Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Individual Documents
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"On 4 July 2024, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) prepared a statement at the 56th session of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council for the Interactive Dialogue with the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar. The statement urged Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, particularly Thailand, not to lend political legitimacy to the junta and to immediately halt all commercial operations profiting the junta by private and public entities in their jurisdictions. Read the statement below.
UN Human Rights Council – 56th session
Item 4: Interactive Dialogue with the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
4 July 2024
Mister President,
FIDH and its member organizations ALTSEAN-Burma and Women’s Peace Network thank the Special Rapporteur for his oral update.
The number of political prisoners in Myanmar is growing - we again call for their release amid increasing reports of serious abuses against them. Meanwhile, the junta’s forced recruitment is fueling more human rights violations.
If the junta is not stopped, the number of airstrikes, overwhelmingly targeting civilians, is set to double this year. During January to May alone, the junta launched 592 airstrikes, compared to 663 for the whole of last year.
Atrocities against Rohingya by the junta and the Arakan Army have accelerated in Rakhine State. Rohingya youth are being forced to join the same army that has been committing atrocity crimes against their families. Rohingya people are being pulled, against their will, into both sides of an escalating conflict that has displaced hundreds of thousands, including the people of Buthidaung.
The impunity must stop. We reiterate our call on UN member states to extend their full support to the Special Rapporteur and the International Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar, including by granting them access to their territories for official visits.
We urge the governments of ASEAN, particularly Thailand, not to lend political legitimacy to the junta and to immediately halt all commercial operations profiting the junta by private and public entities in their jurisdictions..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2024-07-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
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"This document is a follow-up on the situation in the Pauktaw Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, where SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL (SI) is providing comprehensive WASH assistance, in particular to ensure continuous access to water during the water scarcity period. SI started operating in Rakhine State during the emergency phase following Cyclone Giri in 2010. It then responded to the humanitarian crisis resulting from two waves of intercommunal violence in 2012. Since February 2013, SI has been working in Pauktaw IDP camps (ANYC, NC1, NC2, KNP) and village (ANYV), both hosting Rohingyas.
Over the past months, continued blockade of Sittwe-Pauktaw waterways and the lack of Travel Authorization (TA) issued by the authorities still hampered access to the 5 Pauktaw IDP sites. Since November 2023, critical materials required for the water scarcity mitigation could indeed no longer be transported from Sittwe, bringing related activities to a standstill. Most of the planned ponds’ improvements had to be postponed until after the monsoon season. Facing growing concerns related to water scarcity, Camp Management Committees (CMC) and communities agreed to reduce the quantity of water treated and distributed per person, allowing to extend the sufficiency period and thus delaying the water scarcity response itself. In May 2024, thanks to close coordination efforts with the WASH cluster and UNICEF, SI secured alternative solutions for some materials and waterboating was finally underway. As of June 15, 18,512 individuals are benefitting from water in camps, delivered to them as part of SI’s water scarcity response. Further joint efforts will be needed in the coming months, however, to find alternative ways of procuring supplies”..."
Source/publisher:
Solidarités International (Paris) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-07-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, and Shan State from June 22nd to 30th. When the Military Junta used drones and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, and Shan State, a group of civilians died. The political prisoners from Insein Prison, Yangon Region, were relocated to Kyiaksagaw Prison, Bago Region. After the Military was forced to sell the rice at a set price, they arrested the rice merchants and factory owners within a week.
Over 80 civilians died, and almost 60 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian was injured by the landmine of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-07-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
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Individual Documents
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411.09 KB 1.77 MB 2.4 MB
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"LONDON, Jul 3 2024 (IPS) - Myanmar’s army, at war with pro-democracy forces and ethnic militias, must know it’s nowhere near victory. It recently came close to losing control of Myawaddy, one of the country’s biggest cities, at a key location on the border with Thailand. Many areas are outside its control.
The army surely expected an easier ride when it ousted the elected government in a coup on 1 February 2021. It had ruled Myanmar for decades before democracy returned in 2015. But many democracy supporters took up arms, and in several parts of the country they’ve allied with militia groups from Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, with a long history of resisting military oppression.
Setbacks and violence
Army morale has collapsed. Thousands of soldiers are reported to have surrendered, including complete battalions – some out of moral objections to the junta’s violence and others because they saw defeat as inevitable. There have also been many defections, with defectors reporting they’d been ordered to kill unarmed civilians. Forces fighting the junta’s troops are encouraging defectors to join their ranks.
In response to reversals, in February the junta announced it would introduce compulsory conscription for young people, demanding up to five years of military service. An estimated 60,000 men are expected to be called up in the first round. The announcement prompted many young people to flee the country if they could, and if not, seek refuge in parts of Myanmar free from military control.
There have also been reports of army squads kidnapping people and forcing them to serve. Given minimal training, they’re cannon fodder and human shields. Rohingya people – an officially stateless Muslim minority – are among those reportedly being forcibly enlisted. They’re being pressed into service by the same military that committed genocide against them.
People who manage to cross into Thailand face hostility from Thai authorities and risk being returned against their will. Even after leaving Myanmar, refugees face the danger of transnational repression, as government intelligence agents reportedly operate in neighbouring countries and the authorities are freezing bank accounts, seizing assets and cancelling passports.
Conscription isn’t just about giving the junta more personnel to compensate for its losses – it’s also part of a sustained campaign of terror intended to subdue civilians and suppress activism. Neighbourhoods are being burned to the ground and hundreds have died in the flames. The air force is targeting unarmed towns and villages. The junta enjoys total impunity for these and many other vile acts.
The authorities hold thousands of political prisoners on fabricated charges and subject them to systematic torture. The UN independent fact-finding mission reports that at least 1,703 people have died in custody since the coup, likely an underestimate. Many have been convicted in secret military trials and some sentenced to death.
There’s also a growing humanitarian crisis, with many hospitals destroyed, acute food shortages in Rakhine state, where many Rohingya people live, and an estimated three million displaced. Voluntary groups are doing their best to help communities, but the situation is made much worse by the military obstructing access for aid workers.
International neglect
In March, UN human rights chief Volker Türk described the situation in Myanmar as ‘a never-ending nightmare’. It’s up to the international community to exert the pressure needed to end it.
It’s by no means certain the military will be defeated. Adversity could lead to infighting and the rise of even more vicious leaders. One thing that could make a decisive difference is disruption of the supply chain, particularly the jet fuel that enables lethal airstrikes on civilians. In April, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution calling on states to stop supplying the military with jet fuel. States should implement it.
Repressive states such as China, India and Russia have been happy enough to keep supplying the junta with weapons. But democratic states must take the lead and apply more concerted pressure. Some, including Australia, the UK and USA, have imposed new sanctions on junta members this year, but these have been slow in coming and fall short of the approach the Human Rights Council resolution demands.
But the worst response has come from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Ignoring reality and civil society’s proposals, ASEAN has stuck to a plan it developed in April 2021 that simply hasn’t worked. The junta takes advantage of ASEAN’s weakness. It announced compulsory conscription shortly after a visit by ASEAN’s Special Envoy for Myanmar.
ASEAN’s neglect has allowed human rights violations and, increasingly, transnational organised crime to flourish. The junta is involved in crimes such as drug trafficking, illegal gambling and online fraud. It uses the proceeds of these, often carried out with the help of Chinese gangs, to finance its war on its people. As a result, Myanmar now ranks number one on the Global Organized Crime Index. This is a regional problem, affecting people in Myanmar’s neighbouring countries as well.
ASEAN members also have an obligation to accept refugees from Myanmar, including those fleeing conscription. They should commit to protecting them and not forcing them back, particularly when they’re democracy and human rights activists whose lives would be at risk.
Forced conscription must be the tipping point for international action. This must include international justice, since there’s none in Myanmar. The junta has ignored an order from the International Court of Justice to protect Rohingya people and prevent actions that could violate the Genocide Convention, following a case brought by the government of The Gambia alleging genocide against the Rohingya. The UN Security Council should now use its power to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court so prosecutions of military leaders can begin.
China and Russia, which have so far refused to back calls for action, should end their block on Security Council action, in the interests of human rights and to prevent growing regional instability..."
Source/publisher:
Inter Press Service
Date of publication:
2024-07-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"New York, July 2, 2024—Myanmar authorities should release journalist Htet Aung, and allow members of the press to do their jobs without fear of legal reprisal or imprisonment, the Committee to Protect Journalists said Tuesday.
On June 28, a court in Sittwe, capital of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, sentenced Htet Aung, a reporter with the Development Media Group (DMG) news agency, to five years in prison with hard labor. His sentence was in connection with a report the outlet published on August 25, 2023, under the headline “Calls for justice on sixth anniversary of Muslim genocide in Arakan State,” according to the news agency, a DVB social media post, and DMG editor-in-chief Aung Marm Oo, who communicated with CPJ via text message.
Htet Aung was convicted of abetting terrorism under Section 52(a) of the country’s Anti-Terrorism Law. The journalist’s initial indictment was for defamation under Section 65 of the Telecommunications Law, but the charge was changed to abetting terrorism on December 1.
DMG office security guard Soe Win Aung was handed the same sentence as Htet Aung, according to the news report and Aung Marm Oo. Both were also held on a charge of allegedly stealing a motorcycle, the same sources said.
In a public statement reviewed by CPJ, DMG said it “strongly condemns the regime’s unjust imprisonment” of Htet Aung and Soe Win Aung.
“The 5-year sentencing of Development Media Group reporter Htet Aung on bogus terrorism charges is Myanmar’s latest outrage against the free press and should be immediately reversed,” said Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s senior Southeast Asia representative. “Myanmar’s junta must stop harassing and jailing journalists for merely doing their jobs by reporting the news.”
After his October arrest, Htet Aung was held in pre-trial detention at Sittwe’s No. 1 Police Station, where he was denied visitation, according to the news agency’s report and Aung Marm Oo. Htet Aung was initially arrested while taking photos of soldiers making donations to Buddhist monks during a religious festival in Sittwe.
Hours later, soldiers, police, and special branch officials raided the Development Media Group’s bureau; confiscated cameras, computers, documents, financial records, and cash, and sealed off the building. The agency’s staff went underground to avoid arrest, according to Aung Marm Oo, who has been in hiding since 2019 after being charged under Myanmar’s Unlawful Association Act, which can result in up to five years’ imprisonment and fines.
Development Media Group specializes in news from Rakhine State, where in 2017, an army operation drove more than half a million Muslim Rohingyas to flee to neighboring Bangladesh in what the United Nations called a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”
CPJ’s email to the Myanmar Ministry of Information did not receive a response..."
Source/publisher:
Committee to Protect Journalists
Date of publication:
2024-07-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Acting under its early warning and urgent action procedure;
Recalling the Committee’s letter adopted under early warning and urgent action procedure on 14
December 2018 during its 97th session, under which the Committee expressed concerns about
allegations that the Rohingya has been the target of hate speech and violence in India, including
calls for deportation to Myanmar and about the conditions of detention camps for migrants. The
Committee expressed concerns about the manifestations of racial discrimination against the
Rohingya in India and that their return to Myanmar in violation of the principle of nonrefoulement would infringe their rights protected under the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the Convention);
Regrets the lack of response by the State party to its abovementioned letter or information on
measures to ensure sufficient capacity to replace detention camps by reception facilities,
providing adequate shelter, basic services, and humanitarian assistance including effective access
to health care services as well as to comply with the obligation of non-refoulement arising out of
the international norms concerning refugees and human rights;
Reiterates its concerns about the order of the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 8 August 2017,
which considered Rohingya who fled Myanmar to India (thereafter “Rohingya”) as “illegal
immigrants” and called upon all State Governments to “sensitize all the law enforcement and
intelligence agencies for taking prompt steps in identifying the illegal migrants and initiate the
deportation processes expeditiously and without delay”1
;
Alarmed about reports of racial discrimination and restrictions faced by the Rohingya following
the adoption of the order in August 2017 preventing them from exercising their economic, social
and cultural rights, in particular their rights of access to education, employment and health-care
and reportedly the discontinuation of granting them long term visas;
Deeply concerned about reports on the spread of racist hate speech and the dissemination of
negative stereotypes against Rohingya on the Internet and in social media, reports on the use of racist hate speech by politicians and public figures, and the lack of information on investigations,
prosecutions and convictions of public figures and politicians for hate speech;
Concerned about reports of the prevalence of arbitrary mass detention of the Rohingya, including
children, in inadequate conditions and in some cases without due process or access to legal
representation, following the order of the Ministry of Home Affairs in August 2017;
Alarmed about reports of several cases of forcible deportation and returns of Rohingya to
Myanmar between 2018 and 2022 as well as the ongoing risk of deportation of the remaining
Rohingya in India, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement;
Concerned about reports that human rights defenders, lawyers, members of civil society
organizations, and activists have increasingly become targets of intimidation, harassment and
reprisals as a consequence of their work on the rights of the Rohingya in India;
Taking note that two Rohingya filed a writ petition in 2017 before the Supreme Court of India to
release the detained refugees and halt their deportation from India;
Regrets the delay of the Supreme Court of India in considering the abovementioned petition,
which was submitted six years ago; Also taking note that the Supreme Court of India issued an Interim Order on 8 April 2021 and
decided not to grant an interim measure to prevent the deportation of around 160 Rohingya
detained in Jammu;
2
Takes note of the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,
submitted for the 78th session of the UN General Assembly, in which he noted that “six years
after the genocidal attacks by the Myanmar military in Rakhine State, the Rohingya continue to
face violence, persecution and neglect, regardless of their location. The situation in Rakhine State
remains fundamentally unchanged since the violence in 2017, except for the additional misery
wrought by Cyclone Mocha. Approximately 600,000 Rohingya remain under an apartheid
regime, with 140,000 confined to de facto internment camps”;3
Also notes the report Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, submitted
for the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council, in which he highlighted reports of
Rohingya in India being subjected to pushback at land borders, forcible deportation to Myanmar
and arbitrary detention;4
Notes that persons who had to flee Myanmar due to the currently prevailing situation of
widespread human rights violations in the context of the conflict are likely to be in need of international refugee protection under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Convention), in accordance with the Guidance Note on the International
Protection Needs of People Fleeing Myanmar by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
5
Recalling the Committee’s general recommendation no. 30 (2004) on discrimination against noncitizens and general recommendation no. 31 (2005) on the prevention of racial discrimination in
the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system;
Calls upon the State party to fully respect its international obligations arising from the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
Calls upon India to ensure that legislative guarantees against racial discrimination apply to noncitizens regardless of their immigration status and that laws and policies relating to immigration,
deportation, or other forms of removal of non-citizens do not discriminate—in purpose or
effect—on the basis of race, colour or ethnic or national origin; Further calls upon India to refrain from forcible deportation and returns of the Rohingya to
Myanmar where they would be at risk of being subjected to serious human rights violations and
abuses as well as to provide access to its territory for persons in need of international protection;
Urges the State party to ensure that the Rohingya have access to effective remedies, including
the right to challenge deportation orders, and are allowed effectively to pursue such remedies as
well as to ensure that the system of justice guarantees the victim a court judgement within a
reasonable period, particularly in relation to the petition before the Supreme Court of India;
Calls India to end the arbitrary mass detention of the Rohingya, and ensure that immigration
detention is applied only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period, provide
detained Rohingya with legal safeguards and ensure their access to legal counsel, and ensure that
living conditions in places of detention are adequate and in accordance with international
standards; Urges the State party to end racial discrimination against Rohingya and to remove restrictions
preventing them from enjoying their rights without discrimination, in particular with regard to
access to employment, health and education, especially by ensuring the issuance of long term
visas and other identity documents;
Urges the State party to combat the spread of racist hate speech in the media, on the Internet and
in social media and to firmly condemn any form of hate speech and distance itself from racist
hate speech expressed by politicians and public figures, including members of parliament and
religious leaders, and ensure that such acts are investigated and adequately punished; Also urges India to continue to collaborate with the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar, including through facilitating a country visit to India from
the Special Rapporteur..."
Source/publisher:
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Date of publication:
2024-07-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"မိဘပြည်သူများသို့ အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
၁၃၈၆ ခုနှစ်၊ နံယုန်လပြည့်ကျော် (၁၁) ရက်
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ (၂) ရက်
အာရက္ခတပ်တော်အနေဖြင့် သံတွဲမြို့ရှိ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ စခန်းများအပါအဝင် သိမ်းပိုက်ရန် ကျန်ရှိနေ သေးသော အခြားမြို့များရှိ စစ်စခန်းများအားလုံးကို မရပ်မနား ထိုးစစ်ဆင်တိုက်ခိုက်လျက်ရှိသောကြောင့် တိုက်ပွဲ များ ဆက်လက်ပြင်းထန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့ တိုက်ပွဲများပြင်းထန်နေမှုကို အခွင့်ကောင်းယူလျက် မသမာသူ အုပ်စုတစ်စုသည် မိမိတို့ ULA/AA နာမည်ကိုအသုံးပြုပြီး သံတွဲ၊ ငပလီပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ရှိ ဟိုတယ်နှင့် ခရီးသွားလာရေး လုပ်ငန်းရှင်များထံမှ အတင်းအဓမ္မ ငွေလိမ်လည် တောင်းခံကောက်ယူနေကြောင်း သိရှိရပါသည်။
မိမိတို့ ULA/AA နာမည်ကိုအသုံးပြုပြီး အယောင်ဆောင် ငွေလိမ်တောင်းခံနေသောသူများအနေဖြင့် ယခုကဲ့သို့သော လုပ်ရပ်များအား ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရန် သတိပေးလိုက်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် သံတွဲ၊ ငပလီပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ရှိ ဟိုတယ်နှင့်ခရီးသွားလာရေးလုပ်ငန်းရှင်များထံမှ ယခုကဲ့သို့ အခွန်ကောက်ခံခြင်း၊ ငွေကြေးတောင်းခံခြင်းမျိုး မရှိပါကြောင်း မိဘပြည်သူများအား လေးစားစွာဖြင့် အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။ အကယ်၍ ယခုကဲ့သို့ ခြိမ်းခြောက် ငွေညှစ်တောင်းခံခြင်းများ ထပ်မံရှိလာပါက မိမိတို့ ULA/AA ဗဟိုဌာနချုပ်နှင့် သံတွဲဒေသ တာဝန်ခံများထံသို့ အချိန်မရွေး တိုက်ရိုက်ဆက်သွယ်ပြီး စုံစမ်းမေးမြန်းနိုင်ပါကြောင်း အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Arakan Army
Date of publication:
2024-07-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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89.93 KB
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"Myanmar: New report urges robust support for women, girls and LGBT people in post-coup Myanmar
GENEVA (2 July 2024) - The military coup was a devastating setback for gender equality in Myanmar and has left women, girls, and LGBT people acutely vulnerable to discrimination, violence, and exploitation, according to a new report published today by Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
“Courage amid Crisis: Gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar” describes the terrible toll that human rights violations by the military junta have had on women, girls, and LGBT people. The report also highlights the role of women at the forefront of the revolutionary movement, to embed equality, justice, and non-discrimination into the foundation of a future democratic state.
The international community must step up support for women, girls, and LGBT people in Myanmar by working with local civil society organisations on delivery of humanitarian aid tailored to the needs of the most vulnerable and funding programmes for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, the Special Rapporteur said. He urged governments and donors to work with emerging governance structures, ethnic resistance organisations, and civil society to ensure accountability for crimes against women, girls, and LGBT people.
“The threat of sexual and gender-based violence is a dark shadow that follows women, girls, and LGBT people in Myanmar. Cruelty and dehumanisation are the defining features of widespread sexual violence perpetrated by junta forces in conflict zones, at check points and in places of detention,” the expert said.
“The junta has carried out a coordinated campaign to dismantle organisations and networks that support women, girls, and LGBT people. These advocates contend with the constant threat of arrest and imprisonment, leading some to continue their work from exile. Vicious online harassment campaigns target women and LGBT leaders with violent and sexualised threats.”
The report describes threats to the economic, social, and cultural rights of women, girls, and LGBT people, including loss of economic independence, shrinking access to education and health care, and impacts of protracted displacement.
“In cities, villages, and displacement sites across the country, women are shouldering their families’ burdens. They are skipping meals so their children can eat, taking on new duties in the household, and struggling to keep their families safe in violent and chaotic environments. Facing these challenges, many women and girls are turning to negative coping strategies and are vulnerable to gendered protection concerns, including trafficking, sexual exploitation and early marriage,” Andrews said.
The report also highlights the dire situation of Rohingya women and girls, who face intersecting layers of discrimination and grave security risks due to the systematic denial of citizenship and basic human rights, as well as discriminatory beliefs and practices within their own community.
“Facing grave risks and persistent discrimination, women and LGBT leaders refuse to be silenced. They are claiming roles in revolutionary governance structures, tirelessly advocating for meaningful political participation, and bravely developing accountability measures to hold all perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence to account. Women-led civil society organisations have been the backbone of local humanitarian relief efforts,” he said.
“I am inspired by the courage, resilience, and tenacity of women and LGBT leaders, who are advancing a revolution within the revolution, one that seeks to upend patriarchal hierarchies and guarantee gender equality for future generations. The international community must empower them now with the support they need and deserve,” Andrews said.
Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-07-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-01
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and international relations
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Camps for people displaced by war have also been evacuated, residents said.
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"Rivers in northern Myanmar swollen by torrential rain have burst their banks, forcing about 10,000 people, including many displaced by war, to flee, while many others have been trapped on their roofs by the rising waters, relief workers told Radio Free Asia on Monday.
Heavy rain in Kachin state has led to floods in four townships along the banks of the Irrawaddy and N’mai rivers, forcing residents to seek shelter in monasteries and elsewhere on higher ground.
"Every neighborhood is flooded. It could be worse than the record set in 2004,” said one relief worker in the state capital, Myitkyina, referring to the last severe flooding in Myanmar’s northernmost state 20 years ago.
“There are lots of people affected,” said the aid worker, who declined to be identified in fear of reprisals by the military authorities for speaking to the media.
RFA called Kachin state’s junta spokesperson, Moe Min Thein, for information on rescue efforts but calls went unanswered. A junta-backed newspaper, The Global New Light of Myanmar, reported that relief operations were underway and nine evacuation facilities had opened in Kachin state since Sunday.
Overflowing rivers forced residents from their homes in Tanai, Waimaw, Chipwi townships, and parts of Myitkyina, which is on the west bank of the Irrawaddy.
Collapse at notorious Myanmar rare earth mine kills 15 people
At Myanmar camp for displaced hundreds struggle as rainy season looms
Five dead, 20 missing in Myanmar landslide
Camps for people displaced by weeks of fighting between the autonomy-seeking Kachin Independence Army insurgent group and junta forces in Waingmaw, Chipwi and Myitkyina townships were also flooded, with their inhabitants forced to find higher ground, witnesses said.
There were no immediate reports of deaths in the latest flooding but landslides, partly triggered by the heavy rain, have recently killed at least 35 people in rare earth mines in Chipwi township.
By 9:30 a.m. on Monday, the Irrawaddy river had risen four feet (1.2 meters) above its critical level, and was still rising by about three inches every hour, Naing Linn Htwe, chief of the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology, said in a statement.
Some residents of Myitkyina have taken refuge from the swirling, murky waters on the roofs of their homes.
"We’re trapped,” one resident stuck on a roof told RFA. “The water is almost as deep as the height of a man.”
“In my household, there are three kids and two elderly people and rescue hasn't come yet, but they said they would. They said they’d run into some difficulties on the way.”
To the south, residents in river-side communities in the Sagaing, Magway and Ayeyarwady regions, which are also on the Irrawaddy, are fretting that the inundation will soon reach them..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-07-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Flooding in Burma/Myanmar
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Women and Children Face Ongoing Risks to their Safety and Security Amid Increasing Attacks by the Military Junta
Description:
"Women & Children Targeted by Junta Attacks
According to the latest Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimates, nearly 3 million people are displaced across Burma. Local organizations report even higher approximations, including the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP), whose recent data show over one million people displaced in Karen State alone. These numbers reveal a situation of extreme devastation for local people who have had their lives uprooted by conflict fueled by an illegitimate and corrupt military.
Data collected by the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) also reveals distress and uncertainty. As the armed resistance movement increasingly gains more ground, Burma Army soldiers are scaling up attacks that have targeted local populations. Women and children are being killed in their homes, places of worship, hospitals and schools.
At the beginning of the month, an explosion occurred on June 4th at a basic education primary school in the Eain Shwet Pyin ward of Dawei Town. The blast resulted in the death of one third-grade student and injuries to 26 others, according to local sources.
The explosion, believed to have been caused by a bomb, happened around noon during the lunch break. Among the injured were eleven male students and fifteen female students. Tragically, a nine-year-old third-grade boy lost his life.
“The deceased child’s face was disfigured, and one of his arms was severed,” a resident reported. Additionally, a female primary student suffered severe injuries and received emergency treatment.
The injured students were treated at both the military junta hospital and the main public hospital of Dawei. According to humanitarian organizations, seventeen students were taken to the military hospital, and five were treated at the main public hospital.
The cause of the explosion is still under investigation. However, the school’s proximity to a nearby inspection gate, where recent military activity occurred, has led locals to speculate that leftover military equipment might be responsible.
In mid-2023, a similar incident occurred in a garden near a police station in Pa La Town, Pu Law Township, where three children were injured by an explosion while playing.
Schools are places of education, and to target them is a war crime. Children are being deprived of their childhoods in Burma as the junta unleashes ongoing, unabated attacks against them in places where they have the right to feel safe and protected.
On June 26th, HURFOM released the second issue of the ‘Voice Up’ series, which found at least twenty women were injured, sixteen were killed, and eighteen were arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained. Several of those killed were in their homes at the time of indiscriminate firing by the junta. Landmines also continue to pose a devastating risk that robs innocent people of their mobility and freedom of movement. Landmines are hidden, increasing the risk of their detonation.
The indiscriminate firing in villages targets women and children as they are tending to their households, running local businesses and cultivating their fields. On the morning of June 2nd, the Kyaikto Revolutionary Forces launched an artillery attack on the junta’s 310th Artillery Battalion and 207th Infantry Battalion based in Thein Zayat. In retaliation, the junta forces began shelling villages, including Thon Kone, Wazat Kwin, Sit Kwin, Ah Kine, Mouk Kha Maw, and Khruay, both day and night.
During the shelling, 26-year-old Ma Khin Lay Ree, who was six months pregnant, was injured in her left leg by artillery fragments in Mouk Kha Maw village. Additionally, on June 3rd, a Catholic nun from Thon Kone village and a 20-year-old youth from Wazat Kwin village were also injured by artillery fragments.
“Artillery shelling happens every day. Villagers are forced to take cover in bomb shelters, and those who can’t endure it have already fled,” said a resident from Mouk Kha Maw village.
Due to the artillery shelling by the junta, three houses in Thon Kone village and two houses in Sit Kwin village were damaged, and several villagers fled their homes seeking safety. In Kyaikto Township, junta forces’ artillery shelling in May resulted in the death of one civilian and injuries to at least seven others, according to a statement from the KNU Thaton District.
Then, on June 14, at 1 PM, the 310th Artillery Battalion of the military junta stationed in Thein Za Yat launched two shells without any ongoing combat. Due to the explosion, a fourteen-year-old girl, Ma Nandar Lin, and a one-and-a-half-year-old, Ma Shwe Zin Lin, were hit by the blast and died.
“Their parents are devastated,” a Kyaik Hto resident said.
On the same day, the 310th Artillery Battalion and the 207th Light Infantry Battalion of the junta fired more than 15 shells randomly around Thon Kwa village without any battle, according to KNU Thaton District officials.
“There is no right to fire artillery into villages where civilians live, regardless of whether there is fighting or not. This act violates civilians’ freedom of movement and human rights,” said Saw Aye Naing, Secretary of KNU Thaton District.
On June 12, an artillery strike by the Thein Za Yat Artillery Battalion injured 64-year-old U Than Oo and his 31-year-old daughter, Ma Yi Yi Win, from Pain Nae Kone village, who is now receiving treatment at Thein Za Yat Hospital.
In May alone, thirteen civilians were killed, and 41 were injured by artillery strikes by the junta troops in Mon State, according to a report released by the La Gon Eain on June 12.
In a separate incident, during a clash near Yapu village in Yephyu Township, Tanintharyi Region, a house was destroyed by a multiple rocket launcher strike from the Mawrawaddy Navy, resulting in the death of three family members and severe injuries to two teenagers.
Local sources reported that fighting broke out between junta troops and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) near Yapu village and Phaya-Thone-Zu on June 7th. At approximately 2:30 PM, the junta troops, advancing from Phaya-Thone-Zu to Yapu village, encountered resistance from the PDF.
A resident stated, “The Mawrawaddy Navy fired over a hundred rockets. Three people from Yapu-Ywa Thit were killed.”
The victims from Yapu-Ywa Thit were identified as U Aung Aung, Ma Lah Wah Htoo, and their infant daughter. U Aung Aung and his daughter died instantly, while Ma Lah Wah Htoo succumbed to her injuries on the way to the hospital. The house was also set ablaze by the rocket strike.
Additionally, a teenage boy and girl from Yapu-Ywa Thit were injured and are currently receiving treatment at Kalain Aung Hospital.
Due to the attack, residents from Yapu, Thayar Mon, Yapu-Ywa Thit, and Mile-60 villages have fled their homes for safety. The clash lasted approximately one and a half hours.
Following the skirmish, junta troops entered Mile-60 village and looted various items from abandoned homes. A local woman reported: “They took phones, batteries, wires, fuel containers, and shoes from two empty houses. Currently, they have occupied the monastery in Mile-60 village.”
No place is safe as hundreds continue to flee and seek safety and, as many told HURFOM, ‘dare not return’ to their villages. The situation on the ground in Burma has worsened since the attempted coup, especially for those living in rural areas and where the resistance has made significant gains. These conflict-prone areas have led to attacks led by the various Burma Army battalions by land, air and Naval command.
Families Separated by Indiscriminate Firing by the Military Junta
Families have endured crippling levels of stress as unprovoked attacks threaten the loss of life and displacement. On the night of June 5th, the Burma Army under the MOMC 19, Southeast Command of Mon, fired artillery shells into Mawkanin Village, explicitly targeting a home in the Karsip neighbourhood. The shelling resulted in injuries to five family members, including two children, despite the absence of any prior armed conflict in the area.
Residents and sources close to the affected family reported that an artillery shell from the 588th Rapid Deployment Battalion struck the roof of a house, causing it to explode upon impact. The injured family members have been identified as Nai Aung Nai, 50, his wife, Mi San Aye; their eldest daughter, Mi Sandar Oo, 28; their 17-year-old son, Min Soe Pai, and their 11-year-old son, Min Jalon Htaw.
Emergency response teams from the Lamine Youth Emergency Assistance Group were quickly mobilized and transported the injured to Lamine Hospital for urgent medical treatment. A close relative of the family recounted the attack, saying:
“The artillery shell exploded while the family was asleep inside their home. The house was severely damaged, and Mi Sandar Oo sustained serious injuries. Even their motorcycle was destroyed.”
The family members suffered various injuries. Nai Aung Nai sustained a severe abdominal wound, while Mi Sandar Oo suffered significant injuries to her leg, including fractures. Their daughter, Mi Non-Nadi Chan, was transferred to Ye Township Hospital for further treatment due to a fractured knee. Min Soe Pai received injuries to his knee, hand, and abdomen, and Min Jalon Htaw had severe lacerations on one of his legs.
Another witness noted: “Throughout the night, the artillery shelling continued without pause, indiscriminately hitting houses in the area.”
Reports from the night of June 5 to the morning of June 6 indicate that the military junta fired nearly 70 artillery shells into the area despite the lack of any ongoing conflict. This indiscriminate shelling has caused significant distress and fear among the local population.
Authorities and humanitarian organizations assessed the damage and provided the affected families with necessary assistance. Meanwhile, calls for an immediate ceasefire and humanitarian intervention are growing among local and international communities.
Starting at 9 PM on June 22nd, the junta began shelling Dhamma Tha village in Kyaikmayaw Township with artillery weapons. Eight artillery shells were fired, exploding near the town, causing significant concern among the residents.
As of the morning of June 24th, a few families fled to escape the escalating situation. A naval warship from the junta has also moved towards the Kaw Bein area. Only about a hundred internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to Dhamma Tha village.
Organizations supporting the IDPs stated that after returning and setting up tents, each family would receive 500,000 kyats, as cited by a resident. Over the past three months, more than 100 IDP families from Dhamma Tha village have been taking refuge in Mawlamyine City and have not received any assistance. This is primarily due to challenges in accessing and securing long-term and sustainable funds.
It costs nearly 1.5 million kyats to return to the village and set up tents. Around 400 IDP families from Dhamma Tha village are still taking refuge in other towns. The IDPs estimate that among the more than 100 families who have returned, only about 30 were affected by the fire. Due to the renewed artillery shelling by the military, the IDPs have stated that it is neither a good time nor a suitable condition for them to return.
On June 19, from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., heavy artillery fire was exchanged near Myauk Chaw village within the Yar Phu village tract, where resistance alliance forces and junta troops were engaged in combat. By the afternoon, a military helicopter and a jet fighter had dropped six bombs on Myauk Chaw.
“Since this morning, we have continuously heard the sounds of artillery until 5 PM. We heard about six loud explosions,” said a resident of Yar Phu.
Investigations are ongoing to determine the extent of casualties and whether there were any civilian injuries or deaths resulting from the fighting and airstrikes.
According to members of the local People’s Defense Forces (PDF), the junta troops involved in the fighting had also faced a drone bombing attack by resistance forces on June 11 while temporarily stationed in Yar Phu village. Preliminary reports indicate casualties on both sides during today’s battles, with detailed investigations underway.
On June 18, it was reported that a battle occurred between resistance alliance forces and junta troops near the Zar Dee village tract, close to the Kan Bauk village tract. Since June 3rd, the junta troops have been launching military operations towards the Nat Kyi Sin village tract in Yebyu Township, resulting in ongoing military tension in the area.
Raids, Theft and Arson Fueling Displacement
Ongoing raids by the junta are also undermining civilian safety. Surveillance and violations of privacy are widespread as the Burma Army attempts to violently suppress all forms of freedom of movement and expression.
More than 100 homes in Maung Mae Shaung village, located in Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region, were raided by the military junta, which occupied the town for two days.
On June 1st, after Colonel Zin Win Aung of the junta was shot dead while driving near Maung Mae Shaung village, nearly 100 Burma Army soldiers from the 302nd Artillery Battalion and the Yebyu area arrived at Maung Mae Shaung village. Upon entering, the junta troops randomly fired both artillery shells and small weapons, causing most of the villagers to flee to nearby areas. The troops then began occupying Maung Mae Shaung village.
On the morning of June 3, the junta troops left Maung Mae Shaung village to return to the 302nd Artillery Battalion in Za Ha village, taking with them three full trucks of goods, including refrigerators, fans, electrical appliances, food, domestic chickens, and other valuable items that they had stolen from local villagers.
During their two-day occupation of the village, the junta arrested 20 local men. On the early morning of June 3, they left the town, releasing 19 detained men and taking one man with them. According to local sources, as of June 5th, most villagers could not return to their homes and remained in nearby areas.
Maung Mae Shaung village, located about 7 miles from Dawei, frequently experiences clashes between the junta troops and resistance forces. The junta troops regularly fire artillery weapons indiscriminately. Due to the frequent ambushes by resistance forces around the village, the junta troops have been conducting searches and raiding homes to seize valuable items, which has happened before.
Additionally, on May 13, the military junta’s checkpoint at the entrance of Dawei Township’s Eain Shwet Pyin ward was attacked, resulting in the deaths of two junta soldiers.
Offensives at the beginning of the month in Dawei District, Yebyu Township, forced over 300 households to flee their homes, which were also subsequently raided.
A resident from 60 Miles village said, “The junta troops raided Ma Yan Chaung, Thayar Mon, Yar Phu (New Village), Pyar Thone Su, Sein Bone, and Nat Gyi Sin villages. People had to prepare in advance and flee when the troops invaded.”
With the onset of the rainy season, the displaced need additional shelter and medicines, according to a local man assisting them. He added, “They are not fleeing to established refugee camps; they are fleeing to avoid conflict.”
The military junta’s troops, consisting of around 50 soldiers, began approaching the villages on June 2nd. Along their route, they set up snipers and laid ambushes.
On June 4th, resistance forces attacked the junta’s Light Infantry Battalions 408, 409, and 410, based in Kalain Aung. Concurrently, a junta force of around 200 soldiers advanced towards the village of Kaw Hlaing in Ye Township, Mon State.
Based on reports from travellers and town residents, the Mawrawaddy Navy has increased security and tightened inspections at the Kalain Aung Bridge gate in Yebyu Township since June 3rd. Following the arrival of Mawrawaddy Navy troops, nightly patrols have been conducted within Kalain Aung. Additionally, on the Kalain Aung-Kan Bauk road, there have been increased inspections at three or more locations since June 5th.
Following an attack on a military junta checkpoint at the Kalain Aung Bridge on May 22nd, around 100 junta troops from the Mawrawaddy Navy conducted operations around Mi Kyaung Hlaung village and Kalain Aung. These troops remain in the area to this day and are occupying homes belonging to displaced residents. As a result, many displaced people from Mi Kyaung Hlaung and Kalain Aung have been unable to return home.
During April and May, military junta offensives and battles in Yebyu Township displaced over 2,000 people. Most of these displaced people have since returned home.
Increasing Surveillance and Restrictions on Freedom of Movement
Travellers are facing increasing restrictions on their mobility as surveillance by the junta extends to those passing through various checkpoints. In early June, the junta bases on Pain Nal Taw Road, specifically the No. 9 base, Wee Yaw base, and Pain Nal Taw base, were supervising inspections, according to local sources.
A local traveller said, “Now they are carrying out detailed inspections, asking for photos to be shown, and questioning us.”
Much of the rise in interrogation and questioning is due to the ongoing forced conscription being unjustly enforced by the military junta. According to Myeik residents in southern Burma, since June 2nd, personal data of each adult individual has been collected in various wards and quarters in Myeik City for conscription registration.
The Mudon to Three Pagodas Pass highway, a critical route connecting the Thai-Burma border, faces increased scrutiny and toll fees imposed by junta forces and some armed groups. This situation has made it difficult for locals and travellers to afford the journey amid the current economic crisis.
Drivers report paying over 10,000 MMK per passenger at multiple checkpoints along the route. These acts of extortion are blatant and are viewed by locals and travellers as a means for the Junta and armed groups to exploit the public for financial gain.
Since early 2024, drivers have had to use the ‘Danone village route’ alternative due to restrictions on the Three Pagodas Pass-Mudon forest route. As a result, travel on the Mudon-Three Pagodas Pass highway now involves navigating ten checkpoints, the majority of which were managed by the Junta, their alliance armed forces, and some tolls operated by the joint forces of KNLA-led voluntary groups—the toll fees amount to approximately 16,000 MMK per passenger, creating significant financial burdens.
“Checkpoint fees are calculated per passenger, costing around 16,000 MMK each. If there are more passengers, the fees increase. We can’t charge passengers more for the ride, so the rising toll fees are problematic,” explained a driver who operates along the Mudon-Three Pagodas route.
Additionally, the alternative ‘Danone route’ presents challenges, including rough terrain and the risk of conflicts, requiring drivers to exercise caution. The travel time has increased considerably, often requiring overnight stays and posing safety concerns due to potential clashes.
“Previously, travelling to Thanbyuzayat took only five hours. Using the Danone route often requires changing to boats and sometimes staying overnight. The frequent checkpoints and risk of sudden conflicts make it difficult for drivers,” another driver shared.
Since the military coup, nearly 30 checkpoints have been established along the Thai-Myanmar border routes, including Three Pagodas Pass, Kyaikdon, Thanbyuzayat, and Mudon.
Forced Conscription
On May 26th and June 2nd, households in Innlay-Myine were called to provide detailed household population data and guest lists. The Village Administrator informed residents that men and women aged 18 to 35 were being registered for military service.
“The current list will be submitted to the office, and those listed will be called up on election day. Pregnant women and mothers were also registered,” said a female resident from Innlay-Myine.
Similarly, in the Myeik Taung quarter, village administrators collected data from households for the upcoming military conscription from May 28th. A local man from Myeik Taung stated that men and women aged 18 to 35, including those with families and children, were registered. In Kyan Taw, Won Dan, Kan Hpyar, and Myit Nge neighbourhoods, data collection occurred on May 30 and 31.
A resident of Myeik Taung expressed concern, stating:
“We can’t contact those conscripted in the previous batch, and there have been no updates. This makes the current registrants very worried.”
According to village administrators, the women’s data was collected not for the immediate upcoming batch but for the fifth batch of military conscription at the Palaw Military Training Center. Since March, names of men aged 23 to 35 have been collected for conscription lotteries by neighbourhood. Data is currently being collected from men over 18 and women aged 18 to 35 who were not previously registered.
According to some conscripted students and their close associates, conscription letters for the third round of military service in Dawei District were received, including those for current university students and individuals abroad. These letters, dated May 24th, were received in the last week of May and listed names, father’s names, and registration numbers, along with invitations to attend a meeting at the Dawei Township office department.
An attendee from Dawei Town reported that almost a hundred guardians attended the meeting, even though the conscripted individuals themselves did not show up. “They are also calling those who are abroad. The conscripted individuals are not present in the neighbourhood,” said a resident of Dawei.
Although the conscription law allows temporary exemptions for students, during the second round of military service, some states and regions conscripted current students without their consent.
The meeting discussed only the conscription law. Parents who attended were provided with various reasons and explanations. In the first and second rounds of conscription in the Tanintharyi Region, the military junta is training over 500 young men at the No. 12 Advanced Training School in Palauk.
In Mon State, migrant workers and impoverished individuals are being paid a few million Myanmar Kyats to replace the recruits for the junta’s weekly military conscription. The conscription law enforced by the coup military junta mandates weekly conscription batches nationwide, including in Mon State.
Due to a lack of volunteers for military service in the relevant villages and wards, administrators have begun hiring migrant workers and impoverished individuals for a few million kyats.
An anonymous source reported:
“Currently, the price for one person ranges from 3 million to 6 million kyats. In places like Mawlamyine, this practice of hiring substitutes is common. Once recruited, these individuals are immediately sent to the recruiting units. There is more hiring and replacement activity in places like Ye and Thanbyuzayat. Many of the substitutes are poor people, mostly migrant workers.”
In Mon State, with over 1,100 villages and village tracts, the junta has instructed ward and village administrators to provide one man per village for the weekly conscription. Administrators face various pressures because many wards and towns cannot meet the junta’s recruitment demands.
Relief Organizations and Activists Targeted
Social workers and relief agencies are also being targeted for their efforts to support displaced communities. Five members of the Lamine Youth Charity Group (Ye Township, Mon State), including Charity’s Chairman U Win Aung, were detained for over a week, causing significant difficulties for emergency patients.
Later, the military junta conducted a full-force raid on the office of the Lamine Youth Charity Group, detaining three more members and subsequently arresting Chairman U Win Aung. As of June 6, all five members remain detained at LIB No. 588 and have not been released.
Due to the detention of these five members, all social relief operations have been suspended indefinitely since June 3rd, the group announced.
On June 5, at 10 PM, LIB No. 588 fired 60mm mortars, hitting a house in the Ka-Site neighbourhood of Mawt Kanin village, causing an explosion. The artillery injured U Aung Naing, aged 50, and his family of five and are receiving medical treatment at Lamine Hospital. Two family members sustained severe injuries and were supposed to be transferred to Mawlamyine Hospital. However, due to the suspension of the Lamine Youth Charity Group’s operations, they continued to receive treatment at Lamine Hospital, according to a family member.
During the military coup in Mon State, social relief organizations have frequently been detained and interrogated by the junta.
On June 16, around 9 a.m., junta troops arrested 50-year-old Ko Hla Moe, an activist and backhoe driver, and his wife near Kyaik Htee Saung Pagoda:
“The junta soldiers arrived in a car, entered their house, and captured both. They were blindfolded with black hoods,” a local reported.
Ko Hla Moe and his wife supported the National League for Democracy (NLD) during the 2020 election and participated in peaceful protests at the beginning of the military coup. The junta troops took the couple to Bilin Township Police Station for interrogation, but their family has not been able to contact them so far.
Bilin Township is known for its vigorous resistance movement activity, where junta-appointed administrative officials and members have faced attacks. Activists and civilians, including those involved in the democracy movement, are frequently arrested for various reasons.
Political Prisoners Protest Denial of Care and Neglect
Life for the people in Burma continues to be increasingly challenging. However, the junta’s terror tactics have not silenced or deterred the ongoing movement in the country for peace and democracy. Even in the junta-run prisons where thousands of political prisoners remain unjustly detained, they continue to demand their rights and freedoms.
On the evening of June 12th, protests erupted inside Kyaikmayaw Central Prison in Mon State due to the denial of care for an injured prisoner who was ordered to perform welding work on a two-story building during a rainstorm. The inmate was electrocuted, fell, and lost consciousness.
Political prisoners demanded medical treatment for the individual, but their calls were ignored. The lack of urgency and attention to the seriously wounded individual sparked the protest. According to a source close to Kyaikmayaw Central Prison, the protest lasted two hours, from 5 to 7 PM. It only subsided after the guards agreed to transfer the inmate to Mawlamyine General Hospital.
Following the incident, on the morning of June 13th, numerous junta troops entered Kyaikmayaw Central Prison and increased security measures, as reported by sources close to the prison.
In the early morning of June 15, a total of 146 political prisoners, both men and women, were transferred from Kyaikmayaw Central Prison:
“We learned that Mon State Prison Chief Director Zaw Myo Aung directly ordered the transfers. The male political prisoners were moved to Tharyarwaddy Prison, and the female political prisoners were sent to Daik-U Prison (Bago District).,” a source close to the prison stated.
Another reliable source added:
“The prisoner who was electrocuted is Aung Chit Htwe. He fell from a height of about 20 feet onto the women’s ward side. The delay in transferring him to an external hospital prompted the female inmates to demand immediate medical treatment and accountability from Director Zaw Myo Aung. After about an hour and a half, the inmate was finally taken to Mawlamyine General Hospital.”
As of the latest update, the inmate, Aung Chit Htwe, is expected to undergo brain surgery due to his injuries.
The denial of care to those detained for their activism is further evidence of a worsening pattern of denied medical care to political prisoners. Prison authorities have reportedly imposed stricter restrictions on political prisoners and inmates requiring medical treatment at external hospitals than on other inmates, according to a Dawei Prison nurse who participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
Mon State
In the first week of June, artillery and airstrikes by the military junta’s troops in Bilin and Thaton townships, Mon State, destroyed 12 houses, including a monastery. This information was reported by the Karen National Union (KNU) Central Committee on June 6.
On June 1st, junta troops conducted an aerial bombing on Shwe Yaung Pya village in Bilin Township without any ground engagement, destroying ten houses. Additionally, more than five artillery shells were fired by the 310th Artillery Battalion, causing further damage. Although civilians had to flee their homes, no injuries were reported.
On June 3rd, the 9th Light Infantry Battalion, based in Thaton, fired artillery shells into Yay Wai village, destroying two religious buildings within the village monastery.
The villages of Shwe Yaung Pya and Yay Wai, shelled by the junta’s artillery, are located in the KNU Brigade 1-controlled area of Thaton District and are primarily inhabited by Karen people.
Earlier, on May 24th, two civilians were killed and five others injured in Bilin Township’s Taung Thu Htay Kon village due to an artillery attack by junta troops, which also destroyed ten houses.
Meanwhile, disruptions to the education systems in Mon State are delaying local learning pathways. Schools in Kaw Bein, Kaw Pauk, and Kaw Palaing villages along the Mon-Karen Gyaing River region remain closed due to ongoing security issues.
Since late March, armed clashes have led to a lack of security, preventing teachers from returning and parents from sending their children to school. As a result, many schools, including 30 government schools in the area, remain shut. Local children are attending Mon language classes at village monasteries instead.
According to a resident:
“Military-run schools in Kaw Bein, Kaw Pauk, and Kaw Palaing have yet to open mainly due to security concerns. The region is still a conflict zone, so teachers are not coming, and parents are hesitant to send their children to school.”
Only about 50% of schools in the region are operational. For instance, schools in Kaw That, Kaw Swe and Tarana villages are open. However, there is a significantly reduced attendance rate, as many students have either stopped attending or moved to schools in urban areas or even to Thailand. One teacher recalled:
“Last year, we had about 1,500 students in high school; this year, there are only about 500.”
Mon National Schools in the area also remain closed due to security concerns. Additionally, around 20 military council troops have set up checkpoints, restricting movement and extorting travellers, with indiscriminate shooting occurring at night.
Since the attempted military coup in 2021, conflict-related disruptions have severely impacted education, with 6 million children nationwide needing humanitarian assistance and approximately 4 million losing access to education.
In Kha Ywal village, Kyike Hto Township, Mon State, four individuals, including two monks, were injured due to artillery shells fired by military junta troops, according to local sources and KNU Thaton District authorities.
At PM on June 21st, the junta’s No. 310 Artillery Battalion, stationed at Thein Zayat, launched two 120 mm artillery shells into Kha Ywal village despite no ongoing battles. The shells exploded within and around the residential areas near the southern monastery in Kha Ywal village.
“A senior monk from the southern monastery and one of his disciples were wounded. Additionally, two elderly people living near the monastery were injured. The monks’ injuries are not serious. The other two were sent to the hospital,” said a resident of Kha Ywal.
As a result of the artillery assault, the senior monk of the southern monastery and another monk sustained minor injuries. However, 75-year-old U San Tin suffered severe abdominal and leg injuries, and 62-year-old Daw San Myint sustained injuries to her back and knees. Three houses were also damaged. U San Tin was taken to Bago Hospital, while Daw San Myint was sent to Thein Zayat Township Hospital for treatment.
In Kyike Hto Township, junta troops have been advancing and shelling daily with artillery for several days, forcing residents from around ten villages to flee their homes.
On June 20th, during a clash between the junta and joint resistance forces in Pain Nae Kon village, the junta troops set fire to and destroyed an independent medical clinic within the town, locals reported.
On June 14th, two 10-year-old children were killed by an artillery attack by junta troops in the Kyauk Huk Kwin area between Ah Khaing and Thone Khwa villages in Kyike Hto Township. Please continue reading this report in the attached PDF..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2024-07-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Mon State, Various rights: reports of violations against several ethnic groups
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"This Incident Report describes events occurring in Kyeh Htoh (Kyaikto) Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District, on October 22nd 2023. On the early morning of October 22nd , State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #2 shelled 81mm mortar rounds into C--- village, Nghet Pyaw Taw village tract. One of the mortar rounds landed in a villager’s house and injured three civilians. The injured villagers were sent to Kyaikto hospital to receive treatment, and one was later transferred to Thaton hospital, due to the severity of his injuries.
Excerpt
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On October 22nd 2023, at around 7 am, the State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #2, from Thaton Town army camp [which is based at Let Pan Pin temporary camp in C--- village] shelled 81mm mortar rounds [in the area], and [one of] the mortar shells landed in C--- village, Nghet Pyaw Taw village tract, Kyeh Htoh (Kyaikto) Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, in Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled area. As the SAC shelled several rounds of mortar, a villager named Saw D--- went under his [stilt] house to hide from the mortars. At that time, one of the mortar shells exploded on the top of his house and injured Saw D---, along with two women who were hiding under the house. In total, three people sustained injuries. The names of the two injured women are Naw E--- and Naw G---.
While Naw E--- was handing out invitations [for a funeral ceremony], she heard the sound of mortar shelling, so she went to hide under Saw D---’s house and was injured along with Saw D---. Similarly, while Naw G--- was waiting for the ‘line car’ [pick-up truck, used as a shared taxi] to go to Kyaikto Town, she heard the sound of mortar shelling and went to hide under Saw D---’s house. Then, she was injured along with Naw E---.
The shrapnel from the shell hit and was embedded inside Saw D---’s right arm and broke his bone. The mortar shrapnel hit Naw E---’s right arm, but she did not sustain severe injuries. Naw G--- was injured on her head, and she sustained life-threatening injuries. These three villagers were sent [by local villagers] to the nearby hospital which is Kyaikto Hospital [run by the SAC]. However, Kyaikto hospital did not admit Saw D--- [as they were not adequately equipped to treat his injuries] and then, he was transferred to Thaton hospital [run by the SAC]. [As of January 2024,] Saw D--- had not fully recovered from the injuries yet.
While Saw D--- was being treated at the hospital, he received a total of 150,000 kyats [71.33 USD] in cash from [two] local humanitarian groups. After this incident, Saw D--- expressed: “It will be better if they [SAC soldiers] don’t conduct shelling like this again. Then, the villagers will live peacefully. Now, we dare not sleep as we don’t know when they will conduct shelling”. He added: “Since I was injured, I have not been able to work, and it causes challenges for my livelihood”..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"YANGON—Former Myanmar President Thein Sein departed for an official visit to China on Thursday, Beijing’s embassy in Yangon said, in his first foreign trip since the military seized power three years ago.
Former general Thein Sein, 79, ruled Myanmar from 2011 to 2016 as the reformist president of a quasi-civilian government which ceded power to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi following landmark elections.
He later retired to the military-built capital Naypyitaw and has largely stayed out of the public eye since.
On Wednesday Thein Sein met China’s ambassador and discussed “the situation in Myanmar and cooperation between the two countries,” the embassy in Yangon posted on its Facebook page.
Ties between the junta and Beijing—a major ally and arms supplier—frayed last year over the junta’s failure to crack down on online scam compounds in Myanmar’s borderlands.
The compounds were staffed by citizens of China and other countries who were often trafficked and forced to work swindling their compatriots in an industry analysts say is worth billions.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has not visited China since the 2021 coup that plunged the country into turmoil.
The Southeast Asian nation has seen widespread fighting since the military coup ended democratic rule.
Myanmar is a vital piece of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s flagship US$1-trillion project that includes maritime, rail and road projects in Asia, Africa and Europe.
But progress in Myanmar has been hampered by the conflict since the military coup.
Last year an alliance of ethnic minority armed groups seized swathes of territory in Shan State along the border with China’s Yunnan province..."
Source/publisher:
Agence France-Presse (Paris) via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military
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Description:
"President Joseph R. Biden
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 200500
Dear President Biden,
We, the undersigned 228 organizations, including the ethnic and religious minorities of Burma, are deeply concerned by the upswing in aerial attacks carried out by the Burmese junta since the start of the coup. These airstrikes target heavily populated areas, taking the lives of civilians, and completely destroying crucial public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. We urge you to take and coordinate action immediately and implement harsher sanctions that will effectively hold the military junta accountable for this blatant violation of international law and cut off its fuel and weaponry supply.
Since the start of the coup in 2021 until now, the Burmese junta has carried out at least 1,427 airstrikes across Burma, killing over 434 civilians. Countrywide data on reported airstrikes reveal the junta’s increasing reliance on aerial strikes over time. In 2023, the International Institute for Strategic Studies found that the military conducted, on average, at least 49 airstrikes monthly. This was 25% higher than 2022 when the military conducted at least 39 average monthly aerial attacks. Airstrikes are expected to double this year, unless immediate action is taken. These aerial attacks occur in civilian spaces, even when there are no resistance groups present, nor fighting occurring.
Organizations have been sounding the alarm since 2022, when the military intentionally bombed an outdoor concert in October, killing over 80 civilians. The limited action from the U.S. and the international community has only encouraged more aggressive attacks to continue over the years, resulting in mass destruction and suffering. Around the same time in 2023, the military attacked an IDP camp, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children. This year, in February 2024, the junta went as far as to conduct airstrikes on schools, taking the lives of children and teachers.
We appreciate that after receiving a letter from organizations urging the ban on jet fuel last year, the U.S. has taken some actions in targeting the junta’s access to jet fuel, including sanctions on part of the Asia Sun Group business network that was importing fuel into Burma. However, these sanctions have been limited and more is needed. The U.S. has yet to make extensive use of the regulatory determination it used last August emphasizing that selling aviation fuel to Burma was a sanctionable offense.
Additionally, this year, the UN adopted a resolution for states to refrain from supporting aviation fuel trade and sale. As a responsible member state, the U.S. must only further demonstrate unwavering commitment and strict adherence to this resolution. This involves placing comprehensive aviation fuel sanctions, which only Canada has accomplished at the moment. The U.S. however can demonstrate its own leadership in this matter and fulfill its international obligations by participating in a complete aviation fuel embargo.
To prevent these devastating attacks, it is imperative that the United States further lead coordinated action within the international community to cut off the junta’s ability to purchase aviation fuel and supplies. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur showed that the junta’s imports of aviation fuel increased in 2023, including fuel imported through Asia Sun network. More must be done. Targeted sanctions must have harsher penalties and stronger enforcement. Otherwise, these international allies will continue to sell and transport aviation fuel to the junta which will be used to target and kill civilians.
We recognize and thank you for the actions you have taken thus far to support the people of Burma. However, as organizations that have connections, indirect and direct, with those on the ground in Burma, we know that the United States needs to do more. Please regard the junta’s aerial attack as a devastating warning of what is to come for the people of Burma should the military continue to have unchecked access to fuel and other supplies. The United States holds the power and influence to create change – please ensure that this power is not wasted.
We ask for the specific actions below:
Sanction international companies that sell aviation fuel supplies to the military junta. While smaller Burmese entities can be easily replaced, major international entities would face severe repercussions and serious obstacles to their ability to supply the military.
Bar any entity from providing shipping insurance, transport, storage facilities, or other shipping services to companies selling aviation fuel to the military, its allies or affiliated companies. The most effective way of disrupting the flow of aviation fuel is to prevent ships from picking up cargo or accessing ports by withholding insurance and services.
Impose full sanctions on the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), as the European Union has already done. Sanctions on MOGE itself, not just on MOGE officials, would cut off one of the junta’s largest revenue streams and have the greatest impact on stopping the junta’s campaign of lethal violence in the country.
Hold the Burmese junta accountable for their clear violations of international law and active war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and mass atrocities..."
Source/publisher:
228 Organizations via Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Sanctions, Business and the Military
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"This Short Update describes events occurring in Hsaw Htee (Shwegyin) Township, Kler Lwee Htoo (Nyaunglebin) District during November and December 2023, including air strikes and shelling conducted by the State Administration Council (SAC). In November 2023, the SAC military conducted an air strike near Z--- village and L--- village, in Klaw Thoh Hkee village tract, and Y--- village, in Htee Hkay Loh village tract. In November and December 2023, SAC soldiers also conducted mortar shelling near villages in Th’Hpih Luh (Gway Kone) village tract and Klaw Thoh Khee village tract. On one occasion, four mortar shells landed in a village causing injuries to a 54-year-old woman, her 7-year-old son, and her 18-year-old daughter. These incidents also caused damages and destruction of villagers’ buildings and plantation fields. In consequence, many villagers fled to the jungle to evade harm.[1]
SAC air strikes in Hsaw Htee Township
On November 17th 2023, at 5 am, fighting occurred between Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[2] forces against State Administration Council (SAC)[3] military. A few hours after the fighting, at 9:10 am, two SAC fighter jets conducted air strikes. [First,] a fighter jet dropped two bombs that landed next to Z--- village, Klaw Thoh Hkee village tract[4], Hsaw Htee Township, and dropped three [more] bombs next to Y--- village, Htee Hkay Loh village tract, Hsaw Htee Township. A second fighter jet conducted air strikes firing Oerlikon [machine guns from the aircraft] for four rounds in total. According to a local villager, these are places where SAC assumed that there would be their enemy [armed resistance forces]. Due to fighting and fighter jets conducting air strikes, villagers from Y---, Z---, and L--- villages fled and are hiding in the jungle. There are 49 households, with more than 200 villagers in Z--- village, and 20 households with 91 people in L--- village. The exact households’ number and population of Y--- village is unknown. [These amounts to more than 300 people displaced and hiding in the jungle.]
Indiscriminate shelling by SAC soldiers in Hsaw Htee Township
During the fighting on November 17th 2023, SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[5] #351, based in Ler Htaw Thoh army camp, led by Aung Bo Bo Battalion Deputy Commander, shelled six 60mm mortar rounds that landed next to L--- village, and the civilians there had to flee to the jungle. Due to the presence of soldiers from both armies [KNLA forces and SAC], villagers residing in this area have not returned to their villages yet. The primary school, run by the Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD)[6], in L--- village closed [due to the fighting]. Most of the villagers are farmers, bamboo cutters, and daily labourers. Due to fighting, villagers face difficulties to secure their livelihood and food. Currently, as it is dry season, villagers are able to take shelter in the jungle beneath the trees while displaced [as of December 2023]. They face health issues and difficulties to recover, especially for babies and elderly women.
On November 24th 2023, around 11:19 pm, SAC LIB #20, based in the army camp in Nyaunglebin Town, shelled approximately eight 120mm mortar rounds into S--- village area, Th’Hpih Luh (Gway Kone) village tract, which is under Karen National Union (KNU)[7] controlled area. Three mortars landed inside S--- village and exploded. Three houses were damaged, as well as [villagers’] belongings in those houses. The owners of the houses are U[8] G--- and Ma[9] E---, U H---, and U V--- and Daw[10] K---. The damaged belongings are a water pump, a motorbike, and furniture.
Ma E---, her son, and her daughter were severely injured due to the mortar explosion. U G--- and Ma E--- have six children, but only one son and one daughter were in the house during the mortar explosions. The mortar shells landed in front of their house, injuring the three. The 18-year-old daughter named Ma O--- was injured on the left side of her stomach, by shrapnel, leaving her in a life-threatening situation. The 7-year-old son named Maung[11] Q--- was injured on the back of his head by shrapnel. 54-year-old Ma E--- was severely injured on her thigh.
Shortly after, an emergency team run by the KNU reached out to help them. Those three injured family members received treatment in an emergency room of a KNU clinic in J--- village, Ain Ba La village tract. After that, Ma O--- was taken to a hospital located at the Thai border by an ethnic organisation and [local] authorities to receive further treatment. The family has been affected also financially after this SAC shelling as they are daily labourers. The family is suffering from trauma and experiencing difficulties due to the injuries caused to the three family members. Currently, Ma E--- and her son Maung Q--- are hospitalised at J--- clinic, and they are receiving treatment [as of November 2023.]
[Since the 2021 coup,] SAC soldiers often deliberately shelled into villages. According to local villagers, SAC soldiers assumed that People’s Defence Force (PDF)[12] and KNLA combined forces were present in the village, and so this is the reason why they indiscriminately shelled into [and near] the villages. Villagers are fearful due to SAC indiscriminately shelling. There are approximately a hundred families in S--- village and half of them were displaced to nearby villages or moved to the city.
On December 4th 2023, SAC Infantry Battalion (IB)[13] #263, based in the army camps in Pein Za Loke Town [located in Bago Region], Hsaw Htee Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, conducted mortar shelling and four [mortar rounds] landed in M--- village [area], Th’Hpih Luh village tract, Hsaw Htee Township. Then, SAC soldiers from LIB #20, based in [other] army camps in Kler Lwee Htoo District, shelled seven mortar rounds which landed in S--- village, Th’Hpih Luh village tract.
The four mortars that landed in M--- village, damaged Saw[14] R--- and Naw[15] W---’s house and Saw U--- and Naw P---’s house. One of the owners said that mortar shells had landed [inside the village] once before in July [2023]. Fortunately, there were no family members injured. Two [of the four mortar shells] landed in N--- village, on the road in front of the school and damaged the school’s [plastic] water storage tank. [Another mortar] landed next to the house owned by a villager named Saw F---, in a farm, and the mortar shrapnel hit Saw F---’s house wall.
Due to the SAC repeatedly shelling in this area [M--- and S--- villages], most of the villagers do not sleep in their houses. They sleep in other villages, where they have relatives, and some sleep at their farm huts, to avoid being injured. Civilians worry that mortar rounds will land on their houses and might injure them, so they remain full of fear.
Further background reading on the situation on air strikes and indiscriminate shelling in Southeast Burma/Myanmar can be found in the following KHRG reports..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports
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"This Short Update describes events occurring in Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District in February 2024. On February 21st 2024, a State Administration Council (SAC) helicopter, from Toungoo air base, conducted an air strike on K--- village, Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract, Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township. Four villagers were injured, including two children, and an 85-year-old woman was killed. One injured victim was transferred to Naypyidaw city for treatment, where her leg was amputated. The SAC helicopter also conducted an airstrike on M--- village, Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract, Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township. In that incident, five villagers were injured and three villagers were killed, including two 8-year-old children. The air strike also damaged houses and plantations and killed livestock. There had been no fighting or armed forces’ movement in or near the village since the first quarter of 2023. Villagers feel devastated, traumatised and aggrieved.
Air strike in K--- village, Htee Day village tract
On February 21st 2024, at 2 pm, an State Administration Council (SAC)2 helicopter from Toungoo air base, located at the SAC Southern Command Headquarters (Ta Pa Ka) in Toungoo Town, dropped bombs on K--- village, section 3, in Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract,3 Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. [Previously,] there had been no fighting or movement of armed forces in or near the village since the first quarter of 2023. Due to the air strike, four K--- villagers were injured by shrapnel, and an 85-year-old woman named Daw4 L---, also from K--- village section 3, died immediately due to injuries to her head, abdomen, and chest. Daw L---’s skull was broken, and her abdomen perforated, expelling her intestines. A 35-year-old woman, named Daw C---, was injured on her leg and required an amputation. The other three injured villagers were Daw T---, a 35-year-old woman; Ma S---, a 12-year-old girl; and a child (unknown name), who is one-and-a-half years old. They are all ethnic Bamar5 and Buddhist. These four injured villagers were transported by car to [a hospital in Yay Tal Shay Town, Bago Division. The hospital in Yay Tal Shay Town lacked resources to treat Daw C---, who required an amputation, so she was transferred to a hospital in] Naypyidaw city, which is [approximately] four hours away. [The injured villagers did not receive any support from any humanitarian organisation to cover treatment costs].
In addition, two houses, belonging to villagers named U 6 O--- and U J---, were hit by the shrapnel. Both villagers are Buddhist and of Bamar ethnicity, ages unknown. Some domestic animals were injured and died as well: a medium-sized cow, one dog, and some chickens died, three cows were injured, and two dogs lost their legs. Crops were destroyed due to the bomb [explosions] and shrapnel. [As explained by local villagers to the KHRG researcher,] the villagers feel devastated, traumatised, and aggrieved after experiencing the air strike..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
https://moe.nugmyanmar.org
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၆/၂၀၂၄)
၁၃၈၆ ခုနှစ်၊ နယုန်လပြည့်ကျော် ၇ ရက်နေ့
(၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၂၈ ရက်)
ကြားကာလအခြေခံပညာ ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်းများအဖြစ်
အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်း ကြေညာချက်..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education, National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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Sub-title:
One would think that Myanmar’s revolutionary moment would create relationships of solidarity between local NGOS performing essential work and their international donors. But the authors’ research shows that Myanmar organisations feel hampered by the continuation of an approach focused on compliance and mistrust.
Description:
"Apart from causing widespread suffering, economic collapse and conflict, the February 2021 attempted coup in Myanmar has also brought an upheaval amongst international aid agencies engaged in the country. International NGOs, UN agencies and bilateral donors have long been active in Myanmar supporting humanitarian and development programming. But the military’s attempted takeover has meant that international agencies have had to shift their approach.
In the days after the attempted coup, almost all aid agencies ceased their direct cooperation with the new military-controlled State Administrative Council (SAC) regime. But they also had to shift their approach to the way projects are delivered on the ground. With greater instability around the country, there has been significant growth in direct partnerships with Myanmar civil society organisations, who are implementing most humanitarian and advocacy related programs.
Amid the context of Myanmar’s revolution, this shift has brought the relationship between international aid agencies and humanitarian and advocacy groups into focus. International agencies have directed more of their resources to partnerships with local organisations, who are often working in extremely risky situations. We could assume that there might therefore be a strong sense of solidarity between Myanmar civil society leaders and their international supporters as they work together to support vulnerable populations in the country. Local organisations are in critical need of support in their work, and international agencies are providing important funding.
Why, then, are there a growing number of studies revealing strong criticism by those local organisations of their international partners? Why do these organisations say that there is a lack of solidarity, and that they are lacking appropriate support from international agencies in the post-coup context? International aid agencies have long received criticism from Myanmar groups. Yet why is there now, in the context of Myanmar’s revolution, such strident criticism of international aid agencies?
Criticism of the approach of international aid agencies around the world is not new. Many critics of partnerships between international and local aid agencies point toward the problem of a broader neoliberal system that favours the power of external organisations over local ones. Partnerships are also often characterised by overt neoliberal processes of competitive grants and subcontracting, or more subtle hierarchical dynamics based on maximising efficiency.
All of this may be true—but these conventional explanations of the breakdown of aid partnerships are often rather generic, and do little to illuminate the context-specific perspectives of local organisations. We think that there is more at play in understanding frictions in local–international aid partnerships in Myanmar and more attention needs to be given to the interpretations of local actors and how they reveal local expectations and practices of reciprocity.
In research published recently at the Journal of Contemporary Asia we draw on interviews with civil society leaders and aid agency representatives in Myanmar between August and November 2022. Rather than perceiving a relationship of solidarity, we found that in the volatile revolutionary environment in Myanmar, international aid agencies are often perceived by Myanmar agency leaders as self-interested and compliance-focused, while lacking confidence in the capacity of Myanmar aid organisations.
These negative perceptions of international agencies are obviously informed by everyday pragmatic challenges for Myanmar groups. But we think that well-known overlapping notions of sedana (goodwill), parahita (charity), and metta (loving kindness)—which are prominent in everyday language around aid in Myanmar—also inform Myanmar organisation leaders’ expectations of reciprocity in their relationship with international aid agencies.
These values place a moral and ethical overlay on interpretations of aid partnerships beyond the project-based and contractual relationship that characterises the formal realm of aid programs. Myanmar NGO leaders therefore often construct their own local organisations as deserving and committed partners whilst international aid agencies are often constructed as self-preserving and compliance focused.
While concerns about international aid agency engagement with Myanmar organisations are longstanding, the context of revolution and instability has sharpened these critiques considerably. The new existential challenges to organisations and aid workers themselves have raised the stakes in aid partnerships and brought diverging discourses into greater clarity.
Myanmar’s revolutionary context
Before looking specifically at the perceptions of international agencies by Myanmar civil society leaders, it is important to understand Myanmar’s revolutionary context, and how the many new challenges for local organisations have accentuated expectations in their partnerships with international agencies, in a way that is different to pre-coup aid partnerships.
In the years of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government before the coup, civil society groups faced ongoing challenges. The NLD government was considerably more restrictive of their speech and operations than had been initially hoped. But compared to the extreme recent restrictions by the SAC, the NLD era presented a far more stable and congenial environment for international–local agency partnerships.
There are now profound everyday challenges for Myanmar aid organisations, both at a personal and organisational level. “The whole country is in fear,” said one Myanmar civil society leader in a September 2022 interview. “Every day we are threatened and don’t have a free mind anymore. We have to struggle and take risks to rebuild our country and support each other. If not, we will never escape from fear”. Those participants operating in SAC-controlled areas of the country reflected on the daily scrutiny they faced from authorities; for example, through being questioned at checkpoints, having telephones and computers searched, and even having a CCTV camera installed in an organisation’s office.
Another Myanmar organisation leader operating in SAC-controlled areas told us in September 2022 that “I am not sure how we can maintain momentum while the military is continuously suppressing the people and using very violent means every day”. Legal changes by the regime—including to Section 505A of the Penal Code, criminalising making comments that “cause fear” or spread “false news,” including on social media—have made it easier for authorities to target local organisation staff.
Despite all these operational risks and challenges, many Myanmar humanitarian and advocacy organisations continue to work with communities and with actors engaged in the revolution. Some organisation leaders have also become part of the National Unity Government’s administration and policy-making mechanisms, which entails further significant personal risk. Yet leaders often framed their motivation in moral terms and their desire to continue their work despite the personal sacrifices and dangers that they faced. Given the risks that these individuals and organisations are taking, it is understandable that their leaders have expectations that their international supporters will be willing to act in solidarity.
Self-interested and compliance focussed?
Yet due to their decisions since the coup to protect their own programmes and staffing, international agencies are often perceived by Myanmar leaders as self-interested—the antithesis of sedana (goodwill) and metta (loving kindness). They also construct international agencies as being overly focused on compliance—lacking confidence in the parahita (charity) worthiness and capability of local organisations.
In our research there were some positive reflections on the role of international organisations. But these positive interpretations tended to come from participants with short-term or less direct experience of partnerships with international aid agencies. Most participants from Myanmar organisations had longer-term and more intensive interactions with donors, UN agencies, and international NGOs, and they presented far less sanguine interpretations of international support.
Rather than acting in solidarity, one leader reflected in an October 2022 interview that “a disappointing thing is that [international NGOs] are focusing more on their survival”. Another Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader interviewed in the same month said, “They give priority to their survival, survival of their offices, continuing to pay the salary to themselves and to their staff”. The perception of international agencies as lacking sedana was made explicit by another Myanmar organisation leader:
For some internationals…as soon as they heard the news about a small bomb blast or gunshot in the area, their head office did not allow their staff to go to these areas. But…we have to keep working for those communities… So, we are asking, “Though you are saying that you want to provide emergency support, you don’t do it when it is needed” … The sedana is not the same (interview, October 2022)
In a context where local organisation staff and leaders faced everyday risks, some participants also perceived that Myanmar organisations were not treated as deserving support for their work, but rather as sub-contracted partners within externally defined programs. Heavy financial and project reporting requirements in turn implied that Myanmar organisations should not be trusted to deliver projects. “Capacity building” was portrayed by several participants as being more about compliance, and making processes easier for the international partner, than developing the effectiveness of local organisation programs. As a Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader explained in an October 2022 interview:
Our criticism is that the capacity building is just to comply with their project needs. They teach us about financial management so that they don’t have any trouble when the report goes to the donor … More for their compliance, more for their safety and security, and for their risk management … It is the “capacity to comply”.
Fostering relationships of solidarity between international and Myanmar humanitarian organisations requires practical change in terms of easing overly onerous compliance processes. Such suggested policy changes have been outlined in recent research papers. But relations of solidarity also require mindset change amongst international agencies. Local organisation leaders are seeking acknowledgement from international agencies about the sacrifices they are making in their work, and hoping for greater international efforts to support growth and strengthening of their organisations and vision, rather than simply demanding compliance with bureaucratic systems.
In the midst of the fear and extreme challenges since the 2021 coup, many organisation leaders are seeking relationships of solidarity with international organisations. Every day, many Myanmar civil society leaders put themselves and their colleagues at risk by continuing to run humanitarian or advocacy programs.
Yet there are diverging expectations about reciprocity between Myanmar and international agencies. Where many local leaders have expectations of engagement characterised by sedana, parahita and metta, they often perceive international organisations as the antithesis of this—as self-interested and overly focussed on compliance. These differences in expectations are fuelling ongoing frustration..."
Source/publisher:
New Mandala
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"When National League for Democracy patron U Tin Oo died on June 1, many mourned his passing. He was one of the few military chiefs held in high esteem in Myanmar. His funeral was held on June 5.
Unlike many other Myanmar military generals, who earned medals for gallantry in battle against ethnic revolutionary organizations that were fighting for equality and self-determination, U Tin Oo earned his Thura title for the commitment he demonstrated in driving Kuomintang Chinese nationalist troops out of Myanmar.
Among the politicians of national significance who have died since independent Myanmar’s first coup in 1962 are the country’s first president, Sao Shwe Thaik (died 1962); the third United Nations secretary general, U Thant (1974); the country’s first prime minister, U Nu (1995); former military chief Saw Maung (1997); and the country’s first military dictator, Ne Win (2002).
Sao Shwe Thaik and U Thant died while U Ne Win was in power. U Nu, Ne Win and Saw Maung died while former military dictator Than Shwe was in power. All of them including U Tin Oo should have been honored with a state or military funeral, but they weren’t.
A state or military funeral is meant to pay final tribute to a public figure who has rendered outstanding service to the military or to Myanmar.
U Tin Oo was a respected public figure who deserved to be honored with a state funeral, having rendered meritorious service to protect the country as a military officer, and striven as a politician to initiate a better political system in the country.
Far from honoring him, the regime did not even allow his colleagues, jailed civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ousted President U Win Myint, to pay their final respects to U Tin Oo. It was like barring children from attending the funeral of their parents, intended to add to the psychological torment the regime has inflicted on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint.
U Tin Oo’s death notice was published in a junta-controlled newspaper. The notice on Page 31 of the June 2 issue of Myanma Alin newspaper measured 6.5 square centimeters, comprising just 8.7 percent of the page. The death notice for an ordinary citizen next to U Tin Oo’s notice measured 8.8 square centimeters (11.6 percent of the page).
In other words, Min Aung Hlaing showed his disrespect for U Tin Oo by only allocating a small space in the state-owned newspaper he now controls.
This is not strange. Min Aung Hlaing’s predecessors Ne Win and Than Shwe harbored similar grudges against their enemies and rivals.
Public figures who died during Ne Win’s reign
After staging the coup in March 1962, Ne Win became the first military dictator in Myanmar since the country’s independence.
Sao Shwe Thaik, who had served as Myanmar’s first president from independence in 1948 to 1952, was arrested following the coup. He died in prison of unknown causes some eight months after his arrest.
U Thant was the first Asian to serve as the UN secretary general. He was also the third UN secretary general, serving a 10-year term from 1961 to 1972. After he passed away in November 1974, his body was brought back to Myanmar. University students and the public demanded a state funeral for U Thant, but Ne Win refused and imposed a clampdown on student protesters in what later became known as the “U Thant incident”.
Public figures who died during Than Shwe’s reign
U Nu, Saw Maung and Ne Win died while Than Shwe was in power. If he wished, Than Shwe could have arranged at least military funerals for his predecessors Saw Maung and Ne Win. But he didn’t.
Ne Win was the most powerful and feared person in Myanmar for decades. It was probably karma that resulted in him being placed under house arrest before his death by Than Shwe, his handpicked successor.
Ne Win appointed Than Shwe as deputy military chief in 1985 before appointing him military chief in 1992, replacing Saw Maung. Than Shwe owed a debt to Ne Win, who put him on the throne.
Than Shwe never repaid that debt, instead ordering the arrest of Ne Win in 2002 and placing him under house arrest for the remaining months of his life. Ne Win was cremated the same day he died without fanfare at a ceremony attended by a handful of close relatives. Only two days after Ne Win’s death, Than Shwe put his death notice in a small column in the state-owned newspapers.
Dictators’ grudges
Unsurprisingly, dictators arrest those whom they view as threats to their power. But they should not hold grudges against opponents who have died.
Myanmar’s military dictators, being Buddhists, have had many pagodas built for the promotion of Buddhism. But they barely follow the Buddha’s teachings at all.
Successive military leaders from Ne Win to Than Shwe to quasi-civilian government leaders to Min Aung Hlaing have all wanted themselves to be considered promoters of Buddhism, on the same plane as the Myanmar monarchs of centuries past. This desire can be seen in their building of pagodas and religious buildings in a manner that was typical of the old monarchs.
Ne Win had the Maha Wizaya Pagoda built near the famous Shwedagon Pagoda. Than Shwe had Uppatasanti Pagoda, a replica of Shwedagon Pagoda, built in Naypyitaw. Current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing had the colossal Maravijaya Buddha statue built in Naypyitaw. And to surpass his seniors, he made sure the statue was the tallest of its kind in the world.
All of them have striven to show that they can do better than their predecessors, and have demonstrated no desire to honor or appreciate them.
What does the future hold for living military leaders?
Former military dictator Than Shwe, former president and ex-general Thein Sein, former parliament speaker and ex-general Shwe Mann, former prime minister and ex-general Khin Nyunt and current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing are still alive.
They might want to have at least a military funeral after they die. However, considering the previous examples, a military funeral is something they can dream about, but shouldn’t hope for.
But there is still a chance for them. If current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing apologizes and returns power to the people (and if the former generals are willing), the future government may consider organizing appropriate funerals for “remorseful” former military leaders..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"India, one of the Myanmar junta’s closest allies, has urged the regime to protect its assets in the west of the country as fighting rages there between junta troops and ethnic forces.
India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said he expressed Delhi’s “deep concern” over the issue on Wednesday during talks with junta foreign minister Than Swe.
“Met with Deputy PM and FM of Myanmar U Than Shwe [sic] as he transited New Delhi today,” Jaishankar said in a Facebook post on Wednesday.
“Discussed our deep concern at the impact of continuing violence and instability in Myanmar on our border.
“Pressed for credible security protection for our ongoing projects in the country,” the post continues.
India is funding the US $484-million Kaladan multimodal transport project in Myanmar’s western states of Rakhine and Chin. The mega-project is a crucial plank of India’s Act East Policy to counter China’s influence in Myanmar through its Belt and Road Initiative.
The Kaladan project will link the seaports of Kolkata and Sittwe in Rakhine State and extend to Paletwa in Chin State via the Kaladan River, then by road to Mizoram in northeast India.
Construction of the project was suspended following the 2021 military coup due to tension between junta troops and the Arakan Army (AA). The project has been shelved completely since the AA seized most of northern Rakhine and southern Chin State in an offensive launched late last year.
The rest of Chin State remains a resistance hotbed, with several Chin ethnic forces combining to fight the regime after the coup.
The AA currently controls Paletwa in Chin State and nine towns in northern Rakhine, where it is now advancing on Thandwe, home to the world famous Ngapali Beach.
Launched 12 years ago to provide an alternate route to India’s landlocked northeast, the Kaladan project had been scheduled for completion in 2023 after long delays. But the war in Rakhine and Chin states has shattered that plan.
Despite proclaiming itself the world’s largest democracy, India has strengthened ties with Myanmar’s regime since the coup, even as other major democracies shun it.
India has been assisting the regime in military, economic and diplomatic affairs along with its other two major allies, China and Russia. Delhi has also offered to help the junta hold a general election that has been widely condemned as a sham designed to cement military rule.
Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing demanded speedy completion of construction during his visit to the Kaladan transport project in March last year, when he also hailed India as a good neighbor and friend. His visit came after Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra called for acceleration of the project during talks with the junta boss in Naypyitaw in November 2022.
Jaishankar said he urged an early return to the path of democratic transition for Myanmar in talks with Than Swe on Wednesday, adding that India was ready to help in any manner..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
At least four civilians were killed and 10 wounded in airstrikes, residents said.
Description:
"An ethnic minority rebel force that recently ended a five-month ceasefire with the military said on Thursday it had captured 26 junta-occupied camps in two days of fighting in northeast Myanmar’s Shan state.
The Ta’ang National Liberation Army, one of three forces in the Three Brotherhood Alliance that launched Operation 1027 in October, resumed fighting across northern Shan state and Mandalay regions on Tuesday.
In January, Chinese officials brokered a ceasefire between the three allied armies and junta forces as the fighting began to pose a risk to Chinese economic interests across the country.
On Wednesday and Thursday, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, captured camps in northern Shan state’s Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Mongmit and Hsipaw townships and Mandalay region’s Mogoke township, the group said in two statements.
Seventeen junta soldiers under the Kyaukme-based Operations Command Headquarters surrendered on Wednesday and the fighting was still going on, said TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo.
“We’re still taking control of some of the camps. I’m not sure what the next step is because fighting is still fierce in those townships,” she said. “The military council is using heavy artillery and air strikes.”
The TNLA, along with allied militias of pro-democracy activists called People’s Defense Forces, have captured eight army camps, including one artillery position, in Kyaukme township, 13 camps in Nawnghkio township and five camps in Mogoke township. Twenty junta troops had been killed but the TNLA did not disclose any casualties among anti-junta forces.
On Thursday morning, the TNLA and its allies launched attacks on two junta infantry battalions in the ruby-mining Mogoke township, the TNLA said. Allied fighters came from People’s Defense Force-Mandalay, the Danu People’s Defense Force and the Northern Shan State Alliance Army.
One resident of Mogoke town told Radio Free Asia that fighting erupted on Wednesday evening when junta forces launched at least seven air attacks on the outskirts of the town at around 8:30 p.m.
“Houses were shaking when they bombed the villages,” said the resident who declined to be identified for security reasons. “Bombs also landed in some city neighborhoods. The plane flew above us over and over again, dropping bombs for about 45 minutes. No one dared to go outside.”
Some residents were wounded in the airstrikes, he said, adding that many people were facing food shortages due to the closure of shops.
IMG_20240627_160514_921.jpg
TNLA joint forces on the front lines in Kyaukme, northern Shan State on June 26, 2024. (TNLA)
Many civilians in Kyaukme township have fled because of the conflict, said another resident, adding that four civilians were killed and at least 10 were wounded in airstrikes on Wednesday.
“We heard the sound of shots fired from junta camps 501 and 502,” said the second resident, who also declined to be identified. “People have started to move. The fighting isn’t over.”
The junta has not released any information about the conflict. Calls to the military’s spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, went unanswered on Thursday..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Non-Ceasefire Groups, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Description:
"The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and allies have captured two dozen junta military bases, including an artillery battalion headquarters, in two townships of northern Shan State and a third in upper Mandalay Region since relaunching Operation 1027 three days ago, the ethnic army said on Thursday.
It resumed Operation 1027 in Kyaukme and Nawnghkio Townships near the border with Mandalay Region in northern Shan State as well as Mogoke, a township that borders Nawnghkio in upper Mandalay on Tuesday, saying it was reacting to repeated violations of the China-brokered ceasefire deal this month by the junta’s military.
The three townships are southwest of Lashio, the junta-controlled capital of northern Shan State. The road connecting Lashio to Mandalay runs through them.
The TNLA has been joined by troops from the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (PDF), which has expanded Operation 1027 to upper Mandalay. The PDF is under the control of the civilian National Unity Government.
Early Thursday, TNLA troops attacked the headquarters of the junta’s Light Infantry Battalion 115 and another junta position at Ohn Makhar village, the ethnic army said. Both are near Nawnghkio town.
TNLA troops also attacked the headquarters of military battalion 114 in Nawnghkio town on Thursday and the junta sent a Y12 airplane and a fighter jet to defend the base, the TNLA said.
Along with troops from the Mandalay PDF, the TNLA also attacked and seized the headquarters of junta Missile Battalion 606 in Nawnghkio shortly before noon today, the TNLA said, adding that the junta responded with airstrikes.
The TNLA and allied PDFs took control of Nawnghkio town on Tuesday after seizing junta positions, including the headquarters of Light Infantry Battalion 115, in and near the town. The town is about a one-hour drive from the garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region.
TNLA and Mandalay PDF troops also attacked the headquarters of two junta Light Infantry Battalions (501 and 502) in Kyaukme town on Thursday morning, residents of the town confirmed. Kyaukme is northeast of Nawnghio and Pyin Oo Lwin is southwest. All three towns are linked by the Lashio Road (Route 3).
A resident of Kyaukme told The Irrawaddy, “Fighting is occurring in the town and no civilians dare to go outside their homes.” The source said junta troops were using drones in the battle in the town.
Residents said the TNLA has taken control of many sections of Kyaukme town since it captured its police station and the headquarters of a junta artillery battalion at the town’s entrance on Wednesday.
During Wednesday’s battles, the junta aircraft and artillery units bombed the town. They killed four civilians and injured 15 more, residents of the town said. On Tuesday, junta airstrikes in the township killed two civilians and injured three more, the TNLA said.
The TNLA said 17 regime troops surrendered during clashes in Kyaukme town on Wednesday evening.
It also attacked a military base at a religious site in Mogoke Township in northern Mandalay on Thursday morning.
“The junta is bombing the town and the situation is very bad here. We had to find a place to hide,” a resident of Mogoke town told The Irrawaddy. Mogoke is famous for its rubies and other precious gems.
A female resident of the town was killed and homes were destroyed by junta airstrikes, local media reports say.
Mandalay PDF said that it has also seized three junta bases in Mandaya Township and continued its attempt to seize the junta’s Air Defense Battalion Headquarters 1014 in the township in northern Mandalay on Wednesday. It has launched attacks on regime positions in upper Mandalay since Tuesday as part of the resumption of Operation 1027.
The TNLA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State on October 27 last year. The alliance swiftly captured 24 junta battalion headquarters and military command centers and hundreds of frontline bases, as well as about 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The offensive was halted on January 10 after the alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"
International banks are playing a significant role in the Myanmar military junta’s ability to carry out its systematic and deadly assault on its people, a new United Nations-backed report has found.
Thai banks have now become the main source through which the Myanmar military is buying weapons and military supplies – including parts for helicopter gunships – used to support its three-year civil war that has devastated the country and killed more than 5,000 civilians, the UN special rapporteur on human rights Tom Andrews said in a new report Wednesday.
Since seizing power in a coup in February 2021, the military has been fighting a deepening war against ethnic armed groups and people’s resistance forces across Myanmar. In recent months it has faced significant losses of territory and troops.
As it contends with widespread public opposition and an economic crisis that has sparked soaring levels of poverty, the junta has increased airstrikes and attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, displacing more than 3 million people.
The military’s brutal campaign of violence has prompted Western nations to impose wide-ranging sanctions on military leaders, family and cronies, state-owned companies, banks, and jet fuel suppliers.
“The junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), is counting on two primary resources from abroad: weapons and money,” Andrews said in the report.
The report, “Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar,” found that 16 banks in seven countries have processed transactions linked to the military’s procurement in the past year.
Weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials secured by the junta from abroad reached $253 million between April 2023 and March 2024, the report said.
“By relying on financial institutions that are willing to do business with Myanmar state-owned banks under its control, the junta has ready access to the financial services it needs to carry out systematic human rights violations, including aerial attacks on civilians,” Andrews said.
However, the volume of weapons and military supplies purchased by the junta through foreign banks has decreased by a third from 2023, with exports from Singapore dropping dramatically, according to the report.
“The good news is that the junta is increasingly isolated,” Andrews said. “The bad news is that the junta is circumventing sanctions and other measures by exploiting gaps in sanctions regimes, shifting financial institutions, and taking advantage of the failure of Member States to fully coordinate and enforce actions.”
The Thai connection
Singapore-based entities were Myanmar’s third largest source of weapons and military materials. But following a government investigation, the flow of weapons materials to Myanmar from Singapore-registered companies dropped by nearly 90% compared to the previous year.
In 2022, Singapore-based banks facilitated more than 70% of the junta’s purchases passing through the banking system. By 2023, that had dropped to under 20%, the report found.
Looking for other financial institutions, the junta found neighboring Thailand.
Between 2022 and 2023, exports of weapons and related materials from Thai-based entities more than doubled, from $60 million to nearly $130 million last year.
“Many SAC (junta) purchases previously made from Singapore-based entities, including parts for Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters used to conduct airstrikes on civilian targets, are now being sourced from Thailand,” the report said.
Siam Commercial Bank is among the Thai banks that have played a “crucial role” in the shift, the report found. In 2022, the bank facilitated just over $5 million in transactions relating to the military, by 2023 that figure ballooned to more than $100 million, according to the report.
CNN has reached out to Siam Commercial Bank for comment on the report but has not received a response.
A spokesperson for Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told CNN, “we have seen the report and are looking into it.”
“Many countries have been named and certainly these are countries where the majority of financial transactions in the region would pass through,” the spokesperson said in a statement.
“Our banking and financial institutions follow banking protocols as any major financial hub. So we will have to first establish the facts before considering any further steps.”
Andrews said it was “critical” that “financial institutions take their human rights obligations seriously and not facilitate the junta’s deadly transactions.”
In addition, sanctioning the networks supplying jet fuel to the junta and the military’s “go-to bank” Myanma Economic Bank, “could play a decisive role in helping to turn the tide in Myanmar and saving untold numbers of lives,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"
Thai banks and registered companies are taking on an expanding and leading role securing weapons to Myanmar’s military regime even as it grows increasingly isolated amid a brutal civil war claiming thousands of lives, a United Nations report released Wednesday says.
The report, Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar, says international sanctions have helped to slash the regime’s purchase of weapons through the global financial system by a third from the 2022 to 2023 fiscal year, which runs April to March, to some $253 million.
“That is a very significant step in the right direction and shows the impact that international action can take,” said the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, the report’s author.
Andrews attributed much of the drop in trade to Singapore, which investigated its own banks and companies in the wake of a report he wrote last year that named the city-state among Myanmar’s main pipelines for arms since the military’s 2021 coup.
The new report says Myanmar’s military purchases through the global financial system from companies registered in Singapore crashed between 2022 and 2023 some 90% as a result, from $110 million to just $10 million last year.
“The bad news is that we’ve seen the opposite happen in Thailand, where there has been a significant increase in both the facilitation of weapons procurement transactions by Thai banks and the export of weapons materials from Thai companies into Myanmar,” Andrews told VOA.
According to his report, Myanmar’s military purchases from companies registered in Thailand over the same period doubled to $120 million, topping all other countries, including China and Russia.
China and Russia saw their companies’ arms trade with Myanmar through the global financial system fall in 2023, to $80 million and $10 million respectively. India’s trade stayed steady at $15 million.
Myanmar’s recent military purchases via Thailand, the report says, included items ranging from chemicals to machine tools and radios to spare parts for fighter jets and helicopters, which the junta is widely accused of using to deadly effect on civilian targets.
Myanmar’s military regime has denied targeting civilians and claims it is taking proportionate action against “terrorists.”
Andrews’ report does not claim that the Thai government was directly involved in the arms trades, or that all the military material and goods were made or assembled in, or exported from, Thailand. It also does not capture any arms trade outside of the global financial system, including any deals that may have been settled with hard cash or by barter.
Previous research by Andrews and others showed most weapons shipments to Myanmar since the coup starting out from China and Russia.
Even so, this week’s report highlights the major role international commercial banks continue to play in arming Myanmar’s military despite the mounting allegations of the junta’s war crimes. It names 16 banks in Thailand and six other countries across Asia handling $630 million worth of military-related purchases for the junta over the past two years.
Despite the impact sanctions have had in stemming that trade, Andrews told VOA countries keen on thwarting Myanmar’s junta can do much more to enforce, coordinate and add to the sanctions, to leave fewer gaps for the junta to exploit.
Countries that have placed sanctions on Myanmar have not all sanctioned the same companies, and some companies vital to the junta’s arms trade still have not been sanctioned at all.
Andrews said the junta has reacted to sanctions on two of its key banks for military trades, for example, by redirecting most of that business through another bank still free of sanctions. The junta has also gotten better at disguising its arms purchases.
“What is critical now is that the response of the international community, specifically with respect to sanctions, be coordinated, be strategic and be focused, and that the international community work together to enforce these sanctions and eliminate these loopholes,” he said.
“The reason that is so important is because, given the fact that the junta is on its heels … their response is to escalate attacks on civilians,” he said.
Citing research by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, a U.S.-based research group, he said the junta has picked up air strikes fivefold in the past six months alone. The junta has lost significant territory to armed resistance groups across the country over the same period and is now believed to be in control of less than half of Myanmar.
Andrews said the junta’s weapons supplies would also be hit hard if Thailand were to follow Singapore’s lead and crack down on its own companies doing business with Myanmar’s military and known suppliers.
Unlike Singapore, though, Thailand’s government has not explicitly come out against trading arms with Myanmar.
Asked for comment, Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nikorndej Balankura said the government was looking into the report.
“Our banking and financial institutions follow banking protocols as any major financial hub. So we will have to first establish the facts before considering any further steps,” he said in a statement shared with VOA.
“This is a matter of policy which has to be carefully considered, particularly the impact of sanctions on the wider population,” he said. “Thailand has always taken the position not to support any action that impacts the wider population.”
In a separate statement, a group of past and present lawmakers from across Southeast Asia said it was “alarmed” by Myanmar’s shift from Singapore to Thailand to source weapons and urged all 10 governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to learn from Singapore.
The bloc agreed to a five-point peace plan for Myanmar in April 2021 but has failed to make any headway besides providing some humanitarian aid.
In the statement, Philippines lawmaker Raoul Manuel said the role of Southeast Asian companies in helping to arm the junta only undermines the bloc’s peace efforts.
“ASEAN’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Myanmar cannot be taken seriously if ASEAN member states are helping to arm and fund the murderous Myanmar junta, which has already killed thousands of its own people and continues to indiscriminately attack the civilian population,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
more
Description:
"The Myanmar junta is cutting millions of people off from the world by banning the use of many Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) – the last remaining tool for accessing blocked social media apps, messaging platforms, and thousands of websites. In parts of Myanmar, people continue to suffer from one of the world’s longest, most widespread, and pervasive internet shutdowns — already an enormous barrier to getting access to vital information or reporting serious human rights violations. If the global community continues to be silent, Myanmar will soon be behind a digital iron curtain just as severe as China’s or Iran’s.
Who’s behind the digital iron curtain project?
According to local media reports, the project to intercept VPN traffic on internet gateways coming to Myanmar is led by Brigadier General Lu Mon, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC). The departments responsible are MOTC’s Information Technology and Cyber Security Department and the military’s Directorate of Signals.
A company called Mascots Technologies and Telecommunications Company Limited is involved in implementing the ban, according to information shared in a military-run Telegram channel called Sit Thadin Military News.
Justice for Myanmar (JFM) reports that the junta began using a new web surveillance and censorship system at the end of May 2024. The system reportedly allows the military to “intercept and decrypt web traffic and block applications and websites, including the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs).” According to JFM, the system uses technology from Jizhi (Hainan) Information Technology Company Limited, also known as Geedge Networks. Notably, one of Geedge Networks’ founders, and its chief scientist, is Fang Binxing, known as the “father of China’s Great Firewall.”
The military has previously ordered licensed telecommunications and internet service providers to block websites. To ensure compliance, they would often do unannounced checks.
Impact of the VPN ban: what we know so far
Internet traffic volume to many sites, including Facebook, has significantly dropped since the ban was imposed on May 30. Using a VPN to access the internet securely and privately has become increasingly risky. Police have been doing random phone checks, arresting people under anti-terrorism laws if they catch them with Facebook or VPN apps on their phone.
Since the coup started in 2021, the military has been building a massive surveillance infrastructure. It has activated intercept technologies in telecommunications infrastructure, installed a network of CCTVs all over the country, and enacted surveillance-enabling regulations on SIM and IMEI registration. With this recent VPN ban, the people have lost secure communication channels and their ability to hide their online footprints.
The junta has banned many VPNs, including popular ones such as Psiphon and Nord. It is clear that the military will block more in the near future. Local digital rights groups report that VPN access varies from one platform to another, paid and free alike. It is extremely difficult to track what is working and what is not, as conditions shift every day. Since most of the free VPNs are no longer working, millions who cannot pay for premium accounts have already lost secure, private access to the internet.
The international community must act now!
To push back against this recent authoritarian move from the Myanmar junta, the international community must:
Make a collective public call for the military to stop banning VPNs and cease all other internet restrictions in Myanmar so that people can continue to securely access the internet as part of their ability to exercise fundamental rights and freedoms.
Coordinate with global tech companies, VPN providers, social media companies, and other companies in the telecom industry to deploy options/ possible technology that can be made available to those who are facing challenges connecting safely to the internet as a result of the ban.
Develop a coordinated action plan to cut off or prevent financial, technical, and other forms of support that benefit the military’s massive digital surveillance and censorship infrastructure.
Deepen its efforts to stop the sale/technical transfer of dual-use surveillance technologies, censorship tools, and mass data-collecting infrastructure to Myanmar.
Through regular engagement with local CSOs, collect data and evidence against companies involved in providing tools and services to the Myanmar military that are being used to violate people’s rights – and hold them to account using various measures and before all available remedy mechanisms..."
Source/publisher:
Access Now
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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Description:
"As the Civil war in Myanmar intensifies, the Arakan Army (AA) has emerged as a formidable force against Myanmar military in Rakhine State. Recent escalation in hostilities between the rebel group and the military in Rakhine has not only disrupted Junta’s hold in the region but also poses serious security threats to Bangladesh. Stray Mortar shelling in Bangladesh’s bordering regions included, last month, AA rebels even kidnapped innocent fishermen from the Naf river that Bangladesh shares with Myanmar. AA’s activities are becoming a growing concern for Bangladesh especially considering that Bangladesh has consistently responded with patience and dignity to the numerous provocations and challenges posed by Myanmar.
On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA), composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army and numbering some 15,000 fighters, launched Operation 1027, an anti-SAC offensive in Shan State. The coalition had been preparing for this offensive for years, according to local interlocutors, and its forces were equipped with advanced weapons, including drones acquired on foreign markets.
The Arakan Army, founded in 2009, initially aimed at gaining greater autonomy for the Rakhine people. Since the offensive last October, it has actually steered close to its goal and undoubtedly has become one of the strongest pillars challenging the Myanmar junta in the ongoing civil war. The rebel group has taken control of more than half the Rakhine State – nine of its 17 townships. They have seized key territories in the neighbouring Chin state as well. The AA’s tactical prowess and strategic territorial gains have drawn the attention of regional stakeholders, including Bangladesh. The proximity of AA operations to this border has heightened security concerns for Bangladesh, as cross-border skirmishes and the potential for infiltration increase.
The Escalation of Conflict in the borders of Bangladesh
On May 22, Arakan Army launched a large-scale attack on Maungdaw town in northwestern Rakhine State near the border with Bangladesh. If the Arakan Army can seize Maungdaw, only one town in northern Rakhine will remain under the regime’s control: Sittwe, the state’s capital. Capturing Maungdaw will also give the Arakan Army control over the 270-km border with Bangladesh. That possibility does not seem far-fetched as the group has captured more than 10 junta camps in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw in less than two weeks, killing about 200 junta troops.
Direct Security Implications for Bangladesh
The AA’s intensified activities near the border areas in southeastern Bangladesh, particularly in Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar, have experienced stray gunfire, mortar shelling, and airstrikes from Myanmar forces. These incidents have not only caused casualties among Bangladeshi civilians but have also forced thousands to flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis.
Just this month, ferry services on the Teknaf-Saint Martin route have been suspended since 6th June due to firing from Myanmar. This had caused a massive food shortage in the region endangering lives of more than 10000 residents. Often shots were fired at trawlers and boats to Saint Martin’s. One of such trawlers was carrying Bangladeshi election officials. Arakan Army members are believed to have fired the shots.
The conflict has also led to an influx of displaced persons, including Myanmar Border Guard Police personnel, into Bangladesh. More than 752 fleeing junta personnel and their families have been repatriated since mid-February after the AA launched offensives near Rakhine’s international border. This sudden influx strains security for Bangladesh-Myanmar border which is already a contested place due to Myanmar people trying to enter the country illegally especially the Rohingya community still living in Myanmar.
Bangladesh’s internal security is already complicated as it is with the existence of over a million Rohingya refugees already residing in camps in Bangladesh. The potential for further displacement due to ongoing violence in Rakhine and Chin states remains high, posing a continuous threat to Bangladesh’s border security and humanitarian stability.
Broader concerns if Arakan army controls Rakhine
Beyond the immediate border incidents, the presence of the AA near Bangladesh raises broader security concerns. The AA’s control over large swathes of territory in Rakhine State, including strategic border areas, increases the risk of arms smuggling, human trafficking, and other illicit activities. Bangladesh geography puts it at the heart of three major Asian drug trade routes: the Golden Wedge, the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent. This, unfortunately, makes the country a lucrative transit for the region’s drugs, especially from Myanmar and India, undermining Bangladesh’s internal security.
Moreover, the AA’s conflict with the Myanmar military has the potential to draw in other armed groups and create a broader insurgency landscape. This could lead to a spillover of violence into Bangladesh, exacerbating the security challenges. The presence of armed militants in close proximity to Bangladeshi territory necessitates a robust security response to prevent infiltration and maintain regional stability.
What should be the future?
The AA had previously assured that they will cooperate regarding border stability issues with neighbouring countries. These words seem hollow when they still have not apologized for the deaths Bangladeshi civilians caused by their fighting. The further show of utmost disrespect to Bangladesh’s neutrality by kidnapping Bangladeshi fishermen fishing, firing at Bangladeshi trawlers within the borders of their own country is totally inexcusable.
Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal are two routes for Arakan or the Rakhine state’s contact with the outside world. Due to the location of Saint Martin’s, most of the north Bay of Bengal is within Bangladesh’s maritime boundary. And so, for the future growth of Rakhine state, creating a friendly relationship with Bangladesh should be priority for the Arakan Army-not provoking the country.
As this situation evolves, Dhaka must remain vigilant and proactive in managing the implications of the AA’s activities to safeguard its national security and humanitarian interests. Diplomatic engagement and cooperation among the parties is essential to ensure the security and stability of Bangladesh..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
Language:
more
Description:
"Summary:
Over the past six months, airstrikes by the military junta against civilian targets in Myanmar have increased five-fold as it loses military outposts, territory, and troops to resistance forces. To sustain itself and maintain its attacks, the junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), is counting on two primary resources from abroad: weapons and money.
This conference room paper examines the SAC’s procurement of weapons and related materials and the role that international banks play in this deadly trade.
In the past year, there has been a significant shift in both the amount and source of weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials that the SAC has been able to secure from abroad. The volume of weapons and military supplies it purchased using the international finance system decreased by one-third—from $377 million in FY2022 (April 2022 – March 2023) to $253 million in FY2023 (April 2023 – March 2024). Exports from Singapore dropped dramatically, from over $110 million to just over US$10 million. Exports of military supplies from the Russian Federation and China also declined, while Thailand became the SAC’s leading source of military supplies purchased through the international banking system. The transfer of weapons and related materials from companies registered in Thailand doubled from over $60m in FY2022 to over $120m in FY2023.
The SAC continues to engage with a broad international banking network to sustain itself and its weapons supplies. Over the past year, 16 banks located in seven countries processed transactions related to SAC military procurement; 25 banks have provided correspondent banking services to Myanmar’s state-owned banks since the coup.
The Special Rapporteur urges Member States of the United Nations to engage at a significantly higher level of sustained action, including by coordinating sanctions to weaken the SAC’s capacity to continue its attacks on civilians and other systematic human rights violations. He recommends, inter alia, that financial institutions terminate or freeze all financial relationships with Myanmar’s stateowned banks, including Myanma Economic Bank, and undertake enhanced due diligence on all business relationships and transactions related to Myanmar. He urges the Government of Thailand to follow the example of the Government of Singapore, which in 2023 launched an investigation into weapons transfers from Singapore-based entities. A dramatic drop in these transfers followed. The Special Rapporteur is committed to supporting these efforts as he strives to shed light on the crisis in Myanmar and the role that governments, financial institutions, and others can play to help to bring the crisis to an end..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.89 MB
Local URL:
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Description:
"For Immediate Release
Today, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) releases the second update in the “Voice Up” series, which provides a gendered overview of the human rights situation in target areas of Southeastern Burma, including Mon State, Karen State, and the Tanintharyi region. The report covers violations against women and children who have been impacted by the junta’s ongoing attacks against civilians between March and May 2024. The first update was published at the beginning of March 2024.
Before the attempted coup in Burma on 1 February 2021, HURFOM had published similar content in a bulletin-style format under the title ‘Voice Up.’ All of the cases documented by HURFOM fieldworkers show the strength of women and children in the wake of great adversity.
Our most recent findings indicate a worsening trajectory of complete and utter disregard for civilian life by the Burma Army. A total of at least twenty women were injured, sixteen were killed, and eighteen were arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained. Several of those killed were in their homes at the time of indiscriminate firing by the junta. Landmines also continue to pose a devastating risk that robs innocent people of their mobility and freedom of movement. Landmines are hidden, increasing the risk of their detonation.
For example, on the morning of March 11th, a distressing incident occurred in Zahar village, Dawei Township, where Daw Hnin Mu, age 60, tragically stepped on a landmine while tending to her garden. The explosion resulted in the amputation of her right leg. This incident, among others, is further evidence of the deprival of everyday rights and freedoms in Southeastern Burma and across the country.
Nonetheless, women remain steadfast and unwavering in their commitment to see a democratic Burma that includes gender equality. Their voices must be amplified across all political and social spaces to ensure their participation goes beyond tokenism and translates to meaningful change. Women are among the majority of those displaced and have suffered immensely at the hands of a brutal, power-hungry regime which has failed to steal their spirit.
HURFOM urges the international community to act swiftly to respond to women’s challenges and fund their efforts as long-time, reliable providers in their communities. Their roles as leaders have transcended gender norms and dispelled harmful gender stereotypes. Recognition of their bravery must extend to advocacy for protection pathways and transitional justice. Donors must also end long-time funding barriers and support their leadership and organizing with localized approaches.
Women continue to spearhead change, respond quickly to crises, and resist injustice, even during deeply challenging times. The second issue of this report is indicative not only of their struggles but also of their unwavering perseverance and determination..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
897.07 KB
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Description:
"Hundreds of inmates including political prisoners were transferred from Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison to Daik-U and Tharyarwaddy prisons in Bago Region this week, according to the Political Prisoners Network-Myanmar (PPNM).
Five vehicles full of prisoners left Insein for the Bago prisons on Sunday, said Ko Thaik Tun Oo of PPNM.
“We heard male prisoners were sent to Tharyarwaddy Prison and females to Daik-U Prison. I don’t know the exact number, but we heard that each vehicle carried around 50 so there might be 250 [in total],” Ko Thaik Tun Oo told The Irrawaddy.
The transfer came a week after around 250 prisoners including political detainees from Mandalay’s Obo Prison and Mon State’s Kyaikmaraw Township were transported to Tharyarwaddy and Daik-U prisons in Bago, Myingyan Prison in Mandalay and Magwe Prison on June 15, according to PPNM.
Details of the political prisoners transferred to other jails are still unknown. Family members said they were not told about the transfer.
A relative of a prisoner transferred from Insein Prison on Sunday said: “We were not informed about it. Family members know about transfers only when they are reported by organizations helping prisoners. And family members often face obstacles when inquiring where prisoners have been transferred.”
Daik-U and Tharyarwaddy have become notorious as the worst jails for human rights violations against political prisoners and other inmates since the 2021 coup.
Individuals and organizations donating free food and other necessities for prisoners said they have difficulties supplying inmates in notorious prisons.
Ko Thaik Tun Oo said: “Hundreds of political prisoners have been transferred since June 15. This is not a coincidence but an attempt by the regime and its correctional department to disperse political prisoners so that they can’t stage protests in prisons and it becomes easier for guards to handle them.”
Last week, women political prisoners were among 80 female inmates beaten in a brutal assault by guards at Daik-U Prison. Five women prisoners were hospitalized after suffering severe injuries in the beating, which occurred as they were protesting confiscation of personal items during their transfer from Kyaikmaraw Prison.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported in February that Myanmar jails are overflowing with an all-time high of 20,002 political prisoners – including nearly 4,000 women and at least 300 children..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"GENEVA (26 June 2024) – Foreign banks are facilitating the Myanmar military junta’s access to weapons and related materials that are sustaining its campaign of violence and brutality against the people of Myanmar, according to a new report released today by Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the military Junta in Myanmar identifies 16 banks in seven countries that have processed transactions linked to the junta’s military procurement in the past two years, and an additional 25 that have provided correspondent banking services to Myanmar’s state-owned banks that are controlled by the junta.
“By relying on financial institutions that are willing to do business with Myanmar state-owned banks under its control, the junta has ready access to the financial services it needs to carry out systematic human rights violations, including aerial attacks on civilians,” the Special Rapporteur said.
“International banks that facilitate transactions that include Myanmar state-owned banks are at high risk of enabling military attacks on Myanmar civilians. I urge them to stop doing so. Banks have a fundamental obligation to not facilitate crimes – and this includes war crimes and crimes against humanity,” Andrews said.
“The good news is that the junta is increasingly isolated. The Myanmar military’s annual procurement of weapons and military supplies through the formal banking system declined by a third from the year ending March 2023 to the year that followed – from US$377 million to $253 million.
“The bad news is that the junta is circumventing sanctions and other measures by exploiting gaps in sanctions regimes, shifting financial institutions, and taking advantage of the failure of Member States to fully coordinate and enforce actions.”
The report examines a dramatic shift in the role of two ASEAN countries as sources of weapons and military supplies for the junta. After a report last year by the Special Rapporteur identified Singapore as Myanmar’s third largest source of weapons and related materials, the government of Singapore launched an investigation of the Singapore-based entities involved in the trade. In the year ending March 2024, the flow of weapons materials to Myanmar from Singapore-registered companies dropped by nearly 90 percent compared to the previous year.
Military procurement through Thailand has moved in the opposite direction. In the year ending March 2024, the junta imported nearly US$130 million in weapons and military supplies from Thailand-registered suppliers, more than double the total from the previous year. Thai banks have played a crucial role in this shift. Siam Commercial Bank, for example, facilitated just over US$5 million in transactions related to Myanmar military in the year ending March 2023, but that number skyrocketed to over $100 million in the following year.
“Singapore’s example demonstrates that a government with sufficient political will can make a significant difference toward shutting down the Myanmar death trade. Thailand has an opportunity to follow this powerful example by taking action that will deal a huge blow to the junta’s capacity to sustain its escalating attacks on civilian targets. I urge it to do so,” the expert said.
Over 5,000 civilians have been killed by the junta since the coup, at least 3 million people are displaced, and more than 20,000 political prisoners remain behind bars in Myanmar. Over the last six months, military airstrikes against civilian targets have increased five-fold while the junta continues to lose military outposts, territory, and troops to resistance forces.
“With the junta on its heels, it is critical that financial institutions take their human rights obligations seriously and not facilitate the junta’s deadly transactions. It is also critical that States step up by fully coordinating their actions, including by closing loopholes in sanctions regimes,” the Special Rapporteur said.
“Sanctioning governments should be targeting the networks supplying jet fuel to the junta. It is also critical that they target Myanma Economic Bank, which is not subject to international sanctions and has become the go-to bank for the junta. These actions could play a decisive role in helping to turn the tide in Myanmar and saving untold numbers of lives,” he said.
Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"On this International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) calls to action on all stakeholders and individuals to unite in support of the hundreds of thousands of people around the world who are victims of torture. Together, we can raise awareness of the plight of torture victims in Southeast Burma, support their healing journey, and work towards a future free from the horrors of torture and arbitrary detention.
Since the 2021 military coup, human rights violations committed against villagers by armed actors in Southeast Burma have grown in intensity and cruelty. Among these violations, incidents of torture of civilians have increased alarmingly. As highlighted in KHRG’s latest Briefing Paper, Permanent Scars, in 2023 alone, 33 incidents involving at least 37 victims were reported to KHRG, mainly perpetrated by the Burma Army.[1] Physical and mental violence is used by the State Administration Council (SAC) as a weapon of war, in gross violation of the internationally recognised human rights norms. This systematic abuse affects the lives, safety, and livelihoods of villagers, causing them serious injuries and trauma.
Torture is a crime under international law, defined by the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as to obtain information, to punish for an act committed or suspected of having committed, to intimidate, coerce, or for any reason based on discrimination.[2] Protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is an absolute human right that upholds the individual’s right to the protection of his or her dignity and integrity.[3] Torture is a grave breach of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions:[4] in Karen State, these acts amount to war crimes and, given their widespread and systematic nature, crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.[5]
The SAC military has systematically subjected villagers to arbitrary arrest and detention to extract information or force confessions about the activities of local armed resistance groups, particularly following attacks or clashes.[6] While villagers are often deprived of their liberty without a trial nor supporting evidence, SAC soldiers use physical violence and other forms of ill-treatment as punishment for villagers suspected of being affiliated to, or supporting, local armed resistance groups. [7] Torture of villagers is also committed by the SAC and other affiliated armed groups to intimidate and demonstrate that they have the power to act with impunity, inflicting harm to the civilian population in a serious abuse of power.[8] The SAC also uses arbitrary arrests of villagers to coerce them into acting as human shields or forced porters, accompanying troops as they travel on foot through contested territory. These acts may amount to torture, as villagers are forced to carry heavy loads while at high risk of being drawn into active fighting or landmine-contaminated areas. In addition, villagers forced to act as human shields are verbally and physically abused while detained. In 2023 alone, KHRG documented 13 incidents of human shielding and forced portering, involving at least 97 villagers.[9]
The impact of torture extends beyond the immediate victims. Families and communities suffer deeply as their loved ones endure unimaginable pain, long-term psychological scars, and physical disabilities that affect their ability to be independent. The pervasive fear of arbitrary detention and torture disrupts social cohesion, undermines trust, and fuels constant insecurity. The trauma inflicted by these acts leaves lasting damage, hindering the ability of individuals and communities to rebuild their lives and sustain themselves. Despite these challenges, efforts to heal and rehabilitate victims of torture in Southeast Burma continue. Local civil society and community-based organisations (CSOs/CBOs) play a crucial role in providing psychological support, legal aid, and financial assistance to survivors and their families. Comprehensive support systems are essential to help victims cope with trauma, reclaim their dignity and reintegrate into society.
On this International Day in support of Victims of Torture, KHRG urges international stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and regional and foreign governments to:
Recognise the serious crimes committed by the Burma Army leaders, avoid endorsing or legitimising the State Administration Council (SAC), and hold the Burma Army leaders accountable in impartial and independent courts. Support local civil society and community-based organisations (CSOs/CBOs), including ethnic service providers, to expand psychological support programmes for survivors, their families, and local communities to help them cope with their trauma. Listen to and support local and civil society organisations in their efforts to document arbitrary detention and torture in Southeast Burma, advocate for victims’ rights, and provide comprehensive support and protection to witnesses who come forward to testify about arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. Raise international awareness of the crimes of torture and arbitrary detention in rural Southeast Burma and explore actionable measures to deter and address the occurrence of these crimes, including by expanding the scope of international investigations to include these crimes.
Media contacts:
Saw Nanda Hsue, Advocacy Coordinator at KHRG, [email protected]
Naw Paw Lah, Advocacy Officer at KHRG, [email protected]
Footnotes:
[1] KHRG, Permanent Scars: Torture of villagers under arbitrary detention by State Administration Council in Southeast Burma (January - December 2023), Briefing Paper, April 2024, p.2.
[2] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1
[3] 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5.
[4] 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3(1)(a).
[5] 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 7(f) and 8(2)(c)(i).
[6] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 4-7.
[7] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 7-9.
[8] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 9-10.
[9] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 10-11..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Reporting torture: resources
Language:
Format :
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Size:
239.16 KB 212.2 KB 162.86 KB
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Description:
"The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and its allies have reportedly seized Nawnghkio town and many regime positions in nearby Kyaukme town in northern Shan State.
Junta administration offices fell in Nawnghkio and regime artillery strikes targeted residential areas of the town on Wednesday morning, residents told the Shan media.
The TNLA on Wednesday said it attacked the junta’s Light Infantry Battalion 115 outside the town. It is also attacking Artillery Battalion 352 and Sakhan Tha hill outside Kyaukme, the TNLA said.
A Kyaukme resident told The Irrawaddy: “Clashes continue and civilians are trapped in the town. There is a power and phone blackout.”
]Four members of a Kyaukme family were killed by junta shelling of their home, Shan News reported, citing residents.
On Tuesday, two civilians were reportedly killed by regime shelling of residential areas.
The TNLA said it attacked a junta hilltop base in Mogoke Township, northern Mandalay Region, on Wednesday.
Mogoke residents told The Irrawaddy that the junta is using airstrikes to defend the hilltop base. People’s Defense Forces stopped civilians approaching the clash site in Mogoke.
The revival of Operation 1027 follows repeated junta violations of the January 10 China-brokered ceasefire with the Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the TNLA. The armed group reported numerous bombardments of its territory this month.
Three TNLA troops and a 10-year-old were killed and eight others injured, including four soldiers, by junta shelling and airstrikes, the armed group said.
The Brotherhood Alliance, which also includes the Arakan Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, launched Operation 1027 – named after its start date of October 27 – against the junta in northern Shan State.
It seized 24 junta battalion headquarters and command centers and hundreds of frontline bases during the operation. The junta lost control of more than half of northern Shan State, including around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The operation was halted on January 10 after the Brotherhood Alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Non-Ceasefire Groups
Language:
more
Sub-title:
A rise in crime in southeast Myanmar is putting stress on already struggling systems.
Description:
"Myanmar’s ethnic minority insurgent groups are grappling with a growing problem as they take over larger areas from junta forces in a surge of fighting since a 2021 coup: how to maintain law and order with few resources and while under constant threat of attack.
The Karen National Union, or KNU, controlling areas of Kayin state, is among the groups dealing with rising violent crime rates, especially offenses against minors, while struggling to maintain governance amid battles with junta forces.
“When there is conflict, there is not a normal situation. Whoever commits crimes like this, they have a lot of chances to flee,” said KNU spokesperson Saw Taw Nee, highlighting the difficulties in prosecuting offenders amid the chaos of war.
The conflict has displaced more than 229,000 people in Kayin state alone, according to the U.N. and amidst the turmoil, the KNU’s justice system has been pushed to its limits, resulting in controversial measures to combat heinous crimes.
Saw Taw Nee confirmed that “two or three” death sentences had been carried out in recent years, but declined to comment further, citing a lack of knowledge on the details. The KNU’s Department of Judiciary did not respond to requests for comment from Radio Free Asia.
In January 2024, a 60-year-old man was sentenced to death for raping two 12-year-old girls. This followed a 2022 case where two men received death sentences for the rape and murder of sisters aged 9 and 12.
These cases underscore the KNU’s resort to capital punishment, despite criticism from human rights organizations.
“As a human rights organization, we utterly condemn capital punishment in all circumstances,” said Saw Nanda Hsue of the Karen Human Rights Group. However, he acknowledged the complex reality in the “absence of proper mechanisms to hold civilian perpetrators accountable.”
The challenges faced by the KNU are not unique. Other political organizations opposing military rule and trying to administer civilian populations, such as the United League of Arakan and the Karenni Interim Executive Council, struggle with similar issues.
A source asking to be cited as an observer of the Arakan Army insurgent force, part of the United League of Arakan political group, told RFA that the group did not have enough lawyers or judges, and “very inadequate” infrastructure and facilities while prisons are at a constant risk of being attacked by junta troops.
“As [they gain] more controlled area and more population, the ULA will definitely face an increase in all types of cases,” the source said in a statement. “In some areas, gender-based violence and sexual assault cases might be more heard [in the] public domain.”
He told RFA he was not aware of any recent executions under the United League of Arakan.
Huge caseload
Similarly, the Karenni Interim Executive Council in Kayah state has begun training police forces to handle an increase in looting of homes abandoned because of the conflict, and petty crimes, as well as security for civilians, said John Quinley, director of Fortify Rights. Quinley interviewed members of the police force, who told him about the shortage of both facilities and personnel.
“They said, ‘you know, it’s really difficult. We have airstrikes and artillery fire in this area almost on a daily basis. But we’re also trying to get these guys that are trying to steal goods from houses,’” he said.
“Even the amount of judges that you have is fairly limited and their caseloads are really high, and so you just have a lot of petty crime, you have also other cases that are related to prisoners of war or related to crimes that maybe the resistance forces committed that need to go through the courts, so it’s just really quite a big caseload.”
Ethnic minority political groups and their armies are increasingly taking over areas that have been devastated by the battles in which control over them was won.
“If you’re dealing with towns and villages that have been bombed out ... the courthouse is gone, the jails are gone, what they use for detention, and then once the sentences have been issued, prisons just simply aren’t available,” said Jonathan Liljeblad, an associate professor at Australian National University’s College of Law.
The United League of Arakan’s handling of more than 4,000 cases in recent years may soon be dwarfed by the growing caseloads across all areas controlled by ethnic minority organizations potentially leading to a bigger crisis in their makeshift justice systems.
“There’s a lot of challenges, like how to maintain the rule of law in our territory, especially prisons and the capacity of our people,” said the KNU’s Saw Taw Nee.
“We are still in a struggling time for our rights and liberties, so we could not focus on the specific issues like that,” he said in reference to the death penalty..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
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Sub-title:
Residents are trapped by fighting and in need of aid.
Description:
"About 10,000 people in Myanmar, most of them members of the mainly Muslim Rohingya minority displaced by fighting, are in urgent need of food and medical aid, residents told Radio Free Asia on Tuesday.
Fighting between junta forces and autonomy-seeking Arakan Army insurgents has intensified in recent weeks in Maungdaw township in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state, compounding hardships for the population after junta troops shut down hospitals, prohibited travel and forcibly conscripted villagers into the army.
The fighting has forced residents from four neighborhoods in the outskirts of Maungdaw town to take shelter in schools for the past two months.
Food and medical resources are now running out as the fighting in the area intensifies, said one resident, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals.
“We can hear heavy artillery all the time. People have been killed and wounded as a result of shells landing on their houses. There are no hospitals, no doctors, that’s why people are so worried,” he said.
Fighting between insurgent armies and the junta that seized power in a 2021 coup has intensified since late last year in several parts of the country, including Rakhine state, where Arakan Army fighters occupy nine townships and have captured nearly all junta outposts, including those on the Bangladesh border.
While civilians have been suffering throughout the country, the Rohingya people have faced particular hardship with human rights groups saying both sides in the conflict have abused their rights, accusing them of helping their rivals and press-ganging them into their armies.
Rohingya have for decades faced persecution in mostly Buddhist Myanmar with more than 700,000 fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh in 2017 from a military crackdown following Rohingya insurgent attacks on police.
The Maungdaw resident said this time, junta roadblocks imposed as part of their anti-insurgent operations meant fleeing to Bangladesh was not an option and no aid groups were able to provide food and medical care.
Residents reported casualties from the shelling but could not confirm the number or details. Access to the internet and telecommunications has been cut.
Rakhine state’s junta spokesperson Hla Thein did not respond to calls from RFA requesting comment on the situation.
According to the junta-controlled Myanma Alin newspaper, junta officials provided more than 2,000 households in Maungdaw’s affected neighborhoods with a bag of rice each on Saturday.
The World Food Programme said on Tuesday its warehouse in Maungdaw township was burned down on Saturday. The U.N. food agency has not been allowed to travel in Maungdaw township since last month.
The Arakan Army warned residents to evacuate on June 16, saying in a statement its fighters would attack Maungdaw town..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Recent military air attacks pushed the Three Brotherhood Alliance to respond, insurgents said.
Description:
"Fighting broke out in northeast Myanmar on Tuesday as a five-month ceasefire brokered by China between junta forces and ethnic minority insurgents fell apart, with clashes including air strikes by military jets, residents of the area told Radio Free Asia.
An official in the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, insurgent force said the fighting in Shan state started because of attacks by junta forces on their positions.
“Fighting erupted around 5 a.m. and can still be heard,” said one resident of the area, about 220 km (140 miles) northeast of the city of Mandalay.
“Fighter jets shot and bombed near the side of Kyauk Kyan village,” said the resident who declined to be identified for security reasons. “The villagers have fled. We can’t leave through Kyauk Kyan because the road is closed and there’s fighting there.”
The TNLA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance of insurgent factions that launched an offensive in October and made significant gains against junta forces, especially in areas of Shan state near the border with China.
Chinese officials brokered a ceasefire between the insurgent alliance and junta forces on Jan. 11 and organized talks between the rivals in May in the Chinese city of Kunming. Sources with knowledge of the talks said China was keen to protect its economic interests on the border and in Rakhine state on the coast.
The other two members of the insurgent alliance are the Arakan Army, from Rakhine state, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, based on the Chinese border.
Airstrikes in recent weeks
A TNLA statement on Tuesday said the junta has repeatedly violated the January truce over the last two weeks by conducting airstrikes and drone and artillery attacks in Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mogoke townships in Shan state.
The TNLA will defend itself if the junta continues to use airstrikes and heavy weapons, said the group’s general secretary, Major Gen. Tar Bone Kyaw.
The TNLA’s head of information, Lway Yay Oo, told RFA that the fighting began after junta troops attacked their camps.
“Fighting broke out with the junta army at the intersection of Nawnghkio’s Ohn Ma Thee village and Kyaukme’s Nyein Chan Yay Kone village,” she said.
Junta jets struck on the outskirts of Nawnghkio town, near an army camp at Kyauk Kyan village, residents said.
Fighting spread to the villages between Nawnghkio and Mandalay region’s Pyinoolwin, along a 56 km (35 mile) stretch of road where junta troops were attacking villages by air.
TNLA forces surrounded Kyaukme town while junta troops were shelling them from the camps in the town, residents said.
Two civilians were killed and four others were injured when the shells dropped in neighborhood No. 8 and in Kyaukme township’s Tilin ward, according to a volunteer for war-displaced persons.
“The official death toll is two until now,” the volunteer said. “But casualties are expected to be higher.”
A death toll report hasn’t been received from nearby Man Hkar village, which faced a barrage of artillery shells. Artillery attacks also hit two other villages, he said.
Could grow wider
The junta has yet to release any information about the renewed fighting. RFA called its national spokesperson, Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for comment but he did not respond.
A former military officer told RFA that the resurgence of fighting in northern Shan state is likely aimed at reducing pressure on the Arakan Army.
“This will prevent the military from sending reserve troops to Rakhine state,” he said.
However, political analyst Than Soe Naing said the renewed fighting could grow into a wider effort to capture more towns.
“The TNLA will decide if they take control of Kyaukme and Lashio townships,” he said. “If they continue to fight to control these townships, MNDAA will also join in the offensives.”
The junta appears to be preparing for wider conflict as well. Earlier this month, troops used bulldozers and other heavy equipment in northern Shan State to make several key roads impassable as the TNLA and MNDAA began to reassemble forces.
The main road to Kyaukme was one of the roads that was destroyed and blocked. As a result, the cost of transporting goods into the area has nearly doubled, one truck driver said.
“I no longer wish to continue. There’s no profit left,” he said. “Crossing the creek now costs about 700,000 kyats (US$180), including payment to both sides.”
The military junta has also imposed restrictions on the transportation of rice, edible oil, medicine and fuel into the area, according to several sources who have traveled through the area.
That has led to a severe shortage of items like meat, fish and medicine, a shop owner in Hseni said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Various groups
Language:
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Description:
"The Arakan Army’s capture of Rakhine State’s Thandwe Airport on Sunday puts the ethnic army just steps away from Myanmar’s most valuable beach – seven kilometers of fine white sand stretching between turquoise sea and palm-fringed forest – and puts many of the country’s most brazen cronies in an unenviable position.
Will the tycoons who turned their military ties into riches, including the son of junta boss Ming Aung Hlaing, try to negotiate with a rebel army to save their assets?
Ngapali Beach is where Myanmar’s cronies built their most lavish resorts. Its gateway is Thandwe Airport, just 30 minutes away.
The fall of the airport means the loss of the prized beach, which is also famous for watching the sun set over the Bay of Bengal.
The airport was used by the regime to reinforce troops, and send in weapons and supplies from Ayeyarwady Region and southern Shan State. That’s no longer possible. Without the airport’s runway, Thandwe Township is only accessible by two roads that weave through the Arakan Mountains: Gwa-Ngathaingchaung and Taungup-Padaung. Both roads leave convoys prone to ambush. Moreover, the arrival of the monsoon season makes it treacherous to send more troops and supplies by sea to protect the crony beach.
There are 64 hotels and resorts on Ngapali Beach and most of the grandest ones are owned by tycoons with close ties to the leaders of successive military regimes, from the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which ruled from 1988 to 2011, to the current State Administration Council.
Amazing Ngapali Hotel was built on land leased from the military by Aung Myo Min Din, who has personal ties to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing and his wife Kyu Kyu Hla. Aung Myo Min Din was Kyu Kyu Hla’s pupil when he was a high school student and reportedly has an open invitation to Min Aung Hlaing’s home.
Hoteliers say Aung Myo Min Din also bought Max Hotel from crony Zaw Zaw for Min Aung Hlaing’s son Aung Pyae Sone. Max Hotel, now rebranded as Ananda Hotel, is adjacent to Amazing Ngapali Hotel. Local residents also say Aung Pyae Sone is its owner.
The Pristine Mermaid Ngapali is owned by Nandar Aye, a daughter of the deputy junta chief of the previous junta, Maung Aye. The Htoo Group of Companies, owned by crony and arms broker Tay Za, reportedly built the hotel for her for free.
Tun Naing Shwe, son of former junta chief Than Shwe, owns the Thande Ngapali Hotel.
Arch crony Aung Ko Win owns the Jasmine Ngapali Resort through his Kanbawza (KBZ) Group of Companies, which includes KBZ Bank. The resort’s guests include Min Aung Hlaing. In January of last year, it hosted the 8th High-Level Committee Meeting between the Myanmar and Thai armed forces. Participants included General Chalermphon Srisawasdi, Chief of the Defence Forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.
Ngapali’s Aureum Palace is owned by Tay Za’s Htoo Group of Companies Za, while its Jade Marina Hotel is owned by crony Ne Win Tun, the leader of a Pa-O militia with ties to the junta’s military, through his Ruby Dragon Co.
Other, less flamboyant cronies, also bought or built resorts on Ngapali Beach.
This may be why the regime tried so hard to hang on to the seven-kilometer strip of white sand. It even sent reinforcements from the Aung Zeya Column to Thandwe in early June. The column is advancing towards Myawaddy along the Thai border in Karen State with the goal of retaking the vital border town.
The Arakan Army defeated the junta soldiers and police protecting the airport and the beach. Reports say more than 100 junta soldiers and police surrendered. Others fled to the bases of nearby battalions in Thandwe Township. Both Light Infantry Battalion 566 and Infantry Battalion 55 have bases there.
The Arakan Army told both battalions to surrender after it seized Thandwe Airport.
The 5th Military Operations Command in Taungup is the nearest battalion to Thandwe, but Taungup is surrounded by Arkan Army troops. The regime is not in a position to regroup its soldiers in Rakhine to send reinforcements to Thandwe.
If the Arakan Army takes Ngapali Beach, Myanmar’s cronies will face a stark choice: abandon their assets or negotiate with a rebel army to save them..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Business and the Military
Language:
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Description:
"MESSAGE FROM THE HEAD OF THE MECHANISM
The conflict in Myanmar continues to intensify and spread across the country, resulting in ever-increasing suffering inflicted upon the civilian population. People of various ethnic groups and religions have been injured and killed in their homes, schools and places of worship. Villages have been burned and houses destroyed. Thousands have been arrested and killed or tortured in detention. In the past six months, over three million people were forced to flee their homes.
The Mechanism is closely monitoring attacks on civilians across the country, including in the recent upsurge in fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. We are speaking to victims and witnesses of violent events and analyzing information that we have received to assess if crimes against humanity or war crimes have been committed. From the violence and destruction of property in Buthidaung Township to the alleged torture and killing of more than 70 people in Byaing Phyu village, we are looking at potential crimes committed regardless of the ethnic group or affiliation of the perpetrators or the victims.
Conducting our investigations without access to crime scenes is an enormous challenge. The Myanmar military has ignored numerous requests from the Mechanism for access to the country and specific information. We recently issued a statement on our latest request for information concerning the capture and burning alive of two young men in Magway Region, in the hope that publicizing a request about such a heinous crime might lead to a response.
Without access to Myanmar and with regular internet blackouts that restrict the flow of information from affected areas, the Mechanism relies to a great extent on courageous civil society organizations to provide us with information about crimes and connect us to witnesses. At our second Civil Society Dialogue last month, representatives of organizations shared their challenges securing funding, recruiting staff and dealing with their own trauma amid increased threats to their security. We noted their recommendations on how the Mechanism could better respond to the realities on the ground, and we are currently assessing what modifications we might make to our working methods.
The Mechanism is grateful to everyone who shares evidence and testimonies with us. We use this information to objectively investigate and to build criminal cases against those perpetrators most responsible for serious international crimes. This includes crimes committed by Myanmar security forces and members of armed groups. Just as we are sharing evidence with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina, I am optimistic that the evidence we collect and analyze of other crimes will one day be used to bring justice for the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
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1.34 MB 1.45 MB
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Sub-title:
Mass civilian casualties are likely as a desperate regime terrorizes the Bamar heartland with fire bombs.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta expected to consolidate power within a few days of their Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat. Nearly three-and-a-half years on, they continue to lose territory. They never had any legitimacy to lose.
The military have always acted as if time was on their side. But that’s no longer the case, and there are signs that the junta is moving with urgency – in ways that will bring even more suffering and indiscriminate killing upon the majority Bamar heartland.
First, the churn of senior officers has intensified as junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing replaces under-performing officers with eager and ambitious sycophants. In the latest reshuffle, some 30 officers were reassigned; five major generals were relieved of their command.
Min Aung Hlaing remains in control and Soe Win, rumored to have been injured by an opposition drone strike, is back. If there is opposition within the ruling State Administrative Council, the formal name for the military junta, to their leadership, it has not made itself manifest.
Second, the economy continues to weaken, hobbled by soaring inflation, a devalued currency, capital flight, and a collapse in foreign investment. Food insecurity is growing, with a benchmark basket of staples having gone up 270% since the coup.
A sharp downturn in government revenue collection also limits the junta’s ability to wage a prolonged conflict. The unlikelihood of a recovery in the near term is forcing the junta to be more aggressive.
Third, given losses on the ground and defections, the military has stepped up their reliance on aerial bombardment and long-range artillery strikes.
Airstrikes terrorize population
Between January and May, the regime launched nearly 2,000 airstrikes, largely against civilian targets. While insufficient to retake or hold territory, airstrikes are meant to crush public support for the opposition.
Given the limited number of aircraft, tempo of operations, and shortage of spare parts, air attacks have exceeded predictions, but this is not sustainable in the long-term.
Fourth, the junta is throwing additional resources into holding the cities.
The military may have lost effective control over half of the country, including 60 towns and small cities, but they still control nearly two-thirds of the population of 55 million.
The military launched an offensive to retake Loikaw, the Kayah state capital which Karenni National Defense Forces had partially taken in early 2024. The military has taken partial control but efforts to reinforce its troops from Hsihseng township in southern Shan state have met with resistance.
Likewise, while the Arakan Army now controls almost the entire north of Rakhine state, the junta has been reinforcing troops in the state capital Sittwe by sea, making the city’s fall unlikely in the near term.
Urban operations remain very costly for the opposition. A recent plot to target Min Aung Hlaing, during the opening of a Japanese-funded bridge, resulted in the arrest of a 13-member cell.
Ceding the borderlands
It's important to also look at what the junta is doing to better position itself for the next phase of the conflict. There are operational and logistical moves underway.
Short on personnel and resources, the military has largely ceded the ethnic dominated regions along the borders for the short term.
The military’s losses in the border regions are enormous. Ethnic resistance organizations and people’s defense forces have captured 218 military camps between January to May 2024. The conquests included 63 in Rakhine, 103 in Kachin, 19 in Shan, 12 in Kayin, eight in Chin, four in Mandalay, three in Mon, two in Tanintharyi, and one each in Kayah, Magee, Bago, and Sagaing.
The Irrawaddy online news site reported that opposition forces have taken 74 battalion headquarters around the country, as well as one of 12 military region headquarters.
The resistance controls most of the border regions and almost all border crossings. The Kachin Independence Army recently captured their state’s final crossing.
The military’s priority is the Bamar heartland, and they have fought with intensified ferocity in Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, and other regions to crush ethnic Burmese opposition.
Once that is achieved, the military will no longer worry about vulnerable supply lines across the country’s central dry zone and can then mount counter-offensives in each region, at a time of their choosing; a return to their traditional divide and conquer strategy.
Critical roads and border towns
That leads to the second major junta initiative: The military is determined to regain control over the critical roads to Muse and Myawaddy, the major trading cities on the Chinese and Thai borders, respectively.
The military has been making slow, yet determined progress through the Dawna mountains to retake control over the Asia Highway 1 to Myawaddy on the Thai border. The opposition has put up stiff resistance, but the military has thrown a lot of troops into this.
The junta has recently stepped up air and drone attacks in northern Shan state against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), despite a Chinese-brokered ceasefire.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies reportedly sent a delegation to Naypyidaw to protest the ceasefire violations. But, the junta appears to be building up their forces in Lashio, northern Shan’s largest city, for an offensive to reopen Highway 3 to Muse. It has destroyed roads to block TNLA reinforcements.
Facing shortages of foreign exchange, the military has stepped up domestic arms production.
Largely located in the Bamar heartland around Magwe, these defense factories have remained out of reach of the opposition National Unity Government and the ethnic resistance organizations.
In addition to small arms and munitions, these factories also produce 250-lb and 500-lb gravity dropped bombs.
Mass civilian casualties
In a forthcoming report, the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar, an independent expert group, documents China’s assistance in producing new munitions. China North Industries Group (NORINCO), the sprawling state-owned conglomerate, appears to have provided prototypes and manufacturing processes to produce fuel air explosive (FAE) aerial bombs.
Often referred to as thermobaric weapons, the bombs are believed to have been dropped on Pa Za Gyi village in Sagaing, in April 2023, an attack that killed more than 165 people, including children.
The report, which is a follow up to a January 2023 study on the Tatmadaw’s defense production capabilities, finds that China has also dispatched technicians to assist in production.
Given the military’s strategy of terrorizing the population into submission, the junta should be expected to increase their use of these indiscriminate weapons, with the likelihood of mass civilian casualties.
The domestic arms production does not mean there has been no new imported weaponry. Reuters documented the deployment of Chinese drones into the SAC’s ranks. Local production of Chinese-designed drone-specific munitions has already started.
The military will continue to train drone operators and integrate them into their front-line units. This was seen on June 19, when a military drone attacked a TNLA position in northern Shan state, killing four people.
Another prong of the renewed campaign is the junta’s intensification of their conscription program, as well as the call-up of retired officers.
Despite the opposition’s targeted killing of over 80 conscription administrators, the military appears to be on track to meet its monthly target of 5,000. RFA-Burmese has reported that preparation for the conscription of women has begun in the Tanintharyi and Bago regions.
While the majority of the conscripts are hastily trained and poorly motivated, and veterans can be as old as 67, they free up experienced personnel and can be used as human shields and porters.
In war, quantity is its own quality.
The junta’s continuing build up of logistics and personnel point to more assaults in the Bamar heartland and an intensified offensive to retake border trade routes..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"YANGON, MYANMAR —
A Myanmar ethnic armed group has seized the country's most popular beach resort town, with junta troops holed up in a nearby airport, military and local sources told AFP on Tuesday.
Clashes have rocked western Rakhine state since the Arakan Army attacked the military there in November, ending a ceasefire that had largely held since the 2021 military coup.
For days, fighting has raged around Ngapali beach in the south of the state, where upmarket resorts dot the pristine, palm-fringed sands of the Indian Ocean.
The town of Thandwe, a few kilometers from the beach and home to the local airport, was largely deserted as of Monday, a resident who fled that day told AFP.
"Almost everyone in the town has fled... Very few people are now in Thandwe," said the resident, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
"A rocket shell landed in the town yesterday. We also heard continuous heavy artillery shelling."
A military source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP security forces had retreated to the airport and were in control of the site.
A local hotel owner who was no longer in the town told AFP his staff said the military had carried out airstrikes near the airport on Monday.
His employees told him there were "some army and police trapped inside the airport building."
AFP was unable to reach a junta spokesman for comment and has contacted an Arakan Army spokesman.
Thandwe airport has been closed since early this month as Arakan Army fighters launched attacks in the area.
Analysts say many of the hotels and resorts at Ngapali are owned by businessmen close to the junta or are part of the military's sprawling business empire that includes gems, tourism, tobacco and real estate.
Since launching its offensive in November, the Arakan Army has seized territory along the border with India and Bangladesh, piling further pressure on the junta as it battles opponents elsewhere across the Southeast Asian country.
State capital Sittwe is one of the few holdouts for junta troops in Rakhine state.
The Arakan Army, which says it is fighting for autonomy for the state's ethnic Rakhine population, has vowed to capture the city, home to an India-backed deep sea port and around 200,000 people..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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Description:
"Regime boss Min Aung Hlaing has apologized for his junta’s killing of a senior Buddhist monk last week but blamed the victim for allegedly failing to comply with security measures.
Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa, a retired member of the State Sangha Nayaka Committee, the highest Buddhist authority in Myanmar, was shot dead by junta troops last week near Tada-U Airport in Mandalay Region.
Junta media initially accused resistance groups of killing the abbot of Win Neinmitayon Monastery in Bago Region with a landmine.
The regime finally admitted its troops killed the 78-year-old Buddhist monk on Wednesday after another monk who survived the attack exposed the truth.
Rather than apologize in person, Min Aung Hlaing sent his religious affairs and culture minister Tin Oo Lwin to read his statement to monks at the slain abbot’s monastery in Bago on Monday. Tin Oo Lwin was a classmate of the junta boss at the Defense Services Academy, having graduated from the 19th intake.
The apology reads: “The vehicle transporting Sayadaw was a private vehicle with no religious emblems and was speeding with its windows closed. I sadly learned that Sayadaw was hit and passed away in the shooting when the car drove away after being told to pull over for a security check. I am deeply grieved at the loss of the renowned Sayadaw, who was prized for Pariyatti Sāsana [scriptural theory for Buddhist monks and missionary work], and we offer profuse apologies.”
Tin Oo Lwin said the regime had formed a panel of high-ranking officials to investigate the shooting, and punitive action would be taken based on the result of the findings.
Min Aung Hlaing ended his statement by saying, “I would like to humbly and respectfully state that we will continue to serve the interests of Sasana [Buddha’s teaching] by ensuring harmonious cooperation between Sayadaws [senior monks] and us disciples.”
One monk replied: “We have learned [the truth] now. We can’t forget. We feel sorrowful. That’s we want to say.”
Prominent monk Sitagu Sayadaw, who is close to Min Aung Hlaing, urged the Buddhist clergy “to forget and forgive” the attack during the victim’s wake at Win Neinmitayon Monastery, triggering public outrage.
The Mandalay Sangha (monks association) condemned the shooting on Friday. Former students at Win Neinmitayon Monastery have also called for a boycott against the regime.
The body of Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa is now lying in state at Win Neinmitayon Monastery. The funeral is scheduled for Thursday..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Crime, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Military's political role
Language:
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Description:
"Junta police and government employees have left Thandwe as the fighting between the regime and the Arakan Army (AA) moves closer to the town in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, Thandwe residents said.
While initial reports suggested that police had surrendered to the AA at noon on Sunday, a resident close to Police Department staff said police had fled the town in plain clothes along with their weapons.
“They didn’t surrender. They fled to Gwa. There was a rumor that the two sides were exchanging fire after the AA troops attacked the police station. In fact, police just fired some shots as they were getting into their vehicles to flee,” he said.
Another Thandwe resident said a department employee told him that senior police officials had ordered police officers in the town to leave.
“Municipal staff and Immigration Department staff were told Sunday not to sleep in the town and to get as far as 10 miles [16 km] away from the town. So, they fled hastily overnight. They did not even take their belongings,” the resident told The Irrawaddy.
Guards at Thandwe Prison were released from their duties at noon on Sunday, according to a source close to the prison. It is not clear if the prisoners were freed.
Thandwe residents and Rakhine State-based media outlets reported the AA had seized Thandwe Airport on Sunday, but pro-junta Telegram channels dismissed the reports. Thandwe residents fled the town on Sunday and Monday for fear of junta air raids.
An unexploded bomb dropped by a junta jet hit a house in No. 1 Ward in Thandwe town on Monday morning.
Fighting broke out in Thandwe Township on April 13..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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Description:
"Responding to news that the Myanmar military has issued a rare apology and pledged to investigate the killing of a prominent monk, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research, Montse Ferrer, said:
“After killing thousands of people since the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military authorities have issued an unprecedented apology and promised to investigate the tragic shooting of a senior monk. But with the military authorities’ track record on human rights, apologies ring hollow and pledges leave little hope of justice.
“The pattern of this killing can be applied to so many violent attacks in Myanmar. First, the military authorities tried to deflect blame, pinning responsibility for the murder on resistance forces. But when a brave witness and survivor of the shooting shared testimony, military authorities were forced to backtrack.
“Myanmar’s military authorities must launch thorough, impartial, independent, transparent and effective investigations into the thousands of killings they have directed, overseen or tacitly encouraged since the coup took place. This is not an isolated incident but a common feature of life in Myanmar, where people pay the price for the reckless behavior of a military that has no respect for human rights.
“Authorities must bring those suspected of being responsible in this case to justice in fair trials and ensure that the victims are provided with access to justice and effective remedies. Authorities must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of everyone in the country.”
Background
On 19 June, a senior religious figure in Myanmar’s Buddhist community, Bhaddanta Muninda Bhivamsa, was shot and killed while travelling in a car in Mandalay Region’s Ngazun Township, according to military-controlled media. The 78-year-old was the head abbot of Win Neinmitayon Monastery in Bago Region. He was travelling with another monk who was injured along with the driver.
At first, the military blamed the People’s Defense Forces, armed groups that sprang up in response to the 1 February 2021 coup. But they quickly changed course after the survivor of the shooting, Bhaddanta Gunika Bhivamsa, posted a statement about the event on social media that contradicted the military’s version of events.
The surviving monk said that the shooting occurred around 10:30am as the group was traveling through a checkpoint, and that afterwards, members of the military stationed nearby told him they mistakenly targeted the vehicle, believing it to belong to resistance forces.
“I said to the soldiers, why are you so cruel to us? We are monks. The soldiers then replied because we didn’t know you were monks. They admitted it on the spot,” he said in his video post.
On 22 June, the military then issued a rare statement promising to investigate and expressing regret, saying there had been clashes in the area and when a car tried to pass by while they were conducting a search operation they “shot it to stop.”
A spokesperson pledged to take “necessary action” based on the findings of an investigation. A video has also circulated of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who took power in the 2021 coup, apologizing for the incident through an intermediary at the monk’s monastery in Bago Region on 24 June.
Myanmar’s military has killed more than 5,300 people since the 2021 coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a monitoring group..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink met with a senior Myanmar regime naval officer in Vietnam last week, according to a source familiar with the meeting.
Kritenbrink was in Hanoi on June 21 and 22 on a visit to promote a strategic partnership between the two countries and their support for “a free and open Indo-Pacific region”, according to the State Department.
During the visit, Kritenbrink met with Commodore Kyaw Lin Zaw, a Myanmar regime naval commander, in Hanoi. The Irrawaddy has learned that another US official and the senior diplomat at the US Embassy in Myanmar, Chargé d’Affaires Susan Stevenson, joined the meeting. But the agenda of the meeting is unknown.
The US State Department would neither deny nor confirm the meeting when asked about it by The Irrawaddy.
A State Department spokesperson said the US continued “to deploy all diplomatic tools” at its disposal to press the Myanmar military regime to change course, adding that the US policy on the country has not changed.
“We continue to make clear to the military regime—including through limited private channels—that it must end its violence against the people of Burma, release those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the will of the people for a return to the path of progress and an inclusive, representative democracy,” the spokesperson said.
Since the military coup in Myanmar 2021, the US has ramped up economic and political pressure on the junta while engaging with leaders of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement, including the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and other political, ethnic and religious stakeholders.
In June last year, the US leveled sanctions against Myanmar’s Ministry of Defense and two banks—Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB)—used by the junta to purchase arms and other goods in foreign currencies.
The US has also supported the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s five-point peace plan for Myanmar. However, the junta has failed to implement the plan, which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country. The junta had killed more than 5,300 people as of Monday.
In May, Kritenbrink underscored the US’ close coordination with ASEAN to support Myanmar’s path to inclusive democracy, in line with ASEAN’s peace plan, during the 36th annual ASEAN-US Dialogue in Washington. The dialogue was joined by Thet Win, chargé d’affaires at the Myanmar Embassy in Washington. Kritenbrink called for the military regime to immediately end the violence, release those unjustly detained, and allow unhindered humanitarian access to all those in need.
NUG Deputy Foreign Minister U Moe Zaw Oo said that despite the US’ engagement with the NUG, it had no information about Kritenbrink’s meeting with the junta official in Hanoi and was not notified about it.
On Saturday, when Kritenbrink was in Hanoi, the State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Robert S. Gilchrist met with NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min as well as U Moe Zaw Oo.
During the meeting, the ministers urged the US to take more action against the regime and provide support to the Myanmar people that would be directly effective, the NUG said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
The air force apparently bombed a monastery under the control of junta forces by mistake.
Description:
"Myanmar junta forces killed 17 people in an airstrike on a monastery where people were taking shelter from fighting after insurgents battling to end military rule attacked a nearby army camp, members of anti-junta militia groups told Radio Free Asia on Monday.
The junta’s air force launched the attack on Saturday night on a monastery in Nant Thar village in the central region of Sagaing, killing a monk and 16 other people including three members of the same family, they said.
Sagaing has seen unprecedented levels of violence since a 2021 military coup triggered an insurgency by pro-democracy activists who formed People’s Defense Forces around the country to confront the military.
Junta forces have been accused of razing villages, carrying out mass shootings and bombing villages indiscriminately as they hunt for members of the People’s Defense Forces.
The airstrike in Indaw township followed an attack on a junta camp carried out by an alliance of fighters including members of the Indaw People’s Defense Force, the Kachin Independence Army, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, and other groups, activists said.
Nant Thar has two monasteries, one under the control of rebel forces and another occupied by junta forces, said an official of the anti-junta Indaw Revolution group, who declined to be identified for security reasons.
“People were called to the monastery and locked down by the junta troops when fighting erupted and the jet then bombed the monastery at midnight while people were locked down,” the group official said.
“They must have wanted to bomb the monastery on the mountain,” he said, referring to the monastery controlled by anti-junta forces. “They dropped the bombs on their own monastery by mistake.”
The military has not released any information about the incident and calls to Sagaing region’s junta spokesperson, Nyunt Win Aung, for more information went unanswered.
Junta troops have cut communication links to the village, a frequent tactic after big attacks.
More than 10 people, including children, were wounded, the Indaw Revolution official said, adding that some were in critical condition.
The dead were cremated on Monday, he said.
The village has been largely empty since April last year when anti-junta forces repeatedly attacked the military camp in Nant Thar, which is on a major road, residents said. But junta troops had prevented remaining residents from leaving, including those killed on Saturday, they said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Description:
"Many people claim to know what’s happening in northern Rakhine State, but judging by the statements and counter-statements and different figures, no one really knows and most people are seeing the situation through their selective lenses and echo chambers with the truth somewhere in the middle.
On March 26 I wrote an article for the Irrawaddy entitled, “Myanmar’s Junta Plays Both Rakhine and Rohingya for Fools” and in the last paragraph I said,
“Desperately trying to survive in Rakhine State with a large defeat looming, the junta is fomenting ethnic divide as fast as possible. The question is how deep the reconciliation between Rakhine and Rohingya is, to what extent they will see through and reject the junta’s games, and to what extent they will allow themselves to be the junta’s puppets again.”
Judging by social media, the junta has been successful. Extreme, contradictory points of view are dominating and drowning out moderate voices. This was of course the junta’s intention and they have 70 years of experience in psychological warfare. Many of the X posts accuse the Arakan Army (AA) of any crime they can think of, including genocide, while conveniently failing to mention any of the junta’s crimes. One suspects that some of these are actually junta-controlled X accounts. Unfortunately, many members of the Rohingya diaspora and activists have joined this chorus, with the AA responding with racist tweets and anger that escalates the tension.
There is a lack of empathy and understanding on all sides. By empathy I don’t mean sympathy, although it can lead to that. I mean putting oneself in another person’s position and trying to understand how they feel, think and what motivates them; the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another. One may still strongly disagree, but empathy enables one to better strategize how to respond to others. The prominent emotional condemnation approach drowns out moderate voices and puts people in a corner from which they tend to come out fighting, especially if they are proud and nationalistic.
The junta approach is, “If we can’t have it, we will destroy it physically and socially.” They started by forcing Rohingya to protest against the AA in Buthidaung and Sittwe. This angered many Rakhines, including, it seems, the AA leadership, who ignored the fact that the junta forced them to protest. Then the junta ironically conscripted Rohingya people who they don’t recognize as citizens and in fact tried to eliminate them in 2017. This increased the AA sense of betrayal as they had supplied many Rohingyas with aid and safety in their areas. The inconvenient truth that some Rohingya joined the Myanmar military voluntarily didn’t ease the tensions and AA chief Tun Myat Naing’s tweets demonstrated anger and a lack of empathy.
The Rohingya have suffered from most people in Myanmar; successive military governments, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Rakhines and the apathy of those not actively persecuting them, so many don’t feel it is their revolution. One Rohingya on social media scoffed, “What revolution!” For some Rohingya it is just a matter of choosing what they see will be the best option for them. Some choose the Special Administrative Council because they think it will win and it gives them food, uniforms and guns.
From the AA leadership’s point of view, they had provided the Rohingya with humanitarian aid and protection and were betrayed when some Rohingya joined the junta and fought them. The majority of Rohingya support the revolution and many have joined the AA administration, police and even military voluntarily, but Tun Myat Naing fell into the trap of communal blame and some of the AA troops dished out communal punishment. This of course caused condemnation and accusations, even of genocide, from mainly members of the Rohingya diaspora and activists, which in turn angered the AA leadership even more. The junta inflamed this by making inflammatory statements on social media posing as Rohingya. There seems to have been a lack of empathy by some activists towards the AA leading to an inappropriate heavy-handed approach by the AA. Putting the nationalistic AA in a corner is not going to achieve much except trouble.
In addition, the high levels of international and national attention civil society organizations (CSOs) put solely on the Rohingya have alienated Rakhine CSOs. Even before Buthidaung, hundreds of non-Rohingya were killed in airstrikes and hundreds of thousands left with inadequate shelter as the monsoon started with very few international groups taking note, never mind responding. This happened in 2013 when international aid organizations focused on the Rohingya, causing resentment from Rakhines and harming communal relations. Rakhines didn’t know of the UN rapid needs assessments! All they saw was World Food Program trucks passing their villages going to Rohingya villages.
Maungdaw is in focus at the moment. There are Rohingya, Rakhine, Hindus, Maramagris and Dainets trapped in Maungdaw. The AA warned people to leave from June 14. It seems that those with money have fled irrespective of ethnicity. Some rich Rohingyas have even moved to Yangon. Some Rohingya from villages have already fled to safer places within Maungdaw township. The question is why have some people of various ethnicities stayed in Maungdaw. After talking to Rohingya, Rakhine and Mararagris, it appears people are staying for various reasons, such as lack of information, fear of leaving their homes unprotected, lack of money, fear of junta check points, and fear of being attacked by Rohingya junta fighters or the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army which perversely is supporting its old enemy the Myanmar Military. Old people are generally the most reluctant to move. There were Rohingya villages in AA areas they could have fled to. In fact, some Rohingya villages have charged those fleeing to pass them. It is not clear if they also charged Rohingya or just other ethnicities.
Now people are trapped in Maungdaw and I hear AA is trying to rescue them. A Rakhine journalist now in Bangladesh said,
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from June 15th to 21st. The Military Junta used drones and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region and Mon State. The political prisoners from O-Bo Prison, Mandalay Region, and Kyaikmaraw Prison, Mon State, were relocated. The head of the Prison who works under The Military threatened, arrested, and tortured the female political prisoners, and over 80 people were injured in Daik-U Prison, East Bago Region. The Military arrested the civilians who sold and wore the flowers on the birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on June 19th.
Almost 20 civilians died, and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. The Military Junta arrested over 280 civilians within a week. 3 civilians died in the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-06-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Thailand is the only ASEAN country, sharing a substantial 2,401-kilometer border with Myanmar, receiving many Myanmar migrants for employment, education, and property investments over time. With a shared Buddhist heritage, both countries have similar festivals, food and languages, helping to build a close friendship socially, culturally and also, economically.
Since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, the Thai government has refrained from openly supporting Myanmar’s democracy movement against the junta, while Thai people and civil society groups express solidarity. Moreover, humanitarian assistance for the increasing numbers of Myanmar refugees at the borders remains insufficient and most importantly, irregular refugees and migrants are being forcibly repatriated to Myanmar where violence, torture and mandatory military service law await. Many Myanmar youths are relocating to Thailand to escape conscription and apply for educational visas; yet stricter visa restrictions are being imposed. This raises the question of whether Thailand has become a frenemy to Myanmar people amidst these difficult times.
The Unclear Stance of the Thai government Towards Conflict and Myanmar Politics
The Thai government under the Prayut administration maintained close relations with the Myanmar military after the 2021 coup and continued its business-as-usual cooperation, and so did the recent Sretha government in 2024.
The two militaries have a long-standing relationship in joint border patrols and military cooperation and practices. When the Thai military gained control back in politics after the 2014 coup, this led to a closer and more supportive relationship in bilateral military cooperation after the abandonment of a ‘buffer state’ policy towards Myanmar. Consequently, in 2022 Pornpimol Kanchanalak, being a convicted lobbyist in the U.S was appointed as a special envoy to Myanmar to shape Thai-Myanmar foreign policies together with Don Pramudwinai, Thai foreign minister. So, Thai foreign policies sway more to maintaining good relationships with the military-backed State Administration Council (SAC), given their shared economic interests. Recently, two militaries cooperated in taking a patrol along the Thai-Myanmar border near Mae Sot, which showed significantly good relationships even as conflicts escalate in Myanmar.
Besides strong military ties, Thailand also has significant economic reliance on Myanmar’s resources, particularly natural gas supplies for electricity generation and investments in the Thai company PTT. In early 2024, the two countries decided to enhance their economic cooperation during the visit of U Chan Aye, SAC’s representative to Thailand. Moreover, investments in PTT company for oil and natural gas increased to 89.209 billion baht for 2024-2028, and reportedly, tripled its initial investment of 33.3 billion baht to 93.5 billion baht in 2023 alone because PTT has been ensuring energy security for domestic consumption and reducing foreign currency risk. In 2021, 15% of natural gas consumption was fulfilled by Myanmar’s energy supply; so Thailand has been hesitant to risk this energy source by taking a stance against the junta. Besides PTT, Thai companies have invested over $11 billion in 154 projects in Myanmar, ranking itself as the third largest investor. These companies are likely hoping to benefit from other foreign companies pulling out from Myanmar and to capitalize on economic opportunities and expand their economic presence. Therefore, the Thai government is unlikely to sever ties with the SAC government due to said economic interests.
In over 3 years of civil war after the 2021 military coup, despite the Thai government having several meetings with the SAC and being a supportive friend, the talk between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Myanmar military facilitated by the Thai government was the first political engagement between the Thai government and revolutionary ethnic resistance organisations from Myanmar. That was also because KNU’s occupation of the Myawaddy border township affects border trade and trade revenues for the Thai government. As a result of the occupation, fighting in Myawaddy led to a big influx of refugees crossing the border into Mae Sot, with daily numbers reaching around 4,000 people, and also disrupted border trade for days—this was a concern for Thailand due to its reliance on stable economic activity. This suggests that the Thai government will never hold talks or meddle as a mediator in Myanmar people’s democratic efforts with revolutionary ethnic resistance groups unless their economic and security interests are threatened.
Nonetheless, border areas play a significant role in encouraging Thailand to become such an active player in conflict resolution as a moderator for peace talks between the SAC and revolutionary forces. This signals the importance of Thailand’s role in Myanmar’s revolutionary efforts to end internal conflicts and can be a way for both revolutionary parties and international communities to leverage Thailand’s interests to support democratic efforts in Myanmar, promoting a positive outcome for all involved parties.
Humanitarian Challenges at Thai-Myanmar Border and Forced Repatriation
After the military coup, it saw a big influx of Myanmar people fleeing violence and persecution from the junta at the border areas. Approximately, 20,000 new refugees are finding sheltering in rural border areas of Thailand, staying in inadequate conditions such as Temporary Safety Areas (TSA). Many of them live in doorless bamboo houses exposed to environmental and health hazards such as malaria, coupled with the lack of food, and the malnourishment in infants and pregnant women. Also, the lack of documentation exposes people to high risks of arrest, detention, and deportation—not to mention, the shortage of job opportunities for refugees and educational prospects for children. Moreover, local Thai authorities and villages do not seem to welcome these refugees because they perceive them as threats to local job opportunities and development.
Thailand, despite not being a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, has provided humanitarian assistance to refugees in seven temporary shelters and camps across Thai-Myanmar borders. With the country’s Anti-Torture Act not clearly defining the term ‘refugee’, newly arriving refugees encounter several humanitarian challenges, especially detention and deportation, including the lack of access to healthcare services, shelter and food. Asylum Access Thailand reports that the National Screen Mechanism is leaving out new refugees who are in real danger of persecution and violence and fails to protect and accommodate these individuals at the borders.
The humanitarian crisis has now reached a new level of danger, such that there are 754,000 internally displaced persons in states and regions bordering Thailand as of February 2024, with expectations that the number of refugees will increase. Many escaped to nearby Thailand for only one purpose: to flee violence, air strikes, and military attacks. However, many of them are being forced to return to conflict zones despite the high-security risks they face in Myanmar. Thai authorities forced new refugees and IDPs back to Karenni State where airstrikes and severe conflicts are escalating. Therefore, the Thai government must stop immediately forced returns because these refugees may face persecution, torture, violence or any forms of ill treatment by the junta, violating the principle of non-refoulement.
More Restrictions on Visa Applications for Myanmar Citizens
The Thai government has implemented even more visa restrictions for Myanmar citizens. Myanmar migrant workers are now required to go back to their home country to extend their visas after 4-year contracts, even though they used to be able to extend their books at their same workplace domestically. At the same time, the SAC announced that no Myanmar migrant worker will be allowed to work abroad anymore, and eligible youths must serve in the military under the compulsory military service law. This new visa restriction which was probably a SAC request to the Thai government has triggered plenty of risks such as forced military service, high-security risks for eligible youths, detention, and torture upon their return to Myanmar for visa extensions.
Besides work visas, Myanmar youths who are at risk of forced military service and arbitrary arrests are fleeing to Thailand for safety rather than going to civil war for the junta. Many have applied for non-immigrant educational visas through language schools and universities, but their visa applications are being rejected on the ground by the Thai Immigration Bureau. On the other hand, Thai immigration authorities deny visa restrictions to Myanmar applicants—which is the opposite of the reality on the ground, especially in Chiang Mai. Many students are being asked to apply for education visas in Thai embassies outside of Thailand such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, which most students cannot afford due to the high travel and accommodation costs. Moreover, Myanmar youths and people without any legal documents who irregularly flee to Thailand in search of safety and freedom are reportedly being forced to return to Myanmar by Thai local police and the Royal army at the borders.
These new restrictions clearly disadvantage Myanmar citizens fleeing from the junta’s violence, putting them at high risk of persecution and violence. The Thai government has not only failed to help Myanmar people, but seem to be actively blocking every opportunity for Myanmar refugees to seek safety. These developments point to indications that the Thai government is not supportive of Myanmar people’s revolution for democracy and peace.
Is Thailand a Frenemy to the Myanmar people?
There are 1.5 million Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, and they comprise 52 percent of migrant workers in Thailand. Myanmar students are the second largest group after Chinese students in Thailand, a number which has increased in the post-coup period. Myanmar people’s natural resources have long supported Thailand’s domestic economy and business companies. All of these contribute towards foreign income, tax revenues, royalties, cheap labour, and further, even boosted domestic Thai economic enterprises. Even so, the Thai government withholds support for the Myanmar revolution and the human rights of Myanmar citizens. As a close neighbour of Myanmar, this is an act of negligence towards Myanmar citizens.
The Thai military and government are still friends with the SAC-led military, given their close historical military relations and deep economic interests. However, it is indeed a frenemy towards Myanmar people and the Spring Revolution even though Thai citizens stand by Myanmar people. For example, in the early months of the coup, Kasit Piroma, the former Thai foreign minister, called for the Thai government’s full support for Myanmar citizens suffering violence from the junta and warned that Thailand must be a friend to Myanmar people —especially during their time of desperate need for protection and assistance. Moreover, Pita Limjaroenrat, a former Prime Minister candidate, clarified his stance on Myanmar revolution that the Thai government must help Myanmar people and revolutionary forces in their democratic revolution, and force the junta to adhere to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, from Thailand’s Future Forward Party, has also articulated a similar position.
The Thai government must immediately end its support to the Myanmar military by all means and take the side of Myanmar people in the revolution—help them to live free from fear and violence, with the understanding that the reliance on the junta and the SAC for economic interests is not a sustainable long-term solution. Otherwise, it will always be a frenemy to Myanmar people in the revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2024-06-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Standing tall beneath the same stars, but the look in their eyes was not as bright as we are. Sleeping in the warm-soft bed while the cries of the innocent pierce the night. I was around 15 when the TV screen showed the puffy eyes of the hijabi US citizen woman desperately asking for justice in that superpower country. At that moment, with my whole life raised by an Islamic family, my teenager’s mind built a level-1 madness towards Islamophobic people.
According to Georgetown University, Islamophobia is an extreme fear of and hostility toward Islam and Muslims which often leads to hate speech, hate crimes, as well as social and political discrimination. With it placed as the second most widely practiced religion in the world after Christianity, Islam, subjectively, remains the most hated religion in the world, at least in the West. The phrase of this term is not as simple as people being hateful towards Muslim people but it occurs to become serious and rumbling the humanity of today’s society. Islamophobia was recognized as a significant issue of concern in a 2011 meeting of the League of Arab States, a key ally, and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (Gallup, n.d.).
The Starting Point of Islamophobic
As the 9/11 incident appeared to be so-called the beginning of the islamophobia trend, however, this phobia term and propaganda towards Islam started in the middle-ages era and heavily pointed to the Crusades event that negative notions about Muslims were spread during this time to encourage Islamic wars and win over citizens of Europe as the Christian leader tried to subjugate the Muslim-ruled land in the Middle East region (Kulik, 2024). Major period jumped to the Renaissance era where the expansion of the Ottoman Empire was also the time of the journey of Islamophobia in which many scholars believe that fear is buried in the minds of Europeans within the potential influence of Islamic countries (Kulik, 2024).
The hyperbola badly portrayed of Muslim people in the Ottoman Empire period has been embedded long ago amongst the West scholars and remains still until today. The misconception of those Western intellectuals and the world against Islam is when they view Islam as the bearer of a dominant civilization that seeks to colonize other civilizations, which often depicts Islam in the eyes of the world as a so-called ‘destroyer’ of the world.
The 9/11 incident, which was short for September 11, where it is the most fatal terrorist strike in American history was a suicide incident carried out by 19 terrorists connected to the Islamic extremist organisation al-Qaeda against American targets (Bergen, 2003). The mid-year gift in the quite regular year left a big-hole trauma for Americans where according to the 9/11 Museum, around 2,900 people were killed beyond New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania triggering enough for them to even build a national museum for this incident in the middle of crowded-hectic New York City. Since then, Islamophobia headlines – which have actually never lighted down – seem to have found the momentum to speak out even louder where the hate over Muslim people pierced the media at that time.
Human Rights Violations Against Muslim People
The mass use of Islamophobia trend was taking it too far to get into the serious stage where they are taking the basic human rights out of Muslim people. Too serious that even myself already gotten used to the human rights violation news against Muslims. Still struggling in the West, in the purported most beautiful country along with its language, France, ironically, served the highest number of islamophobia that even reached to disrupt the human rights of the Muslim people. France’s law restricted Muslim women from using headscarves (hijab) in classrooms in 2004 wherein further years, which in 2010, marked the passing of legislation in France that outlawed face-covering apparel in public, mostly targeting burqa-wearing women (Hajjat & Mohammed, 2023). The bad portrayed and the effort of the past legislation that harms Muslim people, especially women, are coming from France’s highest hierarchy itself, the prime minister, Emanuel Macron, who stated that headscarves or hijab does not align with France values (Al Jazeera, 2021).
Took almost 5,000 miles from France, in China, which took place in northwestern China, Uyghur is the place where many innocent Muslim people were tortured in the practice of ethnic cleansing. China is known for using communism as its form of government. But since 2017, The so-called re-education camp is home to between 800,000 and 2 million Uyghurs and other Muslims, including ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks. China has received many curses from the international world for the re-education camp where it conducts to have violated human rights through maltreatment, rape, torture, and in certain cases, a genocide in which most of the victims are women.
Not so far away from China, in the Southeast Asia region, in Myanmar for specific, the Rohingya case has been a serious issue for a long time. The discrimination towards the minority ethnic of the Muslim people has been running since the 1970s forcing them to flee to other states. Though many Rohingya have centuries-old roots in Myanmar, they remain considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In 2017, the military campaign initiated by the Myanmar government resulted in the forced migration of seven hundred thousand Rohingya. The government denies allegations made by rights groups that the government is responsible for genocide against the Rohingya (Albert & Maizland, 2020). The discrimination and the torture towards Rohingya people include the number of killings, enforced displacement, and sexual assault.
International Efforts to Combat Islamophobia
As this crisis is already taking it to a serious stage, the solution must also be serious. According to the 2011 meeting of the League of Arab States, alongside the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), Islamophobia is considered a significant concern that needs to be tackled. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghane, in her report, stated the increase of hate towards Islam is the weak policies of diversity in which states are the responsible ones who should bring up the policies that promote diversity and freedom of expression, Ghane added.
In taking this concern into significant step, as many governments already passed legislation for anti-hate-crime by doing public awareness campaigns about Islam, the UN with 60 Member-States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as the sponsors formulating the International Day to Combat Islamophobia which take the date on 15 March. This international day demands an international discussion on the growth of a culture of peace and tolerance built on respect for human rights and religious diversity.
Nevertheless, as the international world already puts efforts into reducing the hatred of Islam, after all, we can’t deny that there will always be people who will hate Islam even though there is already a lot of external intervention to combat this ‘phobia’. If we look through the wider glasses, other religions also received hate from the other parties, might be worse, such as anti-semitism (hate towards Jews). At the end of the day, the world cannot be fully at peace, at least for now, with seeing many kinds of hateful to each other..."
Source/publisher:
"Modern Diplomacy"
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Since the military coup in 2021, the regime’s military has faced an unprecedented armed revolt, not only from long-established ethnic revolutionary organizations, but also from newly formed armed resistance groups across the country.
The military has suffered historic losses and humiliating defeats, losing one Military Regional Command (MRC), three Military Operations Commands (MOCs), seven Border Guard Police battalions and 63 of 545 military battalion HQs, as well as more than 2,500 frontline bases including tactical headquarters and frontline headquarters of military divisions.
As a result of these defeats, around 60 towns have fallen into the hands of anti-regime resistance groups across the country.
Based on reports and ground information, The Irrawaddy has compiled a list of the junta military headquarters and divisions that have been occupied by the anti-regime groups.
Northern Shan
During the approximately three-month-long Operation 1027 launched by the Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful armies – the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – and allied resistance groups in northern Shan State, the junta lost hundreds of frontline bases as well as 24 military battalion headquarters including military command centers. As result, it lost control of more than half of northern Shan State, including many towns and vital trade routes with China.
Eradicated junta bases in northern Shan
Thirteen military bases have not yet been defeated.
Rakhine State
As part of Operation 1027, the AA has been conducting a large-scale offensive against junta targets in Rakhine State and Paletwa Township in neighboring Chin State since Nov. 13 last year. The ethnic rebel army has managed to eradicate 36 headquarters of military and police battalions, including military command centers, as well as hundreds of frontline junta bases including tactical strongholds.
After seizing around 11 towns or townships, the ethnic army now controls more than half of Rakhine State. Intense clashes are ongoing in Rakhine, as the AA is attempting to seize towns in the south of the state. Meanwhile, the junta is fortifying Rakhine State’s capital Sittwe, as the AA is poised to attack the capital soon.
Eradicated junta battalion headquarters
Twenty junta bases, including the headquarters of Sittwe Military Region, Military Operations Command 5 and the Western Regional Military Command, have not yet been defeated.
Kachin State
Since the 2021 coup, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been engaged in fighting against the junta. The rebel army has also provided military training to thousands of anti-regime activists, who have gone on to become members of the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). Alongside the PDFs, the KIA is attacking the military regime not only in Kachin State, but also in upper Sagaing Region and neighboring Shan State.
The ethnic army has seized several hundred frontline junta bases, as well as a number of towns and eight military battalion headquarters across Kachin State and some areas in northern Shan State. Currently, the KIA is attacking junta bases in Waingmaw Township next to Kachin State’s capital Myitkyina.
Forty military bases including MOC 3 have not yet been defeated.
Karen State
Thousands of clashes between the regime and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), have been reported in Karen State. The country’s oldest ethnic army has also trained several thousand anti-regime activists, who have gone on to join the PDF.
Alongside the PDF groups, the KNLA has been fighting the regime in Karen and Mon states and Tanintharyi and Bago regions. The ethnic rebel army has also seized hundreds of junta frontline bases and five military battalion headquarters in Karen State.
Recently, KNLA and PDF forces briefly took control of the vital trade town of Myawaddy near the Thai border, after defeating the military headquarters nearby. Currently, the junta is conducting a major offensive, Operation Aung Zeya—which it has called a “state-level operation”—against the KNLA and PDF in Myawaddy, but junta troops engaged in the operation have been stuck in the Daw Na Mountains for about two months and have suffered heavy losses due to resistance attacks.
During the fighting with the AA in 2019-20, the division was assigned to conduct military operations in Paletwa and Mindat townships in southern Chin State. When the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State and Rakhine State, the headquarters of Military Division 11 relocated to Mrauk-U Township in northern Rakhine State and conducted military operations along the Kaladan River from Chin State’s Paletwa Township to Mrauk-U.
Brigadier General Min Min Tun, the commander of the division, was killed during fighting with the AA in Mrauk-U Township on Jan. 7, 2024. All 10 battalion headquarters under Military Division 11 were defeated during the fighting with the AA, while the division’s deputy commander and all of its military strategists were either killed or captured.
2. Military Division 22
The military division was assigned to conduct military operations against the AA in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships in northern Rakhine State in 2019-20. Following the 2021 coup, the division was assigned to military operations in the Kawkareik and Kyondoe areas in Karen State, where it was badly defeated by Karen resistance groups and allied PDFs. It no longer leads military operations, but has been involved in Operation Aung Zeya targeting Myawaddy along with military divisions 55 and 44.
3. Military Division 33
The headquarters of the military division is based in jade mining hub Hpakant in Kachin State, and its battalions are deployed to nearby villages. It sent two battalions to conduct military operations in Chin Shwe Haw in northern Shan State during Operation 1027. The entire Light Infantry Battalion 13 was eradicated by the alliance after being airlifted to Chin Shwe Haw in late October 2023.
The division lost its frontline bases around the jade mining hub during offensives by the KIA and allied PDF groups. The remaining bases and troops of Military Division 33 are currently fighting the KIA and PDFs.
4. Military Division 44
The frontline headquarters of the division is located in Myawaddy near the Thai border in Karen State. After it was defeated by Karen resistance and PDF groups during the fighting for the Mount Lat Khat Taung outpost near Myawaddy, the military division’s commander, Brigadier General Win Naung Soe, was replaced with military strategist Colonel Aye Min Naung, who was promoted to brigadier general.
However, Aye Min Naung was killed along with other senior officers during a trip to a military tactical base in Thingyan Nyi Naung near Myawaddy when their chopper was shot down by Karen resistance forces. After his death, Colonel Soe Min Htut, the deputy commander of MOC 13, was appointed as the commander of Military Division 44.
However, due to his incompetent command during the battle for Myawaddy in April 2024, Soe Min Htut was replaced with Colonel Nyi Nyi Thwin, a former instructor at the junta’s Defense Services Academy. The division continues to suffer defeats and has yet to return to full troop strength.
5. Military Division 55
Before the launch of Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, a military tactical unit and four battalions of Military Division 55 were based in Hpasawng Township, Karenni (Kayah) State, while the division’s frontline headquarters were in Mrauk-U Township, Rakhine State. With the launch of Operation 1027, the whole division was assigned to military operations in the Kokang region in northern Shan State.
After suffering defeats, around 850 of the division’s troops, including its commander Brigadier General Zaw Myo Win and 89 other military officers, surrendered to the MNDAA on Jan. 4, 2024. After being handed over to the junta, Brig-Gen Zaw Myo Win was handed a death sentence by a junta military tribunal for surrendering to the ethnic army. The junta then appointed MOC 8 strategist Major Aung Soe Min as the commander of Military Division 55.
Currently, Division 55 is leading the Aung Zeya Operation against the Karen resistance and allied PDF groups in Myawaddy Township alongside the remaining troops of military divisions 22 and 44 as well as two tank battalions, a missile battalion and two artillery battalions. However, the troops conducting the operation have been halted in the Daw Na mountains range and have been suffering heavy defeats for over 50 days.
6. Military Division 66
Following the military coup in February 2021, the division was assigned to military operations in Karenni State. After suffering heavy defeats to Karenni resistance attacks, its operational duty was transferred to MOC 2. However, Division 66 has been assigned as a reserve unit to Loikaw Region Military Command in Karenni State’s capital Loikaw, most of which is under the control of Karenni resistance groups.
7. Military Division 77
The division lost troops during operations in northern Shan State in 2015-16 and Rakhine State in 2019-20. However, it managed to replenish its ranks in 2020. When the junta military staged the coup in 2021, the military division was assigned to security duty in Yangon and Bago.
When anti-regime armed resistance emerged in upper Myanmar, the military division’s headquarters were relocated to northern Sagaing Region and it has conducted military operations against resistance groups there since October 2021. The military division has suffered only light losses. Currently, two tactical units of the miliary division are operating in upper Sagaing Region and another tactical unit is operating in northern Magwe Region near the border with Chin State.
8. Military Division 88
Since the military coup in 2021, the military division has been assigned to the Bhamo area in Kachin State. Its headquarters is in Momauk Township near Bhamo. A military tactical unit and three military battalions of the division are based in Katha Township. The division’s commander Brigadier General Min Htut Oo was killed during a clash with the KIA in the Kone Law area in Momauk Township on March 20. All of its frontline bases except the battalions at Bhamo and Momauk towns were defeated by the KIA, which is currently conducting offensives against the last junta bases in the towns.
9. Military Division 99
The military division has been assigned to the Mongkoe area in northern Shan State since ethnic armies resumed fighting there in 2015-16. Its commander Brigadier General Aung Kyaw Lwin was killed at a strategic hilltop base in Mongkoe during Operation 1027 on Oct. 29, 2023. It also lost strategic frontline bases and military strategists.
The junta appointed Brigadier General Soe Hlaing as commander of the military division on Dec. 10, 2023. Currently, its headquarters, a strategic unit and four military battalions are based in Muse near the Chinese border. Another strategic unit of the military division is assigned to security duty in Mogoke Township in upper Mandalay Region. Another strategic unit comprising three military battalions has been assigned to Kachin State’s Bhamo Township since April 1. The military division has been assigned as an auxiliary force, as it is no longer tasked for operational duty.
10. Military Division 101
In 2017, the division’s headquarters were based in Namhsam Township, northern Shan State, and it conducted military operations in the Palaung Self-Administered Zone in the area. In 2023, a strategic unit of three military battalions under the division was assigned to military operations in Magwe Region. The division’s commander Brigadier General Min Min Tun was arrested by the TNLA during a clash in Namhsam on Dec. 15,2023.
The junta appointed Major Myint Shwe from the Office of the Chief of the Military Staff in Naypyitaw as the new commander of Military Division 101.
The division was assigned to Namshan, Kyaukme and Nawnghkio townships in northern Shan State during Operation 1027.
Currently, it is tasked with security duty for the junta’s garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region and adjacent Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships in northern Shan State. A strategic unit under its control is operating in Magwe Region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Rice prices rose 7% in May and pulses were up 6%, although cooking oil prices were fairly stable;
Vegetable prices were unusually stable in May, and eggplant prices pulled back from April's relatively large price increases;
Meat/fish price trends varied by market in May, although prices for fish paste were 6% higher and prices for fish paste were 19% lower;
Prices for hygiene products varied by market May, and they rose sharply in Hpapun;
Food and NFI prices were 20-90% above last year, although prices for hygiene products were just 5-10% above last year;
Near-term prices increases are more likely than not for items like mosquito nets, essential foods, and various hygiene products.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Essential food prices rose in May, and the sharpest increases were in Taungoo. Rice prices rose 7% or more in various markets in May, and prices for pulses were 6% higher. Cooking oil prices were stable except in Taungoo. Essential food prices were sometimes stable but rarely falling.
Vegetables – Vegetable prices were unusually stable in May, and some vegetable prices fell. Prices for onion and eggplant fell 25% and 10%, respectively. Other vegetable prices were generally stable, although there were isolated instances of prices rising or falling.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices varied by market in May. Fish paste prices rose 6% in May, while dried fish prices fell 19%. Prices for shrimp, fresh fish, chicken, and pork rose and fell in different markets but were overall mostly stable. Meat and fish prices were generally stable in Pekon, rising in Taungoo, and falling in Pinlaung.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products varied considerably by market. Prices for hygiene products climbed sharply in Hpapun where some produces were out of stock. Prices for hygiene products fluctuated in Taungoo while remaining quite stable in three other markets.
Other NFIs – NFI prices also varied considerably by market, with falling prices in Taungoo but a mixed picture elsewhere. Prices for charcoal, umbrellas, and plastic tarps fell a modest 4-12% in May. Prices for cooking pots and jerry cans rose 12% or more across markets. Pekon and Pinlaung saw a second month of stable NFI prices, while Taungoo saw lower prices for a number of NFIs in May..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-06-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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728.22 KB
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"Myanmar’s regime has admitted its troops killed a 78-year-old Buddhist monk on Wednesday after junta media claims of a resistance ambush were contradicted by another monk at the scene.
Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa, a retired member of the State Sangha Nayaka Committee, the highest Buddhist authority in Myanmar, was shot dead by junta troops near Mandalay International Airport in Tada-U Township, Mandalay Region.
The junta media initially accused resistance groups of killing the abbot of Win Neinmitayon Monastery in Bago Region with a landmine.
Another monk, Bhaddanta Gunikabhivamsa, the abbot of Kanthonhsint Buddhism Learning Center in Mingaladon Township, Yangon, and the driver U Kyaw Win were injured in the attack.
Bhaddanta Gunikabhivamsa said in an online video for a wake where Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhiwamsa lay in state on Thursday in Bago that junta soldiers in a truck opened fire on their car.
He said the soldiers admitted that they thought the car contained resistance fighters.
Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun admitted on Friday that regime troops were responsible.
“Our security forces in a truck shouted at the vehicle and fired warning shots to make it pull over. Security personnel opened fire on the moving vehicle from behind,” he said.
The spokesman said senior officers were conducting an inquiry and action would be taken..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role, Burmese social and political culture
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"IN BRIEF:
On its 15th anniversary, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) faces criticism for its inaction against human rights abuses in member states. The AICHR's outdated terms of reference and avoidance of challenging state sovereignty limit its effectiveness. This is highlighted by its silence during major incidents of human rights abuse, lack of a complaint mechanism, and the individualistic approach taken by representatives, leading to concerns about its future relevance and impact in the region.
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The year 2024 marks the 15th anniversary of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). While the endorsement of human rights is vital, the AICHR leaves a lot to be desired. In its 15 years it has done little in word or in deed to prevent human rights abuses and must evolve to effectively tackle these issues in the region.
The AICHR drafted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which was adopted in 2012 at the 21st ASEAN Summit. It is considered by many advocates and scholars to fall short of basic international standards of human rights. It embodies principles of sovereignty and non-interference, but most importantly identifies duties that are as important as rights. It also uses the language of human rights understood in the context of ‘regional particularities’. This language is reminiscent of the discredited ‘Asian values’ debate, a less than stellar beginning for the human rights mechanism.
George Yeo, former Singaporean foreign minister, once remarked that while the AICHR did not have teeth, it ‘at least [has] a tongue, and a tongue will have its uses’. But Yeo’s words have rung hollow. Since the AICHR’s establishment, ASEAN has faced four major incidents of human rights abuses, and in each case did not speak up or issue a single collective statement.
The AICHR did not condemn the 2014 coup in Thailand or call for the restoration of democracy. Thailand’s representative at the time, Dr Seree Nonthasoot, went as far as to say that ‘we all know AICHR has a tacit agreement not to discuss such an issue’.
During and after the 2017–2018 mass expulsion and alleged genocide of the Rohingya from Rakhine State, in which over 1.2 million Rohingya were displaced, the AICHR again did not raise a single question to Naypyidaw. Indonesian and Malaysian AICHR representatives issued statements, but only in their individual capacity.
Upon becoming president of the Philippines in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte announced a ‘War on Drugs’. Subsequent violence, much of which was allegedly perpetrated by state officials, led to the death of over 12,000 people as reported by Human Rights Watch.
When the Myanmar military seized power in the February 2021 coup, the AICHR again did nothing. Instead, former AICHR representatives issued a statement of condemnation and called for return to democratic processes in the country. Since the coup, Myanmar has spiralled ever deeper into conflict and civil war.
This silence raises concerns about the effectiveness of the AICHR as a regional human rights mechanism. The AICHR’s Terms of Reference dictate that it operates according to the region’s method of doing business, the ‘ASEAN Way’. The ASEAN Way centres on principles of state sovereignty, non-interference and consultation and consensus for decision-making. This essentially gives every ASEAN member a veto over all agendas and initiatives — meaning the AICHR is held to the standard of the region’s most troublesome member.
AICHR representatives, while nominally independent, often view themselves as government representatives instead of national representatives. This leads representatives from conservative states especially to view their role as protecting their governments rather than their people.
Another barrier to effective action is that the AICHR lacks a complaints mechanism, breaking the link between people and the member states at a collective level. At an individual level, national representatives receive complaints and forward these onto national bureaucracies. So far, Dr Seree Nonthasoot and Indonesia’s representative Yuyun Wahyuningrum have done so and both received no response to their complaints. These representatives, as well as others, have played active roles — but always as individuals and not as part of an AICHR collective.
AICHR’s Terms of Reference state that the terms ‘shall be reviewed every five years’, but after 15 years no revision has taken place, limiting future prospects. In 2019, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to convene a high-level panel to study and propose revisions to the AICHR’s mandate. As of June 2024, only Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have nominated representatives.
It can only be inferred that some ASEAN states are content with how the AICHR performs. The AICHR was never intended to be a powerful body or to challenge state power. It has not interacted with the UN human rights system or national bodies. The AICHR operates alone at the regional ASEAN level, carrying out activities of limited impact while providing a veneer of human rights legitimacy.
It is difficult to see the relevance of the AICHR in its current form or any measurable impact on the people of the region. But it is commendable for ASEAN states to endorse the establishment and maintenance of a human rights mechanism. With the human rights agenda of the West now fading, China’s rise in the region and ASEAN’s democratic backsliding, it is unclear whether the AICHR will ever evolve and become a beacon of hope and protection for people in the region. Only time will tell..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"21 June 2024: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must find creative ways to build on its Five-Point Consensus (5PC), and the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council must ensure that its upcoming resolution on the rights of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar accurately and effectively addresses the grave situation on the ground, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M founding member Marzuki Darusman and members of the SAC-M team visited Geneva this week to meet with ASEAN members, senior diplomats, UN officials and Myanmar civil society in the margins of the UN Human Rights Council session.
The SAC-M visit came as the crisis in Myanmar continues to evolve rapidly and after a recent visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the region. The High Commissioner on Tuesday expressed in a statement to the UN Human Rights Council that “it is time to go beyond the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus” and that the new generation in Myanmar should “be supported in a ‘visioning process’ for the future of the country”.
The Myanmar military junta is irreversibly weakened by three years of sustained, nationwide resistance and no longer has the control necessary to exercise state power. It is unable to unilaterally determine the course of events in Myanmar.
Grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law continue to be reported daily across the entire country. The junta’s efforts to ban VPNs are putting those reporting on its violations at even greater risk. The situation in northern Rakhine state is of particular concern, with all communities in the region reporting violence and violations and abuses in recent weeks perpetrated by the military junta, the Arakha Army (AA) and other armed actors. Rohingya are once again at heightened risk of atrocities.
Three years after the ASEAN 5PC was originally agreed to with Min Aung Hlaing, his junta cannot be considered an effective implementing partner. ASEAN should therefore engage creatively with the legitimate representatives of the Myanmar people – the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs) and broader civil society – on 5PC implementation if it is to remain relevant.1
The UN Human Rights Council is due to adopt its annual resolution on the rights of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar at its current 56th Session. The resolution should directly address the situation in Rakhine, including in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, and call on all armed actors, including the junta and the AA to uphold their obligations under international law.
The resolution should also welcome the NUG’s policy position on Rohingya in Rakhine state2, which acknowledges the Rohingya as Myanmar nationals, and the NUG’s filing of a declaration with the International Criminal Court (ICC) under 12(3) of the Rome Statute, which accepted the Court’s jurisdiction across Myanmar dating back to 2002.
ASEAN and the UN Human Rights Council must wake up to and address the new realities in Myanmar if they are to have a meaningful impact on the dire situation or any hope of contributing to a resolution to the crisis.
Footnotes:
1Human Rights Council resolution 55/20 (2024) acknowledges at PP40 ‘the central role’ of ASEAN ‘in facilitating a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar and in facilitating constructive and inclusive dialogue among all parties, including the National Unity Government, ethnic organizations and broader civil society, as well as in the provision of humanitarian assistance to all those in need’.
2General Assembly resolution 77/227 (2022) acknowledges the pronouncements of the National Unity Government articulated in the “Policy position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State” released on 3 June 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-06-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya
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Description:
"For those looking to engage with the Myanmar military regime, make no mistake: The men in uniform are blatant liars. I repeat: They don’t deserve your trust at all.
The latest reminder of their cunning nature came with their attempted cover-up of the deadly shooting of a senior Buddhist monk by junta soldiers two days ago, in which they accused an anti-regime People’s Defense Force (PDF) group of the killing.
But their lie was exposed in a video in which a monk who was with the victim at the time of the incident said the regime soldiers chased them down in a truck and fired a volley of shots at the car carrying the monks, leaving the senior monk dead.
The surviving monk’s revelation of course left junta boss Min Aung Hlaing red-faced. He has proclaimed himself the protector and promoter of Buddhism in Myanmar, only for his soldiers to shoot dead a 78-year-old monk who was a retired member of the country’s highest Buddhist authority.
More importantly, the junta’s attempt to shift the blame by accusing a PDF group of a killing it had nothing to do with should be viewed with the utmost seriousness, as it’s a grim reminder of just how fundamentally dishonest the Min Aung Hlaing-led Myanmar military regime really is.
If they are prepared to lie so blatantly about such a killing, what does it say about their other claims, such as their justification for the 2021 coup—that they acted in response to “vote rigging” in the 2020 general election? Should we believe it?
Absolutely not. International observers praised the election as free and fair, and within days of the coup the world witnessed the anger of disenfranchised Myanmar voters nationwide, who flooded the streets shouting “Respect our votes!”
Are we to believe the regime’s repeated statements that it is working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to implement the bloc’s five-point peace plan for Myanmar?
Think about the 3 million people who have been internally displaced by the junta’s bombings and arson attacks since the regime agreed to follow the plan in April 2021, not to mention the junta’s killing of more than 5,000 people for their anti-regime activism. If the junta is implementing the peace plan, why are there so many internally displaced people and why are civilians still being killed? One of the plan’s requirements is that the junta act to stop the violence.
Should we believe the junta’s claim that it seeks peace with ethnic armed groups as it wages war in ethnic areas? What about their purported attempts to repatriate Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, even as they recruit Rohingya to fight the Arakan Army, which enjoys overwhelming support among Rakhine people?
More than three years after he seized power, should we believe Min Aung Hlaing’s frequent justification for the ongoing military rule in Myanmar—that his army has “temporarily” assumed responsibility for the state in line with the constitution?
His recent announcement that he will hold an election next year deserves similar skepticism. You can’t hope for anything positive from a poll organized by an army that stole power from a civilian government based on a false claim of electoral fraud.
Everything Min Aung Hlaing and his regime says must be taken with more than a few grains of salt—everyone in the Myanmar military junta was born to lie. Their cover-up of the shooting of the monk is the latest reminder that the Myanmar regime is totally untrustworthy.
Internationally, now is the time for anyone who is eager to engage in or who has partnered with the regime—from India to China to other neighboring countries or even some others in the West—to ask themselves some difficult questions, starting with “Should I believe them?” It’s a question they should be asking out of their own self-interest.
Just a reminder: Befriending a liar will do you no good in the long term, and only an evildoer listens to wicked lips..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Since its founding in 2022, the Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Governance (IHRDG) – an interdisciplinary faculty under Spring University Myanmar (SUM) – has hosted an annual speaker series aimed at promoting research and awareness about Myanmar. In 2023, the seminar series ran monthly from August to December and featured a diverse speaker line-up from scholars around the world. Although the presentations spoke on a wide variety of issues – ranging from the historical marginalization of the Rohingya to digital oppression tactics of the SAC – what they shared was an emphasis on contemporaneous political trends and real-world policy implications. In this report, I will briefly summarize each event and reflect on some overarching lessons.
The first lecture of the year, titled “Revisiting the Polity: The Making and Remaking of the Rohingya Identity in Myanmar” (3rd August 2023) was presented by Dr. Kazi Fahmida Farzana, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Sharjah (UAE). Demonstrating how the Rohingya ethnic identity has been continuously constructed and reconstructed by consecutive military regimes in Myanmar, Dr. Farzana emphasized that the imposition of a “fixed” identity against various ethnic minorities has been a recurring strategy of successive military regimes since the 1960s. Ideologically, the Myanmar state has effectively subscribed to Buddhist and Burmese nationalism against minority ethnicities to marginalize, exclude, and – in the case of the Rohingya – expel entire ethno-linguistic groups. For example, state policies are often constructed against the backdrop of one unchanging tactic: to (re)define and control ethnic boundaries, as evidenced by the classification of 135 national ethnicities that excluded minority groups like the Rohingya. The exclusion of the Rohingya (amongst others) from this official list is self-contradictory. As Dr. Farzana notes, some Rohingya scholars say the Rohingya ethnicity was excluded on the basis of their Islamic faith, not ethnicity per se. It is worth noting that Rohingya were recognized as part of a British-promised “Muslim National Area” before 1948, promises that never materialized after independence despite the British conscription of Rohingya and other Arakanese Muslims to fight the Burmese.
After Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948, the military government excluded Rohingya from the ethnic integration of the new Myanmar by stating Rohingya were not qualified to be an integral part of Myanmar because they supported Britain, defining their military involvement as a betrayal to the Burmese people. The resulting power imbalance is still visible in the post-2021 political dynamics, including in the Rohingya repatriation project from Bangladesh.
The second event of the series – on 7 September 2023 – was a panel discussion on labor politics in post-coup Myanmar, featuring two Myanmar researcher-activists (Khin Thazin Oo and Ko Maung) and chaired by Stephen Campbell, an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Both speakers employed class analysis in their discussion of labor politics and have published extensively on labor rights issues in Myanmar and abroad. Their research shed light on Myanmar’s political dynamics since the 2021 military coup, with a practical focus on labor rights, protest mobilization, and everyday workers’ struggles. Indeed, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) was started by labor unions in the industrial zones in Yangon after the February 1 coup . By focusing on the experience and agency of people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, the research challenges elitist accounts that privilege high-profile political and military figures in favor of a “history from below” of present-day Myanmar in the Spring Revolution. This recognizes and spotlights the impact of ordinary people in challenging and transforming post-coup conditions. The purpose of this panel is to employ the concept of labor politics more broadly, expanding it beyond the limited Burmese term that can be translated as “affairs of the state” (နိုင်ငံရေး). However, the presenters emphasized the personal experiences of ordinary people. Such accounts include Myanmar’s domestic migrant workers in Singapore supporting the People’s Defense Force (PDF), the unwaged and largely, unacknowledged, social reproductive labor of women who sustained the Spring Revolution, and the workers’ role in organizing CDM in the industrial zones of Yangon, Mandalay and other major cities since the coup. The labor force has been driving the Spring Revolution and wholeheartedly supporting People’s Defense Forces (PDF) since day one, even though many struggles to support their own family.
The third event, featuring Dr. Shona Loong from the University of Zurich, was titled “A Country with Many Histories: Myanmar’s Diverse Geographies of War and Everyday Life” (5 October 2023). Contrary to dominant strands in conflict studies which demonstrate theories and underlying factors about how armed conflict shapes social processes, Dr. Loong’s long-term ethnographic research in Myanmar demonstrates that the opposite is equally true. Drawing on both pre- and post-coup research, especially in Karen State and the Salween Peace Park, the talk highlighted how the impacts of conflict are geographically diverse, thus challenging dominant (and often Bamar-centric) historical narratives. Another important theme was that of community resilience amidst the violence of military junta. Three years on since the coup began, it continues to negatively affect livelihoods and living conditions, giving rise to increased human rights violations against civilians across Myanmar. However, people continue to fight to put an end to impunity. The session concluded with reflections on the limitations facing Myanmar studies researchers, recognizing the need for a nuanced insight into Myanmar’s complex socio-historical landscape from different community perspectives. The presentation offered new perspectives on approaches for how ethnic armed groups could potentially evolve toward restoring federal democracy in Myanmar.
The fourth event, presented by Professor Ardeth Thawnghmung on 2nd November 2023, was titled “Challenges in Researching Local Governance Structures in Post-Coup Myanmar.” This ongoing research highlights the complexity and heterogeneity of how local government officials – all the way down to the village and ward levels – and their mechanisms for coping with rising post-coup violence. Driven by the nature of localized interpersonal relations, these coping strategies have continued to flexibly evolve in tandem with on-the-ground changes, as many local administrations were partially or completely taken over by pro-democracy armed groups like Rathedaung township of Arakan State, Myanmar. Dr. Thawnghmung’s original research methodologies underscored a need for research in contemporary Myanmar to become more innovative and localized. As a result, new research projects in Myanmar would become ever more subjective (i.e. based on relations of trust) but also more reliant on local researchers, thus shifting the epistemic power balance from the people’s government to the military junta. Similarly, her project’s findings demonstrate that conflicts in Myanmar have become increasingly localized due to the collapse of central authority, which necessitates a re-thinking in strategy by national and international policymakers in how local administrators can play a role in preventing violence – both now and in the future.
The final event of the series, titled “Scrutinizing Digital Repression: Policing Mobile Money in Myanmar,” by Vox, Bradley, and Gar explored the significance of mobile money, banking systems, and digital freedom for daily life in post-pandemic Myanmar. Facing increased regulation and surveillance under a repressive military regime, many people in Myanmar have had their digital rights curtailed. The three speakers presented preliminary results from their ongoing research, examining the role of online financial systems in state surveillance and their contribution to the rise of techno-authoritarianism in Myanmar. The speakers emphasized alternative methods, including decentralized critical infrastructures, as a way to enhance digital security and freedom. The research also revealed the institutionalization of the violation of digital rights and rights to privacy in Myanmar, calling for potential policy improvements once a roadmap to federal democracy is possible. This could mitigate the gap between oppressive legislation and democratic agencies, relieving the suffering of Myanmar civilians for decades.
The 2023 IHRDG Seminar Series on Myanmar Studies yielded valuable lessons for students, scholars, activists, and pro-democracy movements. Firstly, it underscored the persistent use of identity manipulation by successful military regimes to marginalize ethnic groups, as evidenced by the Rohingya Genocide. Furthermore, the focus on labor politics in the post-coup period highlighted the pivotal role of grassroots movement and ordinary people, challenging elitist narratives. Dr. Shona Loong’s insights emphasized the geographical diversity of conflict impacts and the resilience of communities in their heterogeneous and creative responses to ongoing crises. Prof. Thawnghmung’s research showcased the evolving coping strategies of local governance structures in response to post-coup violence, emphasizing the need for innovative, localized research approaches. Finally, the examination of digital repression highlighted the importance of safeguarding digital rights and proposed policy improvements for a future federal democratic union of Myanmar. These lessons reaffirm the significance of a nuanced, grassroots-oriented approach in addressing Myanmar’s complex socio-political landscape.
Note: The 2023 IHRDG Seminar Series was generously funded by the IDRCs Knowledge for Democracy Myanmar (K4DM) initiative. All views expressed in this post and by the various speakers are solely their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of IDRC or Spring University Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2024-06-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s National Unity Government and Karenni State Government should investigate killings and cooperate with international justice mechanisms
(DEMOSO and BANGKOK, June 20, 2024)–The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) and the Interim Executive Council (IEC) of Karenni State should investigate the killings of three women and their three children and hold the perpetrators of the killings accountable, said Burma War Crime Investigation (BWCI) and Fortify Rights today.
A new joint investigation by BWCI–a community-based human rights organization in Myanmar–and Fortify Rights found that the Myanmar military captured seven civilians during a military operation in Shadaw Township, Karenni State on February 5, 2024. Although one man escaped, three women—including a pregnant woman—and their three children were killed during an armed clash between the Myanmar army and ethnic resistance fighters.
The civilians killed were identified as Soe Mae, 50, Law Mae, 45, and Ma Mae Mo, 33, who was pregnant, Nang Khin, 7, Baw Reh, 5, and Li Reh, 3.
“Wartime killings of civilians should be thoroughly investigated and perpetrators held accountable,” said Swe Lin, a researcher from BWCI. “The NUG and the IEC are well-placed to investigate the killings of civilians and work alongside international investigators. Resistance forces fighting against the junta should actively seek to protect civilians and work to support victims and ensure accountability for crimes.”
The killings took place during a battle between the Myanmar military and resistance fighters, including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the Karenni Army (KA) near the village of Daw Ka Tel located northeast of Shadaw town in Shadaw Township.
In June 2024, BWCI and Fortify Rights spoke with members of IEC and NUG and shared the findings of their investigation. A member of the IEC said they are concerned about “any killing of civilians” and would investigate and charge perpetrators from the Myanmar military or Karenni forces who are responsible for crimes.
Between February and June 2024, BWCI and Fortify Rights interviewed 11 people, including a Myanmar military prisoner of war (POW) in the custody of the KNDF, a survivor of the incident who escaped, relatives of victims, two medical doctors, and a soldier from KA. BWCI and Fortify Rights also analyzed and reviewed photographs and videos taken by resistance fighters of the dead bodies on February 6, 2024. BWCI and Fortify Rights’s investigation could not independently verify the perpetrators of the killing.
According to the witnesses, on February 5, 2024, Myanmar junta soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion 249 detained the group of seven civilians who were hiding in a small house on top of a hill. The Myanmar military POW interviewed by BWCI and Fortify Rights also confirmed that soldiers from his unit detained the civilians.
Describing the incident, a 20-year-old Karenni man who escaped after being captured together with the women and children by the Myanmar military soldiers said:
I was working in the forest in the mountains and was resting for one or two days afterward. That was the same time when the [Myanmar military] soldiers came, and I was detained. The military caught me and other women and [children].
He went on to describe what happened after the junta soldiers detained the group:
[The Myanmar soldiers] tied me up with white nylon rope. … I was worried, of course. Capture means death. … [I was] thinking, when would I die? But nothing could be done. When they first arrived and captured me, they kicked me in the head and hit me with their gun. One [soldier] took out a knife and threatened to cut my ear off.
The man explained that the soldiers forced him to walk ahead with a few soldiers, while women and children were behind with other soldiers. When the soldiers began exchanging fire with the resistance troops, he escaped. He said:
There was active shooting. Because of that, they could not capture me again, and I escaped. …When I walked a bit far in front of the military, I ran. [The children and women] were left behind. … I ran, and the rest shouted. [The soldiers] shouted that I escaped and started shooting. … I ran and didn’t look back. I could only hear the screams [of the young girls]. They were shouting, “Please let us go,” and “We want to go back home.” I heard the girls screaming. It could be when they were shot and killed. When I escaped, I went to the farming field. When I got back to the displaced camp, I met with people who released me from the tied ropes.
Although he managed to escape, his niece was among those killed.
A KA resistance fighter who was part of the battle described the scene:
We had the area surrounded, with our forces both down the hill and on top. The [junta] troops were climbing up the middle, split into two units, unaware we were there. We started firing as they climbed towards us. As soon as the fighting started, we heard women screaming and thought the [junta soldiers] had brought their families. But it turned out they were [captured] civilians.
The KA resistance fighter told BWCI and Fortify Rights how he heard screams from the battle ground, saying:
I heard [screams], but we had no idea who [the civilians] were or how they got there. Since we started the fight, we had to finish it. We couldn’t tell if we hit the children, because we were firing from far away. We couldn’t see them clearly as they were with the junta troops. We could only see the junta troops and fired at them.
He continued, saying: “During the fight, kids and moms were screaming things like, ‘Oh, my son,’ or ‘Oh, my daughter,’ frightened. We heard the junta troops ordering them to stop screaming.”
Describing the aftermath of the offensive and seeing the civilians’ dead bodies, the resistance fighter said: “We did [see the bodies] after the troops fled. … I couldn’t bring myself to check on the children I didn’t have the courage to check on the children when asked. When I saw their bodies, I couldn’t stop crying and was too scared to uncover them.”
He continued, saying:
The youngest one, a child, was found a bit away from the group and was still breathing at first. I called a medic, but the child died on the way. I didn’t know where he was shot, but the medic said he was hit in the back. He was the youngest boy [Li Reh], and I couldn’t save him.
Photographs and videos on file with BWCI and Fortify Rights show the six dead bodies, including 45-year-old Law Mae and seven-year-old Ma Nang Khin with gunshot wounds to the head.
Relatives of the women and children described the impact. One woman said, “[The military] took everything. … I don’t know what to say. I lost my sisters. My elder sister, my younger sister, my nieces.”
A 55-year-old Karenni farmer also described how Myanmar military soldiers ransacked his home during the same attack, saying: “[The soldiers] looked inside the hut to see if anyone was inside and stirred things up before heading back downstairs. We could see and hear them as they looted the house.”
When the junta soldiers arrived, the farmer hid in his uncut fields, saying, “Otherwise, we would have been exposed and potentially shot on sight.”
Starting November 11, 2023, KNDF, together with other ethnic resistance organizations, initiated “Operation 1111” to attack the Myanmar military in Karenni State. The KNDF, KA, and People Defense Forces (PDF) has liberated Demoso, Mese and Ywar Thit and Shadaw townships in Karenni State. The battle that liberated Shadaw took place between January 15 and February 12, 2024.
At the time of writing, KNDF continued to detain three junta soldiers captured during the battle in Shadaw Township.
International humanitarian law—known as the laws of war—is applicable in the situation of Karenni State, where armed conflict is taking place between the Myanmar military and armed resistance organizations including KNDF, KA, and other resistance fighters. The Geneva Conventions expressly guarantee the protection of civilians “against all acts of violence.”
On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military launched a deadly coup d’état, killing untold numbers of civilians and imprisoning tens of thousands of others in a bid to secure nationwide political power. In February 2022, Fortify Rights released a flash report documenting how the Myanmar military massacred civilians, used human shields, and committed other atrocities in Karenni State in acts that amount to war crimes. The junta’s ongoing attack against civilians provides further evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
“The IEC and NUG should work cooperatively with international accountability mechanisms to address ongoing war crimes in Karenni State,” said John Quinley, Director at Fortify Rights. “Both parties to the conflict should uphold the laws of war, including ensuring that the rights of prisoners of war are respected.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of publication:
2024-06-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Junta-controlled media blames death on rebel fighters.
Description:
"A senior Buddhist monk in Myanmar was shot dead Wednesday in his car as it left an airport in the central Mandalay region — an attack perpetrated by junta soldiers, according to another monk who was in the car with him.
Junta-controlled media, however, blamed the death of Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa, the abbot of Win Neinmitayon Monastery in the Bago region and retired member of the State Sangha Nayaka Committee, which oversees the nation’s Buddhist clergy, on rebel fighters.
Television broadcaster MRTV announced that the abbot’s car was caught in a firefight between junta troops and guerillas from the rebel People’s Defense Forces, resulting in the vehicle overturning and the abbot’s death.
But in a video that spread on social media Thursday, the abbot’s colleague, Sayadaw Bhaddanta Gunikabhivamsa, who was a passenger in the car at the time of the attack, said junta soldiers in a truck fired around seven or eight shots at the car, killing the abbot and injuring himself and the driver.
“[I said] how can you soldiers be so cruel?” the monk recounted. “They replied that they did not know monks were inside the car.”
The soldiers said they believed the car was an enemy vehicle because the windows were closed, so they shot at it, he said.
Gunikabhivamsa’s account appeared to match a report on the incident submitted by the chief of the Mandalay Region Religious Affairs Department, the online journal The Irrawaddy reported.
The report cited local authorities who said soldiers conducting a security patrol killed the abbot when they shot at his vehicle after he did not pull over as instructed.
RFA contacted junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for comment, but did not receive a response.
RFA could not reach the Mandalay PDF for comment, either.
Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa will be cremated on June 27..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Society and Culture, Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Buddhism in Burma - general
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Description:
"On this International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) stresses the serious harm inflicted by armed actors committing conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Southeast Burma, and its profound impact on local communities. Today, KHRG calls on the international community and relevant stakeholders to condemn the dire human rights situation in Burma, to take decisive action to end the abuses perpetrated against civilians, including by protecting them from sexual violence, and to stand in solidarity with survivors, their families, and those who support them.
Conflict-related sexual violence, used as a tactic of war and torture, both in areas of active fighting and in the broader theatre of war, is a heinous crime and a violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. It has devastating physical, sexual, reproductive, and mental health consequences for survivors and destroys the social fabric of communities. Often, victims/survivors, more commonly women and girls, do not report the incident nor they seek medical care due to fear, stigma or prevailing insecurity. Survivors and their families face many challenges, including coping with physical injuries, psychological impacts, high medical costs, and livelihood challenges.[1] Villagers in Southeast Burma have experienced decades of violent attacks, including the use of CRSV, by the State Administration Council (SAC) and the Border Guard Force (BGF).[2] The perpetrators enjoy total impunity and have never faced prosecution for their crimes. As such, the very presence of Burma Army soldiers in and near villages generates insecurity for female villagers, leading many to send young women into hiding when Burma Army soldiers are nearby.[3]
CRSV is also being committed since the 2021 coup. In March 2023, a SAC sergeant of Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #340 sexually abused his 7-year-old stepdaughter at a SAC army camp in Meh Klaw village tract, Bu Tho Township, Mu Traw (Hpapun) District. The girl, who lived with her mother and the perpetrator in the army camp reported that she had been abused by the sergeant several times before, in the absence of her mother. Before the daughter disclosed the abuse, the victim’s mother was unaware of her husband’s crime. Living in the military camp, the family was afraid of the sounds of shelling, had difficulty in getting food, and did not feel safe reporting the crime to SAC authorities. Finally, with the assistance of local KNU leaders from the village tract, the mother and her two daughters were able to leave the SAC army camp and return to their village, in April 2023. No action has been taken against the perpetrator, as the incident remained unreported to SAC authorities.[4]
The issue of impunity, of knowing that a Burma Army soldier can commit rape and other acts of sexual violence, and not be punished, feeds the pathology that keeps this problem terrible and growing. According to the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (OSRSG-SVC), emerging concerns and trends related to conflict-related sexual violence include the strategic use of violence in the selective targeting of victims.[5] The fear of sexual violence is a significant motive for displacement among villagers in Southeast Burma, and the threat of sexual violence continues to serve as a driver, hindering the return of communities, especially in the absence of accountability for this crime.[6] CRSV cases are widely underreported and there is still a significant lack of support for the long-term effects of trauma.[7] Mental health and psychosocial support interventions are essential components of a comprehensive package of care aimed at protecting or promoting psychosocial well-being and/or preventing or treating mental disorders in survivors of sexual violence.[8] Today, KHRG also praises the efforts made in this direction by local civil society and non-governmental organisations, including the Karen Women Organisation (KWO), and we advocate that further international support should be made available for them to enhance the effectiveness of these services.
On this day, 19th June 2024, KHRG condemns the crimes of sexual nature being used by the Burma Army, which pose a grave threat to civilians’ safety, dignity and lives. We reaffirm our commitment to and solidarity with survivors whose rights have been denied. Therefore, KHRG urges:
All relevant regional and international actors to take immediate action to bring to justice in international courts and tribunals those military leaders in Burma who have ordered, instigated, permitted or condoned conflict-related sexual violence; Local actors to continue and expand their work for the benefit of survivors of CRSV and their communities, including by providing medical and psychological services to trauma survivors, and by addressing the stigma and discrimination that may arise within local communities; The international community and humanitarian actors to deepen their engagement with local civil society organisations and support them in strengthening programmes to implement appropriate and effective long-term support services for victims of sexual violence and their families..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Discrimination/violence against women: reports of violations in Burma, Human Rights Watch Reports on Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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288.42 KB 314.47 KB 363.67 KB
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"On this World Refugee Day, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) celebrates the strength and courage of people forced to flee Burma to escape conflict and persecution. For internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Karen State, for communities sheltering in refugee camps in Thailand, and for those on the run along the Thai-Burma border, KHRG draws international attention to the needs and hopes of the displaced. Today, KHRG calls on the international community to stand in solidarity with all who have been forced to flee their homes to escape the junta's targeted attacks on civilians. We call on neighbouring countries, as well as global international actors, to take concrete and effective action to protect civilians fleeing such brutality and those who support them.
Despite initial voluntary repatriations and returns had increased after the signing of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA),[1] the 2021 Coup and the violence that followed have reinvigorated the mass displacement of civilians in Karen State and other regions. The State Administration Council (SAC) is responsible for the ongoing violence, persecution and other serious human rights violations, including indiscriminate shelling, air strikes and the burning of entire villages, which have plunged the country into chaos and created a dire humanitarian crisis. Children are the most disproportionately affected by the fighting, facing dangers and disruptions to their education and well-being. Deprived of their childhoods, they are the future of Burma, and ensuring their access to education is crucial to lasting peace.
The SAC continues to deny the critical humanitarian needs of displaced civilians, while actively obstructing and sabotaging the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in desperate need. This is a clear violation of international humanitarian law, which underlines the obligation to prevent and repress forcible displacement of the civilian population by warring parties,[2] and to protect and assist civilians fleeing systematic violence and conflict.[3] Moreover, under international refugee law, the 1951 Refugee Convention sets the standard for protection: although most Southeast Asian countries are not signatories to the Convention, its core principle of non-refoulement, which states that refugees should not be rejected entry to a safe country, nor should be returned to a country where they face a serious threat to their life or freedom,[4] is universally recognised as customary international law.[5]
Displacement has a profound and lasting psychological impact, not only on the survivors but also on the wider community. When attacks against the civilian population are particularly widespread, especially when they are part of or combined with other acts of terror and intimidation, those who perceive themselves or their children to be at risk may live in fear and experience lasting psychological trauma. This trauma can also affect social cohesion within the community, straining relationships and making it difficult to rebuild a sense of normalcy.[6]
On this World Refugee Day, KHRG urges international stakeholders and foreign governments to:
Ensure that neighbouring countries’ authorities do not deny entry to people crossing the border seeking refuge, and encourage them to work with cross-border organisations to develop support and protection services for those seeking refuge. Allow aid to enter Burma through cross-border aid agencies and local civil society organisations (CSOs) already working in the area. Diversify the distribution of funds to include non-state actors, especially local ethnic service providers and CSOs, regardless of their registration status, and involve local actors and communities in decision-making on humanitarian response and crisis resolution. Recognize that the SAC is the root cause of the current human rights and humanitarian crisis and refrain from legitimizing the junta by signing agreements or working with them. Ensure the SAC has no decision-making power over aid distribution and prevent funds from being indirectly channelled through them. Take immediate steps to bring Burma's military leaders to international justice for ordering and/or permitting the targeting of civilians..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-06-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burmese refugees: discussion groups, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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243.46 KB 316.87 KB 279.63 KB
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, and Rakhine State from June 8th to 14th. The Military Junta Troop arrested a youth for Military Service from Nyaung-U Township, Mandalay Region, and tortured and murdered. The Military Junta did not confirm Cyber Security Law, but Junta troops checked the Mobile Phones at their controlled places and arrested and blackmailed the VPN users. Almost 100 civilians from the Magway Region and Shan State were arrested as human shields.
Over 20 civilians died, and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian died and one was injured by the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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288.44 KB 307.09 KB 129.35 KB
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Description:
"The illegal Myanmar military junta has accessed Chinese equipment, technology and support in its efforts to spy on Myanmar internet users and to censor the internet as it speeds up efforts to build a digital dictatorship.
A Justice For Myanmar investigation based on sources including leaked documents and corporate records has exposed the involvement of two Chinese companies in the junta’s digital surveillance and censorship program.
Planning documents show the use of two products from the Chinese company Geedge Networks, which trades as Jizhi (Hainan) Information Technology Company Limited, in the surveillance and censorship system that was activated in Myanmar at the end of May.
Geedge Networks founder and chief scientist is Fang Binxing, the “father” of the Great Firewall of China.
One product, Taingou Secure Gateway (TSG), uses deep pack inspection and claims to be able to decrypt and inspect traffic between the server and client that is encrypted with secure sockets layer (SSL) and transport layer security (TLS) encryption protocols.
TSG also features a firewall that can block applications, including virtual private networks (VPNs), based on their behaviours and attributes.
Cyber Narrator, also from Geedge Networks, is a network intelligence platform designed to monitor and analyse internet traffic and respond to “threats”, including the use of VPNs.
In addition, the Chinese state-owned company China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), also linked to Fang Binxing, has been involved in a proposed location tracking system for the junta controlled communications ministry.
Both companies business with the junta is brokered by the crony Mascots Group of Companies, led by Dr Win Kyaw and his wife Khin Kay Khaing, who are part of a network of at least 30 companies across Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand, more than half of which were named by the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar calls on governments to urgently impose sanctions against Geedge Networks, CEIEC and Mascots Group, its directors and related companies.
Governments must block companies and individuals in their territory from providing the illegal junta with arms, equipment, technology, technical support and jet fuel.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Chinese companies and their Myanmar crony partners are providing the illegal junta with surveillance and censorship technology that will cost lives.
“The junta is a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and definitions in international law that is waging a campaign of terror against the people with total impunity.
“The junta is killing, torturing and arbitrarily detaining people across Myanmar and this new Chinese technology will further aid and abet the junta’s crimes against humanity as it seeks to track down those who oppose the military’s illegitimate coup attempt.
“Geedge Networks’ censorship system is further violating the Myanmar people’s right to free expression and is part of the junta’s war on independent sources of information.
“Governments must take urgent action against the complicity of foreign and Myanmar companies in the junta’s international crimes, including through targeted sanctions.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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pdf
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157.57 KB
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Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in Central and Northern Rakhine State and Chin State. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. Data and product specifications are available online through the MPR dashboard at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Rice prices rose 4-8% in May, but in general essential food prices were more stable than other product types;
Vegetables prices rose 15-37%, and recent price in-creases outpaced those at this time last year;
Hygiene NFI prices rose at their fastest rate in months, adding 16-54% on top of five months of past price hikes;
Meat/fish prices rose 6-10% in May, although recent months have seen prices falling more often than rising;
Mosquito net prices spiked in May, although NFI prices were other stable following April's sharp increases;
Hygiene NFI prices were 100-200% above last year, while other NFIs were often double 2023 levels;
Wholesale price and supply should be monitored as retailers suggest local conflict is not their only challenge;
Relentless price hikes for hygiene NFIs may be critical as prices push three-times above last year's levels.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Essential food prices were stable or slightly higher again in May, with rice prices up 4-8%. Rice prices fluctuated in May but trended upward slightly as retailers worried about stable access to supply. Prices for cooking oil also fluctuated but were overall 3% lower. Prices for pulses were flat after rising steadily in March and April.
Vegetables – Vegetables saw a third straight month of rising prices amid continued reports of falling supply. Prices for egg-plant and watercress rose 15-22%, and green chili prices were up 37%. Other vegetable prices fluctuated with little clear trend, although Minbya saw a number of falling prices.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices rose 6-10% in May. Shrimp and fish paste prices rose 6-7% in May, while prices for chicken and dried fish rose 10%. Fresh fish prices varied by market. Retailers said reduced supply of fresh fish increased demand (and therefore prices) for substitutes like dried fish.
Hygiene Products – Hygiene product prices climbed 16-54%, marking the largest increase in six months of higher prices. Prices for sanitary pads and detergent rose 16% and 31%, respectively, while toothpaste rose 54%. Soap prices rose and fell in different markets. Multiple retailers reported rising wholesale prices for hygiene items and overall less supply than normal.
Other NFIs – NFI prices were relatively stable in May, although mosquito net prices jumped 50%. Plastic tarp prices fell in several markets but spiked 40-60% in Mrauk-U and Ponnagyun. Prices for charcoal and longyis fell 2-9%. Prices for cooking pots and mosquito nets rose, while other NFIs were stable. Retailers said Yangon supplies had begun raising mosquito net prices..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations
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"As we convene here in the Council, yet again discussing Myanmar, we are bearing witness to a country being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime. Myanmar is in agonizing pain. And the disintegration of human rights continues at breakneck speed. This is a crisis emblematic of a decades-long legacy of military domination, the stifling of dissent, and division,” Türk told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
“And right now, these very same dynamics are playing out in terrifying form with the Rohingya and Rakhine communities.We are hearing stories of horrific war tactics, such as beheadings. Midnight drone attacks. The burning of homes as people sleep. People being shot at as they flee for their lives,” he said.
“The military has lost control over a considerable amount of territory. So it is resorting to increasingly extreme measures. Forced conscription. Indiscriminate bombardment of towns and villages. Brutal atrocity crimes,” the High Commissioner said.
“The Myanmar military continues to gain access to foreign currency and weapons it needs to sustain its campaign of terror, while international financial support for the people of Myanmar is meagre at best,” Turk said.
On a recent visit to Southeast Asia, the High Commissioner met with Myanmar civil society to discuss the spiralling regional impacts and the urgent need for leadership and influence to halt the catastrophe in Myanmar.
In Malaysia, he met with representatives of almost all ethnic communities from Myanmar, noting that a few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to meet with Rohingya and other ethnic communities around one table.
“I also witnessed a profound sense of hope. In my discussions with Myanmar civil society, human rights defenders and refugee communities, it was clear to see there is a new generation of young people from all ethnic communities leading the struggle to create an inclusive vision for the future of Myanmar,” he said.
“We are witnessing a people’s revolution against decades of oppression and violence,” Türk said.
In some areas outside the military’s control, new local governance structures have emerged, supported by ethnic armed groups and activists alike. They are providing food, shelter, education and healthcare for hundreds of thousands who are otherwise receiving little to no humanitarian support. And they are delivering critically needed protection services in the complete absence of a functioning public system.
Armed conflicts continue to rage brutally across the country, taking an increasingly grim toll on the lives of civilians, Türk said. The UN Human Rights Office is investigating several reported attacks against civilians in Rakhine State and Sagaing over recent days with large numbers of civilians allegedly killed -- in airstrikes, naval artillery barrages and shootings.
In a cynical move, the military has pressured and threatened young Rohingya men to join their ranks. Some reports have indicated thousands of Rohingya youth have been conscripted into the very same forces that displaced hundreds of thousands of their community in 2016 and 2017.
In response, the Arakan Army has exhorted Rohingya to fight with them against the military. They have targeted their communities by forcibly displacing residents. On multiple occasions, they have detained or killed men of fighting age who they suspected of taking up arms against them.
“These tactics have brought back the shocking images and memories from 2017 of systematic terrorisation, persecution and forced displacement of populations,” the High Commissioner said.
And tens of thousands of civilians from these communities have been forced to flee, among them entire Rohingya communities with no guarantees of finding safe haven. Over one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are still living in limbo in dire conditions, with no prospect for durable solutions.
“The violence must end. The attacks against civilians must end. The forced conscription must end. And the denial of humanitarian aid must end,” Türk said..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2024-06-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များ၏ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်တစ်ရက်ဖြစ်သည် "အီဒုလ်အသွဟာ" ကုရ်ဘာနီ စွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှုအိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့ အခါသမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ နိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ် ဘာသာဝင်အပေါင်း ရွှင်လန်းချမ်းမြေ့ကြပါစေလို့ ဦးစွာ ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သလိုက်ပါသည်။
အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များသည် နှစ်စဉ်နှစ်တိုင်း ဇွလ်ဟဂျ်လ ၁ဝ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှုအိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့တွင် အလ္လာဟ်အသျှင်အမြတ်ထံတော်ပါး ဝတ်ပြု ဆုတောင်းခြင်း၊ အလ္လာဟ်အသျှင်အမြတ်၏ အမိန့်ကို လိုက်နာခြင်းအားဖြင့် ကုရ်ဘာနီ စွန့်လွှတ် လှူဒါန်းမှု၊ ကောင်းမှုကုသိုလ်များ ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းနှင့်အတူ နွမ်းပါးသူများအား ပေးဝေလှူဒါန်းခြင်း ကောင်းမှုသီလများအား ပြုလုပ် ဆင်နွှဲကြကြောင်း သိရသည်။
ယခင့်ယခင်ကတည်းက "အီဒုလ်အသွဟာ" ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှုအိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ နိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များမှ ဟင်းလျာများ ချက်ပြုတ်ကာ ဘာသာလူမျိုး မတူသူများအား ဖိတ်ခေါ် ဧည့်ခံကျွေးမွေးသည့် အလွန်အပင် နှစ်လိုဖွယ်ကောင်းသော အစဉ်အလာ တစ်ရပ် ရှိခဲ့ပြီး၊ ယနေ့တိုင် ကုရ်ဘာနီနေ့တွင် နေရာအတော်များများတွင် အစ္စလာမ် ဘာသာဝင်များမှ ချက်ပြုတ်လှူဒါန်းမှုများ ရှိနေသည်။
သို့သော် ယခုအချိန်အခါသည် အမိမြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ အဓမ္မသိမ်းယူထားပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့အလိုကျ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ပြည်သူများအား နေ့စဉ်ရက်ဆက် အကြမ်းဖက် လျက်ရှိနေပြီး တနေ့တခြား ဆိုးရွားလာသည့် အခြေအနေများကို ပိုမို သတိကြီးစွာ ကာကွယ်ရမည် ဖြစ်သည်။ တဖန် အကြမ်းဖက်ရန်လိုနေသည့် စစ်တပ်အား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ နိုင်ငံသား ပြည်သူ တစ်ရပ်လုံးက နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲလျက်ရှိနေပြီး ပြည်သူ့အင်အားဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက် နေသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးမှာ အားရစရာအခြေအနေတစ်ရပ်သို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ နိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်အပေါင်းတို့မှာလည်း ကျရာကဏ္ဍကနေ အမိမြန်မာ နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးအား ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကဏ္ဍတွင် ပါဝင် နေကြောင်း သိရှိရ၍ ဝမ်းမြောက်ဝမ်းသာ ဂုဏ်ယူရပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။
ဆက်လက်ပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင် ဖျက်သိမ်းရေးနှင့် လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ဘာသာပေါင်းစုံ ခွင့်တူညီမျှသည့် ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကို ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့် အတူ လက်တွဲကာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးလိုပါသည်။
"အီဒုလ်အသွဟာ" ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှုအိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့တွင် အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်အပေါင်း ကိုယ်ကျန်းမာ၊ စိတ်ချမ်းသာကြပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အပေါင်းမှ ကင်းဝေကြ ပါစေကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့မှ ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်သည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-06-17
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Islam, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"In eerie echoes of the brutality of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, the Myanmar military junta is killing and torturing people as it desperately tries to hang on to power in a country inaptly dubbed the “Golden Land”.
Just over the last couple of weeks, the horrific story has been exposed of a brutal and vicious massacre of over 50 people in the village Byai Phyu, which is just outside the Rakhine State capital of Sittwe. This is one of many massacres and killings since the 2021 military coup, displaying the brutality of this “Pol Pot-like regime” that appears to hate its countrymen and women. Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing appears to encourage this horrific behaviour of his troops.
More than 170 soldiers are believed to have raided the village Byai Phyu as part of operations to tackle the Arakan Army (AA) that has grabbed a number of towns and junta military positions in Rakhine.
Witnesses told the media that everyone in the village, which has just over 1,000 households, were kept out in the open for two days, under the sun, with little or nothing to eat or drink, while dozens of men were tied, blindfolded and some taken away in trucks for further interrogation. Many are yet to return.
According to a BBC report, men who had tattoos showing support for the AA were singled out for especially harsh treatment, locals said. One eyewitness said the soldiers cut out the tattooed skin, poured petrol onto it and set it alight. Men were taken away one by one, brutalized and shot. Several women were gang-raped. Valuables were looted. Another eyewitness recalled an army officer telling the villagers he had come from the fighting in northern Shan State, where the military suffered heavy losses under Operation 1027 late last year, to take his revenge on them.
The National Unity Government (NUG) said in a statement that 51 people aged between 15 and 70 were “violently tortured and killed”. The AA estimates the death toll to be more than 70 people.
The Myanmar junta has denied the accusations, but it is clear that this is yet another massacre perpetrated by soldiers on civilians, displaying a level of brutality on a par with Pol Pot and the Killing Fields of Cambodia.
“Myanmar’s Year Zero” is happening in front of our eyes – unlike the killings in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 that took place behind a security curtain and media blackout. Independent media reported Myanmar’s Byai Phyu massacre a day after it happened, details beginning to emerge a day or two later. Various organizations including the United Nations have spoken out. But it appears tough to hold the Myanmar junta accountable. The junta has no honour and no soul, using their troops to raise fear amongst the population.
“Vicious cruelty” is how the AA referred to this massacre. While some might argue that comparing Min Aung Hlaing to Pol Pot – responsible for the murder of close to 2 million Cambodians – doesn’t quite fit, anybody hearing the testimony of the survivors of the Byai Phyu massacre will recognize the similarly between the brutality of the Khmer Rouge and the brutality of the Myanmar junta soldiers. They are perpetrating horrific crimes against humanity, a clear breaking of the laws of war..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of publication:
2024-06-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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The hard-hit middle class is searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after three years of war.
Description:
"The rumors were everywhere: A politically connected crony, U Thein Wai, better known as Serge Pun, was called in for questioning.
While he was not arrested, the military’s questioning of the CEO of Yoma Bank and eight directors of other subsidiaries under his control is another indicator of just how dire Myanmar’s economic situation is.
The 71-year old Sino-Burmese tycoon sits atop a massive business empire of some 50 different interrelated companies. The most important of these are First Myanmar Investment Company (FMI), Serge Pun and Associates (SPA), and, of course, Yoma Bank.
While largely invested in real estate through Yoma Land, SPA is one of the largest conglomerates in the country, with investments in real estate, construction, banking and financial services, Suzuki automobile assembly, the KFC franchise and healthcare.
Yoma Bank is one of the largest private banks in Myanmar and has been in important overseas conduit, especially after the US government sanctioned two state banks in June 2023.
Yoma Bank has ties to the military, lending to both the military-owned Mytel and Pinnacle Asia, which is owned by Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Mon.
In November 2022, the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally called, bestowed on him the honorific Thiri Pyanchi, granted for outstanding performance.
Pun’s ties to the military are deep enough that the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation divested their 4.55% equity stake in Yoma Bank in December 2022, selling it to FMI.
This is not to say that Pun has been completely pro-military. Compared to other cronies, he’s been much less so. He’s hedged his bets and incorporated holdings in Singapore and Hong Kong. Arguably he would be a lot wealthier were it not for the coup, but he’s worked within the reality of the coup.
So what prompted the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs, the feared military intelligence service, to come calling?
In short, facilitating capital flight.
Real estate roadshow
In late May, a group of five executives of a real estate firm, Minn Thu Co., held an unauthorized roadshow, selling Bangkok condominiums. Minn Thu had allegedly established unauthorized bank accounts in Thailand to facilitate the sales.
Thai real estate is being pitched to Burmese as a safe investment at a time when the kyat has fallen to a record low of over 5,000 kyat per dollar, while soaring inflation eats into the currency’s purchasing power.
Gold has reached record rates: 5.8 million kyat per tical (15.2 grams, .54 oz) – 4.5 times the pre-coup rate of 1.3 million kyat. Over 20 gold dealers have been arrested recently, accused of engaging in speculation.
The beleaguered middle class is desperately searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after more than three years of conflict.
Four of the five businessmen who staged the roadshow have been arrested, and one other executive is at large.
To serve as a deterrent to others, the junta arrested three people who purchased the condos, having illegally transferred assets overseas.
Yoma Bank is believed to have assisted in financing the purchases by transferring assets to Bangkok in violation of the junta’s currency controls.
Military intelligence officials are also investigating whether Yoma Bank is offering what are de facto mortgages for overseas real estate, as an investment vehicle, in contravention of Myanmar law.
In recent days, the junta has expanded their investigation into over 100,000 private bank transfers.
Capital flight began immediately after the coup. Radio Free Asia reported the purchase of THB2.5 billion (US$69 million) and THB 3.7 billion (US$100 million) in Thai real estate in 2022 and 2023, respectively.
In the first quarter of 2024, Burmese were the second largest group of foreign nationals to invest in Thai real estate, according to the Bangkok Post, having purchased at least 384 units, worth THB2.2 billion ($60 million).
Estimates, though, are far higher, as many properties are believed to have been purchased using Thai nominees.
Focus on funds
And of course, the revelation that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s own children have moved their own assets to Thailand was a huge embarrassment for the regime. Aung Pyae Sone owns a condominium worth around $1 million in Bangkok, while Khin Thiri Thet Mon has two accounts at Siam Commercial Bank.
Reports are emerging that Khin Sri Thet Mon purchased a condo in the ultra swank SCOPE Langsuan, which was completed in May 2023, and where a three bedroom unit sells for $4.2 million to over $15 million.
The SAC has deployed uniformed personnel to both public and private banks since mid-2021 to block transfers to the civil disobedience movement, the National Unity Government, and ethnic resistance organizations. But soon after that, they also began monitoring capital flight.
The junta is increasingly cracking down on the informal banking sector, known as hundi, that is used by at least 40 percent of overseas workers.
In early June, the regime froze the accounts of 39 additional hundi dealers, following the crackdown on 20 others in January.
The hundi system keeps desperately needed foreign exchange out of the formal banking system, where people and companies are forced to convert it to kyat at artificially low exchange rates.
Given the state of the economy, capital flight is the rational choice for Burmese with the means..
The World Bank has reported on the dire state of the economy, which has shrunk by nearly 20% since the coup. The poverty rate is now 32%, while 2024 GDP growth estimates have been halved to 1%.
The NUG estimates that the junta has printed 30 trillion kyat (US$11.5 billion) since the coup, a leading – though not the only – cause of inflation, which is now at 30%. The kyat has lost 22% of its value.
Public debt is soaring. Currently at 63% of GDP, compared to 42% under the ousted Aung San Su Kyi government, and it is expected to worsen as revenue collection is collapsing.
A recent report by the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar shows that only one of 51 townships that have border crossings is under stable junta control, with four more under their proxy militias, which has led to a loss of significant amounts of customs duties.
Pinching trade
More importantly, the junta has restricted the volume of trade that can be transacted in local currencies. The World Bank reported that exports fell by 13% and imports by 20% in the first six months of 2024, but that cross border exports, except for gas, fell by 44%, while imports fell by 71%.
In early June, the junta announced further restrictions and controls on importers to stop the outflow of hard currency.
Military losses have forced the Ministry of Oil and Gas Enterprise to abandon two oil fields. Oil and gas production generates some $1.5 billion, half of the regime’s foreign exchange earnings.
Meanwhile, attempts to increase the number of tourists have largely faltered..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Bangladesh: Low voter turnout and partisan violence mar local body elections
Bangladesh recorded an increase in political violence in May compared to the month prior, coinciding with the first three phases of polling for the upazila parishad (sub-district council) elections; the final phase is scheduled for 5 June.1 The principal opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the elections alongside other parties, calling them “farcical” and questioning the Election Commission’s independence.2 The boycott left electoral competition between rival factions within the ruling Awami League (AL), which has precluded candidates from using the party’s official electoral symbol in an attempt to make the polls more competitive.3 During the first three phases of polling, which had low voter turnout, deadly clashes between supporters of rival candidates led to dozens of injuries and at least four fatalities. While most clashes took place between rival AL or independent candidates, isolated clashes between supporters of the AL and BNP also occurred, even as some BNP leaders contesting in defiance of the party diktat were expelled.4 The BNP’s decision to boycott these elections follows their boycott of the general elections held in January 2024, when the party had led nationwide demonstrations over its concerns regarding the Election Commission’s ability to hold free and fair elections under the incumbent AL government.5
For more, see ACLED’s report on The Violent Politics of Bangladesh’s 2024 Elections.
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India: General elections continue amid partisan violence and claims of voter suppression
India’s 18th general elections continued in May, with polling for four of the scheduled seven phases spread across the month ahead of a final round of voting that was held on 1 June.6 Amid the elections, the states of West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh saw increases in political violence, where the majority of voting was completed in May. In West Bengal, which often has high levels of partisan violence, a significant amount of violence was related to inter-party clashes and the targeting of rival politicians, with the majority of clashes taking place between supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the incumbent party in the national government, and the Trinamool Congress (TMC), the ruling party at the state level. In Nandigram city, the killing of a female BJP leader on 22 May, days before polling for the sixth phase, prompted violent demonstrations. While the victim’s family blamed the TMC for her death, the TMC claimed that it was the result of a factional feud within the BJP.7
In Uttar Pradesh, allegations of voter suppression, mainly targeting the Muslim community, threatened the election’s integrity. Outside polling centers in Sambhal district, police personnel were accused of assaulting Muslims and stealing their identification cards, preventing them from voting. Opposition politicians alleged that this harassment was designed to benefit the Hindu nationalist BJP’s electoral chances.8
For more on the unrest around the 2024 Indian elections, see ACLED’s Special Election Series on India.
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Myanmar: Civilians subject to military airstrikes and retaliation
Military airstrikes and retaliation targeting civilians continued in the month of May in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions. On 9 May, the military conducted an airstrike on a monastery compound in Saw township where local businessmen and National Unity Government-affiliated administrators were gathering to discuss trade and checkpoint taxation, killing at least 16 people.9 Two days later, the military used bombs and machine gun fire during three airstrikes on the Ma Gyi Oke village school in Tabayin township, where locals, including anti-military resistance group members, were gathering to access Starlink internet, killing seven people and injuring 23 others.10 Locals believe the military acted with precise intelligence of the gatherings, deliberately targeting them. Dozens of people are reported to have been killed in more than 30 airstrikes that hit Magway and Sagaing regions in May.
Meanwhile, the military carried out multiple retaliatory ground assaults on civilians in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions. In Myinmu township, the military shot and killed at least 30 men in Let Htoke Taw village monastery after they failed to reveal a local defense force’s camp location on 11 May.11 The military claimed they entered the village in retaliation for a resistance group attack against a military convoy en route from the Wanbao copper mining project a few days prior.12 This also followed a deadly clash in Myingyan township in which several resistance groups coordinated an attack on suspected pro-military Pyu Saw Htee militia members in Son village on 9 May. At least 30 people were reportedly killed in the crossfire.13 Ten more locals, including some children, were then tortured and killed in other retaliatory attacks in Paungbyin and Myingyan townships on 17 May.
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New Caledonia: Proposed electoral reforms trigger deadly rioting
Proposed voting reforms triggered weeks of rioting in New Caledonia that left at least nine people dead, including two gendarmeries. Riots broke out after the French National Assembly approved a proposal on 13 May that would unfreeze the list of eligible voters in New Caledonia for the provincial electoral body and open it to people who have lived in the country for at least 10 years.14 The violence led the French government to declare a state of emergency on 15 May and deploy 3,000 troops from mainland France.15 New Caledonia’s airport also closed, prompting foreign governments to stage military evacuation flights for stranded tourists.16 The proposed electoral reform is opposed by members of the Indigenous Kanak independence movement in New Caledonia, which sees it as an attempt to dilute Kanak voting power and undermine future possibilities of independence.17 This is the largest and deadliest outbreak of rioting in New Caledonia since ACLED coverage began in 2021.
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Papua New Guinea: Deadly communal violence breaks out in Bogia, Madang province
In Madang province, an attempted robbery escalated into deadly communal violence in Bogia district. In mid-May, robbers seized a motorized boat on the Ramu River, reportedly believing its occupants were carrying cash from selling vanilla and cocoa. After finding none, they plunged the passengers into the water and disembarked. The incident led to a series of violent confrontations involving people from Dakit, Guaia, and Kumnug villages, which reportedly saw five people beheaded and one shot dead, and 20 houses torched.18 Security personnel intervened in some of the violence and detained six suspects.19 While responsibility for the initial attacks remains unclear, several gangs, including the Het Wara Gang and Albu Youths Gang, have operated in Mandang, carrying out killings, rapes, and mass displacements.20
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**Thailand: **Violence in the Deep South continued with tactical and symbolic actions
The Deep South remains persistently volatile, with suspected separatists maintaining heightened levels of activity for the second consecutive month following an upswing in activity during Ramadan. On 6 May, a bomb concealed in a gas tank attached to a stolen motorcycle was triggered in Bang Nak, Narathiwat city, injuring nine people, including two public health officers. The attack was claimed by state authorities to have been intended to cause fear and sabotage tourism revenues.21 On 16 May, separatists set fire to car tires and CCTV cameras in eight locations of Rueso District, Narathiwat Province, coinciding with the 29th anniversary of the Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP).22 Founded by the late Jehkumir Kuteh, the GMIP has a history of political violence but has been relatively inactive since 2004. Violence in the Deep South often increases at times of peace discussions between separatists and the state, but it is unclear if the events in May are related to any existing dialogue.23
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Taiwan: Nationwide protests erupt in opposition to KMT-backed legislative reform bill
On 21 May, in one of the largest peaceful protest movements seen in Taiwan in the last decade, over 30,000 people, including representatives from over 40 civic groups, protested at the Legislative Yuan in Taipei.24 The crowds protested against a legislative reform bill, backed by opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) parties, that expands the power of parliament. The bill’s proponents are attempting to push it through the Legislative Yuan without consultation with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The bill would allow legislators to unilaterally question, or demand information from, any government official, including newly inaugurated president Lai Ching-te. It also contains a ‘contempt of legislature’ clause that could punish those under investigation for asking questions or behaving in any way deemed to be non-compliant.25 Protesters brandished sunflowers along with their placards and banners — echoing the historic sunflower movement in 2014, which saw hundreds of thousands demonstrating against a trade agreement similarly forced through the legislature by the KMT.26 Protesters returned to the Legislative Yuan on 24 May in a crowd of up to 100,000 people and in lesser numbers in Kaohsiung, Chiayi City, Tainan City, Changhua City, Taichung City, Magong City, and Taitung City.27..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication:
2024-06-10
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"During a critical briefing on June 13th, Wiroj expressed concerns that the army's drone capability is falling behind in confronting modern-day threats in Thailand’s western border areas. Highlighting the urgency, he noted that while the army plans to procure an additional fleet of 10 drones for fiscal 2025, this number is insufficient to counteract current security threats.
Wiroj pointed out that both Myanmar’s Tatmadaw troops and various armed ethnic groups operating in the region already employ advanced drone technology. These include attack drones armed with missiles and surveillance drones, posing significant challenges to Thai security forces, who currently rely solely on surveillance drones.
Expressing frustration, Wiroj stated, "The Thai army does not possess any attack drones and faces immense difficulties due to the variety of drones it uses from different countries, such as Israel, Turkey, and China, which complicates tactical coordination during field missions."
Moreover, Wiroj revealed that drug and human traffickers in the border areas are increasingly using drones to locate authorities, further complicating the security situation.
Equally troubling is the lack of anti-drone weapons within the army’s current arsenal. This shortage leaves gaps in the army's capability to neutralize hostile drones, hence increasing their vulnerability.
In addition, Wiroj mentioned funding concerns, noting that the 40 million baht allocated for repairing the army's wheeled personnel carriers in fiscal 2025 is grossly inadequate. These rough-terrain combat vehicles are crucial for maintaining security along the expansive 2,400-kilometre Thai-Myanmar border.
Wiroj's revelations paint a troubling picture of the Thai army’s preparedness and highlight the growing need for technological enhancement and funding to address evolving security challenges in the region..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Now
Date of publication:
2024-06-14
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Rebel forces are targeting them for helping the ruling junta
Description:
"More than 80 junta-appointed administrators across Myanmar have been assassinated for aiding or participating in the military conscription of civilians since the draft was announced in February, according to an RFA tally.
In all, 82 village and ward administrators, clerks and others have been killed in the past four months, according to statements from the People’s Defense Force militias, largely made up of ordinary citizens who have taken up arms against the military rulers.
Myanmar’s ruling junta activated the mandatory conscription law, dormant since 2010, as it lost ground — and troops — to ethnic armies and PDF guerilla fighters.
The law allows for men ages 18 to 45 and women ages 18 to 35 to be drafted into the armed forces for two years. Medical doctors and other specialists up to age 45 must serve for three years.
Evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine.
Rebel groups have sought to undermine the draft, and killing those ordered to carry it out has been one way.
“In the past, administrators were well-regarded by the people,” said a relative of an administrator killed in Yangon. “Now, they are becoming widely disliked by the public. Even after his death, his remaining family members face ostracism.”
‘Only one fitting punishment’
In Yangon, administrators in Kungyangon, Insein and North Dagon townships were killed after resistance forces warned them to resign, to stop supporting the junta, and to stop conscripting civilians.
“If they continue these actions without compliance, then there is only one fitting punishment during the revolution,” said an official from the People's Defense Force of Shwebo township in northwestern Myanmar’s Sagaing region.
In the central Mandalay region, two dozen administrators have been killed during the past four months — the highest number of fatalities in a single region or state — followed by Magway region with 18 fatalities.
Nearly 40 administrators have resigned, other officials said.
Residents say that some administrators are extorting amounts equivalent to hundreds of U.S. dollars from civilians who refuse to perform military service.
An administrator in Ayeyarwady region, who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons, said he is waiting for the junta to approve his resignation.
“I won’t continue because my family's lives are in danger,” he said. “Although I have resigned, the head [of the township’s General Administration Department] will not accept it. As a result, our lives are now filled with chaos and uncertainty.”
The military council has not issued any statements about the administrators’ deaths.
‘Alternative strategies’
A former military officer, who also requested anonymity for safety reasons, said civilian conscription efforts have not slowed down despite the number of administrators who have been killed.
“If one administrator dies, the next assigned administrator will continue the task,” he said. “Killing individuals will not stop the process. If this method fails, the military will pursue alternative strategies.”
The junta’s Central Body for Summoning People’s Military Servants based in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyitaw said it would work with security forces in relevant states and regions to step up protection for administrators.
Political analyst Than Soe Naing said administrators are arbitrarily mistreating civilians under the pretext of the law.
“There is no police department to lodge complaints about these cases, nor a court to file a lawsuit,” he said.
“When the public protests, they are met with gunfire, torture and imprisonment,” he said. “These actions have persisted, leading the public to resist this unjust law in acts of civil disobedience.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
" Myanmar's resistance fighters notched decisive breakthroughs last year by relying on a scattered fleet of drones in battles against one of Southeast Asia's most feared militaries.
But as the civil war grinds on, the rebels increasingly find their familiar weapons - Chinese-made commercial drones modified to carry arms - in the unfamiliar hands of the country's ruling junta, according to seven people with knowledge of the matter.
"The battle is changing now as drones are being used by both sides," said a 31-year-old rebel fighter in the country's southeast, identifying himself by the nom de guerre of Ta Yoke Gyi.
He said the junta began using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to attack the rebels at around the turn of the year and that his unit recently shot down a drone, which they identified as Chinese from its components and had been modified for combat. Two rebel fighters in other parts of Myanmar also described similar skirmishes to Reuters.
The news agency interviewed four resistance fighters, two analysts and an official from a country in the region who tracks the conflict. They described for the first time specifics about the junta's use of Chinese-manufactured drones that are jerry-rigged to carry explosives. Some of them spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
Some resistance fighters have been injured by the junta's drones, said Ta Yoke Gyi. "They've become better at using them."
The junta started procuring thousands of Chinese commercial UAVs at the start of the year that it is modifying to arm with locally-manufactured munitions, said Min Zaw Oo, executive director of the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security think-tank.
He said he obtained information on junta drones from military officials and people with knowledge of weapons production.
A junta spokesman did not respond to calls seeking comment. The military has not spoken publicly about its recent use of UAVs. Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing said last year that rebels had dropped over 25,000 bombs using drones during a major October offensive on military posts, some of which had to be abandoned.
In response to a Reuters question, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said: "China has always adopted a prudent and responsible attitude in the export of military products and dual-use items."
A spokesperson for the shadow National Unity Government, part of the anti-junta resistance, did not return a request for comment.
Myanmar's military also ordered about 12 armed CH-3 UAVs from China around 2013, according to an estimate by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's arms transfer database.
But the junta isn't using such aircraft during offensives, instead deploying multi-rotor commercial drones - including ones designed for agriculture - in the latest sorties, the resistance members said.
Four rebel fighters told Reuters they had only seen a handful of junta drones at a time on the frontline in recent months, suggesting the military hadn't deployed all the newly procured aircraft.
Reuters could not independently establish why the CH-3s were not being used for offensive operations or why the junta does not appear to have engaged in mass deployment of the Chinese-made commercial drones.
More than three years since its dawn coup abruptly ended Myanmar's tentative experiment with civilian democracy, the junta is at its weakest, having lost vast territories to an opposition comprising new armed groups and established ethnic armies.
While is hard to predict the trajectory of the civil war in the coming months, the resistance appears to have lost its early advantage of being the main fighting force using drones, said the Myanmar Institute's Min Zaw Oo, a view supported by another analyst and Ta Yoke Gyi.
INSTAGRAM INSTRUCTIONS
Commercial drones emerged as a game changer during the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, when Kyiv's forces used them to rapidly build large fleets deployed for battlefield purposes.
In Myanmar, Ta Yoke Gyi wasn't thinking about weapons until a few years ago. Before the junta unseated the elected government of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021, he was a long-distance bus driver.
Angered by the junta's crackdown on the ensuing protests, Ta Yoke Gyi joined thousands of other young people in taking up arms against the military.
He now heads a unit called the Angry Bird Drone Rangers, part of a rebel force that began deploying small UAVs made by China's DJI for reconnaissance missions shortly after the coup.
DJI didn't return a request for comment.
The unit subsequently built larger drones that it modified to carry domestic-produced bombs, using instructions gleaned from experts on TikTok, Instagram and YouTube.
"We bought the components part by part and started testing the drones for about four to five months," said Ta Yoke Gyi.
The three other resistance members described similar methods of building larger armed UAVs. Several components of such drones are available on regional e-commerce platforms, according to a Reuters review of the websites.
The rebels use the drones to scout junta positions, before sending them on bombing runs that are followed by ground assaults, the four people said.
Until recently, Myanmar's junta had relied on artillery and conventional aerial support to hold on to strategic outposts in the borderlands, where the bloodiest fighting is taking place, said Min Zaw Oo.
Additional troops were rushed in when necessary, but the junta lacked adequate reserve forces to reinforce positions across multiple frontlines, he said.
The swarms of rebel drones disabled artillery positions and resistance ground troops cut off nearby military bases, said the analyst, who previously worked on ceasefire negotiations involving the military and ethnic armies.
The most significant demonstration of rebel drone warfare came during Operation 1027, a major offensive led by an alliance of three ethnic armies last October, according to two analysts.
Fighters from the rebel Three Brotherhood Alliance "just sent wave after wave after wave of drones to drop explosives onto these bases," said Morgan Michaels, a Myanmar expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank.
But in the following months, the resistance started being attacked by the junta's drones.
"I think that Operation 1027 and the way that drones were used against the regime was definitely a wake-up call," said Michaels, who follows the battleground closely. "Now they appear to be substantially expanding their use of drones in an offensive capacity."
Two resistance fighters told Reuters that they had shot down drones that appeared to be originally designed for spraying crops. One of them, based in eastern Myanmar, said that a drone brought down by his unit had "Boying" written on it in English.
China's Boying, which manufactures flight controllers for UAVs mainly used for agriculture, declined to comment.
An expanding UAV attack fleet is welcomed by demoralised junta forces that are now relying on conscription to replenish shrinking frontline battalions, said Min Zaw Oo.
As the military takes time to retrain and refit, it will likely maintain a defensive posture, he said. "But at the same time, they will harass the opposition's positions with the use of drones."..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
" Myanmar's resistance fighters notched decisive breakthroughs last year by relying on a scattered fleet of drones in battles against one of Southeast Asia's most feared militaries.
But as the civil war grinds on, the rebels increasingly find their familiar weapons - Chinese-made commercial drones modified to carry arms - in the unfamiliar hands of the country's ruling junta, according to seven people with knowledge of the matter.
"The battle is changing now as drones are being used by both sides," said a 31-year-old rebel fighter in the country's southeast, identifying himself by the nom de guerre of Ta Yoke Gyi.
He said the junta began using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to attack the rebels at around the turn of the year and that his unit recently shot down a drone, which they identified as Chinese from its components and had been modified for combat. Two rebel fighters in other parts of Myanmar also described similar skirmishes to Reuters.
The news agency interviewed four resistance fighters, two analysts and an official from a country in the region who tracks the conflict. They described for the first time specifics about the junta's use of Chinese-manufactured drones that are jerry-rigged to carry explosives. Some of them spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
Some resistance fighters have been injured by the junta's drones, said Ta Yoke Gyi. "They've become better at using them."
The junta started procuring thousands of Chinese commercial UAVs at the start of the year that it is modifying to arm with locally-manufactured munitions, said Min Zaw Oo, executive director of the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security think-tank.
He said he obtained information on junta drones from military officials and people with knowledge of weapons production.
A junta spokesman did not respond to calls seeking comment. The military has not spoken publicly about its recent use of UAVs. Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing said last year that rebels had dropped over 25,000 bombs using drones during a major October offensive on military posts, some of which had to be abandoned.
In response to a Reuters question, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said: "China has always adopted a prudent and responsible attitude in the export of military products and dual-use items."
A spokesperson for the shadow National Unity Government, part of the anti-junta resistance, did not return a request for comment.
Myanmar's military also ordered about 12 armed CH-3 UAVs from China around 2013, according to an estimate by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's arms transfer database.
But the junta isn't using such aircraft during offensives, instead deploying multi-rotor commercial drones - including ones designed for agriculture - in the latest sorties, the resistance members said.
Four rebel fighters told Reuters they had only seen a handful of junta drones at a time on the frontline in recent months, suggesting the military hadn't deployed all the newly procured aircraft.
Reuters could not independently establish why the CH-3s were not being used for offensive operations or why the junta does not appear to have engaged in mass deployment of the Chinese-made commercial drones.
More than three years since its dawn coup abruptly ended Myanmar's tentative experiment with civilian democracy, the junta is at its weakest, having lost vast territories to an opposition comprising new armed groups and established ethnic armies.
While is hard to predict the trajectory of the civil war in the coming months, the resistance appears to have lost its early advantage of being the main fighting force using drones, said the Myanmar Institute's Min Zaw Oo, a view supported by another analyst and Ta Yoke Gyi.
INSTAGRAM INSTRUCTIONS
Commercial drones emerged as a game changer during the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, when Kyiv's forces used them to rapidly build large fleets deployed for battlefield purposes.
In Myanmar, Ta Yoke Gyi wasn't thinking about weapons until a few years ago. Before the junta unseated the elected government of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021, he was a long-distance bus driver.
Angered by the junta's crackdown on the ensuing protests, Ta Yoke Gyi joined thousands of other young people in taking up arms against the military.
He now heads a unit called the Angry Bird Drone Rangers, part of a rebel force that began deploying small UAVs made by China's DJI for reconnaissance missions shortly after the coup.
DJI didn't return a request for comment.
The unit subsequently built larger drones that it modified to carry domestic-produced bombs, using instructions gleaned from experts on TikTok, Instagram and YouTube.
"We bought the components part by part and started testing the drones for about four to five months," said Ta Yoke Gyi.
The three other resistance members described similar methods of building larger armed UAVs. Several components of such drones are available on regional e-commerce platforms, according to a Reuters review of the websites.
The rebels use the drones to scout junta positions, before sending them on bombing runs that are followed by ground assaults, the four people said.
Until recently, Myanmar's junta had relied on artillery and conventional aerial support to hold on to strategic outposts in the borderlands, where the bloodiest fighting is taking place, said Min Zaw Oo.
Additional troops were rushed in when necessary, but the junta lacked adequate reserve forces to reinforce positions across multiple frontlines, he said.
The swarms of rebel drones disabled artillery positions and resistance ground troops cut off nearby military bases, said the analyst, who previously worked on ceasefire negotiations involving the military and ethnic armies.
The most significant demonstration of rebel drone warfare came during Operation 1027, a major offensive led by an alliance of three ethnic armies last October, according to two analysts.
Fighters from the rebel Three Brotherhood Alliance "just sent wave after wave after wave of drones to drop explosives onto these bases," said Morgan Michaels, a Myanmar expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank.
But in the following months, the resistance started being attacked by the junta's drones.
"I think that Operation 1027 and the way that drones were used against the regime was definitely a wake-up call," said Michaels, who follows the battleground closely. "Now they appear to be substantially expanding their use of drones in an offensive capacity."
Two resistance fighters told Reuters that they had shot down drones that appeared to be originally designed for spraying crops. One of them, based in eastern Myanmar, said that a drone brought down by his unit had "Boying" written on it in English.
China's Boying, which manufactures flight controllers for UAVs mainly used for agriculture, declined to comment.
An expanding UAV attack fleet is welcomed by demoralised junta forces that are now relying on conscription to replenish shrinking frontline battalions, said Min Zaw Oo.
As the military takes time to retrain and refit, it will likely maintain a defensive posture, he said. "But at the same time, they will harass the opposition's positions with the use of drones."..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"JAKARTA – ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) call on the international community to monitor, and take preventive actions to discourage, the use of judicial instruments to dissolve the Move Forward Party (MFP), which won the most number of seats in the Thai general elections in May 2023 and is currently the largest party in the Thai parliament.
The possible dissolution, which could take place as early as the third week of June, would lead to at least a 10-year ban on the executive members from participating in formal politics. The Election Commission and the Constitutional Court have stated that the MFP’s campaign promise to reform the lèse-majesté law is equivalent to an attempt to overthrow the democratic government with the King as Head of State.
The probable judicial overreach risks encroaching on the prerogative of the legislative branch and blatantly disregards the principle of the separation of powers. “By preventing parliamentarians from deliberating on the law that is not in line with international human rights standards, the court undermines the very idea of democracy as it puts that specific law beyond the reach of any amendments,” APHR Chair and Indonesian Member of Parliament Mercy Chriesty Barends said today.
APHR also calls on international human rights mechanisms and the international community to explore various tools in international law to hold those committing judicial harassment in Thailand accountable.
“Democracy in Thailand is backsliding, not only due to a military coup, but also through dubious interpretations of laws employed to target opposition politicians. If the Move Forward Party is banned, like the Future Forward Party in 2019, millions of people will be disenfranchised, and unrest that could destabilize Thailand is a real possibility,” said APHR Co-Chair and former Malaysian MP Charles Santiago. “This would not only hurt Thailand’s democratic development, but would further harm the economy and damage the reputation and legacy of the current Thai government.”
Prior to this, the MFP was blocked from leading the coalition government by the institutionalized counter-majoritarian mechanism in the Thai military-drafted constitution. Its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, along with other leading members of parliament have individually been faced with an ongoing campaign of judicial harassment.
Apart from the cases against the MFP and its MPs, the overall human rights trend in Thailand is worrisome. The use of lèse-majesté laws and computer crime accusations to charge and jail those who voice dissenting opinions is on the rise. Surprisingly, these violations are increasing while Thailand is campaigning for its seat at the UN Human Rights Council.
“APHR urges the international community to continue monitoring the deteriorating human rights and democratic situation in Thailand and to take appropriate measures to protect not only parliamentarians at risk but also other political prisoners,” said Barends.
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"In the late evening of Friday 17 May 2024, Rohingya neighbourhoods in the town of Buthidaung in Myanmar’s Rakhine State were disturbed by an ominously familiar sight. Armed gunmen had come to their doors and ordered them to leave before the gunmen set their houses alight. If they refused, they were told, they would be burnt with their house.
As the Rohingya community fled to fields to the west, the gunmen torched their houses. By morning, most of what remained of Buthidaung had burnt to the ground. Buthidaung was the largest town to be burnt in a cycle of arson attacks throughout April and May, in which the junta and affiliated militants burnt approximately 2,400 structures, and the resistance-aligned Arakan Army retaliated by burning a further 8,500 structures across around 50 villages.
With communications in this area of Myanmar effectively cut off, with no independent media presence and with a desperate lack of supplies and food reaching the area, it is challenging to pin down specifics of what happened on 17 May. Using detailed analysis of satellite imagery, news reports, statements and open-source analysis of incidents on the ground, it is possible to provide crucial context to the violence that has occurred over the past weeks—enough to begin to verify the perpetrators.
This Strategist special report explains what happened that night and presents new satellite imagery analysis that reveals a systematic campaign of retaliatory arson that has occurred in the township since 24 April and continued until at least 21 May.
The majority of these arson attacks occurred in uncontested Arakan Army territory with attacks on rural villages reportedly forcing many Rohingyas to flee from their burnt village to Buthidaung town itself prior to the arson attack there.
Following the genocidal anti-Rohingya violence of 2017, when the majority of Maungdaw Township’s Rohingya community was expelled or killed in a series of violent campaigns by the military, the township of Buthidaung in the Mayu River valley became home to the largest Rohingya community remaining in Myanmar, with over 150,000 Rohingya living in the township. Although the Rohingya community in Buthidaung is not as controlled or restricted as those living in internally displaced person camps across the rest of the state, the area is still subject to significant human rights abuses, including unreasonable restrictions on movement and access to services, along with a complete impunity for government forces in the area.
Following the outbreak of clashes between the Arakan Army and Burmese state forces in 2019, the township became more isolated and cut off from services and supplies. The township has been effectively under siege since the latest outbreak of violence during which the Arakan Army has captured much of Rakhine state from the junta.
With an increasingly dispossessed community, the junta has leveraged people’s desperation into actions deliberately calibrated to stoke communal tensions. In February and March 2024, junta authorities in Buthidaung town coerced and co-opted Rohingya residents to hold anti-Arakan Army demonstrations that were widely publicised in pro-junta media. These efforts were generally disregarded as a ploy to inflame communal tensions. However, the situation became more critical in March and April, as the junta started to enforce widespread conscription in an attempt to address its staggering losses on the battlefield over the preceding five months. Despite the Rohingya community long being denied citizenship or residency permits by government authorities, the junta sought conscripts from the Rohingya community using a mixture of false promises of citizenship along with threats and intimidation.
Despite having previously fought against the Burmese army, some Rohingya armed groups carried out forced recruitment into junta-aligned militias, including by abducting boys (reportedly some as young as 14) from Bangladesh refugee camps to return to Myanmar and fight.
Starting on 11 April, the military junta and Rohingya militants began burning down predominantly Buddhist and Hindu neighbourhoods of Buthidaung town to stoke further sectarian tensions. Over the following week, these attacks destroyed roughly 2,400 structures across 150 acres of Buthidaung town, with several of Buthidaung’s most densely populated neighbourhoods being entirely destroyed, including an office and pharmacy of the medical charity Doctors Without Borders.
While these attacks were taking place in Buthidaung town through April, the Arakan Army was gaining full control on the other side of the Mayu River. It besieged and captured remaining junta military bases one-by-one.
And from 24 April, the Arakan Army began an arson campaign against Rohingya villages, retaliating against the whole Rohingya community for arson attacks in Buthidaung town. Over the following 10 days, it burnt 27 villages and hamlets on the eastern bank of the Mayu River, according to our analysis of satellite imagery.
Buthidaung town was, by all accounts, a chaotic place on 17 May, as conflict in the township was reaching its nadir. The Arakan Army had told residents that they would assault the town at 10am the next day, and ordered a general evacuation. However, by around 6pm on Friday afternoon, the group was overrunning four junta battalions on the western edge of town. According to statements by the Arakan Army, the remnants of these units then fled into the town, with local media reporting clashes at the entrance to Buthidaung town throughout Friday. This hastened the Arakan Army’s advance, and by 9:30pm much of the town was under their control, according to eyewitnesses. On the night of the arson attack, there was significant movement of Arakan Army and Burmese junta troops through the town, along with continued and hasty displacement of civilians.
Given the chaotic scene on the ground, and the immense communication restrictions in the area, independently and firmly establishing the perpetrator of this attack is challenging. However, satellite imagery analysis of arson attacks enables us to establish a clear pattern of retaliatory violence by the Arakan Army against Rohingya villages and neighbourhoods. The images show that as Arakan Army forces advanced across rural Buthidaung township in late April and May, they left a trail of rubble and ash as they burnt down Rohingya villages, seemingly indiscriminately.
That trail started on 24 April, around a week after the initial bout of junta-directed and Rohingya-committed arson in Buthidaung town ended. On that day, the village of Raza Berha (Nan Yar Kone), with around 100 homes, became the first Rohingya village torched on the Mayu River’s eastern bank. Satellite imagery from the next morning shows much of the northern part of the village destroyed. Over the next week, around a dozen villages would be burnt, including the large settlements of Kun Taing Ywar Gyi and Taung (Pale Taung).
The comprehensive destruction, completely burning all villages in this area of the township, strongly suggests that this has been a deliberate campaign of arson and that these towns were not merely damaged by airstrikes, artillery fire or columns of fleeing troops.
In a 4 May statement announcing their control over the entire eastern bank of the Mayu River, the Arakan Army provided some clarification regarding their territorial control over the area in the preceding months. They state that for much of 2024, Arakan Army troops had surrounded and blocked the 15th Military Operations Command HQ in the area, and that since around 20 April, there had been heavy clashes within the base itself before the Arakan Army seized it on 2 May. As early as the start of April, local media was reporting that every battalion in Buthidaung was besieged by the Arakan Army.
Accordingly, 4km away from the nearest battalion base, when Raza Berha village burnt in the last week of April, the only armed group with presence in this part of the countryside was the Arakan Army. Similarly, other villages burnt in the early days of this arson campaign were some distance from besieged junta bases.
Over the following weeks, as the Arakan Army captured the remaining besieged junta battalions one-by-one, a disturbing pattern emerged of nearby villages being burnt immediately following their capture.
On 25 April, the 565th Light Infantry Battalion was captured and, within a week, the neighbouring Rohingya villages of Shawdawr Para and Hadimma Para were burnt.
On 2 May, the 15th Military Operations Command HQ was captured, and that night the neighbouring Rohingya village of Da Bru Yaung was burnt.
On 3 May, the 551st Light Infantry Battalion was captured and within three days the neighbouring Rohingya village of Setawr Para was burnt.
On 13 May, the 353rd Light Infantry Battalion was captured and, the following night, the neighbouring Rohingya village of Na Khine Daung was burnt.
On 18 May, the final Junta battalions with the Buthidaung Tactical Operations Command were captured, with the neighbouring villages of Thar Mai Khali, Myaung, Daing Net Ywar, Kyauk Hpyu Taung and Let Wea Det Pyin Shey all burnt over the next two days, along with nearby town of Buthidaung itself.
This pattern was not repeated, however, in villages near military bases that were captured prior to the junta-directed arson attacks in Buthidaung town in mid-April. The 564th Light Infantry Battalion HQ was the first in the township to fall to the Arakan Army, being captured on 5 April. None of the villages surrounding this military base were burnt following its capture. This provides further evidence that the recent spate of arson attacks was in direct retaliation to junta-orchestrated provocations of communal tension.
The village of Na Khing Daung serves as a useful case study providing insight into the timeline on the Arakan Army’s control of the area. Following the arson attack on Buthidaung town and its widespread condemnation, official propaganda channels from the Arakan Army released photos showing their troops caring for injured Rohingya civilians in Na Khing Daung on 14 May. As Arakan Army troops were capturing the neighbouring 353rd Light Infantry Battalion the previous day, fleeing junta troops opened fire at the village as they passed through, causing injuries among civilians, according to local media reporting. A video from the same date and previously released through official Arakan Army channels shows scores of Rohingya from Na Khing Daung who were detained by junta forces being released by Arakan Army troops.
These two videos show the Arakan Army in firm control of the village on 14 May, with junta forces that were previously nearby rapidly disintegrating and fleeing across the countryside. Satellite imagery from the early afternoon of that day shows fire beginning to consume the village, with houses along the main road through the village having already been burnt. These fires would continue overnight and into the next day until, by the next satellite pass, the entire Rohingya hamlet within the village was burnt to the ground.
Tellingly, the ethnically Daingnet (a predominantly buddhist ethnicity from northern Rakhine state numbering around 80,000 people) hamlet of the same village remained completely undamaged. A mosque in the Rohingya hamlet was burnt, while the monastery 200m away was spared.
The burning also continued in many villages following the complete capture of Buthidaung township by the Arakan Army, with around a dozen villages, mostly to the west and southwest of Buthidaung town being burnt down following the expulsion of all junta positions in the area.
Together, the satellite evidence clearly demonstrates a systematic pattern of arson attacks across much of Buthidaung township, both in areas under complete Arakan Army control, and in a manner suggestive of on-the-ground arson attacks as compared to damage from airstrikes or artillery.
Thankfully, it appears that there have been no reports of continued arson attacks in the area beyond 21 May. It is possible or even likely that the Arakan Army command has reacted to the attention the atrocities generated, and prevented their troops on the ground from committing further arson. However, this is not enough. The already vulnerable and dispossessed Rohingya community of Buthidaung is now languishing in even worse conditions than before, with some reports suggesting that up to 60 displaced people have died, largely as a result of a lack of clean drinking water.
The Arakan Army urgently needs to restore community relations in the Rohingya heartland of which it is rapidly seizing control. It faces an uphill climb given the extent of the recent violence in which it has played a significant part, but there is room for reconciliation, especially as Rakhine and Rohingya communities can point to a common enemy as the actor responsible for provoking sectarian tension and as a springboard for common reconciliation.
The Arakan Army must act with initiative and urgency by providing immediate aid and assistance to displaced and desperate communities. It should reach out to key Rohingya leaders in areas under its control and commit to treating the Rohingya community as brothers just like all other members of the Arakanese nation, and demonstrate this commitment. It should recognise that at the individual level, Rohingya militants coerced into fighting alongside the junta are victims of the junta and not targets for reprisals. It should call them ‘Rohingya’ instead of the variety of slurs it has used and that immediately demonstrates the Arakan Army’s hostility. It should also recognise the opportunity in both human capital and economic development that could be realised if the Arakan Army is able to reverse its course and foster community relations in northern Rakhine state that facilitates widespread repatriation of Rohingya citizens.
The national resistance organisations must make it clear, both privately and publicly, that such atrocities are unacceptable, and that if the Arakan Army wants a seat at the table in a future federalised and democratic Myanmar, it must treat all civilians under its control with dignity and respect. It should publicly name the Arakan Army as the perpetrator of these atrocities that it condemned. It should facilitate dialogue and reconciliation efforts between the Arakan Army and Rohingya community leaders both inside and outside of Burma.
International actors should continue to recognise that the military junta remains the biggest impediment to peace and stability in both Rakhine and Myanmar more broadly, and that this communal violence has been directly and deliberately provoked by them. Even over the last week, junta forces and affiliated militias cordoned off a village in Rakhine state before executing over 70 civilians and burning scores of houses. Any policy that seeks to restore a pre-coup status quo is misguided and counterproductive. Despite this outbreak of violence, the Arakan Army—should it reflect and evolve from these atrocities—is far more likely to transform into a responsible and reliable partner in the region than the military junta.
AUTHOR
Nathan Ruser is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. All maps and imagery created by Nathan Ruser, using Planet satellite imagery.
Methodology
Identification of burnt areas.
Burnt areas were initially developed in a ‘point’ manner, by comparing areas of FIRMS hotspot detections with urban land use and through visual interpretation of post-fire Planet imagery (3m resolution) of the township.
These points were refined and expanded into polygons of burnt area through more detailed comparison of pre and post-fire imagery examined through the web-based Planet Explorer tool. The dates of these comparisons were variable based on local dates of burning and cloud-cover conditions. Areas with FIRMS hotspot detections in urban areas, but where satellite imagery revealed only scattered burning of individual houses and not significant parts of the urban area, these points were removed. The detailed delineation of burnt areas was developed by ‘tracing’ burnt areas in the Planet Explorer tool with direct comparisons to pre-burn imagery, then exported to geojson files and combined within QGIS.
To ensure that no villages were missed, Sentinel-2 imagery (10m resolution) across the township was accessed through Google Earth Engine and analysed using the differenced Normalized Burn Ratio (dNBR) formula. This highlighted burnt areas across the township and these were then individually examined with Planet Imagery.
Metadata.
Metadata for the burnt area is split into two categories: metadata surrounding the village and metadata surrounding the arson.
Metadata for village information was obtained by joining the burnt-area polygons to the nearest settlement from Myanmar Information Management Unit’s (MIMU) national and geocoded database of settlements. The Rohingya name of villages (where available) was manually extracted from the field “Commonly_Used_Local_Vlg_Name_Eng” when the name in that field appeared to be of Rohingya origin. The MIMU dataset is not perfect – especially in areas of ethnic named villages – and may miss settlements or name them incorrectly, therefore this metadata should be considered as a guide and not a replacement for detailed on-the-ground knowledge.
Metadata for burn date was primarily detected from FIRMS data. For cases where FIRMS did not detect a fire hotspot (often due to timing of the burns and cloud cover) the date was estimated by establishing the ‘last unburnt’ and ‘first burnt’ dates from Planet imagery. This is why in the text of the report some references are made to burning happening “within x days”, for cases when an exact burn date is unavailable and the ‘first burnt’ data was used instead.
Estimating the impact of the burnt area.
For all this analysis it was replicated twice, once for the area burnt in Buthidaung town between April 11-17, and separately for areas burnt by the Arakan Army between April 24 and May 21.
The burnt polygons were reprojected into the local UTM grid and then the area was calculated for each polygon. These areas were summed across the polygons to calculate the total area burnt.
The estimate of burnt structures was derived from splitting the burnt area into a grid of 50x50m cells, a random subset of these was picked (25 cells for the mid-April burning and 50 cells for the Arakan Army burning) and the number of structures was counted using pre-burn, very-high-resolution (
Source/publisher:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"13 June 2024: The United States (US) Government and United Nations (UN) member States must respond to rapidly evolving dynamics on the ground in Myanmar by providing material and political support to the country’s many resistance actors and taking action to protect civilians from escalating junta atrocities, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M founding members Yanghee Lee and Chris Sidoti and members of the SAC-M team this month travelled to Washington, D.C. and New York in the United States to speak to members of the United States Government, UN member States and representatives of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG).
The visit coincided with the third anniversary of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/287 on the situation in Myanmar, adopted on 18 June 2021. Since then, the Myanmar military junta’s sustained attack on the civilian population has created an unprecedented humanitarian and human rights disaster in Myanmar. The crisis is severely undermining the stability and security of the entire region. Despite this, the General Assembly has not addressed the situation since Resolution 75/287.
Conflict dynamics in the country have evolved significantly since nationwide resistance first emerged in response to the Myanmar military’s coup attempt on 1 February 2021. International actors have a responsibility to respond to the new dynamics on the ground and move beyond their current wait-and-see approach to the crisis by taking decisive action to alleviate the suffering of civilians and protect human rights in Myanmar now.
SAC-M calls on the UN General Assembly to adopt a new resolution on Myanmar that recognises the importance of the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organisations (EROs) and broader civil society in realising the federal democratic will and aspirations of the Myanmar people. The General Assembly must address Myanmar’s humanitarian emergency by calling for the massively scaled-up provision of humanitarian assistance directly to the Myanmar people, including through cross-border channels, by coordinating directly with the NUG, EROs and broader civil society. Furthermore, the General Assembly must call on all States to immediately cease all transfers of arms, munitions, military equipment and dual use items, as well as jet fuel, to the Myanmar military junta.
It has been one and a half years since the UN Security Council attempted meaningful action on Myanmar. The junta has refused to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2669 on Myanmar since it was adopted in December 2022. The United Kingdom, as the permanent Security Council member that informally leads on Myanmar issues, has been failing in its responsibility to push the Council to address the growing emergency in Myanmar. The Council’s dysfunction on Myanmar reached a new low in April when Myanmar’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, was barred from speaking at an open briefing on Myanmar. SAC-M considers this denial of speaking rights to a permanent representative of a concerned country as setting an extremely dangerous precedent.
The Security Council must adopt a new resolution on Myanmar under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that refers the whole situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. If the Security Council can’t, or won’t, act, the General Assembly must establish a special international criminal tribunal for Myanmar to begin prosecutions of Myanmar military leaders for the most serious international crimes committed in the country.
Finally, SAC-M urges the US Government to return the more than US$1 billion of frozen Myanmar national reserves held by the US Federal Reserve since February 2021, or at least the substantial interest accrued since then, to the legitimate representatives of the Myanmar people: the NUG, EROs, and broader civil society. These funds would provide a lifeline for resistance authorities to address the massive humanitarian needs of the population and strengthen governance capacity and service delivery in areas of the country under their expanding control..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime blocked Facebook and other messaging apps following the 2021 coup in a bid to restrict freedom of expression and communication that it believes threatens its rule.
Myanmar people were using virtual private networks (VPNs), either paid or free versions, to bypass the restrictions.
However, the regime recently banned the use of VPN services in the country, and residents are now reporting difficulties accessing Facebook and other social media platforms.
Ma Wai Phyo Myint, who heads Myanmar’s branch of Access Now, which promotes digital rights around the world, recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how the VPN ban will affect Myanmar people’s access to information and the ability of resistance groups to coordinate their efforts.
People are reporting difficulties using VPNs. What is happening?
The regime blocked access to websites, Facebook, WhatsApp and other messaging platforms in 2021 and 2022. They used blacklisting and whitelisting, handing lists of websites that they wanted blocked to telecom operators and internet service providers.
This time is different. They have bypassed telecom operators and internet service providers and are directly controlling [the internet] from Naypyitaw. We are waiting to see if they will deploy firewalls like China.
People say they can’t use certain VPNs. Which ones?
Local organizations are checking. Some VPNs can still be used. Local organizations say the regime listed VPN servers in late 2023 and early 2024. It has blocked access to widely used VPNs including Psiphon. This includes the paid version [as well as the free version].
The point of using a VPN is to make your browsing history and location untraceable by military and government organizations. Your data are not safe unless you use a secure VPN. So, why haven’t they blocked access to widely available VPNs yet? Perhaps they want to keep monitoring, which is a cause for concern.
People in China can still access banned sites despite the VPN ban? Is there any way to bypass the restrictions in Myanmar?
This is a technical issue and we are still trying to figure out what exactly the regime is doing. Then, we will talk with VPN service providers about how they can help to restore VPN access in Myanmar. Neither local organizations nor VPN service providers can explain the details now.
Why is the junta banning VPNs?
Mainly, it wants to restrict people’s right to information. Since the coup, it has deployed various measures to restrict the information flow. It imposed restrictions to control widespread criticism on websites and [social media pages] of media outlets, sharing of information about the regime, and coordination of anti-regime efforts. It has tightened this grip over time.
At the same time, it has deliberately kept VPNs usable so it can monitor and collect information [about anti-regime activities]. Lately, however, it has lost control. Despite restrictions on the internet, people are still managing to share information via alternative communication channels.
The regime made threats and arrests to instill fear. But people still found ways to communicate. Unable to restrict information flows, the regime decided to resort to an internet shutdown to keep people in the dark.
The VPN ban will also affect the junta, though it may have alternative communication channels. The ban will impact its business operations and spying mechanisms. Though the ban targets the people, the regime will inevitably be affected. So, the fact that it has resorted to this measure means it is failing.
Are there other ways people can use to share information?
We heard that Facebook use has significantly declined due to the VPN problem. The regime can restrict internet access and information flow for the public. The VPN ban is unprecedented and may have severe impacts.
Thanks to technological advances, even China’s government can’t completely ban VPNs. People can switch to other VPNs, and the regime won’t be able to block all the new technologies. There will be impacts, but people will be able to find ways [to evade the VPN ban] over time.
It is very costly to build firewalls. The regime doesn’t have sufficient resources to deploy firewalls in the long run. People should not underestimate what the regime is doing. Yet at the same time, they should not succumb to unwarranted fear. The regime can’t control everything.
Anti-regime forces are trying to use internet service providers that are not controlled by or tied to the regime. They are trying to get satellite phones and satellite internet, which have become accessible both technically and financially. The regime can’t shut down all the channels.
The junta has been promoting a social media app called MySpace. How far can it go?
It has previously created other apps to replace YouTube and Facebook. No social media app, whether it is MySpace or anything else, will be successful unless people accept it. People have boycotted military-linked products. And they know that any such technology made by the military is intended to monitor the people. So, there is little chance that any app created by the regime will succeed.
But we urge the Apple Store and Google Play Store not to offer these applications. We must continue to push international companies not to accept these apps on their platforms.
Is there anything else you want to say?
China had been the only country to ban the use of VPNs, so this situation is quite serious. I urge international bodies and governments to pay serious attention to this and provide tech and resources so people inside Myanmar can use the internet to keep track of the military situation and anti-regime forces can use communication channels that are not controlled by the regime. We notified the international community two years ago that the regime would do this, but there was almost no response or preparations. We continue to push for international assistance in this urgent matter..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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Description:
"KEY FINDINGS
• Conflict shuttered Maungdaw market, and spillover concerns affected Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U;
• Markets reduced operating hours in May, and five-of-seven operated only in the morning;
• Customer traffic remained stable despite seasonal change and growing security concerns;
• Lower fuel prices reduced shipping costs, and most markets saw growing inter-township trade;
• Food and NFI supply improved somewhat after interstate highways partially reopened mid-May;
• Retailers reported more challenges both seasonal and conflict-driven, especially in Mrauk-U District.
Market Functionality - Markets were open in May, but some reduced hours due to security concerns. Five of seven markets monitored in May were open only in the morning, including several in major towns. Market hours were reduced in Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, and Pauktaw.
Market Activity - Markets remained active in May, and there weas more inter-township commerce. Markets in Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun, and Myebon were particularly active in May. Ward markets in Mrauk-U, Minbya, and Sittwe were naturally quieter but still saw relatively stable customer traffic. Minbya, Myebon, Pauktaw, and Ponnagyun saw more intra-township trade in May, possibly due to lower fuel costs in May.
Availability of Goods - Supply of food and NFIs improved in May, possibly due to looser travel restrictions on interstate highways. Supply was generally stable or improved, perhaps due to more movement on interstate roads (which nonetheless remained unsafe). Supply improved most for scarce NFIs like medicines and hygiene items, and fuel supply improved as prices fell. Supply improved most in Sittwe and Minbya Towns, where some foods and NFIs were more available.
Transport & Logistics - Lower fuel prices helped reduce shipping costs in multiple markets in May. Shipping costs declined in Sittwe, Ponnagyun, Minbya, and Mrauk-U, although they rose in Kyauktaw and held stable elsewhere. Retailers continued sourcing goods both by road and waterway, and some lead-times shortened slightly. Meanwhile, Sittwe retailers still remained largely isolated from markets in neighboring townships.
Retailer Challenges - Retail challenges increased in May, particularly in Mrauk-U District. Retailers in Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, and Minbya reported more challenges in May than in April, particuarly related to poor cash access and market damage. Retailers in Sittwe and Ponnagyun also reported growing challenges, particularly related to security and transportation. Overall, poor safety/security, limited transportation, and poor access to supply remained the most common retail challenges..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-06-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
11.03 MB
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Sub-title:
This is the author’s acceptance speech, receiving the the Arthur Svensson Prize to promote trade-union rights today in Oslo.
Description:
"I am deeply honoured to be awarded this prize for the fight of the Myanmar people and trade unions for democracy, justice and freedom. On behalf of the Confederation of Trade Unions Myanmar (CTUM) and its members and people from Myanmar, I thank you sincerely for your support and solidarity in this struggle. We are in a fight not just for our rights and freedoms but for the essence of democracy. This is a long and bitter fight that requires resilience, sacrifice and strong determination.
Since the military coup in February 2021, the military has tried to force us into subordination—with killings, torture, bombing, countless arrests and displacement. Since then, over three million people have been internally displaced. At least 8,000 civilians, including many trade unionists, have died. Seventy per cent of the whole nation have faced armed clashes.
More than 86,000 buildings, including schools and healthcare facilities, have been attacked and destroyed. Around 400,000 government employees who joined the civil-disobedience movement have lost jobs and income. At least 26,799 people have been arrested—among them more than 500 trade unionists.
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For over three years, the military has waged an open war against the people of Myanmar and the world has started to notice. Yet the oppression by successive military regimes has been continuing for decades, as evidenced by the many who had to seek refuge in Norway over many years. We thank the people and the government of Norway, the Norwegian Burma Council and LO Norway, which have supported our organisation (then FTUB) since 1992—for the many years of political and financial support and for allowing the Democratic Voice of Burma to be established in Oslo.
Constant threat
In February 2021, the CTUM condemned the coup and left the National Tripartite Forum. We organised our members and the opposition on all fronts. Members and leaders of the CTUM took to the streets and helped bring hundreds of thousands out in protest. The military issued arrest warrants against all the CTUM central-committee members, including myself. All our passports were declared void and we all have court cases against us for state treason.
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The CTUM headquarters office was ransacked and everything was taken. Our family members are under constant threat—forcing many to leave the country. Many have been tortured to death or forced into hiding.
Our organisation has experience in fighting against the military regime—we did it from 1988. Comparing the progress we have achieved, we can say for a fact that today’s regime is much weaker than the one 20 years ago and the democratic forces are much stronger. The military has lost more than half of the country’s territory because of the co-ordinated attacks by democratic armed forces.
We can win and we will win. However, the international community can and must do more to support our people who risk their lives to free our country.
EU-funded project
The military denies workers all human rights and creates conditions where garment workers have to work for $1.50 per day without any chance to improve their conditions through organising. Under the Made in Myanmar project funded by the European Union, fake unions are sprouting. Made in Myanmar is a shame for the EU and must be stopped immediately! It is nothing but a cover-up for global brands that want to benefit from the cheap labour in Myanmar with the excuse of ‘providing jobs’. What they provide is slave labour!
When workers dare to organise in genuine trade unions, the leaders and their families are threatened with arrest, killing and torture. In many factories, the conditions of garment workers are close to slavery, with more than 16-hour workdays to produce garments for poverty wages—garments that go to European consumers!
It is a convenient lie for multinational fashion brands to argue that they stay in Myanmar to provide jobs for otherwise unemployed workers. In reality, they make use of cheap labour. Under this military regime, any talk of due diligence is nothing but window-dressing. Show me one brand that has prevented and stopped the countless arrests, killings and tortures of trade unionists fighting for decent work in their factories. They cannot stop it, of course, because it is not possible.
Brands claim to do ‘heightened due diligence’—but ‘responsible business conduct’ is simply impossible under a military dictatorship. Global brands that stay in the country, such as the Danish brand Bestseller, implicitly accept the rampant violations of trade-union rights. Brands can even be said to contribute to these violations through the payment of taxes and ‘protection fees’ by factories to the military, which provide funds to the regime. No more excuses: global brands have to exit responsibly from Myanmar!
ILO inquiry
The International Labour Organization formed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the violation of freedom of association and forced labour in Myanmar. The commission adopted its report in August 2023, confirming that the military authorities violated Myanmar’s obligations under these fundamental conventions and recommending actions to be taken by the ILO governing body, including within the framework of article 33 of the ILO constitution. We need not only the trade unions but also employers and governments at the ILO to back the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry with firm actions.
We, trade unions, will continue to fight against the brutal military regime by establishing the federal democratic system that we want. As Myanmar trade unions, we are very grateful for the support of the international union movement so we can continue our struggle. We need your continued solidarity and support, politically and financially, to remove the military as quickly as possible.
In October 2023, the United Nations news agency reported the information about the ILO Commission of Inquiry. The recommendations urge the military authorities to cease immediately all forms of violence, torture and other inhuman treatment against trade-union leaders and members; to release, and withdraw all criminal charges against, trade unionists detained in relation to the exercise of their civil liberties and legitimate trade union activities; and to restore fully the protection of basic civil liberties suspended since the coup d’état. The recommendations also urge the military authorities to end the exaction of all forms of forced or compulsory labour by the army and its associated forces, as well as forced recruitment into the army.
Yet, as reported by state broadcasting media, the junta ‘issued the notification of the effectiveness of People’s Military Service Law starting from February 10 2024’. All men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 are required to serve for up to two years under military command, and specialists such as doctors aged up to 45 must serve for three years, state media said on Saturday, according to Reuters.
Describing the move as a further sign of the junta’s ‘weakness and desperation’, the UN special rapporteur, Tom Andrews, called for stronger international action to protect vulnerable populations across the country.
Economic sanctions
If you observe the above happenings, it is clear that the Myanmar junta does not listen to resolutions only. Resolutions enforced through economic sanctions are the only available non-violent action to end the military regime. I stand here representing not only workers and trade unions from Myanmar. I also represent 183 democratic organisations of youth and women, strike committees from across the country, student unions and government employees, such as teachers, doctors and nurses who joined the civil-disobedience movement following our call. Together:
we demand a total arms embargo and comprehensive economic sanctions—with enforcement through legislation provided within the US and UK systems against the three national banks, which mainly collect foreign currency;
we call on multinational companies—including insurance companies and fashion brands—to exit responsibly from Myanmar and for shipping companies to stop delivering to Myanmar weapons or dual-use goods, such as fuels for military vehicles and airplanes;
we call on the EU to withdraw the ‘everything but arms’ trade benefits (EBA). The EU’s EBA programme was designed to offer trade incentives to the poorest countries to promote democracy and full respect for core human and labour rights. The EU withdrew some preferences from Cambodia in 2020, because it does not respect key labour rights—but it maintains the full EBA preferences for Myanmar!
The EU claims it is possible to implement due diligence in a country where industrial zones are under martial law—where freedom of association is banned and all genuine trade-union representatives are under arrest warrant, hunted, tortured or killed. The EU must stop subsidising the military with the EBA trade preferences. It must recognise the government in exile and do everything to support our liberation struggle.
Heartfelt thanks
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to the international trade unions and supporters who have helped and supported me and shared your love and care with me, to stand strong in fighting the brutal dictatorship in Myanmar. I do not have enough words to show my appreciation for what you have done for our movement and for me personally.
I would also like to thank my trade-union brothers and sisters from Myanmar, especially from the Myanmar Labour Alliance. I am so proud to represent you and I thank you for giving me the chance to represent you even though I am away. Your courage and sacrifices make me feel proud but also pained.
I want to thank the jury for awarding the Arthur Svensson Prize to me and all trade unionists in Myanmar. It means a lot to us. Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Social Europe
Date of publication:
2024-06-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International labour standards and mechanisms, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Resistance plot to assassinate coup leader Min Aung Hlaing at a bridge-opening ceremony raises hard questions about insurgent tactics
Description:
"Myanmar’s dictator Senior General Min Aung Hlaing showcased a major infrastructure project on June 8, opening the Thanlyin Bridge 3 across the Bago River, linking the commercial capital Yangon with the Thilawa Special Economic Zone.
Started in 2019 with a 31 billion yen (US$197 million) loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the bridge symbolizes economic progress under the State Administration Council (SAC) junta that is largely at odds with widespread armed conflict and economic decline its coup has caused.
Just days later, however, military-controlled media announced that security forces had thwarted a plot to attack the bridge opening ceremony. Several people were arrested with two 107mm rockets and launching gear in a workers’ housing area close to the bridge. Two more were arrested the following day with another rocket.
SAC-aligned media claimed that “(o)n the morning of June 8, 2024, in an old wooden cabin in the shipyard workers’ housing area in Ward 61 of Dagon Myothit (Seikkan) Township… several UG (underground) members were apprehended…(a)ccording to a report from a concerned resident opposed to terrorism.”
The military media, which can never resist displaying a “perp-chart” of mug shots and alleged connections between the conspirators, designated some of them as “rocket shooter”, “shooter assistant”, and “situation monitor.”
It claimed that a man called “Arkar Min (yet to be apprehended) of the Brigade Drone Force PDF (People’s Defense Force) provided instructions on how to use rockets via Instagram in the third week of April 2024.” Another alleged leader, Phyu Hnin Aye, was designated as “Rocket shooting director (at large from Mae Sot).”
The SAC has accused the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) of being behind the alleged plot but stopped short of designating it as an attempt on Min Aung Hlaing’s life. If that was the intention, it raises questions over the ability of the resistance forces to mount an operation that could have decapitated the SAC’s topmost leadership.
Two days after the incident, in a speech published in state media, Min Aung Hlaing “stressed the need to wipe out terrorists in Yangon Region…(he) underscored that as terrorists attempt to commit terror acts, taking a chance in unguarded moments of security forces, individuals have to monitor the movements of terrorists with security awareness and knowledge to ensure peace and stability.”
A rare admission of instability or the fears of a war criminal who just lived through a possible assassination plot? How many other attempts have been made to target who must be the most hated man in Myanmar?
There was an initial optimism among many Myanmar resistance forces that the SAC second in command, Vice Senior General Soe Win, had been killed in a drone strike in mid-April at the military Southeast Command in Mawlamyine.
Not seen for several weeks, speculation swirled that he had been severely injured, that he was in intensive care in Yangon, or that he had been transferred to a hospital in India but he soon resurfaced in apparently fine health.
The anti-SAC resistance has been making increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the largely symbolic drone attack on the military fortress capital of Naypyidaw in early April, which didn’t cause much damage but must have jarred the military leadership to some extent.
But the bridge plot reveals several larger trends in the war against the SAC. On the one hand, it illustrates that urban operations, which have been largely low-level, sporadic and in decline over the past year, are still viable if an urban cell can form, operate, plan and surveil a target, and smuggle into Yangon ordnance to carry out an attack. More dramatic would have been an actual launch of the rockets.
Another interpretation would suggest that the security services’ intelligence capabilities are sufficient to thwart such resistance operations, as they have managed to do in many large urban spaces such as Yangon and Mandalay.
There were numerous predictions that a surge of urban uprisings would follow the successful Operation 1027 in northern Shan state in October, which saw insurgents seize scores of towns and over 200 military positions. But this failed to materialize, partly because of the difficulty in staging urban operations in Myanmar’s proficient and ruthless police state.
The incident also reveals the air of twisted normalcy that hums through Yangon, where the regime’s top leader, Japanese engineers from the Nippon Koei Company and reviled SAC members like the former Karen leader Mahn Nyein Maung open new infrastructure as if the situation is stable.
The regime blithely claimed the bridge “will help utilize the East-West Economic Corridor, which will benefit the Hpa-an/Myawady area, as well as the development of Mon and Kayin states and the improvement of connection with regional countries” – areas the embattled regime has largely lost control over, including that crucial section of the Asia Highway.
But the bridge operation also raises important questions about resistance targeting choices. 107mm rockets have been used in multiple battlefronts in Myanmar, and are notoriously inaccurate and prone to malfunction.
Originally developed by the Chinese military in the 1960s, in a multiple launch system called a Type 63, the rockets can be used in very low-tech mode, often simply propped on a stand or sandbag and ignited using a simple battery in a “fire and forget” fashion. They have a range of several kilometers with a blast radius of 12 meters and were popular with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in their resistance against the Soviets.
107mm rockets have become a weapon of choice for many Myanmar resistance groups, before and after the coup, used in multiple attacks on built-up areas or airfields. Resistance forces deployed 12 against Mandalay’s Tada U airport in January, with only five actually igniting.
The military airfield at Nam Paung near the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina was targeted in April, but it’s not clear how much damage was inflicted. The rockets are plentiful, easy to use and indicative of the asymmetric nature of Myanmar’s scattered armed conflicts.
But two recent incidents deserve greater scrutiny over the decision-making protocols of anti-military resistance forces. The SAC claims that a large number of 107mm rockets were captured in early February in the city of Bago, and that the “Dark Side Revolution Burma” (DSRB) PDF was planning attacks on tea shops and restaurants where large crowds were gathered to watch the annual Myanmar Academy Awards ceremony on television.
There is no confirmation that the group was actually planning such an attack against civilians. The DSRB is not a widely active organization, so this could potentially be a false flag accusation of the SAC.
Yet in April in Pyin U Lwin, during the annual Thingyan water festival, the Mandalay PDF fired nearly a dozen rockets into the large town, striking a military academy and wounding several cadets, but also hitting a monastery and hospital, killing two Buddhist monks and severely wounding a number of civilians including children.
It wasn’t widely raised at the time but this is potentially a war crime committed by resistance forces. The use of indiscriminate weapons, especially in built-up areas, could also be in breach of international humanitarian law.
The targeting of Min Aung Hlaing with such unguided munitions in a large crowd of civilians could also have constituted a war crime if it had not been thwarted. But the “bridge plot” should also serve as a moment of clarity for the resistance.
Targeting large crowds with indiscriminate weapons is something the SAC does on a daily basis, murdering civilians across the country with airstrikes and artillery. For anti-SAC forces, even those plotting the assassination of senior regime figures, extreme or desperate measures may have a counter-productive effect if innocent civilians become collateral damage..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2024-06-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, and Kachin State from June 1st to 7th. People who were selected for Military Service were evaded, and therefore, over 20 people of their relatives were arrested instead. The Military Junta arrested people for Military Service, and now women are included in Bago Region, Magway Region, and Shan State.
Over 60 civilians died, and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 2 civilians died from the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-06-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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291.63 KB 436.22 KB 274.72 KB
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Description:
"In a country thick with spies and informers, suspicion can be
crippling. History shows that confidence is hard to win back.....We hear a lot these days about the “trust deficit” and “the loss of social capital”. Thanks to a succession of royal commissions, parliamentary inquiries, media investigations and revelations by whistle blowers, many Australians have lost confidence in their most cherished institutions. Faith in politicians, public servants, bankers, churchmen and other traditional authority figures is said to be at an all-time low.
This phenomenon has real world consequences. According to Jerry Useem, writing in The Atlantic, high levels of trust are important for social cohesion, political stability and even economic growth. A downward trust spiral, on the other hand, has the opposite effect. One study has found that, more than 30 years after the Berlin Wall came down, fully half of the income disparity between East and West Germany could be traced to the legacy of informers employed by the Stasi, East Germany’s notorious Ministry for State Security. As Useem wrote, “The legacy of broken trust has proved extraordinarily difficult to shake”.
This statement prompts a comparison between East Germany under the communists and Myanmar under successive military regimes. Both countries had (and, in Myanmar’s case still has) the reputation of being brutal police states. Both regimes relied on hundreds of thousands of informers to spy on their fellow citizens, undermining social cohesion.
It has been estimated that in the 1980s, when the Stasi was at its most powerful, there were 200,000 inoffizielle mitarbeiter, or “unofficial collaborators”. In a population of 16 million, that was one informer for every 50 to 60 people.
The equivalent statistics for Myanmar are more difficult to estimate, but by some calculations the ratio is even higher. Under the Ne Win regime (1962–88), it was widely believed that one in ten Burmese were dalan, or informers. After the 1974 U Thant disturbances in Rangoon, for example, Western diplomats estimated that 20% of the country’s tertiary students were informers. Some of them actively supported the generals, but most were forced to cooperate with the regime.
The junta places a high priority on the identification, location and removal of anyone deemed a threat to the regime, a definition with a very wide meaning.
After the abortive 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) expanded, extending its reach across the entire country. As part of that process, it recruited even more informers. In those pre-digital days (in Myanmar, at least) their contribution to the regime’s mass surveillance of Burmese society was critical. In 1998, one observer wrote that “one in seven (or even one in five) Burmese are informers”.
This claim is valid, but a little misleading. The number and concentration of informers varied between locations, with far fewer located in the rural districts where most Burmese lived. Even so, as another Myanmar watcher suggested in 2001, it was commonly believed that in the urban areas there was one informer for every ten houses. If this was true, then it means that the ratio of informers to other citizens in Myanmar was higher than in East Germany, a country where, in Timothy Garton Ash’s words, the Stasi became “a default global synonym for the secret police terrors of communism”. Under successive military regimes in Myanmar, the DDSI could claim a similar standing.
In one sense, however, the actual numbers do not matter. It is the perception that counts. This was a key feature of both the East German and Burmese surveillance systems. Because no-one knew who was an informer, it was widely assumed that they were everywhere. This had the effect of sowing suspicion and shutting down discussion of politically sensitive subjects.
As a Burmese journalist told the writer Emma Larkin: “It doesn’t make any difference whether they have informers or not. It is enough that we believe their informers are everywhere. After that, we do their work for them.” As Larkin noted, even without the technological means available to other oppressive regimes, in Myanmar “Big Brother really is everywhere”.
This situation only eased slightly under Aung San Suu Kyi’s quasi-civilian government, between 2016 and 2020.
Since the 2021 military coup, the level of surveillance in Myanmar has greatly increased. The country is thick with spies and informers, both paid and unpaid. The junta places a high priority on the identification, location and removal of anyone deemed a threat to the regime, a definition with a very wide meaning. The regime now has greater technical means to monitor the population, but it still relies heavily on human intelligence.
As so often happens in these circumstances, the competition between informers and those secretly working against the regime has turned into a nasty war within a war. The resistance knows that informers pose perhaps the most serious threat to their lives and ability to continue their struggle. Like so many insurgents before them, in many different countries, they have retaliated against informers with a campaign of “targeted killings”.
Many in the resistance appear to subscribe to the views of the legendary Irish guerrilla leader Michael Collins, who said in 1920 that “There is no crime in detecting and destroying, in war-time, the spy and the informer.” Male and female, young and old, service and civilian, no-one has been spared by the opposition’s so-called urban guerrilla units.
Even before the coup, levels of social trust in Myanmar were very low. In 2014, for example, the Asia Foundation conducted a nation-wide survey and asked the question: can most people be trusted? 77% of respondents answered “no”. To a similar question about their close neighbours, 43% still answered in the negative. Trust in government institutions varied but they also fared badly in the survey.
The 2021 coup, and the bitter civil war that has followed, has clearly made this situation much worse. Many communities, normally divided by other things, have been brought together by their shared fear and hatred of the junta. However, in other ways deep divisions have opened up in Myanmar over political allegiances, military tactics and social mores.
To return to the arguments made by Jerry Useem, the lack of trust that has blighted Myanmar for more than half a century will need to be taken into account in any consideration of the country’s future. Myanmar badly needs leaders in whom most people can put their trust. In the past, Aung San Suu Kyi has filled this role, but she will be in prison for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, as the civil war grinds on, Myanmar’s social capital diminishes further and the trust spiral continues downwards..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of publication:
2024-06-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Toshikazu Tajima
Board Director and CEO
TASAKI & Co., Ltd.
7-3-1, Minatojima Nakamachi, Chuo-ku, Kobe, Hyogo 650-0046, Japan
Re: Inquiry regarding TASAKI’s business partnership with sanctioned entity Myanmar Pearl Enterprise.
We are civil society organizations from Japan and Myanmar that make policy proposals urging Japanese companies to consider the environment, society, and human rights in their overseas business operations.
We are writing to you to express our concern regarding your company’s continued partnership with Myanmar Pearl Enterprise (MPE), a US, UK, and Canadian[i] sanctioned state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation that is illegally controlled by the Myanmar military junta.
Since February 1, 2021 when the Myanmar military attempted a coup, it has been committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity as it tries to take control of Myanmar. These grave international crimes include deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, indiscriminate airstrikes, and destruction of civilian property, which have led to the displacement of more than 3 million people across the country.[ii] There are grave concerns that the military is committing these crimes relying on revenue from MPE and other junta-controlled entities.
We are aware that MYANMAR TASAKI Co., Ltd, a subsidiary of TASAKI & Co., Ltd, has been in a business partnership with MPE since 1997 under a production sharing contract under a license granted by the now junta-controlled Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC). The military junta benefits from revenues generated through the pearl industry, including through a production sharing agreement under which MPE reportedly receives 20-25% of the pearls harvested.[iii] The junta also benefits from customs duties, other taxes and the transfer of technology that can support further production.
Of the companies that have been granted permission for pearl farming, MYANMAR TASAKI was the largest producer at over ten billion MMK (over US$8 million at the time) worth of pearls in 2017-2018, the year with the most recently published data available.[iv] We understand that your company has sold Myanmar pearls around the world, with TASAKI’s website listing stores in Australia, China, France, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, UK and USA among others and that the junta has continued to earn revenue from pearls. According to a Myanmar junta run newspaper, 400 pearl lots were up for sale this year during the 59th Myanmar Gems Emporium, which was attended by the junta leader and commander-in-chief of the Myanmar military, Min Aung Hlaing.[v]
In April 2021, over three years ago, TASAKI’s business partner MPE was sanctioned by the US. In adding MPE on the Specially Designated Nationals list, the US stated that “pearl industries are key economic resources for the Burmese military regime that is violently repressing pro-democracy protests in the country and that is responsible for the ongoing violent and lethal attacks against the people of Burma, including the killing of children.[vi]” The UK also sanctioned MPE and a state-owned timber enterprise to “target the junta’s ability to profit from pearl and timber, 2 high-value natural commodities that generate millions in revenue for the military regime.[vii]”
While TASAKI’s website states that pearls produced by the company’s own pearl farms “are ethically and sustainably sourced”, we are concerned that TASAKI’s continuing partnership with MPE contravenes human rights responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.[viii] Under the OECD Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles, all businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights and are therefore required to exercise human rights due diligence to identify and prevent, mitigate and account for adverse human rights impacts.
We would like to reiterate our concern that by continuing its partnership with MPE, TASAKI is providing the junta with a source of revenue that it can use to procure the very weapons and jet fuel that it needs to continue to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. We also believe that TASAKI’s continued business with MPE undermines the effects of the sanctions imposed by the US, UK and Canada against MPE, which are intended to block the junta’s access to revenue from the pearl sector. Justice For Myanmar, together with another Japanese organization, Human Rights Now, has previously issued a press release expressing concerns regarding TASAKI’s continuing business with MPE.[ix]
While we understand that an objective of TASAKI’s philosophy on sustainability is “harmonious co-existence with local communities'' inspired by a “spirit of sustainability,[x]” we are further concerned by several Myanmar civil society reports on the situation of the indigenous Moken people of Myanmar, which were submitted to the UN in 2020.[xi]According to these reports,[xii] TASAKI’s pearl farms in Myanmar, which are located in the Tanintharyi Region of southern Myanmar, could lead to further forced displacement of Moken people from their ancestral lands due to loss of water and land access.
In light of these concerns, we would like to know what human rights due diligence has been performed since the military’s coup attempt, the results of that due diligence and what measures TASAKI has taken in response.
We believe that by remaining in business with MPE, TASAKI may be in contravention of human rights responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles and the OECD Guidelines and risks complicity in the military junta’s international crimes. Therefore, we call on you to responsibly end all business with the military junta controlled MPE and fulfill your responsibilities to respect human rights. In addition, TASAKI should publicly disclose its transactions with MPE and other junta-controlled entities since February 1, 2021.
We would appreciate your timely reply to the contact address listed below by July 5, 2024 to share the requested data and to outline your course of action for addressing the issues raised. Furthermore, your response will be published on our organization's website among other platforms (including the fact of no response at the time of deadline). We look forward to receiving your response.
Sincerely,
Yuka Kiguchi
Executive Director, Mekong Watch
Yadanar Maung
Spokesperson, Justice For Myanmar
Contact address:
Mekong Watch
3F Aoki Bldg., Taito 1-12-11,
Taito-ku, Tokyo 110-0016,
Japan
TEL: +81-3-3832-5034
EMAIL: [email protected]
[i] Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Burma-related Designations; Kingpin Act Designations Removals”, April 21, 2021https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20210421; Government of Canada, “Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations: SOR/2021-106”, May 14, 2021 https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2021/2021-05-26/html/sor-dors106-eng.html; Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, “Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK”, June 2, 2021https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65bb618927fccf000d4bd1b3/Myanmar.pdf.
[ii] UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. for Myanmar, “Statement by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. for Myanmar”, May 3, 2024 https://myanmar.un.org/en/267754-statement-resident-and-humanitarian-coordinator-ai-myanmar.
[iii] Frontier Myanmar, “Moken Fear a Sea Grab in the Myeik Archipelago”, December 29, 2019 https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/moken-fear-a-sea-grab-in-the-myeik-archipelago/.
[iv] Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Myanmar, EITI Report 2017-2018”, January 2019 https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/attachments/meiti_reconciliation_report_2017-2018_final_signed_31st_march_2020.pdf.
[v] The Global New Light of Myanmar, “400 Pearl, 160 Gem, and 4,550 Jade Lots Up for Sale”, May 2, 2024 https://cdn.myanmarseo.com/file/client-cdn/gnlm/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/4-5-2024.pdf.
[vi] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Key Timber and Pearl Enterprises in Burma”, April 21, 2021 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0138.
[vii] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, “Foreign Secretary Announces Further Sanctions on Companies Linked to Myanmar’s Military Regime”, June 21, 2021 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-further-sanctions-on-companies-linked-to-myanmars-military-regime.
[viii] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct”, June 8, 2023 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_81f92357-en; United nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights : Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, January 1, 2012https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.
[ix] Human Rights Now and Justice For Myanmar “Human Rights Now and Justice For Myanmar call on TASAKI to end business with the Myanmar military junta, following US designation of Myanmar Pearl Enterprise for sanctions”, April 21, 2021 https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/press-releases/human-rights-now-and-justice-for-myanmar-call-on-tasaki-to-end-business-with-the-myanmar-military-junta-following-us-designation-of-myanmar-pearl-enterprise-for-sanctions.
[x] TASAKI Website, “Our Sustainability”, accessed June 10, 2024. https://www.tasaki-global.com/corporate/sustainability/about/.
[xi] Burma Human Rights Network, “The Coming Extinction: The Moken People of Burma’s Mergui Archipelago”, December 12, 2020https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/component/edocman/bhrn-report/the-coming-extinction-the-moken-people-of-burma-s-mergui-archipelago.html; FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights and Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability, “Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 37thSession Myanmar: Joint Submission by FIDH and MATA”, July 2020, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh-mata_joint_upr_submission_july_2020.pdf; Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in Burma/Myanmar, “Joint submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Myanmar July 2020: 37th Session of the UPR Working Group of the human Rights Council January/February 2021”, https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=8278&file=EnglishTranslation.
[xii] United Nations Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, “Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Myanmar: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, 12 November 2020, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3893981?ln=en&v=pdf. ..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-06-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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221.59 KB 291.63 KB
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"Exposing the underreported involvement of Burmese Authoritarian left on Rohingya Genocide as an activist who is a descendant of Bengali ethnicity and who also has the distance relatives from Rohingya ethnicity. However, I'm not a ethno-nationalist in any sense. I am only writing this for accountability, responsibility and universal human rights.
Rohingya Genocide was indeed a commonly known incident even for those who don’t really know much about Burma. Before the Rohingya Genocide, Burma was only well known for Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy, even for the activist circles. Later, Rohingya Genocide is something that made Burma famous again, not in the good way.
Everyone well aware that Rohingya Genocide is committed by the Myanmar Military Army and Aung San Suu Kyi defended them at ICJ. There are some interpretations that since ICJ sued the whole nation instead of the Myanmar Military Army as the sole entity, Aung San Suu Kyi had to defend the nation. Regardless, if it’s the case, she could simply say the Myanmar Military Army did it and the state has nothing to do with it. She didn’t do as such. Rohingya Genocide has its root in 2012 Rakhine-Rohingya riots and the 969 grassroot movements which in turn has their roots in far-right islamist Pakistan separationist movement from Burma of 1946 and Arakan massacres by Rohingya in 1942 (during colonial era of divide and rule politics of British colonialism).
The main underreported information of the whole Rohingya Genocide was the passive involvement of Burmese Authoritarian Left. Venerable Wirathu, the xenophobic and racist monk whom Time magazine called “The Face of Buddhist Terror” used to be active among the far-left circles. One of his first books from around 2000s, named “The Criminals of History”. In that book, Venerable Wirathu wrote about how the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee was reactionary and tool of the military dictatorship at the expense of the grassroot monk community. After his release of prison at 2012, he was seen preaching anti-military and pro-NLD messages at the local branches of NLD party. In 2012, Venerable Wirathu was invited by the chairman of the Kayan New Land Party, Than Soe Naing, to discuss and deliver knowledges on nationalism, self-determinism, federalism and democracy. Here, it’s important to know that federalism used to a word of kryptonite for the military junta until 2015. The military junta believed in one state solution for Burma. The opposition, including those from the far-left, believed in federalism and self-determinism. So, the military interpreted federalism as an enemy of their one state solution (unitary union). Communist Party of Burma always believed in the one state solution (unitary union). However, since it was too weak around 2010s, it endorses the united front against the military junta. Here, it’s important to know the history and ideological development of the political party that invited Venerable Wirathu to deliver the speech. Since 1979, Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) was a close ally of Communist Party of Burma. It even adopted the Maoist "people's war" strategy upheld by the CPB since 1979. In 1983, under CPB's leadership, KNLP alongside Karenni National People's Liberation Front and Shan State National Liberation Organization formed the central regional command which lasted until CPB was forced underground due to internal mutiny from its Wa and Kokang cadres. The video of Venerable Wirathu delivering speech about nationalism, self-determinism, federalism and democracy at Kayan New Land Party can be seen in the following YouTube link.
YouTube Video - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFFTzRR2RyQ
Also, All Burma Federation of Student Union, the historical pro-CPB student union, was resurrected by a far-left student union leader called Kyaw Ko Ko in 2007. In 2014, which is after 2012 Rakhine-Rohingya riots, the success of 969 movement led by Venerable Wirathu, All Burma Federation of Student Union invited Venerable Wirathu and fellow monks to host an event that was organized by All Burma Federation of Student Union (ABFSU) to memorated the student union leaders who were killed by the military in 1988. The image from the event is attached as the featured photo of the whole article. It’s still available at the official Facebook page of a branch of All Burma Federation of Student Union whereas it cannot be found the official Facebook page of the All-Burma Federation of Student Union (ABFSU) anymore.
Also, current All Burma Federation of Student Union (ABFSU) which was refounded back in 2007 by Kyaw Ko Ko had some members who became ultra-nationalist right-winger. All Burma Federation of Student Union was refounded with Kyaw Ko Ko as its chairman. Back then, the organising committee contained 12 members. One of the senior members (secretary of student committee) was Ye Min Oo, who later became popular as Wira Ye Min Oo for his close relation with the racist monk Venerable Wirathu.
Some references about him can be seen here:
https://english.dvb.no/charges-against-arakanese-nationalist-baseless-lawyer/
https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/all-burma-students-unionabfsu-has-been-reformed/
In 2013, Ye Min Oo was arrested for with the two charges, one of them for anti-Muslim riots. Later, the leaders of 969 movements (mostly monks) launched a nation-wide campaign called "Free Ye Min Oo".
Reference: https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2013/04/06/alert-chit-ko-lin-former-pp-ye-myat-hein-former-pp-new-hnin-ye-aka-noe-noeformer-pp-and-ye-min-aung-younger-brother-of-ye-min-oo-were-sued-under-penal-code-353506/
The campaign was led by "U Pammokha", one of the future leader of Patriotic Association of Myanmar (MaBaTha), the far-right ultranationalist monk led pro-military and anti-NLD association.
Again in 2024, there are several reports from international humanist communities about the war crimes committed against Rohingya community by both the Myanmar military junta and the Arakan Army. The Arakan Army and their allied brotherhood are considered the strongest ethnic armed organization and played the imperialistic type of influence on the whole revolution against the military junta. Their operation 1027 was indeed effective against the Myanmar military junta. However, it doesn't give them the license to commit genocide or war crimes.
As of now, given all these reports of international humanist communities about the war crimes committed against Rohingya community by Arakan Army, around 100 non-government civil society organizations published statements and call for an investigation of Arakan Army. Among them, GSC (General Strike Committee) and so other left-wing groups such as Alliance of Students’ Unions Yangon and so on. However, Kyaw Ko Ko, an influential student leader from 2007 generation who also is the founder of “Social Democratic Party”, took the pro-AA position on the on-going Rohingya genocide of Arakan Army. GSC (General Strike Committee), Alliance of Students’ Unions Yangon and several far-left or left-leaned left-wing groups retracted from the statement.
Anti-Junta Mass Movement – AJMM was one of the few groups among the far-left or left-leaned left-wing groups that didn’t retract their statement. The argument given by all of these individuals and these groups for retracting their statement calling for “formal investigation into Arakan Army for genocide or massacre level war crimes committed against Rohingya people” was that they claimed there were no information to back the accusations up. However, a lot of Rohingya refugees and Rohingya activists have been providing audio recordings, video recordings, and photographic documentations of the situations. A Rohingya left-wing activist named Arafat Jamil can been seen confronting Kyaw Ko Ko for his silence on his official Facebook page about the current Rohingya genocide by Arakan Army. Kyaw Ko Ko replied (in briefly translated version) that “Arakan Army despite being ethno-nationalist right-wing group is more left-wing than most of the so-called left-wingers in Burma. I'm dealing with them, so, I know they're more left-wing than you”.
The interaction can be founded under this post: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/Z27QnKGrjwWyNw3R/?mibextid=WC7FNe
In the meantime, United League of Arakan (Arakan Army) publicly stated via “The New Humanitarian” that “from the perspective of the local native indigenous population, ‘Rohingya’ is a political movement to separate a part of Arakan, our fatherland, by destroying the integrity of our ancestral history. We see it as a very unfaithful and dishonest act. However, it does not mean that we will never recognize the term ‘Rohingya’. We want them to admit the historical facts of colonial migration in addition to the removal of politically motivated distorted historical claims harmful to other communities in the region.”
This whole narrative of Arakanese Buddhists being the local native indigenous population and ‘Rohingya people’, the political movement name of “Bengali settlers living in Arakan” was not a new one. The former General of the Myanmar military army and the former president of Myanmar’s quasi-military regime, U Thein Sein, also said the similar thing. He said and I quote “These are no Rohingya among the races in Burma. We only have Bengalis who were brought for farming during British rules”.
A satellite army which is helped and nurtured by Arakan Army called "Bamar People's Liberation Army" which use the classical right-wing ethno-nationalist representation of Bamar ethnicity is in total silence of the whole war crimes committed by Arakan Army. Their founder "Maung Saung Kha" who was a ex-NLD member, who identified himself as a left-wing, despite his active presence on Social Media, refused to offer comments on the war crimes and accused genocide of Arakan Army committed against the Rohingya community. Let alone the genocide, they don't even warn the ULA/AA for their same wavelength racist remarks of "Rohingya" people as post-colonial settlers.
Both the Myanmar military and Arakan Army always conflated Bengali people with Rohingya people. Indeed, they're unique ethnicity with unique language and culture. Among Chittagong Hill Tracts, there are a lot of genocides happening. Myanmar military junta and Arakan Army are committing war crimes against Bengali and Rohingya. On the other hand, the Bangladesh Army is committing war crimes against Chakma people and other Buddhist ethnic minorities for almost a century too. The world has woke up to the sufferings of Rohingya people, yet the Burmese left-wingers are selectively woke only when the Myanmar military junta is the oppressor, not when their ally. Here, I urged everyone to learn more about the sufferings of Rohingya people, Bengali people when it comes to the state of Myanmar and Chakma people when it comes to the state of Bangladesh.
Summing up, it’s not new for Burma to witness the left infightings for interests-based politics and so-called authoritarian far-left movements uniting with far-right movements for political gains. Burma has this curse of authoritarian far-left movements messing up people's lives since independence. Since independence, the CPB have been following Stalin’s Third International lead and tried to establish a one-party rule against the democratic socialism regime of AFPFL led by a popular third camp socialist Kyaw Nyein. Due to the hostility between socialists and communists within AFPFL, General Ne Win conducted a coup in 1962 and founded a NazBol alike ideology called “Burmese Way to Socialism”..."
Source/publisher:
libcom.org
Date of publication:
2024-06-10
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"At least 50 people were killed by Myanmar soldiers in a raid on a village in Rakhine State last week, say local residents and opposition forces.
Warning: You may find some of the details in this piece disturbing
Eyewitnesses told the BBC the village was subjected to two-and-half days of terror as soldiers blindfolded and beat them up, poured burning petrol on their skin and forced some of them to drink their urine.
They were looking for supporters of the Arakan Army (AA), which has become one of the most effective ethnic fighting forces in Myanmar.
Fifty-one people aged between 15 and 70 were "violently tortured and killed", the National Unity Government (NUG), representing the ousted civilian government, said in a statement. The AA estimated the death toll to be more than 70 people.
The ruling military council, or junta, has denied the accusations, which would amount to one of the worst atrocities committed in the three year-old Myanmar civil war.
“They asked the men if the AA was in this village,” one woman told the BBC.
“Whatever answer they gave, whether they said AA was there or it wasn’t, or they didn’t know, the soldiers hit them."
In just six months, the AA has swept through most of Rakhine State, forcing the military to keep retreating. It ended a ceasefire with the army last year and joined ethnic insurgents in other parts of the country in a combined operation aimed at overthrowing the junta which seized power in February 2021.
"I saw with my own eyes my husband being taken away in a military vehicle. My son was separated from both of us, and I don't know where he is. Now I don't know if my son and husband are alive or dead," the woman told the BBC..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2024-06-06
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"This Incident Report describes two events that occurred in Kaw T’Ree (Kawkareik) Township, Dooplaya District, in November and December 2023. On November 4th 2023, State Administration Council (SAC) conducted an air strike into E--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, and injured an 11-year-old boy, Saw A---, on the leg, while he was near his house. The boy was immediately sent to a hospital in Hpa-an Town by his parents to receive treatment, and later transferred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwaw village tract, Ta Kreh (Paingkyon) Township, Hpa-an District. On December 2nd 2023, at 8 am, the SAC dropped a 500-pound bomb into F--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township. The bomb injured a pregnant villager named Ma B---. Her husband sent her to D--- clinic, in Nabu [T’Nay Cha] Township, Hpa-an District, but she was referred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwaw village tract, as this clinic was better equipped to treat her.[1]
[Excerpt]
Part 1 – Incident Details
Type of Incident
Air strike
Date of Incident(s)
November 4th 2023 and December 2nd 2023
Incident Location
(Village, Township and District)
E--- section and F--- section, in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District.
[...]
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On November 4th 2023 [in the morning], fighting broke out between State Administration Council (SAC)[6] soldiers [unknown battalion] against combined forces from People’s Defence Force (PDF)[7] and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[8] in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. At around 10 am, the SAC conducted an air strike [and one bomb landed] inside E--- section, Kawkareik Town. [At the time,] Saw A--- (11 years old), a Grade-3 [primary school] boy, was with his grandmother [in their house in E--- section], and went outside of the house to urinate. While he was urinating, he was hit by shrapnel [from a bomb] on the right calf. His grandmother heard him being wounded by the shrapnel and immediately called his parents, who sent him [by car] to a hospital in Hpa-an Town, Hpa-an District [located one hour away] to receive treatment. When he reached the hospital, he had very low blood pressure [due to blood loss], thus it could not be predicted whether he would live or not. Saw A--- received treatment on time and was saved. [His parents paid for the treatment themselves, and did not receive assistance from any organisations]. By November 30th 2023, his wound was not fully healed, so he received further treatment at C--- clinic, in Naw Kwaw village tract, Ta Kreh (Paingkyon) Township, Hpa-an District. [C--- clinic is under the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)[9], so treatment was free of charge.] Regarding the incident, his mother expressed: “In this political situation, it is not convenient to work. Our financial situation is becoming more difficult. It’s really sad to witness my son experience it [the attack].”
On December 2nd 2023, at 8 am, the SAC conducted an air strike into F--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. The shrapnel [from the dropped bomb] injured Ma B---, a woman nine months pregnant, on the left side of her back. At the time, she was gathering things inside her house to flee [as villagers could hear the sound of aircraft approaching them]. Her husband witnessed what happened to his wife, as he was on his motorbike and had just started the engine. He immediately sent his wife to D--- clinic, Meh Pah Leh village tract, Nabu [T’Nay Cha] Township, Hpa-an District. It was hard to perform surgery on a woman who was nine months pregnant, so at 10 am she was referred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwee village tract, [which is better equipped]. Regarding the incident, Ma B--- expressed: “A 500-pound bomb, dropped from the aircraft, injured villagers. And I don’t know how many were killed by it. I don’t want to put the blame on anyone when such things happen. But for certain, I’m very sad and feel bad about the incident.”..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-05-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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901.91 KB 262.79 KB 184.54 KB
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"30 May 2024: The trajectory of the conflict in Myanmar has accelerated rapidly in favour of the country’s resistance actors, finds a new briefing paper published by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) today. The junta is not the de facto government of Myanmar as it is not in effective control of the state. International actors should immediately revise policies that are bound by that false assumption and instead massively scale-up support to Myanmar’s many resistance actors, SAC-M said.
The briefing paper, ‘Effective Control in Myanmar 2024 Update’, presents a picture of the dynamics of contestation and control across all of Myanmar more than three years since the beginning of an historic national uprising in response to the Myanmar military’s attempted coup of 1 February 2021. SAC-M finds that armed resistance to the junta has expanded across the country and that the junta has proven incapable of reversing, or even arresting, the rate of its military losses to resistance forces, which have accelerated considerably since October 2023.
“We had identified that the trajectory of the conflict favoured the resistance in 2022, when the prevailing narrative within the international community was that the military was in control and would soon be holding elections,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “Since then, the overall trajectory of the conflict has accelerated further in favour of the resistance. The junta is not a de facto government as it is not in effective control of the state. The international community must understand this reality and work directly with resistance authorities and civil society to deliver urgent aid and assistance to the Myanmar people.”
Several years of sustained pressure from acts of non-violent and armed nationwide resistance paved the way for a series of rapid military advances against the junta by resistance forces beginning in October 2023. Between October 2023 and April 20241, the junta lost meaningful ground access to the majority of townships on Myanmar’s international borders and 55 cities and towns were taken by resistance forces.
The junta has responded to its mounting military losses by escalating its commission of atrocities against civilians, increasingly through airstrikes and artillery. 2.7 million people have been internally displaced since the coup and 18.6 million people require humanitarian assistance as a result of junta attacks and junta blockades on vital humanitarian assistance. The majority of those in dire need are in areas outside of stable junta control, where the junta has limited capacity to address the humanitarian crisis it has deliberately created.
“The military junta is refusing to meet the demands of the democratic revolution, despite the historic advances being made by Myanmar’s allied resistance forces. The junta shows only a commitment to further violence and suppression,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The international community must act to protect people from the junta’s atrocities against civilians by ceasing all transfers of arms and imposing comprehensive arms embargoes, strengthening financial sanctions on the junta and referring the entire situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.”
SAC-M’s analysis published today, an update to its 2022 analysis on effective control, features three maps2 depicting illustrative visualisations indicating degrees of contestation and control across Myanmar’s varied geography. The qualitative assessments used to produce the visual models were guided by internationally accepted criteria for determining whether an entity has effective control as a de facto government of a state, derived from international case law. Those criteria include the acceptance of the population, the capacity to administer functions of government and degree of permanency, in addition to taking control of territory into account.
SAC-M finds that resistance groups collectively have greater control in more territory than the junta, but no one group exercises de facto power over the state itself. Governance capacity across the country remains weak, including for resistance authorities, who are straining to meet the growing humanitarian needs of the population and protect civilians from escalating junta violence.
“Fears of increased violence as inevitable should the junta collapse, fail to account for the fact that the main source of violence and instability in Myanmar is the junta,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The path towards lasting peace and stability for Myanmar is through realisation of the unified federal democratic aspirations of the Myanmar people and their legitimate representatives: the National Unity Government, National Unity Consultative Council, ethnic revolutionary organisations and broader civil society. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international community have a moral and political responsibility to the people of Myanmar to do everything in their power to support this outcome as quickly as possible.”
The international community must respond to Myanmar’s fluid and complex crisis in a manner that accepts the dynamics on the ground and upholds obligations under international law to facilitate the clearly stated democratic aspirations of the Myanmar people. Included in SAC-M’s recommendations to States, the United Nations and ASEAN, are immediate actions that must be taken to undermine the military junta’s ability to commit atrocities and to massively scale-up provision of humanitarian assistance to people in need through direct coordination with resistance authorities and civil society. Longer-term support from the international community will be critical for resistance actors to build the capacity of government departments and services and to promote economic development in post-revolution Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-05-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
188.89 KB 24.08 MB
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Description:
"The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has made numerous requests to the Myanmar military for information related to the many serious crimes that we are investigating. These include crimes allegedly committed by the Myanmar security forces and by armed groups. To date, the military has not responded to any of these requests. Today the Mechanism has sent a new request and is issuing this statement in the hope that it will lead to a response.
Today’s request asks for information about the capture and killing of two young men in Myauk Khin Yan village in the Magway Region. In a video widely circulated on the internet, armed men tied the two men and hung them from a tree, then built a fire beneath and killed the men by burning them alive.
Video footage showing the brutal treatment of these young men circulated on social media in early February 2024. The two victims, identified in media coverage as Phoe Tay and Tha Htaung, were in their early twenties and allegedly members of anti-junta group the Yaw Defence Force.
The Mechanism is conducting an impartial and independent determination of the facts surrounding this incident, including the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. As part of this investigation, the Mechanism has asked the Myanmar military to share with it any information about the units in the area and their commanders, the circumstances of the victims’ detention and treatment, and the persons seen committing the torture and killings.
I urge the Myanmar military to fully cooperate with the Mechanism, as called for in numerous resolutions by the United Nations Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, by giving us access to the country and sharing requested information. The evidence collected by the Mechanism is used to objectively investigate and to build criminal cases against those perpetrators responsible for the most serious international crimes. The goal is to break the cycle of impunity, including for persons so brazen as to commit such sadistic and inhumane crimes, and to bring justice for the people of Myanmar.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files that can be used by authorities to prosecute individuals in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-05-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
138.67 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Chin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from May 15th to 21st. Over 200 men from Magway Region, Yangon Region, and Shan State were arrested for 2nd batch of Military Service and blackmailed. Military Junta Troop and staff who work for the Military collected money from the cars and passengers and also were getting money for making NRC cards (National Registration Citizenship).
Over 20 civilians died, and over 50 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 8 underaged people died and 5 were injured when the Military committed Human rights abuses. A civilian also died by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-05-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
211.59 KB 197.85 KB 781.69 KB
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Description:
"Bangkok —
Interviews have begun with Myanmar refugees living in Thailand who are eligible for a new resettlement program in the United States, the Thai government said.
Thailand said it hopes the first group may get to move by the end of the year.
Some 90,000 refugees live in nine camps on the Thai side of the border to escape fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic minority rebel armies vying for autonomy. Some of the refugees were born in the camps, which started to form in the mid-1980s, and many have lived in them for decades.
Persistent fighting in Myanmar, amplified by a military coup in February 2021, has kept most from returning home.
Aiming to give the refugees a safe way out of the camps, Thailand, the United States and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees announced the resettlement plan in May 2023.
One year on, Thailand’s Ministry of Interior says that the Thai government and UNHCR have finished checking the personal information of the refugees to verify their eligibility for the program. More than 80,000 refugees were deemed eligible, and nearly all of them told officials they wanted to resettle.
“After that, the U.S. team went to the first two camps for interviews, which have already been done,” Zcongklod Khawjang, an interior ministry official in charge of overseeing the resettlement program, told VOA this week.
The two camps — Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin — are among the smallest of nine and host about 8,750 refugees combined.
Zcongklod said the U.S. Embassy in Thailand has not told the Thai government when the authorized refugees would be resettled or when interviews in the other seven camps would begin. But he added that Thailand was expecting the “first batch” to move to the U.S. sometime this year.
Hayso Thako, a joint secretary with the Karen Refugee Committee, one of the charities working in the camps, said he received the same message from the UNHCR at a meeting in March.
“They said most probably the first group would be able to leave by the end, almost the end of this year,” he said.
The UNHCR declined to comment on when resettlement might begin and referred the question to the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok declined to provide a time frame.
“Resettlement operations are ongoing in cooperation with the UNHCR and the Royal Thai Government,” the U.S. Embassy told VOA by email, attributing the comment to “a U.S. official.”
The embassy also would not say how many of the 80,000-plus eligible refugees the U.S. was prepared to take in, either annually or in total. Zcongklod said the embassy has not provided the Thai government with those figures, either.
The Border Consortium, a network of charities that coordinate much of the international aid that reached the camps, said it has not been provided with official figures but said plans for the program appear to have been scaled down over time.
“Figures have changes. At the beginning, it was this number of people who could be resettled … and maybe now it could be a lower number of people who could be resettled,” Leon de Riedmatten, executive director of The Border Consortium, told VOA.
Even so, he said, “It’s important for the residents in the camps themselves that there is still the possibility of resettlement. I think this is the main message, even if it’s not going to be so many people who are going to be resettled to the United States.”
Thailand has denied the refugees a regular path to gaining permanent legal residence and keeps tight control over their movements in and out of the camps.
Myanmar’s 2021 coup brought the country's brief experiment with democracy to a halt, plunging it into civil war and dashing hopes that the refugees could return safely anytime soon.
Hayso Thako and de Riedmatten said it would help if other countries committed to taking in some of the refugees.
Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told VOA it has encouraged more countries to join the resettlement program.
A previous program ended about five years ago after resettling thousands of refugees in the United States and a few other countries.
Without a clear idea of how many of the refugees the new program can handle, and no end in sight to the civil war raging in Myanmar, charities say the Thai government should also give the refugees the opportunity to settle permanently in Thailand.
“I think it’s key. It’s very, very important, because we cannot expect that all these refugees will be resettled. We cannot expect also that a large part of these refugees will return to Myanmar. So the ones, the majority, who will be left in the camps should have a better future,” de Riedmatten said.
Even after four decades, most of the camps still lack electricity and running water. Most homes are huts of bamboo and eucalyptus poles topped with thatched roofs.
The refugees are mostly barred from studying or working outside of the camps, have few job opportunities inside and receive an average of about $9 in food aid a month.
Some advocates say a growing sense of despair across the camps is causing a rise in domestic abuse, gang violence, drug use and suicide.
“Living in the camps is not easy,” Eh Nay Moo, 30, who fled Myanmar with his parents when he was three years old, told VOA.
“Here, we are just illegal people. … There is no freedom for us. Going here and there outside of the camp, we are not allowed,” he said from Mae La, the largest of the nine camps on the border.
Having spent almost his entire life in the camps, Eh Nay Moo said he cannot imagine returning to Myanmar but sees no real future for himself in the camps.
Eh Nay Moo said he has applied for the new resettlement program and is eagerly awaiting an interview.
“If I get a chance to move to the U.S. … I believe that I will get more opportunity or freedom to do and live my life as a human being,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-05-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karen and other refugees from Burma in Thailand - general reports and articles
Language:
more
Description:
"This Incident Report describes events occurring in Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District. On October 30th 2023, villagers from Waw Loo village tract, Noh T’Kaw Township, were transporting yams with two trucks in order to sell them in Mawlamyine Town. When they reached an army camp checkpoint on Ka Lee Hkee hill, where Border Guard Forces (BGF) Battalion #1023, Cantonment Area #4, and State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Division (LID) #44 are based, SAC soldiers shot at them. A 35-year-old villager, Saw A---, from B--- village, Waw Loo village tract, was injured by the shooting. After this incident, the villagers were afraid to travel on that road, but they had to use it for their livelihood activities.[1]
Excerpt
Part 1 – Incident Details
Type of Incident
[Shooting of civilians] A villager’s arm was injured because SAC soldiers shot him while he was travelling.
Date of Incident(s)
October 30th 2023
Incident Location
(Village, Township and District)
Ka Lee Hkee (Hkoh Kwar) army camp, Waw Loo village tract,[2] Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District.
[...]
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On October 30th 2023, villagers from B--- village, Waw Loo village tract, Noh T'Kaw Township, Dooplaya District, were transporting elephant foot yams [a vegetable used in local cuisine] with two trucks in order to sell them in Mawlamyine Town. Before they went up to [Ka Lee Hkee (Hkoh Kwar)] hill, [where BGF Battalion #1023, Cantonment #4, and SAC LID #44 army camp is located], they passed a car that was returning on that road and asked whether they could go [pass through Ka Lee Hkee camp] or not. After that, they continued their journey until they reached the [camp’s] checkpoint. One of the villagers, Saw C---, from B--- village, Waw Loo village tract, explained to KHRG: “Actually, we waited for them [SAC and BGF soldiers] to come [to the checkpoint] and collect the gate fee. After a few minutes, no one came and collected the fee. Then, we honked the truck’s horn [as a warning noise], but no one came. I thought maybe the situation was not good [something might happen], so I went to the truck and drove it. When we drove [the first truck] about 20 yards [18 meters] past the gate, they [SAC soldiers] shot at us [with machine guns].”
In this incident, a 35-year-old villager, Saw A---, from B--- village, was injured. While [the first truck had already passed the checkpoint gate, and the second truck was still at the gate,] Saw A--- was about to open the truck’s door, when SAC soldiers at the top of the hill camp shot at him. He was shot on his right arm and fell down in front of the gate. [After the victim was shot,] a villager from D--- village, Noh T'Kaw village tract, Noh T’Kaw Township, took the victim away from the gate by motorcycle [to a nearby Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)[7] checkpoint]. After that, a DKBA leader, General Nay Lah, sent the victim to Seik Gyi Town hospital. Saw C--- explained: “He [Saw A---] put his arm on the truck’s door. During the shooting, the [second] truck driver said he had doubts about whether he should go [continue driving] or not. The driver stopped the truck and asked Saw A--- to get out of the truck to put a chock under the [truck] wheel because the road is a slope. Saw A--- was [shot and] injured when he was about to open the truck’s door. As soon as he was injured, [a villager took him to the DKBA checkpoint a few minutes away from Ka Lee Hkee camp and] we asked for help from a [DKBA] soldier. The civilians [nearby] dared not transport him [to the hospital] because they did not know whether he was three fingers [People’s Defence Force (PDF)[8]], DKBA, or Karen National Union (KNU)[9]. Actually, we are civilians. We asked for help from the DKBA, and a soldier contacted his company commander. At that time, the company commanders, Nae Klar and Nay Lah, were coming [to the DKBA checkpoint]. So they [the commanders] took him to the [Seik Gyi] hospital”.
As soon as the victim arrived at the hospital, a health worker came immediately. Due to the fact that the victim was injured by a bullet, he needed an X-ray, but Seik Gyi hospital is unable to provide treatment [due to a lack of capacity]. The victim stayed at Seik Gyi hospital for one night. Saw C--- continued: “We called the ambulance, but the ambulance crew dared not transport the victim. The next day, the company commander [DKBA] scolded the ambulance crew and said ‘you guys dared to transport the soldiers who were injured, but not civilians.’ Later, we rented another car [found someone to drive the victim], and the victim was sent [to Mawlamyine].”
The victim was sent to Mawlamyine Town on October 31st 2023, and sought treatment at Mawlamyine Hospital. He has not yet been discharged from the hospital [as of November 2023]. The victim has two children, and his wife is pregnant. The victim was the breadwinner of his family. Therefore, after he got injured, his family faced problems, and they moved to E---village, Poh Yay village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, and stayed with his wife’s parents. The victim’s family did not receive any support [from any organisations as of November 2023].
After this incident, the villagers were afraid to travel on that road. Saw C--- added: “If it was possible, I would not use this road for travelling anymore. However, we only have this comfortable [paved] road to travel, so we need to use it. We dare to travel only when many people are travelling.” The villagers do not want to travel on this road, but they have to use it for their livelihood..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-05-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, Kachin State, Shan State, and Kayin State from May 8th to 14th. 20 civilians died and over 50 were injured by the airstrike and dropping bombs in Saw Township, Magway Region, and Tabayin Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta committed a massacre which involved shooting and killing over 30 local civilians from Lathtuttaw Village in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta Troop arrested men from Magway Region, Ayeyarwady Region, and Bago Region for 2nd Batch of Military Service and also arrested 7 youths who denied Military Service and their relatives as hostages.
Over 80 civilians died, and over 120 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian also died by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-05-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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341.43 KB 327.81 KB 120.52 KB
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"Scam centers have plagued the border areas of Thailand, Myanmar and China as nationals from all three countries are tricked into – and subsequently enslaved in – online fraud. Typically, the businesses force trafficked workers to call people across Asia and convince them to deposit money in fake or fraudulent investments.
Tens of thousands involved in the criminal schemes were deported from Myanmar in 2023 by both junta and rebel army officials. Many are linked to forced labor, human trafficking and money laundering, which proliferated after COVID-19 shut down casinos across Southeast Asia.
In March, more than 800 Chinese nationals were deported from Myawaddy township’s infamous gambling and scam center, Shwe Kokko, in Myanmar’s Kayin state, in relation to online fraud. An investigation by RFA found that up to 3,000 foreign nationals are being held at the casino, including people from Thailand, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia and Uganda.
RFA Burmese recently spoke with Major Naing Maung Zaw, spokesperson for the ethnic Karen Border Guard Force, or BGF, which controls Myawaddy township. He said that the BGF is cooperating with China to eradicate money laundering and online scam operations in Kayin state and has vowed to evict foreign nationals involved in the activities from Myawaddy by the end of October.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: The Karen BGF has issued a notice to foreigners engaged in online business in the vicinity, including Myawaddy in Karen state, mandating their departure within six months. Why did you make this announcement?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: The intent is to gradually resolve the issue by prompting the departure of these people, thereby mitigating the prominence of this particular locale in the illicit [online fraud] business sector ... While the problem has recently surfaced in Myawaddy, its roots stretch both domestically and internationally over an extended period of time … So far, the situation hasn’t reached a critical level, but there’s increased pressure.
RFA: Since the BGF issued the notice, have any foreigners left?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: Yes, some foreigners went home. Those who came here via agents, they are secretly leaving the region.
RFA: Why is the BGF giving them six months to leave?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: Many critics … [are] dismissing this plan as mere theatrics, [since the BGF is] stretching it out to six months. While there may be some truth to their assertions, we must also consider the social implications.
We called on these companies and they came to negotiate. I have already told them that whether [their business] is legal or illegal, they must vacate the premises on their own terms … They must remove all relevant equipment from their workplaces. These factors necessitate careful consideration.
‘We don’t accept this willingly’
RFA: How many foreigners are working in these online businesses?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: That's hard to say. I prefer to have an exact number if I’m going to answer something. Currently, I think there are a few thousand.
RFA: When did these foreigners come to Kayin state?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: They arrived relatively recently. To be frank, the issue arose here not too long ago. Myawaddy is the most recent center for the [online fraud] business in Myanmar.
RFA: When they first came to Kayin state, did you try to stop them?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: We only became aware of the matter regarding [online fraud] when others drew attention to it. Our primary focus is on land leasing. Our goal is singular and simple … to embark on a new city project. We will develop our region. We have started to implement it in order to provide employment opportunities to residents.
We do not accept this [scam] situation willingly … In the past, we had restrictions on this [kind of business], and contracts were already in place. We are prepared to provide proof of the timing and terms of our contractual agreements at any time.
‘A gradual exodus’
RFA: Now that the [BGF] commanders have given them six months, they will continue to operate their businesses. What are you going to do about continued illicit activities?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: Since we made the announcement, we established a supervisory team to monitor and inspect the businesses for possible closure. It is already being implemented.
It’s important to remember that when there are thousands of people in one place, it is impossible to send all of them home in a short time ... We’re not giving them time to run their businesses. They have to pack their belongings to leave, making it logistically difficult for large groups to depart all at once. Instead, they are trickling out gradually – just a few individuals initially, gradually increasing over time. Our approach aims to facilitate a gradual exodus of these people.
RFA: The Thai and Chinese governments, as well as the U.S. government, are trying to crack down on these money scamming gangs. Are you in communication with these countries?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: We have maintained regular communication with the Chinese embassy and have been engaged in ongoing efforts. Now, the Chinese news media has also started talking about it.
We have a history of facilitating the repatriation process for foreigners, coordinating closely with the Chinese, Thai, and American embassies upon their requests via official letters ... They give us locations and we find their people. There have been a lot of cases where we have returned the concerned to the embassies with the assistance of the Myanmar police force. Our commitment moving forward is to continue to address [the issue of scam operators] domestically, ensuring the well-being of all involved parties..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-05-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
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Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Prices rose sharply in Taungoo and Demoso in April, but other markets monitored saw relative price stability;
Vegetable prices rose 10-40% as seasonal supply fell, with eggplant and long bean recording the largest price increases
Meat/fish prices rose in Taungoo in April, but they were largely stable in other markets monitored;
Hygiene product prices rose 10% in some markets, and price increases were particularly large in Demoso;
Many prices remained 40-70% above last year, as April price increases largely tracked with price trends at this time last year;
Route closures will continue to raise transport costs and increase the price of goods in Kayin State, especially as road quality worsens in monsoon season.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Rice prices were a bit lower in April, although other essential food prices rose in some markets. Rice prices fell 10-20% in several markets in April, although prices for pulses and cooking oil were stable. The exception was Hpapun, where rice prices rose 3-5%. Cooking oil prices rose 8-9% in Demoso and Hpapun while holding stable elsewhere.
Vegetables – Vegetable prices rose 14-37% in April as seasonal supply shifted. Prices for eggplant, long bean, watercress, and green chili rose at least 14% across markets, and prices often doubled in Taungoo. By contrast, garlic and onion prices were stable in three of five markets monitored.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices rose in Taungoo while holding stable or falling elsewhere. Prices for dried fish, fish paste, chicken, and pork increased sharply in Taungoo, but they were stable or 6-17% lower elsewhere. Shrimp and fresh fish prices rose 25% in Demoso but they were stable elsewhere.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products rose sharply in Taungoo and Demoso, but they were mixed elsewhere.
Prices for hygiene products rose 20-33% in Demoso in April, and they rose 10% or more in Taungoo. Prices for hygiene products were stable in Pinlaung in April, and they fluctuated in Pekon and Hpapun.
Other NFIs – NFI prices spiked in Demoso and Taungoo, but they were stable in Pekon and Pinlaung. Most NFI prices monitored climbed 20-50% in Demoso and 32% or more in Taungoo in April. Some NFI prices did fall in these markets, such as charcoal and cooking pots in Taungoo and longyis in Demoso. NFI prices were exceptionally stable in Pekon and Pinlaung in April, except for cooking pot prices which fell 38%..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-05-14
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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pdf
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715.74 KB
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"The Indian authorities’ forced return of 77 Myanmar refugees violates the principle of non-refoulement, and any further plans to forcibly return more Myanmar refugees must be immediately halted, said the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) today.
On 2 May 2024, Manipur’s Chief Minister, Biren Singh, announced on social media that they had “completed the first phase of deportation” of 77 Myanmar refugees, referring to them as “illegal immigrants”, and noted that the State Government is continuing to identify “illegal immigrants” and recording their “biometric data”.
“The forcible return of Myanmar refugees from Manipur violates the principle of non-refoulement under international law as it exposes them to a real risk of serious harm, such as indiscriminate violence against civilians amidst escalating conflict in Myanmar, and the widespread and systematic human rights violations being committed by the Myanmar military,” said Mandira Sharma, ICJ Senior International Legal Adviser.
Reports indicate that over 6,000 Myanmar refugees have sought safety in Manipur as a result of the deteriorating security situation in Myanmar. The Manipur Chief Minister has blamed “illegal immigrants” for stoking ongoing violence and unrest between the Meitei community, the Kuki and other tribal hill communities, and promised to “identify and repatriate them”, despite the lack of substantive evidence of their involvement in the ongoing violence in Manipur.
“The Indian authorities must immediately halt all further forcible returns of Myanmar refugees from Manipur and should instead offer protection and support to those seeking safety from serious harm, in line with the non-refoulement principle and India’s other obligations under international human rights law. The incitement of discrimination, hostility or violence against Myanmar refugees in relation to the ongoing violence must also be stopped and prohibited,” added Sharma.
The forced return of Myanmar refugees will expose them to a real risk of serious harm arising from the escalating conflict between the Myanmar military junta and resistance groups, with reports of indiscriminate attacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence, conscription and forced recruitment. This escalation of fighting has included areas in Myanmar along the India-Myanmar border, such as Chin State and Sagaing Region.
Furthermore, the Myanmar military junta has continued perpetrating widespread and systematic human rights violations, many of which amount to crimes under international law, in a climate of near absolute impunity, with rampant arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, summary executions and enforced disappearances for political reasons.
The forced returns of Myanmar refugees breach the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the forcible removal of anyone to territories where they may face a real risk of irreparable harm, such as torture or other ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations. The non-refoulement principle is the cornerstone of international protection under international law, including under customary international law and is therefore binding on all States. In addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), by which India is bound as a State party, guarantee protection against refoulement.
The ICJ is also concerned about the authorities’ mass collection of biometric information of Myanmar refugees in Manipur, including iris scans and fingerprints. The circumstances in which such collection is taking place are coercive and contrary to the principle of prior informed consent, which should be a prerequisite to collection. The ICJ is also concerned that such sensitive data may be used to carry out arbitrary arrests and detention.
Background
India hosts 86,100 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar, including the Rohingya, but lacks a national refugee protection framework. The Myanmar refugees in Manipur are mostly from the Sagaing Region, Chin State and Magway Region. Many are arbitrarily arrested and detained in prisons and detention centres and accused of immigration-related offences under India’s Foreigners’ Act 1946 and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules 1950.
India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. India is party to the ICCPR and CRC, and has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. As a signatory, India should refrain from any conduct contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, which explicitly prohibits refoulement under article 3.
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR states that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” There have been claims by the authorities that the violence in Manipur “is being done by people who have come from outside, including militants and drug smugglers”. The ICJ has received credible reports of the circulation of messages and social media posts with similar claims, which appear to incite discrimination, hostility or violence against Myanmar refugees.
In February 2024, the Indian government announced its plan to suspend the free-movement border zone agreement between India and Myanmar, and to fence the India-Myanmar border. The agreement had allowed those living in border zones to enter into their neighbouring nation’s territory without a visa. According to India’s Interior Minister, the suspension was necessary “to ensure the internal security of the country and to maintain the demographic structure” of regions bordering Myanmar, such as Manipur.
India’s controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which came into effect in March 2024, excludes refugees from Myanmar and/or those belonging to the Muslim religion, despite its purported aim of providing citizenship to persons persecuted on account of their religion in neighbouring countries. The CAA grants nationality to six religious minorities (Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians) who had come to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before 2015 and faced religious persecution..."
Source/publisher:
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2024-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese refugees in India
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Description:
"Executive Summary
Organized crime is a significant driver of conflict globally. It preys on weak governance, slack law enforcement, and inadequate regulation. It tears at the fabric of societies by empowering and enriching armed actors and fueling violent conflict. In Asia, criminal groups prop up corrupt and dangerous regimes from Myanmar to North Korea, posing a direct threat to regional stability.
Concerned by the impact of organized crime on governance, local conflict, and global security, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) formed a study group to explore the dimensions and nature of Southeast Asia’s China-origin criminal networks and the scourge of online scamming they are now spreading globally. Since 2021, the power, reach, and influence of these criminal networks have expanded to the point that they now directly threaten human security globally while posing a growing threat to the national security of the United States and many of its allies and partners around the world. Equipped with a series of case studies by experts on the key Southeast Asian countries involved with these networks and on the particular methodology and advanced technology employed in scamming, the study group developed a clearer understanding of the interconnections that facilitate the criminal networks’ operations and endow them with the flexibility to remain one step ahead of law enforcement. The resulting study illustrates how these networks have used their power and influence to develop a web of scam compounds within the region, centered primarily in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, but involving most other countries of the region in the management of their operations and fraudulent proceeds. It analyzes in detail the nature of the online scams, how the criminal groups utilize advanced technology, how they gain control over weak and corrupt governments, how they traffic labor and deploy torture to engage victims in forced criminality, how they launder stolen funds, and how they attempt to whitewash their criminal activity.
Perhaps the most pernicious aspects of this spreading regional—and increasingly global—criminal phenomenon are the extent and character of the networks supporting it. They operate in both licit and illicit business spheres, gaining access to regional government and business elites through apparently legitimate connections and creating lucrative incentives for local elites to associate with and provide material support to their criminal activity, which is often hidden by a veneer of apparent legitimacy, such as casinos, resorts, hotels, and special economic zones (SEZs). The dispersal of these networks into the region is strongly correlated with the areas of weakest governance and the most profound state-embedded criminality. The melding of these groups with corrupt local elites has generated a malign ecosystem that is rapidly evolving into the most powerful criminal network of the modern era.
The only hope of destabilizing and disrupting this complex and entrenched criminal network in Southeast Asia is a dedicated and coordinated international effort..."
Source/publisher:
US Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2024-05-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"India: General elections underway amid ethnic and militant violence
The 18th Indian general elections started in April, and two out of the scheduled seven phases of polling were completed on 19 and 26 April. The elections will continue until 1 June, with the results set to be declared on 4 June.1 Amid the elections, there was an approximately 34% increase in political violence across the country in April compared to the month prior, including increases in the restive Manipur state and the Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory. Meanwhile, security forces intensified their crackdown on Naxal-Maoist rebels as several states in the ‘Red Corridor,’ the epicenter of the Naxal-Maoist insurgency, went to the polls. At least 29 Naxal-Maoist rebels were reportedly killed during a counter-insurgency operation in Chhattisgarh state on 16 April, marking the deadliest clash between Naxal-Maoist rebels and state forces in three years.
In Manipur, videos showing the mutilated bodies of two Kuki assailants, reportedly killed during a clash between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Kangpokpi district, were widely circulated on social media, further escalating ongoing inter-ethnic tension amid the elections.2 Meanwhile, re-polling was organized in several polling locations amid claims of armed assailants, including those from the Meitei militia Arambai Tenggol, intimidating and attacking voters and opposition supporters, mainly from the Indian National Congress.3
In Jammu and Kashmir, where voting for its five constituencies has been spread over five phases due to security concerns,4 armed clashes between security forces and militants increased in April to eight events, up from four in March. Escalating clashes come against the backdrop of a fresh spate of targeted attacks by militants against nonlocal migrant workers and government officials, resulting in at least two reported fatalities in April. Attacks against migrant workers have been a growing concern in Kashmir since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which ended special protections for locals with regard to jobs and land ownership. Many in Kashmir fear that the government, led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, aims to change the demographics of India’s only Muslim-majority region.5
For more on the unrest around the 2024 Indian elections, see ACLED’s Special Election Series on India.
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Indonesia: Intensified conflict in Papua puts civilians at risk
The conflict between Indonesian security forces and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) intensified in April, endangering civilians’ safety in the Highland and Central Papua provinces. In Yokatapa village, Intan Jaya, one child was killed and another seriously injured when they were caught in the crossfire between police and the TPNPB, which was trying to free a detained member of the group. In Highland Papua, the rebels killed the son of a Papuan village head and a non-Papuan local public servant. Both were accused of being spies for the Indonesian authorities.6 ACLED records 11 reported fatalities in April in events involving the TPNPB, compared with six during the previous month. Civilian deaths contributed to at least four of the fatalities. Amid the increase in violence, the Indonesian military forces announced they would return to using the term OPM (‘Free Papua Movement’) to describe the TPNPB, rather than KKB (‘Armed Criminal Group’). The military has changed the way it categorizes the TPNPB several times, with this most recent change emphasizing its view that the TPNPB is an enemy made up of soldiers or combatants. The change alters the group’s status under humanitarian law, leading to less legal oversight of military operations against the TPNPB.7
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Myanmar: Conflict escalates over control of Myawaddy border town
Fighting between the military and resistance forces led by the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) intensified in April as both sides clashed over the control of Myawaddy town in Kayin State, a major trade hub on the Thailand border. The violence escalated in early March, when resistance forces launched offensives to seize control of key military bases on the town’s outskirts, and continued in April, which is usually quieter due to the Buddhist New Year holiday. Political violence levels in both March and April were three times higher than in February. On 5 April, resistance forces captured the strategically important Thin Gan Nyi Naung base, under the Eastern Military Command, which has maintained a presence in the area since 1968.8 On 11 April, about 200 soldiers from the last military battalion guarding the town retreated and sought refuge near the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge No. 2, which connects Myawaddy to Thailand, resulting in the military losing control of Myawaddy proper.9 Thailand authorities ordered tightened security at the border and instructed the air force to strike Myanmar aircraft if they entered Thailand’s airspace.10 The military then launched Operation Aung Zeya to reassert control of the town, deploying a large convoy of hundreds of soldiers to march east toward Myawaddy. The KNU/KNLA and its allies ultimately withdrew, allowing the military to reoccupy the base and town. Thousands of residents were forced to flee to Thailand amid the escalating clashes and the military’s airstrikes.11
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Pakistan: Separatist violence rises in Balochistan province
Political violence in Pakistan’s Balochistan province increased in April by nearly 50% compared to the month prior, as Baloch separatists continued to target ethnic Punjabis, politicians, suspected government employees, and polling infrastructure. On 12 April, Balochistan Liberation Army militants enforced a blockade on a strategic highway connecting Iran and Pakistan, stopping a bus and reportedly killing nine passengers after identifying them as ethnic Punjabis. Separatist Baloch groups have often targeted ethnic Punjabis, who dominate Pakistan’s military and political establishment, as part of their decades-long separatist movement against the Pakistani government, which they accuse of exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources and oppressing the local population during counter-insurgency operations.12 ACLED data show a recent spike in targeted attacks by Baloch separatists against ethnic Punjabis residing in Balochistan, with more events recorded in the first four months of 2024 than in all of 2023.
There was also significant separatist violence associated with re-polling in two constituencies for the February elections, with militants targeting polling booths and party offices with gunfire and explosives.13 The February elections, held amid a steep increase in separatist violence and organic boycotts by the local population, featured widespread allegations of rigging, with regional Baloch parties leading demonstrations against the results.14 These demonstrations followed a sustained protest movement, mainly led by Baloch women, demanding an end to the enforced disappearances of Baloch youth and accountability for those involved in disappearances and alleged extrajudicial killings.15 Some experts attribute the rise in Baloch separatist violence to dissatisfaction among the local population with the political process following the disputed February elections and the suppression of demonstrations over enforced disappearances.16
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Philippines: Top BIFF commander killed
Fighting persisted between the Karialan faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and state forces in April, following a resumption in March, with multiple deadly firefights between the groups during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. On 22 April, the military killed the top commander of the Karialan faction, Mohiden Animbang (also known as Kagui Karialan), and 11 other militants in Datu Saudi-Ampatuan town, Maguindanao del Sur, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).17 This offensive took place approximately one year before the first-ever BARMM parliamentary elections, set to be held in May 2025 in fulfillment of the 2014 peace agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the national government. Military officials expressed hope that their offensive would lead to peace and stability in the area and thanked the MILF for their assistance.18 The BIFF broke away from the MILF in 2010 as they opposed the peace negotiations that later led to the 2014 peace deal.19
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Thailand: Separatist violence surges during Ramadan and Hari Raya Aidilfitri
The Deep South saw an increase in separatist activities during Ramadan and subsequent Hari Raya Aidilfitri celebrations. On 7 April, Malay Muslim Separatists ambushed rangers during an inspection of the construction of a Hari Raya celebration arch, reportedly killing two rangers and injuring 10 others.20 The separatists then set off explosions at two power plants in Pattani and Songkhla, on 25 and 26 April, respectively. The 2024 Ramadan period, which ran from 12 March to 10 April, marked the deadliest Ramadan in three years, with seven reported fatalities. The Ramadan periods in 2022 and 2023 each saw three reported fatalities. The failure of the government to negotiate a ‘Ramadan truce’ with separatists calls into question the new civilian government’s ability to address longstanding conflict in the Deep South and its role in the ongoing peace talks with Barisan Revolusi Nasional, the primary insurgent entity in the Deep South. At the same time, the government extended the enforcement of the Emergency Decree until 19 July, the 76th time it has done so since the decree was enacted in 2005, prolonging military presence in the region.21..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication:
2024-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.56 MB
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Description:
"Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s discreet meetings with Myanmar opposition groups and some ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) to discuss possible solutions to the country’s ongoing civil war have not only failed to elicit a response from Myanmar’s military junta, but also left some EROs feeling uncomfortable.
Thaksin and his team met separately with representatives of revolutionary groups including the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Kachin National Organization and the National Unity Government in Chiang Mai in March and April. He also met with representatives from the Restoration Council of Shan State.
The meetings were unpublicized at the time but have been confirmed by Thailand’s new Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, a longtime associate of Thaksin. Maris said the talks were conducted on a private basis, and were not part of any official Thai foreign policy initiative.
Sources said Thaksin wished to mediate between the EROs and the junta, who have been fighting since Myanmar’s military seized power from an elected government in February 2021. The talks came as the junta struggles to contain a nationwide armed resistance movement that has inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on the regime, especially in the country’s north, west, southeast and south.
Thaksin is the de facto leader of Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party, though he holds no official position. The controversial former prime minister was accused of abusing his power and having autocratic tendencies during his tenure, and was convicted of corruption after being deposed by the army in 2006.
“We have to admit that Mr. Thaksin is well-known and has connections. Myanmar [the military junta] believes that he can help,” said the new foreign minister.
Thaksin, who is believed to be close to Myanmar junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, has reportedly requested permission to visit Myanmar. He visited Min Aung Hlaing in 2013 during a trip to the country, and had business interests there under the previous regime.
Since the meetings in March and April, however, the Myanmar junta has been silent on the issue, as well as on Thaksin’s visit request.
A well informed Thai source familiar with the matter said the meetings had backfired on Thaksin.
“Thaksin is now being grilled by the media and opposition. It’s good for him to step back without losing face, as Min Aung Hlaing didn’t respond to his request,” the source said.
On Wednesday, Thailand’s House Committee on State Security and Border Affairs, which is led by a key MP of the opposition Move Forward party, announced it would investigate Thaksin’s talks with anti-junta groups, saying the meetings could cause confusion regarding Thailand’s role in restoring peace in the neighboring country.
Sources also said the Thai army is keeping a close watch on those whom Thaksin has been meeting, including the Myanmar opposition groups and EROs. They said the ethnic armed organizations and EROs based along the Thai-Myanmar border are not sure whether the Royal Thai Army is happy to see Thaksin meeting with such groups, as some of the EROs are militarily active.
One source from an ERO that participated in a meeting said Thaksin brought a formal document, granting himself the authority to act as a mediator, for each group to sign, Thai news website The Nation reported.
“No group has signed the document presented by Thaksin,” the source said, citing concerns over upsetting the Thai government.
Furthermore, the meetings didn’t go as the former prime minister had hoped. During talks with the NUG, Thaksin was only able to meet with mid-level officials from the shadow government despite expressing a desire to meet with its senior leadership.
U Aung San Myint, Secretary 2 of the KNPP, told The Irrawaddy that during his meeting with the group, Thaksin said he wanted to mediate Myanmar’s ongoing issues.
“We didn’t strike any agreement with him. We said now is not the time for dialogue. We discussed how humanitarian assistance could be helpful for people as there is fighting. We didn’t discuss anything else,” he said.
Despite Thaksin’s eagerness to mediate the Myanmar crisis, another Thai source familiar with the situation doubted he would be able to do so, as Thaksin has little fresh information about the Myanmar situation.
The source said that rather than just listening to him, the Myanmar opposition side really needs to feed Thaksin information on the situation in the country.
“If they just go and listen to him, this is not the right approach; tell him what he needs to know and do not mislead him,” the Thai analyst, who has met Thaksin, said last week.
Rangsiman Rome, a key MP of the Move Forward party and the chair of the House Committee on State Security and Border Affairs, asked in what capacity Thaksin hosted the meetings.
“Thaksin has no position in this government and the government did not assign him to create peace in Myanmar,” he said.
“Any talks with Myanmar’s warring groups should only be conducted by legitimate and authorized representatives,” Rangsiman added.
So far, neither Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin nor Foreign Minister Maris have said anything critical about Thaksin’s meetings..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"For years, the Myanmar military has relied on back-alley trade with global entities to support its brutally violent campaign of terror against its own population — including business with notorious Chinese truck manufacturer Sinotruk and, through it, German Volkswagen subsidiary Traton SE.....
Executive Summary.....
The Myanmar military junta’s continued campaign of repression and violence against the people of Myanmar is reliant on a fleet of military trucks that transport troops and weapons across the country. There is substantial evidence that the military obtains and assembles these trucks through the support of the Chinese state-owned company Sinotruk, which, in turn, benefits from the investment and collaboration of the German company Traton SE. Sinotruk claims to have never conducted business with the Myanmar military junta or sold trucks to the military. However, recent reporting and publicly available information indicate that Sinotruk’s vehicles are widely used during military operations and that the company has directly engaged with the Myanmar military through sales and manufacturing support. If so, Sinotruk should immediately cease business with the Myanmar military. Not doing so exposes the company to the risk of liability for aiding and abetting the junta’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. Traton should ensure that Sinotruk ends any and all business with the Myanmar military junta or divests from the company in accordance with its international human rights responsibilities..."
Source/publisher:
Center for Advanced Defense Studies
Date of publication:
2024-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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2.18 MB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Bago Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from May 1st to 7th. The Military Junta prohibited and blocked working permission in foreign countries on May 1st. The Military’s Pyusawhtee troop killed and wasted 4 civilians in Bago Region. Men were arrested for the Military Service in the Sagaing Region and Magway Region
7 civilians died and over 50 were arrested by the arresting and killing of Military Junta within a week. A civilian died and 2 were injured by the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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270.97 KB 258.48 KB 1.78 MB
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Description:
"World Press Freedom Day was marked on May 3rd, during which the international community condemned the Myanmar military junta for its continued repression of independent media outlets and threats against journalists.
It has been reported that since February 1, 2021, the military junta has arrested more than 80 journalists, with over 40 of them still in detention. Thus, it makes Myanmar the world’s second most dangerous place for journalists.
Since they took power in 2021, the military junta has implemented severe measures to suppress independent media, including the cancellation of licenses, the seizure of media offices, and shutting them down. Moreover, journalists who dare to report independently are subjected to intimidation and threats, creating a climate of fear and censorship.
Therefore, the military junta has undoubtedly breached the universal human rights although it has signed the international conventions on the protection and prevention of human rights violations.
Of course, in a truly democratic country, journalists should have the right to report without fear of reprisal, protected by the rule of law. However, in authoritarian regimes like Myanmar, press freedom has been systematically undermined by the junta’s oppressive tactics. For example, the military junta exploits state-controlled media to disseminate propaganda, with leaders like Min Aung Hlaing and spokesperson Zaw Min Tun using official channels to manipulate public perception.
Regarding this, psychologists argue that the consistent use of such behavior has the potential to legitimize and sustain additional authoritarian actions.
While the junta uses media as a propaganda tool, it is vital to recognize that opposition organizations also use media to further their own ambitions. This dynamic converts the media into a biased tool serving competing interests, exposing the public to misinformation.
This means that both the military junta and the National Unity Government (NUG) are guilty of this manipulation because they undermine the public’s trust and exacerbate societal divisions.
An example of this is the failure to fulfill the NUG’s commitment to assist ethnic armed groups in their pursuit of federal democracy.
For instance, the NUG’s pledges to support ethnic armed groups (EAOs) in achieving federal democracy, however, these have not materialized as promised. Instead, their declarations have led groups like the Karen and Chin to face heightened challenges including internal conflicts. These cases reveal the severe consequences due to the false information disseminated by the NUG.
Again, the NUG’s assertion is that armed struggle is the only viable solution to the country’s crisis. This shows their disregard for peaceful political negotiations and human rights principles.
However, it goes without saying that the misuse of information has far-reaching consequences for the entire population..."
Source/publisher:
Shan Herald Agency for News
Date of publication:
2024-05-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Shan State
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Expect an uptick in fighting in the weeks before monsoon rains and the next phase of the war.
Description:
"Myanmar’s dry season is ending soon, with the military junta on the back foot after more than six months of reversals and losses to the opposition. This points to an intensification of attacks from the beleaguered regime.
With official forecasts that monsoon rains will start in the second week of June, the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, is likely to focus on six priorities before the rains set in, hampering the military’s already weak logistics and troop mobility.
While the military recently retook control over the key Thai border city Myawaddy, they have not retaken much of the territory lost since the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027 began in late October, especially outside of the Bamar heartland.
With the rainy season favoring the more flexible opposition, the junta is likely to focus on six strategic priorities in the coming weeks.
The first priority is to retake control along Asia Highway 1, which connects Myawaddy with Yangon. This road is the economic lifeline to Thailand, with over $1 billion in annual border trade.
The SAC cannot afford a repeat of Muse in northern Shan state, where junta troops still control the border town, but the Ta’ang National Liberation Army controls much of the road to Lashio, the state’s largest town, which allows the rebel group to collect taxes.
And yet, their attacks have not only faltered, but also tied down troops who are needed elsewhere.
Focus on Ann township
The second junta priority is playing out now in western Rakhine state’s Ann township, where the Arakan Army has captured two strategic outposts that protect the city after a two-month long battle.
Ann is the headquarters of the Western Military Command, one of the 12 military regions, so its loss would be hugely embarrassing for the junta.
More importantly, Ann is a critical transportation and logistics hub, the junction for the road north to the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe and to a major Chinese special economic zone and port project in Kyaukphyu. China’s oil and gas pipelines also pass through Ann.
In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has already captured eight townships comprising most of northern Rakhine state, while reports are emerging that it has just captured Maungdaw, a key border port with Bangladesh, and surrounded Buthidaung.
The Arakan Army has not tried to capture Sittwe or Kyaukphyu for now, seemingly content to try to consolidate control of the roads to both. The capture of Ann would force the junta to supply what they still control in Rakhine by sea or from the south through the town of Toungup.
In sum, without control of Ann, the chances for a significant and sustained military counteroffensive in Rakhine get a lot harder. So the military is surging reinforcements there now and stepping up airstrikes.
The third priority for the junta is to push for a new round of ceasefire talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the Kachin Independence Army. As such, it will increase its lobbying of China, which borders Kachin state.
Beijing seeks border ceasefire
Beijing clearly wants a ceasefire on its border. Both Beijing and Naypyidaw are keen to see border trade return to pre-war levels. The junta now controls only 11 of 17 border posts with China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh – and pinched trade flows have led to shortages and spiking prices.
China has also dispatched some 300 additional technicians to Kyaukphyu as construction there ramps up, so Beijing is urgently trying to broker a ceasefire between the junta and the Arakan Army. Before any such pact is reached, we should expect a lot of fighting and air attacks before then.
Unlike the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is likely to reject a ceasefire, as they seek to take advantage of the military’s distractions.
Indeed, on May 5, after a lull of several weeks, the KIA launched a second wave of attacks, capturing a number of junta camps along the Myitkyina-Laiza highway, as well as an assault on the town of Sumprabum, midway between the provincial capital and Puta-O. The KIA has taken over 12 positions in the past four days.
The fourth priority for the junta in the coming weeks must be the resupply of its deployed forces. One of the leading factors in military defections that have taken place since October has been the military’s failure to resupply remotely deployed forces with food, water, ammunition and medical supplies.
Sustaining operations is getting much harder for the military. They have lost several of the few helicopters in their inventory. This week in eastern Myanmar The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force insurgent group said it shot down a junta military helicopter and killed its pilot in Kayah State.
Convoys under threat
With roads and bridges are increasingly being mined, and military manpower spread thin, convoys are smaller and less well protected, making opposition ambushes more costly. Captured weaponry has allowed opposition forces to target junta riverine convoys more effectively.
If the junta is unable to supply those light infantry battalions in the coming six weeks, the ethnic resistance organizations and People’s Defense Forces will pick them off one by one during the rainy season.
The fifth priority for the military regime will be to continue their assaults in Sagaing and Magwe. The heartland of the majority ethnic Bamars is arguably more important to the junta psychologically than militarily. That they do not have full control of Burmese-majority regions and have to worry about their supply lines in once-secure areas is hard for the generals to countenance.
While the generals don’t have the means to hold territory, the junta is punishing civilians with air and artillery strikes, serving up a harsh reminder of the cost of supporting the opposition.
The sixth junta priority is to ramp up the production of arms and munitions. There is a parallel here with Russia, which also expected a very brief war in Ukraine, and did not have its logistics or defense industries prepared for a multi-year conflict.
Drones on both sides
The SAC is broke and cannot afford the costly import of weapons and ammunition, forcing its own defense industries to go into overdrive.
At the same time, given the shortage of spare parts and regular servicing of their overtaxed air force, which has led to the crash of several aircraft, the military has stepped up the production of armed drones.
The opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and the ethnic armies have used modified hobby and crop dusting drones with incredible efficacy, including an attack that purportedly wounded Soe Win the deputy junta commander.
There is concern among the opposition that the military will be able to replicate the NUG success with cheap drones. Evidence has surfaced that the military is already fielding more lethal drone-specific munitions, rather than relying on mortar shells.
The junta has lost significant amounts of territory since Operation 1027 began – which is notable because it happened during the dry season, when the military should have had all the advantages. The rainy season tends to benefit resistance forces.
Along with the scorching heat, expect blistering, brutal attacks, as the military junta desperately tries to retake lost territory and critical supply lines before the rains set in..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-05-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Since 1962, the people of Myanmar have endured brutal military oppression, human rights abuses, and the denial of self-determination. In their decades-long struggle against military oppression and for self-determination, numerous uprisings have been met with extreme brutality from the military, yet the spirit of resistance has endured. By 2012, this perseverance bore fruit in the form of a fragile pseudo-democracy, where a civilian government operates under the shadow of military control, which still holds sway over key ministries and commands 25% of the parliament seats.
The pivotal 2020 elections saw civilians secure enough of the 75% of available parliamentary seats to potentially overturn the 2008 constitution, which had been crafted to perpetuate military dominance. This development precipitated a military coup, sparking widespread protests. Initially peaceful, the demonstrations, including street rallies and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), eventually escalated into violence after the military brutally suppressed protestors, including shooting young, unarmed women in the heads.
In response, the protestors, now organized into the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), began to fight back with homemade weapons, as the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war. The PDF, alongside diverse Ethnic Resistance Organizations that have long contested military rule for equal rights and self-determination, are coordinated, though somewhat loosely, by the National Unity Government (NUG). This government is the executive branch mandated by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which consists of elected parliament members who evaded the coup.
Over the past three years, and particularly in the last six months, these resistance movements have demonstrated significant military victories and have gained control of substantial territories, surprising many international observers. This critical juncture presents the Internation Community, especially the United States, with a prime opportunity to intervene—not merely as observers but as catalysts for a democratic future in a region desperate for freedom. The time to act is now, before the flickers of hope are extinguished.
Strategic Significance
Geographically and politically, Burma bridges South and Southeast Asia. It borders both giants like India and China, and smaller ASEAN nations, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, making it a key player in regional stability and a potential democratic ally in a strategically competitive region.
Burma is not only pivotal for its geopolitical location but also as a crucial corridor for international trade and energy supply. It provides the most convenient ocean access for landlocked southwestern China and serves as a vital conduit for oil and gas supplies from Russia and the Middle East. Furthermore, Burma is a strategic hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, designed to expand its influence across South and Southeast Asia through infrastructure development.
Historical Struggles for Democracy
Since the military coup of 1962, Burma has endured a tumultuous struggle for democracy marked by student and worker unrests in the mid-1970s, the massive 8888 Uprising in 1988, the Saffron Revolution in 2007, and significant political reforms starting in 2011. Each of these movements has been met with brutal crackdowns with the loss of thousands of lives but have clearly demonstrated the resilience and determination of the Burmese people to pursue a democratic future. The majority of the NUG have sacrificed their youth in prison for daring to ask for self-determination from the military. For instance, Daw Zin Mar Aung, the Foreign Minister spent ten years in prison and the Deputy Foreign Minister U Moe Zaw Oo spent nine years. Many of the democracy activists among the Burmese diaspora have faced prison and exile.
A Moment for Change
The 2021 military coup, staged under the pretext of election fraud, starkly illustrates the junta’s disregard for democratic processes. However, the unified resistance against the military coup and the widespread abhorrence of its rule presents an unprecedented opportunity. This broad consensus against the junta including the heartland Bama and the majority of the ethnic minority groups, creates fertile ground for compromise and the introduction of democratic reforms. The International Community must seize this moment to support the internal movements striving for democracy while anticipating how such actions could be perceived by Burma’s neighbors and addressing potential geopolitical tensions.
The International Community’s Role: A More Direct Approach
The U.S. decision to delegate Burma’s crisis handling to ASEAN has been met with skepticism, as little progress has been made, and most ASEAN members seem to favor the status quo. This necessitates a more direct and initiative-taking approach from the U.S., particularly through the effective and timely implementation of the BURMA Act. This legislation provides powerful tools to support pro-democracy forces if applied strategically.
The BURMA Act contains humanitarian aid for the Internally Displace People (IDP) and non-lethal assistance for the resistance in addition to sanctions on the military junta, their cronies and military controlled businesses which are their principal sources of funds.
A few NGOs are objecting to the provision non-lethal assistance and recommend converting it to humanitarian assistance which USAID usually delivers through NGOs, but many have the opinion that non-lethal assistance such as battlefield medical supplies and communication equipment to assist in aid delivery could be extremely helpful and direct distribution of materials could save overhead costs.
Navigating External Influences
Even though many in the neighboring countries and civil society organizations support a democratic Burma, but struggle with how to achieve it. The U.S. must remain vigilant against efforts by some neighboring countries, self-serving NGOs, and religious extremists to undermine the BURMA Act and the broader democratic revolution. These groups may lobby with narratives that serve their own interests against the people’s democratic aspirations. Narratives like the military being necessary to keep the country together in peace are not logical when the military itself is the main source of unrest. The fear of the country fracturing is not as great a concern as none of the EROs have declared that they are going to leave the union. Many EROs have declared interest in forming a federal democratic state.
Some neighboring countries have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Economically, Burma serves as a source of cheap, compliant labor and a market for goods. Politically, a democratic Burma could set a precedent that some neighbors find undesirable amidst their own authoritarian leanings. These countries exploit Burma’s instability, using it as a buffer state while engaging in economic activities that do little to promote sustainable development within Burma itself.
Moreover, Burma has become a hotbed for illicit activities including drugs, cybercrimes, gambling, and human trafficking. The military’s corrupt alliances with regional warlords and its involvement in these illegal economies have exacerbated conflict and lawlessness, hindering the nation’s progress toward peace and democracy with repercussions in the region.
Investing in the Future
Burma is a youthful country, with a generation that has an immense hunger for democratic change. This burgeoning demographic is pivotal as their enthusiasm and drive for reform can catalyze the country’s transition to democracy. Failure to adequately support this demographic at this critical time risks engendering a cynical and disenfranchised generation, which could have long-term negative consequences for regional stability and global democratic ideals.
As part of the BURMA Act, the U.S. has allocated $10 million for 2024 to educate Burmese stakeholders on effective governance, federalism, democracy, human rights, tolerance, and reconciliation. These educational initiatives are crucial and should commence as soon as possible to lay the groundwork for a sustainable and inclusive government. This is the most effective preventative measure against the country fracturing after the military is deposed.
Conclusion: A Strategic Imperative
As Burma stands at its crossroads, the international community of democratic nations has a golden opportunity to guide and support its transition into a true democracy. This is not just a matter of international solidarity—it’s a strategic imperative. Committed to the ideals of freedom and democracy, the international community should not squander this chance to help Burma join the ranks of democratic nations within ASEAN. The time to act is now, with the understanding that assisting Burma can also help secure a more democratic, stable, and prosperous Southeast Asia. The ongoing efforts and resilience of the Burmese people, highlighted by the National Unity Government and ethnic resistance organizations, continue to press for a democratic breakthrough despite overwhelming challenges.
References
Asia Times; Myanmar’s faltering junta in a do-or-die offensive; By ANTHONY DAVIS; MAY 6, 2024; https://asiatimes.com/2024/05/myanmars-faltering-junta-in-a-do-or-die-offensive/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3Rlf8rgSwfWVL2aXQR-Pw07wXbQS84m22JwvUAHnstQlrMb4sZtbGbvK0_aem_ATGBQOsq5tUO7Y5cwLgNtO5xXmOfrcq9sp-waq8wTJM5coho6djbfKu2mL0txC24hiisKugIVW5HscciKAv28Npy
Myanmar Now; Kachin fighters capture town in Myanmar’s far north; May 6, 2024; https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/kachin-fighters-capture-town-in-myanmars-far-north/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR2osNZAJy26K1r4455D4PiwCG_8qbxs20VRe1Gm
Boq92ygFL9ruPowuL20_aem_ATHAkD-MALt5N8IxEgjdhOQRYwi_yJ-oOShSxchHTC3-L-54xgynqFSiWhRgV8H-a9kp8l29hem_ddNN2Dnj7K04
The Straits Times; Myanmar ethnic armed group says it captured hundreds of junta personnel in Rakhine; MAY 06, 2024: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/myanmar-ethnic-armed-group-says-it-captured-hundreds-of-junta-personnel-in-rakhine?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3Vdkf7kGTaQ-4zp08yQzDqo83JmnYNvirIHmsHpT1WBH44U7mxpxuTKTo_aem_AQW4TL-X0rGdlX2TsRJ85ZP_1_yWgja9gCRbDO4ke86QsDBdjNlcAKh17PskpzGFNBxCOJopARJVrNIaJnIGFpMC
Nikkei Asia; Thai policy toward Myanmar must move forward; Pita Limjaroenrat; May 3, 2024; https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Thai-policy-toward-Myanmar-must-move-forward?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR166Toj4LuEBayD7l57O1GuMfp2ObO_fjUBoJVnTnrUejPIth0ul3zY2qU_aem_AQVtBB5Eskyd8C3OIw7R0G_gM2tWG7dlitO5GR5g6X0mo0s8W0CY2Ku78BRPtQYo3jXiNT286Pz_Yx0EGCRZtyJ-
The Diplomat; Myanmar’s Revolution Has Entered a New, More Complicated Phase; By Tommy Walker; May 01, 2024; https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/myanmars-revolution-has-entered-a-new-more-complicated-phase/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1Jbv_hUm9PYyiNlOh41q3emRNkO1bsTQIw3Dzts0Tbjjf-QNQHIQmn0kg_aem_AQV9F8yzCsSGSyw0CYZ83FbAYLERu5KVpi3Vd58qfyy-9zf1psR0Jn9XuMyA4F4nk2QyMAcRY-B8G3PC2SDqwVz2
Nikkei Asia; U.S. ‘nonlethal’ aid for Myanmar’s ethnic armies likely to backfire; Michael Haack; April 29, 2024; https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/U.S.-nonlethal-aid-for-Myanmar-s-ethnic-armies-likely-to-backfire?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3PMzxkLqItIgcgVhm-wNgwtyFNiOi2P95bQerExTtNY-B_cgBDmxbmk3k_aem_AQWnRqIWfbc-zQtuCOaqPFxssmKDkofEd99H7Osa79ddNyThfkKqvefTH1BmXAhDwAhoADCJwYmN6BrlpB6iOfFF
Statesman News Service | New Delhi; ASEAN needs longer-term approach to Myanmar; April 29, 2024; https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/asean-needs-longer-term-approach-to-myanmar-1503295136.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR2y0P3e9Tx8zzfTwFDf3p1XrLxF2PMsfE4M-T9WoU3c-UjNX0M_U7nMwuY_aem_AQVo9K5PtCXMZ0eq1KLDtHoseiuP-1PKH1-KT5W0NxAma0kKk1nyA7BXlsc_cnuK0Gt0fJOzVF9Zjz0YXYc6cDW0
Australian Institute of International Affairs; Addressing the 2021 Myanmar Coup: A New Strategy for ASEAN; By Dr Tun-Aung Shwe; 29 APR 2024; https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/addressing-the-2021-myanmar-coup-a-new-strategy-for-asean/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0U3QHLotJFX-WbZo7Vs7W8caHWk4kD8uEvZURkYE9MZKOx_cvwCCWYHvM_aem_AQWHBDfYkpfkKh9nZUNDREYWZAFpi6fXHhHJVw7uTAn8E8yfClfB257gWjddDRPvHv3_BxQYulZ3e5noIaUDr7QB
The Irrawaddy; The Organic Logic of Myanmar’s Revolution; By Matthew B. Arnold; April 27, 2024; https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/the-organic-logic-of-myanmars-revolution.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR05w2aKdXt_B1ugwB5IlgGIXrTn8QzhUtBPfe5XY4n38X6prJMwsruM-5Y_aem_AQWwGGKGzsSm8GXNhjXnI7eH8UGor9Ah6ahup2JSBl1d4W8ad48yLyuHPOixtC_AEphp6QAusggmZKSuh54135j3
THEHILL.COM; Escalating Myanmar crisis rare opportunity for US-China cooperation BY LAURA KELLY UPDATED APRIL 26, 2024; https://www.fresnobee.com/news/politics-government/article288044985.html#storylink=cpy
VOA; Myanmar junta slams US aid plan; By Ingyin Naing; April 23, 2024; https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-junta-slams-us-aid-plan/7581977.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0cCB3Y69iFfc6XyKT2lT4qMV_s9HJXuXzr9nNSRGiToRGLqTvdUGiMaPk_aem_AQWlgK86HL5LpNkH_VNDdl0UtgLA4vRAHLHqfd_rF7q9gDIqtPSAPBnsfoxoF8nvy8Myfz62Xwxj1n0jqXuNgpvz
Deccan Herald; India needs to protect its strategic stakes in ‘unstable’ Myanmar; Gautam Mukhopadhaya: 20 April 2024; https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/india-needs-to-protect-its-strategic-stakes-in-unstable-myanmar-2987691?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0IN7Iu36_BOyjq2TI-iwrYB472BWSIIXpXGrz659y3baqw1DFndef_HT0_aem_AQW8NTCaD0sylHMcLzvAuGX6vJ9eghGOWpcTYabrk7l_Uc8q3KZRplaPrEQpZJIKMOkiAUxJYOdzS4Gd7n8GNNUU
The Guardian; Myanmar’s lost generation: nation’s youth sacrificing futures for freedom; Guardian reporter in Myanmar; 14 Apr 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/15/myanmars-lost-generation-young-people-sacrifice-futures-for-freedom
Times; Why China Stands to Gain from the Coup in Myanmar; BY IAN BREMMER; FEBRUARY 2, 2021; https://time.com/5935243/myanmar-coup-china/
Council on Foreign Relations; Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict; Lindsay Maizland; January 31, 2022; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#:~:text=Myanmar%2C%20also%20known%20as%20Burma%2C%20has%20suffered%20decades,starting%20in%202011%20spurred%20hopes%20of%20democratic%20reforms.
CNN; Myanmar’s shadow government launches ‘people’s defensive war’ against the military junta; By Helen Regan and Kocha Olarn, September 7, 2021; https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/07/asia/myanmar-nug-peoples-war-intl-hnk/index.html
The Diplomat; Life in Hiding: Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement; By Robert BociagaJune 22, 2021; https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/life-in-hiding-myanmars-civil-disobedience-movement/..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of publication:
2024-05-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
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