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Title: Myanmar junta orders its workers to pay it part of their Thai wages
Sub-title: Those who don’t comply are at risk of losing their jobs and legal status in the kingdom.
Description: "Hundreds of thousands of Myanmar workers in Thailand have to hand over part of their wages to the junta ruling their country or risk losing their jobs under a new rule introduced by the military aimed at collecting foreign exchange and perpetuating army rule. Myanmar’s economy has been in crisis since the military overthrew an elected government in early 2021, facing significant economic challenges as conflict, macroeconomic instability and dislocation constrained production. The kyat currency has plunged from about 1,350 to the dollar before the coup to about 4,500 to the dollar now, fueling inflation. The junta, battling a growing insurgency and widespread opposition to its rule, has responded with various measures including cracking down on gold and rice traders to stop them putting up their prices and on the property sector to prevent people buying flats abroad. In another effort to boost foreign reserves, the junta announced late last year that Myanmar nationals living and working in Thailand were required to pay Myanmar income tax, and it also began pressuring migrant workers to send their salaries home. Now it is seeking more. In a directive that came into effect on Aug. 1, the junta said that the estimated 250,000 migrant workers in Thailand under a labor scheme agreed by the two governments must pay a quarter of their salary, or at least 6,000 baht (US$170), through junta-owned banks and agencies, over the three months before they apply to renew paperwork allowing them to stay in Thailand. Workers must renew the permit after four years in Thailand at offices in the Myanmar towns of either Myawaddy or Kawthaung on the Thai border. The Myanmar Ministry of Labor said in a notice that workers must show proof of the transfers via approved banks, which will only change their Thai currency into Myanmar kyat at an artificially low rate. The Myanmar embassy did not respond to a request from Radio Free Asai for comment. ‘Unacceptable’ A labor rights organization based in the Thai town of Samut Sakhon, a hub for migrants working in Thailand’s fishing industry, said it has been inundated with phone calls from angry workers asking about the new order. “The forced requirement to transfer money is unacceptable to the workers,” said a spokesperson for the Labour Rights Foundation, Aung Kyaw. “If they don’t comply, they will become illegal workers, unable to stay in Thailand.” Aung Kyaw said his group had written to the Thai government asking it to allow workers to stay even if they have not complied with the junta’s directive. Myanmar’s shadow, pro-democracy National Unity Government recently made a similar request. Many of the Myanmar workers in Thailand fled a military crackdown on protests that erupted after the 2021 coup, and more recently from the draft following the imposition of a conscription law early this year. Aung Kyaw said many people could not go home given the fate they could face there, adding that he hoped Thailand could let workers stay on. “If we negotiate with the Thai government to secure employment in Thailand with a single work permit issued by them, it will greatly ease the situation for the millions of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand,” he said. There are an estimated two million Myanmar workers in Thailand, or about 75% of Thailand’s total migrant labor force..."
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Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-08
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Title: Myanmar’s Junta Has Tightened Its Conscription Noose at Airports
Description: "The regime has toughened checks on young people attempting to leave Myanmar by flight to prevent them from evading mandatory conscription, blocking scores of job seekers and tourists from boarding their flights. Since August 1, scores of young travelers with either passports for jobs or for visits have been turned back by immigration officials at Yangon International Airport, with officials citing a lack of documents for their refusal to let them fly to another country. (Myanmar issues two types of passports: one for citizens leaving for jobs, PJ, and the other for visits, PV). Many of those who were refused to board their pre-booked flights were between 23 and 32 years of age who had returned to Myanmar on their PJ passports but wanted to go back to their jobs in foreign countries. Immigration officials are denying exit to those who cannot present overseas worker identity cards, tax receipts and proof that they had remitted 25 percent of their foreign currency income back to Myanmar through the country’s banking system. A member of an overseas employment agency said: “The regime apparently thinks that young people planning to leave the country after returning from abroad want to dodge conscription.” Workers looking for overseas jobs through licensed employment agencies are also affected by the tighter restrictions, he added. More than 40 documented employees leaving for jobs in Japan, Singapore and the Middle East were turned back at Yangon Airport on August 1. They lost the money they spent on their flight tickets. Five overseas employment agencies serving them said they would have to negotiate with the junta’s Labor Ministry for permission to let the workers leave. One worker turned back on August 1 said, “I was turned back. Transit flights to Japan are expensive.” The owner of one overseas job agency said the workers were prevented from boarding their flights because the junta suspected they were trying to evade conscription. Stringent checks are also being imposed on men aged between 23 and 32 of age leaving on PVs. They are required to show proof of funds, return tickets and a hotel booking. Some were prevented from leaving, but others were allowed to board their flights after paying “fines.” A Myanmar national who recently arrived in Thailand for a visit told The Irrawaddy that immigration officials at Yangon Airport ask for money from people leaving the country even if they have all the newly required documents.. I saw some travelers asked to pay from 50,000 to 100,000 kyats (about US$ 10 to 20).” The junta announced on Feb. 10 that it was enacting the Conscription Law, requiring men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to join the military. It began its first intake of forced recruits in March, prompting an exodus of young people from Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-08
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Title: In Myanmar, internet restrictions and surveillance increase
Description: "Restrictions on phone and internet service, and increased surveillance, are leaving large parts of Myanmar cut off from outside information, a recent report finds. The report by nonprofit Athan Myanmar shows that more than 80 townships have had phone and internet service cut so far this year, and authorities have arrested at least 70 people for alleged criticism of the military. The internet is blocked completely in some regions and has been slowed in others. A person who works in the fiber internet business told VOA that the expanded censorship is making it increasingly difficult to access news websites and social media. Many people in Myanmar use social media to access media and information. “I will tell you — Facebook Messenger, news websites, BBC and Reuters, etc., [have been] disrupted since yesterday,” said the person, who asked not to be named because of security concerns. “The Military Council has banned many of the software that provides the base for our cloud server. We can't use it anymore. If you want to use them, you have to use a VPN.” The military — also known as the Tatmadaw — is actively blocking virtual private networks, or VPNs, which help internet users bypass restrictions to access websites, as well as social media and messaging platforms. The move "poses a major threat to press freedom, activism and the ability of people to hold their government accountable," Simon Migliano, head of research at Top10VPN, told VOA last month. The London-based organization tests the security of VPNs and researches internet and tech security. The Athan Myanmar report shows that almost all the townships in Rakhine State, Sagaing Region, Chin State, Kachin State and the northern Shan State capital, Lashio, are affected. All are experiencing intense resistance fighting, or in the case of Sagaing, is a stronghold of the People's Defense Forces, the unity government’s armed wing that opposes the coup. U Han from the Myanmar Internet Project told VOA that the consequences of cutting phone access in the midst of fighting and a “political volatile situation” is troubling. “It has a direct impact on all the daily life activities of people of all walks of life, and because of what happens, it affects human rights,” he said. Since the military seized power in February 2021, it has sought to block access to independent news and information. Media licenses were revoked, internet blocked and dozens of journalists jailed. At least 176 journalists have been arrested and four killed, with as many as 50 still in jail or in police detention, according to the International Federation of Journalists. The military council has not responded to VOA's questions about internet restrictions. It has previously denied targeting media. Data by media watchdogs and rights groups, however, show Myanmar has a poor record in upholding freedoms. Freedom House says Myanmar is the second-worst country globally, after China, for suppression and violating digital rights. Reporters Without Borders ranks the country 171 out of 180 on the World Press Freedom Index, where 1 shows the best environment. The watchdog says that journalism in Myanmar is “an extremely dangerous profession” and notes “significant risks of [media workers] being tortured, jailed or murdered.”..."
Source/publisher: "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication: 2024-08-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-07
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Title: Myanmar Junta Reinforcements Attacked as TNLA Advances in Northern Shan
Description: "Clashes erupted in Nawnghkio Township, northern Shan State, on Tuesday as Myanmar’s junta deployed reinforcements near Nawnghkio town, which was captured by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) last month. The ethnic Brotherhood Alliance member resumed Operation 1027 in June and seized control of Nawnghkio town, which lies on the vital Myanmar-China trade route, on July 10. At around 11.40 am on Tuesday, the TNLA and allies attacked a unit of junta reinforcements sent to Shwe Mote Htaw village, 19 kilometers north of Nawnghkio town. Nawnghkio is situated on the main road from Mandalay to the Chinese border, making it a strategic hub in northern Myanmar. The town is connected to Mandalay, Pyin Oo Lwin, Kyaukme, Hsipaw and Lashio by road and rail, and linked to Shan State’s capital Taunggyi by National Road 43. Also on Tuesday, the TNLA and its allied Mandalay People’s Defense Force (MDY-PDF) attacked fleeing regime forces in Mogoke township. Mogoke, Mandalay Region’s famed ruby-mining town, was seized by the TNLA and MDY-PDF on July 24 after a month of fighting. “We chased the enemy and a clash broke out around Sein Kone village in Mogoke,” said the TNLA in a statement. Tuesday also saw the TNLA and allies seize Kyaukme town, 50 kilometers northeast of Nawnghkio, after defeating its last remaining junta defenses. “The clashes halted in both Mogoke and Nawnghkio on Wednesday. After we took complete control of Kyaukme, the junta is now dropping bombs on Kutkai,” said a TNLA official, describing the airstrikes as junta retaliation. Kutkai town lies 185 km northeast of Kyaukme on the Myanmar-China trade route. Regime airstrikes in Kutkai Township on Tuesday killed at least six residents, wounded 10, and destroyed around 400 shops in a market, the TNLA said. Kutkai was taken by the TNLA last year during the first phase of Operation 1027. The TNLA, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and allied groups resumed Operation 1027 on June 25 after a China-brokered ceasefire collapsed. Over a month into phase two of the operation, the ethnic armies and People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) under the civilian National Unity Government have seized six towns and over 100 junta bases — including the regime military’s North Eastern Command headquarters — in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-08-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-07
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Title: Surging rebel advances press for Myanmar regime collapse
Sub-title: Limits of Chinese power to influence actors and events in Myanmar’s raging civil war have become starkly apparent
Description: "In the closing weeks of 2023, the sweeping advances of an alliance of ethnic forces across Myanmar’s northeastern Shan state were often described as a watershed in a slow-grinding war, a telling sign that a military regime long held to be too big to fail could after all be defeated and ultimately overwhelmed. Eight months on, following the late June collapse of a shaky Chinese-brokered ceasefire, a return to full-scale war and the military’s signal loss of the north Shan city of Lashio mean the issue looming over Myanmar is now of an entirely different order. It turns simply on whether, beyond the watershed, the second phase of the 1027 campaign initiated by the Brotherhood alliance on October 27 last year has triggered a landslide of accelerating and potentially terminal reverses for the State Administration Council (SAC) coup regime; or whether, propped up by another Chinese-sponsored ceasefire, the military, or Tatmadaw, can stabilize an increasingly desperate situation. In three fundamental respects, the latest hostilities in northern Myanmar have wrought a sea change in the conflict. Importantly, all three underscore the rapidity with which events are assuming a momentum of their own beyond the control of any of the main actors, domestic or external, but with striking geopolitical implications that will impact them all. The decisive shift of hostilities into the national heartland spearheaded by ethnic Bamar People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), militarily capable and largely loyal to the opposition’s National Unity Government (NUG), has been the first and perhaps biggest game-changer. Launched on June 25, 1027 Phase Two was planned and executed across three organizationally and logistically distinct fronts. One, best described as the “highway front”, required seizing control of the towns of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw strung out along the national highway between the regional capital of Lashio and Mandalay in central Myanmar. That task has fallen mainly to the ethnic Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Front (TNLA), a force of around 11,000 troops based in the tea-growing hill country in the northwest of the state. Focused on Lashio itself, operations on the second front were undertaken by the TNLA’s Brotherhood ally, the Kokang Chinese Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). A city with a pre-1027 population of some 200,000 and an army garrison estimated in late June at around 6,000 troops, Lashio constitutes the strategic lynchpin of northern Shan state and, until it finally fell on August 3, was the headquarters of the Tatmadaw’s Northeast Regional military command (RMC). From late June through July, fighting on both Shan fronts was bitter as Brotherhood forces, hammered by unrelenting airstrikes, assaulted and overran a score of well-defended battalion bases screening all four urban centers. By the beginning of August, the two Brotherhood allies had basically secured their key objectives, albeit at a high human cost. Neither side has even hinted at its losses, but given the scope and intensity of the fighting, it is probably safe to assume a toll of at least 5,000 killed and wounded on both sides. The critical new element of 1027 Phase Two, however, has been a third western front driving into the national heartland along the Ayeyarwady Valley. Fighting in this zone spread from the ruby-mining center of Mogok south to the outskirts of the country’s second-largest city, Mandalay, with Bamar PDFs spearheading the advance. The most notable has been the Mandalay PDF (MDY-PDF), a well-organized and well-equipped force of at least 3,000 troops based in the hills along the Shan state-Mandalay Region border to the north of the garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin. While the force has declared its allegiance to the NUG and received some funding from the shadow government, it has grown since late 2022 as the result of training and material support provided by the TNLA and operates under TNLA command and control. As in Shan state, opposition advances were fiercely contested: joint TNLA and PDF forces did not finally secure Mogok until July 24. Further south, the strategically vital town of Singu where a bridge across the Ayeyarwady links northern Mandalay Region to Shwebo city in Sagaing Region, fell to PDF forces on July 20. By that time PDFs were attacking army-held villages 20 kilometers from the northern suburbs of Mandalay which, with its population of 1.6 million, is the headquarters of the Central RMC. The shift of large-scale hostilities into the Bamar heartland is critically significant. It offers logistical and organizational connectivity between the MDY-PDF and opposition forces in two other key zones: to the north, the riverine towns of Tigyaing and Katha that fall within the greater sphere of influence of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA); and to the west, the resistance hotbed of central Sagaing around Shwebo city, potentially threatening the highway between Shwebo and Mandalay. If in the coming weeks the TNLA/MDY-PDF combine advances from newly captured Nawnghkio along the highway to threaten the garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin, the noose around Myanmar’s ancient royal capital would tighten inexorably from both the north and east. Limits of Chinese influence While highlighting the role of well-organized PDFs with strategic punch, 10.27 Phase Two has also laid bare the stark limits of Chinese influence in stemming the coming landslide. Following the collapse of the Hai Geng ceasefire, an agreement reached in Kunming in January this year, repeated efforts to broker another cessation of hostilities in the midst of fierce battles proved predictably unsuccessful. All three Brothers – including the alliance’s third partner, the Arakan Army (AA) – benefit to a greater or lesser degree from cross-border connectivity with China and have been at pains to stress that they will safeguard Chinese economic and infrastructure interests. At the same time, all three are evidently intent on prioritizing war objectives that go well beyond securing autonomy for their own regions to include supporting at various levels Bamar efforts to bring down the edifice of military dictatorship. For its part, China is undoubtedly deeply frustrated with Senior General Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, a capricious and incompetent dictator whose 2021 coup effectively torpedoed Beijing’s long-term economic and geostrategic objectives in Myanmar. At the same time, China has no interest in facilitating the collapse of the SAC regime, which it fears would mean either a descent into fragmentation and chaos or an interim administration in Naypyidaw centered on a NUG that Beijing views as a stalking horse for Western meddling in its backyard. As a result, Beijing appears caught between the Scylla of the Brotherhood and aggressive PDFs it cannot rein in and the Charybdis of its support for a regime in Naypyidaw led by generals whose floundering defeats and potential collapse have set at risk years of economic and political investment in Myanmar. Thrown into sudden relief by the fall of Lashio, the upshot will not be a foreign policy debacle on the scale of Cambodia 1978, when Beijing’s errant Khmer Rouge proteges were abruptly swept from power by a Vietnamese army forcing thousands of Chinese advisors to flee for their lives. But the dilemma policymakers in Beijing are wrestling with today is already a far cry from the caricature of China-in-Myanmar projected by its many Western critics: as a deeply prescient chess master skillfully moving pawns and knights in pursuit of grand geostrategic ambitions stretching decades into the future. All of that, however, has gone to underscore the importance of one trusty knight that China does have on the board and can probably count on: the United Wa State Army (UWSA), one of the world’s largest drug-trafficking militias. The sudden intervention of the China-leaning, 30,000-strong force which had earlier stood aside from the post-coup chaos sweeping the rest of the country has undoubtedly been the third major game-changer triggered by 1027 Phase Two. Having grown strong, rich and influential behind the shield of a 35-year-long ceasefire with the Tatmadaw, the once-despised Wa tribals have emerged from their mountain redoubts east of the Salween River and along the Thai border to reshape the political and military balance across south-central Shan state. On July 27, even as fighting in Lasho still raged, a contingent of around 500 Wa troops advanced into the city as a neutral force enjoying good relations with both belligerents ostensibly to protect a liaison office and other real estate interests. Not lost on independent observers, however, was that the UWSA had effectively taken advantage of the conflict to establish a significant and easily reinforceable military presence in the regional capital of north Shan well beyond their traditional bailiwicks. For those paying attention, pointers to the wider scope of Wa ambitions had come 16 days earlier in central Shan State when on July 11 UWSA forces abruptly crossed the Salween River and occupied the Tatmadaw garrison town of Tangyan on the west bank without a shot fired. It remains unclear whether the move was brokered by China two days earlier when Myanmar Army commander Vice Senior General Soe Win was attending a Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in the Chinese city of Qingdao — and likely pleading with his hosts to rein in the Brotherhood and pass on more ammunition. But the occupation of Tangyan was clearly agreed in advance with the Tatmadaw garrison and effectively shielded the army from losing the town to advancing MNDAA and TNLA forces. It was also coordinated with a close Wa protege, the ethnic Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) which since the coup has benefitted from new infusions of UWSA-supplied weaponry, vehicles and drones to expand its presence west of the Salween. Shortly after the Wa moved into Tangyan, SSPP troops advanced into Mong Yai town 65 kilometers to the west that controls the road to Lashio. The Wa power-play has served to throw into sharp relief two new realities with major geopolitical implications. The first is that the UWSA-SSPP alliance is now well-placed to dominate south-central Shan state. The expansion will come at the cost of the only other significant ethnic faction in the region: the SSPP’s longtime rival for leadership of the state’s ethnic Shan majority, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). Led by Yord Serk, an aging warlord-cum-businessman, and already weakened by a string of military reverses, the RCSS faces the imminent prospect of being pushed back to its bases on the Thai border. Its retreat would leave the Wa-SSPP combine dominant across the entirety of central and southern Shan state sharing a loose border with the northern Brotherhood Alliance forces of the MNDAA and TNLA. The second emerging reality is closely related to the first: the Tangyan gambit served to lay bare the striking weakness of the Myanmar military, an incapacity with potentially far-reaching repercussions. As the Tatmadaw faces escalating pressure in the national heartland in the coming months, the Tangyan precedent is all too likely to encourage further Wa takeovers of larger army bases in eastern Shan state, including potentially the Triangle RMC in Keng Tung and Tachilek city, a short drive south on the Thai border. Any such scenario implies the realization of a long-cherished Wa dream: the merger of the UWSA’s autonomous zone along the China border with its Military Region 171 enclave on the Thai border. The territorial tie-up would mean the emergence of a newly unified “Wa State” with close political, military and economic links to China and sympathetic to China’s infrastructure ambitions in Shan state and beyond. What for the Wa leadership is a dream on the cusp of reality, however, may prove a nightmare for Thai military planners already struggling to stem a tsunami of illicit narcotics flowing south across a porous border from industrial-scale production centers in Wa-ruled territory..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2024-08-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-07
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Title: The United League of Arakan (ULA) statement No.16/2024
Description: "The United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) continues its offensive operations to completely capture the remaining camps of the terrorist military junta near Maungdaw along the Bangladesh-Arakan border. Since June 16, 2024, we have been urging civilians in Maungdaw town to evacuate as quickly as possible before the battle to capture the town began. On the other hand, the military junta and extremist Muslim armed groups such as ARSA, RSO, and ARA are using weapons and manpower to intimidate and prevent innocent civilians from reaching safe places, in addition to coercion and persuasion based on Islamic religious extremism. At the same time, Muslims and non-Muslim minority civilians such as Rakhine, Hindu, and Khami trapped in Maungdaw town face daily threats, oppression, and killings from terrorists. Additionally, we are saddened to learn from social media that in recent days, many Muslims fleeing the town have reportedly died from artillery or small arms fire, bombings, drownings, airstrikes, or massive explosions near the coast of Maungdaw, causing great distress. We respectfully announce that these deaths did not occur in areas under our control and are not related to our organization. We are investigating the details of these incidents and will promptly release information as soon as we have verified the facts. The ULA/AA is an organization that, from the beginning of military training, has clearly instructed its members to adhere to military discipline, the soldier’s code of conduct, human rights laws, and international humanitarian laws during warfare. Our organization does not support terrorism and condemns all forms of violence against civilian population. We will not allow any terrorist groups to establish a foothold in the Arakan and will eliminate all terrorist organizations. To ensure the safety of innocent civilians amidst the increasingly intensified battles around the capture of Maungdaw, we request every civilian to strictly adhere to the following guidelines: 1. All civilians should evacuate from Maungdaw town toward areas with the Arakan Army, which can provide safety, rather than venturing into dangerous areas. 2. Civilians unable to evacuate should take shelter in safe places in their vicinity, mark their locations with white flags, and stay as far away as possible from combat zones and terrorists. 3. Avoid staying in military junta’s roads, houses, and major buildings where defense positions and sniper posts are established, or where military junta personnel are stationed. 4. Stay as far away as possible from military junta and extremist groups like ARSA, RSO, and ARA to prevent being used as human shields. 5. If you encounter terrorists mingling with civilians while fleeing from the battlefield, promptly report to the nearest ULA/AA troops. We urge the innocent civilians in Maungdaw to strictly follow these directives and recommendations to avoid harm and remain safe..... United League of Arakan..... DISCLAIMER: The English version of this statement serves as a translation of the original Burmese text for informational purposes only. In case of any discrepancies, the Burmese original shall prevail..."
Source/publisher: United League of Arakan, Arakan Army
Date of publication: 2024-08-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Do-no-harm compliance is needed in Myanmar
Description: "Local aid workers and organisations must not only be accountable to the communities they serve but also meet the compliance requirements of international funding agencies. Compliance frameworks are of course important to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of internationally funded programs. However, local humanitarian actors often find these frameworks to be top-down, overly rigid, and unsuited to volatile and politically complex crises. This persists despite the commitments made in the Grand Bargain to localise aid systems and simplify requirements such as those related to reporting. Our evidence from Myanmar demonstrates that, while perhaps established with good intentions, international agencies’ compliance frameworks and related requirements can have unintended negative consequences for local actors and communities. Since the military junta’s coup in early 2021, civilian populations in Myanmar have faced an escalating humanitarian emergency. In a country of approximately 56 million people, more than three million have been forced to flee their homes. This crisis is a direct result of the Myanmar military’s targeting of civilian populations and aid workers. In this context, local aid workers and systems are essential to ensuring vital aid for civilian populations, serving as a “lifeline for the population,” as one aid worker said. Yet our interviews with leading members of Myanmar’s local humanitarian networks revealed a pattern of negative repercussions from the compliance requirements imposed on internationally funded aid programs, including increased security risks and the obstruction of vital aid flows. In Myanmar, the junta’s widespread use of extreme violence has led local organisations to develop very low-profile approaches which enable them to navigate military restrictions and reach communities in need of humanitarian aid. However, the compliance frameworks of international aid agencies commonly require local organisations to collect detailed information from “beneficiaries”, including sensitive information, revealing a dangerous lack of situational awareness. These systems can lead to critical delays in the delivery of humanitarian aid, undermining rapid and adaptive approaches. International compliance requirements can also increase the already grave risks faced by actors on the ground. For example, the common requirement to obtain multiple quotes before procuring aid supplies can draw increased attention to aid workers and suppliers. A local Civil Society Organisation (CSO) member pointedly said: [The Myanmar military] asked the local sellers to report to them when there is buying of temporary shelters … as they do not want [them] to reach [internally displaced people] and defence forces … But if we ask for three quotations using organisational formats in our small town, they will know us right away, putting us at risk. Other requirements like the need to supply copies of drivers’ licences to show how supplies are transported, or the location of displacement camps, similarly jeopardise the low-profile approaches that local aid workers have developed. During our interviews, aid workers described having to hide sensitive documents, often storing them at staff houses or concealing them on their bodies to cross through checkpoints. There were exceptions, with some international agencies having increased the flexibility of their systems since the coup — for example, allowing for soft copies of documentation or reducing the need for multiple quotes for procurement. But these changes often took the form of short-term “emergency exceptions”, leaving local actors concerned about a return to “business as usual”. For local humanitarian actors, there is a perception that this business-as-usual approach is linked to self-interest. As one local organisation leader said: The most important thing that many INGOs and UN agencies should consider right now is the community, what they need and how they can support … Instead, they are just considering themselves, their survival, staff salaries, organisational survival, and self-preservation. Amid Myanmar’s complex emergency, leaders of local organisations were not advocating for the abandonment of compliance systems; they acknowledged the crucial role they play. Instead, they argued for “a balance between what local partners can do in this context and how to ensure … minimum accountability requirements,” as said by one CSO member. They felt that this balance was currently lacking. Not only can inappropriate compliance systems cause harm for local aid workers and organisations, they can also perpetuate unequal aid partnerships and create the perception of a lack of trust by international actors in their local “partners”. The knowledge and expertise of local aid organisations are often sidelined when compliance systems impose externally determined ways of working that are ill-suited to Myanmar’s volatile situation. This speaks to a disconnect between international approaches and the commitments made in frameworks like the Grand Bargain and the Charter for Change. Many local organisations have developed contextually appropriate internal policies and systems to ensure accountability and compliance. However, international agencies too often deem these policies and approaches inadequate. This can force local agencies into prioritising what one CSO leader called the “capacity to comply” with internationally determined standards and criteria, rather than focusing on the “capacity to grow” their organisation and human resources based on local context and needs. As highlighted by analysts like Hugo Slim, genuine localisation should enhance the agency of local populations in crisis situations to develop and lead their own humanitarian systems and approaches. Yet a “compliance-first” culture impedes the agency of local actors, reinforcing power inequalities in aid relationships. It is vital that international agencies adopt a “do no harm” approach in relation to all compliance systems, ensuring that local partner and beneficiary security is always prioritised above other concerns, including financial risk management. They should also work with local organisations to develop systems that achieve a fair balance between their requirements and what is realistic in a context like Myanmar. In developing and implementing compliance systems, they should “walk the walk” and not just “talk the talk” of shifting power to the local actors who are leading humanitarian responses on the ground. The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of Tamas Wells to this blog. Disclosure This research was conducted by the authors for the Myanmar Research Network at the University of Melbourne. The research was part-funded by a European NGO that prefers not to be identified..."
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Source/publisher: Australian National University
Date of publication: 2024-08-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-06
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Title: The Myanmar Junta’s North Eastern Command Has Fallen: What’s Next?
Description: "The fall of the Myanmar military’s North Eastern Command in the northern Shan State capital Lashio is a major blow to the military—not to mention a deep humiliation. Analysts are already predicting it is the beginning of the end for the military regime. Established in 1972, the regional command achieved numerous battlefield victories against the Communist Party of Burma and ethnic armies. During the Myanmar military’s decades-long presence in Lashio it built formidable defensive structures. The base commanded all military activities from neighboring Mandalay Region in the west to the Chinese border in the north and east. It was one of 14 regional military commands in the country. Now it is gone. The regional headquarters in Rakhine and Kachin states may face a similar fate. We shall see. The question now is: Is the Myanmar military at a tipping point? The fall of the North Eastern Command will have huge consequences. Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership is in serious question. Of course, he blamed everyone but himself in his speech addressing the nation on Monday. He even accused external forces of interfering in the civil war. While he stopped short of naming the country, it was an obvious reference to China. In fact, he is the one to blame and should be held accountable by his forces. The defeat is all the more striking given that the Myanmar military is still far superior in terms of hardware and manpower to the ethnic armies and resistance forces it has been fighting for more than three years. It possesses warplanes, helicopters, heavy artillery, naval ships, armored vehicles and mounted missiles. To its shame, none of this could prevent the loss of the military command headquarters in northeastern Shan. The loss has come as a jarring wakeup call for those analysts who cling stubbornly to the daydream that the military will ultimately prevail against the anti-regime armed resistance movement. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army—who comprise the Brotherhood Alliance, which has inflicted a series of defeats on the junta since October last year—and their allied resistance forces possess only minimal heavy weapons and drones. In an attempt to defend Lashio, the regime prepared extensively to deter any offensive, using the time it gained during a Chinese-mediated ceasefire from January to June to put up a defensive perimeter. At the time, analysts wrote approvingly that the Myanmar military’s defensive capabilities appeared to have improved. To capture Lashio, the MNDAA encircled it and the approximately 10,000 Myanmar junta forces—about 6,000 regular troops plus militia members—defending the city. The MNDAA mobilized its three brigades and steadily dismantled the outer defensive positions of the Myanmar military forces, progressively shrinking the defense line and penetrating the interior of the city. Local analysts said the ethnic Kokang army and its allies showed a high level of military competence, local support, intelligence, and strategic clarity, all of which positioned them favorably in the conflict and allowed them to win the Battle of Lashio. More importantly, unlike in the past, the Burman population is not behind the Myanmar military. The majority of Burmans opposed the coup in 2021 and, having experienced and witnessed the brutality and atrocities of the regime, are satisfied to see it pay dearly on the battlefield. Most heartily celebrated the news of the fall of the North Eastern Command. Several senior junta military commanders responsible for the defense of Lashio were captured by the MNDAA and are now being interrogated. However, some analysts and diplomats are now wondering whether a China-installed regime is imminent. It is interesting to note that China reportedly put pressure on the MNDAA and its allies to stop attacking Lashio. Analysts speculated that China wanted to wait and see whether the regime would proceed with another extension of its emergency rule at the end of July. As expected, the regime did exactly that and Min Aung Hlaing is now acting president. It is important to note that the fall of Lashio and the regional command came three days after the extension of emergency rule. The debacle in Lashio will no doubt have shaken the military. Among military supporters, the feeling of defeat, fear, anger, frustration and humiliation is palpable. Min Aung Hlaing is no commander-in-chief of the armed forces, nor a leader of the country. He is the murderer-in-chief, a war criminal and a coward. There have been calls for him to step down and even go into exile. He will do neither. This means we will see more offensives in the coming months. On the heels of Lashio’s fall, Kyaukme, located on the Mandalay-Lashio Road, was taken by the TNLA on Tuesday morning. Will Pyin Oo Lwin be next? Garrison town emptying War veterans and holiday home buyers in Pyin Oo Lwin—a former British hill station in Mandalay Region not far from Kyaukme—have deserted the town and the real estate market there has collapsed in anticipation that war will soon arrive. The town has already come under drone and rocket attack this year. Unconfirmed reports suggest the regime has ordered military cadets and military hospital staff in Pyin Oo Lwin—home to the military’s Defense Services Academy—to relocate to Hmawbi, Yangon. After Pyin Oo Lwin, Mandalay—Myanmar’ second-largest city—is the next target of the resistance, analysts said. Clashes have already occurred on the periphery of Mandalay city, as Mandalay People’s Defense Force, operating jointly with the TNLA, is active in that part of Mandalay Region. The regime recently sent jet fighters to bomb villages in the area, killing many civilians and children. Residents of Mandalay—Burma’s royal capital until the British seized it in 1885—have been rattled by the news from Lashio, which is only five hours away by road. But they are no stranger to war. Warplanes pounded the city and Royal Palace during World War II as allied forces battled the Japanese there. If indeed war does come to the once royal city in the cold season this year, it will not be for the first time..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-08-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-06
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Title: Myanmar: Mid-year metrics 2024
Description: "Although no longer at the top of the Conflict Index, Myanmar retains its January 2024 rankings across all four major indicators. This ACLED infographic provides a snapshot from the first six months of the year of the conflict in Myanmar using insights from ACLED’s Conflict Exposure Calculator, Conflict Alert System (CAST), and Conflict Index..."
Source/publisher: "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project" via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication: 2024-08-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Who is asking for capacity-building? Reflection on the Myanmar context
Description: "The concept of localisation, which gained prominence with the Grand Bargain agreement from the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, has been evolving over the past decade. This approach emphasises the importance of local actors in humanitarian aid, striving for practical frameworks and realistic methodologies. In countries like Myanmar, where international aid plays a crucial role, localisation is familiar to some of the local communities. Drawing from practical experience with local aid groups, this discussion aims to reinforce better practices and explore the nuances of capacity-building and strengthening for local support organisations and community members. The practical implementation of localisation often varies widely depending on who is involved, leading to significant differences on the ground. One key area of discussion is the role of capacity-building or strengthening for local support organisations, including individual community members. Many efforts are being made in this regard, prompting the question: why is there a need to improve the capacity of local support organisations and individuals? Suggesting the need to improve and strengthen capacity may be perceived as implying a lack of capacity among the locals, which has sparked considerable debate. While this is a complex issue, it is crucial to address it without straying from the primary intention. Focusing on capacity-building or strengthening, there is a significant emphasis on demand-driven approaches. International humanitarian aid organisations are seemingly tailoring their capacity-building initiatives based on the needs expressed by local groups. Aligning efforts with genuine needs and demands A critical question arises from this: ‘On whose demand are we building or strengthening capacity?’ Or put another way, who exactly is asking for this capacity-building? This question is at the heart of ensuring that capacity-building efforts are genuinely aligned with the needs and demands of local communities. Based on experiences on the ground, it is evident that many are developing demand-driven capacity-building strategies based on their own agenda. However, it is crucial to scrutinise whether these initiatives are truly driven by local demands or if they are influenced by outside agendas. First, capacity-building/-strengthening programmes are often shaped by the requirements of donors, United Nations (UN) agencies and international intermediary organisations. These programmes prioritise compliance with financial, auditing and project management standards. More recently, additional requirements such as child protection and protection against sexual exploitation and abuse have also become mandatory. While these requirements are important, they are often externally imposed, leaving local groups with no choice but to comply, regardless of their own priorities. Instead, capacity-building/-strengthening should be based on the actual needs of local groups, which can be multi-faceted. Local organisations frequently seek guidance from their more experienced peers to meet donor requirements. However, smaller organisations often request support based on their perception of donor expectations, which may not always align with their practical needs. Conversely, some organisations with more experience are better able to identify and articulate their own needs. To enhance the effectiveness of capacity-building, donors, UN agencies and international intermediary organisations should support local aid groups in developing skills to reflect on their own needs and those of their communities. This approach would ensure that capacity-building is more relevant and tailored to the actual requirements of local organisations. This speaks to the concept of community demand, as defined within the framework of the Grand Bargain. This approach emphasises the community’s ability to self-reflect and identify their own needs for improving their resilience and response capacity. Appeals based on community demand are often directed to local support groups that are close to the community, and occasionally to donors, UN agencies and international organisations. In such situations, it is crucial to systematically encourage local support groups to strengthen the necessary capacity to meet these community-driven demands. Building this capacity not only enhances the ability of local groups to respond effectively but also fosters greater community trust and cooperation. To ensure the community’s voice is heard, and their needs are addressed, local support groups should receive robust support in developing the necessary skills and resources. For example, enhancing networking capacities can enable local support groups to better coordinate and cover community needs. Adapting to rapidly changing environments Finally, it is important to highlight contextual demand, which refers to the capacity to adapt to rapidly changing environments. Sudden changes such as war, civil conflicts, or emergency situations often result in unforeseen needs that require swift responses to alleviate human suffering. For instance, in a country like Myanmar, the situation is constantly evolving. While local responders can analyse the overall situation, there is often a lack of capacity and resources to provide the necessary support to affected communities. Additionally, local responders may have a development mindset but lack an understanding of international humanitarian rules and regulations when responding to emergencies. Given these challenges, it is crucial for donors and international intermediary organisations to prioritise discussions and provide encouragement to ensure local communities and responders develop the necessary skill sets. This process should be conducted with mutual respect and flexibility, allowing adjustments based on local systems. This approach will help to build the capacity of local responders and enable them to effectively address the needs of their communities in rapidly changing situations. The capacity-building and -strengthening of local responders is fundamental. Evidence has shown that this approach is beneficial in many aspects. However, defining the demand must be done with care, to prioritise the needs of the community and local support groups. The situation is often complicated and unstable, especially in conflict-affected settings. Donors, UN agencies and intermediary international organisations should also consider supporting the capacities necessary for the survival of local support groups, rather than always aiming for their development and growth. Local aid organisations operating in areas with heavy fighting or under military control, like in Myanmar, face enormous pressure and have limited functional space. For these groups, the emphasis should be on developing the capabilities and resources necessary for their continued survival. In summary, demand-driven capacity-building and -strengthening should exist as a process and method that is discussed and deciphered by all concerned stakeholders. At the same time, while using the principle of improving and strengthening capacity based on demand, donors, UN agencies and international organisations should be careful to avoid spending excessive time on compliance demands..."
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Source/publisher: ODI - Humanitarian Practice Network
Date of publication: 2024-08-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-06
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Title: ‘Domino Effects’: Historic Defeat of Myanmar Military Command Shakes Junta
Description: "Fifty-two years after it was founded to fight the Communist Party of Burma in northeastern Myanmar near the Chinese border, the military’s Northeastern Command in Lashio, northern Shan State, fell on Saturday. The defeat marks the first time since 1962, when the military staged its first coup, that a military command has been lost to ethnic armed groups and their allies. It was also a major milestone for Myanmar’s resistance movement, which has captured its first command since the 2021 coup. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and allies seized both Lashio and Northeastern Command one month after launching their offensive on July 3. The Lashio defeat is the biggest blow so far to a military regime that takes pride in the command’s historic achievements. Junta spokesman Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun recently declared, “Among the 14 military commands in the Tatmadaw, the Northeastern Command stands out for its tradition.” “It defeated the Kuomintang invasion from abroad. It repeatedly defeated invasions by the Communist Party of Burma. It is the military command that helped free the local national race from the oppression of warlords and opium kings,” he said. One week after that declaration, the command headquarters was conquered. The MNDAA said in a statement that its troops “took complete control of the Northeastern Command at 12.20 pm on August 3, and its operation has achieved complete victory.” Ye Myo Hein, a Visiting Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, said the fall of Northeastern Command represented more than the loss of a regional command for the Myanmar military. The defeat showed the Myanmar military’s combat power had weakened to the point that it could no longer resist the advance of revolutionary forces, he wrote on Facebook. “Though the battle itself was crucial, [it showed] the institution of the military has weakened to the extent that it could not recover when it started to lose ground during the fighting.” He added that the rout of Northeastern Command also dealt a severe blow to morale within the military while bolstering confidence among anti-regime forces. “The defeat will have domino effects,” he predicted. Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun acknowledged the fall of the military hub, saying the regime had “lost contact with officers at the headquarters on Saturday afternoon.” In June 1970, the Myanmar Socialist Program Party led by dictator Gen. Ne Win formed a strategic command headquarters in Lashio to counter the threat of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), whose troops entered Kokang in 1967. In 1971, Northeastern Command-led troops successfully repelled 40 days of “human-wave” attacks on Kunlong by the CPB, halting the offensive’s momentum and marking a historic turning point in the battle against the insurgency. After the fighting subsided, the regime dissolved the strategic command headquarters and established nine regional commands: Northern Command based in Myitkyina, Northeastern Command in Lashio, Eastern Command in Taunggyi, Southeastern Command in Mawlamyine, Yangon Command in Mingalardon, Southwestern Command in Pathein, Western Command in Sittwe, Northwestern Command in Mandalay and Central Command in Taungoo. Northeastern Command engaged in fierce fighting with the Shan State Army, ethnic Palaung groups, troops under drug lord Khun Sa, and Kachin Independence Army Brigade 4, active in northern Shan State until the collapse of the CPB in 1989. The command assumed an even more important role protecting the Muse-Lashio route to China after border trade resumed following the CPB’s collapse. Senior officers at the command also started to get involved in local business. In 2009, amid tensions over the military-drafted 2008 Constitution’s requirement for ethnic armed organizations to transform into border guard forces, the military attacked Kokang and expelled the MNDAA led by Peng Jiasheng. The MNDAA returned to Kokang in 2015, triggering further clashes. Northern Shan State saw few clashes in the aftermath of the 2021 coup, until the Brotherhood Alliance including the MNDAA launched Operation 1027 in late October last year. The regime quickly lost Kunlong, Hseni and Namhkam townships near Lashio, before China brokered a ceasefire in mid-January. The alliance resumed Operation 1027 in late June, making more gains culminating in the MNDAA seizing both Lashio and the Northeastern Command HQ it hosted. Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing has now assured his place in history as the first military commander-in-chief to have lost a regional command..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-08-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-05
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (July 22 to 31, 2024) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 22 to 31, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Mandalay Region, Shan State, and Rakhine State from July 22nd to 31st. The Military Junta Ships attacked with heavy artillery to the villages along the Chindwin River in Monywa Township, Sagaing Region. Prisoners from Insein Prison, Yangon Region, and Kyaiksagaw Prison, Bago Region, got Seasonal Diarrhea Disease and needed medical care. The Military the Minister of Labor gave directions to give fines to the agencies that do not provide the personal details of the coworkers and to send the people to Thailand when they show the papers that give the 25% of their tax fees that must be given to Myanmar. Around 50 civilians died, and nearly 70 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian also died by the landmine of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication: 2024-08-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.43 MB 1.61 MB 708.46 KB
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Title: Myanmar Junta Extends Post-Coup State of Emergency for Sixth Time
Sub-title: Despite the deteriorating security situation, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing remains committed to holding elections at some point next year.
Description: "Myanmar’s military junta has once again extended its state of emergency for another six months, as resistance groups continue to make battlefield gains across the country. According to state media reports, the decision was made at a meeting of the military-controlled National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) on Wednesday, at which coup leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing held fast to his previously announced plans to hold a multi-party election. “Holding the election is a government’s vision which never changes. Hence, preparations are ongoing to hold an election,” the Global New Light of Myanmar paraphrased Min Aung Hlaing as saying. The junta leader told the NDSC that the extension was necessary in order to enact “security measures” and “continue the restoration of peace and stability across the nation.” According to other reports, he said that the military administration also needs time to carry out a pre-election census. The new phase of emergency rule is now due to expire at the end of January; Min Aung Hlaing announced in June that polls will be conducted sometime in 2025. During the meeting, Min Aung Hlaing repeated his prior claims that the February 2021 coup was necessary due to pervasive “voting fraud” at the general election held in November 2020. (No evidence of extensive fraud has ever been adduced.) Such extensions are supposed to be endorsed by the country’s president, but on July 22, Myanmar state media announced that acting President Myint Swe, who had served in the role since the coup on February 1, 2021 coup, had gone on medical leave, authorizing Min Aung Hlaing to carry out the presidential duties with the NDSC. The extension of the state of emergency – the sixth since it was imposed following the military takeover – amounted to an admission that the armed forces do not exercise enough control to prepare for the elections that the junta intends as a transition back to a form of civilianized military rule. Indeed, over the past year – and since the most recent extensions of the state of emergency, in August 2023 and February of this year – the junta’s battlefield fortunes have gone from bad to worse. In late October, the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed groups launched Operation 1027, a sweeping offensive in northern Shan State along the country’s border with China. The first phase of the offensive, which ended with a China-backed ceasefire deal in January, left the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), two members of the Alliance, in control of large swathes of territory in Shan State, including numerous towns and several important border crossings with China. The most significant of these was the MNDAA’s reconquest of the ethnic Chinese-majority Kokang region, from which the military had expelled it in 2009. At the same time, the Arakan Army, the third member of the Alliance, scored remarkable successes against the Myanmar military in Rakhine State in Myanmar’s west. After a five-month pause in fighting, the TNLA and MNDAA, backed by allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other anti-regime groups, opened the second phase of Operation 1027 in Shan State and Mandalay Region in late June. This saw the MNDAA launch attacks on Lashio, the largest city in northern Shan State where the military’s Northeast Regional Command is located, which is reportedly besieged and on the brink of defeat. Meanwhile, the TNLA this week announced the complete seizure of the town of Mongmit in Shan State, the third town that it claims to have captured since the second phase of the offensive began. Addressing the NDSC yesterday, Min Aung Hlaing said that the MNDAA and TNLA had “violated the temporary ceasefire agreement” and vowed to continue efforts to “forge peace and stability” in northern Shan State and Mandalay Region. These gains, and the prospect of a full collapse of the military position in northern Shan State, make any discussion of elections increasingly fantastical and detached from reality. While it is hard to gauge claims about which groups have effective control over which areas, it is clear that the junta probably would only be able to administer elections in a minority of the country, predominantly on the dry central plain and in the major cities like Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw. Whether such partial and illusory exercise would fulfill even the military’s minimal goal of resetting international expectations or disguising its rule in civilian guise, remains very much open to question..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication: 2024-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-02
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Title: Myanmar rebels are claiming their biggest victory yet over junta forces. Could it be a turning point in the brutal civil war?
Description: "ry base in Kokang region, on March 11, 2015. Stringer/Reuters CNN — The pounding of sustained gunfire and artillery had rattled Khin Swe’s home in northeastern Myanmar for days, with shelling getting ever closer until it was impossible for her to remain. “If I had stayed, I would have been dead by now because of artillery firing and airstrikes that were falling all over the town,” Khin Swe told CNN, using a pseudonym for security reasons. “There was nothing we could do to be safe, except to run,” said the 28-year-old online sales rep. Like many of the residents of Lashio, a major town of about 170,000 people nestled in the mountains of northern Shan state, Khin Swe packed what she could and fled. Images published by local media in the past few weeks show a mass exodus from the town, with a long line of cars, trucks and bikes laden with belongings snaking through muddy, monsoon-lashed roads. Since late June, a powerful ethnic rebel army and its allied resistance forces have mounted a renewed offensive to capture Lashio. The strategic garrison town, the largest in Shan state, is the seat of the junta’s regional Northeastern Military Command and the center of its power base in Myanmar’s northeast and areas near the Chinese border, with about 40 battalions under its command. Myanmar has spiraled into a devastating civil conflict since the junta’s 2021 coup was overwhelmingly spurned by the people, as the military wages a ruthless war against a nationwide armed resistance determined to oust it from power. On July 25, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a rebel force of the ethnic Chinese Kokang minority, announced it had “won a decisive victory” against the junta and declared Lashio “fully liberated” following a 23-day operation. If confirmed, the capture of Lashio would be the biggest victory for the resistance since the coup and mark a turning point in the three-year civil war that has been characterized by increasingly brutal attacks against civilians by junta soldiers and warplanes, and the mass displacement of more than 3 million people. Junta spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun has repeatedly denied that the town and the regional command has been captured, calling the claims “propaganda.” The junta said the rebel group has “devastated civilians’ areas [rather] than military strategic holds.” Video and images posted to social media and on the MDNAA’s accounts in recent days appeared to show their troops in central Lashio, including at the railway station, prison and a broadcast station, and within hundreds of meters of core military infrastructure. CNN cannot independently verify the claims from either side. Analysts say the situation remains fluid and while the rebel group is quickly moving through the town, capturing several battalions especially to the south of the city, fighting is ongoing. “That sort of position in the very middle of Lashio certainly points toward significant gains within the city,” said Nathan Ruser, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, who has been mapping positions of the resistance in Lashio. For Lashio to fall, “it basically eliminates the junta as an effective organized force from a huge part of the country,” Ruser said. “And for it to appear to be happening after only about a month of clashes shows how much the capabilities of the junta have declined in the last year especially.” Caught in the crossfire Khin Swe said Lashio’s residents were used to the sounds of fighting nearby but not within the city itself. “Artillery shelling was fired constantly at night over the town. With our phones in our hands to keep updated with the news, we all sat anxiously. Some nights, I didn’t dare to sleep as shells roared overhead. At some point I fell asleep and was woken up by the sound of the loud artillery again,” she said. “It was the scariest moment I have ever experienced in my life.” The main forward part of the rebels’ assault had focused on the south and west of Lashio, with the MNDAA and its allies targeting the LIB 507 military base before entering the town and clearing it street by street, analysts and residents told CNN. Khin Swe, whose home was close to the base, described how shelling started near her part of town but had grown in intensity in other areas as the military’s soldiers exchanged fire with the rebels. She escaped to Myanmar’s second-biggest city Mandalay, a six-hour drive away in normal conditions. Bus fares leaving the city had skyrocketed, she said, as droves of people tried to flee. Some of her family members decided to stay in Lashio to protect their homes and businesses. Before phone lines got cut off, Khin Swe said her relatives “saw Kokang troops move into the town and position themselves in empty buildings, while they urged the people to leave.” “I am sure my home has been wrecked, but we can’t reach out to people who are left in the town because the phone connection is cut off,” she said. “My friend who had stayed in the town until very recently told me that most of the houses have been damaged.” Being among many people displaced by war in Mandalay, Khin Swe said she and her family “are barely surviving.” “The displacement shelters are full up with the entire population of Lashio town, some of us are struggling to find a place to live. Besides, we don’t have food to eat either,” she said. “Our family could not take some valuable items other than some money, and now we are living with more than 30 people in a place we rented.” Other Lashio residents caught in the crossfire have written desperate messages for help on local community and neighborhood Facebook groups. “There are children and elderly being caught in a high school amid crossfire in Lashio, they have not eaten the whole day, I don’t know how to help,” one social media user posted. “We are a group of three girls with a 70-year-old grandma, we want to leave the town either for Taunggyi or Mandalay, but we are struggling with how,” another resident posted, leaving her phone number. One man who spoke to CNN by phone said he fled Lashio at 4 a.m. last Friday as heavy fire raged overhead. “We left the town with a bunch of people by truck. The road on the way was badly damaged,” he said as he traveled to Taunggyi, the Shan state capital some nine hours south of Lashio. The fighting, which has extended across Shan state and the neighboring Mandalay region has forced thousands of civilians to flee – many of them multiple times – often to towns and villages also facing a barrage of junta airstrikes and shelling. The deteriorating humanitarian crisis is being exacerbated by a lack of food and aid, with local community networks risking their lives to reach those in need. Coordination of anti-coup resistance Rebels have reportedly seized dozens of junta bases and several northern towns since a renewed offensive in late June by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a trio of ethnic armed groups fighting alongside the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the armed wing of the national unity government in exile. The gains for the rebel alliance – made up of the MNDAA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army – followed the collapse of a Chinese-brokered ceasefire, according to local media and resistance groups. Last week, the TNLA said it had captured another strategic town in the Mandalay region – Mogok, the center of Myanmar’s lucrative gem mining industry. Analysts say resistance forces now control many of the roads to Lashio and other key towns in the northeast, preventing the military from resupplying soldiers in its peripheral outposts. “They’re unable to push forces up because all the roads are controlled by the opposition, so they have a hard time sending reinforcements,” said Miemie Winn Byrd, a retired US Army Lt. Col. and professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Since October, the military has been weakened by a series of territorial losses, troop defections, desertions and loss of manpower. Endemic corruption and poor command within its ranks mean the junta leadership may not have a clear idea of the situation on the ground across the country, including in Lashio, analysts say. “Because of the corruption, Naypyidaw does not know how many forces it has… they have had a lot of desertions and defections that are going unreported,” Byrd said. “I’m not sure (junta chief) Min Aung Hlaing knows that that city has fallen into the hands of the opposition. I’m not sure his people are telling him that.” Last week, the junta reportedly replaced the head of the northeast command. There were also reports in local media that the junta had ordered its staff to leave Lashio as fighting got closer. CNN cannot independently verify these claims. In a recent address, junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun appeared to counter claims of a weakened military, which he referred to by its local name, the Tatmadaw. “As long as Myanmar exists, the Tatmadaw will exist. As long as we exist, Myanmar will live even stronger because we will safeguard your lives and your properties. Therefore, you all must work hand in hand to defend your country,” he said. The anti-coup resistance in Myanmar was once considered a loose grouping of ill-equipped fighters, but recent successes, including the MNDAA’s push into Lashio, has shown a new level of coordination and capability, according to analysts. “This phase of Operation 1027 has really shown a new level of interoperability and coordination between the ethnic resistance organizations and the political PDF resistance,” said Ruser, referring to the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s name for its ongoing offensive. “Given the sort of snowballing gains by the resistance, and especially the Three Brotherhood Alliance over the last six to eight months, they’re now a really equipped force. They have artillery, they have plenty of drones, they have all sorts of capabilities that now allow them to really strike apart at qualified and static positions.” For Khin Swe, the fighting in Lashio has left people divided. “Chinese people in the town and young people who are in support of revolution are largely in favor of the Kokang group while the older generation, who don’t want war, blame the Kokang for their territorial invasion [and] are in support of the military,” she said. Khin Swe said she is “saddened to see the destruction” in her hometown but she supports the “revolutionary groups defeating the junta.” “I am happy and sad at the same time because I don’t know how we will rebuild our home. But the news of Lashio being captured gives us hope that one day in the near future we can go back home,” she said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Weekly Update of National unity Government ( 31 / 2024 )
Description: "Former Karen National Union Vice President Naw Zipporah Sein Passes Away.....NUG Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann Emphasizes Administrative Preparedness Amid Expanding Territorial Control.....NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min Highlights Junta’s Decline at Philippine Conference......NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min Urges Philippine Support for Myanmar Democracy Movement.....NUG Ministry of Health Urges Participation in Spring Health Heroes Program.....NUG Ministry of Education Extends University Admission Deadline.....PDF Forces Capture Military Council Base in Inn Nat Village.....NUG Ministry of Defense Congratulates P29999/Special Operations Force on 3rd Anniversary.....NUG Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs Issues Condolence Message for Naw Zipporah Sein...."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 3.89 MB
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၃၁ / ၂၀၂၄ )
Description: "Weekly Update of National unity Government ( 31 / 2024 )..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar Junta Boss Admits Simultaneous Nationwide Election Impossible
Description: "Walking back his vow to hold a nationwide election, junta boss Min Aung Hlaing said during the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) meeting on Wednesday that elections would be held first in areas where it is safe to do so while his regime tries to bring “stability and security” to conflict zones. The junta boss added that his troops would bring “peace and stability” to Lashio, Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw and Mogoke—areas where his troops have recently suffered humiliating defeats, including the losses of several major bases and towns, to ethnic armies and their allies. He insisted that after seizing power on Feb. 1, 2021, his regime had planned to hold a nationwide election when the initial two-year state of emergency expired. Hostilities hindered the regime’s plan to return to democracy while forcing an extension of the state of emergency, he said. During the civil war in the early 1950s, a general election was held over seven months between June 1951 and April 1952 due to armed conflicts. Nationwide general elections were held in 1990, 2010, 2015 and 2020. But after losing vast swathes of territory in northern Shan State and Rakhine State and with unrest ongoing in many parts of the country, the regime has been left with no option but to hold the election in stages. At an NDSC meeting in January 2023, Min Aung Hlaing said his regime had complete control over only 198 of 330 townships in the country, and that it needed to improve security in 132 townships. That was before the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armed organizations launched its large-scale offensive, Operation 1027, which has seen the regime lose dozens of towns in northern Shan State. One of the three alliance members, the Arakan Army, has seized more than half of Rakhine State in western Myanmar. The junta’s loss of territory is not limited to Shan and Rakhine, however. It has also ceded territory in other ethnic states including Kachin. Recently, it lost two towns in Mandalay Region, home to the second-largest city in Myanmar. Even as the regime was holding the NDSC meeting on Wednesday to extend the state of emergency for a sixth time, allied anti-regime groups continued their attacks on junta positions in northern Shan State, seizing almost total control of Lashio, where the regime’s Northeastern Command is based. Nearly 70 towns have fallen into the hands of anti-regime groups since the beginning of Operation 1027 in October last year, which would reduce the 198 townships under junta control claimed by the junta chief to around 130. Furthermore, the junta’s administrative mechanism is not fully functional in some of the areas it claims to control. Observers doubt the regime has the capacity even to conduct the population census needed to compile voter lists, let alone a nationwide poll. Min Aung Hlaing earlier said a poll would be held next year after a census scheduled for October. Observers say polls are highly unlikely except in Naypyitaw, Yangon and Mandalay, and in large towns in other regions and states. At the NDSC meeting on Wednesday, Min Aung Hlaing said his regime would never give up on its objective of holding an election. After being extended by six more months on Wednesday, emergency rule is now due to expire at the end of January 2025. If Min Aung Hlaing returns power to the NDSC then, it is constitutionally required to organize polls within six months..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-08-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-01
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Title: Myanmar junta extends emergency rule amid escalating conflict
Description: "July 31 (Reuters) - Myanmar's embattled military government extended a state of emergency on Wednesday for another six months, state media said, as the junta struggles to maintain its grip on power with fighting flaring on multiple fronts and the economy in crisis. Army-run Myawaddy media said the military-controlled National Defence and Security Council extended emergency rule to give the junta more time to put together population data for voter lists. The junta has said it will hold an election next year. The military put the country under emergency rule for a year when it took power in a February 2021 coup, deposing the elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi and triggering nationwide street protests that it violently crushed. The junta has since extended that every six months, as the protest movement morphed into an armed rebellion that has widened and is now posing an existential threat to the generals. "It is necessary to restore peace and stability because of ongoing terrorist activities," state-run media said of the latest extension, referring to the armed resistance. Last week, all responsibilities of Myanmar's figurehead president were handed over to junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, after the nominal head of state was placed on medical leave due to a prolonged illness. Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly promised to hold a multi-party election, with the general saying in June that polls will be conducted in 2025. Previous election timelines have been postponed, citing the ongoing violence as the reason. Min Aung Hlaing has insisted the junta does not plan to hold power long. The military took power after complaining of fraud in a November 2020 general election won overwhelmingly by Suu Kyi's party, which the party denied. Election monitoring groups found no evidence of mass fraud..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2024-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-01
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Title: Myanmar Junta Surrenders Third Town to TNLA in Northern Shan State
Description: "The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) says it has seized complete control of a third town, Mongmit, in northern Shan State following the resumption of Operation 1027 in late June. The junta’s Infantry Battalion 276, Light Infantry Battalion 348, and a tactical command overseen by the Northern Command fell on Wednesday, TNLA spokesman Lwei Yay Oo told The Irrawaddy. “We seized total control of Mongmit today,” she told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday. Details of casualties are still unknown, she said. Mongmit is bordered by Mandalay Region’s Mogoke to the south, Namtu to the east, and the Irrawaddy River to the west. The northern Shan State town of Namtu was captured by the TNLA during the first phase of Operation 1027 in December. The TNLA together with People’s Defense Force groups under the command of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) took complete control of ruby hub Mogoke in northern Mandalay Region last week on Wednesday. Mongmit is located 46 km north of Mogoke. The ethnic Kachin Independence Army (KIA) briefly occupied Mongmit in November, but the town was retaken by the regime. The TNLA and allied groups have also captured Nawnghkio town in northern Shan State. They are now focusing their assault on junta positions in Kyaukme and Hsipaw. Elsewhere, the KIA has also seized Mabein town, 57 km north of Mongmit. Much of the Shweli River basin has now fallen into the hands of anti-regime groups. Meanwhile, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, a TNLA ally, has seized almost complete control of Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State. PDF groups have also seized Singu town in Mandalay Region and are now conducting an onslaught on junta positions in Madaya and Thabeikkyin just north of Mandalay City..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-08-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s Military Hit by Deadly Ambush in Attempt to Reinforce Stranded Troops
Description: "A convoy of reinforcements the junta sent to the northern Shan State capital Lashio retreated after suffering heavy losses in an early morning ambush by the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies on Tuesday, according to resistance sources and Shan media. The 30-truck convoy carrying an estimated 400 reinforcements was ambushed near Man Bang town, about 95 kilometers southeast of Lashio. The reinforcements included young men who were forcibly drafted under the conscription law activated earlier this year, a military analyst close to resistance groups said. Charred remains of junta troops are visible in a video showing MNDAA fighters inspecting the destroyed vehicles, some of which were still burning. The video has gone viral in Myanmar. Reports said the convoy was led by Brigadier General Than Tun Aung, a commander of the junta’s Middle East Command based in Kholam town in southern Shan State. The convoy was ambushed while traveling to Lashio on the road between Tangyan and Nampawng towns. “Eight military vehicles were destroyed or burned and up to 80 regime troops, including the brigadier general suffered injuries. The commander was sent back to Kholam and the other injured soldiers were treated in Tangyan town,” the military analyst told The Irrawaddy on Thursday. It is now impossible for the junta to retake Lashio because it has to rely on a longer land route to supply and reinforce its troops in and around the city, the analyst said, noting that the MNDAA and its allies were fighting to take control of the city’s airport. About 50 regime forces were killed in the ambush, according to Shan media reports citing troops on the ground. The Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies launched Operation 1027 in October last year. The coordinated offensive steamrolled through northern Shan State and was closing in on its goal of liberating the region from the regime’s military when a China-brokered ceasefire halted its progress in January. Since then, all land routes to Lashio have been controlled by resistance groups. The junta only had access to the city by air. It lost that access after the MNDAA and its allies captured parts of the airport north of Lashio. They are now fighting for control of Lashio Airport. Intense clashes continued on Thursday as resistance groups attacked the regime’s remaining bases and positions in Lashio. They are poised to assert complete control over the city after seizing the headquarters of the junta’s North Eastern Command last Thursday. The MNDAA on Saturday announced the formation of a commission to rebuild and administer the city. The MNDAA resumed Operation 1027 on July 3 along with its allies by attacking the junta’s outposts and battalion headquarters defending Lashio. Another member of the Brotherhood Alliance, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army is attacking junta troops west of Lashio in both northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region. It is fighting alongside other resistance groups, including People’s Defense Force units, under the command of the civilian National Unity Government. Since the resumption of Operation 1027, ethnic armies and allied resistance groups have captured six towns and cities, including Lashio, and about 100 junta bases – including several battalion headquarters – in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region. In the first phase of Operation 1027, the ethnic alliance and its allies seized 17 towns, 24 junta battalion headquarters and hundreds of the junta’s frontline bases, including command centers..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-08-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-08-01
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Title: Anti-Regime Groups Seize Myanmar Junta Positions in Southern Shan State
Description: "Anti-regime groups have seized junta outposts at the tourist hotspot of Inle lake since launching an offensive against Myanmar’s regime and the allied Pa’O National Organization (PNO) in Nyaung Shwe Township, southern Shan State, on July 18. The People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) from Inle and Pekon, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force from Pekon and other groups joined the offensive targeting junta and PNO positions in rural Nyaung Shwe. An anti-regime fighter said: “We captured a PNO base and a military checkpoint on July 18. We have also seized smaller positions.” Inle lake is a major tourist destination with numerous hotels, including hotels owned by junta cronies Tay Za and Aung Myo Min Din. The clashes are about 32km from Nyaung Shwe town. Anti-regime forces have also surrounded a junta hilltop base after briefly occupying it. “We surrounded the Htee Ree tactical command base. Our troops have been deployed in villages, which were previously PNO strongholds near Htee Ree,” said a fighter. At least 5,000 people from five villages in the township have been reportedly displaced by the fighting, including about 1,700 displaced people from Karenni State (Kayah) who fled previous fighting. They have reportedly moved to Nyaungshwe, Taunggyi, Pinlaung and Aungban towns. A Loikaw town resident, who was sheltering at a monastery in Sankar village in Nyaung Shwe, said: “Approximately 1,700 people from Karenni State were taking shelter in the villages. All of them and other villagers have fled since the fighting. I am now in Taunggyi.” Nyaung Shwe borders Taunggyi, Hsihseng, Kalaw, Pinlaung and Pekon townships. The regime has been sending reinforcements from Pinlaung Township, said anti-regime groups. Military tensions have been running high in Lwel Lone and Sankar villages as the regime tries to retake them. Fighting has also been reported on the border of Pinlaung and Pekon townships. The latest clashes took place at the Htee Ree base and four villages on July 27 when anti-regime groups attacked junta and PNO positions. The regime has retaken parts of Karenni State after launching a large-scale counteroffensive in June. Karenni State borders southern Shan State..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Doo Tha Htoo District Situation Update: SAC looting and shelling causing casualties, destruction, and displacement, and landmine contamination in Tha Htoo Township (February to November 2023)
Description: "This Situation Update describes events occurring in Tha Htoo (Thaton) Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District during the period between February and November 2023, including State Administration Council (SAC) shelling and looting, as well as villagers’ displacement and landmine contamination. During the reporting period, the SAC military conducted indiscriminate shelling at least 25 times, firing 135 mortar rounds. As a result, five villagers died (including two children) and 26 villagers (including nine children) were injured. Livestock was also affected, including 22 cattle killed. Property was also destroyed: 17 houses, four monastery buildings, critical infrastructure, and a car were also destroyed by the SAC’s shelling. 20 civilian houses and 26 rubber trees were damaged. Villagers fled for their safety and SAC military looted their properties from their houses. A landmine-related incident was also reported, that injured a villager and her 12-year-old daughter while they were foraging in the forest.[1] February 2023: SAC shelling caused injuries and property destruction On February 9th 2023, at 6:30 am, State Administration Council (SAC)[2] Artillery Unit #314 [based in Kya T’Raw (Zi Won) army base, in Shwe Yaung Pya village tract] shelled several mortars in Tha Htoo Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. One of the mortar rounds landed on Saw[3] A---’s plantation in B--- village, Ka Ti Pu village tract[4], Tha Htoo Township, and his rubber trees and betel nut leaf plants[5] were destroyed by the explosion. One of the mortar rounds also landed on Saw A---’s rubber tree plantation, so his 11 trees were destroyed [by the explosion]. On February 9th 2023, at 10:06 am, SAC Artillery Unit #314 shelled several 80mm mortars at a rubber plantation nearby C--- village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, in Karen National Union (KNU)[6]-controlled territory. Two of the mortar rounds landed in Naw[7] D---’s rubber plantation, damaging her 13 rubber trees. Shrapnel also hit a 52-year-old villager named Saw E---, injuring [his face, on] his eyebrow. April 2023: SAC shelling and landmine incident On April 2nd 2023, SAC troops [unknown battalion] entered KNU-controlled territory in Tha Htoo Township and were attacked by [combined troops from Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[8] and People’s Defence Force (PDF)[9]] on the way to enter Tha Htoo Township. During the skirmishes, SAC Artillery Unit #9, based in Ah Lah T’Ya army camp [located in Ah Lah T’Ya village tract, Tha Htoo Township] shelled several mortars around the fighting area to help their troops [as reinforcement]. Three of the mortar rounds landed beside F--- village, Htee Nya Paw village tract. One of the mortar explosions injured two children who were collecting plums. The injured children are Saw G--- (17 years old), who was injured in his knee, and Saw H--- (16 years old), who was injured in his thigh. They were taken to a local clinic for treatment. The villagers [from F--- village] did not flee, but they were fearful and waiting to see the situation [if there will be more SAC attacks]. On April 3rd 2023, Border Guard Force (BGF)[10] forces led by General No Way, entered I--- village, in Hpa-An Township, and shelled multiple mortars toward Tha Htoo Township. One of the mortar rounds landed on a village farm in J--- village, Waw Poo village tract, Tha Htoo Township, and injured a 63-year-old villager named Saw K---. On April 6th 2023, at about 3:30 pm, Naw L--- (30 years old) and her daughter, Naw M--- (12 years old), were going out from their village [N--- village, Win Raw village tract, Tha Htoo Township] to search for Kaempferia candida Wallich [one type of local edible flower]. They stepped on a [handmade] landmine on their way to N--- forest, and both of them were injured [by the landmine’s shrapnel]. Naw L--- was injured on her hip, back and right leg, and Naw M--- was injured on her abdomen, legs, hand and her whole face, including her right eye. Therefore, they had to seek medical treatment in N--- village clinic, Win Raw village tract, Tha Htoo Township, run by local KNU. Villagers do not know which armed group planted this landmine because both SAC and KNLA operate there, and fighting often occurred in this area. On April 6th 2023, at 7:40 am, SAC Military Operation Command (MOC)[11] #8, based in P’Nweh Klah army camp, Maw Lay village tract, Tha Htoo Township, shelled several mortar rounds around their army camp. Two of the mortar rounds landed in O---village, Maw Lay village tract, Tha Htoo Township, and damaged a house and plantations owned by a villager named Naw P---. Another mortar round landed in Q--- village, Maw Lay village tract, Tha Htoo Township, and damaged three villagers’ houses owned by Saw R---, Saw S---, Naw T--- and Saw U---, one shop owned by Naw V---, and some coconut trees. This [second] mortar explosion injured a 55-year-old villager named Naw W--- on the hip, and a 66-year-old villager named Saw X--- on his left thumb. The explosion also injured a goat owned by Saw Y---. May 2023: SAC shelling caused casualties and property destruction On May 27th 2023, at 9 am, SAC Artillery Unit #314 based in Kya T’Raw (Zi Won) army camp in Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, shelled seven mortar rounds in Tha Htoo Township. Two of the mortar rounds landed in the compound of a monastery in Z--- village, Sway Yaw Pya village tract, and shrapnel from the explosion injured five people. The first injured person is a novice monk named U[12] Aa--- (24 years old), injured on his waist, hand, leg and other parts of his whole body. The second injured person is novice Ashin[13] Ab--- (19-year-old), injured on his hand and right leg. The third injured person is novice Ashin Ac--- (13 years old), injured on his neck. The fourth injured person is Saw Ad--- (16 years old), injured on his right thigh. The fifth injured person is Saw Ae--- (27 years old), injured on his hand and leg. The injured people were sent to a local clinic under KNU administration, and received treatment. Shrapnel also destroyed a Buddha statue, a monastery’s hall, wall, preaching hall, kitchen, light post, water storage, and three pots. Another two mortars landed at Z--- village grave, Shwe Yaw Pya village tract, without causing any casualties. Three of the mortar rounds landed into Af--- village, Daw Ya village tract, and two of the rounds exploded. Shrapnel from the mortar explosions damaged one house and killed one cattle. Two 15-year-old villagers named Saw Ag--- and Saw Ah--- were also killed by the shrapnel. Saw Aq--- was seriously injured on his head and died at the incident place. Saw Ah--- was gravely injured in his stomach, and also died at the incident place. June 2023: SAC shelling caused displacement [During the month of June,] SAC Artillery Unit #314, based in Kya T’Raw (Zi Won), Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, continuously shelled mortars at villages around their army camp, so many villagers had to flee. One of the incidents occurred on June 8th 2023, when the SAC’s mortar rounds landed in Ak--- village, Kaw Ler village tract, so villagers had to flee from their village. July 2023: SAC shelling caused casualties and property destruction On July 7th 2023, at 11:05 am, SAC Artillery Unit #314 based in Kya T'Raw army camp, Kya T’Raw village, Shwe Yaw Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, shelled mortars at Al--- village, Shwe Yaw Pya village tract. The shrapnel injured six villagers, and one of them died at a local clinic on July 9th 2023. Villagers helped the six injured villagers with emergency first aid and transportation to seek medical treatment at a local clinic in Am--- village, under KNU administration. The six injured villagers were one man, Saw An--- (25 years old, injured on his right hand); one boy, Saw Ao--- (5 years old, injured at his leg and the right side of the neck); one girl, Naw Ap--- (9 years old, injured at the left side of head, near her ear); and three women named Naw As--- (58 years old), Naw Aq--- (18 years old), and Naw Ar--- (57 years old, injured on her hip). Naw Ar--- died at the clinic on July 9th 2023. The mortar explosions also damaged three houses and some properties owned by Naw At--, Naw Au--- and Naw Av---, including solar panels. On July 27th 2023, between 4:55 am and 10:30 pm, a skirmish happened [between SAC soldiers and KNLA/PDF soldiers] at SAC’s Way Raw army camp. SAC LIB #9, based in Wa Pa (Win Pa) army camp, Wa Pa village tract, Tha Htoo Township, conducted an artillery barrage consisting of four series of shelling around the area where the skirmish was happening at Way Raw army camp [to assist the SAC soldiers]. During the first shelling, nine of the mortar shells landed and exploded in N--- village, Way Raw village tract, near a school campus, and injured four villagers. [There were no lessons taking place at the time of the shelling, but many villagers live near the school campus and were injured]. The four injured villagers were Saw Aw--- (48 years old, injured at his right leg); Saw Ax--- (17 years old, injured at the right side of his back); Naw Ay--- (13 years old, injured on her left hand); and Naw Az--- (54 years old, injured on her right hand). During the second shelling, nine mortar shells landed in an area between Ba--- village, T’No village tract, and Bb--- village, Way Raw village tract. Five shells landed in Nya Htee Kyo place, four shells landed in Mee Chaw Koh [place], and five shells landed next to T’Rweh Kloh stream, in Way Raw village tract, without causing any casualties. [A total of 23 shells landed in these villages and nearby areas.] During the third shelling, 14 mortar shells landed in Bb--- village, Way Raw village tract, and caused a large amount of destruction in the village, including two monastery buildings, cars, and 13 houses. The houses are owned by Naw Bc---, Saw Bd---, Naw Be---, Naw Bf---, Saw Bg---, Saw Bh---, Saw Bi--, Saw Bj---, Saw Bk---, Naw Bl---, Saw Bm---, Saw Bn--- and Saw Bo---. Entry signposts of village clinics and the monastery were also damaged by the mortar explosions. Shrapnel from the explosions also killed two cattle owned by Saw Bp---, three cattle owned by Saw Bq---, and one cattle owned by Naw Br---. During the fourth shelling, at 1:30 pm, SAC mortar rounds also landed in Bs--- village, Sway Yaw Pya village tract, and the shrapnel injured a 37-year-old villager named Saw Bt--- on his right hip. July 2023: Houses damaged by SAC shelling and looting of villagers’ properties In July and early August 2023, SAC troops (under Light Infantry Division (LID)[14] #44) shelled mortars and looted villagers’ belongings in Bs--- village, Shwe Yaw Pyaw village tract. The mortar explosions damaged eight villagers’ houses. The eight damaged houses are owned by Naw Bu--- (50 years old), Tee[15] Bv--- (50 years old), Naw Bw--- (40 years old), Saw Bx--- (55 years old), Saw By--- (35 years old), Tee Bz--- (70 years old), Saw Ca--- (45 years old) and Naw Cb---(45 years old). September 2023: Shelling caused casualties, property destruction, and displacement On September 9th 2023, from 9:20 am to 4:10 pm, SAC soldiers under LID #44, based in P’Nweh Klah camp, Maw Lay village tract, shelled six mortar rounds around their army camp in Tha Htoo Township. Three of the mortar rounds landed on O--- village, Maw Lay village tract, and injured a child [unknown age], Saw Dm---, on his left leg. One of the mortar rounds also landed in Dn--- village, Maw Lay village tract, and shrapnel damaged four villagers’ houses and injured a 38-year-old villager, Naw Do---, on her left leg. The two injured villagers were sent to a local clinic for medical treatment. The four damaged houses are owned by villagers named Tee Dp---, Naw Dq---, Tee Dr--- and Tee Ds---. Another two mortar rounds landed in [other locations at] Maw Lay village tract, so villagers in Maw Lay village tract were afraid and had to be displaced. On September 9th 2023, at 7:30 pm, SAC Infantry Battalion (IB)[17] #24 shelled five mortar rounds in Ak--- village, Kaw Ler village tract; two of them landed in Ak--- village and damaged Tee Dt---’s house, and another three mortars landed beside Ak--- village without causing any damage. November 2023: shelling caused casualties and properties destruction On November 10th 2023, at about 3:10 pm, SAC soldiers under LID #44, based in in P’Nweh Klah army camp, Maw Lay village tract, shelled six 60mm mortar rounds [around their army camp]. Two of the mortar rounds landed on Htee Nya Loo farm, one mortar landed beside Du--- village, one mortar landed on Lah Ko forest and one mortar landed in eastern Dv--- village, Maw Lay village tract. One of the six mortar rounds [landed at an unidentified place and] did not explode. The mortar explosion in eastern Dv--- village injured four villagers, and two of the villagers died from their injuries. Saw Dw--- (73 years old) died immediately after his whole body was injured by shrapnel, and Saw Dx--- (46 years old) died in a hospital in Thaton Town. The two [surviving] injured villagers are Naw Dy--- (72 years old), injured on the left leg, and Saw Dz--- (32 years old), injured on his back. The mortar explosion in the eastern area of Dv--- village also damaged two villager’s houses, owned by Saw Ea--- (52 years old) and Saw Eb--- (26 years old). On November 13th 2023, between 7:40 and 8:30 pm, [SAC] LIB #9 in Way Pa army camp shelled eight mortar rounds in Way Raw and Shwe Yaw Pya village tracts, Tha Htoo Township. Two mortar rounds landed beside Ec--- village, two mortar rounds landed in Ed--- village, and two mortar rounds landed beside Ee--- village, Way Raw village tract. Two mortar rounds exploded in Ef--- village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract. A mortar explosion beside Ec--- village damaged four villagers’ houses, owned by Naw Eg--- (78 years old), Naw Eh--- (48 years old), Saw Ei--- (72 years old) and Naw Ej--- (50 years old). On November 18th 2023, between 6 pm and 8:30 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #314, based in Kya T’Raw (Zi Won) army camp, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, shelled 16 mortars in Shwe Yaung Pya, K’Dee Poo and Daw Ya village tracts, Tha Htoo Township. Two mortar rounds landed in Ek--- village, and two landed in an area between Al--- and Z--- villages, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract. Two mortar rounds landed in Af--- village, Daw Ya village tract, and one mortar round landed in El--- village, K’Dee Poo village tract. Two mortar rounds landed in an area between Em--- and En--- villages, four mortar rounds landed beside Eo--- village, and two mortar rounds landed in an area between Ep--- and Eo--- villages, K’Dee Poo village tract. There were no major damages or casualties. On November 28th 2023, at 9:50 am, SAC Artillery Unit #402, based in Noh Ta Shuh village tract, shelled eight mortar rounds in Kaw Ler village tract. Six of the mortars landed in an area between Eq--- and Ak--- villages, and two mortars landed on Er--- villagers’ farms, without causing any damage or injury. On the evening of the same day, from 6 pm to 11 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #402 shelled six more mortar rounds [in Kaw Ler village tract]. Two mortars landed in Ak--- village, two mortars landed beside Er--- village and the other two mortars landed beside Es--- village, without any [major] damages or casualties. On November 30th 2023, at 4:10 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #314, based in Kya T’Raw (Zi Won) army camp, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, shelled two mortar rounds beside Ep--- village, K’Dee Poo village tract, without causing any [major] damages or casualties. On the same day, at 7:45 pm, SAC IB #8, based in Myay Taung [army camp] in Bilin Town area [Tha Htoo Township], shelled four mortar rounds. Three of the mortar rounds landed in an area between Eo--- and Et--- villages, K’Dee Poo village tract [Tha Htoo Township]. One mortar round landed in Et--- school compound, damaging three school buildings and two villagers’ houses situated close to the school. The houses are owned by Saw Eu--- (47 years old) and Saw Ev--- (47 years old). On the same day at 7:30 pm, SAC LIB #118, based in Thaton Town, shelled two mortar rounds in an area between Ak--- and Ew--- villages, Kaw Ler village tract, Tha Htoo Township, without causing any [major] damage or casualties. On November 30th 2023, at 3 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #402, based in Noh Ta Shuh village tract, shelled three mortar rounds on villagers’ farms near Ex--- village, Noh Ta Shuh village tract, Tha Htoo Township. The explosions killed 15 cows and bulls owned by a villager named Saw Ey--- (58 years old). Further background reading on shelling in Southeast Burma/Myanmar can be found in the following KHRG reports: ‘Doo Tha Htoo District Situation Update: SAC shelling into villages in Tha Htoo Township, causing injuries and destruction (September 2022 to February 2023)’, March 2024; ‘Doo Tha Htoo District Situation Update: villagers used as human shields, forced labour and navigators; SAC shelling and looting; and forced displacement in Bilin Township (July 2021 to September 2022)’, January 2024; Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers’ lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023; ‘Doo Tha Htoo District Situation Update: Two villagers were killed and 17 villagers were injured by SAC’s indiscriminate shelling in Kyeh Htoh Township (December 2022 to February 2023)’, August 2023; ‘Doo Tha Htoo District Short Update: House burning and indiscriminate shelling in Kyeh Htoh Township (January 2023)’, June 2023..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication: 2024-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: MNDAA Tells Troops and Allies to Protect Chinese Assets in Myanmar’s Conflict Areas
Description: "The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) has told its commanders to protect Chinese interests and citizens as it advances in northern Shan State. Beijing has influence over the MNDAA, an ethnically Chinese armed group from the Kokang Special Region on Myanmar’s side of the Chinese border. The MNDAA and its allies began attacking junta troops in the northern Shan State capital, Lashio, on July 3. The MNDAA formed a military governing body last week after claiming control of Lashio and the regime’s Northeastern Command headquarters after three weeks of offensive. The MNDAA is still attacking the remaining junta forces in Lashio, despite having announced a unilateral ceasefire until the end of July in response to pressure from China. On Tuesday, the MNDAA said its troops must “seriously” protect foreign investments and “make their utmost efforts to prevent Chinese businesses from being harmed”. China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning last week called for an end to hostilities, the preservation of China’s border security, safety for border communities and Chinese projects, businesses and personnel in Myanmar. China has major investments in Myanmar, including an oil and gas pipeline from the Indian Ocean in Rakhine State to Yunnan Province, crossing northern Shan State. In Rakhine, the MNDAA’s ally, the Arakan Army, has been fighting against the regime. The MNDAA instructed its commanders to discourage its allies from harming Chinese investments and staff. “If an activity that can harm China’s interests is spotted, it must be stopped immediately and reported to the military affairs committee and the Chinese authorities,” the MNDAA told its commanders. The MNDAA instructed troops to remove Chinese citizens from conflict zones and help any injured Chinese citizens or businesses under threat..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-31
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Title: Myanmar rebel group vows to protect China’s interests
Sub-title: The force said it would speak with allied insurgent groups to ensure protection of Chinese citizens and businesses.
Description: "A member of a Myanmar rebel alliance fighting military rule has promised to protect Chinese interests in northern Myanmar. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, pledged to protect Chinese nationals and investments as the battle for a major Shan state town intensified, the group announced on Tuesday. Several ceasefires brokered with China’s help between Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance and junta forces have failed to maintain a lasting peace since January. Since July 22, when the latest ceasefire collapsed, fighting over Lashio, the main city in northern Shan state, has surged. The MNDAA has since claimed it captured most of the town, including a regional military headquarters, which junta officials have denied. The group said it would consult allied organizations and “prevent actions that may harm Chinese investment and Chinese employees.” Political analyst Than Soe Naing told Radio Free Asia that groups involved in fighting the junta, which include the allied Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Arakan Army, are already obligated to protect Chinese interests under an earlier agreement. The renewed declaration may be the result of a warning from China to be more cautious during battles, he said. “China’s interests in northern Shan state are to keep its trade routes convenient and smooth and to maintain stability on the border region. Its interests are also to clean up online scamming,” he said. “Therefore, China has put its trust in the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee to ensure that its interests are not affected.” RELATED STORIES: Insurgents claim seizure of regional headquarters in northeast Myanmar Myanmar junta airstrike on market kills 15, residents say Myanmar insurgents free political prisoners in northern Shan state city The committee is an alliance of seven ethnic minority forces established in 2017. In 2023, it called on China to help solve the crisis triggered by a military coup two years earlier. China’s investments in Myanmar include oil and natural gas pipelines running through both Shan and Rakhine states. Fighting in the latter has threatened the safety of Chinese employees. The MNDAA said it would urge its allies to assist injured Chinese citizens trapped by fighting as well as those who have businesses affected by the war. RFA telephoned MNDAA spokesman Li Kyar Win to ask about the details of the statement, but he did not answer calls. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a recent briefing China’s borders and the security of people living there, as well as its projects and businesses in Myanmar, should not be compromised. China has called on Myanmar’s rivals to end their fighting and resolve differences peacefully and said it would push for ceasefires and talks. Wa army claims neutrality Conflict in Lashio continued early on Wednesday morning, after another ethnic minority militia group, the United Wa State Army, which controls an autonomous region of Shan state and is known to be closely affiliated with China, evacuated trapped Lashio prison employees and their family members, residents told RFA on Wednesday. The Wa army led more than 120 junta-affiliated prison staff and their relatives, who had been trapped by clashes, to a nearby town on Tuesday, said one witness, declining to be named for security reasons. “I saw three military vehicles carrying prison employees. They were sent to Mongyai town,” he said, referencing a town 93 km (58 miles) from Lashio. The evacuees said they were trapped when MNDAA fighters captured an infantry battalion’s position near the prison. RFA attempted to contact Nyi Ran, an official of the Wa Liaison Office in Lashio, regarding the evacuation but he did not answer. One resident close to the Wa army, asking to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals, told RFA that troops arrived in Lashio on Saturday in order to protect properties at the request of “various ethnic groups” in the town. However, the resident declined to reveal which parties had asked the Wa force to come although the resident said the Wa army would not take sides in any battles. Two Lashio neighborhoods have been damaged by junta airstrikes and heavy weapons fire, residents said, but they could not verify if there were any casualties The Wa Liaison Office and nearby houses were also damaged in air strikes, they added. RFA called Shan state’s junta spokesperson Khun Thein Maung for more information on the battle in Lashio but he did not answer..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-31
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Title: Myanmar’s Dictator Extends Emergency Rule Again, Citing Election Preparations
Description: "After taking over the position of acting president less than two weeks ago, junta boss Min Aung Hlaing extended the state of emergency for another six months on Wednesday, saying he and his regime need more time to bring “stability and security” to the country, junta media said. The coup-maker told a meeting of his National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) that after he initially seized power – on Feb. 1, 2021 – his regime planned to hold a new nationwide election when the two-year state of emergency expired, junta media said. The return of democratic elections was hindered by ongoing unrest, junta media quoted Min Aung Hlaing as telling the Wednesday morning meeting in the junta’s nerve center, Naypyitaw. Min Aung Hlaing also said that a nationwide census was necessary to ensure “accurate” voter lists for the election, possibly in 2025. The need to keep trying to impose stability and security was due to “terror acts” perpetrated by the civilian National Unity Government formed in the wake of the coup, its armed wing, People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and ethnic armed groups, he said. The latest extension of the state of emergency is necessary to continue implementing the measures necessary to ensure the nation’s stability and development, junta media quoted Min Aung Hlaing as saying. The junta said the members of its NDSC “unanimously decided to extend the period of the state of emergency by another six months.” Min Aung Hlaing, 68, on July 18 replaced acting president U Myint Swe, 73, after he reportedly took medical leave and was unable to perform daily activities. Myint Swe was the military-appointed vice-president under the elected National League for Democracy government ousted in the coup. He was named acting president after President Win Myint was arrested during the coup. Myint Swe was widely seen as a puppet of the junta boss, who wields absolute legislative, executive and judicial power. Min Aung Hlaing was addressed as both acting president and Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services at Wednesday’s NDSC meeting. Others present at the meeting were Lower House Speaker T Khun Myat, Deputy junta chief Senior General Soe Win, Defense Minister General Tin Aung San, Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, Border Affairs Minister Lt-Gen Tun Tun Naung, State Administration Council Secretary Lt-Gen Aung Lin Dwe and Joint Secretary Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo. The military declared a state of emergency when it ousted State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in February 2021, alleging fraud in the 2020 general elections. More than three years later, the junta is struggling to contain widespread resistance against its rule nationwide. It has suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of an alliance of ethnic armed groups and PDFs, especially in northern and western Myanmar. Myanmar’s constitution states that an emergency can be declared for an initial period of one year and can “normally” be extended for a maximum of two half-year terms at the discretion of the military-dominated NDSC. Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, however, has extended emergency rule six times. Each time he cites the need to restore peace and stability so that the fresh election he promised after the coup could be held. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported that it had verified that at least 5,464 civilians have been killed by the junta since the coup and over 27, 000 more have been arrested. These numbers likely under-report deaths and arrests because they only include those it can verify, the association said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-31
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Title: Thailand’s offer of aid to Myanmar gets mixed reaction
Sub-title: Coordinating with the junta alone means aid will not reach those most in need, says government in exile.
Description: "A Thai pledge to donate millions of baht to help alleviate a humanitarian crisis in neighboring Myanmar has met with a mixture of gratitude and skepticism from Myanmar’s pro-democracy government in exile. The kingdom will give nine million baht (US$250,000) to the humanitarian center of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as ASEAN, Thai Foreign Affairs Minister Maris Sangiampongsa told a regional meeting in Laos on the weekend. But Kyaw Zaw, spokesperson for the president’s office of the National Unity Government, or NUG, said that while they greatly appreciated Thailand’s gesture, coordinating with the junta alone was not enough to ensure the aid would reach those most in need. “Since most of the desperately in need internal [displaced people] are living in resistance-controlled areas, not the junta,” he told Radio Free Asia on Wednesday. “The coordination with the junta will just give them the photo opportunities and not effectively reach out to the desperately in-need people on the ground.” ASEAN has been struggling to help fellow member Myanmar resolve a bloody crisis triggered by a 2021 military coup, pressing all sides to accept a plan aimed at ending the violence and initiating talks. But Myanmar’s military has largely ignored the plan and fighting between junta forces and various allied insurgent groups has intensified this year, with the number of internally displaced rising to more than 3 million civilians, according to the United Nations. Since forming its humanitarian corridor into eastern Myanmar in March, ASEAN’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management, or AHA Centre, has overseen a Thai shipment of 4,000 aid packages into Kayin state to assist civilians affected by fighting. The AHA Centre has also distributed nearly US$2 million worth of food and hygiene supplies to communities in Myanmar’s Sagaing and Magway regions, as well as southern Shan state and Mon states, ASEAN said in a statement on Saturday. The earlier Thai aid was initially sent over the border into a part of Myanmar under the control of junta forces and was then transported deeper into the interior. Thai officials at the time declined to be drawn into a debate on whose territory the aid ended up in but the NUG believes such donations have failed to target populations that are the most seriously affected by conflict. Political analyst Panitan Wattanayagorn shared that view. He told RFA that Thailand’s initiatives regarding Myanmar were not as clear as they were in the past, including the potential use of the humanitarian corridor, because the delivery of aid had become more complicated as the control of territories changed as the course of the war unfolded. “More and more areas are under control of groups that can deliver the support, like the Karen and others,” Panitain said. “Thailand’s participatory role is changing. It’s adopting a more maybe wait-and-see approach, unlike the previous administration.” Parts of western Myanmar have seen critical food and healthcare shortages as junta blockades as part of its effort to battle the Arakan Army insurgent force, which has captured at least nine townships in Rakhine state and one in neighboring Chin state..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-31
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Title: Landmine casualties becoming more common in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state
Sub-title: Recent attacks by the Arakan Army have prompted junta troops to plant more mines outside their camps.
Description: "Landmines and unexploded ordnance are posing a greater threat to residents of western Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where intense fighting has caused junta troops to lay more landmines near their outposts. Data collected by Radio Free Asia indicates that 11 civilians have been killed and 31 injured by landmines in Rakhine state between April 1 and July 25. Junta troops have been planting landmines to protect their camps, according to groups working to raise awareness about the dangers of landmines. However, ethnic minority rebels have been attacking junta outposts since last November, causing many junta troops to abandon the sites. That’s when the leftover landmines become a danger to nearby residents, said Zaw Zaw Tun, director of the Action for Community Resilience Organization, which is based in Rakhine’s capital, Sittwe. “Currently, people cannot avoid areas with landmine threats, which are increasingly impacting their daily lives,” he said. The Arakan Army, or AA, has made significant gains against the military junta that seized power in a 2021 coup. It has captured 10 townships in Rakhine state and neighboring Chin state since late last year – part of a series of setbacks for the embattled junta. On July 13, the AA issued a warning advising against travel to areas near towns, roads, bridges and junta outposts in Rakhine state. Recently, there have been frequent landmine incidents in Gwa, Kyaukphyu, Mingba and Ponnagyun townships in Rakhine state. Forest areas One resident told RFA that although the junta warned civilians to avoid certain areas, local residents have had no choice but to go into forest areas to sustain their livelihoods. Another resident said junta troops have planted landmines in the areas surrounding Kyaukphyu. “Some farmers have lost their land in Kyaukphyu because of these landmines,” he said. “The junta has planted more mines along forest routes near the villages. It is very dangerous for the local population.” RFA was unable to contact the junta spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun and AA spokesman Khaing Thukha to ask about the recent landmine casualties. UNICEF reported earlier this year that civilian casualties from landmines and unexploded ordnance across Myanmar have significantly increased since the 2021 military coup. There were 1,214 explosions from landmines and unexploded ordnance between January 2021 and March 2024, resulting in 422 deaths and 1,643 injuries, according to UNICEF. In comparison, from 2015 to 2020, there were 786 explosions of landmines and unexploded ordnance from the conflict, resulting in 254 deaths and 954 injuries..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-30
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Title: Myanmar Military Deputy Commander Killed After Retreating to Hilltop Base in Lashio
Description: "The deputy commander of the North Eastern Command, Brigadier General Tin Tun Aung, was killed after being severely wounded in a rocket attack on the hilltop base he had retreated to in Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State, resistance sources said. The brigadier general oversaw the defense of the city with Colonel Thant Htin Soe – Commander-in-Chief of the North Eastern Command – following the coordinated attack on the city by the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies that began on July 3. Brig-Gen Tin Tun Aung and his troops shifted their defense position to Lashio City Hall on July 23 and 24 before retreating to a hilltop base on July 25. However, a military informant tipped off resistance fighters that he had moved to a new position and the MNDAA swiftly launched a rocket attack on the hilltop base on July 25, a resistance source told The Irrawaddy. “Within 30 minutes after telling the revolutionary groups the location of the junta’s deputy commander, the MNDAA attacked the hilltop base with 107mm rockets,” the source explained. The head of the northern Shan State Police Force, Colonel Hla Min, was killed in the rocket attack and Brig-Gen Tin Tun Taung sustained serious injuries, the source said. The brigadier general’s death was confirmed by a military informant on Sunday, the source said. The MNDAA and its allies seized the hilltop base on July 27. The MNDAA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched Operation 1027 on October 27 last year. The coordinated offensive steamrolled through northern Shan State and was closing in on its goal of liberating the region from the regime’s military when a China-brokered ceasefire halted its progress in January. The operation resumed on July 3 with attacks on regime bases in Lashio township. The MNDAA and its allies are poised to assert complete control over Lashio after seizing the headquarters of the junta’s North Eastern Command on Thursday. Intense clashes continued on Tuesday as resistance groups fought to take the regime’s remaining military bases in the city. On Saturday, the MNDAA announced the formation of a commission to rebuild and administer the city. Since June 25, another Brotherhood Alliance member, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, has been fighting junta troops west of Lashio, in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region, along with other resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces under the command of the civilian National Unity Government. Since Operation 1027 resumed, ethnic armies and allied resistance groups have captured six towns and cities, including the Lashio, and about 100 junta bases, including several battalion headquarters, in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-30
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Title: Myanmar’s MNDAA Forging Lashio Administration After ‘Historic Capture’ of Northern Shan Capital
Description: "The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) on Saturday announced rules for its troops in Lashio after claiming to have seized the northern Shan State capital and formed a commission for its administration on Thursday. The commission will handle administrative matters and reconstruction work, it said. The statement by the MNDAA, aka the Kokang army, ordered its troops not to occupy or enter houses in Lashio unless militarily necessary, not to seize civilian vehicles, not to ask for money or resources from civilians, and not to levy tax from individuals or entities during the martial law period. The MNDAA and allies began advancing on the northern Shan State capital, which hosts the junta’s Northeastern Military Command, early this month. The Command oversees the regime’s military activities up to the Chinese border. On Thursday, the ethnic army claimed a historic victory, marked by the first seizure of a Command headquarters and capital by an ethnic armed group since the 2021 coup. However, local reports indicate fighting is ongoing between Kokang forces and junta troops who remain in the town. The junta has denied that the town and command headquarters have fallen. Over the weekend, the MNDAA released photos of its soldiers celebrating victory in front of army bases, government offices and the town hall in Lashio. A local observer said most of the town was under MNDAA control on Monday, bar small pockets of fighting. “That’s why the MNDAA announced its administration,” he said. Town residents couldn’t be reached due to a telecommunications outage. The MNDAA statement also warned of punishment for any violations of human rights, cautioning MNDAA troops to treat prisoners of war and those who had surrendered according to rules of conflict. The MNDAA attacked Lashio despite calling a unilateral truce in northern Shan State two weeks ago while the Communist Party of China held its Third Plenary Session. China, which neighbors Shan State, had brokered a ceasefire in mid-January after the MNDAA and its Brotherhood Alliance allies overran most of northern Shan State, including border trade towns. In Saturday’s statement, the MNDAA said it would “end the fighting as early as possible” and “do its best to bring about peace” in response to Beijing’s mediation. The MNDAA did not respond to a request for comment on Monday. On Saturday, the United Wa State Army entered Lashio to protect its liaison office and possessions in the town, its spokesperson Nyi Rang said. The UWSA sought permission to enter from both the MNDAA and the regime but would not take part in the conflict, he added. “UWSA troops are not going to intervene, cooperate or give support to the warring groups,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-30
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Title: Northern Myanmar cut off by state-wide communications blackout
Sub-title: Families are growing increasingly concerned about not being able to contact relatives.
Description: "Northern Myanmar is experiencing a communications blackout that has cut Kachin state’s population off for 10 days, residents told Radio Free Asia on Tuesday, with telecoms providers promising to restore services but declining to say why they were down. Junta officials have at times shut down telecommunication links in different parts of the country since seizing power in a 2021 coup, usually in response to a security crisis, often leaving victims of violence isolated and unable to call for help. But residents who have left Kachin state said that while there has been fighting between the military and anti-junta insurgents over recent months, there did not seem to be a particular reason for the military to cut phone lines and mobile services in all 18 of the state’s townships since July 21. RELATED STORIES Myanmar junta introduces random searches for VPNs Anti junta forces set up satellite forces in 60 areas Myanmar activist say junta will use SIM card registration to target opposition The junta has not made an announcement about the blackout. Myo Swe, director of the junta’s Ministry of Transport and Communications, blamed telecommunication operators for the failure but told Radio Free Asia he didn’t know why the services were down. That is little comfort for families increasingly worried about being cut off from loved ones. “I don’t know what’s going on,” said one woman in Myanmar’s main city of Yangon who has family in the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina. “I still can’t connect with my family … I can’t even wire money to them,” said the woman, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals. Junta-affiliated telecommunication operators that provide services in the region, Myanma Post and Telecommunications, known as MPT, and ATOM, both told RFA that they were working to restore services but did not give a reason for the blackout. Since Myanmar’s coup, junta officials have introduced increasingly strict measures to crack down on dissent, such as prohibiting the use of virtual private networks, or VPNs, and decreasing broadband speed nationwide. As of July 22, the internet is inaccessible in 249 areas across the country due to direct military action, according to data collected by the Myanmar Internet Project, a civil society organization monitoring internet access. The Sagaing region has been the hardest hit by restrictions, followed by Kachin and Chin states..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-30
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Title: Operation 1027: Major Gains in Phase Two of Myanmar Resistance Offensive
Description: "Myanmar’s junta has suffered another humiliating defeat and more territory losses since the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies and allies resumed Operation 1027 on June 25. The Brotherhood’s Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), plus resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), are attacking the regime in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region. In the past month, the junta has lost around 100 bases, several military battalions including North Eastern Command headquarters, and at least six towns including northern Shan State’s capital, Lashio. Below, The Irrawaddy highlights the significant gains made by the armed resistance in phase two of Operation 1027..... Fall of Nawnghkio town.....The TNLA and allied groups including Mandalay People’s Defense Forces managed to take effective control of Nawnghkio town in northern Shan State on the second day of attacks after Operation 1027 resumed on June 25. The TNLA and allies claimed complete control of Nawnghkio Township on July 10 after seizing its last remaining junta position, Missile Battalion 606 headquarters. Nawnghkio Township is located next to Pyin Oo Lwin, the garrison town in Mandalay Region that houses the junta’s Military Defense Academies. Nawnghkio town is also strategically located on the Mandalay-Lashio-Muse Highway, a vital Myanmar-China trade route. The town is located 56 km north of Pyin Oo Lwin.....Kyaukme Town.....The TNLA and allied resistance groups took effective control of Kyaukme town after seizing all junta positions in the early days of Operation 1027’s resumption. The town is 51 km north of Nawnghkio and also strategically located on the Mandalay-Lashio-Muse Highway. The TNLA has not yet claimed complete control of Kyaukme town amid continued attacks on a remaining junta position outside the town......Singu Town.....Mandalay PDF and local allies took complete control of Singu Township and Singu town in northern Mandalay Region on July 20 after around 20 days of attacks on regime targets in the township. Singu, 91 km north of Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, is the first town seized by Mandalay PDF. The town is also strategically located on the east bank of the Irrawaddy River.....Mandaya Township....Mandalay PDF, the TNLA and allies have seized around 30 junta bases and police stations including Air Defense Battalion 1024 headquarters in Madaya Township, threatening neighboring Mandalay city, where the junta’s Central Command is based. The resistance attacks have prompted the junta to tighten security in Mandalay city. Mandalay PDF and allies recently seized a junta base at Alpha Cement Factory in Madaya, 30 km north of the junta’s Central Command......The fall of ruby town, Mogoke.....The TNLA and allied PDFs took complete control of Mogoke town in northern Mandalay Region on July 25 after a month of attacks. Mogoke is known as “Ruby Town” for mines that produce some of the world’s finest red gemstones. Mogoke neighbors Singu Township, which was seized by Mandalay PDF on July 20. The town also shares borders with Monglon and Mongmit towns, which have also fallen to the TNLA and allied resistance.....Mongmit town.....The TNLA and allies seized effective control of Mongmit town in northern Shan State in mid-July. Intense clashes are still ongoing in Mongmit Township as resistance groups attack the remaining regime bases outside the town in order to take complete control of the township. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied resistance groups briefly took control of Mongmit in January before the junta retook the town after in a heavy offensive. Mongmit is an hour’s drive from Mogoke town, which has been captured by the TNLA and allied PDFs.....Northern Shan State’s capital and North Eastern Command .....The MNDAA (or Kokang army) and allied groups seized almost all of Lashio town, the capital of northern Shan State, last week after 23 days of attacks on frontline junta bases and battalion headquarters defending the capital. The ethnic army also claimed to have captured the junta military’s North Eastern Command headquarters in the capital. This would be the first military regional command headquarters seized by the resistance, marking a major milestone in the popular uprising against the regime following the military coup in February 2021. North Eastern Military Command oversees operations across northern Shan State, including areas on the Chinese border. Intense clashes are ongoing in the capital Lashio as the MNDAA and allies attack the remaining junta position. The MNDAA on Saturday announced the formation of a commission which will handle administrative matters and reconstruction work in Lashio..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-30
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Title: Russia Ambassador Discusses Economic Ties with Myanmar Junta Deputy
Description: "Russian ambassador to Myanmar Iskander Azizov met deputy Myanmar junta boss Soe Win on Friday in Naypyitaw to discuss the progress of special economic zones and power projects. Soe Win urged the ambassador to publish more news reports in the Russian media about the regime’s “achievements”, junta media reported. The ambassador also met junta foreign minister Than Swe to discuss increased cooperation in trade, commerce, investment, customs, science and technology and culture, according to junta media. Russia and the junta have become increasingly close since the 2021 coup, with Moscow expanding its cooperation in trade, nuclear energy, education, culture and other sectors. Direct flights began for the first time in 30 years in September last year. Russia has been the only country that welcomed Min Aung Hlaing after his coup. The junta boss has visited Russia three times since the coup and met President Vladimir Putin. The two countries have also exchanged honorary titles and medals. Former president Thein Sein, Soe Win, the foreign, commerce and finance ministers and political parties cooperating with the regime have visited China since late June. Than Swe visited India this month for the regional BIMSTEC foreign ministers’ retreat. The Indian ambassador to Myanmar Vinay Kumar has visited several junta ministers including its third-in-command Maung Maung Aye this month. The Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval visited junta boss Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw this month. Russia is planning to invest in the Dawei deep-sea port in Tanintharyi Region in southern Myanmar. It was also planning to invest in tourism development in Myanmar’s premier beach, Ngapali in Rakhine State. The beach is largely controlled by the Arakan Army which is fighting for complete control of Rakhine State. China and India have not invited Min Aung Hlaing for an official visit but both are key suppliers of arms to the regime along with Russia. They have also provided diplomatic and financial support for the regime and expressed their support for the election proposed by the regime. Other countries say any general election organized by the regime would neither be free nor fair..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Silent Winner of Myanmar’s Northern Conflict
Sub-title: From the chaos of the conflict in Shan State, the United Wa State Army has emerged as a potentially decisive force.
Description: "On the morning of July 28, a convoy of soldiers from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) drove through Lashio, the capital of the northern Shan State and home of the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Regional Command, taking control of the administration under the pretext of peacekeeping. This occurred amid renewed fighting in northern Shan State, as the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed groups launched the second phase of its Operation 1027 offensive, massing their forces around Lashio. Without firing a single shot, the UWSA has gained control of three additional townships in Shan State since October 2023 – Hopang, Pan Lon, and Tangyan – and likely more in the coming weeks. Sources in Naypyidaw indicate that the military State Administration Council (SAC) has agreed to have the UWSA and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) step in as peacekeepers to prevent the renewed conflict from spilling over into other parts of Shan State. This indicates the SAC’s inability to maintain control and the potential total collapse of its authority in northern Shan State. The key question is: what are the strategic aims and implications of the UWSA’s entry into Lashio? To answer that question, here are five things you need to know about the UWSA, what it stands to gain from the northern conflict, and the broader regional implications. A Role Model and Political Leadership As the largest of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, the UWSA, which controls two non-contiguous territories in Shan State and has as many as 30,000 soldiers under arms, is widely viewed as a model and a source of inspiration for other ethnic organizations in Myanmar. “We have ambitions that are nothing less than Wa State,” said Twan Mrat Naing, leader of the Arakan Army (AA), during celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of the UWSA’s founding in Pangsang, the UWSA’s capital, in 2019. Newly formed ethnic armed groups are now drawing similar inspiration from the AA and its battlefield successes in Rakhine State since the launch of Operation 1027. The UWSA has also established itself as a political leader among the 20-odd ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar. At the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference convened by Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in 2017, the group submitted a proposal for a confederation model as part of an ethnic coalition known as the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). Led by the UWSA, the FPNCC’s policy reflects the interests of the UWSA in two key ways: first, it advocates self-determination and authority over local security forces within designated areas until the establishment of a future federal system; and second, it advocates the creation of a security system that prioritizes local authorities and the self-defense of autonomous states through the formation of ethnic armies. This forms the foundational document of its political leadership. This significant demand for a parallel peace and political dialogue process in 2017 seemed ambitious at the time. However, seven years after the proposal, with the central administration at its weakest in decades and ready to negotiate, it appears achievable. The FPNCC, which also includes the AA, SSPP, Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), is now Myanmar’s largest ethnic coalition. It includes more than half of all EAO combatants in Myanmar and operates from the banks of the Mekong River to the Bay of Bengal. The FPNCC has held regular meetings since the 2021 coup, with a clear framework and vision and clear political demands. Since the military takeover, no other ethnic coalition has hosted summits or regular meetings on this scale or presented a clear political position like the FPNCC. De facto leadership of the FPNCC has made the UWSA the most politically influential armed group in Myanmar, a role historically contested by the Karen National Union and the KIA. The existing FPNCC’s political framework differs significantly from the federal charter formulated by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). This difference is evident not only in the political process, but also in terms of fundamental visions, security arrangements, and relationship with the union administration. With its strength and influence, the FPNCC is unlikely to agree to participate in either junta or NUG processes, instead choosing to chart its own course. Wa State and Vision Using the FPNCC as a platform, the UWSA has aligned its political aspirations with the FPNCC’s principles. In addition to this, the UWSA submitted two other documents in 2017: a proposal for a consultation process with the Myanmar government over the creation of an autonomous Wa State from the territories under the UWSA’s control and a proposal for a new ceasefire agreement. These documents illustrate the UWSA’s inspiration and vision for Wa State. These proposals left open the question of what exactly constitutes Wa State. This has again become a live question in the current context, which the UWSA is hoping it can use to extend its territory as much as possible. Taking advantage of the weak central administration, it has already created buffer areas around UWSA-administered areas. The critical issue is whether it can link the central Wa State, which lies along the border with China, with southern Wa State, along the Thai border, over which it established control in the 1990s while fighting against a Shan insurgency alongside the Myanmar military. In its 2017 proposal for a new Wa State, the UWSA requested the inclusion of Kengtung township in eastern Shan State. This would link the southern and central Wa States, turning the eastern part of Shan State into an exclave under direct UWSA control. The UWSA attempted this territorial expansion in 2016. In September of that year, a force of 1,000 UWSA troops marched toward Mong La, an area under the control of the NDAA, creating tensions with the NDAA. A settlement with the NDAA was reached following talks between the UWSA leadership and Aung San Suu Kyi’s government. All of this is to say that the UWSA’s territorial ambitions extend beyond the current status quo. Linking the southern and northern parts of Wa State is a crucial aim. Having been granted permission by the SAC to mobilize in northern Shan State, the UWSA will undoubtedly seize the opportunity to expand its areas of influence and control. Given these territorial aspirations, and the UWSA’s influence over the Three Brotherhood Alliance, particularly the MNDAA, since the start of Operation 1027, the UWSA now exerts possibly decisive influence in a long arc from the China-Myanmar border in the north of Shan State to the Thailand-Myanmar border in the south. This makes it the most influential and capable EAO in Myanmar’s modern history. The Strategic Stalemate In making its decisions, the UWSA has tended to act cautiously. In general, it has sought to maintain the status quo between the central administration, rival EAOs, and China. This strategic posture has been evident in its response to the coup and Operation 1027 offensive. While not directly involved, the UWSA has indirectly supported the MNDAA during the operation, for which the MNDAA leadership expressed gratitude in January. By avoiding conflict with the SAC and maintaining its distance from the NUG, the UWSA has upheld its neutrality, at least officially. This neutrality has allowed the UWSA to increase its influence amidst the stalemate in the Shan State, not only among FPNCC members but also with those in southern Myanmar that are seeking supplies and arms. By preserving a relationship with the military junta and avoiding outright conflict, the UWSA’s strategic approach seems to have paid off, positioning it as a leading political entity in northern Myanmar. This unique position allows it to mediate the relations between various EAOs and the junta administration, as evidenced by the SAC’s request for the UWSA to deploy its forces in Tangyan and now in Lashio. Despite the UWSA’s entry into Lashio, its FPNCC allies, particularly the MNDAA, are continuing their siege of the city, and the TNLA persists in its offensive in northern Shan State and parts of Mandalay Region. The critical question is whether the UWSA will allow its own alliance to become uncontrollable, potentially challenging its political influence and disrupting the new status quo. Alternatively, the UWSA might seek to maintain a stalemate in northern Shan State. Regardless of its chosen path, it is certain that the UWSA will continue to have a significant impact on Myanmar politics for the foreseeable future. New Leadership, Rising Kingdom The UWSA’s strategic shift is being driven by a new generation of leaders. Young and energetic leaders in their 30s and early 40s, including Zhao Ai Nap Lai (son of Zhao Nyi-lai) and Bao Ai Kham (son of Bao Youxiang), were introduced in strategic meetings with the MNDAA in April. Zhao Ai Nap Lai has succeeded his father as general secretary and head of the Politburo, while Bao Ai Kham is the UWSA’s new deputy general secretary. These leaders, part of the generation that witnessed the fall of the Communist Party of Burma (from which the UWSA was created in 1989), bring different visions, views, and objectives. They lead the UWSA with heightened nationalism, seeking to preserve their legacy while seizing any opportunities that present themselves. However, their political ambitions may necessitate a recalibration of the UWSA’s decades-long strategy of maintaining the status quo and stalemate in the region, given the evolving political and regional context. As China’s power grows and Myanmar’s central administration weakens, the UWSA is actively seeking a new status quo that can maximize its influence. This context is reminiscent of the rise of new kingdoms. With substantial tin deposits, rare earth elements, control over a critical juncture of Southeast Asia’s largest drug trafficking route, and the ability to produce small arms, the UWSA possesses the resources needed to achieve its strategic goals. Importantly, the Wa State territories straddle the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and are relevant to the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation platform, both of which are crucial to China’s strategic expansion in mainland Southeast Asia. Influencing and Threats to Thailand Given that it is considered a natural ally of China, the UWSA maintains a close relationship with Beijing and the provincial administration in Yunnan. The UWSA’s influence in the heart of the Mekong region extends Chinese influence deep into Myanmar and down to the border with Thailand. As the UWSA grows more powerful, its political model will become more attractive to other EAOs. If Chinese efforts to mediate the current conflict secure formal autonomy and territorial concessions for the UWSA, other groups along Myanmar’s borders might adopt the UWSA’s approach and choose to come under greater Chinese influence. This development could undermine all dialogue processes initiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the establishment of local administrative processes by the NUG and other ethnic Interim Executive Councils, which enjoy the backing of Western countries. The UWSA’s expansion along the Thai-Myanmar border means that states and entities influenced by China could soon surround Thailand. This new player in the region poses a critical question: Is Thailand, the last remaining U.S. ally in mainland Southeast Asia, prepared for this expansion?..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication: 2024-07-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-30
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Title: Anti-Coup Icon on the Future of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution as Junta Crumbles
Description: "Dr. Tayzar San, the first protester to take to the streets in Mandalay after the military coup on February 1, 2021, recently returned to the city amid heightened security. He held a protest in the city, advocating for a coordinated people’s movement alongside military resistance. The military council charged him with defamation, searched his home in Mandalay, and even raided and destroyed Shwe O-ya village in Sagaing Division, where he was born. The Irrawaddy interviewed Dr. Tayzar San about the current political situation as the armed resistance advances on Myanmar’s second largest-city, Mandalay, home to the junta’s Central Military Command. What is your view on the penetration by resistance forces into Mandalay Region under the second phase of Operation 1027? The junta’s primary advantage is supposedly its military capability, which includes the air force, and its ample supply of weapons and ammunition. Despite these advantages, it is clearly losing. In the first wave of Operation 1027, it lost control of many major cities and international border trade terminals. As a last resort, it is defending Yangon, Naypyitaw, and Mandalay regions while taking up defensive positions elsewhere. Some may also be aware that the parallel NUG government is calling phase two of Operation 1027 the ‘Shan-Man’ operation (‘Man’ for Mandalay). We see steps being taken to penetrate into the Mandalay area, which is a junta center of military and economic strategy. Revolutionary forces now control the town of Singu, less than 50 miles (80km) from Mandalay. Massive waves of attacks have penetrated areas close to Mandalay. The second phase of Operation 1027 aims to capture the enemy’s heart through military efforts. What do you think about resistance efforts to draft an interim political agenda for Mandalay Region as the offensive advances? TZ: A successful revolution requires a coordinated effort involving politics, the military, and people’s movements. The current period, before the fall of the military dictatorship, can be called the interim period. The NUG’s official name is the Interim National Unity Government. Once the revolutionary period ends and the dictatorship falls, we will enter a transitional period. Only after the transitional period can we achieve the true federal union which we hope for. In the current revolution period, we must attack the junta politically, militarily, and through people’s movements, on one hand. On the other, it is crucial for revolutionary and political forces to stay united and coordinated, to strengthen the revolution. This is essentially the interim political plan for Mandalay Region. It is a federal movement to support the ongoing revolution and connect with us. Our aspirations are to form a new federal state. Interim political plans are being crafted for all revolutionary political forces in Mandalay Region to collaborate in the revolutionary effort. This process is not new. It began about a year ago, and involves the parliament, administrations, defense forces, people’s strike forces, CDM forces, activists, and political parties, collaborating on these efforts. We are now forming a working committee to draft an interim political plan for Mandalay Region. It is not wrong to say that it is aimed at supporting the advance of the revolutionary movement. With revolutionary forces controlling more areas, frictions have emerged between local communities and groups such as defense forces, People’s Administration Forces, People’s Security Forces, and the PDFs. How should this issue be handled? This issue was not very apparent in 2021-2022 due to revolutionary forces’ limited control of territory. Now, they have significantly increased their dominion in areas like Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magway regions. Consequently, they must implement administrations as well as social services such as education and health. Essential pillars like a legal system and associated mechanisms must also be formed to maintain the rule of law. Who is responsible and currently working on this? The NUG. It has started developing mechanisms and forces including People’s Administration Forces, People’s Security Forces (PSF) for police operations, and the community-based armed resistance People’s Defense Forces for militia duties. Other mechanisms and revolutionary organizations like the PDF, which have permanent combat responsibilities, were developed, too. Meanwhile, we are seeing more incidents due to friction between these organizations and local communities. In other words, it’s natural. In place of the enemy junta, which no longer exists in those areas, these organizations have become governing forces that are providing security. That’s why we are seeing more friction and disputes with local communities. Friction is also more frequent among revolutionary organizations, such as between separate PDFs, between People’s Administrative Forces and People’s Security Forces, between these organizations and strike organizations, and between the PDFs and local armed forces that have not yet integrated with the NUG. I always emphasize that this revolution is a people’s revolution. In civilian terms, these forces include doctors, nurses, schoolteachers, palm tree climbers, farmers, masons, carpenters, trishaw drivers – all kinds of people united by their opposition to authoritarianism. What I want to say is that many of these individuals may lack the skills or experience required in their current administrative roles. They had to take on these roles for the revolution, and now bear security responsibilities. In fact, all these individuals are also revolutionaries. However, as their ability to control territory increases, it becomes crucial for administrators to acquire the necessary skills, knowledge, and capabilities related to administration. That is why we are continuously urging the NUG to improve its organizations and mechanisms and to follow the right path. This is vital. There are codes of conduct for armed forces and administrators, and there are manuals and publications for martial ethics and administration. It is essential to speak, practice, and act in line with these ethics and codes of conduct. Similarly, the public also bears a responsibility. It has a duty to regulate all revolutionaries and revolutionary organizations. If both the NUG, to whom we have entrusted this responsibility, and the people on the ground supervise these revolutionary forces, we hope these revolutionary organizations will adhere more closely to the relevant ethical rules. This revolution has progressed this far because it is people-focused. If revolutionary organizations and revolutionaries trigger unhappiness and frustration among the public, firstly, the people will become disappointed with the revolutionaries. Gradually, the public will become indifferent to the revolution, which will significantly hinder the revolution’s success. Therefore, it is crucial that we don’t let this happen. Prevention is better than cure. These are the reasons why it is imperative for all revolutionary organizations to adhere strictly to the codes of conduct. I would like to emphasize that now is the time to build a strong and fair chain of command and administration to strengthen each organization. Friction and disputes also exist between ethnic armed groups that are currently attacking the junta. There are also conflicts between local communities. Do you have any thoughts on this? Myanmar’s political problem didn’t arise yesterday or within the last three or four years of the Spring Revolution. It has been a problem for over 70 years. There are numerous issues spanning these decades that we need to resolve and negotiate, including demarcation of borders. To give a clear example, there are many ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State. Between these groups, there are sometimes minor frictions. However, one thing is certain: our common enemy is very apparent, which is the military dictatorship that seeks to monopolize control of the country. We will work together to end this common enemy. When there is no more common enemy, we should, as comrades and friends, negotiate and find peaceful solutions for the issues between us, while treating these conflicts as friendly conflicts. I fully believe that solutions will be found. During this revolution, if the minor frictions and disputes between groups are handled carefully with wisdom, with full awareness and discipline among the leadership, I believe they can be resolved. But if frictions increase, the public will become disappointed with the revolution and the revolutionary organizations. This would benefit no one except perhaps the dictators. It is crucial for all involved to consider this point carefully. A photo of you with Arakan Army chief General Twan Myat Naing has surfaced on social media. Tell me more about this picture and your visit to armed resistance areas. During this revolution, traveling has been a key activity for me. In central Myanmar, I have been to regions like Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magwe, as well as areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations. During my visits to Kachin and the northern and eastern Shan states, I also met with leaders of ethnic armed organizations and became familiar with them. I had the opportunity to meet General Twan Myat Naing, the chairman of the United League of Arakan (ULA/AA), and we posted a photo. We all have a common enemy and a shared goal. We are comrades heading toward this common goal. Naturally, during this revolutionary period, we cannot reveal everything. I believe the public understands this. Over the past three years of revolution, it is very clear that our hearts have grown closer and more united. After the dictatorial system that has plagued our country for over 70 years is gone, it will be peaceful. I would like to convey to the public that we will be able to build a new country in a new era, with a new system where people are treated as equals and secular laws flourish. How do you analyze the junta’s efforts to hold a national election amid the escalating offensives of revolutionary groups? The root cause of all the people’s movements and armed revolution in Myanmar is the coup d’état. All the people of Myanmar, including critical thinkers, simply seek peace and want to live peacefully. No one wants to experience conflict and see their towns and villages being destroyed. Now, the military activity that the junta once considered advantageous is no longer beneficial to the regime. The international community has not accepted its rule, and the junta has become completely discredited in the eyes of the public. Now, it appears that the junta is looking for an exit by holding a fake election. We desire democracy and will not reject legitimate elections, as they are an integral part of a democracy. But will the junta’s planned poll be a truly democratic election? I am certain it will not. Just look at the registration process for political parties to participate in the election. What types of parties are allowed to register? Can these parties ensure a truly independent election process? Lastly, under what legal framework will the junta hold the election? It will definitely be conducted under the 2008 (military-drafted) constitution. We all know the nature of the 2008 constitution. The junta will proceed according to the undemocratic laws that it has crafted. Our Spring Revolution aims to build a true federal democratic union. The fake election being planned by the junta cannot resolve Myanmar’s political problems. It will only complicate these problems further. The public won’t accept it either. I want to state that this election will only be a political charade to prolong the military dictatorship’s existence. How do you view China’s current involvement in Myanmar’s political and military issues? We have presented and discussed these issues many times with our neighbor, China, which we will coexist with for as long as the world exists. Frankly speaking, the people of Myanmar are completely disappointed with China’s current position and are very unhappy about it. I always tell China that the goal of federal democracy which Myanmar people are striving for today aligns with China’s national interests. As long as the authoritarian system continues, Myanmar will suffer from conflicts, and China’s border will not be stable. Nowhere will be stable. If Myanmar is unstable and not peaceful, it will not benefit China. There will be no advantages. The root cause of all the instability in Myanmar is the coup and the authoritarianism. If you want to see Myanmar as a peaceful neighboring country, the dictatorship must end. We want to present this issue as an extremely serious matter to China. Looking at the history of China-Myanmar relations over the past 70 years, the relationship of true kinship was at its strongest when governments representing the people in Myanmar were elected. Therefore, on behalf of the Myanmar people, I once again urge China to stop supporting the dictatorship as soon as possible. Otherwise, I want to clearly state, the people of Myanmar will harbor even greater resentment towards the Chinese government. What message do you want to convey to the public about the current political and military situation? The military progress is evident. Enemy camps, cities, and villages controlled by the enemy have been captured, and wave after wave of military offensives (by resistance forces) are advancing. However, the main message to the public is that we cannot rely solely on military tactics. Over more than three years of revolution, we have come this far due to well-balanced collaboration between people’s movements and military actions. Collaboration between people’s movements and military actions which involved CDM activities, strike activities, and international diplomatic efforts have all contributed to the revolution’s rapid progress. To achieve our endgame and goal quickly, it is crucial to balance military efforts with people’s movements and uprisings. We believe that all individuals are revolutionaries. We are all revolutionaries, and the people are the revolution’s supporters. They are not mere spectators or passive supporters. Every citizen is a revolutionary. Therefore, the people must actively participate in the revolution. The endurance and stamina of the people is the key to the revolution’s success. Thus, it is time to accelerate the development of community-wide movements, such as boycotts and financial warfare. I urge the public to continue the movements and uprisings to drive the final battle..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-29
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Title: In China, Myanmar Junta Minister Visits Firm Planning Controversial Irrawaddy River Dam
Description: "Junta Foreign Minister Than Swe visited State Power Investment Corporation Yunnan International Power Investment Co. Ltd. (SPICYN), the developer of the controversial Myitsone Dam hydropower project in Kachin State, during his visit to Yunnan Province last week. His visit included a meeting with the SPICYN chairman, junta media reported. The meeting followed the junta’s formation of a body to evaluate hydropower projects on the Irrawaddy River in April. The body, according to the regime, will undertake research, develop technical solutions and handle public relations for Irrawaddy River projects together with the SPICYN. The body was formed amid growing concerns that the regime was planning to revive the China-backed power project at the source of the Irrawaddy River in northern Myanmar, more than a decade after it was shelved amid a public outcry. The regime’s move comes as the Kachin Independence Army and allied groups are advancing on Waingmaw town, which is linked to the Kachin State capital, Myitkyina, by a bridge spanning the Irrawaddy River. Located 32 km from Myitkyina, the US$7.2-billion project with a proposed capacity of 20,000 megawatts was initiated in 2009 under the previous military regime led by Than Shwe. The project has been stalled since a government suspension order in September 2011 under then-President Thein Sein’s administration following widespread public protests against the dam. The protests were fueled by a variety of fears and misgivings: that the majority of the electrical power generated would go to China; that the dam’s location near a seismic fault line posed a flood risk in the event of an earthquake; that the dam would threaten the flow of the Irrawaddy River and biodiversity and livelihoods downstream; and concerns over the general lack of transparency and public consultations undertaken before the project was awarded to China. Political observers believe the regime has yielded to China’s demand to resume the project in the hope that it will intervene and stop the coordinated assault of anti-regime forces in Kachin. Before the project was halted, SPICYN was planning seven large dams on the Mali, N’Mai and Irrawaddy rivers with a combined capacity of 20,000 megawatts. The Myitsone Dam is the largest of the seven. SPICYN is also developing the Chipwe Nge Dam with installed capacity of 99 megawatts on the N’Mai River. Than Swe visited the SPICYN office while attending the 8th China-South Asia Expo and 28th China (Kunming) Export and Import Fair in Kunming from July 22-24. SPICYN chairman Wu Zhiqun presented the corporation’s ongoing projects as part of the development of the electric power sector in Myanmar, said the junta media. Than Swe also met Ding Zongli, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress of China, while in Yunnan. The two discussed swift implementation of projects of mutual interest, junta media reported. Power outages became a problem after the 2021 coup, affecting people from all walks of life and businesses in Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing admitted during a cabinet meeting in August last year that current production could not even meet half of domestic demand. He told the meeting that the country would not be experiencing power outages if suspended mega electricity projects like Myitsone Dam had been implemented. His remark caused widespread concerns over a possible resumption of the project. Even after the coup, residents in Myitkyina and Chipwe have continued to stage protests against the dam projects on the Irrawaddy River, telling SPICYN to leave Myanmar once and for all..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar insurgents free political prisoners in northern Shan state city
Sub-title: Fighting in Lashio between the military junta and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army began in June.
Description: "A Myanmar insurgent army and its allies have freed political prisoners and taken control of a hospital and several police stations in the strategic northern Shan state city of Lashio, where fighting with junta forces has been ongoing for more than a month. Last week, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, announced it had captured the junta’s northeastern regional military headquarters in Lashio, although the junta has denied the claim. Fighting in neighborhoods near the regional headquarters continued over the weekend, several residents who requested anonymity for safety reasons told Radio Free Asia. The MNDAA announced on Sunday that it had also seized a market, a sub-broadcast station and three junta battalion camps in Lashio, which is located about halfway along the main road linking the city of Mandalay and the Chinese border. One of the junta camps was located near Lashio prison, where insurgent fighters have opened the gates, several sources said. Some 200 political prisoners walked free over the weekend, including Tun Tun Hein, a member of the Central Executive Committee for the National League for Democracy party, which was overthrown by the military in a 2021 coup d’etat. “Local resistance forces are working together to help with the prisoners,” said Maung Maung Swe, the deputy secretary for the shadow National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defense. “Some have been injured by shrapnel from landmines during the prison break, and we are also providing health care for them,” he said. A family member of Tun Tun Hein told RFA that there were few details about the prisoners due to telecommunications blackouts. RFA’s attempts to contact the MNDAA’s spokesperson to ask about the prison were unsuccessful on Monday. Junta spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun was also unavailable. Wa troops in Lashio On Saturday, the United Wa State Army, or UWSA, entered Lashio and took positions near its liaison office and some of its property. The UWSA – Myanmar’s largest ethnic army – waited until MNDAA forces controlled most of the city before going into Lashio, according to UWSA liaison officer Nyi Rang. “We officially informed both sides in advance about our entry,” he said. “Our Wa army will not intervene or side with any armed groups. We also hope for nationwide peace, including in Lashio, as soon as possible.” The UWSA vowed in November to remain neutral as the Three Brotherhood Alliance began a large-scale operation against junta forces. The alliance – made up of the MNDAA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army – has made significant gains against junta forces in Shan state and elsewhere in Myanmar since last October, when it launched Operation 1027. It resumed offensive operations in June following a ceasefire. Zaw Min Tun told local news media that the junta was aware of the UWSA’s presence in Lashio. Fighting since late June has forced more than 200,000 Lashio residents to flee their homes, according to aid workers. More than 10,000 people remain in the city. A junta airstrike on Sunday morning killed five people who had taken refuge near a monastery in Lashio, an aid worker told RFA. Elsewhere in the city, a 25-year-old woman was killed by shrapnel from a landmine that struck the back of her head, the aid worker said..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-29
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Title: Myanmar Junta Arrests Ex-Navy Chief for Disobeying Orders
Description: "Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing has had his former Navy chief arrested for failing to obey his orders during the fighting in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, sources told The Irrawaddy. Admiral Zwe Win Myint, formerly Navy Commander-in-Chief, submitted his resignation after disobeying Min Aung Hlaing’s order to attack Arakan Army (AA) troops deployed in hotels on Myanmar’s premier beach, Ngapali, in Thandwe Township without using artillery. Min Aung Hlaing ordered Zwe Win Myint to use landing craft to transport troops to the beach, but told him that artillery must not be used, said a source. “AA troops have taken up positions in the hotel zone. There are also snipers. Min Aung Hlaing ordered that they be cleared. The navy chief said he could, but he proposed that artillery be used first to suppress the enemy before sailors land on the beach in landing craft. Min Aung Hlaing didn’t accept that, for fear that the hotels would be damaged by the artillery,” a naval officer who asked for anonymity told The Irrawaddy. Ngapali Beach is where Myanmar’s cronies have built their most lavish resorts. There are 64 hotels and resorts on Ngapali Beach and most of the grandest ones are owned by tycoons with close ties to the leaders of Myanmar’s successive military regimes, from the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which ruled from 1988 to 2011, to the current State Administration Council. The Russia-Myanmar Association for Friendship and Cooperation and Treasure of Ngapali Development Co. Ltd, which is a local company according to the regime, signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a luxury seafront apartment project and cooperate in the tourism sector in Ngapali Beach. Association president Anatoly Bulochnikov met junta boss Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on Jan. 30, reportedly to discuss tourism and trade with Myanmar’s largest arms supplier. “If we only use landing craft to land on the beach without artillery support, we all would die,” said the naval officer. Min Aung Hlaing has also refused to bomb Thandwe, the native town of his wife, Kyu Kyu Hla. Zwe Win Myint was arrested on July 8 for disobedience and was replaced with Vice-Admiral Htein Win. Htein Win was part of the 29th intake of Defense Services Academy. He served as the commander of Mawrawaddy naval base in Tanintharyi Region’s Yebyu Township, and became the Chief of Staff (Navy) in January..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-29
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Title: Myanmar’s Wa Army Moves Forces Into Lashio
Description: "YANGON—Fighters from Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic minority armed group have moved into a strategic town fought over by the junta and another ethnic armed group for weeks, they and the military said on Sunday. Fighting has rocked Lashio in northern Shan State since early this month after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) renewed an offensive against the military. On Thursday the MNDAA claimed it had captured the town of around 150,000 people and the military’s northeastern command there—a claim denied by the junta. On Saturday the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—another ethnic minority armed group with greater manpower—moved personnel into Lashio to “protect” its properties there, its spokesman told AFP. The UWSA is the best-equipped of Myanmar’s dozen or so ethnic rebel groups, with close ties to China, which analysts say supplies much of its weaponry. It has so far stayed out of the fighting sparked by the military’s 2021 coup, which reignited decades-old conflicts with some ethnic minority groups. “Security members from Wa State entered into Lashio town on the night of the 27th to protect our external relations office and properties in Lashio Township,” UWSA spokesman Nyi Rang told AFP. “Before entering the town, we informed both sides which are fighting and entered smoothly with their approval.” Wa personnel in Lashio “are not going to intervene, cooperate nor give support to the groups which are fighting,” he said. He did not say how many UWSA fighters were now in the town, or how long they would stay. The military had “been informed in advance” about the move, the junta’s information team said in a statement, without giving details. Military sources told AFP on Sunday that the northeastern command was still under its control. AFP was unable to reach a spokesman for the MNDAA for comment. The loss of Lashio and the regional military command would be a huge blow from the junta, which has lost territory to the MNDAA and other armed groups in recent weeks. In January the MNDAA captured the city of Laukkai near Myanmar’s border with China after around 2,000 junta troops surrendered, in one of the military’s biggest defeats in decades. South of Laukkai, the Wa region remains virtually locked-off, ringed by checkpoints and tight internal controls, and uses the Chinese yuan and internet services. China is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta, but analysts say it also maintains ties with armed ethnic groups in Myanmar that hold territory near its border. Beijing was “paying close attention to the situation in northern Myanmar” and urged a halt to the fighting, foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning told a press conference on Thursday. Neither the junta nor the MNDAA have released casualty figures from the fighting in Lashio, which broke out on July 3. Local rescue groups say dozens of civilians have been killed and wounded..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-29
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Title: U.S., India Cooperation Can Help Get Humanitarian Aid Across Myanmar Border
Description: "Three years into Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, the country’s humanitarian crisis is only worsening. The Myanmar military continues to compensate for territorial defeats by punishing the civilian population with air strikes and large-scale arson attacks. The devastation is particularly dire in northwest Myanmar. According to the United Nations, half of Myanmar’s 3,136,000 internally displaced persons are in Chin State, Sagaing and Magway. Physical access is a consistent challenge, as the region is far removed from existing humanitarian operations which are primarily operating from the country’s southeast. Recent victories by resistance forces, however, have left them in control of much of the border between India and Chin State, presenting new options for humanitarian operations on the India-Myanmar border. While this will require coordination among donors and a nuanced approach to internal politics within the resistance, the chance to address northwest Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis should not be missed. [T] he chance to address northwest Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis should not be missed. Opportunity on the Border Since early in the post-coup conflict, Sagaing and Chin State have been the sites of mass atrocities. The Myanmar military has burned tens of thousands of homes and churches in Sagaing and torched the large town of Thantlang and many other areas of Chin State. Indiscriminate air strikes and shelling are de rigueur, displacing thousands of people into the jungles or across the border to India. In November 2023, resistance forces in Chin State began an offensive that wrested control of the India-Myanmar border away from the Myanmar military. On November 13, the Chin National Front (CNF) and its allies captured Rikhawdar, a main border crossing connecting Chin State to Mizoram state in India. In the months since, they have also captured the northern town of Tonzang, while the Chin Brotherhood Alliance has taken the southern hub of Matupi. In the same period, the Arakan Army (AA), one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armies, seized most of neighboring Rakhine state’s north and has made rapid gains in central and southern Rakhine as well. The AA went on to cement its control of Chin State’s southern Paletwa township, expelling the junta from the Kaladan river corridor and key roads from Lawngtlai district in Mizoram. Taken together, Chin and Arakan forces have ended the Tatmadaw’s physical presence along much of Myanmar’s border with India, creating potential pathways for cross-border aid to reach isolated people in the war-torn northwest. U.N. agencies, international aid organizations or a consortium replicating that of the Thai-Myanmar border, could use this opening to reach the mass of displaced people in northwestern areas. Mizoram’s Border Politics Thus far, the Indian government has not allowed any such presence, suspending the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar and proposing new fencing on its 1,000-mile border. New Delhi maintains ties with the junta while keeping resistance groups at an arm's length for reasons that encompass border security, domestic politics and geopolitical interests, though this may be shifting. India has long relied on the Myanmar military to keep the border clear of anti-India insurgents and the drug trade, which is particularly important given the outbreak of ethnic violence in Manipur. India also relies on the junta to safeguard the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project, a grand infrastructure link from Mizoram to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. Finally, India may worry that breaking with the Myanmar military will cede control of Myanmar to China. However, India’s reluctance to take an active role in Myanmar and build ties with the resistance has hampered its ability to shape events. The Myanmar military’s scorched earth warfare is creating chaos on the India border, forcing roughly 64,600 refugees into India; the vast majority have gone to Mizoram, which shares ethnic and cultural ties with the Chin people. While the state has welcomed the refugees, their limited resources are increasingly strained without access to outside assistance. Elsewhere, the Myanmar military is no longer the border’s governing authority; by controlling Paletwa, the AA has become a key actor in completion of the Kaladan link. To preserve border stability and its geopolitical position, New Delhi should consider cultivating partners among anti-junta groups, much as China does on its own border. There are some signs that New Delhi is reconsidering its stance. In January 2024, India’s Assam Rifles border guards were seen meeting with Chin resistance counterparts at Rikhawdar. On February 29, Mizoram’s sole member of Parliament in the Indian Upper House (Rajya Sabha), K. Vanlalvena, traveled 10 km into Paletwa to meet with the AA, who pledged cooperation on the Kaladan project. India’s 2024 general election saw the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies lose all four of their Lok Sabha (Lower House) seats in the border states of Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland, signaling dissatisfaction with how the government has handled ethnic and border issues. While observers expect foreign policy continuity from the BJP, regional parties such as Mizoram’s Zoram People’s Movement may now have even more leverage with the center. Earlier in 2024, Mizoram’s Chief Minister Lalduhoma met with high-ranking Indian officials, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, to advocate for changes in border and refugee policy. Post-election, Lalduhoma met with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on June 21, invoking India’s “Act East” regional policy and “challenges on the border.” A meeting with Home Minister Amit Shah on the same day produced a promise of humanitarian assistance from the center for refugees in Mizoram. While the Indian government has not announced a reversal on the Free Movement Regime, border fencing in Mizoram is now looking less likely. The Chinland Experiment If India needs stable and competent partners to manage the India-Myanmar border, then new organizational efforts among the Chin should attract its attention. If India needs stable and competent partners to manage the India-Myanmar border, then new organizational efforts among the Chin should attract its attention. After the coup in 2021, the Chin formed dozens of Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs), corresponding roughly to Chin State’s distinct cultural and dialect groups. In December 2023, the CNF and its allied CDFs founded a Chinland Council to establish administrative authority over the entire state. This state-building project has progressed to the point of establishing a government, complete with a defense ministry, interim constitution, legislature and court system. An estimated 80% of Chin armed groups joined the effort. On the ground, administration varies from one village to the next. The civilian wings of the many CDFs, which include former civil servants from the Civil Disobedience Movement, make up the actual governing presence in most places. One such example is CDF-Zophei, whose administrators recognize the Chinland Government and maintain hospitals and schools in Zophei-speaking areas. In May 2024, the new Chinland Ministry of Defense launched its first official military action, successfully taking the northern town of Tonzang, a township administrative center. Soon afterwards, the CNF began highlighting anti-drug efforts in the area, possibly to demonstrate its effectiveness as a potential partner on border security. In southern Chin State, Chin Brotherhood forces allied with the AA have set up their own parallel administrations in territory taken from the Myanmar military. In all of these newly liberated areas, administrators must now tackle the challenge of rebuilding and providing for thousands of displaced people. Finding a way to work with these local authorities could lead to a more inclusive aid effort free of junta interference. U.S. Aid Appropriations In March 2024, six months into the fiscal year, the U.S. Congress passed its final budget for FY 2024 with $121 million in funding for Myanmar-related programs. Whereas appropriations in previous years had only mentioned Thailand, this year’s budget identified India as a potential conduit for a combined allocation of $75 million to “assistance and cross-border programs.” This represents an opportunity to reduce human suffering for refugees and displaced people on both sides of the India-Myanmar border. As with most U.S. humanitarian aid to Myanmar, the United Nations, its implementing partners and other international humanitarian organizations would be the ideal partners for delivery. This will require the United States to invest time and effort in diplomacy with India to allow them access to the border area. A first step could be for the Indian central government to heed the suggestion of Mizoram’s State government and populace and lead a refugee relief effort. The promise of government aid by Shah, India’s home minister, is a start, but lifting restrictions on the activities of U.N. agencies and international NGOs in Mizoram would catalyze the influx of even more substantial humanitarian aid. The next step would be cross-border aid to reach the thousands of displaced people in Chin State and, eventually, those in Sagaing and Magway. Using the precedent of the Thai-Myanmar border, a consortium or similar system allowing NGOs to provide cross-border aid should be established. These middlemen could provide assistance to the region without jeopardizing the U.N.’s arrangements with the Myanmar military elsewhere. The geography of the India-Myanmar border suggests the possibility of several humanitarian corridors. The geography of the India-Myanmar border suggests the possibility of several humanitarian corridors: two through the town of Rikhawdar and Thantlang township, which are governed by the Chinland Council, one through AA-controlled Paletwa township and one leading to the Chin Brotherhood’s newly captured town of Matupi. Where territorial control overlaps, agreements to allocate aid on an equal basis could help rebuild trust between the different Chin groups, which are at odds over governing authority. At a time when fighting is intensifying in Myanmar’s northwest, there is a lot that India and the United States can collaboratively do to alleviate human suffering and stem the damaging effects of the war, and potentially stem the destabilization of India’s northeast. Now that physical barriers to aid are vastly reduced, outside actors should begin building the infrastructure for a more robust major humanitarian operation..."
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Source/publisher: United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication: 2024-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-29
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Title: China’s frustration with the Myanmar junta’s incompetence is mounting
Sub-title: Beijing will not abandon the regime and sees the military as part of a future political settlement.
Description: "Chinese frustration with Min Aung Hlaing appears to be heightening, as the junta prepares to issue another six-month extension of its emergency decree on Aug. 1 and ignores Beijing's calls to seek a political solution. Beijing has sent multiple signals that this is unacceptable and that the military government must prepare to hold elections as an off-ramp to the political crisis. While some observers saw Beijing’s hand in Min Aung Hlaing’s seizure of power on Feb. 1, 2021, the coup really went against core Chinese interests, leading to political instability, a breakdown in the national cease-fire agreement, and the further stalling of the key projects Myanmar-China Economic Corridor and port in Kyaukphyu. Beijing failed to endorse the coup, pressured the junta to not dissolve the National League for Democracy, the then ruling and recently re-elected party of Aung San Su Kyi, and backed ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus for ending the conflict. In March 2022, Beijing appointed a special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun. By mid-2022, however, it seems as though China had come to the conclusion that the opposition National Unity Government and their alliance of ethnic resistance organizations would be unable to prevail. Beijing stepped up their engagements with the junta. But even with Chinese diplomatic and political support, the generals were unable to consolidate power. Operation 1027, launched by an alliance of ethnic armies in late 2023, led to the junta’s loss of significant amounts of territory along the border with China in Shan state. The Kachin Independence Army’s subsequent offensive led it to now control all border crossings in that state. On Jan. 10, Beijing negotiated a ceasefire in northern Shan state. Yet, the junta continued their air and long range artillery attacks, prompting China, in a show of force, to stage live fire military exercises on the border in April. Pushing for an off ramp Frustration with the junta’s military and economic incompetence is mounting. To be clear, Beijing has never trusted Min Aung Hlaing, whom they are said to view as incompetent and an embarrassment. Chinese leaders have consistently denied him an invitation since the coup, including to the sparsely attended third Belt and Road Initiative Forum in Beijing in October 2023. Beijing appears more convinced that Min Aung Hlaing is unable to stabilize the country, no matter what, and has been more vocally pushing for elections as an off ramp to the military’s self-made crisis. There have been a number of high-level delegations in the past few months. The one that piqued the most interest was that of former president Thein Sein. In a very obvious slight to Min Aung Hlaing, Thein Sein received an audience with Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping and was described by foreign minister Wang Yi as an “old friend”. Despite China’s concerns about Thein Sein’s transition to democracy after 2010, they look back on the former army chief and president as a competent leader who protected China’s interests. This presents a stark juxtaposition with Min Aung Hlaing. While Singapore’s Channel News Asia reported that Wang had conveyed Beijing’s call for Min Aung Hlaing to resign, this was never confirmed. But China has clearly increased its calls for elections to be held this year, and appears to see Thein Sein as an appropriate transitional figure, accepted by the international community and ASEAN in the past. Pressing for elections China invited Soe Win – deputy commander of the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself – to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Green Development Forum in early July. He was the highest ranking SAC official invited to China, though in a multilateral, not bi-lateral setting. While Soe Win’s goal was to secure further military and diplomatic assistance, Beijing saw the meeting as another opportunity to speak directly to the junta leadership and press for a firm date for elections. In mid-July, China invited a delegation of political parties, led by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP, whose routing in the November 2020 election led to the coup. But rather than commit to elections, the SAC continues to dither. On June 25, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the Lunar New Year would become a national holiday – a pathetic attempt to curry favor with Beijing. The SAC will hold elections only from a position of strength, which is possible only with Chinese military assistance. According to the UN Special Rapporteur and a forthcoming report from the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar, China continues to sell arms and deploy technicians to Myanmar’s military defense industries. It has also provided software and technical support to monitor telecommunications. Despite Chinese pressure, Min Aung Hlaing shows absolutely no signs of stepping aside. On July 20, he assumed the acting presidency, in addition to his role as army chief, Prime Minister, and head of the SAC. RELATED STORIES As Myanmar junta falters, rival ethnic armies jostle in Shan state Myanmar rebels rack up more gains as Operation 1027 enters new phase Myanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta Ethnic army overruns junta command center in Myanmar’s Kokang region Enter China’s proxy Despite Chinese admonishment, the junta is about to extend the emergency decree by an additional six months. There are even some reports that under Chinese pressure, Min Aung Hlaing will cede the acting presidency to Thein Sein in August. Yet, defying China is unlikely to play well for Min Aung Hlaing. When Phase 2 of Operation 1027 began in June, China put far less pressure on the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the tripartite insurgent force that has led the campaign. Although China negotiated a ceasefire on July 20, it didn’t last a day. China has held back since then, as the alliance member Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army took over parts of Lashio and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army took Mogoke. The junta’s air attack on Laukkaing on July 14 is going to antagonize China further. Rather than the junta, China is increasingly relying on another proxy, the United Wa State Army, to check the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s advances. In western Myanmar, where China’s bid Belt and Road Initiative projects are, China is clearly dealing with the new reality on the ground. While the Arakan Army has not taken Kyaukphyu, it has effectively surrounded China’s special economic zone in that Rakhine port city. Any future development there will necessarily entail negotiations with the Arakan Army, the third Brotherhood Alliance member.. If there is one area of ongoing cooperation, it’s assistance in shutting down some of the online scam centers and the return of Chinese nationals. Indeed, between September 2023 and June 2024, 5,482 Chinese citizens were handed over to Chinese police, according to Chinese state media. Although many of those were handed over by Myanmar police, an increasing number have been handed over by ethnic armies, who are proving themselves to Beijing to be more competent partners than the junta. China is clearly fed up with the junta. They will not abandon the regime, despite its losses, and Beijing sees the military as part of a future political settlement. China is inherently cautious, and its notion of sovereignty as a pillar of international relations makes it very hard for them to abandon Naypyitaw in favor of an opposition government and loose coalition of ethnic resistance organizations. But China has always had direct relations with the ethnic armies, especially those along its border, and it will continue to leverage those relations to pressure Naypyitaw. Beijing has made their preference for a negotiated settlement through elections abundantly clear. The only ones who are missing this message are the generals, who are cocooned in their fortress capital and oblivious to their mounting battlefield losses..."
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Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-28
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Title: UN expert praises Thai plans to stem banking for Myanmar’s arms trade
Description: "BANGKOK — The United Nations’ special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has told VOA he welcomes Thailand’s plans for a task force to help Thai banks vet business with Myanmar’s military regime for possible arms deals. Thailand announced the task force last week, nearly a month after a report by Andrews exposed the lead role Thailand’s banks have taken in financing arms purchases for the military regime that ousted Myanmar’s elected government in 2021. The civil war that has followed has claimed thousands of civilian lives. “It’s a real step in the right direction” and a sign “that Thailand is really taking this seriously and efforts are being made to stop these weapons transfers,” he said in a Saturday interview. His report, Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar, says international sanctions have helped slash the regime’s purchase of weapons through the global financial system by one-third from the 2022 to 2023 fiscal years, which runs April to March, to some $253 million. The report says those sanctions have also driven most of the regime’s arms-related banking away from Singapore, which clamped down on its banks’ weapons business with Myanmar last year, to Thailand. While the regime’s weapons financing through Singapore over the past fiscal year tumbled from $260 million to $40 million, it says, those through Thailand doubled to $120 million, the most of any country. Andrews said he hopes the task force will help Thailand follow Singapore’s lead in slashing its arms-related banking with Myanmar’s military regime, which the U.N. and others have accused of war crimes in its bid to put down a growing armed and civil resistance. “The action that we saw from Singapore was extremely important. And now the process that Thailand is engaged in … is part of an important momentum that I’m hopeful will cut off the means by which the junta can continue to commit these gross human rights violations,” he said. “We know that as the junta continues to suffer losses, it is responding by intensifying its attacks on innocent people,” he added. “So, it is very important that any and all efforts to stop this be conducted with a great sense of urgency, and I’m hopeful that this task force will convene and act quickly and urgently to address this crisis.” ‘The human rights agenda’ A spokesman for the Myanmar regime could not be reached for comment. The military has previously denied targeting civilians and claims to be taking proportionate action against “terrorists” to restore peace and order. In its announcement last week, Thailand said its Anti-Money Laundering Office and the Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, would be setting up the task force to help commercial lenders investigate transactions that may be linked to weapons purchases for Myanmar’s regime and avoid the taint of any human rights abuses. In the wake of Andrews’ report, representatives of the Thai banks it named told a meeting of the national security committee of Thailand's House of Representatives that they lacked the capacity to probe all their transactions with Myanmar for possible weapons deals. The Thai government has not said when the task force would convene or exactly what types of transactions with Myanmar would be off-limits from now on. A spokesman for the foreign affairs ministry, which announced the task force, said officials will be holding more talks with Andrews before deciding whether and how to urge the banks to change their behavior. The government has not come out against facilitating any and all arms deals with Myanmar’s military regime, the spokesman, Nikorndej Balankura, told VOA last week. “But Thailand attaches great importance to the human rights agenda, and of course we do not support the use of violence. So, if we know for sure that the transactions that took place [are] to purchase weapons, our stance would be definitely not to support that,” he said. Thailand’s goals of kickstarting a sluggish economy, developing its financial sector and repairing its international reputation since emerging from years of military rule itself will give the new task force a strong incentive to stamp out the country’s role in Myanmar’s arms deals. That’s according to Sean Turnell, an economist and senior fellow at Australia’s Lowy Institute with a focus on Myanmar and Southeast Asia, who spoke with VOA. Thailand may choose to tread more softly than Singapore and avoid telling its banks to cut the Myanmar junta’s lenders off outright, Turnell said. “But one could imagine a regulator suggesting quietly to a bank that they regulate that, you know, maybe it’s not such a good idea to be doing business with them,” he added. Looking for alternatives Turnell also served as an economic adviser to the civilian government ousted by Myanmar’s military and now advises the National Unity Government, a shadow government vying to kick out the junta. He said Myanmar’s military regime will try to find other countries to help finance its arms purchases should Thailand shut it out, the way it turned to Thailand after Singapore clamped down. “Definitely there will be other takers; they’ll find their way through the cracks. But every time you have to do that you lose some of your ability to do that sort of financing,” he said. With each move, he said, the regime will have to turn to less globally connected and reputable banks that will charge higher fees, possibly even bribes and kickbacks, for their services. “As soon as you start leaving major financial centers and major international banks, it just becomes more and more difficult to get these sorts of transactions going,” Turnell said. Getting shut out of one country after another could also push Myanmar’s military regime into settling more and more of its arms purchases informally, for instance with cash and barter trades that come with their own costs and limitations, Turnell added. “I’m not sure how many countries are going to want to barter jet fuel for beans and pulses,” said Jared Bissinger, an economist and visiting fellow in the Myanmar program at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, in an interview with VOA. With the exception of only natural gas, dried beans have been Myanmar’s main export in recent years, according to World Integrated Trade Solution, a trade data aggregator developed by the World Bank. “I’d imagine they will continue seeking out ways to make transactions via banks and intermediaries in a range of countries that are less cooperative with enforcement of sanctions,” Bissinger said. “But this takes time, effort, and money. So, there is certainly some value in the disruptions and resource denials that sanctions cause. Sanctions are a bit of a game of whack-a-mole,” he said, where a problem is solved in one place only to reemerge someplace else. "But it still hurts the mole when it gets whacked,” he added..."
Source/publisher: "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication: 2024-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-28
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Title: ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Joint Statement on Strengthening Humanitarian Mine Action Cooperation
Description: "AFM-CN/2024/01/STM We, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People's Republic of China, gathered on the occasion of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) Plus One Session with China in Vientiane, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on 26 July 2024; DEPLORING the mass civilian casualties caused by landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the region, and cognisant of the serious threat that landmines and other ERW pose to the safety of the people as well as to economic and social development; APPLAUDING the tremendous efforts and achievements made by landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States on mine action in recent years; NOTING that many ASEAN Member States are still facing diverse challenges, including in carrying out humanitarian demining efforts along the border areas, in putting an end to landmines and other ERW threats; HIGHLIGHTING the importance of addressing humanitarian aspects of landmines and other ERW through a coordinated and integrated approach; ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to promote mine action cooperation; RECOGNISING the role of ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) in promoting ASEAN’s efforts to address the issue of landmines and other ERW for interested ASEAN Member States and raise awareness of the danger of landmines and other ERW among affected communities; ALSO RECOGNISING that strengthening mine action cooperation is crucial for sustaining peace, security, stability, prosperity and sustainable development of the region; APPRECIATING the valuable support that China has provided to some landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States since 1998 as well as ARMAC, which highlights ASEAN and China's friendship and cooperation, while taking note of China’s vision to build a peaceful, safe and secure, prosperous, beautiful, and amicable home in the region; and REAFFIRMING the commitment to advance ASEAN-China relations by forging closer cooperation in line with important documents such as the Joint Statement of the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development and the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2021-2025) and its Annex to Advance the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership; WE HEREBY: Emphasise the importance of humanitarian mine action, enhance people’s awareness of the danger of landmines and other ERW, accelerate the restoration of the residual contaminated land, provide appropriate medical and rehabilitation assistance to the victims, and allow people to return to their homeland in dignity, safety and security; Integrate humanitarian mine action into the sustainable development agenda of the region, advance regional and cross-border cooperation and resource mobilisation, including exploring various financial instruments for mine action, and enhance the cost-effectiveness of resources; Optimise existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action, and carry out more practical cooperation in areas such as personnel training, standard setting and joint exercise, to enhance the capacity of ASEAN Member States for mine action; Support the work of ARMAC including in advancing cooperation on the use of technology in demining to further reduce the risk of human casualties, promoting innovation, enhancing the effectiveness of mine action operations, convening regional high-level and technical working group meetings, encouraging the active participation of multiple stakeholders, and promoting the sharing of experience and achievements; Strengthen cooperation with United Nations (UN) agencies such as the UN Mine Action Service and the UN Development Programme, actively explore South-South and trilateral cooperation, and call on all parties to step up support to landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States, including through ARMAC; and Enhance closer communication and coordination between ASEAN Member States and China at the UN to promote cooperation on mine action that contributes to the maintenance of peace, security, stability, development, and prosperity in the region and the world..."
Source/publisher: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication: 2024-07-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-27
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Title: National Unity Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement (6/ 2024) - Statement on NUG’s position on the 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
Description: "1. The National Unity Government welcomes the continued attention of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the situation in Myanmar. The National Unity Government expresses its position regarding the 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting as follows:- 2. As the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people, the National Unity Government continues to extend its full cooperation to ASEAN. The attempted coup staged by the military on February 1, 2021 was a direct insult to ASEAN's principles of democracy, the rule of law, and good governance, as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. 3. Over three years have passed since the attempted coup, and the military junta continues to violate and obstruct the implementation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC). During this same period, the NUG and its ethnic partners have secured significant territorial control and have expanded their service provision and administrative governance. It follows that the National Unity Government and its ethnic and civil society partners are the legitimate dialogue partners for ASEAN. This situation calls for a comprehensive review of the 5PC, a renewed approach to engagement, and increased diplomatic pressure to hold the junta accountable for its actions. The continued presence and participation of military junta members and appointees in ASEAN-related meetings solely represents the interests of the junta, not the will or welfare of the people of Myanmar. 4. The junta’s proposed “sham election”, which aims to secure a fig-leaf of legitimacy, will not solve the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. Rather, it would exacerbate the situation and extend regional instability and insecurity. We urge ASEAN to prioritize sustainable solutions to address the root causes rather than short-term fixes, to reject this “sham election” process and to support the people of Myanmar in their pursuit of a genuine and sustainable federal democracy. 5. To address the ongoing conflict, we request ASEAN members to: (i) Engage directly with the NUG and its ethnic and civil society partners as the legitimate representatives of Myanmar and its people, including through a process to review and operationalise the 5PC. (ii) Increase pressure on the junta: Impose targeted sanctions on the military leadership and entities supporting them, including restrictions on jet fuel to prevent indiscriminate airstrikes. (iii) Protect refugees: Urge Myanmar’s neighbouring countries to accept, protect, and assist those fleeing the violence in Myanmar. (iv) Facilitate cross-border humanitarian aid: Establish mechanisms to deliver essential aid directly to those in need, including through ethnic and civil society channels, and bypassing the junta's obstructions to ensure aid reaches the most vulnerable communities. (v) Seek international support: Build on point 17 of the 2023 ASEAN Leaders’ Review and Decision on the Implementation of the 5PC by specifying the kind of support that ASEAN seeks from external partners and the international community. 6. We believe ASEAN has a crucial leadership role in resolving the Myanmar crisis. We strongly urge swift and decisive action in consultation with the people of Myanmar to implement effective initiatives that address the root causes of the conflict and alleviate the suffering of the Myanmar people. 7. The NUG and its partners have developed a robust transition plan and implemented a comprehensive strategy toward restoring democracy, peace, and stability in Myanmar. We restate our readiness to work with ASEAN and all stakeholders to find a peaceful and just solution to the crisis. Together, we can restore democracy, peace, and stability to our country..... Ministry of Foreign Affairs National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication: 2024-07-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-27
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၆/ ၂၀၂၄) - (၅၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ အစည်းအဝေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description: "၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေအနေ များနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ဆက်လက်အလေးပေးအာရုံစိုက်မှုကို ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အနေဖြင့် (၅၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများအစည်းအဝေးအပေါ် မိမိတို့အစိုးရ၏ သဘောထားကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားပြုဖြစ်သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အာဆီယံနှင့် ဆက်လက်၍ အပြည့်အဝ ပူပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့က အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုသည် အာဆီယံပဋိညာဉ်တွင် ပြဌာန်း ထားသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်၊ တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးနှင့် ကောင်းမွန်သော အုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်ဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံ ၏အခြေခံမူများကို တိုက်ရိုက်စော်ကားလိုက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည်မှစ၍ သုံးနှစ်ကျော်ကာလအတွင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်(၅)ရပ်အား အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်းမရှိဘဲ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန် ဖောက်ဖျက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ဤကာလအတွင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားမိတ်ဖက် များအနေဖြင့် နယ်မြေထိန်းချုပ်မှုများ သိသာထင်ရှားစွာ ရယူနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်မှုများကို လည်း ပိုမို၍ ပံ့ပိုးပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ယင်းအချက်က အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် ၎င်း၏ တိုင်းရင်း သားနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်း မိတ်ဖက်များသည် အာဆီယံအတွက် တရားဝင်ဆွေးနွေးဖက်များ ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ရပ်ကို ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ပြန်လည်သုံးသပ်ရန်၊ ပိုမိုအားကောင်းသော ချဉ်းကပ်မှုနည်းလမ်းတစ်ရပ် ရှာဖွေ ဖော်ထုတ်ရန်နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား ၎င်း၏လုပ်ရပ်များအတွက် တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိစေရေး သံတမန်ရေး အရ ဖိအားပေးမှုများ ပိုမိုတိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ အာဆီယံဆက်စပ်အစည်းအဝေး များတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ၎င်းကခန့်အပ်ထားသူများကို ဆက်လက်ကိုယ်စားပြု ပါဝင်စေခြင်းသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကိုသာ ထင်ဟပ်ပြီး၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ စိတ်ဆန္ဒနှင့် ကောင်းကျိုးကို လုံးဝထင်ဟပ်ခြင်း မရှိပါ။ ၄။ ထို့အပြင် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကို တရားဝင်စေရန်ရည်ရွယ်သည့် စစ်အုပ်စုက ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်မည့် “အတု အယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ” သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိပြဿနာများကို ပြေလည်စေမည် မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ အခြေ အနေများ ပိုမိုရှုတ်ထွေးစေပြီး၊ ဒေသတွင်း မတည်ငြိမ်မှုနှင့် မလုံခြုံမှုများကိုသာ ပို၍ဖြစ်စေနိုင်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာများကို ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရေးဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် ရေတိုဆေးမြီးတို ဖြေရှင်းနည်းထက် ပြဿနာ၏အရင်းအမြစ်ကို ကုစားသည့် ရေရှည်ခံမည့်ဖြေရှင်းနည်းများကို ဦးစားပေး ရှာဖွေရန်၊ ယင်း “အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ” လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို လုံးဝငြင်းပယ်ရန်နှင့် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေး အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းတိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကို အားပေးထောက်ခံရန် အာဆီယံအား တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။ ၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသော ပဋိပက္ခများကို ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းရန် အာဆီယံ အဖွဲ့ဝင် နိုင်ငံများထံသို့ အောက်ပါတို့အား တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည် - (က) အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ရပ်အား ပြန်လည်သုံးသပ်ခြင်းနှင့် အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အပါအဝင် ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံမှုများတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရနှင့် ၎င်း၏ တိုင်းရင်းသားနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်း မိတ်ဖက်များအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအဖြစ် တိုက်ရိုက်ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံ ရန်၊ (ခ) အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အပေါ် ဖိအားများ တိုးမြှင့်ရန် - အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား ခွဲခြားထား မှုမရှိသော လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကိုတားဆီးရန်အတွက် ဂျက်လေယာဉ်လောင်စာ ဆီ ကန့်သတ်ချက်များအပါအဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် ခေါင်းဆောင်ပိုင်းနှင့် ၎င်းတို့နှင့် ဆက်စပ် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားသော အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ချမှတ်ရန်၊ (ဂ) ဒုက္ခသည်များကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ရန်- မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကြောင့် ထွက်ပြေးခိုလှုံလာသူများအား လက်ခံပေးရန်၊ ကာကွယ် စောင့်ရှောက်ပေးရန်နှင့် ကူညီပေးရန်တို့အတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများထံသို့ တိုက်တွန်းရန်၊ (ဃ) နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ လွယ်ကူ ချောမွေ့စွာ ပို့ဆောင်ပေးရန်- တိုင်းရင်းသားနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှတဆင့် ဆောင်ရွက်သည့် နည်းလမ်းများအပါအဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အတားအဆီးများကို ကျော်လွှားကာ မရှိမဖြစ်လိုအပ်သောအကူအညီများအားလိုအပ်နေသူများထံသို့ တိုက်ရိုက် ပေးပို့နိုင်မည့် ယန္တရားများ ထူထောင်ရန်၊ (င) နိုင်ငံတကာအကူအညီများ တောင်းခံရန်- အာဆီယံအနေဖြင့် ပြင်ပမိတ်ဖက်များနှင့် နိုင်ငံ တကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းထံမှ တောင်းခံမည့် အကူအညီအမျိုးအစားများကို သတ်မှတ်၍ (၂၀၂၃) ခုနှစ် အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်(၅)ရပ်အား အကောင် အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ သုံးသပ်ချက်နှင့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အပိုဒ်(၁၇) အား ဆက်လက် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်၊ ၆။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အာဆီယံသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အကျပ်အတည်းကို ဖြေရှင်း ရာ၌ အရေးပါသော ဦးဆောင်မှုအခန်းကဏ္ဍတွင် ရှိနေကြောင်း ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ပဋိပက္ခများ၏ မူလ အရင်းခံအကြောင်းများကို ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ပြီး၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများကို ‌ဖယ်ရှားပေးနိုင်မည့် ထိရောက်သည့် ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များကို လျင်မြန်စွာ ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား လုပ်ဆောင်ရန်ကိုလည်း အလေး အနက် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၇။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် မိတ်ဖက်များအနေဖြင့် ခိုင်မာသော အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး အစီ အစဉ်ကိုရေးဆွဲချမှတ်ကာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်မှု ပြန်လည် ဖော်ဆောင် နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည့်စုံကျယ်ပြန်သည့် မဟာဗျူဟာကို အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကျပ်အတည်းအတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းပြီး တရားမျှတသော အဖြေကို ရှာဖွေနိုင်ရန် အာဆီယံနှင့် အားလုံးသော သက်ဆိုင်သူများနှင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အသင့်ရှိပါကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်းဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်မှုတို့ကို ပြန်လည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အတူတကွ လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ကြမည်ဟု ခိုင်မာစွာ ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication: 2024-07-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-27
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Title: In Myanmar, Diplomats Are Being Trapped Inside a Disquieting Bubble
Description: "An AFP article published ahead of this week’s meeting of Southeast Asian foreign ministers in Laos quotes a diplomat as saying: “The center is still solid under the junta.” The Southeast Asian envoy who was planning to attend the event went on to warn that Myanmar could “become a failed state.” This is the main misperception about Myanmar’s revolution that diplomats cling to, whether they are based in Yangon, Bangkok or elsewhere in Southeast or South Asia. It is not just the view of the anonymous Southeast Asian diplomat quoted in the report. It is safe to say it is a diplomatic dogma. It seems that quite a number of diplomats, mission staff and other international workers in and around Myanmar don’t really live there. Instead, they are ensconced in their own narratives, and they feed these narratives to each other. Through various donors, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and consultancy firms, they commission “research” and “analytical reports” that echo their misperceptions and dogmas. They sound like they live in echo chambers that completely removes them from reality in Myanmar. None of these diplomats or international staff say much about the total incompetence of Myanmar’s junta. The State Administrative Council, the moniker the junta has given itself, has done nothing well. It has three accomplishments: mismanagement, failure and a more than three-year-long crime spree. This does not seem to register in the echo chamber, even though the crime spree includes mass murder among its atrocities. Diplomats and international “experts” do not talk much about the junta’s daily atrocities and other crimes. Civilians are the prime target of Myanmar’s military. In three years, over 3 million people have been driven from their homes. Most of the population has been driven into poverty. Not a single day passes without the junta bombing a market, a monastery sheltering refugees, a school, hospital or a residential area. The sole purpose is to destroy and terrorize. However, in the circles where diplomats and international “experts” compare notes, this is hardly mentioned, as if they accept this as completely normal. Instead, they talk about their worries that Myanmar could become a “failed state” if the revolution succeeds and the people prevail over the junta. The diplomats and international “experts” do not shy away from long discussions about the weaknesses and incompetence of the National Unity Government, but they avoid talking about the crimes and incompetence of the military regime, as well as the obvious fact that it is crumbling. The junta and its military are still regarded as the credible and inevitable partner of any future “solution” in Myanmar, which may be why it must be seen as “solidly in control of the center” despite all the defeats that it is rapidly accumulating across the country. Another widely shared talking point in the diplomatic bubble is that ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) will “for sure stop fighting once they secure control over their own territory.” Every single statement or speech from ethnic revolutionary leaders says the opposite. They keep repeating that they are committed to removing the military dictatorship. For three years, EROs have been training, equipping and fighting in tandem with People’s Defense Forces. They are spilling blood together. Month by month, allied EROs and PDF liberation forces are becoming increasingly capable and strategic in squeezing faltering junta troops from three sides: from the west and southwest, from the north, and from the east and southeast. Since October 2023, coordinated offensives by liberation forces have been unrelenting. Once advances by resistance forces in one theater of war abate, an advance starts immediately from another direction as resistance forces elsewhere reposition themselves and build up supplies for another offensive. If one talks with senior ERO leaders, one can hear only their deep historical experience and determination. Here’s what one told me: “It is not possible to trust the Myanmar military. They will always break all the promises and deals they make when they are weak. As soon as they become a bit stronger, they come back to attack, occupy, kill, rape, burn and plunder. We have had more than enough experience with them. Now, when the Bamar population is in rebellion against the junta, we see a historic opportunity to liberate the country, and we will not miss that opportunity.” What he said was not unique. However, diplomats and international “experts” cocooned in their echo chambers know better. Nothing can persuade them that EROs are not focused only on the narrow self-interest of taking control of territory and establishing their own states, without any care about what happens in Burma proper and without concern about who occupies Naypyidaw. In the diplomatic bubble, the talk is about “possible future fragmentation.” This is seen as the biggest threat Myanmar faces. It is a bigger threat than the devastation Min Aung Hlaing and his junta have delivered: Three years of destruction. The annihilation of civilians, villages, towns and cities. The unrelenting attacks on the body and soul of a nation are occurring in front of our eyes. Among diplomats, this is not a matter of concern or conversation. Inside the bubble, the focus is on the imaginary disintegration of the country in the future, not the destruction Myanmar’s military is inflicting now. Last but not the least, those in the bubble are behaving as if China’s electoral manipulation plan is inevitable. Many feel they need to jump on the election train so they can be well-placed in the queue to welcome the new “elected” government. It does not matter that it is very uncertain whether any election will take place at all. It does not matter that, even if an electoral farce is staged, it will only cover one third of the territory and be completely manipulated and falsified. Still, it seems, everybody in the bubble is ready to welcome the “opening” and “opportunity that should not be missed.” The usual rationalization of those arguing that the junta is “too strong to fall” is that appeasing the Myanmar military is the only solution to stop further fighting, achieve a ceasefire, bring back stability and reduce civilian suffering. This argument is nothing but shamefully dishonest. It does not recognize that it is not revolutionary forces that are causing civilian suffering. It is primarily the SAC’s intentional targeting of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure that is creating civilian suffering. Myanmar’s neighbors have done absolutely nothing to reduce the capacity of the junta to target civilians. They have applied little real pressure on the SAC to stop it from targeting civilians. India and China are still providing the junta with weapons. Thailand is paying the junta money for gas that the junta uses to continue funding its war of terror against the civilian population. Myanmar’s neighbors and the whole of ASEAN have not even provided meaningful humanitarian aid to millions of internally dispersed persons. They have not provided shelter for civilian victims of war, which would be adequate for the size of the humanitarian catastrophe. Instead, neighbors preferred to create an invisible but effective cordon sanitaire to protect themselves from refugees and other spillover effects. It is much more correct to conclude that when diplomats in the bubble talk about concern for the civilian population if the war continues, they are in reality concerned about the possibility of the final fall of the military-as-regime. Myanmar’s neighbors and other ASEAN countries are not able to imagine the Myanmar state without a military-as-regime. They think that without a military-as-regime there will be no central authority, and in their minds that means chaos and state failure (currently they call it “fragmentation” or “Balkanization”). So they say that the junta is still “solid in the centre” (which it is not) and that the military “cannot fall” (which it can), because that is their wish. They would like to have the junta solid in the center and they do not want the military to fall. So they create all those disillusioned, out-of-touch narratives and repeat them in their echo chamber. The consequence is that Myanmar’s neighbors and international “experts” are not ready for the probable fall of the SAC because they fear it. They remain blinded by their denial of reality..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-26
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Title: Lashio Fighting Continues After MNDAA Seizes Myanmar NE Command HQ
Description: "Fighting continues in Lashio after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) reportedly seized two-thirds of the northern Shan State capital. Residents said junta shelling and airstrikes continued on Friday. Lashio’s Northeastern Command headquarters was occupied on Thursday morning, the first junta command hub to fall to anti-regime forces since the 2021 coup. The MNDAA and its allies since July 3 have seized around five junta battalion headquarters and other bases around the city. Sources said junta troops have spread through Lashio in smaller units while the airport, Lashio Motel and university are controlled by the MNDAA. U Han of a rescue team based in Lashio said: “Junta troops are spread through residential areas, endangering civilians.” He said five male bodies were found near Mansu pagoda in western Lashio but rescue teams could not retrieve their bodies. “They were killed by shelling but we cannot get close and cannot identify them,” U Han said. The MNDAA urged residents not to panic and said business as usual would soon return while it urged its troops not to break the law. It said its police would combat online scam gangs operating in Lashio and that a civilian administration would be established to fund residents to reconstruct their damaged houses. A Lashio resident said: “The junta troops are like guerrillas, hiding behind buildings and houses and using civilian areas as shelters.” The junta has yet not admitted that Lashio has fallen. U Nay Myo Zin, a former army captain, posted on Facebook about the death of Brigadier General Tin Tun Aung, the deputy chief of the junta’s Northeastern Command, blaming his death on his refusal to surrender to the MNDAA. Most Lashio residents have left the city, according to rescue groups. A Shan civil society organization member said remaining civilians were increasingly at risk during the current street fighting. A communications blackout was hampering rescue efforts, he added. “We are very concerned for the safety and the humanitarian situation,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-26
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Title: Retreating Myanmar Junta Troops Blow Up Another Bridge in Southern Rakhine
Description: "Junta troops retreating from Thandwe Township to Gwa Township in Rakhine State blew up a bridge between the two towns on Wednesday to impede the progress of Arakan Army (AA) troops who were pursuing them, according to residents. “Half of Chin Kwin Bridge remained on Tuesday, but they destroyed the entire bridge early Wednesday morning,” a resident who arrived at the scene on Wednesday morning told The Irrawaddy. The bridge is located near Kyeintali town 56 km from Thandwe town, on the only route that civilians can use to flee from Thandwe to Gwa. Part of the Thandwe-Gwa-Yangon Road, the route is used for trade and for patients who need to go to Yangon for healthcare services not available in Rakhine. A trader who supplies groceries in Thandwe said: “The situation is getting worse. We can’t send supplies without that bridge. I filled a tuk-tuk with food to send to Thandwe, but I can’t send it now.” One Gwa resident said: “I heard around 80 junta soldiers were deployed at a monastery near a bridge in Sap Thwar Village a few days ago. Junta soldiers have built bamboo fortifications outside checkpoints.” The regime has set up checkpoints at three important locations in Gwa Township including on Gwa-Yangon Road, residents said. Three overland routes link Rakhine with other parts of the country. The regime is using a road through the mountains in Gwa Township in the southernmost part of Rakhine to send reinforcements from Ayeyarwady Region to Thandwe Township, which is 128 km from Gwa. Fighting has been raging in the hotel zone in Mya Pyin Ward and Jeiktaw Village, the junta’s last base in Ngapali Beach. The two sides clashed in at least four locations in Mya Pyin and Jeiktaw on Wednesday, according to residents. At least six civilians were killed and several others injured when the regime shelled villages where displaced people were taking shelter this week, residents said. Fighting has been raging in Ngapali Beach since early June. The AA has seized Thandwe Airport, Light Infantry Battalion 566 and Infantry Battalion 55, and much of the popular beach. It is now focused on attacking the last remaining junta position on the southern tip of the beach. The regime is defending it with air and naval support..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-26
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Title: KNU and Civilian Government Mourn Death of Karen Revolutionary Leader
Description: "The Karen National Union (KNU) and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) expressed sadness about the death of the group’s former vice-chairwoman Padoh Naw Zipporah Sein, recognizing her as a revolutionary hero. Naw Zipporah Sein, 69, died of cancer on Wednesday afternoon at her home in the Thai border town of Mae Sariang. The country’s oldest armed revolutionary group said she dedicated her life to liberating the Karen people and to serving the community. The KNU said, “may her legacy of courage and commitment continue to inspire us all”. The NUG said the death of Padoh Naw Zipporah Sein was a loss for the whole country, not only for her community. The NUG said she was the first leader to declare that the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was void after the 2021 coup and pledged support to the civilian government. Naw Zipporah Sein led the KNU’s Concerned Group which abandoned the NCA and recognized the NUG, sharing its vision for a federal union. The daughter of KNU commander-in-chief, General Tamla Baw, she served the organization as a school teacher, women’s rights activist, general secretary and vice-chair. From 1988 to 2008, she was general secretary of the Karen Women’s Association, dealing with refugee issues. Naw Zipporah Sein was awarded the Women’s Peace Prize by the Women’s Organization Network in 2014. Messages of condolences spread on social media. Saw Kapi, a Karen educational rights advocate, said: “Naw Zipporah Sein’s legacy extends beyond her political achievements. She was an inspiration and a role model for countless Karen women and girls who saw her as a symbol of strength and possibility. Her leadership and courage have left an indelible mark on the Karen struggle for self-determination and principled politics.” He praised her role ahead of the signing of the 2015 NCA as the head of the KNU delegation in negotiating a ceasefire agreement with Thein Sein’s transitional government. Her ability to navigate the complex and often treacherous negotiations was a testament to her skill, patience and unyielding commitment to the Karen cause, Saw Kapi added..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-25
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Title: Milestone as MNDAA Claims Capture of Myanmar Junta’s NE Command in Lashio
Description: "The ethnic Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and allied resistance groups claimed to have seized the junta military’s North Eastern Command headquarters in northern Shan State’s capital Lashio on Thursday morning. It is the first military regional command headquarters to be seized by anti-regime resistance forces, marking a major milestone in Myanmar’s fight against the regime since it grabbed power in a coup in early 2021. One of 14 junta military regional commands scattered across the country, the North Eastern Command oversees military operations across northern Shan State, including areas near the Chinese border. The MNDAA on Thursday announced it had taken control of the command headquarters after 23 days of fighting in what it called a “historic victory.” Lashio itself has yet to be completely seized, however, as clashes are still going on in parts of the city, sources close to resistance forces on the ground told The Irrawaddy. Maung Saungkha, the founder of the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, which is fighting alongside the MNDAA, wrote on his Facebook on Thursday that the resistance groups only needed to finish seizing a few remaining junta positions and to capture regime forces trying to flee the city. The fall of the junta’s North Eastern Command, the regime’s stronghold in northern Shan State, leaves the junta’s garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin, home to its Defense Services Academy, vulnerable to resistance attack. The academy is Myanmar’s answer to West Point. Alongside several resistance groups, the MNDAA, a member of the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies that launched the highly successful Operation 1027 offensive in northern Shan State in October last year, resumed its attacks on frontline junta bases and military battalions defending Lashio on July 3. It took just a little over three weeks for the ethnic alliance and allied resistance forces to seize around five junta battalion headquarters and frontline bases in and around Lashio. A total of 317 junta soldiers including a lieutenant colonel, two majors and five army captains from regime bases defending Lashio surrendered to the MNDAA on Sunday, the ethnic army said. The city is almost empty as most residents fled in the early days of the resistance operation, but some people remain trapped there, according to local rescue groups. Meanwhile, fierce clashes have broken out in Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mongmit townships in northern Shan and Singu, Madaya and Mogoke townships in northern Mandalay Region, where the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—another member of the Brotherhood Alliance—are fighting alongside resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the command of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). They resumed fighting on June 25 as part of Phase 2 of Operation 1027. The TNLA and PDF groups took complete control of Mogoke, Myanmar’s major ruby hub, in northern Mandalay Region on Wednesday after a month of fighting against junta forces. As part of Operation 1027, Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also taken complete control of Singu Township, 91 km north of Myanmar’s second-biggest city Mandalay, where the headquarters of the junta’s Central Command is based. Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also managed to seize around 30 junta bases including the junta’s Air Defense Battalion Headquarters in Madaya Township next to Mandalay city. With the PDF attacks threatening Central Command, the regime has tightened security in Mandalay city. The TNLA and PDF groups have also taken control of Kyaukme and continue to attack regime bases outside the town. Kyaukme is located next to Nawnghkio. Since the resumption of Operation 1027 on June 25, the ethnic alliance and allied resistance groups have seized around 90 junta bases including around 10 battalion headquarters and the North Eastern Command, and have taken control of five towns in northern Shan and northern Mandalay. However, towns under the control of the ethnic alliance and PDFs are at risk of being bombarded by the junta as it seeks to avenge its losses. Military-backed pro-junta Telegram channels are eagerly urging the military regime to incinerate all the towns it has lost, by bombing them from the air. Together with several resistance groups, the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing hundreds of junta bases, command centers and 24 military battalion headquarters as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China in its first phase. The operation was halted on Jan. 10 after the ethnic alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime, but fighting resumed last month after the ceasefire collapsed..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar Junta Puts Leaders of Old Regime Under Surveillance
Description: "Myanmar’s military regime has placed former senior military leaders—including ex-dictator Than Shwe and former President Thein Sein—under surveillance, sources close to the matter said. They confirmed that current junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has directed his security forces in Naypyitaw to monitor not only the retired senior leaders of the previous regime and the quasi-civilian government that followed it, but also members of their households. Others under watch include the previous regime’s No. 2, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe Mann, who was chief of the general staff of the Myanmar armed forces under the Than Shwe regime, which ruled Myanmar from 1992 until early 2011. The Irrawaddy has learned they have been under watch since a few days after Thein Sein’s three-day trip to China in late June, during which he attended commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Chinese government’s foreign relations principles. He met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the event. Following the trip, Channel News Asia reported that “a source told CNA that Wang had asked Thein Sein to persuade Min Aung Hlaing to hand over power and form an interim government to pave the way for elections.” Thein Sein briefed Min Aung Hlaing after his China visit, local media reported. Within 10 days of Thein Sein’s visit, China hosted General Soe Win, deputy chief of the State Administration Council (SAC—the junta’s formal name) and commander-in-chief of the army. Since then, speculation has been rife and rumors have swirled about the purpose and larger significance of the visits. Among the rumors are that Min Aung Hlaing will be removed and that a counter-coup is looming. The sources said the former president’s trip may have raised suspicions among some leaders of the current regime, especially Min Aung Hlaing. “Since then he no longer trusts anyone. He’s afraid of being removed,” a source said. The new security arrangements came just days before the SAC announced that Min Aung Hlaing had assumed the position of Myanmar’s acting president. Critics said the move was unconstitutional, and it has raised anger and strong reactions among the public as well as in the pro-military camp. In 2002, Than Shwe placed former Myanmar dictator and ex-general Ne Win under house arrest, along with his grandsons and his favorite daughter and son-in-law, on charges of attempting to stage a coup and split the armed forces..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar regional military HQ captured, rebels say, in blow to junta
Description: "July 25 (Reuters) - A rebel army in Myanmar said on Thursday it had seized control of a major regional military headquarters near the border with China, in what could be the biggest recent defeat for a ruling junta that is battling to contain a widening revolt. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) said it had taken the strategic city of Lashio in northern Shan State, about 120 km (75 miles) from the Chinese border, after 23 days of fighting with government troops. "Our army has won a decisive victory and is now clearing out the remaining enemy troops. The city is now declared completely liberated," it said in a statement shared by its mouthpiece on social media, urging the public to remain calm and comply with its administration of the city. Reuters could not independently verify the group's claim and a spokesperson for Myanmar's junta did not respond to calls seeking comment. The MNDAA is among several ethnic minority rebel groups fighting to repel the military from what they consider their territories, in a loose alliance with an armed resistance movement that has waged a nationwide campaign to undermine the junta's rule. The conflict has morphed into a civil war that represents one of the biggest challenges to Myanmar's well-equipped military in its combined five decades of rule. More than 2.6 million people are displaced, according to the United Nations. The military, which seized back power in 2021 after a decade of tentative democracy, has been stretched by fighting on multiple fronts across the country of 53 million people, hampering its ability to govern and manage a crippled economy. The junta has described its opponents as "terrorists" seeking to destabilise the country. The MNDAA launched its latest offensive after the recent collapse of a ceasefire brokered by China, which has been concerned about fighting at its border and its impact on trade. China's foreign ministry on Thursday urged all sides to cease hostilities, enter into dialogue and ensure Chinese businesses and nationals were unharmed. "We will continue to encourage peace and push for talks," spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular briefing. Online news outlet Myanmar Now quoted the commander of another armed group fighting alongside the MNDAA as confirming the capture of the regional command headquarters at Lashio. According to an analysis earlier this year by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, the junta has no effective control of Myanmar, having lost authority over townships covering 86% of the country and two-thirds of the population..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2024-07-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: TNLA, PDF Seize Myanmar’s Ruby Hub Mogoke From Junta
Description: "The ethnic Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and People’s Defense Force groups under the command of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) on Wednesday took complete control of ruby hub Mogoke in northern Mandalay Region after around 30 days of attacks on Myanmar regime targets. Mogoke, 189 km north of Myanmar’s second-biggest city Mandalay, has become the third town seized by PDFs and ethnic rebel armies during Phase 2 of their successful anti-regime offensive Operation 1027. “We completely seized the last remaining strategic military base and another junta base at Phaung Taw Oo pagoda. Now, we have taken complete control of the whole town,” TNLA spokeswoman Lway Yay Oo told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday. Viral videos and photos show Mogoke’s residents warmly welcoming TNLA and PDF troops entering the town after defeating the last junta bases on Wednesday. After the fall of the town, junta-backed pro-military Telegram channels eagerly urged the military regime to incinerate the whole of Mogoke with aerial bombardments. On Saturday, TNLA ally Mandalay People’s Defense Force and local resistance groups took complete control of neighboring Singu Township in Mandalay after around 20 days of attacks. Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also seized around 30 other junta bases including the Air Defense Battalion Headquarters in Madaya Township next to Mandalay city. Along with several resistance groups including Mandalay PDF, the TNLA, a member of the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies, resumed Operation 1027 on June 25 by attacking regime targets in several townships in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region. As part of the operation, TNLA and Mandalay PDF took complete control of Nawnghkio town in northern Shan on July 10. Meanwhile, several other resistance groups led by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), another member of the ethnic alliance, have been attempting to seize Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State, since July 3. Intense fighting continued to be reported in Lashio city on Wednesday after some battalion headquarters and frontline bases around the town were seized by the resistance group. During the second phase of the operation since June 25, the ethnic alliance and allied resistance groups have seized around 90 junta bases including around 10 battalion headquarters and have taken complete control of three towns in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region. They also have effective control of Kyaukme and Mongmit towns in northern Shan, though they do not yet claim to have fully captured them as they continue to attack remaining junta positions outside the towns. Alongside several resistance groups, the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing hundreds of junta bases including command centers and 24 battalion headquarters as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China. The operation was halted on Jan. 10 after the ethnic alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime, but resumed last month when the ceasefire collapsed..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ဝမ်းနည်းကြောင်း သဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး(KNU)၏ ဒုတိယဥက္ကဌဟောင်းတစ်ဦး ဖြစ်သည့် နော်စီဖိုးရာစိန်သည် ယနေ့မွန်းလွဲ ၂:၂၁ နာရီတွင် ထိုင်း-မြန်မာနယ်စပ်ရှိ မဲ့စလိယန်းမြို့ နေအိမ်တွင် ကွယ်လွန် သွားကြောင်း သိရှိရသည့်အတွက် မိသားစုနှင့်ထပ်တူ ဝမ်းနည်းပူဆွေးရပါသည်။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး (KNU)၊ ကရင်အမျိုးသမီးအဖွဲ့အစည်း (KWO)တို့တွင် ခေါင်း ဆောင်အဖြစ် တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး အမျိုးသမီးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကွန်ယက် (WON)က ပေးအပ်သည့် အမျိုးသမီးငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးဆုကို ချီးမြှင့်အပ်နှင်းခြင်းခံရသည့် နော်စီဖိုးရာစိန်သည် စိတ်ဓာတ်ခိုင်မာ ပြတ်သားသည့် အမျိုးသမီးခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးဖြစ်ပြီး ယခုကဲ့သို့ကွယ်လွန်သွားရခြင်းသည် ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးတို့အတွက်သာမကမြန်မာတနိုင်ငံလုံးအတွက်အဖိုးတန်သည့် ခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦး ဆုံးရှုံးသွားရသည်ဟု မှတ်ယူပါသည်။ နော်စီဖိုးရာစိန်သည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် တိုင်းပြည်အာဏာကို မတရား သိမ်းယူခဲ့သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲရေး သဘောတူစာချုပ်(NCA) ပျက်ပြယ်ကြောင်း အစောဆုံးထုတ်ဖော်ပြောကြားခဲ့သည့် အမျိုးသမီးခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးဖြစ်သလို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအား အဖက်ဖက်မှ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ဖော် ပြောကြားခဲ့သူလည်း ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ကြီးမားသည့် ဆုံးရှုံးမှုတစ်ရပ်လည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်အတွက် နော်စီဖိုးရာစိန်၏ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို လေးစားအသိအမှတ်ပြုပါကြောင်း မှတ်တမ်းတင်ရင်း ဤဝမ်းနည်း ကြောင်း သဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-07-24
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (July 15 to 21, 2024) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 15 to 21, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Shan State, Kachin State, and Mon State from July 15th to 21st. The Military Junta Navy attacked heavy artillery on the villages along the Ayeyarwady River in Singu Township, Mandalay Region. Political prisoners from Insein Prison, Yangon Region, were relocated to Thayawaddy Prison and Kyaikzagaw Prison, Bago Region. Over 40 civilians died, and nearly 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Over 30 civilians were arrested, and over 10 were killed by the arrest of the Military Junta within a week..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication: 2024-07-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 278.49 KB 289.86 KB 65.55 KB
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Title: Market Analysis Unit: Market Price Report - Rakhine State (June 2024)
Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in Central and Northern Rakhine State and Chin State. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. Data and product specifications are available online through the MPR dashboard at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit..... KEY FINDINGS..... Cooking oil prices rose 7% in June, but prices for other essentials like rice and pulses were fairly stable Some vegetables prices rose 40-60% amid reports that road closures significantly increased shipping costs; Meat/fish prices rose another 5-9% in June, continuing upward at a pace similar to May; Toothpaste and detergent prices rose 12-17%, but other hygiene NFIs were stable after May's sharp hikes; NFI prices rose 6-15% in June, and NFI price hikes were particularly steep in Kyauktaw and Ponnagyun; Hygiene NFI prices remained 100-300% above 2023, while other NFIs were often double last year's levels; Hygiene and shelter NFI prices will likely keep rising, putting some items out of reach of most households; Prices may cool in some markets in July, such as Pon-nagyun and Myebon, where prices spiked in June..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit
Date of publication: 2024-07-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 787.96 KB
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Title: Market Analysis Unit: Market Price Report - Southeast Myanmar (June 2024)
Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Essential food prices were fairly stable, with rice pric-es up 4-6% and pulses and cooking oil mostly stable; Meat/fish prices were stable or rising in June, and they climbed faster than other food categories like vege-tables or essential foods; NFI price trends varied by market, with more stable prices in Pekon and Demoso and more rising prices in Taungoo; Soap and detergent prices jump 20-25%, but prices for other hygiene NFIs were relatively stable; Essential food prices remained 30-50% above 2023, while vegetable prices were 60-100% higher, and NFIs prices were 30-90% higher; Vegetable prices have risen slower than last year, suggesting large increases may yet be ahead as the mon-soon season progresses..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication: 2024-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 738.82 KB
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Title: Market Analysis Unit: Rapid Market Assessment - Rakhine State (July 23, 2024)
Description: "This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in Rakhine State. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during June 21-23, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit..... KEY FINDINGS..... Most markets operated in mornings only, al-though southerly markets were open longer; Market activity increased in Mrauk-U District as market activity grew with returning IDPs; Conflict altered market dynamics as market dam-age pushed customers from Ponnagyun to Pauktaw; Shipping costs climbed, driven by poor monsoon conditions and trade disruptions with Toungoup; Food and NFI supply was stable, but supply of food and NFIs was very poor in Rathedaung; Retailers reported more challenges, both season-al and conflict-driven, mostly in Mrauk-U District..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication: 2024-07-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 12.53 MB
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Title: Hip Hop Artist Recalls Her Husband’s Execution in Myanmar: ‘We didn’t say goodbye’
Description: "The second anniversary of the execution of hip-hop artist, social justice advocate and lawmaker Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw is on Tuesday (July 23). His death, along with three others, by hanging at Insein Prison marked the end of a more than 40-year moratorium on executions in Myanmar. The junta cited violations of terrorism laws to justify killing them. It was merciless and swift. Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw was arrested on Nov. 18, 2021, sentenced to death by a military court two months later (on Jan. 21 , 2022) and executed on July 23 along with 88 Generation student leader Ko Jimmy and two other democracy advocates: Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thu Zaw. Within Myanmar, people knew the executions for what they were, retribution and a warning. The junta also desecrated the men by not returning their bodies or ashes to their families. Before the execution, Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw’s wife, hip hop artist Ma Thazin Nyunt Aung, pleaded with the international community not to stand by and let the regime kill her husband. She was on the run. After the junta detained Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, they started hunting for her. Her husband’s execution hardened her resolve to fight the regime. Ma Thazin Nyunt Aung now hosts online entertainment programs like “Send Your Letter” and “By-The-Way” with Myanmar actor Aung Myint Myat. The income raised supports resistance fighters. Last year, she gave the rights to her song “Longing for Days of Yangon” to a campaign targeting the regime. In an interview with The Irrawaddy ahead of the second anniversary of her husband’s execution, Ma Thazin Nyunt Aung recalls the time they were together, what his absence means, and the interplay between politics and art during a revolution. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. If there was a last word that Zeya Thaw said before he was arrested, what would it be? Thazin Nyunt Aung: Every year I tell myself, and sometimes my friends, here comes July. The anniversary of injustice. When we were together before he was detained, we mostly gazed at each other. Actually, there were last words, but they were about work related to the [political crisis]. That was all. We didn’t say goodbye … We didn’t say anything personal. Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw is especially popular with young people. His interest in politics, not just art, led him to become an advocate for social justice. What do you want young people to remember about him? TZNA: I believe that everyone will have words to remember him by. He said in an interview, “We are behind you and if we have to stay in front, we are also ready.” I always see people who loved him post this phrase when they share memories of him on social media. They always use that phrase. Another phrase would be, “The big brother who is always with us” or “Our big brother.” Which one is more memorable for you? I think of the happier memories we had together. Over time, I developed an attitude that he should be remembered for good things and not bad ones. Rather than being sad about this bad incident [execution], I think of the time we were happy, comfortable … successful moments … and think of our attitude towards each other, the words we said to each other and our decisions. I will always remember these. I have a lot of memories of him. It’s hard to choose one. The comrades who lived with him or met with him also have memories of him. They always talk to me about them every time I see them. “The brother said this and that at the meeting. At that time, he was angry and scorned us. Big brother has encouraged us.” They share [memories like] those whenever we meet. You have been deeply involved in the anti-regime movement since the 2021 coup. You are determined. What drives you politics as well as your commitment to art? I always think about what kind of content I’ll be doing when I compose songs. I rarely focus on love songs or too much longing for love. My songs reflect my life. I was born in Yangon and raised in the same city. In my songs, there are many lyrics that represent the city of Yangon and urban life. I also highlight discrimination [against] women in society. In this revolution, I always say to this day that “it is too shameful that I am still alive” because, over the past three years, we have lost many lives. People sacrifice a lot and they are not afraid to enter battlefields. Many peaceful protesters have been shot dead. Young people were dragged on the street after being shot. We lost them. I always feel that we are nothing compared to them. At this moment, my sadness is there … I want to say that my loss is [of] one person, and it is incomparable to the losses of [many] others every day. The terrorist army kills innocent families, rapes daughters in front of family members, arrests young people or severely beats parents when they cannot find their children. Recently, a family of six was killed by artillery strikes. Every day we hear and see about people being hit by bombs. The more I see, the stronger I become … Sometimes we may feel depressed, sometimes we may be active and energized … We must work harder and we must continue. What message do you have for your followers? The artist’s job is to create. How can we encourage art without empathy? In taking sides, there are right and wrong sides. Will you be on the right side? Will you be on the wrong side? Will you stand with those who oppress, set fires, kill or bomb innocent civilians? We have to think about what kind of art and artists we support. Regarding the boycot [of artists who side with the junta], I have consistently urged people to clearly know who they are supporting, because art is powerful and very important in persuading people..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Power Behind the Robe
Description: "In Myanmar’s Buddhist society, while monks are highly revered as moral authority figures, they have also long been a political force—in British colonial times, during previous military regimes, and continuing with monks’ anti-regime activism today. To give you a better understanding of the Myanmar Buddhist clergy’s history of defying authoritarian regimes, The Irrawaddy presents our October 2007 cover story, reposted here as part of our new section, “Stories That Shaped Us”. In the section, we will reintroduce you to significant and important stories we have published on Myanmar politics, culture, history, ethnic issues, international relations and more to provide context and help you grasp the nuances and complexities of the issues Myanmar is facing today. Enjoy the read—we will be back with more! The Lord Buddha shunned worldly affairs, but in his teachings he stressed the need for good governance and good rulers in the practice of politics. The Buddha said: “When the ruler of a country is just and good, the ministers become just and good; when the ministers are just and good, the higher officials become just and good; when the higher officials are just and good, the rank and file become just and good; when the rank and file become just and good, the people become just and good.” If these admonitions are followed by the large community of monks—the Sangha—in predominantly Buddhist Burma, the lingering “love lost” relationship between the country’s military rulers and its monks should be no surprise. Over the last two decades, Burma’s Sangha community, officially estimated to number around 400,000, has had an uneasy relationship with the ruling generals, who have imprisoned several prominent, politically active monks or pongyis. It is estimated that since the present military regime came to power in 1988, about 300 monks have been defrocked and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Monks, considered “sons of Buddha,” are the biggest institution in Burma after the armed forces, which number more than 400,000 soldiers and police. In their close contacts with the common people and during their morning alms rounds of local households, the monks witness firsthand the suffering and poverty of ordinary Burmese citizens. They have a very clear picture of the deteriorating situation in Burma. More importantly, they probably have a better network, connections and influence than politically active students, who are constantly watched, imprisoned or forced into exile. Who could imagine that these monks, living quietly in monasteries and studying Dhamma, would ever plan to rebel against the repressive regime? Yet history has shown that monks have long played a pivotal role in politics and that they would indeed dare such a bold and dangerous undertaking. The role of political pongyis is controversial and potentially threatening to the ruling elite, although there has been a continuing debate on whether monks really should involve themselves in politics. The Early Rebellion Monks were involved in early outbreaks of resistance against British colonization, joining lay people in taking up arms against the British after seeing King Thibaw sent into exile. Monks have their resistance martyrs—U Ottama, for instance, who led 3,000 rebels in the Salin area a year after the invasion of Mandalay. The rebel monk, also known as Bo Ottama, was captured and hanged by the British in 1889. Interestingly, historians noted that monks who took up arms voluntarily defrocked themselves first, following the precept forbidding monks to take lives. Another martyr, Saya San, who was an ex-monk, led a peasant uprising in Tharrawaddy opposing the tax system imposed by the British. Burma’s colonial masters sent 10,000 troops to quell the rebellion, capturing Saya San and sending him, too, to the gallows. One of the top Burmese lawyers who defended Saya San at his trial was Dr Ba Maw, who later became head of state in Burma’s Japanese-backed government. Not all monks advocated armed struggle. Two who preached nonviolent resistance, U Wisara and another monk named U Ottama, spent many years in prison for their opposition to colonialism and their names have joined the list of independence heroes. U Ottama, a globe-trotting, well-respected monk from Arakan State, was a powerful speaker whose calls for independence were featured in the national newspaper Thuriya. He once famously told the British Governor Sir Reginald Craddock to go home to Britain, in a speech that landed him in prison. Like U Ottama, U Wisara was imprisoned several times for his public speeches and died in jail in 1929 after 166 days of a hunger strike. His prison sentences included terms of hard labor, and he was also defrocked. Both monks became an inspiration to activists and students involved in the independence movement. Scholar Michael Mendelson wrote in his “Sangha and State in Burma,” that all politically active monks tended to be labeled by the colonial authorities as “political agitators in the yellow robes.” Interestingly, a similar term is used by Burma’s current leaders to describe protesting monks. Historians wrote that the British authorities were surprised to learn the influential role of the Sangha community, and soon after the invasion of 1885 they abolished the position of “Supreme Patriarch,” or Thathana-baing. In former times, Burmese kings appointed Thathana-baing to govern the Sangha community and made them responsible for doctrinal instruction and discipline of all monks. But the position wasn’t accepted by the entire Sangha. The progressive Shwegin sect was one group that rejected it. Sectarianism created controversy and bitter rivalry among monks. During the Kon-Baung period in the 18th century, conflicts arose within the Sangha over how the monastic robes were supposed to be worn, and two conflicting sects arose—the so-called Ton Gaing and Yon Gaing. The Burmese scholar Tin Maung Maung Than records that the Toun-goo and early Kon-Baung dynasties were drawn into the rivalry by their royal patronage of one party or the other. In 1782, King Bodawphaya intervened in the controversy by siding with Ton Gaing. One experienced colonial political officer, Col Edward Sladen, conversant with the power of the Sangha, advised British authorities to maintain the Thathana-baingsystem in order to head off conflicts in governing the predominately Buddhist country. The role of Thathana-baing was undoubtedly a complicated one, involving a direct link between the monarchy and the Sangha. The Thathana-baing wielded influence and could even intervene in state affairs. One respected abbot even persuaded King Mindon to abandon corvée labor for his irrigation projects. It’s ironic that the current regime argues that forced labor is a feature of Burmese tradition and a means of making merit. After independence, however, the influence of Buddhism and the Sangha went into decline, except for a period under the late prime minister U Nu, a devout Buddhist. U Nu himself was ordained as a monk several times and rarely exploited Buddhism for his own political ends. Under his government, the Sixth Great Buddhist World Council was held in 1954, and he also created the Buddha Sasana Council. Tin Maung Maung Than noted in his book, “Sangha Reforms and Renewal of Sasana in Myanmar: Historical trends and Contemporary Practice”: “Because of various Gaing and sectarianism U Nu failed to take effective reforms in spite of institutionalization of Buddhism within the state superstructure and notwithstanding the holding of the Sixth Buddhist Synod in 1954.” U Nu also attempted to legalize Buddhism as the state religion in 1961. The attempt was considered to be a misguided policy, and it anyway failed to materialize as U Nu was ousted by Gen Ne Win one year later. Ne Win regarded monks as a potential opposition and he developed a different strategy to control them. In the mid-1960s, his regime called a Sangha conference to issue monks with identification cards. Young monks and abbots stayed away from the gathering. It wasn’t until 1980 that Ne Win succeeded in containing the monks by establishing a “State Sangha Nayaka Committee,” after a carefully orchestrated campaign to discredit the Sangha. Part of the campaign was to discredit a famous monk, Thein Phyu Sayadaw, who was accused of romantic involvement with a woman. He was defrocked. Before the campaign, intelligence officers and informants of the government infiltrated the temples as monks and gathered information about monks and abbots. Some well-known abbots, including Mahasi Sayadaw, an internationally respected monk who was invited by U Nu in 1947 to teach Vipassana meditation, were also targeted in the campaign. Anthropologist Gustaaf Houtmann wrote in his paper “Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics” that the regime had “distributed leaflets accusing Mahasi of talking with the nat spirits, and it was claimed that the Tipitaka Mingun Sayadaw, Burma’s top Buddhist scholar, had been involved in some unsavory incident two years after entering the monkhood.” Both monks were victims of their refusal to cooperate with the regime. A number of scholars and historians noted, however, that some abbots accused and charged by the government were indeed involved in scandals and had romantic relationship with women or nuns. The regime’s campaign sometimes took bizarre forms. Rumors were circulated, for instance, suggesting that one Rangoon monk, U Laba, was a cannibal. Several famous abbots were implicated in scandals and were either defrocked or fled to neighboring Thailand. Ne Win successfully launched a “Sangha reform”—also known as “Cleaning Up the Sangha.” The government managed to get some recognition from elderly Buddhists by forming the Sangha Committee. But Ne Win did not pretend to be a devout Buddhist. He rarely participated in Sangha meetings and held few religious ceremonies during the 26 years of his rule. Unlike current leaders, he was rarely seen with monks. During the 1988 uprising, however, his government asked the Sangha Committee to help restore order, and senior monks appeared in live television broadcasts appealing to the public for calm. In August, 1988, days after the massacre in Rangoon, monks expressed sorrow for the loss of life, but—to the surprise of many—they also appealed to the regime to govern in accordance with the 10 duties prescribed for rulers of the people. The appeal failed to calm the public mood, but the message did remind many Burmese of the “10 duties of rulers”—the monks were telling Ne Win to be a good ruler. On August 30, the Working People’s Daily reported: “1,500 members of the Sangha marched in procession through the Rangoon streets and gathered in front of the Rangoon General Hospital emergency ward, where they recited “Metta Sutta” in memory of rahans (monks), workers and students who fell in the struggle for democracy.” Many young monks were among the demonstrators. For many Burmese, the struggle for democracy is not yet over and the discord between the Sangha and the ruling generals remains strong. Unlike Ne Win and U Nu, the generals who came to power in 1988 openly and audaciously schemed to buy off the Sangha community. They have also claimed to be protectors of the Sangha, although their motive is to gain political legitimacy. Aside from holding numerous merit-making ceremonies, offering hsoon and valuable gifts to monks, the military leaders are launching well-publicized pagoda restoration projects throughout Burma. Nevertheless, confrontations between rebellious monks and the authorities continue. In Mandalay in 1990, troops fired on the crowds, killing several people, including monks. Angered by the military’s brutality, Mandalay monks began a patta ni kozana kan, refusing to accept alms from members of the armed forces and their families. The same action has now been taken by monks in several provinces after authorities beat protesting monks in Pakokka, central Burma. “Patta ni kozana kan” can be called in response to any one of eight offences, including vilifying or making insidious comparisons between monks, inciting dissension among monks or defaming Buddha, the Dhamma or the Sangha. A “patta ni kozana kan” campaign can be called off if the offended monks receive what they accept as a proper apology from the individuals or authorities involved. This procedure involves a ceremony held by at least four monks inside the Buddhist ordination hall, at which the boycott would be canceled. Some monks in Burma may believe that the “patta ni kozana kan” of 1990 is still in effect, since they haven’t yet received any proper apology—only a harsh crackdown. At that time, monks refused to attend religious ceremonies held by military officials and family members. In one incident, the Mandalay Division commander at the time, Maj-Gen Tun Kyi, who later became trade minister, invited senior monks and abbots to attend a religious ceremony but no one showed up. Military leaders realized the seriousness of the boycott and decided to launch a crackdown. In Mandalay alone, more than 130 monasteries were raided and monks were defrocked and imprisoned. As many as 300 monks nationwide were defrocked and arrested. Former political prisoners recalled that monks who shared prison quarters with them continued to practice their faith despite being forced to wear prison uniforms and being officially stripped of their membership of the Sangha. Several monks, including the highly respected Thu Mingala, a Buddhist literature laureate, and at least eight other respected senior abbots, were arrested. Thu Mingala was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Apart from being stripped of their robes, imprisoned monks in Mandalay were forced to wear white prison uniforms and were taunted with nicknames instead of being addressed with their true titles, according to former political prisoners. One year later, in 1991, the then head of the military junta, Snr-Gen Saw Maung, suffered a nervous breakdown and retired for health reasons. Buddhist Burmese still say this was punishment for his maltreatment of the monks. The 1990 crackdown divided the Sangha community. The late Mingun Sayadaw, who was secretary of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, was ridiculed by young monks for not supporting the boycott campaign. He was at one time called “senior general Mingun Sayadaw,” and when he visited one temple in Mandalay young monks reportedly saluted him. Today, while rebellious monks are prepared to go to prison, many senior monks and abbots are allowing themselves to become government tools by accepting gifts and large donations from the generals. By cuddling up to the ruling generals, these elderly abbots can no longer speak for the Sangha community at large, let alone comment on the suffering of the Burmese people. The divisions between abbots and young monks have inevitably widened. The generals, on the other hand, won’t give up easily. In one spectacular bid to win the hearts and minds of the people, they borrowed a Buddha tooth relic from China and toured the country with it and also held a World Buddhist Summit. In 1999, military leaders renovated Shwedagon Pagoda, after the Htidaw, the sacred umbrella, had been removed amid reports of minor local earthquakes. Local people said the spirits of Shwedagon had been upset with the removal of the Htidaw. Restoration of the pagoda complex did nothing to help the generals’ image, though. The generals have also applied “divide and rule” strategies in dealing with the Sangha community and the opposition. In 1996, the regime accused the National League for Democracy of infiltrating the Sangha with the aim of committing subversive acts against the authorities. The generals obviously did not want to see opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi developing too close a relationship with the monks. In an attempt to neutralize the political role of Suu Kyi, the government sent a famous, London-based monk, Dr Rewatta Dhamma, to visit the detained opposition leader in 1995. Claiming to be a peace-broker between Suu Kyi and the generals, the monk shuttled between her and top leaders. But his mission failed and he returned to London. Skeptics believe the generals had merely used U Rewatta in a bid to persuade Suu Kyi to relinquish politics. Ironically, the regime leaders publicly accused Suu Kyi of being a communist and of sacrilege because she had said in a campaign speech that “any human being can become a Buddha in this life.” Soon after her release from her first term of house arrest in 1995, Suu Kyi immediately traveled to Karen State, followed by infuriated intelligence officers. She went there to make an offering to “Thamanya Sayadaw.” Traditionally, temples have provided hiding places for activists, and in 1988 monks offered shelter to fugitives from the intelligence authorities. At one time, the regime even placed restrictions on opposition members, preventing them from ordaining as monks. Like universities and schools, politically active monasteries are under heavy surveillance. The widely respected abbot Bhaddanta Vinaya, known as Thamanya Sayadaw because he lived on Thamanya Hill, was involved in projects to help villagers in the area, work that was shunned by the generals. He was revered not only for the mystical powers he was said to possess, but also because of his refusal to kowtow to the regime leaders. He once famously refused to accept the gift of a luxury vehicle from the then powerful intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt. Khin Nyunt could not buy Thamanya. It may indeed be wrong to assume that Burma’s regime leaders are devout Buddhists. The generals and their families seem to place more trust in astrology and numerology than in Buddhist ritual. They treasure white elephants and lucky charms and are constantly seeking advice from astrologers. Birds of a feather, such as the generals and their chief astrologers, not only flock together but fall together, too. Ne Win’s family astrologer, Aung Pwint Khaung, was arrested in 2002 when the former dictator and his family were charged with high treason. Khin Nyunt’s chief astrologer, Bodaw Than Hla, was imprisoned after the former Prime Minister and Military Intelligence chief was toppled in 2004. Many Burmese may find it hard to believe that their military leaders are actually preserving Buddhism. Even when they are building pagodas and erecting Buddha images, the projects are based on astrological predictions and readings. Who, for instance, advised Ne Win to ride a wooden horse on his aircraft and to ask the pilot to circle his birthplace nine times? Who advised him to issue banknotes in denominations of 45 and 90 kyat? Who advised Khin Nyunt to dress up in women’s clothing, complete with the signature flower that Suu Kyi wears, in order to steal power from “the Lady”? Who told Than Shwe to move his capital to central Burma? It certainly wasn’t a belief in Buddhist tenets. Nor does Buddhism permit the military to beat, defrock, imprison and kill monks. The decline of Buddhism and the rise of militarism in Burma are a source of concern for the people of Burma. Thus, it is no surprise to hear social critics and political pongyismaintain that the generals who kneel down before images of Buddha are the real threat to Buddhism and Dhamma..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-22
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Title: Landmark Order on Arms Exports: High Court of South Africa Sets Aside Permits for Arms Exports to Myanmar
Description: "Today, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), represented by Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), was granted an order by the Gauteng Division of the High Court (Pretoria) setting aside permits that were granted by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to facilitate arms transfers to Myanmar. The order by the High Court further declares that the NCACC has an obligation to suspend any contract or export permit of arms to a country that (i) has experienced an unconstitutional change of government and/or (ii) is reasonably suspected, by a special rapporteur, independent expert, or other person working in terms of a United Nations mandate, of having committed any crime against humanity, war crime, or genocide. SALC and LHR, as well as Justice For Myanmar, an activist organisation that works on arms trades to Myanmar, welcome the High Court's order as it will have immediate consequences not only for any future arms exports from South Africa to Myanmar, but to many other countries too. SALC’s International Justice Cluster Lead, Dr Atilla Kisla, highlighted that: “Arms exports to a country that violates human rights and that underwent a military coup are illegal. This order is crucial in creating a more responsible and accountable arms trade regime in South Africa. It shows that human rights and international law are limiting factors for arms exports. The example of Myanmar illustrates that words of condemnation or concern are not sufficient. Fighting for human rights requires action in the form of applying the law and suspending and/or cancelling permits if needed.” Charné Tracey, attorney at LHR, stated that: “This case is not just about legal obligations but about moral responsibility and the NCACC's inaction in the face of clear evidence was not just a legal oversight but a moral failure. Today's order has the potential to ensure that South Africa’s policies reflect our values and principles.” Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung stated: “We welcome the High Court’s ruling in this matter as it protects the people of Myanmar by clarifying that such arms transfers are not in compliance with domestic and international law. Such permits should never have been approved in the first place. We hope to see South African arms transfer authorities give full effect to the Court’s decision.” South Africa has committed itself to a foreign policy guided by human rights and international law. The order by the High Court clarifies that obligations under international law apply to all arms exports. Arms exports to states like Myanmar in times of human rights violations, alleged breaches of the Genocide Convention and a military coup are in breach of domestic and international law. This order directs the NCACC to review, suspend and/or cancel all its permits for exports to states that fall under the categories set out in the order. Ultimately, the order is implementing a foreign policy based on human rights and respect for international law. ‍ Background Information In 2016 and 2017, Myanmar authorities took measures against its own population that led to serious human rights violations in the country, a refugee crisis of the Rohingya minority, and allegations of genocide against the Rohingya minority. UN special procedures like the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar and the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar have reiterated in their respective reports on the need for investigation and prosecution of military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In this context, on 14 November 2019, the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorised an investigation by the ICC Prosecutor into the situation of Myanmar/Bangladesh for alleged crimes against humanity. In a separate case, on 23 January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued provisional measures against Myanmar and directed Myanmar to act in accordance with the Genocide Convention in relation to the members of the Rohingya group in its territory. On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected government in an unconstitutional coup. From 2017 to 2021, South Africa exported arms to Myanmar with a total value of R215,735,677 (USD 11,866,216). SALC filed its application in the High Court in October 2022..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-07-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-19
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Title: Myanmar at HRC 56: “Myanmar is Being Suffocated by an Illegitimate Military Regime”
Description: "UN experts demanded more attention from the international community and called for immediate and decisive actions. The 56th session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC 56) took place in Geneva, Switzerland from 18 June to 12 July 2024, which had two Interactive Dialogues (IDs) on Myanmar: the ID with the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights on his report (A/HRC/56/23) on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities (ID HC) on 18 June; and the ID with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on his oral progress report (ID SR) on 4 July 2024. The SR Myanmar has also published two conference room papers prior to the ID: “Courage amid Crisis: Gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar” (HRC/56/CRP.8) and “Banking on the Death Trade: How banks and governments enable the military junta of Myanmar” (HRC/56/CRP.7). A resolution tabled by OIC was adopted on 10 July (A/HRC/RES/56/1) without vote. ID HC Opening the ID, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, presented his report saying that Myanmar was “being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime” and that “the disintegration of human rights continues at breakneck speed.” Highlighting terrifying situation faced by the Rohingya and Rakhine communities, worsening humanitarian situation and displacement, and stories of horrific war tactics and extreme measures taken by the military such as indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, forced conscription and other brutal atrocity crimes, HC stressed “the urgent need for leadership and influence to halt this catastrophe”, for accountability, end of violence as well as the denial of humanitarian aid. Reporting on the efforts of Myanmar civil society and Human Rights Defenders and emerging local governance structures, he stressed on the need for more attention, investment, political will and action from all parties, pointing out the need for “an urgent rethink of how we can respond collectively to this unmitigated crisis”, including the call for ASEAN to go beyond its 5PC and for “all anti-military armed groups to ensure the protection of civilians, defectors and surrendees at all times.” ID SR Opening the ID, the SR stressed to the Council on the need for its attention and action saying that “there are opportunities available to your governments right now that would make an enormous difference in how and when this crisis comes to an end.” By presenting his oral progress report as well as two conference room papers, the SR further reported on continued military airstrikes on civilian targets; sexual and gender-based violence against women, girls and LGBT people committed by the military and other groups; extremely dire situation in Rakhine, especially faced by both Rohingya and Rakhine communities; military procurement by the junta through transactions facilitated by foreign backs; among others. Pointing out that “actions taken by the international community to isolate the junta and degrade its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar are working”, the SR called for more and immediate action from the international community. In closing, he stressed to the Council that “the tide is turning in Myanmar, the junta is on its heels, and the opportunity to take decisive action is now.” CCPR Centre at the HRC 56 The Centre submitted a written statement to the HRC 56 and presented oral statements during the ID HC and ID SR. The Centre also co-sponsored a side event on 4th July organised by Permanent Missions of Liechtenstein, Albania, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Slovenia, Switzerland, as well as Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), International Commission of Jurists and Human Rights Watch. At this event, focused on ways to combact impunity, both the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and the Deputy Head of the IIMM joined as speakers. Prior to the HRC 56, the Centre also published a briefing paper on the situation of civil and political rights in Myanmar (January – April 2024) in English, French and Spanish, as well as its findings paper of the HRC 55 discussion on Myanmar. The Centre’s database on what countries are saying about Myanmar at HRC was also updated reflecting on the analysis of discussion up to HRC 55. Following HRC 56, the Centre also updated the list of silent countries on Myanmar at HRC..."
Source/publisher: Centre for Civil and Political Rights
Date of publication: 2024-07-18
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-18
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Title: Weekly Update of National Unity Government ( 29 / 2024 )
Description: "National Unity Government Pledges Increased Cooperation with Ethnic Resistance Forces.....NUG Prime Minister Urges Preparedness for Humanitarian Aid and Military Council Overthrow.....NUG Prime Minister Calls for Transparent Management of Natural Resources.....Ministry of Education Vows Swift Action in Student Murder Case.....NUG Ministry of Defense Announces Operations Involving Multiple Battalions.....Hostage Situation in Sagaing Region: NUG Ministry of Defense Report.....Ministry Provides 205 Million Kyats in Aid Amid War-Driven Floods.....Drone Attack in Sagaing Region Kills Six and Injures Fifteen.....NUG Ministry of Human Rights Welcomes UN Special Rapporteur’s Report.....Burmese Workers Protest in Bangkok, Demand Action from UN and Thai Government..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-18
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၂၉ / ၂၀၂၄ )
Description: "Weekly Update of National Unity Government ( 29 / 2024 )..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-18
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Title: Myanmar - Cholera outbreak (DG ECHO, WHO, Myanmar Ministry of Health) (ECHO Daily Flash of 17 July 2024)
Description: "The military-controlled Ministry of Health has confirmed the presence of cholera in Yangon in an official statement. As of 17 July, there are 77 confirmed cases of hospitalisation. According to other reports, cholera cases have also been identified in Rakhine, Chin and East Bago regions, with local media reporting over 240 hospitalisations. The World Health Organization (WHO) is providing training to local health workers, while the in-country water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) humanitarian cluster has a response plan that includes a rapid response team, capacity building, water supply and provision of non-food items (NFIs). Rapid assessment is partially hindered by ongoing conflict and access restrictions across the country. DG ECHO is assessing the situation and possible response together with humanitarian partners..."
Source/publisher: European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Date of publication: 2024-07-17
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-17
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Title: Argentinian Arrest Warrants for Crimes against the Rohingya: The Power of Small States
Description: "On 28 June 2024, the Argentine Prosecutor Guillermo F. Marijuán asked a Federal Court to issue arrest warrants for 25 members of the Myanmar government and military, including the Head of State Min Aung Hlaing, and the Former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Considering that he had gathered sufficient evidence to support charges for crimes against humanity and genocide committed against the Rohingya between 2012 and 2018, the Prosecutor sought the international capture of these 25 suspects, and the registration of red notices with Interpol. This is the first glimmer of something resembling justice for the close to 1 million Rohingya victims who fled persecution, and brutal clearance operations in Myanmar to seek refuge in the sprawling refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. The authors of this article have been working with and representing members of the camp-based Rohingya since 2019. We obtained standing to be recognised as plaintiffs in the proceedings on behalf of Victim Advocates International (‘VAI’), advocating for the collective interests of Rohingya victim associations, and were represented before the court by Dr. Roberto Durrieu. Testimony and stories from these camp-based Rohingya, are at the heart of the Prosecutor’s request. The 2017 footage and images of the Rohingya, fleeing for their lives across treacherous terrain and waterways, are seared into our collective memory. We watched in real-time as the gradual segregation, marginalisation and then outright persecution of this group forced them to abandon their home in Rakhine state, and flee across the border into Bangladesh. The calls for justice and accountability were loud and repeated. An ICC investigation opened to much fanfare in 2019 for the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution committed on the territory of Bangladesh, an ICC State Party. The ICC investigation, now having run for six years, has produced no defendants in the dock in The Hague, and no publicly available arrest warrants. This is despite the parallel investigation of an Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (‘IIMM’), a team of experienced lawyers and investigators based in Geneva, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2018 with a mandate to collect, preserve and analyse evidence of serious crimes committed in Myanmar since 2011. In an increasingly polarised international landscape, situations of mass atrocities are still largely met by paralysis and inaction. The situation of the Rohingya has followed this trend. Despite a plethora of blog posts, articles, panel discussions on the question of justice for the Rohingya, not one person has been arrested, tried or held accountable. The most recent ICC Registry report to the Pre-Trial Chamber recounts the growing disillusionment among members of the Rohingya community, noting that their “enthusiasm for the ICC’s investigation appears to be at an all-time low” with their focus having shifted “almost entirely to their day-to-day survival in Bangladesh”. There are notable exceptions on this slow path to justice. The Gambia, the smallest country in continental Africa, has stepped up for its Rohingya brothers and sisters, a community with which it has no discernible link apart from a shared humanity. On 11 November 2019, The Gambia, on behalf of the 57 members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, initiated proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging that Myanmar failed to fulfil its obligations to prevent and punish acts of genocide committed against the Rohingya in Rakhine State as required under the Genocide Convention. A provisional measures order followed on 23 January 2020, directing Myanmar to “take all measures within its power” to prevent the commission of acts defined in the Genocide Convention. Perhaps even more significant than this order, was the symbolism of the then-State Chancellor Aung San Suu Kyi, sitting in a courtroom in The Hague, while submissions on the provisional measures were heard by the 15 Judges of the international court. The significance of this image to our clients, was immense. Other states, The Maldives, Canada, the U.K., Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have sought to intervene in these proceedings, following The Gambia’s lead. Regardless of the merits of the case, and whether a violation of the Genocide Convention will ultimately be established, solidarity from The Gambia, and its unilateral moral leadership, has given hope. The same hope is now being expressed in relation to this week’s request from the Argentine Prosecutor. When informed of the news of the Prosecutor Marijuán’s request, our clients in the camps who had shared their stories with the Prosecutor reacted with relief, saying “I am feeling better now with this news” and that “it is a moment of great joy for all Rohingya, especially for the victims and survivors of genocide”, saying that they “deeply appreciate” the Prosecutor’s request, and that they are looking forward to seeing the practical outcome. Again, there is no obvious link between the crimes committed against the Rohingya and interests of the Argentinian population. This fact, among other considerations, led to the initial dismissal of the application for an investigation. The first instance decision was revoked on 26 November 2021 by the Federal Court of Appeals, who ordered the resumption and deepening of the investigation. The Prosecutor, citing the ultimate goal of avoiding impunity for the authors of serious crimes, made a decision to invest the finite resources of his office towards building a case against those who planned, directed and carried out the slaughter and abuse of the Rohingya community, refusing to accept the continued grip on power of their abusers. In seeking arrest warrants, the Prosecutor recalled a universal acceptance that the most serious crimes affecting the international community as a whole should not go unpunished; a request which is arguably just as significant to the growing body of universal jurisdiction cases as it is to the Rohingya. The Prosecutor’s request is essential reading for anyone with an interest in advancing the cause of justice for the Rohingya. Drawing on the testimony and statements of direct victims, the Prosecutor explores not only the emblematic clearance operations of 2017, but the years of pervasive discrimination and persecution that set the scene for the violence which was to follow. Relying on analytical reports provided by the IIMM on the failures to prevent and punish sexual violence, and the horrors of detention centres in Rakhine State, the Prosecutor also gives significant amplification to the role of hate speech, particularly that spread on Facebook, and its role in the violence. Examples of Facebook posts paint a particularly sinister picture of deliberate campaign of othering of the Rohingya in the months and weeks leading up to August 2017. Also significant is the Prosecutor’s reliance on the documentation gathered by the Rohingya civil society group ARSPH, the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights. This reliance will stand as a lasting tribute to our client and the ARSPH’s founder, Mohib Ullah, who was assassinated in October 2021 for the very work which now forms part of the evidential matrix underlying the Prosecutor’s request. Having engaged in an analysis of the hierarchical structure of Myanmar’s security forces, within the framework of command responsibility, the Prosecutor then assembles his list of 25 individuals for which arrest warrants are sought. Most, if not all the names will be recognisable to those who work with the Rohingya community. They overlap in part with the list of those for who sanctions have already been imposed by the US and UK. The Argentine Prosecutor and his staff expended time, resources, and humanity because of their compulsion to act in the services of the Rohingya, a group with whom they share no common language, culture or history. This is an extraordinary act, particularly at a time where our faith as proponents of international criminal justice is being so violently tested. Lawyers in Argentina, like in The Gambia, have shown unilateral moral leadership where multilateral efforts have failed, motivated by the simple premise that international crimes affect the international community, and cannot go unpunished. While there are many steps between a request for an arrest warrant, and a Head of State appearing in an Argentinian courtroom, a swathe of red notices against the upper tranche of the Myanmar government and military will have an impact. It will impact not only the ability of these individuals to live, travel and hold wealth with impunity, but also the willingness of other states to consider Myanmar as a trusted, or tolerated, partner. Any decision on the Prosecutor’s request will include judicial findings of fact, which can then inform the ICJ proceedings and the ICC investigation. This is a first step, but not a small one. It is, more importantly, a good news story for the Rohingya. Thanks, almost entirely, to the power of small states..."
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Source/publisher: Opinio Juris
Date of publication: 2024-07-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-16
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Title: Myanmar Junta Bolsters Security in Mandalay as Clashes Intensify
Description: "The military regime has bolstered security at entrances to Mandalay amid fierce fighting near Myanmar’s second-largest city. More junta soldiers, police and affiliated Pyu Saw Htee militias have been posted at city entrances since July 8. Around 50 personnel are deployed in Chanmyathazi Township and around 30 in Thalae Kone village on the Mandalay-Pyin Oo Lwin road in Patheingyi Township, according to residents. The imposition of tight checks follows clashes in Patheingyi Township north of Mandalay city, and the seizure of Nawnghkio town in Shan State by resistance forces after the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) resumed its anti-regime offensive on June 25. The Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armed organizations including the TNLA launched Operation 1027 in October last year. The ethnic alliance seized several hundred junta frontline bases and military command centers, plus 24 battalion headquarters, around 20 towns, and vital trade routes with China, before a truce was brokered by Beijing in mid-January. “The Mandalay-Pyin Oo Lwin road passes through the middle of our village. Since they [junta soldiers] arrived, they have been checking villagers who use the road to cross the village. Young people are forced to do sit-ups as a punishment when they fail to give satisfactory explanations for why they want to go to the other side of the village,” one resident said. Locals report that junta soldiers are stopping travelers day and night on the Mandalay-Pyin Oo Lwin road. The regime has also reinforced Mandalay with militias and former military personnel as clashes in Madaya and Mogoke townships threaten its Central Command in the city. After fighting spread to villages on the border of Madaya and Patheingyu townships, the regime has turned Madaya town into a fortress while also deploying large troop numbers in Patheingyi to deter advances on Mandalay. A junta administrator in Mandalay insisted that a security alert had not yet been issued in the city. The regime has imposed tight checks on vehicles at three entrances east and north of Mandalay since June 26. It has also deployed large numbers of guards on ring roads and is conducting frequent patrols in the town. The Irrawaddy reached out to Mandalay Region’s junta spokesman, Thein Htay, for comment but got no reply. Mandalay residents have been withdrawing cash from banks and buying up food, according to locals. Junta personnel are checking homes for unregistered overnight guests and making arrests, they added..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-16
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Title: Myanmar Junta Shatters Truce as Battle for Northern Shan Capital Intensifies
Description: "Intense clashes are ongoing in northern Shan State despite a four-day unilateral ceasefire declared by the ethnic Brotherhood Alliance on Sunday, according to the ethnic alliance and residents. The Brotherhood’s Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) called a halt to the fighting while the Communist Party of China holds a meeting. However, clashes continued in the northern Shan State of Lashio on Monday, with reports of civilian casualties caused by shelling. On Sunday night, five civilians were killed and two others including a Buddhist monk were injured when blasts ripped through a monastery and surrounding residential ward in Lashio, according to residents. Another civilian was shot dead nearby at a military checkpoint. Clashes continued to break out at Light Infantry Battalion 507 headquarters in Lashio. “My whole family fled the town earlier and I was left to look after my house. Fighting continued to break out and civilians were killed by shelling last night. So, I left the town this morning,” a Lashio resident told The Irrawaddy on Monday. “I think the aim of the unilateral ceasefire is to allow remaining residents to leave the town. The situation in the town may worsen after the ceasefire.” On Monday, the junta airlifted more troops, weapons and ammunition into Lashio while parachuting weapons and ammunition to frontline soldiers around the city, according to local Shan media reports. A video posted online shows crates being parachuted over Lashio. The TNLA said clashes broke out when regime troops attacked its forces at three locations in Kyaukme Township despite the ceasefire. It said junta forces also used drones and artillery to bombard areas around two villages in Nawnghkio on Monday. A junta hilltop artillery base also shelled a residential ward and villages in Mogoke Township, northern Mandalay Region on Monday night, killing a mother and her child and injuring four civilians, according to the TNLA and local media reports. The junta has responded to the renewed resistance offensive in northern Shan by bombing the capital of Kokang Self-Administered Zone, Laukkai, which is under MNDAA control. The airstrikes have killed one civilian, injured several others and damaged civilian buildings including hotels, according to MNDAA media wing The Kokang News. The Brotherhood Alliance of the MNDAA, TNLA and Arakan Army (AA), launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State on October 17 last year, seizing hundreds of junta frontline bases, commander centers and 24 battalion headquarters, as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China. The operation was halted on January 10 after the ethnic alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime. The TNLA and MNDAA resumed the operation in northern Shan on June 25 after junta forces violated the ceasefire by repeatedly bombarding TNLA territory in early June. Along with local resistance groups including the Mandalay People’s Defense Force under the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), the TNLA is attacking the regime in northern Shan and northern Mandalay Region. MNDAA-led forces have been attempting to seize Lashio since July 3. Phase 2 of Operation 1027 has seen the ethnic alliance and allies seize more than 80 junta bases, including almost a dozen battalion headquarters, while taking control of Kyaukme and Nawnghkio towns and a large part of Mogoke, known as ruby town..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-16
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Title: Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region
Sub-title: Two are dead, including a child, following an airstrike as the junta battles for control of Mogoke town.
Description: "Junta forces have tightened security in Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, while shelling civilians elsewhere in the region, after coming under renewed attack from an alliance of insurgent forces battling to end military rule. A shell killed a seven-year-old boy and a woman in her 30s after it exploded in a residential area of Mandalay region’s Mogoke town on Monday evening, residents told Radio Free Asia Tuesday. Another four-year-old girl and a 60-year-old woman, as well as a woman and man both in their 30s, are in critical condition, said one Mogoke resident, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “A child and a grandmother were seriously injured by shrapnel that hit them in the neck,” he said. “It was not easy to send them to the hospital, so they were treated at home by people who have some medical knowledge.” The shells were fired from a junta camp on Strategic Hill in eastern Mogoke, a ruby-mining town about 200 km (120 miles) north of Mandalay city. Over half the town’s population has fled after fighting intensified between junta troops and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, which has taken control of western Mogoke, residents said. RELATED STORIES Myanmar rebel army calls ceasefire after junta airstrike Thousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fighting Myanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta The TNLA is part of an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance launched an offensive last October, codenamed Operation 1027 for the date it began, and pushed back junta forces in several regions. After a five-month ceasefire ended on June 25, the TNLA, and allied forces attacked junta camps in Madaya, Singu and Mogoke townships in Mandalay region, and Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns in Shan state to the east. Stepping up Security The TNLA and its allies have also turned their attention to junta bases near Mandalay region’s capital, causing the military to step up security in Mandalay city, residents said. One city resident, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. told RFA that after Operation 1027 resumed in late June, the junta had increased the number of outposts around Mandalay and its historic palace. “We’re getting a sense that the areas around the palace are more secure. They also installed heavy weapons on top of Mandalay Hill and also on Yankin Hill,” he said. “Security has been increased a lot. If there was a place with four or five soldiers before, there are about 10 soldiers now.” Troops are also stationed on top of high-rise buildings in the city’s Chanmyathazi township, one resident said, also asking for anonymity to protect his identity. “The junta troops are stationed on the top floors of Ma Ma-29 and No. 49 buildings,” he said, adding that soldiers also occupied buildings in the Myayenanda, and Aungpinlel neighborhoods, as well as Mandalay’s industrial zone. “The troops asked residents to leave in order for soldiers to be stationed there.” Army personnel are also stationed in Inwa (Inn Wa) town, 32 km (20 miles) south of Mandalay city, which is close to a junta air force base, he added. On Monday, the junta closed the Mandalay-Madaya Road after fighting with allied rebel forces near Madaya township’s Kyauk Ta Dar village, which is just 27 km (17 miles) away from Mandalay city. According to the Mandalay People’s Defense Force, the group had captured 25 junta camps in Madaya township and 11 in Singu township as of July 7. RFA called Mandalay region’s junta spokesperson Thein Htay for more information on increased security and the attack on Mogoke, but he did not answer phone calls..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-16
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Title: Myanmar pearl company TASAKI and investors risk complicity in Myanmar military junta’s international crimes
Description: "TASAKI must responsibly end all business with the sanctioned entity Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. ‍Mekong Watch and Justice For Myanmar have sent letters dated June 11, 2024 to TASAKI and its potential investors FountainVest Partners and Unison Capital, raising concerns over TASAKI’s continuing partnership with Myanmar Pearl Enterprise (MPE), a US, UK, and Canadian sanctioned state-owned enterprise illegally controlled by the Myanmar military junta. The Myanmar military continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity, relying on revenue from MPE and other junta-controlled entities. The two organizations urged TASAKI to responsibly end all business with MPE. The letter inquired whether TASAKI, a luxury jeweler founded in Japan, has performed human rights due diligence since the military’s coup attempt, the results of that due diligence and what measures TASAKI has taken in response. The two organizations further urged TASAKI to publicly disclose its transactions with MPE and other junta-controlled entities since February 1, 2021. MYANMAR TASAKI Co., Ltd, a subsidiary of TASAKI & Co., Ltd, has been in a business partnership with MPE since 1997 through a production sharing contract under a license granted by the now junta-controlled Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. MYANMAR TASAKI was the largest producer of pearls at almost eleven billion MMK (over US$8 million at the time) worth of pearls in 2017-2018, the year with the most recently published data available. According to the TASAKI’s website, it has stores in Australia, China, France, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, UK and USA among others. The military junta benefits from revenues generated through the pearl industry, including through a production sharing agreement under which MPE reportedly receives 20-25% of the pearls harvested, as well as through customs duties, other taxes and the transfer of technology that can support further production. According to Bloomberg, FountainVest Partners and Unison Capital are jointly intending to purchase TASAKI & Co., Ltd. Since February 1, 2021 when the Myanmar military attempted a coup, it has been committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity including deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, indiscriminate airstrikes, and the destruction of civilian property, displacing more than 3 million people across the country. Despite grave concerns that the military is committing these crimes relying on revenue from MPE and other junta-controlled entities, TASAKI did not disclose any information by the requested deadline on July 5, 2024. Yuka Kiguchi, Director of Mekong Watch, said, “Under the OECD Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles, TASAKI has a responsibility to respect human rights and are therefore required to exercise human rights due diligence to identify and prevent, mitigate and account for adverse human rights impacts. As a global company founded in Japan, TASAKI is failing to take up their responsibility to respect human rights and disclose important information that affects the lives of the people of Myanmar. TASAKI should end their partnership with MPE or risk complicity in the military’s international crimes.” Yadanar Maung, Justice for Myanmar’s spokesperson, said, “By continuing its partnership with the MPE, TASAKI is providing the Myanmar military with a source of revenue that it uses to procure the weapons and jet fuel it needs to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. Potential investors should use their leverage to ensure TASAKI responsibly divest from Myanmar, or they risk contributing to the military’s international crimes. We call on TASAKI to stop selling blood pearls and finally end its business with the junta, which is a terrorist organization.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar, Mekong watch
Date of publication: 2024-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Why Min Aung Hlaing Could Be the Unifying Figure for Myanmar Peace Efforts
Description: "Over three years since the February 2021 coup, the enormous momentum gained by the popular armed resistance is reinforcing the narrative that Myanmar’s military, once recognized as one of Southeast Asia’s strongest armies, can be defeated. The international community, spanning Myanmar’s neighbors to Western powers, now realizes that the fall of the military is no longer impossible, though far from inevitable. Many observers and analysts remain skeptical that the resistance, with its scattered operations, can deal a final blow to the mighty military, citing the lack of historical precedent. But Myanmar analysts have moved on from their initial assessment – that an uncoordinated resistance armed with makeshift weaponry would be short-lived and only worsen the toll on civilian lives. The emerging consensus is that Myanmar is fragmenting as civil war tears the country apart. The current discourse consists of a wide variety of views and perspectives, ranging from Myanmar’s political history to economic realities; the current crisis to centuries-old Burmese societal values; and military tactics on both sides to the politics of resistance forces (ethnic armies and People’s Defense Forces) and the Myanmar military. However, little attention has been paid to the personal aspirations and struggles of the man at the top, the commander-in-chief and coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing. The man most responsible for current crisis Studies of Myanmar’s precarious civil-military relations, and military vs democratic doctrines, are worth analyzing to better understand the current crisis. Based on Myanmar’s political nature, no one would argue that one person is more important than the institution he or she represents. Min Aung Hlaing was therefore rowing against the tide when he staged a coup widely understood as a solo decision driven by his personal aspirations and paranoia. Thus, Min Aung Hlaing and his motivations cannot be ignored in whatever scenarios we envision for the country’s future. For this reason, the question that needs to be raised is not whether foreign governments will have to deal with future statelets in Myanmar, or whether Myanmar people would accept such fragmentation, or even if a negotiated settlement can be reached between ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs), the junta, and the civilian National Unity Government plus the ousted National League for Democracy. The pressing question is what actions Min Aung Hlaing would take if any of these scenarios were to materialize. How would the junta chief react to these scenarios, and what would be the best choices for him? And most importantly, how would Myanmar’s people, political leaders, EROs and the wider international community hold him accountable for his heinous crimes to pave the way to a better future for Myanmar? Coup was the only exit for Min Aung Hlaing From the coup leader’s perspective, it would have been difficult to imagine that any alternative except a coup could guarantee his position, legacy, wealth, family, and even his life. As dark clouds loomed over Naypyitaw in late 2020, the future looked bleak for the military chief. The people’s leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had won another landslide election victory and was not swayed by Min Aung Hlaing’s relentless petitions to betray her campaign promise and make him president of the country. The military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was considering radical reforms after humiliating defeats in the 2015 and 2020 elections – reforms which would effectively limit free access for military top brass. Also, the International Court of Justice was likely to convict Min Aung Hlaing for genocide in Rakhine in 2017. The coup-leader could not trust that his stone-faced generals, loyal to their old chief Than Shwe, would defend him against the ICJ charges, fearing instead that they might push for his downfall. Yet while all these facts were apparent, most Myanmar observers failed to see the choices facing Min Aung Hlaing and therefore underestimated the possibility of a coup. The consensus prior to the putsch was that Min Aung Hlaing was doomed, the military had been defeated again, and democracy had prevailed. The possibility of a coup was widely dismissed as too politically and economically costly. However, just as a drowning man will clutch at a straw, Min Aung Hlaing found the devasting consequences of a coup preferable to being charged at the international court, betrayed by his generals, and living in shame minus a legacy or wealth. The protracted armed conflict that followed was evidently the least of his concerns. Masking personal interests with military narratives Despite being unpopular both within and outside the military, Min Aung Hlaing is a seasoned general who understands his institution well. Amid the bitter realization of his own shortcomings, his strategic choice was to flex his power through his institutional mandate, which he earned through obedience to his seniors rather than any military acumen. Than Shwe, the old chief, appeared to believe that his young and obedient generals, particularly Min Aung Hlaing, would play along with his plans to retire in 2016 and allow a new elected government to take over, with deputy commander-in-chief Soe Win following suit at the 2020 election. These arrangements would have cemented the military’s role in politics, backed by a constitutionally secured 25% seats in Parliament plus control of military-affiliated ministries and economic holdings. But in that case, why did the other top generals not consider Min Aung Hlaing’s coup as personally motivated? Likely because the generals also prioritized their personal interests over their old boss’s plan. The top generals’ betrayal of institutional interests may appear naïve, but this was a game of personal survival – it was now or never for them. Consequently, with their limited worldviews and lack of imagination for better alternatives, Min Aung Hlaing and the top generals resorted to their last option: reopening the old playbook of military dictatorship and using violence and terror to enforce submission to their rule. Although Min Aung Hlaing and his generals have tried to disguise their personal interests behind a mask of military narratives, institutional fears, and objectives, the institution itself seems to be fighting back. Continuing military defeats and resistance gains appear to have sparked shock and awe among soldiers and military supporters. Many have blamed long-term corruption and weak leadership. Few however seem to realize that Min Aung Hlaing and his generals’ pursuit of personal interests at the cost of their institution is the main reason for the failures of junta ground troops. Weak link in longstanding military dictatorships Min Aung Hlaing’s unpopularity has spilled over into China, the target of multibillion-dollar online border scams protected by the junta. As Beijing’s frustration with the scams peaked, China cracked down with little concern about embarrassing Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. Worried for his own survival, the junta boss promptly purged his generals to please his powerful neighbor. The move apparently exacerbated mistrust for the coup-maker among his generals. While it may be too early to say that the interest-based alliance among the generals is disintegrating, arrests of old regime loyalists and frequent purges of the junta cabinet betray widening cracks that are further undermining the military institution. At this point, loyal members of the military face a dark future looming over their institution. Neither of the two scenarios – a resistance victory or Min Aung Hlaing and his self-serving generals maintaining power – offer hope. The end of Min Aung Hlaing Since he sparked the crisis, it is reasonable to assume that Min Aung Hlaing will be instrumental in ending it. More than three years after his coup, with tens of thousands of civilians killed or arrested, the junta boss remains mired in a rising tide of bloody crimes. Any scenario – a negotiated settlement brokered by the international community, or a decisive resistance victory to establish federal democracy – would be intolerable for Min Aung Hlaing. And anyone considering a possible power-sharing arrangement with the military, as seen from 2010-2021, must address the role of Min Aung Hlaing. Given the long list of atrocities and other crimes he has ordered and the numerous enemies that surround him, he would not be afforded the kind of impunity that his predecessor Than Shwe enjoyed. The people would be reluctant to accept any pardon, even if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political elites offered one. A formal pardon and return to ordinary life would be accompanied by widespread fury and threats against his and his family’s life. And for a military general who dragged the country into chaos just to save himself, the threats would be real, not a case of paranoia. To settle the disputes, it may be practical for all stakeholders to place the blame on Min Aung Hlaing as the sole enemy of Myanmar’s people. Burmese history has a precedent for this: When several independence leaders including Aung San were assassinated in 1947 amid intense political rivalries and ideological debate, U Saw was singled out for blame and duly executed; the country moved on. In the ongoing crisis, as well as betraying the military’s institutional interests, Min Aung Hlaing has created more enemies than all his predecessors combined managed in their lifetimes. He failed to secure any ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations, as his predecessors had done. He has alienated traditional military loyalists such as USDP supporters and religious fanatics. He has overseen plunging morale among soldiers, thereby losing battles on the ground. He also stands on the verge of being charged with genocide and facilitating the online scam industry. He has wrecked the economy, shrinking the share of the pie for military cronies both old and new. It is difficult to imagine any reasonable person defending him when his time comes. The fall of Min Aung Hlaing is only a matter of time. However, all stakeholders, including the Myanmar military itself, must ensure that his ousting does not go to waste. All well-meaning peace efforts – for the delivery of humanitarian aid, release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political prisoners, cessation of violence, five-point consensus, and engagements with statelets as an entry point to ending the conflict – have proved to be less effective than focusing on the one man solely responsible. Many would argue that a country like Myanmar needs a strong military. However, do the country and the military need Min Aung Hlaing? Even in a negotiated settlement, would Min Aung Hlaing put his institution’s interests above his own survival? Could condemning this one man, who has caused insufferable pain to millions of Myanmar people and brought the worst crisis in the country’s history, be a good starting point to unite all stakeholders and people to end the current conflict in Myanmar?..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-16
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Title: The Chinese Way of ‘Peacemaking’ and ‘Democracy-Building’ in Myanmar
Description: "China invited two high-profile figures from Myanmar to visit recently, with former President Thein Sein flying to Beijing on June 27 and General Soe Win, deputy chief of the current junta, following him a week later, visiting Qingdao. Since Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Thein Sein, speculation has been rife and rumors have swirled about the purpose and larger significance of the visits. The week of Thein Sein’s visit saw a renewal of fighting between ethnic armies and junta forces in northern Shan State after a Chinese-brokered truce collapsed, while in Rakhine State, where China has built a deep seaport and a terminal for its oil-and-gas pipeline project, the Arakan Army continues to gain territory and push the Myanmar military back. The official reason for Thein Sein’s visit was to attend an event in Beijing commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Declaration of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence—a set of principles laid out by China in the early days of communist rule governing the country’s foreign relations. It was his first foreign trip since the military seized power over three years ago, plunging the country into turmoil. Even before Thein Sein arrived back to Naypyitaw the rumors were flying thick and fast, and they have yet to stop. One has it that China seeks to nudge the junta into forming a transitional government including some ministers from the 2011-16 quasi-civilian government led by Thein Sein. According to another, China asked Thein Sein to persuade coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to step down. Here is my take. First, China believes Min Aung Hlaing is incompetent and incapable of holding the country together, and has lost patience with him. But Min Aung Hlaing will not leave his post voluntarily and cannot be persuaded to do so. Second, China is working on Thein Sein, possibly sounding out his opinions and the possibility of his re-entering politics at some point in the future. But is this realistic? Thein Sein is infirm and frail. He would need political backing to fix things in Myanmar. Could he persuade Min Aung Hlaing to step down? No. Some have floated a scenario in which Thein Sein would guide a transition to civilian rule after an election in 2025—assuming one can be held. One question that arises from this approach is whether—assuming Aung San Suu Kyi is released—Thein Sein would be able to work with her as a “political guiding force” to restore calm to the nation. Or is that sheer fantasy? Third, analysts say that China doesn’t want to see the junta extend its emergency rule yet another time. And China is not alone in this. Myanmar’s other neighbors also want to see an end to this process of repeated extensions of junta rule. One thing that must be understood is that Min Aung Hlaing will not leave national politics unless he is forced to do so. At the meeting between Wang Yi and Thein Sein, China no doubt repeated its commitment to the two countries’ “paukphaw”, or sibling, ties (seemingly its favorite phrase when discussing ties with Myanmar) and expressed a desire to see stability restored in its southern neighbor. For his part, it seems a safe bet that Myanmar’s former president delivered a plea from the regime that China intervene with the ethnic armies to halt the war in the north—underscoring China’s influence and the outsize role it plays in the Myanmar conflict. Over the last two weeks unverified reports have emerged that China has asked the junta to hold talks with several key players including detained State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and powerful ethnic armed leaders. The regime leader reportedly rejected the proposal, insisting that Suu Kyi is a criminal and thus he can’t talk to her. Regarding the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), Min Aung Hlaing reportedly said that they have been officially invited to join talks under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement guidelines. Upon hearing this reply, not only China but also Myanmar’s neighbors were not pleased. Soe Win’s surprise trip China’s invitation to Gen. Soe Win surprised many. While the hardliner second-in-command’s alleged orders to bomb innocent civilians make him responsible for the deaths of many innocent people since the coup, he has no political ambitions. Min Aung Hlaing (Defense Services Academy Intake 19) and Soe Win (DSA Intake 22) are known to be at loggerheads, but Soe Win does not dare challenge his boss’s leadership. Some analysts have even speculated that China wants to see Min Aung Hlaing removed. Does it follow that it wants to see Soe Win replace him? For the time being, Min Aung Hlaing isn’t going anywhere. Min Aung Hlaing and Soe Win are both war criminals. Whichever of them leads the nation, they are doomed to failure. On his first official visit to China since the 2021 coup, Soe Win did not go to Beijing, rather he traveled to Qingdao to attend the Green Development Forum organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). There, he discussed border stability, security for Chinese investments in Myanmar, elimination of online scam operations, promotion of trade and the proposed election, junta media said. Soe Win met Shen Yueyue, vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and president of the SCO’s Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Commission. Needless to say there was no mention of China’s pending massive arms shipment to the junta during the meeting with Shen. Wa: Wild card in the war in the north Only a few days after Soe Win came back from China, the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) deployed troops to Tangyan town in northern Shan State—a strong indication of the Wa’s goal of expanding its territory. Wa spokesman Nyi Rang said the UWSA negotiated with the regime to allow it to deploy troops in Tangyan after residents called for protection from fighting between the junta and the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies. Negotiated with Myanmar’s regime? This is interesting. Nyi Rang said: “It is a preventive measure to stop the conflict in northern Shan State from spreading to Tangyan. We maintain our neutrality and reject conflict. We want peace and stability in Tangyan and believe our deployment will be constructive in every aspect.” So the regime gave the greenlight to the Wa to enter Tangyan? This move coincided with Soe Win’s visit to China. It is likely that Chinese officials and Soe Win discussed the situation in northern Shan State, including the position of the Wa. Chinese officials have reportedly asked the Myanmar military to elevate the political status of the Wa in order to ease the armed conflict in the north. Indeed, the Wa, backed by China, are kingmakers in the conflict in the north and suspected of backing (as well as providing arms to) the Brotherhood Alliance, which comprises the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The alliance is now seriously threatening Lashio, where the regime’s Northeastern Command is based. Granting a new political status to the Wa could be a way for the regime to ease the ethnic offensive in the north, where its troops continue to suffer losses. Expansion of territory In January 2024, a few days after the ceasefire agreement brokered by China was reached between the three northern ethnic armies and the regime, the junta agreed to the Wa’s demand for administrative control of Hopang and Panlong towns in northern Shan State. The transfer of the two towns to Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army expands the Wa Self-Administered Region east of the Salween River. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and United Wa State Party were established after ethnic Wa soldiers split from the Communist Party of Burma on April 17, 1989 and signed a ceasefire with the then military regime. What the Wa call “northern Wa State” is officially classified in the 2008 military-drafted constitution as the Wa Self-Administered Region, also known as Special Region 2. This region’s capital is Panghsan, also known as Pangkham, and it is made up of Mongmao, Monglin and Mongpauk districts and Pangkham Special Township, an area covering around 1,500 square kilometers. Today the UWSA is the most powerful EAO in Myanmar. It has maintained a ceasefire with successive governments, but refused to sign the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Wa leaders have also said that Wa State will not secede from the Union, but the UWSA will manage its state independently except for national defense and diplomatic relations. With the previous military regime’s approval, the UWSA also expanded its territory to include Monghsat District on the border with Thailand in southern Shan State, and around 80,000 to 100,000 ethnic Wa resettled there. Now the district is referred to as “southern Wa State”, also known to the UWSA as Military Region 171, and some 9,000 UWSA fighters are stationed there. Clearly, the Wa want their territory in southern Shan State to be combined with the northern areas and recognized officially as Wa State. And the winner is …? Last week, Min Aung Hlaing surprised everyone, declaring Chinese New Year a national holiday amid the renewed fighting near the border with China. This is the first time in Myanmar’s history that a foreign festival has been officially recognized as a public holiday. Until now, apart from internationally recognized days like New Year’s Day, only national anniversaries, religious holidays such as Christmas and Eid, and some commemorations associated with the major national ethnicities such as traditional Karen New Year’s Day, have been observed. The junta’s official explanation was that Chinese New Year is a public holiday in Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and in many other countries around the world. In truth, there is no ASEAN-wide tradition of observing Chinese New Year. While Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia do officially mark it, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Laos and Brunei do not, and Vietnam has its own Tet Lunar New Year holiday. At any rate, the primary reason—as spelled out in a regime statement—for the move is that “Myanmar wants to deepen the Pauk-Phaw relations with China,” according to the regime statement. It has been reported that China’s outgoing ambassador, Chen Hai, proposed the official recognition of the day to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing during the embassy’s Lunar New Year celebrations in February. Observers commented that the move reflects a level of dependence on Beijing unprecedented in the 76 years since Myanmar gained independence. The decision is certainly controversial and has caused unease among Myanmar citizens including military personnel. No wonder Myanmar people often now jokingly refer to their country as the “Chinese Republic of the Union of Myanmar”! China’s “provinces” or “protectorates” in northern Myanmar will no doubt be celebrating Chinese New Year. For instance, the MNDAA on Sunday officially announced that it would stop fighting for four days (from July 14 to 12 a.m. on July 18), saying in a statement that “at the time of the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China, all combat troops were required to stop active offensive” operations. Now, with the northern ethnic forces closely connected to China gaining more territory and overtaking military outposts and pushing through to the interior of the country, the regime’s dependence on China will only deepen. China’s geostrategic and economic interest are enormous in Myanmar, including oil-and-gas pipelines, railroads, deep-water seaports on the Bay of Bengal, border trade and access to the Indian Ocean. In Myanmar’s quagmire there are many losers, but it’s obvious who the winner is—and it’s unquestionably not the Myanmar people. Is it too early to wish my countrymen a Happy Chinese New Year?..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-15
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Title: Joint Press Statement on the Humanitarian Situation in Myanmar (15 July 2024)
Description: "Delivered by Ambassador Robert Wood, Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs, on behalf of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of Albania, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union and its Member States, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. We are deeply concerned by the escalation of violence and conflict and credible reports of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law across Myanmar that are deepening the humanitarian crisis. Recent reports indicate the Myanmar regime has taken deliberate steps in Rakhine State to use internally displaced persons (IDP), many of whom are Rohingya, as human shields amid the conflict. We are particularly concerned by reports indicating the regime has placed landmines around IDP camps and appears to have taken steps to use these camps as military bases. There are also credible reports of forced recruitment of persons, including children, belonging to ethnic minorities by the Myanmar Armed Forces in particular and other parties, which risk further fueling inter-communal tensions and aggravating the humanitarian situation. These concerning developments follow a range of reports of other violations and abuses, particularly by the Myanmar Armed Forces, including indiscriminate aerial bombardments of civilians and civilian objects, burning of civilian homes, attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities, and restrictions on humanitarian access. These practices are unacceptable. Since the regime’s violent military coup in February 2021 and attack on the Myanmar population, the number of people in humanitarian need has risen from 1 million to 18.6 million. More than 2.9 million have been newly displaced, including 66,000 people who have sought protection in neighboring countries, adding to the more than 1 million Rohingya refugees who fled before the coup. We highlight the importance of all countries respecting the principle of nonrefoulement. We reiterate our commitment to support safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation when conditions allow. We also reiterate the call for full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to all people in need, including women, children, and members of ethnic and other minority populations. We urge the Myanmar Armed Forces in particular and all parties concerned in Myanmar to de-escalate violence, respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, and to protect civilians. We recall our demands for the full implementation of UNSC resolution 2669 (2022). We reiterate our full support for ASEAN’s central role and for the appointment of Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Julie Bishop. We reiterate calls to engage in constructive and inclusive dialogue to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-15
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Title: Joint Statement by 240 Myanmar and International Organizations call for coordinated sanctions on the Myanma Economic Bank and Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise
Description: "Since it launched a coup attempt on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military junta has killed over 5,000 civilians and over 3 million people have been displaced by conflict and junta human rights violations. Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner, told the Human Rights Council last month that “we are hearing stories of horrific war tactics, such as beheadings. Midnight drone attacks. The burning of homes as people sleep. People being shot at as they flee for their lives.” It comes as the junta increasingly uses air strikes to target civilians. Since the coup attempt began, the junta has used state-owned enterprises, particularly state-owned banks and revenues from the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), to fund its atrocities, purchase weapons and aviation fuel and access international financial markets. The EU sanctioned MOGE on 21 February 2022, cutting the junta off from at least USD 500 million without stopping gas exports to China. The U.S. has, however, only partially sanctioned MOGE and PTT Group, the Thai state-owned fossil fuel conglomerate, continues to pay tens of millions in monthly gas revenues to MOGE accounts controlled by the junta. On 21 June 2023, the U.S. belatedly heeded calls from Myanmar civil society to sanction the state-owned Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB). While these banking sanctions were a welcome step forward, it came with warnings that the junta would switch to Myanma Economic Bank (MEB) and Myanma Agricultural Development Bank (MADB). The EU and U.K. have failed to sanction any of these banks while Canada and Australia have sanctioned only MFTB and MICB. A report published on 26 June 2024, by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar shed further light on how weapons and military supplies continue to make it into Myanmar, including identifying the financial institutions responsible for facilitating military procurement transactions and confirming the continued outsized importance of gas revenues. The Special Rapporteur’s report also shows two things. First, international actions can effectively disrupt the military junta’s supply chains – the report identifies a 33% drop in military procurement from the junta’s FY2022 to FY2023 and shows a major decline in the amount of military supplies sold by Singapore-registered companies and facilitated by Singaporean banks. However, the report also shows how the junta has used gaps in sanctions and moved procurement to countries willing to leave routes open for it to get around these actions. Specifically: As Singapore banks have cut their ties with the junta, Thai banks have stepped in to fill the gap. In particular the “Siam Commercial Bank facilitated just over US$5 million in transactions related to Myanmar military procurement in FY2022, that figure leaped to over US$100 million in FY2023.” MEB has become a key conduit for the junta’s access to international financial services which it uses to buy weapons. Thai companies, using Thai banks, sold USD 80 million of aviation fuel in 2023 that could be used by the junta to increase its attacks on civilians. Gas revenues flowing PTT Group, through Thai banks to MOGE, via MEB, remain the largest single source of revenue for the junta. In response to a previous report from the Special Rapporteur and subsequent pressure from the Singapore government, Singapore banks have largely cut ties with the junta. The UN Special Rapporteur sets out how Thai banks have stepped in to fill the gap. While ASEAN continues to rely on its failed 5-Point plan and its so-called policy of non-inference, Thailand is allowing PTT and Thai banks to fund the junta and ensuring that Thai banks and companies grant the junta access to weapons and aviation fuel. While the international community has gone some way to improve sanctions coordination, huge gaps remain. We call on the international community to follow the recommendations of Special Rapporteur, in particular, to coordinate targeted sanctions on Myanmar’s state-owned banks, gas sector and aviation fuel. The U.S. must immediately sanction MEB and MADB and fully sanction MOGE. The U.N. Security council and individual member states, including the U.K. and EU, should sanction MFTB, MICB, MEB and MADB and follow the EU’s lead on sanctioning MOGE. We call on ASEAN member states to address Thailand’s apparent policy of allowing PTT Group and Thai banks to back the Myanmar military junta. We call on the Thai government to support sanctions that cut off the junta’s access to international financial services and gas revenues and follow Singapore’s lead in ensuring that its banks are not helping the junta procure weapons and aviation fuel. We call on Thai banks to comply with their obligations under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights cease all transactions that support Myanmar’s military junta. We call on PTT group to end its contribution to grave human rights abuses and divert gas revenues away from their junta in line with calls from Myanmar civil society, Myanmar’s National Unity Government and Thailand’s Move Forward Party. We call on investors in PTT Group to follow the lead of the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund and Robeco and divest from PTT Group due to its links to human rights abuses in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: 240 Myanmar and International Organizations via Burma Campaign UK
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-15
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Title: Myanmar rebel army calls ceasefire after junta airstrike
Sub-title: One person died and 10 were injured in the attack on a Shan state town.
Description: "A rebel army in eastern Myanmar announced a four-day ceasefire shortly after a town under its control was hit by junta airstrikes, residents said. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, captured Laukkaing, or Laukkai, town in northern Shan state on Sunday, after which the junta hit back, residents said. A resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told Radio Free Asia that a fighter jet fired at several hotels and residential areas in Laukkaing for 20 minutes, killing a civilian and wounding others. “What we know is that the person who died was a guest staying at the Full Light International Hotel. More than 10 people were injured,” he said. “At the moment, civilians are not allowed to enter the area because it’s being cleared.” MNDAA newspaper, The Kokang, identified the victim as a 37-year-old man named Wang. It said several other hotels were damaged in the attack. Most Laukkaing residents are sheltering in their homes and closing their businesses for fear of more airstrikes, witnesses told RFA. RFA phoned MNDAA spokesperson Li Kya Win and its head of external relations, Gen. Phone Win Naing, for more details on the fighting but they did not answer calls. A reporter also attempted to contact Shan state’s junta spokesperson Khun Thein Maung and national junta spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment, but those calls also went unanswered. However, a junta account on social messaging app Telegram said Laukkaing was bombed because some MNDAA leaders were living in the town. The MNDAA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance that launched Operation 1027 last October to seize territory from the junta. It said it had captured seven towns, including Chinshwehaw, Hseni and Kunlong since Operation 1027 began and was implementing its own administration, regional development, education and health sectors. In January, China brokered a state-wide ceasefire between junta and alliance forces, bringing them together for talks in the Chinese city of Yunnan in May. At the time it said it was concerned fighting would affect border stability and trade between the two countries. Three Brotherhood Alliance members the Ta’ang National Liberation Army broke the ceasefire in late June, blaming junta airstrikes for the resumption of hostilities. Since then, the alliance has captured dozens of bases across Shan state and Mandalay region. The MNDAA said the latest ceasefire will run from Monday through Thursday, although residents said both armies have continued to fire weapons near Laukkaing. In a statement Sunday, it said the ceasefire was called as a result of China’s concerns, although it didn’t specify what those concerns were. Since the resumption of Operation 1027, alliance forces have been trying to seize control of Lashio, the capital of northern Shan state, where fighting has raged for weeks and killed over a dozen civilians. Political analyst Than Soe Naing said the junta attack on Laukkaing was probably in retaliation for that attack. “[The MNDAA] took part in Operation 1027, in the second wave of the Spring Revolution. The next thing that happened was that the junta's most important town, Lashio, was targeted and attacked by four military columns,” he said. “I believe the junta bombarded Laukkaing in response to that.”..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-15
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Title: Myanmar: Epidemic - 07-2024 - Acute Watery Diarrhoea (2024-07-15)
Description: "Notes: AWD cases are reported in two township in Thaketa , Dawbon Township, Yangon. Infection initially start in Insein Township and spread to other Townships. More cases are found in Thaketa Township and now spreading more. In Yangon region, there are 77 hospitalization cases till 17 July 2024. There are also unconfirmed reports of AWD in other states and regions. The general perspective of situation is deteriorating. Sources for data marked as Other https://www.mohs.gov.mm/page/19764 Description The primary affect is the shortage of ORS, preventive items, low health knowledge which directly impact the community. The secondary effects are the overburden of hospitalization, low number of health care personal due to the breakdown of health system and potential loss of life..."
Source/publisher: International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies, Myanmar Red Cross Society via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-15
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Title: Myanmar’s junta implosion, revolution and national balkanisation
Description: "The extraordinary arc of failure of Myanmar’s military has gone from coup and crack-down to the brink of regime crack-up. When seizing power in February 2021, the military expected to consolidate power and crush resistance. Instead, the junta’s violence pushed popular opposition to become revolution and civil war. The military’s hold on Myanmar shrinks as it suffers a ‘succession of humiliating defeats’. The spreading authority of rebel groups mean Myanmar’s government no longer controls most of the country’s international borders. The military dictatorship holds less than 50 percent of the country. As the centre’s grasp on the country weakens, one possibility is that the centre collapses. The implosion prospect is about more than battlefield defeats but goes to the junta’s internal cohesion and vanishing legitimacy. The junta head, Min Aung Hlaing, will be keeping a Caesar-like ‘et tu’ eye on his fellow generals. The daggers may not be plunged into his toga, but defeat makes any strongman disposable. This is not the coup Min promised. The shock and awe effects are on the military. Southeast Asia has shifted from apprehension about what Myanmar’s junta would do to astonishment at its ebbing control. In her new role as the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar, the former Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop must deal with a loathsome regime that is losing. And a weak government can be as dangerous, in different ways, as a government confident in its power. The experience of the envoys that have gone before her shows Bishop has little immediate chance to get the military to reduce violence or to get a serious dialogue, as the veteran diplomat Scot Marciel observes: The Myanmar military, in addition to being xenophobic, misogynistic, dishonest, and brutal, is by nature uncompromising and absolutely committed to maintaining political power. This is true even in the face of significant resistance gains, a worsening economy, and a severe humanitarian crisis. For its part, the broad resistance—and arguably the population at large—is dead-set on removing the military from power and unlikely to accept anything short of that. Bishop shares with countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations an excruciating dilemma of diplomacy: does Myanmar’s regime still have the capacity to act as a normal government, to negotiate in good faith, to change policy if needed and even offer concessions to strong opponents? A failing government battered by military defeats is so focussed on the struggle it has little capacity for much else. The military’s draft of men between the ages of 23 and 31 is the action of a scrambling government—more grim desperation than resolute determination. To maintain lines to the junta, Bishop and ASEAN must be relatively polite. For a blunt call on what the region sees unfolding, turn to ASEAN’s ‘in principle’ 11th member, Timor-Leste. Its president, Jose Ramos-Horta, no stranger to popular resistance and military struggle, judges: ‘This is the first time in the history of Myanmar when the military are not winning and will not win. They are losing.’ Ramos-Horta says a junta facing collapse must crawl to the negotiating table: Efforts have to be intensified to mediate this conflict. Otherwise, it gets out of control. It spirals out of control. And then it will be far more difficult to bring back law and order and a solution. Thus, because the military is very, very weak, on the point of implosion, there is an incentive for them to talk. Someone has to bring all the parties together. No preconditions. Ramos-Horta’s ‘implosion’ call is more description than prediction. The centre has already lost much. Balkanisation is no longer a possibility; it’s what has happened to Myanmar. The Oxford dictionary of politics describes balkanisation as ‘the division of a state into smaller territorial units. The term tends to imply a policy of “divide and rule”, whereby the strength of a united country is diluted by the creation of internal division.’ Myanmar’s balkanisation sees lots of divide and limited rule. Even the junta is talking about the country being ‘split into various parts’. Myanmar’s reality today is revolution and balkanisation. The military cannot win; its task is not to lose. The dark forecast is for more years of war. The Crisis Group’s Richard Horsey sees a fragmented Myanmar becoming a confederation of autonomous ethnic zones: Even in some Burman-majority regions, the idea of de facto self-rule is gaining momentum, and local communities, organizations, and armed resistance groups are starting to put the administrative building blocks in place. All this threatens to leave Myanmar as a collection of statelets, with a rump state at the centre. Deep into the wars they willed, Myanmar’s junta and Russia’s Vladimir Putin vie for the dreadful honour of committing the worst strategic blunder of this decade. Both were revisionist efforts at resurrection: seeking to remake the Soviet empire or recover the military’s traditional control of Burmese life. Putin’s delusional megalomania and the junta’s delusional desperation were back-to-the future gambles that turned to war. Reaching for the old historical role instead turns into historic blunder. The bloody prize of the greatest strategic disaster of the decade is the only achievement in sight for Myanmar’s military. Putin’s war does not yet threaten his hold on Russia. Myanmar’s junta has smashed the country as the regime staggers towards its own ruin..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Date of publication: 2024-07-17
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-15
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Title: Struggle to Survive: Life Under Military Rule in Myanmar’s Biggest City
Description: "Galloping inflation over the past few months has pushed Myanmar people toward God. The link between piety and prices? “Oh My God” is the frequent response when the cost of everything from food and fuel to pharmaceuticals rises every four or five days. A chicken egg that cost 120 kyats before the 2021 coup is now 360 kyats. A duck egg has jumped from 200 kyats to 500 kyats. The same goes for cooking oil, rice, tomatoes, cabbage, white radish, chicken, pork and prawns. There is no food whose price has not shot up. In Yangon, the long lines of people queuing to buy palm oil recall Ne Win’s era, when necessities including rice were rationed. Customers must show their citizenship ID under a regime diktat to prevent people from queuing twice for extra cooking oil. Mobile shops selling subsidized cooking oil at 6,000 kyats per viss (around 1.6 kilos), half the market price, are crowded and sell out quickly. Satirical cartoons on social media depicting people snatching cabbages from markets are not entirely an exaggeration. Cabbage, water spinach and eggs were once common on the dining tables of low-income households. But under Min Aung Hlaing’s rule, even middle-class families sigh heavily at their prices. Shopping may be an enjoyable pastime elsewhere, but not for Myanmar people. The scramble for household provisions is a daily torment for most housewives. Low-quality rice has surged from 2,000 kyats per viss (2.13 kilos) before the putsch to more than 5,000 kyats. Higher-quality grain is something only well-off families can afford now. I was left speechless when junta boss Min Aung Hlaing told an 8 pm news broadcast a few days ago that Myanmar was exporting surplus rice. An aunt of mine complains about the soaring price of sea fish she buys to feed street dogs. Min Aung Hlaing’s coup has increased hardship even for stray animals. Meanwhile, power outages force me to use canister gas to cook my children’s lunch. Cooking gas prices have also gone up recently, but charcoal prices are not cheap either. I am also muttering “Oh My God!” But price hikes are not the only problem. Certain goods are also becoming scarce. I entered a store to buy chicken seasoning powder a couple of days ago but found none on the shelves. The salesgirl who knows me as a regular customer told me in a low voice to wait while she fetched some from the storeroom. When I told my wife about it in surprise, she said chicken seasoning had been unavailable for weeks. At a City Mart supermarket, I discovered that Ovaltine nutrition drink was being rationed at two packets per customer. When I said I needed three packets for my grandparents, the cashier kindly sold me two packets and the third with a separate receipt. I realized that Ovaltine might be out of stock too. After months searching for Gillette Foamy shaving cream at popular shopping centers, I finally tracked down two bottles at a pharmacy. Logic told me to grab both, but the needs of my two young kids come first. Diaper prices are also increasing. The prices of pharmaceuticals have skyrocketed too. Patients risk further damage to their health when they hear the prices of pills they need. “That medicine is out of stock” is a common refrain at pharmacy counters these days. My wife has had to get used to her stomach pain, as Kremil-S antacid is often out of stock. I can’t help cursing Min Aung Hlaing. However, we urban residents are at least more fortunate than compatriots elsewhere, who are forced to abandon their belongings and businesses as they flee junta air raids and artillery barrages. Inflation, shortages of consumer goods, serious power outages, and a crime wave of theft, mugging and pickpocketing have become part and parcel of life in towns. Adding to the general deterioration are the unlicensed buses that are back on Yangon’s streets. The rogue vehicles are notorious for driving dangerously as they scramble for passengers. Women wearing sling bags on their shoulders are no longer safe in Yangon. The mugging epidemic also targets phones, bikes and electric bikes. Public bus drivers frequently warn passengers to “take care of their phones and purses” – a sign that pickpockets are on board. Rogue bus drivers exhort commuters to pray to God as they speed to overtake public buses and taxis. They also provide a source of extra income for traffic police and soldiers, with “bus bribes” now a familiar sight in Yangon. Out on the streets, Yangonites are in constant fear that junta soldiers will stop them and check their phones. You can be arrested for using a virtual private network (VPN) or storing photos deemed politically sensitive or offensive to the regime. Walking in downtown Yangon, the din of diesel generators rattles your ears and the stink from overflowing garbage cans gives you a headache. Fine restaurants like Japanese eatery Gekko that attracted both local and international customers have shut down since the coup. The regime claims foreign arrivals have increased, but tourists are a rare sight in Yangon. The flocks of foreigners that you saw at Shwedagon Pagoda, outside Yangon City Hall, in Chinatown, and on buses to and from the airport are a thing of the past. Both urban and rural areas of Myanmar have been in turmoil since the coup. No guest likes to visit a troubled home. Every morning, my wife tells me, “Why don’t you play Paritta [Buddhist chant believed to ward off misfortune or danger] on your computer?” But I know it will take more than chanting to lift the curse of military rule..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-15
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Title: The ICJ accepts the Declaration of Intervention by the Maldives into The Gambia v. Myanmar case
Description: "The International Court of Justice (ICJ), on 3rd July 2024, unanimously decided that the Declaration of Intervention submitted by the Republic of Maldives in the ICJ case concerning the "Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)" is admissible in so far as it concerns the construction of provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”). This Order was made by the ICJ despite the objection submitted by Myanmar in relation to the admissibility of the Maldives’ Declaration of Intervention. The Gambia instituted proceedings against Myanmar in the ICJ on 11th November 2019, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention through acts committed by Myanmar against the Muslim majority Rohingya population. The Maldives remains steadfast in its efforts to contribute to the international community’s pursuit of justice for the Muslims of Rohingya and to support the enforcement of the Genocide Convention’s provisions..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Maldives
Date of publication: 2024-07-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-14
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Title: The Difference Between Chinese and Western Peace Efforts in Myanmar
Description: "There is a fundamental difference between Western and Chinese peacemaking efforts in Myanmar. Western governments, NGOs, and think-tanks produce lengthy, well-crafted reports, and some even organize workshops and study trips for what they call “stakeholders.” The Chinese, on the other hand, have an extensive intelligence network throughout Myanmar, and they are a major supplier of military hardware to the Myanmar military, while several resistance forces are equipped with Chinese-made guns obtained through the United Wa State Army (UWSA). In that way, China has leverage over the Myanmar military as well as ethnic armed organizations. And the Chinese are not involved in Myanmar’s internal affairs for entirely altruistic reasons. They want to secure their geostrategic interests in the region, the main one being access to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, Myanmar has become a playground for well-paid Western peacemakers and analysts who seem to believe that they are in a position to “engage” the military as well as the opposition, armed or otherwise, with the aim of holding talks so that all the parties involved in the conflicts can meet and sort out their differences “peacefully”. The Indians, Myanmar’s second largest neighbors next to the Chinese, have a far more realistic approach to the issues. Like the Chinese, they are also motivated by geostrategic concerns. They realize what the Chinese, their main regional adversaries, are up to in Myanmar and are countering this by following a similar course of action: friendly relations with Naypyitaw – and informal contacts with the opposition. But India has nowhere near the same level of influence – or muscle – inside Myanmar as China, and its efforts have yielded few positive results. Myanmar’s importance to China as an outlet to the region is not new; it is China’s foreign-policy priorities that have changed since the time of the old chairman, Mao Zedong. In the past, when China wanted to export revolution, Myanmar was the main springboard from which Maoist-style rebellion would spread to Southeast Asia and the region. Today, Beijing wants to export consumer goods and import oil and gas, and, once again, Myanmar serves as its most coveted entranceway to the world beyond China’s southern borders. China first became involved in Myanmar’s internal conflicts when Naw Seng, a Kachin rebel, crossed into Yunnan with 500 of his men in 1950. They were given shelter in Guizhou province, but not allowed to engage in political activities. A few years later, another group of rebels, this time from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), trekked into China, and were allowed to settle in Sichuan, where they received political training. But, like Naw Seng’s Kachins, they were told to refrain from Myanmar-related political activities. At that time, the Chinese had good relations with Myanmar, but they also had a major security concern: thousands of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers had, after their defeat in the Chinese civil war, set up bases in eastern and northeastern Shan State, from where they launched cross-border raids into Yunnan. In a tacit agreement with the then U Nu government, a total of 20,000 soldiers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the border between Sipsongpanna in southern Yunnan and Kengtung state in January 1961. In human waves, they swept down across the hills surrounding Möng Yang, Möng Wa and Möng Yawng. The campaign, codenamed the “Mekong River Operation,” broke the back of the KMT in northeastern Myanmar. Beaten Nationalist Chinese forces retreated towards Möng Pa Liao on the Mekong River, where 5,000 Myanmar soldiers launched an attack. The KMT’s base was captured without much resistance – but when the Myanmar troops marched in, they found large quantities of US-made arms and ammunition. When the news hit the newspapers in Yangon, rowdy demonstrations were held outside the US embassy, then on Merchant Street. Neither the Myanmar government nor the Chinese, however, have ever acknowledged that the PLA formed the core of the force that drove the KMT out of the eastern border areas. Myanmar’s cordial relations with China came to an end when Gen. Ne Win staged a coup to oust the elected U Nu government on March 2, 1962. The Chinese, long wary of the ambitious and unpredictable general, for the first time allowed the CPB exiles to print and publish propaganda material. They were mostly urban intellectuals without military backgrounds, so the Chinese brought them together with Naw Seng’s warriors, and the nucleus of a new CPB army was formed. Teams were sent to the Myanmar border to identify possible infiltration routes, and, inadvertently, Ne Win’s junta provided the Chinese with an opportunity to connect the exiles in China with the remnants of the poorly equipped CPB forces which at that time were holding out in old strongholds like the Pegu Yoma mountains north of Yangon. In July 1963, the junta invited all rebel groups in the country to a “peace parley” in Yangon, and promised them safe passage to and from the meetings regardless of the outcome. Twenty-nine of the exiles in China also flowed in on special planes from Beijing, ostensibly to take part in the talks. Predictably, the talks broke down in November because the junta offered no more than “rehabilitation” if the rebels, communists and ethnic fighters surrendered. But only two of the “Beijing returnees,” as they were called, went back to China; the rest joined the forces in the Pegu Yoma and assumed de facto leadership of the party at home. They had brought with them radio equipment from China, and a direct link was established between the exiles in Sichuan and the Pegu Yoma. Anti-Chinese riots in Yangon in June and July 1967 provided the Chinese with the pretext they needed to launch their push across the border. That happened on January 1, 1968, and the CPB established a new base area in the northeast. In the beginning, most of the forces consisted of Chinese volunteers and it was only when the Wa Hills were occupied in the early 1970s that the CPB gained a truly indigenous fighting force. Many ethnic resistance armies, eager to benefit from the supply of Chinese weapons, forged alliances with the CPB. But whatever guns they received had to be provided by the CPB; nothing came directly from China. The CPB collapsed when ethnic Wa soldiers rose in mutiny in 1989 – and China had adopted a new foreign policy. The UWSA, which emerged from the ashes of the CPB, maintains a close relationship with China’s security services and is better armed and equipped with weapons obtained from China than the CPB ever was. And, again, other ethnic resistance armies have also benefited from the supply of Chinese weaponry but, as before, the guns have come from China’s main ally inside Myanmar, now the UWSA. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw. Significantly, when then President’s Office Minister U Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China … we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.” By “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, among them the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Kokang, another former CPB force. The MNDAA returned to armed struggle in February 2015 after having entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military in 1989, and has now assumed a leading role in ongoing battles in northern Shan State. China, predictably, has denied any involvement in that conflict, but the fact remains that most of the MNDAA’s weaponry – and that of its allies, among them the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – have been supplied by the UWSA. At the same time, the Myanmar Army is using its Chinese-supplied weapons to fight the resistance. The UWSA, however, does not send soldiers to take part in the current battles. China appears to believe that its interests are best served by playing both sides in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. But it is not in China’s interest to see the emergence of a strong, peaceful, democratic and federal Myanmar. As long as Myanmar is weak, China can play official games of being a “friendly neighbor” as well as “peacemaker” and use a carrot-and-stick approach with whatever government is in power: trade coupled with investment on the one hand and indirect support for the ethnic armies on the other. If Myanmar ever became exactly that – strong, peaceful, democratic and federal – China would be the first to lose. The leverage China has today inside Myanmar would be gone. But then China does not want to see the situation get totally out of hand either, because that would mean serious instability in the frontier areas and, most likely, a flood of refugees across the border. Typical examples of China’s unique role in the conflicts occurred in late June and early July, when former President Thein Sein was invited to Beijing. Ironically, Thein Sein’s trip was planned to coincide with the 70th anniversary of “The Declaration of the Five Principles of Co-Existence” which was worked out by China – and India, then friends – in 1954. One of those is non-interference, but no country has interfered more blatantly in Myanmar’s internal affairs than China. Thein Sein met foreign minister Wang Yi and, reportedly, urged China to help bring peace to Myanmar, knowing full well that China is the only outside country that has any clout over the ethnic armies. It was noteworthy that the Chinese invited Thein Sein, a less controversial personality than the hugely unpopular junta-boss, Sn. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Had he been invited, it would most probably have caused an anti-Chinese backlash in Myanmar. But then, on July 6, Min Aung Hlaing’s deputy, Gen. Soe Win, went to China, not to Beijing but to Qingdao in Shandong Province to attend “the Green Development Forum” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and he was met at the airport by a local representative of the Communist Party of China. China had taken a cautious step forward towards establishing full relations with the junta, and then on a less informal party level. Myanmar’s future depends on what China will do next – and if India will assume a more pro-active role. Squeezed between the two giants of Asia, which are also bitter enemies, Myanmar’s troublesome geographic location has now become a bigger problem than it ever was. Seen in that context, Western peacemakers are irrelevant sideshow artists. Finnish, Swiss, Norwegian and Australian organizations and an obscure outfit called the Joint Peace Fund are once again quietly sniffing around Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, hoping to “engage” them and reactivate the idea of talks with the military. But all they can hope to achieve is to persuade various UN agencies to issue statements condemning the atrocities perpetrated by the present junta and call for peace. But the UN is as impotent as the West when it comes to influencing the Myanmar military. Since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, dozens of rapporteurs and special envoys have come and gone, and the military has always ignored their often critical reports. The UN’s current secretary general, António Guterres, pledged at a news conference on February 5, 2021 – only four days after the coup – that “the United Nations will do everything it can to unite the international community and create conditions for the military coup in Myanmar to be reversed.” But the only actions Guterres has taken since then are a series of statements urging the military to refrain from using violence against civilians. And UN agencies continue to cooperate with military authorities in Naypyitaw while whatever humanitarian aid they have provided has been channeled through junta-controlled entities..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-12
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Title: Myanmar Political Parties Invited to China as Beijing Pushes for Election
Description: "The Communist Party of China (CPC) has invited Myanmar’s military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party, People’s Party, Arakan Front Party (AFP) and Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (SEDP) to pay a seven-day visit to China. The invitation by China’s ruling party to the four parties – members of a working group of parties registered under the junta’s election commission – comes after junta chief Min Aung Hlaing again vowed to hold the long-delayed election next year. The coup leader has repeatedly failed to hold the promised election after ousting the elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and annulling the 2020 election results that secured the NLD a second term. The junta has imprisoned senior NLD members and dissolved the party. Myanmar people have condemned the election plan as a ruse to legitimize military rule that has brutalized their lives since the 2021 coup. The poll plan has also been dismissed as a sham by much of the international community, including the United States. However, China – the junta’s major ally and arms supplier – has offered to assist the process. According to the invitation seen by The Irrawaddy, a 17-member delegation from the four parties will visit China from 20 to 27 July. The trip aims to strengthen relations between the CPC and Myanmar’s political parties, the invitation stated. The delegation will consist of seven representatives from the military proxy USDP and three each from the People’s Party (PP), AFP and SEDP. Airfares and expenses will be borne by the Chinese side, the invitation added. The delegation will travel to Yunnan and Qinghai for field studies and talks with Chinese experts on rural development and the Belt & Road Initiative, it said. People’s Party leader U Ko Ko Gyi confirmed that he would be among three PP representatives in the delegation. “Our ties with the CPC have existed since the PP’s founding,” he told The Irrawaddy, adding that he would not comment on the trip until after the visit, as he does not know what will be discussed yet. U Ko Ko Gyi told the pro-junta Eleven Media outlet that his party’s delegation would discuss stability and restoring democracy in Myanmar while explaining to Chinese officials the fear and insecurity people face due to armed conflict. Former general Thein Sein, whose quasi-civilian government ceded power to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s party following landmark elections in 2015, left the country for the first time since the coup to visit China last month. Junta deputy chief Soe Win followed in his footsteps a few days later to explain election preparations to Chinese officials. Igor Blazevic, a human rights campaigner and Myanmar expert, commented that China is pushing for an election to shore up the junta as a viable, if weak, central government. The giant neighbor is exerting pressure and offering incentives to military elites to proceed with votes in territories still under junta control, he added. This raised the likelihood that Myanmar would see a “Chinese election” heavily influenced by Beijing. “This is nothing but very serious meddling in the internal matters of a neighboring state,” Blazevic said. The four parties’ participation in Chinese preparations for the junta’s election amounted to high treachery, he added. The junta last year dissolved 40 political parties including the NLD, whose leaders including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remain in regime prisons. Myanmar boasted more than 90 political parties at the 2020 election. So far, the junta’s election body has approved registration applications of 49 parties..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-12
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Title: ICC Member States: Coordinate to Protect Witnesses with Evidence of Atrocities, Refer Myanmar to Chief Prosecutor
Description: "Secretly recorded videos expose Myanmar junta’s torture of detainees (BANGKOK, July 11, 2024)—Member States of the International Criminal Court (ICC) should ensure appropriate protection for witnesses from Myanmar who have evidence that would contribute to accountability for ongoing potential war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, said Fortify Rights today. Fortify Rights obtained ten secretly recorded videos showing Myanmar military junta soldiers severely torturing detainees at an interrogation facility in Mandalay Region, and the defector-whistleblower who filmed the incidents is in need of protection. The videos expose numerous incidents of severe torture of detainees by Myanmar junta personnel, including fatal beatings as well as electrocutions. In one video, junta personnel use a long implement to severely beat a man who is naked on the floor with his hands bound behind his back. In another video, soldiers allegedly beat two detainees to death. “These torture videos are the type of evidence needed for justice and accountability, but the key witness who filmed them requires protection to ensure the usefulness of this valuable evidence,” said Chit Seng, Human Rights Associate at Fortify Rights. “Collecting and preserving evidence of atrocities in Myanmar is more crucial now than ever, but without urgent witness protection, significant amounts of evidence will be lost. These videos add to the mounting evidence of the junta’s flagrant violations of international law and should compel the international community to hold the Myanmar junta accountable, including by referring the situation to the ICC.” To preserve the integrity of the video evidence and future prosecutions and for the security of the witness, Fortify Rights is not at liberty to release the videos at the moment but is preserving them as future evidence in potential war crimes cases. The witness in question has communicated with the Independent International Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which was created to collect and preserve evidence of international crimes in Myanmar. The IIMM works with U.N. member states to provide protection support for witnesses, including potential deserters, stating in their 2023 annual report, “The Mechanism is in contact with many defectors from the security services, some of whom appear to have valuable ‘insider’ evidence that could advance investigations of crimes within the Mechanism’s mandate.” In March 2023, Fortify Rights received ten videos from a 35-year-old former private in the Myanmar Air Force who secretly recorded fellow Myanmar military soldiers torturing detainees in an interrogation center in Mandalay Region in October and November 2021. The private defected from the military and fled the country, bringing the videos with him. Fortify Rights interviewed the defector, who served as a security officer at the interrogation facility, and a civilian whom the military detained at the facility and later released. Fortify Rights remains in direct communication with the military whistleblower as well as the former detainee. The videos, the exact location of the interrogation facility, and the names of five military soldiers—including Army, Air Force, and military intelligence, known as Sa Ya Pa in Burmese language, personnel holding the ranks of major, captain, corporal, and warrant officer—who ordered, committed, and oversaw the torture are on file with Fortify Rights. These men should be investigated and prosecuted for their role in the junta’s widespread and systematic use of torture as an attack against the civilian population or crimes against humanity under international law, said Fortify Rights, which is ready to share the evidence with relevant prosecutorial authorities. Fortify Rights analyzed the ten videos that range from 20 seconds to four-and-a-half minutes in length and show six different incidents of torture and abuse, including severe and fatal beatings of detainees with heavy whips and other implements, non-fatal electrocutions of detainees, kicking of detainees, threats of sexual violence, and forcing detainees to perform humiliating acts. Altogether, the videos depict the interrogation and torture of approximately 48 detainees, including two women. All the videos were recorded in an outdoor courtyard within the military facility’s compound; in half the videos, the torture took place during the night between approximately 11 p.m. and 2 a.m. Speaking about the videos he recorded, the 35-year-old military defector told Fortify Rights: I took ten videos. … [A]ccording to the law, during the interrogation, only intelligence officers are allowed to [interrogate] the detainees. But [at the facility], everyone [all military personnel] was doing the torture, everyone was kicking and hitting [the detainees]. … When you witness these things almost every day, after a while, I didn’t feel good inside. I felt sad, and it was devastating for me to see the military torturing people every single day. At some point, I decided that I wanted to do something. So, I started recording videos to keep as evidence for the victims who were tortured. I want to do what I can for the victims. One video that runs for one minute and 19 seconds shows two men lying next to each other on the ground. One of the detainees’ hands is bound, and he is lying in the fetal position as three plain-clothed soldiers beat him repeatedly with sticks and a whip. The other detainee is lying face-up and does not appear to move during the entire video, indicating that he may be unconscious or dead. A fellow officer told the defector that the detainees died from the torture in the interrogation facility the day after the video was filmed. “I have seen people die in front of me,” the defector told Fortify Rights. “As you can see in the video, [two people were beaten to death.] … I took this video secretly from behind the tree. They were interrogated and beaten up repeatedly during interrogation. … They died in the morning.” In the video, the three soldiers hit the bound man with implements at least 20 times, and the detainee can be heard saying, “Please help me. I am telling the truth.” A man in a black tank top with dark shorts hits the detainee with an approximately three-foot-long stick. “Does it hurt?” another soldier in a white tank top with a thin cane asks. “Yes, it hurts,” the civilian cries. Following this exchange, in a span of 26 seconds, a soldier in a red t-shirt and longyi [a traditional cloth worn by men] strikes the detained man 11 times with a whip while taunting: “What’s wrong? Huh? I have been waiting for guys like you.” The detainee cries out in pain as the soldier with the thin cane hits the civilian again while shouting: “Are you a man or a woman? Are you a man? Are you a man? Huh?! Are you a man? … If you say you’re a man, don’t make a single sound!” The video ends with the military officer with the long stick hitting the detainee, who cries out, “It hurts a lot.” The 35-year-old defector confirmed that the men involved in beating the two detainees “were from the intelligence, special branch police, and security personnel from army and air force.” He said: “I don’t know [their names] because I took this secretly.” In a three-minute 56-second video filmed at night, a bound, naked man, who is blindfolded with a blue surgical mask and black cloth, is lying face down on the concrete ground while three soldiers interrogate and beat him 65 times with a large wooden stick. The bound man has visible bruises in the middle of his naked back that look purple or black and splotches of discoloration on his left upper thigh and buttock. One soldier asks the bound civilian if he transferred 500,000 Myanmar Kyat [approximately US$150 to US$200] to a resistance group operating against the Myanmar military in the area. The bound man answers that he only transferred 10,000 Myanmar Kyat [approximately US$3 to US$4]. The soldiers threaten the man’s family for the rest of the video. “Go and put the gun on his father and call me once you are there,” the interrogator ordered junior soldiers. Speaking to the man being tortured, he adds, “If you don’t tell the truth, your parents will be shot dead. We will set an example of what happens with the families who support [resistance groups].” The video ends with the detainee repeatedly crying out, “Please, I beg. I apologize. Please don’t do it.” In two further videos, also filmed at night, show a group of up to eight plain-clothed soldiers surrounding six bound detainees, who are kneeling or lying face down on the ground. The soldiers beat them with a whip and thin canes and electrocute them with what appears to be a hand-held taser. The sound of the detainees being shocked and cries of pain are audible in the video. The soldiers are heard questioning the detainees about payments made to resistance fighters. Another 15-second video similarly shows interrogators in military uniforms electrocuting detainees. Filmed during the daytime, a uniformed army major and two plain-clothed soldiers are seen encircling two kneeling detainees, who are blindfolded and wearing surgical masks with their hands tied behind their backs. The major proceeds to shock one of the men continuously for eight seconds with a handheld electric taser while interrogating him. The man’s body spasms uncontrollably for the duration of the treatment, and he sobs and begs that he didn’t do anything. In another one-minute video, two soldiers, one in green camouflage pants and army green singlet and another in plain clothes, interrogate two blindfolded men, whose hands are tied behind their backs, accusing them of being involved with armed resistance fighters. The first detainee is writhing on the ground as one soldier whips the detainee with a black whip while saying: “So now, these hurt you? Huh? How about when my drivers were hurt?” Another soldier interrogating a second kneeling detainee says: “You… decide to blow up this car with a landmine? So, does that give you some satisfaction?” The video ends with the soldier whipping the first detainee while the detainee is squatting on the floor with folded hands, groaning in pain. The video ends with one of the soldiers saying: “So now, you think your life is good?… No, right? It’s not good now.” Fortify Rights interviewed a 61-year-old civilian who spent 45 days detained in the same interrogation facility where the defector was stationed and at the same time when the defector recorded the videos. He stated: I was detained on October 10, 2021. … The village administrator and two soldiers ambushed me in [redacted] town and detained me. … They took me back to the village first. I was beaten up once I arrived at the village. … They hit me with the butt of the guns. It was about three hours that they were interrogating me. … [T]hey blindfolded me and tied my hands behind my back. I couldn’t see who was beating me. … They accused me of supporting the [resistance fighters] by donating money. The 61-year-old man recalled being taken to the military interrogation center afterward in a car, still blindfolded and bound. He said: “I arrived at the interrogation center around 2:30 p.m., but they wouldn’t remove my blindfold until I was settled in the room around 9 p.m.” The man described how the soldiers confined him and others in a metal shipping container for ten days, saying: [T]he ten days that they put us in the container box, I felt like I was in hell. There were 15 of us thrown in there. To paint a picture for you, a container box that is usually attached to a truck was just placed on the ground, and there was nothing made up inside to accommodate us. We had to scream out to the guard if we wanted to go outside for bathroom breaks or to breathe. But it depended on the guards, and we all had to be brought out together. The sun’s heat would seep through the metal walls, and it was excruciating inside. We had to stay there day and night. Sometimes, if we wanted to pee, we had to pee into water bottles inside that container. Sharing what he saw while detained at the interrogation facility, he said: What I witnessed at the military interrogation center rattled me a lot because I had never ever experienced anything like this before. I saw the soldiers torturing a person they accused of being a [resistance fighter]. What I mean by “torture” was that I saw them asking the person if he was thirsty, and they would force one detainee to pee into another detainee’s mouth. He went on to describe how he heard other detainees being tortured, saying: There were small holes in our holding rooms, so we would peep out of them to see what was happening. Most of the interrogation happened at night. One of the worst things I witnessed was the day they brought in youths, who were accused of being [resistance fighters]. The screams were a lot. I could hear the youths denying [the accusations], but [the soldiers] wouldn’t stop hitting them. I saw each person taking turns to hit [the youths] whenever they passed by or when they felt like it. At some point, I saw the soldiers putting tires on the youths’ necks, and if they happened to lean forward, the soldiers put a knife in front of their bodies and had the knife pierce them every time the youths happened to lean forward from having the weight of the tires on their necks. The former detainee also witnessed how the facility commander at the time, holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, threatened to rape a young woman. He said: [T]he interrogation facility commander came and asked me to follow him. He was drunk at that time. I was taken to a room where a father, a mother, and a young daughter were detained. … He threatened to rape the young girl in front of her family and me. We all had to beg him not to do it, and we also begged the guards around not to do this to the girl and also to the parents. Describing the commander of the detention center, the 61-year-old torture survivor said: I don’t know the [commander]’s name. He was about five feet eight inches with tan skin and a round face. I think he was 50 years old. I don’t know his rank, but he referred to himself as the interrogation facility commander, and we had to call him “A Ba” [or “respected elder” in Burmese language], and other [soldiers] only called him “A Ba.” The military defector also described the commander, saying: He is really a bad man. … He drinks a lot. Whenever he was drunk, he would bring out all the detainees and do whatever he wanted with them. The video I am about to show is when he put a bottle on top of a detainee’s head, and he was about to shoot the bottle. The part when he fired is not recorded. I didn’t dare to record, but at least I managed to record him threatening and aiming at the bottle on top of the detainee’s head. In the video, the commander is heard saying to the civilian: “I am just going to shoot the bottle. I won’t shoot your head. Just shooting the bottle.” The civilian in the video looks visibly terrified as he balances the bottle on his head with his left hand and puts his right hand over his heart. The defector clarified that the commander did not fire his gun during this incident; however, in another video taken during the same incident, the commander is seen kicking a woman in the face after she is unable to answer a question asked by the commander. At one point, he returns to the woman, holds her head, and hits the left side of her head while shouting: “I didn’t want to [kick you]. Do you hear me? I said, ‘Do you hear me?’ I am angry!” The defector also told Fortify Rights how the commander threatened two women detainees with sexual abuse, saying “…he would use a taser on their genital area. It gave me goosebumps when I heard [this threat].” Fortify Rights has documented how the Myanmar military is responsible for committing ongoing atrocity crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. For example, the joint report “Nowhere is Safe,” published by Fortify Rights and Yale Law School in 2022, documented various acts, including acts of torture, committed by the Myanmar military following the February 2021 coup. The report found that such acts were carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at a civilian population and amounted to crimes against humanity. The ten videos obtained by Fortify Rights provide further evidence of torture and crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military, which should be investigated, said Fortify Rights. In March 2024, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, addressed the U.N. Human Rights Council, expressing deep shock at the continued “systemic use of torture against political detainees in police stations, military interrogation centers, and prisons.” The Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) defines torture as the intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,” for a specific purpose, such as punishment, intimidation, or coercion, “or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” Although Myanmar is not a party to CAT, the convention provides authoritative guidance on the act of torture and other forms of ill-treatment under international human rights law. Under CAT, torture is committed “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” When carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at a civilian population, torture may constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute. Although the ICC is investigating crimes committed against the ethnic Rohingya community in Myanmar and the state of Myanmar is currently on trial for the Rohingya genocide at the International Court of Justice, there are no criminal investigations by prosecutors into the military junta’s more recent post-coup crimes. Member states of the ICC should urgently refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, and the Prosecutor should immediately investigate torture and other ongoing mass atrocity crimes in the country, said Fortify Rights today. Article 14 of the Rome Statute empowers ICC member states to request the Prosecutor to investigate international crimeswithin the Court’s jurisdiction. While Myanmar is not an ICC member state, the National Unity Government—the body representing Myanmar’s democratically-elected leaders—lodged a 12(3) declaration with the Court’s registrar on July 17, 2021, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for international crimes committed on Myanmar territory since July 1, 2002 and into the future. On March 14, 2024, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, called on ICC member states to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC prosecutor. At the time of writing, no ICC member state has referred Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor. The ICC has a witness protection program for various types of witnesses, including “insider witnesses,” which could include military defectors. However, the ICC’s witness protection can only be activated in relation to an ongoing investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor, and the ICC is not investigating atrocity crimes in Myanmar in relation to the military coup and subsequent attacks on civilians nationwide. For this reason, ICC member states should urgently coordinate to ensure protection for high-value witnesses from Myanmar and should urgently refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor, said Fortify Rights. “No one has been prosecuted anywhere in the world for the horrible atrocities unfolding in Myanmar. The Myanmar junta will not get serious about ending its attacks against civilians until the international community ends this lethal inaction,” said Chit Seng. “The junta has shown again and again that it will continue to persecute and abuse those who oppose its dictatorship. The international community and the ICC must act immediately to investigate these violations and create an environment where individuals with evidence on such crimes feel safe to share information and are actually protected.” Correction: This news release was corrected on July 16, 2024 to include information about the IIMM’s support for witnesses..."
Source/publisher: "Fortify Rights"
Date of publication: 2024-07-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Asia Pacific Regional Cash Working Group (APRCWG) 2024 Q2 Presentation: Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (MPC) in the response plan
Description: "Desk Review Findings..... • Lack of multisectoral needs and analysis hinders MPC scale* • Limitations on tracking CVA means data does not exist on MPC growth over time • MPC design is inherently basic needs approach = context selected sector objectives and outcomes • MPC provides opportunities to increase reach and enhance outcome monitoring across sectors ‘the impact of multi-purpose cash should not be measured in isolation and should instead focus on what combinations of assistance and modalities can create synergistic impacts’ (UNHCR) and broader quality humanitarian action (CALP..."
Source/publisher: Asia-Pacific Regional Cash Working Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication: 2024-07-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: China Filling Huge Arms Order Placed by Myanmar Junta
Description: "China is supplying military hardware and ammunition to the Myanmar military junta as it struggles with fierce and growing armed resistance across the country. Sources familiar with the matter based in Naypyitaw and on the Thai-Myanmar border said Beijing is in the process of shipping arms purchased by the regime. “The [regime’s] shopping list is long and huge arms caches are on the way to Myanmar,” they said. “They will arrive Myanmar in two weeks to a month,” they added. The Irrawaddy has learned the list includes military hardware for both ground forces and the regime’s air force. China and Russia remain major arms suppliers to the Myanmar regime and continue to supply it with jet fighters and advanced drones. The regime has deployed them to attack armed resistance forces and ethnic forces. Currently, the regime’s deputy leader Soe Win is in China to attend the Green Development Forum organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), according to junta media. However, it’s believed the main reason for his visit is to take care of more urgent matters like arranging arms purchases and shipments. In the Myanmar military, major arms purchases overseas are normally handled by the army chief—a position Soe Win currently holds. Soe Win’s visit to China comes after weeks of fighting in northern Shan State, where anti-regime ethnic allied forces have resumed fighting. Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State and home to the regime’s Northeastern Military Command, has come under attack. Both sides have suffered heavy casualties in the fighting, which has caused thousands of civilians to flee the city. The fighting has expanded to areas in neighboring Mandalay Region, where Myanmar’s second-largest city Mandalay is located. Meanwhile, junta forces are also struggling in Rakhine State in the country’s west, where the ethnic Arakan Army has launched a series of successful offensives against the regime’s forces since late 2023. Late last year the regime suffered a humiliating defeat in northern Shan when ethnic forces launched well-coordinated attacks on junta-controlled townships and military outposts in areas near the Chinese border. By the time China brokered a ceasefire between the allied ethnic forces and the junta in January, the regime had lost about 20 towns as well as control of vital trade routes with China, not to mention huge caches of arms and ammunition and large numbers of armored vehicles and tanks. On Sunday, Soe Win met Shen Yueyue, vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and president of SCO’s Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Commission, to discuss border stability, security for Chinese investments in Myanmar, elimination of online scam operations, promotion of trade and the proposed election. He will be in China until Tuesday. It is his first official visit to the country since the 2021 coup. In a move that notably coincides with Soe Win’s visit to China, the junta announced on Monday that it would make Chinese New Year an official holiday in Myanmar starting next year. In taking the unprecedented step—a move even the junta’s predecessors shunned—Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has prompted criticism that it is kowtowing to Beijing in an effort to win Chinese assistance in combating the resistance..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-09
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Title: The Future of Myanmar: Ethnic Diversity or Ethnic Strife?
Description: "The breakdown of a China-initiated ceasefire in northern Shan State, and the advance of ethnic resistance armies in the same area, have highlighted two crucial issues for the future of Myanmar: the nature and aims of Chinese peacemaking, and what the re-establishment of a federal system akin to that which the country enjoyed prior to the 1962 military coup should look like. China is evidently the only outsider power that is in a position to exercise real influence over some of the ethnic armies as well as the Burmese military. And although most resistance groups, armed or otherwise, say they are in favor of a “free, democratic and federal Myanmar,” none one these has addressed what the status of ethnic minorities within their areas would, or should, be. Would it really bring decades of ethnic strife to an end if the existing seven ethnic minority states – Shan, Kachin, Chin, Karen, Mon, and Karenni (Kayah) – were granted genuine autonomy, the majority Burmans were left to govern the other seven regions, and the union territory around Naypyitaw became common ground for everyone? The problem is that Chin State is perhaps the only “ethnic state” with only one major “ethnic group”. But, even so, the Chin have no lingua franca; mutually unintelligible dialects are spoken in different parts of the state. In Kachin State, there has always been a huge Shan community , and migration from other parts of Myanmar means that ethnic Kachins have become a minority in their state. And then there is the question of whether the Lisu and Nung-Rawang identify themselves as Kachins? Most Karen, meanwhile, live in Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) Region, not in Karen State in the east, which has Shan, Burman and other communities as well. In Mon State, it is hard to say who is what because most urban Mon are Burmanized and the state capital Mawlamyine has an ethnically and religiously very mixed population. Karenni (Kayah) State has large Shan, Padaung, and Pa-O communities. The population of Rakhine State in the west consists of Buddhist Rakhine (Arakanese), Muslim Rohingya and Kaman, and tribal people in the highlands. And then there is Shan State, the largest and ethnically most diverse state where several non-Shan peoples – among them the Wa, the Palaung, the Kokang Chinese, and the Pa-O – want their own states or, at least, to be self-governing. The main complication can be observed in the north where Shan, Palaung, and Kachin groups have overlapping claims, and their respective armies have throughout the history of the civil war frequently clashed over territory. The Wa already control a de facto self-governing state spanning more than 20,000 square kilometers in the eastern mountains. Their United Wa State Army (UWSA) is allied with the Shan State Army (SSA) of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), but has fought battles with the SSA/SSPP’s rival, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), whose army is also called the Shan State Army. In the south, the Pa-O rose in rebellion in the late 1940s, not to fight the central government but against the power of the Shan saohpas, or princes. The original SSA, which was set up in 1964 and in 1971 formed a political wing called the SSPP, made a point of having other nationalities among its ranks to show that it was fighting for the entire Shan State. There was a Kokang Chinese unit and several Palaung battalions, and it had Kachin and Wa officers. The RCSS, on the other hand, promotes a strongly ethnocentric, Shan-Buddhist identity. Since an above-ground Shan political party, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, was formed in 1988, the SSA/SSPP has also become more Shan nationalistic. The near-absurd complexity of the situation in Shan State could be illustrated by the example of late Ta Kalei, an ethnic, Christian Karen who wore Buddha amulets and headed a Pa-O rebel army which was allied with the once powerful Communist Party of Burma. So, what a future federal Myanmar, and, especially, Shan State, would look like is very much an open question. There are, however, some similarities between Shan State and India’s northeastern state of Assam (which was historically a Shan-ruled kingdom). In the years after India’s independence from Britain in 1947, Assam consisted of all areas east of the Siliguri Neck with the exceptions of the old princely states of Manipur and Tripura. Like the Shan, the Assamese dominated the lowlands and various hill peoples lived in the surrounding highlands. But following years of insurgency, the Naga Hills in the east were separated from Assam and, in 1963, became the state of Nagaland. The Mizo area south of Nagaland also saw a rebellion against the Indian state, and peace efforts resulted in the formation of the union territory of Mizoram in 1972, which in 1987 was proclaimed a state. In 1972, the Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills also became a separate state called Meghalaya. Assam then had to move its capital Shillong, which was located in what was to become Meghalaya, to Dispur near Guwahati, the main city in the lowlands. In 1972, the Northeast Frontier Agency, which consisted of the northern areas of Assam bordering China, became the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh, and, in 1987, a state. All that remains of Assam are the lowlands around the Brahmaputra River. The “Balkanization” of Assam did not come about without discontent among the majority Assamese, but it was the price they had to pay for peace. Would the Shan be willing to accept a similar solution to their internal, ethnic conflicts? With all likelihood, no. But, if there won’t be separate states for the non-Shan peoples of Shan State, what could a solution look like? A “confederation” of smaller, ethnic entities? Autonomous districts within the state? But that has been rejected by the Wa, who already have a self-governing territory that for all intents and purposes is being governed separately from the rest of Shan State. A similar development appears underway in Kokang, where the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army has wrested control over most territory and established its own administration. And what would happen to Kachin State? Some Shan, supported by the authorities in Naypyitaw, are already arming themselves to fight the Kachin Independence Army. Even if there is peace in that part of the country, the local Shan as well as Burman and Rakhine migrants, and most likely also the Lisu and the Nung-Rawang, would be opposed to attempts to establish a Kachin-dominated state government. Would a future Karen State consist of the present state as well as Karen-dominated areas in Ayeyarwady Region? Should the Rohingya minority in northern Rakhine State have their own state, or could the Mayu Frontier District, which existed for them between 1961 and 1964, be recreated? And how many from the Buddhist Rakhine majority would be willing to accept either solution to the ethnoreligious antagonism in their state? There are no easy ways of solving Myanmar’s decades-long ethnic conflicts, and it is not only the leadership of the supposedly unified resistance, called the National Unity Government, that has been unable, or unwilling, to provide workable alternatives to the present order. The foreign peacemakers, who descended on Myanmar in droves during the period of relative openness from 2011 to 2021, held seminars and workshops on catchy topics such as “peacemaking,” “dialogue patterns,” “good governance,” and “reconciliation,” which had little or no relevance to the bitter realities on the ground in the conflict areas. Millions of dollars were wasted on fatuous exercises, suggesting inapplicable solutions modelled on entirely different kinds of peace processes elsewhere in the world. In the end, those efforts raised false hopes, caused confusion, and have only served to aggravate already existing problems and conflicts. In the broader scheme of things, those foreign groups were and still are irrelevant because there is only one outside power that has the leverage that is needed to put pressure on the military as well as major ethnic armies. And that, of course is China. Unlike the Western peaceniks, China has vital geostrategic interests in Myanmar and will do everything in its might to get what it wants, namely, to secure the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor from the southern province of Yunnan to the Indian Ocean. And that corridor consists of already constructed gas- and oil-pipelines, upgraded highways, and plans for high-speed railroads leading to deepwater ports on the Bay of Bengal. China’s interests are also economic as it has become a major investor in Myanmar and its biggest trade partner. Contrary to the expectations of many, the junta State Administration Council (SAC) in Naypyitaw is not about to fall, but if it did, that would only mean the beginning of a process to find realistic and workable solutions to a host of challenges related to ethnicity and governmental structures. And any post-SAC administration would also have to find ways to deal prudently with its two giant neighbors: China, which wants to control Myanmar, and, not to be overlooked, India, which, without much success so far, wants to keep Chinese influence at a bare minimum. Other outside actors such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, ASEAN, Canada, Australia, Norway, and Switzerland, which at various times have tried to play roles in Myanmar’s internal affairs, lack the means as well as the manipulative skills to be of any decisive importance..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-09
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (July 1 to 7, 2024) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 1 to 7, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, and Shan State from July 1st to 7th. The Military Junta used the civilians as human shields and searched mines on Monywa-Mandalay Road. The Military’s ward and village Administrators asked for the money under the reason of Military Service Law. The Military’s Minister of Labor said that will stop the workers who go to foreign countries with visiting visas (PV) and working on July 6th. Almost 30 civilians died, and nearly 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 under-aged children died, and 4 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication: 2024-07-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The road to a resistance victory in Myanmar
Sub-title: Junta falling back to urban-based porcupine strategy, leaving it vulnerable to rebel attacks on supply chains that aim for regime collapse
Description: "In major cities around Myanmar’s war-torn borderlands, a pattern is emerging. From Myitkyina and Bhamo in northern Kachin state to Lashio in northeastern Shan, and Sittwe, on the Bay of Bengal in the west, the Myanmar Army is pulling back into urban bastions shielded by air power, artillery and plentiful supplies of ammunition. Driven by eight months of serial defeat at the hands of ethnic minority insurgent armies, the country’s embattled State Administration Council (SAC) junta is shifting slowly but surely to what can best be described as a porcupine strategy – curling up on itself behind an array of lethally sharp quills. Whether this war plan offers a viable path for regime survival will likely be decided in the coming months as what began early this year in the ethnic borderlands becomes an increasingly nationwide phenomenon. Indeed, in central Myanmar, the porcupine’s shift towards the national heartland has already begun. Since June 25 ethnic Palaung insurgents of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and their ethnic Bamar People’s Defense Force (PDF) allies have begun pressing army forces back toward Mandalay, Myanmar’s ancient royal capital, with offensives in Madaya township immediately north of the city and towards Pyin Oo Lwin, home to the military’s prestigious Defense Services Academy (DSA) that overlooks Mandalay from hills to the east. The military’s grinding retreat into apparently impregnable urban strongholds is a less conscious strategy than a chaotic response to an aggressive advance of resistance forces that shows no sign of easing. But even if enforced rather than planned, the emerging urban porcupine offers three distinct layers of advantage. Militarily, it invites the opposition to come down from the hills and jungles of the borderlands and meet the army on the plains and rice paddies around large cities where the army’s overwhelming superiority in artillery, armor and air power will be most lethally effective. Provided it can be concentrated to effect, such firepower stands to decimate ill-equipped and loosely coordinated PDFs. Politically, the SAC’s grip on urban areas maintains control over the majority of Myanmar’s population and offers the foundations for fresh elections planned for next year – the only viable exit strategy for a military that has been trapped in a catastrophic political cul-de-sac since the coup of February 2021. Diplomatically, meanwhile, if some form of electoral process – however transparently constrained and flawed – can be staged, the pseudo-civilian administration that emerges may manage to buy the military sufficient time to win at an internationally-brokered negotiating table what it currently risks losing on the battlefield. Certainly, Myanmar’s key neighbors, China, India and Thailand, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc more generally will waste little time in endorsing the polls and expanding engagement with any administration dressed in civilian longyis rather than military khakis. Once that engagement gathers traction, it seems likely enough that the West will slowly, if grudgingly, fall into line. The overarching question for the coming year is whether the SAC’s porcupine strategy anchored on the cities of the populous national heartland can sustain a military stand-off for long enough to ensure the military’s ongoing central role in Myanmar’s governance that it sees as its prerogative. At the beginning of the rainy season of 2024, it would be foolhardy to suggest a clear answer. There is certainly nothing inevitable about the survival of a beleaguered military regime overstretched and exhausted by unprecedented challenges that continue to mount. Conflict endgames in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 and Afghanistan in 1992 and 2021 point to an irrefutable lesson: well-equipped militaries enjoying foreign backing but anchored on the defense of shrinking urban enclaves can be overwhelmed by ubiquitous and relentless resistance forces to the point of disintegration and collapse. Equally, there is nothing preordained about the success of Myanmar’s federal-democratic resistance. Despite enjoying wide popular support, the “Spring Revolution” continues to lack the most important prerequisites for revolutionary victory: a vanguard political party capable of imposing strategic coherence and direction, charismatic leadership able to inspire and rally, and an external backer willing to provide material and diplomatic support. Two strategic approaches Against this fluid backdrop, two key variables will be critical in shaping Myanmar’s chaotic battlespace over the coming year. Unknowns today, both will be on full display by the beginning of 2025. First, and perhaps the more crucial, is the extent to which opposition forces adopt a direct or indirect approach towards the SAC’s porcupine strategy. A direct approach would involve PDF forces, either affiliated with the National Unity Government (NUG) or independent of it, attempting to launch attacks on large urban centers and risk being slaughtered in front of the military’s big guns with potentially disastrous implications for resistance morale that since 2021 has weathered three and half years of conflict remarkably well. The NUG’s Ministry of Defense’s tendency to date has typically been to compensate for what it lacks in material resources and effective command and control with politically rousing calls for “victory within a year.” There is no guarantee that the MoD, where real military experience is in short supply, will not continue to press ahead with calls for stirring but unrealistic objectives. By contrast, an indirect approach would involve a multi-pronged effort aimed at dividing and exhausting already depleted regime forces. Requiring only minimal coordination, the primary operational focus would not be around urban areas but rather – and especially in the coming months – on the strategic road, rail and riverine lines of communications that connect them. In short, a war for the roads needs to precede any war for the cities. By triggering internal collapse through blocked supply routes, resistance forces could avoid the need for a war for the cities. It was not by chance that in the examples from Indochina and Afghanistan noted above, all three capitals of Saigon, Phnom Penh and Kabul, and most provincial centers, fell to anti-government forces with little or no fighting. The topography of central Myanmar offers a remarkably favorable setting for such a strategic approach. Main north-south lines of communication along the Ayeyarwaddy and Sittaung river valleys are hemmed in to the west by mountains of the Arakan Yoma and Chin Hills, to the east by the Karen hills and along the central spine of the country by the Bago Yoma. What begins with small-unit hit-and-run ambush and harassment escalates into a war of attrition along lines of communication and supply lines critical for the delivery of crucial fuel and munitions. The process sees an incumbent regime being drawn into exhausting and costly operations to hold open and then re-open major arteries while being forced to abandon minor roads and lose smaller towns for lack of troops to defend them. To a degree, such a strategy has already emerged by default over the past dry season along the major highway connecting SAC-held centers in the southern Tanintharyi panhandle along the Andaman Sea coast and with escalating sabotage of the Yangon-Mawlamyine and Yangon Mandalay railway lines. But achieving strategic traction in the coming months would undoubtedly require larger mobile resistance units severing roads for days at a stretch; ambushing in strength and at points of their own choosing regime response units; and then disappearing into nearby hills before repeating the process elsewhere. Such tactics would mirror operations launched in early 1944 by British Chindit columns operating behind the lines of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Indaw region of northern Sagaing, which cut its supply routes to lethal effect. Other elements of an indirect approach would include mounting pressure on outlying townships in which the regime lacks the manpower to retake once lost, and destabilizing guerrilla attacks inside major cities where the SAC is already facing daunting economic strains and, before long, the challenge posed by large restless populations. The ethnic variable The second variable hinges on a decision that the leaderships of key ethnic resistance organizations, most notably Kachin, Karen, Ta’ang and Rakhine, will need to make soon if they have not already done so. Historic in its ramifications, that decision hinges simply on what approach better serves the long-term interests of any ethnic community in relation to who holds power in the country’s Bamar heartland. One option would involve increased support for allied PDFs in the shape of munitions, advisors and training that could fuel an indirect strategy and decisively tip the military balance against the SAC, likely ushering in an interim administration centered on the NUG. The alternative would be based on an assessment that ethnic interests are better served by formalizing with the SAC an autonomy already largely won on the battlefield while accepting the risk of leaving an unreformed if weakened military in the national driving seat. In mid-late 2024, the reality is almost certainly that either a wait-and-see or a hedging approach on the part of the ethnic armies would be objectively more likely to favor the survival of the SAC porcupine than the success of under-equipped and ill-directed PDFs. These variables will play out against the backdrop of the military’s Achilles Heel: its manpower shortfall. What has been a persistent problem over the past two decades with infantry battalions typically numbering around 200 men rather than the prescribed 827 is today a crisis with potentially terminal implications. The frantic scramble to accelerate conscription since the introduction of the People’s Military Service Law last February has given the lie to the Wikipedia mythology of a 350,000-400,000 strong Tatmadaw—figures, which to the extent they were ever true, emerged from calculations based on units at full strength and included the military’s notoriously bloated tail of non-combat branches – administrative, commercial, technical and medical. Today, almost all credible assessments of the army’s combat-capable strength made by Myanmar and foreign analysts coalesce around a figure somewhere between 70,000 and 90,000 troops. The shortfall in raw numbers is exacerbated by two factors. The first is structural: a pattern of penny-packet battalion-size deployments across 14 regional military commands driven by the essentially political need to garrison the population of the entire country, not least in ethnic regions, rather than defend against foreign aggression. The second driver, highlighted by recent dry season campaigns in Rakhine and Kachin states, is operational: a stubborn unwillingness to temporarily surrender territory in the interest of regrouping forces for counteroffensives. The result, again and again, has seen isolated battalions or larger tactical operations commands (TOCs) fighting until they have either been overrun or surrender while the hemorrhaging of numbers continues apace. Indeed, the military now faces the risk that current battlefield losses may soon be outpacing the advertised 5,000 man-per-month rate of induction of new conscripts – even assuming draftees with no combat experience have some enthusiasm for the fight. A resistance strategy targeted squarely over the rest of this year on corridors of communication and supply rather than SAC-held urban porcupines would be well-calculated to act as a further accelerant to the army’s escalating manpower crisis. Whether such a strategy will be adopted, however, or whether Myanmar’s key ethnic armies, whose role on the national stage is now decisive, will be willing to support it is anything but guaranteed..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2024-07-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-09
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Title: Myanmar Junta Deputy in China to Discuss Election and Border Security
Description: "With Myanmar regime’s emergency rule expiring at the end of this month, the junta’s second-in-command Soe Win discussed preparations for a general election with Chinese officials on Sunday. On his first official visit to China since the 2021 coup, Soe Win arrived in Qingdao on Saturday to attend the Green Development Forum at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On Sunday, he met Shen Yueyue, vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and president of SCO’s Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Commission. Junta media said they discussed border stability, security for Chinese investments in Myanmar, elimination of online scam operations, promotion of trade and the proposed election. The deputy minister for natural resources, Min Thu, and Myanmar’s ambassador to China, Tin Maung Swe, also attended the meeting. Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has promised an election next year and China has offered to assist the process. Min Aung Hlaing has not visited China since the 2021 coup. Soe Win’s only previous official visit was to Russia. Former president Thein Sein last month visited Beijing to mark the adoption of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, which established Communist China’s foreign policy. The ex-general met Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Observers say Soe Win may have discussed the ongoing fighting in northern Shan State which will also dominate the National Defense and Security Council’s meeting that will be held in late this month to extend the junta’s emergency rule..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-08
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Title: Myanmar's ethnic rebels claim airport capture in new setback for military government
Description: "One of Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic minority groups battling the military government said it captured an airport serving the country’s top world-class beach resort, marking the first time resistance forces have seized such a facility. Residents of the area in the southern part of the western state of Rakhine, along with local media, also reported the seizure of Thandwe Airport, also known as Ma Zin Airport, about 260 kilometers (160 miles) northwest of Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city. It's the latest major setback for the military government that took power in 2021 after ousting the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Armed resistance to military rule is taking place in much of the country, led by pro-democracy militants as well as guerrilla groups affiliated with ethnic minorities. The Arakan Army said in a statement on the Telegram messaging app on Sunday night that it had recovered the bodies of more than 400 soldiers from the recent fighting in the area, as well as a cache of ammunition. The Associated Press could not independently verify the claims by the group, which in the past have been disputed. The seizure of the airport, one of six in Rakhine, would appear to open the way for the rebels to seize Rakhine’s coastal region, even as they consolidates control over much of the northern part of the state. The Arakan Army is the military wing of the Buddhist Rakhine minority, which seeks autonomy for Rakhine state from Myanmar’s central government. It has recently also called itself the Arakha Army. Since November last year, the group has been on the offensive and has gained control of nine of 17 townships, along with one in neighboring Chin state. It is also part of an armed ethnic alliance that launched an offensive last October that gained strategic territory in the country’s northeast on the border with China. Ngapali, a 7-kilometer (4-mile) long beach on the Bay of Bengal had been getting attention from international tourism but development stalled due to COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict that followed the army takeover. Sporadic fighting in villages near Ngapali beach on the Bay of Bengal since April has halted flights to the airport, which serves the beach resort, and most of the 46 hotels and guest houses were shut down. A Ngapali hotel executive who had recently escaped the area told The Associated Press on Monday his staff had fled the property. A travel agent in the town of Thandwe, about 5 kilometers (3 miles) east of Ngapali, told the AP that she had heard the sound of the fighting coming from outside of the town, but the situation inside was quiet with no guerrillas in the immediate vicinity. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of fear for their safety..."
Source/publisher: Associated Press (New York) via "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication: 2024-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-08
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Title: Renewed fighting drives 50,000 people from homes in northern Myanmar
Sub-title: An aid worker says that at least 15 residents near Lashio have been killed from artillery fire since July 3.
Description: "Some 50,000 people have fled their homes over the last five days amid renewed fighting around Lashio, the capital of northern Shan state, residents and relief workers told Radio Free Asia. At least 15 civilians have been killed since July 3, when forces allied with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDA, began an offensive in the township around Lashio, which is home to the military junta’s Northeastern Military Command’s headquarters. Battles have since taken place in Nam Tong, Man Hawng, Nam Ma Baw Da and Nawng Mun villages. Most of the deaths happened in one area of Lashio township that was struck by artillery fire during the first day of fighting, an aid worker who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told Radio Free Asia. Several other residential areas have since been hit by artillery attacks. “The artillery fire occurs frequently until now,” the aid worker said. “The residents have fled their homes in these areas.” A heavy artillery shell that was dropped on another neighborhood on Sunday injured three Buddhist novices and two civilians, he said. Residents of Lashio township have been heading south toward the city of Taunggyi, the capital of Shan state that is about 340 km (210 miles) away, one resident told RFA. Others aimed to look for shelter in the Mandalay region or in the commercial capital of Yangon, he said. Lashio sits at the junction of a highway that connects mainland Myanmar to the Chinese border to the north. Fighting between Lashio-based junta soldiers and insurgents resumed on June 25 after the collapse of a ceasefire brokered by Chinese officials in a series of meetings that began in January. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army, an ally of the MNDAA, announced the capture of 26 junta camps in the days following the end of the ceasefire. The TNLA and other resistance forces in Mandalay have been attacking junta outposts in four townships in northern Shan state and Mandalay region. RFA tried to contact MNDAA spokesperson Li Kya Win and the junta’s spokesperson for Shan state, Khun Thein Maung, for more details on the fighting, but neither of them answered the phone..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-08
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Title: Some 13,700 schools in Myanmar are closed due to civil war
Sub-title: School buildings are often targeted by indiscriminate airstrikes or shelling from artillery.
Description: "More than a quarter – or about 13,700 – of Myanmar’s 48,753 public schools have been closed due to the country’s civil war, the military junta’s Ministry of Education said. In western Chin state, which has seen fierce fighting since the 2021 military coup d’etat, only 38 schools out of some 1,500 are still open, according to figures released by the ministry. In neighboring Sagaing region, where the coup triggered an insurgency by members of the majority Burman community in Myanmar’s heartland, more than 4,200 schools have been closed. Junta troops often target civilian homes and other buildings – including schools – during or after ground battles with insurgents. “Children have suffered a lot in education,” said U Htay, a resident of Ma Taw village in Sagaing’s Mingin township. “They have lost their dream. We see that their potential to become outstanding citizens is being destroyed.” Most schools remain open in the commercial capital of Yangon and nearby Ayeyarwady region, the ministry said. The shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, has opened more than 4,300 schools nationwide in areas controlled by insurgent forces. NUG was formed by pro-democracy politicians and allies following the coup. But even those schools have been targeted by the junta’s indiscriminate airstrikes, the NUG’s deputy minister for education, Sai Khine Myo Tun, told Radio Free Asia. Intense fighting in eastern Kayah state has also put students at risk. But the Karenni state Interim Executive Council has still opened more than 400 schools there since 2021, the council said..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-08
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Title: Violence in Myanmar intensifying humanitarian needs
Description: "Since October 2023, resistance forces in Myanmar have gained territorial control across different parts of Myanmar. Expanded resistance has been accompanied by increased losses for the Myanmar military. Myanmar’s de facto authorities have routinely punished civilians they view as supporting the opposition, a trend that has worsened since October 2023 as they lose ground to resistance forces across the country. Escalating armed conflict has led to deepening humanitarian need, high poverty levels, violence against civilians, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and civilian casualties. These recent shifts are challenging the delivery of aid to the most vulnerable. To address the losses to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and mass desertions in the Myanmar military, on February 10, 2024, Myanmar’s de facto authorities reactivated an old law requiring young men and women to enlist in the military. Reports indicate forced conscription into the junta’s ranks, using threats and violence for enlistment. Fear of conscription has driven large numbers of individuals—especially young men—to seek safety in neighboring countries and internally in different parts of the country. Forced recruitment by other parties to the conflict, including EAOs and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), are also being reported. Rohingya populations are particularly vulnerable to conscription due to a long history of persecution, limited mobility, and limited access to aid. In Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State, the Rohingya population faces increasingly brutal abuses at the hands of both the military and the Arakan Army (A.A.), a powerful ethnic armed group in Rakhine State. In recent weeks, the A.A. has seized control of several townships in Rakhine, including northern Rakhine, leading to the displacement of thousands of people and increased tensions between Rakhine and Rohingya communities. More than 200,000 people have been displaced in Rakhine since clashes between Myanmar armed forces and AA resumed in November 2023, and the delivery of essential supplies and aid items remains restricted as Myanmar’s junta blocks major roads and waterways. For Rohingya, conscription is just one element of the continued persecution they face. Both the A.A. and the Myanmar armed forces (MAF) are allegedly forcing Rohingya to join their ranks, generating immense fear of having to fight alongside the armed actors responsible for abuses to their communities. With their movement restricted in Rakhine State, Rohingya are forced to seek safety in makeshift shelters, including in public buildings like schools. A.A.-MAF clashes are expected to continue resulting in attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In addition to violence, populations in Rakhine face telecommunication and internet restrictions that prevent civilians from contacting loved ones amid the conflict, contributing to the isolation that allows for ongoing human rights violations. The violence and oppression are reminiscent of what Rohingya experienced at the hands of the military back in 2017, which triggered the mass exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya into neighboring Bangladesh. United Nations (U.N.) officials said they have received recent reports of serious human rights abuses. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called for an immediate end to the violence and for all civilians to be protected without any distinction based on identity. Unfortunately, these events are not confined to Rakhine State—almost all parts of the country are facing human rights violations and continued access restrictions. In a country already experiencing immense humanitarian needs, these conflict dynamics only deepen suffering while the essentials for life, such as food, medical treatment, and shelter, go unmet. Recommendations The people of Myanmar are highly resilient and adaptable, but they should not have to face this alone. Despite access and funding challenges, humanitarian organizations continue to use diverse and complementary modalities and localized access strategies to reach people in need, often at great risk. These approaches need additional funding and continued donor flexibility to support adaptive programming to meet the rapidly increasing needs on the ground. Donor governments are responsible for ensuring sufficient funding and appropriate risk-sharing mechanisms for the humanitarian response plan, which is currently funded at only 12%. The international community must stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and take swift action to address the growing humanitarian needs and insecurity. International actors have a significant role to play in helping address and end the rising insecurity, violence, and repression. The U.N. must put in place strong and permanent humanitarian leadership in Myanmar for sustainable humanitarian engagement and outcomes. U.N. Member States must uphold obligations under international law to facilitate the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar and strongly advocate with all parties to the conflict to adhere to international human rights and humanitarian law. The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) should ensure open and regular briefings on the situation in Myanmar and monitor the progress of UNSC Resolution 2669. The Human Rights Council should swiftly condemn all human rights abuses and violations against Rohingya, Rakhine, and other communities by the Myanmar military and other parties to the conflict. Principled engagement with diverse stakeholders at the national and regional levels must be strengthened to ensure a holistic response to the Myanmar crisis..."
Source/publisher: InterAction
Date of publication: 2024-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Weekly Overview: Human Rights Situation in Mon State, Karen State and Tanintharyi Region
Description: "Throughout the first week of July, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) observed worrying patterns of violence against women and girls in target areas of Mon State, Karen State and the Tanintharyi region. At the end of June, HURFOM’s latest volume of ‘Voice Up’ also presented evidence of the rise in targeted gendered attacks. Further, a new report released by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on the gendered impacts of the coup found, “The threat of sexual and gender-based violence is a dark shadow that follows women, girls, and LGBT people throughout Myanmar.” Over the last week alone, a woman died, and three others were injured after artillery shelling by the junta’s police station in Pala Town, Pu Law Township, Myeik District, Tanintharyi Region, on June 28th. The shelling occurred without any prior fighting. At 9 AM, the junta’s police station in Pala Town launched two artillery shells. One of the shells hit and exploded near a shop at the three-way intersection in Pala Town. Daw San Yu, a woman in her 40s who was inside the shop, died due to the explosion. Another two women a man who was near the shop, were also injured. Earlier in June, an artillery shell fired by the military junta’s naval headquarters in Mawrawaddy exploded on a house in Yar Phu village, Yebyu Township, killing four family members, including an infant. On June 29th, a novice monk was killed, and a woman was injured by artillery fire from Battalion 310 in Thane Zayat Township, Kyaik Hto Township, Mon State. According to locals, a shell fired by Artillery Battalion 310 under junta control struck the Dhamma Duta Monastery, causing casualties. This incident followed a similar tragedy on June 14th, when a shell fired by Artillery Battalion 310 exploded, killing a 14-year-old girl named Ma Nandar Lin and injuring a one-and-a-half-year-old girl named Shwe Zin Lay. On the same day, four people, including two monks, were injured by artillery fire from junta troops in the village of Kha Kwal. Furthermore, Artillery Battalion 310 and other military units under junta control frequently launch artillery shells into villages where civilians live. On June 3rd, an artillery mortar landed in Mok Kha Maw village in Thane Zayat, injuring a resident. On June 2, artillery fire destroyed two houses in Wa Duk Kwin village in Thane Zayat. The ongoing rise of attacks against women, children and young people should be of significant concern to the international community. The lack of justice referral pathways in Burma has made it impossible for justice and accountability. Further, transparent, coordinated, and decisive calls must be organized in collaboration with local organizations to ensure evidence of the junta’s crimes can be tried in international legal systems..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication: 2024-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: July 7 Memorial: Recalling The Source of Myanmar’s Revolutionary Spirit
Description: "On the evening of July 7 in 1962, soldiers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Sein Lwin of the then General Ne Win’s military regime carried out a bloody crackdown on student protests on the Rangoon University campus in Yangon. The government announced that 16 students were killed and 86 injured. Eyewitnesses, however, said that more than 100 were killed. The July 7 crackdown also led to the dynamiting of the Student Union building on the campus – a historic building that had played an important part in Myanmar’s independence struggle – the next day, as Gen. Ne Win said he had suspected it was a hotbed of rebel associates, referring to communists. Known as the “July 7 Crackdown,” the massacre and demolishing of the building go down in Myanmar’s modern history as one of the regime’s most brutal crackdowns on the student movement. In 2012, The Irrawaddy’s English Edition Editor Kyaw Zwa Moe had a chance to talk to U Hla Shwe, who was a secretarial member of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions during the July 7 crackdown. He narrowly escaped the bloody crackdown that day. At the time, he was an editor of “Oway Magazine” published by the Rangoon University Student Union. U Hla Shwe was arrested six times since 1959, spending 24 years in prison for his political activism. He died of COVID-19 in July 2021 at the age of 84. In this commemorative report for the 62nd anniversary of the July 7 crackdown, The Irrawaddy is publishing a conversation between Kyaw Zwa Moe and U Hla Shwe. During the interview at U Hla Shwe’s Yangon home 12 years ago, they discussed the role played by student unions in Myanmar’s politics and what role they can play to encourage reforms. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. Kyaw Zwa Moe: You were a student union leader in 1962. There were protests on July 7 that year. At about 5 am the next day, the Rangoon University Student Union Building was blown up. What happened that day? U Hla Shwe: The regime didn’t dynamite the student union building because of the student protests the day before. The main reason for blowing up the building was that when the military staged a coup in March of that year, all the political parties in the country were silent. Only the student unions spoke out. KZM: The political parties supported the coup? HS: Yes. They were silent about the [junta’s] killings. Student unions, student movements and student leaders have a long history. Since the first student strike in 1920, students never wanted to be a threat to political power. Students did not organize to take political power. We only demanded peace, fundamental human rights and democracy, for which we have struggled and made sacrifices. KZM: You said political parties were silent about the coup then. So, is it fair to say the regime viewed students as its main enemy after they protested? HS: We protested when the civilian government was forced to transfer power to the Myanmar military for six months the first time. We also protested when power was transferred to the military the second time by amending Article 116 of the 1947 Constitution … and we protested the military coup in 1962. Political parties like the Myanmar Socialist Program Party and others emerged in fresh form after the coup. Some parties, especially the major left-wing political party, the National United Front, openly supported the coup. No one was with us. Even after the killing [of university students], they were still silent. No one spoke out. Only a peace group led by Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing spoke out. Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing called it a tragic event in Myanmar’s history. KZM: Where were you when the student union building was blown up? How did you hear the news? HS: Two weeks beforehand we had scheduled a meeting of students on July 6 [to discuss] the 22 hostel regulations imposed by the Ne Win regime. At the time, they were even stricter than those in prison. I had been at Mandalay Hostel since my second year [and] served as the secretary and chairman of the hostel management. All the students there behaved well. The regime limited the time for tea, lunch and dinner, baths, access to electricity and going outside. Students were not allowed to visit each other’s rooms after 9 pm. So, they were not happy. Unfortunately, the electricity went out on the night of July 6. As you know, it is usual for students to make a commotion when the electricity goes off. But that night, students were furious, and they broke book shelves, desks and beds and threw them to the ground and burned them. Then, they made torches and marched in circles around the university campus for the whole night [in protest]. We waited at the gates and told the [protesters] not to go outside of the university campus. They dispersed only at around 3 am. The meeting had started at 11 am [on July 6] and ended at 1 pm the following day. It ended peacefully and students dispersed. Only three student union leaders spoke at the meeting, explaining why they opposed the new hostel regulations. Myanmar military soldiers came to arrest us at 2 pm [on July 7]. Security forces then known as the special police, and police from the special branch, entered the university campus from Thaton Street and University Avenue. The three student leaders who spoke at the meeting – Ko Tin Tun, Ko Thet and Ko Ba Shwe Lay – were arrested. Tensions arose after the arrests and students returned to the student union building from their hostels. When the police came to arrest us, we fled and went into hiding. I was hiding in Marlar Hostel and left there around 7 pm. Student leader Ko Tun Kyi and I stayed overnight on Kan Lan Street near Inya Lake. We could feel how powerful the explosion was from there. We went to bed at around 1 am [on July 8]. I was awakened by the loud noise. At first, I didn’t know what was happening. I had not expected that they would do it. Ko Tun Kyi was older than me. He was already a doctor. I saw him weeping, and I was shocked. I asked him what happened. He said they must have destroyed our student union building. The impact of the explosion was so strong that I woke up. KZM: What happened next? HS: There were around 60 student leaders [at Pinya Hostel]. They were key student leaders, especially those from All Burma Federation of Student Unions (known by the Burmese acronym as Ba Ka Tha) and the Confederation of University Student Unions (known by the Burmese acronym as Ta Ka Tha), gathered at Pinya Hostel. We discussed how to respond in the East, West, North and South districts of Yangon. Then, we dispersed. KZM: Did you go to see the student union building after it was blown up? HS: We couldn’t go. The military opened fire from 6.15 pm [on July 7]. They fired wherever they saw lights on in the university campus. KZM: Were students inside the student union building on July 8? How many were killed? HS: Nobody knows exactly. Only the then-regime knows. I issued three demands on the 50th anniversary of the July 7 event. The first demand is that an investigation committee be formed with fair-minded representatives and the results of their investigation made public. The second demand is that the student union building be rebuilt and used as a museum of the student movement in Myanmar. The third demand is for the July 7 monument erected by student leaders to be rebuilt. The monument was destroyed by the authorities in 1963. KZM: People have been talking about the culprit responsible for dynamiting the student union building. General Ne Win and Brigadier-General Aung Gyi were named as the main culprits. Brig-Gen Aung Gyi said in his books that he had received approval from Gen. Ne Win to dynamite the building. Who do you think was the main culprit? HS: Whenever we talk about the July 7 incident … there is a rumor among people who talk about the 7 July incident [that] if Gen. Ne Win is the No. 1 culprit, then Brig-Gen Aung Gyi is the No. 2 … and if Brig-Gen Aung Gyi is the No. 1 culprit, then Gen. Ne Win is the No. 2. If you ask me, I believe this. But objectively, there was a commanding unit in the military then. It consisted of Major Kyaw Soe, the chairman of the national security and administration committee, a role similar to the prime minister. Another man is Lieutenant-Colonel Sein Lwin. He was not a member of the commanding unit. His troops were deployed outside Yangon University to curb the students. He was the head of either Battalion 4 or Battalion 5 … I don’t remember clearly … but both battalions provided personal security for Gen. Ne Win. He was responsible for the shooting. KZM: That’s why Sein Lwin earned the name “Butcher of Yangon.” HS: Yes, it is. He directly commanded the troops on the ground and gave the order to shoot. KZM: Student unions have been banned since the destruction of the student union building in 1962. They emerged again only decades later, in 1988, but they were unofficial. Still, when a student union issued a statement in 1988, it had considerable influence on students. Twenty years later, how much influence do you think student unions retain? HS: Since the 1920 student strike, student unions, student leaders and student movements have been at the forefront of the fight against colonial rule. This is history. We are not exaggerating this because we participated in student movements. Student unions, student leaders and student movements were at the forefront of Myanmar’s independence struggle. They were also at the forefront of the peace process and the fight against the military dictatorship after independence. Over the 63 years since independence, the main problems were civil war and the military dictatorship. We students risked lives and imprisonment to end the civil war and the military dictatorship. Student unions have a long history. The agitator of Myanmar’s independence struggle was student unions. The first political generation of Myanmar [citizens] who led Myanmar’s independence struggle between 1906 and 1948 came from student unions. The Dobama Asiayone [We Burmese Association] and the General Council of Burmese Associations were not yet formed. Gen. Aung San, Dr Hla Shwe, Thakhin Nu, U Kyaw Nyein, U Ba Swe and so on were from the first political generation. They led the student movement first, before leading the nationalist movement and the independence struggle. In our time, students engaged in the struggle for peace and democracy. Student unions have never asked for power. Why have they killed students? We have not been allowed to organize a memorial for July 7 over the past 50 years. [Authorities] still ban a memorial. Why are they so afraid of student unions and student movements? Students are a popular force. People are behind the students. Military regimes in successive periods fear that students and people will cooperate and threaten their grip on power. KZM: Students were at the forefront of the independence struggle and the fight against military dictatorship. But it is the politicians who take the lead role in the political movement. In 1988, students led the pro-democracy protests. But it was the political parties, including the National League for Democracy, that worked for political reforms. You also established a political party called The People’s Progressive Party. Politicians take over responsibility from students. There have been some political changes today [in 2012]. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is in the Parliament, and the government is not entirely a military government. There have been reforms. What role can student unions play now? HS: If we compare now with the parliamentary democratic period before the 1962 coup … you can see there has been repression since 1988. There has been no space for student unions and the opposition since 1988. Only a few dissidents can speak out under [such] harsh repression. As you know, universities are built in remote places. It takes hours to get to a university. This is not coincidental. They separate students so that they can easily suppress them. Students today face harsher repression than we did. Back in our time, university degrees did not guarantee a job either, but things are worse today. University students need to pay extra tuition now. Back in our time, there was no tuition. We should not view students just as they are. They are the new generation. Both the government, the Union Solidarity Development, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi must understand this. Students are the new generation who will shape the future of Myanmar. They will serve as teachers, doctors and so on. Holding a hostile attitude toward them amounts to [undermining] the future of your country. We can’t view them as an enemy. We have to hand over the military and political responsibilities to this new generation. Military chiefs talk as if it is the Myanmar military that loves the country most. This is wrong. People just dare not to complain about it for fear of reprisal. The new generation must be able to learn peacefully and live well. But, the civil war has not yet ended and we have yet to enjoy full democracy. Many people live in grinding poverty. Many poor families in urban areas survive on just 1,000 kyats for a meal. You can see extremely crowded buses at the north-south Dagon junction in the evenings. The country can’t be more primitive..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Human rights expert slams global arms trade that bolsters Myanmar military crackdown
Description: "GENEVA — A prominent human rights expert is calling on governments to end the billion-dollar arms trade with Myanmar’s military, which is “helping sustain the junta’s brutal campaign of violence against civilians across Myanmar.” In a report to the U.N. human rights council Thursday, Thomas Andrews, special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, accused international finance systems of helping Myanmar procure the weapons that have “enabled attacks on civilians” and have killed, maimed and displaced thousands of people. Since the military junta toppled the country’s democratically elected government in February 2021, the U.N. human rights office reports at least 5,280 civilians, including 1,022 women and 667 children, “have been killed at the hands of the military.” Additionally, the agency reports at least 3 million people have been displaced — “the vast majority still without proper shelter,” and more than 20,000 political prisoners remain in detention. Andrews told the council that in the two years ending March 2024, the Myanmar military has purchased $630 million in weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials through the international finance system. The special rapporteur identified 16 foreign banks that have facilitated transactions related to military procurement by the junta, noting that the junta and its cronies have worked to obscure the specific nature of the transactions “including by setting up military front companies.” He referenced a report he issued last year, “The Billion Dollar Death Trade,” in which he identified Singapore as the junta’s third largest source of weapons and related materials. Because of that report, he told the council that “to its credit, the government took immediate action and launched an investigation of my findings. I am very pleased to report that the junta’s purchase of military supplies from Singapore dropped by nearly 90 percent since the publication of that report.” “Unfortunately, military procurement through Thailand has moved in the opposite direction,” he said, underscoring the junta imported nearly $130 million in weapons and military from Thailand-registered suppliers, “more than double the total from the previous year.” He observed, however, “It is important to note that as was the case with Singapore last year, I found no evidence that the government of Thailand was involved or even aware of these transactions,” adding that he was hopeful Thailand based entities, including its banks “will no longer be facilitating the transfer of weapons and weapons materials to the military junta.” Andrews called on financial institutions to stop facilitating transactions with banks that are controlled by the military junta and for governments to sanction those junta-controlled banks, including Myanmar Economic Bank. The special rapporteur garnered support from member states, including the United States, for his appeal. “We applaud Singapore for taking action to cut arms supplies to the military and call on others to follow suit,” Michele Taylor, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Council, said during the council’s interactive dialogue. “We urge the Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to prevent future atrocities, including by reinforcing this body’s call to cut off the military’s access to jet fuel, and to support efforts to find a peaceful and just resolution to the crisis,” she said. Andrews said the people of Myanmar need and deserve the support of the council and governments. He emphasized they also need international action, “not only because of the military junta’s relentless attacks on the people of Myanmar, but because there are opportunities available to your governments right now that would make an enormous difference in how and when this crisis comes to an end.” “The tide is turning in Myanmar, the junta is on its heels, and the opportunity to take decisive action is now,” he said, pointing out that civilian resistance forces are gaining ground. He said the government’s military bases are falling, tens of thousands of troops “have been lost to casualties, surrender, or defections,” and the economy is being squeezed. “In response, the junta is doubling down on its brutal attacks on civilian populations,” he said. “Junta leaders appear committed to destroying the country that they cannot control.” He said the world must not allow that to happen. “We now have clear evidence that actions taken by the international community to isolate the junta and degrade its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar are working. “But more must be done and done now to build on this progress including strategic coordination between all governments who support human rights to stop the flow of sophisticated weapons of war that are being used to attack innocent Myanmar civilians,” he said..."
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Source/publisher: "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication: 2024-07-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Civilians Flee as Noose Tightens on Myanmar Junta’s NE Command Headquarters
Description: "Thousands of residents fled the capital of northern Shan on Friday morning after the ethnic armies encircling it continued bombarding the headquarters of the junta’s Northeastern Military Command in Lashio’s center on Thursday, residents of the city said. They fled after a dozen residents of Lashio were killed by shelling and drone bombs on Thursday. One resident of the city told The Irrawaddy that shells and bombs had hit residential wards and killed residents. “That is why people are leaving the city [and] many others are sheltering in monasteries,” the resident said. At least 12 residents, including children, were killed on Wednesday and Thursday when their houses were hit by heavy explosives. More people were injured, and several homes were destroyed. Another Lashio resident told The Irrawaddy that most evacuees fled residential wards adjacent the headquarters of the regime’s Northeastern Military Command, which is being shelled and bombed by drones. Most of those fleeing the city are traveling to Taunggyi, the capital of southern Shan State, and Mandalay Region. Fighting intensified near the city this week as the ethnic armies that control most of Lashio Township closed in on it. The families of the junta officers stationed in Lashio were reportedly evacuated to Naypyitaw by helicopter on Thursday. Fighting broke out across Lashio Township on Tuesday night when the members of the Brotherhood Alliance – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arkan Army – launched simultaneous attacks on regime bases in the township. The alliance has reportedly captured several junta bases outside Lashio city, but has yet to officially comment on the status of the battle for Lashio. The TNLA said that it had captured the junta’s Shwe Tharyar military base in northern Shan State’s Mongmit Township along with its ally, the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (PDF). The PDF is under the civilian National Unity Government. The TNLA said it also attacked a military base at a bridge crossing the Dohktawaddy River (also known as Myitnge River) in northern Shan State’s Hsipaw Township. Intense clashes between regime forces and the TNLA were reported in nearby Mandalay Region’s Mogoke town, the country’s ruby hub, on Thursday. Clashes intensified in the northern Shan State’s Nawnghkio Township on Thursday as the TNLA, Mandalay PDF and Danu People’s Liberation Army continued their attempt to capture the headquarters of the junta’s Missile Battalion 606. The TNLA accused the junta of using chemical weapons to defend the headquarters of the missile battalion. It said resistance troops exposed to the chemicals are suffering from breathlessness, nausea, extreme agitation, fatigue, and low blood oxygen. The junta has frequently been accused of turning to chemical warfare when its troops face losses on the battlefield. The Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 against the regime in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing 24 battalion HQs, hundreds of bases, around 20 towns and trade routes with China before a ceasefire was brokered on January 10 by Beijing. Before the ceasefire, the alliance had encircled Lashio. The TNLA resumed the operation on June 25 after repeated junta bombardments of territory it controls. As of Thursday, the TNLA and allied PDFs had seized about 40 junta bases, including several battalion HQs in three townships in northern Shan State – Kyaukme, Mongmit and Nawnghkio – and three others in upper Mandalay Region – Madaya, Mogoke and Singu. They have also taken control of Kyaukme and Nawnghkio towns as well as large parts of Mogoke town..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Defector Stories: Inside the Exodus from Myanmar’s Military
Description: "Shortly after the Myanmar military staged a coup on February 1, 2021, it began brutalizing, imprisoning and killing individuals at peaceful protests throughout the country. The ruthless treatment of civilians by the military and police did not go unnoticed, with photos and reports of their actions published widely. The reports deeply affected many soldiers and police, triggering a surge of defections. Since the coup, a total of 12,341 junta personnel – 3,015 soldiers and 9,326 police – have defected to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), according to the People’s Embrace, a group helping defectors. Military defections peaked in 2021, but the People’s Embrace now expects another surge as soldiers abandon their positions “amidst the escalating war, especially in the Kachin, Karen, and Karenni regions.” Also spurring defections is February’s enforcement of the conscription law, dictating mandatory military service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27. Seven former soldiers shared their reasons for defecting and their experiences afterward in interviews conducted in safe houses and secure locations in Thailand. Their motivations for joining the Myanmar military were also discussed. The interviews were conducted in February, with follow-up sessions when additional information became available. Aged from 22 to 39, the interviewees had spent between four and 22 years in the military, achieving ranks ranging from private to major. For safety, all names used in this article are pseudonyms and specific locations are not mentioned. Refuge from poverty The defectors said they joined the Myanmar army as teenagers or in their early 20s. All but one was motivated by refuge from unemployment and the education, skills training, and other perceived long-term benefits of military life. Bo Pyay joined the army aged 17 to escape unemployment. “There was little prospect of getting a job to earn my living. At that time, the country was somewhat peaceful and the military offered more education and job opportunities.” Khant Tun had no special interest in the army but needed a career after college. Zeya Hein entered the military in 2014. “There was a positive perception of the military during that time. The economy was bad and it was difficult to find a job after high school.” Lin Aung enlisted mostly out of despair. With no family to assist him, he was unable to find employment and needed to support himself. “I had no other good options to earn a living.” However, while entering the army was easy, exiting was a different story. One defector signed an agreement to serve five years but was barred from leaving when he completed his term. “This happens to the majority of soldiers,” he said. Lin Aung thought he could join for one or two years to see if he liked it and then leave if not. “I was not told how difficult it would be to leave,” he said. A common reason for staying in the military is financial survival. Lin Aung enlisted in 2020 but stayed on even after the 2021 coup. “Even though I realized how the military was treating the people and ruling the country, I couldn’t see a way to survive on my own,” he explained. The defectors interviewed had various roles and duties in the army. Bo Pyay worked on a project to produce cluster bombs during his decade as a soldier. Thawda Win described his role as support, transporting ammunition to soldiers in the field. Support roles do not always mean being out of harm’s way, and his deliveries exposed him to life-and-death situations. On one occasion, his supply convoy was ambushed by resistance forces, and he narrowly escaped with his life. Thawda Win now shares his expertise with the People’s Defense Force (PDF), providing guidance on weapons maintenance, storage, transportation, and related subjects, highlighting how defectors are valuable to the resistance. Turning point Many soldiers want to defect, but fear for their personal safety and the potential harm it could bring to their families act as significant deterrents. Others have succumbed to military indoctrination, regulation and control. They look to the army for benefits in terms of both status and wealth. Pyae Mg recalled both senior officers and subordinates declaring that Min Aung Hlaing was not tough enough in fighting “insurgents” and advocating hanging for anyone who resisted the military. “Most of the soldiers in my company felt this way and that’s why I realized that I couldn’t stay in the military.” Interviewees gave various reasons for defecting, but certain ones were mentioned frequently. Safety was a major concern when weighing the consequences of defecting. The Washington Post recently reported accounts of punishment meted out to defectors who are caught, including testimony from a defector saying he was tortured. The interviewees said they deliberated over their own safety as well as potential retribution against their families when contemplating defection. Casual mistreatment of soldiers was a factor, too. “Everyone in the military should be treated with respect regardless of rank. Due to abusive conditions imposed by the higher ranks on lower ranks, the military is failing,” said an army captain who defected. A former private said he was often bullied and overloaded with duties. “I didn’t have enough time to eat or sleep.” Each said that defecting was an individual decision. “My grandmother was blinded by the military’s bombs,” said another. “That‘s when I decided to leave the army.” When asked if the success of resistance operations 1027 and 1111 affected their defection decisions, no specific event or battle was mentioned. However, interviewees conceded that the anticipated outcome of these ongoing operations – the collapse of the entire army – was a factor in their decision. People’s Embrace continues to assert there is a limited window of opportunity for soldiers to defect, declaring “Stand with the people before it’s too late!” However, none of the interviewees was aware of a time limit for defecting. One former senior officer had this advice for would-be defectors: “Have a strong determination to defect because the road is not an easy one.” Another former high-ranking officer said that not enough was being done to attract others to defect, especially since officers often have “valuable and secret” military information. The incentives on offer are not attractive enough for them to consider leaving their posts, he added. Defector organizations conduct a rigorous process before soldiers are accepted. The vetting process varies and was different for almost everyone interviewed. A defector’s journey from their base to safety in a resistance-controlled area is not straightforward and can be filled with danger. It can take days to reach a defector organization’s representative, with creativity and cunning required to evade roadblocks, patrols and checkpoints. Life after defection Once they reach safety, defectors’ living conditions are typically spartan. Pyae Mg lives in a small, one-room apartment with three others. Thawda Win and his wife stay in the lobby of a four-story safe house that houses a mix of single men and families. He said defectors are permitted to stay in their safe house for three months but can ask for an extension if they still can’t find alternative accommodation. Defectors are also expected to find jobs. Some find casual jobs lasting a day or two, but the work is not consistent. People’s Embrace says it does not have the capacity to help defectors find jobs. By some estimates there are over a million Myanmar migrants and war refugees in Thailand, and defectors are fortunate if they reside within the support network of a Myanmar-centric community. The defectors interviewed expressed gratitude for financial support from Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG). Each defector is currently paid 700 baht per month, or 1,400 baht if accompanied by a spouse. The sum may be small, but it’s vital for survival. Difficulties faced by both defectors and Myanmar refugees are numerous. Most cannot speak the local language and they all lack official recognition by the Thai government. One defector summed up what others had said: “I would like more support from organizations that help defectors. I realize this is not easy, but I would like the NUG to give me documents for a legal stay, a work permit, and not to be harassed by Thai police.” Most defectors face a precarious existence in Thailand, with little money, no legal protection, and often forced to live under new identities. Venturing outside their safe house or small community puts them at risk of police harassment. Defectors also fear the Burmese military asking Thai authorities to deport them. Despite their long and perilous journeys to freedom, all the interviewees expressed gratitude for the defection process. In a follow-up interview, Lin Aung explained how difficult life was for him now. Basic sustenance is an issue, and day-to-day living is stressful. Jobs are hard to find, and he worries about his dire living conditions and when they will change. Yet he has no misgivings about his decision. “No matter how hard it is, I don’t regret leaving the Myanmar military.” The defectors wanted the world to know that they joined what they believed was “the people’s army.” When they realized that the military was no longer serving civilians but instead harming them, they defected to the people’s side..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-05
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Title: Myanmar Junta Kills Over 1,000 Civilians in Six Months
Description: "Myanmar’s junta violence, atrocities and bombings have claimed 1,076 civilian lives in the first half of this year, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). In retaliation for battlefield losses, the junta has escalated airstrikes and shelling of non-military targets, such as villages, schools, hospitals, markets, displacement camps and religious sites resulting in mounting civilian deaths. The AAPP, the activist group which monitors junta arrests and killings, said this year until June 30, Sagaing Region witnessed the highest number of deaths with 313, followed by Rakhine State with 259 fatalities. Junta shelling caused 318 deaths and airstrikes claimed 308 lives, it said. The AAPP reported that 348 of those killed were female, 15 members of religious orders were among the dead and 30 were from the education sector. The regime arrested nearly 27,000 civilians and killed over 5,300 people since the 2021 coup, according to the AAPP. Myanmar’s anti-regime ambassador to the United Nations, U Kyaw Moe Tun, wrote to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres about civilian suffering in Myanmar on June 27. “I would like to reiterate again that the people of Myanmar desperately need immediate and decisive action from the international community,” he wrote. U Kyaw Moe Tun called on the international community to cut the flow of weapons, jet fuel and money to the junta, which would immediately save lives in Myanmar. “Decisive timely action from the UN, in particular the UN Security Council, is well overdue…I with a very heavy heart appeal to the international community in particular the Security Council to take concrete action now to save the lives of the people of Myanmar by putting humanity first,” the ambassador said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-07-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar junta's VPN block poses 'major threat,' say analysts
Description: "WASHINGTON — Access to independent media has been tightly restricted in Myanmar since the military coup in 2021. But now, the junta is also blocking VPNs, in what analysts say marks an escalation in censorship. The military — also known as the Tatmadaw — is now actively blocking virtual private networks, or VPNs, which help internet users bypass restrictions to access websites, as well as social media and messaging platforms. Analysts believe the junta may be using technology from a Chinese company to enforce the blocks. The move "poses a major threat to press freedom, activism and the ability of people to hold their government accountable," said Simon Migliano, head of research at Top10VPN. The London-based organization tests the security of VPNs and researches internet and tech security. Block limits access to information The junta has threatened to block VPNs since it overthrew the civilian-led government more than three years ago. In late 2021, the Tatmadaw drafted, but did not enact, a cybersecurity law that could punish people with three years in prison if they used a VPN without official permission. The blocks, which began in late May, have dire consequences for internet freedom in Myanmar, where opposition to the military and its coup has largely been organized online, according to Migliano. "The VPN crackdown in Myanmar severely restricts citizens' access to independent and accurate information, reinforcing government control over the flow of information," Migliano told VOA. Several news outlets have reported that security forces are stopping people at random to inspect their phones for VPN apps. Around two dozen people were arrested and fined in early June after police found VPNs on their cell phones. In addition, Myanmar's Transport and Communications Ministry has blocked access to Facebook, Instagram, X and WhatsApp, according to media reports. Myanmar's military did not reply to VOA's request for comment. Myanmar's military is seeking to control the flow of information as a way to control the country, say experts. "They really want to control the narrative and spread their propaganda," Wai Phyo Myint, a Myanmar analyst at the digital rights group Access Now, told VOA. Experts say junta seeks 'digital dictatorship' The VPN crackdown is the latest example of what a group of United Nations experts in 2022 called the junta's efforts to establish a "digital dictatorship." "There's a battle in the digital space," one digital rights activist told VOA. The individual, who is from Myanmar but moved to Thailand after the coup, requested anonymity for security reasons. Part of the reason the military may have taken so long to target VPNs is because blocking is more difficult and expensive than other forms of censorship, according to Oliver Spencer, an expert on free expression in Myanmar. The military has already consolidated control over the country's telecommunications companies, imposed scattered internet shutdowns, revoked media licenses, and arrested dozens of journalists. The repressive environment led many independent news outlets to flee into exile. "They basically cracked down on the internet in all the ways that they could do more easily," Spencer said. That means blocking VPNs was the last main step the military could take to prevent the country's people from accessing websites and platforms that the Tatmadaw would rather hide from them, according to Spencer. Citing leaked documents, the activist group Justice for Myanmar reported in June that the military's enhanced censorship system uses technology from the Chinese network security company Geedge Networks to block VPNs. The Beijing-based company did not reply to VOA's email seeking comment. With this technology, authorities create a list of all known VPN domains and IP addresses they want blocked, according to Migliano. The simplest way to circumvent the block is to cycle through various VPNs, because some still work sporadically, Migliano added. Demand for VPNs has on average been more than 1,000% higher than it was in the month before the crackdown, according to research by Top10VPN. The largest uptick was on May 30, when demand was 2,333% higher, Top10VPN reported. Violence perpetrated by Myanmar's military against those resisting the coup means that not having access to independent, accurate information can be a matter of life and death, said Washington-based Wai Phyo Myint, Asia Pacific Policy Analyst for the AccessNow. In many cases, crucial information such as how to find safe places to avoid the military "got cut because of the VPN ban," she said. That's particularly concerning given the gravity of the violence perpetrated by the military, which stands accused by rights groups of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity since the coup. Spencer estimates that the crackdown now means that there are "millions and millions" of people who have no access to any information or any way to communicate electronically. "Instead of just attacking the media, which they've done until now, [the junta are] actually attacking the ways that the general public can communicate and can access information," Spencer said. "It's probably one of the largest attacks on freedom of expression in Myanmar since the coup."..."
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Source/publisher: "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication: 2024-07-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-05
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Title: Argentine Prosecutor seeks arrest warrants for genocide and crimes against humanity committed against Rohingya community
Description: "On 28 June 2024, Argentine Prosecutor Guillermo Marijuán asked the federal criminal court in Buenos Aires, Argentina to order international arrest warrants against 25 Myanmar government officials for the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya community between 2012 and 2018. This is the first time that arrest warrants are being sought against the Myanmar military for the crime of genocide, the historic persecution and violence suffered by the Rohingya community, which culminated in the horrific “clearance operations” in 2017 and the death of at least 10,000 people and the mass exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya – half of them children. Requests for arrest warrants include the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Min Aung Hlaing, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, Soe Win, and the former commander of the Western Command, Maung Maung Soe. Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) represents Rohingya survivors who provided testimonies in this case in 2023. This is the first time that any Rohingya survivors from the 2017 “clearance operations” have testified before a court of law. “I could not believe I could tell a court about my sufferings. I could not believe it until I stepped into the courtroom. I did it for justice, for my grandchildren, for a future where we can return home with dignity… Who would have thought that we, the Rohingya women, would be taking the Myanmar military to the court one day” – said Haseeba, a female witness, name changed to protect identity. The request from the Prosecutor, under Article 294 of the Argentinian Code of Criminal Procedure to seek statements from the identified perpetrators and issue international arrest warrants is a result of an investigation under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which was initiated following a complaint filed by the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) in November 2019. It is now for the Court to decide on whether there is sufficient evidence to issue the warrants. “The request for warrants by the Prosecutor is a critical step in the fight for justice for the Rohingya community. A positive decision of the federal court in Argentina can challenge the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military, which has emboldened it to continue to commit atrocity crimes against civilians across the country. Many of the witnesses, who are mainly women who have suffered from severe sexual violence have shown incredible bravery by coming forward and they are an inspiration to us all,” said Antonia Mulvey, Executive Director of LAW. Sexual violence perpetrated mainly by the Myanmar military was a hallmark of the 2017 “clearance operations” against the Rohingya. The UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the scale and brutality of sexual violence against women and girls was one of the factors that indicated the Myanmar military’s genocidal intent to destroy the Rohingya community. “I am truly pleased that the Argentinian prosecutor has asked for Myanmar military to provide answers to the court. I strongly believe that if we can catch the high-ranking military or police officials, we can protect my community. Arresting the masterminds behind these atrocities will bring peace to those who are still suffering inside Myanmar.” – said Salma, a female witness, name changed to protect identity. LAW represents over 400 Rohingya in the ongoing international justice processes including the Gambia v. Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Gambia recently filed its Reply to Myanmar’s counter memorial submitted last year. Whilst the international justice processes in relation to crimes against Rohingya and post-coup atrocities are underway, the ongoing human rights crisis across Myanmar under an illegitimate military regime continues to escalate. No ethnic peoples are left unaffected by the ongoing fighting in Myanmar. For the Rohingya particularly, with the intensification of the armed conflict in Rakhine State in recent months, they face a systematic misinformation campaign directed against them to fuel ethnic tensions, which is reminiscent of the 2012 and 2017 violence. The UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) has called upon all governments to prevent the recurrence of atrocities against Rohingya and for more political will and more action to urgently respond to the unmitigated crisis in Myanmar. About LAW LAW is an independent, non-profit organisation of human rights lawyers and jurists working in fragile and conflict-affected areas. LAW provides legal aid to victims and communities that have suffered human rights violations and abuses in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. For questions or further details, please contact LAW’s Communications Manager, Vittoria Groh at [email protected] or Legal and Programme Advisor, Ishita Kumar at [email protected]..."
Source/publisher: Legal Action Worldwide (Genève)
Date of publication: 2024-07-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: France, Britain and others allowed to intervene in Myanmar ICJ genocide case
Description: "AMSTERDAM, July 3 (Reuters) - Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain and the Maldives are allowed to intervene in Gambia's Myanmar genocide case with the International Court of Justice, the ICJ said in a statement on Wednesday. The countries had asked to intervene in the case at the ICJ, also known as the World Court, in November 2023. "The seven States concerned will... be allowed to submit their written observations on the subject-matter of their interventions," the ICJ also said in the statement. "The Court will determine at a later date whether they should be authorized to make observations in the course of the oral proceedings." In 2017 Gambia, a predominantly Muslim West African country, filed a case against Myanmar at the ICJ accusing it of committing genocide against the Rohingya, a minority Muslim group in Myanmar. A United Nations fact-finding mission concluded that a 2017 military campaign by Myanmar that drove 730,000 Rohingya into neighbouring Bangladesh had included "genocidal acts". Myanmar has denied genocide, rejecting the U.N. findings as "biased and flawed". It says its crackdown was aimed at Rohingya rebels who had carried out attacks. The World Court rejected Myanmar's objections to the genocide proceedings in July 2022, paving the way for the case to be heard in full but no date has yet been set..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2024-07-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-07-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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