Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Individual Documents
Description:
"It was hard not to feel a sense of déjà vu when the military stepped in to assume absolute power in February two years ago. It was like 1988 all over again. Demonstrators staged initially peaceful protests in the streets of cities and towns all over the country and were met with bullets from the military. Many were killed, and activists of various kinds fled to the border areas where they linked up with the ethnic rebel armies, which have been resisting central government control for decades. A government truly representing the people was set up and became active mostly in exile. A broader front including some of the ethnic armed groups was formed. And the struggle to topple an immensely unpopular military regime continued without anyone seeming to win the war. Those are the most common superficial observations—because there are fundamental differences between what happened after 1988 and now. As a journalist who has covered Myanmar affairs for more than 40 years—including the 1988 uprising and its aftermath—I have been approached by some close friends who have asked me to explain why the current uprising is not just a repeat of what happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
First of all, mobile phones and the internet, with their associated digital media and email, did not exist in the 1980s. I was banned from visiting the country at that time, but managed with extreme difficulty to get news through a confidential network of raspy telephone lines and occasional letters, which were hand-delivered to me in Bangkok by trusted contacts. I would not have been able to write my articles for the now defunct Far Eastern Economic Review without the help of those contacts inside the country, and I am forever grateful to them for providing me with up-to-date information, often at great risk to themselves. Photos had to be taken by cumbersome cameras with film, and the rolls smuggled out of the country and developed in Thailand or elsewhere. Some grainy video recordings also made it to safety outside Myanmar, as did printed material ranging from flyers and posters to independently produced newspapers and journals. What has been preserved constitutes important historical material, but it is limited and cannot be compared with what is available online today. Now, nothing happens inside Myanmar—a protest, a gun battle, an assassination or an atrocity—without the outside world getting to know about it within a day or two, or even hours. Young people in Myanmar are very cyber savvy and continue to outsmart the military, which is much less adept at using online technology.
At the same time, it is important to remember that the brutality the military unleashed on the protests in the cities and towns in 1988 was far worse than what was witnessed after the 2021 coup. When people took to the streets on Aug. 8, soldiers sprayed automatic rifle fire into crowds of unarmed people not only in Yangon, where even armored vehicles equipped with Bren machine guns were used to crush the demonstrations, but also in Bago, Sagaing, Taunggyi and many other places. An especially bloody and virtually unpublicized event took place in Sagaing on Aug. 11 when troops and policemen commanded by Kyaw Zwa, an army veteran and the local head of the ruling Burma Socialist Program Party as well as chairman of the Sagaing Division’s People’s Council, gunned down at least 100 demonstrators, among them many Buddhist monks. According to estimates by local medical personnel, thousands of civilians—not hundreds as often mentioned in later writings about the uprising—were gunned down by the military in 1988. It would have been 3,000 countrywide in August, and another 1,000 when the military stepped in to reassert their grip on power on Sept. 18, which was also when a new junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), was formed.
The carnage prompted about 10,000 mostly young, urban activists to leave their homes and trek through the jungle and over the mountains to remote border areas controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Karenni Army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Only a handful made it to areas in northeastern Shan State where the Communist Party of Burma had its strongholds, and no one went to the area on the Thai border controlled by the drug lord Khun Sa because they knew that he had a tacit business arrangement with the Myanmar military. In January 1996, Khun Sa also surrendered, dissolved his army and moved with his closest business associates to Yangon.
The flight to the border led to the formation of a number of alliances and fronts. On Nov. 5, 1988, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) was set up at a meeting in Kawmorrah, a KNU camp on the Thai border (which now, incidentally, is called Shwe Kokko, a new town under the control of a junta-allied Border Guard Force—and where many of the newly built casinos are located). Two weeks later, the ethnic Burman resistance and several ethnic armed groups formed the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). Then came the May 18, 1990 election, which resulted in a resounding victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD). But the assembly that was elected was never convened. Instead, the SLORC began arresting elected MPs—and more pro-democracy activists fled to the border. On Dec. 18 that year, they formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which in turn led to the formation of a broader front including NLD exiles, members of the NCGUB and the ethnic armed groups called the National Council of the Union of Burma, or NCUB. After the NCGUB was formed, I wrote a then-much-criticized article for the Far Eastern Economic Review titled “Cry of Desperation”. I stressed that no foreign country was likely to recognize the border-based “cabinet” and it was unlikely that it would have any impact on the situation inside Myanmar. The resistance was holed up in camps along Myanmar’s borders and the plethora of groups and acronyms also made sympathizers outside the country confused; who should they listen to and cooperate with? Who was who in the alphabet soup of armies and fronts?
I visited the resistance camps on the Myanmar side of the border with Thailand several times and also went to Mangshi and Ruili in Yunnan, China, where I met activists based in Kachin State. It was, to be absolutely frank, not an encouraging sight. I had no reason to doubt the sincerity of the young ABSDF activists who had given up everything to fight for what they believed in. But the way in which they bore uniforms adorned with flashes and insignia, and had their organization structured into numbered military units, made them no different from other armed groups fighting in the jungle-clad frontier areas. And it did not last long. The ABSDF soon split into competing factions and, for a while, there were even two ABSDFs. The activists in Kachin State even turned against each other; one group accused another of being government agents and killed them in a grisly massacre. The DAB collapsed when several of the ethnic armed groups entered into ceasefire agreements with the military. The NCGUB never became more than an acronym.
In the mid-1990s, I visited Dr. Cynthia Maung, an ethnic Karen doctor who ran—and still runs—a clinic in the Thai border town of Mae Sot. I asked her what kind of patients from the ABSDF she had received over the years, and she summed it up succinctly: “Well, the first year, it was mostly malaria cases. Then came those with gunshot wounds. Now it’s mostly deliveries.” The activists were young people from urban areas who were not used to the hard life in the jungle, and became sick from malaria and other diseases. Those who were determined to fight and still had some strength left ventured out onto the battlefield, and were often wounded. In the end, many settled down in Mae Sot and other border towns, had children and raised families. Many former activists also ended up in exile, primarily in Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States.
What remained of the ABSDF finally gave up the armed struggle and decided to focus on disseminating information about the dictatorship and networking with international NGOs. But that, curiously, did not prevent the ABSDF from being one of eight “armed groups” which signed a so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA) with the military in October 2015. Needless to say, of the signatories, only two—the KNU and the Restoration Council of Shan State—had armies worth the name. On Feb. 18, 2018, the government proudly announced that two more groups, the Lahu Democratic Union and the NMSP, had signed the NCA. But the Lahu outfit is little more than an NGO based in Thailand, and today’s Mon army is tiny compared to what it once was. The NMSP had, in any event, entered into a ceasefire agreement with the military in June 1995, so it was unclear what difference it would make. Although the NCA is a signed agreement and those struck in the late 1980s and 1990s were not (the sole exception being the ceasefire with the KIA, which insisted on having it formalized in writing), there is no reason—and there never was one—to believe that the military would be seriously interested in finding a peaceful, political solution to Myanmar’s civil wars. The KIA came under attack in June 2011 and fighting broke out between the military and the KNU as well as the Chin National Front, another NCA signatory, shortly after the February 2021 coup.
It is true that there are some striking similarities between the situation after the 1988 uprising and today. The National Unity Government (NUG), set up by elected MPs and others in April 2021, seems to mirror the NCGUB, and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which combines Burman and ethnic armies, looks like a contemporary version of the NCUB. But a closer look at today’s resistance reveals that the most obvious difference between then and now, access to the internet, is not the only one.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the activists actually believed that some foreign “uncles” would come and support them. After all, the US Congress had issued statements condemning the dictatorship, and so had the European Union, Australia, and other democracies around the world. Today’s fighters for democracy seem to have no such illusions. They know that Myanmar is not Ukraine and no weapons or other material support will come from abroad. Relying on their own resources, they are fighting with home-made guns and weapons captured from the military and the police, and they have also brought the war to the Myanmar heartland. Although many of the resistance fighters were trained by the Karen or Kachin armies and did get some weapons from them as well, it’s no longer a jungle-based insurgency. Financial support for the struggle comes from the many Myanmar nationals living in exile, including through some imaginative methods like a popular online video game, which also serves as a propaganda tool. It’s now or never.
The resistance in the heartland is often lumped together as the “People’s Defense Forces”, or PDFs, but that doesn’t mean that they are under any effective central command. Nor do they necessarily take orders from the NUG. But that also makes them harder to crush, because the military can’t find out who the leaders are, and how and where they operate. There are dozens of local resistance armies that depend on popular support in their respective areas and given the nationwide, deep-rooted hatred of the military, it is not difficult for the activists to mingle with crowds anywhere. It is obvious that the generals messed with the wrong generation when they staged their ill-fated coup.
Another important difference is that the economy was in a shambles after the 1988 uprising but, to the surprise of many, the SLORC (renamed the State Peace and Development Council in 1997) managed to not only rebuild but, by attracting foreign investment, also create a fledgling capitalist system to replace the old “socialism” that had prevailed from 1962 to 1988. The economic fallout of the 2021 coup is a severe crisis. Foreign investors are leaving and those who remain are reeling under the effects of boycotts and sanctions. In this area, digital media have made a decisive impact. The true extent of the 1988 massacres was little known outside the country, and although some sanctions were imposed even then, they were limited and had little or no effect. Today, the viciousness of the military is well documented, and anyone doing business with them is named and shamed on the internet.
The adversary the pro-democracy forces are facing is also not the same as before. Junta leader and self-appointed prime minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing lacks the capabilities and military skills of his predecessors. Moreover, he is uncharismatic and every time he appears in public or on the TV, he appears nervous and unsure of himself. But if he is replaced, it would most likely be by someone who is more hardline than he is, such as Vice Senior General Soe Win, who often oversees operations, including devastating air strikes, against any identifiable resistance stronghold; more often than not, these turn out to be villages and entire towns. The military may be more isolated from the public at large than ever before and it has become the country’s most hated institution. There is also little doubt that the various resistance forces continue to enjoy popular support, and two years after the coup they have not given up. Rather, fighting across the country is intensifying.
But there is a huge problem facing the resistance forces: They do not today have the weaponry that is needed to defeat the well-armed military with all the firepower it has at its disposal, the most devastating being air power. The military may not win the war, but they also cannot lose. And mediation efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have failed and even backfired on the bloc as it has exposed its weaknesses. Guided by two cardinal principles, noninterference and consensus, there is actually nothing it can do when there is a crisis in a member country. International peacemakers and conflict-resolutionists have time and again shown that their efforts have been a waste of time and money; the generals simply won’t listen and, even if they pretend to, they won’t take any advice from such outsiders. That brings us to the sad reality: the military has been in power under different guises since General Ne Win’s coup in 1962, and nothing is likely to change unless and until there is a split at the top or a mutiny within the ranks. That was true in the late 1980s and remains so today. But such a development could also lead to an even bloodier civil war, a potentially devastating scenario for which the outside world and all those involved in Myanmar must be prepared. Nevertheless, if the military remains united, the decades-long civil wars will continue to bleed the country for years to come—and the main victims will be the people of Myanmar, who are suffering under the brutal rule of a power-obsessed clique of men in green..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Labour Day, also known as International Workers' Day, is an important occasion to celebrate and recognize the contributions of workers around the world. In Myanmar, Labour Day is celebrated on May 1st each year, and it holds great significance for the country's workforce.
The first May Day celebration in Myanmar started in 1938, when workers went on strike against the British-owned Burmah Oil Company (BOC) in Yenanchaung, in the central region of Myanmar, before the country's independence. The strikes were part of a larger movement known as the "Revolution of 1300", named after the year in the Myanmar Calendar. After Myanmar gained independence, Labour Day was designated a "national holiday".
Before the military coup in 2021, Labour Day was celebrated with the labour ministry, business leaders, and representatives from international organizations attending ceremonies. Workers from various industries would rally in the industrial zones and march to demand their rights. Since the coup, these celebrations have not been possible. But workers have continued to organize and resist: garment workers went on strike despite police and military intervention, and delivery riders organized themselves for collective action.
We also want to take this opportunity to thank those workers who participated in Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and stood firm against the genocidal military and refused to work under the terrorist dictatorship. In fact, peaceful acts of protest such as the CDM are much more powerful than the genocidal military's acts of terrorism against the civilian’s population of Myanmar. Because of these heroes, the brave and courageous workers who participate in the CDM, our revolution has gained momentum and we are headed down the path of success. They are no more and no less than the heroes of peace and the vanguard of our freedoms and federal democracy for ALL the people of Myanmar.
Labour Day is an important occasion to acknowledge the hard work and dedication of Myanmar's workers and to renew our commitment to fighting for better working conditions and workers' rights. It is a day to celebrate the achievements of workers and to recommit to the ongoing struggle for labour rights, even in the face of challenges and obstacles..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
31.63 KB
more
Description:
"၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ(၂၃)ရက်နေ့၊ ညနေ(၄)နာရီခန့်တွင် မကွေးတိုင်း၊ ဆောမြို့နယ်၊ ကျောက်ထုဒေသ၊ ကျောက်ထု အမြှောက်တပ် (၃၆၈)မှ ထွက်လာသော ရန်သူ့အင်အား (၁၃၀) ဦးခန့်ကို ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(PDF) ဂန့်ဂေါခရိုင် တပ်ရင်းအမှတ် (၁၃) နှင့် CDF မင်းတပ် တို့ပူးပေါင်း တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ရာ ရန်သူ့ဘက်မှ ထိခိုက်ကျဆုံးမှု ရှိခဲ့ပြီး ရန်သူ့ဘက်မှ လက်နက်ကြီးများဖြင့် ရမ်းသမ်းပစ်ခတ်သဖြင့် CDF မင်းတပ်မှ ရဲဘော်တစ်ဦး ဒဏ်ရာ အနည်းငယ်ရရှိခဲ့သည်။ည(၈:၀၆)နာရီတွင် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(PDF) ဂန့်ဂေါခရိုင် တပ်ရင်း အမှတ်(၈)က ကျောက်ထု အမြှောက်တပ်(၃၆၈)နှင့်ကျောက်ထုလေတပ်ကို Rocket များဖြင့် ထပ်မံပစ်ခတ် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ပြီး အထိအခိုက်မရှိ ပြန်လည်ဆုတ်ခွာနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ဧပြီလ(၂၄)ရက်နေ့၊နေ့လည်(၁၂:၁၅)နာရီခန့်တွင် မကွေးတိုင်း၊ ပေါက်မြို့နယ်၊ ပင်တောင်ကျေးရွာ (ပျူစောထီးရွာ)မှ နယ်မြေခံ ပျူစောထီးများက လုံခြုံရေး ကင်းယူလျက် ယောချောင်းအတွင်း ငါးဖမ်းနေစဥ် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(PDF) ပခုက္ကူခရိုင်တပ်ရင်းအမှတ် (၁၈) - တပ်ခွဲ (၃) - နဂါးမျိုးအဖွဲ့၊ ပေါက် မြို့နယ် အခြေပြု ဗိုလ်တစ္ဆေအဖွဲ့၊ ပေါက်ကျေးရွာကာကွယ်ရေး အဖွဲ့များ နှင့် မြိုင်မြို့နယ် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ဖွဲ့ - မြိုင် ပကဖ တပ်ရင်း (၁) - တပ်ခွဲ(၅) - တပ်စိတ် (၂၊ ၄) တို့က ပြောက်ကျားစနစ်ဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် ရန်သူ့တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင် (၄) ဦး နေရာ၌ပင် သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး (၁) ဦး ပြင်းထန်ဒဏ်ရာဖြင့် ထွက်ပြေး လွတ်မြောက်သွားခဲ့သည်။ ဧပြီလ(၂၄)ရက်နေ့၊နေ့လည်(၁:၃၅)နာရီခန့်တွင် သေဆုံးသွားသော ရန်သူ့တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင် ရုပ်အလောင်းများကို ရန်သူ့တပ်နှင့်ပင်တောင်ကျေးရွာ၊ သစ်ချိုကုန်းကျေးရွာ နှင့် ဝန်ခြုံးကျေးရွာများ မှ နယ်မြေခံ ပျူစောထီးများက လာရောက်သယ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြပြီး သပြေအေးကျေးရွာသို့ ဝင်ရောက်ကာ ပြည်သူပိုင် နေအိမ် များကို အကြမ်းဖက် မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့သောကြောင့် ပြည်သူပိုင်နေအိမ်များ မီးလောင်ပြာကျခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့တပ်နှင့် ပျုစောထီးများက ဒေသခံ ပြည်သူများ၏ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာများကို အကြမ်းဖက်ခိုးယူသယ်ဆောင် သွားခဲ့သည်။ ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
309.12 KB
more
Description:
"Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။
https://t.me/modnugmyanmar
ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
442.61 KB
more
Sub-title:
အမည်ပျက်စာရင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း များအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန် မထမ်းဆောင်ဘဲ ဓမ္မဘက်မှရပ်တည်၍ ပြည်သူနှင့်တသားတည်း ဖြစ်စေရန်နှင့် အမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ကြစေရန် အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ဖိတ်ခေါ် ကမ်းလှမ်းခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင် ခဲ့ကြသည့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအသီးသီးမှ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းသူရဲကောင်းများ၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေး၊ လုံခြုံဘေးကင်းရေး နှင့် ဖိအားကင်းစင်ရေး တို့အတွက် အလေးထားဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန် ထမ်းဆောင်နေပြီး CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအား ဖိအားပေးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ရာထူးမှထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း၊ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းနှင့် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုတော့သည့် လစာ ချေးငွေများအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်ခိုင်းခြင်းများစသည့် အမျိုးမျိုးသော ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်နေသော ပို့ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် ဆက်သွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ မြန်မာ့မီးရထားမှ အောက်ဖေါ်ပြပါ ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းသွင်း လိုက်ပြီး ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပယ် (Dismiss) လိုက်သည်။
မှတ်ချက် - အငြိမ်းစား ယူသွားပြီးဖြစ်သော ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ CDM - နိုင်ငံ့ ဝန်ထမ်း ဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒ အရ ဆက်လက် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.16 MB
more
Description:
"Every dictatorship believes it needs a secret police force in order to survive in power, and the more brutal, the more effective. Nazi Germany had its Gestapo, or Geheime Staatspolizei: “The Secret State Police.” The Shah of Iran depended on Savak, the country’s domestic security and intelligence service, and Romania’s dictator Nicolae Ceausescu had his dreaded Securitate, “Department of State Security.” And Myanmar’s generals have their military intelligence service, which over the years has changed its name but always remained a main pillar of state power.
But because of its secretive nature, Myanmar’s military intelligence has also on at least two occasions morphed into a state within the state, which became a threat to the established order and, therefore, was purged with some of its leaders receiving lengthy prison sentences. The question of maintaining that blind loyalty is the reason why Myanmar’s current dictator, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is keeping his top intelligence operatives closer to him than his predecessors did. Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, head of what since 2020 has been called the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA), accompanies Min Aung Hlaing at all meetings with the junta-appointed cabinet, to meetings with foreign diplomats, and during trips abroad.
Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo went to Russia with Min Aung Hlaing in June 2021 to attend the 9th Moscow Conference on International Security, and again in July 2022 to meet state-owned nuclear energy and weapons companies. During the second trip, Ye Win Oo’s wife Nilar and other spouses of the generals also went along, but more for shopping in Moscow than to participate in any important meetings. Since the 2021 coup, Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo has been responsible for tracking down opponents to the junta and he also runs the military’s interrogation centers where detainees are subjected to torture, which usually includes electric chocks, burning of genitalia, pouring boiling liquid or chemical solutions down the mouths of victims, and rape if those arrested are women. The Internet and social media have made it possible to disseminate such information to the outside world, but the methods are as old as Myanmar’s military intelligence itself.
It dates back to General Ne Win, who seized power in 1962 and built up one of Asia’s most ruthless as well as efficient secret police forces. Originally called the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), it was known down to the lowliest non-English speaking peasant as em-eye and everybody feared it. Informants could be everywhere, sometimes even within dissident families. Ne Win was originally trained by the Japanese, in Tokyo in 1940-41 and when they occupied the then Burma 1942-45.
US Lieutenant Colonel James Mc Andrew states in his 2007 study of Myanmar’s military intelligence apparatus: “Chosen for both ‘guerilla tactics and clandestine activities’ and ‘special’ leadership training was the future dictator and longtime strongman, Ne Win. Significantly, this curriculum included intelligence training provided by the Kempeitai, the brutal Japanese Military Police and counterintelligence organization. Being selected for Kempeitai is more than noteworthy in hindsight, and it must be viewed as an important early demonstration to Ne Win that maintaining coercive intelligence and counterintelligence organizations were essential to maintaining authoritarian rule.”
Ne Win’s trusted intelligence chief for many years was his subordinate Brigadier General Tin Oo — not to be confused with the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Tin Oo, or Tin U, a retired general and former army chief. ‘MI Tin Oo’, as he became known, was trained by the US’s Central Intelligence Agency on the US-held Pacific island of Saipan in 1957, and so was Lay Maung, who rose to become a top jurist for the military and Myanmar’s foreign minister 1980-1981.
In those days, US support for Myanmar’s military was motivated by the fact that it fought against the insurgent Communist Party of Burma, but that cooperation came to an abrupt end in 1961 when the military and the People’s Liberation Army of China began joint operations against remnants of US-supported, nationalist Chinese Kuomintang forces who had been ensconced in eastern Shan State since their defeat in China’s civil war.
Even if judicial executions of political opponents were the exception rather than the rule, anyone suspected of having contacts with the political or ethnic opponents of Ne Win’s regime was likely to be arrested and tortured while in jail. The MIS also had its own prison and torture center, the infamous Yay Kyi Aing, or “Clearwater Pond”. Many political prisoners were tortured to death there and in other, smaller MIS-run jails all over the country. The MIS kept a watchful eye not only on ordinary citizens, but especially army officers with perceived liberal ideas, which apart from constant rotations, corruption and institutional brutality contributed to the remarkable cohesiveness of Myanmar’s armed forces.
MIS agents also watched politicized exiles living in Britain, West Germany, Thailand, Australia and the USA. For many years, mutual suspicion neutralized them as a political force because no one was ever sure who was an informant or not.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the MIS was becoming increasingly powerful, and, at the time, Rodney Tasker characterized MI Tin Oo in the Far Eastern Economic Review: “He and his MIS colleagues were men of the world compared with the other short-sighted, dogmatic figures in the Burmese leadership. They were able to travel abroad, talk freely to foreigners and generally look beyond the rigid confines of the corrupt regime….although ruthless, he built up a reputation as a gregarious, open-minded, charismatic figure — a direct contrast to some of his mole-like colleagues in the leadership.”
But in May 1983, Ne Win’s regime suddenly and unexpectedly announced that Tin Oo had been “permitted to resign” along with his former aide, Colonel Bo Ni. They had been purged ostensibly because their wives were corrupt — a charge that could be brought against any army officer in the country. Tin Oo and Bo Ni were subsequently jailed — and the entire MIS apparatus purged as well. The reason behind the move, however, remained a matter for conjecture. It was suggested at the time that the urbane MIS people had become too powerful for comfort and had almost managed to establish another state-within-a-state, which threatened Ne Win’s inner circle of hand-picked, less-than-intelligent yes men.
Whatever the reason behind the purge, it had immediate effects on the security situation in the country. On October 9, 1983, 21 people, including four visiting South Korean cabinet ministers, were killed in a powerful explosion in Yangon. Three North Korean military officers were behind the atrocity. One of them was killed in a shoot-out with Burmese security forces, while the other two were captured alive. One of the bombers was executed in 1985, the other remained in Yangon’s Insein Prison until he died of natural causes in 2008. Observers at the time believe that the incident would never have taken place if MI Tin Oo had still been in charge; it clearly indicated that the military intelligence apparatus was no longer what is used to be. A new intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, was appointed in 1984. His Directorate of the Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) soon became almost as efficient as the old outfit, and Khin Nyunt in many ways also resembled Tin Oo; he was fairly young and reasonably bright, but could be exceedingly ruthless whenever this was considered expedient by the old dictator, Ne Win.
Less than four years after Khin Nyunt began rebuilding Myanmar’s shattered military intelligence apparatus, the country faced the largest civil unrest in its history. Millions of people nationwide marched against Ne Win’s regime and for a return to the democracy that the country had enjoyed before the 1962 coup. Any regime anywhere would have collapsed under the pressure of an entire population rising up against tyranny. That was not the case with Myanmar’s military-dominated regime, however. Thousands of people were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere as the military stepped in, not to overthrow the government but to shore up a regime overwhelmed with popular protest. After the military had crushed the uprising, the DDSI was expanded. By 1991, nine new units were established and the DDSI also operated 19 detention centers, seven of them of Yangon, of which Yay Kyi Aing was still the most notorious. Undercover DDSI agents covered every movement of the NLD’s leaders and other opponents of the regime.
However in 2004 Khin Nyunt, who had become prime minister, was ousted and arrested along with up to 3,500 intelligence personnel countrywide, including some 300 senior officers. Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace followed the death of his mentor Ne Win in December 2002. The old general had been placed under house arrest earlier that year, allegedly because of the corrupt behavior of his daughter, Sanda Win, her husband Aye Zaw Win — and the couple’s three unruly grandsons, who had terrorized private businessmen in Yangon with demands for bribes and “protection money.” But few doubted that the move against Ne Win and his family came as preparation for the post-Ne Win era; to make sure that Khin Nyunt’s influence would be limited. The dictator, who had ruled with an iron fist for several decades, was cremated near his home in Yangon. The funeral was attended by a handful of family members and about 20 plainclothes military officers, none especially high-ranking.
Khin Nyunt’s ouster was not, as some reports in the foreign media at the time suggested, a power struggle between the “pragmatic” intelligence chief and “hardliners” within the military regime. A more plausible explanation for the purge was that Khin Nyunt and his DDSI had accumulated significant wealth through involvement in a wide range of commercial enterprises. They were building up a state within a state — like the old MI Tin Oo had done in the 1970s — and not sharing their riches with the rest of the military elite. Like Ne Win, the new dictator, Senior General Than Shwe, did not want to have any potential rivals around him, and Khin Nyunt clearly had political ambitions. He was a man not to be trusted.
Immediately following the ousting of Khin Nyunt, the latest intelligence outfit, the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence [the expanded DDSI], was dissolved and an entirely new organization established: the OCMSA, which was placed under more direct military control. It is highly unlikely that Lt- Gen Ye Win Oo will repeat the mistakes which MI Tin Oo and Khin Nyunt committed, and Min Aung Hlaing may, at least for the foreseeable future, be secure.
OCMSA remained active throughout the decade of openness from 2011 to 2021, carefully watching the activities of politicians, activists and journalists. But Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo and his men unleashed the full force of the organization’s most brutal operatives after the 2021 coup. According to the rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 3,194 people have been killed since then, while 17,075 people have been detained and 5,274 of them have been sentenced by a court. A total of 108 prisoners received the death penalty, 121 of them are in absentia. 150 are currently on death row awaiting execution. So far, according to AAPP’s data, 3,874 have been released from prison.
Until the 1988 uprising, Myanmar’s military intelligence conducted only limited operations overseas, mainly collecting information and giving the exiled community a scare. But after the dramatic events of the late 1980s and the subsequent flight of thousands of pro-democracy activists, especially to Thailand, its agents became more operational outside the country. Khin Nyunt’s right-hand man, Colonel Thein Swe sent thugs to beat up activists and, allegedly, ordered murders when he was defense attaché in Bangkok. In the early 1990s, the colonel built up an extensive network among diplomats, spies, informants and some media in Thailand. He was rewarded by being made the top-ranking intelligence officer under Khin Nyunt after he returned to Myanmar.
There is now every indication that the OCMSA is even more active in foreign countries. To the surprise of many, not only are regular operatives involved in keeping a watchful eye on activists, journalist and others in Thai cities like Chiang Mai and Mae Sot, but people who once played roles in the pro-democracy movement and the so-called “peace process” during the 2011-2016 U Thein Sein presidency have become informants.
At home in Myanmar, as The Irrawaddy has reported, old loyalties to military supremacy remain: even military intelligence operatives who were purged or sidelined in 2004 have been used as advisers. Among them are Colonel Ngwe Tun who was at the Defense Services Academy in Pyin Oo Lwin at the same time as Min Aung Hlaing, Lieutenant Colonel Nyan Linn, who in 1988 was responsible for distributing leaflets condemning democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Sai Aung Thein who used to serve in Kengtung in Shan State, Myint Htay, an operative who liaised with Pa-O militia leader Aung Kham Hti, Lin Mingxian, another militia leader at Mong La on the Myanmar-China border, and Thein Swe, the horror man of Bangkok who has become a Brigadier General. As Ne Win once put it, lukaun lutaw, which refers to his preference for promoting loyal cronies rather than talented persons. Significantly, Major General Kyaw Win, an intellectual who Than Shwe in 1993 appointed deputy head of DDSI to counterbalance the rising power of Khin Nyunt, has not been seen since the coup.
The future of the pro-democracy movement depends on its ability to understand the inner workings of Myanmar’s past and present military intelligence services [which to all intents and purposes have been a secret police], to map the current OCMSA’s activities, and counter them with increased vigilance in the streets — as well as in cyberspace. New, sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment, not available before, has been obtained from firms in Singapore and Israel. And with the military and its most repressive organ of power operating more closely than in the past, domestically as well as in foreign countries, the dangers are real..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ ရှာဖွေရေး အစီအစဉ်တစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည့် PRF - ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု အစီအစဉ် စတင်ခဲ့သည့်အချိန်ကပင် ယနေ့ထက်တိုင် လစဉ်မပျက် ထည့်ဝင်ပေးခဲ့ကြသော ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု ရဲဘော်များ ၊ Fundraiser များ နှင့် OFP အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအားလုံးကို ကျေးဇူး အထူး တင်ရှိပါကြောင်းနှင့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု အစီအစဉ်မှ တဆင့် (၁၅) လ တာ ကာလအတွင်း ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၉.၄၂) သန်း ရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများကို ပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်၊ တပ်ရင်း၊ တပ်ဖွဲ့များ၏ ရိက္ခာထောက်ပံ့ငွေအဖြစ် သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီး စုစုပေါင်း ရိက္ခာ ထောက်ပံ့ငွေ ၏ ၇၅ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းခန့်ကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု အစီအစဉ်မှ ရရှိသည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ များကို စနစ်တကျလက်ခံ၍ တပ်ရင်းများ၏ ရိက္ခာဖူလုံရေးကိစ္စရပ်များတွင် အဓိက အသုံးပြုနေပြီး လစဉ် အသုံးပြုနေ မှုများကို သင့်တော်သလို သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
194.21 KB
more
Description:
"The Burmese military announced on 28th March 2023 that it has banned 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has won every election it has been able to contest.
The ban follows the military demanding that the political parties reregister with the military-appointed Union Election Commission, something the parties refused to do as the military has no legitimacy or legal power to set election rules.
The Burmese military have arrested, killed, jailed and tortured NLD members, and closed their offices, but have never gone so far as to impose a complete ban. The ban is a sign of how desperate and insecure the Burmese military are as they face unprecedented resistance after their attempted coup began two years ago.
“The Burmese military banning 40 political parties should be a wake-up call to those in the international community who still think there can be genuine dialogue and compromise with the military,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “For decades the Burmese military has held the country back from building democracy, human rights, and economic development. The people of Burma want a future without the Burmese military and the international community should be supporting them in achieving that goal. At the present time, the Burmese military receives far more international support than Burma’s democracy movement, with even the USA and UK still dithering over whether to sanction gas revenues.”
There are no soft-liners or genuine reformers in the military waiting in the wings. The Burmese military is not an institution which can be reformed. Each leader is more hardline and brutal than the last. Even the so-called reform period during the 2010s saw a significant escalation of violence and human rights violations perpetrated against ethnic people in Burma, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The plodding pace of the implementation of sanctions enables the Burmese military to continue to receive revenue, arms and equipment, including aviation fuel, which it is using to commit violations of international law against the population of Burma.
“Faced with increased repression, airstrikes, artillery bombardments and a humanitarian crisis, the people of Burma need swift and decisive action to cut off revenue and arms to the Burmese military, including gas revenue and aviation fuel. The pace of sanctions implementation is simply too slow, and people are dying as a result,” said Mark Farmaner.
The 40 political parties listed in Burmese military-controlled state media are:
Lahu National Development Party
Democratic Party (Myanmar)
Kayen National Party
Ta’ang (Palaung) National Party
Party for Democracy and Peace
Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
Wunthanu Democratic Party
National Democratic Party for Development
Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP)
Kaman National Development Party
Bamar People’s Party
National League for Democracy
Democratic Party for a New Society
Myanmar National Congress Party
Asho Chin National Party
Shan National League for Democracy
United National Congress Party
National Prosperity Party
Dawei Nationalities Party
Federal Union Party
Union Pa-O National Organization
Khumi (Khami) National Party
Democratic Party for a New Society
Karen National Party
Mro National Democracy Party
Guiding Star Party
88 Generation Democracy Party
Lhaovo National Unity and Development Party
New Era Union Party
Zo National Region Development Party
National Development Party
Daingnet National Development Party
Arakan League for Democracy Party
Kayah State Democratic Party
National United Democratic Party (NUDP)
The Yeomanry Development Party (YDP)
Chin National League for Democracy Party
Chin National Party (CNP)
Kachin National Party
Alliance of Myanmar’s Worker and Farmer Party (AMWFP)..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"In this second installment of an interview, human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic asks security analyst Anthony Davis what changes we can expect to see this year in the Myanmar resistance’s armed campaign against the junta, as well as likely developments on the international front.
Blazevic: How effective are the resistance attacks on the stockpiles of arms and fuel? Can that be an effective tactic for the resistance?
Davis: Obviously ammunition supplies and aviation fuel are the lifeblood of the military. Without them a war cannot be sustained. The military understands that, and ammunition and fuel dumps will be extremely well protected, not only on the ground but also from drone attack. So, are they worthwhile targets? Absolutely, and I would hope that various ethnic resistance organizations and the Defense Ministry of the NUG are mapping very carefully where these dumps are and how effective security precautions are. There will always be weak spots. Identifying them may take weeks of covert surveillance but taking out a major fuel or ammo dump is a huge coup, materially and psychologically.
At this stage in the war, I’d be surprised to see this type of operation but it’s not impossible, and certainly a worthwhile objective.
Let me add one more aspect. Between fuel and ammunition dumps and various fronts, there are lines of supply along highways and rivers and that is really where the resistance can and must become more effective. That’s where the real vulnerability lies. But to hit supply convoys—and I know this from personal observation—you need well organized units of 20 or 30 men equipped with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and machine guns in addition to IEDs and assault rifles. Plus a level of resistance which is confident about operating along those lines of supply. If you look at the main roads between Yangon and Naypyitaw or Mandalay and Myitkyina, the resistance is probing those areas, but it doesn’t yet have either the confidence and/or probably the logistic support that would allow it to operate in strength. This probably comes further into the war.
Blazevic: What is the role of pro-junta militia? How important are they for the army and can they successfully add manpower to the military?
Davis: The military is putting a lot of stress on recruitment of these militia forces, so clearly they are regarded as important. Why? Because in the countryside, particularly in Sagaing and Magwe, they provide the military with eyes and ears. Many battalions have little or no familiarity with the township in which they operate. So, in terms of local intelligence, the Pyu Saw Htee militia and the villages they operate from are seen as adding to overall capability. How effective they are in purely military terms is another matter. They’re mostly untrained and poorly armed so in some areas may even be more of a liability than an asset if they require army troops to help them out.
Blazevic: How do you evaluate the NUG and resistance chain of command and coordination capacity between the PDFs and ethnic revolutionary organizations? Do you notice any improvement? Is command and coordination getting better or is the resistance still not achieving a sufficient level of coordination?
Davis: That’s an extremely important question and sitting in Bangkok I don’t have as clear an answer as I would like. But I would say that compared to this time last year, there has been significant improvement. We can see that particularly in Karen and Karenni [Kayah] states and also in southern townships of Kachin where they abut northeastern Sagaing. Is this sufficient to produce a strategic impact at this stage in the war? Not yet. One must hope that incremental, gradual success will accelerate matters. There is an old saying in English, “success breeds success,” and it’s very true.
It is obviously critically important that the NUG and its Defense Ministry is liaising regularly with allied ethnic military organizations—Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Chin—and maybe with others that are not direct allies. I believe that is the case already, but that liaison and confidence building must move forward.
At this stage in the war, this cannot and should not be about attempting to organize grand coordinated offensives involving different parts of the country which end up in disappointment and mistrust. It’s ideally about confidence building and sharing experience and best practices. Where improving battlefield coordination is really important is at the township and district levels. Achieving results there will involve ethnic forces with better weaponry and long experience extending operational and tactical command-and-control over new and inexperienced PDFs. This is a lot easier said than done, but it is still worth saying.
Blazevic: What could be the turning point in Myanmar?
Davis: An impossible question to answer, I don’t have a crystal ball. No one knows. Talking about the coming year is more useful and in that time frame personally I don’t foresee any dramatic turning points, more of a long, hard slog, a progression in which the resistance becomes more effective and hopefully better connected while the military finds it increasingly difficult to solve growing problems—military, economic and political. That would be my prediction for this coming year.
That process might be accelerated if there were policy shifts by external players. I’m thinking the United States, India and possibly Thailand, after the May elections. These are key players and it is not inconceivable that ongoing erosion of the military’s capabilities on the battlefield will encourage a corresponding shift in the policies of external actors towards the NUG and the resistance more generally—not overnight changes but slow shifts. To a degree this is something which is already happening on the diplomatic and aid fronts: no dramatic turning points but definitely shifting dynamics.
Blazevic: On several occasions Myanmar people have called for a no-fly zone. Is that something that can happen?
Davis: No, a no-fly zone is not going to happen. Period. Even if the Myanmar Air Force were to conduct major strikes against urban areas captured by resistance forces resulting in the deaths of hundreds, even thousands of civilians—something entirely in their playbook—a no fly zone will still not happen. Why? Because only the United States could enforce one and that would necessitate moving an entire carrier battle group into the Bay of Bengal at a time where the US Navy has its hands more than full in the Asian theater. Even more importantly, it would provoke a very severe reaction from China, diplomatic consternation in ASEAN, and imply US responsibility for the future of a post-Tatmadaw Myanmar at a time when Myanmar is nowhere near the top of US government priorities. Bottom line: this is not the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. We can forget it.
Igor: Let us look at other outside factors. What impact can Western sanctions have? Can the positions of Thailand and India be shifted? It doesn’t look promising so far.
Davis: Sanctions are important politically and symbolically. They reflect the interest of any given state or in the case of the EU, a group of states, to make clear that they are opposed to the military’s attempt to take over Myanmar. Sanctions play a symbolic role but it would be a big mistake to think that sanctions are going to have any real impact on the battlefield in Myanmar in the coming year or two.
Regarding Thailand and India, you said that things don’t look very hopeful. I don’t think that’s necessarily the case if the resistance, PDFs plus ethnic armed organizations can achieve a degree of military momentum. This year is going to be an important, even decisive year in terms of defining trajectories—who’s going up, who’s going down. It won’t be about final victory, but if the resistance can demonstrate military momentum in the right direction that will necessarily impact the policies of important neighbors like India and Thailand. There are unlikely to be official statements, but things will likely shift on the borders in a way that reflects the changing dynamics inside Myanmar. So the military dynamic inside Myanmar is key: that’s what will influence what foreigners think and do, not the other way around.
Blazevic: Can the Myanmar resistance get some military support from outside? Is the US slowly shifting in that direction or is that an unrealistic expectation for the time being?
Davis: It is important to define the terms here. If you’re talking about an arms pipeline, a process of resupply over a period of time with a military objective in mind, I don’t believe there is any possibility of any external player looking to institute such a pipeline.
However, what I am suggesting is that as the military dynamic in Myanmar shifts, you may see states on Myanmar’s borders—Thailand and India most importantly—becoming more inclined to “look the other way” to what weapons are crossing the border courtesy of the “private market”. I’m not suggesting either of those states would agree to join with the West in moving truckloads of weapons to the resistance—even assuming the West were interested in providing weapons. But as they realize the Myanmar military is slowly sinking in this quagmire, they may gradually look to hedge their bets and ask themselves whether the internal conflict dynamics are changing the map? How does that impact our border security? Who do we need to be talking to and dealing with?
Blazevic: Could that include MANPADS—man-portable air defense systems?
Davis: It’s difficult to see that happening. MANPADS are extremely problematic at a range of levels—political, logistical, and in broader security terms. And the resistance as a potential beneficiary is itself far too fragmented. Even assuming an external actor were interested to supply them, to make a difference on the battlefield the resistance would need a supply chain: one or two would achieve nothing. And then you have the problem of where they end up. If you can shoot down an air force jet with a surface-to-air missile, you might also possibly sell it to somebody who wants to shoot down a civilian airliner taking off from Don Mueang airport outside Bangkok. So, risks at every turn. What has happened in Ukraine—and there is no shortage of risk there—is almost certainly not going to happen in Myanmar.
Blazevic: Can Russia be the game changer in Myanmar? Or is Russia simply too weak because of the war in Ukraine to play a game-changing role as it has done in Syria.
Davis: Even without the Ukraine war, Russia was never going to be a game-changer in Myanmar. It would be near impossible to imagine Russia intervening militarily in support of the Naypyitaw regime as it did in Syria, where it had real strategic concerns. But beyond that it’s a solid marriage of convenience in which both parties need the other. We understand the diplomatic and geopolitical implications of Russia’s problems. For its part, the Myanmar military already relies heavily on a range of Russian equipment and is diplomatically thrilled to have at least one admirer.
Practically though what more can this marriage produce? The Myanmar Air Force might benefit from spare parts and perhaps Russian advice in niche areas like air mobile operations, where their record has been unimpressive. But beyond that, actual Russian systems they might need more of—such as attack helicopters or additional Mi-17 transport helicopters or even basic Kamaz trucks—the Russians clearly need themselves. When it comes to fixed-wing aircraft, the Myanmar Air Force can certainly make do with what it has.
At the end of the day, the military is struggling to prosecute a scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign against their own population, not a high-intensity conventional war. And as we already discussed, their problem is fundamentally about manpower and potentially logistics, not a lack of big-ticket equipment be it from Russia or anywhere else.
There’s also a lot of talk about economic and nuclear cooperation, and even tourism, which unless you’re a Russian male looking to avoid a one-way ride to the front in Ukraine, is something of a joke. But all this talk presupposes that the Myanmar military can reestablish a credible degree of security in the country, which in the coming years is unlikely. So, everything in the non-military sphere is probably more talk than substance.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst with extensive field experience on a range of armed conflicts across Asia. He writes primarily for Janes, a security and defense publishing house..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"It was a fraught, reluctant, but urgent and necessary operation. We could rightly call it an “escape mission”.
It was not the first time I had been forced to flee my home country to avoid political persecution—that occurred in 2000, a year after I was freed from the previous military regime’s gulag. Twenty-two years later, I found myself with no choice but to make my escape once again, for the same reason.
It was this month last year—Feb. 23, 2022 to be precise—exactly one year and 23 days after the military seized power, overthrowing an elected government and launching its reign of terror over a population that now lives in fear of arrest, torture and death at the hands of the regime. Its endless violent crackdown on dissent has forced countless anti-coup protesters, students, politicians, artists and members of various professions, including journalists, to flee the country.
A few hours before sunrise on that day in Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city, a colleague and I headed for a previously arranged location where an unknown driver would be waiting for us. Minutes later, two more colleagues joined us, and the young but calm driver wordlessly drove his old van into the darkness. His assignment was to take us to a remote border town; our mission was to flee our country.
It was something we hated to do.
In the van, it was still too dark to see each other, and we traveled in silence. But I could feel that all of the passengers were overwhelmed with worry and sorrow. For them, it must have been an unfamiliar feeling, as it was the first time they had undertaken such a journey. As for the driver, he must have had concerns of his own: Though he didn’t know we were journalists, he knew he was transporting “fugitives” fleeing the junta’s arbitrary persecution.
Fear of being detained by junta security forces before reaching our destination mingled with the sorrow of leaving our homes and loved ones behind, along with everything that we held dear, or that was simply familiar: a cracked or stained coffee mug; an old dining table around which family members would sit to eat every meal; a stained wall, empty, or perhaps with a tilted painting or yellowing, framed family photograph hung on it; the smell of one’s bed; the stuffy air in one’s rooms or the way sunlight shines through a particular window; a beloved pet; even the everyday noises of the neighborhood—and too many more to name. Nothing can replace such things, nothing feels more valuable or beautiful once taken away. Together, such things, I believe, add up to what we think of as “home”. Without them, there is no home, just a building. Their absence creates a powerful nostalgia for home.
Yes, leaving home was something we all hated to do. But we had to do it to survive.
Three days earlier, junta troops had arrested one of our admin staff who knew the home addresses of all of The Irrawaddy’s employees, including the editors and reporters. He was forced to show the authorities where we lived, making it necessary for us to leave our homes immediately. The group of us in the van were one of the last groups from our publication to leave the country.
After the junta’s ruthless and bloody crackdown on nationwide peaceful anti-coup protests in the early months of 2021, following the coup on Feb. 1, tens of thousands of people fled their homes and many of them left the country. Among them were many dozens of journalists.
As it confronts the sheer scale of the anti-regime movement, the military regime has identified as one of its main enemies the news media, in particular the journalists whose work daily exposes the true colors of the coup leaders—their cruel, inhumane and immoral acts against the entire population. Their work has made the media an enemy of the regime. Myanmar was the world’s third-worst jailer of journalists, with at least 42 journalists behind bars, at the time of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Dec. 1, 2022 prison census.
In those early days I made the risky—some of my friends said daring—decision to stay inside the country to continue to work as an editor for The Irrawaddy, which by this time had been charged under various repressive laws. I thought I would be able to hide, periodically shifting locations, while continuing to work. In early March, one month after the coup, I went into hiding. This life of concealment and disguising myself in public was manageable for a year, but eventually, moving from one hiding place to another became untenable due to the junta’s oppressive laws, such as the mandatory guest and household registrations, not to mention its manhunt operations targeting us. Friends who offered to hide me at their places became concerned for their own safety, as they were helping a “fugitive journalist”.
With the security situation deteriorating, the arrest of our staff member forced me and my colleagues to make the difficult decision to flee the country. It was an unwanted outcome but the only practical one if we were to survive.
Our car had to stop at every one of the many security checkpoints we encountered throughout the trip. The driver, however, was prepared, and knew how to deal with police and military personnel: He slipped a roll of cash into the palm of the security guard at every checkpoint. He had prepared many rolls of cash ahead of time; his method worked—we were never seriously asked to identify ourselves.
We fled because it’s simply not worth getting arrested, tortured and given lengthy prison sentences, if not killed, for doing the work that is our calling—our work with the pen, with words. No citizen of my country deserves to live and work under this brutal junta and its generals, or any kind of dictatorship or authoritarianism. Our country has endured six decades of this. That should be enough, but it has yet to end. Of course, no one deserves such ruthless rulers; the Ukrainians don’t deserve Vladimir Putin’s invasion and war, either.
I endured plenty of what I didn’t deserve—to understate matters—under the previous regime. As a 19-year-old student, I was handed a 10-year prison sentence for my peaceful anti-regime activities, including publishing a pro-democracy journal, after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. I managed to survive that harsh eight-year incarceration in two notorious prisons. For what? To carry on what I started—my own revolution against authoritarianism and military dictatorship.
In 2000, one year after my release, I fled my country for the first time, vowing not to be jailed again. In the 13 years of exile that followed, I worked as a journalist, dedicating myself to exposing the real nature of Myanmar’s cruel, greedy generals and other powerful figures. I survived exile, just as I had survived prison. For what? To tell stories: Not only horrific stories of the regime’s inhumanity, but also stories of the resilience of the Myanmar people. To share them with those citizens of our world lucky enough to be spared such experiences, as well as for the future generations, for whom our stories contain valuable lessons of survival.
In the days following the coup in 2021, my friends urged me to leave the country immediately. They said it wasn’t worth it, risking another lengthy imprisonment. But I was stubborn, determined to continue my work from hiding. Why? Because I wanted to share with the world the stories of our people who were suffering and fighting against the brutal regime—I wanted to tell these stories from the ground.
Now, though, having been forced from my country for a second time, I have come to believe that the decision to leave was the correct one—that I need to survive this time, too. The reason is the same: to be able to tell the stories of our terrible, all too “interesting”, times—starting with my own experiences of life under the dictatorship.
After a 12-hour drive, we arrived at a town on the Thai border. The driver took us to a meeting point where a four-wheeled pickup waited for us. The drivers greeted each other familiarly; they seemed to have conducted many such missions since the coup. We moved straight from the van into the second vehicle, a four-wheeled pickup, which set off after a brief exchange of words between the two drivers. Our new driver was actually an officer from an ethnic rebel group. While driving through rebel-held territory he told us that, due to the heightened security situation along the border, his group had stopped smuggling people out of the country. He had made an exception in our case, however, as he had been told that our group was very important. He said: “You are VIPs. That’s why.” I am sure many “VIPs” preceded us in this journey. We thanked him.
A couple of hours later, we reached our destination. All things considered, it was a relatively quick and safe experience. Some of our colleagues weren’t so lucky. Traveling with a baby they endured a horrific, two-day-long ordeal on a different route, though they eventually made it out too.
Our mission was to escape from the hell of military rule.
Mission accomplished. We survived.
But escaping the junta’s persecution was just our first mission. As journalists, our new and greater mission is to continue to report and write about what’s going on in our country under the ruthless military regime, and to explain the larger truths beyond the headlines, both to our own citizens and the world.
The morning after our arrival, all of us did exactly what we had been doing in hiding for the past year: We turned on our laptops. This is the job we have been doing for many years. The difference is that we are no longer in our homes, or in our country. To be suddenly wrenched away from our homes, our loved ones and our cherished belongings leaves one vulnerable to nostalgia. But in nostalgia, along with the slight sadness, there is a positive side, something I remember feeling in my first exiled life: a positive, even pleasurable energy with the power to motivate someone who has been forced from their home to strive to find a way to return.
For me, it’s the beginning of my second life in exile. The first kept me from home for 13 years. For my colleagues, it’s the beginning of their first such life. The bitter truth is that nobody knows how long it will take this time, either. Well… it should no longer matter to me. I am what I am, as I chose who I am. I am sure this rings true for my dedicated colleagues, other journalists and the countless resolute citizens of our country who have been forced to leave their homes for acting in the service of their country.
At the very least, we all need to survive to see the fall of the dictatorship.
That still greater mission remains unaccomplished…"
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Since September 2022, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the National Unity Government has organized a number of trainings on International Humanitarial Law (IHL) in cooperation with Principles of Humanity.
The IHL trainings have been provided to members of People’s Defence Force (PDF) and People’s Defence Organizations (PDO) under the MoD in different military divisions and regions.
This is another bold step the MoD has taken to ensure combatants under its command and control follow international norms and standards while engaging in an armed conflict.
MoD will continue to organize further IHL trainings for its defence forces across Myanmar in 2023 and beyond.
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
17.81 KB 115.85 KB
more
Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် Principles of Humanity အဖွဲ့၏ ပူးပါင်းပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုဖြင့် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ စက်တင်ဘာလမှစ၍ နိုင်ငံတကာလူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေ (International Humanitarian Law) သင်တန်းများကို စီစဉ်ကျင်းပလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အဆိုပါသင်တန်းများအား စစ်တိုင်းနှင့် စစ်ဒေသအသီးသီးတွင် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနလက်အောက်ရှိ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (People’s Defence Force) တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ - ပကဖ (People’s Defence Organization) အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ အတွက် ပို့ချပေးခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ အမိန့်စီးဆင်းမှုအောက်တွင်ရှိနေကြသော တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရဲဘော်၊ ရဲမေ များအနေနှင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခဆိုင်ရာ နိုင်ငံတကာစည်းကမ်းသတ်မှတ်ချက်များနှင့် စံချိန် စံညွှန်း များအတိုင်း တသွေမတိမ်း လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးကြစေရန်အလို့ငှာ ဤသင်တန်းများကို စီစဉ်ကျင်းပခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာလူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေသင်တန်းများကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအတွက် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အတွင်းတွင်သော် လည်းကောင်း၊ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အလွန်တွင်သော်လည်းကောင်း ဆက်လက်ကျင်းပသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
144.15 KB
more
Description:
"1. NUG Acting President remarks friendships & alliance with
neighbor countries should be established 14/2/2023.....2. NUG welcomes Singapore’s prohibition of arms
transfers to Myanmar 16/2/2023.....3. PDF and its alliance strategically attack 19 military targets in Magway Region
15/2/2023.....4. Defence Ministry calls for volunteer air scouts
16/2/2023.....5. Education Ministry partners with EdX to deliver tertiary education programs for up to 5000 students
16/2/2023.....6. Home Affairs Minister says systematic efforts being made to install administrative mechanisms in the ever growing democratic areas12/2/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.54 MB
more
Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (8/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.13 MB
more
Description:
"Until the Myanmar military’s 2021 coup, assassinations involving guns were rare in the country, with the notable exception of the shooting of prominent lawyer U Ko Ni outside Yangon International Airport in 2017.
But since the putsch, assassinations involving guns have become increasingly common and are now happening on an almost daily basis.
Over 5,000 military sympathizers, alleged informants, members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), junta officials and employees have been killed since the coup, with another 4,000 injured, said junta boss Min Aung Hlaing at a meeting of the National Defense and Security Council on February 1.
Having failed to protect its supporters and workers, the junta is now attempting to remedy that by amending the Arms Act. A new policy issued by the regime’s Ministry of Home Affairs will allow junta supporters to hold weapons to protect themselves.
The military has already turned much of the country into a battlefield. Now it is bringing arms into society itself, a sign surely of more bloodshed to come.
Under the new policy, arms and ammunition will be issued to civilians who agree to participate in local security and law enforcement in their states and regions. In other words, the new policy will allow regime supporters to fight for the junta in plain clothes.
Citizens over the age of 18 will be issued licenses allowing them to hold five different types of weapons including pistols and hunting rifles. The arms are intended for USDP members, military supporters, former military personnel, administrators, and business owners.
“In the past, licenses to hold arms were only granted to prominent cronies like U Tay Za and U Aung Ko Win. Now it appears that weapons licenses will be given to many business people,” said a source close to the regime.
U Tay Za, a notorious arms broker and long-time military crony, used to buy arms from overseas and present them to generals who were close to him, added the source.
“Generals have some of the best foreign-made guns in the world. Every general has more than one gun, apart from the one issued to them by the Ka Pa Sa [the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defense Industries],” said the source.
In Myanmar, only the Ministry of Home Affairs is allowed to import weapons and ammunition, and citizens are prohibited from buying guns from abroad.
But it has been a long time since cronies were able to import weapons to present to generals or to use for hunting and shooting sports, said a source from the home affairs ministry.
“The weapons seized from Phyo Ko Ko Tint San were imported that way,” said the source.
Phyo Ko Ko Tint San, the son of U Tint San, the sports minister in U Thein Sein’s administration, was arrested on October 15, 2017, after two pistols and ammunition, as well as narcotics, were discovered in his backpack at Naypyitaw Airport. Police went on to seize more than 20 guns from his hotel, company offices and houses in Naypyitaw and Yangon. In 2020, Phyo Ko Ko Tint San was sentenced to 30 years to prison.
Under the new regime policy, pro-junta militias and security organizations will be allowed to hold pistols, rifles and automatic weapons with permits issued by the home affairs ministry. This is similar to the way the Myanmar military previously armed ethnic militias in Shan State to combat ethnic armed organizations operating there.
Since the coup, the regime has formed militias known as Pyu Saw Htee to fight the resistance in Sagaing, Magwe and Mandalay regions.
The move to arm civilians comes at a time when the junta is facing ever-growing resistance nationwide from People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations.
“This plan amounts to pushing military supporters into the killing fields. There will be more pre-emptive attacks and more bloodshed,” said a soldier who has joined the Civil Disobedience Movement.
Government employees, administrators and military supporters in the 37 townships where the regime has imposed martial law will be given priority in the issuing of gun licenses, according to information leaked from the home affairs ministry.
In the two years since the coup, weapons have already flooded into civilian society. Military supporters have publicly asked to be armed at junta press conferences so that they can respond to resistance attacks and the regime has now agreed to their demands.
Notorious ultranationalist and USDP member U Hla Swe has been urging the regime to allow supporters to have licensed guns.
He said in an interview that some junta-appointed ministers have asked him how they could acquire arms. He has said that he will apply for licenses to hold two guns.
“In fact, all the administrators, [junta-allied] politicians and business owners have guns already. And the regime is now making it legal by asking them to apply for licenses,” said a source in the capital Naypyitaw.
There have already been frequent firefights between junta officials, Pyu Saw Htee and PDFs in the resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region.
“Soldiers and police only come to wards during their patrols. They are usually in police stations and security outposts for the rest of the time. But ward administrators are always in their ward. So they face a greater security threat,” said one politician.
However, there is a risk that the new policy will backfire on the regime.
“They [junta supporters] face the risk of their guns being grabbed. And there is also the risk of officials defecting along with their guns,” said a striking police officer.
Police and ward administrators will know who has weapons in their areas, as people applying for the new gun licenses will have to apply to their ward administrators and local police first.
Eligible citizens will be allowed hold up to three different types of weapons per person under the new policy. Government employees will be permitted to hold an automatic weapon in addition to the three different types of gun.
Ammunition will also be issued. The new policy allows 50 bullets for each pistol and 100 bullets for each automatic weapon. Neither telescopic sights nor silencers will be allowed under the policy.
Retired lieutenant colonel and former National League for Democracy member U Kyaw Zeya wrote on his Facebook page: “I am not holding arms again at this age. I am happy to die if someone comes and kills me.”
“It is the duty of the Myanmar military to protect the people,” he added.
Military lobbyists are calling for arming all officials down to the level of 100-household administrators.
But there are concerns about the new guns being used to attack non-Buddhists, as the ultranationalist Buddhist association Ma Ba Tha are military supporters. And there are also concerns about the guns fueling an increase in crime.
The price of weapons on the black market along the Myanmar-Thailand border has increased by at least five times since the coup, according to arms experts.
“The price will increase again if the military issues the licenses,” said a weapon expert.
The military’s ordnance factories can produce both pistols and bullets, and they have the capacity to manufacture to order, said a striking soldier.
Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun has told pro-regime media outlets that the junta will legalize the establishment of weapons-manufacturing companies.
More than 3,000 civilians have died at the hands of the junta since the coup, according to a February 17 statement from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Now it seems that many more will die as a result of the regime’s new policy of issuing weapons to its supporters..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Despite widespread opposition to the Myanmar junta’s proposed general election, four political parties have re-registered with the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), as required by the new Political Parties Registration Law.
The military-proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Federal Democratic Party (FDP), Myanmar People’s Democratic Party (MPD) and Union Democracy Party (UDP) re-registered this month.
The USDP, FDP and MPD were among 34 parties that met military chief Min Aung Hlaing ahead of the 2020 general election.
The party leaders sought the commander-in-chief’s assurance that he would intervene if voting was deemed unfair. They also called for then UEC chairman U Hla Thein to be replaced, saying they do not trust him because he was appointed by the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Min Aung Hlaing’s coup came three months after the NLD’s landslide victory.
FDP leaders Daw Than Than Nu and Daw Cho Cho Kyaw Neyin accepted honorary titles on behalf of their fathers from Min Aung Hlaing in January in Naypyitaw. Daw Than Than Nu was the daughter of U Nu, prime minister under the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League government after independence from British rule.
Daw Cho Cho Nyein is a daughter of U Kyaw Nyein, U Nu’s deputy.
The United Democratic Party, known as the Rose party because of its logo, was dissolved ahead of the 2020 election after its chairman Michael Kyaw Myint was accused of money laundering, flouting business laws and fleeing an earlier prison sentence handed down under a previous military regime.
The UDP was dissolved after it failed to field three candidates – the legal minimum – in the 2020 general election.
The Political Parties Registration Law, according to observers, favors the USDP, which was formed by ex-generals.
The law requires parties to re-register with the junta’s UEC within 60 days or be disbanded. Under the law, parties running nationally must recruit at least 100,000 members within 90 days of registration and have offices in at least half of Myanmar’s 330 townships within six months. They must also deposit 100 million kyats with a state-owned bank.
Sai Leik, general secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, told The Irrawaddy, that the law will ensure the USDP secures power and the military maintains its grip on power.
There are 91 political parties in Myanmar and all are now required to re-register or be dissolved.
The NLD says it will not recognize any junta election but the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, People’s Pioneer Party led by the junta’s social welfare minister Daw Thet Thet Khine, Arakan Front Party and other parties close to the junta are expected to re-register.
In the 2020 election, 87 of 91 registered parties contested the election and 19 won parliamentary seats.
The civilian National Unity Government, ethnic armed organizations and other pro-democracy forces have called any junta election a sham.
Malaysia has urged fellow ASEAN members to reject any election held by Myanmar’s regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"A Myanmar junta court sentenced jailed former student leader and democracy activist Ko Lin Htet Naing, aka Ko James, to an additional five years in prison on a terrorism charge on Monday.
According to his wife Ma Phyoe Phyoe Aung, who is herself a prominent activist and former political prisoner, Botahtaung District Court handed down the latest sentence under Article 52 (b) of the Counterterrorism Law.
Ko James was earlier sentenced to three years’ imprisonment under incitement charges. With Monday’s sentence, he now faces a total of eight years’ imprisonment.
“It is an unjust and false charge and sentence using repressive laws; it is a terrorism charge against an activist for defending democracy,” Ma Phyoe Phyoe Aung wrote on her Facebook account.
Junta forces arrested Ko James on June 18 in Yangon and he has been detained in Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison since then. His mother was killed on Oct. 19 in a blast at the prison’s parcel drop-off office while delivering food for her detained son. The junta denied his request to attend her funeral.
According to rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 19,000 people including elected leaders, lawmakers, activists, protesters and striking civil servants have been arrested since the coup, mainly for anti-junta activism. Of those arrested, 15,177 remain behind bars..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1.Terrorist SAC has no control over territories2/2/2023.....2. Justice Ministry urges civilians to report atrocitiest5/2/2023.....3. NUG announces serious action taken against labour agencies that violate labour rights5/2/2023.....4. 5.6 million children are in need of humanitarian assistance7/2/2023.....5 . SAC atrocities and arson resulted in 4 deaths, including a monk in Sagaing
03/02/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1000.06 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့တွင်ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အမျိုးသားနေ့တွင် ကရင်လူမျိုးအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာရွှင်လန်းပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာပြည်အနှံ့ရှိ ကရင်အမျိုးသားများအားလုံး စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ကရင်ပြည်ရရှိရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေး၊ လူမျိုးရေးပဋိပက္ခများ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်အတွက် ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ သမိုင်းဝင် လူထုဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်ခဲ့သည့် နေ့ရက်ကို ကရင်အမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် ၁၉၅၃ ခုနှစ်တွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သော ကော်သူးလေညီလာခံကြီးတွင် အသိအမှတ်ပြုခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤသို့ဖြင့် ကရင်အမျိုးသားနေ့အား ဂုဏ်ပြုကျင်းပလာခဲ့သည်မှာ စိန်ရတုအထိမ်းအမှတ်သို့ပင် ရောက်ရှိလာပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ လွန်လေပြီးသော နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ကရင်အမျိုးသားများသည် ပြည်တွင်းစစ်၏ အနိဌာရုံများကို အလူးအလဲခံစားခဲ့ကြရပါသည်။ သို့သော်လည်း ကေအဲန်ယူ-ကရင်အမျိုးသား အစည်း အရုံး၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုဖြင့် ကရင်အမျိုးသားများ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးမျှော်မှန်းချက်အတွက်သာမက ပြည်ထောင် စုမြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် မဆုတ်မနစ် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိနေပါသည်။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားများ၏ ပေးဆပ်မှုနှင့် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုအပေါင်းကို ထပ်တူခံစားပြီး များစွာ လေးစားအသိအမှတ်ပြုပါကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ် ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
၄။ ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း ကရင်အမျိုးသားတို့၏ ဦးဆောင်မှု၊ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှု နှင့် စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှု အားလုံးကို ပြည်ထောင်စုတဝှမ်းလုံးရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူလူထု အပေါင်းမှ မျက်ဝါးထင်ထင် တွေ့မြင်သိရှိပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ကရင်တော် လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် လက်တွဲ၍ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ် အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မှန်သမျှ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အခွင့်အရေးများကို အပြည့်အဝ အာမခံချက်ရှိသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် အဆုံးတိုင် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားများအနေဖြင့် ရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင် ရောက်ရှိရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ဆတက်ထမ်းပိုး ပိုမိုစွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း အလေး အနက်ဆန္ဒပြုရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karen (cultural, historical, political)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
411.17 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားများအနေဖြင့် ကရင်ပြည်နယ်အတွက် ၁၉၅၃ ခုနှစ် နိုဝင်ဘာလ (၂၃) ရက်နေ့မှ (၂၅) ရက်နေ့ထိ ဖာပွန်မြို့တွင်ကျင်းပသော ကော်သူးလေပြည်လုံးဆိုင်ရာကွန်ဂရက်က ကရင်ပြည်နယ်ရရှိရေး အကြမ်းမဖက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်ခဲ့သည့် နေ့ရက်အား ကရင်အမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်လျက် အထိမ်းအမှတ်ပြုကျင်းပခဲ့သည်မှာ (၇၅) နှစ်ပြည့် စိန်ရတုနှစ်တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် ဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူရပါကြောင်း ဦးစွာဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကရင်လူမျိုးများသည် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြာ အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်အား တွန်းလှန်ခုခံ ခဲ့ကြသည်မှာ သမိုင်းဝင်မှတ်တမ်းဖြစ်သည်သာမက လက်ရှိ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အကြမ်းဖက်ဖိနှိပ်ခံရမှု အများဆုံးပြည်နယ်ဒေသများတွင် တစ်ခုအပါအဝင်ဖြစ်သည့် အတွက် စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူများသည် ဘေးဒုက္ခများ၊ စိန်ခေါ်မှုများစွာကို ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့ နေကြရပါသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် ကရင်တမျိုးသားလုံး၏ ဇာတိသွေး၊ ဇာတိမာန်နှင့် ရဲရဲတောက် စိတ်ဓာတ်တို့ဖြင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုအင်အားသည် အခက်အခဲမှန်သမျှကို အောင်မြင်စွာ ကျော်လွှားသွားနိုင်သည်မှာ ပကတိအရှိတရားပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယခုတော်လှန်ရေးကာလ နှစ်နှစ် အတွင်း၌ ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားများအနေဖြင့် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် အတူ လက်တွဲညီညီ စိတ်တူကိုယ်တူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက် ကူညီပေးမှုများအပေါ် အထူးပင် ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ကရင်သွေးချင်းမောင်နှမများနှင့်အတူ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးအနေဖြင့် အနာဂတ် ကာလတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးများအပြီးတိုင် ချုပ်ငြိမ်းကွယ်ပျောက်၍ လောကပါလတရား များထွန်းကားလျက် ဒီမိုကရေစီစံနှုန်းများပြည့်ဝပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစည်ပင်ဝပြောသော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး ပေါ်ထွန်းလာရေးအတွက် ဆက်လက်ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်မှုဖြင့် မိမိတို့ ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသော နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအောင်မြင်မှုပန်းတိုင်သို့ အရောက်ချီတက်နိုင်မည်ဟု ခိုင်မာစွာယုံကြည်လျက် ဤ (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက်ကရင်အမျိုးသားနေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာအားပေးပို့အပ် ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Shan (cultural, historical, political) articles
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
230.71 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့သည် ကရင်အမျိုးသားများ၏ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုကို တခဲနက် ထုတ်ဖော်ပြသခဲ့သော သမိုင်းဝင် နေ့ရက်တစ်ရက်ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုတဝှမ်း နေထိုင်ကြသော ကရင်ပြည် သူများသည် လွတ်လပ်သော ကရင်ပြည်ရရှိရေး၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လူမျိုးစုများ အချင်းချင်း ချစ်ကြည်ရေး အစရှိသော ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် လူထုဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်ပွဲများကို နိုင်ငံအဝှမ်း ဆင်နွှဲ ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ထိုနေ့သည် ကရင်အမျိုးသားများ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးအသိ နိုးကြားမှု၊ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုနှင့် ရဲရဲတောက် သတ္တိကို ပြသခဲ့သော နေ့ဖြစ်ပြီး ကရင်ကို ကမ္ဘာကပါ ပိုသိစေခဲ့သည်။
၄။ အဆိုပါနေ့ကို အစွဲပြု၍ ၁၉၅၃ ခုနှစ် နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၂၃-၂၅ ရက်နေ့များတွင် ဖာပွန်မြို့၌ ကျင်းပသည့် ကော်သူးလေပြည်လုံးဆိုင်ရာ ကွန်ဂရက်မှ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၁) ရက်နေ့ကို ကရင်အမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် အတည်ပြုသတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ယနေ့တိုင် ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ကျင်းပခဲ့ကြသည်။
၅။ ကရင်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် ကရင်ပြည်သူလူထုသည် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ နိုင်ငံရေးလှိုင်းတံပိုးကြမ်းများကို ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံ ကျော်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်အား ဂုဏ်ရောင်ပြောင်စွာ တွန်းလှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၆။ ယနေ့ တတိုင်းပြည်လုံး ခုံခံတွန်းလှန်ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသည့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးတွင် ဘုံရန်သူတူညီပြီး ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို တည်ဆောက်ရာတွင် အချင်းချင်းညီညွတ်မျှတစွာ၊ ခွင့်လွှတ်ခြင်းကြီးစွာဖြင့် လက်တွဲညီညီ လျှောက်လှမ်းပြီး “တသံတည်းညီ၊တချီတည်းရုန်း” ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းပြောကြားရင်း ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karen (cultural, historical, political)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
170.08 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၆ ရက် မှ ၁၂ ရက် အတွင်း ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်၊ ပင်လုံမြို့၌ကျင်းပခဲ့သော ကျင်းပခဲ့သောပင်လုံညီလာခံတွင် ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားသီချင်း နှင့် ဝါ စိမ်း နီ ရှမ်း အမျိုးသား အလံတော်ကို တရားဝင်သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၇ ရက်နေ့ကို ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ (ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့) အဖြစ် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းသတ်မှတ် ကျင်းပ ခဲ့သည်မှာ (၇၆)ကြိမ်တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ထို့ပင်လုံညီလာခံ၌ပင် ကြားဖြတ်ဗမာအစိုးရ (Proper Burma) နှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ရှမ်းပြည် ကချင်ပြည်၊ချင်းပြည်အပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားကိုယ်စားလှယ်တို့အကြား နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ ယုံကြည်မှု များတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၏နိဒါန်း၌ “ကြားဖြတ်ဗမာအစိုးရနှင့် ချက်ချင်း ပူးပေါင်း လိုက်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် ရှမ်း၊ ကချင်၊ ချင်းတို့သည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ပိုမိုလျင်မြန်စွာ ရရှိလိမ့်မည်” ဟူသော ဖော်ပြချက်၊ ပင်လုံစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၅ ၌ “နယ်တွင်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးတွင် ယခုရရှိခံစားလျက်ရှိသော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ဆုံးပါးရန် မည်သည့်ဒေသတွင်မဆို လုံးဝပြုလုပ်လိမ့်မည် မဟုတ်ပါ” ဟူ သော ဖော်ပြချက်တို့နှင့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၇ ၌ “တောင်တန်းဒေသရှိ ပြည်သူတို့သည် ဒီမိုကရေစီ တိုင်းပြည်များတွင်ရရှိ ခံစားလျက်ရှိသော အခြေခံအခွင့်အရေးများနှင့် ရပိုင်ခွင့်ဟု သတ်မှတ်ထား သည့် အခွင့်အရေးများနှင့် ရပိုင်ခွင့်များ ရရှိခံစားစေရမည်” ဟု ဖော်ပြချက်များအရ အဆိုပါ ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်များအပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်တို့၏ ပင်လုံညီလာခံမှ သဘောတူ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များသည် ယနေ့နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နယ်နိမိတ်၊ အကျယ်အဝန်းနှင့်ပုံသဏ္ဍာန်ကို တည်ဆောက်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး ပင်လုံ၏ ကတိကဝတ်သည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံထူထောင်ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်ပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ပင်လုံညီလာခံမှ ရရှိခဲ့သော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ၊ ကတိကဝတ်များ၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှရေး သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်များသည် ကာလရှည်ကြာမြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာအား အဖြေရှာရေး အဓိကလိုအပ်ချက်ဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် လွန်စွာ အရေးကြီးသည့် အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်လည်း ဖြစ်နေပါသည်။
၄။ ထိုအခြေခံအုတ်မြစ် ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်တို့ဖြင့် တည်ဆောက်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မှန်သမျှ မချုပ်ငြိမ်းသရွေ့ ထူထောင်နိုင်မည် မဟုတ်သလို ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးအစစ်အမှန်သည်လည်း ရရှိနိုင်မည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်း ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်ပျက်ကွက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့သည့် နှစ်(၇၀)ကျော်ကြာ နိုင်ငံရေးပြသာနာများက မီးမောင်းထိုးပြလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးလက်တွဲလျက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင် စနစ်မှန်သမျှ အဆုံးသတ်စေရန် နည်းလမ်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ကြရာတွင် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများ၊ ရှမ်းပါတီများ အပါအဝင် ရှမ်းတော်လှန် ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ အသက်သွေးချွေးစွန့်လွှတ်ကာ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည်မှာ မျက်မှောက်ခေတ် သမိုင်းတွင် အထင်အရှားပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ သို့ဖြစ်ရာ ယခုရှမ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက်အခါသမယတွင် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့ အပါအဝင် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံ ထူထောင်ရေး အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်ဖြစ်သည့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ တွဲလက်မြဲမြံစွာ တော်လှန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဟု အလေးအနက်ကတိသစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါကြောင်း သဝဏ်လွှာ ပေးပို့ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Shan history
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
474.11 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ထူးခြားလှသောသမိုင်းအစဥ်အလာနှင့် ယဉ်ကျေးမှုကိုမြတ်နိုးတန်ဖိုးထားသည့် သွေးချင်း မွန်တိုင်းရင်းသားများသည် အေဒီ ၅ ရာစုနှောင်းပိုင်းတွင် ဟံသာဝတီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးကို စတင် တည်ထောင်ခဲ့သည့်နေ့ရက်ကို မွန်အမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်၍ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်မှစတင်ကာ ဂုဏ်ပြုကျင်းပလာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၇၆)နှစ်မြောက်တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် အလွန်ပင် ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ရပါကြောင်း ဦးစွာပဏာမ ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် အာဏာရှင်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး တော်လှန်ရေးတိုက်ပွဲတိုင်း၌ တက်ကြွစွာ ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော မွန်တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် မွန်အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများ အားလုံးအား ဂုဏ်ယူလေးစားရပါကြောင်းနှင့် မိမိတို့ပြည်သူများ၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးခရီးလမ်းသည် တူညီ ခိုင်မာသောယုံကြည်ချက်များဖြင့် မဝေးသော အနာဂတ်တွင် အောင်ပွဲပန်းတိုင်ဆီသို့ နီးနီးကပ်ကပ် ချဉ်းကပ်ရောက်ရှိလျက်ရှိနေပါကြောင်း သတင်းစကားကို အသိပေး ဖော်ညွှန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၃။ မွန်တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး၏ မင်္ဂလာရှိသော ဤနေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်အခါသမယတွင် မွန် တိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ ပြည်သူအားလုံးသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းအပြီးသတ်ရေး အတွက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် တည်ဆောက်ရေးဆီသို့ မျှော်ရည်မှန်းကာ တွဲလက်ညီညီ ခွန်အားအပြည့်ဖြင့် ကြိုးစားပါဝင်အောင်ပွဲဆင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် (၇၆)နှစ်မြောက် မွန်အမျိုးသားနေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာအား လေးစားစွာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Mon history
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
162.66 KB
more
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
771.11 KB
more
Description:
"၁.၂.၂၀၂၃ရက်နေ့၊ ၁၀၀၀နာရီတွင် ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပဉ္စမ အကြိမ်အစည်းအဝေး(ဒုတိယနေ့)၌ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်သို့ ဖတ်ကြားတင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကော်မတီ၏အစီရင်ခံစာအား မိဘပြည်သူများ ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ရန် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း လေးစားစွာ အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်အပ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
724.71 KB
more
Description:
"မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သောအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒအမှန်ဖြစ်သော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ရလဒ်ကို လက်မခံဘဲ ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အနိုင်ကျင့်လုယူရန်ကြိုးစားမှုအား ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ် လုံးက ခေါင်းငုံ့မခံဘဲ ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် (၂) နှစ်ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။
ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ (၂) နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ ပြတ်သားသော စိတ်ပိုင်းဖြတ်မှု၊ စွန့်လွှတ်စွန့်စားမှု၊ ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိနှင့် တစိုက်မတ်မတ် ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်မှုများကို အရင်းတည်၍ တော်လှန်ရေးအုတ်မြစ်သည် အခြေခိုင်ခဲ့ကာ လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင် မည်သူမျှ ဖြိုလှဲ ဖျက်ဆီးပစ်၍ မရနိုင်သော ခိုင်မာအားကောင်းမှုတစ်ခုဖြင့် ရှေ့ဆက်နေပြီဖြစ်သည်။
ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်ခဲ့သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်ကို နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ အလံမလှဲစတမ်း ဆန့်ကျင်တွန်းလှန်ခဲ့ကြသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားမဟာမိတ်အင်အားစုများနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာ လုယူမှုကို တိုက်ဖျက်ကာ စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ထောင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အနှစ် (၇၀) ကျော်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သော နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာကို အပြီးတိုင်ဖြေရှင်းကြမည်ဟူသည့် တူညီသော ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်တစ်ခုဖြင့် စုစည်းမိနေကြပြီဖြစ်ပြီး အဆိုပါ စုစည်းမှုအင်အားနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အင်အားတို့ စုပေါင်းကာ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်ကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်ကြရန် သန္နိဌာန် ပြုခဲ့ကြပြီးပြီလည်းဖြစ်သည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများ၊ အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက လေ့လာကောက်ခံထားသည့် စာရင်းများအရ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး ၂ နှစ်တာ ကာလအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ရက်စက်စွာ ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုကြောင့် သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသူ ပြည်သူစုစုပေါင်း (၂,၈၉၄) ဦးရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပြီး ၎င်းတို့အနက်တွင် အသက် ၁၈နှစ်အောက် ကလေးသူငယ် (၂၇၉) ဦး၊ အမျိုးသမီး (၄၄၇) ဦး၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်း (၇၀) ပါဝင်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးမှု ခံရသော နေအိမ် (၆၂,၃၉၉) လုံးရှိပြီး၊ ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အုံ (၁၆၃) လုံး သည်လည်း နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ဖျက်ဆီးခံခဲ့ရပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အရပ်သားများအားပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးနေ ကြရသော စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ဦးရေမှာလည်း (၁,၅၇၄,၄၀၀) ဦးရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တော်လှန်ရေး ၂ နှစ်တာကာလ အတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လေကြောင်းမှတိုက်ခိုက်မှု အကြိမ်အရေအတွက် (၆၅၄) ကြိမ်ရှိခဲ့ကာ အဆိုပါ တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများအတွင်း ပြည်သူ (၂၈၈) ဦး သေဆုံးကာ (၃၇၇) ဦး ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရခဲ့ကြရပါသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက အကြမ်းဖက် အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာထားပြီးဖြစ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် အထက်တွင် ဖော်ပြခဲ့သည့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူအစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ ကျူးလွန်ဆဲ ဖြစ်ပြီး ယင်းပြစ်မှုများမှ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ရရန်အတွက် တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတစ်ရပ်ကို ဆင်နွှဲရန် ကြိုးစားလျက်ရှိပေသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအပါအဝင် အခြားသော ခြေလှမ်းတိုင်း၊ လုပ်ရပ်တိုင်းသည် ပြည်သူ့ အချုပ်အခြာ အာဏာကို မတရားရယူရန် ကြိုးစားသည့် အာဏာဖီဆန်မှုမြောက်သော ဥပဒေချိုးဖောက်မှု များသာ ဖြစ်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင် အစိုးရတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အဆိုပါ ဥပဒေချိုးဖောက်မှုများတွင် တာဝန်ရှိသူများအားလုံးကို တရားဥပဒေရှေ့မှောက်သို့ ပို့ဆောင်ပြီး ထိခိုက်နစ်နာခဲ့ရသူအားလုံးအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုကို ရယူပေးနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးစားသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သိစေအပ်ပါသည်။
ထို့အပြင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် “ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိဉာဉ်ပါ မျှော်ရည်ချက်နှင့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို အလေးအနက်ခံယူလျက် အားလုံး သဘောတူ ချမှတ်ထားသော “နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းပြမြေပုံ”ကို တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများက စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု၊ စုပေါင်းတာဝန်ယူမှု၊ ခိုင်မာသော ကတိကဝတ်ပြုမှုများဖြင့် တညီတညွတ်တည်း လက်တွဲပူးပေါင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်ကြရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချမှတ်ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်” ဟူသည့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ နှစ်သစ်ကူး ပူးတွဲထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာစာတမ်းပါ သဘောထားအတိုင်း ပြည်သူလူထုလိုလားတောင့်တသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ပန်းတိုင်ဆီသို့ မယိမ်းမယိုင် ဆက်လက် ဦးတည်ချီတက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲနေသော မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် မကျေနပ်မှုများ အတွက် စိတ်ကျေနပ်မှုရှာဖွေရုံ တော်လှန်ပုန်ကန်နေကြခြင်းမျိုးမဟုတ်၊ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် အမြစ်တွယ်နေခဲ့သော အာဏာရှင်သရုပ်သကန်ကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အပြီးအပိုင် ချေဖျက်မောင်းထုတ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြင်းပြသော စိတ်အားသတ္တိကို စနစ်ကျသော စုဖွဲ့မှု၊ ပြင်ဆင်မှု၊ စုစည်းညီညွတ်မှုတို့ဖြင့် ပေါင်းစပ်မွမ်းမံကာ ခိုင်မာအားကောင်းစွာ တည်ဆောက်တွန်းလှန်နေသော တော်လှန်ရေးဖြစ်ပေသည်။ ထို့အပြင် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အနာဂတ်အတွက် လွန်စွာအရေးပါသော ခေတ်ပြောင်း စနစ်ပြောင်း တော်လှန်ရေး တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည်ကို နားလည်သိမှတ်ထားကြရန် အရေးကြီးသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ စဉ်းစား ဆင်ခြင် ဝေဖန်ပိုင်းခြားနိုင်စွမ်း၊ မြဲမြံခိုင်ခန့်သည့် သန္နိဌာန်၊ ပိုင်းဖြတ်ပြီးဖြစ်သော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် တို့နှင့် အတူ မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အသွင်သဏ္ဍာန် အစစ်အမှန် ကို သေချာစွာ သိမြင်နားလည်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးစားကြရန်နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အတူ ရပ်တည်ပေးကြရန် အားလုံးကို တောင်းဆိုသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
791.79 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"From January to December 2022, the junta troops violated numerous human rights abuses and committed international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in various parts of Myanmar. National Unity
Government, Ministry of Human Rights collaborated with Network for Human Rights Documentation (Burma) – ND-Burma, Equality Myanmar and Spring Archive to provide summary review on the military regime’s human rights violations.....Regions where most human rights violations reported: The region where the junta troops committed the most human rights violations was the Sagaing Region, with 783 cases, followed by Magway Region with 311 and
Yangon Region where the country’s commercial hub is located with 171.
Most human rights violations were reported in Sagaing Region’s Kalay, KhinU and Yinmarbin Township. 81 human rights violations were recorded in Kalay, 61 in KhinU and 57 in Yinmarbin Township. There were 30 types of human rights violations in these three townships.
Among the states, Rakhine State has the highest number of human rights violations with 138 cases. Kyauktaw Township has the highest number of human rights
abuses with 24 cases. Junta soldiers have committed 18 types of human rights violations in Rakhine State.....The most common forms of human rights violations: Arbitrary arrest and arbitrary arrest are the most common violations of human rights, followed by the burning of public housing and property. Firing heavy weapons into civilian areas is the third most common violation committed by the junta troops.
One of the most serious human rights violations by the military regime is the execution of anti-authoritarian activists, students, and civil servants who joined the
Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). The second human rights violation is the extrajudicial killing of detainees in the military's notorious interrogation centers, and the third is the inhumane dismemberment and dumping of bodies in rural areas.....General review: The military regime had not been able to suppress the people’s resistance against
the military coup by ground force alone in 2022. Junta troops launched attacks on antiregime forces’ camps across the country with the support of aerial bombings and
artillery strikes. The junta troops have repeatedly fired at villages, homes and schools that are not military targets.
With the aim of destroying the local people’s strong support for the People’s Defence Forces, the regime armed the pro-regime militias called “Pyu Saw Htee”
through the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) members
and extreme Buddhist nationalists. Pyu Saw Htee members have targeted killings of local people and National League for Democracy party members, and the military columns have repeatedly raided and torched villages where the anti-dictatorship revolutionary movement is strong, systematically and extensively..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Spring Revolution, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.85 MB
more
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
871.03 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ၁၉၄၉ ခုနှစ်မှ စတင်၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင် အဆက်ဆက်ကို ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ခဲ့သော ကရင့် တော်လှန်ရေးသည် ယနေ့တွင် (၇၄) နှစ်တိုင်တိုင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားပြည်သူလုထုတရပ်လုံး လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူတန်ဖိုးထားရသည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် ဖြစ်သည်နှင့် အညီ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင့်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ကို ကရင်အမျိုးသားများနှင့် ထပ်တူ ဂုဏ်ပြုဦိးညွှတ် ကြိုဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။
၃။ (၇၄) နှစ်တာ ကရင့်တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးအတွင်း ကရင်ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်များကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ရင်း အသက်၊ကိုယ်လက်အင်္ဂါ စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ရသည့် ကရင့်အာဇာနည် ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ၊ ကရင့်သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့် ကရင်ပြည်သူများကိုလည်း လေးနက်စွာ အောက်မေ့ဦးညွှတ် ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ယနေ့အချိန်အခါသည် ကရင်အမျိုးသားများနှင့်အတူ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ကြုံတွေ့ခံစားနေရသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ဆိုးသွမ်းယုတ်မာသော လုပ်ရပ်များကို ကျော်လွှားနိုင်ရန် တစ်တိုင်းပြည်လုံး အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအား ဟန်ချက်ညီစွာဖြင့် ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေသော ကာလလည်းဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ်ဆိုးကို အပြီးတိုင် ဖြုတ်ချပြီး ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ကို အပြည့်အဝ အာမခံသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကို ထူထောင်နိုင်ရန် အတူတကွ လက်တွဲညီစွာဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်နိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု အလေးအနက် ယုံကြည်လျက် (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင့်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာကို ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karen (cultural, historical, political)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
175.49 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces called on the public to stage a silent strike on Wednesday to mark the second anniversary of the military takeover.
“With loud voices of silence, we have repeatedly shaken the dictator,” the General Strike Coordination Body (GSCB) said on Friday, referring to previous silent strikes.
The junta claims life has returned to normal under military rule but by staying at home, shutting businesses and emptying streets, the movement aims to show mass discontent.
“We will again stage the silent strike on February 1 to remind the world that our people continue to fight in every way despite the cruel oppression of the terrorist regime…and make it clear that we won’t accept the planned illegal election,” the GSCB said.
The GSCB, which includes over 30 strike committees in Myanmar, urged the public to remain indoors from 10am to 3pm on Wednesday.
Prominent anti-regime leader Tayzar San wrote that the coup anniversary is the day when a state of emergency declared by the “terrorist” military will expire and it is important to show continued opposition to the junta on that day.
“I urge the whole country to stage the silent strike unanimously,” he wrote.
Silent strikes were held last year on February 1, on Human Rights Day and on March 24 despite junta threats of businesses seizures, arrests and prosecution. The junta usually staged pro-military rallies to counter the campaigns.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 2,890 people have been killed and more than 17,400 detained since the 2021 coup.
Two years ago the military locked up much of the elected leadership, including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, declaring a state of emergency..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup campaigns, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
To comply, the NLD would need to declare that it is in no way associated with the CRPH or NUG, and dismiss jailed officials including Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint
Description:
"While Myanmar civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint serve decades-long jail sentences meted out in farcical court proceedings that followed a military coup in early 2021, their National League for Democracy (NLD)—the country’s largest and most popular party—is in disarray.
Hundreds of NLD officials have been incarcerated, some even tortured to death in military interrogation centres. The party’s headquarters in Yangon and its offices throughout the country have been repeatedly vandalised by individuals presumed to be affiliated with the military.
On Thursday, the military published a legal statute seen as a final blow to the party. The Political Parties Registration Law, enacted under the order of coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, requires all of Myanmar’s existing political parties to re-register with the military-appointed election commission within a period of 60 days. Those who fail to do so will be abolished, and the party’s assets confiscated.
The NLD’s leadership has already declared that they will not re-register with the junta’s electoral body, which is headed by a former military official who chaired the same commission under a previous dictator, Than Shwe.
However, even if the NLD chooses to re-register, it would likely make no difference: the junta law states that no political party may have as its members individuals who are serving jail terms or who are affiliated with entities designated by the military as “unlawful associations.”
Many NLD MPs elected in 2020 formed the parliamentary body known as Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and others hold positions in the publicly mandated National Unity Government (NUG). Both have been declared as “terrorist groups” by the junta.
In order to comply with the coup regime’s party membership requirements, the NLD would need to declare that the party is in no way associated with the CRPH or the NUG, and dismiss Suu Kyi, Win Myint and many other jailed officials from its ranks.
It is not a new condition, and was once featured in an older party registration law enacted in 2010 under the rule of former military ruler Than Shwe.
At that time, Suu Kyi was under house arrest and the country was on the brink of a military-orchestrated transition to a “discipline-flourishing” democracy after decades of army rule. The NLD’s senior leadership opted not to dismiss Suu Kyi and other jailed party members and refused to re-register the party, resulting in an automatic boycott of the general election in the country.
It also led some of the top party leaders to leave and establish a breakaway group called the National Democratic Force (NDF). Two prominent NDF figures, Khin Maung Swe and Thein Nyunt, are now members of the junta.
This controversial clause in the party registration law was obviously designed to prevent the NLD from contesting the election in November 2010; the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), led by former army generals, unsurprisingly declared a landslide victory.
After Suu Kyi was released from house arrest one week after the 2010 vote, ex-general Thein Sein—who had become the President in the USDP-led administration—removed the controversial requirement from the electoral law. The gesture followed a highly publicised meeting with Suu Kyi in August 2011—part of an effort to demonstrate to both domestic and international audiences that the country’s political transition was genuine and substantive.
The change in the law paved the way for Suu Kyi to re-register the NLD as a party and contest the parliamentary by-elections in 2012. It was a move for which she and the NLD faced objections from some senior colleagues and civil society organisations for seemingly legitimising a political system guided by the undemocratic and military-drafted 2008 Constitution.
Thursday’s newly-enacted law by Min Aung Hlaing restores the old clause that once kept the NLD at bay. It serves as a conclusion to an incident of historical rapprochement between the military establishment and the country’s main political opposition dating back more than a decade, and which formed the basis of Myanmar’s short-lived political liberalisation.
Speaking to the BBC’s Burmese language service, military council spokesperson Zaw Min Tun denied that the law was designed to persecute the NLD.
“We don’t have the intention of targeting any particular party,” he said. The fate of the NLD, he added, “is mainly in its own hands.”
NLD spokesperson Tun Myint, now in exile, explained that he remains positive about the future of the party, even when asked by Myanmar Now about the junta law that again disqualifies them from governing. He noted that the NLD had overcome several challenges since its establishment following the democratic uprising in 1988.
“Our party’s survival relies on public support. Since we will continue to reflect the will of the public, we have every confidence that we will survive,” he said.
One party rule
If the NLD is abolished, the USDP—headed by Khin Yi, a former police chief who recently served as the junta’s immigration minister—will be the dominant party in the country.
Myanmar Now previously reported that Khin Yi was assigned by Min Aung Hlaing to take on the party’s chairmanship role in order to quell internal tension between the junta chief and the USDP’s former leadership. The move was seen as a step toward ensuring that Min Aung Hlaing would be able to rely on the party to support his political ambitions.
In this increasingly restrictive context, ethnic political parties may also find themselves marginalised, barred from contesting the elections at a national level. A clause in the junta’s new law requires parties which intend to run in more than one state or region to enlist at least 100,000 members within 90 days of registering with the military-appointed election commission or face de-registration.
Opting to register as “regional parties” allows these entities to mobilise just 1,000 members, but then limits them to running in constituencies in one chosen state or region.
One of the largest and most prominent ethnic political parties, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), has its largest support base in Shan State, but also traditionally contests in other areas with sizable ethnic Shan populations, such as Kachin State.
SNLD general secretary Sai Leik said that his party’s central executive committee members would need to convene a meeting in order to decide whether to re-register the party under the military council’s terms.
He pointed out that the junta’s electoral law would ensure that the Union parliament would be dominated by the USDP, as well as the military itself, which holds 25 percent of seats in all legislatures in accordance with the 2008 Constitution it drafted.
“The new law will merely intensify the competition between regional parties for a greater number of seats [in the state and regional parliaments], while our representation at the Union level will be seriously weakened,” Sai Leik said. “Only the military, the USDP and a few other parties backed by the military will remain significant in the Union parliament.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
About Aung San Suu Kyi, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles and reports about the NLD, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1. Prime Minister oversees PDF training completion ceremony17/01/2023...2. NUG calls on neighbours to block terrorist SAC’s use of their airspace for its atrocities 17/01/2023...3. NUG welcomes establishment of ASEAN Special Envoy Office to Myanmar13/01/2023...4. NUG sends documentation and evidence of the SAC’s atrocities
to international organisations and media
18/01/2023...5. 5 civilians killed in SAC arson attacks
17/01/2023...6. 27 SAC staff joined CDM
16/01/2023...7. NUG collects 3 million MMK in controlled areas through interim tax policy16/01/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.01 MB
more
Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (4/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.79 MB
more
Description:
"Ever since Hnin Si Hlaing joined the armed revolution against the military regime, she said she would do anything she could to kill the junta soldiers she referred to as “military dogs”.
The 20-year-old member of the logistic group of Kawlin Township’s People’s Defence Force (PDF) in Sagaing Region proved her words on January 7, when she and her comrade blew themselves up when confronted by regime troops.
The two women were riding a motorcycle and transporting homemade bombs for the resistance when they unexpectedly encountered a regime column patrolling in Kawlin Township, one of the strongholds of the resistance to the military dictatorship.
Rather than surrender and face brutal interrogation which might have led them to give up information about their comrades, the women blew themselves up as the soldiers approached them.
A number of soldiers were injured in the bombing, while the remains of the two women have yet to be returned to their families, according to local PDF the Kawlin Revolution Team (KRT).
Hnin Si Hlaing worked as a sales clerk in a Kawlin store and was preparing to take the parallel National Unity Government’s (NUG) matriculation exam, while also serving in the Kawlin PDF.
Her comrade who died alongside her was Daw Su Su Yee. The 45-year-old is survived by her 20-year-old son and 70-year-old mother. Before the coup, Daw Su Su Yee worked as a betel nut seller in Kawlin Township.
But after the military takeover, she took part in anti-junta protests and then became a member of the Kawlin PDF logistics group, as well as acting as a scout for the KRT.
Daw Su Su Yee said she felt sorry for young comrades who gave their lives for the revolution, saying she would rather die instead of them, according to KRT.
Her house was sealed off by the regime the day after she died. Her son and mother are now under the protection of the Kawlin People’s Administrative Body, the NUG’s administration in the township.
The PDF said in a statement that Daw Su Su Yee and Hnin Si Hlaing had sacrificed their lives for the revolution and honoured them as heroes.
The attack by the two women stands out as the latest example of the fighting spirit of the revolutionary forces battling to restore democracy to Myanmar.
But there are other resistance fighters who have also sacrificed their lives for their comrades and the revolution. These are some of them.
Ko Moe, Yesagyo Revolution Group (YRG)
Ko Moe attacked regime soldiers by blowing himself up with hand grenades in Magwe Region’s Yesagyo Township in early July last year.
The father of two was a member of local PDF the Yesagyo Revolution Group (YRG) and a village defense force volunteer. The 45-year old encountered junta troops near Thae Taw Village monastery on the border of Yesagyo and Pakokku townships on July 8. Ko Moe did not know that nearly 80 Myanmar military soldiers were deployed at the monastery.
After being shot and injured by regime troops near the monastery, he fell off his motorcycle. As the soldiers approached him, Ko Moe exploded three hand grenades, killing seven soldiers instantly. Another eight troops died later in hospital, according to YRG.
“He wasn’t a combatant. He was in the supply force, but he always carried three grenades. He always said that he would rather die than be captured,” said Ko Zero, a YRG spokesperson.
YRG leader Ko Pathay told The Irrawaddy that Ko Moe helped scout for the PDF when it laid mines to ambush junta forces.
“We have all thought about how to kill as many soldiers as possible if we were captured by them,” he said.....
Eze, Moe Nyo Revolution Force: Eze, 19, a student who passed the matriculation exam with two distinctions, joined the Moe Nyo Revolution Force in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region last year in order to topple the military dictatorship.
He wanted to be an engineer and his parents intended him to go and work in Japan. But he said that he would go to Japan only after the revolution succeeded, said Ko Tay Zar, a spokesperson for the Moe Nyo Revolution Force.
“He said that he would never surrender as long as the revolution is ongoing. He refused to return home when his parents asked him to come back,” said Ko Tay Zar.
Eze was a mine technician and led the mine attacks on the Sagaing-Myinmu Road. He died in late October 2022 while he was covering his comrades during a clash with junta forces. He and four other comrades were surrounded as they prepared to detonate a mine to attack a column of 150 regime soldiers.
After being hit in the thigh, he refused attempts from his comrades to rescue him and instead told them to retreat and to leave him. His friends left him a homemade shotgun with five bullets. Just one bullet was left when his body was found.
“He might have been captured alive, but he didn’t let himself be interrogated,” said Ko Tay Zar, who told The Irrawaddy the resistance group wasn’t raided after the attack.
Eze’s corpse was found the day after the attack far away from where he was captured. Three gunshot wounds were found in his chest and heads, while his legs were torn from being dragged by the soldiers.
“He told us that if he was arrested by the military dogs, he would not talk to them but only spit in their faces,” recalled Ko Tay Zar.
His fellow fighters remember Eze as a young man with a good attitude who always smiled, and as someone who sacrificed his life in order to save his comrades.
“People like Eze are a rare breed. Although he was young, he was also mature,” Ko Tay Zar told The Irrawaddy.....Bo Thanmani, Shwebo Defense Force (SBDF): Bo Thanmani sacrificed his life to save his comrades during a clash last June in Sagaing Region’s Wetlet Township.
The 49-year-old founder of the Shwebo Defense Force (SBDF) was killed in action along with a fellow fighter. More than two dozen junta soldiers opened fire on Bo Thanmani and his troop of 15 fighters. Bo Thanmani and fellow fighter Ko Soe Paing were injured.
With the regime troops just 20 feet away, Bo Thanmani ordered his comrades to retreat while he and Ko Soe Paing covered them, according to Ko Yan Gyi, the commander of Battalion 23 of the SBDF.
“If Sayar [Bo Thanmani] and Ko Soe Paing hadn’t covered us, we wouldn’t be alive now,” Ko Yan Gyi told The Irrawaddy.
The pair were found dead and holding hands. Bo Thanmani had been shot twice, once in the heart and again in the head.
“The death of Sayar [Bo Thanmani] is an irreplaceable loss for us,” Ko Yan Gyi told The Irrawaddy.
Bo Thanmani treated his SBDF comrades like his own children. His fighters wanted him to command them from their base camp, but he insisted on leading missions from the front.
“He thought about his comrades until his last breath and he gave his life for us,” said Ko Yan Gyi.
Along with his comrades, Bo Thanmani resisted the regime forces with only MA-1 rifles and homemade weapons.
A lack of sufficient arms is one of the reasons why resistance fighters are dying in battle. Ko Yan Gyi urged the NUG, which is responsible for arming the over 300 PDF battalions currently operating, to provide them with more weapons as soon as possible.
He explained that if SBDF had had around 10 automatic weapons, the group would have been able to defeat the junta soldiers and save the life of their leader Bo Thanmani.
Ko Tay Zar of the Moe Nyo Revolution Force in Myinmu Township also called for more and better arms. “If we had automatic rifles, our comrades like Eze might not have died,” he said.
The NUG has admitted that while it can’t supply the resistance with all its needs, it is trying to support them as much as possible.
“We will have to give more lives until we get better weapons,” said Ko Tay Zar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"JCC-CDM တွင် အတည်ပြုပြီး ပေးပို့တင်ပြထားသော နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM မူဝါဒစာတမ်းကို အခြေပြု၍ အောက်ပါ မူဝါဒလေးရပ်ကို ချမှတ်သည်။
၁။ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM များသည် တိုင်းပြည်ပြောင်းလဲရေးအတွက် တော်လှန်ရေး၏ အရေးပါသည့် အင်အားစုတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်သည်ကို NUCC အနေဖြင့် မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ CDM နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးဆိုင်ရာ တရားမျှတမှု ပြန်လည် ရှာဖွေဖော်ထုတ်ခြင်းတွင် အသိအမှတ်ပြု မှတ်တမ်းတင်ခြင်း၊ ဂုဏ်ပြုချီးမြှင့်ခြင်း၊ အမှန်တရားနှင့် တရားမျှတမှု ရှာဖွေခြင်း၊ နစ်နာမှုများကို ပြန်လည်ကုစား ပေးခြင်းတို့ ပါဝင်သည်။
၃။ JCC-CDM တွင် အတည်ပြုပြီး ပေးပို့တင်ပြထားသော နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM မူဝါဒစာတမ်းကို အခြေပြု၍ လိုအပ်သော ဥပဒေ၊ နည်းဥပဒေနှင့် လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများကို ဆက်လက်ရေးဆွဲသွားရန် ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM များအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးအပေါ် အာဏာရှင် ထောက်တိုင်များ ဖြစ်ကြသည့် Non-CDM များက လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှု၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ၊ ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်နေကြောင်း သက်သေအထောက်အထားများ တွေ့ရှိပါက သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒေသအသီးသီးမှ တရားဝင်အတည်ပြုထားသော သက်ဆိုင်ရာဒေသ ဥပဒေဖြင့် အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
191.96 KB
more
Description:
"One of the most unexpected developments in the struggle against Myanmar’s latest military dictatorship is the support for the resistance that has come from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). An ethnic armed organization (EAO), the MNDAA is based in Kokang in the far northeastern corner of Shan State in eastern Myanmar.
More than 90 per cent of Kokang’s population of approximately 150,000 people are ethnic Chinese of Yunnan descent, and the region’s cultural, personal and even political ties with China have always been strong. Given Beijing’s support for the junta that was installed after the February 2021 coup, it may seem surprising that the MNDAA is getting away with supporting the resistance to the regime. But, as a long-time observer of Myanmar politics, put it: “It looks to me as if the Chinese are working, as they often do, to keep a foot of some sort in all camps.”
The MNDAA has trained several groups of fighters from the pro-democracy resistance, which are loosely-banded together and known as People’s Defense Forces (PDF). Arms for the resistance have also been provided through the MNDAA and its close ally the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, a powerful EAO that is active in Palaung-inhabited areas of northern Shan State. The weapons, in turn, are Chinese-made and come from the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has had a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military since 1989, and therefore cannot be directly involved in the fight.
The flow of guns and the fact that no Chinese-made FN-6 Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), of which the UWSA has many, have been provided seems to indicate that the China is giving its tacit approval to the arms supplies, but with certain limitations. The PDFs need MANPADS urgently to protect themselves against the increasingly frequent airstrikes that the military regime has unleashed against resistance strongholds. But it wouldn’t look good if any of the Chinese-made planes in service with the Myanmar Air Force were shot down by Chinese-made MANPADS.
In this rather complicated context, it should also be remembered that this is not the first time that the MNDAA has been engaged in a conflict with the Myanmar military. The group was one of four EAOs that emerged from a mutiny among the rank-and-file of the once powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989. The others were the UWSA, the National Democratic Alliance Army in eastern Shan State, and the New Democratic Army in Kachin State. All four entered into, but did not sign, ceasefire agreements with the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but fighting broke out between the MNDAA and the Myanmar military in 2009. The MNDAA lost most of its territory, and an estimated 30,000 Kokang people fled across the border to Yunnan.
Most of them were able to return but, in February 2015, fighting resumed and between 40,000-50,000 refugees ended up in Yunnan. Massive airstrikes and artillery barrages were used. In a May 2015 article for Jane’s Defense Weekly, writer Anthony Davis described the offensive as “the largest war since Myanmar’s independence.” China cannot have been pleased with what happened in 2009 and 2015, and probably thought it wise to maintain good relations with the MNDAA. With its ethnic Chinese population, Kokang has always served as an unofficial buffer zone between China and Myanmar, as well as gateway for China’s influence in Shan State and beyond. Consequently, Kokang is of the utmost strategic importance to Beijing.
Kokang’s exact status has always been somewhat ambiguous. Prior to the arrival of the British in the then Burma, Kokang maintained a dual relationship between local chieftains and the Shan saohpa [sawbwa in Burmese] of Hsenwi to the west of the Salween River and with Chinese rulers to the east of the Salween. But under an 1894 agreement between Britain and China, Kokang was recognized as Chinese territory. However, a new agreement was reached in 1897 under which China had to cede Kokang to the British, who placed the region under the jurisdiction of North Hsenwi State and a local myosa, literally a ‘town eater’, or local tax collector, who also had other duties.
During World War II, Kokang’s status was changed again and, in 1951 it became a separate entity within the Shan States ruled by its own saohpa. His name was Yang Kyein-sai and he belonged to the Yang clan, the most powerful family in Kokang. His sister Yang Kyin-hsui, better known as Olive Yang, is perhaps the best-known of his siblings. She had her own armed militia and, in the 1950s, became involved in the opium trade, although her role in business and politics has been grossly exaggerated and even glamorized, perhaps because she was openly lesbian.
Some contemporary writers have elevated her to the status of an early LGBT activist and, even more imaginatively, as a superspy connected with various foreign intelligence agencies. In fact, Olive Yang’s main and only real claim to fame was that she was the first person to send opium in truck convoys down to the Thai border, rather than by the usual mule caravans. She traded opium with the remnants of the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces on the Thai-Shan State border, but had hardly any other significant connections with the outside world.
In 1960, Olive wanted to assume the title of saohpa of Kokang, a title still held by her brother, but she was detained by Myanmar’s central authorities from 1963 to 1968. She lived quietly in Yangon and Shan State after her release until 1989, when the then military intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt appointed her, ex-opium warlord Lo Hsing-han and Aung Gyi, a Sino-Burmese former army officer, to negotiate with the CPB mutineers in Kokang. She died in 2017 in Muse in northern Shan State.
Another Yang sibling, Yang Kyein-sein, aka Jimmy Yang, was far more important than Olive. He was elected MP for Kokang in 1950, a position he held until General Ne Win’s coup in 1962 and the end of Myanmar democracy. Jimmy Yang also founded the Burma Bank and was a prominent personality in politics and business throughout the 1950s.
He went underground after the coup and formed the Kokang Revolutionary Force which, in 1964, merged with two Shan groups to form the Shan State Army, led by Sao Nang Hearn Hkam, the widow of Myanmar’s first president Sao Shwe Thaike. But Jimmy soon broke away and served for a while as a manager of the long-gone Rincome Hotel in Chiang Mai. He later allied himself with the KMT in the opium business and with ousted Prime Minister U Nu in exile politics. Jimmy Yang left for Paris in 1973, but returned to Myanmar during a general amnesty in 1980. He died in Yangon in 1985.
Meanwhile at home in Kokang, crucial events took place which became a turning point in the modern history of the territory. In 1967, two of Jimmy Yang’s officers, Pheung Kya-shin and Pheung Kya-fu, traveled to China to ask for help. The Chinese introduced them to CPB exiles, who for several years had been planning a major push into Myanmar. On January 1, 1968, heavily-armed CPB units crossed into Myanmar at Möng Ko in northern Shan State. Five days later, the Pheung brothers and the force they commanded crossed into Kokang, which was overrun within days. Kokang and large parts of northern Shan State soon came under CPB control.
By the mid 1970s, the CPB had extended its ‘liberated area’ to encompass 20,000 square kilometers of land along Myanmar’s border with China. The problem, though, was that the CPB’s soldiers consisted almost exclusively of people from the mountains of northern and eastern Shan State, while orthodox, Maoist Bamar dominated the CPB’s political leadership. People like Pheung Kya-shin didn’t even join the CPB; he was content to be an army commander and local administrator in Kokang. Almost inevitably, this led to a mutiny, which began in Kokang in March 1989 and, in April, spread to the Wa Hills and other CPB-controlled areas.
At first it was believed that the CPB mutineers would link up with Myanmar’s other EAOs. But the SLORC was faster, and made the mutineers an offer they accepted without hesitation: keep your armies but don’t share your guns with the other EAOs, and you can also retain control over your respective areas and get involved in any kind of business. In the beginning that meant the trade in opium and its derivative heroin, but now commercial pursuits are more diversified and include tin and rare earth mining with China being the main market for exports.
Since the mutiny, Kokang has been transformed into a center for cross-border trade with China. Whereas during the CPB days there were only bamboo huts and a few bigger houses made of stone, high-rise buildings now loom over market places and shopping centers. There are even talks about building a high-speed railroad from China through the southern part of Kokang to Hsenwi, and then all the way to Mandalay and, eventually, Yangon and the port of Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State. Needless to say, Kokang’s recent development is more in tune with what the leaders in Beijing want, as China no longer exports communist revolution. Today it’s a question of trade, commerce and all kinds of influence over Myanmar’s internal affairs, be it the insurgencies and military affairs or mainstream politics and, most important, geopolitical concerns.
Pheung Kya-fu died in June 2017 at the age of 81 and Pheung Kya-shin on February 16, 2022. He was 94. With those old warlords gone, a new generation of Kokang leaders have taken over, but little is known about them. It is also not known how and when they invited PDF fighters to their area. But with Kokang commanders in charge it is certain that relations with China are bound to be strong. And will the PDFs be able to maintain their independence? Their main weakness is that the PDFs have no central command and no common strategy. They can easily end up being totally dependent on the stronger groups that train and equip them.
That means that the struggle for Myanmar’s future is as uncertain as it always has been: a never-ending civil war with more suffering for the people, who are now being bombarded by the Myanmar Air Force and ruled by an incompetent junta that has pushed the country close to an economic abyss. And much of it has to do with China’s desire to secure its control over the vital ‘Myanmar corridor’, which gives it access to the Indian Ocean and markets across the world.
As for Kokang, it will not be an easy task for anyone in power in Naypyitaw to establish some semblance of authority over that virtually autonomous territory. Like the Wa Hills to the south, it is a part of Myanmar that has never been under any effective, central governmental control — but which for a very long time has had much closer ties to China..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"16 January 2023: Companies from at least 13 countries, including in Europe, Asia and North America, have been enabling the Myanmar military to manufacture weapons used for human rights atrocities. They must stop doing business with the Myanmar military and associated entities immediately, if they have not done so already, said the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), in a new report on the Myanmar military’s in-country arms production and the global value chains that facilitate it. Weapons produced in Myanmar have been used and continue to be used by the military to commit widespread human rights violations that amount to the most serious crimes under international law.
The report, Fatal Business: Supplying the Myanmar Military’s Weapon Production, identifies companies domiciled in Austria, France, China, Singapore, India, Israel, Ukraine, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. They have been providing supplies that are critical to weapon production in Myanmar by the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries (DDI) at arms manufacturing factories commonly referred to as KaPaSa.
The report also maps out the locations of KaPaSa factories and their current production lines as well as other locations of strategic importance for the DDI’s weapon manufacturing. The Myanmar military has invested heavily over many years in building up its capacity to produce arms in-country, particularly small arms and light weapons, in response to embargoes and sanctions that have restricted its access to essential military supplies produced elsewhere.
“Foreign companies are enabling the Myanmar military – one of the world’s worst human rights abusers – to produce many of the weapons it uses to commit daily atrocities against the Myanmar people,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “Foreign companies and their home states have moral and legal responsibilities to ensure their products are not facilitating human rights violations against civilians in Myanmar. Failing to do so makes them complicit in the Myanmar military’s barbaric crimes.”
The report draws on a range of sources including leaked budget-related documents from the Myanmar military-controlled Ministry of Defence and the DDI, shipment records, interviews with individuals formerly associated with the Myanmar military and photographic evidence shared by them as well as open-source materials.
Through its investigation, SAC-M has identified companies supplying raw materials, parts and components, end-items, and high-precision Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines and associated technology to the DDI for the sustained production – both licensed and un-licensed – of weapons currently in its arsenal. The report also names front companies, including companies domiciled in Myanmar, and middlemen that enable the DDI to purchase products and services by brokering deals or otherwise acting as intermediaries for the DDI.
“Weapons produced at the Myanmar military’s KaPaSa factories have been used to commit human rights atrocities for decades,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “States must investigate and, if necessary, initiate administrative or legal proceedings against companies whose products we have identified as enabling the DDI to produce weapons used by the Myanmar military in its indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Foreign companies that profit from the suffering of the Myanmar people must be held accountable.”
Companies identified in the report may be contravening various export controls and other restrictive measures that apply in relation to Myanmar, the Myanmar military and companies associated with it. They may also be failing to uphold their international responsibilities to respect human rights under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Meanwhile, the home States of companies identified may be in breach of their obligations and duties under applicable international human rights and humanitarian law.
Over many years media and human rights groups have gathered extensive video and photographic evidence of DDI-manufactured weapons being used by the Myanmar military to commit gross human rights violations. This includes, for example, evidence of DDI-made weapons being used during lethal crackdowns on peaceful protests in response to the attempted coup of February 2021, and during the genocidal atrocities against Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. Companies involved in the provision or supply of essential products to the DDI may be found complicit in these and other atrocities committed by the Myanmar military.
“The Myanmar military has built a robust arms manufacturing industry that makes it largely self-sufficient in its ability to produce the small arms, light weapons and ammunition it uses to brutally suppress the Myanmar people,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “However, the DDI’s reliance on external supplies to sustain its weapon production means it is still vulnerable to external pressure. UN member states should do everything in their power to restrict the Myanmar military’s access to those supplies to protect the Myanmar people, including by adopting targeted sanctions against the KaPaSa, its leadership and its network of brokers.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
970.79 KB 225.84 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သော နှစ် (၆၀) ပြည့် တအောင်းအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်တွင် တအောင်းအမျိုးသား ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး စိတ္တသုခ၊ကာယသုခနှစ်ဖြာ ပြည့်စုံကြပါစေဟု ဦးစွာ ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။၁၉၆၃ ခုနှစ်မှစတင်၍ တအောင်းအမျိုးသားပြည်သူများသည် အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်ကို ရရာလက်နက်စွဲကိုင်ပြီး ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။နှစ်ပေါင်း (၆၀) တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးအတွင်း အသက်၊သွေး၊ချွေး၊စည်းစိမ်များစွာ ရင်းနှီးပေးဆပ် စွန့်လွှတ်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့သော တအောင်းအမျိုးသား သူရဲကောင်းအာဇာနည်များနှင့်တကွ တအောင်း ပြည်သူများအားလုံးကို လေးနက်စွာ ဦးညွှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့ စစ်တပ်မှ မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းယူမှု နောက်ပိုင်း တွင်လည်း ပလောင်ပြည်နယ်လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး/ တအောင်းအမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော် (PSLF/TNLA)သည် ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သော စစ်ကောင်စီအား အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရန် တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ဟန်ချက်ညီစွာလက်တွဲလျက် ခုခံတွန်းလှန် လျက်ရှိသည်။
၅။ယနေ့အချိန်အခါတွင် တအောင်းအမျိုးသားများနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး၏ မျှော်မှန်း တောင့်တချက်ဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အား အပြီးတိုင် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်သူများနှင့် အတူတကွ စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် အင်တိုက်အားတိုက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက် အောင်မြင်ပြည့်ဝနိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
151.98 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် ထူးမြတ်သော နှစ်(၆၀)ပြည့် စိန်ရတုနှစ်၊ တအာင်းအမျိုးသား တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် တအာင်းသွေးချင်းညီအစ်ကိုများနှင့်တကွ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူပြည်သားများ အားလုံး၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးရည်မှန်းချက်များ အမြန်ဆုံးပြည့်ဝကာ ဘေးရန်ကင်းဝေးပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ တအာင်းပြည်သူများသည် ၁၉၆၃ ခုနှစ်မှ စတင်ကာ တအာင်းအမျိုးသားတစ်ရပ်လုံး အတွက် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အခွင့်အရေး၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုတို့အတွက် ဖိနှိပ်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးနှင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံကာ တွန်းလှန်ခုခံရင်း ပေးဆပ်မှုတို့ဖြင့် စုပေါင်း အင်အား တည်ဆောက် ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် နှစ်ပေါင်း(၆၀)တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ တရားမဝင်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ နိုင်ငံတော်ပုန်ကန်မှုပြစ်မှုအား ကျူးလွန်ကာ တရားဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူထားသည့်အပြင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရက်စက်သောအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်လျက်ရှိခြင်းကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူများသည် နေ့စဉ် အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများ ဆုံးရှုံးနေရပါသည်။ မိမိတို့အားလုံး၏ ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သည့်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်အား ပြည်သူလူထုအားဖြင့် ဟန်ချက်ညီညီ ပူးပေါင်း ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေသည့် ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် တအာင်းပြည်သူများနှင့် အားလုံးသော တိုင်းရင်းသားများအတွက် သမိုင်းတွင် ကမ္ပည်းထိုးနိုင်မည့် တော်လှန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်မှုတို့အား ရဲရင့်သော သတ္တိ၊ ဇွဲ၊ ခွန်အား၊ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့နှင့်အတူ အသက်သွေးချွေးပေးဆပ်ကာ အမျိုးသားရေးတာဝန်တစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် ရင်ဆိုင်တော်လှန်နေကြသည်မှာ အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက် နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လူမဆန်သော လူသတ်အာဏာရှင်များအား အမြစ်ပြတ် တိုက်ထုတ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် မိမိတို့တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး၏ စုပေါင်းအင်အားနှင့် ညီညွတ်ခြင်း ခွန်အားတို့ဖြင့်သာ အောင်ပွဲသို့ လျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင်ကြမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး တပ်ဦးတွင် အတူယှဉ်တွဲပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော တအာင်းခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် တအာင်းပြည်သူများ၏ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှု၊ ပေးဆပ်မှုနှင့်ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်မှုတို့အတွက် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ဝမ်းမြောက်လျက် နှစ်(၆၀)ပြည့် တအာင်းအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့သဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူလေးစားစွာ ပေးပို့ အပ် ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
307.77 KB
more
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.32 MB
more
Description:
"AAPP issues this statement to bring attention to the gross human rights violations perpetrated by the military junta. On the evening of January 5, 2023, a dispute occurred between prison authorities and political prisoners. Eight political prisoners were called out and brought from the compound. Their hands were tied behind their back, and they were savagely kicked and beaten with batons. Following brutal torture several political prisoners were severely injured some of whom are in critical condition, and at least one political prisoner was killed. AAPP strongly condemns these severe crimes of extrajudicial murder and torture in a crackdown.
In Burma since the coup, rule of law and any judicial system have collapsed. The pillars of military rule – judges, soldiers, police, and prison guards are being used by the junta to abuse and torture political prisoners. In fact, in every prison, political prisoners are intentionally tortured and violated.
On January 5, 2022, there was an altercation between political prisoners and prison guards. Prison personnel used excess force to crackdown with brutal beatings on political prisoners who were severely beaten with hands tied behind their back. One political prisoner was killed, and several critically injured. Looking at these events, the torture and extrajudicial killings in Pathein Prison are crimes under the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT).
Junta authorities including Pathein Prison Superintendent Nay Min Htet, Pathein City Surveillance Police Station Officer Myint Aung, and Police Station Officer Kyaw Oo, are responsible for Pathein Prison. Those who ordered crimes be perpetrated in Pathein Prison, as well as all other relevant prison officers who personally carried out the violations are responsible and must be held to account.
AAPP condemns these extrajudicial killings and brutal torture which occur daily under military rule and will strive to achieve justice for all political prisoners whose rights have been violated.
We urge the international community to provide protection from the daily perpetrated human rights violations, extrajudicial killings and brutal torture. The junta is committing international crimes, but such cases cannot be handled within the domestic judiciary system – international judiciary mechanisms must hence take action for accountability..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
114.79 KB
more
Description:
"ပုသိမ်အကျဉ်းထောင်အတွင်း ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၅ ရက်နေ့ ညပိုင်းတွင် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများနှင့် ထောင် အာဏာပိုင်တို့ကြား ပြဿနာြဖစ်ခဲ့ပြီး ထောင်အာဏာပိုင်တို့ဘက်မှ လူကိုသေစေနိုင်သည့် လက်နက်များဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ခြင်း၊ အသံဗုံးခွဲခြင်း၊ အုပ်စုလိုက်ဝိုင်းဝန်းရိုက်နှက်ခြင်း၊ လက်ပြန်ကြိုးတုပ်ပြီးအပြင်းအထန်ရိုက်နှက်ခြင်း တို့ကြောင့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားအနည်းဆုံးတစ်ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့ရပြီး နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားအများအပြား အပြင်း အထန် ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့ကြောင်း သတင်းရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုလုပ်ရပ်များသည် အကျဉ်းထောင်လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်း များကို ကျော်လွန်၍ လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး မတရား ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုနှင့် ဥပဒေမဲ့သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည့် ကြီးမား သောရာဇဝတ်မှုကိုပါကျူးလွန်လိုက်သည့်လုပ်ရပ် ဖြစ်သည်ဟု နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေး အသင်း (အေအေပီပီ)မှ ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။
၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအာဏာသိမ်းပြီးချိန်မှစပြီး တရားဥပဒေ စိုးမိုးရေးပျက်ပြယ်သွားခဲ့ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု ၏ အမာခံထောက်တိုင်များဖြစ်ကြသည့် တရားသူကြီးများ၊ စစ်သားများ၊ ရဲများ၊ အကျဉ်း ဦးစီးဝန်ထမ်းများက စစ်အုပ်စုအလိုကျ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ ဥပဒေမဲ့မတရားပြစ်ဒဏ်များချမှတ်ခြင်း၊ အကျဉ်း ထောင်အသီးသီးတွင်လည်း နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများအား ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိဖြင့် ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ အနိုင်ကျင့်စော်ကားခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိနေပါသည်။
၂။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၅ ရက်နေ့ မှစတင်ခဲ့သောပုသိမ်ထောင်ဖြစ်စဉ်တွင် အင်အားအလွန်အကျွံသုံး၍ အသက်သေဆုံးစေသည့် ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှု ပြုမူဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းကြောင့် အနည်းဆုံး နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား တစ်ဦးသေဆုံးပြီး နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား အများအပြား ဒဏ်ရာပြင်းထန်စွာရရှိခဲ့သည်။ အဆိုပါဖြစ်စဉ်သည် အကျဉ်းထောင်တွင်း မတရား ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း နှင့် ဥပဒေမဲ့မတရားသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းကို ကျူးလွန်လိုက် ကြောင်း ထင်ရှားနေပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ကျူးလွန်မှုသည် ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုနှင့် အခြားရက်စက်၍ လူမဆန်သော သို့မဟုတ် လူ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာကျဆင်းစေသော ဆက်ဆံမှု သို့မဟုတ် ပြစ်ဒဏ်ပေးမှုဆန့်ကျင်ရေး နိုင်ငံတကာ သဘောတူစာချုပ် (UNCAT) ကို အတိအလင်းချိုးဖောက်ရာရောက်သည်။
၃။ အဆိုပါဖြစ်စဉ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး ပုသိမ်အကျဉ်းထောင် တာဝန်ခံအရာရှိ နေမင်းထက်၊ ပုသိမ်မြို့မရဲစခန်မှူး မြင့်အောင်၊ နယ်မြေစခန်းမှူး ကျော်ဦးတို့အပါအဝင် အမိန့်ပေးစေခိုင်းသူများ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာထောင်အာဏာပိုင်များ၊ ကိုယ်တိုင်ကျူးလွန်သူများအားလုံးအနေဖြင့် တာဝန်ခံရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ဥပဒေမဲ့မတရားသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းနှင့် မတရားညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်းများအပေါ် မိမိတို့ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်း သားများကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်အသင်း အနေဖြင့် ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန်ကန့်ကွက်ရှုံ့ချလိုက်ပြီး မတရားကျူးလွန်ခံခဲ့ရ သည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများအားလုံးအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုရရှိနိုင်ရေး အစွမ်းကုန် ကြိုးစားအကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့်လည်း ပုသိမ်ထောင်ဖြစ်စဉ်အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း နေ့စဉ်ကြုံတွေ့ နေရသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများ၊ ဥပဒေမဲ့သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများနှင့် မတရားညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုများသည် နိုင်ငံတကာလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေများအား ကျူးလွန်နေခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး အဆိုပါကျူးလွန်မှုများကို ပြည်တွင်း တရားစီရင်ရေးကဏ္ဍအတွင်း ကိုင်တွယ်အရေးယူနိုင်ခြင်းမရှိသည့်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစီရင်ရေးယန္တရားတွင် အရေးယူနိုင်ရေး ဝိုင်းဝန်းကြိုးပမ်းပေးကြပါရန် အလေးအနက်တိုက်တွန်းလိုက်ပါသည်။
ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှုနှင့်အခြားသောရက်စက်၍လူမဆန်သည့်(သို့)လူ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာညှိုးနွမ်းစေသည့်ပြုမှုဆက်ဆံမှု (သို့) ပြစ်ဒဏ်ပေးမှုတို့ကိုတားမြစ်ဆန့်ကျင်သည့်သဘောတူစာချုပ် (UNCAT)
အပိုဒ်(၂) (၂) စစ်မက်ဖြစ်ပွားသည့်ကာလ(သို့)စစ်ဘေးအန္တရာယ်ကျရောက်နိုင်သည့်ကာလ၊ ပြည်တွင်း နိုင်ငံရေး မငြိမ်သက်မှု(သို့) အခြားသောအများပြည်သူအပေါ် သက်ရောက်သည့် အရေးပေါ်အခြေအနေ တို့အပြင် မည်သည့် အခြေအနေမျိုးတွင်မဆို ညှင်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှု ပြုလုပ်ကျူးလွန်ခွင့်မပြု။
အပိုဒ်(၂)(၃) အထက်အရာရှိ(သို့) အစိုးရအရာရှိများထံမှအမိန့်တစ်ရပ်ရပ်အား နှိပ်စက်မှုပြုလုပ်ကျူးလွန်ရန် အကြောင်းပြချက်အဖြစ် သုံးခွင့်မပြု။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
248.42 KB
more
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.29 MB
more
Description:
"AAPP Secretary U Tate Naing said “the junta’s propaganda mouthpiece Myawaddy media today stated that 7,012 prisoners would be released. An illegal regime cannot announce an amnesty – since its coup the junta has announced several so-called amnesties to distract international attention. AAPP has been monitoring the situation and understands that over 200 political prisoners from at least (19) prisons were released today. We have so far confirmed 43 identities and will continue to monitor the situation. In fact, today on January 4, 2022 – an additional (22) political prisoners were arrested across the country but mostly in Sagaing”
Since the February 1, 2021, military coup and the emergence of the Spring Revolution, a total of (2701) people, pro-democracy activists and other civilians have been killed through military crackdowns following pro-democracy movements.
Since the coup, a total of (13,356) people are currently under detention, (1923) of whom are serving sentences. There are a total of (100) post-coup death row prisoners as of January 4, 2023. (121) people have been sentenced in absentia, of whom (42) have been sentenced to death. This makes a total of (142) people who have been sentenced to death. (24) people have been released on bail and (3517) people have already been released. These are the numbers verified by AAPP. The actual numbers are likely much higher. We will continue to update accordingly.
According to information gathered today, on January 1, junta troops stationed in Htan Ma Kauk Village, Seikphyu Township, Magway Region indiscriminately fired into the village. A 12-year-old called, A Mu Mu Aung, was killed while gathering firewood on the hill to the southwest of the village.
In addition, on January 3, Ashin Arsar Ya (aka Thabeik Khin) from Sangha Union Mandalay who was involved in anti-dictatorship protests in Mandalay City, was detained by the armed wing of the junta. He was arrested whilst carrying out a photo campaign at Kyauk Taw Gyi Pagoda, near the foot of Mandalay Mountain.
AAPP will continue to inform on verified daily arrests, charges, sentences and fatalities in relation to the attempted coup, and update the lists with details of these alleged offenses. If you receive any information about detentions of, or charges against, CSO leaders, activists, journalists, CDM workers, other civilians and fallen heroes in relation to the military and police crackdown on dissent, please submit to the following addresses: [email protected] [email protected] .....“အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုရဲ့ဝါဒဖြန့်သတင်းမီဒီယာတစ်ခုဖြစ်တဲ့ မြဝတီသတင်းဌာနကနေ ပြစ်ဒဏ်ကျခံနေရတဲ့ အကျဉ်းသား/အကျဉ်းသူ ၇၀၁၂ ဦးကို လွှတ်ပေးမယ်လို့ ဒီနေ့မှာ ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာလု စစ်အုပ်စုအနေနဲ့ လွတ်ငြိမ်းချမ်းသာခွင့်ပေးဖို့ရာ တရားဝင်ဘာအခွင့်အာဏာမှမရှိနေပေမယ့် သူတို့အနေနဲ့ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းကို အာရုံလွှဲဖို့ရာအတွက် အမည်ခံလွတ်ငြိမ်းချမ်းသာခွင့်တွေကို အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်မှာ ပြုလုပ်နေပါတယ်။ AAPP က ဒီနေ့လွတ်မြောက်လာတဲ့ အခြေအနေနဲ့ပတ်သက်ပြီး စောင့်ကြည့်မှတ်တမ်း ပြုစုလျက်ရှိရာမှာ လက်ရှိအချိန်ထိ ရထားတဲ့အချက်အလက်တွေအရ အကျဉ်းထောင် (၁၉) ခုထက်မနည်းကနေ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား (၂၀၀) ကျော် လွတ်မြောက်လာတယ်လို့ သိထားရပါတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီထဲကမှ အမည်စာရင်းနဲ့တကွ မှတ်တမ်းကောက်ယူထားနိုင်သူဦးရေ (၄၃) ဦးရှိနေပြီး အချက်အလက်တွေကို ဆက်လက်ကောက်ယူနေဆဲပါ။ စစ်အုပ်စုက အကျဉ်းထောင်တွေကနေ အကျဉ်းသားတွေကိုလွှတ်ပေးနေတယ်လို့ ပြောပေမယ့်လည်း ဒီနေ့မှာ နိုင်ငံရေးအရ အဖမ်းခံရတဲ့သူ (၂၂) ဦးရှိနေပြီး အဲ့ဒီထဲက အများစုဟာ တိုက်ပွဲအရှိန် ပြင်းထန်နေတဲ့ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းကပါ” ဟု နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးအသင်း (AAPP) ၏ အတွင်းရေးမှူးဖြစ်သူ ဦးတိတ်နိုင်မှ ပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မတရားစစ်အာဏာလုမှုဖြစ်စဉ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသော ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများ နှင့် ပြည်သူများ၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသူ စုစုပေါင်းမှာ (၂၇၀၁) ဦး ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့ထိတိုင် ဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၃၃၅၆) ဦးရှိပြီး ၎င်းတို့အနက်မှ (၁၉၂၃) ဦး မှာ ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသည်။ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အထိ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးနှင့်ဆက်စပ်၍ သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရပြီး အကျဉ်းထောင်များတွင် ထိန်းသိမ်းခံနေရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၀၀) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မျက်ကွယ်သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံထားရသူ (၄၂) ဦး အပါအဝင် (၁၂၁) ဦးမှာ မျက်ကွယ်ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်းခံ ထားရသည်။ ထိုကြောင့် သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရသူ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၄၂) ဦးရှိပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အာမခံဖြင့် လွတ်မြောက်သူ (၂၄) ဦးရှိပြီး၊ ပြန်လည်လွတ်မြောက်လာသူဦးရေမှာ (၃၅၁၇) ဦး ရှိသည်။
ဖော်ပြပါ ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များသည် AAPP မှ ကောက်ယူရရှိထားသည့် အရေအတွက်ဖြစ်ပြီး မြေပြင်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသည့်အချက်အလက်နှင့် ကိန်းဂဏန်းအရေအတွက်များမှာ ယခုထက်ပိုမိုများပြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ အချက်အလက် များကို ထပ်မံကောက်ယူရရှိလာပါက ဆက်လက်ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြသွားပါမည်။
ယနေ့ရရှိသော အချက်အလက်များအရ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် မကွေးတိုင်း၊ ဆိပ်ဖြူမြို့နယ်၊ ထမ္မကောက်ကျေးရွာ၌ တပ်စွဲထားသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏တပ်မှ ရမ်းသန်းပစ်ခတ်ခြင်းကြောင့် ရွာ၏ အနောက်တောင်ဘက်ရှိ တောင်ကုန်းပေါ်တွင် ထင်းခွေနေသော အသက် ၁၂ နှစ်အရွယ် ဧမူမူအောင်သည် ကျည်ထိမှန်ပြီး သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။
ထို့ပြင် မန္တလေးမြို့တွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်ဆန့်ကျင်သော ဆန္ဒပြလှုပ်ရှားမှု၌ ပါဝင်သည့် သံဃသမဂ္ဂ (မန္တလေး) မှ အရှင်အာစာရ (ခ) သပိတ်ခင်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏တပ်မှ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃ ရက်နေ့၌ ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်။ အရှင်အာစာရသည် မန္တလေးတောင်ခြေအနီးရှိ ကျောက်တော်ကြီးဘုရားတွင် ဓာတ်ပုံကမ်ပိန်းပြုလုပ်နေစဥ် ဖမ်းဆီး ခြင်း ခံခဲ့ရသည်။
အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းမှ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ အရပ်သားများ၊ တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူများ၊ သတင်းသမားများ၊ CDM လှုပ်ရှားနေသည့် ဝန်ထမ်းများစသည့် နယ်ပယ်အသီးသီးမှ မည်သူမဆို ဖမ်းဆီး၊ ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံထားရ ခြင်းများနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသူများ၏ အချက်အလက်များကို သိရှိပါက အောက်ပါလိပ်စာ များသို့ ဆက်သွယ်၍ အသိပေး၊ အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ကျဆုံးအချက်အလက်များကို ဖော်ပြပါ [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ အဖမ်းအဆီးအချက်အလက်များကို [email protected] အီးမေးလ်သို့လည်းကောင်း တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးပို့၍ ဆက်သွယ်အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"ငါတို့နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးသည် မည်သူ တဦးတယောက် တဖွဲ့တသင်း၏ အမွေအနှစ်မဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတဦးတယောက်တဖွဲ့တသင်း၏ ပုဂ္ဂလိကအပိုင် ပစ္စည်းမဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတဦးတယောက် တဖွဲ့တသင်းက ချုပ်ကိုင်အနိုင်သိမ်းယူ အကျိုးခံစားအပ်သော နိုင်ငံမဟုတ်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Federal Union Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
393.5 KB
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
471.75 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing handed out decorations to honor his predecessors and ultranationalist Buddhist monk U Wirathu on New Year’s Day.
He honored the first post-independence dictator General Ne Win and his successors General Sein Lwin and Senior General Saw Maung last year and Daw Khin Sandar Win, Ne Win’s daughter, accepted the decorations for her father on Sunday.
Ne Win seized power in the March 2, 1962, coup and oversaw the country’s descent into the list of least-developed countries.
The children of Sein Lwin and Saw Maung also accepted decorations on the behalf of their fathers. Ne Win loyalist Sein Lwin was responsible for brutal crackdowns on student protesters and was dubbed the butcher of Rangoon during the pro-democracy uprising in 1988.
Saw Maung was also responsible for the brutal crackdown on the uprising as the military chief. He also ensured a fresh military takeover at the instruction of Ne Win to perpetuate military rule.
Min Aung Hlaing has handed honorary titles and medals to around 3,700 people over the past year.
Marking the 75th anniversary of Independence Day on Wednesday, Min Aung Hlaing credited Daw Aung San Suu Kyiv’s father General Aung San with gaining independence from the UK.
But he seized power from the elected 77-year-old leader, who has been given 33 years in prison on 19 charges.
A junta court sentenced Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to a further seven years in prison on December 30.
Among those receiving awards in Naypyitaw were the children of Ne Win loyalist, San Yu, president of Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Program Party, and former prime minister U Nu.
Also honored were U Kyaw Nyin and U Ba Swe, colleagues of Gen. Aung San, and post-independence political leaders.
The junta’s newspapers on New Year’s Day showed Min Aung Hlaing and his wife greeting Ne Win’s daughter Daw Khin Sandar Win and his grandson Kyaw Ne Win.
Daw Khin Sandar Win attended Armed Forces Day last year and Kyaw Ne Win’s Omni Focus Co Ltd is involved in junta plans to bring electric buses to Myanmar.
Daw Yin Yin Oo, an adviser to Min Aung Hlaing’s advisory body, received decorations on behalf of her father, Dr. Maung Maung, another Ne Win loyalist.
On Tuesday Min Aung Hlaing handed over the Thiri Pyanchi title to ultranationalist monk U Wirathu, who was dubbed the Buddhist Bin Laden in the early 2010s for his racial and religious hate speech. U Wirathu’s title honors his cooperation with the regime’s “peace, development and prosperity” program.
Last year, Min Aung Hlaing handed out 1,290 titles and medals on Independence Day, 877 on Armed Forces Day on March 27, 146 for Myanmar’s New Year on April 1 and thousands more in November and December, totaling nearly 3,700.
The golden medals cost more than 7 billion kyats (around US$33.3 million) of public funds..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"ဤ ၂၀၂၃ နှစ်သစ်နှင့်အတူ သမိုင်းတလျှောက်တွင် အထူးခြားဆုံးသော စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှု၊ မတူ ကွဲပြားမှုများ၏ စုစည်းမှုအောက်မှ အားနည်းချက်များကို ဆင်ခြင်သုံးသပ် ပြုပြင် ထိန်းကျောင်းရင်း အားသာချက်များဖြင့် အတူတကွ ပေါင်းစပ်ရင်း ခွန်အားသစ်လောင်းလျက် မိမိတို့ လိုလားတောင်းတသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး ပီပြင်စွာ အမြန်ဆုံး ပုံဖော်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပန်းတိုင်အရောက် အတူတကွ ဆက်လက် လျှောက်လှမ်းကြပါစို့ ..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
297.6 KB
more
Source/publisher:
The Three Brotherhood Alliance
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
138.35 KB
more
Description:
"Executive Summary: The Myanmar Interim Arrangements Research Project (MIARP)
was funded by the Joint Peace Fund (JPF)1
, and implemented
between October 2017 and October 2018. Researchers spoke
to more than 450 people in Shan, Karen/Kayin and Mon States,
Tanintharyi Region, Naypyidaw, Yangon and Thailand, including confict-affected communities, representatives of Myanmar government and Army, leaders and members of Ethnic
Armed Organisations (EAOs), civil society organisations (CSOs),
political parties, diplomats and donors, and international aid
workers and analysts.
The term “Interim Arrangements” (ၾကားကာလအတြ߾္းေࠀာ߾္ရြက္ရ
မည့္အ߿ီအ߿ဥ္မ်ား) is a contested concept, meaning different
things to different stakeholders. The MIARP adopted the following working defnition of Interim Arrangements:
“Service delivery and governance in confictaffected areas, including the relationship
between EAOs and government systems, during
the period between initial ceasefres and a
comprehensive political settlement.”
Interim Arrangement refers to EAOs’ governance functions,
administrative authority and service delivery systems. The issue of which geographic areas are covered by Interim Arrangements is problematic. The Myanmar Army has pressed to
restrict EAOs’ service delivery and governance functions to
areas under armed groups’ exclusive control (which in most
cases have not yet been demarcated); on the ground however,
EAOs’ infuence and delivery of services and governance functions extend into areas where political and military authority
is mixed, and contested with the government and Tatmadaw.
In principle, the “interim” period extends until a comprehensive political settlement has been implemented, which given
recent setbacks in the peace process may take many years to
achieve. In the meantime, recognition of Interim Arrangements
refects the government’s acknowledgement of key EAOs’ political legitimacy and administrative responsibilities - at least,
for those groups which have signed the Nationwide Ceasefre
Agreement (NCA). One of the key recommendations of this
report is to support EAOs to exercise governance and administrative authority in a responsible and accountable manner.
The only offcial text referring to Interim Arrangements is
the October 2015 NCA. However, Interim Arrangements are
relevant in areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and
furthermore the NCA text fails to cover the full range of
meanings associated with the term.
Although Interim Arrangements are about more than the
NCA, Chapter 6 (Article 25) of this agreement does recognize
the roles of signatory EAOs in the felds of health, education, development, environmental conservation and natural
resource management, preservation and promotion of ethnic
cultures and languages, security and the rule of law, and illicit
drug eradication. The NCA allows EAOs to receive international aid, in coordination with the government. However, with
no agreed mechanism for addressing these goals through the
peace process architecture, the NCA has had limited impacts
on improving confict-affected communities’ access to equitable and effective governance and services. Furthermore,
on the ground in southeast Myanmar, government offcials
seem to regard EAOs primarily as service delivery actors, and/
or private companies, rather than legitimate governance and
administrative actors.
For many years, Myanmar’s larger EAOs have taken on governance and administration roles in their areas of control, often
delivering a wide range of services in partnership with CSOs.
In the southeast, groups like the Restoration Council of Shan
State (RCSS), Karen National Union (KNU) and New Mon State
Party (NMSP) are de-facto governments in relatively small pockets of territory. They also have infuence and provide some
services in wider areas of “mixed administration”, where EAO
authority overlaps with that of the government and Myanmar
Army. Between them for example, these three EAOs administer or support more than 2,000 schools, providing ethnic
language teaching to vulnerable children who would otherwise often be denied an education. They also work with local
partners to provide health services, access to justice and other
public goods.2
Similar arrangements exist in other parts of the country, both
in ceasefre areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and
in areas of on-going armed confict. For example, across much
of Kachin and northern Shan States, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and other EAOs provide elements of
governance, and life-saving if under resourced services to Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other highly vulnerable
communities.
There are three principal rationales for supporting Interim Arrangements:
1. Effective Interim Arrangements will provide the best outcomes for vulnerable and marginalised communities in
confict-affected areas. Rather than reinventing the wheel,
existing EAO and CSO service delivery systems should
be supported on a case-by-case basis, recognising best
practice (an “appreciative inquiry” approach). Meeting the
government’s targets for school enrolment and universal
health coverage for example, will depend on the work
of EAOs and affliated civil society actors, who should be
seen as partners in meeting critical needs and achieving
development goals. Chapter 3 explores how these issues
play out in relation to specifc sectors and issues.
2. Several of Myanmar’s EAOs (including NCA signatory and
non-signatory groups) enjoy long-standing political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent.
Supporting EAO governance regimes will counter perceptions of the peace process as a vehicle for state penetration
into previously autonomous areas, displacing existing EAO
authorities and services, without consulting local stakeholders. In order to be confict-sensitive, aid should be delivered in ways that do not undermine systems associated with
EAOs, to the beneft of the government (which is a party to
the confict). Timely peace dividends can best be provided
to vulnerable and marginalized communities by working
with existing and trusted local service delivery systems.
3. Interim Arrangements could be a key element in building “federalism from below” in Myanmar, supporting
effective local governance through equitable practices of
self-determination. The administrative functions and services provided by key EAOs (and their civil society partners) should be regarded as the building blocks of federalism in Myanmar - a political solution to decades of armed
confict which key stakeholders have endorsed.
It will be very diffcult for confict-affected parts of Myanmar
to move from the current mixture of service delivery systems
and governance regimes towards a formalized (federal) system, without better coordination, and substantial political
and technical negotiations. However, given the slow pace of
the peace process since 2016, Interim Arrangements have
been given relatively little attention.
Given that the Political Dialogue element of the peace process
appears stalled, it could be useful to identify a small number of
political priorities, to help deliver on ethnic stakeholders’ key
aims. These could be negotiated by EAOs (and political parties)
in a „fast track“ manner, resulting in a Union Peace Accord
that benefts both the government and ethnic stakeholders.
Areas for possible progress include education and language
policy (recognition of and funding for EAOs’ extensive school
systems; “mother tongue” teaching in government schools);
land issues (recognition of land title documents provided by
EAOs; revision of unjust land laws; compensation and restitution for people who have had their land unfairly taken); equitable natural resource management; and addressing forced
displacement – i.e. Interim Arrangements. This would not
prevent ethnic stakeholders from continuing to campaign for
federalism, including changes to the 2008 Constitution..."
Source/publisher:
Joint Peace Fund and Covenant Consult
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
14.2 MB (100 pages) - Original version
more
Description:
"An election is understood to mean “a formal and organized choice by vote of a person for a political office or other position.” Myanmar’s junta has claimed it will organize an ‘election’ for August 2023. Don’t call it what it isn’t. The junta’s event, whatever it is and looks like, will in no way be an election. If analysts, media, and diplomats use the term ‘election’, the onus is on them to justify and prove why and how exactly it wasn’t legitimate when in fact it wasn’t even what happened.
This isn’t just about semantics. It is about establishing the factual basis for what is transpiring in reality. Autocrats who co-opt democratic terms are very skillful at doing so to create a narrative that they are something they are not. The best way to prevent this is to stop allowing them to freely use words they have no basis for using. Simply put — democracies need to stop letting dictatorships co-opt the terminology of democracy. By not pushing back, and by not introducing new terminology that accurately describes what dictatorships are doing, it allows the autocrats of the world to claim legitimacy by dressing up their actions with words that should never have been used in the first place.
When Myanmar’s generals say “discipline flourishing democracy”, it means dictatorship. When Xi Xinping says there is a “Chinese-style democracy” and an “American-style democracy”, he is spouting utter nonsense. China under the Communist Party is a totalitarian dictatorship from top to bottom and in no way is a democracy. Even more onerously totalitarian and unquestionably not a democracy is North Korea, the so-called “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Claims of elections in such countries are nonsense. Having a ‘choice’ of one person picked by one party does not make for an election.
In Myanmar in 2008 a ‘referendum’ on the 2008 Constitution never happened. This was a coerced, fraudulent exercise that in no way reflected the will of the people or even marginally synced with the intentions of the term ‘referendum’. The fact that the exercise happened in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis highlights this point, namely that the exercise was coerced, predetermined, and never had any intention of representing the will of the Myanmar people. The sad thing is that because this term was used so extensively and became mainstream, including in international media, over the years it became, by default, accepted as what happened. This then lent unfortunate credence to the 2008 Constitution. The same is true for the 2010 election. Myanmar’s only free and fair elections in its modern history, even though problematic in important ways, were the by-elections starting in 2012 and the general elections of 2015 and 2020.
As regards the junta’s plans for a 2023 poll, commentators in the media, civil society or diplomacy that use terms and phrases like “sham elections” or “elections under military rule” unfortunately start the discourse from a disadvantage. They inherently force those rightly accusing dictators of being dictators to prove that the ‘election’ wasn’t good enough for this or that reason, when what happened wasn’t even an election in the first place. If one starts the conversation with a false term, it inherently lends legitimacy to whoever is claiming that term as being true. This approach became mainstream after being adopted by former United States President Donald Trump, when he called the 2020 US election “fraudulent”.
Words matter. They matter because they set narratives about what is happening or what will happen. By allowing the junta to use the term ‘election’ and to state that it will occur in August 2023, it catalyzes the wider international narrative about what’s happening in Myanmar. In simple terms, it creates the axis around which policy discourses begin to swirl about what to do as regards the country. Within Myanmar even if some fraudulent, coerced event occurs in August 2023 it will not actually do anything to stop the revolution against the junta because the Myanmar people have made it clear in a thousand ways that they do not accept a return to military rule. Internationally, though, the military regime is using this term to create the illusion of a clear “roadmap” of what the world can expect. While some countries have already called out the junta’s plans and said that they won’t accept the result of any ‘election’, other countries are clearly just waiting for the junta to declare the event a success, even if it will be the regime’s proxies and newly-retired generals who will ‘win’.
There is a story unfolding in Myanmar, but it does not match what the junta is saying. An August report from the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar highlighted that the junta only has stable control over 17 per cent of the country. The rest of the country is in active and escalating armed resistance against junta forces or is controlled by ethnic armed organizations that do not accept military rule in their areas, even if they maintain ceasefires with the military.
Hence, this is a country of approximately 55 million people in a sustained, committed revolution that’s focused on building a better future for themselves and future generations. It is not just about getting rid of the military or the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s myopic “returning to normalcy” tomfoolery, in other words a toxic quasi-democracy built around military paramountcy. It is about creating a fundamentally different country built around real federal democracy. As the National Unity Government’s Acting President Duwa Lashi La has so profoundly stated: this is the second war for independence. Myanmar’s people want to start afresh.
The world should stop accepting the Myanmar military’s use of the term ‘election’ completely because that is not what will happen. The military’s event — which will undoubtedly be preordained, coercive, highly violent and in no way an election in any meaning of the word — is not the pole around which the conflict in the country will be resolved. A better term doesn’t currently exist in the English language, but surely one needs to be created along the lines of “coerced deception”.
In essence, don’t accept the regime’s narrative that there is a pathway to peace and stability and that the key date is August 2023. There is a pathway to peace in Myanmar, but it means the complete defeat of the current military and the implementation of the roadmap articulated by the Federal Democracy Charter drawn up by the democratic resistance’s National Unity Consultative Council..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"ယနေ့ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၄ ခုနှစ် တန်ဆောင်မုန်လပြည့်ကျောာ်(၁၀)ရက်၊ ခရစ် သက္ကရာဇ် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၁၇ ရက် နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စု သမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ (၁၀၂) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အခါသမယတွင် နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားအပေါင်း ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာကျန်းမာ ချမ်းသာပြီး ဘေးအန္တရာယ် အပေါင်းကင်းဝေးအောင်မြင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်တွင် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ကို နှစ်စဉ် တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်လေ့ရှိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အချုပ်အချာအာဏာဆုံးရှုံးပြီး နယ်ချဲ့ လက်အောက်ခံ ကိုလိုနီဘဝသို့ ကျရောက်ခဲ့ရာမှ နယ်ချဲ့ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးနှင့်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖြစ် မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်း လပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ရက် (၁၉၂၀ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ၅ရက်) နေ့တွင် ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေကို တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများက သပိတ်မှောက် ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့သည့်နေ့ကို အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့အဖြစ် ဂုဏ်ပြုသတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
နယ်ချဲ့ဗြိတိသျှအစိုးရသည် တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေကြမ်းကြီးကို ပြည်သူများ ကန့်ကွက်နေသည့် ကြားကပင် ၁၉၂၀ ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာလ (၂၆) ရက်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဗြိတိသျှ ဒုတိယဘုရင်ခံ ဆာရယ်ဂျီနယ်ကရက်ဒေါက်က ရန်ကုန်အက် ဥပဒေကို ထောက်ခံခဲ့ပြီး၊ အိန္ဒိယဘုရင်ခံ ချမ်းစဖို့ဒ်က အတည်ပြုရန် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့ပြန်သည်။ နယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်မှ ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖြစ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ် တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀)ရက်၊ ၁၉၂၀ပြည့်နှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာ (၅) ရက်တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားကြီးများ ဦးဆောင်သော ပထမ ကျောင်းသားသပိတ် စတင်ခဲ့ရာ နယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်လိုသည့် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်ဓာတ်များအစပြုဖြစ်တည်ခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အနယ်နယ် အရပ်ရပ်သို့ တစ်ဟုန်ထိုး ပျံ့နှံ့သွားခဲ့သည်။ ထိုအမျိုးသားရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးကို အကြောင်းပြု၍ အမျိုးသားအထက်တန်းကျောင်းများ၊ အမျိုးသား ကောလိပ်များ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပြီး တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး နယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက် လိုသော မျိုးချစ်စိတ်များဖြစ်တည်စေခဲ့သည်။ မျက်မှောက်ကာလတွင်လည်း တိုင်ရင်းသား မိဘပြည်သူအပေါင်းတို့သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရန် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆင်နွှဲနေကြပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျောင်းများ ထူထောင်ကာ စစ်ကျွန်ပညာရေးကို ချေဖျက် အဆုံးသတ်ရန် ကြိုးစားမှုသည်လဲ တော်လှန်ရေး၏ အစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ခုအဖြစ် ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိပေသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် (၁၀၂) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့သည် နယ်ချဲ့အာဏာရှင် စနစ်ကို တိုင်းရင်းသား မိဘပြည်သူအားလုံးက စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့သည် သာမက လက်ရှိစစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို တော်လှန်နေသည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုကို လည်းအထောက်အကူပြုစေသည်ဟု ယုံကြည်မိပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် တိုင်းရင်းသားမိဘပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင် လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် ပူးပေါင်းကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ထောင်ရေးကို အလေးပေး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ၁၀၂ နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့တွင် ထပ်လောင်း၍ သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
525.69 KB
more
Description:
"Since late 2021, fierce fighting has raged between the SAC regime and Karen resistance forces in Dooplaya District (KNU’s 6th
Brigade) on both sides of the Dawna Range, south of the Asia Highway, Burma’s main trade route to Thailand. Heavy shelling
and airstrikes by SAC forces have killed or injured 71 civilians and displaced over 86,000, many of whom are sheltering in makeshift
IDP camps along the Thai border.
This briefing paper describes the unfolding of conflict, instigated by the regime’s incursions into KNU ceasefire territories, and
fueled by mobilization of thousands of SAC troops, including from bases across Dooplaya which were never withdrawn despite
the KNU’s 2012 ceasefire.
A key flashpoint has been the Lay Kay Kaw "Peace Town”, south of Myawaddy, funded by Japan for returning refugees. This flagship
peace project now lies deserted and bomb-scarred, its over 3,000 residents once again fleeing for their lives. This must serve as a
lesson for Japan, not only against premature funding of refugee return, but also provision of billions of dollars in development aid
to the Naypyidaw government without benchmarks of progress towards genuine peace. Japanese ODA has not only subsidized
Naypyidaw’s war machine, but also funded strategic infrastructure projects such as the East West Economic Corridor (EWEC) which
have facilitated quick deployment of the regime’s troops into conflict areas.
As the SAC’s atrocities mount across the country, KPSN calls for stronger economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime, and
urges Japan to suspend all ongoing ODA projects, including bridge building along the EWEC. KPSN also urges foreign donors to
provide increased cross-border humanitarian aid to IDPs.....Post-coup eruption of
conflict in Dooplaya...For nearly ten years after the KNU's 2012
bilateral ceasefire, there was little armed
conflict in Dooplaya. However, as the
regime began cracking down on anti-coup
protesters in the months following the
coup on February 1, 2021, tensions began
to rise between the regime’s forces and
the KNU in the KNU’s 6th Brigade, where
anti-regime activists were sheltering. SAC
troops set up new checkpoints along roads
and carried out random searches in villages.
In September, the SAC sent armed patrols
into KNU territories south of Kawkareik,
in violation of ceasefire protocols. On
September 30, KNU troops resisted, and
the ensuing fighting spread into six villages,
causing thousands to flee their homes.
At the same time, KNU troops sought to
block the SAC from sending reinforcements
along the road from Thanbyuzayat to 3
Pagodas Pass, and on October 11, the SAC
attacked and seized the KNU’s Lu Shah
checkpoint, 20 kilometers southeast of
Thanbyuzayat. The fighting displaced four
villages in the area.....Fighting erupts in Lay Kay Kaw "Peace Town", spreads
southwards along Thai border...The “Peace Town” of Lay Kay Kaw south of Myawaddy, funded by Japan for returning
refugees after the KNU ceasefire, was one of the areas suspected of harbouring
anti-regime activists. At the end of September 2021, SAC troops from LIB 560, under
Tanintharyi-based Military Operations Command (MOC) 13, deployed to Dooplaya
before the November 2020 election, started carrying out house-to-house searches in
Lay Kay Kaw, but did not initially make any arrests.
However, on December 13, 2021, Brigadier General Myint Htun Naing, the MOC 13
commander, arrived at the SAC artillery base just south of Lay Kay Kaw and on December
14 led over 150 troops into Lay Kay Kaw, forcibly entering houses and arresting suspected
activists. On December 15, the troops returned at 10 am, beating and carrying out further
arrests. In total 22 men were arrested, tied up and taken to Myawaddy for interrogation,
including two former NLD MPs. The fate of those arrested remains unknown.
Local KNU officials immediately protested the arrests, but SAC
troops ignored this, and continued searching through Lay Kay Kaw,
causing the KNLA to open fire. Heavy fighting ensued, with SAC
shelling indiscriminately into Lay Kay Kaw from nearby “Artillery
Hill”, causing the town residents to flee in terror.
Over the next few weeks, fighting between SAC and Karen
resistance forces spread east and south along the Thai border,
displacing thousands more villagers. On December 23, SAC started
launching airstrikes over Lay Kay Kaw to try to dislodge the KNLA.
During early 2022, fighting continued to spread southwards. On
March 21, KNLA temporarily seized the SAC base at Maw Khee,
50 kilometers south of Lay Kay Kaw, and carried out successful
ambushes of SAC troop reinforcements from Myawaddy,
prompting further retaliatory airstrikes.
On May 18, 2022, KNLA forces managed to seize the SAC base at
Thay Baw Boe on the Thai border, 30 kilometers south of Lay Kay
Kaw, despite multiple airstrikes by SAC fighter jets and helicopters..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Peace Support Network
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
682.77 KB 2.93 MB 3.59 MB
more
Description:
"Veteran author and journalist Bertil Lintner has been reporting on Myanmar for decades. In this wide-ranging interview he talks to The Irrawaddy editor-in-chief Aung Zaw about China’s goals and strategy in Myanmar—including its relations with the National League for Democracy and the ethnic armed groups—the future of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the most likely scenarios for ending the military’s grip on the country.
Aung Zaw: Thank you Bertil. I think we will have a long discussion. We’ve covered the peace process and ethnic states, the ethnic army EAOs [ethnic armed organizations]. Now I want you to talk about China, Burma’s powerful neighbor. I want to hear your thoughts on China’s political clout and geopolitical ambitions, because we often debate and talk about China’s roles in Myanmar’s internal affairs and internal conflicts; how China interferes in Myanmar’s domestic affairs and also China’s geopolitical ambitions and access to the Indian ocean.
Bertil Lintner: Well, first of all, if you look at the map of China, it’s a huge inland empire with a comparatively short coastline for such a big country. And then China decided to change its economic system from socialism to capitalism—their development model was exports. The export industry was developed in order to give the country income and so on, and lift the living standard. And the coastal provinces took off immediately because, naturally, the ports were there. And that’s where the production was taking place. This was Guangdong, there was Fujian, and later on Shanghai. Whereas the landlocked inland provinces were lagging behind. And the difference in income between the coastal provinces and the landlocked inland provinces was becoming so severe that it could actually threaten the entire unity of the country. Because China is actually massive, it’s a continent.. it’s more than a country. It’s huge. And you have many different ethnic groups there as well.
So back in the 1980s, the Chinese started to look at the possibilities for development, export-oriented development in the landlocked inland provinces. And this was published in the official Beijing Review in 1985, the official magazine.
AZ: Yes, I have read that one.
BL: Well, they mentioned that the three provinces were Sichuan, Yunnan and Guangzhou—with a combined population of 100 million people. There is no way they could develop an industry there and send goods to China’s own ports. They had to find an outlet through another country. If you look at the whole of China, the same thing applies. And there are only three countries which border China that have direct access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea and making it easier than promoting exports to China’s own ports. That’s Burma, India and Pakistan. India, forget about it. There is no way they’re going to help the Chinese….
AZ: No.
BL: Pakistan, yes. There is a highway there, the Karakoram Highway. But it’s one of the most dangerous highways in the world. And then of course, you have all the political turmoil of Pakistan, which is, you know, can be quite frightening. So you see, there is actually only one country that provides easy and convenient access to the Indian Ocean for China, and that is…
AZ: Burma.
BL: Yes. So, therefore, China has long-term strategic interests in Burma, which other countries don’t have. The West can talk about human rights and democracy and this sort of thing, which is of course good, but it wouldn’t have any real impact on what’s happening in the country. And India is of course worried about Chinese influence; so far they haven’t been very successful in countering it. Whereas China has gone full speed ahead in developing relations with the country. Actually, regardless of who is in power, even when Aung San Suu Kyi was becoming State Counselor, the Chinese Embassy was the first to congratulate her on her election victory at that time. And it was sort of….
AZ: And she was invited to China even before the election in 2015, and she met with President Xi Jinping.
BL: Absolutely. I think the Chinese, they would prefer to have a “stable” military government in power.
AZ: But weak.
BL: Yeah, but not too strong.
AZ: Not democratic.
BL: No, they wouldn’t like that. But even when Aung San Suu Kyi was… not running the country—it was still being run by the military, we have to remember that, but she was at least running the government—the Chinese made an effort to establish very close and cordial relations with her and the NLD as well. So, my only point is that if you look at China’s long-term strategic interest, they would prefer a government which they can deal with more easily, a non-democratic government; but if it’s a democratic government, they will deal with that too, in their own way of course. And China’s relations with the various EAOs follow the same kind of…
AZ: Yes, that’s my next question. You know in the past communist China exported revolution to neighboring countries including Burma. But today China wants to export goods and wants to trade with neighboring countries, and we are part of the Belt and Road Initiative—gigantic projects. We have the China Myanmar Economic Corridor [CMEC] … China and Burma have signed an agreement to implement so many mega projects. Some of the projects have started in Shan State. There have been feasibility studies done as far as we understand and there are so many EAOs and militia active in Shan State. A lot of CMEC projects will start from Shan State and in these areas with EAOs like the Wa, Kokang, TNLA [Ta’ang National Liberation Army] and even the Arakan Army [AA]. China has been providing arms to support those groups; this northern part seems to be part of [a Chinese enclave]. So the last five years or six years we also saw China aggressively involved in the Myanmar peace process, can you tell us more on this subject and also I want to ask you a quick question: Can China be trusted?
BL: Well, this question is very easy to answer. No. Trust in the sense that they are interested in the genuine peace of the country. They are not. Because it’s not in in their interests. If you look at the United Wa State Army, and Kokang as well… They are basically successors to the CPB, the Communist Party of Burma. They received massive support from China from the late ’60s, ’70s to until the 1980s. At that time, China was exporting revolution. Now they’re exporting consumer goods. But it would be foolish of the Chinese to give up the foothold they had inside the country to the CPB because of the 1989 mutiny. They probably have even better relations with some of the Wa leaders than they ever had with the CPB. Because they speak the same language, to begin with. And most of the Wa leaders speak Chinese as a second language, whereas very few of the CPB leaders ever did that. And if you look at the arms that the Wa have, they’re more sophisticated, they’re more heavily armed than the CPB ever was. And all of those guns are all coming from China. Period. There’s no discussion about that. Doesn’t matter how much China’s think tankers deny that. But then if you look at the broader picture; let’s say for argument’s sake that tomorrow all the ethnic groups sit down and they agree that, ‘Yes, we want to have a federation or a confederation that looks like this, sign an agreement, there is no more fighting in the country, there is peace, and all the armed groups will become local police forces or something else.’ Who would be the first to lose? China. It’s not in their interest to see that. China wants to have a certain degree… they don’t like total chaos because it would mean refugees coming into Yunnan and so on. But they are not interested in [total] stability either because they can’t control anything. And they want to have a certain degree of stability, over which they exercise some degree of control. And that is actually the situation now.
AZ: They want to keep the forces against each other.
BL: Yes, definitely. It’s not in their interest to see them give up the struggle. Not now. Maybe someday, in the future, you don’t know but certainly it’s not in their interest today. China is not interested in peace, it is interested in a kind of situation that makes the country… it shouldn’t be too stable because they can’t control it. And they have connections with everybody. But China has a very peculiar foreign policy. They differentiate between government-to-government relations, and party-to-party relations, and it’s quite ridiculous for the country where there is only one political party and that party controls the government in China. So, they have government-to-government relations with whoever is in power—in Yangon, previously, but now in Naypyitaw. But party-to-party relations—they can have that with anyone. So they have party-to-party relations with the Wa, the Kachin, with the NLD [National League for Democracy], with the USDP [Union Solidarity and Development Party], everyone. And they would say, ‘Oh this is different. This is party-to-party; not government-to-government.’ But of course, it’s all part of the government strategy mapped out by the party, which controls the government.
AZ: This year in April, the Chinese Foreign Ministry invited the Myanmar foreign minister, Burmese foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, to China. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “No matter how the situation changes, China will support Myanmar in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; in exploring a development path suited to its national conditions.” But we were discussing, … how China was trying to control the forces inside the country, we talk about China’s enclavement and now China was promising the Burmese that they will respect their territorial integrity.
BL: But they’ve never done that. First, it supported the CPB for 20 years. And they had relations with certain EAOs on the border. They’ve always been a player in domestic politics in Burma, especially when it comes to the various armed groups and organizations there.
AZ: Then, what will happen to Burma, or Shan State in particular, where a lot of huge projects are coming in in the next 10-20 years, whether we like it or not? This is quite worrying, that the Chinese are coming, and even the Wa, known to be a proxy of China, are moving to the southern part of Shan State. Thailand is also looking at it with worry.
BL: Well, I don’t think China wants to annex certain parts of the country. That is not the way they exercise influence and how they expand their spheres of influence. Actually, what China is doing in Burma today, the plan, predates the Belt and Road Initiative. In the ’80s, they were looking at the waterways, railways, roadways, through Burma, from Yunnan down to the Indian Ocean. They were talking about how it should be developed. And of course, that is interference. It’s not just help. They are not doing this out of the goodness of their heart. The have economic, and political and strategic interest in controlling the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as it is called today. And they are going to continue doing that. If you look at EAOs that.. but you always have to remember that even though they are very dependent on China—because they cannot exist without what they are getting from across the border—it doesn’t mean that they are necessarily pro-Chinese or pro-China, let’s put it that way. The Kachin, we know they are not. I mean, they are Christians and they don’t.. they are not trusted by the Chinese either, that’s why the Chinese are not giving them any weapons; and they are getting them from other sources. Even the Wa, they are not happy about the Chinese dominance. They are fiercely independent people. And they know how the Chinese central authorities treated the Wa in China in the 1950s. They haven’t forgotten that.
AZ: China is not trusted—I got it. But today, the Chinese government seems to be backing and supporting the military regime in Burma, which the Burmese people hate and despise; the Burmese people loathe it. Last year we saw anti-China demonstrations taking place in Yangon and other cities. Chinese factories were attacked. Later, this year and last year we have seen local armed groups, opposition groups, make a threat against Chinese companies and a gas pipeline and copper mines inside the country. China is also trying to reach out to some opposition members as well as to the NUG [National Unity Government] government in exile asking them to protect Chinese interests and Chinese businesses in the country. And the Chinese have also asked the regime to protect [their interests] at all costs, to prevent any attacks on Chinese interests and Chinese business in Burma.
BL: Well, it sort of underlines the whole thing that … the way the Chinese are reacting to this, that they even started talking to the National Unity Government and all the armed groups and this sort of thing—on a “party-to-party” basis though. But their long-term strategic interest remains the same. And there is a corridor, an outlet to the sea, the outlet to the Indian Ocean. And therefore, they have to play, they cannot afford to antagonize certain groups, because that will backfire. Back in the SLORC days, they actually put all the eggs in one basket, they supported only the military. And they had no link to the opposition at all, of course to some of the EAOs but they were sort of different. But even there, they showed a certain degree of flexibility—that they didn’t really want to antagonize, not even the NLD during its early days of its existence. And I can tell you an anecdote that reflects that, in a curious kind of way, a peculiar kind of way. After the 1988 uprising, everyone was at Aung San Suu Kyi’s compound at University Avenue. All the activists, the doctors, the lawyers, the politicians, the journalists—everybody. And the Western embassies went there to meet her and the NLD leaders. The Chinese diplomats did not. But one day, I can tell you the story now because it was Michael Aris, who was Aung San Suu Kyi’s late husband who told me. He’s gone now and I don’t think he would mind my telling this story. And he was there of course in the house in University Avenue. The Chinese diplomats never came to talk to Suu Kyi. But one day, they saw a car, a diplomatic number plate, the Chinese Embassy coming into University Avenue. And everyone was surprised. And then the junior officer from the embassy came with a big box full of books in Tibetan about Tibetan Buddhism. It was their way of indirectly saying that “We are careful but we are not, well, don’t look at us like we are some kind of enemy. It was not to Suu Kyi, it was to her husband. It’s about Tibetan Buddhism. But that gesture showed that everyone, I think, even at that time, the Chinese wanted to maintain a certain degree of flexibility. They didn’t even know if the military government was going to survive or not. What the future would look like. Because, again, their long-term interests remain the same. And they are playing various games accordingly. And that’s what happens.
AZ: But in the last 30 years, since SLORC-SPDC came into power, we have seen massive exploitation of natural resources by the Chinese in the northern part of Myanmar.
BL: Yes. In Wa State it is tin and rare earth metals. When we’re talking about Chinese exports of rare earth metals, it’s only half the truth. Most of it actually comes from the Wa Hills. The Chinese… they also have two rare earth mines up in Kachin State. Of course to export these kind of items makes it possible for these armed groups, like the KIO, the KIA and UWSA [Kachin Independence Organization, Kachin Independence Army and United Wa State Army] to maintain their organizations, to get more arms and run … whatever they have inside their respective areas. But so, they are dependent on each other in a way. But I would argue that if there was a central government in Myanmar with a more enlightened approach to people like the Wa, the problem could be solved. I think they would be happier staying with Myanmar than to be, you know, totally dependent on China. But so far, it is so easy to dismiss them as drug traffickers and, you know, whatnot. They are, I mean they used to trade in drugs. There is no doubt about that. But today, their sources of income have become more diversified and even if they get money from drugs, who hasn’t done that in Burma—including the government?
AZ: Last year, a Chinese special envoy visited Burma twice after the coup. He reportedly asked coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing to allow him to meet with the detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. And he was denied [permission]. And again, we heard the news that the Chinese told the Burmese not to disband the National League for Democracy. Do you think China has political leverage over Burma, compared to other Western countries or Western governments?
BL: Well, you’ll also have to remember that as you mentioned before, the Burmese military is fairly xenophobic. They haven’t forgotten the long and bitter war with the CPB. A lot of soldiers were killed, their boys were killed, with Chinese guns. And a retired officer once told me it’s like a scar in the heart. They cannot forget that. And then of course, you know, in the beginning, after the coup in ’88, they had to rebuild, or strengthen their armed forces. At that time, it was only China that was willing to sell them anything. But they became so dependent on China, so they had to look for alternatives. They didn’t want to have this heavy dependence on China. So they turned towards… Russia. Of course, it worked for a while, but it’s not going to work much longer, given what’s happening in Ukraine right now. So, they’re back in the Chinese camp, very reluctantly, and I don’t know how they would want to handle that. And they are not particularly happy about it either. And the Chinese of course, they know this. They know that the military doesn’t like them, they don’t trust them. But I think actually they find it easier to deal with Aung San Suu Kyi than Min Aung Hlaing, in a way—a very strange and peculiar way. So, there were even some reports before the 2015 elections that the Chinese wanted to see the NLD win rather than the USDP. Maybe because it would give the country a bit more, a degree of stability at that time. And instead of military rule, which would be resented by everyone. But the Chinese are playing all these different games at the same time, and it is very important to look at the bigger picture and see a pattern and see where it leads to. They don’t just sign with one particular actor or one particular group. And therefore, the Chinese policy towards Myanmar or Burma is very different from that of Western countries, which are more sort of ideologically motivated.
AZ: Definitely, Burmese people, including the military, are Sinophobic. Burmese people in general are pro-Western, they are not pro-China. You know over the past decades we have seen the US politically invested in Burma promoting democracy, human rights and press freedom in Burma or Myanmar. Recently the US invited the foreign minister of the NUG to Washington DC while the US-ASEAN summit was taking place. Definitely there was competition between the US and China. I think there is competition, rivalries between the US and China. And this Cold War mentality is coming into the Indo-Pacific region including ASEAN. Burma is also one of the countries where the US and China are trying to gain influence. What are your thoughts?
BL: Well, if the United States wants to get more influence in the country, they will also have to be more active than they are today.
AZ: Like in Ukraine?
BL: Well, maybe not to send all the weapons that they’ve been sending to Ukraine; maybe there is another way of doing it. But certainly, it seems to be that Burma is now on the backburner when it comes to American foreign policy. They are much more… entirely preoccupied with Ukraine, what’s happening in Europe. And therefore of course, the road is wide open for the Chinese to…
AZ: What I remember was, in 2007-08, US policy was very consistent, engaging with Burma stakeholders and all sides, all forces. It was very active, and I would say that it was quite impressive.
BL: If you look at America’s or Washington’s Burma policy, that was engaging everyone … It predates the 2015 election victory for the NLD. Even during Thein Sein, he was invited to the White House, and I think the Chinese, at that time, felt—and I have seen translations of articles in Chinese academic journals saying—that ‘We have lost Burma to the West’. That’s the way the Chinese felt. And therefore, they had to reestablish their influence in Burma. And they did so very cleverly really. They started taking to more so-called ‘stakeholders’—a term I really don’t like—in the country; not just the government. They started engaging the media, for instance. They’ve never done that before. They invited journalists to China, they started talking to journalists. The ambassador in Yangon suddenly answered the phone when journalists rang him and they went to talk to all the different political parties. Just to, in a way, to counter the spread of American influence. Economically of course, they were always much stronger than the Unites States when it comes to investments and so on. But when it comes to sort of people-to-people relations, they were way behind the Americans at that time. And they tried to reestablish some kind of—not reestablish because they never had any—but to establish some kind of better relationship with the public, the general public in Burma. If they succeeded or not? I’m not sure. I don’t really think so. But at least they tried; they realized that it was important. They couldn’t just “lose” Burma to the West, as some of their academics said at that time.
AZ: I am curious. Do you think Aung San Suu Kyi still has a role in the future? She is now 77.
BL: No, I mean she’s done her thing, and she’s meant a lot to the people of Burma. The role she has played cannot be denied by anybody. But she’s old and she’s tired. And many young people have even become critical about her because they think she could have handled things in a different way.
KAZ: The mis-steps.
BL: Yes, exactly. So, I think we’ll have to wait for the next generation. And the next generation—I mean, among the Burmans as well as among the other groups. Many of the ethnic leaders are also stuck in the past. Old visions, old ideas, they do not know how to move forward.
AZ: And my last question. Any democratic transition would stall in any country unless the powerful armed forces are brought under civilian control in the context of a balance between executive power and legislative branches of government. Democracy can exist only where the soldiers are the servants, not the masters, of the state. The military in Burma is different, the Burmese army is unlikely to assume the servant role, so until it does, the prognosis for Burmese democracy cannot be good. Because the Myanmar military is going to stay in power indefinitely.
BL: That’s what they want to do, yes. But you have to remember also when the military first seized power in 1962. It was at a time when there were military coups all over the world, in the so-called Third World. I mean Thailand had coups, a couple years later there was the turmoil in Indonesia, Africa, Latin America and so on. But in most countries, the military were content with seizing political power and they left economic power, running the economy, to other interests. Take Thailand for instance, there was a marriage of convenience between the military and the Sino-Thai plutocracy. And they let them run the business, and that’s why Thailand’s entirely prosperous today. Indonesia had a very similar kind of arrangement, and other countries too. But the 1962 coup in Burma was different because the military seized political as well as economic power. And that economic power was what they called the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’. In which everything was nationalized and placed under military-controlled—they would say state-controlled but it was mainly military-controlled—state corporations. […] Even when they started introducing new economic reforms after 1988, they’re dependent… the military is still a strong player. And the so-called cronies are entirely dependent on military support. And the relationships between the cronies and the military is not the same as between the rich Thai entrepreneurs and the government, with the military here [in Thailand]. Here they kind of let each other run their own thing. And then everyone benefits from it.
Now the military is going after some of the cronies too. But how can you do that if you want to see the country develop? So, the power structure in Burma is so different from any other country I’m aware of really. You have a military which [holds] economic and political power – and wants to control everything. But if you can break that. Well, I don’t know how it is going to work … to be frank. But it can only happen from within the military. And the problem there is of course that if there is a serious split in the military, not just some defections, they you may have to see a very bloody civil war.
AZ: Always great to talk to you, Bertil. Thank you so much..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, China-Burma relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ပြည်သူ့ခေါင်းဆောင်၊ အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ်၊ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၏ (၇၇)နှစ်ပြည့် မွေးနေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများနှင့်တကွ ကမ္ဘာသူ/ ကမ္ဘာသားများအားလုံး မင်္ဂလာအပေါင်းနှင့် ပြည့်ဝပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာဆုတောင်း မေတ္တာပို့သ အပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံတော်သည် ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြာ နည်းလမ်း များစွာဖြင့် ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်ခဲ့ကြသော်လည်း အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အပြီးတိုင် အမြစ်ပြတ် အောင် လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ခြင်းမရှိသေးသည့်အတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသော နိုင်ငံတော်ကို မတည် ဆောက်နိုင်သေးပါ။ သို့သော်လည်း ယနေ့အချိန်ထိ ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပရှိ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် တကွ ခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် မလျော့သော ဇွဲလုံလဝီရိယများ၊ ခွန်အားသစ်များဖြင့် ယုံကြည်ရာ ဦးတည်ချက်သို့ ရှေ့ဆက်ချီတက် လျှောက်လှမ်းနေကြဆဲဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့ အားလုံး ထပ်တူမျှော်လင့်တောင့်တနေသော အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးကို မဝေးသော အချိန်ကာလတွင် စည်းလုံးမှုကို အခြေခံကာ ညီညွတ်မှုအားဖြင့် တည်ဆောက် နိုင်မည်ကို ယုံကြည်ပါကြောင်းလည်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
၃။ အာဏာရှင်ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်တွင် အသက်သွေးချွေးပေးဆပ်ကာ တရားမျှတမှု အတွက် ပါဝင်တော်လှန်ခုခံခဲ့ကြသည့် သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးနှင့်တကွ လက်ရှိနွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း အဖက်ဖက်မှ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် သူရဲကောင်းများ အားလုံးကို လေးစားဂုဏ်ပြုပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
၄။ ပြည်သူ့ခေါင်းဆောင်၏ အမှန်တရားကို လေးစားယုံကြည်မြတ်နိုးသည့် စိတ်ဓာတ် နှင့်အတူ သမိုင်းတလျှောက်တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်နှင့်ပြည်သူလူထုအတွက် ရှေ့မှ မားမားမတ်မတ် ရပ်တည်လျက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအုတ်မြစ် ခိုင်မာရေးကို ရဲရဲဝံ့ဝံ့ ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်ခဲ့သည့် သမိုင်း လုပ်ရပ်များနှင့် လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင် အာဏာရှင် လူတစ်စု၏ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းကို ခံထားရသော်လည်း ကြောက်ရွံခြင်းမရှိ ကိုယ်ကျိုးမတွက်ဘဲ ဒီမိုကရေစီအောင်ပန်း အမြဲ ဆင်မြန်းနိုင်စေရန် ပြည်သူ၏ဆန္ဒနှင့် တသားတည်းဖြစ်အောင် ရပ်တည်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနေ သော လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များအား ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အနေဖြင့် အစဥ်အမြဲ တန်ဖိုးထားလေးစားပါကြောင်းနှင့် ဂုဏ်ယူပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ ခေါင်းဆောင်၏ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၇) နှစ်မြောက် မွေးနေ့မှသည် နောင်နှစ်များစွာတိုင် ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာရွှင်လန်းကာ ပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ ပျော်ရွှင်စွာ ဘဝခရီးလမ်း လျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ် ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
265.81 KB
more
Description:
"Armed resistance to the military regime in Kayah State, southeast Myanmar began in May last year in response to the lethal crackdowns on civilians by the junta. Along with resistance groups in Sagaing Region and Chin State, Karenni fighters pioneered the use of homemade weapons against the regime.
Despite being the smallest state in Myanmar, with a population of around 300,000, Kayah State is currently home to over a dozen resistance groups. Among them is the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), which has been fighting the junta for over a year.
On May 31, the KNDF celebrated its one-year anniversary. The group now has 21 battalions, some with female fighters, led by young people. It fights alongside several People’s Defense Forces (PDF), and the Karenni Army (KA), the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party.
To understand the complexity of the resistance movement, and the prospects of building a peaceful federal democratic union, The Irrawaddy spoke to KNDF chair Khun Be Du, who is also a deputy minister of natural resources and environmental conservation for the shadow National Unity Government (NUG).
A dedicated fighter, the ethnic Karenni leader patiently answered The Irrawaddy’s questions despite an unstable phone connection and having to cut off the call every two minutes to avoid it being traced by the junta and so revealing his location.
What are the achievements of the KNDF since it was formed?
We measure our achievements based on the current strength and capability of the KNDF. We now have control over main roads and in towns and we are better equipped to execute and accomplish missions. We also measure our achievements based on the size of our arsenal and networking with PDFs and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) fighting alongside us in Kayah State. Our achievement is that we are only getting stronger to complete the revolution in shorter time.
How did you found the KNDF and is it difficult combining your role as leader with being a deputy NUG minister?
The KNDF is doing an important job and the NUG also plays an important role. So we have to do those two jobs together. Young and middle-aged people in our state decided to carry out revolution and organized training. We gathered arms on our own and also looked for donors. After our group had managed to obtain around 100 weapons, people in other townships also wanted to join the revolution and we gave up our original name and ambitions. We chose our current name KNDF so that not only indigenous ethnic Karenni people but also other ethnic people in Karenni State can join the task of protecting the people. Today, we have 21 battalions and over 8,000 fighters who have signed up to serve in the army for two years.
I engage mainly in preparing and overseeing military operations including the provision of food supplies and weapons. At the same time, the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) has assigned us to join the NUG to establish better networking with resistance groups across the country. We are assigned not just to take a seat in the NUG but to work actively in it. Besides my work as a deputy minister, I also engage as a coordinator in other NUG programs such as assisting military defectors and the NUG’s local administration as well as other committees. We coordinate closely to ensure that the revolution succeeds across the country, and not just in our state.
How much territory does the KNDF now control? What are the challenges in feeding, arming and managing a big army?
It is important that every member has discipline and follows the rules and regulations. Yes, there have been a few cases of KNDF member kidnapping and extorting people. But we have been able to enforce rules and regulations in most of the cases. We also treat prisoners of war in line with international procedures. We have detained more than 100 [civilian] criminals and junta soldiers. It is important to make sure our side does not commit war crimes.
Our army is fed and armed by contributions from people near and far. Most of the weapons are bought by KNDF members themselves. As cash contributions from the donors are likely to decline over time, we have designed some plans. But those plans are not about extorting money or imposing taxes on people. Instead, we will use methods that are acceptable to all.
We have been able to produce some weapons, as well as ammunition, in the last six months. So we believe we will not run short of weapons. The revolution will succeed when we share our resources and technology with each other.
How many resistance fighters have died in comparison to junta casualties in Kayah State?
It is the people who have borne the brunt of the fighting. We have sympathy for them. People are enduring this to seek justice one day. More than 200 civilians have died [in Kayah State]. Junta troops have committed arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings. They have dumped bodies into septic tanks. They are quite cruel. In December last year, they slaughtered more than 40 civilians and set fire to their bodies. Over 500 houses were destroyed and damaged by junta artillery strikes and arson attacks. Many villages were torched. This is the loss of the country.
Nearly 50 KNDF members have sacrificed their lives so far. We gave them proper burial as the martyrs of our revolution. We assume some 30 junta soldiers died or were at least seriously injured for every KNDF member who has fallen. The combat capability of KNDF members is not in question. Our fighters work hard and have high morale, which determines the results of the clashes. Our arsenal grows day by day while the regime has to bring in reinforcements every day.
We had to withdraw from Demoso in January and February when junta troops conducted large-scale operations with artillery strikes and aerial attacks to retake control of towns. We returned to attack junta troops in Demoso around April. Our fighters were killed or injured by landmines there, and have learned lessons from that. Although regime troops are deployed in towns, they can’t run the administration at all. And although we had to withdraw from Demoso, sneak attacks on junta troops still continue daily there. We occupied a few outposts temporarily and seized arms. The KA, which is older and more senior than us, seized the Kyar Pa Sak outpost, but had to withdraw later.
We are holding fire and preparing ourselves for now, considering the losses people have suffered so far, and waiting for the rise of revolution in other parts of the country. The revolution will succeed early if the international community takes action before the country sustains huge losses. Especially, the revolution will succeed quicker if senior Myanmar military personnel take swift action [mutiny]. We are still hoping to avoid more bloody fighting that will harm the country.
The KNDF has a company of female fighters. What percentage of KNDF members are women and do you think the role of women revolutionaries is important?
We don’t have a military unit that solely consists of women. There are women leading companies in our 21 battalions. Women leaders are largely involved in the administration of battalions. We have strong female participation.
I don’t want to highlight the number of women members. What is more important is that women are playing a part in the revolution. We haven’t sent women fighters to the frontline. But we need them now for fighting, and have provided advanced level training and refresher training for them. Now women have opportunities to utilize their shrewdness on the frontline.
Soon there will be guerilla operations by women KNDF members. There will be women commanders. We will recognize, without discrimination, their rights and their ability to perform. There will be women snipers, too. Thanks to the capacity of women members, the administration of our battalions is systematic and organized. Women medics have proven their remarkable performance by saving many resistance fighters. They should be honored. They have saved the lives of more than 100 fighters who were seriously injured or lost their limbs. They also carried them back to the rear safely and protected them in safe places.
How is the relationship between the KSCC, revolutionary groups, the KNDF and the NUG?
The KNDF serves as the defense force of Kayah State and the Karenni State Police [KSP – a parallel police force formed by striking police officers] takes responsibility for the rule of law in Kayah. The KNDF is fully responsible to fight the regime troops and the KSP is responsible for enforcing existing laws, and the laws issued by the NUG, the KSCC, our customary laws, and enforcing the rulings of the judiciary and providing security to establish the rule of law.
Both the KNDF and the KSP network with PDFs and other groups in implementing our goals on the ground, although we are not under a single chain of command. The KSCC is working to coordinate those goals and the administration of Kayah State.
As everyone knows, the KSCC consists of elected lawmakers, representatives of EAOs, ethnic political parties and civil society organizations. The KSCC is providing public services as the regime’s administration has ceased. The KSCC implements its aims according to the charter [adopted by the National Unity Consultative Council]. The charter allows states and units to form their own governments, and all units and states network together in fighting the regime.
The NUG is our interim government [of the country] and the KSCC is our interim government of Kayah State. We expect we will be able to present a clearer picture of union-level units and state-level units next month. We are taking pragmatic approaches to building a federal Union, which is the aspiration of the people.
Karenni State was never ruled by any central Myanmar authority until independence from Britain. The KA has fought successive military regimes for autonomy for Kayah State. It is now cooperating with NUG to build a future federal union. What role will the KNDF play in any future union?
Firstly, before Myanmar’s independence, Karenni State worked together with inland Myanmar to fight the British. Karenni leaders in 1947 decided to join the union.
Secondly, we were oppressed all along after we became part of the union. Natural resources in our state were never used for us, but used for other parts of country or exploited by the generals, while we were denied our rights.
Thirdly, we must be aware that the National League for Democracy (NLD) had power only after it won the election. Fourthly, it must be acknowledged that all of us, including those in other states who have actively participated in this revolution, hope that power will be equally shared, that there will no more civil war, and that there will be no more discrimination and repression after we win this revolution.
So we can’t dwell on the past or let the NLD play us as it pleases. We have to find a common answer, which is federal democracy. We have to prepare for this now. So all the groups in our state must work in unity in fighting the regime, and when this revolution succeeds we must undergo security reforms together in the state.
After the revolution is completed, the KSCC will continue to serve as the interim government and initiate reforms which will enable us, after a democratic election, to make good use of natural resources and bring about sustainable development of Kayah States as well as the country. We want to prove that it is wrong to accuse us of wanting to secede from the union.
We will approach federalism pragmatically. Based on historical status, current situation, and aspirations of the people, our state will join as a part of the union. And we will make sure we can enjoy all the rights people in our state should enjoy. We will not make unrealistic demands, but the union must grant us equal rights. This is our approach.
The NLD government suppressed Karenni youth and organizations before the coup. What made the Karenni people resist the military regime despite that suppression?
Young Karenni people were arrested for protests against [the NLD government’s erection of] General Aung San statues in Kayah State. And some were detained and jailed when we protested over civilian deaths. There were also arrests and imprisonment under U Thein Sein’s government.
Young Karenni people have always demanded equal rights and reasonable opportunities for development of our state and that our identity is recognized. But successive governments have rejected our demands and suppressed us.
We have always done what is important first. We have not just demanded equal rights, but we have fought for many years to end military dictatorship. When the 2008 [military-drafted] constitution was ratified, many young Karenni people staged protests despite the risk of imprisonment.
As the most important thing is to fight the regime, we have ignored arrests and imprisonment over the [General Aung San] statues. And we are even working together with people from the NLD, for example officials of the Kayah State government, who detained and imprisoned our Karenni people. We are working together with them to end military dictatorship, holding meetings with them daily.
We are politically aware that military dictatorship must be deposed. Only when military dictatorship has ended, will there be freedom and transparency which will enable us to make demands and have a greater say. This is our major motivation for fighting the regime at the frontline.
After the coup, we demanded that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi be released, parliament be convened, the 2008 constitution be scrapped and a federal union established. We have demanded that all political prisoners including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi be released and elected parties take power while our federal rights are being established.
Has there been any discussion about establishing an independent Karenni State? What is the KNDF’s position?
We will not work to have an independent state while we are working to establish federalism. We are concerned when charters for independent states and self-administration are talked about. As the country is gaining political momentum, some are portraying us as would-be separatists. We assume all those acts are dangerous.
The position of both the KNDF and the KSCC is that we don’t have a policy to ask for a charter that allows self-government and an independent state, but that we stand for equal rights in the union. Our approach is for all parties ‘to come together’.
For this approach to be successful, both the regime, the NLD and other parties that won [the 2020 general election] must see this and cooperate again with correct steps. They must welcome each other.
The military regime is extremely frightened that our democratic forces will unite. At the same time, some people from the NLD are concerned that ethnic people will have equal rights, and they hold the view that the central government that won the election should decide everything. And their responses are influenced by those concerns, which is very saddening. Their actions undermine the current cooperation between us and amount to a violation of the charter agreed by the majority..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1. We have learned of the offer to enter peace discussions conveyed to the leaders of Ethnic
Resistance Organizations by the chief of the Military Council, Min Aung Hlaing via television
broadcast on April 22, 2022.
2. We have consistently called for the resolution of the federal crisis through political negotiations,
by political means. However, to pursue such a resolution would require the inclusion of all
stakeholders, as well as the participation of representatives of the United Nations and the
international community as mediators to ensure fairness and facilitate negotiations. Only through
such political negotiation will we attain our vision of establishing the federal union.
3. Therefore, we call upon the military council immediately to halt all offensive military operations,
to hold meaningful negotiations that include the participation of all stakeholders, and allow
unfettered humanitarian access for international and local responders to deliver unrestricted
assistance to all people affected by conflict and crisis..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party and Chin National Front
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
23.78 KB 92.65 KB
more
Description:
"“…due to its non-inclusive manner and lack of any genuine gesture to solve [political] crisis…this is not the right time for any negotiation with the SAC.”.....“တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး လွှမ်းခြုံသည့် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှု မဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ လက်ရှိ ဖြစ်နေသည့် နိုင်ငံ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးအကြပ်အတည်း များကို ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းဖော်ထုတ်မှု မဟုတ်သဖြင့် ဤ ဖိတ်ခေါ်မှုသည် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးရန်အတွက် အချိန်ကောင်းမဟုတ်ပေ။”..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Discrimination against the Karenni (Kayah), Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
28.96 KB 96.86 KB
more
Description:
"Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was formed
on the 2nd of May 1957, nine years after the beginning
of Karenni National Resistance, prompted by the
invasion of independent Karenni State by the Union of
Burma government in 1948. The party was formed in Ka
Thoe Kee village, Lerpwakho District of Karenni to
provide political leadership for the resistance.
At its inception, KNPP was led by a 9-member Central
Committee that included a chairman, a secretary, and 7
members as follow:
1. Htaw Blo - Chairman
2. Samuel - Secretary
3. Mu Day (Biba Moo) - Member
4. Gay Hsoe (Law Oo) - Member
5. Thawthi Poe (Mee Ei) - Member
6. Kyaw Naing - Member
7. Ta Eh Poe - Member
8. Htoe Kho - Member
9. Kah Poe - Alternate Member
Just 4 months after its founding, KNPP saw its first
crushing test when Chairman Htaw Blo was assassinated
by his own bodyguard on September 28. After Htaw
Blo's assassination, Saw Maw Raw was elected chairman
in January 1958. However, after just two months of
service, he defected to the Burmese government. His
successor Chairman Mee Ei was killed in a battle in
Kwah Kee village in March 1959. The Second National
Congress in 1959 elected Kyaw Naing (Poe Kyaw) as the
4th chairman of the party. Unfortunately, he was
captured by the Burmese government troops during a
trip in 1960.
That turbulent period was the first 3 years of KNPP's
shaky and tragic experience. Yet the party persevered.
New generations of leadership emerged to take the
party to the next level of resistance and political
leadership and build a resistance organization that
worked shoulder to shoulder with its allies of ethnic
resistance organizations and faced its enemies with solid
principles and deadly force.
Yet more tests were to come. Perhaps the harshest of it
all was the largest split within KNPP in 1978 caused by
ideological differences among the party's leadership.
The split rocked KNPP at its core and shook its
foundation. However, it did not fall. The party reflected
and rebuilt to become stronger. It has continued to lead
Karenni resistance through political and military means
towards the realization of Karenni people's selfdetermination
and freedom from oppression and
federal democracy for all in Burma. KNPP has also
provided important administrative services in education,
health, and defense sectors, to name a few, in areas
where the Burmese military juntas have tried to
destroy.
With unwavering principles in its armed struggle, KNPP
was never shy to engage in peace talks. It had joined
such talks in the 1960s, 1990s, and between 2012 to
2020 for bilateral and nationwide ceasefire, either
collectively with allies or unilaterally. However, KNPP
would not take any offer of superficial peace as a
solution for the deep-rooted political problems in
Burma. As such, the Karenni resistance continues.
The 2021 coup ironically granted a new and rare
opportunity for KNPP to work with not only the Karenni
people statewide but also with various ethnicities and
groups across Burma to uproot the evil dictatorship
once and for all. KNPP takes this opportunity very
seriously by engaging all stakeholders domestically and
internationally on all fronts including humanitarian,
political, diplomatic, and military fronts. With the
mandate granted by the 14th Congress of KNPP in 2022,
the new leadership will continue the fight to uproot any
form of dictatorship and built a federal democratic
union together with the people..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
43.45 KB 486.32 KB
more
Description:
"A Myanmar regime’s court in Naypyitaw did not follow legal procedures when passing a “five-year” jail sentence to the country’s ousted democratic leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for a corruption case last week, legal sources said.
Detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said she was unhappy with the verdict after a junta court sentenced her to five years in prison based on the account of her former colleague on April 27.
Her remark upset Mandalay Region High Court judge U Myint San, who delivered the verdict, according to court sources.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been on trial on a corruption charge for accepting bribes from her Yangon Region chief minister U Phyo Min Thein, who testified in October last year that he gave her seven viss (around 11.4kg) of gold and US$600,000 in 2017 and 2018.
At the trial last week, U Myint San quickly read out the verdict against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and left the court immediately, according to those present.
The verdict was due on April 26 but was postponed until the next day. He might have been waiting for an instruction from the regime.
At the hearing on the morning of April 26, the judge said the verdict would be delivered that afternoon but then it was put off until the next day.
In other cases verdicts have been postponed.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team appealed to the Supreme Court in early March against the prosecution. The Supreme Court judges ignored the appeal even though the special Naypyitaw court announced that the verdict was due on April 26.
According to judicial procedures, if the Supreme Court takes over the case, the special court in Naypyitaw cannot pass a verdict, legal sources said.
Only after the Naypyitaw court delivered the verdict on April 27, the Supreme Court said it would hear the appeal on May 4.
The verdict will be quashed if the Supreme Court decides that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should not be prosecuted.
Observers say the Supreme Court wants to avoid handling Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s case.
But her legal team will appeal against the verdict which was based only on the testimony of U Phyo Min Thein without any evidence, according to court sources.
He is the only National League for Democracy chief minister not to be jailed since the 2021 coup, apart from the Chin State chief minister, who managed to flee to India.
The regime has imposed a gagging order on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers.
She faces sentences of more than 100 years from 17 charges filed by the regime. She has so far been given 11 years in prison..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Intro:
In three short months, the situation on the ground in Karenni state continues to
deteriorate at an alarming rate. The Burmese military is intensifying its attack under
the pretense of eliminating any and all opposition, such as the local ethnic armed
organizations (EAO) and the Karenni Defense Force, or associates with ties to the
exiled civilian government, the National Unity Government. However, unarmed
civilians have become one of the top targets of the Burmese military. About 200,000
civilians are displaced, which is more than 1/3 of the state’s estimated 300,000
population. About 200 Karenni have been killed by the Burmese military since the
start of the coup. As junta forces continue to attack villages and cities, their campaign
has expanded to include internally displaced person (IDP) camps. Assaults on IDP
camps force constant movement of IDPs in the state, as well as a significant number of
displaced to flee to neighboring states and regions. Due to the junta’s blocking of
humanitarian aid, IDPs in Karenni state are forced to face starvation and, ultimately,
death as access to food, clean water, medicines, and other necessary supplies continue
to dwindle. This is not a problem that will solve itself with the current noninterference policy most countries are adopting. The Burmese junta is systematically
killing the Karenni people in order to maintain control of an already precarious
situation.
For this quarterly briefer report, the Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG)
painstakingly collected the raw data found in Tables 1.1 through 3.4 to present
accurate information that is typically distorted by the Burmese junta in order to hide
their criminal activity.
Human Rights Violations
In order to take and maintain control of the country,
the Burmese military is intensifying their attacks on
civilians, including the Karenni people. It has become
clear that the Burmese junta aims to remove opposition
in Karenni state by any means necessary with complete
and utter disregard to the safety and security of the
Karenni. Over the last three months, 52 Karenni were
killed. As indicated in the data, many Karenni were
killed due to mortar shells and airstrikes, but the
majority were arbitrarily arrested and detained before
they were ultimately killed by the Burmese military.
Arrested, Detained, & Missing: There are a total of 42
Karenni that are documented as arrested, detained,
and/or missing after detention. In January alone, there
were 21 Karenni detained and/or missing. According to
reports, there were eight Karenni taken from Loikaw
and three taken from Six Mile village. Junta forces also
targeted traveling Karenni. As civilians flee from their
homes, there is a noticeable migration of Karenni IDPs
to southern Shan state. At least eight Karenni civilians
were reported to be taken as they traveled from Loikaw and/or missing. At least 10 were taken from Warree Su Palain Village. Again, the junta
forces targeted traveling Karenni. Four were taken while traveling to Hoe Pon village,
southern Shan state and two were reportedly taken after returning home to Zee Phye
Gone after staying in an IDP camp (Table 2.1). During the month of March, the
number of detained and/or missing decreased tremendously with only five Karenni
reportedly taken by junta forces (Table 3.1).
Arrested, Tortured, & Killed: While the previous section discussed the number of
Karenni that were arrested, detained, and/or missing, this section will look at
confirmed number of Karenni that were arrested, tortured, and killed by junta forces.
Almost half of the 52 Karenni killed during the 3-
month period were first arbitrarily arrested and
detained by Burmese troops. Upon discovery of
the bodies, evidence of torture was clearly visible.
The junta denied use of any kind of torture
during the victims’ detention. At least 1/3 of the
30 total number of deaths in January were
arrested, tortured, and killed (Table 1.2). In
February, four Karenni were reported to be
arrested and detained by junta forces in Six Mile
village, Deemaw Soe township and Warree Su
Palain village in Phe Khone township (Table 2.2).
These four Karenni were subsequently killed. In
March, nine Karenni were arrested and detained
in Six Mile village and Sin Taung village in
Deemaw Soe Township and Nan Pae village in
Bawlake township. Just like the four cases in
February, the nine Karenni were killed by junta
forces during their detainment (Table 3.2).
Mortar Shells and Airstrikes: Since the beginning of the year, junta forces have been
firing hundreds of shells every day. Shelling has reached at least 5km outside of
conflict zones forcing thousands to flee from their homes in neighboring areas. Over a
three-month period, about 1/4 of those who died were killed by mortar shells. At least
eight were killed by mortar shells launched during armed conflict in Loikaw during
January (Table 1.2). Another 10 were reportedly injured. In March, three children, one
woman, and one elderly woman were killed by mortar shells in Lah Htun village in
Loikaw Township and Daw Taw Kue village in Deemaw Soe Township. The usage of
mortar shells also prevents local civilians from accessing emergency healthcare. Four
elderly women died of heart attacks when shelling was launched near their homes
(Table 3.2).
As junta forces continue their assault on the Karenni people, the military is also
including airstrikes in its arsenal. The junta suffered huge losses with its ground
troops due to the armed conflict with local anti-junta opposition. To offset these
losses, the junta is supplementing their attacks with airstrikes to effectively eliminate
the PDF and local EAOs; however, the Karenni people are also suffering from the
onslaught of airstrikes. From January to March, more than 1/8 of Karenni killed were
killed by airstrikes. In January, five Karenni were killed, including two young females
(Table 1.2).
In February, Karenni civilians were targeted by airstrikes three times. From these
airstrikes, two Karenni were killed in Sele Done village in Deemaw Soe Township
(Table 2.2). The number of airstrikes increased in March to five reported airstrikes
targeting civilian areas. Fortunately, there were no recorded deaths linked to these
attacks.
Outliers (Shot/Killed, Killed/Burned, Unidentifiable): While the majority of Karenni
were killed while detained or from mortar shells and airstrikes launched by junta
forces, there were Karenni killed that fell outside the common documentation. In
January, three bodies of Karenni were discovered; however, the cause of death is
unidentifiable (Table 1.2). Even though the cause of death cannot be confirmed, it is
believed that the Burmese military is responsible for the deaths of the three Karenni.
In February, there were two confirmed kills by the junta forces in Daw Mukla village
in Loikaw township. Using a favorite tactic in efforts to remove evidence, the Burmese
troops then burned the bodies of the two Karenni (Table 2.2). The last unique death
was the killing of a young female in Mine Long Ward in Loikaw City. She was shot and
killed by Burmese troops in March (Table 3.2).
Destruction of Property
Since the beginning of the year, the Burmese military has been systematically
destroying entire villages and homes in order to drive the Karenni people out. In three
months, KnHRG documented a total of 348 structures that were burned or sustained
damage, of which more than half were burned to the ground. In January, a total of 85
structures were burned or sustained damage in Karenni state. More than half of the
documented structures in January were burned to the ground. Two religious buildings
were included in the total number for January. Both religious buildings were shelled
by the Burmese military, but only one was documented as burned to the ground
(Table 1.4).
In February, there were a total of 80 structures that
were reported as burned or sustained damage. A
significant amount, an estimated 75%, of structures
were intentionally burned to the ground by junta
forces in Warree Su Palain village, Wee Thel Ku
village, and Six Mile village in Deemaw Soe Township.
Two religious buildings were reportedly damaged by
shells launched by the Burmese troops (Table 2.4).
There was a significant increase of structures that
were burned or damaged by junta forces in March. A
total of 183 structures were documented by KnHRG
as burned or sustained damage. While almost half of
the total structures were intentionally burned down
by Burmese troops, they targeted several locations: Ce
Lie Done village, Pue Par village, Tay Hsoe Leh
village, Twe Due Bilar village, Hsaung Dular Ywe Tit
village, Sin Taung village, and Five Mile village in
Deemaw Soe Township as well as Nan Pae village in
Bawlake Township. Four religious buildings were
damaged by mortar shells and airstrikes, as well as
one health clinic damaged by mortar shells launched
by the Burmese military (Table 3.4)..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Discrimination against the Karenni (Kayah), Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Internal displacement/forced migration of Karenni villagers
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.37 MB
more
Description:
"On 21 April 2022, people around the world will be wearing blue shirts or blue clothing to raise awareness for Burma’s political prisoners and in solidarity with those who have been unlawfully imprisoned for supporting human rights and democracy.
21 April 2022 also marks the eighth anniversary of the death of U Win Tin – journalist, democracy activist, founding member of the National League for Democracy, and one of Burma’s most high profile and respected political prisoners. He spent over 19 years in prison. Every year, human rights activists in Burma hold a Blue Shirt Day event, with Burma Campaign UK and other organisations around the world supporting it.
Arrest, torture, and forced disappearances are taking place daily in Burma since the military staged a coup on 1 February last year. Over 13,000 people have been arrested, and more than 9,900 political prisoners are currently in jail. This figure does not include people who have forcibly disappeared in remote ethnic areas or Rohingya civilians who have been arrested unlawfully.
“Political prisoners in Burma face horrific torture, harassment and intimidation, but the international community barely mentions their cases,” said Wai Hnin Pwint Thon, Senior Advocacy Officer at Burma Campaign UK. “These activists bravely stood up against the military coup, but the world seems to have forgotten about them. The international community must speak out for political prisoners in Burma and call for their immediate, unconditional release.”
Please join Blue Shirt Day on Thursday 21st April. Wear blue, post pictures on social media, and tell the world that there is a growing number of political prisoners in Burma and that they must be freed immediately.
Post a picture of yourself on Facebook, Twitter etc, using the hashtag #blueshirt4burma or on Instagram: @blueshirt4burma..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"As the world’s eyes fall on Ukraine, a human rights catastrophe
continues to unfold in Burma/ Myanmar. Decades of impunity have
fueled a regime that knows no bounds when it comes to violence
in the pursuit of power. In its first broad human rights report since
the coup, the United Nations found the Burmese army has engaged
in systematic human rights violations, amounting to war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Civilians are not being caught in the
crossfire, they are being deliberately targeted by the Burmese army.
The US State Department’s determination that the Burmese army
committed crimes against humanity and genocide against the
Rohingya people in 2017 is welcomed, but long overdue. As each day
passes, the junta’s policy of systematic violence continues to cause
insurmountable suffering across the entire country, specifically in
ethnic regions. Over the February and March period, the junta’s violent
actions demonstrate its continued disregard for the life and dignity of
the people
During a raid of Pauk Township in the Magway Region on March 6, the
junta raped and killed a 42-year-old woman, Daw Aye Aye Win, and
then stabbed her three-year-old daughter to death. The junta troops
detained 29 villagers, including nine children to use as potential
human shields. Among the detainees was Daw Aye Aye Win’s 11-yearold daughter, who was found dead three days later.
The use of civilians as human shields is not an isolated incident, but
rather a systematic practice of the junta. In late February, the junta
detained 80 primary schoolchildren to use as human shields during
a raid in Sagaing Region’s Yinmabin Township. There are at least 85
reported incidents where the junta has forced individuals to perform
labour and act as human shields. This constitutes serious violations of
international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes.
Arson is a hallmark of the Burmese army’s operation, burning
townships, food stocks, essential provisions for displaced people,
and even their victims. As of March 3, 2022, the junta has torched at
least 6,158 civilian homes, mainly in Chin and Karenni/Kayah states
and Sagaing and Magway regions.
Injuries and death from landmines and other explosive remnants of
war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are increasing as the
number of displaced people move through conflict areas. In 2021, 88
civilians, including 19 women and 19 children, were killed and another
196 people, including 33 women and 55 children, were injured from
landmines and ERW.
The Burmese army continues to bomb civilian villages almost every
day, deliberately targeting civilians and Internally Displaced People
(IDP) camps. Many homes and livelihoods have been burned down or
destroyed, leaving thousands unable to go home. The number of IDPs
continues to increase at alarming rates. As of February 28, the number
of IDPs reached 519,500, this is up from 451,000 people since WLB’s
December-January 2022 update.
Access constraints and inadequate humanitarian aid funding have
prevented aid relief for millions of people across Burma/Myanmar. Crossborder assistance is the only way to reach people in need, and local
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are doing most of the heavy lifting,
by delivering food, water, shelters, health care, and sanitary packs for
women. An increase in international humanitarian relief is critical, as
food, clean water, and medical supplies are quickly running out. Women
have been disproportionately affected by the impact the coup has had
on the economy, which has left half of the population in poverty.
Across the country, frequent electricity power outages have tripled the
cost of alternative fuel sources, such as candles, coal, and firewood. The
cuts to electricity have significantly impacted the supply of water, forcing
people to return to old ways of manually pumping water. In an attempt
to curb dissent and pro-democracy organizing, the junta tripled the
corporate tax rate for mobile and internet providers which has doubled
the price of internet data. The disruption to essential services, coupled
with rising levels of poverty, has disproportionately impacted women, as
they struggle to provide for their families and face an increased risk of
domestic violence.
WLB members report that women are not just experiencing an increase
in domestic violence, but gender-based violence more broadly. On March
7, three men entered a clothing store in North Okkalarpa Township,
Yangon, and attacked a woman, binding her hands and mouth, and
holding a knife to her neck. On March 24 in Myitkyina, Kachin State
capital, a woman selling small pieces of iron and bottles was murdered
by a group of men when she refused to hand over her money.
Despite the Burmese army’s efforts to terrorize civilians by stripping
people of their homes, livelihoods, and safety, the resistance movement
continues to grow. Eleven days after losing their homes and seeing their
village burn down, women in Sagaing Region’s Pale Township have bravely
stood up to protest against the junta. Having lost everything, these women
are fighting with a rare determination and bravery that is at the core of the
women’s resistance movement..."
Source/publisher:
Women's League of Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
932.56 KB
more
Description:
"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံတော်ယာယီသမ္မတ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ၊ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ဝင် ဝန်ကြီး၊ ဒုဝန်ကြီးများ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ ဖိတ်ကြားထားသော ဧည့်သည်တော်များအားလုံးကို မင်္ဂလာအပေါင်း ခညောင်း တဲ့ ပြည်သူ့အောင်ပွဲနှစ်သစ် ဖြစ်ပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာပထမ ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါတယ်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ကြီးများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ ကိုယ်စား တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်နှစ်တာ အောင်မြင်မှုများ၊ အခက်အခဲများနှင့် ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို တင်ပြခွင့်ရသည့်အတွက်လည်း များစွာကျေးဇူးတင်မိပါတယ်။
ကျွန်တော်တို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် အပိုင်း (၁) အရ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၁၆) ရက်နေ့တွင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့တာ ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် ယခုဆိုရင် တစ်နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တော်လှန်ရေးအစိုးရတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည့် အားလျော်စွာ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် သာမန်အစိုးရများနှင့်မတူ အခက်အခဲပေါင်းများစွာကို ပြည်သူနှင့်အတူ ရင်ဆိုင်ဖြတ်သန်းရင်း အောင်မြင်မှုတွေ ရရှိအောင်လည်း ကြိုးစားခဲ့ကြပါတယ်။ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရနှင့် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးဟာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အမျိုးမျိုးသော ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို အတူတကွရင်ဆိုင်ကြရင်း သာမန်အချိန်ကာလမျိုးမှာ မရရှိနိုင်တဲ့ အင်မတန်နီးကပ်တဲ့ စာနာမှု၊ နားလည်မှု၊ အားပေးကူညီ ဖေးမမှုတွေနဲ့ ဖြတ်သန်းခဲ့ကြတာ သမိုင်းမှတ်တမ်းဝင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် ဒီနေ့မှာတော့ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်မှုများကို အစီရင်ခံရင်း၊ အခက်အခဲများ၊ ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ကျနော်တို့အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အနေနှင့် စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ လူမှုရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးဟူ၍ တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်တိုင်ကြီး (၅) ခုသတ်မှတ်ပြီး လေးလေးနက်နက် စီမံ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိသည်များကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
ပထမဦးစွာ စစ်ရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စရပ်များကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အရေးအကြီးဆုံး အလှည့်အပြောင်းတစ်ခုလို့ ပြောလို့ရနိုင် သည့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် People Defence Force (PDF) ကို အစိုးရဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး တစ်လမပြည့်မီ မေလ (၅) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒများနှင့်အညီ စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်း တည်ထောင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ စစ်တပ်၏ရာစုနှစ် တစ်ခုနီးပါးအကြာမျှ အနိုင်ကျင့်ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို အကြမ်း မဖက်နည်းဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြရာမှ နောက်ဆုံးမဖြစ်မနေ မိမိကိုယ်ကိုယ် ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေး အတွက် ခုခံကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေးနည်းလမ်းကို ရွေးချယ်ခဲ့ကြခြင်းသာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တစ်နည်းအားဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှမှုတို့ကို အကြမ်းမဖက် နည်းလမ်းဖြင့် အေးချမ်းစွာ တောင်းဆိုနေသည့် ပြည်သူလူထုသည် စစ်တပ်၏ တဖက်သတ် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ကာကွယ်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြခြင်းသာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
ယခုအခါ တန်းတူညီမျှရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်အရေးနှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်နှင့် လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒ ဆန့်ကျင် ရေးတို့အတွက် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်လျက်ရှိကြသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသား အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အသစ်ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသည့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်များ လက်တွဲညီညီ ပူးပေါင်းနိုင်ကြပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဗဟိုကွပ်ကဲရေးနှင့် ပေါင်းစပ်ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Central Command and Coordination Committee) ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး စစ်ဒေသကြီး (၃) ခုဖွဲ့စည်းကာ လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုအသစ်များနှင့် ရှိနှင့်ပြီးတပ်မတော်များ ပူးပေါင်းကာ စစ်ဆင်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာများ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက် နေပါတယ်။ ထို့အတူ ပြည်သူ့ စစ်မဟာဗျူဟာတပ်ဖွဲ့များဖြစ်တဲ့ ပ.က.ဖ များကိုလည်း နိုင်ငံအဝှမ်းဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ အဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် အခြားရှိနှင့်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှု ဖြင့် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး၏ ၁၅ % ခန့်လွှမ်းမိုးထားနိုင်နေပြီ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး မဟာမိတ်များသည်လည်း နိုင်ငံ၏ ၃၀ % စိုးမိုးထားသဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေမှာ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး၏ တစ်ဝက်စွန်းစွန်းသာ ကျန်ရှိပါတယ်။ မိမိတို့၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများတွင် မဟာမိတ် များနှင့်အတူ မူဝါဒများချမှတ်ကာ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့များ ပ.အ.ဖ နှင့် ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့များ တိုးချဲ့ဖွဲ့စည်းလျက်ရှိပြီး ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်များ ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေး၊ တရားဥပဒေ စိုးမိုးရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို ကော်မတီများ စနစ်တကျဖွဲ့စည်းကာ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိနေပါတယ်။
အခက်အခဲများအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်အတွက် လက်နက်အပြည့်အစုံ တပ်ဆင်နိုင်ရေးမှာ စိန်ခေါ်မှုတစ်ရပ်အနေနဲ့ ရှိနေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် မြောက်များလှစွာ သော LDF များနှင့် စနစ်တကျချိတ်ဆက် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် စီမံတဲ့အခါမှာလည်း အခက်အခဲတွေကတော့ ရှိနေဆဲဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခက်အခဲတွေ စိန်ခေါ်မှုတွေကို ကျွန်တော်တို့အနေနဲ့ မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် တက်ညီလက်ညီ ပူးပေါင်းရင်း ကျော်ဖြတ်နေကြောင်း လည်း အသိပေးတင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
တစ်ဖက်မှာလည်း ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ကော်မတီကိုဖွဲ့စည်းကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များ လက်အောက်မှာ ဆက်လက်အမှုမထမ်းလို၊ ပြည်သူကို မသတ်ဖြတ်လိုတော့တဲ့ တပ်မတော်သားများ နှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များကိုလည်း ဘေးလွတ်ရာသို့ စီမံဆောင်ရွက်ပေးပြီး ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နေပါတယ်။ ယခုအခါ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံလာသူ (၁၀၀၀၀) နီးပါး ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သလို အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် အပြင်ထွက်မလာနိုင်ဘဲ အတွင်းထဲကနေ ချိတ်ဆက်တော်လှန်နေကြတဲ့ သူတွေလည်း များစွာရှိနေပြီး ၎င်းတို့ဆီကနေလည်း တန်ဖိုးရှိတဲ့ သတင်းအချက်အလက်တွေ ရရှိနေ ပါတယ်။ လက်ရှိအချိန်မှာလဲ ပြည်သူကိုသတ်ဖို့ စေလွှတ်ခံရတဲ့ တပ်ရင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့တွေဟာ အမှန်တရား ကို သိမြင်ပြီး နီးစပ်ရာတိုင်းရင်းသားနယ်မြေတွေ၊ PDF တပ်စခန်းတွေမှာ လက်နက်ချခိုလှုံတဲ့ အဖြစ်အပျက်တွေလည်း များစွာပေါ်ပေါက်နေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
ဒုတိယ ထောက်တိုင်ကြီးတစ်ခုဖြစ်တဲ့ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ရေးကဏ္ဍများကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။ ဒီကဏ္ဍဟာ မိမိတို့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်မှု အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာမှ အသိအမှတ်ပြု ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှုများ ရရှိရေးအတွက် အသက်သွေးကြော တမျှ အရေးကြီးပါတယ်။ အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအများစု၏ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုကို တရားဝင်ရရှိခြင်းမရှိသေးပါ။ မိမိတို့အောင်မြင်မှုအနေဖြင့် NUG အစိုးရကို ကိုယ်စားပြုလျက်ရှိသည့် ယခင် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရ၏ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်သည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား ဆက်လက်ကိုယ်စားပြုခွင့်ကို ရရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အလားတူ ဥရောပပါလီမန်၊ ပြင်သစ်ပါလီမန်တို့မှ NUG အစိုးရကို တရားဝင် အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်း ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပြီး သက်ဆိုင်ရာအစိုးရအဖွဲ့များအနေနဲ့လည်း NUG အား တစ်ခုတည်းသော အစိုးရ အဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုရန် တိုက်တွန်းခဲ့ကြသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၇) နိုင်ငံတွင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိကာ ကျန်နိုင်ငံများတွင်လည်း ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိနိုင်ရေး ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်လည်း အာဆီယံဆိုင်ရာကိုယ်စားလှယ်ကို ထားရှိဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှု အပါအဝင် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအားလုံးကို နိုင်ငံတကာမှ အရေးယူနိုင်ရေးအတွက်လည်း ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်အတူ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ အခြား ဆက်စပ်လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကြီးများဖြစ်တဲ့ စစ်ကောင်စီကို စီးပွားရေး ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူနိုင်ရေး၊ ကိုဗစ်ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ ရယူနိုင်ရေး၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် လိုအပ်သည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေရှာဖွေရေးများကိုလည်း ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအကြား နီးကပ်စွာပူးပေါင်းချိတ်ဆက် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
အခက်အခဲများအနေဖြင့် ကမ္ဘာ့ရေးရာများ အထူးသဖြင့် ယူကရိန်းစစ်ပွဲ၏ ရိုက်ခက်မှုများ ကြောင့် အရှေ့နှင့်အနောက်နိုင်ငံများ အားပြိုင်မှုများအကြားတွင် မြန်မာ့တော်လှန်ရေးအပေါ် အာရုံစိုက်မှုများ လျော့နည်းလာသည်ကို တွေ့ကြုံနေရပါတယ်။ စစ်ကောင်စီကို နိုင်ငံတကာ ဆက်ဆံရေး ဖိအားပေးနိုင်ရေးများ ဆောင်ရွက်ရာမှာ ယခင်ထက်ပိုမို ခက်ခဲလာသည့်အတွက် အခွင့်အလမ်းများကိုလည်း စေ့စပ်သေချာစွာ ရှာဖွေလုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည်ကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
တော်လှန်ရေး၏ တတိယထောက်တိုင်ကြီး တစ်ခုဖြစ်တဲ့ စီးပွားရေး၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ပြန်လည် ထူထောင်ရေးကဏ္ဍကို ဆက်လက်တင်ပြခွင့်ပြုစေလိုပါတယ်။ စီးပွားရေးကဏ္ဍဟာလည်း ပြည်သူလူထု၏ တခဲနက် ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီ ထောက်ပံ့မှုကြောင့် အောင်မြင်မှုများရရှိနေတဲ့ ကဏ္ဍ တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စစ်ကောင်စီကို စီးဝင်နေသည့် ဝင်ငွေရပေါက်ရလမ်းများကို ဖြတ်တောက် နိုင်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ရရှိရေးတို့အတွက် မူဝါဒများ၊ လုပ်ငန်းများ ချမှတ်ကာ စီးပွားရေးနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများနှင့်အတူ စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်မှု ကော်မတီများမှလည်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
ပထမဦးစွာ စစ်တပ်နှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည့် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ၊ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များကို ဥရောပ သမဂ္ဂနှင့် အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံတို့မှ အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့စေခဲ့ပါတယ်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဓိက ဝင်ငွေရပေါက် ရလမ်းဖြစ်တဲ့ ရေနံနှင့် သဘာဝဓါတ်ငွေ့မှ ရရှိနေသည့် ဝင်ငွေများ မရရှိနိုင်ရေး ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး Total နှင့် Chevron ရေနံကုမ္ပဏီကြီးများ စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် အဆက်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပါတယ်။ အလားတူ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ပြည်တွင်းရှိ ဆက်သွယ်ရေး၊ လူသုံးကုန်နှင့် ဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများကို အသုံးမပြုစေ ခြင်းဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်မှုဖြင့် ထိုးနှက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အခွန်၊ မီတာခများ မပေးဆောင်ရေးနှင့် စစ်တပ်ထုတ်ကုန်များ သပိတ်မှောက်ရေး တို့ကိုလည်း အားသွန် ခွန်စိုက်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ မိမိတို့၏ စီးပွားရေးဖိအားပေးမှုသာမက စစ်ကောင်စီကိုယ်တိုင်၏ စီးပွားရေးမူဝါဒအမှားများကြောင့် ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်း၊ မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေနှင့် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေလည်ပတ်မှု များနှင့် ကုန်သွယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ ထိခိုက်လျက်ရှိရာ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအခြေအနေမှာ များစွာချိနဲ့ နေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
ပြည်သူလူထု၏ တော်လှန်ရေးအပေါ် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ဖြင့် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများကြောင့် နွေဦးထီမှစ၍ ငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်များ ရောင်းချခြင်းအပါအဝင် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများမှ အခွန်ငွေများ ပေးဆောင်ခြင်းကြောင့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ဒေါ်လာသန်းချီ၍ တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ရရှိအသုံးပြုနိုင်ခဲ့ပါ တယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေဖြစ်သည့် အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံတွင် ထားရှိသည့် အရံဘဏ္ဍာငွေ ဒေါ်လာ (၁) ဘီလျံကို ပြည်သူလူထုအတွက် အသုံးပြုနိုင်ရေးကိုလည်း အားစိုက် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါတယ်။
မူဝါဒများအနေဖြင့်လည်း တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိသော ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှု များကို လမ်းညွှန်ပေးခြင်းများ၊ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများ ရုတ်သိမ်းခြင်းဆိုင်ရာမူဝါဒများ၊ ပြည်သူပိုင်မြေများ တပ်မှသိမ်းယူထားမှုများကို ပြန်လည်ရယူခြင်းဆိုင်ရာမူဝါဒများ စသည်ဖြင့် ချမှတ် အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် ပြည်တွင်းမှ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာအကူအညီများရယူရာတွင် တာဝန်ခံမှု၊ ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာမှု ရှိစေရန် ဘဏ္ဍာရေးဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒ များကိုလည်း ချမှတ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေ များတွင်လည်း အခွန်ကောက်ခံမှုများ စနစ်တကျ ဖြစ်စေရန်ဆောက်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
အခက်အခဲများအနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီကို ယခုထက် ပိုမို ကြပ်တည်းစေရန်ဆောင်ရွက်ရာမှာ နိုင်ငံတကာ၏ အကူအညီများ ဆက်လက်လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ စနစ်တကျဖြစ်စေရေး၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ထိရောက်စွာ အသုံးပြုနိုင်ရေး၊ CDM ၊ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူများ ထောက်ပံ့နိုင်ရေးတို့အတွက် အကူအညီများ များစွာ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသေးတယ်။
နောက်ထပ်စတုတ္ထထောက်တိုင်ကြီး တစ်ခုဖြစ်တဲ့ လူမှုရေး၊ ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်း များနှင့် လူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများကဏ္ဍကို ဆက်လက် အစီရင်ခံပါရစေ။ မိမိတို့မှာ ပြည်သူ့ အစိုးရဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ ပြည်သူနှင့်အတူ ဒုက္ခဆင်းရဲများကို အတူတကွခံစားရုံတင်မကဘဲ ပြည်သူ အားကူညီဖေးမရန်လည်း ကြီးမားသည့် တာဝန်တစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် ခံယူထားပါတယ်။ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူများ၊ နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာရသူများ၊ CDM များ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများနှင့် စစ်ကောင်စီကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ကျဆုံးရသည့် မိသားစုများကို အခက်အခဲများကြားကပင် ကျပ်ငွေ ၂.၇၆ ဘီလျံ ထောက်ပံ့နိုင် ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုအနေနဲ့လည်း Covid-19 ကပ်ရောဂါကာကွယ်ရေး အပါအဝင် အခြေခံကျန်းမာရေးကိစ္စရပ်များကို လွတ်မြောက်နယ်မြေများတွင် မဟာမိတ် EHO များနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ထို့အပြင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေး မူဝါဒများ ရေးဆွဲခြင်း၊ WHO ၊ အခြား နိုင်ငံတကာ INGO နှင့် ပြည်တွင်း NGO များ၊ CSO များ၊ EHO များနှင့်ပူးပေါင်း ချိတ်ဆက်ကာ နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများ ပေးနိုင်ရေး၊ ဆေးဝါးနှင့် ဆေးပစ္စည်းများ ထောက်ပံ့နိုင်ရေးတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
ပညာရေးအနေဖြင့်လည်း Online မှ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် လုပ်ဆောင်ပေးမှုများအပြင် ယခုအခါ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်ထားနိုင်တဲ့ ဒေသများတွင် မြေပြင်အထိ သင်ကြားရေး လုပ်ငန်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်နေနိုင်ပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို တင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
ပဉ္စမ ထောက်တိုင်ကြီးဖြစ်တဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကဏ္ဍကို အရေးအကြီးဆုံး တစ်ခုအနေနှင့် တင်ပြခွင့်ပြုပါ။ နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍမှာ အဓိကလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အားဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီကို ဖြုတ်ချနိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ထောင်ရေးဟူ၍ ချမှတ် ထားပါတယ်။ လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အားဖြင့် နှစ်ခုပင်ဖြစ်သော်လည်း အသေးစိတ်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်များမှာ အင်မတန်မှ အရေးကြီးပြီး ကျယ်ပြန့်တဲ့လုပ်ငန်းများဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့အနေနဲ့ ယခုလက်ရှိ တွင်လည်း အထက်ဖော်ပြပါ စစ်ရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများပေးရေးများ အားလုံးကို မဟာမိတ်များ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားအဖွဲ့အစည်းနှင့်အတူ နိုင်ငံရေး သဘောတူညီမှုများဖြင့် နက်နက်ရှိုင်းရှိုင်း ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး စတင်ပြီး ယခု တစ်နှစ်ကျော်လာသည့်တိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးအရှိန်အဟုန် အားကောင်း နေခြင်းမှာလည်း နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍအောင်မြင်မှု၏ ပြယုဂ်ကြီးပင် ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍတွင် ပြည်သူလူထုသည် ပါဝင်မှု မျှသာမဟုတ်ဘဲ ၎င်းတို့၏ ဦးဆောင်မှု၊ အားပေးမှုတို့ကြောင့်သာ မိမိတို့အစိုးရ အပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု အားလုံးတို့ဟာ အင်အား အပြည့်နဲ့ ရှေ့ဆက်နိုင်ကြတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများမှ ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ် များ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ သပိတ်ကော်မတီများ၊ လူထုအခြေပြုအဖွဲ့များ၊ လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ ပါတီများနှင့် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ အားလုံးပါဝင်သော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး NUCC ၏ ညှိနှိုင်း ဆွေးနွေးသဘောတူညီမှုဖြင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ချာတာအရ မိမိတို့အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရကို ဖွဲ့စည်း ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ထိုအချိန်မှစ၍ မိမိတို့ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် NUCC နှင့် CRPH တို့၏ ထိန်းကျောင်းမှု များနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးဆွေးနွေးမှုများ သဘောတူညီမှုများ ရရှိရေးတို့ကို အားလုံးသော အင်အားစုများနှင့် အတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။
အဆိုပါ စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု အင်အားမှ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာတဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးသဘောတူညီမှုများနှင့် စစ်ရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးနှင့် လူထုဝန်ဆောင်မှုများကို မဟာမိတ်များအားလုံးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်လာတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ NUG အနေဖြင့် ပြည်တွင်းတွင် မဟာမိတ်များနှင့် ယုံကြည်မှု များကို တစ်နေ့တခြား ပိုမိုတည်ဆောက်နိုင်လာနေပြီဖြစ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုများ ရရှိနိုင်ရန် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးစား ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
ထို့အတူ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ပြုတ်ကျရေးသာမက မည်သည့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မျိုးမှ မပေါ်ပေါက် စေရေး၊ စစ်မှန်၍ ခွင့်တူညီမျှသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရေးအတွက်တို့လည်း အားထုတ်ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါတယ်။
တက်ရောက်လာကြသော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံတော်ယာယီသမ္မတနှင့် အစိုးရ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များနှင့် ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီး များခင်ဗျာ...
ကျွန်တော်တို့ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရဟာ တိုးတောင်းလှတဲ့ တစ်နှစ်အတွင်းမှာ အသက်အန္တရာယ် ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုများနှင့် အခက်အခဲပေါင်းစုံကြားမှပင် သမိုင်းတွင်မည့် တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ရပ်ကို ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စား ပါဝင်ဦးဆောင်ခွင့်ရနေတာ အင်မတန်မှ ဂုဏ်ယူစရာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ယခုအချိန်မှာ ဆိုလျှင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအချင်းချင်းသာမက အစိုးရနှင့် ပြည်သူများအကြား အပြန်အလှန် နားလည်စာနာမှုဟာ အမြင့်ဆုံးအခြေအနေမှာရှိနေပါတယ်။ တစ်ဖက်မှာလည်း တော်လှန်ရေးအစိုးရ ဖြစ်သည့်အားလျော်စွာ မိမိတို့အစိုးရ၏ မူဝါဒများ၊ လုပ်ငန်းများ၊ ဦးစားပေးမှုများဟာ သာမန် အချိန်မှာလိုမဟုတ်ဘဲ ကြီးမားတဲ့ အကျိုးဆက်များ ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် မိမိတို့အနေနှင့် ကိစ္စရပ်တိုင်းကို အဖက်ဖက်မှ အပြန်ပြန်အလှန်လှန် ဆွေးနွေးသုံးသပ်ကာ မူဝါဒနှင့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ ချမှတ်လျက်ရှိကြောင်းကို အသိပေးတင်ပြလိုပါတယ်။
မိမိတို့အစိုးရအပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများဟာ အချိန်ကြာလာသော်လည်း အားပျော့သွားခြင်းမရှိဘဲ အင်တိုက်အားတိုက် ဆက်လက်မောင်းနှင်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ စစ်အာဏာရှင် ပြုတ်ကျရေး သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ဟာလည်း တစ်နေ့ထက်တစ်နေ့ ပိုမိုအားကောင်းလျက် ရှိပါတယ်။ ထို့အတူ တပ်မတော်တစ်ခုရဲ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာကို စွန့်ပယ်ကာ အာဏာရှင်တွေရဲ့ လက်ပါးစေ ဖြစ်နေတဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီဟာလည်း တစ်နေ့တခြား အင်အားနည်းပါးလာပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် မိမိတို့ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဟာ ယခုနှစ် နှစ်သစ်မှစ၍ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်အတွင်းတွင် တော်လှန်ရေး၏ ကြီးမားတဲ့အချိုးအကွေ့ အောင်မြင်မှုတစ်ခုကို မလွဲမသွေ ရောက်ရှိလာတော့မှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့်လည်း အစိုးရအနေနှင့် ယခင်ထက်ပိုမိုအားစိုက်ပြီး ကြုံလာမယ့် အခွင့်အလမ်း ကောင်းများကို အမိအရဆုပ်ကိုင်ကာ အခက်အခဲများကို ပြည်သူနှင့်အတူ ကျော်လွှားသွားကြဖို့ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါတယ်။ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရရဲ့ တစ်နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည့် အားနည်းချက် အားသာချက်များကို စေ့စပ်သေချာစွာသုံးသပ်ကာ ရှေ့လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမှာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဟာ သမိုင်းတစ်လျှောက် တော်လှန်ရေးများနှင့် မတူတဲ့ ထူးခြားတဲ့ သမိုင်းဝင်တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ပြုတ်ကျရေးသာမကဘဲ ပြည်သူ တစ်ရပ်လုံးက နိုင်ငံသားအချင်းချင်း လူမျိုးဘာသာမရွေး စာနာနားလည်နေကြပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ် ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ထောင်ရန် အချိန်အခါ ရင့်မှည့်နေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒီအချက်ကို အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီကလည်း သိရှိပြီးဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် အိမ်နီးချင်းများက မည်သို့ပင် စောင့်ကြည့်နေစေကာမူ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို အတိုင်းအဆမရှိ လူမဆန်စွာ ကျူးလွန်နေတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ၎င်းတို့အနေနှင့် ပြန်လမ်းမရှိသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းကြောင်းကို ရွေးချယ်ကာ ပြည်သူ လူထု၏ ၎င်းတို့အပေါ်ဖြစ်တည်နေသည့် အမုန်းတရားများကို အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ၊အကြောက်တရား တို့နှင့် ဖိနှိပ်ရန်သာ ထွက်ပေါက်ရှာနေပြီဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထုကိုပါ အသိပေးလိုတာ က စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဆတိုးအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများဟာ ကျနော်တို့ အားလုံးကို အပြင်းအထန် ထိခိုက် နေပေမယ့်လည်း ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုင်းဟာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့ကိုယ်တိုင် ၎င်းတို့ အသက်ရှင် ရပ်တည်ရေး ထောက်တိုင်များကို တစ်ခုချင်း ဖြိုချနေကြတာဖြစ်ပြီး အဆုံးမှာ မလွဲမသွေ ပြိုကျ ပျက်စီးသွားမှာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။
အရေးအကြီးဆုံးအချက်မှာ ယခု သမိုင်းတွင်မယ့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဟာ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အဓိက ပါဝင်ဦးဆောင်မှုဖြင့် ရှင်သန်အားကောင်းနေတာ ဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် မိမိတို့အစိုးရအနေနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒများကို ထင်ဟပ်နိုင်ရေးကို အလေးပေးကာ ပြည်သူ၏ ထိန်းကျောင်းမှုကိုလည်း အပြည့်အဝခံယူလျက်ရှိပါကြောင်း အသိပေးရင်း နိဂုံးချုပ်အပ်ပါတယ်။
“အရေးတော်ပုံ မုချအောင်မြင်နေပါပြီ”..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.82 MB
more
Source/publisher:
Women's League of Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
182.82 KB
more
Description:
"Message from the Karenni National Defense Force on the occasion of the BPLA 1st Anniversary Day..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Nationalities Defense Force
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
125.75 KB
more
Description:
"Congratulatory message from the three fraternal allies on the occasion of BPLA Anniversary Day..."
Source/publisher:
The Three Brotherhood Alliance
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
199.13 KB
more
Description:
"အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေး၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်ရရှိရေး၊ ကိုယ့်ကြမ္မာကိုယ်ဖန်တီးနိုင်ခွင့် ရရှိရေးနှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ဖြုတ်ချနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ရခိုင်ပြည်သူလူထုကိုဦးဆောင်ပြီး တော်လှန်ရေးတိုက်ပွဲများ ဆင်နွှဲနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ထူထောင်ခဲ့သည့် ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်(AA)၏ (၁၃)နှစ်ပြည့်အခမ်းအနားသို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကိုယ်စား ဂုဏ်ပြုအသိအမှတ် ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အာဏာရှင်များ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်ကျင့်သုံးခဲ့သည့် လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒနှင့် တပြည်ထောင်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးစနစ်ကို အပြီးတိုင် ဖျက်သိမ်းပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုး အားလုံး၏ တန်းတူညီမျှရေး၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကြမ္မာကိုယ်ဖန်တီးပိုင်ခွင့်ကို အာမခံသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးစနစ်သစ် ဖန်တီးနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော် (AA)၏ (၁၃)နှစ်ပြည့်အခမ်းအနား အောင်မြင်ပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် ရခိုင်လူမျိုးများနှင့်အတူ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်၏ နိုင်ငံရေးရည်မှန်းချက်များ ပြီးမြောက်အောင်မြင်ပါစေကြောင်း အထူးဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Arakanese/Rakhine/Rohingya history, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
250.76 KB
more
Description:
"The human rights situation in Myanmar is becoming increasingly unstable. Hundreds of thousands have been forcibly displaced. Among those trying to help injured civilians, protesters and combatants from the People’s Defense Forces are medical professionals. They too have been targeted by the Myanmar junta who have used their weapons to destroy clinics and confiscate medicine. In the midst of a pandemic, these actions are increasingly volatile.
Doctors and nurses, who have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have been forced into hiding. Despite mass arrest warrants issued, many are still providing treatment and care in secret. Their will and spirit cannot be marred by the junta.
The war that the Myanmar military is waging in their cruel pursuit for power has destabilized the country beyond repair. The health care sector is one of many which has been obliterated. Health care services are now largely beyond reach of every day civilians who are struggling to survive on the bare minimum as conflict wreaks havoc across the country.
On World Health Day, the Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma recognizes the many injustices perpetrated against health care workers by the soldiers of the Myanmar Army. We condemn these unlawful attacks and call for their immediate protection, as well as for those arrested and detained to be released and all charges dropped..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Health Workers Strike, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
365.44 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေမှာ ပို၍ မတည်မငြိမ်ဖြစ်လျှက်ရှိသည်။ သိန်းနှင့်ချီသည့် ပြည်သူလူထု မှာ မဖြစ်မနေ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်နေရသည်။ ဒဏ်ရာရ ပြည်သူများ၊ ဆန္ဒပြသူများနှင့် PDFs တပ်သားများအား ကြိုးစား ကုသပေးနေသူများမှာ ဆေးဘက်ဆိုင်ရာကျွမ်းကျင်သူများဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဆေးရုံ၊ ဆေးခန်းများအား ဖျက်ဆီး၍ဆေးဝါးများ မတရားသိမ်းဆည်းနေသည့် မြန်မာစစ်အာဏာရှင်တပ် များ၏ ပစ်မှတ်ထားခြင်းခံနေရသည်။ကမ္ဘာ့ကပ်ရောဂါ ဖြစ်ပွားနေချိန်တွင် ထိုသို့လုပ်ဆောင်မှုကြောင့် ကျန်းမာရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပြဿနာများကို ပို၍ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေသည်။
CDM တွင် ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်သည့် ဆရာဝန်နှင့် သူနာပြုများသည် တိမ်းရှောင်နေကြရသည်။ ဖမ်းဝရမ်းများ အထုတ်ခံထားကြရသော်လည်း ဆရာဝန်နှင့် သူနာပြုများက တိတ်တဆိတ် ကုသ၍ ကျန်းမာရေး စောင့်ရှောက်ပေးကြသည်။ ၎င်းတို့၏ စိတ်ဓာတ်နှင့် ဆန္ဒကို စစ်အာဏာရှင်များမှ ရိုက်ချိုး၍ မရပေ။ အာဏာကို ငန်းငန်းတက် လိုချင်၍ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဆင်နွှဲနေသည့် စစ်ပွဲသည် ထိန်းချုပ် ပြုပြင်၍ မရလောက်အောင် မတည်မငြိမ်ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေသည်။ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှု ကဏ္ဌသည် ဖျက်ဆီးခံရသည့် ကဏ္ဌများထဲမှ တခုဖြစ်သည်။ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုသည် နိုင်ငံတဝှန်း ပဋိပက္ခများကြောင့် အကြီးအကျယ်ထိခိုက်ကသောင်းကနင်း ဖြစ်နေပြီး အနိမ့်ဆုံးအဆင့်ဝင်ငွေဖြင့် အသက်ရှင်သန်ရန် ရုန်းကန်နေရသည့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ လက်လှမ်းမမီနိုင်သည့် အခြေအနေတွင် ရှိနေသည်။
ကမ္ဘာ့ကျန်းမာရေးနေ့တွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ စစ်သားများက ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများအပေါ် မတရားမှုများကျူးလွန်နေသည်ကို မိမိတို့ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးမှတ်တမ်းကွန်ရက် (မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ) (ND-Burma) မှ သိရှိနားလည်သဘောပေါက်ပါသည်။ ယခုလို မတရား တိုက်ခိုက်နေမှုများကို ပြစ်တင်ရှုံ့ချပြီး ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများအား အလျင်အမြန် အကာအကွယ်ပေးရန်နှင့် ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်း ခံထားရသူများအားလည်း အမှုများမှ ရုပ် သိမ်း၍ အမြန်ဆုံးလွှတ်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Health Workers Strike, Anti-coup protesters, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
372.51 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"SAC terrorist Force launched offensive from 6 mile, 5 miles and Htolwebila in Demoso to Ngwe Taung Ywar Thit in Phruso township. SAC sent convoy consist of 40 vehicles from Shan state to karenni state, reinforce in Demoso township.
Karenni Coliation Forces continuously carried out Guerrilla attacks on SAC force encompassed on mountains and hills in vicinity of Htolwebelar and Ngwe Taung Ywar Thit inDemoso.
On March 24, Fight escalated between Karenni coalition forces and SAC terrorist force encompassed in Htolwebela village. SAC terrorist force burnt down (6) houses in Htolwebelar village.
Moreover, KNDF launched guerrilla attack on SAC force advancing to Ngwe Taung Ywar Thit in Pruso townships. The fight was intensified and SAC force incurred heavy causalities.
Early Morning on March 25, KNDF attacked SAC force stationed on hill near Lin Phon Lay Village. KNDF occupied the hill as SAC forces retreat and abandon their post during the attack.
In the evening of that day after 4 pm, there were two clashes between Karenni Coalition Forces and SAC force advancing form Daw Poe Ci, 5 mile and 6 Mile to Bathalein. Five houses were burnt down by SAC forces in 5 Mile.
Two attacks were carried out by Karenni Coalition forces on SAC’s infantry Battallion ( Kha Ma Ya – 428 ) in Pruso on March 26 and 27. The Fight last for about an hour in each attack, SAC incurred heavy casualties.
On March 26 at (8:00) pm, KNDF attaked on (Kha Ma Yan – 422) based in Moe Bye, killing five SAC soldiers.
Early morning at (6:00) am on March 27, Karenni Army and KNDF carried out attack on SAC force stationed in Khone Thar, Demoso. Six SAC soldiers were killed in the attack. Another attack was conducted on No. (14) Military Training School in Pruso on March 27, Killing two SAC soldiers.
On March 28, KNDF attacked SAC force in Daw Nang Khar, Demoso. two soldiers including an officer of SAC were killed. Two elderlies were injured in Daw Taw Ku village in Demoso, by SAC force’ shelling the village around 16:00 pm on March 28.
On March 30, KNDF and the People's Defense alliances Forces jointly attacked SAC’s infantry Battalion (Kha Ma Yah - 428) in Pruso Township. Eight soldiers, including an officer of SAC were killed in the attack.
On March 24, A comrade from KNDF B15 was killed during the battle of Ngwe Taung Ywar Thit. The KNDF pays tribute to the fallen comrade as a martyr..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Nationalities Defense Force
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
30.73 KB
more
Description:
"Daw Su Su Lwin, the wife of former President U Htin Kyaw and a National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmaker, has refused to meet the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) special envoy to Myanmar, according to NLD lawmakers.
The special envoy, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn, was set to meet Daw Su Su Lwin at the Park Royal Hotel in Yangon.
However, Daw Su Su Lwin refused to meet the envoy, citing health issues, an NLD lawmaker told The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity. Even if Daw Su Su Lwin had met with him, she could only have do so as a private individual and not as a representative of the NLD, added the lawmaker.
“One point of the five-point consensus is for the ASEAN special envoy to meet all stakeholders. Without Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, it is impossible to represent the NLD as well as democratic forces,” said the NLD lawmaker.
Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun also told the BBC that Daw Su Su Lwin could not meet Prak Sokhonn because of her health.
One Myanmar-based political analyst said Daw Su Su Lwin deliberately avoided meeting the ASEAN envoy because she is concerned that it might result in friction within the NLD.
“If she meets him, I am not sure about other results, but it will definitely cause friction within the party. As the ASEAN envoy is the guest of the regime, meeting him amounts to recognizing the regime. That could lead to friction within the party, so Daw Su Su Lwin evaded the envoy,” said the political analyst.
The central executive committee of the NLD also told the media that Daw Su Su Lwin’s meeting with the special envoy couldn’t be as an official representative of the NLD, while the NLD leadership is being detained by the military regime.
Another political analyst said that while the junta has detained senior NLD leaders to try and kill off the party, it was attempting to make use of Daw Su Su Lwin to show the international community that the NLD still exists.
“China apparently does not like [the regime] ditching the NLD. China accepts that the NLD should exist in Myanmar’s politics. Although the regime dares not continue with its plan to dissolve the NLD under such circumstances, and it also dares not release NLD leaders, they want to show that the NLD still has representation. So they arranged a meeting between Daw Su Su Lwin and the special envoy. But Daw Su Su Lwin backed off as she can’t represent the NLD,” said the political analyst.
ASEAN’s special envoy arrived in Myanmar on Monday and met junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin, international cooperation minister U Ko Ko Hlaing and People’s Party chairman U Ko Ko Gyi.
As Prak Sokhonn wrapped up his Myanmar visit on Wednesday, political analysts said that he only met regime representatives and failed to meet with all stakeholders, which goes against the five-point consensus.
Another political analyst said: “As he did not meet other stakeholders, the ASEAN consensus can’t be implemented. One of the points in the consensus is to bring all the concerned parties to constructive dialogue. But the regime is not willing to engage in dialogue. So the ASEAN envoy can’t implement the ASEAN consensus.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Articles on the NLD, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar is a country in transition in more ways than one. Since the general elections held by the State Peace and Development Council(SPDC) in November 2010, the world’s attention has focused on the startling transformations at work in the long-isolated Southeast Asian Nations..."
Source/publisher:
Academia.edu (San Francisco)
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Social studies of Burma
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
320.37 KB
more
Sub-title:
ကရင်နီဒေသတိုက်ပွဲတွေမှာ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သားတွေ ၈၀၀နီးပါးသေဆုံးခဲ့ဟု PKPF ထုတ်ပြန်
Description:
"မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ခေါင်းဆောင်တဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်က အာဏာသိမ်းခဲ့တဲ့နောက်ပိုင်း ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့တဲ့ ကရင်နီဒေသ တိုက်ပွဲတွေမှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သား ၈၀၀ နီးပါးသေဆုံးခဲ့တယ်လို့ တိုးတက်သော ကရင်နီပြည်သူ့အင်အားစု(PKPF)က ဒီကနေ့ ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်ပါတယ်။
၂၀၂၁ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ၁ရက် ကနေ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလကုန်အထိ ကရင်နီပြည်အတွင်းစစ်ရေး နိုင်ငံရေး အခြေနေ အကျဉ်းချုပ်ကို PKPFက ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့တာမှာ ဖော်ပြထားတာပါ။
အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်းစစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ကို ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်(KNDF)၊ ကရင်နီတပ်မတော်(KA)၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်(PDF) အပါအဝင် ကရင်နီဒေသ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု တွေက စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ကို ခုခံတိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့လို့ လွိုင်ကော်၊ ဒီးမော့ဆို၊ မိုးဗြဲ၊ ဖယ်ခုံ၊ ပင်လောင်း၊ ဘောလခဲ၊ ဖရူဆို၊ ဖားဆောင်း စတဲ့ဒေသတွေမှာ တိုက်ပွဲတွေ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပါတယ်။
၂၀၂၁ မေလကနေ ၂၀၂၂ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလကုန်အထိ တိုက်ပွဲပေါင်း ၁၈၇ ကြိမ်ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့တာမှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သား ၇၉၀ ဦးသေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး ဒဏ်ရာရသူအများအပြားရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ ပျက်စီးသွားတဲ့ စစ်ကောင်စီယာဉ် ၂၆ စီးထက်မနည်းရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ တိုက်ပွဲတွေပြင်းထန်ခဲ့လို့ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်က လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုတွေ အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ရာမှာ စုစုပေါင်း ၆၉ ကြိမ်ရှိတယ်လို့ဆိုပါတယ်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်နဲ့ဖြစ်ခဲ့တဲ့ တိုက်ပွဲတွေမှာ KNDF/KA/PDF ပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးရဲဘော် ၈၇ ဦးကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသလို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ပြည်သူလူထုတွေကို အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့လို့ အရပ်သားပြည်သူ ၂၂၁ ဦးသေဆုံးခဲ့ရတယ်လို့ PKPFက ထုတ်ပြန်ပါတယ်။
ဒါ့အပြင် အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးနဲ့ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရတဲ့ ပြည်သူလူထု ၂၂၀ ဦးရှိတယ်လို့လည်းဆိုပါတယ်။
ကရင်နီဒေသတိုက်ပွဲတွေမှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်က လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်တာ လက်နက်ကြီးတွေနဲ့ အလွန်အကျွံပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်တာနဲ့နေအိမ်တွေကို တမင်မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးတာ အပါအဝင် စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်တွေလက်ချက်ကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတွေရဲ့နေအိမ် ၆၅၀ နီးပါး နဲ့ ဘာသာရေး အဆောက် အအုံ ၁၀ ခုတို့ ပျက်စီးခဲ့တယ်လို့ ဆိုပါတယ်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ဟာ လက်ရှိအချိန်မှာလည်း အရပ်သားတွေကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားပြီး လေကြောင်းကနေ တိုက်ခိုက်တာ၊ စစ်ရှောင်စခန်းတွေကို လေကြောင်းက ဗုံးကြဲတာ၊ လက်နက်ကြီးတွေနဲ့ တိုက်ခိုက်တာ တွေ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့လို့ ကရင်နီစစ်ရှောင်ပြည်သူတွေ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရမှုတွေလည်း ဖြစ်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
Progressive Karenni People Force
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Karenni State, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
131 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
440.13 KB
more
Description:
"တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးက လိုလားတဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို အမှန်တကယ်တည်ဆောက်နိုင်တဲ့အထိ NUCC အနေနဲ့ မဆုတ်မနစ်ကြိုးပမ်းလုပ်ဆောင်မယ်လို့အလေးအနက် ကတိပြု
ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁၂ ၊ ၂၀၂၂
စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံ ကတိကဝတ်နဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပဋိညာဉ် အခြေခံမှုတွေအပေါ်အခြေပြုတဲ့ ညီညွတ်ရေး၊ ကတိကဝတ်တွေကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရေး၊ လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒချုပ်ငြိမ်း ရေးတွေကို ဖော်ဆောင်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးက လိုလားတဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို အမှန်တကယ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်တဲ့အထိ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ - NUCC က မဆုတ်မနစ် ကြိုးပမ်းလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမှာဖြစ် တယ်လို့ အလေးအနက်ကတိပြုကြောင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုတဲ့ ၇၅ နှစ်မြောက်နေ့အတွက် ပေးပို့တဲ့ သဝဏ်လွှာမှာ ဖော်ပြလိုက်တာပါ။
အစိုးရ အဆက်ဆက်က ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်တွေကို ချိုးဖောက်ကာ သမိုင်းတလျှောက် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဖိနှိပ်အနိုင်ကျင့်ခဲ့မှုတွေ၊ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုတွေအတွက် မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ - NUCC အနေနဲ့လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးကို လေးနက်စွာတောင်းပန်တယ်လို့ ဖော်ပြထားပါတယ်။
ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်တွေ၊ အစိုးရတွေက ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ခွဲခြားဖိနှိပ်မှုတွေ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်တဲ့ ရာဇဝတ်မှုတွေနဲ့ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုတွေ၊ လူမျိုးသုဉ်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုတွေကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့မှုနဲ့ပတ်သက်ပြီး နစ်နာသူများအား အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရကယနေ့ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရတရပ်ဖြစ်တာနဲ့အညီ တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု အပြည့်ဖြင့် တောင်းပန်ပြီး လုပ်ဆောင် သင့်တဲ့ ကိစ္စရပ်တွေကို ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား လုပ်ဆောင်သွားဖို့လည်း တိုက်တွန်းထားတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။
အစိုးရအဆက်ဆက်က ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်ကို ဖော်ဆောင်ဖို့ ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ကြတာကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတို့ရဲ့ နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရမှုတွေကို ယနေ့ကာလ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ တော်လှန်ရေးရဲ့ ဦးဆောင်မှုအခန်းကဏ္ဍမှာ ပါဝင်နေသော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ- NUG အပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုတွေက ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းသိမြင်နေမှာလို့ ပြောထား ပါတယ်။
ဒါအပြင် အဲဒီလို ထပ်မံမဖြစ်ပွားစေဖို့နဲ့ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်တွေကို တိကျစွာဖော်ဆောင်ရန်မှာ လွန်စွာမှ အရေးကြီး တယ်ဆိုတာနဲ့ တိုင်းရင်း သားပြည်သူတွေ လိုလားတဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီးကိုလည်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိ ကဝတ်နဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်အတိုင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်သွားရန် လိုအပ်တယ်လို့လည်း ဖော်ပြထားတာ တွေ့ရပါတယ်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီအနေနဲ့ကတော့ စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ်နဲ့ အာဏာရှင် စနစ်မှန်သမျှ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းမှသာလျှင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်နိုင်မှာဖြစ်တယ်လို့လည်း ထောက်ပြထားတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
434.39 KB
more
Description:
"Message from Chairman Gen. Saw Mutu Say Poe on the 74th Karen National Day..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karen National Union (KNU), Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
715.59 KB
more
Description:
"အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံးနဲ့ အတူတကွကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမှာဖြစ်တယ်လို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်က မနေ့ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့တဲ့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်အပြီး ညပိုင်းမှာ ထုတ်ပြန် ခဲ့တဲ့ ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်ထဲ ဖော်ပြထားတာပါ။
အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတွေ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီတွေ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေ၊ အင်အားစုတွေ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းတွေ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာနဲ့ ဒေသတွင်း လွှတ်တော်တွေ၊ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်တွေက လက်တွဲ ပူးပေါင်းပေးကြပါဖို့ ထပ်မံဖိတ်ခေါ်ထားပြီးတော့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်အနေနဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံးနဲ့အတူတကွ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမှာဖြစ်တယ်လို့ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်မှာ ဖော်ပြထားတာ တွေ့ရ ပါတယ်။
တစ်နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်းမှာ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီက နိုင်ငံတကာရဲ့စီးပွားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ သံတမန်ရေး အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ် ဆို့မှုတွေနဲ့ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက် အဝန်းကလည်း ဖယ်ကြဉ်ထားတာကို ခံနေရကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ထဲမှာလည်း အချင်းချင်း ပြိုကွဲလျက်ရှိနေပြီး အချိန်တစ်ခုသာ ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံ လျှောက်လှမ်းပါက ပြည်သူတွေရဲ့ အောင်ပွဲက ဧကန်မလွဲ ရောက်ရှိတော့ မှာဖြစ်တယ်လို့လည်း ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်မှာ ဖော်ပြထားပါတယ်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်တွေ အပြီးတိုင်ကျဆုံးပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတွေ မျှော်လင့်တောင့်တနေတဲ့ ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေ စီ နိုင်ငံတော်တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး ခက်ခဲကြမ်းတမ်းတဲ့ တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးမှာ သည်းခံစိတ်ရှည်စွာ ပါဝင်ပေးခဲ့ကြတဲ့ ပြည်သူတွေ၊ အဖက်ဖက်မှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီပေးကြတဲ့ ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပက အလှူရှင်တွေ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ လွှတ်တော်တွေနဲ့ ကမ္ဘာ့နိုင်ငံတွေကို ပြည်သူလူထုကိုယ်စား ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိတဲ့အကြောင်းလည်း ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်က မှတ် တမ်းတင်ဖော်ထားတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်တွေအနေနဲ့ အနာဂတ်ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ရာမှာ ကျရာကဏ္ဍအသီးသီးမှာ ပါဝင်ထမ်းဆောင်နေပြီးတော့ ပြည်သူလူထုရဲ့ ယုံကြည်ကိုးစားမှုနဲ့ ပေးအပ်ထားတဲ့ တာဝန်ကို ကျေပွန်အောင် ထမ်းပိုးသွားမယ်လို့ ဆိုပါတယ်။
ဒါအပြင် အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာဖီဆန်မှု(CDM)မှာ ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြတဲ့ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းသူရဲကောင်းတွေကို ဂုဏ်ပြုချီးမြင့်နိုင်ရေး၊ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး တိုက်ပွဲအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသူတွေအတွက် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများအဖြစ် ဂုဏ်ပြုနိုင်ရေး ဥပဒေတွေ ပြဋ္ဌာန်းနိုင်ရေး ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားမှာဖြစ်တယ်လို့လည်း ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်မှာဖော်ပြထားတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။.."
Source/publisher:
The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
507.47 KB
more
Description:
"75th Diamond Jubilee Shan State National Day..."
Source/publisher:
Kalay University Students' Union
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Shan (cultural, historical, political) articles, Shan history
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
109.69 KB
more
Description:
"အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်ခံ ကျောင်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့မှ ဖွင့်လှစ်သော ဘွဲ့ကြိုသင်တန်း အသီးသီးသို့ တက်ရောက်သည့် ကျောင်းသူ/သားများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်..."
Source/publisher:
University of Medicine1, Yangon Interim University Council
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
529.2 KB
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Up to 170,000 people are thought to have left homes in Myanmar’s Kayah state due to intensified fighting
Description:
"Nan and her family had just one hour to gather their belongings and prepare to flee their home. A charity had offered to drive them away from Loikaw, the capital of eastern Myanmar’s Kayah state, to relative safety. She considered staying behind, with the plants, dogs and pigs that she had raised, but knew she had to leave.
Since last week, Loikaw has seen intense fighting between groups opposed to last year’s military coup and the armed forces, which have launched airstrikes and fired artillery. An artillery shell had dropped near Nan’s fence, terrifying her cousin’s children, who ran to hide under their bed. “It was so loud,” she said. “My grandma was shocked and sweating, we had to give her medication to calm her down.” Other homes in Nan’s neighbourhood have been hit.
The UN estimates that half the population of Loikaw have been forced to leave their homes, and that almost 90,000 people from Kayah state, formerly known as Karenni state, are displaced. Estimates by local media and a rights group are far higher, suggesting up to 170,000 people in Kayah, more than half of its population, have left their homes.
Almost one year since the military seized power in Myanmar, the junta faces widespread and defiant opposition to its rule, and to the heinous violence it has inflicted on the public. Alongside a peaceful protest movement, people across the country have resorted to taking up arms, sometimes with support from established ethnic armed organisations.
The military is now battling armed groups on multiple fronts. This includes in Kayah state, where it has been met with strong opposition, and has in turn launched brutal crackdowns. In December, more than 30 people, including children, were killed and their bodies burned in a massacre on Christmas Eve.
On 7 January, a day after fighting intensified, Nan, 26, left her home along with her grandmother – who was in ill health – her parents, cousins and their children.
The drive to Shan state, where they sought refuge, would normally take three and a half hours. Instead, it took the family three days. Fighting forced them to stop and take shelter on the way, only for the attacks to then become so close that there was no option to move again. “They continuously launched behind us as we moved forward,” she said.
Ba Nyar, a spokesperson from Karenni Human Rights Group, said the situation was the most severe he had seen in the state and that 170,000 people are displaced. Many had sought refuge in Buddhist temple compounds, schools and community halls, he said. But people were struggling to access food or basics such as blankets or makeshift roofs to provide shelter at night, he added.
After the recent escalation in fighting, the military has stopped all trucks coming in and out of Loikaw, cutting off supplies, said a volunteer at a refugee camp where about 100 families are sheltering. According to a report by the independent outlet Myanmar Now, the military has also cut off electricity to several areas of Loikaw, halting water supplies and wifi coverage.
More than 650 houses and other civilian properties, including churches, monasteries and schools have been burned down or destroyed in Kayah state since May 2021, according to reports cited by the UN.
This week, the UN special rapporteur for Myanmar, Tom Andrews, called on the junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing, to “immediately halt the air and ground attacks that junta forces have unleashed on Loikaw”, to lift the blockade of those seeking to escape and allow access for those seeking to provide aid and shelter.
The UN’s children’s agency, Unicef, said it was gravely concerned by the escalating conflict and condemned the killing of at least four children across the country, and the maiming of others over the past week. Among those injured are a 12-year-old girl and 16-year-old boy from Loikaw, who were hit by heavy weaponry “following intense airstrikes and mortar attacks”, according to Unicef.
Phil Robertson, the deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, said the military had “clearly decided to make an example of Loikaw, hitting it with indiscriminate artillery and aerial bombardment that puts civilians at serious risk of grievous harm”.
“Humanitarian assistance is urgently needed, and NGOs, UN agencies and donors should bend over backwards to get assistance to displaced persons who require it,” he said.
Few remain in Loikaw. One resident who is still in the city said there was shooting on Wednesday evening until 9pm, and that three military helicopters were seen in the sky. “I have to stay very quiet inside my house for my safety and eat what I have,” he said. “I gave everything else to my family.”
He stayed in the city to watch over the family home, but will leave if fighting worsens. “I think we can still leave, but there are many military soldiers hiding on the roads,” he said.
Nan’s family were stopped twice at checkpoints before they eventually reached relative safety in Shan state. Her grandmother, who had heart problems, died before they arrived. Nan believes it was the shock and trauma caused by the sound of the firing of artillery shells.
Even as the family tried to pause their journey to hold a funeral for her at a nearby town, they were again forced to leave immediately due to worsening violence. Residents from the area were also forced to flee.
Nan has considered returning home. As she drove past the mountains at the back of a truck, she longed to go back. “If my parents are safe, I’d like to go back there even if I have to move from one place to another when fighting takes place in the town,” she said. “I miss home so much.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Karenni State, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The People’s Defense Force (PDF) raided a labor camp in Sagaing Region’s Tamu Township on Monday, killing the prison governor, his wife and 11 police officers, commanding officer Bo Ba Hman of Tamu PDF Battalion 1 told The Irrawaddy.
Two PDF fighters died and four others were also injured in the early Monday morning raid, which ended in a shootout, he added.
“We raided the camp and had gained the upper hand. Some of [the prison guards had been incapacitated]. But then, the prison governor ordered [the guards] not to surrender even if he died. He switched off the electricity, which led to confusion. Then [prison guards] from the guard tower opened fire with a machine gun and both sides were hit in the hail of machine gun fire,” said Bo Ba Hman.
One of the four injured PDF fighters suffered serious injuries, but was not in critical condition, and only one of the bodies of the killed PDF fighters could be retrieved, he said.
“We didn’t have a plan to go this far. We only intended to take control of them and seize their weapons. But things happened unexpectedly and resulted in casualties,” he said.
The labor camp is located some 3.2 km to the east of Wut Shu Village in Tamu. It was established in 1991, and was the first labor camp to be built in Kabaw Valley.
The camp housed a number of political prisoners detained by the military regime after last year’s coup. The attack on a labor camp is believed to be the first of its kind since the coup in Myanmar, though other junta targets are often attacked by resistance groups.
Tamu, a town on the Myanmar-India border, was one of the first towns to take up arms against the military regime. The Tamu PDF Battalion 1 said it would also attack government departments operating under the junta’s administration.
“We will have no more mercy for departmental employees working for the regime as well as military informants and Pyu Saw Htee [militia groups trained and armed by the regime],” said Bo Ba Hman.
“We had invited them to join the civil disobedience movement. But they didn’t join no matter how much we requested, and they have gotten worse. If we still treat them with consideration, our revolution will never reach its goal.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"An estimated 2,380 Myanmar junta soldiers were killed and around 600 wounded during the last month, according to the parallel National Unity Government.
Between Dec. 7 and Jan. 6, 1,077 blasts and attacks targeting junta forces were reported across the country, except in Rakhine State.
The Irrawaddy could not independently verify the reports or the junta casualty numbers. The regime was unavailable for comment.
The shadow home affairs ministry, which charts reports from resistance groups, the media and residents, said there could have been more attacks which went unreported.
The preceding month, only 788 incidents were reported with 2,117 regime troops killed and 682 injured.
Sagaing Region, where people’s defense forces (PDF) are most active, reported the most attacks in December with 246 ambushes and explosions.
Sagaing resistance groups claim their hit-and-run tactics and landmine ambushes are inflicting heavy losses on the junta. The regime’s air force has responded with airstrikes and by dropping reinforcements.
Sagaing Region reported the most attacks on regime forces in November, with 209 incidents.
In December, Karen State reported 244 incidents between the regime and PDFs and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union.
Fierce clashes occurred in mid-December after junta troops raided Lay Kay Kaw in Myawaddy Township near the Thai border. The regime claimed democracy activists and PDF members were hiding in the KNLA-controlled new town.
Intense fighting and junta airstrikes have since been reported with large numbers of junta soldiers, including commanders, reportedly killed. Several thousand civilians have fled to Thailand to avoid the fighting.
The state only reported 22 clashes in November.
After reporting 45 attacks and 173 explosions targeting regime forces in Yangon, the city has become the third most violent area of the country.
Several resistance groups in the commercial capital have urged residents to avoid junta forces and regime-controlled government offices as they may be attacked.
Yangon’s resistance groups reported 32 attacks and 118 blasts targeting regime forces in November.
The junta continues to commit atrocities, including arrests, using hostages, arbitrary killings, burning alive, mass killing, using civilian detainees as human shields, shelling residential areas, looting and burning houses and sexual violence, especially in Sagaing and Magwe regions and Chin, Shan, Kayah and Karen states..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime launched air strikes on Loikaw, the capital of Kayah State, on Saturday and Sunday, forcing thousands of local residents to flee their homes.
Fierce clashes broke out between resistance groups and junta troops in the town on Friday. Residents of at least three of 13 wards in Loikaw have fled since Saturday and more are fleeing, according to humanitarian groups helping the displaced people.
“Around 2,000 people were evacuated on Saturday and Sunday. We evacuated them together with the Red Cross Society. Nearly half of the town has fled the fighting. Though the fighting took place in Mong Lone, Pan Kan and Ywa Tan Shae, people from the other parts of the town have also fled out of fear,” a charity worker told The Irrawaddy on Sunday.
People who remain in the town are staying in their homes, and businesses have also closed, he said. While his group is helping to evacuate displaced people to churches, many others have also fled the town on their own, he said.
“People don’t go out because helicopters were hovering. The town is deserted. Those who were not able to flee in time remain in their homes. But we are evacuating people at their request. We pick them up at their homes when they phone us,” he added.
Six civilians were killed in Friday’s fighting as junta troops attacked civilian targets, said the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF). The following day, the regime shelled several wards in Loikaw as junta jets dropped bombs.
Some residents have fled to Shan State, Mandalay, Naypyitaw and other towns, but some are only taking shelter at local churches in Kayah.
Local administrators in Nyaungshwe in southern Shan State at the border of Kayah State have warned locals not to shelter displaced persons from Kayah, and displaced people were also not allowed to enter Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State, according to the Shan State-based news agency Shan Herald.
Junta troops and local People’s Defense Force (PDF) members clashed in Loikaw, and junta helicopters were hovering over the town on Sunday morning.
“Many people remain in the town, though others are fleeing. We have not yet fled. We have packed things up, and got the car ready to flee. If the situation is OK, we will move tomorrow. But we heard gunfire today, and choppers were hovering,” a resident of Mong Lone ward told The Irrawaddy on Sunday.
More than half of Kayah State’s 300,000 population have already been displaced by fighting following the February coup, and the majority of Loikaw’s some 150,000 residents are fleeing the junta’s weekend aerial attacks, according to locals.
A Loikaw resident told The Irrawaddy on Monday that “the town is deserted and many more, including my family, are planning to leave today and tomorrow.”
Junta attacks from the air were also heard in Demoso, Shardaw and Moebye and Pekhon towns. Helicopters could be heard hovering above Hpasawng Township, said the Loikaw resident.
At least 30 junta soldiers including a lieutenant died and many more were injured in Saturday’s fighting, according to the KNDF. The group said it shot down a gunship and destroyed an armored vehicle in the fighting, and also seized weapons and ammunition from the regime.
Junta troops also clashed with resistance groups in Demoso on Sunday, and at least 10 junta soldiers died in the fighting despite air support.
“Some 20 junta soldiers are believed to have been injured, and at least 10 are thought to have died. The regime fired artillery and also carried out aerial attacks. One of our comrades died and three were injured. One of them had to have one of his kidneys removed. He is stable now,” a KPDF spokesman told The Irrawaddy.
Some civilian houses were damaged in the junta shelling and air strikes and junta troops also deliberately set some houses on fire to cremate their colleagues’ bodies, said the spokesman.
“Junta troops burnt the bodies of their fellows in civilian houses. We have found three charred bodies of junta soldiers,” he said.
The KPDF said it had also seized weapons and communications devices from the regime in the Demoso fighting. The military regime, according to Loikaw residents, has intensified its attacks in Loikaw, deploying helicopters to regain road access to other parts of Kayah State via Loikaw. Resistance groups have blocked road access since last month, preventing the regime from sending reinforcements and food supplies..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Karenni State
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"ကမ္ဘောဒီယားနိုင်ငံဝန်ကြီးချုပ်နှင့် အာဆီယံ အလှည့်ကျဥက္ကဋ္ဌဖြစ်သည့် ဟွန်ဆန်သည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၇ ရက်မှ ၈ ရက်အထိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့လာရောက်၍ နေပြည်တော်၌ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့မှုအပေါ် မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) အနေဖြင့် လွန်စွာ စိတ်ပျက်မိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအရေးတွင် ထဲထဲဝင်ဝင် ပါဝင်လာခဲ့သည့် ဝန်ကြီးချုပ် ဟွန်ဆန်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာ့ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီ အရေးတို့နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ထုတ်ပြန်သင့်ပါကြောင်း၊ သို့မဟုတ်လျှင် ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ဟွန်ဆန်သည်လည်း မင်းအောင်လှိုင်၏ လွှမ်းမိုးချယ်လှယ်မှုကို ခံနေရသူ တစ်ဦးအနေဖြင့်သာ ပြည်သူက သတ်မှတ်လိမ့်မည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ဟွန်ဆန်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ ခရီးစဉ်လာရောက်ခြင်းသည် နှစ်နိုင်ငံဆက်ဆံရေး အရသာဖြစ်ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအား အသိအမှတ်ပြုလာရောက်ခြင်းမဟုတ်ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြ ထားသော်လည်း အာဆီယံအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံအများစု၏ ထောက်ခံမှုမပါဘဲ အာဆီယံဘုံသဘော တူညီချက် (၅) ချက်ကို သွေဖယ်၍ လူမျိုးရေးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်းချိုးဖောက် နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုအား လာရောက်တွေ့ဆုံညှိနှိုင်းခဲ့ပြီး အာဆီယံအဖွဲ့ကြီး၏ စည်းလုံးမှု၊ အခွင့်အာဏာကို အဟန့်အတားဖြစ်စေခဲ့ပါသည်။
ထို့အတူ ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ဟွန်ဆန်အနေဖြင့်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ခြယ်လှယ်ရန် ပစ်မှတ် တစ်ခု ဖြစ်လာခဲ့သည်။ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် နှင့် ကမ္ဘောဒီးယား နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး၏ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၈ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြောကြားချက်တို့အရ ကမ္ဘောဒီယားဝန်ကြီးချုပ် ခရီးစဉ်မှာ ပဋိပက္ခများ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရန်နှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ ပေးအပ်ရန် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။ ပဋိပက္ခများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်မှုနှင့် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ လိုအပ်နေမှုတို့မှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များ ကြောင့်ပင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ခရီးစဉ်အတွင်း လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်မှုအကူအညီပေးရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ စစ်အုပ်စု၏ COVID-19 ကပ်ရောဂါကို လက်နက်သဖွယ်အသုံးချ၍ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်မှုများ၊ ဆေးကုသခွင့်နှင့် ဆေးဝါးရရှိခွင့်များအား ပိတ်ပင်မှုတို့အပေါ် ပြောကြားချက် တစ်စုံတစ်ရာမျှ မတွေ့ရပါ။ ထို့အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအပေါ် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှုမရှိဘဲ “ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ် မဟာဗျူဟာ” ၏ အစိတ်အပိုင်းဖြစ်သည့် ရေနှင့် အစားအသောက်၊ ဆေးဝါးများ ဖြတ်တောက်ထားမှုအပေါ် အသိအမှတ်ပြု ထောက်ခံသကဲ့သို့ ဖြစ်နေပါသည်။
မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ ကရင်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် ကယားပြည်နယ်တို့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လေကြောင်းဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူပေါင်း များစွာ အသက် သေဆုံးမှုများနှင့် လူပေါင်းထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာ အိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာထွက်ပြေးတိမ်း ရှောင်ရမှုများဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့ရပြီး တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တစ်ဖက်သက် အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲရေးထုတ်ပြန်မှုအား ဘုံသဘောတူထုတ်ပြန်ချက်တွင် ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ သွေးခွဲ တိုက်ခိုက်မှုနည်းဗျူဟာဟောင်းကို အသုံးပြု၍ တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအကြား သွေးခွဲလုပ်ဆောင်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိ ပါသည်။ အာဆီယံအလှည့်ကျဥက္ကဋ္ဌအနေဖြင့် အပစ်အခတ် ရပ်စဲရေးဆွေးနွေးပွဲများတွင် ပါဝင်ဆွေးနွေးလိုမှုအပေါ် တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ စသည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံး သဘောတူမှသာ အရေးပါနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ပြီး သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံး၏ သဘောတူညီမှုမရခဲ့လျှင် ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ဟွန်ဆန်အနေဖြင့် သာမက အာဆီယံအနေဖြင့်ပါ အရေးပါသည်ဟု သတ်မှတ်ခြင်း မခံရနိုင်ပါ။ ဟွန်ဆန်အနေဖြင့် တရားမဝင် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ကိုယ်စားပြုသဘောသာ ဆောင်နေပါလိမ့်မည်။
ဘုံသဘောတူထုတ်ပြန်ချက်နှင့် ရှင်းလင်းပွဲများတွင် ပြောကြားချက်များသည် မပြည့်စုံပါ။ ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူပြည်သားများ၏ ဖြစ်ချင်သည့် ဆန္ဒသဘောထားတို့ ဖော်ပြထားခြင်းမရှိသည်ကို တွေ့ရပါသည်။ အသစ်ခန့်အပ်လိုက်သော ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့် သူမ၏ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့် နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အကြောင်းတစ်စုံတစ်ရာ ဖော်ပြထားခြင်းမရှိသည်ကို တွေ့ရပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံအထူးသံတမန် ခန့်အပ်ရေး၊ အာဆီယံ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ချက်အရ နိုင်ငံခြား ရေးဝန်ကြီး Park Sokhonn နှင့် သက်ဆိုင်သည့် အဖွဲ့များတွေ့ဆုံရေး တို့နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍လည်း ဖော်ပြထားခြင်း မရှိသည်ကိုလည်းတွေ့ရပါသည်။ ဝန်ကြီးချုပ် ဟွန်ဆန်အနေဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက် များအပေါ် ကောင်းမွန်စွာဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခြင်း မရှိပါက စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လိမ်လည်လှည့်ဖျားခြင်းကို ခံလိုက်ရပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်း မုချဝေဖန်ခံရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အာဆီယံအနေဖြင့် ယခုအချိန်တွင် မည်သည့်လမ်းကို ရွေးချယ်ရန်မှာ အရေးကြီးနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဘုံ သဘောတူညီချက် (၅) ချက်သည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသော အဖြေကို ရှာဖွေရန် ကတိကဝတ်ကို ဖော်ပြခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ စတင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုသည် မအောင်မြင်သည့်တိုင် ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များဖြင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူပေါင်း ၁,၄၄၇ ဦးထက် မနည်းကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လှုံ့ဆော်မှုများကြောင့် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရသော နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေးနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု အကျပ်အတည်းများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ အပြုအမူနှင့် ပေါင်းစပ်ကာ အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်း တစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် ဒေသတွင်း လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် အာဆီယံအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ပြည်သူများ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားတို့အပေါ် ကြီးမားသော ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်လာလျက်ရှိသည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးများမှ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များကို ဖယ်ထုတ်ရန် အာဆီယံ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အာဆီယံနှင့် ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅) ချက်တို့အား မထီမဲ့မြင်ပြုနေခြင်းအပေါ် ရှင်းလင်းပြတ်သားသည့် တုံ့ပြန်ချက်တစ်ရပ်လည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် အာဆီယံအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၁၈ ရက်နေ့မှ ၁၉ ရက်နေ့အထိ Seam Reap မြို့တွင် ကျင်းပမည့် အာဆီယံ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ အစည်းအဝေးသို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) အား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် တက်ရောက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဖိတ်ကြားနိုင်ရေးကိုလည်း အကောင် အထည်ဖော်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) အနေဖြင့်လည်း ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅) ချက်နှင့်အညီ ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရန်၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို အဆုံးသတ်ရန်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသူအားလုံးကို လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ အရေးတကြီး ပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်ရန်တို့အား အာဆီယံနှင့်အတူ ဆက်လက်ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင် သွားမည်ဟု ကတိပြုပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) သည် အာဆီယံအလှည့်ကျဉက္ကဋ္ဌ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးသံတမန်အသစ်နှင့်လည်း ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံရန် အသင့်ရှိနေပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၊ အထွေထွေညီလာခံနှင့် အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်စသည်တို့က အသိအမှတ်ပြုထားသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်တို့အပါအဝင် NUG ခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် လူချင်းတွေ့ဆုံမှုများအား အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
846.84 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"In a New Year’s message, U Thein Nyunt, a member of the State Administration Council (SAC)— the governing body of the military regime—wished death and destruction upon the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) as well as its legislative body, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF).
“Myanmar is going through a war for the cause of ‘nationalism’ between patriots and those under foreign influence. My wish is that the foreign invaders and traitors will be totally defeated in the New Year,” the turncoat wrote in his New Year’s greetings published in the junta-controlled newspapers.
U Thein Nyunt was previously a member of the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s Central Executive Committee. When the NLD boycotted the 2010 general election, he left the party and co-founded a new one, the National Democratic Force. He later resigned from the party and ran as an independent in the 2010 poll, winning a seat in the Lower House. He later founded the New National Democracy Party (NNDP). He contested the 2015 poll as the NNDP chair, but lost the race to the NLD.
He has since allied himself with the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and spent the years prior to the coup finding fault with the NLD government. In the run-up to the 2020 election, he made statements encouraging a military coup. He again suffered defeat in the 2020 vote, but became a member of the SAC following the takeover. He has always tried to curry favor with Min Aung Hlaing, seconding whatever he says at regime meetings.
On Karen New Year’s Day, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing wished the Karen people well. It was rank hypocrisy—the general ordered airstrikes on Karen villages last month, bringing devastation to the lives of thousands.
Since Dec. 15, Myanmar’s military has carried out ground and aerial attacks on Lay Kay Kaw and surrounding areas in Karen State’s Myawaddy Township near the Thai border, claiming that PDF fighters were taking shelter there. The attacks have forced more than 10,000 locals from their homes and across the border into Thailand.
Only the regime’s media acknowledged Karen New Year’s Day with any energy. The occasion went unmarked even in relatively peaceful Yangon and Ayeyarwady regions, which are home to large Karen populations.
Min Aung Hlaing eyes electoral ‘reform’ to maintain grip on power
In his message on Myanmar’s 74th annual Independence Day, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing articulated the merits of the proportional representation (PR) electoral system, which he said would allow all-inclusive and wide representation in Myanmar.
In the first-past-the-post system that has been practiced to date in Myanmar, candidates who win a majority of votes in their constituencies are elected lawmakers. Under the PR system, parties receive parliamentary seats proportional to the percentage of votes they win in an election. Calls by the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party and its allied parties to switch to PR have become louder since last March, one month after the coup.
Obviously, Min Aung Hlaing is preaching the advantages of PR not because of its benefits for Myanmar, but because it would benefit the military and himself personally.
With the military-drafted constitution guaranteeing 25 percent of seats in the legislature for Myanmar’s military, its proxy USDP and allied parties only need to secure an additional 26 percent of total seats to form the government. However, after they failed to do so in both the 2015 and 2020 elections, they knew they would never be able to take control of the parliament and the government unless PR is introduced.
The military regime, after annulling the results of the 2020 general election in July, said it would hold a new election in August 2023, but to Myanmar people, that is nothing more than a tall story.
Hun Sen: Myanmar’s Unwelcome Visitor
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen arrived in Naypyitaw on the morning of Jan. 7 on a visit opposed by Myanmar’s people, who fear it will lend legitimacy to coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, given that Cambodia currently holds the rotating chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. The dictatorial Khmer ruler is the first foreign leader to visit the head of the Myanmar junta since the military seized power in February last year.
Junta leader honors his deputy and regime supporters
To mark Myanmar’s Independence Day on Jan. 4, Min Aung Hlaing conferred titles on military officials including his deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win, and military supporters including well-known Buddhist monks.
The coup leader, who himself had the title Maha Thray Sithu bestowed on him by his military seniors earlier in his career, conferred the title Thray Sithu on his deputy, and other titles on various military officials who are in one way or another involved in the ongoing brutal crackdown on anti-regime protesters and killings of civilians.
Among the other title recipients were Major Naing Bo Bo, who rammed a vehicle into anti-regime protesters in Yangon’s Kyimyindaing in December, and well-known Buddhist monks Ashin Chekinda and U Tilawkar Biwonsa. The latter is the chief monk of the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, an ultranationalist group known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha.
The honorary orders are traditionally awarded to individuals who have done great work for the country. This year, however, the awards went to supporters of Min Aung Hlaing.
Other recipients included Dr. Aung Kyaw Win, the husband of the regime’s Social Welfare Minister Daw Thet Thet Khaing, and U Aung Min Kyaw Thu, the vice chairman of pro-military nationalist group the Young Men’s Buddhist Association. Posthumous honors were conferred on ward administrators and regime employees who were killed for allegedly being military informants.
Junta admits it did not expect armed resistance from civilians
Regime spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun admitted in an interview with the BBC on Dec. 5 that the military had not expected armed resistance from civilians.
“Tatmadaw is facing challenges. The main challenge is mine attacks and sneak attacks by resistance fighters disguised as civilians,” Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun added.
Myanmar civilians initially responded to the coup with peaceful demands that democracy be restored in the country. However, after their protest columns were hit by live bullets and grenades and many of their comrades shot dead in late February and March, they came to realize that taking up arms was the only answer if they were to defeat the regime.
Since then, hundreds of resistance groups known collectively as the PDF have sprung up across the country, fighting the regime in both urban and rural areas of Myanmar.
In the cities, junta soldiers who had shown no mercy for unarmed protesters have tasted fear. Fatal guerrilla attacks by resistance fighters have forced junta soldiers to duck behind sandbags and barbed wire mesh fences.
Even as the regime has branded the resistance fighters as terrorists and launched a series of manhunts across the country, everyone can see that attacks on regime targets have only increased in Yangon and elsewhere..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1. The 14th Congress o f the Karenni National Progressive Party was convened on the 27th of
December 2021 and successfully concluded on the 30th o f December 2021.
2. At the Congress, the four-year reports o f the Party and government work implementation as
well as interim Party's affairs of 13th Party Congress were submitted and approved.
Furthermore, the Party's constitution and government procedure were reviewed and
amended. Future work plans were also discussed and laid down.
3. Discussion on cooperation with fellow Ethnic Armed Organizations, the National Unity
Government, Karenni National Defense Forces, and political parties to end military
dictatorship and all forms of dictatorship during the interim period, as well a s collectively
striving together with other stakeholders for building up a future federal democratic union
within National Unity Consultative Council were also made at the Congress. In addition,
necessary measures for the investigation and documentation o f the military coup-m akers'
intentional attempts of crimes against humanity and all forms of human rights violations
were also laid down for future implementation.
4. A new Party Chairman, 18 Central Committee Membe rs and seven Alternate Central
Committee Members of the KNPP were elected by a secret vote. Right after the con dusion
of congress, the first 14th Central Committee Meeting was held and the following Executive
Committee Members were elected..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karenni history
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
36 KB 90 KB 164.84 KB
more
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Karenni history, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
118.4 KB
more
Description:
"The dissertation argues reconciliation as a way of doing mission in Myanmar. The
see-discern-act method of research is used. The study has three parts.
First, the study critically reflects on the context of reconciliation by diagnosing the
present reality and situation of the country. Related information and data are collected
from different fields of study. The research identifies the main obstacles to peace,
harmony, and reconciliation as civil war, socio-ethnic conflict, religious violence,
militarism, political unrest, fragmentation, poverty and corruption.
Second, the research discerns and evaluates the challenge of reconciliation. It
accesses the research problem from interreligious and multicultural perspectives in search
of the possible solutions. If Myanmar will not have a future without reconciliation, the
Church must be part of working on reconciliation in order to build that future. The
research finds out that mission as reconciliation is possible by upholding spiritual ideals,
which are found in Myanmar, such as harmony, nonviolence, peace, truth, justice,
forgiveness, and healing. Mission is promotion of the spiritual ideals for reconciliation.
Third, the dissertation proposes reconciliation as mission. Apart from the
traditional scope of human-God-nature reconciliation this study extends a new frontier of
spirits-ancestors-cultures-religions reconciliation. The research proves that reconciliation
is more a mission, a religious act, and a spiritual virtue than a strategy, a political
program, a secular concern, and a civic project. Therefore, the Church must do mission as
ministry of reconciliation in many areas, at various levels, and according to its capacity.
When reconciliation is adopted as a way of doing and being in mission the Church
walks the path to a new way of being Church as communion through reconciliation.....ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: To pay homage to God, Dharma, Sangha, Teachers, and Parents is the fivefold
Burmese socio-religious teaching (annandaw annanda nga pa) which the researcher is deeply
obliged to fulfill for the accomplishment of his research.
Fr. Edgar G. Javier, SVD his professor and advisor, first and foremost, fully deserves
this homage in a special way for his great enlightenment and accompaniment.
Gratefulness goes to Dr. Mike Lambino for editing this dissertation and for his kind
corrections to the text.
Professors who teach the student in the doctoral class deserve the greatest gratitude
for all their noble gift of Dharma of intellectual support which surpasses all other gifts.
Archbishop Paul Zinghtung Grawng (Archbishop emeritus of Mandalay), Bishop
Philip Lasap Za Hawng (Bishop of Lashio), and Cardinal Charles Maung Bo (Archbishop of
Yangon) deserve this homage for their various helps in conducting this research.
Colleagues and friends of the student are given “a big thanks” for their critiques,
suggestions, and insights in the process of this research writing.
All the personnel of Institute for Consecrated Life in Asia (ICLA), and the librarians
of Loyola School of Theology (LST), St. Vincent School of Theology (SVST), Myanmar
Council of Churches (MCC), Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT) and St. Joseph Major
Seminary (SMS) are fully acknowledged for the academic support in this research.
Special gratitude is due to the Institute of Missiology Missio e.V. (MWI) for the
scholarship for this study. Likewise, the anonymous supporters are graciously thanked for
their generosity..."
Source/publisher:
Maung John
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.8 MB (289 pages)
more
Description:
"Burma/Myanmar’s postcolonial elites have established a military-state with
hybrid-imperial structures, characterized by high despotic but low infrastruc-
tural modes of power, and fueled by rent-extraction. Given the resulting eviscera-
tion of opposition political groups, citizens understand explicit politics as
dangerous. That said, cleavages between state and the polity afford vast space
for “civil society” groups (CS) to form and operate. CS stabilize the political
economy by managing citizen needs; conversely, CS stand as a wedge between
state and masses, (potentially) constructing spaces to coordinate and magnify
potential demands. Yet CS currently err toward managing needs. Opposition
must politicize Burmese masses and CS through idioms that interface with
CS’s material tasks—a “politics of the daily”—encouraging them to make, collec-
tively, a multiplicity of non-adversarial demands. This may compel the state to
pivot and seek new bargains, at which point elite advocacy-oriented CS can
provide progressive policy reforms. The paper will examine recent inchoate
social-political movements in Burma for models of this politics.
AFTER A TUMULTUOUS FOUR years for Myanmar—punctuated by mass protests in
September 2007, the devastation of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, and a con-
tentious national election in November 2010—by early 2011 many Burma-
watchers were left wondering if those epic events amounted to sound and fury
signifying nothing.1 Indeed, they had anticipated that 100,000 protesters and a
mismanaged natural disaster would subsequently lead to the cracking of the
ruling military regime and a transition to democracy (OSI 2007). Instead the
ruling military-state junta created a proxy civilian party, presided over an election
beset with fraud and intimidation, and installed a “new” government. This
effectively normalized the 2008 Constitution and closed the book on the coun-
try’s last democratic poll, which had been held in quasi-abeyance for two
Elliott Prasse-Freeman ([email protected]) is Founding Research Fellow at the Human Rights and
Social Movements Program at the Carr Center for Human Rights and an Advisory Board Member with the
Sexuality, Gender, and Human Rights Program at Harvard University.
1
Contrary to popular understanding, both “Burma” and “Myanmar” have always been used by those
native to the space, the former typically in colloquial speech, and the latter mostly in the formal
written language. To consciously avoid the binarism ascribed to the use of one over the other in
English (where “Burma” signifies solidarity with the opposition, while “Myanmar” endorses the
regime), this paper will use them interchangeably.
decades.2 Most ethnic groups put down weapons to reluctantly rejoin this politi-
cal process (Smith 2006), while the principal opposition, the National League for
Democracy (NLD), remained irreconcilable and was officially dissolved as a con-
sequence. When its leader, Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, was finally
released from house arrest, her political activities were initially declared
“illegal” and she was threatened with reincarceration.3 Actors on the outside,
too, were ineffectual in their central focus on effecting democratic change:
U.N. mediation was repeatedly unsuccessful, and neither sanctions nor punitively
low foreign aid4 directly coerced the junta into capitulation (Pedersen 2008, 232).
China (Steinberg 2001a, 223–39), ASEAN (Tonkin 2008, 3–4), and India contin-
ued to support the junta economically and covet it strategically, providing exter-
nal cover from Western coercion. But beyond this, internal political challenge
appeared anemic; the military-state maintained an effective monopoly over
explicit political expression.
And yet, despite its effective weathering of these paroxysms (protest, emer-
gency, election), the military-state then began showing stunning signs of reform:
by late 2011, political prisoners had been freed, the unheard-of phenomenon of
public pressure leading to a change in policy (the halting of the Myitsone
mega-dam project) had occurred, and the same Suu Kyi—threatened only
months before to avoid politics—had been allowed to run for parliament.
When this article went to print, debate was raging over what the changes signi-
fied, if anything at all. Sanguine observers heralded nothing less than a new dawn
in Myanmar (ICG 2011), while wary counterparts insisted that the superficial
“reforms” risked papering over deeper consolidation of military control
(Zarni 2011).
How to reconcile these two stories? Rather than adjudicating between them,
this article seeks two orthogonal objectives: first, to make the apparent contradic-
tions explicable by describing the system of political economy and social regu-
lation that has developed in the sixty years since independence. The second
objective will be to argue that these political events risk capturing the attention
of internal and external actors alike, when more important lessons generated
by the events perhaps lay elsewhere. The paper will argue that recent events
have illuminated actors that heretofore had been flying below the radars of
many observers and policymakers: whether organizing protests, pulling bodies
out of lakes, or delivering civic education seminars, civil society groups (hereafter
“CS”) are literally and figuratively everywhere in Burma (Heidel 2006). As such,
exploring how they function can stimulate a new way of seeing the challenges
facing Myanmar: instead of making state-to-state or “international
community”-to-state politics the only ways to contest an authoritarian regime,
Burmese CS provide a window through which we can penetrate an opaque pol-
itical economy and inform us about the way life (in the villages and urban slums)
actually functions, and can also demonstrate how an alternative politics may
contest the status quo. Myanmar scholars—including in a recent issue of this
journal (Thawnghmung 2011)—are increasingly mining these political spaces
and practices, exploring daily experiences of average citizens. This article
hopes to continue this conversation, contributing to determining what role
these largely forgotten actors can play in driving change from within. Indeed,
if the government is serious about reform, these forgotten actors will be
seminal in channeling and shaping it; if the government is not, these actors
will need to emerge to help compel change.
METHODOLOGIES
Against simplistic binary descriptions—totalitarian accounts in Burmese
commentary and classic authoritarian portrayals in political science—I describe
Burma’s political space as incorporating multiple particular governmentalities
(Foucault 2007); I examine those by exploring (a) the institutions or actors that
de facto govern subjects (states, customary leaders, CS representatives,
businesses, spiritual guides, etc.); (b) the modes that those forms of governance
take (“rights”-based, negotiated bargains, implicit deals, etc.); therefore (c) the
kinds of relationships that develop (patron/client, state/citizen, corporation/
employee, NGO/“partner,” “international community”/victim); through which
(d) power then flows to produce, regulate, punish, discipline, or expel subjects.
And finally (e) how the different zones constituted by these different fields of
governmentality, with their respective intensities, intersect with and hence influ-
ence one another to create a broader system or assemblage (Deleuze and
Guatarri 1987 [1980]). Taking up each of these permutations is beyond the
scope of any single paper, but this methodological framework informs the
project. Indeed, only by more precisely understanding this system can collective
political attitudes become comprehensible and social space at Myanmar’s periph-
eries and within its interstices become apparent, thereby contextualizing current
CS actions and animating our ability to perceive the form this potential takes.
To accomplish this, inter alia, I conducted semi-structured interviews with
150 members of 61 Burmese CS and/or political organizations in December
2009 and January 2010. Organizations were identified through referrals, and cross-referenced with NGO lists compiled by the Burma Library (in Mae Sot,
Thailand) and Local Resource Center in Yangon, respectively, to ensure adequate
coverage. Organizations are kept anonymous due to their sensitive activities.
Finally, two conceptual deviations from classic civil society conceptualizations
attend my use of CS. First, I define CS as those groups making social decisions
outside of direct state control and without ambition toward capture of, or partici-
pation in, the state. I avoid language such as “individuals coming together”
to “make collective decisions” because I neither imply quasi-democratic or
even necessarily collaborative decision making, nor do I suggest that individuals
are what drive CS decisions. Instead, CS often take on institutional conscious-
nesses and logics that act recursively on those people who constitute them
(Zizek 2008, 167). Second, CS will be used plurally—signifying a multiplicity
of organizations—and will also imply an alternative space that CS both constitutes
(by virtue of its operation) and enters into..."
Source/publisher:
The Journal of Asian Studies (Vol. 71, No. 2)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Civil Society, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Social and Cultural History, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
148.52 KB (27 pages)
more
Description:
"Since first coming to direct political power in 1958, Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) has
dominated the country’s politics and controlled the state apparatus.
2 Despite a series of
challenges to its rule, the Tatmadaw has been able to constantly reinvent itself and,
ultimately, to reassert its dominance over Burmese society. Cycles of popular protests,
economic and political crises, and dissatisfaction with military rule failed to overthrow or
undermined the military’s organizational coherence. The most tangible outcome of the
1988 public protest movement and its suppression was the collapse of Ne Win’s Burmese
Socialist Program Party (BSPP). For it was those events that permitted the Tatmadaw to
return Myanmar to direct military rule under the ostensible leadership of the State Law
and Order Council (SLORC), later renamed as the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC). The SLORC/SPDC regime effectively crushed protests, arrested opposition
leaders, and began a process of rebuilding the military to become the most competent and
formidable institution in the country with uncontested control over the state apparatus
(ICG 2001: 24; ICG 2011; Kyaw 2009: 272). Given its dominance, it is thus puzzling that
the SPDC self-elected to dissolve itself and allow the formation of a nominally-civilian government in 2011. By 2012, this new government has declared its intention to
liberalize Myanmar and has introduced a series of dramatic changes that permit expanded
pluralism, economic freedoms, and freedom of the press.
3
This paper examines the historical development of the Tatmadaw as an organizational
actor since its rise to power in 1962. It seeks to understand and clarify the significance of
recent reforms in which the Tatmadaw appears to have ceded powers. In so doing, two
prominent approaches to regime change are considered in turn. First, the game theoretic
model that focuses on the personalities of reformers and challengers in explaining why
authoritarian regimes reform. While such frameworks offer helpful insights in the
dynamics of political change, they nevertheless fall short in explaining why changes are
taking place at an institutional/regime-level. This paper will thus focus on a chronological
path-dependent approach that traces the organizational evolution of the Tatmadaw and
identifies how it sought to strategically reposition itself vis-à-vis society. By adopting
regime typologies introduced in the works of Linz and Stepan (1996), this paper will
argue that current developments should be seen as a diminished form of authoritarianism.
The conclusion discusses the present situation and its implications for the country’s
trajectory of political development.
The paper’s main claim is that the ongoing dramatic reforms introduced since mid-2011
should not be understood simply as an exit strategy by the military to retreat from
national politics. On the contrary, this paper suggests that ceding dominance is in fact an
evolving strategy by the Tatmadaw to continue consolidating its organizational powers
and to institutionalize its influence over government, though without the responsibility
for the direct administration of the state. The Tatmadaw no longer governs directly and
reforms have increased political competitiveness on the national stage.
4 Be that as it may, the Tatmadaw has designed various mechanisms to safeguard its interests. It has done so
through the creation of what Linz and Stepan referred to as “reserve domains” (1996: 67).
Hence, while there is no doubt that major changes in Myanmar are underway, it is
premature to assume this entails a fundamental realignment of political power, let alone a
transition to consolidated democracy.
Game theoretic perspectives on Myanmar’s transition
Much of the popular reports on current liberalization efforts in Myanmar have explained
recent changes by essentially adopting a classical game theory model. Many Myanmar
watchers and popular press for example have examined current political transition as a
strategic game between regime softliners/reformers versus hardliners with a particular
focus on the elite actors (Callahan 2012, Fuller 2012, Jagan 2012, Kyaw 2012, Tin 2012).
For example Kyaw Yin Hlaing explains that in the absence of intervention from the
retired Than Shwe, some officials within the new government have emerged labeling
themselves as liberals while calling for further liberalization of the country’s political
economy (Kyaw 2012: 209). Similarly, Callahan (2012: 122) argues that despite having
hand-picked his successors, Than Shwe have now “lost the ability to control the [reform]
process from behind the scenes.” She credited this as a long-held “pent-up pressure” from
Than Shwe’s subordinates that are now well placed to “push the envelope” and
essentially curb the “once-boundless policy-making powers” of the Tatmadaw.
Under this model, game theorists argue that democratization is possible for authoritarian
regimes when moderates from both the ruling elites and the opposition compromise and
work together in other to prevent backlashes from their respective hardliners (Przeworski
1992: 105-53; Linz and Stepan 1996: 61). Additionally, according to Linz and Stepan
(1996: 65), military authoritarian regimes that are hierarchical in nature are among the
most likely regime types to allow this type of transitional path towards democratization,
as the “military as institution” views the cost of maintaining the “military as government” as too high, thus would eventually compromise and allow liberalizing reforms as an exit
strategy for the “military as institution.”5
Though the hardliner versus moderate argument certainly gives a plausible explanation of
how a regime can democratize, it nevertheless falls short of articulating why a
consolidated military regime, which is in a position of strength both as an institution and
as government, would choose to liberalize. It is certainly important to understand the role
of elite “reformers” such as President Thein Sein and Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann
and how they have coordinated for a push for liberalization of Myanmar’s political
economy, yet it is also vital to note that they were both key members of the preceding
SPDC regime and the Tatmadaw, and neither individual previously demonstrated that
they would push for further political reforms in a post-SPDC state.6 What then allowed
these actors to change the “rules of the game” and thus effectively reposition themselves
as liberals in a reforming regime?
As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 21) point out, in authoritarian regimes, “no transition
can be forced purely by opponents against a regime which maintains the cohesion,
capacity, and disposition to apply repression.” Additionally as Huntington (1991: 114)
suggests one must examine the “continuum in terms of the relative importance of the
governing and opposition groups as the source of democratization.”
However, in the case of Myanmar, in the absence of any effective and unified political
opposition that could realistically topple and replace the military regime (Mya 1992: 146-
59; Kyaw 2008: 128-9), current political reforms are led from the top-down by military
elites as part of a “transformation” process (Huntington 1991: 114). Given the non-
democratic credentials of the Tatmadaw’s long authoritarian rule over Myanmar, current
attempts to “transform” the regime should not be understood as an attempt to introduce a top-down transition towards a Western-style liberal democracy per se, but rather as a
strategy for the military to prolong its continued dominance over the state apparatus, as
well as to ensure that the core interests of the military are preserved.
7
When the Tatmadaw first took direct control of the state apparatus in 1962, the
Revolutionary Council (1962-1971) under the leadership of General Ne Win attempted to
transform Myanmar by purging all forms of pluralism to ensure the primacy of the
Tatmadaw as the only potent political force responsible for the affairs of the state. At the
height of the Ne Win regime, the Tatmadaw attempted to regulate all aspects of social life
but was unable to achieve absolute domination over its population and was constantly
challenged by armed insurgencies on the peripheries suggesting that the regime was at
best an “arrested totalitarian” regime. Additionally, the regime elites were disillusioned
and lacked commitment to the proclaimed Burmese Way to Socialism ideology (Kyaw
2003: 35).
Subsequently, in order for the Tatmadaw to regain control and support for the state, the
arrested-totalitarian authoritarian regime began to co-opt traditional non-state actors that
had “roots in society before the establishment of the regime” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 44).
This led the regime to seek support from the very actors, for example private businesses
and monastic organizations, that it had initially aimed to purge, thus modifying the
character of the Tatmadaw as government. The result was the establishment of the de jure
BSPP single-party state apparatus, whereby the party was theoretically leading the
Tatmadaw (Taylor 2009a: 317). However, the inability of the authoritarian BSPP regime
to further correct problems brought about by its grossly mismanaged economy finally led
to the collapse of order thus paving way for the re-emergence of an authoritarian military
SLORC/SPDC regime which was no longer committed to the socialist vision of its BSPP
predecessors. Though the SPDC was able to preserve some sort of peace and stability for nearly two
decades, the mass protests of 2007, popularly referred to as the “Saffron Revolution,”
indicated that the SPDC’s rule had not fundamentally led to a sustainable state-societal
relationship.8
The 2007 crackdown of the mainly urban protests saw the return of order
and the re-silencing of the regime’s critics. However, it also signaled that a re-negotiation
of the socio-political order between the state and its society was long overdue. In order to
understand this evolutionary development of the shifting attitude between the state and its
society, the evolution of the Tatmadaw as the state apparatus will be traced including
why reforms in the current context came about as a calculated top-down process that was
designed to preserve the interest of the Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher:
Southeast Asia Research Centre and The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
592.35 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s detained leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has denied testimony from one of her ousted government’s chief ministers that she took a bribe from him, dismissing his claims as “all absurd”, according to her lawyers.
Testifying as a civilian witness, detained Yangon Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein told the court last week that he paid her US$600,000 and 7 viss (11.4 kg) of gold. The regime has charged Daw Aung San Suu Kyi with corruption.
“She said she didn’t take anything [from him], and he didn’t pay her the gold or dollars,” U Kyi Win, one of her lawyers, quoting her as saying. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team met with her for a few minutes on Monday before her trial hearings. She is facing 11 charges, including corruption charges, brought by the junta since her arrest following the coup in February.
“She said U Phyo Min Thein was likely to have been forced [by the junta] to say so under detention,” the lawyer said.
Another lawyer said, “‘All absurd’ is what Daw Aung San Suu Kyi commented about the testimony.”
The chief minister has been detained by the regime since February.
In March, the regime released a video that it claimed proved the graft allegation against detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. In the video, U Phyo Min Thein says he went to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at least three times to give her the money and gold between December 2017 and March 2018. But the video met with public skepticism as the chief minister’s lip movements were not synchronized with the audio.
On Friday, however, he appeared before the court and repeated what he said in the video, becoming the first plaintiff witness against her from the National League for Democracy (NLD). U Phyo Min Thein was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the party led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Unlike other senior NLD leaders and chief ministers, he has not faced any legal charges from the junta..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s deposed President U Win Myint and State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and Naypyitaw Council chairman Dr. Myo Aung earlier this week pleaded not guilty to charges of incitement brought by the military regime that removed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government in February.
The regime led by coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has brought 11 charges against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and two each against U Win Myint and Dr. Myo Aung. It is well known that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was subjected to decades of oppression by successive military regimes. But legal persecution is not new to U Win Myint and Dr. Myo Aung, either.
However, the detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in an unknown location and the attempt to imprison her on baseless charges indicate that Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing is more ruthless than his predecessor, Senior General Than Shwe.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest three times spanning a total of 15 years between 1989 and 2010 by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and its successor, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Deposed president U Win Myint and Dr. Myo Aung were also the political prisoners of previous regimes.
As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity grew along with that of the pro-democracy movement in 1988, she was put under house arrest for the first time in July 1989 under Section 10 (b) of the 1975 State Protection Act. The provision carries three years in prison and she was due to be released in July 1992. But in 1991, the regime changed the law and increased the prison term to five years.
The amendment meant Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would be kept under arrest for two more years. Her release was due in July 1994, but the regime refused to free her, saying she had been detained under a decree from July 1989 to July 1990, so that period would not be counted in her five-year house arrest. Thanks to the regime’s crafty interpretation, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had to spend six years in total under house arrest and was only released in 1995.
In September 2000, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was forcibly stopped at Yangon General Railway Station as she was attempting to leave for Mandalay to campaign for her party. She was taken back to her home in Yangon’s Bahan Township where she spent one year and eight months in confinement until May 2002, without having committed any offence.
Just before her second house arrest, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage, while traveling to Kunchangon and Kawhmu townships, were beaten and placed under house arrest for two weeks. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was snatched and taken home by six policewomen from Dala on the opposite bank of Yangon. Among those who were placed under 14 days of house arrest was Dr. Myo Aung, who later served as Naypyitaw Council chairman in the NLD government that was ousted this year.
The public support for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not wane, despite the regime’s hope that she would fade into obscurity after years of separation from the public. This led to the attempted assassination of the NLD leader while she was on a campaign trip in Tabayin in May 2003. She escaped the attack and was sent to Insein Prison, then again locked up at her house.
Her third house arrest began in May 2003. Under the law, the maximum punishment is five years in prison, but again the regime counted the prison term as starting from May 2004. Then, US citizen John Yettaw trespassed upon her lakeside residence in early May 2009, two weeks before her scheduled release from house arrest.
This illegal visit prompted prosecution of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi under Section 22 of the State Protection Act. People believed the regime used it as an excuse to confine her until the 2010 general election was complete.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was detained at the officers’ quarters of the Correctional Department inside Insein Prison and for the first time put on trial. She was sentenced to three years in prison with labor in August 2009.
Consequently, Home Affairs Minister Major General Maung Oo read Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s instruction before the judges, diplomats and journalists that she would only have to serve half of the jail term no matter how many years she was handed by the court. The remainder of the sentence would be suspended and she would be freed from having to serve it if she behaved well. She was placed under house arrest. As scripted and directed by the regime, she was released from house arrest on Nov. 13, 2010, five days after the regime held a general election.
Two years later, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi entered the parliament, which was dominated by the ex-generals. Her NLD won a majority in the general election in 2015 and formed the government for the first time, 25 years after winning the 1990 general election, only for the regime to refuse to hand over power. It was the first civilian government in more than five decades, since the 1962 coup by Gen. Ne Win.
In the 2020 poll, the NLD again secured an electoral mandate to manage the country for five more years. However, the Myanmar military, which has never enjoyed public support and has never been able to remove Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from Myanmar’s political leadership role, seized power in a coup in February this year. She was arrested for the fourth time at the age of 76 and is being held in an unknown location in Naypyitaw Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is facing 11 charges, a larger number than was brought by former military dictators Senior General Saw Maung and Snr-Gen Than Shwe. Facing at least 75 years in prison, the now 76-year-old would spend the rest of her life behind bars if convicted of all charges..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Articles and reports about the NLD, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Almost eight months after the military coup, Myanmar’s currency depreciated to a record low this week, prompting fears of worsening social and economic instability in the country, which has been devastated by the takeover.
On Tuesday, the US dollar exchange rate rose to a record high of around 2,500 to
2,700 kyats per dollar. Prior to the Feb. 1 coup, the exchange rate was between 1,300-
1,400 kyats per USD. The rates on Wednesday are the same as yesterday, according to sources from different money exchanges and the black market.
The value of gold on the domestic market reached a record high of more than 2.25
million kyats per tical on Tuesday, up sharply from a little over 2 million kyats the
previous day. Gold shops had to close on that day and the market reopened only on Wednesday afternoon with prices at 2.2 million kyat per tical. The tical is a traditional Burmese measurement of gold weight equal to16.33 grams (just over half an ounce). The gold price before the coup was 1.32 million kyats per tical.
People are only looking to buy US dollars in the currency market, with almost no one willing to resell, pushing the value of the greenback up sharply against the local currency, according to market sources.
“Dollar sales are almost nonexistent and demand [for US currency] is rising as more people want to buy than previously,” said a businessman who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Under the junta, the Central Bank of Myanmar has been selling reserve dollars to some companies importing key commodities such as petrol, cooking oil and pharmaceuticals through local private banks on a quota basis. However, the businessman said, there is a large demand for dollars in the market.
Since the coup, the central bank has sold more than 190 million US dollars to the market in an attempt to stabilize the exchange rate. Of that amount, some $60 million was sold in September alone.
However, unwilling to accept the drop in the Myanmar currency’s value, the junta set the official exchange rate at around 1,755 kyats per USD on Wednesday.
Economists told The Irrawaddy that the economic slowdown, the banking crisis and political instability in the aftermath of the coup have led to volatility in the US dollar/kyat exchange rate, adding that the banking crisis had escalated into a currency crisis.
A business analyst in Rangoon said, “It is mainly based on political instability. As the political situation becomes more volatile, some rich people will buy gold and dollars. The Central Bank also tries to monitor [the situation]. But as the bank does not have a lot of dollars, it can’t control things.”
He said the current economic problems in the Southeast Asian country could not be resolved through economic policies alone, but only through political change.
The rise of the US dollar/kyat exchange rate has seen petroleum prices increase steadily to more than 1,400 kyats per liter. At the end of January, fuel prices ranged between 660-770 kyat per liter.
As a consequence, transportation costs have risen, as well as domestic commodity prices and the prices of some imported goods. On Wednesday, some companies abruptly halted their sales of imports due to the serious drop in the kyat’s value.
An economist said: “People have lost faith in the kyat and are reluctant to deposit in banks. So they purchase the commodity they trust. People are trying to save dollars rather than spending.”
He said that due to a decline in exports, the cessation of foreign investment and the absence of international aid, the junta’s income from foreign currency had dried up, limiting its ability to control the US dollar/kyat exchange rate.
“They can’t solve this crisis. It is clear that they cannot do it. The whole economy is collapsing because of them,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Banking, Economic History, Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Yaw Region, once a haven of peace and tranquility, is now a war zone with civilian resistance fighters battling Myanmar’s military regime.
Local people in Yaw – which comprises Gangaw, Hteelin, Saw and Kyukhtu townships in Magwe Region and which is located between the Pongtaung-Ponnya mountain range on the western banks of the Chindwin River and the Chin Hills – are rebelling against military rule with whatever weapons they have.
Most of the villages in Yaw support the National League for Democracy Party, whose government was ousted by the Myanmar military in a February 1 coup. But the area is also home to military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party strongholds, where Pyu Saw Htee groups – militia trained and armed by the junta – are active.
Civilian resistance fighters in Yaw have only traditional hunting rifles to battle junta forces, who significantly outnumber them. As a result, the number of civilian deaths, displaced people and homes destroyed in junta raids is increasing.
The memory of what happened on September 9 in Myin Thar, a large village in Yaw with a population of 3,800 people, will haunt the villagers for the rest of their life. It was a tragic and painful sight for people resisting the military regime.
On the morning of September 9, Myin Thar was thrown into chaos after locals heard that junta troops were torching nearby Thar Lin Village, located to the west of Myin Thar on the opposite bank of the Myitthar River.
Then, junta troops and armed men in sports shorts came across the bridge that links Thar Lin and Myin Thar villages. A firefight erupted at 10am between civilian resistance fighters and the regime forces. The resistance fighters were forced to withdraw after the junta troops used heavy weapons.
A total of 18 people, including teenage boys and senior citizens, died in Myin Thar on September 9, and some 20 houses were burned down by the junta forces.
“We formed a defense group out of fear that our village might be raided and torched. We defended for around 45 minutes with traditional hunting rifles after they opened fire on us. We are upset,” said one villager.
Regime spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun said junta troops went to Myin Thar in response to a tip that a local People’s Defense Force (PDF) was active there. The junta spokesperson claimed that the regime forces were attacked by some 50 men near the village.
One soldier died and the military seized 23 rifles and eight homemade grenade launchers, added Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun. But he did not mention the deaths of the 18 villagers.
Locals said that the armed men in civilian clothes who fought alongside the junta troops are Pyu Saw Htee members. Some villagers were killed after the junta forces entered the village. And since September 9, the village is enveloped in silence and grief and the residents live in fear of another attack.
Piles of corpses were found. Almost all of them had been shot in the head, suggesting that the victims, many already wounded, were executed.
“Most of them were shot in the head. Their heads were broken and their brains spilled out like a ripe papaya that has fallen from a tree,” said one resident.
U Tun Ngwe, 86, was found dead with signs that he had been tied up and beaten to death. A 50-year-old paralyzed man barely able to walk had been shot dead in a chair in his house. It appears that every male that the junta forces encountered was shot dead.
Some villagers fled to the forest or the village monastery. Around 20 junta soldiers and armed men came to the monastery and threatened to shoot those in hiding if they did not come out. Residents including elderly persons, women, mothers and children were forced to kneel down for more than an hour and interrogated.
“Your children and brothers must have been among those killed in the fighting. Go and collect their bodies at the bridge. There are at least ten of them. Go and collect their bodies after we leave,” the junta soldiers reportedly told the villagers.
Junta troops burned and looted houses, said witnesses. The following morning, they torched more houses before they left. Then, the residents returned to their homes and collected bodies. The youngest victim was barely 16.
“Some of the victims were the only sons in their families and their parents broke down. Since that day, everyone in the village, whether young or old, is in tears,” said a resident.
Junta forces have also raided some 15 villages in Gangaw Township, killing more than 20 locals and displacing thousands of villagers. They have raided Hnan Kha Village in Gangaw four times, destroying some 50 houses.
In response to junta attacks, the combined forces of the Gangaw PDF and the Chin Defense Force-Hakha have ambushed military convoys on the Gangaw-Kale Road with mines.
People everywhere in Yaw were very upset when they saw the pictures of the young victims from Myin Thar Village, alongside the rudimentary rifles they had used to defend themselves from the regime troops.
“They [junta forces] are too inhumane. I can’t bear hearing their voices,” said one female Yaw resident. “I don’t want to experience this anymore. I wish other people also did not have to face this. I believe we will win the fight. We are not afraid of the junta forces, but we feel disgusted by them,” she added.
Many Myin Thar villagers are too upset to return to their village and are staying elsewhere.
The victims who died on September 9 were cremated near the bridge at the entrance of the village. Residents plan to plant a garden in their memory in the future..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Kachin youths gathered in downtown Myitkyina to show their opposition to coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to the capital of Kachin State in northern Myanmar.
Over a dozen youths staged a flash mob protest against the coup leader during his visit to Myitkyina over the weekend.
“Min Aung Hlaing, don’t you feel ashamed to come to Kachin land? Get out of Kachin Land,” shouted the youths in unison, despite the heavy presence of junta forces.
“We can’t welcome the military leader who has killed hundreds of people to our land,” said an anti-regime activist from Myitkyina.
Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing has visited Kachin State numerous times as the chief of the Myanmar military, but this was his first visit to Kachin since the February 1 coup.
By THE IRRAWADDY 21 September 2021
Kachin youths gathered in downtown Myitkyina to show their opposition to coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to the capital of Kachin State in northern Myanmar.
Over a dozen youths staged a flash mob protest against the coup leader during his visit to Myitkyina over the weekend.
“Min Aung Hlaing, don’t you feel ashamed to come to Kachin land? Get out of Kachin Land,” shouted the youths in unison, despite the heavy presence of junta forces.
“We can’t welcome the military leader who has killed hundreds of people to our land,” said an anti-regime activist from Myitkyina.
Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing has visited Kachin State numerous times as the chief of the Myanmar military, but this was his first visit to Kachin since the February 1 coup.
Sunday’s protest was also the first time he has been booed by Kachin people, despite the fact that he has overseen military operations even before the coup that have killed hundreds and displaced tens of thousands of people in Kachin.
Junta-appointed Kachin State Chief Minister Khet Htein Nan presented the coup leader with a Kachin traditional costume, bag and ceremonial silver sword, prompting huge criticism in Kachin circles.
Kachin communities have slammed Khet Htein Nan as a traitor to the Kachin people. He was condemned by the Kachin people for accepting the position of chief minister from the military regime and a series of protests have been staged against him, with some locals calling for social punishment against him and his family.
Khat Htein Nan has drawn fresh criticism following Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing’s weekend visit to Myitkyina, with Kachin people calling for a boycott of the clothing business run by his daughter.
The coup leader arrived in Myitkyina on Saturday and met military personnel and their families from Northern Command and the Myitkyina battalion, as well as junta-appointed Kachin State ministers.
At the meeting with military personnel, he repeated claims that he has made to soldiers in other parts of the country that Myanmar is in crisis because the National League for Democracy (NLD) rigged the vote in the 2020 general election.
“From what we have seen and heard the current political situation is quite complicated and there are serious armed conflicts in Kachin. Security is always in a state of emergency in Kachin. We heard that he came to give some guidance regarding that situation,” a source close to Northern Command told The Irrawaddy.
There have been frequent clashes between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Myanmar military since a bilateral ceasefire broke down in 2011, although fighting stopped for two years before the February 1 coup.
Since March 11, the KIA has attacked regime troops and police stations in Kachin and northern Shan State, inflicting heavy casualties on junta forces. Clashes have taken place in some eight townships across Kachin State. The KIA has claimed that the regime had brought in thousands of extra soldiers since late March.
The ethnic armed group has provided military training to civilians wishing to fight back against the regime, as well as giving shelter to political activists and NLD lawmakers wanted by the junta. Moreover, Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of the parallel National Unity Government, is reportedly backed by the KIA and other influential Kachin politicians.
Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing likely attaches great importance to Kachin State as the KIA is viewed by the regime as the major ethnic armed group backing the nationwide revolt against the junta’s coup.
KIA information chief Colonel Naw Bu told The Irrawaddy that the central executive committee of the Kachin Independence Organization, the KIA’s political wing, had no comment so far on the coup leader’s visit to Kachin..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has denied false reports that she didn’t accept armed resistance against the military regime by the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs).
Last week, fake news circulated online by military supporters stated that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi delivered a message to the public that she denounced the NUG and PDFs’ activities as terrorist acts—the same stand as the regime.
The report also falsely claimed the detained leader said armed resistance is not the right approach and that she wants a peaceful solution, and that she urged the public not to support the NUG and PDFs. The NUG was formed by elected lawmakers of the National League for Democracy chaired by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with ethnic and civil society leaders, to rival the military junta after the Feb. 1 coup. PDFs were formed by local civilian resistance fighters to defend the junta’s offensives against civilians.
The false report came amid increasing attacks on the military regime and its assets by civilian resistance fighters following the parallel NUG’s Sept. 7 declaration of a nationwide defensive war against the junta.
And the fake report claimed the message was released by the detained leader through her legal team, which is currently the only link between her and the outside world.
Her legal team had previously rejected the reports, saying that no one on the team had been relayed any such information from the State Counselor. They said they asked her to comment on the false reports on Monday before her weekly trial hearing.
“When we told her about the report, she asked ‘Do people believe that?’ and added that ‘I would never say words which will dismay the public [or go] against their will,” U Khin Maung Zaw, one of her lawyers who was at the brief meeting with her on Monday before the court hearing, told The Irrawaddy.
Since her arrest, the leader has met with no outside persons and was only allowed to have a brief chat with her legal team for the first time on June 7, at the first hearing where she appeared in court in person.
The junta has brought a total of six charges against her including alleged violations of COVID-19 restrictions, possession of illegal walkie-talkies, sedition and breaching the Official Secrets Act. The military regime has also filed four corruption charges against her. She faces a potential prison sentence of 75 years.
By THE IRRAWADDY 20 September 2021
Myanmar’s detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has denied false reports that she didn’t accept armed resistance against the military regime by the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs).
Last week, fake news circulated online by military supporters stated that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi delivered a message to the public that she denounced the NUG and PDFs’ activities as terrorist acts—the same stand as the regime.
The report also falsely claimed the detained leader said armed resistance is not the right approach and that she wants a peaceful solution, and that she urged the public not to support the NUG and PDFs. The NUG was formed by elected lawmakers of the National League for Democracy chaired by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with ethnic and civil society leaders, to rival the military junta after the Feb. 1 coup. PDFs were formed by local civilian resistance fighters to defend the junta’s offensives against civilians.
The false report came amid increasing attacks on the military regime and its assets by civilian resistance fighters following the parallel NUG’s Sept. 7 declaration of a nationwide defensive war against the junta.
And the fake report claimed the message was released by the detained leader through her legal team, which is currently the only link between her and the outside world.
Her legal team had previously rejected the reports, saying that no one on the team had been relayed any such information from the State Counselor. They said they asked her to comment on the false reports on Monday before her weekly trial hearing.
“When we told her about the report, she asked ‘Do people believe that?’ and added that ‘I would never say words which will dismay the public [or go] against their will,” U Khin Maung Zaw, one of her lawyers who was at the brief meeting with her on Monday before the court hearing, told The Irrawaddy.
Since her arrest, the leader has met with no outside persons and was only allowed to have a brief chat with her legal team for the first time on June 7, at the first hearing where she appeared in court in person.
The junta has brought a total of six charges against her including alleged violations of COVID-19 restrictions, possession of illegal walkie-talkies, sedition and breaching the Official Secrets Act. The military regime has also filed four corruption charges against her. She faces a potential prison sentence of 75 years.
U Khin Maung Zaw said Daw Aung San Suu Kyi urged the team to point out that they were not being allowed to defend her in accordance with due legal process.
At Monday’s court hearing, public prosecutors applied to the court to present an additional witness, an official from the Ministry of Communications, and the defense objected..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, About Aung San Suu Kyi
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"စူဇန်နာ (ကလောင်အမည်) မှ ဖမ်းဆီးအကျဥ်းချခံထားရသူ သူငယ်ချင်းတဦးထံသို့ ပေးစာ ရေးသားသည်။
ရွှေပြည်သာနှင့် အင်းစိန် မှလွဲ၍ နေရာများနှင့် ရက်စွဲများကို လုံခြုံရေးအရ ပြန်လည်ပြင်ဆင်ထားသည်။ ယခုစာကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဂျွန်လလယ် တွင်ရေးသားခဲ့သည်။
မူရင်းပို့စ်အား ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဩဂုတ်လ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ရေးသားထုတ်ဝေခဲ့သည်။ အင်္ဂလိပ်ဘာသာဖြင့် ဤနေရာတွင် ဖတ်ရှုပါ။
အကိုနဲ့ နောက်ဆုံးစကားပြောခဲ့တာ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် မေလ ၂ ရက်နေ့ ညနေ ၄ နာရီပါ။ နောက်နေ့ နေ့တနေ့ရဲ့ အစ ပထမဆုံး ကော်ဖီသောက်နေတုန်းမှာ ရန်ကုန်ကသူငယ်ချင်း တယောက်စီက “နင်သိပြီးပြီလား” ဆိုတဲ့ စာ ၀င်လာတယ်။ ကျွန်မ ဘာကိုသိပြီးရမှာလဲ။ တကယ်တော့ သိပ်မကြာသေးခင်ကမှ အကိုပုန်းရှောင်နေတဲ့ တိုက်ခန်းတခုကို မနက် ၂ နာရီမှာ စစ်သားတွေလာပြီး အကို့ကိုလာဖမ်းသွားတဲ့ အကြောင်းကိုပါ။ ပြီးတော့ အဲ့ကတည်းက အကိုကို့ ဘယ်ခေါ်သွားတယ်၊ ဘာဖြစ်သွားတယ် ဆိုတာ ဘယ်သူမှမသိဘူး ဆိုတဲ့ အကြောင်းကို ပေါ့။
ဖြစ်နိုင်ရင် မေလ ၂ ရက်နေ့ညက အကိုအဲ့လိုအဖမ်းခံရမယ်ဆိုတာ ကြိုသိခဲ့ရင်ကောင်းမှာပဲလို့ တွေးမိတယ်။ အင်တာနက်လိုင်းပြန်ရပြီပဲလေဆိုပြီး အကိုကို့ ချက်ချင်း တိုက်ရိုက်ဖုန်းခေါ် စကားပြောဖို့ ကျွန်မ တွန့်ဆုတ် ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အကိုနဲ့ စာအပြန်အလှန်ပို့တဲ့ အကျင့်ကို မျက်နှာချင်းဆိုင် စကားပြောတဲ့အကျင့်နဲ့ ကျွန်မ တကယ် ပြောင်းလဲချင်ခဲ့တယ်။ အဲ့လိုပြောင်းကြရအောင်လို့ ဘာလို့မတိုက်တွန်းခဲ့မိတာလဲတော့ မသေချာဘူး။ အခု အင်တာနက်တွေ ပြန်ရပြီ၊ မြို့လယ်ခေါင် အင်တာနက်ဆိုင်တွေ ထိုင်ပြီး ဆက်သွယ်ဖို့ သတင်းပို့ဖို့ မလိုတော့ဘူး၊ ကျွန်မတို့ အချိန်မရွေး ဆက်သွယ်နိုင်ပြီလို့ အကို ပြောခဲ့တာကြောင့် မတိုက်တွန်းမိတာလဲ ဖြစ်နိုင်ပါတယ်။ ဟုတ်ပါတယ်၊ ကျွန်မတို့မှာ တယောက်နဲ့တယောက် စကားတွေအချိန်မရွေး ပြောလို့ရတဲ့ ဘ၀တခုရှိခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီ ဘဝကို ညတွင်းချင်း ခိုးယူ မခံလိုက်ရခင်ထိပေါ့။
ရန်ကုန်အပြင်ဘက် စိမ်းလန်းစိုပြေတဲ့နေရာလေးတခုမှာပဲ အချိန်တွေရင်းနှီးမြုပ်နှံပြီး ဘေးဖယ်ထားခဲ့တဲ့ အကိုရဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးတက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားမှုတွေဟာ ဖေဖော်၀ါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့ အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနေ့မှာ ပြန်အစပျိုးခဲ့တယ်။ အကို ဟာ ဩဂဲန်းနစ် ဟင်းသီးဟင်းရွက်လေးတွေ စိုက်ပျိုးနေခဲ့တယ်။ အကိုဟာ သဘာဝတရားကြီးနဲ့ ပြန်ချိတ်ဆက် မိသွားပြီ၊ အဲ့လိုစိုက်ပျိုးနေရတာ အကို့တွက်ကောင်းတယ်လို့ ကျွန်မထင်တယ်။ မြစ်ဘေးနား ကြိုးပုခက်လေးထဲ က အကို့ပုံတွေ ကျွန်မ ဖေ့စ်ဘုတ်ပေါ်မှာ မြင်တွေ့လိုက်ရတိုင်း စိတ်အေးချမ်းသာမှု ဖြစ်ရတယ်။ ဇန်န၀ါရီလ ကုန်မှာ အကို့ ကံတရားဟာ အကို့အိမ်ရှေ့တံခါးဝကို တံခါးလာခေါက်တော့မလိုမျိုး ပတ်၀န်းကျင်အသစ်မှာ မိတ်ဆွေဟောင်းတွေနဲ့ အကိုပြန်လည်ချိတ်ဆက်မိသွားတာကိုလည်း ကျွန်မ သတိပြုမိပါရဲ့။ ရက်အနည်းငယ်အကြာမှာပဲ အဲ့ကံတရားဟာ ရောက်ချလာတယ်။ မြေအောက်လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွေ စည်းချက်ညီညီ ပြန်စပြီး လူထုဆန့်ကျင်လှုပ်ရှားမှုလမ်းကြောင်းကို ဆက်လျှောက်ဖို့ သူတို့နဲ့ အတူတူ အကိုဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့တယ်။ ပို့ပေးနေကြ ခရမ်းချဥ်သီး၊ သခွါးသီး လတ်လတ်ဆတ်ဆတ် ပုံတွေ၊စာတွေဟာ ပျောက်ကွယ်သွားတယ်။ ကျွန်မတို့ ပြောဆိုဆက်သွယ်ရတဲ့ ပုံတွေ၊ အကြောင်းရာတွေဟာ ပြင်းထန်လာတယ်။ အကိုအင်တာနက် ရနေချိန်တိုင်း ကျွန်မတို့အဆက်သွယ် လုပ်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။
ကျွန်မတို့ဟာ အချိန်နဲ့ နေရာ ထပ်တူမကျတဲ့ ပြင်ပအရပ်တခုမှာ မမျှော်လင့်ဘဲ ဆက်သွယ်နေခဲ့ကြတာပါ။ မတူညီတဲ့ ကမ္ဘာနှစ်ခုက လူနှစ်ယောက်ဟာ တက်ညီလက်ညီ အလုပ်လုပ်ခဲ့ကြတာပါ။ တခါတခါ လျှပ်စစ်ပစ္စည်းတွေကနေ ဆက်သွယ်ကြ၊ တခါတခါလည်း စိတ်ခံစားချက်တွေပေါက်ကွဲကြ ငြင်းခုံကြနဲ့ ဒါတွေအားလုံးရဲ့ နောက်ကွယ်မှာတော့ ဘာဖြစ်လာမလဲဆိုတာကို ကြိုသိနေတဲ့ စိုးရိမ်ပူပန်မှုတွေ ရှိနေခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အာဏာသိမ်း သတင်းနဲ့အတူ ကျွန်မကိုယ်တိုင်လည်း အလုပ်သစ်ရနေတာကို တွေ့လိုက်တယ်။ ကျွန်မက အကိုရဲ့ သတင်းအချက်သိမ်းဆည်းရာ database တခု၊ သတင်းအချက်လက်အလွယ်တကူသယ်ယူလို့ရရာ hard drive တခု၊ သတင်းရှာတဲ့ ကြားခံ browser တခု၊ ပြီးတော့ အကိုယုံကြည်ရတဲ့ ဘော်ဒါတဦးဖြစ်လာတယ်။ အကိုအဆင်ပြေနေရင်လည်း ကျွန်မသိသလို၊ အကိုအဆင်မပြေနေရင်လည်း ကျွန်မသိတယ်။ အပြန်အလှန် ဆက်သွယ် စကား ပြောနေရင်းနဲ့ မြန်မာမှာဖြစ်နေတဲ့ အကြောင်းရာ၊ အဖြစ်ပျက်တွေကို ကျွန်မသိရှိနေခဲ့တယ်။
ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှာ လူထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာလမ်းလျှောက်ဆန္ဒပြနေတုန်းကလည်း အကိုလျှောက်သလို ကျွန်မလိုက်လျှောက်ခဲ့တယ်။ လအနည်းငယ်ကြာပြီး အဲ့လျှောက်ခဲ့ဖူးတဲ့လမ်းတွေပေါ်မှာပဲ မီးတွေလောင်၊ သွေးတွေရဲနေတုန်းကလည်း အကိုလျှောက်သလို ကျမလိုက်လျှောက်ခဲ့တယ်။ စစ်သားတွေ သေနတ်နဲ့ပစ်ခတ်တဲ့ အချိန်မှာလည်း အကိုပြေးသလို ကျွန်မပြေးခဲ့တယ်။ အကို တယောက်တည်း ပုန်းရှောင်နေတဲ့ တိုက်ခန်းလေး တခုမှာ အကိုရဲ့ အထီးကျန်မှုတွေကို ကျွန်မခံစားခဲ့ရတယ်။ အကို့ ရဲဘော်တွေရဲ့ ကံကြမ္မာကို မြင်ရတဲ့အခါ အကို့ကိုထိုးနှက်လာတဲ့ ၀မ်းနည်းမှုတွေကို ကျွန်မတွေ့ကြုံခံစားရတယ်။ ဧပြီလညတညမှာ အကိုပုန်းရှောင်နေတဲ့ မြောက်ဥက္ကလာပက နေရာတခုရှေ့တည့်တည့်မှာ စစ်သားတွေ သေနတ်တွေနဲ့ပစ်ခတ် နေခဲ့တဲ့ ညကတော့ ကျွန်မအတွက် ကြောက်စရာအကောင်းဆုံးပါပဲ။ အဲ့တာတွေအားလုံးကို အကိုကနေ တဆင့် ခံစားသိမြင်ခဲ့တာပါ။ လက်တွေ့မှာ ကျွန်မက အဲ့နေရာတွေမှာမှ တကယ်ရှိမနေခဲ့တာပဲ။ အကိုသာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ရဲ့ မတရားမှုနဲ့ လူသားမဆန်မှုတွေကို ကံတရားနဲ့ ရင်ဆိုင် အလဲထိုးတဲ့ဒဏ္ဍာရီထဲမှာ အခြားထောင်ပေါင်များစွာသော လူတွေနဲ့အတူ ပါ၀င်ခဲ့တာပါ။ အမှောင်ခွင်းပြီးအလင်းဆောင်ဖို့ မြန်မာပြည်ရဲ့ အခြားထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာသော လူတွေလိုပဲ အကိုသတ္တိမွေးခဲ့တယ်။ ဒါပေမယ့် အမှောင်ဟာ ဖော်ပြလို့မရတဲ့ နည်းလမ်းမျိုးနဲ့ မျက်နှာပြင်မှာ ဖက်တွယ်ထားတယ်။ မဖြစ်နိုင်တာမဟုတ်ပေမယ့် ဖယ်ရှားဖို့အတွက် ဇွဲရှိဖို့လိုအပ်တယ်။ အကို့မှာ ဒီလို ဇွဲသတ္တိမျိုး ရှိတယ်ဆိုတာလည်း သက်သေပြခဲ့ပြီးပါပြီ။
အကို့ကိုမလိမ်ပါဘူး၊ အကို့ရဲ့ ကံတရားက ကျွန်မကို အစောကြီးကတည်းကစိုးရိမ်စေခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အကိုက ကိုယ်သင်ပြပေးခဲ့ရတဲ့ လူငယ်တွေအပေါ် အမြဲတမ်းဂရုတစိုက် ရှိခဲ့သလို အကို့ ဆီ အကူညီ တောင်းလာတဲ့ သူတွေကိုလည်း ပံ့ပိုးပေးခဲ့တာချည်းပါပဲ။ မြန်မာလူငယ်တွေမှာ အကိုလိုလူမျိုး လိုအပ်တယ် ဆိုတာ မြေကြီးလက်ခတ်မလွဲပါဘဲ၊ အခုလက်ရှိအဖွဲ့လိုပေါ့။ ကံကောင်းတာက အခြားအရာတွေအပြင် စည်လုံးညီညွတ်မှု၊ စိတ်အားထက်သန်မှုတို့ လည်းရှိနေပြန်တယ်။ ဒါပေမယ့်လည်း ဒလန် (သတင်းပေးသူ) တွေများလာတဲ့ ပတ်၀န်းကျင်မှာ အဖွဲ့တွေအများကြီး၊ လူတွေအများကြီးနဲ့ ချိတ်ဆက်တာဟာ တဖြည်းဖြည်းနဲ့ အကို့အတွက် အန္တရာယ်ဖြစ်လာတယ်။ အမှန်တကယ်လဲ ဒလန်ပါခဲ့ပါတယ်။ အကိုဟာ ကျွန်မကို အခြား အန္တရာယ်ရှိနိုင်တဲ့ ကိစ္စတွေနဲ့ ပတ်သတ်ပြီး အသိပေးခဲ့တယ် ။ ဒလန်တွေအကြောင်းတော့ အကိုမသိခဲ့ဘူး။ ဒီတော်လှန်ရေးအတွက်၊ အမှန်တရားအတွက် အကို့ဘ၀ကိုပေးဆပ်ဖို့ အဆင်သင့်ပဲလို့ အကို ကျွန်မကို မကြာခဏ ပြောခဲ့တယ်။ အဖမ်းမခံရမချင်း ဆက်လုပ်နေမှာလို့ သိပ်မကြာခင်ကလည်း အကိုထပ်ပြောခဲ့တယ်။ အကိုကို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံက ထွက်သွားဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းတိုင်း၊ အဲ့လိုဆုံးဖြတ်တာပေါ် မူတည်ပြီး အကိုလုံခြုံ သွားမယ်လို့ ပြောတိုင်း အကိုနဲ့ အပြိုင်မပြောနိုင်ခဲ့ဘူး။ အကို့ ကြယ်လေးတွေမှာ ရေးသားသဘောတူထားပြီးတဲ့ ကံတရားကို ၀င်စွက်ဖက်ရအောင် ကျွန်မက ဘယ်သူမို့လို့လဲ။ အကိုက နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ အကျဥ်းချခံခဲ့ရတဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဥ်းသား သမားတယောက်၊ ထပ်ဖမ်ဆီးခံရတာက အကို့အတွက်ကော ကျမအပါအ၀င် အကိုချစ်ရတဲ့သူတွေအတွက်ကော အရမ်းကိုရက်စက်ရာကျမှာပဲ။
ဒီလိုနဲ့ မေလ ၂ ရက်နေ့မှာတော့ အကို့ သတင်း အစနပျောက်သွားတယ်။ ၀ိုင်ဖိုင်နဲ့ အကိုပုန်းခိုလို့ ရမယ့်နေရာ အသစ်ကို အကိုဆုံးရှုံးသွားတယ်။ ပွင့်ပွင့်လင်းလင်းပြောရရင် အကို့လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်တွေအားလုံး ဆုံးရှုံးသွားပြီး တခြားကမ္ဘာတခုထဲကို ခြေချော်လက်ချော်ကျသွားခဲ့တာပါ။ ဒီဆက်သွယ်မရ ရုပ်ဝတ္တုမဲ့ကမ္ဘာကြီးက လူတယောက်ကို အရိုးထဲထိစိမ့်နေအောင် ခြောက်ခြားစေခဲ့တာပါ။ ရူးကြောင်ကြောင်နိုင်တယ်ဆိုတာ ကျွန်မသိပေမယ့် အကျင့်တွေက ပြင်ရခက်တယ်။ အကိုဘယ်မှာလဲနဲ့ အကိုအားတင်းထားရဲ့လားဆိုတာကို စာပို့ပြီးမေးဖို့ အကြိမ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြံမိပြီးမှ ကျွန်မစာကို အ၀တ်အစိမ်းတွေ၊ ဘွတ်ဖိနပ်တွေ ၀တ်ထားတဲ့ အာဏာရူးတွေ ဖတ်မိမှာပဲဆိုပြီး မပို့မိအောင် ကိုယ့်ကိုကိုယ် ပြန်သတိပေးရတယ်။ အကိုဘယ်မှာလဲဆိုတာ ကျွန်မတို့မသိခဲ့ပါဘူး။ အကို အသက်ရှင်လျက် ရှိနေသေးလားဆိုတာတောင် ကျွန်မတို့ မသိခဲ့ပါဘူး။ ညသန်းခေါင်ကြီးမှာ အကို့ကိုဖမ်းတဲ့ အကြောင်းကို ပြန်တွေးရင်တောင် ခေါင်းတွေကိုက်ခဲလာတယ်။ ဒါပေမယ့်လည်း ကျွန်မခေါင်းထဲမှာ ခဏခဏပြန်တွေးရလွန်းလို့ အသေးစိတ်တွေတောင် စပြီး စဥ်းစားမိ လာတယ်။ နိုင်ငံရေးတက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူတွေက ညအိပ်၀တ်စုံကြီးနဲ့ အဖမ်းခံသွားရတာလား။ ဒီလို ဘာမဟုတ်တဲ့ အတွေးတွေက အကို့အခန်းတံခါးကို မနက် ၂ နာရီ ဖျက်ပြီး ၀င်လာချိန်မှာ ဘယ်လောက်များ စိတ်မသက်မသာ ခံစားနေရမလဲဆိုတဲ့ အတွေးတွေမတွေးမိအောင် ရပ်တန့်ပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။
ဒီလိုနဲ့ အကို့ကို ကျွန်မတို့ ရက်ပေါင်းများစွာ ရှာဖွေခဲ့တယ်။ ကောက်ရိုးပုံထဲ အပ်ရှာရသလိုပါပဲ။ ရန်ကုန်က သူတွေကို ဆက်သွယ်တယ်။ အကို့မိသားစုကို တဆင့်ခံ ဆက်သွယ်တယ်။ အကိုဘယ်နေရာမှာ ရှိနေနိုင်မလဲဆိုတဲ့ သတင်းအချက်လက် အရှိနေနိုင်ဆုံးသူတွေ၊ အဖွဲ့တွေကို ဆက်သွယ်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ သူတို့က ရှေ့နေ တယောက်ကို ဆက်သွယ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး အကို ရွှေပြည်သာ စစ်ကြောရေးမှာ စစ်ဆေးမေးမြန်းခံနေရတာ ဖြစ်ဖို့များတယ်လို့ ရှေ့နေက ကျွန်မတို့ကိုပြောပါတယ်။ ကျွန်မ တိတ်ဆိတ်ဆွံ့အပြီး ကြက်သေသေသွားခဲ့တယ်။ ကြားရတဲ့စကားတွေက ခြောက်ခြားစရာကောင်းလွန်းတယ်။
ဒီလိုဆိုတော့ အကို့ကိုလည်း အဲ့နေရာကိုခေါ်သွားခံရတာပေါ့။ အကိုကို ရုပ်ဆင်းရဲ၊ စိတ်ဆင်းရဲအောင် လုပ်တဲ့အတွေ့အကြုံကို ပထမတကြိမ် ထောင်သွင်းအကျဥ်းခံရတုန်းကတည်းက တွေ့ကြုံခံစားဖူးပြီးသားဆိုတာ ကျွန်မသိပါတယ်။ အဲ့မှာ အကိုရှိနေမယ်လို့လည်း ကျွန်မတို့ ၁၀၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းမသေချာပါဘူး။ ခန့်မှန်းချက်အများကြီးထဲက တခုပါ။ အဲ့နေရာကို ဘယ်သူမှမသွားနိုင်သလို၊ ဘယ်ရှေ့နေမှလည်း ၀င်ရောက်ခွင့်မရှိပါဘူး။ ဝမ်းနည်းဖို့ကောင်းစွာပဲ အကို့ဆီကသတင်းအချက် လက်တွေ ရဖို့အတွက် နှိပ်စက်ကြမယ်၊ အကိုဟာ စစ်ဖိနပ်တွေ လက်ခုပ်ထဲကရေ ဖြစ်နေတာပါ။ အကိုဟာဘယ်လောက်ခက်ခဲပါစေ၊ ဘယ်လောက်ထိ မခံမရပ်နိုင်အောင် ခံစားနေရပါစေ၊ ဘယ်တော့မှ ဒူးထောက်မှာ မဟုတ်ဘူးဆိုတာ ကျွန်မတို့သိပြီးသားပါ။ နှစ်ပတ်ကြာပြီးတဲ့နောက်မှာတော့ အကိုမိသားစုကို အမည်မဖော်လိုတဲ့ နေရာတခုကနေ ဖုန်းဆက်လာတယ်။ စစ်ကြောရေးမှာ အကို ဒဏ်ရာရသွားတယ်တဲ့။ နောက်ဆုံးမှာတော့ ကျွန်မတို့ အကိုကို့ရှာတွေ့ ခဲ့ပြီ။ ဘယ်လိုအခြေနေမျိုးမှာ ရှာတွေ့ခဲ့တာလဲ ဆိုတာတော့ ကျွန်မတို့မသိပါဘူး ။ ဒါပေမယ့် အကို အသက်ရှုနေတုန်းပဲ။
ရက်ပေါင်းများစွာ ကြာပြီးတဲ့နောက်မှာ နောက်ဆုံးမှာတော့ အကို့ကိုအင်းစိန်ထောင်ကို ရွှေ့ ပြောင်းခဲ့တယ်။ အဲ့ဒီတခဏမှာ ကျွန်မတို့အားလုံး စိတ်သက်သာရာရခဲ့တယ်။ ဒီခံစားချက်နဲ့အတူ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာဖြစ်နေတဲ့ လူသားတွေနဲ့ သူတို့ရဲ့ ရူးသွပ်မှု အဖျက်စွမ်းအားကို လူတယောက်ဟာ နားလည်ခဲ့ရတယ်။ အင်းစိန်ထောင်ဟာ နာမည်ဆိုးနဲ့ကျော်ကြားပါတယ် ။ အင်းစိန်ရောက်ဖူးတဲ့ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဥ်းသားတွေက ကမ္ဘာပေါ်ကငရဲ လို့ ပြောကြတယ်။ ဒါပေမယ့် အခုတော့ အဆိုးဆုံးရဲ့ အဆိုးဆုံးထက် ပိုကောင်းနေတယ်။ အခု အကို့ကို တခါတလေ လာတွေ့မယ့် ရှေ့နေတဦးရှိပြီ။ သူလဲ အများကြီး တတ်နိုင်မှာမဟုတ်ပေမယ့် တနည်းအားဖြင့် အကောင်းဆုံးဖြစ်အောင် ကြိုးစားပေးမယ့် တယောက်တော့ရှိနေပြီ။ အကျဥ်းသားတွေရဲ့ ကံတရားဟာ အင်းစိန်ထောင် ထောင့်က ဖြစ်ကတက်ဆန်း တရားရုံးလက်ထဲမှာရှိနေပြီ။ အကိုကို့ တပတ်နှစ်ပတ်အတွင်း သို့မဟုတ် လပေါင်းများစွာ ကြာပြီးတဲ့အခါမှာ အမိန့်ချမှတ်ပါလိမ့်မယ်။ လွယ်လွယ်ကူကူနဲ့ ပြီးသွားမယ် လို့ တော့ မထင်ပါဘူး။ လွယ်တယ်ဆိုတဲ့ သတင်းကောင်းမျိုးလည်း မရှိခဲ့ဘူးလေ။
ဒီနံရံတွေကြားမှာ အသားကျအောင် အကိုဘယ်လိုလုပ်မလဲ၊ အချိန်တွေကုန်သွားအောင် ဘယ်လိုလုပ်မလဲ ဆိုတာ ကျွန်မမသိပါဘူး။ တခါတလေ တရားထိုင်နေမယ်၊ တခါတလေ မိုးကျမှာကို စောင့်စားနေမယ်လို့ ကျွန်မစိတ်ကူးကြည့်ပါတယ်။ အကို့မှာ အကို့လို အေးအေးချမ်းချမ်းနဲ့ စိတ်အားထက်သန်မှုရှိတဲ့ ပြီးတော့ အကို့ရဲ့ ဆန္ဒမျှော်လင့်ချက်တွေကို ဆက်လက်တောင်လောင်နေဖို့ရာ အပြန်လှန်မျှဝေနိုင်တဲ့ အခြားနိုင်ငံရေး အကျဥ်းသားအဖော်တဦးရှိမယ်လို့ မျှော်လင့်ပါတယ်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဥ်းသားတွေ အများကြီး ရှိပါတယ်။ ဒီနေ့ ဒီအချိန်မှာ သူတို့ထဲက အချို့ဟာစစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ကြတဲ့ ထင်ရှားတဲ့ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်တွေ ဖြစ်လာနေကြပါပြီ။ လူတွေနဲ့ သူတို့လျှောက်ခဲ့တဲ့ခရီးတွေဟာ မသေချာတဲ့ အနာဂတ်ကို ဆေးရောင်စုံခြယ်မယ့် ခွန်အားအရင်းမြစ်တွေ၊ မျှော်လင့်ချက်တွေ ဖြစ်လာပါပြီ။ အကျဥ်းထောင်ထဲက အကိုတို့တွေဟာ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င်နေတဲ့၊ ဒီပန်းတိုင်ကို ရောက်အောင်ကြိုးစားနေတဲ့ ပြယုဒ်တွေပါပဲ။ အဲ့ဒီအတွက် အကိုတို့အားလုံးကို အရမ်းပဲလေးစားပါတယ်။ သူတို့ဘာပဲပြောပြော လွတ်မြောက်မှု အလင်းရောင်ကိုဆုပ်ကိုင်ထားတာက အပြောင်းလဲတခုကိုဖြစ်စေနိုင်တယ်ဆိုတာ အကိုလည်းသိနှင့်ပြီးသားပါ။ အကို့ရဲ့ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုတွေက အလကားမဖြစ်ပါဘူး။ တလက်လက်တောက်နေတဲ့အလင်းစက်တွေက အမှောင်ထုကိုခွင်းနေပါတယ်။
…. ကိုယ့်ကိုကိုယ် ဂရုစိုက်ပါ။ ကျွန်မလမင်းကြီးကိုမေးလိုက်တယ်။ အဲ့ဒီမီးခိုးရောင်နံရံတွေရဲ့ တဖက်ခြမ်းမှာ တော်လှန်ရေးက ခရီးဆက်နေတယ်၊ ကျွန်မတို့ကလည်း အကို့ကိုစောင့်နေပါတယ်။ ကျွန်မတို့ တယောက်နဲ့တယောက် ခဏ အဆက်သွယ်ပြတ်သွားခဲ့ပေမယ့် ကြယ်တွေလင်းလက်တဲ့ တခုသောကောင်းကင်ကြီးအောက်မှာ အတူတူရှိနေတုန်းပါပဲ။ တကယ်လို့သာ ဘယ်လိုနားထောင်ရ မယ်ဆိုတာကိုသိရင် ကြယ်တွေဟာသတင်းစကားတွေကို လက်ဆင့်ကမ်းပေးနိုင်တယ်လို့ ကျွန်မကြားဖူးပါတယ်။ သိပ်မကြာခင်ပေါ့ အကို… ညီမ။
“မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဥ်းသားတွေ ရှိနေသရွေ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဟာ မလွတ်မြောက်သေးပါဘူး။ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဥ်းသားတွေဟာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲ့ ပြည်သူတွေလွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှမှု၊ လူ့အခွင့်ရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေး တိုက်ပွဲများကို ကိုယ်စားပြုပါတယ်” နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဥ်းသားများ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေး အသင်း (အေအေပီပီ)..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Seven months after the military coup in Myanmar, some young Buddhist monks have taken off their yellow robes to join the armed struggle against the junta, while other older and senior ones are throwing in their lot with the junta leaders.
One of the monks in the latter group is Sitagu Sayadaw, who accompanied Vice Senior General Soe Win, the No. 2 man in the military regime, on his Russia trip earlier this month. Another big name that is closely connected with the coup is U Kovida, a monk from Shan State’s Kengtung who has been accused of providing coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing with astrological advice ahead of the takeover.
Other influential monks include 92-year-old Bhaddanta Dhamma Siri from Tachileik in eastern Shan State; Bhaddanta Kavidaja from Hpa-an in Karen State, a leading monk in the now-defunct Association for Protection of Race and Religion, known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha; and Dhammaduta Ashin Chekinda.
After the coup, some Buddhist monks joined civilians in street protests against the regime, some staged silent demonstrations inside their monasteries, some were beaten and arrested by security personnel for their anti-junta activities, and some took off their robes to take up arms against the regime.
But it has been a different story for other high-profile monks including Sitagu Sayadaw. The 84-year-old is the second-most-influential leader of Shwe Kyin, one of Myanmar’s nine Buddhist clergy sects. Its members are known for strictly obeying the Vinaya, the code of conduct for Buddhist monks.
The monk was widely recognized for his outreach and charity work, and was an outspoken critic of military dictatorships in the past. He apparently got close with Myanmar’s military under U Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government in 2015 when he, as the vice chairman of the nationalist organization Ma Ba Tha, pushed for enactment of a legislative package known as the race and religion protection laws, which are designed to prevent the spread of Islam in Myanmar.
Later, Myanmar’s military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing—now the coup leader—became a familiar face among his high-level followers.
Since the coup, he has never failed to portray himself as a promoter of Buddhism, making the most of popular opinion among the country’s nationalists that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s ousted National League for Democracy government favored human rights over the religion that the majority of citizens practice. He started his mission by hastily paying a visit to the well-known Zaygone Sayadaw and other monks in Naypyitaw one day after the coup. (Sadly, the monk died in a military plane crash in June.) The general has also ordered his subordinates to follow suit, visiting and making offerings to other monks. As Myanmar is a Buddhist-majority country, senior monks have a significant influence on their many followers. Min Aung Hlaing might think that if he has blessings from the monks, support from their disciples will follow.
While many young Buddhist monks were taking to the streets nearly every day against the regime, Sitagu Sayadaw never failed to receive Min Aung Hlaing and his wife at his monastery at Sagaing Hill. When Min Aung Hlaing took blessings from Myanmar’s senior monks for his construction of the world’s largest Buddha statue in Naypyitaw in March, Sitagu Sayadaw was there. At the time, nearly five dozen protesters were gunned down by the regime’s troops across the country.
The monk was present when since-ousted State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi of the National League for Democracy government offered meals to Buddhist monks. He often receives offerings from Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing and the general’s wife, Daw Kyu Kyu Hla. Some three months before the coup, the couple offered meals to the monk.
The monk is currently at the Myanma Theravada Buddha Vihara Monastery in Moscow. The monastery has received donations from Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing and his wife, among others.
Ashin Arsara, a striking monk from Mandalay, said he felt sad to see Myanmar’s leading monks like Sitagu Sayadaw stand with the regime when the whole nation is fighting against it.
“One of the figureheads of the Buddhist clergy is standing with the unjust. As a Buddhist monk, I feel embarrassed and sorry for the people,” he said.
Another famous monk is U Kovida, commonly known as Vasipake Sayadaw and famous for his vows of silence. Min Aung Hlaing has been his follower since 2006, when the general was serving as the commander of the Myanmar military’s Triangle Region, which oversees eastern Shan State.
He has been accused of advising the senior general to tell security forces to shoot protesters in the head. Most of the anti-regime protesters killed in the early days of the junta crackdown had bullet wounds to the head.
The monk was singled out for criticism at anti-regime protests, with some protesters attaching photos of him to htamein—women’s sarongs—and hanging them in public places to express their wrath. Seeing the pictures of the monk he venerates attached to htamein is an infuriating sight for Min Aung Hlaing. He ordered his troops to take the women’s garments down and publicly announced in his state-run papers that anyone committing the act would be charged with insulting Buddhism. The 64-year-old monk has close ties with Sitagu Sayadaw.
Another monk, Bhaddanta Dhamma Siri, known as “Two Dragon Sayadaw” after his monastery, was the first to receive the Abhidhaja Maha Rahta Guru, one of the highest religious titles in Myanmar, after the coup. The monk with red and white amulets on both wrists came under fire as the coup leader presented the title to him in person at his monastery, and he accepted the title after hundreds of young activists had been killed by the regime. It’s noteworthy that Min Aung Hlaing personally presented titles or paid visits only to monks who either have influence or knowledge of some “special power.” The coup leader was seen, even at the regime’s governing body meetings, wearing a red amulet believed to be given by one of the monks on his return from Kengtung and Tachileik.
In May, during their tour to Karen State, Min Aung Hlaing and his wife visited the radical monk Bhaddanta Kavidaja, who, prior to the NLD government’s ousting, publicly showed his support for the military by organizing pro-military rallies. The monk, known as Zwegabin Sayadaw after the name of his monastery, publicly defied the NLD government’s designation of the Ma Ba Tha as an unlawful association and its order that the group’s signboards should be taken down across the country.
He is widely believed to have taken the helm of the Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation, the successor to Ma Ba Tha.
Dhammasuta Chekinda is known for his summer school programs, in which he teaches teenagers Buddhism and other subjects, attracting hundreds of youngsters annually. The monk has barely appeared in public since the coup and has been tight-lipped about the regime’s brutal crackdowns on peaceful protesters, some of which were the same age as his summer school students. He is therefore thought to share the views of Sitagu Sayadaw. Ashin Chekinda currently serves as a department head at the International Theravada Missionary University in Yangon. Rumors have it that the monk chooses not to offend the regime and senior monks who have close ties to it, like Sitagu Sayadaw, because in order to become the rector of the university he may need the approval of senior monks and authorities.
Military dictators have never been reluctant to manipulate religion to maintain their grip on power. The regime earlier this week dropped the legal case against firebrand nationalist monk U Wirathu, who was charged with sedition by the since-ousted NLD government. U Wirathu, who has earned a notorious name among Myanmar people, is a faithful follower of Sitagu Sayadaw, who once blessed the younger monk by calling him “my comrade.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Inter-Communal violence and discrimination - Myanmar - General articles and analysis, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Three other Myanmar political parties, including the NLD’s military-backed rival, will also attend
Description:
"The National League for Democracy (NLD) will attend an online meeting organized by the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Thursday, according to a senior party member.
Four parties from Myanmar have been invited to the meeting on “Political Parties’ Cooperation in Joint Pursuit of Economic Development,” which will bring together parties from across South and Southeast Asia.
The Union Solidarity and Development Party—the NLD’s main, military-backed rival—and the Arakan National Party are also expected to attend. It was not clear at the time of reporting which other Myanmar party would be present.
NLD lawmaker Bo Bo Oo posted on social media on Wednesday that the NLD would be attending the meeting. A senior party member later told Myanmar Now that Bo Bo Oo, who handles the party’s communications with China, would also be taking part.
The NLD was Myanmar’s ruling party until it was ousted by the military on February 1, despite winning a landslide victory in last year’s election.
China is one of the few countries that recognize the coup regime led by Myanmar’s top general, Min Aung Hlaing. But it has also reportedly expressed concern over the military’s plan to dissolve the NLD, according to media reports.
The invitation to Thursday’s online meeting was not the first time that China has publicly signalled its ongoing relationship with the NLD since it was ousted from power.
In July, the CPC sent a letter to the NLD’s central executive committee thanking it for sending congratulations on the occasion of the CPC’s centenary.
Also, during a week-long visit to Myanmar in late August, China’s special envoy for Asian affairs, Sun Guoxiang, reportedly requested a meeting with NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The request was denied.
While the Myanmar junta has been tight-lipped about the visit, China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported that it was part of Beijing’s effort to help Myanmar “restore social stability and resume democratic transformation at an early date.”
China, which has long been seen as an ally of successive military regimes in Myanmar, was the target of protests and boycotts around the country in the wake of the coup..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Articles and reports about the NLD, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, China-Burma relations
Language:
Local URL:
more