Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Individual Documents
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"As Operation 1027 shifts the balance of power from the Myanmar military to revolutionary forces, we argue that the on-the-ground sociopolitical realities advocate moving past conventional nation-state models, and even the federalism debates, and demand a political will to adapt to the Mandala order, a governance style indigenous to Southeast Asia for centuries before the colonialism of the West. The future of Myanmar centers on transformative political visions that reject the reestablishment of a “national/federal army” and “central state”. It is fundamental to accept this paradigmatic change because only this will enable all parties involved to embrace and align with the emergence of various governance systems, as the material reality demands. Next, we must insist that these systems are democratic, inclusive, responsive and well-coordinated.....Beyond nation-state and federalism .....Myanmar’s economy has transitioned into a war economy. On the military junta’s side, the domestic economy has collapsed, hit by bank runs, inflation and, in rural areas, the inability to farm due to village burnings, as well as increased military spending amidst reduced public service budgets, as reflected in a recent report by the World Bank. Soaring dollar exchange rates and aviation fuel and gasoline prices, combined with international pressure and sanctions, make their fuel-dependent administration unsustainable. On the revolutionary and ethnic armed organization (EAO) side, Operation 1027 symbolizes a transition from guerrilla tactics to a coordinated alliance-led offensive with significant public support and resource flow. Despite the fact that the Myanmar public has endured unprecedented hardships, there seems to be no desire for the military to succeed, even if it would bring a return to stability. Coupled with the declining morale among the rank-and-file soldiers, as evidenced by unprecedented defections during Operation 1027, the larger picture and economic analysis points to the fact that the military will not be able to continue this fight.
Despite the military generals’ lack of interest in pursuing a political exit, the international community is reluctant to decisively support the revolution, preferring to safeguard their own interests—a stance akin to the Burmese saying of “trying to get the snake out without breaking the cane” (မြွေမသေ တုတ်မကျိုး). Having provided little substantive support, now they presumptuously debate Myanmar’s future and what the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs should do, obsessing over a “power vacuum” and “political fragmentation”. This stance stems from the assertions of certain politicians and analysts who warn that the chaos following the military’s collapse might intensify into greater violence and conflict. Such a perception is not only misguided but ironically might cause the very chaos they anticipate.
We emphasize that the chaos and violence could only happen for two reasons: externally due to attempts to reimpose central control, rather than the lack of it, and internally because of attempts to create exclusive ethnic-based systems in regions with diverse ethnic populations. In fact, it is mainly the analysts and elites who are wary of what they call “political fragmentation”, not the local populace, who have experience with Mandala-like political arrangements, with two or more than two political authorities trying to govern them, such as those seen in the long-sustaining Wa State. This may sound quixotic to the political elites but it is very practical and realistic for the local populace.
The realities on the ground demand a new imagination beyond the conventional nation-state. Now is the opportune moment to offer the people a governance system they are familiar with, rather than enforcing a federal system with extensive decentralization; even setting up a federal system will invariably require a somewhat central authority—a “federal government”. Such models, dependent on a nation-state structure, would necessitate the NUG—or whoever is charged with the task—successfully uniting all EAOs under a singular political leadership and vision, which is next to impossible and a feat that no politicians have achieved over seven decades. The current fixation on establishing a central command stems from persistent assertions by Western analysts, who argue that the lack of unity among opposition forces is the reason why the foreign governments were not providing meaningful assistance to them. If the international policy industry insists the NUG and EAOs must create a central command under a singular political leadership, it is bound to fail spectacularly.
While opposition groups share the objective of overthrowing the junta, on-the-ground political realities are almost antagonistic to a single, central command or joint command. A prime example is in Chin State, where, despite military successes, politicians face growing internal divisions, rooted in both geographical and linguistic differences. Similarly, in Shan State, local Shan groups express frustration over being marginalized and have held longstanding grievances against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In central dry regions too, there are reported conflicts among the opposition armed groups and governing bodies. Meanwhile, groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Arakan Army (AA) have also explicitly stated their political vision of achieving a confederation, differing from other factions’ goals.
Myanmar’s present landscape makes one recall the historical period following the disintegration of the Bagan Empire in the 13th century, which saw 250 years of political interregnum, characterized by the emergence of multiple regional powers such as the territorially limited local kingdoms of Myinsaing, Pinya, Sagaing, Taungoo, Hanthawaddy, Ava and others, including the notable rise of the Tai people with the establishment of the Lanna kingdom. Currently, various groups exert control over specific territories, necessitating both domestic and international negotiations for effective governance. For instance, Chin communities now administering India-Myanmar border towns and the MNDAA initiating governance in the Kokang region, bordering China, must engage in complex discussions with multiple actors. Similarly, the NUG, now in control of the town of Kawlin, faces the challenge of implementing effective administration.
This power structure reflects the dynamics of the Mandala system, characterized by local autonomy and complex alliances, a system from the not-so-distant past and familiar to the local populace. The Mandala system, unlike a modern nation-state, features multiple political power centers (kingdoms back in those days) with diminishing political power as one moves away from the center, characterized by ill-defined, porous boundaries in contrast to the well-demarcated borders of nation-states. Within this Mandala system, these polities existed in a hierarchical order, with lesser tributaries and a possible supreme king or overlord. Allegiances were fluid and overlapping, and yet, as Thongchai Winichakul puts it, “each king had his own court, administrative and financial system, tax collection, army, and judicial system”. Thus, these polities maintain distinct autonomy and independence.
The call for a new, responsive Mandala
With our call for a new responsive Mandala, the better focus would be on ensuring democratic, inclusive and representative governances, rather than attempting to re-centralize control or establish a federal/national army. This approach involves: 1) acknowledging the emergence of multiple governance arrangements across Myanmar, no matter whether it is called “federal” or “confederal”; 2) prioritizing the establishment of democratic, inclusive and representative governance in captured territories, recognizing that international recognition is secondary to providing effective local governance for residents whose immediate concern is sustenance; and 3) avoiding the expenditure of time and resources on creating a centralized command structure, and instead fostering coordination mechanisms across different polities.
Perhaps more importantly, the new political system or systems in Myanmar must transcend narrow ethnic identities, acknowledging the diverse populations across regions, be it Shan Land (ရှမ်းပြည်), Arakan Country(ရခိုင်ပြည်) or Sagaing Nation (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း). An ethnic-based political system in places like Arakan (Rakhine) or Shan will be a recipe for disaster as the current armed conflicts have already witnessed rising inter-ethnic tensions. In the same spirit, the calls to establish a Bamar state overlook the diverse ethnic populations in the central dry regions, not to mention the Chinese, Hindu or Muslim communities who have been persecuted by successive governments. Instead, efforts should focus on establishing democratic and inclusive governance systems that reflect the Mandala-like order today.
The specific form of these new polities, whether one-party systems akin to Singapore, constitutional monarchies like Thailand, Sweden or the UK, or even communist systems like China or Vietnam, is secondary to their adherence to these democratic inclusive and responsive principles of governance. This is what the internal actors starting with the NUG should aim for. At the same time, the international community must be prepared to accept this, not push for a single political authority who will represent the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
While the role of armed groups in the current stage of Myanmar’s revolution is undeniable, it’s crucial to remember that the military success of these armed groups stems from unprecedented civilian participation and public support. The revolution must center on the people, not the armed groups, ensuring these groups remain accountable and adhere to democratic principles. While the abolition of all armed forces should be a political aim for the long term, the immediate priority right now is to embrace the emerging Mandala-like political arrangements, avoiding the futile pursuit of a centralized chain of command under a singular political leadership. The focus must now shift to ensuring that these emerging political entities embody democratic, inclusive and responsive governance systems tailored to meet the immediate needs of the people, providing the essential services and support required in the here and now. This approach, grounded in current realities, paves the way for a more stable and prosperous future for the peoples of Myanmar.
Htet Min Lwin is a scholar of religion, social movements and revolution, currently writing a PhD at the York Centre for Asian Research at York University, Toronto.
Thiha Wint Aung is a political scientist who holds an MA from the Central European University (CEU) and an MPP from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, Japan..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International Bill of Human Rights
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They say the junta must first ensure their labor rights, while others refuse to fund a coup regime.
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"Myanmar nationals working abroad say they won’t pay income tax to their country’s junta as required by a newly passed law unless they are guaranteed protection of their labor rights, while others oppose funding what they see as an illegitimate military regime.
Myanmar’s Union Taxation Law of 2023, signed by junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, went into effect on Oct. 1, requiring migrant workers to pay a portion of their income to the regime. The new law ends an exemption that had been in effect since 2012.
On Dec. 13, the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok announced a tax rate of 2% on the earnings of migrant workers in Thailand.
But workers in Thailand are questioning why they should be forced to make the payments when they are afforded little assistance from the junta in protecting their rights abroad.
“We’ve witnessed many migrant workers suffering violations of their labor rights, but they don’t receive any assistance from Myanmar officials,” said Kyaw Zeya, a Myanmar national who works in Thailand. “So we won’t pay taxes without any protections.”
Migrant workers in Thailand told RFA Burmese that they are already struggling to make ends meet on low wages and that the new income tax will mean additional burdens.
Salaries for migrant workers in factories, workshops, agriculture and livestock, construction, and services is fixed at 7,500 baht (US$220) per month, meaning they will now be required to pay 150 baht (US$5) to the junta from each monthly paycheck.
In Japan, the Myanmar Embassy in Tokyo also recently announced a 2% tax on migrant worker incomes.
Under this taxation scheme, a Myanmar national in Japan who earned 200,000 yen (US$1,385) or more each month had to pay the junta 4,000 yen (US$30), while those who earned less had to pay 3,000 yen (US$20). Following resistance to the scheme, the requirements were reduced to 3,000 yen and 1,000 yen (US$5), respectively.
And while labor rights are generally better protected in Japan, Myanmar nationals working in the country told RFA that they prefer to pay their income taxes to the host nation, where the money won’t be spent on funding a military that kills and arrests those who object to its seizure of power in a Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat.
“Those [Myanmar nationals] who need to extend their passport cannot avoid the tax,” said Ye Zaw Htet, who lives and works in Japan. “But I refuse to pay a tax that can be used to harm people in Myanmar.”
Migrant workers who have paid the tax receive a certificate, which is needed to renew one’s passport, apply for labor ID cards and request certain official documents.
Funding a civil war
Analysts RFA spoke with said that the junta wants additional revenue to fund its purchase of aviation fuel, arms and ammunition, even while Myanmar has seen its economy contract and foreign investment vanish amidst a raging civil war.
With an estimated 5 million Myanmar nationals working in Thailand, the junta can expect to earn nearly 750 million baht (US$22 million) per month at a rate of 150 baht per worker.
From Singapore, where around 300,000 Myanmar nationals work and are required to pay a tax rate of 2%, the junta can expect to earn some 2.4 million Singapore dollars (US$1.8 million) per month.
One Myanmar citizen in Singapore who is working as a technician and spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, said they will only pay taxes to a government with a legitimate mandate.
“We aren’t talking about a tax payment,” the worker said. “We will pay taxes to both our home and host countries for the development of our country under an elected government. But we aren’t willing to pay the coup regime.”
Sein Htay, an economist, said that regardless of how it is generated, government revenue “should be spent for public development programs and services, not for war expenses,” and certainly not to fund a civil war.
Attempts by RFA to contact Myanmar’s embassies in Tokyo, Bangkok and Singapore, as well as the junta’s Planning and Finance Ministry, for their response to criticism of the taxation plan went unanswered by the time of publishing.
However, Nyunt Win, the permanent secretary of the junta’s Labor Ministry, characterized the tax scheme as a way to pay for “work permits” for Myanmar nationals overseas.
“Work permits abroad have no connection to the government in the homeland,” he said. “The tax is needed to pay to the home country.”
In addition to the recent taxation plan, the junta has forced migrant workers to hand over 25% of their salaries to the regime when remitting money home through official transfer channels.
Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand staged a protest against the monthly 2% taxation plan in front of the United Nations’ office in Bangkok on Dec. 17, which received a message of support from the Ministry of Labor under the country’s shadow National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese migrant workers, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"The number of children killed by junta forces in Myanmar since the February 2021 coup reached 578 on Wednesday, based on statistics compiled by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and additional casualty reports from the past few days. The figure covers those killed who were under the age of 18.
Myanmar regime forces’ indiscriminate air strikes, shelling and raids on villages and other civilian targets across the country have killed large numbers of non-combatants including many children since the Min Aung Hlaing-led military seized power from Myanmar’s elected civilian government on Feb. 1, 2021, NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy.
He said his ministry recorded at least 576 child deaths from Feb. 1, 2021 to Monday.
Since then, Nyan Min Hein, a 3-year-old child from Myauktaung Village in Rakhine State’s Kyauktaw Township was killed by junta shelling on Tuesday and Joseph Malsawmhlua, 9, from Let Pan Chaung Village in Sagaing Region’s Kale Township was killed in another junta artillery strike on Wednesday, taking the total death toll among children to 578.
Already this year, junta troops have fired artillery shells indiscriminately at residential areas as well as schools and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in several parts of the country where clashes between regime forces and resistance forces are ongoing, resulting in fresh child casualties.
The junta has been using aircraft and artillery to attack resistance forces in their stronghold areas of Karenni (Kayah), Kachin, Karen and Chin states and Sagaing and Magwe regions since the armed resistance movement started, but frequently targets civilian locations in those areas as well.
According to the NUG, the junta committed nine mass killings in 2021 causing 147 civilian deaths, followed by 44 cases in 2022 killing 515 civilians. In 2023 the number of mass killings increased dramatically to 86, leaving 1,342 civilians dead.
According to a report by the NUG’s Ministry of Human Rights, 172 children were killed last year alone, following 165 the year before.
“The regime has targeted civilians as the enemy and this continues to affect children. In 2023 alone it killed 108 boys and 64 girls, including some who were just months old, in their indiscriminate attacks,” U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy.
The Myanmar military has committed a number of crimes against humanity, the minister said. A few significant cases are the Pazi Gyi Village attack on April 11, 2023 in Sagaing Region in which 40 children were killed; the Let Yet Kone air strike, which killed 11 children on Sept. 23, 2022; the Mone Lei Khet IDP camp artillery strike in Kachin State, which killed 11 children on Oct. 11, 2023; and the A Nang Pa incident on Oct. 28, 2022, which killed dozens of people, although it is unclear exactly how many children died.
All people under the age of 18 are protected and it is the responsibility of all armed groups to shield them from conflict, according to international laws and child rights principles, U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy.
“Although we can confirm the total death toll of the children, the number of wounded and those who have been left disabled is beyond our capacity” to record, U Aung Myo Min said.
In Karenni, Rakhine and northern Shan states the junta is currently facing its greatest military challenge since seizing power, having lost many bases and outposts to resistance forces including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force and the Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful ethnic armies: the Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Amy and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG)
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"On behalf of the United States of America, I reaffirm our commitment to the people of Burma as they mark the 76th Anniversary of the country’s independence on January 4.
The United States has long supported the people of Burma and their right to chart their own future toward a cohesive union. The military’s campaign of violence since the February 2021 coup has not dimmed the strong commitment of the people of Burma to regain their prosperity and advance the goals of freedom, peace, and justice. We mourn and honor the lives lost in this pursuit.
We stand in solidarity with the people of Burma in their resolve to bring democracy, self-determination, stability, and security to their country. The military regime must end its violence, release all those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and recognize the people’s desire to return to the path of progress and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of publication:
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနှံ့အပြားတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှု အခြေအနေများကို လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနက စုဆောင်းကောက်ယူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ ကောက်ယူရာတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုဖြစ်စဥ်များနှင့်ပတ်သက်ပြီး ခိုင်မာသည့် သတင်း မီဒီယာများကို စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာမှု၊ Online Monitoring တို့မှတဆင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှု ဖြစ်ရပ်ပေါင်း (၄၆၅၆)ခု တို့ကို ကောက်ယူရရှိခဲ့ပြီး၊ မြေပြင်အခြေအနေနှင့် ဆန်းစစ်အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုဖြစ်စဥ် စုစုပေါင်း (၆၅၇)ခု ကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်သိမ်းဆည်းထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုဖြစ်ရပ်များထည်းမှ အင်တာဗျူး၊ ဓာတ်ပုံမှတ်တမ်း များအပါအဝင် အချက်အလက်များရရှိပြီး မှန်ကန်ကြောင်းခိုင်မာစွာ အတည်ပြု နိုင်ခဲ့သည့် ဖြစ်စဉ်ပေါင်း (၃၂၂)ခု ရှိခဲ့သည်။ IIMM နှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာသို့ ဖြစ်စဉ် (၁၆၅)ခု ပေးပို့နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
ထိုကဲ့သို့ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူထားရှိသည့် အချက်အလက်များအား အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် ခေါင်းစဉ် (၇) ခုဖြင့် ပိုင်းခြားသတ်မှတ်၍ ပြည်သူသို့ လေးစားစွာ တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး တန်းတူညီမျှမှုရရှိရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးတည်းဟူသော ဦးတည်ချက်များကို ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာလက်ကိုင်ဆွဲထား၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ကျုးလွန်မှုများကိုအပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူနိုင်ရေး အစွမ်းကုန်တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"The National Unity Government expresses profound sadness upon learning about the earthquake that struck the central region of Japan on January 1, 2024, and the potential threat of a subsequent tsunami.
We extend our heartfelt condolences for any loss of life and express ongoing concern for all those who may be affected. We want to assure the government of Japan that, during this critical time, the people of Myanmar stand in solidarity with them, and our thoughts are with the entire nation.....ဂျပန်နိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်းတွင် ၁ ဇန်နဝါရီ ၂၀၂၄ ကလှုပ်ခတ်ခဲ့သောငလျင်နှင့် နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ဆူနာမီဖြစ်နိုင်ကြောင်း သတင်းကို ကြားသိရသည့်အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင်တုန်လှုပ်မိပါသည်။
ငလျင်ဘေးဒဏ်သင့် ဂျပန်တိုင်းသူပြည်သားများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်များ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးရမှုအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင်ကြေကွဲဝမ်းနည်းရပါသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူပြည်သားများက ပူဆွေးသောကရောက်နေရသောဂျပန်နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများနှင့်အတူ နွေးထွေးစွာအတူရှိနေပေးပါကြောင်း ဂျပန်အစိုးရအား ထပ်လောင်းပြောကြားရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။.....統一致政府
ミャンマー連邦共和国
2024 年 1 月 2 日
挙国一致政府は、本日日本の中部地方を襲った地震と、それに伴う津波の可能性について、深い悲しみを感じています。
私たちは、命が失われたことに心から哀悼の意を表するとともに、影響を受ける可能性のあるすべての人々に引き続き懸念を表明します。私たちは日本政府に対し、この危機的な時期にミャンマー国民達が思いを共にしていることを保証します。
ミャンマー統一致政府..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-01-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"NUCC and NUG Issue Joint New Year
Statement for 2024.....Spring Development Bank to Open
First Branch in Kawlin Township.....Ministry of Defence: Resistance Forces Take Over the Military Base in Thabeikkyin Township.....Cabinet: Acting President Urges People to
Escalate Perseverance for the Success in 2024.....Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration....Acting President States to Respect
for Justice and Human Dignity in His Christmas Greeting Message.....Central Committee for Implementation
of Interim Local Administration.....Ministry of Defence: Officers of Myanmar Military Council Desert Naung Gyi Ine Police Station in
Ayadaw Township.....Interim Board for Heritage Administration.....National Unity Consultative Council
(NUCC).....December 2023 Military Affairs Brief Review.....New Year Greetings..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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4.15 MB
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Description:
"NUCC and NUG Issue Joint New Year Statement for 2024.....Spring Development Bank to Open First Branch in Kawlin Township.....Ministry of Defence: Resistance Forces Take Over the Military Base in Thabeikkyin Township.....Cabinet: Acting President Urges People to Escalate Perseverance for the Success in 2024.....Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration....Acting President States to Respect for Justice and Human Dignity in His Christmas Greeting Message.....Central Committee for Implementation of Interim Local Administration.....Ministry of Defence: Officers of Myanmar Military Council Desert Naung Gyi Ine Police Station in Ayadaw Township.....Interim Board for Heritage Administration.....National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).....December 2023 Military Affairs Brief Review.....New Year Greetings..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.78 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူကို ဗဟိုပြုသည့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်သော ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်ရန် ရည်မှန်းထားသည်နှင့်အညီ လွတ်လပ်၍ တက်ကြွပြီး ဘက်မလိုက်သော နိုင်ငံခြားရေးမူဝါဒကို ချမှတ် လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးလျက်ရှိသည်။
2။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နှစ်နိုင်ငံအကြား သမိုင်းကြောင်း အရ အလွန်ခိုင်မာ၍ နီးကပ်သည့်ဆက်နွှယ်မှု အစဉ်အလာများရှိသည်သာမက တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသည် ကမ္ဘာ့အင်အားကြီးနိုင်ငံ တစ်နိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်သည့်အားလျော်စွာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် အထူးအရေးပါသည့်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည်ဟု ခံယူသည်။
3။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နယ်နိမိတ်အားဖြင့် ကီလိုမီတာ နှစ်ထောင်ကျော် ထိစပ်လျက်ရှိပြီး၊ ကမ္ဘာတည်သရွေ့ အတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်သွားရမည့် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား စစ်မှန်သည့် “ဆွေမျိုး-ပေါက်ဖော်” ဆက်ဆံရေးတည်ဆောက်သွားမည်။ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံအတွက် အိမ်နီးချင်းကောင်း ဖြစ်ရေး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံက အမြဲ ကြိုးပမ်း၊ ရပ်တည်မည်။
4။ တရုတ် တစ်နိုင်ငံတည်း မူဝါဒကို ဆက်လက်ထောက်ခံကျင့်သုံးမည်။
5။ တရုတ်နှင့်မြန်မာ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား ပြည်သူနှင့်ပြည်သူ ဆက်ဆံရေးကို အလေးထားလျက် အပြန်အလှန် ချစ်ကြည်မှု၊ ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစွမ်းကုန် မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
6။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား လူမှုစီးပွားအရ အကျိုးတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစဉ်သဖြင့် ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
7။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံပြည်သူများ၏အကျိုးစီးပွားဖြစ်ထွန်းရေးကိုမျှော်ရည်လျှက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်းရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ စီးပွားရေးအရ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများနှင့် အခြားလူမှုစီးပွားလုပ်ငန်းများ၏ လုံခြုံရေး ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်မည်။
8။ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများ၏ နိုင်ငံတော်လုံခြုံရေးကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်နေသည့် မည်သည့် အဖွဲ့ အစည်းကိုမျှ မြန်မာ့ပိုင်နက်အတွင်း အခြေချခွင့်မပြု။
9။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုမတိုင်ခင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်နိမိတ်သတ်မှတ်မှုစာချုပ်များ အပါအဝင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား သဘောတူချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သည့် စာချုပ်များအားလုံးကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ တာဝန်ယူ ဆက်ခံမည်။
10။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်စပ်တည်ငြိမ်ရေး နှင့် လုံခြုံရေးသာမက ဒေသတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်ရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကိုပါ ထိခိုက်စေသည့် ကျားဖြန့် အွန်လိုင်း လိမ်လည်မှုနှင့် လောင်းကစားလုပ်ငန်း၊ လူကုန်ကူးမှုလုပ်ငန်း၊ မူးယစ်ဆေးဝါးလုပ်ငန်းများအပါအဝင် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် ရာဇဝတ် မှုခင်းများကို တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ တိုက်ဖျက်သွားမည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
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692.43 KB
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Sub-title:
How HRW Documents Wartime Abuses, Advocates to Protect Civilians, and Promotes Justice
Description:
"Armed conflict dominates the headlines, from the hostilities in Israel and Palestine, to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to the militaries and militias committing atrocities in Sudan. For nearly four decades, Human Rights Watch (HRW) researchers have investigated international armed conflicts and civil wars, reporting on violations of human rights and the laws of war, and working to protect civilians caught in the crossfire. But what exactly does this look like?
We sat down with Human Rights Watch’s Executive Director Tirana Hassan to discuss how the organization – which has been defending human rights since 1978 – operates in times of armed conflict and how teams of people specializing in research, communications, and advocacy work together to compel world leaders to protect civilians and push for justice.
What does Human Rights Watch do when conflict erupts?
We seek to keep civilians safe during fighting by pressing warring parties to respect international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, which are the rules that guide and limit warfare. Human Rights Watch’s job is not to say whether war should be waged or not, but to make sure the conduct of warring parties respects the law.
It’s clear what humanitarian organizations do during conflict – they work to get civilians food, water, and shelter, and help those at risk to be protected. What is our role?
We have worked in armed conflicts for decades, from the civil wars in the Americas in the early 1980s to the current hostilities in Israel and Palestine today. We have warned the international community of potential armed conflicts and the risks that violations of the laws of war pose for civilians.
Our researchers document the conduct of the parties to the conflict and any laws they have violated during the fighting. We analyze this evidence and bring it to the warring parties, using our findings to lean on them – or convince governments around the world to lean on them – to change their conduct and protect civilians caught in the middle, as is their legal duty. We also campaign for justice and accountability before national courts and global courts, like the International Criminal Court, when violations amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.
Your answer leads me to another question – can Human Rights Watch’s work prevent conflict before it starts?
Our work can help prevent armed conflict by shining a spotlight on the human rights abuses that are the root cause of so much fighting in the world. When security forces abuse the populations they are meant to protect, when governments repress ethnic, national, or religious groups, when free media or the internet is shut down and when journalists are killed, allowing disinformation to flourish, when weapons flow into places that lack governance. Our research on violations like these, and our advocacy to get governments to change course and respect rights, can help stem tensions that often lead to armed conflict.
What type of laws-of-war violations do we look at?
The laws of war that we use today to protect civilians – also known as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its additional protocols – were created in response to the atrocities and inhumanity of World War II. These laws have been adopted by all countries and govern how a war is fought to limit civilian suffering as much as possible.
Warring parties – including national armed forces and non-state armed groups – don’t have carte blanche to do anything they want. They must respect international humanitarian law as well as international human rights law, which remains in effect.
International humanitarian law says that the warring parties are required to distinguish between civilians and combatants when carrying out attacks. Detainees are also protected from mistreatment and torture. The laws make sure civilians have access to food, water, and somewhere safe to live. International humanitarian law also protects essential civilian institutions and services, including hospitals, medical staff, markets, schools, and aid workers delivering life-saving assistance. Taking hostages is a violation, as is recruiting children to fight. Places of worship, such as mosques and churches, and key cultural and historical sites are also protected.
For example, when Taliban forces detained and then summarily executed some members of the former Afghan government’s security forces, that was a serious violation of the laws of war.
We have people with different research specialties across Human Rights Watch. When conflict hits, who does what?
We deploy multidisciplinary teams because conflict affects people in different ways. We have teams of country experts who have been working in and on these situations for a very long time. So, for example, when covering the conflict in Sudan, our Sudan researcher helped gather evidence on the ground and led our efforts to push governments to do more to stop abuses and protect civilians. For the conflict in Ukraine, our researchers specializing both in Ukraine and Russia are essential. The overwhelming majority of abuses are by Russian forces in Ukraine, but some also take place in Russia.
Human Rights Watch also has a Crisis and Conflict division, with researchers who are trained for and have experience working in conflict zones and crisis situations. This year they documented abuses in Sudan, Ukraine, Haiti, and Israel/Palestine.
Armed conflicts also affect different groups of people differently. In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, we documented how Ethiopian and Eritrean military forces, as well as local militias, used sexual violence, including rape, mainly against women and girls. Our Disability Rights Division documented that civilians with disabilities and older people in Gaza were unable to flee the Israeli government’s bombing and faced difficulties accessing necessities and aid under Israel’s blockade. Our health and human rights experts can speak to the health effects of sieges and blockades, which are violations of international law if they are used to deny civilians food and water. Children, we know, are disproportionately affected by conflict, and our colleagues specializing in children’s rights have documented how schools have often been used by warring parties as bases or weapons depots. Our work has led to soldiers vacating schools in Thailand, Somalia, Yemen, the Central African Republic, India, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Increasingly in conflict, our researchers can’t get close to where the abuses are happening because it’s unsafe or they are blocked from entering the country. Thanks to our Digital Investigations Lab, we can use technology to corroborate and strengthen our on-the-ground research and eyewitness testimony we’ve been told over the phone or a messaging app. These researchers scrape the internet for open-source evidence from photos and videos that people post on social media. They also conduct digital analyses to confirm that what they find is true, and they triangulate photos or videos depicting abuses with satellite imagery and geospatial analysis to confirm their accuracy.
We used satellite imagery in Myanmar in 2017 to help show the torching of 700 buildings in an ethnic Rohingya village in Rakhine State. The images show large burn scars and destroyed tree cover consistent with widespread destruction, corroborating accounts from refugees who described killing and arson by Burmese military, police and ethnic Rakhine mobs.
Our Arms Division specializes in all-source weapons analysis and treaty compliance monitoring. Among other activities, they conduct field investigations, book-research, and collaborate with technical sources and research teams to identify the specific type of weapons used by analyzing any remnants, impact craters, and other information that munitions leave behind after they are used. The division also monitors and documents when controversial weapons are used, including incendiary weapons like white phosphorous, which leave people with severe thermal burns. We report on new use of cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines, which are banned internationally because they are inherently indiscriminate against the civilian population.
In addition, the division advocates for stronger international law to better protect civilians from problematic means or methods of warfare in future armed conflicts. And our advocates campaign to stop weapons transfers to armed forces or groups that are likely to use them in violation of the laws of war.
What types of research have we done recently?
We have been documenting unlawful attacks by Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza and Israel. Israeli forces have apparently unlawfully struck hospitals and medical facilities in Gaza and put civilians at risk by using white phosphorus in populated areas. They have also used explosive weapons in densely populated areas on a massive scale. These strikes have caused large-scale destruction and loss of civilian life. In Lebanon, Israeli forces have killed a number of civilians in unlawful attacks amounting to apparent war crimes. We have also documented that Palestinian armed groups have deliberately killed civilians, taken hostages, and launched rockets indiscriminately into Israel’s civilian areas, which are war crimes.
The Israeli government has also cut off basic services, like electricity and water, to the civilian population in Gaza as collective punishment, blocked all but a trickle of aid and food, and used starvation as a weapon of war. These acts amount to war crimes.
We use our research to push for justice. Human Rights Watch was the first human rights organization to publish in-depth research on the issue of forced transfers and deportations of Ukrainians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and his children’s rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, for alleged war crimes involving the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.
How do we get our research in front of key people?
Part of our strategy is through the media and strategic communications. We share our unique research with journalists, who cover our work in the news. We leverage new and sometimes local communications channels to get the information not only to those in power, but also the communities who are affected. Our reports are based on detailed investigations, which are more important than ever in a world rife with disinformation. When the world has forgotten about certain armed conflicts, we work to keep them in the news and on policy makers’ agendas.
We advocate with people who are in positions to make the changes we want to see. For example, if we document an armed group using cluster munitions, we will go to the warring parties and say these are illegal under international law. If we can identify who manufactured and sold these weapons, we can go to those countries, show them our evidence, and tell them they may be complicit in war crimes.
We have also focused on identifying the leaders – like senior commanders in the armed forces – who are responsible for the abuses taking place. Then we can work with governments to implement targeted sanctions or travel bans. For example, we are now pressing the European Union to use sanctions against those responsible for grave violations in the armed conflict in Sudan.
It is our job to hold governments and their leaders accountable when they violate their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, no matter how powerful they are. When a military coalition including the United States and United Kingdom invaded Iraq in 2003, we documented their laws of war violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes that killed civilians and the torture of detainees. We also reported on Iraqi violations. Many years later, that work isn’t over. Righting wrongs is usually a marathon, not a sprint.
But it can take time. Human Rights Watch’s documentation of abuses in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s contributed to the creation of war crimes tribunals and the prosecutions of leaders for war crimes. These trials began in the 2000s and continue in 2023.
When it comes to our advocacy, where are our advocates located and what does their work look like?
Our advocates take our research and engage with people in power to influence the political response to fighting on the ground. Sometimes they are engaging with the warring parties themselves, and sometimes they are urging change among those funding and supporting the warring parties. Our advocates’ goal, in the most general sense, is to make sure human rights are centered in these policy responses.
We advocate with multilateral institutions at the global and regional level, whether it be the United Nations, the African Union, or the European Union, or other local and regional bodies that have responsibilities to protect civilians.
We have a research presence in about 100 countries, and our advocates and researchers can advocate with governments in each of these countries.
We have other advocates based all over the world, including in Tokyo, London, Washington DC, and Johannesburg, and in Australia, Brazil, and across Europe.
Here’s an example of what our advocacy looks like. Starting in 2014, we worked to expose the violent crackdown on dissent by Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro government, which led to a spiraling humanitarian emergency and the exodus of millions of people. We shared our research at the UN Security Council and pushed for a UN response, and the pressure we helped generate ultimately resulted in more aid reaching people. Our research was cited by the Biden administration to grant temporary protected status to Venezuelans living in the United States, and by the Brazilian refugee agency to grant thousands of Venezuelans legal status.
In short, our research, communications, and advocacy all work together in an incredibly effective way, ensuring that we deploy information in a way that compels those in power to take action.
Who does Human Rights Watch work with during conflict?
Our advocates and researchers work closely with partners – local human rights and other civil society groups, like humanitarian organizations, labor unions, and faith communities.
For example, after armed conflict broke out in Sudan in April 2023, we knew we needed more power behind documenting – and preserving evidence of – the atrocities. Sustained advocacy by Human Rights Watch, combined with the power of the voices of Sudanese and regional partner organizations across Africa, helped lead the UN Human Rights Council to establish an independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan.
What are the challenges you face? Today we see a number of conflicts raging where one side or the other – or both – shows little respect for these laws.
I know some people can be skeptical of whether international humanitarian law and human rights law helps while a conflict rages. There are armed conflicts where the warring parties don’t seem to be showing any restraint – they seemingly flout these laws without consequence.
We’ve seen this in the Horn of Africa since 2020. Government forces and allied militias in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have used rape as a weapon of war and destroyed infrastructure critical to civilians’ survival. They also had cut off the region from food, power, and communications for almost two years. This year, in neighboring Sudan, war has broken out – despite consistent warnings about escalating abuses by the country’s notorious security forces. Eight months later, we’ve documented ethnically motivated attacks on civilians in Darfur, how explosive weapons repeatedly used in urban areas have killed civilians and damaged critical infrastructure in the capital, Khartoum, and widespread obstruction of aid.
In both countries, perpetrators of the crimes have faced very few consequences. In Ethiopia, after warring parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement, international investigations into conflict-related atrocities were jettisoned as Ethiopia’s international and regional partners sought to normalize relations with the federal government. In Sudan, despite investigative efforts, accountability for crimes is just not being made a priority in political discussions.
That doesn’t mean we give up. And the laws of war do matter, as they give us a framework to render meaningful judgments against combatants, affording victims and their families a measure of justice.
Also, we know that when the laws of war are enforced, including through trials, they can help prevent atrocities by breaking cycles of violence and impunity. Our research shows that, all too often, when justice is scrapped to protect the powerful, these crimes just recur, creating new generations of victims. We’ve seen this in Afghanistan, when warlords granted themselves immunity, and when the International Criminal Court downgraded investigating US abuses in its investigation of alleged war crimes. We’ve also seen this in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
If you want to stop recurring abuses, you need justice. And sometimes justice in a courtroom is a long time coming.
In Syria, Human Rights Watch and many other groups spent years painstakingly documenting human rights violations and war crimes while those responsible were seemingly getting away with murder. Over 10 years on, though, we see that prosecutions for these crimes are gaining steam.
You mentioned that we also campaign for support for justice, including before courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).
One of our ultimate goals is justice and accountability for abuses. This includes shaping investigations and pressuring governments to arrest people wanted for serious crimes. We also push for effective war crimes courts, and work to secure financial and political support for accountability efforts. We sustain these campaigns for justice over many, many years. This often starts by making sure our published reports are brought to the attention of the international community and to authorities working before national courts, international courts – including the International Criminal Court – and hybrid courts, which are domestic courts containing international elements.
Human Rights Watch has also advocated for national authorities to put in place the laws and expertise needed to support the practice of “universal jurisdiction,” under which national judicial authorities investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in other countries, regardless of the nationality of the suspects or their victims. Over the course of 2020-2022, a German court held a trial on state-sponsored torture in Syria, ultimately convicting a former Syrian intelligence officer of crimes against humanity. A Human Rights Watch report documenting torture in Syria’s detention centers was referenced by the court during the trial.
Any last thoughts?
If I could wave a magic wand and stop conflicts around the world and bring people to an understanding, I’d do it. But that’s not reality. This is what we do instead. We document war crimes and other abuses. We make sure the world knows what’s happening, and we push for change. It’s not a perfect system, and sometimes it’s a long road to justice. But Human Rights Watch has done this work for decades, and we know from experience that justice is possible, and we do everything we can to make it probable..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-12-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Abductions, Forced Recruitment Violate Laws of War
Description:
"(Bangkok) – An ethnic armed group in northern Myanmar has abducted and forcibly recruited civilians fleeing fighting in Shan State, Human Rights Watch said today. Myanmar’s military also has a long record of using adults for forced labor and recruiting children, but getting recent information about unlawful practices in junta-controlled areas is difficult.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group, should immediately end its abusive practices against civilians, and take all available measures to protect them during hostilities against Myanmar’s armed forces and pro-junta militias.
“The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army is violating the laws of war by abducting and forcibly recruiting civilians, putting them at grave risk,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Civilians should be able to seek safety from fighting without fearing that the Myanmar military or ethnic armed groups will force them into their armies.”
On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army – began Operation 1027, an offensive targeting Myanmar military outposts in northern Shan State. The offensive triggered attacks by opposition armed groups elsewhere in the country. Since late October, fighting between opposition forces and the military has displaced more than 600,000 people, including almost 100,000 in Shan State.
Tens of thousands have fled Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Special Autonomous Zone in northern Shan State, in advance of an anticipated MNDAA assault on the town, which the group formerly controlled. Although the MNDAA assisted those fleeing by opening up previously closed forest roads, the armed unit also confiscated mobile phones and detained an unknown number of people as they left Laukkai, local media and witnesses said.
On November 24, the MNDAA abducted seven men as they traveled from Laukkai to Chin Shwe Haw, near the Myanmar-China border. Relatives told the Shan News Herald that the men’s friends last saw them detained on the roadside just outside Chin Shwe Haw, before Alliance Army fighters took them away. The Shan News Herald reported that an MNDAA spokesperson said that Sai Ai Naw, 18; Maung Nyi Ka, 19; Sai Lianghan, 20; Sai Ilaw, 26; Maung Nor Goon, 26; Sai Aung Heng, 27, and a seventh, unnamed 20-year-old man would be assigned to military service.
On November 25, a doctor who left Laukkai along the same route said he witnessed many young men pulled over and detained by MNDAA fighters outside Par Hsin Kyaw, a village between Laukkai and Chin Shwe Haw.
“They [MNDAA fighters] were pulling over men who were on motorcycles in groups of twos and threes,” he said. They did not pull over couples, and I had one of the female nurses riding pillion, so we didn’t get stopped. But there were scores of young men pulled over and I saw them being rounded up. I was too afraid to stop and look but they were being gathered together and taken away somewhere.”
On December 12, the parents of seven other young men who did not arrive home after fleeing Laukkai in late October issued a letter to the MNDAA, pleading for their release. The families wrote, in the letter obtained by Human Rights Watch, that they last saw their sons being led away by MNDAA fighters near Chin Shwe Haw. All those abducted were of Ta’ang ethnicity and came from Man Khite village, Namhsan township, in northern Shan State.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army operates in northern Shan State along the China-Myanmar border. It was founded as the Communist Party of Burma collapsed in 1989 and agreed to a ceasefire with the Myanmar military later that year. The ceasefire ended in 2009, when a military-aligned faction of the Alliance Army became the Kokang Border Guard Force and was put in charge of Laukkai, where illegal activity, most recently cyber scam centers, has thrived. The MNDAA has attempted multiple times to regain the territory, including Laukkai, that it lost in 2009.
Some ethnic armed groups, including the MNDAA, impose quotas requiring villages or households to supply a recruit, who in some cases may be willing to serve. Myanmar’s military and pro-junta militias also use forced recruits, including children, to bolster their armed forces or for other roles such as porters, cooks, or cleaners.
In a widely shared video dated December 5 that Human Rights Watch reviewed and verified, an MNDAA official in uniform warns families not to shirk their responsibilities and to ensure those recruited were at least 15 years old and younger than 50.
“If [you don’t] have a boy … if you have a girl … if you have three [one must serve],” the official tells a crowd gathered at a monastery in Pang Hseng village, Monekoe township, in northern Shan State. “If you have five, two of them must serve. Got it? If you have five males at home, two of them must serve.”
He continued: “So, if you’re thinking about not bringing your sons and daughters because you’re concerned, don’t do that. … One day when they come back because things are peaceful, we are going to collect household registrations and we will know that they did not serve, and we will arrest them for it.”
Under international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, applicable to the non-international armed conflicts in Myanmar, warring parties are prohibited from arbitrarily depriving anyone of their liberty, including through abductions and forced recruitment. Parties must treat all civilians humanely; arbitrary deprivation of liberty is incompatible with this requirement.
In September 2019, Myanmar ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which obligates non-state armed forces not to, “under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18.” The 2019 Myanmar Child Rights Law also forbids recruiting anyone under 18 into the armed forces or non-state armed groups.
In 2023, the United Nations secretary-general's annual report on children in armed conflict identified the Myanmar military as responsible for the majority of the cases the UN had verified as recruiting and using children the previous year. However, the report also named the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as having recruited up to seven children and separately, abducting up to seven others. The UN special rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has also received various reports that the Myanmar military’s recruitment and use of children has increased since the 2021 military coup.
“Governments with any influence over opposition and ethnic armed groups in Myanmar should impress upon them that violations by the Myanmar armed forces never justifies abuses by their own forces,” Pearson said..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-12-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"၁။ အဖက်ဖက်က မရှုမလှ ရှုံးနိမ့်လျက်ရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၎င်းတို့ သက်ဆိုးရှည်စေရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုကို အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်ရန် အရေးတကြီးလိုအပ် နေသော နိုင်ငံခြားငွေ ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ယင်း၏အမည်ခံ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ စစ်ကောင်စီဗဟိုဘဏ်၊ စစ်ကောင်စီထောက်တိုင်ဘဏ်များပူးပေါင်း၍ ပြည်ပရောက် ရွှေ့ပြောင်း အလုပ်သမားများ၏ သမ္မာအာဇီဝချွေးနှဲစာအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်ရယူရန် နည်းလမ်း ပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၂။ ထို့အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၃၀-၈-၂၀၂၃ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ညွှန်ကြားစာ တစ်စောင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီး ရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ မိသားစုလွှဲပို့ငွေအဖြစ် အခြေခံ လစာ၏ အနည်းဆုံး ၂၅ % ကို လစဉ် သို့မဟုတ် သုံးလလျှင် တစ်ကြိမ် ၎င်းတို့ သတ်မှတ် ထားသော ငွေလွှဲဝန်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများမှတဆင့် လွှဲပို့ကြရန် ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင် အကျိုးဆောင် အေဂျင်စီများကို ဖိအားပေးညွှန်ကြားခဲ့ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၃။ သို့ပါသော်လည်း မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများသည် တရားဝင်မှု အလျဉ်းမရှိ သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အမိန့်အာဏာဟူသမျှကို တော်လှန်လိုစိတ်ပြင်းပြစွာဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်အန်တုခဲ့ကြသည့်အတွက် ယခုအခါ ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများတွင် ရောက်ရှိအလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင် နေသော မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းသို့ ပြန်လည်လွှဲပို့ငွေ များသည် ယခင်ကထက် ၁၀ ပုံ ၁ ပုံခန့်သာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီထံသို့ ရောက်ရှိတော့ ကြောင်း လေ့လာသိရှိရသည်။
၄။ မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ စိတ်အားထက်သန်စွာ အာဏာဖီဆန်မှုကြောင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအတွက် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေရရှိမှု သိသာစွာလျော့နည်းခဲ့ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြပ်အတည်းဆိုက်ရောက်စေခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်း အလုပ်သမားများအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့ ကျရာနိုင်ရာအခန်းကဏ္ဍက အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီထံ လွှဲပို့ငွေများ မရောက်ရှိစေရန် အချိန်ကိုက်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းသည် ဘဏ္ဍာရေး တိုက်စစ်တွင် တတပ်တအားပါဝင်ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါ၍ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံအသီးသီးသို့ရောက်ရှိနေသော မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများအား အထူးကျေးဇူးတင် မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-12-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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1.17 MB
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"Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Bago Region, Rakhine State, Shan State, and Kayin State from December 8th to 14th. 7 civilians including a child who liked and shared the posts about against Military Junta on social media, were arrested and charged. Military Junta arrested 8 locals from Ywangan Township, Southern Shan State, as hostages on December 12th. Military Junta Troop forced to plant the sunflower to the farmers in Ayeyarwady Region.
16 civilians died and over 20 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 6 underaged children were injured and 5 died when the Military Junta committed violations. Over 80 civilians were arrested and over 30 were tortured within a week by the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-12-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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210.36 KB 199.99 KB 614.52 KB
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"Myanmar faces a protracted learning crisis where the COVID-19 pandemic was compounded by a coup in February 2021, which furthered school closures. Save the Children created Catch-up Clubs (CuCs) to support children’s remedial learning in a matter of weeks and address barriers to children’s successful return to school in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. An innovative model that offers community-led, play-based literacy instruction to children grouped by ability, not age, CuCs assess children’s foundational literacy and Social and Emotional Learning (SEL), while addressing child protection and economic barriers to education. CuCs were piloted with over 3000 children in upper primary to lower secondary grades across 36 communities in the conflict-affected states of Rakhine and Kayin in Myanmar. This quasi-natural experimental impact evaluation investigated the cause-and-effect relationship between CuCs and children's literacy outcomes and SEL competencies. The study was contextually adapted to consider children affected by conflict, gender, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity. The results show that children who participated in CuCs had significantly higher literacy level and SEL competency than children who did not participate. Children participating in CuCs also showed greater self-confidence and educational aspirations to remain in education or continue their schooling to a higher level..."
Source/publisher:
Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies
Date of publication:
2023-12-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights Education, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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pdf
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1.09 MB
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"Joint media release with:
The Hon Andrew Giles MP, Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and, Multicultural Affairs
The Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, Minister for International Development and the Pacific
The Albanese Government has pledged $265 million at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-led Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in Geneva to support refugees and to sustain humanitarian assistance in protracted crises.
As the world faces a deepening crisis with more than 114 million people displaced across the globe, Australia is working to take a leading role in international resettlement efforts.
In response to the ongoing displacement crisis, Australia will provide:
$235 million to support displaced Rohingya and communities in need in Myanmar and Bangladesh.
$20 million to support people in Afghanistan and those displaced to neighbouring countries.
$10 million to support people in Sudan and those displaced to neighbouring countries.
At the GRF, Australia reaffirmed its commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees, enhancing refugee self-reliance, and expanding access to third country solutions through resettlement and complementary pathway places.
Australia's Humanitarian Resettlement Program has been increased to 20,000 places, the highest core intake in over a decade, and we are committed to growing skills-based pathways. Australia is also working to support other countries to establish and grow their own resettlement programs.
The Australian Government recently established a Refugee Advisory Panel to Government to ensure those with lived experience can advise Australia's settlement programs.
Australia's official delegation to the GRF includes one of its members Mr Danijel Malbasa, an advocate, writer, lawyer, and a former Yugoslav refugee, who co-delivered Australia's National Statement.
Quotes attributable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong:
“We are seeing the largest displacement crisis unfolding in modern history, with more than 114 million people displaced globally.
“Our humanitarian assistance is part of a broader effort to address the causes of displacement and find durable solutions.
“Through our partners, Australia will deliver vital support to vulnerable people displaced by conflict.”
Quotes attributable to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the Hon Andrew Giles MP:
“Our pledges aim to ease pressure on host countries and demonstrate our commitment to responsibility sharing, in recognition of the shared global challenge of displacement.
“Through our pledges, Australia is firmly committed to supporting refugees globally and the communities that host them at a time where there are more people forcibly displaced than ever before.
“The Albanese Government is committed to working with others globally to find practical, and sustainable solutions for the increasingly complex situations driving displacement, such as through the adoption of machine-readable refugee travel documents”.
Quotes attributable to the Minister for International Development and the Pacific, the Hon Pat Conroy MP:
“Australia is deeply concerned by the unprecedented number of displaced people around the world.
“We are making an important contribution to the humanitarian response in partnership with other countries and international organisations at the Global Refugee Forum.”..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Australia
Date of publication:
2023-12-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. Today marks the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. The democratically elected representatives of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw are striving for a future where human rights and dignity are upheld for everyone in Myanmar. At a time when the resistance movement has made dramatic gains against the illegal military junta, we once again can glimpse a future where human rights are promoted and protected in our country. We call for the international community to support us in our efforts to realize this future at this critical juncture.
2. As of today, human right abuses in many forms continue in many countries, including Myanmar where the situation is worsened by conflict. In Myanmar, we have witnesses the military junta carrying out unspeakable and horrific human rights violations against civilians, including the democratically elected lawmakers in the 2020 general election since the unlawful attempted coup on February 1 2021.
3. The military junta’s atrocities include arbitrary arrests, inhumane torture, extrajudicial killings, massive killings, sexual abuse and gender-based violence, property loot, seizure and destruction, mass arson and targeted aerial attacks against civilians and civilian objects. Some of them amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The executions of four democratic defenders including former lawmaker U Phyo Zeya Thaw constitute some of the most heinous human rights violations committed by the junta.
4. Since the attempted coup, over 4,250 civilians have been killed and 25,522 detained. An estimated 80,000 civilian houses and other infrastructure has been burnt down and destroyed. Schools, hospitals, religious buildings and even IDPs camps have been targeted frequently by airstrikes. The recent airstrikes on Mung Lai Hkyet Village in Laiza Township, Kachin State killed 28 people including 11 children and injured over 60 persons. The unlawful coup and unspeakable violence of the military junta’s armed forces has resulted in nearly 2.5 million people displaced and 18 million people including women and children in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The international community is reminded again that it is very necessary to make practical cooperation with the National Unity Government and ethnic resistance organizations for the effective humanitarian aid to those in need of help.
5. In order to end the human rights violation and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, we must strive to reverse the coup and return Myanmar to democracy. The people of Myanmar are bravely resisting the brutal military junta in the cause of upholding their freedom, human rights, human dignity and justice. The military junta and those involved in human rights violations must be held accountable for their long reign of terror against all people of Myanmar including ethnic minorities and the Rohingya people. This is a critical step to progress towards a political transition to an inclusive federal democratic nation. Our vision is of a world where human rights and democracy are protected for all, not only in Myanmar but across Asia and in all countries worldwide.
6. We call on the global community including the United Nations and ASEAN to understand the current situation in Myanmar which is in a new phase. Democracy’s supporters are united in moving forward towards an end of military dictatorship and the victory of the Spring Revolution. This is an essential time for support from the international community. We welcome the coordinated sanctions of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and urge all countries to take such actions.
7. We mark this Human Rights Day by reiterating our call to the United Nations, ASEAN, democratic countries, human rights organizations and individuals to help us to end the military coup and support the country’s democratically-elected representatives, legitimate institutions and ethnic representative organizations to restore democracy, peace, human rights and the rule of law in Myanmar.
The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-12-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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320.31 KB
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"၁။ ယနေ့သည် ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံ၌ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကြေညာစာတမ်းအား အတည်ပြုခဲ့သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်ပြည့်မြောက် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူသားတိုင်းအတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် လူ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာအားခံစားနိုင်မည့် အနာဂတ်အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်၊၊ တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်မှုများသည် သိသာထင်ရှား သောရလဒ်များ ပိုင်ဆိုင်နေသည့် ယခုအချိန်တွင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့နိုင်ငံတွင် လူ့အခွင့် အရေးအား ကာကွယ်မြှင့်တင်ပေးမည့် အနာဂတ်ကိုလည်း မြင်ယောင်ကြည့်နိုင်ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် ယခုကဲ့သို့ အရေးကြီးသည့်အချိန်အခါတွင် မျှော်လင့်ထား သည့် ထိုအနာဂတ် အောင်မြင်စေရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုများတွင် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီ ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်၊၊
၂၊၊ ယနေ့ခေတ်ကာလတွင် ပဋိပက္ခကြောင့် အခြေအနေပိုမိုဆိုးရွားနေသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံအများအပြားတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများသည် ပုံစံမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ဆက်လက် ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေဆဲဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းသည့်အချိန်မှစ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သက်သေများစွာရှိပါသည်၊၊
၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ ဆိုးရွားသောအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများတွင် အကြောင်းပြချက်မဲ့ဖမ်းဆီး ခြင်း၊ လူမဆန်စွာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ တရားလက်လွန်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာစော်ကားခြင်းနှင့် လိင်ဖြစ်တည်မှုအပေါ်အခြေခံသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် ခြင်း၊ ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကိုခိုးယူခြင်း၊ သိမ်းဆည်းခြင်းနှင့် ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ နေအိမ်များကို မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ များနှင့် အများပြည်သူဆိုင်ရာနေရာများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထား၍ လေကြောင်းဖြင့်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းများ ပါဝင်ပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းတို့အနက် အချို့သည် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်ပါသည်၊၊ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဟောင်း ဦးဖြိုးဇေယျာသော် အပါအဝင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ကာကွယ်သူ ၄ ဦးကို သေဒဏ်ပေး ကွပ်မျက်ခြင်းများသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးသော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများထဲမှ အချို့ပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊
၄။ အာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည့်အချိန်မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူ ၄,၂၅၀ ဦး အားသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ၂၅,၅၂၂ ဦးအား ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်၊၊ ပြည်သူ့အိုးအိမ်နှင့် ပြည်သူပိုင် အဆောက်အအုံ ၈၀,၀၀၀ ခန့်ကိုမီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းများ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည်၊၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဆေးရုံများ၊ ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အအုံများသာမက စစ်ဘေးရှောင်စခန်းများကိုပါ လေကြောင်း ဖြင့် မကြာခဏပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်၊၊ မကြာသေးမီက ကချင်ပြည်နယ်၊ လိုင်ဇာမြို့ရှိ မုန်လိုင်ခတ်ကျေးရွာအား လေကြောင်းဖြင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့မှုကြောင့် ကလေးငယ် ၁၁ ဦးအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူ ၂၈ ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး ၆၀ ဦးကျော် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရခဲ့သည်၊၊ ဥပဒေမဲ့ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုနှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကြောင့် ၂.၅ သန်းကျော်သော ပြည်သူများ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်နေရသည်၊၊ ထို့အပြင် အမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေး သူငယ်များအပါအဝင် ၁၈ သန်းကျော်သည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းအကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသူများထံသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများ အမှန်တကယ်ရောက်ရှိရန်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်း အနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် လက်တွေ့ ကျကျ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်းအသိပေးလိုပါသည်၊၊
၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လျက်ရှိသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများနှင့် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ပဋိက္ခများ အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရန် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ရရှိစေရန် ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်ရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ မြန်မာ ပြည်သူများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး၊ လူ့သိက္ခာနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ရရှိနိုင် ရန် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီကို ရဲရင့်စွာ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေဆဲ ဖြစ်ပါ သည်၊၊ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသူများ အနေဖြင့် လူနည်းစုတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများအပါအဝင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ အပေါ်၌ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်က ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် ရက်စက်အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအတွက် တာဝန်ယူ ရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းသည် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသို့ လျှောက်လှမ်း နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကူးအပြောင်းအား ပိုမိုချောမွေ့စေမည့် အရေးကြီးသော အဆင့်တစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်သာမက အာရှအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ နိုင်ငံများတွင် လူသား အားလုံးအတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအား ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်မည့် ကမ္ဘာကြီး ဖြစ်တည် စေရန်မှာ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ မျှော်မှန်းချက် ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊
၆။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့် အာဆီယံအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာ့အသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် တိုးတက်အောင်မြင် မှုအဆင့် အသစ်တစ်ခုရှိနေသော လက်ရှိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အခြေအနေကို နားလည်ရန် တောင်းဆိုလို ပါသည်၊၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီ ထောက်ခံအားပေးသူများသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အဆုံးသတ်ရေးနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အောင်မြင်မှုအတွက် ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားရန် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်လျက် ရှိပါသည်၊၊ ယခုအချိန်သည် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းထံမှ အကူအညီပေးအပ်ရန် အရေးကြီး အချိန်တစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု၊ ယူကေနှင့် ကနေဒါနိုင်ငံတို့၏ ပူးပေါင်း အရေးယူ ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများကို ကြိုဆိုပြီး အခြားသော နိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် အလားတူ အရေးယူ မှုများ ချမှတ်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်၊၊
၇။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနေ့တွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှု အား အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေး ကူညီဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးအတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ တရားဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား ကိုယ်စားပြုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီပေးရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် ထပ်မံ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-12-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Dec 1 to 7, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Mon State, Rakhine State, Shan State, and Chin State from December 1st to 7th. Military Junta also burnt and killed 11 civilians in Monyea Township, Sagaing Region on December 2nd. 2 Sittwe locals who shared Rakhine News on Facebook, were arrested and opened cases by the Military. The Military Junta also arrested a Community-Based Organization member from Kyaukme Township in North Shan State.
15 civilians died and almost 18 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 4 underaged people were injured and 1 died when the Military Junta committed violations. Over 32 civilians were arrested and 12 were killed within a week by the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-10-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
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291.31 KB 283.75 KB 157.71 KB
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Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးနှင့်တကွ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေး တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော ရဲဘော်များအားလုံး ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အပေါင်း ကင်းဝေးကြပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် အားလုံးရည်မှန်းကြိုးပမ်း နေကြသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံသစ်အား အမြန်ဆုံး တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် စိတ်ကူးသစ်၊ အကြံဉာဏ်သစ်၊ ခွန်အားသစ်များနှင့်အတူ ဆတက်ထမ်းပိုး ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ကြပါစေ ကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂၊၊ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်ခံဘဝ ၁၉၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက်( မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်နေ့)တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများက ဦးဆောင်၍ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေမူကြမ်းကို သပိတ်မှောက်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြပြီး ပထမဆုံး အကြိမ် အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖြစ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယင်းလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးသည် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးသို့ တစ်ဟုန်ထိုးပျံ့နှံ့သွားခဲ့ကာ အမျိုးသားအထက်တန်းကျောင်းများ၊ အမျိုးသား ကောလိပ်များ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပြီး နယ်ချဲ့တို့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်လိုသည့် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်များ ရှင်သန်နိုးကြားလာခဲ့ကြပါသည်။
၃။ တိုင်းပြည်တာဝန်များကို ပခုံးပြောင်းထမ်းဆောင်မည့် လူငယ်လူရွယ် အမျိုးသားများ အနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၏ အတိတ်သမိုင်းအား သင်ခန်းစာယူ၍ အနာဂတ်သမိုင်း ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်အောင် တည်ဆောက်ရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၏ အမျိုးသားနေ့သည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးလမ်းကို စတင်လမ်းဖောက် လျှောက်လှမ်းခဲ့သည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ မီးခဲပြာဖုံးနေသော ကျွန်စိတ် ကို သခင်စိတ်အဖြစ်သို့ အသွင်ပြောင်းနိုင်ခဲ့သည့် နေ့တစ်နေ့လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့တို့ လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအားလုံး အသက်၊ သွေး၊ ချွေးတို့ဖြင့် ရင်းနှီးရယူခဲ့ရခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ပေးဆပ်မှုကြီးမားစွာ ရယူခဲ့ရသည့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးသည် အလုံးစုံ လွတ်လပ်သည့်နိုင်ငံအဖြစ်သို့ မရောက်ရှိခဲ့ပေ။ မိမိလူမျိုးအချင်းချင်း စိုးမိုးချယ်လှယ် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏လက်အောက်တွင် နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော် ကြာ ခါးသီးစွာ ရင်ဆိုင်ခံစားခဲ့ကြရပါသည်။
၄။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒမဲဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထား သော နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်တို့ ဦးဆောင်သည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရထံမှ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်ရန် တစ်ဖန်ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည်။
၅။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့မှုကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံးတို့ သည် နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော်ကြာ အမြစ်တွယ်နေသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ် တိုက်ထုတ်ရန် အနှစ်နှစ် အလလက ကိန်းအောင်းနေသော အမျိုးသားစိတ်ဓာတ်သည် ယနေ့နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ပြန်လည်နိုးကြားလာခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယနေ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအားလုံးသည် အမျိုးသားနေ့မှ ပေါက်ဖွားလာခဲ့သော အမျိုးသားစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို အခြေ တည်ကာ မိမိတိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုးကို လုံခြုံအေးချမ်းသော နိုင်ငံတစ်ခုတွင် ကောင်းမွန်စွာနေထိုင် နိုင်ရေး၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုတိုင်းရင်းသား၊ လူမျိုးအားလုံး ဥမကွဲ၊ သိုက်မပျက် အတူတကွ နေထိုင်နိုင် ရေး၊ ကမ္ဘာ့အလယ်တွင် တင့်တယ်ဝင့်ထည်စွာ ရပ်တည်သွားနိုင်ရေးတို့အတွက် မွန်မြတ်သော စိတ်ဓာတ်များဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသည့်အတွက် ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ရပါသည်။
၆။ ယခုအချိန်ကာလသည် အာဏာလု အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေးနည်းလမ်း အမျိုးမျိုးအား ကိုယ်စီထမ်းရွက်ကာ ညီညွတ်သော ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်မှုများကြောင့် တော်လှန်ရေး ခရီးတစ်လျှောက် အားကောင်းသော အောင်မြင်မှုများကို ရယူပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားနိုင်သည့် အချိန်ဖြစ်ပါ သည်။ ထို့ပြင် တည်ဆောက်ထားပြီးသော ညီညွတ်ခြင်း၊ အပြန်အလှန်နားလည်ခြင်း၊ လေးစား တန်ဖိုးထားခြင်းများကို အခြေပြုလျက် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံတွင် အာဏာရူးစစ်မိစ္ဆာများအား အချိန်တိုတို အတွင်း အမြစ်ပြတ်မောင်းထုတ်နိုင်ပြီး နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အောင်ပွဲကိုလည်း အချိန်တိုတို အတွင်း ရရှိနိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု အခိုင်အမာယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
၇။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် အချင်းချင်း အပြန် အလှန်လေးစားမှု၊ နားလည်ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့ကို ပိုမိုခိုင်မာအောင် တည်ဆောက် သွားပြီး ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် လွတ်လပ်၍ငြိမ်းချမ်းပြီး ဝါဒဖြူစင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့်အတူ ဆက်လက်လက်တွဲ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယမှသည် နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အောင်ပွဲနေ့သို့ တွဲလက်ညီညီ အရှိန်မြှင့် ချီတက်ကြစေလိုကြောင်း လေးလေး နက်နက် တိုက်တွန်းလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-12-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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pdf
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" ယနေ့ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၅ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀)ရက်နေ့၊ ခရစ်က္ကရာဇ် ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ (၁၀၃)နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားနေ့အောင်ပွဲ အခါသမယတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုဖွား တိုင်းရင်းသားညီနောင် အပေါင်း ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာချမ်းသာကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့ခေတ်အတွင်း ကန့်သတ်ချုပ်ချယ်ချက်ပေါင်း များစွာပါဝင်သည့် ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေ(၁၉၂၀) ပြဌာန်းခဲ့သည်ကို လက်မခံနိုင်သောကြောင့် ရန်ကုန်ကောလိပ် ကျောင်းသား/သူများ ဦးဆောင်ပြီး မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀) ရက် (၁၉၂၀ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ရက်)နေ့တွင် ဆန့်ကျင်သပိတ်မှောက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ထိုလူထုသပိတ်ကြီးမှ အမျိုးသားပညာရေး ကို တောင်းဆိုဖော်ပြသည့် အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။ မတရားအုပ်ချုပ်သူ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့အစိုးရကို ပထမဆုံး ထိထိရောက်ရောက် တော်လှန်ခဲ့သော ထိုနေ့ကို အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၁၀၃)နှစ်ပင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ယခုမျက်မှောက်ခေတ်ကာလတွင်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် မတရားလုယူရန်ကြိုးစားပြီး၊ အဆိုပါ လုပ်ရပ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြသည့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအား အကြမ်းဖက် ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ရက်စက်စွာ ကျုးလွန်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ မတရားအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား ခုခံကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေး၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံး လိုလားတောင့်တခဲ့ကြသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံတဝန်းရှိ ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များ အပါအဝင်၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအသီးသီး စုပေါင်းကာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအား ယနေ့အထိ တမျိုးသားလုံး တက်ကြွစွာ ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအနေဖြင့်လည်း တဖက်တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ကျဆုံးရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအစရှိသည့် ကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ၊ စစ်မျက်နှာစာမျိုးစုံ ဖွင့်လှစ်ကာ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေသကဲ့သို့၊ အခြားတဖက်တွင် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု၏ မျှော်ရည်ချက်များကို အမြန်ဆုံး ချမှတ်အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံးနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက် ပူးပေါင်းကာ ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်ပွဲအတွက် ဆက်လက် ကြိုးပမ်းလုပ်ဆောင်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
အတိတ်သမိုင်းတွင် မတရားဖိနှိပ်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည့် လူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်လှုပ်ရှားမှုများကြောင့် နယ်ချဲ့ကိုလိုနီလက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ခဲ့ရသော သမိုင်းအောင်ပွဲ သာဓကရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ပင် ယခုပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထု၏ လိုလားချက်၊ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ကို အခြေပြုပြီး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် (FDC)တွင် ဖော်ပြထားသည့် လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ တရားမျှတမှုနဲ့ တန်းတူညီမျှရေး စသည့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို ကိုင်စွဲကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို လက်တွဲညီညီ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ပြီး ဆက်လက်တော်လှန်သွားမည်ဆိုပါက ခေတ်သစ် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ တရက်ကို ထပ်မံ ဖန်တီးနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ဟု အလေးအနက် ယုံကြည်ပါကြောင်း သတင်းစကားပါးလျက်၊ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃)နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသား အောင်ပွဲနေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ်အတွက် ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-12-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-07
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"The illegal Myanmar military junta is set to host the 26th Ministerial Conference of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program, on December 15 in Naypyidaw, according to Justice For Myanmar sources.
In a welcome move, the Asian Development Bank, which acts as the GMS Secretariat, has told Justice For Myanmar that it will not attend the Ministerial Conference and will not provide any support. In response to an email, an ADB spokesperson told Justice For Myanmar, “The Asian Development Bank (ADB) will not attend the 26th GMS Ministerial Conference. In addition, ADB will not provide any funding for the event, nor provide logistical or advisory support. ADB also will not finance the costs of any developing member countries’ attendees.”
Justice For Myanmar calls on GMS countries to cancel the conference and ban the junta from the GMS program. The ADB should reconsider its support for the GMS program while it continues to engage with the junta.
The conference is planned to take place as the junta continues to lose control of Myanmar, is rapidly losing territory and is waging a campaign of terror against the people, committing mass killings, carrying out indiscriminate air strikes and shelling, arbitrary arrests, torture and mass displacement that has surged to more than 2.5 million.
The conference host is Kan Zaw, the junta’s minister for investment and foreign economic relations, who is sanctioned by the US and EU. The EU noted that Kan Zaw “takes an active role in supporting the military’s efforts to attract foreign investment, thereby contributing to securing the financial needs of the military regime. Therefore, he is responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma as well as for engaging in actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Myanmar.”
According to Justice For Myanmar sources, Kan Zaw has invited China’s finance minister, Lan Fo’an, Cambodia’s deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, Sok Chenda Sophea, Lao’s planning and investment minister, Khamjane Vongphosy, Vietnam’s planning and investment minister, Nguyen Chi Dung, and Thailand’s deputy finance minister, Julapun Amornvivat to the conference.
The conference is being organised by a steering committee headed by the junta’s deputy minister for investment and foreign economic relations. The committee also includes a member of the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) as the sole private sector representative, according to Justice For Myanmar sources. MEC is sanctioned by the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia.
The junta-controlled Myanmar Police Force is providing security for the conference, overseen by the deputy police chief who is also a member of the steering committee. The junta’s police force is directly responsible for killings, torture and arbitrary arrest, which amount to crimes against humanity. The junta is preparing to maximise propaganda from the conference, having formed a committee to manage the release of information to control journalists.
The conference is being held at the Grand Amara Hotel, which is part of the junta-linked crony conglomerate International Group of Entrepreneur (IGE) owned by Ne Aung, the brother of the junta’s navy chief. The junta is covering the accommodation of delegates, their flights between Yangon and Naypyidaw and hosting a gala lunch.
The upcoming conference comes after Min Aung Hlaing participated in the 7th GMS Leaders’ Summit hosted by Cambodia in 2021. The ADB told Justice For Myanmar that they had provided Cambodia with advisory support to prepare documentation for the summit, which was held virtually.
The Leaders’ Summit, which is the program’s highest body, was featured prominently in junta propaganda. In a speech at the summit, Min Aung Hlaing defended his illegal coup attempt and falsely stated that the 2020 election was rigged and that the coup attempt was constitutional.
At the 2021 Leader’s Summit, Min Aung Hlaing illegitimately endorsed the GMS Strategic Framework 2030, which aims to promote investment and tourism that would help generate revenue for the junta, which it needs to finance its terror campaign.
In 2022, Laos hosted the 25th GMS Ministerial Conference, in which the junta was also wrongly allowed to participate. In the conference, the junta illegitimately endorsed the GMS Regional Investment Framework for 2023-2025, in which the junta has proposed US$208.3 million in projects in sectors that include energy, information and communications technology, tourism and agriculture, mostly to be funded by unspecified “development partners”.
The GMS program was established in 1992 under Myanmar’s previous dictatorship, and has focussed on promoting trade and the development of economic corridors and infrastructure, including in ethnic areas of Myanmar.
As part of the Myanmar junta’s chairing of the GMS, the junta linked Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) is leading the GMS Business Council, a grouping of chambers of commerce from GMS countries. The GMS Business Council is currently chaired by Zaw Min Win, a former UMFCCI president and the chair of the Myanmar Industries Alliance, which invests in the mobile operator Mytel with the military conglomerate MEC.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is unfathomable that the GMS program and its members are not only inviting the illegal junta to participate but are even appointing it as host of a ministerial conference.
“The junta is a terrorist organisation that is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity. The military's coup attempt is failing and the GMS program and its members are making a serious moral and strategic error in legitimising it and attempting to facilitate investment that will help it generate revenue and further fuel atrocities.
“GMS members should immediately cancel the planned conference or, failing that, refuse to attend. The junta must be barred from the GMS program, which should instead recognise and support the National Unity Government, which is the legitimate government of Myanmar.
“We welcome the decision of the ADB to withdraw support for the Ministerial Conference and to refuse to attend. The ADB should now reconsider its institutional support for the GMS program as long as its members continue to legitimise the illegal junta.
“The involvement of UMFCCI and the junta-linked crony Zaw Min Win in the GMS Business Council is alarming and is a further sign that the junta and its cronies are using the program to promote investment that can strengthen the junta and worsen the crisis in Myanmar caused by the military’s illegal coup attempt.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-12-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Nov 22 to 30, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kayah State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from November 22nd to 30th. Military Junta Troop is accused of using Chemical Gas Bombs and high destructive 500-pound bombs in airstrikes. The Ministry of Transport and Communications, which works under the Military, released and announced on November 22nd that they will take action for people who use Satellite Connection. Military Junta extorted and arrested the civilians and youths in Mandalay Region and Tanintharyi Region.
Over 36 civilians died and almost 40 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 4 underaged children were injured and 5 died when the Military Junta committed violations. A child also died by the Military Junta Troop’s landmine..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-12-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"H.E. Fumio Kishida, Prime Minister
H.E. Yoko Kamikawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Shunichi Suzuki, Minister of Finance
H.E. Tetsuo Saito, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Statement calling on the Japanese government to stop ODA and publicly-funded projects benefiting the Myanmar military
ayus:Network of Buddhists Volunteers on International Cooperation
Friends of the Earth Japan
Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC)
Network Against Japan Arms Trade (NAJAT)
Mekong Watch
Progressive Voice
More than two years and ten months have passed since the failed coup by the Myanmar military. The military continues to commit serious human rights abuses amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. At least 4,192 people including pro-democracy activists and civilians have been confirmed killed by the military as of November 21, 2023. Among those protesting the attempted seizure of power by force by the military, a total of 25,425 people have been arrested. Across Myanmar, 2 million people are estimated to be internally displaced as of November 10, including 1.7 million currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since the coup.
By 2020, the Japanese government provided JPY 356.518 billion in total in grant aid as well as JPY 109.94 billion in total in technical assistance to Myanmar, and promised JPY 1,378.47 billion in loan aid (figure based on loan agreements). After the failed coup, then Foreign Minister Motegi made the following statement regarding these Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Myanmar on May 21, 2021: “If the situation continues in this way, it is possible that we will be compelled to review ODA and that companies may become unable to provide investment even if they want to.” However, since then, despite the worsening human rights crisis in Myanmar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have simply repeated that it would “comprehensively consider what measures may be effective while viewing the situation of the efforts made by Japan and the international community”. No contract has been signed on new ODA, but no official announcement has been made as to whether any review or assessment has been conducted regarding the existing ODA.
A large part of ODA to Myanmar is loan aid (yen loans) for development of a special economic zone and surrounding infrastructure, construction of roads, and repairing railroads. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated in the Diet that 34 loan aid projects totaling JPY 739.6 billion based on figures in loan agreements are being implemented currently, making it clear that these projects have continued even after the failed coup.
Besides ODA, the Japanese government provides public funds for private projects in Myanmar. Redevelopment of the Defense Services Museum Project (commonly known as the “Y Complex Project”) involves building and operating a large-scale real estate complex at the army-owned site of the former military museum in Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar. Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN), a government-funded infrastructure investment corporation under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) which is Japan’s public export credit agency, invests or lends to the Y Complex Project. Tokyo Tatemono, Fujita Corporation (a subsidiary of Daiwa House Industry), and JOIN set up a Joint Special Purpose Company (J-SPC) in Singapore. JBIC along with Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Mizuho Bank co-financed a loan to this J-SPC, and the J-SPC in turn is co-investing in Y Complex Company Ltd., a Myanmar corporation set up jointly by the J-SPC and Yangon Technical and Trading Company Limited (YTT), a Myanmar crony company. The land lease agreement is between YTT and "Colonel Aung Min Thein (Officer No. Army 17642), Vice Quarter Master General, Office of the Quarter Master General, Commander-in-Chief (Army).” Land lease payments are to be made to "Defence Account no. MD 010424,” an account likely to be under control of the Office of the Quartermaster General.
The US, UK and Canada imposed sanctions on the Office of the Quartermaster General on December 10, 2021. Further, on June 21, 2023, the US designated Myanmar's Ministry of Defence as a “Specially Designated National” subject to financial sanctions, noting that the Ministry was “responsible for the command and control of the armed forces, which has conducted decades of repressive military rule that was violently resumed following the coup in 2021.”
Following are some of the issues that that the continuation of the provision of public funds and ODA could entail:
First, by continuing ODA which requires bilateral agreements even though one of the parties to those agreements has ceased to exist due to the coup in February 2021, and by providing public funds to the Y Complex Project, a venture that allows funds to flow to the Office of the Quartermaster General, it appears that the Japanese government is giving implicit support to the military junta. We share the concern of Myanmar citizens regarding this point.
Second, ODA projects and projects receiving public funds in fact benefit the Myanmar military. It has been made clear by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar that in Myanmar, revenues from business operations conducted by companies owned or controlled by the military are a source of funds for the military, supporting their atrocities. The UK government has pointed out that the Office of the Quartermaster General which is involved in the Y Complex Project "plays a crucial role in procuring equipment for the Myanmar Armed Forces, including ammunition, bombs and jet fuel.” It has been revealed that the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), one of the military enterprises that the Fact-Finding Mission recommended to the international community not to "enter into or remain in a business relationship” with, is involved in the construction of Bago Bridge, a yen loan project. It has been pointed out that Yokogawa Bridge Corporation made payments to MEC from July to November 2022. Further, in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Development Project, the Japanese government along with major trade companies and banks is investing in the Myanmar Japan Thilawa Development Ltd. (MJTD) which operates the industrial area using “Private Sector Investment Finance,” a type of ODA. Myanmar established the Thilawa SEZ Management Committee and holds 10% of MJTD. Soon after the coup, the military detained the chairperson of the Management Committee and appointed a new chairperson. Dividend payments are to be made if MJTD makes a profit, but under these circumstances, the possibility cannot be denied that such dividend payments will benefit the military.
Third, in the type of ODA called “Two-Step Loans” under which ODA funds lent by the Japanese government are held and managed by financial institutions in Myanmar, there is concern that the funds may come to be managed by the military through its control over the financial institutions. Projects in question include the Housing Finance Development Project, Project for the Development of Finance for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, and the Agriculture and Rural Development Two Step Loan Project.
Fourth, funds provided through yen loans are money lent at interest that Myanmar needs to repay, which will increase the debt owed by the people of Myanmar. Japan had already lent a cumulative total of USD 2761.8 million to Myanmar by 2020,but Myanmar will owe an additional JPY 739.6 billion (USD 4.93 billion as of November 10, 2023). This means that the people of Myanmar who are suffering from serious human rights abuses and atrocities by the Myanmar military will be made to bear the burden of repaying ODA for the next decades that is or may well be a source of funds for the military.
As we expressed in our statement in December 2022, we believe that the Japanese government should respect the National Unity Government (NUG), Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and civil society organizations in Myanmar and effectively support the will of the people of Myanmar. We express deep concern that Japan may be complicit in the atrocity crimes by the military by providing ODA and public funds to the benefit of the military. We strongly demand that the Japanese government suspend all yen loan projects currently being implemented. Regarding the Y Complex Project, we strongly demand that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism immediately withdraw the investment made by JOIN, and that the Ministry of Finance immediately cancel the loan made by JBIC.
Statement has been endorsed by the following organizations:
1 Action Committee for Democracy Development (Coalition of 14 Grassroots Networks)
2 Active Youths Kalaymyo
3 Africa Japan Forum
4 Ah Nah Podcast - Conversations with Myanmar
5 All Arakan Students' & Youths' Congress – AASYC
6 All Burma Indigenous People Alliance (ABIPA)
7 Alternative People's Linkage in Asia
8 ALTSEAN-Burma
9 ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
10 Asian Community Center 21
11 Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
12 Asian Health Institute, AHI
13 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
14 Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
15 Association Suisse-Birmanie (ASB)
16 Associazione per l'Amicizia Italia Birmania "Giuseppe Malpeli"
17 Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
18 Burma Action Ireland
19 Burma Campaign UK
20 Burma Human Rights Network
21 Burmese Relief Center Japan
22 Burmese Women’s Union
23 CRPH & NUG Supporters Ireland
24 CRPH Funding Ireland
25 CRPH, NUG Support Team Germany-Deutschland
26 Democracy, Peace and Women’s Organization
27 Earth Tree
28 Educational Initiatives Prague
29 Equality Myanmar
30 Federation of Workers’ Union of the Burmese Citizen in Japan (FWUBC)
31 Freedom and Labor Action Group (FLAG)
32 Fukuoka NGO forum on ADB
33 Future Light Center
34 Future Thanlwin
35 General Incorporation Association WORKSPACE ASIA
36 Generation Wave
37 Grass-root People
38 HANDS（Health and Development Service)
39 Human Rights Educators Network
40 Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM)
41 Human Rights Now
42 Info Birmanie
43 Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)
44 International Association, Myanmar-Switzerland (IAMS)
45 International Karen Organisation
46 Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL)
47 Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace
48 Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)
49 Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service
50 Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN)
51 Justice For Myanmar
52 Karen Human Rights Group
53 Karen Peace Support Network
54 Karen Swedish Community (KSC)
55 Karenni Human Rights Group
56 Karenni National Women's Organization
57 Keng Tung Youth
58 Mandalay Regional Youth Association Revolution Core Group
59 Metta Campaign
60 Myanmar Campaign Network
61 Myanmar Diaspora Group Finland
62 Myanmar International Assistance Organization
63 Myanmar News Now
64 Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
65 Myanmar Refugee Policy Group
66 Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma (ND-Burma)
67 Nway Oo Guru Lay Myar
68 Padauk Finland-Myanmar Association
69 Pakokku Youth Development Council
70 Peace Boat
71 Peace Village United
72 Political Prisoners Network
73 Progressive Voice
74 Save and Care Organization for Women at Border Areas
75 Services for the Health in Asian and African Regions
76 Shan MATA
77 Southern Youth Development Organization
78 Ta'ang Legal Aid
79 Ta’ang Women’s Organization
80 Tanintharyi MATA
81 The Ladies
82 U.S. Campaign for Burma
83 Women's Democratic Club, Femin
84 Yokohama NGO Network
and one other organization..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-12-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
99.27 KB 426.78 KB 196.18 KB
Local URL:
2023-12-01-Statement-calling-on-the-Japanese-government-to-stop-ODA-and-publicly-funded-projects-benefiting-the-Myanmar-military-en.pdf- 2023-12-01-Statement-calling-on-the-Japanese-government-to-stop-ODA-and-publicly-funded-projects-benefiting-the-Myanmar-military-bu.pdf
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Nov 15 to 21, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Bago Region, Mon State, Chin State, and Shan State from November 15th to 21st. Military Junta destroyed 4 of the civilian bridges in Kale, Sagaing Region, and Kyaikmaraw Township, Mon State. The military also prohibited access to travel and fishing in Kyaukphyu Township, Rakhine State on November 19th. Military Junta arrested and extorted the youths who go out at night in the Yangon Region.
Over 50 civilians died and 9 were injured within a week by the Military Junta’s heavy and light attacks. 11 underaged children died when the Military Junta committed violations. PSLF/TNLA released a statement on November 18th that the Military Junta Troop used the Toxic Gas Bombs in the fighting in Namkhan Township, North Shan State..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-11-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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1.73 MB
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Description:
"Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Shan State, and Chin State from November 1st to 7th. Military Junta arrested the local civilians and used them as human shields in Shan State and Mandalay Region. They also arrested 5 people from Mandalay who wrote about supporting the 1027 Operation. Military Junta Troop arrested the rice truck in the Tanintharyi Region and took the rice bags.
Over 30 civilians were killed and 34 injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Civilians left their places 5 times within a week because of the Military Junta Troop’s matching and raiding. An underaged child was injured and 5 children died when the Military Junta committed violations..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-11-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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311.86 KB 332.14 KB 525.57 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Oct 15 to 21, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Bago and Mandalay Region from October 15th to 21st. Military Junta arrested 17 civilians and used as human shields in Sagaing Region. The civilians from Sintgu Township, Mandalay Region, fled from the Military attack from the ship, and a civilian was killed and two were injured from Salingyi Township, Sagaing Region. October 20th, 7 civilians from Pyapon Township, Ayeyarwady Region were sentenced to death by District Judge who works under the Military Junta.
About 11 civilians were killed and over 17 injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Over 10 civilians were arrested and 14 were killed by the Military Junta within a week. Civilians left their places 7 times within a week because of the Military Junta Troop’s raiding and matching..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-10-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Attack in Kachin State Shows Need for Arms Embargo, Aviation Fuel Bans
Description:
"(Bangkok) – The Myanmar military attacked a village hosting hundreds of displaced civilians in Kachin State on October 9, 2023, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children, committing an apparent war crime, Human Rights Watch said today. The nighttime attack on Mung Lai Hkyet, which also injured more than 60 people and caused extensive damage to civilian structures, did not appear to be targeting a military objective.
Human Rights Watch interviewed five witnesses and reviewed 20 images and three videos of the aftermath of the attack, which suggest Myanmar forces initially conducted an airstrike on the village, then fired a barrage of ground-launched mortars or artillery. Images of areas hit by the initial strike show debris and damage consistent with the effects of shockwaves from large high-explosive bombs delivered by aircraft. Human Rights Watch found no evidence of opposition armed groups in the vicinity of the village at the time of the attack.
“The Myanmar military’s repeated strikes and shelling of a village filled with displaced people were either unlawfully deliberate or indiscriminate,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Concerned governments shouldn’t just condemn this reckless disregard for civilian life, they should take meaningful and concrete actions to stop the military from committing future violations.”
Mung Lai Hkyet is located about five kilometers from the ethnic Kachin Independence Army (KIA) headquarters in Laiza, near the border with China. For decades, the KIA has been engaged in conflict with the Myanmar military, which has a long record of committing war crimes in Kachin State and elsewhere. When a ceasefire with the KIA broke down in 2011, Mung Lai Hkyet, which was mainly inhabited by ethnic Lisu, began hosting internally displaced people fleeing the renewed hostilities.
Clashes in Kachin State have increased since the KIA opposed Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021, causing further displacements to areas such as Mung Lai Hkyet. The KIA has also been training recruits in new armed groups opposing Myanmar’s junta.
A resident of Mung Lai Hkyet told Human Rights Watch that despite the KIA’s presence in Laiza, there were no KIA fighters in the village due to a nightly curfew and there had been no fighting near the village leading up to the incident.
A Laiza resident told Human Rights Watch that the first explosion was the loudest and could also be felt in Laiza: “It shook everything and then we heard a few more, smaller blasts.”
Witnesses told local media that they woke to the sound of the first blast around 11:30 p.m. followed by at least four more blasts. Images of the aftermath show a razed area about 500 meters wide and at least one crater roughly 6 meters deep, splintered wood from buildings, and twisted metal from vehicles.
The Laiza resident, who went to Mung Lai Hkyet the next morning to assist, said that villagers described hearing shells hissing through the air as they ran for cover. “It’s a sound we’re familiar with since up here, we’ve all experienced the military’s attacks,” the resident said. “But when you see the damage, it could not just have been shells that did this.”
All six members of one family were killed in the attack, while in another family the only surviving members were a 1-month-old and a 3-year-old, the resident said. Among those killed were 10 women, 10 girls younger than 18, seven men, and one 3-year-old boy.
Human Rights Watch reviewed a local hospital’s patient registry from October 11 that lists 15 injured survivors, including five children, receiving ongoing treatment.
Gen. Zaw Min Tun, a military spokesperson, denied responsibility for the attack in state media and suggested the explosion was caused by explosives stored in the village by the KIA.
The Myanmar military has repeatedly conducted airstrikes on populated areas in violation of the laws of war. In April, Myanmar forces killed at least 160 people in an airstrike using a thermobaric bomb – or “fuel-air explosive” – in Sagaing Region.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) reported that airstrikes in Myanmar have increased every month since February this year.
The laws of war prohibit attacks that target civilians and civilian objects, that do not or cannot discriminate between civilians and combatants, or that are expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian property that is disproportionate to any anticipated military advantage.
The laws of war require parties to a conflict to distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives, and attacking forces must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives. If there is doubt as to whether an object normally used for civilian purposes, such as a school, is being used for military purposes, it should be presumed not to be.
Individuals committing or ordering serious laws-of-war violations with criminal intent, meaning deliberately or recklessly, are responsible for war crimes. The repeated unlawful attacks on Mung Lai Hkyet, without demonstrating the presence of military targets, strongly suggest that the attack was deliberate or reckless.
United Nations officials, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other groups have repeatedly said that the UN Security Council should impose an arms embargo on the Myanmar military and measures to cut off its aviation fuel, as well as targeted sanctions on the military’s revenues.
The United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and other countries have imposed targeted sanctions on the Myanmar military and its business and banking interests, meant to pressure the military to stem abuses and engage with diplomatic efforts over Myanmar’s current crisis. Several concerned governments have taken bilateral steps to block sales or transfers of aviation fuel. Concerned governments should better coordinate to enforce those sanctions and make them more effective, while pressing the Security Council to match them globally, Human Rights Watch said.
“The Myanmar military won’t stop committing atrocities until other governments work together to impose real economic restrictions and meaningful blockages of weapons, fuel, and materiel,” Maung said. “The status quo will only bring more war crimes and civilian deaths.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-10-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Description:
"Insight Email No. 25
This Insight Email is published on October 16, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on October 13, 2023.
In this week’s Insight Email No. 25, ISP-Myanmar focuses on the incident of the Mung Lai Hkyet explosion and what the consequences could be. In addition, it gives an analysis of “the Military’s Succession Crisis” and the widening generation gaps in military leadership. The bulletin also discusses the extreme weather and severe floods in Myanmar brought by El Niño at the beginning of the season: Bago City, for example, encountered the worst recorded incident of flooding in 60 years. Furthermore, a widespread trend of corruption is discussed, along with ISP-Myanmar’s socio-economic survey findings. Last, but not least, the ILO’s Commission of Inquiry report on Myanmar and the future consequences of it are examined......1.Huge Explosion in Mung Lai Hkyet IDP Camp
A huge explosion occurred on the night of October 9 in Mung Lai Hkyet, a place close to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) headquarters on the China–Myanmar border. This is a region of plains between two mountain ranges: “hkyet” means “ravine” in the Kachin language and holds a shelter for many refugees. The bizarre explosion in Mung Lai Hkyet was so severe that a large earthen hole remained at ground zero. The whole Mung Lai Hkyet IDP camp was damaged, and at least 130 families of the 600 displaced persons it houses were evacuated in an emergency. Reports indicate that 29 people, including eleven children, were killed and that 57 others were injured in the explosion.
There are controversies surrounding who committed the October 9 attack. A KIA spokesperson said it was presumably an artillery or drone attack by the State Administration Council(SAC) and is still investigating what type of weapon was used. The SAC’s spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, denied that the deed was committed by the SAC, and explained that it may have been an explosion of stored ammonium nitrate. The KIA rejected this statement.....The BBC Burmese news mentioned on October 10 that the destructive explosion in Mung Lai Hkyet caused all residents living within 300 meters to be killed and injured many outside the 300-meter area. The blast left a large hole in the ground and damaged buildings and vehicles in the surrounding area. The scene is likely to be mentioned as a discarded mine site, BBC reported. Mung Lai Hkyet turned into a bald mountain that seem like bulldozed by machines, causing a village to disappear overnight.
The SAC’s military columns have been attacking KIA forces in Nam Sam Yang village for months since July. Concurrently with the Mung Lai Hkyet explosion, the SAC had fired on the area. On September 28, 2023, the SAC forces shelled places near Mung Lai Hkyet, killing one Arakan Army (AA) officer and injuring another ten. Reportedly, the shells were fired from Khara ridge, situated six miles distance from KIA HQ. Khara ridge was a former post of KIA base and the SAC force occupied in 2013. In another incident, on November 19, 2014, the military fired artillery on KIA’s officer training school, and 23 cadets of KIA’s allied forces were killed. In December 2016, the military shelled Mung Lai Hkyet village and at least 400 refugees were forced to flee.
The consequences of the Mung Lai Hkyet incident may be enormous. Immediately, it will have an impact on the SAC’s preparations for the anniversary of the eight-year Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which it is aiming to organize differently than in the past. The incident may have a moral and sentimental impact on invited guests of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), leaders of political parties, and local and international guests. The incident may fuel distrust and escalate conflicts. If the SAC is sure they were not responsible for the incident, the parties can request an international investigation by China and ASEAN officials. The SAC mentioned that Chinese police are investigating the cause of the explosion while China’s foreign minister only stated that “China is paying close attention to the reports” and “calling on relevant parties to resolve disputes peacefully through dialogue and consultation, avoid escalation of the situation, and take concrete and effective measures to ensure security at the China–Myanmar border.”.....2.The Military’s Succession Crisis and Generation Gap
Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun, a member of the State Administration Council (SAC), and Brig. Gen. Yan Naung Soe were convicted of many offenses, including high treason and corruption, and sentenced by court martial on October 10, 2023, to suffer transportation for a life sentence, equal to a 20-year term. Until this adjudication, Moe Myint Tun (DSA 30) took charge of the military as chief of staff and presumably, he gained favor with the commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing. He was then poised to become Min’s successor. It is typical to deduce who is going along on the trips with the SAC head and who are among the top brass by observing the standing protocol in the official newspapers.
Much like the synchronized retirements of Snr. Gen. Than Shwe and Deputy Snr. Gen. Maung Aye, if the current Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and Deputy Snr. Gen. Soe Win retire concurrently, Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo (DSA 25), who was serving as the chief of general staff for the army, navy, and air force, was once speculated to be the next commander-in-chief of Myanmar defense services. Reportedly, he was thought to be chosen by former junta leader Than Shwe. Nevertheless, since the 2021 military coup, he became minister of defense and was later transferred to deputy prime minister and minister of transport and communications, an apparent demotion. After the punishment of Moe Myint Tun, Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo was assigned to key positions as his replacement. But now he is turning 62 and is therefore less likely to lead the military as commander-in-chief.
When Min Aung Hlaing (DSA 19) was selected for the commander-in-chief, he was a military cadet generation 18–19 years younger than his superiors, Snr. Gen. Than Shwe (OTS 9) and Deputy Snr. Gen. Maung Aye (DSA 1). For that reason, the next commander-in-chief could be chosen from the younger military generation from the Defense Service Academy (DSA), and may end up being someone such as the 30th-batch graduate, Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun. Moreover, it is generally thought that the new commander-in-chief should be in their 50s, as he would be able to serve under two terms of government (two terms of five years). Since the prospective Moe Myint Tun was removed from the scene, who will become the next commander-in-chief for the Myanmar military is still being speculated about. Some military analysts anticipate he could be the rapidly rising Lt. Gen. Kyaw Swa Lin (born 1971, present age: 52) (DSA 35), the present quartermaster general of the defense services. He was popular when he was commanding the Central Military Command in Mandalay with the rank of brigadier general. In 2020, he was promoted to lieutenant general and became the youngest in that position in Myanmar’s army. Though he is taking the position of quartermaster general, he has not been assigned to lead the military’s Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which sets him apart from his predecessors. Moreover, he is reportedly linked to the now-removed Moe Myint Tun.
Another potential contender for the commander-in-chief position is Lt. Gen. Ko Ko Oo (DSA 38), present commander of Bureau of Special Operation (BSO) No. 1. In 2020, he was appointed to command the Central Military Command in Mandalay with the rank of brigadier general, he was only 45 and the youngest commander of a military regional command. He became head of BSO No. 1 in August 2023. Previously, he commanded the military chief of staff and Military Operation Command (MOC). He is reportedly the son of former deputy minister of President Office No. 4, U Aung Thein, in U Thein Sein’s administration.
Lt. Gen. Thet Pon (DSA 29), the present commander of BSO. No. 5 is another possible successor. He is currently commanding in Yangon. He was honored for his performance on the 2020 National Independence Day. But as he was leading the forces to violently crush peaceful protestors, sanctions were imposed upon him by the governments of the European Union and Canada. But he is unlikely to be selected because of his rather old age. According to the SAC’s Protocol, another important possible contender is Lt. Gen. Ye Win Oo (OTS 77), who is currently the SAC’s joint secretary and commander of Military Affairs Security (MAS). According to the official seating plan, he seems to be on the front line and quite stable in the SAC. Nevertheless, in Myanmar military tradition, commanders of auxiliary forces rarely become commanders-in-chief, but rather, it is most often infantry commanders that come to this highest position. He is now 57.
Yet, military commanders junior to Lt. Gen. Kyaw Swa Lin (DSA 35) could also be selected as commanders-in-chief to be. BSO No. 4 Commander, Lt. Gen. Nyunt Win Swe (DSA 36), should be on watch lists. If the successor selection reaches this point, there will be a widening generation gap in the military. Once, there was an 18- or 19-year gap in the military cadet generation, between Snr. Gen. Than Shwe and Min Aung Hlaing, and the gap between Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and the next commander-in-chief will be at least 17 years. The younger officers will find it very difficult to raise questions to the present commanders in charge of the military.
In case, if there were some senior officers selected to be the next commander-in-chief, it is customary to nurture them at least three years in service and it may take time. The present commander-in-chief may groom these officers until he is satisfied. Then the time frame of the military succession will conflict with the speculating election timeline in 2025. Min Aung Hlaing’s dream to shift his career to politics could take longer if he is to leave his military chief post in good hands. At this moment, Myanmar’s military faces tremendous challenges in its legitimacy, in its centrality, in its performance, in its guardian role, and in its popular support.
Last, but not the least, there is an interesting point for military leadership. When the military staged a coup in 1988, the head of SLORC/SPDC, Snr. Gen. Than Shwe, was 48 and Secretary, Gen. Khin Nyunt was in 40s. At the time of 2021 coup, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing was 66 (presently, he is 68). This could be interpreted as a large difference in age. The current heads of the SAC could lack in proactivity, aggression, attentiveness, and innovation, compared to the junta leaders of SLORC/SPDC in the past. As people age, they become more conservative and resistant to change. Current senior military commanders may want to retire peacefully at ease after their terms. They could be hardly become change makers. As time progresses, the military succession crisis and the deepening generational gap will assume increasing significance.....3.Extreme Weather and Acute Flooding in Myanmar...
Soon after the commencement of the extreme weather phenomenon of El Niño, some areas of Myanmar experienced acute floods. In Bago City, the water level reached 940 cm on October 9, above the “danger level” of 880cm. In three days of flooding, fifteen wards and nine villages (80 percent of the city) were inundated, amounting to the worst flooding in 60 years, affecting 13,000 people. News reported that in addition to Bago City, Hmawbi, Taik-Kyi, Kyaik Hto townships and some places on the Yangon–Mandalay highway and railway were underwater.
During the El Niño phenomenon, extreme weather can cause drought, extreme heat and floods in various places, which can damage crops. In SAC’s official newspaper, the SAC officials explain the nature of El Niño to the public in many townships. However, this is not enough, and many preparations should be made on the side of the authorities, such as disaster preparedness, the empowerment of the population, climate-sensitive budgeting, and linking to international humanitarian agencies and climate diplomacy.
During the last year of the U Thein Sein administration, in July and August 2015 (during the previous El Niño phenomenon), floods inflicted extensive damage in Myanmar: twelve out of 14 states and regions were inundated, affecting a million people. Myanmar faces the problem of flooding almost every year and some years are much worse than others. In 2015, some estimated that Myanmar could lose two percent of its GDP because of flooding. For coming natural emergencies, the mantra of “self-help” is not enough: more preparation is required.....∎ Trends to be watched
Widespread Corruption in Myanmar
To understand the post-coup insight into Myanmar’s society, ISP-Myanmar conducted a socio-economic study in 110 townships to identify the SAC’s performance of public services in the three months of May, June, and July 2023. One question in the study was whether it is necessary to pay bribes to township-level officials to get things done. The findings indicated that it is required to pay cash bribes to township officials in 70 to 107 out of 110 townships observed (64 to 97 percent). It is common for people to have to pay gifts to officials and staff in exchange for the public services they receive.
The study observed the SAC’s municipal, tax office, immigration office, electricity supply office, education, hospitals, and administration offices in terms of taking bribes. According to the July findings, people need to pay immigration officials in 109 townships out of 110 townships observed. The second most corruption-ridden offices are municipal, courts and administration offices. The survey result shows people use money to pay bribes in 103 out of 110 townships surveyed. The office that is most likely to accept gifts, rather than money, as bribes is the education department; this was reported by 57 out of 110 townships in May, and this increased to 76 townships in June and July. Another office likely to accept gifts as bribes is the township court; this was observed in 55 townships in May, and 69 townships in June and July.....It is conspicuous that people use gold to pay bribes. It was found that people pay gold as a bribe to township court officials in nine townships in May, eight townships in June, and nine townships in July. Survey results found that administration offices were second most likely to accept gold jewelry; this was reported by six townships in May, two townships in June, and four townships in July, respectively. The tax offices are the third most likely to accept gold: three townships reported this in May, three townships reported this in June, and four townships reported this in July.
The least corrupted departments were found to be hospitals. This was reported by 25 townships in May, 22 townships in June, and 19 townships in July. This was followed by electricity supply offices, as reported by 18 townships in May, 24 townships in June, and 21 townships in July.
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (2022), Myanmar received a score of 23 out of a range from 0 (“highly corrupt”) to 100 (“very clean”). Myanmar ranked 157th out of the 180 countries in the Index. What the results of the ISP-Myanmar’s survey show is the ‘petty corruption’ present among public servants working at the township level. However, the bribe payments involve gold and cannot be underestimated as petty. It is presumable there could be “policy-level corruption” at higher levels of administration. The recent SAC’s actions taken against Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun, Brig. Gen. Yan Naung Soe and other officers may be a good example. However, ISP-Myanmar’s survey findings cannot reveal the corruption of such “big fish”. Academic studies suggested there will be more corruption if there is a combination of a “monopoly of power” and the “discretion of officials” while lacking “accountability.”
In post-coup Myanmar, check-and-balance mechanisms are dysfunctional, as no parliamentary representatives question public services, and there is a very limited and risky role of activists and the media. On the other hand, the pay given to public servants hardly rises in accordance with rapidly increasing inflation and commodity prices. Because of inflation, their spending power is largely dwindling. This trend will inevitably drive these public servants to compensate for their falling standard of living with corruption.
∎ What ISP is reading?
ILO’s Investigation Report and Potential Bigger Impacts on Myanmar
ILO. (August 4, 2023). Towards Freedom and Dignity in Myanmar. 207 pages
A few days ago, the International Labor Organization (ILO) published an investigation report on Myanmar. In June 2021, after the military coup in Myanmar, the ILO called upon the military to restore democracy and respect its citizens’ human rights. At the 344th governing body meeting of Switzerland’s Geneva-based ILO from March 14 to 26, 2022, it was decided to set up a high-level commission of inquiry with respect of the non-observance by Myanmar of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29). The SAC’s Labor Ministry issued a statement on April 4, 2022, strongly rejecting the decision, as it was unilateral.
The Governing Body of the ILO later appointed persons to serve on the Commission of Inquiry: Judge Raul Cano Pangalangan (Philippines) as chairperson and Judge Dhayanithie Pillay (South Africa) and Dr Faustina Pereira (Bangladesh) as members. ILO’s Commission of Inquiry emphasized particularly Convention 87 and Convention 29. The Commission concluded in the report that the military control has “had a disastrous impact on the exercise of basic civil liberties. Trade union members and leaders have been killed, arbitrarily arrested, subjected to sham trials, convicted, detained, abused, and tortured, threatened, intimidated, subjected to surveillance, forced into exile.” In addition, the report of more than 200 pages mentioned with evidence that “women trade union leaders have been exposed to particularly violent treatment on the part of the security apparatus, including sexual violence.”
The ILO’s high-level Commission of Inquiry on Myanmar is the 14th action in its history spanning more than a hundred years. There is a three-month deadline for the Myanmar junta to respond. The Commission has investigated not only the SAC but also the forced labor practices of EAOs in conflict areas, such as the Shan State Army (SSA/SSPP), the Shan State Restoration Council (SSA/RCSS), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Arakan Army (AA).
The SAC Labor Ministry issued a statement mentioning that “Myanmar is a member state of the ILO, complying with ILO Convention No. 87: no one is punished or taken action for practicing his or her rights peacefully or being a member of a trade union. According to the Labor Organization Law (2011), Myanmar granted registrations to over 3,000 organizations – 2,886 basic labor organizations, 162 township labor organizations, 26 region/state labor organizations, nine labor federations, one confederation of trade unions of Myanmar, one basic employers’ organization, one township employers’ organization, and one employers’ federation. More than 190,000 workers are enjoying their rights in these organizations.”
Again, on September 2, 2022, the SAC Labor Ministry strongly rejected the ILO’s website display about Myanmar. A trade unionist assisting with labor issues in Myanmar discussed the ISP-Myanamr for their sandwiched difficulties. Though the SAC claims no official ban on trade unions, the most restrictive new organization law makes it difficult to be registered. These labor campaigners are not collaborating with higher-level ministries, but they are assisting garment workers with township-level officers to mediate industrial conflicts with factory owners and laborers when there were protests and sit-ins to demand pay raises and healthier worksites. Then, they faced criticism from exiles as collaborating with the illegal junta. In the post-coup situation, tripartite negotiations between employers, workers and the government and industrial arbitration have stopped. The SAC announced the minimum wage as 5,800 kyats, changed from 4,800 kyats on October 5, 2023. However, it is unilateral and does not follow the 2013 Minimum Wage Law, which requires to set the minimum wage based on the negotiated result of employers, workers, and government representatives. Unquestionably, workers in Myanmar are losing their rights to be represented, to make demands, and to organize themselves in trade unions.
What could happen if the Myanmar junta doesn’t accept the recommendations of the ILO? In the late 1990s, international sanctions against Myanmar were initiated because of forced labor issues, rather than political ones. This time, if the junta commits similar violations as the ILO demands it to stop, or fails to reform according to the recommendations, the ILO refers the matter to the International Court of Justice, the UN’s top court, without passing through the UN Security Council. On the other hand, the trade unions’ actions will be immense and will fight for the rights of workers in Myanmar, which could result in a heavy blow to trade and tourism..."
Source/publisher:
Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-10-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.46 MB
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Description:
"Between October 8th and 14th Military Junta arrested and used as human shields more than 7 civilians from the Sagaing Region . Military Junta burnt and killed 2 civilians including an underaged child from Kale Township in Sagaing Region. Military Junta Troop attacked with heavy artillery to Monelaichat IDP camp in Laiza, Kachin State and 32 civilians including 13 children were killed. The Military Troop also started cutting off Telecommunication in Tedim, Chin State on October 13th.
About 35 civilians died and over 18 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light attacks within a week. They arrested over 22 civilians and killed 7 within a week. 4 children were injured and 15 killed when the Military Junta committed violations..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-10-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Sub-title:
The Time for Reflection and New Solutions
Description:
"15 October 2023 marks the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which the State Administration Council and few remaining ethnic armed organisations in the accord are honouring in Nay Pyi Taw. Although the NCA process did involve a lot of theatre, the SAC’s true commemoration of the NCA occurred in the middle of the night earlier this week, when the military bombed the Kachin internally displaced persons’ camp of Munglai Hkyet, near the border with China. The attack killed at least 29 persons, including young children, with 56 more injured. Throughout the NCA negotiation and attempted implementation periods, fighting and human rights violations raged on, especially in the country’s north. The Myanmar military and government blocked humanitarian assistance then, as the SAC continues now. The international community responded at times with statements of concern and other assistance, but lacked coherent approaches to curtail the killing or ensure compliance with agreements.
On this anniversary, the NCA’s vestigial institutions remain without public legitimacy, manipulated as part of the SAC’s strategy to divide, confuse, and manipulate national and international actors. The NCA’s basic principles remain valued by various actors, but would be more likely to be practised through new and different approaches and processes. Drawn from an analysis of the NCA published by TNI earlier this year, this summary highlights how the accord was never inclusive, effectively developed or truly implemented and is not fit for purpose in a political and conflict landscape greatly changed since the 2021 coup.*
During the past three decades, the term ‘peace process’ has been commonly used in Myanmar to describe endeavours to end the country’s long-running political and ethnic conflicts. In reality, the Myanmar peace process has always been one of the most labyrinthine in the world. Dating back to 1989, a diversity of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral processes has been underway. In recent years, they were held together by the aspirations of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and 21st Century Panglong Conference. These two initiatives came to an abrupt halt with the military coup on 1 February 2021.
To date, there has been no ‘peace process’ breakthrough that has led to national reconciliation and meaningful reform. The country remains far from the achievement of peace that reaches to all peoples, and Myanmar is currently in the midst of one of its most violent and conflict-divided periods of history since independence in 1948. The peace process – as reconfigured by government after 2011 – no longer exists.
The present breakdown, however, should not be a time of resignation and despair. In the determination of young people and re-imagining of national politics since the coup, there are hopes that a new realism has entered the peace and reform vocabulary which will ultimately lead to effective solutions. For this to happen, it is vital that lessons are learned from the injustices and experiences of the past. Far from being new, the NCA was the latest in a long line of peace process failures, and it repeated many of the inequalities and inconsistencies that undermined peace efforts during previous cycles of government. Despite its high profile, the NCA never marked a moment of national breakthrough. Rather, conflict spread in several parts of the country from the time of its signing, pre-shadowing the state of ethno-political collapse which exists today.
For these reasons, the NCA’s journey demands close examination.
A Backdrop of Failure
Many problems can be identified in the failure to build a nationwide process for peace. These were evident even before the 2021coup and renewed spread of civil war. Following the NCA’s 2015 signing, a catalogue of errors quickly built up. The treaty was initiated under the quasi-civilian administration of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). But the difficulties continued after the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to government office in 2016. Problems and weaknesses in the NCA were not acknowledged; the peace process was not inclusive; the hand of the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat) was never far away; and initiatives to address the reform impasse too often ended in stagnation, political regression and increased conflict. Ultimately, over many years of meetings, the NCA did not bring the key stakeholders and conflict actors to the same table.
Underpinning these failures, the complex nature of the NCA process led to procedural breakdowns and a build-up of disagreements over technical issues. Restructuring the peace process and addressing technical problems was undoubtedly necessary. But the challenges at the root of conflict and failure in negotiations have always been political. Technical fixes alone were never likely to bridge the political divides that exist on such scale. The outcome was the prioritisation of process over delivery, meaning that many commitments were never fulfilled.
In part, these failures stemmed from very different perspectives among NCA signatories over the role of the agreement as a process towards ending armed conflict, protecting the human rights of war-affected communities and negotiating reform. For their part, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – both those party to the NCA and those outside the agreement – focused on the need for trust-building and substantive agreements first. In contrast, government and Tatmadaw leaders insisted on resuming formal meetings or signing agreements before addressing concerns about trust, substance and the implementation of ceasefires. Meanwhile, despite the promise of Panglong-21, NLD leaders focused on electoral politics rather than the peace process as the instrument for reform once in office. In consequence, fundamental differences in interests and needs were never addressed, and the parliamentary and peace processes were never brought on to the same track.
These proved errors of historic proportions. The NCA never acted as a catalyst for building ethnic peace and national unity. Instead, dysfunction and instability grew at the heart of the peace negotiation process. National politics remained dominated by the ethnic Bamar (Burman) majority; the NLD and Defence Services were uneasy partners in government under the 2008 constitution; the Tatmadaw maintained a controlling role in many aspects of political, economic and security affairs (including selecting dialogue partners); ethnic armed movements were represented by a diverse array of ceasefire and non-ceasefire organisations; ethnic political parties and civil society organisations were never effectively included in the NCA or wider peace process; and the Tatmadaw continued to back a multitude of local militia groups and Border Guard Forces that play a key role in their efforts to manage conflict in the ethnic borderlands.
Warning signings were persistently ignored. After the NCA was signed, frustration with the peace process tangibly grew in many ethnic states and regions. Continued fighting, land expropriation, the internal displacement of civilians, natural resource exploitation and the acceleration of business deals with outside investors all sustained an impression that the peace process was being used as a delaying device to constrain ethnic demands while the social, legal, political and economic landscape was reshaped to the government’s agenda and advantage. Too often, renewed conflicts in different parts of the country (including anti-Rohingya violence) were regarded by NCA donors and supporters as exceptions rather than evidence of urgent and systemic failings that need to be addressed. Rather than aiming towards peace, many political actors came to view the process as a continuation of war by other means. In consequence, the NCA never gained the momentum of countrywide support.
Among many failings, the most outstanding was the continuing launch of military operations by the Defence Services. Even while the NCA and peace talks continued, further militarization and the build-up of Tatmadaw forces took place in both ceasefire and non-ceasefire territories of the country. While new ceasefires were agreed in areas that had seen decades of fighting, old ceasefires broke down in places where armed conflict had been mostly absent for 15 years. For communities living in these areas, the words ‘peace process’ sounded very hollow. Military security – not human security – appeared to be the main priority of the central authorities, raising serious questions about the intentions of both the government and Tatmadaw leaders.
For all these reasons, contemporary judgments will be harsh. Despite many fine words, there were no fundamental changes in the conflict landscape before or after the NCA signing. Rather than charting a political roadmap for inclusive peace, the NCA process all too frequently appeared to be a vehicle for asserting and increasing Tatmadaw control. All the major challenges in conflict resolution remained, most of which exacerbated over time, and no political endgame ever came in view. Once the NCA had been signed, there was little momentum towards improving the functioning of ceasefires, deepening the reform basis of dialogue or making the process work.
As these failures continued, key elements in the NCA architecture either fell by the way side or were never fully implemented. Major omissions and weaknesses included the inadequacies or lack of national-level dialogue meetings, interim arrangements, security sector reform and new processes for political negotiation and agreement. Warnings were constantly flagged up. But ameliorative steps were never sufficiently taken.
Instead, from the beginning of 2020 both the NCA and national landscape were dominated by two new imperatives: Covid-19 and the November general election. Hopes that they might produce reflective shifts in the transitional landscape swiftly evaporated. The opportunity to use political and health responses as a means to promote cooperation and understanding between EAOs and government departments was missed by the NLD-led administration. Continued fighting, NCA neglect and the conduct of polling amidst a global pandemic only exacerbated ethno-political concerns. In reality, long before the 2021 coup it was clear that the NCA was malfunctioning as a process for national reform.
The Lack of International Focus and Cohesion
As these events unfolded, the actions of the international community also reflected different, and often divergent, aspects of Myanmar’s conflict impasse. A decade of international support for the peace process and political transition ultimately came to count for very little. Many decisions came out of self-interest rather than informed understanding of the diverse and complex challenges on the ground. A coherent peace programme never emerged, and there were many inconsistencies in the international response.
There was no shortage of international actions. Egregious human rights violations became the subject of investigation by the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. At the same time, political and business actors in China, India, Japan and various Western states were in rivalry for influence over the country’s political and economic direction. All affirmed support for the NCA and peace process as an essential step in political transition. But there was no consensus on policies or priorities to pursue. There was a failure to recognise Tatmadaw stratagems and the inherent weaknesses of the Myanmar state, opportunities were lost, and the manifest problems within the NCA were never addressed.
Adding to the difficulties, while Western actors mainly focused their peace efforts on engagement with the Myanmar government and ethnic armed organisations based in the southeastern borderlands with Thailand, the prism of Chinese officials and businesses – always a key influence in the country – was mainly through the Myanmar government, Tatmadaw and EAOs based along its Yunnan border. Neither Western nor Chinese actors seemed willing and able to engage with all relevant groups. Rather, both apparently failed to understand that leaving out key groups in the peace process would be a major obstacle to achieving lasting solutions. Ultimately, these exclusions were never addressed.
The SAC Coup: a New Cycle of Conflict and Division
For the moment, the 1 February 2021 coup by the military State Administration Council (SAC) has consigned the NCA as a potential and inclusive model for political negotiation and peace-building to history. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the NLD which won the 2020 general election are in prison, and peaceful protests have been brutally suppressed. To all intents and purposes, the tentative moves during the past decade towards a new system of federalism and democracy, brought about by negotiation and peace-building, have been brought to an end.
By seizing power, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing may have thought it easy to return the political clock back to the Tatmadaw-controlled past. Instead, the country is faced with a scale of repression, violence and humanitarian emergency that echoes the worst times of civil war since independence in 1948. Protest and resistance against the regime has spread among the Bamar-majority population; ceasefires – including by three NCA signatories – have broken down in different parts of Chin, Karen, Kayah, Mon and Rakhine States; existing conflicts have escalated in Kachin and northern Shan States; and new armed struggles have developed in Magway, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and other regions as well as urban areas.
The consequences have been profound. The NCA and broader peace process have been subsumed into a very different ethno-political landscape from the context in which they developed. The structures and divisions in conflict have significantly changed. Amidst a diversity of new movements and alignments, there are two rival governments claiming legitimacy in the country: the SAC and National Unity Government (NUG). In this new battleground, a host of resistance groups – generally known as People’s Defence Forces – have proliferated across the country, and their roles in any future process of political negotiation and peace-building are very uncertain.
Reflecting the scale of violence, the nature of warfare has also changed. Anti-regime forces seek to launch urban attacks, while the SAC has increasingly relied on aerial attacks targeting civilian populations and created new Pyu Saw Hti and other local militia forces as it loses control on the ground. Many communities and civilians are caught in the crossfire, with it dangerous to publicly express political opinions or allegiances.
SAC leaders, in the meantime, have been using the empty language of a new general election and the NCA as a theatre to try and divide opponents and deceive credulous outsiders. Since the coup, there has been no peace process or political roadmap of real prospect underway. If the NCA did not achieve breakthroughs under an NLD-led administration, it is improbable that this could happen under a regime headed by the Tatmadaw which, even before the coup, was the most disruptive actor in the implementation of the accord, consistently escalating violence and negating its own agreements.
In the propaganda struggle, there have been intermittent meetings by the SAC with some of the remaining EAO NCA-signatories that have agreed to talks since the coup. But they are mostly among the smallest and weakest in the country. Such parties, several of which are breakaway or remnant factions, can never be regarded as representative of political opinion in the country at large while civil war continues and most of the leading voices for political change are excluded. The same lack of credibility awaits any future general election held by the military while major pro-democracy parties are repressed and during ongoing suppression of freedom of expression.
Looking forward, discussions continue in political circles – framed around the vision of federal democracy – about how a successful peace roadmap might be achieved. Although a single unifying platform may be difficult to achieve, the significance of the challenging work on coordination, relationship-building and practical governance across ethnic and pro-democracy forces should not be underestimated. It is urgent that these efforts be strengthened if military rule and state failure are to come to an end.
As experience warns, national peace processes in Myanmar over the past three decades have only led to assimilation into systems designed by the Tatmadaw. They are not platforms for negotiation, demilitarisation and reform. Indeed the further proliferation in local militia and paramilitaries under Tatmadaw authority since the coup pushes even further into the future the prospect of a peace process that answers the root causes of conflict by political dialogue and democratic reform. After sixty years in power, the Tatmadaw strategy of ‘managing’ rather than ‘resolving’ conflict still continues.
The post-coup landscape also compounds the challenges of engagement for the international community. Currently, the SAC is one of the most criticised armed actors in the world. This is evidenced by repeated condemnation by the Office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Independent Investigate Mechanism for Myanmar and other international bodies. Since the coup, impoverishment, the loss of life and civilian displacement due to conflict have only increased. Currently, there are counts of over three million refugees and IDPs, more than 19,000 political prisoners still in jail, 4,150 civilians killed by the security forces, and estimates of over 20,000 people, including combatants, killed in the conflict zones. Clearly, eight years after its signing, the NCA is effectively null and void.
Recommendations and Lessons for the Future
Given the scale of crisis, it is vital that a united response is developed which supports national healing rather than exacerbates division. It is for Myanmar’s peoples to determine their political future. But, in support of this, human rights protections are essential, and the perpetrators of violations on all sides must be held accountable if lasting peace and justice are to be achieved. In any conflict resolution path, accountability must be at the heart of peace-building. This has been demonstrably missing until now. To date, however, there is little indication of lessons learned. Despite the depth of humanitarian emergency, there has been no indication of a cohesive strategy to address the challenges of national breakdown, whether by the United Nations, ASEAN or other governments and international institutions.
The same imperatives are also essential in any international efforts to build a future peace process. While peace is required, a new process may well be considered inappropriate in the circumstances of coup d'état and repression. New realities should be explored, including those that reflect the role of youth and social dynamics driving elite-level political change, the momentum supporting federal democratic reform, and agreements among stakeholder parties that go beyond the agenda of the 21st Century Panglong Conference. After decades of conflict and military rule, it needs to be recognised that fundamental mistakes were made in support for the NCA in the hopes for rapid change after the accord was signed.
Manifestly, a different and broad-based approach has long been overdue. Since the coup, however, different international representatives have already sought to initiate talks between select groupings, including between the SAC and preferred EAOs, as if this will be enough to build a peace process that is just and equitable for the country. It is critical that such errors are not repeated once again. Simply continuing the same ceasefire practices, tinkering with accord guidelines and mechanisms, or changing faces around the NCA or other peace talk tables will never be sufficient. Most importantly, talks that exclude current major stakeholders or that primarily serve to reduce national and international pressure on the SAC to accede to the public’s demands for meaningful political change will never be enough, and indeed may instead further postpone the time when nationwide peace could become achievable.
In this respect, Myanmar is not unique. After the ending of the Cold War, aid became a Western response to conflict. But this, in itself, does not provide the platform for peace and reform. Rather, it may entrench division and an unrepresentative elite in power. Too often the word ‘transition’ has been invoked as a panacea during the last three decades without understanding the political context and causes of state failure. At best, peace processes in Myanmar have frozen conflicts without opening the way to political solutions. Sustainable peace requires political agreement and compromise. In contrast, approaches that only serve to strengthen the state and existing security apparatus will cause resistance among the wider population, feed community grievances and delay the opportunity for meaningful change.
In Myanmar, a legacy of failure has built up during the past decade that overshadows the NCA and peace process in five key areas: military dominance, non-inclusion, lack of implementation, lack of accomplishment, and lack of political will. After decades of conflict, all sides must take responsibility for their actions. But standing at the centre of these obstacles has always been the Tatmadaw. All too often, international actors have fallen for the illusion of a ‘normative’ state, which can be reformed, without recognising that the Tatmadaw has continued to dominate central government for more than half a century, claiming ‘prerogative’ powers for itself and intruding into every aspect of national life.**
In the aftermath of the 2021 coup, the evidence is clear. Under the 2008 constitution, the Defence Services already enjoyed sweeping powers. But Tatmadaw leaders operate well beyond these parameters, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, land seizures, resource exploitation, paramilitary deployments, and political manipulation in favour of its own party, the USDP. As long as these practices continue, the NCA or any similar peace process can never be an instrument for national reconciliation and democratic reform. Transparency, inclusion, understanding, compromise and dialogue have always been essential steps in any meaningful process towards political transformation and lasting peace.
On a cautionary note, precedent warns that the Tatmadaw leadership may continue to employ an ad hoc mixture of stratagems of political repression and ethnic ceasefires – bilateral, unilateral and NCA – as means to try and maintain central authority. In essence, the NCA, which had been used as a process to extend state control, is now being used to attempt to cling on to power – not as a gateway to political reform. As history has repeatedly shown, military-imposed systems will never achieve inclusive, just or sustainable solutions in the country. If the government does not represent the people, why should the people support it? Headed by a hermetic clique of ruling generals, the Tatmadaw leadership represents a Bamar-centric elite and a narrow nationalist view of the world. The question, then, remains for how much longer they can continue to find, persuade or coerce sufficient support to maintain such dominant position without long-needed reform.
Myanmar today is a land in grave suffering and civil war. A decade after a new peace process began, the NCA did not lead to conflict resolution; it did not build the foundations for peace; and it did not lead to agreement for genuine political reforms to address the root causes of conflict and national instability. At the same time, the political landscape is far from static, and the polarisations in politics and society run deep. While military rule continues in Nay Pyi Taw, a diversity of ethnic armed movements remains in control of extensive territories, presenting very different visions for the future of the country. Adding to the complexity, there are a further cast of conflict actors in the wake of the new divisions created by the coup, claiming the right to be in the seat of government. These are presently symbolised by the SAC, NLD and NUG, while EAOs – in a number of alliances and positions – also demand that their voices are included if solutions are to be achieved. In any new peace process, these contested dynamics must be taken on board.
A critical moment in post-colonial history has been reached. Hopes for better change still remain, and the struggle to shape Myanmar’s destiny is far from over. Shaken by the 2021 coup, there is a willingness among diverse parties to look at the challenges of conflict resolution anew, and there is a resolve that young people today will be the first generation to enjoy nationwide peace. The needs for reform are greater than simply regime change, requiring a federal democratic system of governance which, as the 1947 Panglong Agreement set out, is based upon the equality and union of all peoples.
A political process towards peace, taking account of experiences in the past, can be a key element in such change. But to achieve this, the politics of exclusion must end and a fundamental change in political mind-set are essential. Political transformation, including sustainable and inclusive peace, are urgently required today.
* Martin Smith and Jason Gelbort, The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar: Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control? (Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, April 2023).
** In Ernst Fraenkel’s theory of the ‘dual state’ (developed in the 1930s), the ‘normative’ state co-exists with the ‘prerogative’ state whereby authoritarian parties or actors employ unlimited, arbitrary powers and violence unchecked by legal protections: see, Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 2017)..."
Source/publisher:
Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of publication:
2023-10-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
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"Highlights:
According to recent monitoring of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) incidents during the first seven months of 2023, a total of 650 casualties have been reported nationwide. This figure represents a stark increase, amounting to 167% of the total casualties reported in 2022 (390 recorded).
Delving into the regional breakdown, Sagaing Region emerged with the highest number of casualties, accounting for 39% of the overall total. Bago and Shan followed with 13% and 8% of the total, respectively. The remaining regions, encompassing Ayeyarwady, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Rakhine, Tanintharyi and Yangon, collectively accounted for the remaining 40% of the total casualties.
Children constitute 22% of the total casualties arising from landmine and ERW explosions across the country. It is important to note that these figures only reflect civilian casualties.....အဓိကဖော်ပြချက်များ
မြေမြှုပ်မိုင်းနှင့် ပေါက်ကွဲစေတတ်သော စစ်ကျန်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ၏ ဖြစ်ရပ်များကိုလတ်တလောစောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာချက်များအရ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ပထမ ခုနစ်လတာကာလအတွင်း တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး အတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက် (၆၅၀ ဦး) ရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤကိန်းဂဏန်းသည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်တွင် အစီရင်ခံတင်ပြခဲ့သော အရေအတွက်ထက် သိသိသာသာတိုးမြင့်လာပြီး ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူစုစုပေါင်း၏ (၁၆၇) ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ရှိနေခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည် (၃၉၀ ဦး အစီအရင်ခံခဲ့)။
ဒေသအလိုက်အနေဖြင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း ဒေသကြီးတွင် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက် အများဆုံးဖြစ်ပြီး အရေအတွက်စုစုပေါင်း၏ (၃၉) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းရှိခဲ့ပြီး ပဲခူးတွင် (၁၃) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းနှင့် ရှမ်းတွင် (၈) ရာခိုင်နှုန်း အသီးသီးရှိကြပါသည်။ ဧရာဝတီ၊ ချင်း၊ ကချင်၊ ကယား၊ ကရင်၊ မကွေး၊ မန္တလေး၊ မွန်၊ တနင်္သာရီနှင့် ရန်ကုန် အပါအဝင် ကျန်ဒေသများတွင် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက် စုစုပေါင်း၏ (၄၀) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းရှိပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်း မြေမြုပ်မိုင်းနှင့် စစ်ကျန်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ၏ပေါက်ကွဲမှုများကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက်စုစုပေါင်း၏ (၂၂) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် ကလေးများဖြစ်ကြပါသည်။ ဤကိန်းဂဏာန်းများသည် အရပ်သားထိခိုက်ခံစားရမှုများကိုသာ ထင်ဟပ်ကြောင်း သတိပြုရန် အရေးကြီးပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Children, Reports and maps covering anti-personnel landmines and Burma/Myanmar
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7.08 MB
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Description:
"Three of Myanmar’s armed groups say they will not hold talks with the regime until violence against civilians ends.
The Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, which all signed the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), said they will snub Sunday’s ceremony in Naypyitaw to mark eight years since the deal was agreed.
The three organizations, who are fighting the regime alongside resistance groups, said the 2021 coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA and nullified the military-drafted 2008 Constitution.
A joint statement said the junta’s repeated attacks on civilians violated international humanitarian law.
“This reinforces our position that the NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to resolve problems,” it said.
In establishing a federal democratic union and sustainable peace, the three groups said they had laid out common objects and positions, including toppling the regime and ending military involvement in politics.
They agreed to reform and reorganize the military fully under civilian control, draft a new constitution based on federalism and democracy and seek justice for the victims of the conflict.
The revolutionary groups said talks would not be held without the regime ending violence against civilians and accepting the common objectives.
“We demand a system change, not a change within the regime. Changing one military regime to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable,” said the armed groups.
A new constitution and electoral system will create future governments based on a nation-unity model with a transitional authority agreed by all stakeholders, the statement said.
It called on the public, the other NCA signatories and the international community to boycott the regime’s activities.
Since the 2021 coup, the KNU has provided military training to several thousand anti-regime activists who have joined resistance groups. It is fighting with its allies in Karen and Mon states, Bago and Tanintharyi regions and the capital, Naypyitaw.
The CNF’s armed allies are fighting the regime along with the Chinland Defense Forces in Chin State and neighboring Sagaing and Magwe regions..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
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"Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is planning to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Naypyitaw on Sunday, even though some of the signatories have been fighting the Myanmar military since the 2021 coup, saying the accord is no longer valid.
To his embarrassment, three signatories—the Karen National Union, Chin National Front and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front—said on Thursday that any attempt by the regime to base the peace process on the NCA would just “deepen the country’s crisis and prolong armed conflict” as the military takeover violated the peace agreement’s principles and aims.
What is the NCA and who signed it?
The NCA was signed on Oct. 15, 2015 between the Myanmar military, the nominally civilian government of President Thein Sein and eight ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). They are:
Quitting the NCA
Since the 2021 takeover, the KNU, CNF and ABSDF have denounced the coup and resumed fighting the military, saying the NCA was rendered void by the putsch.
They have been joined in fighting the regime by non-signatories including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). All are not only fighting against the regime, but also arming and providing military training for anti-regime forces known as People’s Defense Forces.
Who is still engaging with the regime’s peace talks?
Faced with growing pressure and diplomatic isolation, Min Aung Hlaing invited EAOs, including non-signatories, to peace talks in April 2022 in an attempt to revive the NCA.
The KNU, CNF and ABSDF rejected the invitation, saying the talks were not genuine efforts at seeking peace.
The remaining signatories joined the talks.
Three NCA non-signatories—the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)—also joined the talks.
Despite the KNU’s rejection of the NCA, former KNU chairman Saw Mutu Say Poe, who led the KNU when it signed the NCA in 2015, recently met with Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw for what the regime described as peace talks.
The KNU has distanced itself from the meeting and reaffirmed its commitment to Myanmar’s revolution.
Observers said those EAOs that have agreed to participate in peace talks with the regime all have their own reasons for doing so. Most need to avoid conflict with the Myanmar military either to protect or promote their interests, while a few are small in size and poorly armed.
RCSS leader Yawd Serk even said the PDFs would become armed robbers if not properly controlled by the NUG.
Min Aung Hlaing has conferred honorary Wunna Kyawhtin titles on the leaders of the seven NCA signatories that are still engaging in peace talks with his regime. Some were conferred posthumously..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
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Description:
"We, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), Chin National Front (CNF) and Karen National
Union (KNU), signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), express our common position
regarding the coup makers’ commemoration of the 8th anniversary of the NCA signing and the fake peace
talks supposedly based on the NCA as follows:
1. The aim of the NCA was to resolve the deep-rooted political crisis that had not been resolved by
successive governments for more than 70 years. We wanted to build a federal democratic Union
by amending the 2008 Constitution according to the results of an extra-parliamentary political
dialogue in order to achieve sustainable peace.
2. The military coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA as well as nullified the
2008 Constitution. Therefore, the implementation of the NCA and the NCA-based political
dialogue process came to a halt.
3. The military's repeated vicious attacks that target civilians by using its Army, Air Force and Navy
are a flagrant violation of International Humanitarian Law. This reinforces our position that the
NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to
resolve political problems.
4. SAC’s use of the NCA to pressure NCA signatories, the fake implementation of the NCA through
sham peace talks, the pretended activities of proposing to amend the invalid 2008 constitution
and preparing to hold sham elections will deepen the crisis and push the country into protracted
conflict.
5. ABSDF, CNF and KNU, the revolutionary organizations that signed the NCA, have laid down the
following common political objectives and common political positions for the establishment of a
federal democratic union to achieve sustainable peace.
Common Political Objectives
5.1. To remove the coup makers and end the military's involvement in politics.
5.2. To reform and reorganize the military and place it fully under the administration of an
elected civilian government.
5.3. To draft and ratify a new constitution based on federalism and democracy that is acceptable
to all stakeholders.
5.4. To implement a process of transitional justice and seek justice for victims of conflict.
5.5. To agree on international involvement in facilitation, technical and financial support,
monitoring, witnessing, observing, etc. at all stages of the implementation of the process.
Common Political Positions
5.6. Dialogue will not be held unless SAC ends all violence against the people and accepts
the above common political objectives.
5.7. We desire a system change, not just a regime change. Changing one military regime
to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable.
5.8. Power-sharing between politically privileged groups at the expense of the people
will not be accepted.
5.9. Resolution of the Myanmar crisis will require a constitution and an electoral system
that will create future governments of Myanmar that are based on a ‘national unity’
model.
5.10. SAC is the main conflict partner. It is not an interim authority. A transition period
requires a genuine transitional authority agreed upon by all stakeholders.
5.11. New elections can be held in Myanmar only after all the above steps are successful.
6. We urge the international governments and the entire people of the country, including the
NCA signatories, to support the implementation process of our proposed political
objectives without participating in the activities of the military that prolong the military
dictatorship..."
Source/publisher:
All Burma Students' Democratic Front, Chin National Front, Karen National Union
Date of publication:
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Description:
"At least two of three siblings hospitalized following the strikes that annihilated their village in Kachin State shortly before midnight on Monday have yet to learn that their mother was killed, according to a volunteer helping survivors.
One is too young—one-and-a-half-months old—while the three-year old is unconscious. It is unclear whether their elder brother, a six-year-old, can comprehend what happened.
“Their mother died at the camp while her three children suffered injuries from the bombing. The middle child is severely injured, and he remains unconscious,” the volunteer said, adding: “Their father is somewhere at a front line fighting against junta troops.”
Like his oldest son, he may not yet know that his wife had been killed. He also may not know that his three children have been hospitalized.
The three siblings are among the 57 people injured that night in a series of blasts that killed at least 29 people, including 13 children—one of whom was just one-and-half-years old.
Regime troops bombarded the village located about two miles north of Laiza Town, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) said. Laiza is the KIA”s headquarters.
“A girl from my village lost all of her family members; her parents, her older brother and his wife. She is the only one who was not harmed because she was studying away from home,” a resident of Mung Lai Hkyet Village said. “Now she has nothing.”
She is not the only one. She is not the only one who lost an entire family, residents of the village that was home to internally displaced persons (IDPs) said.
The junta said on Wednesday that the deaths were a result of an explosion at a KIA warehouse containing about 105 tonnes of ammonium nitrate and weapons—countering the media reports that said the deaths were caused by the junta’s airstrikes or shelling.
KIA spokesman Colonel Naw Bu dismissed the regime’s account as “propaganda”, telling The Irrawaddy that the armed group would never position a gunpowder warehouse near civilians. A KIA investigation had determined that junta had either used a high-tech drone or a fleet of drones carrying bombs to strike the IDP camp, he added.
Other media reports say a series of blasts began shortly before midnight, with some reporting that the first one occurred at 11.30pm.
Former residents of the village told The Irrawaddy that there was a series of explosions. The first was massive, and it was followed by several more, they said. Some pointed to craters that they said were proof their village was obliterated by numerous bombs.
More than 600 IDPs from Mung Lai Hkyet Village are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, local aid groups said on Wednesday.
Most former residents of the village are taking refuge in four shelters near the office of Woichyai IDP camp, a representative of the camp told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday.
“We are struggling … We don’t have enough space for a large number of people. We also don’t have enough food to feed them,” he said.
“They lost everything. We need to provide food, water, clothes, bedding, blankets, diapers, utensils and all sorts of commodities for them,” he added.
Road blocks due to ongoing fighting between KIA troops and junta infantry units make it almost impossible to deliver humanitarian assistance to the victims, said a volunteer from Myitkyina, Kachin State’s capital.
Former residents of Mung Lai Hkyet cannot return to their village because it no longer exists.
“We want justice … This is not the first time they [junta troops] committed crimes against humanity,” a Kachin human rights activist, adding: “I want to stress the need for humanitarian assistance for those affected.”
Following the massacre, the KIA and Myanmar parallel National Unity Government condemned the bombing as a war crime.
The United Nations responded with a press release. It quoted Secretary-General Antonio Guterres saying he was “alarmed” by the deaths and that “those responsible must be held to account.”
“The Secretary-General condemns all forms of violence, including the military’s intensifying attacks throughout the country, which continue to fuel regional instability,” the press release from Guterres’ office added.
The British embassy in Yangon also issued a statement. It said it was “appalled by reports of a Myanmar military strike” that killed civilians..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Internal displacement/forced migration of Kachin
Language:
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Sub-title:
At least 29 people, including children, have been killed in an artillery strike on a displaced persons' camp in north-east Myanmar, near the Chinese border.
Description:
"The camp is in an area controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), one of several ethnic insurgent groups which have been fighting for self-rule for many decades.
All the victims were civilians, a KIO spokesman told the BBC.
It is one the deadliest attacks in the 63-year-long conflict in Kachin State.
Kachin officials say the armed forces have scaled up attacks on KIO-run areas over the past year because of growing Kachin support for other insurgent groups fighting the military government.
Much of Myanmar has been embroiled in a wider civil war since a 2021 military coup displaced the country's elected government. The military has increasingly used air strikes against opposition-controlled towns and villages since seizing power.
The exiled National Unity Government (NUG) has blamed the junta for the attack on the camp, describing it as a "war crime and crime against humanity".
Junta spokesman Maj Gen Zaw Min Tun denied that the military was behind the attack.
He claimed the army did not have any operations in the area and said the destruction was "probably" caused by stockpiled explosives.
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Images shared by local media showed bodies being pulled from the rubble and dozens of body bags lying side by side.
The attack late on Monday night happened in the Mong Lai Khet camp for displaced persons - on the outskirts of Laiza, the town on the Chinese border where the KIO has its headquarters.
Parts of the camp were destroyed by powerful explosions at about midnight, KIO officials told the BBC.
Footage of the aftermath shows many houses obliterated and large numbers of casualties.
Kachin officials believe at least 11 children are among those killed. Fifty-six more people were also injured in the latest attack, 44 of whom had been taken to hospital for treatment.
The United Nations in Myanmar said it was "deeply concerned" about reports of deaths in the camp.
"IDP camps are places of refuge, and civilians, no matter where they are, should never be a target," it said in a statement on Facebook.
The British embassy in the capital, Yangon, said it was "appalled by reports of a Myanmar military strike" that killed civilians.
The area around the camp has experienced conflict for many years, as it is not far from the front lines, where Kachin troops in trenches face off against government forces.
However, locals say that no fighting has taken place near the camp in recent times.
It is possible the attack was carried out from the air, but Col Naw Bu of the Kachin Independence Army said the group "did not hear any aircraft".
Almost exactly one year ago, the Myanmar air force used precision-guided bombs to attack an open-air concert at another Kachin base in the night, killing more than 80 people.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) - the KIO's armed wing - is one of the largest and most powerful insurgent groups in Myanmar. It has been fighting the central government sporadically since 1960 and consistently since a ceasefire broke down in 2011.
Since the coup, the military government has viewed the KIA as a significant threat, as it has been giving weapons and training to some of the new insurgent groups which have formed across the country to resist military rule.
KIA also has a long-standing alliance with the Arakan Army, an insurgent group formed initially in Kachin State. But since 2016, it has been operating in Rakhine State, on the other side of the country, where it has successfully challenged the military for control of much of the territory.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said in its latest report on the country that it had found a "seemingly endless spiral of military violence"..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Internal displacement/forced migration of Kachin
Language:
more
Description:
"On October 11, 2023, on the sidelines of Russian Energy Week, the State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom” and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar signed the Memorandum of Understanding in the field of nuclear infrastructure assessment and enhancement.
The document was signed by Alexey Likhachev, Director General of Rosatom, and Dr. Myo Thein Kyaw, Union Minister for Science and Technology of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
The parties plan to determine the current needs for the development of the nuclear infrastructure of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and draw up a work plan for priority areas important for implementation of the small nuclear power plant construction project in the country. The document determines that the development of nuclear infrastructure will be carried out in accordance with the IAEA approaches and recommendations as well as Rosatom’s best practices.
The memorandum also provides for building up further Russian-Myanmar cooperation in the field of training and human resources development, enhancement of safety culture in the organizations, participating in the nuclear energy development program of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Communications Department of ROSATOM
Date of publication:
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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more
Description:
"A Myanmar regime military court has handed life imprisonment terms to the junta’s former trade chief, ex-Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun, and his assistant, ex-Brigadier General Yan Naung Soe, for corruption, according to junta media. The life imprisonment terms are equivalent to 20 years behind bars.
The two were also removed from their military positions.
The court martial verdicts follow the regime’s investigations into the activities of the duo, other high-ranking officials and hundreds of businesspeople last month.
Moe Myint Tun, who has also been purged from the junta’s top administrative body, the State Administration Council, abused his position for personal benefit in violation of economic policies, and committed high treason by going against the roadmap and objectives of the regime, junta media said Tuesday, adding that he took bribes from companies and illegally held foreign currencies. He was the chairman of the Myanmar Investment Commission, the Foreign Exchange Supervisory Committee, and the Central Committee for Ensuring Smooth Flow of Trade and Goods.
The regime announcement said he was found guilty of failing to take action against persons who raised the price of palm oil rather than selling it at the reference price set by the government. The Central Bank of Myanmar sold US dollars in order to import palm oil to be sold at the reference price, it said.
“Moreover he … [took] bribes from companies, applying his rank and authority, illegally keeping foreign exchange currencies in hand, and participating in civilian businesses by breaking directives related to military discipline,” the statement reads.
Prior to the investigation, The Irrawaddy reported that Moe Myint Tun had squirreled away millions of US dollars in bribes from businessmen over the past two years. Some of the businessmen told The Irrawaddy they had to pay him at least US$20,000 or the equivalent in gold and gifts—Louis XIII cognac, with a list price of more than $4,000 for a 750ml bottle, was highly preferred—just to meet him.
Yan Naung Soe, joint secretary of the Central Committee for Ensuring Smooth Flow of Trade and Goods, personally benefited from violating the economic policies of the state and committed betrayal of the state and treason together with Moe Myint Tun, the regime said.
“He also exchanged foreign currency for Myanmar kyats for businesspersons by applying his rank and authority, accepted foreign currency and Myanmar kyats from businesspersons, created connections between businesspersons with ex-Lt-Gen Moe Myint Tun, illegally kept foreign currencies in hand, and participated in civilian businesses in violation of directives related to the military discipline,” the regime said.
The corruption scandal involving Moe Myint Tun and Yan Naung Soe embarrassed regime chief Min Aung Hlaing. He issued a warning late last month that senior military officers and ministers caught abusing their power for personal benefit would face heavy penalties in addition to dismissal.
However, despite Min Aung Hlaing’s highly publicized anti-graft campaign against his subordinates, it is common knowledge that he leads the regime in terms of corruption and that his son Aung Pyae Sone and daughter Khin Thiri Thet Mon have abused their father’s power to amass great wealth..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Corruption, Military History
Language:
more
Description:
"OVERVIEW
The humanitarian situation in Myanmar has been deteriorating since the military coup in February 2021 that overthrew the Government led by the National League for Democracy. The takeover of the military junta has intensified violence and conflict across the country and limited people’s freedom. The operating environment has also shrunk for humanitarian and development organisations. To design programmes, including life-saving interventions, and anticipate potential risks, humanitarian decision makers and responders need comprehensive, quality information and analyses to understand the evolving context and needs of affected communities. The generation of, access to, and sharing of data and information on the situation in Myanmar have significantly decreased since the coup. A limited amount of publicly available data and information products and scattered information characterise the Myanmar humanitarian analysis ecosystem for the humanitarian response. There are a few public repositories available, but they are not comprehensive with a potential risk of duplication in analysis and data collection efforts. This poses challenges to designing and planning a targeted and effective response.
About this report
This report analyses the current analysis ecosystem in the humanitarian context of Myanmar. It highlights the humanitarian sector’s analysis needs and gaps resulting from the reduced operational space and consequent constraints on data collection and data and information sharing. It also outlines a few opportunities to strengthen the ecosystem based on ACAPS’ expertise in humanitarian analysis. Understanding the information and analysis ecosystem in Myanmar, specifically regarding humanitarian needs, provides decision makers with an overview of what information already exists, what the information gaps are, and how some can be addressed.
Methodology
ACAPS went through the following steps to develop this report.
We conducted a secondary data review of publicly available documents to collect information on the analysis landscape and existing access constraints in Myanmar.
We also conducted a secondary data review of the main publicly available data and information products on Myanmar published between February 2021 and December 2022. ACAPS considered publicly available products related to the humanitarian context gathered on ReliefWeb and various organisations’ websites. From these, we developed a metadatabase using 610 unique products as a sample. Products published in a series (either at regular or irregular intervals) were considered unique regardless of the number of times they were published in the given time frame. The metadatabase was also built as a time-bound snapshot of publicly available data and information on Myanmar to use as a sample for the analysis.
We interviewed 18 key informants, including information management (IM) representatives, research institutions, and individuals working on face-to-face and remote data collection and analysis in Myanmar.
We analysed the above through the lens of an ideal analysis ecosystem.
Limitations
ACAPS developed the metadatabase that supported our study on the Myanmar humanitarian analysis ecosystem based on a selection of publicly available data and information products published between February 2021 and December 2022. Many reports in Myanmar are not publicly available because of context sensitivities. The scarcity of information and data collection restrictions in the country also make it difficult to understand the information and analysis landscape. ACAPS consulted different organisations and experts to complement the findings extracted from the metadatabase..."
Source/publisher:
ACAPS
Date of publication:
2023-10-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Format :
pdf
Size:
1.4 MB
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Description:
"The United States condemns yesterday’s attack by the Burma military regime on the Kachin State town of Munglai Hkyet, which hosts a camp for internally displaced persons, killing and injuring dozens, including women and children.
This latest attack by the Burma military regime is yet another example of its disregard for human life and underscores the need for the UN Security Council to act beyond Resolution 2669. We underline our commitment to using all tools at the Security Council’s disposal to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, a commitment affirmed by the vast majority of the Security Council.
We reiterate our call on the regime to cease all forms of violence, free all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with regard to the protection of civilians.
The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and the establishment of a path toward a genuine and inclusive democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN..."
Source/publisher:
United States Mission to the United Nations
Date of publication:
2023-10-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Bago Region, Sagaing Region and Kayah State from October 1st to 7th. Heavy artillery attacks from Military Junta ships killed a civilian from Yesagyo Township, Magway Region on October 1st. Junta People arrested 11 civilians and 5 were used as human shields from Sagaing Region and Magway Region.
5 civilians died and 6 injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A child was also injured when the Military Junta committed violations. Civilians fled twice to safety by the matching and raiding of Military Junta Troop within a week..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-10-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
274.13 KB 271.6 KB 138.18 KB
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Sub-title:
It’s time to start thinking beyond the country’s nightmarish era of military rule and begin planning for a better future
Description:
"In our decades of interactions with presidents, prime ministers, government ministers and diplomats all over the world, one flawed assumption has underpinned their understanding and approach to our country. That assumption is that Myanmar’s military is somehow invincible.
It’s not a word they use, because the assumption is so deeply ingrained that they don’t even talk about it. The military cannot be defeated—that is their starting point. Their whole policymaking approach stems from this. Over the years, this has led them down paths so convoluted that at some points they have even argued that cross-border aid to ethnic communities fleeing Myanmar army attacks will fuel conflict.
The false assumption of Myanmar military invincibility led the international community to pressure ethnic revolutionary organisations to engage in the sham “peace process” 11 years ago. We warned them that the military’s claims that it wanted peace were not genuine. For the military, this was just a pause button, not a stop button, we said. But Western governments didn’t listen and instead wasted—and still waste—millions of dollars of aid money trying to convince themselves that there can be peace with the Myanmar military.
The assumption of military invincibility led them to pressure Aung San Suu Kyi to run for election and serve in parliament under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution.
In the 2000s, the assumption that the military was invincible led some Yangon diplomats to decide that they knew better than the people of Myanmar, who wanted nothing more than to see an end to military rule. Instead, these diplomats argued that sanctions should be lifted and that ways should be found to engage with the military for some imaginary gradual reform process, despite everything we know about the military mindset and behaviour.
We were told we had to compromise with the military and “dialogue” with them, even as they bombed our villages, schools and clinics. Even now, when we try to defend our people and our land, we are accused of provoking the military and blamed for the attacks against us.
In largely peaceful Yangon, in the bubble where foreign diplomats and United Nations agencies reside, this false assumption still underpins their approach. They assume that the military is there to stay. From that starting point, they like to talk about “creative” alternatives. They talk about whether there are any members of the military or the junta who are a little more open-minded and suggest supporting a younger, reform-minded generation of the military unhappy with the current situation. It’s the same fruitless debate that diplomats have engaged in since the 1990s.
Gradually, in the Yangon bubble, diplomats and international agencies are deciding that the military is here to stay, and that they have no choice but to step up their engagement with the generals. They say they have to do so for the sake of meeting humanitarian needs, even as they provide little or no aid to parts of the country that are not under military control and where civil society is ready to deliver life-saving aid.
Outside of Yangon, there is a very different situation. People are doing everything they can to resist military rule. From boycotts to taking up arms, people know that there can be no human rights, no economic development and no true federal democracy while the Myanmar military holds power. For the first time in decades, the military is losing control of significantly more areas of the country.
“A Shifting Power Balance—Junta Control Shrinks in Southeast Burma,” a new report released by the Karen Peace Support Network last month, reveals that since the coup, the Myanmar military has lost 62 military bases to Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army and its allies.
On the western and eastern boundaries of northern KNU territory there have been big strategic gains. The KNU’s expansion westwards and southwards also poses a significant threat to the junta’s main road and rail transport artery from Yangon to Naypyitaw, as well as to the Asia Highway trade corridor from Yangon to Myawaddy on the Thai border.
Areas under KNU civilian administration are expanding fast. Schools operated by the Karen Education and Culture Department have tripled to more than 900. Meanwhile, schools operated by the regime’s education ministry in KNU and mixed administration areas have fallen from 370 to zero.
In Sagaing and Magway regions, the military has faced unprecedented resistance, losing large areas to the control of the People’s Defence Force (PDF). The military has ceded administrative control to the Arakan Army in large parts of Rakhine State. In Kachin, Chin and Karenni states, the military is struggling to maintain or regain territory.
We are not claiming that the Myanmar military is about to collapse. We know only too well about the vast manpower and weaponry that it has at its disposal, having both experienced attacks by the military ourselves.
What we are saying is that there has been a major shift in dynamics on the ground. The military has not faced this kind of pressure in living memory. The appearance of normality in Yangon and a handful of other cities is an exception, not the rule.
The external pressures that the military is facing from the armed resistance and its loss of territory are visible to all. Internal pressures within the military are also increasingly evident, with the regime making sudden and erratic economic decisions and purging and reshuffling its members and other military personnel.
The shifting power balance in Karen State and other areas should already have prompted governments and UN agencies to reassess their approach, both politically and logistically for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In the areas where they can be most useful, they remain woefully behind the curve.
History is full of examples of seemingly invincible regimes which no longer exist. Some collapsed suddenly and almost overnight. Some took years of struggle to overcome.
At the moment, the international community seems to have put all its policy eggs in the basket of military invincibility and a long grinding conflict. It seems to have done very little short- or long-term planning for a scenario in which the Myanmar military is, at long last, defeated by the country’s people.
We can’t say when the military will fall. But fall it will. There is no alternative for our people or our country. What does it say about international policy-making towards Myanmar that so little thought has gone into preparing for the day that the people of Myanmar are working so hard to reach? The defeat of the military is the essential first stepping stone towards a free Myanmar. We—and the world—need to be ready for what comes next..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2023-10-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar junta’s Supreme Court says it has rejected appeals by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers to overturn six corruption convictions.
Four related to the Daw Khin Kyi Foundation, a charity named after the 78-year-old state counselor’s mother, and two cases involved the accusation of receiving US$550,000 from crony Maung Weik.
On August 29, the Supreme Court declined to hear five special appeals for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Her team has been asking unsuccessfully since January for a meeting to discuss an appeal for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint. They have been in detention since the February 2021 coup.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi faced 19 convictions and 33 years in jail but junta chief Min Aung Hlaing pardoned her of five convictions in a national amnesty on August 1.
She faces 27 years in jail and denies all the charges.
The Nobel laureate has been unwell and in September suffered from a serious dental problem, was unable to eat without vomiting and suffered from dizziness. The prison authorities denied her request to see an outside dentist.
She is being held in solitary confinement in a Naypyitaw prison and has been denied prison visits and access to her legal team since late last year..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-10-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, About Aung San Suu Kyi
Language:
more
Description:
"Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the universally despised leader of the deeply unpopular 2021 military coup that ousted the re-elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government, is preparing to hold a grand ceremony for the 8th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was signed on Oct. 15, 2015.
The military leaders and endorsers of the 2021 coup, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, are a group of cunning, unprincipled and ruthless individuals, to belabour the obvious. They are not very bright, strategically speaking. They lack foresight. And they are anything but patriots.
What kind of patriots would plunge their country into the abyss of nationwide violence, reignite the flames of civil war, condemn 30 percent of their fellow people to the worsening conditions of hunger or “food insecurity”, forcibly displace large segments of the population, including the majority Buddhists, order over 2,000 airstrikes in less than two-and-a-half-years against vulnerable civilians in clinics, hospitals, monasteries, resort to its colonial-style scorched earth operations, block the refugees’ access to emergency and humanitarian aid, burn down entire villages in the heartlands of the Bama majority, destroy nearly 80,000 homes across the country, and serially slaughter young men and women from all ethnic and faith backgrounds who staunchly resist the coup.
I personally know well several of these coup plotters and endorsers, with blood on their hands, including the 3rd ranking coup leader General Mya Tun Oo (his former commander), and ex-Lt.-General Myint Swe who at the time of the coup was vice president in Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration, and Daw Yin Yin Oo (retired Foreign Service official and the military’s counter-intelligence agent) who serves as one of the two key female advisers in the coup regime. Daw Yin Yin Oo’s father the late Dr Maung Maung served as the legal adviser to the late military dictator General Ne Win until the latter’s death under house arrest. [The other woman who has the honour of being an advisor to the coup regime is Dr. Yin Yin Nwe, an ex-daughter-in-law of the late General Ne Win, who trained as a geologist at Cambridge University and worked as the head of UNICEF in China].
In the morning of the coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing instantly made Myint Swe “Acting President”, since the sitting President Win Myint refused to endorse the coup, while literally at gunpoint, as was required by the 2008 constitution. Twisting the military’s own constitutional requirement, Myint Swe play-acted the role of “President” and read out his presidential endorsement to Min Aung Hlaing’s coup.
No such clause existed in the military’s 2008 Constitution that “the Commander-in-Chief shall instantly make the military’s handpicked Vice President “Acting President” in order to constitutionally endorse the coup in the event the real and sitting president refused to go along with the military’s seizure of power, even if a pistol is pointed to the latter’s head!”
Joking and my personal assessment of men and women who made the coup aside, I offer my analysis of the coup and post-coup developments from an institutional perspective. Indeed, the Feb. 1, 2021 coup had inadvertently killed several birds with one stone, specifically the NCA and the 2008 Constitution birds. The constitution was the goose that laid the military’s golden eggs, whichever Senior General may serve as the Commander-in-Chief.
This is precisely the most recent position – and analysis – of the Karen National Union: the coup had rendered null and void both the Constitution of 2008 and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015.
The Myanmar military under the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing was a signatory, to the NCA, alongside the representatives of the parliament and the presidency, as well as eight other armed organizations, including the KNU and the Chin National Front (CNF). Its coup had abolished the parliament and the presidency, while imprisoning the sitting president and leaders of the legislature on trumped up charges, without due process, the KNU argues.
According to the KNU reasoning, since the military as a key signer of the NCA had behaved in such a way that no other signatory has any moral or legal obligation to honour the otherwise legally binding treaty among the central state actors and the armed resistance organizations which signed the agreement, in good faith.
The KNU is the country’s oldest pro-democracy and pro-federal union resistance organization founded in 1947 with 70-years of direct military and political experiences in dealing with the military in Myanmar. During the military-led reform period, the KNU leadership played an instrumental role in pushing for the peaceful political solution to bring an end to the country’s civil war of fluctuating intensities.
First, a word about the 2008 constitution, which served as the basis of the NCA.
To borrow the American lingo, it was the constitution of, for, and by the military. It was designed chiefly by the retired Senior General Than Shwe, who served as a young infantry officer under the command of my late great uncle the late Lt.-Colonel Ant Kywe over half a century ago. Than Shwe’s 2008 constitution was, for all intents and purposes, amendment proof and thus anti-democratic. That is to say, it was designed not to accommodate popular will or public opinion of the electorate as they “mature” or become more democratic and progressive.
It contained no sunset clause for the military to allow itself to be phased out over a period of transitional electoral cycles, typical of all constitutions found in countries in a genuine democratic transition from the decades of military rule to a progressively democratic system (Indonesia, for instance).
Furthermore, it also elevated the Ministry of Defence (or the Armed Forces) above any other institutions in society: the two other branches of the government, the legislature and judiciary, were to have no real control over the military, nor does the executive branch of which the military/Ministry of Defence was merely a component, theoretically. No political parties that enjoy a popular mandate from the people can influence the military’s policies or behaviour. It vested the power in the Commander-in-Chief to re-take power on any occasion which the number one soldier deems “a national emergency”.
It gave the military, not just the Commander-in-Chief, the veneer of political legitimacy, and made lawful any future seizure of power even before such anti-democratic move took place. Alas, in a stroke of strategic genius, the military had killed both the NCA and its own constitution.
When I was growing up during General Ne Win’s one party military dictatorship (1962-88), with the veneer of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, the military propagandists had put in circulation that the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the political wing of the military, was a good system, badly administered by “bad” party cadres, taking and executing dictates from the erratic number one, that is, Ne Win. Those 26 long years had passed, and General Ne Win and his deputies are now fertilizer.
The post-BSPP era (1962-88) in Myanmar has seen two military-drafted constitutions (1974 and 2008) while the control of the state has been passed on from one crop of generals to another. The names of the ruling military cliques – usurpers really – have changed. But the military has remained as the most corrupt, incompetent, mafia-like, economy-wrecking actor, not to mention it being the spearhead of Rohingya genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against Kachin, Rakhine, Karen, Shan, Chin, Mon, Muslims, Christians and defiant Buddhist Mons.
Enter the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with Senior General Saw Maung and General Khin Nyunt as Chairman and Secretary (1988-1992), the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) presided over by Senior General Than Shwe (1992-2010), the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) from 2010-15 and the National Security Council (controlled by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and his deputies who headed the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs) from 2015-2021, which constitutionally and effectively clipped the reformist wings of the NLD government of Aung San Suu Kyi, in a two-tiered system of power-sharing until it decided that the military could no longer tolerate the NLD’s directions and speed of the economic, legal and institutional reforms.
To be sure, there are arguments that see some values and space for reform and federalism in the military’s 2008 constitution and some life in the NCA. They point out that the NCA and the constitution recognize the political nature of military conflicts in Myanmar – now in their 8th decade! And the constitution mandates the president – as opposed to the Commander-in-Chief – to seek peaceful solutions to these armed conflicts at the dialogue table.
No one in their rational mind would argue against resolving political differences and ending violent conflicts and wars through negotiations, especially when the war is not going in your favour. In my recent visit to Neuengamme Concentration Camp Museum on the outskirts of Hamburg, Germany, I discovered that Heinrich Himmler, the dreaded head of the Nazi SS, of all the Nazis, was trying to incentivize the “neutral” Swedish government to reach out to Britain on its behalf for a ceasefire with the Allies: he freed 3,000 Norwegian and Danish inmates which the Swedish Red Cross came with white buses to fetch as the Nazi defeat was becoming apparent – to the SS leadership.
Engulfed in the war at home with the society – and the popular resistance movements in virtually all regions throughout Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing and the coup regime has shown no inclination for suing for peace, NCA or not.
Finally, no analysis of prospect for peace and reconciliation will be complete without a cursory glance at the military’s historical record at such endeavours. Whoever is the Commander-in-Chief, Myanmar’s single largest military force – out of roughly two dozen such armed organizations which are mostly ethnically organized, and thus so-named as Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) – has an unenviable record of failures after failures in making peace and seeking “negotiated settlements” in resolving political disputes.
The ceasefire and peace negotiations did not begin in 2013, the year considered the origin of the NCA which the coup regime is trying to resurrect. The first coup regime of General Ne Win – the Revolutionary Council government with its BSPP wing – had held “peace talks” with “insurgent groups”, then less than six, including the Karens, Shan, Mon and Burmese communists – in 1963, 1972, and 1980. They all collapsed, with no exception as the Burmese generals attempted to make peace and negotiate ceasefires on their own terms, without addressing the root causes – the denial of basic human rights, the refusal to accept ethnic group equality and the need for the military to strictly adhere to the national defence, as opposed to meddling in the messy business of democratic nation-building.
Throughout the last half-century, Myanmar’s resistance organizations have consistently sought peaceful resolutions with or without external support.
In his letter addressed to Richard von Weizsacker, then President of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) dated Oct. 25, 1987 with the subject line “Regarding the Civil War in Burma”, M. Brang Seng, the late Chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and an authorized spokesman for the National Democratic Front, the then largest alliance of the 10 ethnic resistance organizations, wrote: As you are well aware, Burma has been plagued by civil war for the past forty years. The civil war (has) intensified since General Ne Win seized power in 1962, and established a totalitarian, centralistic and one party system of government….We have repeatedly called upon General Ne Win’s regime to solve the nation’s problem politically at the conference table. But he has responded to us with his armed forces only in the battle field ….
Therefore, we, of the National Democratic Front, wish to earnestly request to you, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, to kindly help us find ways to peace negotiations between us and the Burma government. We have been and are willing still to end this forty year long drawn(-out) civil war to an end on the conference table.”
Chairman M. Brang Seng was on a visit to West Germany at the time.
Likewise, one of the leaders of the Shan resistance, the late Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who commanded the 1st Military Region of the Shan State Army (1969-1972) and served as a peace negotiator in General Ne Win’s 1963 peace talks, expressed his fervent desire for ending the civil war in Myanmar.
In his book “The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile” (first published in 1987, by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), Chao Tzang wrote: “a military victory will not bring about any kind of nationhood, or lasting peace and stability. Uprisings will end and rebel armies disappear if and only if Rangoon accepts objective realities and gets down to the real business of providing the peoples of Burma, both the Burmese and the non-Burmese, with the kind of leadership which the country badly needs in the spirit that was displayed before independence of gained.” He was referring to the spirit of democracy, ethnic equality and federated union of independent Myanmar.
Alas, ceasefire, peace, and reconciliation are a far cry in the country where the single largest military force – Myanmar military that seizes power at the whim of the senior military clique of the day, abolish or subjugate all constitutive institutions of the state – including executive, judiciary, and legislature – locking up democratic leaders, summarily executes dissidents, slaughters its own citizens in mass killings, burns down entire villages wantonly, and perpetrates the gravest crimes under domestic and international law.
After six decades in power, the Myanmar military has proven itself to be no partner in peace. Its conduct is guided by neither principles of fairness, justice, equality or basic rights nor abiding sense of patriotism. It takes two hands to make the sound of peace. Even Himmler’s Nazi SS desperately sought an honourable exit, despite its heinous crimes. Not so with the coup-making military of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Democratic Voice of Burma
Date of publication:
2023-10-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
Language:
more
Description:
"Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process – A Reference Guide (2022 – 2023)
Since 2013, our BNI-MPM has been publishing “Deciphering the Peace Process – Reference Guide ” annually by compiling conflict situations and findings during the peace process. This is the 8th book.
We have selected and compiled worthy contents, events and facts, based on the evolving political, military and peace landscapes.
We strongly believe it will be a reference guide that will reflect the current military, political and peace landscapes for the persons and organizations involved in the peace process, researchers, students, international organizations and journalists..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Peace Monitor
Date of publication:
2023-10-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
29.76 MB
more
Description:
"Europe’s largest LGBTQ+ right charity Stonewall has been joined by 245 other organisations across the human rights, refugee, LGBTQ+ and women’s sectors in a powerful display of solidarity, following comments by the Home Secretary, Suella Braverman, last week.
The coalition, including organisations such as Amnesty, Oxfam, End Violence Against Women Coalition, Refugee Council and Women For Refugee Women, has written to UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, to reaffirm the UK’s commitment to protect LGBTQ+ people and women around the world.
Many of the signatories work daily with LGBTQ+ and women refugees, and ‘bear witness to their scars from being persecuted’.
The letter rejects Ms Braverman’s claim that LGBTQ+ and women refuges are misusing their identities to make false claims, and speaks of regret that the Home Secretary’s selective use of stats ‘have nothing to do with genuine concern or respect for international law, refugees or their protection.’
Read the full letter here.
Robbie de Santos, Director of External Affairs at Stonewall, said: “We all deserve a government with the compassion and will to protect the most vulnerable in society. Not only is the incumbent UK Government failing LGBTQ+ people domestically, with inaction on rising hate crime, but they are also failing the international community by indicated their disdain for international law – in the process bringing great shame on party and country.”
Steve Valdez-Symonds, Refugee and Migrant Rights Director at Amnesty International UK, said: “The Home Secretary’s verbal attack on the rights of LGBTQ+ and women refugees is deplorable. Not only did she once again stir utterly false prejudices against people seeking asylum, she also targeted refugees who often continue to face grave insecurity, hostility and violence – even long after escaping persecution and conflict. Ministers must stop their constant scapegoating and put their energy into repairing the utter wreckage they have made of the asylum system.”
Alphonsine Kabagado, Director, Women For Refugee Women, said: “We strongly condemn Suella Braverman’s speech last week – which was dangerous, inflammatory and racist. Not only did her claims stoke hatred and fear, they were untrue. To be granted asylum in the UK, you must prove a well-founded fear of persecution. Her suggestion that people lie about their identities to make false claims for protection, or that it is possible to be granted asylum based on discrimination alone, is unfounded. We know from our work supporting refugee and asylum-seeking women, including LGBTQ+ women, that many face persecution including torture, gender-based violence, sexual violence, trafficking and rape.
Braverman’s speech was also hypocritical. The Government has repeatedly stated its commitment to tackling violence against women and supporting survivors of such violence, as well as to supporting LGBTQ+ people. Yet when it comes to women or LGBTQ+ people seeking asylum in the UK, it seems these commitments do not apply. Instead of whipping up hatred, fear, and division against women and LGBTQ+ people seeking safety, the Government should treat them with compassion and kindness. How we treat people is who we are; the Government’s hostility does not represent us.”
Enver Solomon, CEO of the Refugee Council, said: “Turning our backs on LGBTQ+ people and suggesting they are undeserving of a fair hearing in the asylum system is immoral.
Of the small number of people who come to the UK claiming asylum based on their sexual orientation, the majority are recognised as having a well-founded fear of persecution and are given refugee protection. We know from our work how traumatised they often are – what they need is support to restart their lives in safety, rather than hostility and disbelief.
The Refugee Convention’s fundamental purpose is to offer protection to those who need it, based on shared global values of humanity and fairness. Abandoning these values does not reflect who we are as a country.”
Leila Zadeh, CEO, Rainbow Migration, said: “Across the world there are LGBTQI+ people experiencing violence and persecution simply because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Around 70 countries still criminalise same-sex relations, and in some places the picture is getting worse.
Many LGBTQI+ people that we support every day tell us how they faced life-threatening situations back home. For example, Olu, a lesbian from Nigeria had to run for her life when her husband found out she was a lesbian and nearly killed her, or Adams was violently attacked in the street on several occasions by members of his community in Ghana because he was bisexual.
We all want to live somewhere where we can be safe and live fulfilling lives and most of us welcome people who are fleeing for their lives. We ask that the PM gets in line with public sentiment and commits to the protection of the rights of LGBTQ+ people seeking safety in the UK.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-10-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
108.73 KB
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"3 October 2023: The United Nations (UN) is failing Myanmar, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). UN member States and their inter-governmental forums are failing to act, the UN Country Team (UNCT) is pursuing the same failed approach of appeasing the military despite growing risks and ever-fewer results, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres has neglected his responsibilities to the Myanmar people as head of the UN Secretariat, a new report by SAC-M has found.
The report, How the UN Is Failing Myanmar, looks at the response from the UN’s component parts – the UN intergovernmental forums, the UN Secretariat and the UN Entities, represented in Myanmar by the UNCT – to the crisis in Myanmar caused by the coup that was launched by the military junta on 1 February 2021. For two and a half years, the junta has waged a campaign of atrocities against the civilian population in Myanmar that has left 2 million people internally displaced and up to 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN system is failing to respond in a manner that reflects the gravity of the crisis and the objections of Myanmar civil society to the actions of UN officials are being ignored.
“The junta is the root cause of civil war, poverty, inequalities, and injustices in our country,” said Nai Aue Mon, Program Director, Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), a non-profit human rights and pro-democracy organisation in Myanmar. “We have urged UN agencies, regional and international actors to cut ties with the junta, to deliver humanitarian assistance directly to local humanitarian actors; and commit to meaningful engagement and collaboration with Myanmar’s legitimate stakeholders, including civil society organizations and local service providers.”
“They must listen to our voices and stand in solidarity with us by supporting our calls,” Nai Aue Mon added.
The report is written from the perspective of SAC-M’s members as former UN mandate holders on Myanmar, who, during their mandates, called for an inquiry into the involvement of the UN in Myanmar since 2011. The resulting inquiry published its findings in a 2019 report commonly referred to as “the Rosenthal Report”. It found ”systemic and structural failures” within and across the UN system that rendered the UN impotent in the face of massive human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military, including the atrocities committed against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. Measures taken by the Secretary-General to implement the Rosenthal Report’s recommendations have been insufficient. The UN’s failures in Myanmar are being repeated.
“During the previous democracy uprising in 1988, the UN tried to use engagement with the military junta and it was a failure. We ended up with military rule for the next 30 years,” said Linn Yaung, a former university teacher in Yangon and current member of Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement. “Now there’s an even more brutal junta led by Min Aung Hlaing. The UN’s strategy did not work then, so why do they think it will work this time?”
SAC-M’s report identifies key ways in which the UN system is failing Myanmar in the current crisis and makes recommendations for change. The UN Security Council must enforce the junta’s compliance with Resolution 2669, including by imposing a comprehensive arms embargo and targeted financial sanctions on the junta, and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
The UNCT must redefine its relationship with the junta and should coordinate directly with the National Unity Government, Ethnic Resistance Organisations and resistance authorities for humanitarian access. It should also support – but not co-opt – civil society networks engaged in the existing cross-border humanitarian response. This is the only effective way to reach all of those in Myanmar in need.
Finally, the Secretary-General must fulfil his responsibility as the head of the UN Secretariat to lead the development of a unifying, comprehensive and coherent UN strategy on Myanmar with clear lines of responsibility to monitor and evaluate implementation and ensure accountability for UN actions.
“The humanitarian provision from UN is not being effective and have not reached the people on the ground,” said Musel, a local humanitarian actor with Kyay Latt Myay, a local humanitarian group working in Karenni state of Myanmar. “In Karenni state, people who have been displaced due to the military attacks have not received any support from international humanitarian organizations, particularly from the UN agencies. There are some UN agencies in Karenni state, but they are only active in urban areas. They can only support where the junta allows them to reach… Therefore, I would like to urge the donors to support through cross-border.”
Musel added: “To deliver humanitarian assistance effectively to the ground, the UN agencies must work together with local humanitarian service providers.”
On the day that the military coup was launched, the Secretary-General issued a statement reaffirming “the unwavering support of the United Nations to the people of Myanmar in their pursuit of democracy, peace, human rights, and the rule of law”. That commitment has not been met. The people of Myanmar rightfully expect the UN’s support in their nation-defining struggle to free themselves once and for all from military dictatorship. The UN must end its cycle of failure in Myanmar. The UN must stand on the side of the Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-10-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.27 MB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 15 to 21, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing and Mandalay Region from September 15th to 21st. Over 130 civilians including women from Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi Region and Kachin State were arrested and used as human shields. Military Junta burnt and killed a civilian from Shweku Township, Kachin State. The families of political prisoners were extorted by prison authorities in Pathein Prison, Ayeyarwady Region.
18 Civilians died and over 29 were injured by the heavy and light artillery attacks of the Military Junta. They arrested around 50 civilians and killed 36 within a week. An underage child died and other 3 were injured by the Military junta committed violations..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-09-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
367.54 KB 347.35 KB 129.99 KB
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Description:
"In revolutions, citizens push to overthrow the power of unpopular and unjust leaders. Yet in these contexts, it is often the case that other established power relations in society are also challenged. Revolutions and crises can ‘lift the lid’ on other unequal relationships and injustices.
In the case of Myanmar’s current revolution, the exiled National Unity Government, along with numerous armed groups and resistance movements around the country, are resisting the deeply unpopular and abusive Myanmar military. Amidst this revolution, however, there are other relationships that are being renegotiated, for example between different ethnic groups and, as millennials increasingly take on new leadership roles in the movement, between different generations.
Meanwhile, relationships and power dynamics within the aid architecture are also being challenged, as local and national Myanmar organisations question the longstanding dominance of international actors in humanitarian decision-making and resourcing.
Along with the revolution, there is currently a devastating humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that more than 17 million people, or almost one-third of the country, will need humanitarian assistance in 2023. As international NGOs and UN agencies are heavily restricted in their access to key areas of need, humanitarian programs are almost entirely reliant on local and national organisations. Yet despite their central role in aid program delivery, Myanmar humanitarian organisations remain on the periphery of humanitarian decision-making and resourcing.
In late 2022 and early 2023, we did interviews with 25 leaders of these Myanmar organisations (along with ten interviews with international aid agency representatives in Myanmar), exploring the dynamics of aid localisation.
One of our key findings is that there is a ‘conflict paradox’ for these local organisations – where local humanitarian actors can be both disempowered and empowered through international aid partnerships in settings of conflict. In conflict situations characterised by restricted international access, local actors can have greater control over aid resources and decision-making; yet such contexts can also result in the further disempowerment of local actors, when they are reduced to subcontractors delivering aid programs that remain controlled by international agencies.
In Myanmar, on one hand, local organisations are facing severe restrictions from the military regime – who confiscate and block aid, attempt to control financial transactions, and frequently threaten the security of staff and communities. At the same time, these Myanmar humanitarian organisations also report being hampered in their work by the bureaucracy and risk aversion of their international aid agency ‘partners’.
At times, international agency compliance rules – such as gaining three quotations for services, or keeping recipient lists – place local organisations and communities at risk from the regime. For example, one local aid provider told us how, in Sagaing division in Myanmar, the military regime recently destroyed all of the medicine at a local pharmacy and forced its closure, after local authorities saw the store listed on a voucher which had been kept for financial auditing of an aid project.
While some international agencies have increased their flexibility, Myanmar agency leaders reported that many international partners had shown little awareness or willingness to change systems to be more appropriate. More broadly, local leaders said that the relationship between international and local organisations was often a disempowering one in the humanitarian system. One Myanmar leader said that the “donors’ approach … examining [local groups] and saying ‘you don’t have this and you don’t have that’ … it undermines and disempowers the locals from the initial contact.”
On the other hand, local organisations have also, in some ways, been empowered in their work within the context of Myanmar’s conflict. They are able to operate more autonomously than international agencies as they have the ability to navigate the instability and dangers of the context. One Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader said, “Since COVID in 2020, and followed by the [military] coup [in February 2021], we know that, and we have proven that, local CSOs [civil society organisations] and agencies are the only actors on the ground.”
Along with greater access, local organisations have often developed stronger relationships of trust with other local organisations and communities. In the context of instability and revolution, such trust is crucial and is seen by many to go beyond the context or duration of an aid project. A leader from one organisation said, “trust-building does not happen overnight … If we want to support, help, and work together with [communities], we need to go beyond the project.”
Due to their access and relationships of trust with local communities, Myanmar humanitarian organisations, rather than international ones, are at the centre of current humanitarian responses. Yet regime and donor agency restrictions also hamper these responses.
This conflict paradox, where Myanmar humanitarian organisations are both empowered and disempowered, has led local leaders to attempt to reposition their agencies within the aid architecture. Rather than being subcontracted through a chain of funding – going from bilateral donor to UN agency or pooled fund to international NGO to local NGO – many large Myanmar organisations are now seeking to establish more direct funding relationships with donors. This aim is in line with the commitments made by the largest aid agency donors through the Grand Bargain in 2016.
Myanmar organisation leaders argue that they play a more effective aid intermediary role than international agencies. Access, local knowledge and trust allow them to support other local organisations and communities with more efficiency and context sensitivity.
Yet more than simply having greater effectiveness, Myanmar organisations are pushing for more decision-making power within the aid architecture as a matter of political rights and self-determination. They argue persuasively that decisions made about humanitarian action should be made by the people who are affected by them.
Revolution is not only a time of struggle towards regime change, but also a time when old inequalities of other kinds can be more clearly seen and challenged. This includes the old hierarchies in the aid sector. International aid agencies, including DFAT, need to adapt quickly and find sensible ways to address the inequalities in the aid system and more directly support the growth of Myanmar’s humanitarian organisations..."
Source/publisher:
Australian National University
Date of publication:
2023-09-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
718.29 KB
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Description:
"In Rakhine State, 51,590 individuals have been displaced across 10 townships due to the ongoing AA-Tatmadaw conflict. Additionally, 4,472 individuals have been displaced in Paletwa township in Chin State, bringing the total number of displaced persons to 56,062. As of August 2023, a further 4,174 individuals newly displaced remain in Mrauk-U, Kyautaw, Sittwe, Myebon, Minbya, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, and Ponnagyun townships.
In collaboration with partners and other UN agencies, UNHCR is responding to the humanitarian needs and continues to provide assistance to affected communities. Since January 2023, UNHCR provided core relief items, emergency shelter support, dignity kits and cloth masks to some 44,917 individuals in Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw,
Ponnagyun, Myebon, Sittwe, Pauktaw, Paletwa, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-09-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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The junta’s opponents are contesting roads, rivers and railways throughout the country, but the regime retains sufficient control over supply lines to sustain its offensives.
Description:
"Opposition forces across the country launched multiple attacks on regime convoys and flotillas carrying supplies and reinforcements, as well as against infrastructure like bridges and railways. To secure its lines of communication, the regime deployed more firepower and sent advance units to raid and depopulate nearby communities. This month’s update looks at recent dynamics in the Dry Zone, Bago East, and Kayah, where fighting along vital transport routes continues to escalate.
Regime makes progress over Dry Zone resistance, although some units grow stronger
Widespread armed violence persisted across the Dry Zone, with regime units continuing their efforts to locate and destroy independent Local Defence Forces (LDFs).?
In July, the IISS described an ongoing shift in tactics away from the pervasive use of arson by regime forces. Instead, soldiers are increasingly employing more select forms of violence, drawing on improved intelligence to help them identify and kill resistance fighters and their supporters. Reports of raids, killings, and torture by regime forces continue even as the pace of village arson declines.
The number of successful raids against LDFs coupled with information from multiple sources suggest that the regime may be making progress in reducing the number of localised armed actors operating across the Dry Zone. Most LDFs continue to depend primarily on homemade weapons, restricting their ability to effectively defend against raids, which accelerated after the regime dedicated additional resources to this theatre of operations early this year. Single attacks by regime units commonly result in the destruction of entire resistance cells.
Although independent and poorly equipped LDFs appear to be facing mounting difficulties, some individual People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) operating in coordination with the National Unity Government (NUG) or ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) appear increasingly coordinated and well-equipped. Over the last two months, photo and video evidence uploaded to social media has shown the growing prevalence of what appear to be factory-manufactured rifles, rather than homemade weapons, in the hands of uniformed PDF units operating in the Dry Zone. If these trends continue into 2024, the conflict in central Myanmar may evolve from a grassroots rebellion into a protracted insurgency waged by a smaller number of armed outfits. The geographical extent of fighting between combatants could become more limited even as some individual battles intensify.
The Dry Zone has also witnessed intensified conflict along its rivers, which both sides rely on for transport and supply. In late July, a regime flotilla of six supply ships and three gunboats departed from Mandalay, traveling up the Irrawaddy River on its way to Kachin State. On 31 July, a similarly-sized flotilla embarked from Monywa, moving north along the Chindwin River. In both instances, the regime sent advance columns to secure the riverbank as the flotilla moved upriver by conducting village raids, leading to mass displacement as well as the death and injury of numerous civilians. Multiple resistance outfits equipped with makeshift rockets and small arms made unsuccessful attempts to halt the regime’s waterborne convoys by launching ambushes from dug-in positions along the riverbank. Violence along the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers is likely to accelerate, leading to more civilian casualties and displacement.....Resistance contests regime supply lines in Bago East
The last three months saw a marked acceleration of fighting in Bago East, where allied units from the Karen National Union (KNU) and PDFs are exerting increased pressure on one of the country’s most important corridors. Resistances forces may now aim to break out onto the western side of the Sittaung River in order to threaten three important routes linking Yangon to Naypyidaw and Mandalay: the railway, the old highway, and the new highway further to the west. In the last three months, resistance forces have carried out multiple ambushes near to the railway and old highway. The regime’s hold on the new highway, however, remains relatively secure for now.
Some of the more notable fighting has occurred outside the towns of Kyauktaga and Nyaunglebin, where the river nears the old road and railway. Yet resistance forces will need to overcome several significant obstacles if they are to expand operations further west beyond the Sittaung River. The Karen Hills, which are dominated by the KNU, are an important supply base and launching pad for attacks along the eastern side of the valley. To threaten the new highway in the west, coalition forces will need to establish a firmer foothold in the Bago Mountains or risk overstretching their supply lines. Resistance activities in the Bago Mountains appear limited for the time being.
Despite a growing number of ambushes and acts of sabotage, the regime’s strengths in air and artillery will likely prevent resistance forces from consolidating control over any exposed segment of the transport corridor. Since the coup, a similar contest over the Asia Highway 1 in Kayin and Mon states has involved numerous resistance disruptions to commerce and logistics, sometimes for weeks at a time. However, the regime has consistently proven itself able to repel major offensives, repair damaged segments of the road, and resume the flow of troops and traffic. Moreover, attacks on infrastructure are costly for resistance forces and their civilian supporters who also rely on the same roads and bridges used by the regime. A limited contest along transport routes in Bago is likely to continue, especially in the southeastern portion of the Sittaung Valley.
Kayah State resistance maintains operational tempo despite regime onslaught
An ongoing battle that began in March this year continued unabated in Kayah State, where the regime and a coalition of Karenni resistance outfits are vying for control over key lines of communication. In late May, regime forces adopted a blockade strategy by seizing control of the main junctions and roads along the border between Kayah and Shan states. On 13 June, however, a sizeable faction of soldiers from the regime-aligned Karenni border guard forces defected before launching attacks alongside resistance units in the state’s southeast. The mutiny forced the regime to dispatch additional units southward in an ongoing attempt to regain control of Mese town and its surrounding positions.
Karenni fighters have attempted to halt the regime’s reinforcements with frequent ambushes, especially along the road between Demoso and Hpruso, the state’s second- and third-largest towns. In August, regime units seized several key villages along the route in an effort to secure safe passage for a convoy, reportedly comprising between 80 and 120 trucks. Karenni units responded with surprise attacks behind the enemy’s frontlines in early September, inflicting losses on the regime. In a recent interview, Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) chair Khun Bedu admitted that his forces could not stop the regime’s advances due to heavy air and artillery strikes. Though they struggle to consolidate their gains, Karenni fighters remain able to manoeuvre throughout the theatre and continually contest the state’s key sites, preventing the regime from establishing a secure frontline outside urban areas. Both sides have suffered significant casualties in the last two months.
The Karenni resistance is possibly the most formidable of any movement to have emerged after the 2021 coup. Their success is drawn from a number of factors, including effective coordination among various outfits, a good degree of shared political vision, and strong leadership from field commanders. The Karenni coalition is also well-equipped, making it possible for its motivated fighters to maintain a high tempo of attacks against the regime. The ongoing battle involves some of the fiercest combat of the last two decades and is likely to continue indefinitely, with both sides stubbornly committed to the fight despite the mounting costs in lives and materiel. The conflict is driving a major humanitarian crisis, with as much as 75% of the state’s population displaced..."
Source/publisher:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Date of publication:
2023-09-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations
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"Findings from an online survey suggest establishing direct cooperation with Ethnic Armed Organisations can potentially foster trust towards the National Unity Government, and contribute to a more inclusive and stable political future of Myanmar.
AUTHORS
Jiwon KimPhD Candidate, Stanford University
Since the 2021 military coup, politics in Myanmar has been increasingly tumultuous. The disorder has been especially pronounced in the ethnic minority areas where multiple political authorities were already fighting for control over the population. On top of the conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) fighting for self-determination, the rise of the pro-democracy movement led by the National Unity Government (NUG) has added another dimension to conflict in the country.
Against this backdrop, it is interesting to see where the ethnic minority communities will stand amidst this political upheaval. While some have joined the pro-democracy resistance, others have remained more neutral. It is crucial whether ethnic minority people would support and trust the new national political actor (NUG) as they assess whether it will truly represent their interests, or be another project led by the largest ethnic minority, Bamar?
One key factor that differentiates the ethnic minority areas of Myanmar from the rest of the country is the presence of over twenty different EAOs. They not only ensure security but also provide social services like education, healthcare, and dispute resolution. This raises the question of whether exposure to EAO governance influences one’s perception of other political actors, particularly among ethnic minorities.
To investigate this, an online survey targeting ethnic minority areas of Myanmar was run and Facebook advertisements were leveraged to recruit respondents. By providing translations into Burmese and six minority languages, the survey was able to collect 1,113 respondents from 35 different ethnic groups. They were asked whether they thought the NUG would care for the interests of their ethnic group, and how much they have experienced or heard of various governance activities by the EAO they have the most exposure to.....A high level of trust in NUG among ethnic minority communities.....Results of the survey show that in general, trust for the NUG is high among ethnic minority communities. 69% of all the respondents said they trusted the NUG and 79% said the NUG would be effective in providing social services to their ethnic group’s area.
People were also mostly confident that the NUG would prioritise the interests of their ethnic group or ethnic minorities in general. Around 70% believed the NUG would advocate for their ethnic group’s interests, while 49% said the NUG would ensure representation of their ethnic group’s people in positions of power. Additionally, 51% felt they would prioritise the interests of Bamar and ethnic minority people equally.....Positive and negative EAO governance experiences influence trust in ethnic minority areas.....There is a moderate level of exposure to governance provided by ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in ethnic minority areas. About 33-38% of respondents said they had either directly experienced or know someone who had experienced their EAO providing education and medical care, solving community problems, and dealing with crimes and drugs. When considering those who had only heard about these activities, the rate was as high as 71-79%.
Exposure to negative governance activities including taxation, forcible recruitment, engaging in business with the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), and violence against civilians was much lower in general. Although among respondents, 30% had directly or indirectly experienced taxation, direct or indirect exposure to other activities ranged from 8-15%.
A significant correlation was found between exposure to EAO governance and trust in the EAOs. Greater exposure to positive governance activities resulted in higher trust for the EAOs, while those with more negative exposure had lower trust for the EAOs. These relationships remained true even after accounting for respondents’ strength of ethnic identity, exposure to violence by Myanmar military, and ethno-political beliefs.....Notes: The distribution of responses varies based on the level of exposure, with the majority of respondents reporting the lowest exposure levels (0 and 1). The majority of respondents reported exposure to governance related to education, medical services, and community issue resolution.
Reliance on EAOs for social services may challenge the widespread popularity of the NUG in Myanmar
The survey shows that EAO governance affects trust not only for the EAOs themselves, but also for the NUG. More exposure to positive EAO governance is associated with slightly lower trust in the NUG, as long as the EAO is not perceived as explicitly supportive of the NUG. When respondents believed that their EAO as neutral towards the NUG, then an increase in average exposure score from 0 (never heard) to 3 (experienced firsthand) moves their average perception of the NUG from 5 (somewhat positive) to 4 (neither positive nor negative). This is true even after accounting for factors such as respondent’s exposure to NUG governance, belief in democracy, strength of ethnic identity, and other demographic variables.
This is a significant result considering the near universal popularity of the NUG in Myanmar. It indicates that those accustomed to receiving social services and governance from EAOs are less likely to trust that the NUG would prioritise their ethnic group’s interest if it assumes control of the country.
Figure 2: Positive EAO governance, EAO stance on NUG, and NUG perceptions.....Notes: This figure illustrates the relationship between positive EAO governance and perceptions of the NUG among respondents, showing that increased exposure to positive EAO governance is associated with lower perceptions of the NUG. This relationship is most pronounced when the EAO's stance somewhat opposes the NUG. Conversely, when the EAO's stance somewhat supports the NUG, greater exposure to positive EAO governance leads to slightly higher perceptions of the NUG.
Implications for Myanmar politics
The study’s findings suggest that EAOs are important political actors with significant influence and enjoy a high level of trust among the ethnic minority population. Recognised as major providers of governance and social service providers as well as protectors of ethnic minority interests over many decades, they should be actively included in political dialogues and decision-making processes.
The study also suggests that the NUG would benefit from direct cooperation with the EAOs in order to build trust among ethnic minority populations. Once an EAO is in direct collaboration with the NUG, governance provision by the EAO does not negatively undermine trust in the NUG. Building a cooperative relationship with EAOs would enable the NUG to more easily gain the trust of the ethnic minority communities..."
Source/publisher:
International Growth Centre
Date of publication:
2023-09-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"After several failed attempts in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, Bangladesh and Myanmar recently announced a pilot initiative for the repatriation of Rohingyas. Myanmar scheduled a tour to Rakhine for the ambassadors or consul generals of 11 countries, including Bangladesh, India, China, and eight ASEAN members, in early March 2023, to review the situation there. The envoys noted that Rakhine has a secure security environment now. The repatriation process should now begin.
Following the Ambassador's visit, a commission from Myanmar's military junta visited Bangladesh to evaluate potential repatriation candidates. As part of this pilot initiative, Myanmar confirmed a list of over 1,000 Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh who may be returning soon. On May 5, a 20-person Rohingya delegation from Bangladesh visited Rakhine to examine the situation and urge other Rohingya into voluntary return as part of a confidence-building campaign.
Deng Xijun, China's Special Envoy for Asian Affairs, visited Myanmar twice before visiting Dhaka in July. He reassured Bangladesh that Myanmar had now agreed to return the Rohingyas to North Mangdaw in Rakhine. He explained that the Rohingyas would initially live in temporary camps following their repatriation. They would later build their homes there with voluntary labor. Myanmar will pay the Rohingyas for this.
Unfortunately, certain Western countries and right-wing organizations have continued to advocate for the suspension of this pilot project, claiming that democracy is required for any repatriation and that the current political atmosphere makes it difficult for Rohingyas to return. "Those who keep claiming that the situation in Myanmar is "not favorable" to repatriation have rarely visited Rakhine," Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen responded. "It's bizarre. They also did not address whether the circumstances in Cox's Bazar is conducive to the displaced people living a dignified life. This is a question they must answer for themselves.
Coups, military rule, ethnic conflicts etc. have been the history of Myanmar, so does the persecution on Rohingyas. The unrest was sparked mostly by religious and socioeconomic divisions between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. During World War II in Burma, Rohingya Muslims allied with the British and promised a Muslim state in exchange fought against Rakhine Buddhists aligned with the Japanese. Following the country's independence in 1948, the newly established union government of the largely Buddhist country denied the citizenship of the Rohingyas, subjecting them to widespread and systematic discrimination. Many worldwide academics, analysts, and political figures, including South African anti-apartheid crusader Desmond Tutu, have linked it to apartheid.
Burmese authorities became increasingly antagonistic to the Rohingyas during Ne Win's military reign, enacting measures that denied them citizenship. The persecution of the Rohingyas thus went beyond all bounds. Violent, large-scale crackdowns against Rohingya, such as Operation King Dragon in 1978 and Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation in 1991, drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into Bangladesh. When the Burmese Citizenship Law was passed on October 15, 1982, Rohingya Muslims in the nation were legally unrecognized and denied Burmese citizenship.
To summarize, Myanmar has never had a truly democratic environment devoid of military intervention. As a result, some actors' assertion that "democracy is a prerequisite before any repatriation" is only a purposeful disregard of Myanmar's past.
However, triangular attempts with China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar persist. On September 4, a high-level team from South Asia and Southeast Asia, led by Bangladesh's ambassador to Myanmar, visited Rakhine to discover what steps have been taken to restore trust and give protection to the Rohingyas. Ko Ko Hliang, a union minister and the committee's vice-chair-1 for Rakhine State stability, peace, and development, informed and directed the delegate. The delegate, according to sources, was happy with Myanmar's conduct.
Chinese Special Envoy for Asian Affairs Deng Xijun informed that, 'Myanmar agreed to settle the Rohingyas in their original villages- a demand that the Rohingyas had been making in response to Myanmar's earlier plan of resettling Rohingyas in camps or model villages. Several voluntary organizations including 'Asian Coordination Centre for Humanitarian Assistance' and UNHCR will be engaged during the repatriation process.' All technical issues have been discussed. Myanmar has confirmed identity of 2087 Rohingyas already. Repatriation of the first batch may begin within months. 100 refugees could be sent home every day."
Since the beginning of the crisis in 2017, this can be considered a breakthrough. Every stakeholder should back the endeavor. We should keep in mind that the Rohingya issue appears to be taking a back seat to other global crises in 2022 and 2023, including the Russia-Ukraine war. Because of the huge political attention in, and donor pledges for, Ukraine, there is a donor scarcity for Rohingyas. Bangladesh, the host country, has received little more than 50% of the required cash in 2022, while donors gave only 60% of the required funding in 2020, down from approximately 72% to 75% two years earlier. As of mid-August, the 2023 Appeal, which asked USD 876 million, was only about 28.9% financed, rendering Rohingya refugees particularly vulnerable this year.
Second, because the Rohingya refugees lack viable economic options, the nearby Rohingya camps may become havens for criminal activity, putting the security of the entire region at risk. The recruitment of refugees by extremist networks is raising increasing concern since it may feed unrest not only in Bangladesh but also throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
Third, around 30,000 Rohingya infants are born in refugee camps in Bangladesh each year on average. As a result, the Rohingya population has risen to around 1.2 million. A new generation of Rohingya children is growing up without a sense of belonging, exacerbating the catastrophe.
Fourth, the security situation for Muslims in Rakhine is better than it has ever been. Living conditions, health care, and education have all improved. The number of Muslim-specific educational institutions has grown. After a nine-year hiatus, Sittwe University welcomed 200 Muslim students last year. This year, a large number of Muslim students were accepted. Muslims, too, have access to medical treatment. The Junta government is providing a 'National Verification Card (NVC)' to returnees. Junta's willingness to resolve the situation appears to be improving. Except for Rakhine State, the country has been plagued by severe conflicts between the regime and ethnic groups. Rakhine State is presently better than it has ever been.
In such circumstances, without a doubt, the repatriation procedure should begin immediately. The world community has a primary humanitarian duty to assist the Rohingyas. Though the decades-long antagonism between Rohingya communities and the Myanmar government is unlikely to be erased quickly, the ASEAN, the United Nations, and global and regional entities can all play vital roles in fostering trust between them.
The international community should send a clear statement that "we are watching the situation in Myanmar, as well as the conduct of the Myanmar Junta towards the Rohingyas." If we can input this and act on it, the ice of mistrust will slowly but surely melt. "The returnee Rohingyas will not be abandoned; they will be observed and their security condition will be monitored"- such a message should be delivered by global actors.
Nobody should attempt to prevent test repatriation. Such mock repatriation will help to identify the issues before embarking on a large-scale repatriation move. This will aid in the development of better planning prior to the start of a full-scale repatriation. This is a litmus test for the international community, right-wing organizations, global actors, and Myanmar parts that must pass with flying colors..."
Source/publisher:
"The Daily Observer" (Bangladesh)
Date of publication:
2023-09-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Internal displacement/forced migration of Rohingyas, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
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"The ASEAN summit is important for Southeast Asia because it engages with other states in the region. Over the years, the ASEAN summit decisions have fostered economic growth and development in the region, which has a combined population of over 650 million and a GDP of over $3 trillion. With that, the 2023 ASEAN Summit was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on September 5-7, 2023, under the theme “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth”. At this summit, ASEAN countries expanded their economic opportunities and partnerships.
However, the 2023 ASEAN summit was quite different from the previous one. During the 2023 summit, ASEAN countries showed concern about the civil strife and human rights violations in Myanmar. This was also the first time that ASEAN countries have combined to put diplomatic pressure on Myanmar’s junta. Indonesia has been the most active and vocal ASEAN member in addressing the Myanmar crisis. It proposed and hosted the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in April 2021, where the Five-Point Consensus was adopted. Indonesia urged the junta to stop the violence, release political prisoners, and engage in dialogue with all parties. It has also expressed support for a global arms embargo on Myanmar.
Malaysia has also been outspoken in criticizing the junta and calling for a peaceful resolution. It has also advocated for the protection of Rohingya refugees, who have fled from Myanmar to Malaysia and other countries. Singapore has taken a more pragmatic and balanced approach to the Myanmar crisis. Singapore has maintained its economic ties with Myanmar but has also suspended some military cooperation and imposed targeted sanctions on some junta officials. The Philippines has suspended defense engagements with Myanmar but has not imposed any sanctions or cut off trade relations.
Thailand has been more sympathetic and accommodating to the junta due to its close ties and shared interests with Myanmar. It has refrained from condemning the coup or calling it a coup and instead emphasized the need for stability and non-interference. It has also hosted an informal meeting with some ASEAN members and the junta’s foreign minister, which was seen as undermining ASEAN’s unity and credibility. Cambodia has also been supportive of the junta, citing its respect for Myanmar’s sovereignty. It has opposed any foreign intervention or pressure on Myanmar and called for dialogue within the framework of ASEAN. Laos has been relatively silent and passive in the Myanmar crisis, following its policy of neutrality.
Vietnam has taken a cautious and moderate position on the Myanmar crisis, balancing its interests and principles. It has also supported ASEAN’s role in finding a peaceful solution but has not interfered in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
The ASEAN 2023 summit was an important event for Myanmar, as it was the first time that the bloc discussed the situation in the country since the military coup in February 2021. However, the summit did not result in any significant breakthroughs or pressure on the junta to stop the violence and restore democracy. ASEAN operates on the principle of consensus, which means that all 10 member states have to agree on any decision or action.
ASEAN also adheres to the principle of non-interference, which means that it respects the sovereignty and internal affairs of each member state. This limits ASEAN’s ability to intervene in Myanmar’s crisis, as it does not want to be seen as meddling or imposing its will on Myanmar. ASEAN has no enforcement mechanism or sanctions power to compel Myanmar to comply with its demands or recommendations. The only leverage that ASEAN has is its moral authority and diplomatic influence, which are not enough to sway the junta, which has shown little regard for international opinion or pressure. ASEAN faces competition from other actors, such as China, India, Japan, and the United States, who have their interests and agendas in Myanmar. These actors may undermine ASEAN’s efforts by pursuing bilateral engagements with the junta or offering incentives or alternatives that are more appealing to Myanmar.
Currently, the trade value of Myanmar’s trade with the ASEAN countries has exceeded $10.3 billion in the nine months until December of the 2022–2023 fiscal year, according to the country’s Ministry of Commerce. Major ASEAN countries are Myanmar’s major trading partners, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The main export items are agricultural and fishery products and minerals. Myanmar’s trade with Indonesia recorded an estimated value of over $936.5 million, with Vietnam at over $609.47 million, the Philippines at over $122.74 million, Cambodia at over $25.7 million, trade with Laos at over $1.3 million, and Brunei at over $0.31 million. Therefore, it is unlikely that ASEAN can pressure Myanmar to stop the civil war with the junta government unless there is a significant change in the economic dynamics within Myanmar or among ASEAN members. ASEAN’s role may be more effective in facilitating dialogue and humanitarian assistance than imposing solutions or sanctions.
The inaction of ASEAN 2023 towards Myanmar has further complicated the situation for Rohingyas. The Rohingyas have endured decades of persecution and displacement at the hands of the military and are in a dire situation in Myanmar. The Rohingya have faced several waves of violence and ethnic cleansing by the Myanmar army and local mobs, especially since 2017, which have killed thousands and forced hundreds of thousands to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. The Rohingya who remain in Myanmar are confined to camps or villages, where they face severe restrictions on their movement, livelihoods, health care, and education. The Rohingya have received little support or protection from the international community, which has failed to hold the Myanmar authorities accountable for their crimes against humanity and genocide.
The 2021 military coup has further worsened the situation, as the junta has cracked down on all forms of dissent and opposition across the country. Therefore, the Rohingya people are in a desperate and hopeless situation, with no prospects of returning to their homes or obtaining justice. They are trapped in a cycle of violence, displacement, and deprivation, with no end in sight.
However, Myanmar has rejected the ASEAN 2023 summit statement condemning violence as one-sided. The junta claimed that the statement was not objective and biased, and it seized power in a coup in February 2021. Myanmar also complained that it was not represented at the ASEAN summit. Myanmar accused ASEAN nations of interfering in its internal affairs and ignoring its views and voices. Myanmar has further withdrawn from its scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN in 2026, which is a blow to its international legitimacy. Therefore, it is unlikely that ASEAN can address the issue of Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar effectively unless there is a significant change in the political dynamics within Myanmar or among ASEAN members. However, this also depends on the willingness and cooperation of the junta and other stakeholders in Myanmar.
In conclusion, ASEAN has no enforcement mechanism or sanctions power to compel Myanmar to comply with its demands or recommendations. The only leverage that ASEAN has is its moral authority and diplomatic influence, which are not enough to sway the junta, which has shown little regard for international opinion or pressure..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of publication:
2023-09-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
In new book, Australian economist Sean Turnell talks about his prison experience.
Description:
"Australian economist Sean Turnell was an economic policy advisor to Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 when the country’s military ousted the democratically elected government in a coup and installed the State Administration Council or SAC, led by Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.
Five days later he was arrested on charges of espionage and he spent the next 650 days – or about one year and nine months – in detention, mostly in horrible conditions in Yangon’s Insein Prison.
In his soon-to-be released book ‘An Unlikely Prisoner: How an eternal optimist found hope in Myanmar's most notorious jail,’ Turnell tells the story of his time behind bars.
He told RFA Burmese that although it is a story of great sadness, it is also one of courage for other prisoners jailed by the junta, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, who he calls ‘Daw Suu,’ a term of respect for women. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: What was your motivation for writing this book?
Turnell: Well, it was something that I always intended to do. In fact, I wrote most of the book in my head during the time I was in prison.
On many days, of course, I didn't really have much to do, so part of my pacing up and down the cells, I'd be trying to think of things to think about. And part of it was writing this book.
So probably about one third of it was written inside my head before I even got out. As soon as I got back, it was a relatively easy process of then converting all the thoughts up here [in my head] onto paper.
RFA: Can you discuss how much of the book deals with your time in prison, and before and after the coup?
Turnell: About two thirds of the book is all about the experience post-coup. So I detailed my experiences on the day of the coup itself and then my subsequent arrest five days later, and then the next 650 days in Yangon’s Insein Prison, and then up in Napyitaw and then back to Insein and the court and meeting Daw Suu in the court and all of that.
So that's the bulk of the book. But I have a section there on … background … Why was I there? And how was I involved at all in the NLD government? The basic background to the reforms, things like that, how those reforms increasingly ran up against the military and the difficulties, things like that.
But most of it is a memoir about post-coup, but I've got a section there about Myanmar before the coup and some of the reforms that we were trying to do.
RFA: Is there any subject that you avoid in the book? Was there at any time that you had to pledge to the junta not to write about as a condition of your release? Was there anything like that in your release agreement?
Turnell: Oh, no. I made no pledge at all. None at all. I wondered whether they would ask me to do something like that. But they never, ever did. I never signed anything. In fact, I was very, very careful about that. On the very last day, as I was being released, we were wondering about exactly that. So, yeah. So I made no pledges, no promises to them whatsoever and wouldn't have done so. I hasten to add, I would not have signed anything if it was put in front of me.
But since coming out, you know, I exercised my right as an Australian citizen, of course, back in Australia, which has complete freedom of speech. I was very vocal in talking about my situation and all that.
I don't think – I mean, obviously I'm subjective in this issue – but I don't think I've been at all unfair or unreasonable in my comments about the regime or the conditions under which they held me and the nature of the trial and all the rest of it.
I think any sort of objective account on any of those things would be identical to mine, would be my view. But obviously Myanmar now under the SAC regime is not a place where freedom of speech is welcome. So I’m to some extent not surprised that they've had a negative reaction to it. But it certainly didn't involve any pledge or anything like that.
RFA: What are some of the most powerful memories from your time in prison that you talk about in this book?
Turnell: Many memorable times. I think some really bad stuff. I think, hearing about the death of my friend Khin Maung Shwe or Yacob, as he was always to me, a wonderful man who protected me, was just a dear friend. I met him in the first six months when I was in Insein Prison, where again, he sort of held me and looked after me. I then went up to Naypyitaw Prison for a whole year as the trial went on, and I never found out about him at all until I was sent back to Insein after the trial. And I heard that he'd been murdered in the prison and that that was a real low moment. But certainly, you know, as I say, it's one that is very much in my head.
Other than that, you know, I remember all the horrible stuff, the terrible cell, the terrible food, the awfulness of prison transfers. And I noticed reading some of the reporting on Myanmar, the internal media, that people like your organization have taken up the issue of transporting prisoners. And just to add my voice to that, it really is terrible. Some of the worst moments I experienced were being transported between the prison and the court and between different prisons, et. cetera. So I certainly remember all that.
But I remember again, some of the good things, the incredible conversations that I had with some wonderful Burmese colleagues and so on. I remember the compassion that they showed me. I remember, you know, some funny issues. And yes, It’s a real mixed bag and a mixture of horror, but a mixture of really good things that not only gladdened my heart whenever I think about Myanmar and its people, but even about human nature.
One of the things that struck me is that while some people behave badly under pressure, a great many more people and certainly many Myanmar people behave superbly under pressure. And I was the beneficiary of that.
RFA: Is there any person or individual that you would like to dedicate this book to?
Turnell: I'm dedicating it to my wife, who just championed me from the get go. You know, she knew what was happening on the first day, she was there the last day. And she just ran a massive campaign from here in Sydney. And she reached out to everyone to not only all the political leadership here in Australia, but even to people like Hun Sen in Cambodia. She wrote letters to Min Aung Hlaing’s wife. She tried to rope in the U.S. president. She got the king of England, Charles III, involved. She got everyone involved. It was the most incredible thing.
So it was a no-brainer as to who I dedicate it to. But beyond her were my father, Peter, my sister Lisa, my nephews, my daughter, all of them were just, you know, just superb and then, you know, to the Myanmar people as well as other development friends and people from Australian foreign affairs and so on. But my Myanmar friends were very much in my thoughts beyond my sort of immediate family.
In terms of the structure of the book, I begin with the sort of drama of the arrest, the early interrogation, a terrible two months I experienced in something that I just called “the box,” which was just a room that I was locked into for two months in complete isolation. And the worst treatment that I had was at that period.
Then I have another chapter on being released into Insein Prison and spent a lot of time just talking about that, the conditions, describing it, because it's a most extraordinary place, particularly, I think, for people outside Myanmar. It would be very hard, I think, to visualize just just what inside is like. And a lot there obviously, again, about some great Myanmar friends.
Then, a big section once we go up to Naypyitaw, the awful conditions there in the Naypyitaw detention center was in many ways even worse than Insein.
Then the trial, the absurdity of the trial and the absurdity of the charges against me and against my friends.
Notes about Daw Suu, of course, who it was a great honor to work alongside before the coup. It was a great honor just to see how fantastic she was in the court in the prison. She remains as far as I know, but certainly to my experience, which was only a year ago, undaunted, full of courage, compassion, again, just raw intelligence, the way that it just shows out, the very courteous way that she treated the people who were persecuting her. She was just an inspiration. And so I spend a lot of time talking about that, just how she kept the spirits of myself up, and everyone else up. I never saw her waver or weaken anyway. So, you know, I certainly deal with that.
And then, the absurdity of the trial, the darkest moments immediately after that, transporting back to Insein is then the final thing where I was put amongst the death row prisoners, which was terribly depressing and inspiring as well, because again, even those people in a desperate, desperate situation, they were also incredibly generous and great friends to me. So that's sort of the second last section. And then I have finally the day in which I was told I was going home and the drama of going home and the incredible feeling and lift of going home.
And then finally, just some of the events that I detail a little bit, how the regime became upset when I had the temerity just to say that I wasn't treated that well by them and a little bit on that as well. But overall, it's an uplifting story in many ways, even though along the way, unfortunately, I have to tell the terribly sad story for so many people in Myanmar.
RFA: What kind of impact do you expect to make with this book?
Turnell: Above all, I would like the world to pay attention to what's going on in Myanmar. As we who are interested in Myanmar know, the situation is desperate, and it doesn't give it enough attention. The world's eyes, very rightly, are on Ukraine, but Myanmar deserves attention as well. It's a terrible situation. The people need help. They deserve help. And so if the book can do anything at all, it would be to help draw attention to that.
RFA: Do you have any messages for Aung San Suu Kyi and your other friends in Myanmar?
Turnell: My message to both Daw Suu and my specific friends in Myanmar, but also people just generally is a big thank you. I love the place and still do.
I was asked and I spoke to the media about this when I got released. A leading immigration official told me just as I was getting on the plane, he said, “Sean, please don't hate Myanmar.”
And it was an odd moment because he just spent minutes beforehand giving me a lecture about how I would never be allowed back, et cetera. But then he sort of changed his whole demeanor and again just said, “Please don't hate Myanmar.”
And I said back to him, “I could never hate Myanmar.”
And again, for all the reasons that I've described here about just the love and compassion, the courage … that I witnessed all around me. So, yes, I have a very soft spot for Myanmar. I desperately hope to get back there one day, but that's not going to happen until we get dramatic political change.
That, of course, is a very minor thing compared to the overall story of what the people in Myanmar are going through. Just to get that message and a big thank you across to them and to say to them that even though Myanmar is not getting the attention it deserves, and that's part of the book, but nonetheless, there are millions of people around the world who do follow events in Myanmar and who do care about what's happening.
RFA: What about the regime? Do you have anything to say to Min Aung Hlaing and other regime leaders?
Well, I would say to them to put their country first. To put the people of Myanmar first. Stop being so defensive, selfish. I mean, I could go on and I won't bother doing that, but I mean that very clearly. These are people who don't have the country's interests at heart.
Perhaps some of them might have second thoughts. I like to think that probably not at the very top, but that there must be people, smart people, and for whatever reason, might be caught up in that regime who might just think, “This is terrible, we've got to stop this. This is enough.”
I'm hopeful that that's the case. It's obviously very hard to know, but you just can't help but feel there must be people who look at the economy, look at the dreadful state of the country and just think, “We can't do this. We've got to stop.”
And so to those people, I would encourage them to do so..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-09-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, issues this brief statement on its human rights commitments.
In March 2022, the National Unity Government circulated a report to Geneva delegations that provided Myanmar’s replies and voluntary commitments following its third cycle UPR examination. We stand by these commitments, which included formally abolishing the death penalty, ratifying all international human rights treaties and their optional protocols, cooperating with the International Court of Justice in The Gambia v. Myanmar case, and increasing women’s political representation and decision-making at all levels.
The National Unity Government continues to extend its full cooperation to the Human Rights Council and its mandates. We support and actively engage with the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and we have issued a standing invitation to Special Procedures mandate-holders. We remain committed to implementing relevant recommendations of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar.
The National Unity Government regularly submits information to OHCHR to inform its crucial investigations and reports on Myanmar’s dire human rights situation. We will work with the Office to set up a country presence in Myanmar.
The National Unity Government is committed to delivering justice to survivors of historic and continuing military atrocities. We pledge our cooperation with international, regional and national accountability mechanisms, particularly countries exercising universal jurisdiction. This builds on our article 12(3) declaration to the International Criminal Court in 2021, which accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in Myanmar going back to 1 July 2002.
We also continue to partner with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, submitting information and identifying witnesses to provide testimony in safe and secure ways. We strongly support the IIMM’s efforts to hold the military accountable for its atrocity campaigns against the Rohingya, and we are ready to explore the IIMM’s access to Myanmar to facilitate on the ground investigations into the military junta’s widespread crimes.
The National Unity Government, acting on its ‘Policy Position on the Rohingya’, is committed to creating the conditions needed to bring the Rohingya and other displaced communities home in voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable ways. A Rohingya leader now serves as Deputy Minister of Human Rights to ensure that Rohingya perspectives inform and support the development of government policies and programs.
Furthermore, we are working with the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw on legislative change to ensure the equal treatment and protection of all communities, including ethnic and religious minorities. This will see the replacement of the Citizenship Law of 1982 with a new law that bases citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens, the abolition of the National Verification Card process, and the repeal of the Race and Religion Protection Laws of 2015. We will also introduce laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.
Myanmar’s Federal Democracy Charter promises an inclusive nation founded on peace, justice, equality, human rights and the protection of minorities. We urge the international community to support us in delivering it to our people..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက ကိုယ်စားပြုသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံ တော်၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရပ်တည်ချက်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လတွင် တတိယအကြိမ် နိုင်ငံ အားလုံးအလှည့်ကျ အစီရင်ခံသုံးသပ်ခြင်း (Universal Periodic Review) အတွက် အစီရင်ခံ စာကိုထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တုံ့ပြန်ချက်များနှင့် ရပ်တည်ချက်များကို ဂျီနီဗာမြို့ရှိ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအား အသိပေးအကြောင်းကြားခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ သေဒဏ်ကို တရားဝင် ဖျက်သိမ်းမှု၊ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးသဘောတူစာချုပ်များနှင့် နောက်ဆက်တွဲစာ ချုပ်များကို အတည်ပြုလက်မှတ်ထိုးမှုနှင့် ဂမ်ဘီယာ-မြန်မာ အမှုကိစ္စရပ်တွင် အပြည်ပြည် ဆိုင်ရာတရားစီရင်ရေးရုံးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှု၊ အဆင့်အားလုံးတွင် အမျိုးသမီးများ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကိုယ်စားပြုခြင်းနှင့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ချခြင်းတို့ တိုးမြင့်လာစေမှုများပါဝင်သော ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များအတိုင်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ရပ်တည်ပါသည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့် အာဏာအပ်နှင်းထားမှုများနှင့် အပြည့်အဝ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုကို ဆက်လက်တိုးမြှင့် ဆောင်ရွက်နေပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး အရာရှိ ခန့်အပ်ထားမှုကို အားပေးထောက်ခံပြီး ၎င်းနှင့်လည်း တက်တက်ကြွကြွ ပူးပေါင်း လုပ်ဆောင် လျက်ရှိသည်။ အထူးလုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်း လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အာဏာ အပ်နှင်းခံထားရသော သူများအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့လာရောက်ရန် ဖိတ်ခေါ်မှုကို ထုတ်ပြန်ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ သီးခြားလွတ်လပ်သော အချက်အလက်စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးယန္တရားက ထုတ်ပြန် ထားသည့် အကြံပြုချက်များကိုလည်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားလျက် ရှိသည်။
၄။ ထို့အပြင်အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာ မင်းကြီးရုံး (OHCHR)ထံသို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ချွတ်ခြုံကျနေသော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အရေးပါလှသည့် စုံစမ်းမှုများနှင့် အစီရင်ခံစာများကို ပုံမှန်တင်သွင်းလျက်ရှိပါ သည်။ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးအနေနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း လက်လှမ်းမှီနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ လက်တွဲလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ဆက်လက်ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော စစ်တပ်၏ သမိုင်းဝင် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကြားမှ အသက်ရှင်လွတ်မြောက်သူများကို တရားမျှတမှုဖော် ဆောင်ပေးရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ထားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ၊ ဒေသဆိုင်ရာနှင့် နိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ တာဝန်ခံမှု ယန္တရားများ (အထူးသဖြင့် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကျင့်သုံးသော နိုင်ငံများ)နှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် ကတိပြုထားပါသည်။ ၂၀၀၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်မှုတရားရုံး (International Criminal Court)သို့ ပေးပို့ခဲ့သော အပိုဒ်ခွဲ ၁၂(၃) ကြေညာချက်တွင် ထိုရာဇဝတ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ တရားရုံးအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၀၂ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအပေါ် တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို လက်ခံကြောင်းး အကြောင်းကြားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၆။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် လုံခြုံစိတ်ချရသော နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် သက်သေခံချက်ကို ပေးစွမ်းနိုင် ရန်အတွက် အချက်အလက်များကိုတင်သွင်းပြီး သက်သေများကို သတ်မှတ်ကာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အတွက် သီးခြားလွတ်လပ်သော စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးယန္တရားအဖွဲ့ (IIMM)နှင့် လက်တွဲလုပ် ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်စွာ ကျူးလွန်နေမှု များအတွက် စစ်တပ်ကို တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိစေရန်အတွက် ယန္တရား၏ အားထုတ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေမှု များကို ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ အပြည့်အဝထောက်ခံပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံအနှံ့အပြားတွင် စစ်တပ်က ကျူးလွန် လျက်ရှိသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို မြေပြင်ကျကျ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုပြုရန် ယန္တရား၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အတွင်း လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုအတွက် နည်းလမ်းရှာဖွေဖော်ဆောင်ရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အသင့်ရှိပါသည်။
၇။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ချမှတ်ထားသော “ရိုဟင်ဂျာအပေါ် မူဝါဒရပ်တည် ချက်” အတိုင်း လုပ်ဆောင်ရင်း ရိုဟင်ဂျာနှင့် အခြားအိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာသူများကို မိမိသဘော အလျောက် လုံခြုံပြီးဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိသည့် ရေရှည်နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် နေရပ်ပြန်လာနိုင်ရေး လိုအပ် သောအခြေအနေများကို ဖန်တီးရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ထားပါသည်။ အစိုးရမူဝါဒများနှင့် အစီ အစဉ်များ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်လာအောင် လုပ်ဆောင်ရာတွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများ၏ အမြင် သဘောထားများ ထင်ဟပ်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အသိပေးအားပေးခြင်းများ လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် ရိုဟင်ဂျာ ခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးသည် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး အဖြစ် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၈။ ထို့အပြင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် တိုင်းရင်းသားနှင့် ဘာသာရေးလူနည်းစုများ အပါအဝင် လူ့ အသိုက်အဝန်းအားလုံးကို တန်းတူညီမျှဆက်ဆံရန်နှင့် ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပြည် ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီနှင့် လက်တွဲပြီး ဥပဒေပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ လုပ်ဆောင်နေပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားမိဘနှစ်ပါးက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း မွေး ဖွားသည့် (သို့မဟုတ်) မည်သည့်နေရာတွင်မဆို မွေးဖွားလာသည့် ကလေးသူငယ်များကို နိုင်ငံ သားဖြစ်စေခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံသားအဖြစ်အတည်ပြုမှုကဒ်လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို ဖျက်သိမ်းခြင်းနှင့် ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်မျိုးစောင့်ဥပဒေ ရုပ်သိမ်းခြင်းတို့ကို အခြေခံသော ဥပဒေအသစ်ဖြင့် ၁၉၈၂ခုနှစ် နိုင်ငံသား ဥပဒေကို အစားထိုးပါမည်။ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ တိမ်းညွတ်မှုနှင့် လိင်သတ်မှတ်ချက် တို့အပေါ် အခြေခံပြီး ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုအားတားမြစ်သော ဥပဒေများကိုလည်း ဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ် သည်။
၉။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပဋိညာဉ်စာတမ်းသည် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ တရားမျှတ မှု၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှု၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် လူနည်းစုများကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးမှုအပေါ် အခြေခံထားသော ဘက်ပေါင်းစုံပါဝင်သည့် နိုင်ငံတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်လာစေရန် ကတိပြုထားပါသည်။ ထိုအကြောင်းအရာများကို ပြည်သူများအပေါ် ပေးစွမ်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပံ့ပိုးပေးကြရန် နိုင်ငံ တကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းကို တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
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The Asean-India Summit of 2023, themed "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth," provided Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a platform to articulate his vision for strengthening India-Asean cooperation.
Description:
"While addressing various dimensions of this partnership, including digital transformation, trade, and economic engagement, Prime Minister Modi made it unequivocally clear that his paramount focus was on ensuring peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, he underscored the critical importance of addressing a pressing concern – maintaining peace and security along India's border with Myanmar. This commentary delves into how India can contribute to ensuring peace and security along its Myanmar border, thereby fostering stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Asean as a Central Pillar—India's "Act East Policy" has been central to its foreign policy approach in recent years, with Asean emerging as a pivotal partner in this endeavour. The Act East Policy aims to strengthen India's economic, strategic, and cultural ties with nations in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing the significance of the Indo-Pacific as a dynamic and vital area for India's growth and influence.
Prime Minister Modi's emphasis on peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region during the Asean-India Summit of 2023 underscores the region's growing strategic importance. The Indo-Pacific is not merely a hub of economic growth but also a theater of evolving geopolitical dynamics, marked by competing interests, territorial disputes, and emerging security challenges. In this context, ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is of paramount importance to India, with far-reaching implications for its economic interests, strategic objectives, and overall security. India's contribution to regional stability hinges on several key factors.
When considering diplomacy and strategic partnerships, it is suggested to play an active role in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, India must employ diplomatic means to forge stronger partnerships with Asean countries and other regional actors. Diplomatic engagement is the bedrock of conflict resolution, confidence-building, and creating an environment conducive to peaceful coexistence.
India's diplomatic engagement with Asean nations can serve as a cornerstone for regional stability. By fostering close ties and open lines of communication, India can facilitate dialogues, mediate disputes, and build trust among regional players. As a non-aligned nation with a history of diplomatic finesse, India is well-positioned to act as an impartial intermediary, promoting peaceful resolutions to conflicts in the Indo-Pacific.
In tandem with diplomacy, collaborative security measures are essential for deterring and addressing common security threats in the Indo-Pacific. This includes joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and the strengthening of defense ties with Asean nations. Building a robust security architecture within the region is critical to addressing emerging challenges effectively.
Engaging in joint military exercises and security drills with Asean countries can foster interoperability among armed forces and enhance the collective capacity to respond to security contingencies. Additionally, sharing intelligence and coordinating efforts can help identify and mitigate emerging threats promptly.
Territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, are significant drivers of instability in the Indo-Pacific. India can play a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms in the region. Given its non-aligned stance, India can serve as an honest broker, advocating for peaceful solutions to these disputes.
India's involvement in regional forums and multilateral organizations like the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) provides platforms for constructive dialogue and problem-solving. By actively participating in these forums, India can contribute to shaping a regional environment conducive to conflict resolution and cooperation.
While addressing border security or regional concerns, Prime Minister Modi also highlighted the critical need to ensure peace and security along India's border with Myanmar. This issue holds significant importance not only for bilateral relations but also for broader regional stability. India's approach to addressing this concern involves a multifaceted strategy.
Strengthening border infrastructure, surveillance capabilities, and patrolling along the India-Myanmar border is essential to curbing cross-border illegal activities. These activities, including smuggling and the movement of armed groups, pose security risks and hinder regional stability.
Improved border management can also facilitate better cooperation with Myanmar in addressing shared security challenges. By fortifying the border and enhancing security measures, India can deter potential threats and contribute to the stability of the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Engaging in sustained dialogue with the Myanmar government is crucial to addressing concerns and jointly working toward peace along the border. India's approach should encompass various aspects, including addressing issues related to insurgency, border demarcation, and the movement of refugees and displaced persons. By maintaining open channels of communication and diplomatic engagement with Myanmar, India can collaboratively address security challenges, foster trust, and promote regional stability.
Given the presence of insurgent groups along the India-Myanmar border, robust counterterrorism cooperation is essential. India can collaborate closely with Myanmar in intelligence sharing and coordinated efforts to combat these groups. Additionally, involving Asean countries in such counterterrorism efforts is critical, as some of these insurgent groups have transnational reach. By working collectively, India and Asean nations can effectively address this shared security concern, contributing to overall regional stability.
India can provide diplomatic support for Myanmar's internal peace process. A stable and peaceful Myanmar is not only in India's interest but also contributes to regional stability. By offering diplomatic backing, India can play a constructive role in encouraging Myanmar's efforts toward reconciliation and conflict resolution.
In a nutshell, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's emphasis on ensuring peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, as highlighted during the Asean-India Summit of 2023, underscores the critical importance of India's role in fostering stability in this dynamic and strategically significant area. India's "Act East Policy" has rightly recognized the Asean nations as central pillars in this endeavour, reflecting the region's pivotal role in India's economic growth, strategic interests, and overall security. To contribute effectively to regional stability, India must employ a multifaceted approach that combines diplomacy, collaborative security measures, and proactive engagement with its neighbours, particularly Myanmar. However, diplomacy remains the cornerstone of conflict resolution and trust-building, and India's history of diplomatic finesse positions it as an impartial intermediary in regional disputes. Collaborative security efforts, such as joint military exercises and intelligence sharing with Asean nations, are essential for addressing common security threats in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, India can play a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms in territorial disputes, like those in the South China Sea, promoting peaceful solutions.
Furthermore, India's commitment to ensuring peace and security along its border with Myanmar is not just a bilateral concern but also has far-reaching implications for regional stability. Strengthening border infrastructure, sustained dialogue, and counterterrorism cooperation are vital components of India's approach to addressing this concern. By pursuing these strategies and actively engaging with Myanmar, India can contribute to a more secure and stable Indo-Pacific region, aligning with the theme of the Asean-India Summit: "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth."..."
Source/publisher:
"The National" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-09-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 8 to 14, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Shan State, Sagaing Region, and Bago Region from September 8th to 14th. The local civilians were arrested and used as human shields in Mandalay Region and Kachin State. A woman from Mogaung was arrested, tortured, and killed under interrogation by the Junta in Kachin State. Military Junta’s navy attacked with heavy and light artillery the villages along the river in Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region including Salingyi Township and Kani Township from Sagaing Region.
About 13 civilians died and over 19 were injured by the Military Junta Soldiers’ light and heavy artillery attacks. Over 70 civilians were arrested within a week. 3 underaged children died by the Military Junta Soldiers’ Human Right Abuses and Violations..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-09-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"1.Since the unlawful coup attempt by the Myanmar military, the production and illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs in Myanmar have reached at an all-time high. The threats posed by these conducts now are higher than ever before with far-reaching adverse impacts on the neighboring countries in the form of transnational organized crimes.
2.The National Unity Government of Myanmar considers the drug abuse prevention and control as a core responsibility of the revolution since it can eliminate the existentiality of human beings.
3.The National Unity Government of Myanmar is committed to fulfilling the obligations under United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) and relevant international conventions pertaining to the illicit trafficking and eradication of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
4.The National Unity Government of Myanmar is committed to establishing essential mechanisms for the prevention and control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in accordance with the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law (1993) and its subsequent amendment in 2018. In implementing these mechanisms, the National Unity Government of Myanmar will fully collaborate with Member States of the United Nations Convention, international organizations, neighboring countries, and allied revolutionary organizations.
5.Given the importance of public participation in the prevention and control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, it is essential for individuals and communities to actively engage in these efforts in our government’s activities..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Drugs: regional and global
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Sub-title:
Civil society groups call on Canadian and UK government bodies to help ensure that MTI Energy does not uphold Chevron’s legacy of bankrolling atrocity crimes.
Description:
"September 14, 2023, Today, EarthRights International and a Myanmar civil society organization submitted a complaint to the National Contact Points of Canada and the United Kingdom asserting that Canadian company MTI is engaging in acts of corruption and contributing to human rights atrocities in Myanmar in breach of guidelines established by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The OECD Guidelines are a leading global standard used by multinational corporations worldwide to inform their human rights, anti-corruption, and environmental practices. Many governments belonging to the OECD, including Canada and the U.K., have established National Contact Points that accept complaints about breaches of the Guidelines.
The U.K. and Canada have also repeatedly raised concerns about the Myanmar military’s use of stolen natural resource revenues to fund the military’s atrocities. MTI Energy is going into business with the junta through the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, whose offices were seized by the military early in the coup.
While MTI Energy is registered in Canada, its purchase is being made through a subsidiary registered in Bermuda. Bermuda is a British Overseas Territory and implements U.K. sanctions. MTI Energy is set to take over from Chevron and become the largest shareholder in Myanmar’s Yadana gas project, which earns the junta tens of millions of dollars monthly. The company appears likely to use its substantial management powers to ensure that it and the junta can sell off Myanmar’s state assets, funding the junta’s atrocities. This leaves MTI Energy in breach of the OECD Guidelines.
“MTI Energy has not consulted with communities or civil society in Myanmar that are directly affected by their investment,” said John Doe, a representative of the civil society group, which wishes to remain anonymous for security reasons. “If they had, we’d have told them their pipeline cuts through communities torn apart by civil war, and they will be funding one side of it. The junta is not our government and is using gas revenues to rain bombs from jet planes on our communities.”
MTI Energy can only enter Myanmar’s gas sector by signing contracts with the Government of Myanmar. The United Nations General Assembly has refused to recognize the junta as the government, and Myanmar’s Ambassador to the U.N. instead answers to Myanmar’s National Unity Government.
“In January, Robert Rae, Canada’s Ambassador to the U.N., gave opening remarks during the launch of a U.N. report on why the junta is not the legitimate Government of Myanmar. MTI Energy is planning to treat the military junta as if it were the recognized government so it can profit from Myanmar’s methane gas exports,” said EarthRights Director of Strategy and Campaigns, Keith Slack.
The complaint to the OECD National Contact Points calls on MTI Energy to comply with the OECD Guidelines, including by ensuring that it can use its leverage, either alone or in cooperation with other investors, to divert gas revenues away from the junta. If it cannot, it will contribute to the junta’s atrocity crimes.
“Canada’s National Contact Point (NCP) sits in the office of Global Affairs Canada. As GAC considers whether to finally follow the EU’s lead and impose sanctions on Myanmar gas revenues, we’d hope that the NCP staff might wander down the hall and highlight that MTI Energy is entering a corrupt joint venture with Myanmar’s brutal military junta that will fund airstrikes on school and hospitals,” added Keith Slack.
Just this month, the junta targeted a school and a church in Karen state, killing four students and a teacher. “MTI Energy has completely ignored its responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines by entering into business that contributes to the junta’s atrocities. MTI has so far refused to communicate with Myanmar civil society, and I hope the OECD National Contact Points will provide an avenue for us to resolve our serious concerns about MTI’s investment. MTI’s irresponsible entry into Myanmar is enabled by the failure of the UK and Canadian governments to sanction Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise. I urge them to now take action and block gas funds to the junta,” concluded John Doe..."
Source/publisher:
Earth Rights International
Date of publication:
2023-09-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Oil and gas, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက်သမားများအဖြစ်သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာခြင်း
အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၆။ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (င)နှင့် ပုဒ်မ ၇၂။ ပုဒ်မခွဲ(ခ)ပါ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကျင့်သုံး၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ၏ သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် ဤအမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာကို ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။
၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေအရ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာထားခြင်း ခံရသည့် တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှစတင်၍ ယနေ့အထိ ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူနှင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း ၊ ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ ထောင်သွင်းအကျဉ်းချခြင်း၊ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေဖြင့် ဝယ်ယူထားသော လက်နက်ငယ်များ၊ လက်နက်ကြီးများ၊ စစ်မြေပြင်သုံးတိုက်လေယာဉ်များအား အသုံးပြု၍ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ကျေးရွာများ၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များ၊ အရပ်သားလူစုလူဝေးများအား ဗုံးကြဲ တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း ၊ လက်နက်ကြီးများနှင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း အစရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ် များနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်တစ်ခုလုံးကို ထိခိုက်စေသည့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်သည့် ပြစ်မှုများကို အကြိမ်ကြိမ် ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ပြီး ဆက်လက်၍လည်း ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန နှင့် Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) – AAPP တို့၏ စာရင်းဇယားများအရ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ၊ စက်တင်ဘာလ (၈) ရက်နေ့အထိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏အမိန့်နာခံသူများ၏ လက်ချက်ဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး လှုပ်ရှားသူနှင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၄,၀၅၆) ဦး အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ပြီး (၂၄,၇၄၀) ဦး အဖမ်းဆီး ခံခဲ့ရကာ ယင်းတို့အနက် (၁၉၄၄၇) ဦးမှာ ထောင်သွင်း အကျဉ်းချခံရဆဲဖြစ်ပြီး (၇,၂၉၉) ဦးမှာ မတရား ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရပါသည်။ ကျေးရွာ (၂၀၂၉) ရွာ၊ ရပ်ကွက် (၇၃) ခု၊ အိမ်ခြေပေါင်း (၇၅၉၂၀) ခု၊ ဆေးရုံ ဆေးခန်းများ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အဦးများ အပါအဝင်အဆောက် အဦးပေါင်း (၁၃၅) ခု တို့မှာ စစ်ကောင်စီ မှ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံထားရပြီး မီးရှို့သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရသူဦးရေ (၃၃၄) ဦးထိရှိလာသည့်အပြင် ( ၁.၉ သန်းကျော် ) ဦးမှာ စစ်ဘေး ရှောင်ဘဝဖြင့် နေရပ်၊ အိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးနေရပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် အထက်အပိုဒ် (၁) နှင့် (၂) ပါ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ် များကို ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေအထောက်အပံ့၊ ငွေကြေးစီးဆင်းမှု ၊ နိုင်ငံခြား တိုင်းပြည်များမှ လေယာဉ်ဆီအပါအဝင် လူအများအပြားသေကြေပျက်စီးနိုင်သည့် လက်နက်များဝယ်ယူခြင်း အစရှိသည်တို့တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ဝန်ထမ်းများသည် အဓိကကြံရာပါများအဖြစ် ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ဥက္ကဌဆိုသူမှစ၍ အောက်အဆင့်ဆင့် ဝန်ထမ်းကြီး၊ အလတ်၊ အငယ်များသည် အောက်ပါလုပ်ငန်းများကို ကျင့်ဝတ်နှင့် ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့်တာဝန် ဝတ္တရားများနှင့်သွေဖည်ပြီး မလျော်ဩဇာသုံး၍ ကျူးလွန်နေသောကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ကြီးမားပြင်းထန်သော ဆိုးကျိုးများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေခဲ့ပါသည်။
(က) ဗဟိုဘဏ်တစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံ၏အခြေအနေနှင့် ကိုက်ညီပြီး ပြည်တွင်း ဈေးနှုန်းတည်ငြိမ်ရေးကိုရရှိစေမည့်ငွေကြေးမူဝါဒကိုချမှတ်၍ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မှု မရှိခြင်း၊ ယင်းအစား ပြည်တွင်းသုံးငွေကြေး (မြန်မာကျပ်) အား အမြောက်အများ ရိုက်ထုတ်ခဲ့ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအတွက် အဓိကငွေကြေးထောက်တိုင်များအဖြစ် ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ခြင်း၊ ယင်း၏ အကျိုးဆက်အဖြစ် အဆမတန် ငွေကြေးဖောင်းပွမှုကြောင့် ပြည်သူများ ကုန်ဈေးနှုန်းကြီးမြင့်သည့်ဒဏ်ကို ခံစားကြရခြင်း၊
(ခ) မိမိကိုင်တွယ်ကျင့်သုံးရမည့် ဥပဒေများအား
ဥပက္ခာပြု၍ နိုင်ငံခြားငွေကြေး ဈေးကွက်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအလိုကျ ချယ်လှယ်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်ခွင့်ပြုသဖြင့် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေလဲလှယ်နှုန်း မတည်မငြိမ်ဖြစ်ပြီး မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေတန်ဘိုး အဆမတန် ကျဆင်းခြင်း၊ နောက်ဆက်တွဲအနေဖြင့် အခြေခံလူသုံးကုန်၊ ဆေးဝါး အပါအဝင် လူသုံးကုန်ပစ္စည်းများ ရှားပါးပြတ်လပ်လာခြင်း၊
(ဂ) ဗဟိုဘဏ်တစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စား စီမံခန့်ခွဲရမည့် နိုင်ငံ၏ နိုင်ငံခြားသုံးသီးသန့်ငွေများအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအတွက် နိုင်ငံခြား တိုင်းပြည်များမှ လေယာဉ်ဆီအပါအဝင် လူအများအပြား သေကြေပျက်စီးနိုင်သည့် လက်နက်များ ဝယ်ယူရာတွင်အသုံးပြုခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူပိုင်ငွေကို တလွဲ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။
၄။ အထက်ပါ လုပ်ရပ်များကို ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းသည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၃။ ပုဒ်မခွဲ(ပ) ပါ အကြမ်းဖက်သမား ဆိုသည်မှာ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတစ်ခုခုကို တိုက်ရိုက် ဖြစ်စေ၊ သွယ်ဝိုက်၍ဖြစ်စေ ဥပဒေနှင့်မညီဘဲ တစ်နည်းနည်းဖြင့်ကျူးလွန်သူ သို့မဟုတ် ကျူးလွန်ရန်အားထုတ်သူကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတွင် ကြံရာပါအဖြစ်ပါဝင်သူ သို့မဟုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကျူးလွန်ရန် အခြားသူများအားညွှန်ကြားသူ သို့မဟုတ် စည်းရုံး သိမ်းသွင်းသူကိုသော်လည်း ကောင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ဖြင့် ပါဝင် ထောက်ပံ့သူကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း ဆိုသည်ဟူသော အဓိပ္ပာယ်ဖွင့်ဆိုချက်နှင့် ကိုက်ညီလျက် ရှိကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၅။ သို့ပါ၍ အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များအား အကြမ်းဖက်သမားများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
၆။ ဤအမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်သမားများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာခြင်း ခံရသူများအား အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ၊ အခန်း(၁၄) ပါ ပြဌာန်းချက်များနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Asean has been much criticised over its failure to effectively respond to the crisis in Myanmar that was triggered by the military junta seizing power in the February 2021 coup. Thus, the deliberations of its leaders in Jakarta last week, and the subsequent release and implications of its “review and decision” statement, are under scrutiny.
Many, especially the long-suffering people of Myanmar and humanitarian organisations on the ground, would not see this as a sign of tangible resolution, and they would be right. Yet the decisions reached indicate greater cohesion among different member states on how to move forward and, more importantly, in not yielding to the demands of the junta. The following from the nine decisions bear particular importance.
First, the group was more direct in its condemnation of the post-coup violence which has driven the country down a path of civil conflict and humanitarian tragedy, and the failure of all parties to de-escalate the violence. The Tatmadaw’s indiscriminate use of force was particularly singled out for criticism, which only selected Asean member states had previously done.
Second, Asean agreed to the formation of an informal troika made up of the incumbent, immediate past and incoming chairs to coordinate a more comprehensive management of Myanmar. This means that Asean’s next chair Laos, one of its smallest and least developed states, can count on the support of Indonesia and Malaysia on Myanmar-related matters, lessening the strain on other chair-related duties. This approach also draws lessons from Asean’s efforts to engage different stakeholders in Cambodia before its eventual admission to the regional grouping in the late 1990s.
Third and most importantly, Asean’s leaders upheld their decision to disallow the junta’s participation at the Asean Summit and Foreign Ministers meeting and did not entertain the junta’s preference to “voluntarily defer” its role as Asean chair in 2026.
The leaders decided instead that the Philippines will take on the role after Malaysia, and the rotation continue alphabetically until a different decision is made. This effectively blocks Myanmar from assuming its chairmanship for at least another decade and the international recognition that comes with it. The opportunity for non-political participation remains should Myanmar wish to take it.
It is also notable, given the division among Asean member states over how to proceed on the situation in Myanmar and its current rulers, that the decisions above were endorsed by all Asean leaders, including by those countries that were either friendly or indifferent to the junta. Such is the loss of goodwill among Asean member states that the belligerence of the generals in Naypyidaw has achieved.
That said, progress in this Asean summit is frankly measured by the lack of deterioration, rather than stagnation. Looking ahead, there are long-term considerations that Asean must keep in mind.
The organisation must remain resolute in not being held hostage by the junta’s schemes or threats, and the indifference of some member states. The voices of members like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines are important here, especially in adding heft to the organisation when lethargy sets in.
Asean must also be consistent in its messaging and action that it is the junta – rather than Myanmar or its people – that is being targeted. It would be self-defeating for Asean to further lose the trust of the people of Myanmar.
Closely related to that, Asean must find alternative pathways to engage multiple stakeholders in Myanmar to prepare the ground for a political solution. A crucial aspect in this is for Asean to engage all major stakeholders in Myanmar, including the Tatmadaw and National Unity Government.
The lessons of Cambodia are again relevant here, where different member states and organisations can engage different stakeholders on various tracks. Such efforts, however, must be sanctioned by the troika and Asean as a whole.
There must also be targeted and concentrated efforts to get dialogue partners, especially those who have influence with Naypyidaw like India, China, Japan and South Korea, involved in influencing the different stakeholders in Myanmar.
Given Asean’s structural limitations, it can only effectively play a role if all parties in Myanmar are prepared to allow it. Many, including this author, argued in the weeks following the coup that things were liable to get worse, and Asean must be prepared for the long haul.
The Five-Point Consensus is just a starting point, and an imperfect one at that. The decisions reached in Jakarta, while commendable, are far from the endgame or even the midpoint.
While it cannot fully act to improve the situation, Asean must not fail to act to prevent further deterioration within the spheres that it does have a say in.
Thomas Daniel is a Senior Fellow with the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia..."
Source/publisher:
"South China Morning Post"
Date of publication:
2023-09-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
China has a history of working with organised crime syndicates to achieve political goals. This time, it has affected Chinese nationals.
Description:
"After China opened its economy last year, ending its zero Covid policy, an old problem has roared back with a vengeance. Chinese authorities are grappling with the issue of their citizens operating fraudulent schemes from Southeast Asian countries, targeting mainland Chinese residents.
China has a history of collaborating with organised crime syndicates in places like Australia, Canada, and Taiwan, employing criminal groups to achieve political objectives. However, the increasing prevalence of telecom fraud and human trafficking in Myanmar and the Golden Triangle area is now adversely affecting Chinese citizens.
What has been described as ‘scamdemic’ encompasses a series of illicit activities, including human trafficking and online scams. The epicentre of these activities lies in Cambodia and the Golden Triangle area, which overlaps Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos and is notorious for illicit opium production and other criminal activities.
Global threat of human trafficking
Cambodia, particularly Sihanoukville, has long been known as a hub for Chinese nationals engaging in illicit activities, including gambling. However, these scams originating in Cambodia have now reached industrial scale, deterring Chinese tourists from visiting this once-preferred destination.
In June, Interpol issued a warning about online scam centres operating from Cambodia, with networks extending into Laos and Myanmar.
Interpol noted that initially, victims of human trafficking primarily came from Chinese-speaking regions such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, or Singapore. However, victims are now drawn from as far away as Europe and South America, with even Indian nationals falling prey to job scams in Southeast Asian countries.
“What began as a regional crime threat has become a global human trafficking crisis,” said Jürgen Stock, Secretary-General of Interpol.
Interpol is not the only organisation sounding the alarm. In August, the United Nations reported that over 1,00,000 people were trafficked into Cambodia, and 1,20,000 into Myanmar.
In recent months, the Chinese Public Security Bureau has conducted a large-scale crackdown on the scam centres, which appear to have tacit support from the governments in Cambodia and Myanmar.
The Ministry of Public Security has said that it has “intensified the fight against telecom and online fraud” in the “Northern Myanmar and the Golden Triangle, an area that comprises parts of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar, are two major hiding places of the fraudsters”.
“Since the beginning of this year, the ministry has dispatched teams to countries including the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos for cooperation on international law enforcement, with severe crackdowns on telecom fraud and human trafficking,” said an article in China Daily. The report was subsequently published on the website of China’s Supreme People’s Court.
China’s international security
In a recent joint operation, Chinese police, in collaboration with local law enforcement in Myanmar, shut down approximately 11 dens operating fraudulent schemes. The bust resulted in the arrest of 269 suspects, including 189 Chinese nationals.
In a separate action, China’s Ministry of Public Security launched a massive crackdown on telecom scams in Northern Myanmar, resulting in the transfer of 1,207 suspects from Myanmar to Chinese law enforcement authorities in Yunnan. These suspects were apprehended in connection with telecom fraud cases affecting Chinese citizens.
While improved relations between China and Myanmar have allowed Chinese public security agencies to conduct policing activities more effectively in the country, challenges remain.
Interestingly, there is even a new Chinese blockbuster movie titled No More Bets, released in 2023, which educates people about the dangers of being lured into jobs in Southeast Asia and getting ensnared in networks of fraudsters. The film tells the story of a Chinese model and a computer programmer who are promised high-salary jobs overseas but end up becoming part of a trafficking network that forces Chinese nationals to work for an online fraud scheme. The movie has been a sensational hit, grossing over $500 million in its first month and drawing attention to the issue of human trafficking.
As domestic economic prospects fray, Chinese nationals are increasingly seeking opportunities in Southeast Asia for investment and employment. However, they often find themselves entangled in a web of scams in politically unstable regions, where their fellow compatriots lure them into illicit activities.
Global threat of human trafficking
Cambodia, particularly Sihanoukville, has long been known as a hub for Chinese nationals engaging in illicit activities, including gambling. However, these scams originating in Cambodia have now reached industrial scale, deterring Chinese tourists from visiting this once-preferred destination.
In June, Interpol issued a warning about online scam centres operating from Cambodia, with networks extending into Laos and Myanmar.
Interpol noted that initially, victims of human trafficking primarily came from Chinese-speaking regions such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, or Singapore. However, victims are now drawn from as far away as Europe and South America, with even Indian nationals falling prey to job scams in Southeast Asian countries.
“What began as a regional crime threat has become a global human trafficking crisis,” said Jürgen Stock, Secretary-General of Interpol.
Interpol is not the only organisation sounding the alarm. In August, the United Nations reported that over 1,00,000 people were trafficked into Cambodia, and 1,20,000 into Myanmar.
In recent months, the Chinese Public Security Bureau has conducted a large-scale crackdown on the scam centres, which appear to have tacit support from the governments in Cambodia and Myanmar.
The Ministry of Public Security has said that it has “intensified the fight against telecom and online fraud” in the “Northern Myanmar and the Golden Triangle, an area that comprises parts of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar, are two major hiding places of the fraudsters”.
“Since the beginning of this year, the ministry has dispatched teams to countries including the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos for cooperation on international law enforcement, with severe crackdowns on telecom fraud and human trafficking,” said an article in China Daily. The report was subsequently published on the website of China’s Supreme People’s Court.
Also read: Xi Jinping toured Northeast China during G20. His way of showing he has ‘other priorities’
China’s international security
In a recent joint operation, Chinese police, in collaboration with local law enforcement in Myanmar, shut down approximately 11 dens operating fraudulent schemes. The bust resulted in the arrest of 269 suspects, including 189 Chinese nationals.
In a separate action, China’s Ministry of Public Security launched a massive crackdown on telecom scams in Northern Myanmar, resulting in the transfer of 1,207 suspects from Myanmar to Chinese law enforcement authorities in Yunnan. These suspects were apprehended in connection with telecom fraud cases affecting Chinese citizens.
While improved relations between China and Myanmar have allowed Chinese public security agencies to conduct policing activities more effectively in the country, challenges remain.
Interestingly, there is even a new Chinese blockbuster movie titled No More Bets, released in 2023, which educates people about the dangers of being lured into jobs in Southeast Asia and getting ensnared in networks of fraudsters. The film tells the story of a Chinese model and a computer programmer who are promised high-salary jobs overseas but end up becoming part of a trafficking network that forces Chinese nationals to work for an online fraud scheme. The movie has been a sensational hit, grossing over $500 million in its first month and drawing attention to the issue of human trafficking.
As domestic economic prospects fray, Chinese nationals are increasingly seeking opportunities in Southeast Asia for investment and employment. However, they often find themselves entangled in a web of scams in politically unstable regions, where their fellow compatriots lure them into illicit activities.
Also read: What is the no 1 search word on China’s Baidu? ‘Bharat’, ‘Modi’s table sign’ at G20
Growing clout
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative is a policy tool aimed at expanding China’s influence in the realm of human and national security beyond its immediate borders. The crackdown in Cambodia and Myanmar serves as an example of how China can leverage its security institutions to achieve specific objectives, highlighting China’s growing clout in the region.
With significant economic challenges at home, Xi is keen to project strength in addressing large-scale fraud activities that harm Chinese nationals. Thus, this crackdown represents a display of power on an unprecedented scale in the Southeast Asia region.
In the realm of high-table diplomacy, it is often easy to forget that people are the true drivers of geopolitical influence. Southeast Asia has emerged as a backyard for China’s externalised power projection and a destination for its citizens seeking new opportunities.
The crackdown on ‘scamdemic’ illustrates that China is willing to use its externalised policing authority to address domestic issues on a scale never seen before, thereby expanding the reach of Chinese public security institutions..."
Source/publisher:
The Print
Date of publication:
2023-09-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Smuggling of people - Burma-Myanmar related, Trafficking: global, regional and national reports, Trafficking: specific standards and mechanisms, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Key Event Details
Date, time and location of Incidents:
Airstrikes — 22 June 2023: Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso Township (ဖရူဆို), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.288804, 96.968735].
K-8 plane crash — 30 June 2023: Ywar Thit sub-township (ရွာသစ်), Bawlakhe (ဘော်လခဲ), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.135286,97.520772].
Airstrikes — 9 July 2023: Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.833424, 97.323086].
Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Daw Noe Ku Internally Displaced Persons Camp (IDP) (ဒေါနိုကူး စစ်ရှောင်စခန်း) Shadaw township (ရှားတောမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.32696180, 97.8187087].
Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.833068, 97.324233].
Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Kyauk Su village (ကျောက်စု), Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.769276, 97.389804].
Clashes and airstrikes — 18 July 2023: Yar Do village (ယာဒို), Thantaunggyi township (သံတောင်ကြီး), Kayin State (ကရင် ပြည်နယ်), [19.358822, 96.802461].
Airstrikes — 26 July 2023: Kyauk Su village middle school, Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.769715, 97.3873880].
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Myanmar Air Force (MAF)
Myanmar military
State Administrative Council (SAC)
People's Defence Forces (PDF)
Summary
After the February 2021 coup d'état, Kayah state has been the site of clashes between the Myanmar military and People's Defence Forces (PDF). The Myanmar military has struggled to exert and maintain control on the ground, and has taken to using airstrikes on areas of resistance. This has resulted in damage to not only PDF camps, but also IDP camps and residential areas. During July 2023, multiple Myanmar Air Force (MAF) airstrikes were reported in Kayah state. Myanmar Witness has investigated these events and geolocated user-generated content (UGC) purporting to show the different incidents.
According to claims made in local media reports, the Myanmar military has conducted air and ground offensives to regain control of Mase town (မယ်စဲ့) in Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ) on the Thai-Myanmar border, as well as offensives in Hpasawng township, which sits on the banks of the Salwin River (သံလွင်မြစ်). Resistance groups reported daily battles, which have led to more than 3,500 people fleeing the area and crossing the border into Thailand, where Thailand's Mae Hong Son Inspection Department has been sheltering them.
Myanmar Witness has identified UGC associated with a number of claimed airstrikes in Kayah state in late June and July 2023. On 22 June, the MAF reportedly carried out three airstrikes on Li Khu Pa Yar village, Hpruso Township, damaging four homes and a school and leaving a middle-aged man with significant injuries. On 30 June, a MAF K-8 light attack aircraft reportedly crashed in Ywar Thit sub-township, Bawlakhe. Accounts vary over whether the plane crashed due to bad weather or whether Karenni/Kayah PDF shot down the plane. However, this places a MAF plane which has the capacity to carry out airstrikes in the vicinity during the timeframe when airstrikes were reported.
On 9 July, it was reported that the MAF carried out airstrikes in Hpasawng township (video no longer available online, however it was previously archived by Myanmar Witness). Myanmar Witness captured a still image from a video of the airstrike and used peakvisor to verify the location. Further airstrikes were reported in Kyauk Pe Nyo village, Hpasawng township, on 12 July. Myanmar Witness geolocated footage showing buildings that were allegedly damaged in the strikes. This was done by stitching together a panorama from video footage uploaded to social media and cross-referencing it with satellite imagery.
Two other airstrikes were also reported on the same day. At around 0102 local time on 12 July 2023, it is reported that the MAF bombed an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp on the Kayah/Karenni-Thai border, killing a 10-year-old child and seriously injuring others. The airstrike also allegedly damaged houses which were sheltering IDPs who had already fled conflict elsewhere in the country. Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing the camp before and after the alleged airstrike.
Additionally, an 11-year-old child and an IDP were reportedly killed in an airstrike in Kyauk Su village, Mese township, also on 12 July 2023. Although Myanmar Witness could not independently confirm the number of deaths, it was possible to geolocate the site of the airstrike using UGC. According to a Facebook user, a middle school in the same village, Kyauk Su, was also bombed on 26 July 2023 (source redacted due to privacy concerns). Although Myanmar Witness could not confirm the exact date, the location was verified.
Finally, following a ground battle on 18 July 2023 near Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township, the MAF allegedly carried out an airstrike. Myanmar Witness have analysed a video purporting to show the event and was able to verify the location of the airstrike.
While efforts have been taken to collect as much information as possible on airstrikes in Kayah state over this time period, a number of other airstrikes reportedly took place in the region during this timeframe which Myanamr Witness were unable to verify or partially verify.
Myanmar Witness has been able to verify:
Myanmar Witness geolocated imagery posted on Facebook showing extensive destruction to structures in Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso township (ဖရူဆို), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်)
Myanmar Witness geolocated drone footage which purports to show the aftermath of a K-8 plane crash Ywar Thit sub-township (ရွာသစ်), Bawlakhe (ဘော်လခဲ), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်)
Myanmar Witness geolocated footage showing buildings that were allegedly damaged in the strikes in Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့).
Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing the Daw Noe Ku IDP Camp (ဒေါနို့ကူးစစ်ရှောင်စခန်း) before and after the alleged airstrike and verified damage to structures there which is consistent with airstrike damage.
Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing damage consistent with airstrikes in Kyauk Su village (ကျောက်စု) Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်)
Myanmar Witness geolocated video footage showing airstrikes in Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township (သံတောင်ကြီး), Kayin State (ကရင် ပြည်နယ်).
Clashes prior to the airstrikes
It is reported that three SAC camps and the Mese police station in Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ), were attacked simultaneously by local PDF on 13 June 2023, between 0500 and 1000 local time. According to the Karenni Military Central Information Organisation (KMIC), the three camps included Taung Hla (တောင်လှ) camp near Taung Hla village (တောင်လှရွာ), Meltangwe camp (မယ်လနွယ်) and the Myanmar-Thailand border post Number 14 on the east bank of the Salwin River (သံလွင်မြစ်) in Mese Township. At present, Myanmar Witness has not geolocated the camps.
Approximately 40 automatic rifles were recovered from the three SAC camps, according to a KMIC spokesperson responsible for publishing the Karenni Army's (KA) military news. Additionally, the township police chief was reportedly killed at the Mese police station during the clashes.
Clashes reportedly continued until the 25 June, when according to multiple sources, the entire SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 430 — made up of approximately 100 personnel, including Lieutenant Colonel Zana Aung and Deputy Battalion Commander Kyaw Thu Soe — surrendered to the Karenni joint forces from Mese Byuha Gone Military Camp no. 13. However, the surrender was contested by SAC sources.
The area has been the site of previous conflict; other Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) and LIBs have operated in Kayah state. For example, following the coup, the LID 66 and its 10 subordinate battalions reportedly moved to west Bago (ပဲခူး), Thegon Township (သဲကုန််းမြို့), Kayah state. In September 2021, intense fighting between Karenni resistance forces and LID 66 reportedly led to heavy casualties. The struggle for control of Kayah state has continued since then, with the SAC increasing the use of air attacks in recent months. Loikaw, Demoso, Hpasawng, Mese, and Bawlakhe townships have come under fire and IDPs on the Kayah state/Thailand border have also been put at risk from airstrikes.
Timeline of events
The investigation walkthrough
Airstrikes in Hpruso Township
On 22 June 2023, at 0030, the MAF reportedly carried out three airstrikes on Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso Township. Four homes and a school were allegedly damaged by the airstrikes, and a middle-aged man suffered significant injuries to his chest. The village houses a population of roughly 200 people, within 40 houses and has poor transportation links. According to the Hpruso PDF, there was no fighting going on in the immediate area when the MAF bombed the village and its surroundings.
Myanmar Witness geolocated imagery posted on Karenni’s Voice’s facebook page, which shows extensive destruction to structures in the village [19.288804, 96.968735].
K-8 light attack aircraft crash
On 30 June 2023, a MAF K-8 light attack aircraft reportedly crashed in Ywar Thit sub-township, Bawlakhe (tail number 3935). According to Myanmar Now, pro-SAC media channels claimed that the K-8 crashed because of bad weather and that the two pilots were still missing. However, Karenni/Kayah PDF claimed they shot down the plane. For example, the former SAC Border Guard Forces, Ka-La-La-Ta (ကရင်နီပြည်လူမျိုး ပေါင်းစုံပြည် သူ့ လွတ် မြောက် ရေးတပ်ဦး - ကလလတ) — a group which recently defected and joined the Karenni/Kayah resistance forces — claimed that they had fired weapons at the aircraft while it was flying at low altitude.
The news of a K-8 crashing went viral on social media and on 5 July 2023, Ka-La-La-Ta facebook page posted drone footage purporting to show the crash site. According to the Khit Thit, Ka-La-La-Ta and local PDF repeatedly tried to take pictures using drones of the plane wreckage, located in the forest in the eastern part of Ywar Thit village; however, it was difficult to get a clear view and the site was heavily guarded by the SAC. As a result, drone footage was only possible from a distance (see figure 3 below). While markings on the ground suggest a crash could have taken place here, there is no visible sign of debris from the plane. Reports suggest that SAC personnel, who arrived quickly at the scene, cleared away all debris of the plane.
The two pilots — Captain Thaw Zin and Captain Aung Phyo Kyaw — were posthumously awarded the rank of captain by SAC leader, Min Aung Hlaing, according to an official press release from the Department of War of Ka-La-La-Ta on 23 July. Khit Thit Media reported that the pilots were given awards of “Hero’s Degree” and “Hero Record Seal” as per SAC Order No. 125/2023. This corroborates claims that a K-8 light attack aircraft was active in the area and crashed.
Airstrikes in Hpasawng township
On 9 July, at 1740 local time, a MAF fighter jet reportedly bombed Kyauk Pe Nyo Village in Hpasawng Township, destroying a monastery. Two people were allegedly hurt during the attack. Myanmar Witness was unable to independently verify the casualties; however, the location of the attack was verified using a still image from a video of the airstrike posted on social media and peakvisor.
It is reported that the MAF also carried out airstrikes in Hpasawng township on 12 July 2023. Myanmar Witness identified video footage purporting to show the aftermath of the airstrike and associated damage. This was stitched together to form a panorama of the scene, which was then geolocated and cross-referenced with satellite imagery. The video shows significant damage to buildings and religious sites in the area.
Airstrike on IDP camp
At around 0102 local time on 12 July, it is reported that the Myanmar Air Force bombed an IDP camp on the Karenni-Thai border, killing a 10-year-old child, seriously injuring others and damaging houses. Myanmar Witness has been unable to independently verify the casualties. The camp was housing a population of more than 5,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who had already fled conflict elsewhere in the country. These individuals are in need of shelter and food assistance.
Images of the airstrike’s aftermath published by the media and local civil society organisations’ pages were identified and geolocated by Myanmar Witness, as well as UGC showing the site before and after the airstrike allegedly took place. Through this process, Myanmar Witness has identified that the events took place at the Daw Noe Ku IDP Camp, in Shadaw township, Kayah state and confirmed the camps location at [19.32696180, 97.8187087].
According to UGC, a middle school in the same village, Kyauk Su, was also bombed on 26 July 2023 (source redacted due to privacy concerns). Although Myanmar Witness could not confirm the exact date, the location was verified.
Clashes and airstrike in Thantaunggyi township
A fierce battle was reported on the morning of 18 July 2023 near Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township. Soon after 0900, the MAF allegedly carried out an airstrike on the village. The airstrike was captured in a video posted on Facebook by the Kantarawaddy Times, and can be seen at 0.08 seconds. Myanmar Witness was able to verify the location of the airstrike.
Additional unverified airstrikes
While efforts have been taken to collect as much information as possible on airstrikes in Kayah state over this time period, a number of other airstrikes reportedly took place in the region during this timeframe which Myanamr Witness were unable to verify or partially verify. For example, on 1 June 2023, the Kayan Thit (ကယန်းသစ်) Security Gate in the western part of Mobye Township (မိုးဗြဲ) was reportedly hit by an airstrike. Additionally, on 14 June around 2125 local time, it is claimed that the Myanmar military fired at least 15 rounds of heavy weapons into the Mobye military camp. The following day, at 0200 local time, an airstrike was reported. Myanmar Witness will continue to look for more information on these events, and others in the area, in order to verify their occurrence.
Future monitoring
Kayah state has been the site of conflict since the February 2021 coup. Like other regions in Myanmar, the conflict is escalating and the use of airstrikes has become commonplace. Both Karenni resistance fighters and civilians have been caught up in the attacks.
Myanmar Witness continues to monitor, document and investigate human rights violations, as well as SAC activity, in Kayah state. The impact of attacks on locations used by civilians, including IDP camps, must also be monitored.
Abbreviations
Border Guard Forces - BGF
Internally Displaced Peoples - IDPs
Myanmar Air Force - MAF
People’s Defence Force - PDF
Security Administrative Council - SAC
User-generated Content - UGC
Light Infantry Division - LID..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-09-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.7 MB
more
Description:
"The Karen Women’s Organisation condemns the Burmese military continued airstrikes and indiscriminate shelling targeting civilians which has been ongoing this month. These attacks have killed and wounded at least 30 civilians mostly women and children. The recent aggressive airstrikes and mortar shelling have been particularly intensive in Kler Lwee Htu, Mutraw district.
As just one example, on September 7th, 2023 at 18:03 pm the Burmese military carried out an airstrike in Htee Gaw Hta village, Na Koh Kee village tract, Dweh Lo township, Mutraw district around the school compound areas and killing a teacher with 3 students and wounding one teacher with 5 students. In Kler Lwee Htu district on Sunday, September 3rd, the Burmese military airstrike on civilians resulted in the death of a 12-year-old boy, leaving a 16-year-old girl injured, and causing the destruction of numerous houses and other public buildings..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Women's Organisation
Date of publication:
2023-09-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese women's organisations, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
75 KB
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Description:
"In the nearly three years that have passed since Myanmar’s coup d’état, the global media has shifted its attention to other crises, from the sudden withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan to Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. But despite a lull in headlines, the turmoil that resulted from the coup remains life-altering for the generation of young activists who have been displaced by the shattering of democratic ideals.
Myanmar’s military — the Tatmadaw — staged a coup d’état on February 1, 2021, detaining top government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. The military claimed that the election results were fraudulent, but independent observers have dismissed these claims. The coup has sparked widespread protests and civil disobedience, with many people calling for the release of the detained leaders and the restoration of democracy. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a human rights organization dedicated to justice in Myanmar, more than 4,000 people have so far been killed by Myanmar’s military junta since the coup, and upwards of 24,000 have been arrested, charged or sentenced.
For JURIST, coverage of the Myanmar coup is personal. Despite the risks, Myanmar law student correspondents – most of them women – covered the coup for JURIST from its beginning and have kept reporting in its aftermath. In a bid to keep the crisis in the public dialogue, we have conducted a series of interviews with some of the law students and young lawyers whose lives have been affected by Myanmar’s tumult, ranging from law students who fled abroad to save their futures and continue their studies to those who put down their textbooks and went into the jungle to take up arms against the junta as part of the pro-democracy resistance. Their accounts reflect the full range of emotional responses, from despair to anger to hope.
The interviews, which will be published in a series of articles, explore the challenges and opportunities facing young people in Myanmar as they navigate a country in political turmoil. This is the first interview in a seven-part series. Please note that our interviewees’ names have been kept private to protect their security unless otherwise noted.
Would you briefly introduce yourself? What was your life like before the coup?
I am a third-year law student. I am a Myanmar woman in her early 20s. Before the coup, my life was pretty normal; I went to school regularly, joined many club activities, skipped classes sometimes for a little bit of fun, participated in moot court competitions, spent many hours in the library, and thought life would be just a straight-line till after graduation. Before the coup, Myanmar was not a completely democratic country, but it was a country that was able to offer endless possibilities for a young university student like me. At the time, I thought I could easily come up with a 5-year plan or a 10-year plan.
How are you doing now, two and a half years after the coup?
I am surviving. Surviving is sometimes the only way to live in Myanmar. Our daily life is filled with unpredictable political events. It’s hard enough to try to figure out how I’ll keep meals on the table for the next month, let alone making long term plans. Just as grocery prices continue to change overnight, my path toward legal education has been caught up in the storm. If things had gone as planned, I would be preparing to graduate this year and I would probably be planning for my Master’s study abroad.
Being a law student who learned about concepts like the rule of law, justice, and human rights at school, I’m able to recognize the many unlawful and unethical acts the military junta carries out in plain sight; I can even identify specific actions as violations of specific norms of human rights and international law.
In the beginning, I couldn’t see this as anything more than a curse; my heart just ached to witness it. But I have since come to look for opportunities in the darkness; I do everything I can to share news of our plight with the world. I have seen many traumatic things. I’ll never get used to seeing such horrible things. But at some point, I realized that I have a duty amid these historic events. I am no longer just a law student; I have taken on the role of a citizen journalist, and by virtue of my background, I have a legal perspective to share.
As a law student, do you think the international community is showing enough support for the people of Myanmar? What more could they do to help?
Many key actors of the international community have shown support for Myanmar. In my opinion, I think everyone has the capacity to do more than this. Failing to help Myanmar would not be recorded as just a minor event in a third-world country. This would be remembered as a failure of humanity. The whole international community will share this burden and will bear the consequences. Later on, a military coup could become just a mere trend and a genocide case could become just a temporary entertainment on the news. To prevent this collective failure of humanity, the international community needs to come up with more “actions.” Your voices of comfort and official statements have helped, but I respectfully remind you that this coup has been going on for more than two years and has resulted in over 3,000 deaths.
In addition to sanctions, attempts to bring the military juntas to the International Court of Justice, and recognition for the National Unity Government, I would like to make a request. I hope that Myanmar updates are frequently highlighted in the global mainstream media. I hope that Myanmar news is accessible to the international audience in any possible way so that the whole international community stays “curious” about Myanmar, about a random law student from Myanmar, about the Myanmar people who grit every day to prove that truth and justice shall always win. The silence and ignorance of the international audience would strengthen the military juntas. If we think about this in common sense, would abusers think they need to stop committing a crime when nobody is watching them or taking action against them? I would like to tell the international community that Myanmar desperately needs their constant attention. The misery of Myanmar should not be buried among the world’s media trends. This is life-and-death news.
What are your thoughts on the Civil Disobedience Movement as a law student when the military junta is pressuring all university students to go back to classes?
The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is one of the most powerful counteracts against the military juntas. I made the decision to join the CDM since the beginning of the coup, and I have seen how far this movement has brought us in this revolution. Not only is this a clear message to the juntas that they cannot rule without our cooperation, but it is also a demonstration of individuals’ understanding of how democracy is all about ruling ourselves, not being ruled by a group of juntas.
My stance is that I will never go back to the classrooms run by the professors under military rule. I take the ethical value “Legal profession is a noble profession,” which we learned in our freshman year, very seriously. Even when I went to law classes before the coup, I sought real educational experience through mock trials, moot courts, and internships when I felt that the class lectures at a local university in Myanmar could not offer “a quality education” that met my own standards. I was a law student who tried to be creative with all the resources available. So, for me, a quality education is more than a degree.
However, I also understand the other view that thinks we should all go back to school for a college degree. No matter how talented a person is, an official certificate or diploma is needed in the local work environment. People with language barriers and financial difficulties cannot seek opportunities outside of Myanmar. For various reasons, I have seen my own classmates and close friends go back to school despite their promises at the beginning of the coup. On the other hand, many CDM students would view them as traitors and even discuss setting social punishment after winning this revolution.
Now that the revolution is more than two years old, I see a slight change in the dynamics that individuals have their own limits on the extent of their active participation in politics. Many of the university students who decide to go back to school now, not since the beginning, may not have harmful thoughts against the whole revolution. They will surely have their own situations. They might have made a decision to join the CDM at the very beginning, but we cannot ignore the fact that the military juntas cause difficulties in basic human needs over time. Surrounded by waves of challenges for themselves and for their families, they might not be able to seek the common good but to look after themselves first. As we all know, this is a natural human tendency.
I hope that the university students who go back to school do not cause any significant harm to this revolution, even if they cannot be of great help anymore for the time being. However, I do not think that social punishment for deciding what they think is best for them would be a fair solution. This will forever divide all the legal scholars and professionals in our generation. I hope that they can act upon their own beliefs and together contribute to Myanmar’s legal and political affairs in the future. As long as they are not acting out of fear, I sincerely hope that they act upon their own convictions.
What do you think about the leadership of the National Unity Government as a parallel government of Myanmar?
I think the NUG is making progress over the years. As a citizen who has vested her trust in the government she approves, I understand that the NUG focuses on earning strong recognition through diplomacy on the international horizon and leading the People’s Defense Force in the defensive war against the military juntas. Putting myself in the shoes of political leaders in the NUG, I can sympathize that this is not an easy job overall. Nonetheless, they must listen to the voices of people who call the NUG their government and keep trying everything with endless effort. As a citizen, we do our job which is to keep the NUG in check.
There is something I would specifically like to point out as a law student. Recently, I attended a panel discussion titled “Ending Impunity Through Transitional Justice” held on June 15, 2023. U Thein Oo, the head of the Ministry of Justice, said that the ministry is working on collecting evidence and getting ready to take action after winning the revolution. In response to that, other panelists also discussed how we should come up with mechanisms to take action even before we announce a clear win in this revolution. I agree with the latter view and my main concern here is that the country will be in need of legal scholars and professionals who can execute the goals we are setting right now.
As a law student, I want to demand that the NUG comes up with more actions on:
How law students can continue their legal education either within or outside the country.
How they will open doors for Myanmar students who pursue a legal education in different places and wish to contribute in Myanmar in the near future.
On planting seeds in much younger generations who seek to become legal professionals.
In the era of federal democracy, this revolution shall bring more human resources in the legal field, the merrier.
How do you anticipate the Spring Revolution will end?
I strongly believe we will win. It may take time, but we will win. This is more than intuition. Looking back at what Myanmar has gone through over the decades; we have always been meant to win this revolution.
Do you have any parting words for law students and lawyers across the international community?
If I could get the opportunity to exchange thoughts with law students from different parts of the world, I would like to ask them what kind of legal professional they want to become after graduating from law school.
A very common thought is that many law schools teach us how to read and apply the existing laws. In a simple sense, we obey the laws. However, Myanmar’s experience should serve as a lesson that law students must also learn to challenge the existing laws when it is necessary. Merely knowing the law is not enough anymore. We need to see the intentions behind the formation of each law.
Just in case a law becomes unjust or we have someone sitting above the law, we should be well-prepared with the techniques and stamina to resist unjust laws. I would like to tell fellow law students that it is now our duty to formulate constructive doubts about the existing legal systems, but be hopeful about the better changes we can bring.
I believe that law students should be agents of change. We should use our knowledge of the law to challenge injustice and make the world a better place. We should not be afraid to stand up for what we believe in, even if it means challenging the status quo.
I am hopeful that the next generation of law students will be up to the task. I believe that they have the power to make a real difference in the world..."
Source/publisher:
JURIST
Date of publication:
2023-09-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
Description:
"THE Irrawaddy online reported on August 31 the Myanmar junta’s warning to residents of Nay Pyi Taw, the centre of the military regime, that ‘resistance forces may attack Nay Pyi Taw at any time.’ The day before, a team of junta officials led by Nay Pyi Taw council member Colonel Min Naung held motivational interaction with villagers in the capital’s Pyinmana Township, calling for ‘solidarity between the government, military and people against the danger of the regime’s enemies at the gate.
Before the regime could appreciate the potential danger from resistance forces, fighters from the People’s Defence Force had sneaked into the capital to attack the target of opportunities on hit-and-run tactics. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in April a local administrator, a police officer and two soldiers and seriously injuring a lieutenant colonel at a bar near a military base in Nay Pyi Taw.
In March, two People’s Defence Force fighters were arrested before launching an attack on the Armed Forces Day Parade. In June, the force seized a military outpost near the capital and killed 14 soldiers in three days of operation. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in December 2021 a dozen junta troops in landmine blast at Pyinmana Township near the capital.
In recent months, the media have reported combined operations by the People’s Defence Force and the ethnic armed organisation against the regime forces. Of the 14 states and regions, intense fights have been reported in 13 states and regions. The Arakan Army in Rakhine State has been on informal but long ceasefire with the military regime since the coup on February 1, 2021.
Among the 13 regions and states, Sagaing has been the stronghold of resistance forces from the beginning of the coup. The regime forces sustained the worst losses here. People suffered the worst atrocities at the hands of the regime forces. Fights intensified in Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Chin and Mon states. The People’s Defence Force and ethnic armed organisations are reportedly gaining grounds in all states and regions, forcing the regime forces to take defensive tactics since July 2023.
Air power has been the regime’s crucial weapon to slow down the advances of resistance forces. Indian Defence Research Wing online reported on September 1 that Myanmar Air Force has grounded all its 11 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets because of technical reasons. This has been a blow to the regime’s air power. The grounding of the whole squadron of fighters have significantly disrupted Nay Pyi Taw’s plan for targeted airstrikes against PDF and EAO positions. The United States in August imposed sanctions on three companies which supply jet fuel for Myanmar’s air force. The sanctions will further constrain the regime’s air power.
The military junta has lost control over almost all of the Sagaing region and many townships in Magwe and Mandalay regions because of relentless daily attacks, land-mine ambushes, drone strikes, shelling, and hit-and-run attacks from resistance groups and ethnic armed organisations. An analyst has said, ‘the junta is no longer able to defeat resistance forces there, so its troops can only raid and torch villages.’
The regime’s aggravated cause of concern over the centre has been the fight that has broken out in Bago region barely 100 kilometres south of the capital. The war in the Bago region has created grave insecurity for the regime because the People’s Defence force and Myanmar’s oldest ethnic revolutionary group, the Karen National Union, combinedly increased attacks against the positions that the regime holds. Security analyst in Myanmar say that the junta was struggling to defeat the resistance because it has to focus on multiple front lines across the country. Human resource shortage and defection from rank and files are making regimes struggle tougher.
‘Bago Region has been regarded as an epicentre of revolutionary movements in Myanmar since the country achieved independence in 1948.’ The KNU has long been active in the eastern part of the Bago region. Now, the western part is also contested. The Central Bago region on the west of the Sittaung River basin, is strategically important both to the regime and resistance forces. The road through the region connects Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon and the Tanintharyi region in the south. PDF forces along with KNU is trying to gain a foothold in the area because it would give them control over vital gateways to Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. The fight is continuing since July 2023. Control of the vital roadways could also isolate the south-eastern areas of the country, including Karen (Kayin) and Mon states and Tanintharyi Region..."
Source/publisher:
New Age
Date of publication:
2023-09-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Mister President,
Excellencies,
It is an honour to appear before you to present the fifth Annual Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Last year I reported to this Council an increase in serious international crimes committed in the country. Tragically, the frequency and intensity of war crimes and crimes against humanity has only increased in recent months.
In the past year we have seen more brazen aerial bombings and indiscriminate shelling, resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians including children. We have also seen increased executions of captured combatants and civilians and intentional burnings of homes and villages. There has also been a rise in the number of arrests without due process and we have collected credible evidence that some detainees have been subjected to torture, sexual violence, and other severe mistreatments.
The ongoing violence has forced our Mechanism to expand its inquiries to many parts of the country, but we retain our commitment and focus on collecting and analysing evidence of the campaign against the Rohingya population during the 2016 and 2017 clearance operations. We have collected compelling evidence of the widespread burning of Rohingya villages and the assaults and killings of civilians. I have been particularly horrified by the numerous accounts of sexual crimes that we have collected.
Mr. President,
The quantity of evidence and information we have been able to collect in the past year from individuals and organizations is unprecedented and frankly, unanticipated. With this increased workload and our limited resources, we have had to strategically focus our investigations on the gravest crimes where the impact on victims has been the most severe.
We continue to face the challenge of not having access to Myanmar. Our repeated requests for information and access have been ignored by the military authorities. We also face challenges in conducting investigative activities in other countries where witnesses and information providers are located.
To compensate, we have embraced innovative technology to propel our investigations. Our Open-Source team uses cutting edge technology to analyse and verify large quantities of material, such as videos, photographs and other information posted on social media. We are also using geospatial imagery to determine damage to villages before and after attacks. This type of evidence is then cross-checked against the information received from at least 700 sources, including more than 200 eyewitness accounts.
We have also begun a dedicated inquiry into financial information related to entities and individuals that have contributed to, or benefitted from, the serious international crimes committed in Myanmar. We are looking at weapon supply chains, and the dispossession of land, homes, and businesses, particularly during the clearance operations in Rakhine State.
Mr. President,
We understand this Council did not create our Mechanism to simply place evidence in storage. Rather, we intend to use the evidence to facilitate justice and accountability in courts and tribunals willing and able to prosecute these cases. We are currently sharing information and evidence with three ongoing proceedings focused on crimes committed against the Rohingya at the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court and in Argentina. We are now finalising three analytical reports to share with these authorities concerning: the military chain of command in Rakhine State; the failure of Myanmar authorities to investigate or punish sexual and gender-based crimes; and the organized spread of hate speech content on Facebook by the Myanmar military during the 2017 clearance operations.
I am particularly grateful to the brave survivors of these crimes who have shared their testimonies. None of our work would be possible without the courage and commitment of the many individuals and organizations that provide us with information. We are using the most advanced technologies to ensure that their interactions with us have the highest level of security and confidentiality.
I am also very grateful for the support of this Council and call on all Member States committed to ending the violence in Myanmar to support our work and give us the access we need to witnesses and information on their territories.
Mr. President,
The Myanmar people are suffering deeply from the effects of these ongoing horrific crimes. I would like them to know that the Mechanism is committed to pursuing justice for them and focusing all our efforts to ensure that the perpetrators will one day be held to account..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
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Sub-title:
Statement for the Interactive Dialogue on the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar. As delivered by the UK Human Rights Ambassador, Rita French.
Description:
"Thank you, Mr President.
The UK is grateful for the Mechanism’s continued work to facilitate justice and accountability in Myanmar. Its latest report brings to light the scale of the Myanmar military’s brutal tactics. The reporting of the military’s brutal actions against the people of Myanmar, including indiscriminate targeting and killing of civilians through airstrikes and the large-scale burning of homes, is truly alarming.
Accountability is the only way to end the culture of impunity in Myanmar.
And the UK is committed to supporting this goal - providing £500,000 to the IIMM (Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar), establishing the Myanmar Witness programme, and leading efforts to secure the first ever UN Security Council Resolution on the situation in Myanmar, urging all parties to respect human rights and end violence.
To successfully collect evidence and continue to meet its mandate, the Mechanism relies on the cooperation of all UN and international partners. Without the cooperation of all UN entities, the Mechanism would not be able to undertake vital activities to hold the Myanmar military to account.
High Commissioner, Mr President,
What more can Member States do to facilitate the Mechanism’s collection of evidence and witness statements?
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
GOV.UK
Date of publication:
2023-09-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
Language:
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Title: ‘It’s a Catastrophe’: Ex-Junta Prisoner, NLD Aide Sean Turnell on Myanmar’s Post-Coup Economy
Description:
"Australian economist Sean Turnell served as a policy adviser to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy government during its first term. He was detained by the military shortly after the February 2021 coup and later imprisoned on charges—widely dismissed as trumped up—of violating state secrets and immigration laws. After nearly two years behind bars he was released in November 2022 as part of a general amnesty and has continued to speak out against the military junta from his home country, prompting the regime to revoke its pardon. In the following interview with The Irrawaddy’s Justin Higginbottom, Turnell discusses in detail the economic fallout of the military’s disastrous ‘mismanagement’ of the economy—and whether or not that is in fact the correct term to describe its actions—the post-COVID economic recovery plans the NLD was preparing to implement in its stolen second term, as well as the regime’s access to foreign reserves and what actions foreign governments can take to limit it. He also discusses his forthcoming book describing his experiences as a political prisoner in Myanmar.
THE IRRAWADDY: Can you talk about the general economic situation in Myanmar? What’s going on since the coup? What’s the general situation? Where do they find themselves right now?
TURNELL: I mean it’s just awful.… “Catastrophe” is the word that I generally like to employ. And I don’t think that’s even hyperbole. No matter what you look at, it’s negative essentially. I mean if you begin with growth, economic growth in Myanmar took a bit of a knock with COVID, so we’d been expecting for 2020 a growth rate of about 7 percent, and similar for 2021, but then COVID arrived and growth went down to about 1.8 percent for [2020], and no one was clear about 2021. And it went [to] negative 18 percent [-18 percent] in 2021 [and has] recovered a bit since, but.. If you’d said, OK, where can you reasonably apply the trend line? So in other words you get the knock from COVID but then good policy sort of gets you back on track—which is exactly what’s happened all around the world and all around the region—so it’s not an unreasonable expectation [that] we’d have been back to those sort of growth levels – 6, 7, 8 percent—hopefully, because there actually had been a very aggressive reform program to come into place with that second term of the government; you know, many of the things that weren’t done in the first term were geared up and ready to go in the second term.
So, anyway, just to say that growth rates of 6, 7 percent—we’d have been disappointed if we weren’t hitting those. But irrespective of that, even on the worst assumption of where we’d be at, the economy is now 30 percent below any sort of modest trend; the economy’s about 30 percent down. It’s about 20-odd percent down anyway, but by trend it’s nearly a third. Which is just catastrophic for a country like Myanmar, that is poor to begin with, one of the poorest countries in the world, and people are now one-third poorer than where they should have been. There’s no fat in the system; people are desperately poor now, and they can’t take a knock of one third of their income.
But anyway that’s just growth numbers. No matter what the metric is: the budget deficit is now dramatically blown out. Taxation revenue has now shrunk dramatically along with it. The bond sales are not really proceeding as they could be. The banks are not really in a position to take up the bonds on offer; so all of that means the government is just printing money hand over fist. As a consequence of that we’ve got monetary instability, whether it be measured in terms of high inflation rates, particularly relative to peers in Southeast Asia. [And] a collapsing exchange rate, so the exchange rate is less than half of what it was before the coup. The trade situation’s dire: There’s a bit of holding up in terms of gas revenues, because hydrocarbon prices were quite high, but other than that even other energy prices and income are down; agriculture is down. There’s been a bit of a recovery from the really deep lows immediately after the coup in terms of textiles, but overall the trade situation is terrible. Debt levels have more than doubled. Unemployment, to the extent that it’s measured properly, a lot of the measures are not really there anyway, but we do know that there’s been a wholesale shift from the formal economy to the informal economy—and you don’t get a growing, transforming economy out of one that is based in informality. Informality is really just a coping mechanism and that is where most people are.
On top of that, just the opportunities lost. Back in 2020, young educated Myanmar people had real prospects and had choices about where to get employment, and now people are scattered to the winds outside the country, within the country. People with expensive degrees that they thought would yield them a good income in a growing economy are now on the front lines or in prison. It’s just a catastrophe. I get depressed over so many things in Myanmar; obviously the loss of life and the violence above all, but if you look at the economy, compared to the hopes that people reasonably had for it, it just makes you want to cry.
THE IRRAWADDY: So how much can we chalk this economic ruin up to mismanagement by the junta, or is a lot of it caused by sanctions, or just the general conflict, just the country being in a state of war right now?
TURNELL: I’m probably a little bit biased in this obviously, but to me it comes from… In fact [it’s an] interesting word “economic mismanagement”. I wonder if that is the expression? It’s an expression I’ve used, I hasten to add… The more I think about it, it isn’t really economic mismanagement because in terms of policy—and that’s where a lot of the damage is being done—there is the damage of course being done by violence and so on as well, of course, perpetrated by the regime and instigated by them—but I’m just wondering about that term “mismanagement”, because in some ways what they’re doing is gearing the economy to a war economy and neglecting or abusing everything else, so to some extent it’s management for a purpose. It’s just that that purpose is greatly destructive. But in some ways, if you think about it, what they’ve essentially done is created a war economy, [so] the management that has yielded terrible economic outcomes is in once sense quite deliberate in terms of transferring resources into the military state.
But anyway, it’s only “mismanagement” from an economist’s perspective, and what you’d think would be the objective of any sort of sovereign government. I think we’d have to locate it there, but I think it’s mainly because if we just go to the counterexamples around the world—you don’t have to go to the developed world or rich or even fast-growing economies. You just go to the region and you see the bounce-back [from COVID], and Myanmar is such an extraordinary outlier in terms of economies that just haven’t bounced back, so I think the blame for it is really there. COVID had damaged things but there were some very comprehensive plans to deal with that. Nothing too radical—it was more just the [same] playbook of just about anywhere else, about protecting incomes. And all of that was dismantled after the coup and of course the response to COVID itself was greatly mismanaged and the rest, and repression of medical workers, etc., so even though clearly there were external events, if we look at comparable countries around Myanmar you’d really have to slate most of the economic damage home to the regime and, again, it’s mismanagement, is the word we use for it.
THE IRRAWADDY: We had a story recently that reported that the regime-controlled Central Bank of Myanmar had about US$6.8 billion in foreign reserves as of March 2023. More than half of that’s in Singaporean banks. Do you know how much of that is actually accessible to the regime? If the international community wanted to block access to those reserves what might they want to do?
TURNELL: It’s an interesting one. In terms of “accessible”, it’s hard not to get technical here, because reserves by definition are financial assets that are either issued by other countries like US dollars, euros, Singapore dollars, Australian dollars or whatever, or commodities of some form—valuable commodities such as gold—so in a sense they’re accessible to the point that they still have value. By which I mean, if you have US dollars in a US bank account, those dollars only have value if you can access them at the US bank. So in some ways the question of accessibility is really the critical issue when we think of a country having assets because if they’re not accessible those assets in a sense don’t exist. That’s the first thing to say. That is nothing unusual in a way… It’s not like the regime could access them and bring them home. It could if it was gold. You could just store it at the central bank. But the only way for foreign currency-denominated assets to have value is to have them in foreign currency accounts and usually it’s the case that they’re going to be in foreign banks, so the question of accessibility is caught up with the value of those reserves. It’s a big thing to constrain access to foreign assets of governments. This is why you’ll notice that even with the suspension of access to funds at the [US] Federal Reserve, that that [suspension] is what we’re talking about, rather than the transfer of those assets to anywhere else. This gets into areas of untouchablity or…. a lack of precedent, I would say, for that. So measures to transfer those reserves to anyone else become quite problematic.
Which doesn’t mean you still can’t do things. For instance, the NUG [Myanmar’s shadow, civilian National Unity Government] could come up with some quite creative measures to use the value of reserves in ways that they could … essentially financially engineer other financial assets out of reserves that are not accessible to the regime. I know that’s getting complex because we’re getting into the area of financial engineering and the extent to which [denying the regime] access to reserves—does that create value for anyone else, like an alternative government such as the NUG? And there I think you get into some interesting gray areas. But denial of access is one thing and transferring those assets somewhere else is a different thing, so it’s hard to imagine other countries doing that, apart from the US. The US would be the only one to move in that sort of direction and obviously they have to a certain extent in terms of blocking the regime’s access to the funds at the Federal Reserve, but the others, it’s hard to imagine blocking that.
THE IRRAWADDY: So it’s not realistic to think that Singapore might just one day say, “All those assets you have with us – those aren’t accessible. You can’t take those out.”?
TURNELL: It would be a big leap. Where I was going before with this whole issue of access, this is where this becomes important as well, you would probably have degrees of freedom of movement. So for instance, it’s hard to imagine a country actually blocking another country accessing its reserves. On the other hand, if a country decided that it was going to transfer all of its reserves, it’s hard to imagine that being an easy process either. And in the case of Myanmar, a process that wouldn’t involve extraordinary complications. So the degree to which those reserves are fully accessible to the regime would have to be questionable I think.
THE IRRAWADDY: You’re writing a book about your experience in prison, I believe? Did you want to say anything about that?
TURNELL: Sure. We’ll probably go on a big publicity thing in a few weeks. It’s finished. Just a few technical things with the publisher, which is Penguin. It starts with my arrest back on Feb. 6, 2021. I’ve got a couple of chapters that deal with what we were trying to do in Myanmar, just a broad outline of the reform process, things like that. But for the most part it’s all about the prison experience—arrest, Insein [Prison in Yangon], up to Naypyitaw, the trial, the incredible support I got from my fellow political prisoners and then from the Burmese people more broadly. It doesn’t hold back from detailing the horrors all around me but it’s still a little bit of a “love letter” to the Burmese people, because even though there were these terrible people who were keeping me in the prison, it was the case that 99 percent of the people I dealt with even in the prisons and so on were incredibly compassionate, and incredibly courageous in demonstrating that compassion. I’m very, very blunt in saying how awful the prison was and saying how absurd the trial was and what a terrible injustice was meted out not just to me but more importantly to my Burmese colleagues and people who weren’t even connected with my case, but whose cases I got to know about. I met people who were being tortured and so on, and ill-treated. They even ill-treated me—you know, one would have surely thought that I would have told the story once I got out and of course I did so, which caused the SAC regime [the State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself] to get extremely upset anew. So I think they’re going to get upset again in a few weeks when the book’s out.
(Turnell concluded the interview by offering to add to his earlier reply to the question regarding the junta’s access to foreign reserves.)
If you hold US dollars in a bank, obviously they’re not physical, all they are is on the balance sheet of a bank, and they’re just a promise from the bank to pay US dollars. So you open an account, let’s say it’s 1 billion US dollars, and that account is really just a liability of that bank to pay you. So you give them a billion dollars and they then open up a liability, which is just a deposit account, which says that they will repay that billion at some point in time. But it’s only an asset that sits on the balance sheet of that bank. I guess what I was trying to get at is that access to reserves depends on that relationship between you and the financial institution. Again, it’s so different to gold, etc. It’s not a physical commodity that can just be moved about. It depends on the decision [of the bank] and so if a bank grants access then those assets have value. If that access is in any way compromised, those assets no longer have value, and I think that was the nuance I was trying to get at with respect to even places like Singapore—that the extent to which there’s any doubt of you being able to access quickly and in full your reserves puts a shadow over those reserves, even if there’s no sanctions and so on.
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-09-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 1 to 7, 2023
Military Junta Troop arrested over 70 local civilians and used them as human shields in Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region from September 1st and 7th. 11 women who were holding Sagaing NRC number from South Okkalapa Township were arrested and beaten by the Military Junta on September 3rd. A woman from the Sagaing Region and a man from the Ayeyarwady region died due to beating and torture during the interrogationby the Military’s . Thayarwaddy Prison and Dike-U Prison, restriction of the sending of food and necessity needs of prisoners.
The Department of Electricity distributed the warning letters that the meter boxes will be taken when the civilians do not pay the bill in Yangon Region and Mandalay Region. 14 civilians died and 13 were injured by the Military Junta heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. They raided the villages, attacked and burnt the houses, as a sequence the civilians left their places 8 times..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-09-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
5.02 MB 103.65 KB 5.21 MB
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Description:
"Justice For Myanmar calls on other ASEAN members to follow Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in refusing to attend the upcoming ASEAN Air Chiefs’ Conference (AACC), heeding the outcry from Myanmar and international civil society.
We call on ASEAN members to bar the illegal junta from all ASEAN defence activities, and failing that, to refuse to attend activities in which the junta participates.
The Myanmar junta’s air force head, Htun Aung, is the chair of AACC, and is currently commanding an indiscriminate campaign of aerial terror, slaughtering men, women and children, and destroying homes, schools, places of worship and whole villages.
According to reporting by AFP, the Thai air force chief is the only confirmed attendee of the 2023 AACC, while the air forces of Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam did not respond to questions.
Cambodia’s air force chief refused to comment to AFP on whether he will attend the meeting, which will be held in Naypyidaw from September 12-15.
Justice For Myanmar condemns ASEAN’s continued and direct support for the Myanmar air force, army and navy as it commits genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes with total impunity.
In August, Singapore was the only ASEAN member state that refused to attend a counter terrorism tabletop military exercise in Naypyidaw, chaired by the military junta with the Russian regime.
From September 25-30, the junta is scheduled to co-chair an ASEAN counter terrorism field training exercise in Russia, which ASEAN leaders must cancel, or refuse to attend if it goes ahead.
Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly denounced ASEAN’s defence cooperation with the illegal military junta, called for the junta’s exclusion from ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) activities, and urged countries to boycott defence activities that include the junta.
In an oral update to the UN Human Rights Council in July 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar slammed ASEAN’s appointment of Htun Aung as AACC chair, stating that “those responsible for these atrocities should not be serving in leadership positions in ASEAN. They should be serving sentences for their crimes.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The refusal of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to attend the AACC sends a clear and strong message to the military junta that it is losing support.
“It is untenable for a criminal junta that is committing atrocities with total impunity to chair a regional conference.
“Other ASEAN air force chiefs should follow the example of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and refuse to attend the AACC with the illegal junta.
“ASEAN must take a firm stand against the illegal junta and its aerial campaign of terror, led by the current AACC chair Htun Aung, who is a war criminal.
“ASEAN must stop providing legitimacy and support to the Myanmar military, which totally disregards and directly undermines its own commitments to resolve the crisis in Myanmar.
“We call on ASEAN members to bar the junta from defence meetings and activities, and refuse to attend when the junta participates.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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Size:
114.75 KB 116.62 KB
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Sub-title:
Ukraine War, Other Major Conflicts Accounted for Much of the Increase
Description:
"(New York) – More than 3,000 attacks on education were identified in 2022, a 17 percent increase over the previous year, the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) reported in a data release today. The data were released ahead of the fourth United Nations International Day to Protect Education from Attack, on September 9, 2023. Almost one-third of all attacks took place in just three countries: Ukraine, Myanmar, and Burkina Faso, with the war in Ukraine accounting for the majority.
According to GCPEA, more than 6,700 students and educators were reportedly killed, injured, abducted, arrested, or otherwise harmed by attacks on education in 2022, an increase of 20 percent from 2021. Armed forces and non-state armed groups using schools for military purposes also rose in 2022, with over 510 cases reported, compared with around 450 the previous year. Explosive weapons, both targeted and indiscriminate, were frequently used in attacks on education, causing widespread damage. Unexploded ordnance will continue to pose a deadly risk for years to come.
“The International Day to Protect Education from Attack serves as a stark reminder that schools are not always the safe refuges they should be, but instead are often the sites of extreme violence and terror,” said Diya Nijhowne, GCPEA executive director. “The distressing increase in attacks last year underscores the urgent need for both armed forces and non-state armed groups to safeguard education, including by avoiding using explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, such as near schools or universities, and refraining from using schools for military purposes.”
The coalition also released a new 39-page report, Non-State Armed Groups and Attacks on Education: Exploring Trends and Practices to Curb Violations, which found that, in 2020 and 2021, more than half of all attacks on education, and a quarter of reported military use of schools and universities, were by non-state armed groups. The report highlights the various motivations these groups have for attacking schools and educators, and provides recommendations and strategies for reducing these attacks. In 2022 and 2023, non-state armed groups continued to perpetrate a significant proportion of all attacks. In just one example, Al-Shabaab, an insurgent group in Somalia, claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack in October 2022 against the Ministry of Education that killed at least 121 civilians and wounded hundreds more.
The Safe Schools Declaration, a political commitment to protect students, educators, schools, and universities during armed conflict, endorsed by 118 countries, plays an essential role in preventing, and mitigating the impact of attacks on education. By endorsing the Declaration, governments also commit to using the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict.
The use of schools as bases, firing positions, detention centers, training grounds, and for other military purposes, can convert the schools into military targets, putting the lives of those within them at risk, and deterring students and teachers from attending out of fear or because the schools are closed to education. Those who do attend are vulnerable to sexual violence and recruitment by soldiers. School infrastructure and learning materials are also damaged, affecting the quality of education, and sometimes making learning impossible.
Since 2015, when the Safe Schools Declaration was launched, over a dozen governments have made changes to their national policies, practices, or military manuals, to limit the use of schools for military purposes. Non-state armed groups have also taken measures to safeguard education. In October 2022, several groups operating in Burkina Faso signed unilateral declarations committing to protect educational institutions. In Yemen, the Houthis – who control the capital and other parts of the country – signed an action plan in 2022 to end attacks on schools along with other grave violations against children.
“Despite the chilling statistics on attacks on education and the staggering loss of life and potential that these numbers represent, there is still much hope,” Nijhowne said. “The Safe Schools Declaration and its guidelines on military use of schools provide a roadmap for preserving the lives and futures of students and teachers, and the communities they build. On this International Day to Protect Education from Attack, all countries should endorse the Declaration and put its commitments into action.”
Notes to editors:
The Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) is a coalition of UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations working in the fields of education in emergencies, protection, and higher education. GCPEA is grateful for the support it receives from the Education Above All Foundation (EAA), Education Cannot Wait (ECW), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an anonymous donor..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-09-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Theory and practice of education - global (profiles and books), Human Rights Reporting (global, regional and Myanmar), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"As world leaders gather for the G20 summit in New Delhi this weekend, Burma Campaign UK is calling on G20 members to put pressure on Prime Minister Modi over India arming, financing, and providing diplomatic support for the Myanmar/Burmese military.
A report earlier this year by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation in Myanmar revealed that India-based entities have supplied $51 million worth of arms and related materials to the military since February 2021.
Indian companies have entered into business relationships with the military or are working for the Burmese military, helping to finance the military and providing it with technology enabling it to arrest human rights and democracy activists.
Diplomatically, India has been working regionally to undermine ASEAN’s five-point consensus and assist the military in gaining the international legitimacy it craves, while also attempting to protect the military at a global level, including at the UN Security Council, negotiating to weaken a resolution on Burma and then refusing to vote in favour of it.
The Burmese military were already facing charges of genocide and crimes against humanity even before their attempted coup began in 2021, and India continued to arm them despite this. Since the coup, United Nations investigators have said the military is committing an increasing number of human rights violations which could be classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Numerous Burmese civil society organisations have documented daily atrocities by the Burmese military.
More than 2 million people have been forced to flee their homes, thousands killed and almost 25,000 arrested. Airstrikes and long-range artillery are used to target schools, hospitals, homes and religious buildings.
India has been mistreating refugees from Burma, refusing to give them legal sanctuary and arresting, beating and detaining refugees, and threatening them with deportation.
“We have seen a succession of world leaders visiting India and failing to challenge Modi on his support for the Burmese military,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. “The G20 is an opportunity for world leaders to come together and collectively pressure Modi to stop arming the Burmese military. Modi must not be allowed to use the summit to promote himself while at the same time arming a military which bombs schools and hospitals.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-09-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
more
Description:
"Announcement Regarding Local and Overseas Employment Agencies
In Myanmar, the military junta has damaged several sectors of the country, including the economy, education, health, and education in all aspects. And the entire population is facing numerous tragedies as a result of the military council's oppression, which includes violence and violations of human rights.
Insecurity in the country as a result of the military's illegal actions; businesses are unable to function efficiently, employment opportunities are scarce, and living conditions are getting challenging as a result of high commodity prices. As a result, people are attempting to find job in other countries by contacting overseas recruitment agencies. Taking advantage of this possibility, certain agencies perpetrate exploitation by taking massive service fees from people's sweat money; getting money fraudulently; brokers have been found to be involved in illegal recruitment and sending people through illegal channels.
Local and overseas employment agencies are obliged to take the following responsibilities in accordance with their code of conduct: to charge reasonable fees for job search and matching services, to ensure safe and secure migration, convenience of workers in the destination country's workplace, full labour rights, and not to be exploited. If workers' rights are violated and labour problems arise, the agencies that provided them with services must assist and resolve them as soon as possible. In this regard, the Ministry of Labour of the National Unity Government released an announcement No. (4/2022) on 31-3-2022 outlining the instructions to be followed by employment agencies.
According to the announcement, remaining employment agencies that have not yet registered with the Ministry of Labour of the National Unity Government are encouraged to contact the ministry's email: [email protected] and register by 15-10-2023 in order to engage in the Myanmar democracy movement. Registered agencies will be granted a licence and approved to operate after an investigation for violations of existing laws and the agencies' code of conduct when public administration resumes.
Furthermore, it is warned for the last time that the Ministry of Labour of the National Unity Government has been recording a list of ethical and legal violations by certain agencies and recruitment brokers, as well as a list of agencies supporting the continuation of the military dictatorship in collaboration with the military junta, and the blacklist will be announced, and action will be taken in accordance with the law in the implementation
of interim justice..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Labour issues in Burma
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
30.8 KB 403.91 KB
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Description:
"ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပ အလုပ်အကိုင်အကျိုးဆောင်အေဂျင်စီများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် အသိပေး ကြေညာချက်
၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကြောင့် တိုင်းပြည်၏ စီးပွားရေး၊ ပညာရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေး၊ လှုမှုရေး စသည့် ကဏ္ဍအသီးသီးတွင် အဘက်ဘက်မှ ယိုယွင်းပျက်စီးနေပြီး ပြည်သူ လူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးသည် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ နည်းလမ်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်မှု၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကြောင့် ဘေးဒုက္ခမျိုးစုံရင်ဆိုင်ခံစားနေကြရပါသည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဥပဒေမဲ့လုပ်ရပ်များကြောင့် ပြည်တွင်း၌ လုံခြုံမှုကင်းမဲ့ခြင်း၊ စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ ကောင်းစွာလည်ပတ်နိုင်မှု မရှိ၍ အလုပ်အကိုင်အခွင့်အလမ်းများ ရှားပါး လာခြင်းနှင့် ကုန်ဈေးနှုန်း ကြီးမြင့်မှုကြောင့် စားဝတ်နေရေး ခက်ခဲလာခြင်းတို့ ဖြစ်ပေါ်လျက်ရှိရာ ပြည်သူများသည် ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင်အကျိုးဆောင်အေဂျင်စီများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်၍ ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံ များသို့ ထွက်ခွာ အလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိရာ ဤအခြေအနေကို အခွင့်ကောင်းယူပြီး အေဂျင်စီအချို့သည် ပြည်သူတို့၏ ချွေးနည်းစာမှ ဝန်ဆောင်ခများ အဆမတန်ကောက်ခံ၍ ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ် အမြတ်ထုတ်ခြင်း၊ ငွေကြေးလိမ်လည်ရယူခြင်း၊ လုပ်သားစုဆောင်းသူ ပွဲစားများသည် တရားမဝင် လူစုဆောင်းခြင်းနှင့် တရားမဝင် နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ပို့ဆောင်ခြင်းတို့ ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိ သည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။
၃။ ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင်အကျိုးဆောင်အေဂျင်စီများအနေဖြင့် အလုပ်အကိုင်ရှာဖွေ ချိတ်ဆက်ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးရာတွင် သင့်တော်သည့် ဝန်ဆောင်ခယူ၍ ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံသည့် ရွှေ့ပြောင်းသွားလာမှုများ ဖြစ်စေရေး၊ ဆိုက်ရောက်နိုင်ငံလုပ်ငန်းခွင်တွင် အလုပ်သမားများ၏ အလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင်မှု အဆင်ပြေရေး၊ အခွင့်အရေး အပြည့်အဝရရှိစေရေး၊ နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးမှုများ မရှိစေ ရေးစသည့် အေဂျင်စီများ လိုက်နာရမည့် ကျင့်ဝတ်များနှင့်အညီ တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု ရှိစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်၊ မိမိတို့တာဝန်ယူ အကျိုးဆောင်ခဲ့သည့် အလုပ်သမားများ၏ အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုများနှင့် အလုပ်သမားရေးရာ ပြဿနာများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်ပါက အချိန်နှင့် တစ်ပြေးညီ လိုက်ပါကူညီဖြေရှင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ် သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပ အလုပ်အကိုင်အကျိုးဆောင်အေဂျင်စီများ လိုက်နာ ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့် အချက်များနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ၃၁-၃-၂၀၂၂ ရက်စွဲပါ ကြေညာချက်အမှတ်(၄/၂၀၂၂) ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်အသိပေးကြေညာခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ အဆိုပါ ကြေညာချက်နှင့်အညီ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန တွင် မှတ်ပုံတင် (Register) ပြုလုပ်ရန် ကျန်ရှိသည့် အလုပ်အကိုင်အကျိုးဆောင် အေဂျင်စီများ အနေဖြင့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ email: [email protected] သို့ ဆက်သွယ်ပြီး ၁၅-၁၀-၂၀၂၃ ရက်နေ့ နောက်ဆုံးထား၍ မှတ်ပုံတင် စာရင်းသွင်းကြရန်နှင့် မြန်မာ့ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါကြောင်း၊ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ပြန်လည်စတင်ချိန်တွင် မှတ်ပုံတင်စာရင်း ပေးသွင်းထားသည့် အေဂျင်စီများကို တည်ဆဲဥပဒေနှင့် ကျင့်ဝတ်များ ချိုးဖောက်ထားမှု ရှိ၊ မရှိ စိစစ်ပြီးမှသာ လိုင်စင်ထုတ်ပေးပြီး လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်ခွင့်ပြုမည်ဖြစ် ကြောင်း ထပ်မံအသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ထို့ပြင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် အေဂျင်စီအချို့နှင့် လုပ်သားစုဆောင်းသူပွဲစားများ၏ ကျင့်ဝတ်ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့်ပူးပေါင်း ကာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် တည်မြဲရေး ကူညီပံ့ပိုးနေသည့် အေဂျင်စီများကို စနစ်တကျ စာရင်းပြုစု ထားရှိပြီး အမည်ပျက်စာရင်း (Blacklist) ကြေညာ၍ ကြားကာလတရားမျှတမှု ဖော်ဆောင်ရာ တွင် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း နောက်ဆုံးအကြိမ် သတိပေးလိုက်သည်။
အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Labour issues in Burma
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Sub-title:
Junta leaders are blaming saboteurs and speculators for inflation and devaluation caused by their mismanagement.
Description:
"Amid the news of escalating violence, it’s easy to lose sight of two events in August 2023 that exposed the Myanmar military regime’s vulnerability.
First, in a video message to the Moscow International Security Conference, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing complained about the weaponization of the dollar.
Second, the August appointment of Lt Gen Nyo Saw to two special commissions on trade and foreign exchange that report directly to junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. Saw is a close confidant, but as the chairman of military-owned conglomerate Myanma Economic Corporation (MEC) and a director of military’s other holding company, Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd (MEHL), he’s also the military’s most experienced economic and business expert.
It’s hard to overstate just how bad Myanmar’s economy is. Although the World Bank predicts GDP to grow at 2 to 3% this year, the economy has contracted by 12% since January 2021. A decade’s worth of economic growth was eviscerated.
Nearly 60% of the population is now living beneath the poverty line, and the World Bank is warning about food insecurity across the country. Between war, climate change, and currency controls that limited the amount of the imports of fertilizer and pesticides, agricultural production is down.
Although 2022-23 saw $1.6 billion in pledged foreign investment – almost all of which was from China or boomerang Myanmar investment via Singapore and Hong Kong – far less was actually realized. Other foreign investors are pulling out, citing poor market conditions, pressure from activists, and reputational costs. This has diminished the corporate tax base.
With the exception of gas and oil sales to Thailand and China, exports have been hard hit. According to the military government’s Ministry of Commerce, in the first eight months of 2022, total exports reached $6.57 billion, giving the country a $172 million trade surplus.
In the same period in 2023, total exports dropped by 9.8% to $5.93 billion, with a $500 million trade deficit. But if one disaggregates border trade, it’s even worse.
Currency control confusion
Exports to overseas markets fell by 21%. And it will worsen as key manufacturers, such as clothing makers H&M, Primark, and Inditex,- have left. Some retailers are now shunning Myanmar gemstones.
Trade has been hard hit by a series of hastily implemented currency controls that change regularly, upsetting businesses. Some of the more recent currency controls have forced any individual or business with more than $10,000, without a permit, to purchase the kyat currency at the official exchange rate of 2,100 to the U.S. dollar.
The black market rate for the greenback is 3,900 kyat , a 300% decline in the value of the currency since the Feb. 1, 2021 coup.
Myanmar’s banks are increasingly isolated. U.S. sanctions on Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, which were responsible for the clearing of most U.S. dollar transactions, have forced costly workarounds, such as establishing new shell companies and bank accounts.
Singapore’s United Overseas Bank Limited (UOB) announced that they would close the accounts of Myanmar, and had already stopped providing banking services for Myanmar Airways International. Other Singapore banks are expected to follow suit, following signaling from the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the additional reporting requirements due to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist. A Bangladesh bank froze the accounts of the two sanctioned banks.
Government revenue is flat or declining. While officially a secret, projections built into the annual Union Taxation Law paint a grim picture. The Internal Revenue Department has warned that revenue from lotteries, income tax, corporate taxes, natural resource rents, and customs duties have all stayed flat or contracted since the coup; only rents from oil and gas exports have gone up. Tax authorities are now specifically hitting medical professionals with preemptive taxes.
According to data compiled by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), the Central Bank of Myanmar has compelled banks, state-owned enterprises and insurance companies to buy an estimated 26.5 trillion kyat in bonds, $3.1 billion at the black market rate, since the coup. With an inability to repay, and an NUG pledge that the bonds will not be honored, these are additional liabilities for banks that are already saddled with non-performing loans.
The regime is broke and may have turned on the printing presses. The NUG estimates that the military government has printed up to 20 trillion kyat, roughly $5.1 billion at black market rates, since the coup, partially explaining the high inflation.
Sanctions take a bite
In July 2023, the junta issued a K20,000 note, the highest denomination, creating an inflationary spike and a further decline in the currency’s value. It’s supposed to be a limited issue currency, but with 14% inflation, a higher denominated note may be required.
While international sanctions have not resulted in a massive seizure of funds, they’ve not been insignificant either. The U.S.immediately froze $1.1 billion of Central Bank of Myanmar assets following the coup. The European Union froze $503 million when it sanctioned the Ministry of Oil and Gas Enterprise. More importantly, the sanctions have made everything harder for the junta.
The NUG has identified 13 other banks around the world that are holding some $5.5 billion in Central Bank of Myanmar assets, 67% of which are in nine banks in Singapore. Should the NUG ever convince the Singapore government to freeze those assets, it would deliver the coup de grâce.
This degree of economic mismanagement is a crime in itself, right up there with the military’s daily war crimes. The economy is the regime’s Achilles heel and they don’t have the competence to fix it. Their penchant for control has brought banking to a standstill.
An August meeting of the central bank and other top ministries tapped an intelligence agency to lead an investigation into the high rates of inflation and depreciating kyat. Meanwhile, the regime has revoked the licenses of 30 foreign exchange traders.
This says so much about the junta’s way of thinking. They are oblivious to the fact that it’s their mismanagement that has caused both depreciation and inflation, yet the benighted and paranoid military is convinced that it’s the work of saboteurs and speculators.
All the while, the generals are doing everything they can to enrich themselves and move assets overseas, before it all comes crumbling down..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-09-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
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Description:
"The civilian death toll in Myanmar since the February 2021 coup surpassed 4,000 as of August 24 as the junta escalated its campaign of atrocities against its own people, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which monitors civilian casualties and arrests by the regime.
Number of post-coup civilian deaths in states and regions as of August 24, 2023
At least 1,080 civilians were killed between January 1 and August 24 of this year, as the junta intensified attacks on civilian targets, the AAPP estimated.
An average of 130 civilians are killed each month by junta airstrikes, shelling, gunfire and other methods, it said.
Junta forces killed nearly 3,000 civilians between February 1, 2021 and December 31, 2022.
Estimated number of civilians killed in Myanmar so far this year (by gender)
Graphic: The Irrawaddy Source: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
The resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region suffered the highest number of civilian causalities as junta troops conducted frequent raids, massacres, indiscriminate shelling and airstrikes in both rural and urban areas.
Estimated number of civilian deaths by month so far this year
Graphic: The Irrawaddy Source: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Nearly 1,800 civilians were killed in Sagaing (45 percent of the total civilian death toll) while tens of thousands of homes were incinerated in the region by junta forces since the military takeover.
So far this year, more than 600 women civilians were killed and 18 rape cases were reported, the AAPP reported..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-09-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 22 to 31, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kachin State, and Kayah State from August 22nd to 31st. Military Junta arrested over 30 civilians including 2 children and used them as human shields in Kachin State. They also arrested, tortured, and killed over 20 civilians from the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kachin State, and Shan State. A woman from Wetlet Township was raped and killed by the Military’s Junta on August 26th.
The Head of the Prison who works under the Military Junta sued 33 political prisoners from Pathein Prison again with 2 more Penal codes. At least an underage child died and 4 were injured by the Military’s light and heavy attacks within a week. Civilians were forced to leave their places at least 6 times within a week by the Military Junta troops marching in the regions..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-09-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
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177.59 KB 144.68 KB 297.43 KB
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Description:
"Justice For Myanmar spoofs Forbes 30 Under 30 to profile tycoons funnelling funds, arms and related equipment from Singapore to illegitimate junta
Justice For Myanmar today launched a new effort to draw attention to tycoons supporting the illegal Myanmar military junta. The inaugural Dirty Over 30 list features nine tycoons who continue to funnel funds, arms and related equipment to the junta through the “business-friendly” haven of Singapore, which is currently the third-largest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military. Future editions will feature tycoons in other regions who are enabling and profiting from the crisis in Myanmar.
The campaign is launching ahead of the 2023 ASEAN Summit in Indonesia to pressure Singapore and other ASEAN member countries to more effectively block the movement of funds and arms to the Myanmar junta.
Meet nine paragons of dirty business
The Dirty Over 30 Singapore edition includes nine businesspeople who’ve amassed sizable fortunes funding brutality, mass-murder and war crimes in Myanmar and who continue to do business in Singapore. They include:
Tay Za, Founder and Chairperson, Htoo Group of Companies
Naing Htut Aung, Founder and Managing Director, International Gateways Group of Companies
Aung Hlaing Oo, Founder and Managing Director, Myanmar Chemical & Machinery Group
Aung Moe Myint, Founder and Director, Dynasty Group of Companies
Tun Min Latt, Founder and Managing Director, Star Sapphire Group of Companies
Khin Phyu Win, Founder and Director, Asia Sun Group of Companies
Jonathan Myo Kyaw Thaung, CEO, KT Group
Thein Win Zaw, Founder and Chairperson, Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies
George Yin Soon, Investor
The Dirty Over 30 list parodies the Forbes 30 Under 30 list. Portraits of the Dirty Over 30 “dishonourees” were created using real photos and sophisticated AI facial composites. The profiles include factual details about their lives and dirty business dealings. Notably, in what has been called the “30 Under 30 pipeline to prison,” the pattern of unethical and illegal behaviour amongst “honourees” of the Forbes 30 Under 30 list suggests that the profiteers on the Dirty Over 30 list may not be outliers in the business world.
Putting pressure on the Singaporean government
The Singaporean government has already committed publicly to stopping the movement of arms to Myanmar, but so far their efforts have fallen short. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation in Myanmar identifies 138 unique suppliers in Singapore doing $247 million worth of trade with the Myanmar military. The report concludes that if the Singaporean government successfully stopped all arms trading to the Myanmar military from its jurisdiction, it would “significantly disrupt” the junta’s ability to commit war crimes.
Since the coup attempt in 2021, the Myanmar military has killed at least 4,023 people, including children, committed widespread torture and has arbitrarily arrested over 24,000 people. Many have been killed through indiscriminate airstrikes that require a continued supply of aircraft parts, jet fuel and raw materials that the military needs to manufacture bombs and bullets. It has jailed and tortured countless others.
With the Dirty Over 30 project, Justice For Myanmar calls on Singapore to:
Introduce sanctions to stop the direct and indirect transfer of arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military.
Block the junta’s access to Singapore’s financial system through targeted sanctions, including on junta banks.
Expedite and make public ongoing investigations into Singaporean companies that have supplied arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military.
Push for more sanctions from other ASEAN countries on the Myanmar military and entities that transact business with it..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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120.53 KB 144.68 KB
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Description:
"Justice For Myanmar and The Sentry welcome the recent adoption of sanctions by the United States on two Myanmar state-owned banks, the issuance of a determination on the jet fuel sector, and sanctions targeting a supplier of jet fuel to the Myanmar military. These measures are designed to further weaken the Myanmar junta's ability to access the weapons that it uses in the brutal war it is waging against the country’s population, including through indiscriminate airstrikes.
As global leaders are about to meet in Myanmar’s region, first for meetings with ASEAN in Indonesia from September 2-7 and then for the G20 summit in India from September 9-10, The Sentry and Justice For Myanmar reiterate their call for the US and likeminded partners to take the gloves off and adopt much stronger sanctions on the Myanmar junta and its enablers. The US’s show of resolve would be significantly strengthened by joining the European Union in sanctioning the Myanma Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the junta’s single largest source of foreign currency earnings.
The US and its partners have already improved coordination to more effectively target military-owned businesses, state-owned enterprises, and networks of individuals and corporate entities that enable the junta’s access to international trade and finance. However, this coordination is far from comprehensive, creating loopholes for the junta and its networks of enablers.
For instance, while the US has sanctioned the Star Sapphire Group of Companies’ co-owners, Tun Min Latt and his wife Win Min Soe, for their firms’ involvement with the import of military equipment, the United Kingdom has not sanctioned Win Min Soe to date, and other US partners including the EU, Canada, and Australia have yet to adopt sanctions on the Star Sapphire companies and their co-owners. At the time of his arrest by the Thai police in Bangkok in September 2022 on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering, Tun Min Latt held assets in the names of the two adult children of Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the Myanmar junta, according to Justice For Myanmar and Reuters. These assets included the property deed for a luxury condominium and bankbooks for Thai bank accounts.
The US should urge the newly elected leader of its longtime ally Thailand to effectively enforce sanctions targeting the junta’s sources of funds, equipment, and jet fuel, and to more broadly ramp up the fight against illicit financial flows, as the crisis in Myanmar and other regional trends lead to the rise of transnational crime in the Mekong region. Enhanced collaboration between regulatory authorities, law enforcement agencies, and banks—the latter acting as gatekeepers to the international financial system—is essential in that regard.
Singaporean banks have reportedly strengthened their compliance and risk management measures toward Myanmar since the coup. It was stated during parliamentary questions in July 2023 that, “as Myanmar is on the blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force [FATF], financial institutions in Singapore have also been applying enhanced due diligence for Myanmar-linked customers and transactions that present higher risks.” A media report in August 2023 revealed that United Overseas Bank (UOB), a key offshore bank for “Myanmar’s generals, big corporations and wealthy individuals,” would be restricting transactions and correspondent banking relationships, partly to avoid falling foul of mounting US sanctions on the country. Justice For Myanmar and The Sentry welcome these positive steps, and the US should continue to support Singapore, which currently chairs the FATF, in its efforts to prevent illicit financial flows, including as related to Myanmar. Other Singaporean banks, while avoiding de-risking that could potentially impact on humanitarian aid as well as on trade and business activities that do not benefit the junta, should follow UOB in restricting transactions and correspondent banking relationships, and Singapore authorities should adopt further restrictive measures to prevent the junta’s access to funds and equipment.
Finally, the US needs to encourage its partners in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to step up their responses to the crisis in Myanmar. Quad member Australia has only targeted a small number of entities and individuals in February 2023; in coordination with the US and other partners, it should do more to catch up. The US should encourage Japan, which chairs the G7 in 2023, to coordinate with ASEAN to ensure that no junta representatives are invited to the December 2023 summit in Tokyo that celebrates the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the regional organization. As for India, the US must call for the sale of military equipment to the Myanmar junta to be fully suspended, as research by Justice For Myanmar has found that several Indian firms, including ones controlled by New Delhi, have supplied the junta after the coup. The Quad can and must do more to tackle the crisis in Myanmar.
Yadanar Maung, spokesperson, stated for Justice For Myanmar: “The international community is failing the people of Myanmar. Statements of concern and condemnation have had no impact on the illegitimate junta and the daily atrocities it is committing against the people of Myanmar. Instead, governments and international organizations need to take concrete steps to block the junta’s access to the resources it needs to continue its campaign of terror and ensure that there is international accountability for the military’s genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”
Oliver Windridge, Director of Illicit Finance Policy at The Sentry, said: “The recent adoption of sanctions by the United States on two Myanmar state-owned banks, the issuance of a determination on the jet fuel sector, and sanctions targeting a supplier of jet fuel supplier to the Myanmar military are positive steps forward, but more must be done. As global leaders meet in Myanmar’s region for meetings with ASEAN and then for the G20 summit, The Sentry and Justice For Myanmar reiterate their call for the US and likeminded partner to take the gloves off and adopt much stronger sanctions targeted at the Myanmar junta and its enablers.”
For media inquiries or interview requests for The Sentry, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, [email protected]
For media inquiries for Justice For Myanmar, please contact: Yadanar Maung, Spokesperson, [email protected]
About Justice For Myanmar
Justice For Myanmar is a covert group of activists using research, data visualisation, and reporting to expose and dismantle the business networks that fuel brutality, corruption and mass-scale suffering. One report at a time, Justice For Myanmar is going after the military’s sources of funds and arms. As a result of its work and the work of many others across Myanmar and the world, multinational corporations have already divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military, and targeted sanctions are beginning to disrupt the Myanmar military cartel's global network.
About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption”)
The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and "other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"(Geneva, August 31 2023) – The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) condemns new use of cluster munitions by the Myanmar government’s armed forces and calls for an immediate end to use of this prohibited weapon. A new report by the CMC’s monitoring wing shows how Myanmar’s armed forces have used an apparently domestically produced cluster bomb in attacks in several parts of the country since 2021, including as recently as early June 2023.
“Myanmar’s production and use of cluster bombs is gravely concerning as these indiscriminate weapons primarily kill and injure civilians. There can be no justification for using them,” said Dr. Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Cluster Munition Monitor researcher. “All governments should condemn this use of an internationally-banned weapon.”
Cluster munitions are delivered by artillery, rockets, missiles, and aircraft. They open in mid-air and disperse dozens or hundreds of submunitions, also called bomblets, over a wide area. Many submunitions fail to explode on initial impact, leaving duds that can indiscriminately wound and kill, like landmines, for years until they are cleared and destroyed. A total of 123 countries have prohibited the weapon under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, but not Myanmar.
Cluster Munition Monitor has reviewed photographs showing the remnants of cluster bombs used in attacks by the Myanmar Air Force in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states over the past 13 months. The most recent known cluster bomb attack by the Myanmar Air Force damaged a school in Kedong village tract in Kawkareik township, Kayin/Karen state on 6 June 2023. Another attack in Mindat township, Chin state in April 2023 also involved cluster bomb use. Remnants of this same type of cluster bomb were previously found in the same township after a July 2022 air attack that wounded 13 civilians, according to Amnesty International.
These attacks are part of an internal conflict that has intensified in recent months in both northwest and southeast Myanmar, resulting in civilian casualties, widespread destruction of homes and other civilian objects, and displacing people. The conflict has also been characterized by extensive new use of antipersonnel landmines by all parties.
The cluster bombs used by the Air Force look similar to other products made by Myanmar’s state-owned weapons production facility “KaPaSa” or Defence Products Industries of Myanmar, but there are no markings on the bomb remnants that show where they were manufactured or assembled.
The weapon consists of a 120mm mortar projectile with a plastic arming vane that is attached to an impact fuze that detonates each submunition on contact. Each cluster bomb has space for 12 mortar projectiles or submunitions on an internal frame. This weapon appears to meet the definition of a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which prohibits a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms each.”
Myanmar is not known to have produced or used cluster munitions previously, although a rudimentary cluster munition adaptor was documented a decade ago. (See Cluster Munition Monitor 2013).
The Cluster Munition Monitor hs asked Myanmar's Ministry of Defence to confirm or deny its production and use of cluster bombs. No response was received as of time of publication.
At the United Nations General Assembly in November 2019, Myanmar said that it could not join the convention until a nationwide peace agreement is in place. In 2009, a Myanmar government official told a regional meeting that its forces “do not use cluster munitions.”
For further information see Cluster Munition Monitor briefing note [link].
Ends.
Note: The military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, but many ethnic groups in Myanmar’s border areas and a number of countries still prefer to use the name Burma.
About ICBL-CMC
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC) works for a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war, where all lives are protected. A world where contaminated land is cleared and returned to local populations for productive use and where the needs of affected communities and survivors are met and their human rights guaranteed.
About the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (The Monitor) The Monitor is the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC).
Cluster Munition Monitor 14th annual edition to be released on 5 September 2023 will provide a global overview of recent efforts to implement and join the ban on cluster munitions, ensure clearance of cluster munition remnants, provide risk education, and assist victims of these indiscriminate weapons.
About the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
The convention comprehensively prohibits cluster munitions, requires destruction of stockpiles, clearance of contaminated areas, and the provision of risk reduction education and assistance for victims of the weapons. As of July 2023, 123 countries have joined the convention..."
Source/publisher:
Cluster Munition Coalition, International Campaign to Ban Landmines
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Reports and maps covering anti-personnel landmines and Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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pdf pdf
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567.93 KB 470.19 KB
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Description:
"RE: ASEAN members and their dialogue partners are urged to end Burma/Myanmar military’s access to jet fuel and weapons ahead of ASEAN summit
Your excellencies,
We, the undersigned 149 organizations, are writing to urge prompt, coordinated actions of governments of ASEAN and ASEAN dialogue partners to bring an end to the ongoing atrocities perpetrated daily by the Burmese military.
It has been more than two years since the illegal military coup deposed Burma’s democratically-elected leaders. In that time, ASEAN and its partner governments, including the EU, US, Japan, South Korea and Australia, have failed to take sufficient actions to hold the military to account, implement the “Five Point Consensus,” and end the violence.
From September 5-7, your government will participate in the ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. We urge you to work with all government representatives present at the Summit to deliver the following:
1. A joint call from ASEAN and ASEAN dialogue partners calling for the United Nations Security Council to demonstrate their support of ASEAN, the Five-Point Consensus, and the people of Burma by keeping the situation in Burma on the agenda and introducing resolution that calls for regular meetings and an arms embargo, including a ban on aviation fuel.
2. A joint release from ASEAN governments announcing: a commitment to preventing the junta from procuring aviation fuel. This includes:
Classifying aviation fuel as a “dual-use technology” under applicable local laws;
Banning the shipment or transshipment of aviation fuel through ports in ASEAN member states;
Banning companies located in ASEAN member-states from selling or transporting aviation fuel to any entity in Myanmar; and
Banning the provision of financial services, such as maritime shipping insurance, to companies or vessels transporting aviation fuel to Burma.
3. A joint commitment from ASEAN members to further restrict the military junta’s access to funding and the international banking system. U.S. sanctions on the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank have given ASEAN members legal cover to prevent their banks from transmitting money to the junta. ASEAN members should work with their domestic monetary authorities to ensure that domiciled banks are not making or processing payments to the junta and its affiliated entities.
The junta is using aerial attacks to target civilian-populated areas, including IDPs hiding places, and initiate conflict with local ethnic groups. In the first four months of 2023, there were 442 airstrikes. This nearly eclipses the total number of airstrikes conducted in all of 2022, which was 449.
On July 27, two schools in Karenni State were damaged due to airstrikes, with many villagers emphasizing the intentionality behind the attacks: “When they [the military] can’t establish the educational and administrative systems they want, they resort to attacking schools, hindering Karenni children from learning.” Children from Karen state have been forced to seek refuge in the seven refugee camps that line the Thai-Burma border after military attacks increased the number of school-aged refugees from 16,000 to 21,000 in just one year.
In Kachin state, military planes drop bombs in villages, killing civilians. Civilians in Shan state were killed after the military bombed villages believed to be hiding local soldiers, an accusation later disproved. In late July, over 3,000 civilians were forcibly displaced from central Burma’s Sagaing region over the span of five days of military fighting.
As the civilian death toll rises and the number of refugees and internally displaced peoples increases, it is impossible to deny that access to jet fuel is critical to support the military’s campaign of violence.
Yet governments have failed to act and companies continue to facilitate the military’s access to jet fuel. In November 2022, Amnesty International’s report, Deadly Cargo, linked jet fuel access to increasing human rights abuses; but only months later, Global Witness and Amnesty International revealed the names of several companies, including, but not limited to, Thai, Indian, and Japanese, that were still engaging in the shipment of jet fuel to the Burmese junta in March 2023. The engagement of these companies makes them complicit in the human rights abuses committed by the Burmese junta via aerial attacks throughout the country.
The United States and United Kingdom have both placed sanctions on Burmese and Singaporean entities accused of facilitating the trade in aviation fuel, while the U.S. has issued a regulatory determination threatening further sanctions against companies involved in the sale of aviation fuel into Burma. We strongly encourage ASEAN member-states to support these sanctions and work with international partners to end the trade of aviation fuel in Burma.
ASEAN, the UN, and other governments have failed the people of Burma for far too long. The country is in desperate need of support beyond arbitrary condemnations. We urge you to stand on the right side of history and act with urgency to hold the military accountable for its crimes and bring Burma the peace and justice the people of Burma deserve.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ah Nah Podcast – Conversations with Myanmar, Ireland
ALTSEAN-Burma, Thailand
American Baptist Churches, KS, USA
American Baptist Churches, OH, USA
Arizona Kachin Community, AZ, USA
Australian Karen Organisation Inc
Bangladesh Rohingya Student Union (BRSU)
Better Burma, CA, USA
Burma Action Ireland
Burma Advocacy Group, USA
Burma Campaign UK
Burma Canadian Association of Ontario
Burma Task Force, IL, USA
Burmese American Community Institute, IN, USA
Burmese Women’s Union (BWU), Thailand
California Kachin Community, CA, USA
Calvary Burmese Church, Washington, DC
Campaign for a New Myanmar, Washington, DC, USA
Chin Association of Maryland, Inc. MD, USA
Chin Baptist Association, MD, USA
Community Rebuilding Centre, Bangladesh
Coordination Team for Emergency Relief (Karenni), Burma
Crane Center for Prevention of Mass Atrocities, CA, USA
CRPH Funding Ireland
Dallas Kachin Community, TX, USA
DEEKU-Karenni Community of Amarillo, TX, USA
Det Norsk Baptistsamfunn, Norway
DFW Kachin Baptist Church, TX
EarthRights International, Washington, DC, USA
European Karen Network, Norway
Florida Kachin Community, FL, USA
Free Burma Campaign South Africa
Georgia Kachin Community, GA, USA
Give A Helping Hand, Norway
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, NY, USA
Houston Kachin Community, TX, USA
Human Rights Foundation of Monland, Burma
Humanity Institute, Burma
Institute for Asian Democracy, Washington, DC. USA
International Campaign for the Rohingya, Washington, DC, USA
International Karen Organization, PA, USA
Iowa Kachin Community, IA, USA
Jewish World Watch, CA, USA
Justice For All, Washington, DC. USA
K’Nyaw Baptist Church, MN
Kachin American Community (Portland – Vancouver)
Kachin Baptist Churches, MD, USA
Kachin Community of Indiana, IN, USA
Kachin Community of USA
Kachin Contextual Analysis Team, Burma
Kachin refugee committee, Malaysia
Kachin Women’s Association Thailand
Kansas Karenni community, KS, USA
Karen American Association of Wisconsin, WI, USA
Karen Association of Huron, SD, USA
Karen Baptist Church, CO
Karen Community of Canada
Karen Community in Norway
Karen Community of Akron, OH, USA
Karen Community of Georgia, GA, USA
Karen Community of Greensboro, NC, USA
Karen Community of Iowa, IA, USA
Karen Community of Kansas City, KS & MO, USA
Karen Community of Minnesota, MN, USA
Karen Human Rights Group, Burma
Karen Organization of Illinois, IL, USA
Karen Peace Support Network, Thailand
Karen Women’s Organization (KWO), Thailand
Karen Youth Education Pathways, Washington, DC, USA
Karen Youth Network, Burma
Karenni Community of Arizona, AZ, USA
Karenni Community of Arkensas, AK, USA
Karenni Community of Austin, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Bowling Green, KY, USA
Karenni Community of Buffalo, NY, USA
Karenni Community of Chicago, IL, USA
Karenni Community of Colorado, CO, USA
Karenni Community of Dallas, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Des Moines, IA, USA
Karenni Community of Florida, FL, USA
Karenni Community of Fort Worth, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Georgia, GA, USA
Karenni Community of Houston, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Idaho, ID, USA
Karenni Community of Indianapolis, IN, USA
Karenni Community of Massachusetts, MA, USA
Karenni Community of Michigan, MI, USA
Karenni community of Minnesota, MN, USA
Karenni Community of Missouri, MO, USA
Karenni Community of North Carolina, NC, USA
Karenni Community of Portland, OR, USA
Karenni Community of Rockford, IL, USA
Karenni Community of San Antonio, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Sioux Falls, SD, USA
Karenni Community of Utah, UT, USA
Karenni Community of Utica, NY, USA
Karenni Community of Washington, WA, USA
Karenni Community of Wisconsin, WI, USA
Karenni Human Rights Group, Burma
Karenni National Women’s Organization (KNWO), Thailand
Karenni Society of Omaha, NE, USA
Karenni-American Association, USA, USA
Kayan Women’s Organization (KyWO), Burma
Kentucky Kachin Community, KY, USA
Kuki Women’s Human Rights Organization (KWHRO), Burma
L’chaim! Jews Against the Death Penalty
Lahu Women’s Organization (LWO)
Louisiana Kachin Community, LA, USA
Maryland Kachin Community, MD, USA
Michigan Kachin Community, MI, USA
Milwaukee Myanmar Christian Church, WI, USA
Mingalarama Wiharra Monastery, MD, USA
Minnesota Kachin Community, MN, USA
Myanmar Campaign Network, Australia
Myanmar Christian Church of Metro Chicago, IL, USA
Never Again Coalition, OR, USA
New York Kachin Community, NY, USA
No Business With Genocide, Washington, DC, USA
North Carolina Kachin Community, NA, USA
NUG and CRPH Supporters Ireland
Omaha Kachin Community, NE, USA
Overseas Burmese Christian Fellowship, MA
Pa-O Women’s Union (PWU), Burma
Peace and Justice Committee, KY, USA
Pennsylvania Kachin Community, PA, USA
Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association
Rohingya Action Ireland
Rohingya Students Network, Bangladesh
Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), Thailand
South Carolina Kachin Community, SC, USA
Ta’ang Women’s Organization (TWO), Burma
Tavoy Women’s Union (TWU)
Temple Beth Tikvah, Roswell, GA
Temple Habonim, Barrington, RI
Tennessee Kachin Community, TN, USA
U.S. Campaign for Burma, Washington, DC, USA
Unitarian Universalist Association, NY, USA
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, MA, USA
Unitarian Universalist Women’s Federation, WI, USA
United States Chin Coalition, IN, USA
UU College of Social Justice, MA, USA
UU Mass Action, MA, USA
UU Society of Oneonta NY, USA
Virginia Kachin Community, VA, USA
Washington Kachin Community, WA, USA
West Virginia Kachin Community, WV, USA
Women for Justice (WJ), Burma
Women’s League of Burma, Thailand
Women’s Peace Network, Washington, DC. USA..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Kachin Women's Association Thailand, Karen Human Rights Group, Shan Women's Action Network
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"ASEAN is planning to hold a conference of air force chiefs in Naypyidaw from September 12-15, chaired by the commander-in-chief of the illegal Myanmar junta’s air force, according to a Justice For Myanmar source.
Justice For Myanmar demands ASEAN cancel the conference and strongly condemns the bloc’s continued and direct support for the Myanmar junta’s air force, army and navy as it wages a campaign of terror against the people, committing ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
The ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference (AACC) is currently chaired by the junta’s air force head, General Htun Aung, a war criminal who has commanded indiscriminate air strikes across Myanmar since his appointment in January 2022.
Evidence of Htun Aung’s direct commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity is extensive.
Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows that there were 930 airstrikes between January 10, 2022 and July 31, 2023, under Htun Aung’s command, killing close to 1,000 people.
Through an indiscriminate campaign of aerial terror, Htun Aung has commanded the slaughter of men, women and children, and destroyed homes, schools, places of worship and whole communities.
Htun Aung was in command for the aerial massacre on April 11, 2023 against a civilian gathering in Pazigyi village, Sagaing Region, murdering at least 168 people, including 40 children.
And in command for the aerial massacre on October 24, 2022 against those gathered for a concert in Hpakant, Kachin State, killing more than 80.
And in command for the aerial massacre on September 16, 2022 against a school in Let Yet Kone village, Sagaing Region, killing at least 12 people.
The ASEAN Chair issued a statement strongly condemning the junta's Pazigyi massacre. Yet it is now honouring one of the main perpetrators.
Htun Aung is currently sanctioned by the US, UK, EU and Canada.
ASEAN’s decision to appoint Htun Aung as the chair of AACC on November 4, 2022, and to allow him to convene a meeting of ASEAN air force commanders, is further evidence of the bloc knowingly supporting the junta’s international crimes.
ASEAN’s planned air force chiefs’ conference is part of its extensive program of defence and security cooperation in which the illegitimate junta plays a leading role. The junta currently heads ASEAN air force, navy, military counter terrorism and police cooperation.
In August, ASEAN held a counter terrorism military training exercise in Naypyidaw, and is now planning to hold a counter terrorism field training exercise in Russia from September 25-30, both co-chaired by the military junta.
In May, ASEAN appointed the junta’s navy head to chair the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, and the junta is set to host a conference of ASEAN navy chiefs in 2024.
In March 2022, Myanmar junta police brigadier general Zaw Lin Tun was appointed executive director of the police cooperation body, ASEANPOL.
Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly denounced ASEAN’s defence cooperation with the illegal military junta, called for the junta’s exclusion from ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) activities, and urged countries to boycott ADMM activities that include the junta.
In an oral update to the UN Human Rights Council in July 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar slammed ASEAN’s appointment of Htun Aung as AACC chair, stating that “those responsible for these atrocities should not be serving in leadership positions in ASEAN. They should be serving sentences for their crimes.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “By proceeding with this air force conference and other military and police engagement with the junta, ASEAN and its member states are showing a callous disregard for the lives of Myanmar people and actively undermining its own commitments to resolve the crisis in Myanmar through the Five Point Consensus.
“ASEAN has tried to excuse military engagement with the junta by claiming it is technical and not political. This is insulting to the people of Myanmar who are victims of the junta’s daily attacks. It is an untenable position that in no way can excuse ASEAN’s support for the terrorist junta and complicity in its international crimes.
“There is no denying that ASEAN is legitimising and emboldening war criminals through its defence and security cooperation, endangering the lives of Myanmar people and worsening the crisis.
"Indonesia as the Chair of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting must immediately cancel the air chief’s meeting, the counter terrorism field training exercise and ban the junta from all activities.
“ASEAN members should boycott the air chiefs’ meeting if it goes ahead and refuse to attend all other ADMM activities that include the illegal junta.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
They were accused of having links to pro-democracy forces.
Description:
"Junta troops have arrested 11 people in a raid on Myitkyina township in Myanmar’s Kachin state, locals told RFA Thursday.
They said that six men and five women were detained three days ago after around 30 soldiers went to a house and accused the residents of having ties to the local People’s Defense Force, part of the pro-democracy forces created in 2021.
As of Thursday, the detainees were still being questioned at the Northern Command base in Myitkyina, according to township residents.
One local, who didn’t want to be named for security reasons, told RFA none of the arrested have links to anti-junta militias and had just gathered for a celebration.
“I heard people chanting ‘Happy Birthday’ at around 8:00 p.m. I think it was a birthday party, with people gathered for food and drinks,” the local said.
“Some employees of phone shops were among those detained. I have no idea who informed the junta soldiers about them.”
The local added that the arrests may have been prompted by an attack on the Northern Command in which five bombs exploded close to the base. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack and the junta has not released any statement about it.
Win Ye Tun, the junta’s spokesperson for Kachin state, declined to provide comments.
According to figures exclusively compiled by RFA, the junta arrested at least 700 people between June 2023 and August 2023, and among them, only 500 were released.
More than 24,000 people, including pro-democracy activists, have been arrested since the Feb. 1, 2021, coup, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma)..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"US President Joe Biden’s decision to skip Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-related summits in the Indonesian capital Jakarta on Sept. 5-7 in favor of the G-20 leaders’ meeting in India just two days later has been greeted with howls of disappointment and criticism around Southeast Asian capitals and elsewhere that are concerned about America’s role in the region.
Biden’s unwillingness to show up is said to undermine “ASEAN centrality”, the notion that the bloc should be the main convening platform for promoting regional peace and security.
It would of course be ideal to have the American president take part in the ASEAN-US summit and the East Asia Summit—the latter a preeminent strategic dialogue which also includes Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and South Korea, apart from ASEAN member states.
But ASEAN centrality can no longer be taken for granted or simply assumed to hold. It increasingly has to be earned. First and foremost among ASEAN’s critical shortcomings is its inability to address the Myanmar coup that occurred in February 2021, and the raging and violent civil war that has ensued ever since.
It is common knowledge that ASEAN has been divided on both the United States-China competition and conflict, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Brunei, Laos and Cambodia appear to be in China’s orbit, whereas the rest more or less lean towards the US, especially the Philippines and Vietnam.
Myanmar is an outcast, while Thailand has been more inclined towards Beijing than it needs to be since the military coup in 2014. On the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Laos and Vietnam have abstained from key United Nations resolutions to condemn the aggression, with Thailand joining the abstainers on one of the resolutions. Singapore is at the opposite end, putting its money where its mouth is by imposing sanctions on Russia.
Notwithstanding these and other issues that have split ASEAN, such as human rights and China-Taiwan tensions, the most critical ASEAN divisiveness centers on Myanmar, because the war-torn country is a member state. If ASEAN cannot get its house in order with sufficient unity and common purpose, then it should not and cannot claim a central regional role to promote peace and security.
Indonesia’s chairmanship this year has fallen short in effecting dialogue and a way forward in Myanmar. The Indonesian government did try, however, and should not be blamed for the lack of concrete results, because Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the junta known as the State Administration Council, has been devious and intransigent.
He has taken ASEAN for a ride by agreeing to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), which he personally signed on to after it was brokered by Brunei in April 2021. The 5PC calls for the cessation of violence, inclusive dialogue, humanitarian assistance, an ASEAN envoy, and a delegation visit to promote compromise and a way out.
Yet the 5PC has floundered. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s apparent strategy is to exhaust and outlast other players in the mix. He has been instrumentally assisted by Thailand’s outgoing Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and his envoy for Myanmar, Pornpimol Kanchanalak. The pair have organised and facilitated “Track 1.5” policy-related meetings and even ministerial gatherings to lend legitimacy to the SAC.
Upholding the 5PC as the way to deal with Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have steadfastly refused to join the Thailand-hosted meetings. The Philippines falls in the same category, except Manila sent a mid-level diplomat to take part in one of the meetings.
Under Thailand’s newly elected government, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who has already stated his intention of restoring his country’s international standing, the ASEAN mix on Myanmar will likely be different. If the Philippines can stay the 5PC course, with Thailand’s recalibrated foreign policy posture and projection, including its approach towards the Myanmar junta, there will be a fundamental flip, whereby firm 5PC backers will be the five original founding members of ASEAN.
The alignment of the original ASEAN-5 can bring a lot of diplomatic heft to the table. This is the way to reboot and recover ASEAN momentum. In turn, the ASEAN-5 from August 1967 can pressure the SAC to implement the 5PC, which Gen. Min Aung Hlaing duplicitously agreed to. The ASEAN-5 should also engage the National Unity Government (NUG), especially if Myanmar’s civilian-led parallel administration can be revamped for greater effectiveness. Indonesia and Malaysia have already interacted with the NUG.
These two staunch ASEAN member states, along with Singapore, have maintained what’s left of ASEAN’s credibility and relevance by sticking to the 5PC and not recognizing the SAC and Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s legitimate government. If the Philippines and Thailand, both with democratically elected governments, can follow suit, ASEAN centrality will be given a big boost. Other ASEAN member states can come in as they see fit. But they should not be allowed to hold ASEAN hostage on the Myanmar impasse because the 5PC was signed by representatives from each of the 10 member states.
A newly configured regional grouping led by the ASEAN-5 will have the leverage and latitude to bring Gen. Min Aung Hlaing to heel because his military regime is losing in the country’s civil war. Reliable reports and datapoints suggest the ubiquitous People’s Defence Force units and ethnic armies are winning more territory and keeping Myanmar troops pinned down, and the latter are reluctant to fight without armour or air support. With a coup that has failed to consolidate and impose control over his territory and population, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing is vulnerable.
Getting its act together on Myanmar would enable ASEAN to be taken more seriously. Dissatisfaction with ASEAN centrality has manifested in other forms of “minilateral” cooperation among outside powers, including the Quad among Australia, India, Japan and the US, and Aukus, a security pact of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. If ASEAN wants to be back at the front and center in the region, it will need to regroup around the original core five states. The old ASEAN way of consensus and non-interference would need to be tweaked and nuanced correspondingly..."
Source/publisher:
"The Bangkok Post" via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"In her dreams at least, Phyu Nyo hoped to see all the colors of the outside world and experience freedom, even though she was in prison. But it never happened.
“I thought I could exist only in my dreams,” she said over the phone, recalling her 19 months locked up in two notorious junta prisons.
“But I never escaped from the prisons, even in my dreams. [The dreams] were all about prison, about running away and being recaptured. It was like my mind was also jailed,” the now 30-year-old said in a low voice.
The number of female political prisoners in Myanmar is at a record high under the military junta led by coup leader Min Aung Hlaing. According to rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), at least 4,883 women were arrested for anti-regime activities between Feb. 1, 2021 and Aug. 23 this year. Another 602 were killed, including 114 girls. Of those arrested, more than 3,770 are still in custody, 15 of whom face the death penalty.
The women arrested include political leaders, elected lawmakers, activists, striking civil servants, medics, resistance fighters, students, journalists, businesswomen and those from all walks of life.
Before the military staged a coup and overthrew Myanmar’s elected civilian government in February 2021, Phyu Nyo was a fashion designer and trainer from Yangon, living a decent life with her husband, who had a livestock farm and agribusiness.
But the pair were forced to become fugitives after participating in anti-coup protests and supporting striking civil servants who took part in the civil disobedience movement (CDM).
The two left their house in Yangon and fled to Mandalay to evade arrest, but were detained after being discovered in their hideout in the city in October 2021. The junta also sealed off Phyu Nyo’s fashion shop in Yangon and seized everything inside including clothes, bags and shoes.
She and her husband were sent to the junta’s notorious Mandalay Palace interrogation center, where Phyu Nyo was threatened with rape.
“They [the junta forces] yelled at me and said ‘We could rape and kill you!’” Phyu Nyo recalled.
Since the coup, women in Myanmar have been tortured, sexually harassed and threatened with rape in custody. The National Unity Government’s Ministry of Women, Youth and Children’s Affairs said in March that junta troops have sexually assaulted at least 122 women since the beginning of the coup.
Another form of sexual harassment that female political prisoners increasingly face is humiliating mass strip searches by prison staff.
Phyu Nyo said she had heard in June from female political inmates still held in Yangon’s Insein Prison that such searches had become worse this year.
Female inmates in Insein Prison are being forced to submit to thorough checks of their intimate body parts after court appearances. Told that it is necessary to ensure that the detainees don’t smuggle papers, female political prisoners are required to lift their breasts and expose their vulva. And prison staff wearing gloves touch and rub all of the inmates’ private parts and even use their hand to forcefully penetrate into the vagina during the searches.
In addition to the usual strip search humiliations, women who are menstruating are ordered to remove their sanitary pads in order to be strip-searched.
Supposedly done in order to search for smuggled “papers”, all such activities are violations not only of the detainees’ human rights but also their dignity, Phyu Nyo said.
Phyu Nyo was held in Mandalay’s Obo Prison and Myingyan Prison. During her imprisonment, she didn’t experience the most invasive searches into the vagina but did endure occasional body searches.
“Human rights abuses were common and the prison staff would swear at all of us, including women old enough to be their mothers and grandmothers, every day,” Phyu Nyo said, sobbing as she described the encounters.
“In prison you can’t do anything the way you wish, from speaking to taking a bath,” she said.
For bathing, prisoners are limited to 15 regular cups or 30 small cups of water a day.
Phyu Nyo said that while she would prefer not to think about those days in the military interrogation center and the prisons, as the memories are suffocating and painful, she felt a responsibility to speak up for her sisters who continue to languish in jails across the country, and to let others know their stories and what is happening behind bars.
“Sometimes, I have even thought of suicide. But the mindset that I will not give up on these guys, and that we will be free if we win, keeps me alive.”
Alinn, another former political prisoner who was also jailed in Obo Prison and Myingyan Prison for two years, similarly recalled that the prison authorities, especially in Obo Prison, treated political prisoners with hostility, adding that non-political inmates were encouraged to take part in abuses against political prisoners, and to monitor their activities.
A first year student at a nursing training school at the time of the coup, Alinn took part in peaceful protest rallies in Mandalay to demand the return of democracy in the country.
During a dawn protest on May 12, 2021 in Mandalay’s Pyigyidagon Township, she was violently arrested together with 30 other protesters. She was beaten on the head, back and arm, and collapsed during the arrest. Almost all of the detained protesters were later sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on incitement charges.
Alinn said many political prisoners suffer from health problems inside due to the lack of proper healthcare provisions.
“In prison, whatever your illness, they just give you para [paracetamol],” Alinn said.
According to accounts from media and rights groups, some political prisoners have died because of inadequate medical treatment and health care, including denial of emergency care at public hospitals.
The lack of adequate health care and medical treatment is only compounded by the growing number of female political prisoners that continue to be crammed into Myanmar’s overcrowded prisons across the country.
Khin Waddy, a 27-year-old former female political prisoner and student activist from Monywa, Sagaing Region, said she was forced to share a space, including while sleeping, with 100 to 150 inmates in one single dormitory in Monywa Prison. Around 60 percent of the inmates there were political prisoners, she said.
Being locked up with more than 100 people makes it difficult for prisoners to even change position from one side to another or turn around while sleeping, and inmates were forced to sleep face to face due to the lack of space.
Hygiene is another problem; those positioned near the septic tank were directly exposed to the smell, with liquid leaking from the tank passing near their heads.
To avoid being positioned near the septic tank, prisoners must pay the head of the dormitory for a sleeping space farther away, Khin Waddy said.
The former student activist and human rights advocate was arrested in May 2021 for providing support to 1,500 striking civil servants who joined the CDM following the military takeover.
Khin Waddy recalled that while she was being interrogated in the military interrogation center in Monywa, she was forced to kneel down while holding her hands up for 24 hours, and was beaten if she lowered her hands. She was also denied food and water. After two-and-a-half days of interrogation, she began experiencing stomach pains and vomiting and had to be sent to a military hospital.
While there she met Daw Khin Mawe Lwin, National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmaker for Sagaing Region’s Mingin Township, who was also hospitalized while undergoing military interrogation.
The 56-year-old was twice elected a lawmaker for her constituency, in both the 2015 and 2020 elections. The results of the latter were annulled by the military following the coup.
Khin Waddy said Daw Khin Mawe Lwin, despite her frail outer appearance, stood firm and served as a mother figure for all of the female detainees in the prison.
Later, Khin Waddy and Daw Khin Mawe Lwin were both transferred to Myingyan Prison.
In prison, the two engaged in activities together including political talks and discussions during which prisoners could exchange political views, and organizing strikes mirroring those taking place outside, such as silent strikes, Thanakha (traditional cosmetic paste) strikes and flower strikes, and strikes to mark occasions such as Martyrs’ Day, the anniversary of the 1988 uprising, and detained leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday.
In prison, staging such activities can have repercussions ranging from the imposition of stricter rules or a reduction in the water allotted for showering, to a beating. There have been many reports of female political prisoners being brutally beaten and seriously injured, or being transferred to a remote prison, simply for asking that their rights be observed.
Khin Waddy was released in November last year. But instead of releasing Daw Khin Mawe Lwin, the junta hit the NLD lawmaker with another charge and transferred her to Kalay Prison.
Daw Khin Mawe Lwin suffered facial paralysis due to a stroke while in Monywa Prison. Denied timely medical care, she did not fully recover and later suffered another stroke in Kalay Prison, Khin Waddy said.
“If people like Amay [mother] Mawe were outside, they could do much more than us,” Khin Waddy said, adding that her wish is for Amay Mawe [Daw Khin Mawe Lwin] and all political prisoners to be released soon.
Despite the horrific, traumatizing experiences they have endured, female former political prisoners like Khin Waddy, Alinn and Phyu Nyo are not disheartened, and refuse to abandon their activism. Instead, they have joined other women who are at the forefront of the revolution.
Women from all walks of life have bravely participated in Myanmar’s democracy struggle under successive military regimes, including the current junta, to restore democracy in the country. Similarly, women civil servants in the education, health and other sectors have joined the CDM, refusing to work under military rule—to date, their strike continues. This is to say nothing of the many women resistance fighters who are fighting alongside their male comrades in the armed struggle against the junta.
Phyu Nyo, who was released together with her husband in May this year, said she has continued to dream of her days of imprisonment over the past three months.
“In my dreams, we are both still on the run and being caught, again and again,” she said with frustration. “Only when I wake up without seeing any [prison] bars, and recognize that I am now outside, do I feel relief,” she said.
However, Phyu Nyo hasn’t let her traumatizing experiences stop her from resuming her contributions to the political movement. She has joined the Political Prisoners Network-Myanmar, which was founded by her husband and other former detainees to help political prisoners still being detained by the junta.
Alinn, the former political prisoner from Mandalay, also joined the network with the same aim as Phyu Nyo.
“I couldn’t feel happy on the day of my release. Though I was free, people who had become like family members to me remained behind,” Alinn said.
Through the network, both Phyu Nyo and Alinn now help to send parcels containing medicines and cash to female political prisoners.
Khin Waddy is also working on raising funds for displaced people in Sagaing Region who were forced to flee their homes amid the junta’s raids and arson attacks.
“We want this revolution to end quickly. Only if we win will all the political prisoners be released, and thus we are determined to contribute in all ways we can. The same mindset we had while inside [prison], we now have on the outside,” Khin Waddy said.
Phyu Nyo said that some of the female political prisoners still locked up are serving terms as long as 30 to 40 years.
“I want all of them to escape quickly and return home. That can only happen if the revolution succeeds at the earliest possible time. And thus I will devote myself to the revolution,” she said.
With the exception of Daw Khin Mawe Lwin, the names of the women mentioned in this story were changed to protect their safety..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-08-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Revolutionary forces have seen notable successes in some areas, while struggling to gain traction in others.
Description:
"On May 5, 2021, Myanmar’s parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG), established its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), with the aim of overthrowing the military regime that seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021. Led by members of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government, the NUG has built a strong military partnership with four long-standing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) known as the K3C: the Kachin Independence Organization (K), the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, and the Chin National Front. The NUG is also collaborating less visibly with other EAOs, mostly those that enjoy close ties to China.
Though the military still controls the country’s major cities and assets after two years of battle, resistance groups have slowly taken control of territory, including border areas and some towns in ethnic states, in addition to the territories that have long been under the control of allied EAOs. As territorial competition has intensified, so have human rights breaches and humanitarian crises. As of July 30, the United Nations estimated that there were now 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Myanmar, 1.59 million of whom had been displaced since the coup. On the human rights front, a local NGO reported that 3,850 civilians had been killed for opposing the junta; at least 24,100 had been arrested, of whom 158 had been sentenced to death. In addition, approximately 70,324 houses and buildings had been torched by the military as of May 31. In fact, all those numbers mostly represent open sources and Myanmar military abuses, not counting opposition violations, which were of course relatively insignificant. What the current political climate suggests is that the country’s struggle will not end anytime soon.
Throughout the world’s history, different factors have contributed to the success or failure of armed revolutions, and this article reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the current resistance movement in five key areas.
In the aftermath of the coup, the Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw, offered certain positions to ethnic-based political parties in the newly-formed administration in order to mitigate the political unrest in ethnic states, while anticipating anti-coup protests in the country’s Burman majority regions. The calculation was totally wrong, as the regime’s spokesperson later admitted in a media interview, as the initial protests against the military takeover evolved into a nationwide uprising. The Tatmadaw was brutal in cracking down on peaceful protestors, and yet the public continued to resist it by organizing nationwide silent protests (or uprisings) on specific days, banging pots and pans every night during a specific period, boycotting military businesses, and initiating social punishment against military associates.
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The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) has rapidly evolved into a resistance platform for civil servants, including security forces, and the NUG claims that the number of state workers who had joined the movement reached 360,000 in mid-2021. The movement drew international attention, even being nominated for the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize. Even when the anti-coup campaign devolved into a full-fledged civil war, the people, especially Burmese expatriate communities, continued to fund both the NUG and their own ethnic-based resistance organizations. The public’s support basically ticks all the boxes for the revolution to prevail.
International Support (4/10)
Just as the people’s support was an obvious strength of Myanmar’s revolution, international assistance and support has been on the weaker side. Following the coup, protestors called widely for external armed intervention to safeguard civilians from the Tatmadaw’s inhumanity, but it was utterly unsuccessful. Under diplomatic and economic pressure, the U.S. has played a leading role in coordinating sanctions, pressuring the Tatmadaw on human rights issues, and encouraging the members of ASEAN to move forward with its Five-Point Consensus peace plan.
However, these efforts have been largely ineffective in preventing the military’s action and the U.S. has even failed to persuade its Quad partners – Australia, India, and Japan – to collaborate on a solution to the crisis. The passing of the Burma Act by the U.S. Congress remains the most significant gesture of international support, yet six months later, there has been no meaningful action or pledge under the Act. Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw has maintained close ties with neighboring countries, except Bangladesh, and imported at least $1 billion in arms since the coup, mostly from Russia ($406 million) and China ($254 million).
A Strong & Charismatic Leader (6/10)
An influential and charismatic leader is essential to uniting the populace, motivating followers, gaining international confidence, and waging psychological warfare on the enemy. The Tatmadaw was of course concerned about the anti-coup movement being led by a prominent leader, so it detained key officials and senior members of the ruling party, including the president, Win Myint, and de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, on the morning of the coup.
Arrest warrants are also issued to NLD associate public figures, including Min Ko Naing, once described by The New York Times as the second most prominent opposition leader behind Aung San Suu Kyi. Though he no longer wields much weight in the aftermath of the Rohingya crisis, he was someone the public looked up to during the peaceful protest phase, but has surprisingly played no key role in the NUG.
The current acting president, Duwa Lashi La, is highly praised for his honesty, social skills, and communication skills. However, with all due respect, his appointment was widely seen as a gesture toward the Kachin Independence Organization, the NUG’s most reliable armed group partner, to which Duwa Lashi La is reportedly close. Is it time for a new leader to emerge among the NUG’s trusted armed partners? A former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar, Scot Marciel, once said, “a unifying, charismatic figure would certainly help a great deal, as would a highly professional public communications campaign.”
Adaptability and Resilience (8/10)
By its nature, armed revolution can last much longer than anticipated, and can encounter unforeseeable challenges. Therefore, resilience and adaptation to changing circumstances is crucial for survival and eventual success. The PDF- and NUG-affiliated Local Defense Forces (LDFs) were born out of the immense need to protect civilians from the Tatmadaw’s cruelty without receiving any international aid. The presence of well-established EAOs has been crucial in terms of providing technical and moral guidance for the PDF and LDF.
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With technical support and limited materiel from EAOs, these groups have grown in numbers, manufactured military equipment, built strong coordination, built an operational structure, and developed a military code of conduct. They have attracted defectors from the security forces, with or without arms, through financial rewards and promises of protection. They have modified commercial drones and employed them on the battlefield in a variety of ways, including taking security footage, transporting equipment, and dropping improvised explosive devices. Their fierce drive and endurance gives them an edge over their enemies, who fight for money and power alone.
A Strong Chain of Command (6/10)
The coup and its subsequent bloodshed led to the establishment of approximately 309 armed groups as of November 2021, the troop number in each group could range from less than 50 to more than 1,000. After failing to create a much-anticipated Federal Army, uniting the newly formed armed groups with existing EAOs under a coordinated and cooperated chain of command, the NUG created the PDF as a precursor. As of April 2022, the NUG claimed to have consolidated an estimated 50,000–100,000 troops into its armed wing, while more than 30,000 troops are estimated to be operating outside of their chain of command. As security analyst Ye Myo Hein stated in 2022, more than 100 LDFs, or around 25 percent, had joined the NUG.
The obstacle to further mergers is the NUG’s inability to provide substantial aid. A few groups have refused to join for ideological reasons, seeing the NUG as under the NLD’s dominance. When it comes to military affairs, the NUG relies heavily on partner EAOs to set up an effective chain of command and reinforce its authority over PDFs. However, EAOs are also focusing on strengthening their parallel influence over PDFs or LDFs with technical support and arms supplies. Ye Myo Hein argues that “alliance politics in the resistance movement are still fluid and unstable,” though there are some improvements in military cooperation on the ground.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s decade-long democratic transition during the 2010s produced greater political freedom, economic prosperity, and a new educated generation, all of which have contributed to strong resistance against the return of military rule by any possible means. Resilience and determination are what have kept the revolution moving forward, in contrast to the regime soldiers, who frequently surrender or defect when faced with a crisis.
As the revolution approaches its third year, financial hardship has posed a major challenge to the resistance groups’ continued expansion and even their existence. The passage of the Burma Act was widely expected to be a watershed moment in the revolution that would address its financial burden and help the NUG to consolidate more resistance groups under one chain of command. But the implementation of the Act indicates that it is mostly intended to provide moral support to Myanmar’s opposition forces. As things stand, a power vacuum will likely persist with no side able to fill it anytime soon, leading to increased violence and instability and a worsening humanitarian crisis..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-08-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s situation is becoming more protracted as violence between the military, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), and other ethnic armed groups continues. ASEAN is actively trying for an amicable solution to end the ongoing conflict and restore peace in Myanmar. The forum has voiced its support for a political solution to the crisis.
In the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Conference on July 12, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that only a political solution could bring lasting peace to Myanmar. As the Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is not interested in negotiating with the opposition, the five-point peace proposal given by ASEAN to restore peace in Myanmar has not yet been implemented. ASEAN calls on all member states to strongly condemn the on-going violence in Myanmar and also wants Myanmar’s conflicting parties to resume talks to reach a political settlement. Parliamentarians from ASEAN nations asked Thailand to sever ties with Myanmar’s junta-run government. They argued that no ASEAN member state should have friendly relations with Myanmar’s military because the force has turned Myanmar into a center of instability – threatening the entire region.
However, Thailand, a neighbor of Myanmar and a member of ASEAN, arranged a conference with Myanmar in December 2022 to talk about the current conflict there. Foreign Minister of Laos and Cambodia and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam along with Myanmar Junta representative were present in that meeting. Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore did not participate there. As ASEAN is divided over diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis of Myanmar, the alliance has failed to take a united stand. ASEAN is trying to bridge the divisions that have arisen among the member states over the Myanmar issue.
Chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Chalermpol Srisawat and Myanmar’s Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing, met on January to further strengthen mutual trust, understanding and friendly relations between the two-armed forces. Myanmar has more than 2,400 kilometers of border with Thailand. Cooperation between the two countries is needed on various issues, including human trafficking, drugs, and weapons. Millions of people displaced by Myanmar’s ongoing violence seek refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border, where they fear deportation because of their lack of legal protection. Besides, Thailand has corporate investment in Myanmar totaling more than $11 billion in 154 projects, which is 12.5% of all foreign investment in Myanmar and ranks Thailand third in terms of investment.
Junta Foreign Minister Than Swe said that Myanmar’s military is focusing its efforts on three of the five ASEAN consensus points. He told that, the regime is working to end the violence in the country, initiate dialogue between all parties and provide humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar. ASEAN welcomes any strategy, bilateral, trilateral or multilateral, based on ASEAN or non-ASEAN frameworks, to restore peace in Myanmar. At the same time, the National Unity Government (NUG) and other opposition coalitions in Myanmar along with the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) must unite and demonstrate that they have the strength and capability to lead and protect the nation. Gaining skills in local government structure, good governance and management of federal system and dialogue between NUG and various ethnic groups will play an important role in strengthening their position.
The military coup in Myanmar has led to a wave of civil protests and armed resistance by EAOs and civil defence forces. The junta government responded brutally with hundreds of air strikes, resulting in the destruction of tens of thousands of homes. According to a report issued on July 15 by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs, 1.9 million people have been displaced in Myanmar, including 1.6 million victims of the 2021 military coup, and more than 1 million people have abandoned their homes. The Rohingyas, who fled the nation and sought asylum in Bangladesh as a result of the Myanmar junta’s cruel persecution, are excluded from this estimate. The military junta has killed 3,800 citizens and imprisoned almost 20,000 since taking power. Military personnel have destroyed around 70,000 structures. Millions of people in the country are enduring food shortages, relocation, and economic devastation as a result of the armed conflict. The country has endured international isolation and sanctions, leading in decreased foreign investment and commerce, which has harmed the economy.
The people of Myanmar have resisted to get rid of this situation. The United Nations Human Rights Council established the Independent Investigation Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to gather evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Myanmar. Their reports revealed the burning of entire villages, the deliberate bombing of civilian homes, and the massacre of civilians and captured combatants. After all these, the arms supply to Myanmar could not be stopped. A UN report notes that the junta government bought $1 billion worth of weapons and equipment after taking power. Many Southeast Asian countries, networks, and organizations are benefitting from the plight of the Myanmar people by supplying the junta with weapons and other equipment.
Myanmar’s junta government reneged on its promise to hold general elections in August this year, suspending the election process and extending the ongoing state of emergency for another six months. Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing informed a top officials’ conference that the prevalence of terrorism in Myanmar has dropped as a result of ongoing actions by the military against the attacking groups. However, the country’s position has not yet returned to normal. By extending the state of emergency four times since assuming power, it is clear that the military does not have enough control over the people and most areas of the country.
The Election Commission of Myanmar removed the NLD from the list of political parties due to its failure to register with the Election Commission, making it ineligible to participate in the elections. Extending the state of emergency, according to the US, would plunge Myanmar into bloodshed and instability. Former Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi was imprisoned after being ousted in a military coup in 2021. Suu Kyi was sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison at the end of the 19-count trial. In five of these criminal cases, the term of imprisonment was reduced to six years by declaring amnesty. On July 28, Suu Kyi was released from prison and taken to a government building.
In 2017, under Suu Kyi’s rule, the Myanmar military’s crackdown on the Rohingya ethnic group forced nearly 1.1 million Rohingya to seek refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. Her inability to address the armed forces’ ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in Rakhine State sparked international outrage and criticism. Regardless, her efforts to build a democratic Myanmar are internationally acknowledged. On May 27 and June 4, Suu Kyi and senior military leaders held fruitful talks on the country’s armed conflict, public security and peace building. It is perceived that the current junta government wants to use Suu Kyi’s influence to end the armed struggle.
The international community must continue its support to restore peace and stability in Myanmar. Countries that have been helping Myanmar prolong the present conflict by providing weapons and other aid must withdraw from their positions and help fulfil the election promises made by the junta government. The UN, Western countries and donor agencies believe that a return to peace and democracy in Myanmar will accelerate Rohingya repatriation. As a neighbouring country, Bangladesh hopes for peace, progress and stability in Myanmar. Aside from the Rohingya issue, communication between the two countries can help both countries develop and progress. There is no doubt about ASEAN countries’ contribution to Myanmar’s economy. As a result, ASEAN should maintain its efforts to restore peace and stability in Myanmar. If ASEAN and other regional countries can restore peace in Myanmar, it will be a phenomenal success as well as recognition of the region’s ability to resolve crises locally..."
Source/publisher:
Eurasia Review
Date of publication:
2023-08-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The case for proactive, multilateral, pro-peace diplomacy.
Description:
"The past two-and-a-half years have seen Myanmar enmeshed in a spiraling political crisis.
Since the 2021 coup that toppled a civilian-led government under the National League for Democracy (NLD), the country has been embroiled in a civil war during which at least 3,800 civilians have been killed by the military, and another 23,000 have been arrested. The military and affiliated forces have cracked down upon dissent, opposition, and civil society organizations that they perceive as a threat to their tenuous grip on power.
The civil war has also triggered an ongoing humanitarian crisis, with a large number of internally and externally displaced persons. Estimates suggest that up to 1.6 million people have been internally displaced since the coup. Up to 9,000 refugees are now seeking shelter in Mae Sariang district in northwestern Thailand, where humanitarian aid is provided.
While most of the pro-democracy resistance have coalesced around the National Unity Government (NUG), there are also select fringe militias and ethnic armed groups that have taken the opportunity to engage in territorial expansion and reenact long-standing rivalries. It is likely that neither the incumbent government nor the fragmented and structurally disadvantaged opposition rebels will prevail anytime soon.
While Myanmar’s military government is rumored to have withdrawn from chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2026, the actions of the officially non-recognized and illegal regime in Myanmar have widened the existing fissures within the regional bloc. The fundamental question concerns the extent to which principles of democratic legitimacy and minimal norms of decency should be upheld, even at the expense of ASEAN solidarity and consensus.
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An ASEAN that refuses to speak up for the interests of the ordinary citizens of its member states would have its legitimacy and credibility significantly eroded; but an ASEAN that merely vocally repudiates the junta regime without creating a clear off-ramp or showing any ability to exert actual influence over Naypyidaw, would be fundamentally ineffective in pursuing the goals of partial normalization and restoration of a less malign political order in Myanmar. The bloc’s Five-Point Consensus peace plan that was agreed in Jakarta in April 2021 by ASEAN’s member states, including Myanmar’s military junta, remains under-enforced and only partially implemented.
Efforts by current ASEAN chair Indonesia to juggle these interests through “quiet diplomacy” – exerting pressure on the military government through discreet, back-door negotiations as opposed to high-profile, public talks and discourse – have yielded some, albeit limited, successes. While the junta has authorized selective passage to humanitarian assistance and delegations by high-level United Nations officials, the aid is often held up and obstructed by vindictive local military personnel. Deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi had been granted a partial pardon, but the move was more symbolic than substantive: she still faces 14 cases and 27 years in prison, and remains under house arrest.
Thailand’s Unique Position
The above challenges raise the question: Could Thailand, as the ASEAN member most geographically proximate and historically connected to Myanmar, have a greater role to play? It is clear that Thailand is uniquely positioned in several distinctive ways, which has two clear implications. The first is that Thailand has an obvious stake in bringing about peace in Myanmar, beyond the obvious moral and humanitarian imperatives. The second is that among ASEAN’s member states, Thailand is best-placed to play a critical role as a mediator between the Tatmadaw, the NUG, the Myanmar public, and other opposition forces.
On the latter point, the Thai political establishment plausibly has the most personnel and interpersonal access to past and present senior leaders of the Tatmadaw. The Thai and Myanmar armed forces are close collaborators on regional peacekeeping and anti-drug trafficking operations, with generals on both sides on personally friendly terms. To take one example, in 2012, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing was named the “adopted son” of Prem Tinsulanonda, the former chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA). In 2014, the post-coup government in Thailand received official endorsement from the Myanmar military. Both governments are known to advocate economic and security cooperation in relation to the infamous Golden Triangle.
With Thailand set to embrace a new, civilian-led government with clear military representation in the coming weeks, the RTA will remain a significant player in the country. The long-standing connections between Thai military elite and the Tatmadaw should be harnessed by the incoming administration in order to pursue substantial concessions regarding Myanmar’s brutally oppressed activists and political prisoners. It is also in the interests of the incoming Pheu Thai-led government to shift Thailand’s Myanmar policy away from unquestioning accommodation, to strategic engagement with clear moral baselines.
Secondly, Thailand and Myanmar are highly economically interconnected. A volatile Myanmar caught in developmental limbo is not in the interest of its eastern neighbor, with which it shares a 2,416-kilometer border – the longest among its five borders.
Thailand is the second-largest trading partner of Myanmar, though bilateral trade has significantly declined in recent years due to a combination of political instability and tightened border controls. Tatmadaw-imposed restrictions concerning equalizing exports and imports, and stipulating that payments must be made via a junta-controlled bank, have damaged business confidence, as well as creating huge bottlenecks at land border crossings. Additionally, Myanmar’s labor market faces substantial vulnerabilities, with war-related disruptions contributing towards a labor productivity drop of 10 percent since 2019, with nearly half of households experiencing food access concerns.
These business-related considerations, coupled with Thailand’s significant dependence upon Myanmar for energy production and imports, highlight the urgent need for Bangkok to act. Stabilizing and reviving supply chains and securing Thai businesses and investors’ interests in the country requires both military and rebel factions to arrive at a sustainable modus vivendi.
Thirdly, Thailand has long played an integral role in shaping the diplomatic outlook and strategy adopted by ASEAN. As one of the founding members of the organization and a key regional player during the Cold War, Thailand had been a primary promulgator of “mediator diplomacy.” In 1961, with the only three members then in the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) locked in a bitter Konfontasi in Malaysia, Thailand sought to provide a neutral foundational space for Southeast Asian nation-states to explore the space for a Southeast Asia-centered and -driven economic grouping, eventually culminating in the establishment of ASEAN in 1967.
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Since then, Thailand played a key role in nudging ASEAN members to weigh non-intervention over calls for changes to the totalitarian Khmer Regime (more indicative of intricate balancing of powers between the USSR and China than perhaps any substantive normative position). It also advocated the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in the 1990s, and addressed the challenge posed by insurgent groups along the Thai-Malay border and in Southern Philippines. Recent years have seen a reduction in Thailand’s mediation capacity, as its attention has shifted precipitously towards deepening ties with and balancing between Beijing and Washington, and away from intervening non-militarily in regional disputes and disagreements. If Thailand wishes to revive its erstwhile leadership functions within ASEAN, it needs to play a more active role to resolve Myanmar’s crisis.
Why Unilateralism Won’t Work
Thailand’s responsibilities cannot be discharged unilaterally. The two-person meeting in early July between Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and Aung San Suu Kyi, three days prior to the official ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 11-12, risked derailing efforts by the regional grouping to broker a viable path forward. Initiated by the outgoing Thai government, the meeting offered the Tatmadaw a substantial PR victory, with minimal substantive gains for most in the opposition movement. The comments that Aung San Suu Kyi purportedly made – that she was in favor of “dialogue without any preconditions” – were unverifiable.
Unilateralism will not work. If the Tatmadaw perceives that it can successfully pick and choose from amongst ASEAN members the prospective interlocutors and negotiating “partners,” it will likely to continually drive a wedge between Thailand and other ASEAN powers, offering selective and tokenistic access to the former in exchange for reduced pressures from the other eight member states. This move would also destabilize Thailand’s soft power and stature in the eyes of the other governments, thereby diluting the attention and scrutiny of key stakeholders in ASEAN towards the abuses of the junta regime in Myanmar.
Fundamentally, the Five-Point Consensus has repeatedly affirmed that all solutions to the Myanmar crisis must be led by and steered in accordance with the foundational principles of ASEAN. The need for consensus be inherently restrictive, but the solution should be to advocate reformulations of this norm, as opposed to bypassing it altogether. In seemingly recognizing the legitimate standing of the Tatmadaw as the representatives of the people of Myanmar, the outgoing Thai administration risks upsetting the delicately forged equilibrium that has drawn upon the heterogeneity of ASEAN as a strength, whilst maintaining a consistent underlying line. The “shuttle diplomacy” of Indonesia, and the “access-based diplomacy” practiced by Thailand, can and should complement one another.
The Case for Proactive, Pro-Peace Diplomacy
The incoming administration in Bangkok should invest in significantly greater humanitarian support infrastructure for incoming refugees, and aid to internally displaced persons and victims of the ongoing civil strife in Myanmar. Incoming civilians should be carefully housed and allocated to minimize the burdens placed upon the regions neighboring Myanmar, such as Mae Sai and Mae Sot districts. Both Chinese and American resources should be mobilized to support this effort, though ASEAN countries should also play a role in devising a shared financial support scheme for humanitarian initiatives to be implemented primarily by Thailand.
The Thai government should keep communication channels open with the junta, while emphasizing that it does not thereby recognize the military regime as legitimate. Other ASEAN member states should also be incorporated into these conversations, or at least be kept abreast of the substantive contents discussed by these talks. Additionally, Bangkok should deepen its unofficial ties with the NUG, as well as more radical ethnic minority militias operating in Myanmar. The overarching aim here is to convince all parties of the possibility and value in partial ceasefires or de-escalation (a complete cessation of violence is unlikely to materialize anytime soon, and we must be realistic.)
Thailand should also prioritize the brokering of closed-room dialogues, with precise stipulations of ceasefire, between all parties of interest, both within Myanmar, with the NUG and other major factions present, and in other locales in ASEAN. Each of these dialogue sessions should be driven by precisely defined and clearly achievable objectives, e.g. the establishment and maintenance of the humanitarian corridor, the status and welfare of political prisoners, and the security of the Myanmar-Thailand border.
Some may argue that the above cedes too much ground to the junta, and that full accountability in the form of an immediate relinquishing of control is the only outcome ASEAN states should accept. As sympathetic as we may be to these views, however, it is imperative that we recognize the practical constraints on what is possible. The Tatmadaw may accept a controlled reduction to its scope of influence, as well as a reduction in the level of violence and the intensity of the conflict. Yet to ask for it to dissolve itself with immediate effect would be fundamentally futile. Thailand should instead lobby for civilian representatives to be granted a clear and meaningful say over the peace-brokering process, as well as guarantees of the freedoms and rights of political prisoners still held in captive or in hiding in Myanmar.
Ultimately, the divisions that have emerged between the ASEAN states are not sustainable, and require urgent redress. Last December, Thailand hosted a meeting with Myanmar’s top diplomat, as well as counterparts from Cambodia and Laos, with Vietnam’s deputy foreign minister present. The meeting was not attended by the other five ASEAN states, who have systemically ruled out liaising openly with the military administration. From ASEAN’s perspective, a clear roadmap to normalization, with clearly defined objectives that collectively pave the way for the restoration of civilian rule in Myanmar, must be offered as the carrot, alongside a stepping-up of the punitive “stick” — beyond sanctions alone. A carrot-and-stick approach, as clichéd as it may seem, is perhaps the best model that can draw upon the disparate levels of interconnectivity and mutual dependence between Myanmar and the other member states of ASEAN..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-08-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"This Short Update describes events occurring in T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District during the period between January to June, 2023. In January 2023, villagers’ cows stepped on landmines three times in Htee Wah Blaw village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township. These landmines are suspected to have been planted by the State Administration Council (SAC). After the incident, the SAC instructed villagers from B--- village and P-- village not to release their cows. If the cows were to step on landmines again, the cows’ owners would have to pay a penalty. In another incident that took place on June 13th 2023, at around 2:00 pm, a 41-year-old man from N---village, Yaw Ku village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, stepped on a landmine as he was going to a deserted Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) army camp in the forest to collect some wild plants. He sustained an injury to his right foot and was sent to T--- hospital, Pee T’Hka village tract, Ta Kreh Township, Hpa-an District, for medical treatment.[1]
On February 8th 2023, Saw[2] M---, a 53-year-old village head from B--- village, Htee Wah Blaw village tract[3], T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District explained how villagers’ cows had stepped on landmines three times in his area, killing some and injuring others. The first time, in January 2023 [unknown date], one of the cows owned by a villager named A--- stepped on a landmine at A’Leh Bo Deh camp [an State Administration Council (SAC)[4] camp] and broke a leg. The second time, in January 2023 [unknown date], one of the cows of a villager named K--- was killed by a landmine near Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[5] #356 located in Thin Gan Nyi Nuang military camp, Myawaddy Township. The third time, on January 24th 2023, three cows owned by a villager named D--- were injured and two of his cows were killed by a tripwire mine explosion. This tripwire mine was set up by SAC LIB #357 beside Saw E---'s farm. During this time [March to June] it is common for villagers to release their cows [into fields]. The SAC had planted landmines near the villagers’ farms but did not inform the villagers about the landmines, and so the villagers released their cows unaware of the mine contamination. After the landmine explosions, the SAC soldiers asked to whom the cows belonged but no one answered because they knew the owner would be made to pay for the landmines [that exploded]. After these incidents, the SAC informed villagers from B--- village and P--- village that the cows’ owners would have to pay for landmines if their cows stepped on landmines again. The SAC soldiers also restricted some areas [in Htee Wah Blaw village tract] so that villagers could not let their cows pasture there.
On June 13th 2023, at around 2:00 pm, Saw U---, a 41-year-old man from N--- village, Yaw Ku village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District, stepped on a landmine as he was going to the forest to collect some wild plants from a place near to a deserted Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[6] army camp. His right foot was badly injured in the explosion. With his wounded foot, he travelled back alone from the jungle to a local villager's tent. He was initially taken to the O--- hospital, but they could not provide adequate medical care there. Therefore, he was transferred to T--- hospital, Pee T’Hka village tract, Ta Kreh Township, Hpa-an District, for medical treatment. He has now been discharged from the hospital however he is currently bedridden due to his injury. His inability to work threatens his family's livelihood. The victim was aware of the possibility of landmine contamination in the forest, but in order to support his family and earn some money he went to the forest to collect some wild plants for sale..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2023-08-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-Personnel Landmines - Specialist organisations and commentary, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"La Hkum Lu Aung remembers a time when her life was peaceful and pleasant. Her family had enjoyed normal days, working hard to raise farm animals and cultivate rice and other crops in Nam Lin Pa village of Mansi Township, Kachin State. That was almost ten years ago, before conflict disrupted their lives and they had to flee from their homes. La Hkum Lu Aung has been living in Maing Khaung KBC camp for internally displaced people since then.
"Life at the camp has been full of difficulties," she says. Among the different challenges that they have been facing, La Hkum Lu Aung says one of the most difficult problems was the lack of access to clean water.
"Everyone at the camp used to collect water from a single hand pump so we could hardly ever collect sufficient water for ourselves. The water was also dirty and had high iron content, making it unsafe for drinking or cooking. It was not adequate even for washing clothes because it used to stain all our clothes," she says.
In Maing Khaung village, a total of 6,200 people suffered from limited access to clean water, one of the most conflict-affected areas in Kachin State. The village also hosts 1,600 displaced people.
Therefore, both displaced people and host communities would get water from hand-dug wells and hand pump boreholes, but it was not good enough for drinking, cooking, and washing clothes.
To improve access to clean water for the people living in remote and conflict-affected areas of Kachin, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has implemented four gravity flow water system projects over the last five years, benefiting 11,000 people.
The gravity flow water systems, designed to efficiently transport water from uphill springs to low-lying areas through pipelines, were set up in Sumpyiyang village (Putao Township), Lawa village (Hpakant Township), and Taunglin and Maing Khaung villages (Mansi Township). The system helps people save time and effort in collecting water from distant water sources and increases their access to clean water. "During our assessment visits, villagers shared their everyday struggle to access clean water in sufficient quantity. They were also eager to work collectively in creating a solution," says ICRC engineer Ko Thein Oo. He shares that the communities came together to carry materials to the site, dig for the pipelines, build grooves when the pipelines were laid and connect pipes to transfer water within the villages.
"The gravity flow water system is a simple and cost-effective method of distributing water in areas where electricity or fuel is not available or affordable," says Ko Thein Oo. The system's effectiveness depends on various factors, including the terrain, the distance between the water source and the point of use, and the demand for water. "In Kachin, the system proved to be effective," he adds.
La Hkum Lu Aung expresses that the system has significantly improved their lives.
Now, we get clean water in abundance. We are no longer always anxious about our health and are even able to organize celebrations or events in the village without worrying about the quantity of water required. We appreciate the ICRC for all the help.
La Hkum Lu Aung
Lazing Bawk Mai, who is also from Maing Khaung village, says they used to struggle often to find someone to repair the hand pump. "I have four kids, which means that I have many clothes to wash. It used to be very difficult when we had to collect water from the hand pump. But since the ICRC set up the new system, I am not worried about this basic need. We have enough water, and it is very clean, so we drink without any hesitation," says Lazing Bawk Mai..."
Source/publisher:
International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-08-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
NUG Statement on the Terrorist Military Junta’s Expulsion of the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste from Myanmar
Description:
"1. It has been brought to our attention that the illegitimate terrorist military junta that does not
represent the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, has compelled the Charge d'Affaires of
the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, who is representing the State of
Timor-Leste and its people in Myanmar and exercising his diplomatic responsibilities, to
permanently leave from Myanmar prior to 1st September 2023.
2. Being an illegal organization that has unlawfully taken control of the country’s power
through the use of force, the junta does not hold any authority to make decisions concerning
the international diplomatic relations of the State. The right to decision making on such
matter rests solely with the people of Myanmar and the legitimate government duly elected
by them. The expulsion of Timorese Charge d'Affaires from Myanmar is a customary,
unlawful and inappropriate act of the illegitimate military junta.
3. We deeply respect and appreciate the position of Timor-Leste that values fundamental
democratic policies and standards, the rule of law and human dignity. This stands as an
exemplary model for others to follow.
4. We respectfully state that the Timor-Leste's steadfast stance as a good friend will always be
deeply remembered and our sincere gratitude will be permanently inscribed in the hearts of
the National Unity Government and the people of Myanmar.
5. We appeal to the various governments of the international community which respect and
value democratic principles, human rights values and standards and embrace
humanitarianism, to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar, like Timor-Leste has
done, and provide support to Myanmar for its return to the path of democracy..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-08-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, East Timor-Burma relations
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Sub-title:
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ တီမောလက်စတေး သံရုံးယာယီတာဝန်ခံအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ နှင်ထုတ်ခြင်း နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description:
"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်ကို ကိုယ်စားမပြုသည့် တရားမဝင် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုသည် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံတော်နှင့် ပြည်သူများအား ကိုယ်စားပြုလျက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် သံတမန်ရေးရာ တာဝန်များထမ်းဆောင်နေသည့် သံရုံးယာယီတာဝန်ခံအား ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ စက်တင်ဘာ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မတိုင်မီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ အပြီးထွက်ခွာသွားရန် ဖိအားပေးခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရပါသည်။
၂။ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို ဥပဒေဘောင်ပြင်ပမှ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အဓမ္မ ရယူထားသော တရားမဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နိုင်ငံတကာ သံတမန်ဆက်ဆံရေးကိစ္စရပ်များအပေါ် ဆုံးဖြတ် ဆောင်ရွက်ခွင့် ရှိမည်မဟုတ်ပါကြောင်း သိစေအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် သံတမန်ဆက်ဆံရေး ကိစ္စရပ်များအပေါ် ဆုံးဖြတ်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်သော အခွင့်အာဏာသည် မြန်မာ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ၎င်းတို့မှ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် တရားဝင်အစိုးရ၌သာ တည်ရှိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ တီမောလက်စတေးသံရုံးမှ သံရုံးယာယီတာဝန်ခံအား ယခုကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ နှင်ထုတ်ခြင်းမှာ တရားမဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ပြုမူနေကျဖြစ်သော မလျော်ကန်သည့် ဥပဒေမဲ့ပြုကျင့်မှုသာ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ဒီမိုကရေစီ အခြေခံမူဝါဒများနှင့် စံနှုန်းများ၊ တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးမှုနှင့် လူသားဂုဏ်သိက္ခာ တို့ကို တန်ဖိုးထားသည့် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၏ ရပ်တည်ချက်အား အထူးလေးစား ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိ ပါကြောင်းနှင့် ၄င်းရပ်တည်ချက်သည် အများ စံနမူနာထားသင့်သည့် ရပ်တည်ချက်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းလည်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၏ မိတ်ဆွေကောင်းအဖြစ် ခိုင်မာမြဲမြံသည့် ရပ်တည်ချက်သည် မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ နှလုံးသားထဲ၌ နက်ရှိုင်းစွာ အစဉ်အမြဲ အမှတ်ရနေမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ကျေးဇူးတင်ကဗ္ဗည်း မြဲမြံစွာ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ရေးထိုးထားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း လေးစားစွာဖြင့် ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ဒီမိုကရေစီအခြေခံမူများ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးစံတန်ဘိုးများနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု များကို လေးစားတန်ဖိုးထားသည့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းမှ အစိုးရအသီးသီးအနေဖြင့်လည်း တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အတူရပ်တည်ပေးလျက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ဒီမိုကရေစီ လမ်းကြောင်း ပြန်လည်ရောက်ရှိရေးအတွက် ကူညီပံ့ပိုးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ပေးကြပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံပါ သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-08-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-28
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Official partners of the 2023 Business 20 (B20) Summit, which is the business dialogue forum of the Group of 20 (G20), have supplied arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, including since its illegal February 1, 2021 coup attempt. India is hosting the 2023 B20 and G20 summits.
Justice For Myanmar calls on G20 member states to urge India to end all support for the Myanmar military junta and impose an arms embargo.
B20 Summit partners and participants should end all business with the junta and its conglomerates, in accordance with their international human rights responsibilities.
Among official B20 Summit partners are TATA, Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge, which have supplied arms and military equipment to Myanmar, and JFW, which has supported the construction of a military-owned port.
The Myanmar military has been producing trucks in the Magwe Region under an agreement TATA Motors originally signed with the military’s former junta in 2010. TATA Motors Limited is part of TATA Group and is publicly listed in India. The company manufactures civilian and military vehicles.
A 2019 article published by the war criminal Min Aung Hlaing details a visit to the Magwe Tatmadaw Heavy Industries plant and confirmed TATA’s continued involvement in truck manufacturing following the military’s genocide against the Rohingya.
Indian export records also show over US$13 million in TATA Motors’ shipments of vehicles and parts to Myanmar since August 2018, including to the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Procurement, the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and TATA Motors’ private partner, Apex Greatest Industrial Company Limited.
Apex Greatest Industrial is an official service provider for TATA vehicles in Myanmar and is a current registered supplier of the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Procurement.
Larsen & Toubro Ltd is a publicly listed Indian conglomerate that manufactures arms and has supplied the Myanmar military with LWT-XP torpedoes. Days after the military’s coup attempt, Larsen & Toubro sent on-board spares and an alarm monitoring system to the Myanmar military arms broker, Star Sapphire Group of Companies, via its Singapore subsidiary, according to Indian export records.
Bharat Forge Limited is a publicly listed Indian conglomerate that manufactures arms. Its subsidiary, Kalyani Strategic Systems, produces field guns.
A document leaked to Justice For Myanmar shows that a delegation from Bharat Forge and Kalyani met with the Myanmar military in October 2017, during its campaign of genocide against the Rohingya. The meeting was to discuss India’s Garuda 105mm light field gun.
News reports show that the Indian government was again in discussions with the Myanmar military as recently as October 2020 regarding the supply of 105mm field guns, which may involve Bharat Forge.
2019 Indian import and export records show that Kalyani Strategic Systems provided maintenance and spare parts for the Myanmar military’s T90 battle tank.
JSW Steel Limited is a publicly listed subsidiary of JSW Group. According to the company’s 2021-2022 integrated report, the Adani Ports & SEZ container terminal in Myanmar is a JSW Steel showcase project. The newly constructed port, which Adani Ports recently divested from, is a partnership with the military conglomerate MEC. Adani Ports has paid MEC over US$90 million in rent, land use and “land clearance” fees, and MEC will take ownership of the lucrative and strategic port and its assets at the end of the lease, including the materials supplied by JSW.
TATA Motors, Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge have all provided arms and equipment that have supported the Myanmar military’s international crimes. JSW has supported an infrastructure project that enriches a military conglomerate, benefiting war criminals and helping to finance the military’s atrocities.
TATA Motors and Larsen & Toubro are both on the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List of companies doing business with the Myanmar military.
Indian state and corporate complicity in the Myanmar military’s international crimes extends beyond the actions of B20 Summit partners. As Justice For Myanmar has previously exposed, Indian state-owned companies Bharat Electronics Limited and Yantra India Limited have supplied equipment and technology to the Myanmar military junta following its coup attempt.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The Indian government’s support for the Myanmar military, with the complicity of some B20 Summit partners, should cast a shadow over the B20 and G20 summits and be a concern for participants and member states.
“By selling arms and equipment to the junta, the Indian government and companies are choosing to ignore the voices of the Myanmar people, UN resolutions and their responsibilities under international law.
“Justice For Myanmar calls for India to immediately impose an arms embargo on the Myanmar military and end its support for the junta.
“India’s allies in the G20 should use their leverage to pressure India to finally stop the flow of arms to the murderous junta.
“B20 partners and participants should cut all ties with the junta and its conglomerates.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
စစ်ကောင်စီထုတ်ဝေသော တရားမဝင်နှစ်သောင်းတန်ငွေစက္ကူများကို ပုဂ္ဂလိကဘဏ်များနှင့်ငွေကြေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် သုံးစွဲခြင်းမပြုလုပ်ရန် တားမြစ်မိန့်
Description:
"အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ အခန်း(၁၂)တွင် ဖော်ပြထားသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကို ငွေကြေးထောက်ပံ့မှုဆိုင်ရာ ပြစ်မှုများ အား တားဆီးနှိမ်နှင်းရန်ရည်ရွယ်၍ အကြမ်ဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့မှ ဤအမိန့်ကို ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
၁။ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီက ထုတ်ဝေသော နှစ်သောင်းတန် ငွေစက္ကူများသည် တရားမဝင် ငွေစက္ကူများဖြစ်ကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်မှ ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အဆိုပါတရားမဝင်နှစ်သောင်းတန် ငွေစက္ကူများကို လက်ဝယ်ထားရှိခြင်း၊ အရောင်း အဝယ်ပြုလုပ်ခြင်း၊ တနည်းနည်းနှင့်လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းတို့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေ အခန်း(၁၂)တွင် ဖော်ပြထားသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကို ငွေကြေးထောက်ပံ့မှုဆိုင်ရာ ပြစ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်ရာရောက်သည်။
၃။ ထို့ကြောင့် ပြည်တွင်းကြေးလည်ပတ်စီဆင်းမှုတွင် အဓိကကျသော အခန်းကဏ္ဍ၌ ငွေကြေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်နေသော ပုဂ္ဂလိကဘဏ်များနှင့် ငွေကြေး ဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများအနေဖြင့် တရားမဝင်နှစ်သောင်းတန်ငွေစက္ကူများကို လက်ဝယ် ထားခြင်း၊ အရောင်းအဝယ်ပြုလုပ်ခြင်း၊ တနည်းနည်းဖြင့်လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းများ မပြုလုပ်ရန် တားမြစ်မိန့်ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။
၄။ ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် တရားမဝင်နှစ်သောင်းတန်ငွေစက္ကူများကို ငွေကြေးလည်ပတ်မှု တွင် အသိအမှတ်ပြုလက်ခံသုံးစွဲသောဘဏ်များနှင့် ငွေကြေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများအား အထောက်အထားနှင့်တကွ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟို အဖွဲ့သို့ အသိပေးတိုင်ကြားကြပါရန် နှိုးဆော်တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ တားမြစ်မိန့်ကို လိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းမရှိပါက အကြမ်းဖက်မှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီတားဆီးနှိမ်နှင်းအပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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pdf
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135.41 KB
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"Insight Email No. 21
This Insight Email is published on August 22, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on August 18, 2023.
For this week’s insight email to Gabyin community members, ISP-Myanmar discusses the suffocating lives under military rule. This sense of stagnation stems from the gradual decline of the Myanmar economy, which is now facing not just distress, but a slow demise. We also examine the expansion of conflict as the ongoing Myanmar crisis becomes more brutal and fought more vociferously. Furthermore, there are indications that the SAC could relinquish its responsibility to take up the alternate ASEAN Chairmanship in 2026. Additionally, this bulletin introduces U Ye Htut’s book, ‘Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya?’ published this year. U Ye Htut is a former spokesperson of both the Myanmar government and the former Minister of Information.
∎ Key takeaways
1. Myanmar to shun ASEAN chairmanship in 2026
According to Thailand’s PBS News, Myanmar will defer its ASEAN alternate chairmanship to 2027 instead of the originally scheduled 2026, citing domestic circumstances and unpreparedness as the reasons. The ASEAN chairmanship rotation is based on alphabetical order. Following Indonesia’s (I) chairmanship, Laos (L) is set to assume the role in 2024, followed by Malaysia (MA) in 2025. Myanmar (MY) was initially slated for 2026, but the Philippines (P) will now take its place. This echoes a previous instance when Myanmar’s former junta postponed their ASEAN chairmanship responsibilities in 2006, allowing other ASEAN members to take up the lead. The ASEAN chairmanship was taken only in 2014 when the President Thein Sein’s government came in power with the 2010 general election.
In practice, transferring the ASEAN leadership to other member nations is a complex process that demands extensive consultations. The host country must proactively allocate a budget for organizing events and related expenses. The ASEAN chair is responsible for hosting a minimum of two ASEAN summits, engaging with partner dignitaries, and orchestrating numerous ASEAN ministerial meetings and sessions for officials of various ranks. If Myanmar is unable to assume leadership, the replacement country must make substantial preparations beforehand. In the meantime, leaders of the Myanmar junta are still excluded from attending ASEAN Summit meetings due to their failure to effectively implement the five-point consensus (5PC) aimed at resolving the nation’s crisis.
2.Intensifying levels of conflict
Even two years on from the military coup, conflict and civil unrest continue to escalate in Myanmar, with the total number of armed clashes reaching a minimum of 10,000 to July 2023. This figure represents a twofold increase compared to clashes that transpired over the entire preceding decade, spanning from 2010 to 2020 (which numbered at least 4,600). The conflict zones are widely dispersed, encompassing a significant geographical range. Following the coup, skirmishes occurred in at least 139 townships in 2021. This number surged to 193 townships in 2022 and further expanded to 211 townships in 2023. It is noteworthy that while in 2021 and 2022 clashes mostly occurred between the State Administration Council (SAC) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), but that the number of clashes between these two groups decreased in 2023.
Clashes between SAC forces and Peoples Defence Forces, and Local Defence Forces (PDFs/LDFs) under various designations have also been steadily increasing. Besides which, the number of collaborative military operations between EAOs and PDFs has increased. These developments underscore the expanding capacity for force deployment of new forces that have entered the military-political theatre. In August this year, armed conflict reached the center of power, the plains areas surrounding the capital Naypyitaw. The presence and activities of PDFs and allied forces have emerged as substantial challenges to the authority of the junta.
On the other hand, there is a growing debate about whether the Myanmar military is grappling with a waning potency and declining in strength. Nevertheless, the SAC still maintains military advantages, significantly including air superiority, advantages in heavy artillery, and more recently with the deployment of multiple-launch rocket systems. The SAC military command structure remains capable of maneuvering across diverse theaters of conflict and engaging adversaries in various offensives, although their effectiveness has been somewhat diminished. Nonetheless, the ruthless tactics and indiscriminate assaults employed by SAC forces have wrought significant havoc, disproportionately affecting urban and rural inhabitants, particularly in the Karenni, Chin, and Sagaing regions. One significant aspect of the resistance movement is the ad hoc and irregular nature of opposition forces’ movements and engagement. This lack of any apparent cohesive or coordinated strategy means that whatever clashes do occur, are unlikely to result in territorial advances or greater control projection. Civilian casualties though continue to grow country-wide, reaching almost 9,000 civilian deaths in two years (to July 2023). Additionally, instances of home looting and destruction of civilian property are on the ascent, accounting for around 80,000 affected structures (See ISP Data Matters No. 48).
Conversely, the proliferation of diverse opposition armed factions has inherently given rise to intricate political dynamics among combatants, leading to challenges like resource distribution and rivalry for authority. The Defense Minister of the National Unity Government (NUG) recently asserted that the armed resistance could achieve success in the early months of the upcoming year. However, it remains premature to provide a comprehensive analysis at this juncture.
3.Myanmar’s suffocating economy
While the military junta is struggling to maintain control, the foreign exchange value of the Myanmar Kyat is depreciating swiftly. On August 16, one Thai Baht fetched over 100 Kyats while the US dollar is trading at 3,850 Kyats in the informal market. The consequences of the rapidly devaluing Kyat has made imported goods more expensive while domestic commodity prices also rise, placing substantial strain on the populace as they struggle to make ends meet.
The State Administration Council (SAC) is resorting to market price control measures through directives and leveraging threats against export-import traders. In June, the SAC’s Central Bank revoked the licenses of three foreign exchange companies and arrested 51 people working in currency exchange. On July 15, the SAC once again terminated licenses for ten additional foreign exchange companies. More recently, on August 15, an additional 13 foreign exchange companies were compelled to cease operations.
The genesis of these financial problems traces back to the State Administration Council’s (SAC) imposition of foreign currency controls. The banks are compelled to convert all customer accounts denominated in foreign currencies into Myanmar Kyats at predetermined rates. Additionally, a mandate requires foreign exporters to convert 65% of their export income into Kyats within a single day, using the official designated rate, while the remaining 35% of companies’ export earnings are allowed to be converted at the market rate. However, there was a partial easing when, on July 30, the Central Bank shifted the ratio to 50-50. Despite this adjustment, the alteration has not significantly alleviated the competitive constraints faced by traders.
On June 21, the U.S. Government imposed a new round of economic sanctions against two major state-owned banks, Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanmar Investment and Commerce Bank (MICB). This move had an immediate impact, triggering a decline in the value of the Myanmar Kyat. In a separate development, the SAC announced the forthcoming release of a new limited-circulation currency note with a value of 20,000 Kyats. This has heightened concerns about the Kyat’s stability, eroding people’s confidence in retaining the currency.
In addition, on August 9, Singpore’s United Overseas Bank (UOB) announced its decision to sever correspondent bank relationships with Myanmar, which has worsened confidence in Myanmar’s financial system. The UOB decision complicates the military regime’s access to the global financial system. Furthermore, intensifying armed conflict and natural disasters have damaged crops, properties, and industries, leading to declining productivity. Myanmar’s economic landscape remains fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. The economy isn’t merely grappling with distress—it’s teetering on the brink of collapse. The brunt of these economic hardships is felt most acutely by the marginalized, impoverished, and grassroots segments of the population. They are enduring a gale of difficulty while fighting for survival.
∎ Trends to be watched
Are people happy nowadays?
In a recent episode of the ‘GPS’ program, hosted by Fareed Zakaria, a conversation unfolded with Bruce Feiler, the author of the New York Times bestseller ‘The Search: Finding Meaningful Work in a Post-Career World’. The discourse highlighted widespread discontent among workers with their employment, attributed to various factors such as the pandemic and the subsequent shift to remote work arrangements. However, the situation in Myanmar diverges significantly from global trends, as the populace faces a distinct challenge: the scarcity of viable job opportunities.
According to a recent International Labor Organization (ILO) brief on Myanmar, dated August 2023, the rate of employment terminations increased by 23.5 percent following the military takeover on 1 February 2021. The data includes dismissals of workers increasing by 41 percent while workers’ resignations increased by 22 percent. Many of these ousted workers were from the wholesale and retail trade sector, followed by the textiles, apparel, leather, and related manufacturing sector, and the construction sector. It is significant that among the civil disobedience movement (CDM) many activists refused to collaborate with the regime, which was reflected in the labour statistics. The job termination rate in the public sector increased by 392 percent (comparing the ratio prior to and after the military takeover) following the military takeover, mostly from the education sector. Many dismissals were for ‘non-standard’ reasons and are outside of national labor laws. Such violations rose by 690 percent after the military coup. Their struggle is harsh, some found waged jobs again after termination or become self-employed, but the average time for a worker to return to wage employment was 167 days, ILO reported. It is definitely not a happy experience.
Workers in Myanmar are encountering the most difficult situation. The SAC’s Cooperative and Rural Development Ministry website revealed at least 646 small businesses (SMEs) negated their registrations in the first seven months from early this year to July, as they could not continue their businesses. Simultaneously, a combination of human-caused and natural disasters has inflicted additional devastation upon the population. The situation in conflict-ridden areas has escalated to more dire proportions, with over 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) navigating treacherous terrains in search of safety. These adversities compound existing economic challenges, further compounding societal distress. The confluence of dim economic prospects, the continuous devaluation of the currency, and the State Administration Council’s (SAC) implementation of ad hoc economic policies has created an unfavorable environment for the creation of new job opportunities. The trajectory of employment dynamics and the voluntary or involuntary termination of jobs is a pivotal concern, as it directly influences the well-being of the majority of citizens.
∎ What ISP is reading?
Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya?
Ye Htut, (April 2023). Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya? Yangon: Ye Htut Publication.
A book authored by a former spokesperson of the Myanmar government and Minister of Information has recently been released. Known for his adeptness in Myanmar prose writing, he has garnered a substantial following through his earlier published essays. This latest publication is an anthology of articles and essays drawn from his Facebook page, encompassing a diverse range of subjects: from personal anecdotes and reflections on pivotal events to intricate portrayals of grassroots communities, travel accounts and his freethought. The book comprises 60 essays in 274 pages.
In the preface of his book, he recited Myanmar’s famous author, Mya Than Tint saying, ‘traveling is a type of politics.’ Against the backdrop of heightened security following the military coup in Myanmar, he documented his experiences and observations from routine local shopping excursions to journeys on the Yangon circular train. His essays maintain a message he wants to convey. As he writes in his book’s preface, ‘At the time of almost diminishing freedom, more vigorous conflicts and antagonisms, it is difficult to write about politics, economics, and social lives. Some ideas can be expressed openly, but some subjects can be only touched finely and left the readers to think further.’ The same paragraph is also printed on the back page of the book.
Within the essays, as outlined by the author, a panorama emerges encapsulating “tantrum situations both in the mountains and on the plains.” These narratives underscore the widespread scarcity afflicting numerous individuals, encompassing persistent and often extended periods of electricity blackouts. Individuals are compelled to navigate these challenges by looking for ways to reduce spending, reducing their food costs, and for those people at the grassroots, to ignore the nutritional value of their foods, embark on troublesome long queues in front of banks and ATMs. Soaring prices change the way people use fuel, and people become disgruntled living lives among the three catastrophes of famine, war, and epidemic disease. There are cases of ‘strangers’ pillaging villages and destroying properties. The reader can see the social-justice sensitiveness of the author through the texts as he recurringly points out the growing inequalities. It is observed that if he has to say something, he regularly stands with the view of the grassroots people.
Source/publisher:
ISP-Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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pdf
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2.62 MB
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Sub-title:
The changing world order and the growing Chinese aggression in the SCS have compelled the ASEAN countries to increase their military expenditures
Description:
"With global dynamics changing due to big power rivalry, the Indo-Pacific region is challenging the traditional concept of the Asia-Pacific with ASEAN at its core. Several ASEAN-centric bodies provided the regional security architecture. The United States (US) and its Quad partners—India, Japan, and Australia—have decided to challenge China’s aggressive intent in the South China Sea (SCS) and in the larger Indo- Pacific. ASEAN worries that it may have to choose sides.
ASEAN integration with the Chinese economy is intense. Its defence engagement with China is constrained by China’s assertiveness in the SCS and claims over its ‘traditional rights’ as outlined by the nine-dash line. This brings it into conflict with five ASEAN countries, notably Vietnam and the Philippines; the contention with Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia is more muted.
The Quad, the AUKUS, the threat of a Taiwan conflict, and the Ukraine crisis cause anxiety to ASEAN. ASEAN’s traditional posture of a liberal construct to deal with security challenges is failing. The Chinese have upended the reality in the SCS while providing lip service to ASEAN’s efforts to have a Code of Conduct (CoC) since 2002.
There is enhanced threat perception and defence spending by ASEAN countries. It cannot be termed as an arms race because ASEAN members are generally not competing with each other, nor are they in a position to challenge China or other inimical powers. Yet, military acquisition is increasing as maritime security moves centre stage.
The Chinese have upended the reality in the SCS while providing lip service to ASEAN’s efforts to have a Code of Conduct (CoC) since 2002.
ASEAN countries have a modernisation process underway. This has several aspects to it. Some started a while ago, but the need to bolster defences and replace equipment has had a link to Chinese aggression since 2010. According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure database 2023, ASEAN’s military expenditure increased from US$20.3 billion in 2000 to US$43.2 billion in 2021. From 2002-2007, this was below US$30 billion annually. Since 2015, ASEAN countries spent US$41 billion or more, the highest being US$ 44.3 billion in 2020.
From 2012, Chinese aggression in the SCS grew, cleaving ASEAN and bringing Chinese ships to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), waters and shoals of five ASEAN countries. Notably, military expenditure increases began in 2013, when expenditures leapt from US $34 billion to US $38 billion and have been growing since. Among ASEAN countries, according to SIPRI, from 2002-2021, Singapore has had the largest defence budget, reaching US$11 billion. The next was Indonesia with US$8.2 billion in 2023 marginally lower than US$ 9.3 billion as seen in 2020. Since 2012, Indonesia increased its defence expenditure from US$ 6.5 billion to US$ 8.3 billion in 2013 and has maintained a steady level.
Thailand is another major importer of weaponry with a budget of US$ 6.6 billion though it had maintained US$7 billion per annum for the previous three years. Malaysia and the Philippines both crossed the threshold of US$3 billion per annum and maintained it for a decade. These are likely to rise.
SIPRI does not have reliable defence expenditure figures for Vietnam but places them around US$ 5.5 billion per annum. Vietnam ceased publishing its defence budget in 2018 when it was estimated at 2.36 percent of its GDP. In December 2022, Vietnam held its first Def Expo; 170 exhibitors from 30 countries participated, which is a sign that Vietnam, facing Chinese hostility consistently, aims to diversify its Russian defence base. JSC Rosoboronexport (Russia), Lockheed Martin (US), Airbus (Europe), BrahMos Aerospace (India) and Mitsubishi Electric (Japan) had participated. Chinese companies, though invited, were absent. Vietnam relied on Russia for 70 percent of its weaponry. Most of its large equipment is Russian. The dependence decreased to below 60 percent in 2021. The US lifted an embargo on weapon transfers to Vietnam in 2016. Since 2017, the US and South Korea became suppliers.
Chinese aggression in the SCS grew, cleaving ASEAN and bringing Chinese ships to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), waters and shoals of five ASEAN countries.
South Korea has enhanced its exports to ASEAN. Korean Aerospace Industries in February 2023 signed a US$910-million contract for 18 FA-50 fighters to Malaysia; they challenged the offer of India’s Tejas aircraft. While Malaysia is not among the major arms spenders, its engagement with South Korea and Türkiye is growing. According to SIPRI, between 2017 and 2021, South Korea sold over US $2 billion of defence equipment to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Malaysia.
Threat perceptions and its implications
The perceptions of threats among ASEAN member states and how they should confront them varies. Some are more comfortable in dealing with the US, Australia, and Japan who are Quad members; others are more circumspect. The difference is due to the threat perceptions. Vietnam and the Philippines, for instance, are the biggest victims of Chinese aggression in the SCS. China has occupied islands and challenged control by Vietnam and the Philippines over islets and shoals that were traditionally governed but not defended. The Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal with the Philippines and Johnson Reef with Vietnam have witnessed such aggression. Therefore, the expansion of Vietnamese and the Filipinos armed forces and equipment and capabilities are an important factor.
In cases where military coups have occurred, such as in Thailand and Myanmar, the expansion of the armed forces was faster and more sustained. Some equipment purchased by Myanmar and Thailand cannot be easily linked to direct threats because these countries are not engaged in direct confrontation with China in the SCS. They have no ostensible enemies except within; yet obtaining submarines like Thailand received from China in 2017 and Myanmar obtained from India as a gift looks odd. Myanmar is perhaps responding more to Bangladesh acquiring Chinese submarines. Submarine acquisitions by Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia are also noted in ASEAN.
China has occupied islands and challenged control by Vietnam and the Philippines over islets and shoals that were traditionally governed but not defended.
In several ASEAN countries, the ideology behind the defence of the realm has altered. While the control by the military in Thailand and Myanmar gives impetus to defence expenditure there, in Indonesia and the Philippines, the move away from military governments towards democracy goes in the other direction. Instead of large armies, intended for internal control, and dealing with counter-insurgencies, the emphasis shifts to understanding the maritime challenges and acquiring naval and air assets for developing maritime security capabilities.
In democratic societies, budgetary constraints often come in the way of purchasing new equipment. This requires the executive to coordinate with the legislature and the Treasury. This impacts the kind of weapon systems that are being acquired or have become lost opportunities. The ability to coordinate these internally led the Philippines to outrun Indonesia and Vietnam in ordering the BrahMos missiles from India. In Indonesia, the order has not materialised, because internal coordination between the government and Parliament is inconclusive.
It is not entirely clear why Vietnam, despite its interest in the Brahmos and placing orders for weapons from other sources, is hesitant, though it happily accepts a gift of a warship from India.
In the case of Indonesia, they ordered 42 Rafaeles from France. Meanwhile, they obtained 12 second-hand Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from Qatar for US$792 million. This is the impact of budgetary constraints.
The Philippines during the first Horizon (2013 to 2017) purchased military hardware for internal security. The second horizon (2017 to 2022) focused shifting from internal security to territorial defence. The Philippines allocated US$ 5.6 billion for Horizon 2 and US$ 4 billion for Horizon 3 (2022-2027).
The ability to coordinate these internally led the Philippines to outrun Indonesia and Vietnam in ordering the BrahMos missiles from India.
Thailand, in 2022, ordered armed reconnaissance AH-6 helicopters from the US and Hermes 900 drones from Israel to support maritime operations. Singapore’s 2023 defence budget is US$13.4 billion, witnessing a 10-percent increase over 2022. It will include buying 8 (STOVL)-capable Lockheed Martin F-35B fighter aircraft to replace its F16s. Malaysia, besides the Korean fighters, will acquire three unmanned aerial systems from Turkish Aerospace Industries, and two maritime patrol aircraft from Italian firm Leonardo. In Indonesia, new helicopters, aircraft, naval vessels and surface combatants, military rotorcraft, submarines, underwater and electronic warfare systems, are the key components for expansion,
SIPRI indicates that in 2021, ASEAN countries spent US$43 billion on defence, merely 2 percent of worldwide defence expenditures. Comparatively, the US spent US$ 827 billion (39 percent), Europe US $418 billion (20 percent). China spent US$ 292 billion (13 percent) and Japan and South Korea both spent US$ 46 billion (2.1 percent) each.
The surge started around 2010. Russia was quick to provide equipment particularly Sukhoi aircraft to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Submarines were also popular. The Ukraine crisis and US nudging led ASEAN to avoid Russian equipment. Between 2000 and 2020, Russia was the largest arms supplier to ASEAN with sales of US$11 billion compared to US$8.4 billion from the US. The cost factor, the non-interference by Russia in the internal matters of ASEAN countries, and sometimes the use of barter arrangements by payment in commodities helped Russia. The US sanctions on Russia reportedly led to the cancellation by Indonesia of the Sukhoi 35 fighter deal and reduced the Philippines’ interest in buying 16 military helicopters.
Due to the Ukraine war, Russia is constrained in supplying weaponry. Its diminished capacity leads ASEAN to buy new equipment from American, European, and other Asian countries. The biggest advantage is for South Korea. They provide good technology at competitive cost, with little interest in the domestic politics of ASEAN. Given the new impetus to military modernisation in ASEAN, the market serves a good opportunity for middle powers to expand their imprint especially India..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of publication:
2023-08-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar's detained pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi’s younger son, Kim Aris, has called for international unity against the actions of the Myanmar junta in an interview with VOA from his home in England.
In the interview via Zoom, Aris says, “the scale of junta’s crime against humanity is horrifying.” He also called for the release of his mother, as well as all political prisoners who have been arbitrarily detained.
He describes how his mother, while working to bring democracy to her home country from England, was supported by his father, Michael Aris, who would later die of cancer. Suu Kyi went back to Myanmar to nurse her dying mother in 1988, during the people's uprising against Ne Win’s socialist authoritarian government.
Suu Kyi would go on to lead the democracy movement in Myanmar and be put under house arrest for more than two decades by the military junta. The junta stripped Aris and his older brother, Alexander Aris, of their Myanmar citizenships in 1989, when their mother first was placed under house arrest.
This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
VOA: You have frequently been interviewed by different media outlets regarding the current situation in Myanmar where your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been sentenced to nearly 30 years imprisonment by the junta. Why are you now willingly and actively engaging with the media and the public in a way that you haven't before?
Kim Aris: Since the beginning of the coup, I have had no contact with my mother. The military regime has not answered any of my queries as to her whereabouts or told me that I can have any contact with her in any way, shape or form. So, I have no other way of trying to reach her. I tried to do what I can. And I don't believe that anyone seeing the horrific images and sheer scale of the crimes against humanity being perpetrated by the military, against the Burmese people could turn a blind eye. … I cannot stand by and simply hope others will do what is needed to free my mother and support the people in desperate need of humanitarian aid if I do not do something myself.
The recent news that my mother had been transferred into house arrest is, as far as I'm aware, not true. As far as I know, she's still in prison in Napyidaw somewhere. And the military have used these tactics of false propaganda many times before. And I think this is just what's happening again, now that they're saying to be moved back to house arrest, whereas in fact, she's still in prison.
VOA: Your mother has said that she didn't want her kids to be involved in politics. Do you know what her reasons were?
Aris: Well, I'm sure every mother's natural instinct is to protect her children. From the personal risks involved due to the brutality of the military. Obviously, paramount in her mind that she herself has faced assassination attempts, and how her father was assassinated as well. These things come with risks.
VOA: Many of our viewers know that you don't like to talk about your personal life much, but can you share a little about your experience, especially for our younger audience, on how you overcame the difficult situation of being alone while your mother was back in Myanmar working to lead her country?
Aris: It has always saddened and angered me that my mother has sometimes been portrayed as cold-hearted because she was unable to be by my father's side during his final days. I was nursing him at that time and can say that he did not want my mother to return to England. After all the sacrifices she had already made. His wish was to join her in Burma (now Myanmar) and be with her under house arrest. Unfortunately, the military could not find this in their hearts to grant his dying wish. I believe it was a unity between my parents and this gave them the strength to oppose the injustice with which they were faced. Furthermore, I never felt that it was actually hard for me to be without my mother compared to what the Burmese people are going through. Their sacrifices have been far greater than anything that I've had to endure.
VOA: Can you give us an update on your campaign to bring attention to your mother’s imprisonment? What is the main aim of the campaign? What do you see as the biggest challenges going forward?
Aris: My main aim is to call on the international community to stand in solidarity, take meaningful action to achieve the release of my mother and all political prisoners and hold to account the military leaders responsible for violating the rule of law and numerous rights of the Burmese people.
Also, I'm trying to support humanitarian aid fundraising events taking place around the world, and to generate more global awareness of the crisis in Burma and the crimes against humanity being committed by the military every day. Some of the biggest challenges that I'm going to be facing are that some governments and institutions are willing to facilitate the military in their increasingly brazen crimes against humanity, the ability of the United Nations and wider international community to effectively impose more targeted sanctions on individuals, companies and institutions that facilitate the flow of revenue and aid to the junta’s military capabilities.
VOA: In my interview with Myanmar activists from the U.K., they said that they felt encouragement when you, as the son of Aung San Suu Kyi, showed your support for them. Do you have any plan to work with any of Myanmar organizations, such as the National Unity government, which led among opponents to the junta?
Aris: No, I have no plans on working with any of them. I have no wish to be a politician in any way. But I will be standing in solidarity with all of these organizations. I believe that they will win this war, especially through collaboration and new unity amongst all the different groups in their common fight against this military regime. My belief is that Burma will reemerge as a democratic country with greater inclusivity and acceptance..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-08-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, About Aung San Suu Kyi
Language:
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