan. Tokyo has spent decades investing in the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asian countries and Japan’s economy is heavily dependent on them. On 10 February there was a phone call between the foreign ministers of Japan and Indonesia, with the main issues discussed being the situation in Myanmar and issues related to the South China Sea and the East China Sea. For Japan — and for ASEAN alike — these issues are all linked.
The Japanese government’s approach to the coup in Myanmar is in some ways a middle road between the ‘distant’ Western states that prioritise human rights and democracy and the ‘local’ Asian states that prioritise stability and development. In this way, Japan is treading a fine line between its position as a liberal democracy and its dependence on stability and development in Southeast Asia. The overriding international concern for all states in Southeast Asia is China’s rise and responses to the coup in Myanmar are best understood within that framework..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Japan-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Committed since 2003 to its “Road Map” for national reconciliation, the military regime in Myanmar persevered with the adoption of a new
constitution in 2008, then held multi-party elections in November 2010. Each of these steps was criticized for significant procedural and substantive flaws, and the overall process was neither democratic, transparent, nor inclusive. The freeing of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in November 2010 was welcomed, especially her freedom to carry out political activities. Next, the new parliamentary assemblies were convened in January 2011, and the reins of government were formally handed over to a new, “civilianized” government on 30 March 2011. The new government under President (formerly General) Thein Sein began quickly to introduce some reforms and to set out its own agenda for change in line with the 2008 Constitution, and in its first twelve months in office released a large number of political
prisoners. However, a number of substantive issues — such as the ongoing conflicts with several significant ethnic groups — remain unresolved, and some have even worsened. Government action in relation to the ending of human rights abuses continues to be manifestly insufficient, and the role of the military remains unchecked. No substantive measures for reforms to underpin the rule of law have been implemented, and the restoration of various freedoms, including freedom of the press and freedom of association, are being introduced only slowly and partially. The eleventh Myanmar/Burma Update conference was held at the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra on Monday, 16 and Tuesday, 17 May 2011. It was supported by a grant from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Co-conveners of the conference were Professor Monique Skidmore, University of Canberra, and Trevor Wilson and Nick Cheesman of the ANU. The conference was sponsored by the Department of Political and Social Change, School of
International Political and Strategic Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU. The keynote speaker was Dr Thant Myint-U, historian and author, and formerly of the UN Department of Political Affairs..."
Source/publisher:
"Institute of Southeast Asian Studies" (Singapore)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
732.4 KB
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Description:
"After its coup d’état on February 1, 2021, the military is doing everything to cling to power, and every day, the violence against civilians is growing and becoming more brutal. The situation is horrendous, and no one knows when and how it will end. Yet, the massive popular resistance to military rule, across ethnic, religious, and generational divides, gives hope for a new democracy in Myanmar with ethnic equality and inclusion.
What at first appeared as a power struggle between the military top brass and Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has become a broad-based popular resistance on social media, on streets of cities, and in rural and ethnic border areas. The hundreds of thousands of protesters and civil servants on strike across Myanmar agree on one thing: they reject the military takeover. So far, this has not resulted in one single movement or a single source of clear leadership, but multiple enactments of resistance. The challenge now is to persist against the brutal crackdowns by the security forces and unite around a common message and strategy that is broadly inclusive. Here, multiethnic unity is crucial and presents a challenge to overcome in a country that has been ethnically and religiously divided for so long. However, important signs of unity are emerging through a shared rejection of the military and calls for a federal democracy.
Diversity in resistance efforts – towards a united call for federal democracy
The nationwide scale and diversity of anti-coup protests have been growing ever since the first action on February 2 when, at 8 pm, people in Yangon—and later in many other places—started to bang pots and pans to “drive out the evil spirits” (in this case, the military). On the same day, a leaderless civil disobedience movement (CDM) launched a Facebook campaign, inspiring first doctors and nurses and then many other public and private sector workers to refuse to work for the military regime. Most recently, on March 16, the powerful government-appointed State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (Mahana), which oversees the country’s Buddhist monkhood, also decided to stop its activities in support of the CDM. The strikes have now paralyzed almost all civil services, banks, and ports, making it difficult for the military to run the country and the economy..."
Source/publisher:
Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-coup protesters, General Strike, Spring Revolution, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
486.03 KB
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