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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Friday 17 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-17
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 8.17 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM17.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Friday 17 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-17
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 4.18 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 17.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Friday 17 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-17
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 1.28 MB
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Title: Myanmar South East - Emergency Overview Map: Number of people displaced in South East since Feb 2021 and remain displaced (As of 13 May 2024)
Description/subject: "WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) dropped significantly from 934,000 last week to 912,200 this week. In Bago (East), due to the intensified fighting in the area, 489 IDPs from Shwegyin were displaced within the same township. The fighting near the border with Kayin State displaced 4,415 people from Thandaunggyi Township (Kayin) to Taungoo Township (Bago) - Some151 IDPs from Thadaunggyi fled to Taungoo as a secondary displacement. On the other hand, 30,150 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Myawaddy Town (Kayin). In Tanintharyi Region, 3,814 people from Thayetchaung were displaced within the township due to the intensified fighting that included airstrike. Among them, 238 IDPs fled as a secondary displacement..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-16
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.72 MB
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Title: Market Analysis Unit: Rapid Market Assessment - Rakhine State (May 16, 2024)
Description/subject: "KEY FINDINGS: Market operations varied by township based on very different local security conditions; Kyauktaw and Minbya markets gained new life while Maungdaw and Sittwe markets grew quieter; Supply of vegetables and fuel worsened in April as part of a trend with little sign of changing soon; Medicine and hygiene NFIs were most scarce, although NFIs in general were often unavailable; Mrauk-U and Pauktaw markets functioned best, and supply improved in Mrauk-U again in April; Maungdaw retailers still faced dire challenges, and shipping costs rose in Maungdaw in Sittwe. Market Functionality - Market operations continued to vary regionally based on security conditions. Operations resumed in Minbya Town in April, but Maungdaw and Sittwe operated irregularly. Security conditions improved slightly but remained tenuous in some markets. Market Activity - Some markets continued to regain life, but Sittwe and Maungdaw remained subdued. Activity increasingly returned to Minbya and Kyauktaw Town markets, despite lingering security risks there. Village markets in Pauktaw and Ponnagyun remained swollen due to the loss of nearby town markets. Maungdaw market activity dipped further in April, and Sittwe activity shifted to ward markets. Most markets still served only nearby villages as fuel costs limited customer movement. Availability of Goods - Supply of fuel and vegetables worsened in April, but supply was otherwise stable. Availability of vegetables worsened as local production declined regionally, and fuel supply worsened after improving slightly in March. Supply was poorest in Maungdaw, Sittwe, and Minbya Towns, with the latter two relying mostly on ward markets which seldom sell NFIs. Transport & Logistics - Shipping costs rose further in Sittwe and Maungdaw but were stable elsewhere. Shipping costs outside of Sittwe stabilized in April after two months of moderate price relief. Retailers continued sourcing goods from neighboring townships, and several paid high prices to order goods from Yangon via Toungup. Sittwe and Maungdaw markets still remained isolated in the region and faced rising shipping costs. Retailer Challenges - Retailers in some markets reported fewer challenges in April than in March. Retailers in Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U reported fewer challenges related to supply and cash access as market activity there grew. Yet retailers in Maungdaw continued to face multiple severe hurdles to selling goods. Safety/security and weak demand were common concerns, while worries about poor cash access receded slightly (in part due to greater prominence in April of ward retailers, who mostly sell vegetables and require less working capital)..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-16
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 11.37 MB
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (May 8 to 14, 2024) [EN/MY]
Description/subject: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 8 to 14, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, Kachin State, Shan State, and Kayin State from May 8th to 14th. 20 civilians died and over 50 were injured by the airstrike and dropping bombs in Saw Township, Magway Region, and Tabayin Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta committed a massacre which involved shooting and killing over 30 local civilians from Lathtuttaw Village in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta Troop arrested men from Magway Region, Ayeyarwady Region, and Bago Region for 2nd Batch of Military Service and also arrested 7 youths who denied Military Service and their relatives as hostages. Over 80 civilians died, and over 120 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian also died by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-16
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf pdf pdf
Size: 341.43 KB 327.81 KB 120.52 KB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Thursday 16 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-16
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 8.05 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM16.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Thursday 16 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-16
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.27 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 16.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Thursday 16 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-16
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 5.74 MB
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Title: Rohingya repatriation must not be forgotten
Sub-title: Ensure that the Rohingya can return to their ancestral homeland with full rights
Description/subject: "For close to seven years, ever since the mass exodus from Rakhine State in 2017, Bangladesh has shouldered the immense responsibility of sheltering over one million Rohingya refugees who fled persecution and genocide in Myanmar. Despite the challenges, Bangladesh has gone above and beyond in providing humanitarian assistance and refuge to this persecuted community, setting an exemplary standard for global humanitarian response. There is no room for debate on this. However, this temporary solution cannot be a permanent one, and it is a shame that we continue to see inaction as the status quo. To that end, we wholeheartedly agree with Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud who emphasized the need to begin repatriation, noting that Myanmar's internal conflicts -- a most perpetual issue -- cannot be an excuse for delaying the Rohingya repatriation. The Rohingya crisis has long demanded a sustainable resolution that addresses the root causes -- the systematic discrimination and violence perpetrated by the Myanmar authorities against the Rohingya people. The international community must no longer turn a blind eye. It must hold Myanmar accountable for its actions in Rakhine State and ensure that the Rohingya can return to their ancestral homeland with full rights, dignity, and security. While diplomatic efforts have achieved little success so far, Bangladesh must persist in its engagements across all stakeholders. A viable solution can only be achieved through a collective effort that ensures accountability for the atrocities committed and guarantees the Rohingya's fundamental rights and citizenship in Myanmar. Bangladesh's humanitarian leadership in the Rohingya crisis has been beyond incredible, but the burden should have never fallen solely on one nation. It is about time the rest of the world share the responsibility of finding a just and lasting solution to this protracted crisis..."
Source/publisher: Dhaka Tribune
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-15
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: INTERVIEW: Karen Border Guard Force plans ‘exodus’ of foreign scammers from Myawaddy
Description/subject: "Scam centers have plagued the border areas of Thailand, Myanmar and China as nationals from all three countries are tricked into – and subsequently enslaved in – online fraud. Typically, the businesses force trafficked workers to call people across Asia and convince them to deposit money in fake or fraudulent investments. Tens of thousands involved in the criminal schemes were deported from Myanmar in 2023 by both junta and rebel army officials. Many are linked to forced labor, human trafficking and money laundering, which proliferated after COVID-19 shut down casinos across Southeast Asia. In March, more than 800 Chinese nationals were deported from Myawaddy township’s infamous gambling and scam center, Shwe Kokko, in Myanmar’s Kayin state, in relation to online fraud. An investigation by RFA found that up to 3,000 foreign nationals are being held at the casino, including people from Thailand, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia and Uganda. RFA Burmese recently spoke with Major Naing Maung Zaw, spokesperson for the ethnic Karen Border Guard Force, or BGF, which controls Myawaddy township. He said that the BGF is cooperating with China to eradicate money laundering and online scam operations in Kayin state and has vowed to evict foreign nationals involved in the activities from Myawaddy by the end of October. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: The Karen BGF has issued a notice to foreigners engaged in online business in the vicinity, including Myawaddy in Karen state, mandating their departure within six months. Why did you make this announcement? Major Naing Maung Zaw: The intent is to gradually resolve the issue by prompting the departure of these people, thereby mitigating the prominence of this particular locale in the illicit [online fraud] business sector ... While the problem has recently surfaced in Myawaddy, its roots stretch both domestically and internationally over an extended period of time … So far, the situation hasn’t reached a critical level, but there’s increased pressure. RFA: Since the BGF issued the notice, have any foreigners left? Major Naing Maung Zaw: Yes, some foreigners went home. Those who came here via agents, they are secretly leaving the region. RFA: Why is the BGF giving them six months to leave? Major Naing Maung Zaw: Many critics … [are] dismissing this plan as mere theatrics, [since the BGF is] stretching it out to six months. While there may be some truth to their assertions, we must also consider the social implications. We called on these companies and they came to negotiate. I have already told them that whether [their business] is legal or illegal, they must vacate the premises on their own terms … They must remove all relevant equipment from their workplaces. These factors necessitate careful consideration. ‘We don’t accept this willingly’ RFA: How many foreigners are working in these online businesses? Major Naing Maung Zaw: That's hard to say. I prefer to have an exact number if I’m going to answer something. Currently, I think there are a few thousand. RFA: When did these foreigners come to Kayin state? Major Naing Maung Zaw: They arrived relatively recently. To be frank, the issue arose here not too long ago. Myawaddy is the most recent center for the [online fraud] business in Myanmar. RFA: When they first came to Kayin state, did you try to stop them? Major Naing Maung Zaw: We only became aware of the matter regarding [online fraud] when others drew attention to it. Our primary focus is on land leasing. Our goal is singular and simple … to embark on a new city project. We will develop our region. We have started to implement it in order to provide employment opportunities to residents. We do not accept this [scam] situation willingly … In the past, we had restrictions on this [kind of business], and contracts were already in place. We are prepared to provide proof of the timing and terms of our contractual agreements at any time. ‘A gradual exodus’ RFA: Now that the [BGF] commanders have given them six months, they will continue to operate their businesses. What are you going to do about continued illicit activities? Major Naing Maung Zaw: Since we made the announcement, we established a supervisory team to monitor and inspect the businesses for possible closure. It is already being implemented. It’s important to remember that when there are thousands of people in one place, it is impossible to send all of them home in a short time ... We’re not giving them time to run their businesses. They have to pack their belongings to leave, making it logistically difficult for large groups to depart all at once. Instead, they are trickling out gradually – just a few individuals initially, gradually increasing over time. Our approach aims to facilitate a gradual exodus of these people. RFA: The Thai and Chinese governments, as well as the U.S. government, are trying to crack down on these money scamming gangs. Are you in communication with these countries? Major Naing Maung Zaw: We have maintained regular communication with the Chinese embassy and have been engaged in ongoing efforts. Now, the Chinese news media has also started talking about it. We have a history of facilitating the repatriation process for foreigners, coordinating closely with the Chinese, Thai, and American embassies upon their requests via official letters ... They give us locations and we find their people. There have been a lot of cases where we have returned the concerned to the embassies with the assistance of the Myanmar police force. Our commitment moving forward is to continue to address [the issue of scam operators] domestically, ensuring the well-being of all involved parties..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-15
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Myanmar (May 2024)
Description/subject: "Dr Kyungmee Kim, Nadine Andersen, Katongo Seyuba, Kheira Tarif, Dr Thor Olav Iversen and Ingvild Brodtkorb Myanmar is home to one of the highest concentrations of people vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with 40 per cent of the population residing in low-lying and coastal regions. Following a military takeover in 2021, the establishment of the State Administration Council (SAC) was met with broad popular resistance, retriggering confrontations with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and local antijunta militias. Conflict has exacerbated the country’s vulnerability to climate change and environmental degradation. • Since the 2021 military takeover, escalating violence and climaterelated disasters have undermined Myanmar’s crucial agricultural sector, impacting food security and livelihoods in conflict-affected communities. •Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and urban migrants residing in informal settlements, including protest-engaged youth, are particularly vulnerable to climate hazards. This affects the flow of remittances to rural communities, which serve as a buffer during poor harvests. • Myanmar’s military and EAOs have used humanitarian aid and disaster response to bolster their legitimacy and gain the support of civilian populations, leading to unequal climate resilience and disaster recovery in areas affected by climate-related disasters. • The military takeover accelerated extractive activities conducted by the military and private enterprises, leading to environmental degradation. The intersecting crises of conflict and climate change have created opportunities for elites to exploit vulnerable populations, the landless, ethnic minorities and women. The United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have engaged in conflict mitigation in Myanmar since the military takeover, with limited success. The UN has emphasized that the military takeover triggered a humanitarian crisis, undermined human rights and heightened vulnerability to climate change. The UN and ASEAN leaders have highlighted the importance of peacebuilding initiatives and enhanced community resilience to climate change. Addressing the intersection of climate change, peace and security in Myanmar, without legitimizing the SAC, is critical for strengthening community resilience to climate change, preventing resource conflict and improving the cooperative management of shared resources across communities and other identity groups. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: ▶ The United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should support regional and local mechanisms for monitoring and responding to the effects of climate change, including by investing in Myanmar’s meteorological monitoring capabilities through the UN’s ‘Early Warnings for All’ initiative. Monitoring systems can support locally led disaster preparedness and riskreduction efforts, improved climate adaptation strategies and climate-resilient agricultural practices. ▶ The new UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar should support advancing a climate-sensitive analysis of conflict dynamics, including the impacts of climate change on displacement and migration and the different vulnerabilities of displaced people, ethnic minorities, and men, women and children. Within the UN, stronger reporting on climate-related security risks can improve responses to immediate humanitarian needs, as well as inform programming to reduce climate vulnerabilities and build peace in the longer term. ▶ The UN, ASEAN and governments involved in conflict mitigation should coordinate efforts to ease restrictions on access and remove bureaucratic impediments to the safe passage of humanitarian assistance after climate-related disasters. Engaging with local governance and grassroots networks can support conflict-sensitive recovery and build climate resilience, while reducing the risk that aid efforts are instrumentalized. ▶ UN General Assembly Resolution 76/180 highlights the disproportionate effect of conflict and human rights abuses on minority groups in Myanmar. Organizations working at the intersection of climate, peace and security should look for opportunities to advance minority rights through meaningful participation in, for example, environmental governance, sustainable livelihoods and ecosystem restoration programmes. Environmental conservation, equitable resource management and climate change adaptation can serve as entry points for strengthening resilience and livelihood security..."
Source/publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-15
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 1.73 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Wednesday 15 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-15
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.32 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 15.5.24.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Wednesday 15 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-15
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.32 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 15.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Wednesday 15 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-15
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 5.83 MB
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Title: Market Analysis Unit: Market Price Report - Southeast Myanmar (April 2024)
Description/subject: "The MAU tracks market prices in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Prices rose sharply in Taungoo and Demoso in April, but other markets monitored saw relative price stability; Vegetable prices rose 10-40% as seasonal supply fell, with eggplant and long bean recording the largest price increases Meat/fish prices rose in Taungoo in April, but they were largely stable in other markets monitored; Hygiene product prices rose 10% in some markets, and price increases were particularly large in Demoso; Many prices remained 40-70% above last year, as April price increases largely tracked with price trends at this time last year; Route closures will continue to raise transport costs and increase the price of goods in Kayin State, especially as road quality worsens in monsoon season. Product-Level Price Changes Essential Foods – Rice prices were a bit lower in April, although other essential food prices rose in some markets. Rice prices fell 10-20% in several markets in April, although prices for pulses and cooking oil were stable. The exception was Hpapun, where rice prices rose 3-5%. Cooking oil prices rose 8-9% in Demoso and Hpapun while holding stable elsewhere. Vegetables – Vegetable prices rose 14-37% in April as seasonal supply shifted. Prices for eggplant, long bean, watercress, and green chili rose at least 14% across markets, and prices often doubled in Taungoo. By contrast, garlic and onion prices were stable in three of five markets monitored. Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices rose in Taungoo while holding stable or falling elsewhere. Prices for dried fish, fish paste, chicken, and pork increased sharply in Taungoo, but they were stable or 6-17% lower elsewhere. Shrimp and fresh fish prices rose 25% in Demoso but they were stable elsewhere. Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products rose sharply in Taungoo and Demoso, but they were mixed elsewhere. Prices for hygiene products rose 20-33% in Demoso in April, and they rose 10% or more in Taungoo. Prices for hygiene products were stable in Pinlaung in April, and they fluctuated in Pekon and Hpapun. Other NFIs – NFI prices spiked in Demoso and Taungoo, but they were stable in Pekon and Pinlaung. Most NFI prices monitored climbed 20-50% in Demoso and 32% or more in Taungoo in April. Some NFI prices did fall in these markets, such as charcoal and cooking pots in Taungoo and longyis in Demoso. NFI prices were exceptionally stable in Pekon and Pinlaung in April, except for cooking pot prices which fell 38%..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-14
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 715.74 KB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Tuesday 14 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-14
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 6.83 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM14.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Tuesday 14 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-14
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.38 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 14.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Tuesday 14 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-14
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 6.48 MB
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Title: India: Immediately halt forced returns of Myanmar refugees in Manipur and respect the non-refoulement principle
Description/subject: "The Indian authorities’ forced return of 77 Myanmar refugees violates the principle of non-refoulement, and any further plans to forcibly return more Myanmar refugees must be immediately halted, said the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) today. On 2 May 2024, Manipur’s Chief Minister, Biren Singh, announced on social media that they had “completed the first phase of deportation” of 77 Myanmar refugees, referring to them as “illegal immigrants”, and noted that the State Government is continuing to identify “illegal immigrants” and recording their “biometric data”. “The forcible return of Myanmar refugees from Manipur violates the principle of non-refoulement under international law as it exposes them to a real risk of serious harm, such as indiscriminate violence against civilians amidst escalating conflict in Myanmar, and the widespread and systematic human rights violations being committed by the Myanmar military,” said Mandira Sharma, ICJ Senior International Legal Adviser. Reports indicate that over 6,000 Myanmar refugees have sought safety in Manipur as a result of the deteriorating security situation in Myanmar. The Manipur Chief Minister has blamed “illegal immigrants” for stoking ongoing violence and unrest between the Meitei community, the Kuki and other tribal hill communities, and promised to “identify and repatriate them”, despite the lack of substantive evidence of their involvement in the ongoing violence in Manipur. “The Indian authorities must immediately halt all further forcible returns of Myanmar refugees from Manipur and should instead offer protection and support to those seeking safety from serious harm, in line with the non-refoulement principle and India’s other obligations under international human rights law. The incitement of discrimination, hostility or violence against Myanmar refugees in relation to the ongoing violence must also be stopped and prohibited,” added Sharma. The forced return of Myanmar refugees will expose them to a real risk of serious harm arising from the escalating conflict between the Myanmar military junta and resistance groups, with reports of indiscriminate attacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence, conscription and forced recruitment. This escalation of fighting has included areas in Myanmar along the India-Myanmar border, such as Chin State and Sagaing Region. Furthermore, the Myanmar military junta has continued perpetrating widespread and systematic human rights violations, many of which amount to crimes under international law, in a climate of near absolute impunity, with rampant arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, summary executions and enforced disappearances for political reasons. The forced returns of Myanmar refugees breach the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the forcible removal of anyone to territories where they may face a real risk of irreparable harm, such as torture or other ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations. The non-refoulement principle is the cornerstone of international protection under international law, including under customary international law and is therefore binding on all States. In addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), by which India is bound as a State party, guarantee protection against refoulement. The ICJ is also concerned about the authorities’ mass collection of biometric information of Myanmar refugees in Manipur, including iris scans and fingerprints. The circumstances in which such collection is taking place are coercive and contrary to the principle of prior informed consent, which should be a prerequisite to collection. The ICJ is also concerned that such sensitive data may be used to carry out arbitrary arrests and detention. Background India hosts 86,100 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar, including the Rohingya, but lacks a national refugee protection framework. The Myanmar refugees in Manipur are mostly from the Sagaing Region, Chin State and Magway Region. Many are arbitrarily arrested and detained in prisons and detention centres and accused of immigration-related offences under India’s Foreigners’ Act 1946 and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules 1950. India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. India is party to the ICCPR and CRC, and has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. As a signatory, India should refrain from any conduct contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, which explicitly prohibits refoulement under article 3. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR states that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” There have been claims by the authorities that the violence in Manipur “is being done by people who have come from outside, including militants and drug smugglers”. The ICJ has received credible reports of the circulation of messages and social media posts with similar claims, which appear to incite discrimination, hostility or violence against Myanmar refugees. In February 2024, the Indian government announced its plan to suspend the free-movement border zone agreement between India and Myanmar, and to fence the India-Myanmar border. The agreement had allowed those living in border zones to enter into their neighbouring nation’s territory without a visa. According to India’s Interior Minister, the suspension was necessary “to ensure the internal security of the country and to maintain the demographic structure” of regions bordering Myanmar, such as Manipur. India’s controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which came into effect in March 2024, excludes refugees from Myanmar and/or those belonging to the Muslim religion, despite its purported aim of providing citizenship to persons persecuted on account of their religion in neighbouring countries. The CAA grants nationality to six religious minorities (Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians) who had come to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before 2015 and faced religious persecution..."
Source/publisher: International Commission of Jurists (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-13
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Community, Rights and Gender Barriers Relating to Tuberculosis Prevention and Control among Migrants and Mobile Populations in the Greater Mekong Subregion
Description/subject: "Tuberculosis (TB) is a social disease – and migration, as a social determinant of health, may increase TB-related morbidity and mortality among migrants and the communities in which they live. Across the countries of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), migrants face various barriers to accessing TB detection and treatment services. The Global Fund Strategy 2023–2028 highlights the importance of human rights, gender equality and community engagement, and of addressing the social determinants of TB, through a package of comprehensive and quality TB services. Further analysis of available evidence relating to the community, rights and gender (CRG) dimension of migration and TB in the GMS is therefore needed to ensure that TB programmes in the region are more responsive to the needs and rights of affected communities, contributing to the elimination of TB among migrants, as well as the broader population. This report reviews existing CRG literature, with a specific focus on TB among migrants in the GMS, and categorizes available information, remarking on the country-specific situation in terms of migration, TB burden, key and vulnerable populations for TB, the stigma attached to TB, and human rights-related and gender-based barriers to TB services. The report proposes a set of recommendations, to be considered at the regional and country levels, based on the findings of the review..."
Source/publisher: International Organization for Migration ( Switzerland)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-13
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.12 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Monday 13 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-13
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 7.89 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM13.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Monday 13 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-13
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 4.31 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 13.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Monday 13 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-13
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 5.58 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Sunday 12 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-12
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 7.56 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM12.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Sunday 12 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-12
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.85 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 12.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Sunday 12 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-12
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 5.89 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Saturday 11 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-11
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 9.39 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM11.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Saturday 11 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-11
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.62 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 11.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Saturday 11 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-11
Type: Individual Documents
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Size: 4.01 MB
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Title: War in Western Myanmar: Avoiding a Rakhine-Rohingya Conflict
Description/subject: "The Arakan Army has greatly expanded the territory it controls in Rakhine State, on Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh, seizing many areas inhabited by Rohingya Muslims. With the regime keen to foment inter-communal strife, Rakhine and Rohingya leaders should act swiftly to calm tensions. Over the past six months, one of Myanmar’s most powerful armed groups, the Arakan Army, has swept across much of Rakhine State, on the country’s western border, expelling regime troops from cities and military bases. But in Rakhine’s north, the force, composed mainly of fighters from the Rakhine ethnic group, has become embroiled in a complex three-way battle that also involves Rohingya Muslims. Desperate to hold on to power, the military regime has sought to foment inter-communal tensions, rallying some Rohingya to its side through a mix of coercion and inducements. Although the Arakan Army, whose goal is to create an autonomous enclave, says it wants to govern for all communities, some of its recent statements and actions have angered Rohingya people. The conflict has accordingly taken on a dangerous communal overtone. A war pitting the Buddhist Rakhine against the Muslim Rohingya would come at great cost to both sides. At this pivotal juncture, leaders from both communities should take the long view – tamping down incendiary rhetoric, guarding against abuses, rising above historical animus and spurning the regime’s efforts to set them at odds to preserve prospects for a more peaceful future..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-10
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Title: Myanmar: Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 - Quarter One Dashboard (Jan - Mar 2024)
Description/subject: "OVERVIEW: The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar has deteriorated dramatically in the first quarter of 2024, characterized by persistent conflict, widespread insecurity, surging displacement and disrupted basic services. The intensification of fighting, aerial bombardment in urban areas and growing explosive ordnance contamination is having severe consequences for millions of civilians, exacerbating humanitarian needs across the country, including shortages of food and lack of access to critical services such as health and WASH. Amid the escalating conflict, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) had surged to 2.9 million by 31 March, reflecting a significant increase from 2.6 million at the start of 2024. Changes in territorial control in many parts of the country have made humanitarian operations increasingly complex and conflict dynamics in Rakhine are fueling worrying inter-communal tension. Despite these daunting challenges, humanitarian partners remained committed to delivering assistance to meet the deepening needs of affected populations, reaching almost 950,000 people during the first quarter. However, a comparison between the first quarters of 2023 and 2024 reveals a concerning trend with the percentage of the targeted population reached decreasing from 27 per cent in 2023 to 18 per cent in 2024. This 9 per cent decline is likely the product of both severe underfunding and the heavily restricted operating environment. The 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) remains alarmingly under-resourced, with only 5 per cent of required funding received, according to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) as of 31 March. This is despite the deepening needs, the surge in new displacement, and soaring inflation that have further stretched the grossly insufficient resources across clusters. Challenges posed by funding shortages and access constraints were exacerbated by the targeting of aid workers by parties to the conflict. Between January and March, humanitarian organizations reported a total of 359 access incidents across the country, impeding the delivery of vital assistance and services to conflict-affected populations..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-10
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Friday 10 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-10
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 6.99 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM10.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Friday 10 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-10
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.43 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 10.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Friday 10 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-10
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 1.21 MB
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Title: IOM Chief Visits Bangladesh, Secures Funding Commitments for Rohingya Refugees
Description/subject: "Geneva / Dhaka, 9 May – The Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Amy Pope has concluded a four-day visit to Bangladesh marking strategic engagements and significant initiatives aimed at addressing the pressing humanitarian needs of Rohingya refugees and advancing global migration discourse. Notably, she also launched IOM’s flagship World Migration Report 2024, the first time away from Geneva. During the visit, DG Pope met with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, underscoring Bangladesh's commitment to address the Rohingya crisis and broader migration challenges. Accompanied by representatives from major donor countries and the private sector, DG Pope witnessed firsthand the pressing humanitarian needs for the Rohingya response and raised awareness for the need to urgently raise more funding for the refugees. "I am deeply grateful to our generous donors for their support and commitment to addressing the urgent humanitarian needs of Rohingya refugees and vulnerable populations in Bangladesh. Their substantial contributions will not only make a tangible difference in the lives of those in need, but they also demonstrate our collective responsibility to uphold the principles of solidarity and compassion on a global scale,” said DG Pope. “Together, we are not only assisting Bangladesh but setting a powerful example for collaborative action in tackling migration challenges worldwide.” During the visit, donors pledged their support to IOM’s emergency and development projects in the country. This will significantly aid in addressing the pressing challenges faced by Rohingya refugees and other vulnerable communities in Bangladesh. In March, IOM appealed for USD 119 million to support nearly a million Rohingya refugees in what has been called the world's largest refugee settlement in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, and the vulnerable community generously hosting them. In a momentous step towards preserving Rohingya cultural heritage, DG Pope inaugurated the World Tour of the Rohingya Cultural Memory Centre (RCMC). This exhibition will showcase, in several global locations, the rich cultural heritage of the Rohingya community and raise awareness about their plight. Additionally, DG Pope participated in a high-level dialogue on the Future of Migration and Bangladesh, engaging in fruitful discussions with key stakeholders on shaping policies and strategies to address migration challenges in the country and region. Furthermore, the Director General alongside Masud Bin Momen, Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, and Gwyn Lewis the UN Resident Coordinator inaugurated the new UN Common Premises in Bangladesh, marking a pivotal moment in advancing the United Nations Secretary-General's Reform Agenda. This building symbolizes a significant stride towards enhancing the efficiency, coordination, and effectiveness of UN operations in Bangladesh. This would strengthen the UN’s capacity to address pressing issues, uphold human rights, promote sustainable development, and advance peace and security in Bangladesh and beyond. Through collaboration with donors and partners, IOM remains committed to providing vital support to vulnerable populations and promoting sustainable solutions to migration issues worldwide..."
Source/publisher: International Organization for Migration ( Switzerland)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Ex-Thai PM Thaksin’s Attempt to Mediate Myanmar Crisis Deemed a Failure
Description/subject: "Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s discreet meetings with Myanmar opposition groups and some ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) to discuss possible solutions to the country’s ongoing civil war have not only failed to elicit a response from Myanmar’s military junta, but also left some EROs feeling uncomfortable. Thaksin and his team met separately with representatives of revolutionary groups including the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Kachin National Organization and the National Unity Government in Chiang Mai in March and April. He also met with representatives from the Restoration Council of Shan State. The meetings were unpublicized at the time but have been confirmed by Thailand’s new Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, a longtime associate of Thaksin. Maris said the talks were conducted on a private basis, and were not part of any official Thai foreign policy initiative. Sources said Thaksin wished to mediate between the EROs and the junta, who have been fighting since Myanmar’s military seized power from an elected government in February 2021. The talks came as the junta struggles to contain a nationwide armed resistance movement that has inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on the regime, especially in the country’s north, west, southeast and south. Thaksin is the de facto leader of Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party, though he holds no official position. The controversial former prime minister was accused of abusing his power and having autocratic tendencies during his tenure, and was convicted of corruption after being deposed by the army in 2006. “We have to admit that Mr. Thaksin is well-known and has connections. Myanmar [the military junta] believes that he can help,” said the new foreign minister. Thaksin, who is believed to be close to Myanmar junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, has reportedly requested permission to visit Myanmar. He visited Min Aung Hlaing in 2013 during a trip to the country, and had business interests there under the previous regime. Since the meetings in March and April, however, the Myanmar junta has been silent on the issue, as well as on Thaksin’s visit request. A well informed Thai source familiar with the matter said the meetings had backfired on Thaksin. “Thaksin is now being grilled by the media and opposition. It’s good for him to step back without losing face, as Min Aung Hlaing didn’t respond to his request,” the source said. On Wednesday, Thailand’s House Committee on State Security and Border Affairs, which is led by a key MP of the opposition Move Forward party, announced it would investigate Thaksin’s talks with anti-junta groups, saying the meetings could cause confusion regarding Thailand’s role in restoring peace in the neighboring country. Sources also said the Thai army is keeping a close watch on those whom Thaksin has been meeting, including the Myanmar opposition groups and EROs. They said the ethnic armed organizations and EROs based along the Thai-Myanmar border are not sure whether the Royal Thai Army is happy to see Thaksin meeting with such groups, as some of the EROs are militarily active. One source from an ERO that participated in a meeting said Thaksin brought a formal document, granting himself the authority to act as a mediator, for each group to sign, Thai news website The Nation reported. “No group has signed the document presented by Thaksin,” the source said, citing concerns over upsetting the Thai government. Furthermore, the meetings didn’t go as the former prime minister had hoped. During talks with the NUG, Thaksin was only able to meet with mid-level officials from the shadow government despite expressing a desire to meet with its senior leadership. U Aung San Myint, Secretary 2 of the KNPP, told The Irrawaddy that during his meeting with the group, Thaksin said he wanted to mediate Myanmar’s ongoing issues. “We didn’t strike any agreement with him. We said now is not the time for dialogue. We discussed how humanitarian assistance could be helpful for people as there is fighting. We didn’t discuss anything else,” he said. Despite Thaksin’s eagerness to mediate the Myanmar crisis, another Thai source familiar with the situation doubted he would be able to do so, as Thaksin has little fresh information about the Myanmar situation. The source said that rather than just listening to him, the Myanmar opposition side really needs to feed Thaksin information on the situation in the country. “If they just go and listen to him, this is not the right approach; tell him what he needs to know and do not mislead him,” the Thai analyst, who has met Thaksin, said last week. Rangsiman Rome, a key MP of the Move Forward party and the chair of the House Committee on State Security and Border Affairs, asked in what capacity Thaksin hosted the meetings. “Thaksin has no position in this government and the government did not assign him to create peace in Myanmar,” he said. “Any talks with Myanmar’s warring groups should only be conducted by legitimate and authorized representatives,” Rangsiman added. So far, neither Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin nor Foreign Minister Maris have said anything critical about Thaksin’s meetings..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: FAULTY TRANSMISSION: The Myanmar Junta’s Reliance On Global Military Truck Supply Chains
Description/subject: "For years, the Myanmar military has relied on back-alley trade with global entities to support its brutally violent campaign of terror against its own population — including business with notorious Chinese truck manufacturer Sinotruk and, through it, German Volkswagen subsidiary Traton SE..... Executive Summary..... The Myanmar military junta’s continued campaign of repression and violence against the people of Myanmar is reliant on a fleet of military trucks that transport troops and weapons across the country. There is substantial evidence that the military obtains and assembles these trucks through the support of the Chinese state-owned company Sinotruk, which, in turn, benefits from the investment and collaboration of the German company Traton SE. Sinotruk claims to have never conducted business with the Myanmar military junta or sold trucks to the military. However, recent reporting and publicly available information indicate that Sinotruk’s vehicles are widely used during military operations and that the company has directly engaged with the Myanmar military through sales and manufacturing support. If so, Sinotruk should immediately cease business with the Myanmar military. Not doing so exposes the company to the risk of liability for aiding and abetting the junta’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. Traton should ensure that Sinotruk ends any and all business with the Myanmar military junta or divests from the company in accordance with its international human rights responsibilities..."
Source/publisher: Center for Advanced Defense Studies
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 2.18 MB
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Title: ACLED Regional Overview Asia-Pacific: April 2024
Description/subject: "India: General elections underway amid ethnic and militant violence The 18th Indian general elections started in April, and two out of the scheduled seven phases of polling were completed on 19 and 26 April. The elections will continue until 1 June, with the results set to be declared on 4 June.1 Amid the elections, there was an approximately 34% increase in political violence across the country in April compared to the month prior, including increases in the restive Manipur state and the Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory. Meanwhile, security forces intensified their crackdown on Naxal-Maoist rebels as several states in the ‘Red Corridor,’ the epicenter of the Naxal-Maoist insurgency, went to the polls. At least 29 Naxal-Maoist rebels were reportedly killed during a counter-insurgency operation in Chhattisgarh state on 16 April, marking the deadliest clash between Naxal-Maoist rebels and state forces in three years. In Manipur, videos showing the mutilated bodies of two Kuki assailants, reportedly killed during a clash between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Kangpokpi district, were widely circulated on social media, further escalating ongoing inter-ethnic tension amid the elections.2 Meanwhile, re-polling was organized in several polling locations amid claims of armed assailants, including those from the Meitei militia Arambai Tenggol, intimidating and attacking voters and opposition supporters, mainly from the Indian National Congress.3 In Jammu and Kashmir, where voting for its five constituencies has been spread over five phases due to security concerns,4 armed clashes between security forces and militants increased in April to eight events, up from four in March. Escalating clashes come against the backdrop of a fresh spate of targeted attacks by militants against nonlocal migrant workers and government officials, resulting in at least two reported fatalities in April. Attacks against migrant workers have been a growing concern in Kashmir since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which ended special protections for locals with regard to jobs and land ownership. Many in Kashmir fear that the government, led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, aims to change the demographics of India’s only Muslim-majority region.5 For more on the unrest around the 2024 Indian elections, see ACLED’s Special Election Series on India. Back to Map Indonesia: Intensified conflict in Papua puts civilians at risk The conflict between Indonesian security forces and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) intensified in April, endangering civilians’ safety in the Highland and Central Papua provinces. In Yokatapa village, Intan Jaya, one child was killed and another seriously injured when they were caught in the crossfire between police and the TPNPB, which was trying to free a detained member of the group. In Highland Papua, the rebels killed the son of a Papuan village head and a non-Papuan local public servant. Both were accused of being spies for the Indonesian authorities.6 ACLED records 11 reported fatalities in April in events involving the TPNPB, compared with six during the previous month. Civilian deaths contributed to at least four of the fatalities. Amid the increase in violence, the Indonesian military forces announced they would return to using the term OPM (‘Free Papua Movement’) to describe the TPNPB, rather than KKB (‘Armed Criminal Group’). The military has changed the way it categorizes the TPNPB several times, with this most recent change emphasizing its view that the TPNPB is an enemy made up of soldiers or combatants. The change alters the group’s status under humanitarian law, leading to less legal oversight of military operations against the TPNPB.7 Back to Map Myanmar: Conflict escalates over control of Myawaddy border town Fighting between the military and resistance forces led by the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) intensified in April as both sides clashed over the control of Myawaddy town in Kayin State, a major trade hub on the Thailand border. The violence escalated in early March, when resistance forces launched offensives to seize control of key military bases on the town’s outskirts, and continued in April, which is usually quieter due to the Buddhist New Year holiday. Political violence levels in both March and April were three times higher than in February. On 5 April, resistance forces captured the strategically important Thin Gan Nyi Naung base, under the Eastern Military Command, which has maintained a presence in the area since 1968.8 On 11 April, about 200 soldiers from the last military battalion guarding the town retreated and sought refuge near the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge No. 2, which connects Myawaddy to Thailand, resulting in the military losing control of Myawaddy proper.9 Thailand authorities ordered tightened security at the border and instructed the air force to strike Myanmar aircraft if they entered Thailand’s airspace.10 The military then launched Operation Aung Zeya to reassert control of the town, deploying a large convoy of hundreds of soldiers to march east toward Myawaddy. The KNU/KNLA and its allies ultimately withdrew, allowing the military to reoccupy the base and town. Thousands of residents were forced to flee to Thailand amid the escalating clashes and the military’s airstrikes.11 Back to Map Pakistan: Separatist violence rises in Balochistan province Political violence in Pakistan’s Balochistan province increased in April by nearly 50% compared to the month prior, as Baloch separatists continued to target ethnic Punjabis, politicians, suspected government employees, and polling infrastructure. On 12 April, Balochistan Liberation Army militants enforced a blockade on a strategic highway connecting Iran and Pakistan, stopping a bus and reportedly killing nine passengers after identifying them as ethnic Punjabis. Separatist Baloch groups have often targeted ethnic Punjabis, who dominate Pakistan’s military and political establishment, as part of their decades-long separatist movement against the Pakistani government, which they accuse of exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources and oppressing the local population during counter-insurgency operations.12 ACLED data show a recent spike in targeted attacks by Baloch separatists against ethnic Punjabis residing in Balochistan, with more events recorded in the first four months of 2024 than in all of 2023. There was also significant separatist violence associated with re-polling in two constituencies for the February elections, with militants targeting polling booths and party offices with gunfire and explosives.13 The February elections, held amid a steep increase in separatist violence and organic boycotts by the local population, featured widespread allegations of rigging, with regional Baloch parties leading demonstrations against the results.14 These demonstrations followed a sustained protest movement, mainly led by Baloch women, demanding an end to the enforced disappearances of Baloch youth and accountability for those involved in disappearances and alleged extrajudicial killings.15 Some experts attribute the rise in Baloch separatist violence to dissatisfaction among the local population with the political process following the disputed February elections and the suppression of demonstrations over enforced disappearances.16 Back to Map Philippines: Top BIFF commander killed Fighting persisted between the Karialan faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and state forces in April, following a resumption in March, with multiple deadly firefights between the groups during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. On 22 April, the military killed the top commander of the Karialan faction, Mohiden Animbang (also known as Kagui Karialan), and 11 other militants in Datu Saudi-Ampatuan town, Maguindanao del Sur, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).17 This offensive took place approximately one year before the first-ever BARMM parliamentary elections, set to be held in May 2025 in fulfillment of the 2014 peace agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the national government. Military officials expressed hope that their offensive would lead to peace and stability in the area and thanked the MILF for their assistance.18 The BIFF broke away from the MILF in 2010 as they opposed the peace negotiations that later led to the 2014 peace deal.19 Back to Map Thailand: ​Separatist violence surges during Ramadan and Hari Raya Aidilfitri The Deep South saw an increase in separatist activities during Ramadan and subsequent Hari Raya Aidilfitri celebrations. On 7 April, Malay Muslim Separatists ambushed rangers during an inspection of the construction of a Hari Raya celebration arch, reportedly killing two rangers and injuring 10 others.20 The separatists then set off explosions at two power plants in Pattani and Songkhla, on 25 and 26 April, respectively. The 2024 Ramadan period, which ran from 12 March to 10 April, marked the deadliest Ramadan in three years, with seven reported fatalities. The Ramadan periods in 2022 and 2023 each saw three reported fatalities. The failure of the government to negotiate a ‘Ramadan truce’ with separatists calls into question the new civilian government’s ability to address longstanding conflict in the Deep South and its role in the ongoing peace talks with Barisan Revolusi Nasional, the primary insurgent entity in the Deep South. At the same time, the government extended the enforcement of the Emergency Decree until 19 July, the 76th time it has done so since the decree was enacted in 2005, prolonging military presence in the region.21..."
Source/publisher: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 1.56 MB
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (May 1 to 7, 2024) [EN/MY]
Description/subject: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 1 to 7, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Bago Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from May 1st to 7th. The Military Junta prohibited and blocked working permission in foreign countries on May 1st. The Military’s Pyusawhtee troop killed and wasted 4 civilians in Bago Region. Men were arrested for the Military Service in the Sagaing Region and Magway Region 7 civilians died and over 50 were arrested by the arresting and killing of Military Junta within a week. A civilian died and 2 were injured by the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf pdf pdf
Size: 270.97 KB 258.48 KB 1.78 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Thursday 9 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 6.62 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM9.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Thursday 9 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.73 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 9.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Thursday 9 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-09
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 6.84 MB
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Title: Myanmar’s military on the back foot as the dry season comes to a close
Sub-title: Expect an uptick in fighting in the weeks before monsoon rains and the next phase of the war.
Description/subject: "Myanmar’s dry season is ending soon, with the military junta on the back foot after more than six months of reversals and losses to the opposition. This points to an intensification of attacks from the beleaguered regime. With official forecasts that monsoon rains will start in the second week of June, the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, is likely to focus on six priorities before the rains set in, hampering the military’s already weak logistics and troop mobility. While the military recently retook control over the key Thai border city Myawaddy, they have not retaken much of the territory lost since the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027 began in late October, especially outside of the Bamar heartland. With the rainy season favoring the more flexible opposition, the junta is likely to focus on six strategic priorities in the coming weeks. The first priority is to retake control along Asia Highway 1, which connects Myawaddy with Yangon. This road is the economic lifeline to Thailand, with over $1 billion in annual border trade. The SAC cannot afford a repeat of Muse in northern Shan state, where junta troops still control the border town, but the Ta’ang National Liberation Army controls much of the road to Lashio, the state’s largest town, which allows the rebel group to collect taxes. And yet, their attacks have not only faltered, but also tied down troops who are needed elsewhere. Focus on Ann township The second junta priority is playing out now in western Rakhine state’s Ann township, where the Arakan Army has captured two strategic outposts that protect the city after a two-month long battle. Ann is the headquarters of the Western Military Command, one of the 12 military regions, so its loss would be hugely embarrassing for the junta. More importantly, Ann is a critical transportation and logistics hub, the junction for the road north to the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe and to a major Chinese special economic zone and port project in Kyaukphyu. China’s oil and gas pipelines also pass through Ann. In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has already captured eight townships comprising most of northern Rakhine state, while reports are emerging that it has just captured Maungdaw, a key border port with Bangladesh, and surrounded Buthidaung. The Arakan Army has not tried to capture Sittwe or Kyaukphyu for now, seemingly content to try to consolidate control of the roads to both. The capture of Ann would force the junta to supply what they still control in Rakhine by sea or from the south through the town of Toungup. In sum, without control of Ann, the chances for a significant and sustained military counteroffensive in Rakhine get a lot harder. So the military is surging reinforcements there now and stepping up airstrikes. The third priority for the junta is to push for a new round of ceasefire talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the Kachin Independence Army. As such, it will increase its lobbying of China, which borders Kachin state. Beijing seeks border ceasefire Beijing clearly wants a ceasefire on its border. Both Beijing and Naypyidaw are keen to see border trade return to pre-war levels. The junta now controls only 11 of 17 border posts with China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh – and pinched trade flows have led to shortages and spiking prices. China has also dispatched some 300 additional technicians to Kyaukphyu as construction there ramps up, so Beijing is urgently trying to broker a ceasefire between the junta and the Arakan Army. Before any such pact is reached, we should expect a lot of fighting and air attacks before then. Unlike the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is likely to reject a ceasefire, as they seek to take advantage of the military’s distractions. Indeed, on May 5, after a lull of several weeks, the KIA launched a second wave of attacks, capturing a number of junta camps along the Myitkyina-Laiza highway, as well as an assault on the town of Sumprabum, midway between the provincial capital and Puta-O. The KIA has taken over 12 positions in the past four days. The fourth priority for the junta in the coming weeks must be the resupply of its deployed forces. One of the leading factors in military defections that have taken place since October has been the military’s failure to resupply remotely deployed forces with food, water, ammunition and medical supplies. Sustaining operations is getting much harder for the military. They have lost several of the few helicopters in their inventory. This week in eastern Myanmar The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force insurgent group said it shot down a junta military helicopter and killed its pilot in Kayah State. Convoys under threat With roads and bridges are increasingly being mined, and military manpower spread thin, convoys are smaller and less well protected, making opposition ambushes more costly. Captured weaponry has allowed opposition forces to target junta riverine convoys more effectively. If the junta is unable to supply those light infantry battalions in the coming six weeks, the ethnic resistance organizations and People’s Defense Forces will pick them off one by one during the rainy season. The fifth priority for the military regime will be to continue their assaults in Sagaing and Magwe. The heartland of the majority ethnic Bamars is arguably more important to the junta psychologically than militarily. That they do not have full control of Burmese-majority regions and have to worry about their supply lines in once-secure areas is hard for the generals to countenance. While the generals don’t have the means to hold territory, the junta is punishing civilians with air and artillery strikes, serving up a harsh reminder of the cost of supporting the opposition. The sixth junta priority is to ramp up the production of arms and munitions. There is a parallel here with Russia, which also expected a very brief war in Ukraine, and did not have its logistics or defense industries prepared for a multi-year conflict. Drones on both sides The SAC is broke and cannot afford the costly import of weapons and ammunition, forcing its own defense industries to go into overdrive. At the same time, given the shortage of spare parts and regular servicing of their overtaxed air force, which has led to the crash of several aircraft, the military has stepped up the production of armed drones. The opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and the ethnic armies have used modified hobby and crop dusting drones with incredible efficacy, including an attack that purportedly wounded Soe Win the deputy junta commander. There is concern among the opposition that the military will be able to replicate the NUG success with cheap drones. Evidence has surfaced that the military is already fielding more lethal drone-specific munitions, rather than relying on mortar shells. The junta has lost significant amounts of territory since Operation 1027 began – which is notable because it happened during the dry season, when the military should have had all the advantages. The rainy season tends to benefit resistance forces. Along with the scorching heat, expect blistering, brutal attacks, as the military junta desperately tries to retake lost territory and critical supply lines before the rains set in..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-08
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Navigating Myanmar’s Democratic Transition: A Call To Action For International Community – OpEd
Description/subject: "Since 1962, the people of Myanmar have endured brutal military oppression, human rights abuses, and the denial of self-determination. In their decades-long struggle against military oppression and for self-determination, numerous uprisings have been met with extreme brutality from the military, yet the spirit of resistance has endured. By 2012, this perseverance bore fruit in the form of a fragile pseudo-democracy, where a civilian government operates under the shadow of military control, which still holds sway over key ministries and commands 25% of the parliament seats. The pivotal 2020 elections saw civilians secure enough of the 75% of available parliamentary seats to potentially overturn the 2008 constitution, which had been crafted to perpetuate military dominance. This development precipitated a military coup, sparking widespread protests. Initially peaceful, the demonstrations, including street rallies and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), eventually escalated into violence after the military brutally suppressed protestors, including shooting young, unarmed women in the heads. In response, the protestors, now organized into the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), began to fight back with homemade weapons, as the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war. The PDF, alongside diverse Ethnic Resistance Organizations that have long contested military rule for equal rights and self-determination, are coordinated, though somewhat loosely, by the National Unity Government (NUG). This government is the executive branch mandated by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which consists of elected parliament members who evaded the coup. Over the past three years, and particularly in the last six months, these resistance movements have demonstrated significant military victories and have gained control of substantial territories, surprising many international observers. This critical juncture presents the Internation Community, especially the United States, with a prime opportunity to intervene—not merely as observers but as catalysts for a democratic future in a region desperate for freedom. The time to act is now, before the flickers of hope are extinguished. Strategic Significance Geographically and politically, Burma bridges South and Southeast Asia. It borders both giants like India and China, and smaller ASEAN nations, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, making it a key player in regional stability and a potential democratic ally in a strategically competitive region. Burma is not only pivotal for its geopolitical location but also as a crucial corridor for international trade and energy supply. It provides the most convenient ocean access for landlocked southwestern China and serves as a vital conduit for oil and gas supplies from Russia and the Middle East. Furthermore, Burma is a strategic hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, designed to expand its influence across South and Southeast Asia through infrastructure development. Historical Struggles for Democracy Since the military coup of 1962, Burma has endured a tumultuous struggle for democracy marked by student and worker unrests in the mid-1970s, the massive 8888 Uprising in 1988, the Saffron Revolution in 2007, and significant political reforms starting in 2011. Each of these movements has been met with brutal crackdowns with the loss of thousands of lives but have clearly demonstrated the resilience and determination of the Burmese people to pursue a democratic future. The majority of the NUG have sacrificed their youth in prison for daring to ask for self-determination from the military. For instance, Daw Zin Mar Aung, the Foreign Minister spent ten years in prison and the Deputy Foreign Minister U Moe Zaw Oo spent nine years. Many of the democracy activists among the Burmese diaspora have faced prison and exile. A Moment for Change The 2021 military coup, staged under the pretext of election fraud, starkly illustrates the junta’s disregard for democratic processes. However, the unified resistance against the military coup and the widespread abhorrence of its rule presents an unprecedented opportunity. This broad consensus against the junta including the heartland Bama and the majority of the ethnic minority groups, creates fertile ground for compromise and the introduction of democratic reforms. The International Community must seize this moment to support the internal movements striving for democracy while anticipating how such actions could be perceived by Burma’s neighbors and addressing potential geopolitical tensions. The International Community’s Role: A More Direct Approach The U.S. decision to delegate Burma’s crisis handling to ASEAN has been met with skepticism, as little progress has been made, and most ASEAN members seem to favor the status quo. This necessitates a more direct and initiative-taking approach from the U.S., particularly through the effective and timely implementation of the BURMA Act. This legislation provides powerful tools to support pro-democracy forces if applied strategically. The BURMA Act contains humanitarian aid for the Internally Displace People (IDP) and non-lethal assistance for the resistance in addition to sanctions on the military junta, their cronies and military controlled businesses which are their principal sources of funds. A few NGOs are objecting to the provision non-lethal assistance and recommend converting it to humanitarian assistance which USAID usually delivers through NGOs, but many have the opinion that non-lethal assistance such as battlefield medical supplies and communication equipment to assist in aid delivery could be extremely helpful and direct distribution of materials could save overhead costs. Navigating External Influences Even though many in the neighboring countries and civil society organizations support a democratic Burma, but struggle with how to achieve it. The U.S. must remain vigilant against efforts by some neighboring countries, self-serving NGOs, and religious extremists to undermine the BURMA Act and the broader democratic revolution. These groups may lobby with narratives that serve their own interests against the people’s democratic aspirations. Narratives like the military being necessary to keep the country together in peace are not logical when the military itself is the main source of unrest. The fear of the country fracturing is not as great a concern as none of the EROs have declared that they are going to leave the union. Many EROs have declared interest in forming a federal democratic state. Some neighboring countries have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Economically, Burma serves as a source of cheap, compliant labor and a market for goods. Politically, a democratic Burma could set a precedent that some neighbors find undesirable amidst their own authoritarian leanings. These countries exploit Burma’s instability, using it as a buffer state while engaging in economic activities that do little to promote sustainable development within Burma itself. Moreover, Burma has become a hotbed for illicit activities including drugs, cybercrimes, gambling, and human trafficking. The military’s corrupt alliances with regional warlords and its involvement in these illegal economies have exacerbated conflict and lawlessness, hindering the nation’s progress toward peace and democracy with repercussions in the region. Investing in the Future Burma is a youthful country, with a generation that has an immense hunger for democratic change. This burgeoning demographic is pivotal as their enthusiasm and drive for reform can catalyze the country’s transition to democracy. Failure to adequately support this demographic at this critical time risks engendering a cynical and disenfranchised generation, which could have long-term negative consequences for regional stability and global democratic ideals. As part of the BURMA Act, the U.S. has allocated $10 million for 2024 to educate Burmese stakeholders on effective governance, federalism, democracy, human rights, tolerance, and reconciliation. These educational initiatives are crucial and should commence as soon as possible to lay the groundwork for a sustainable and inclusive government. This is the most effective preventative measure against the country fracturing after the military is deposed. Conclusion: A Strategic Imperative As Burma stands at its crossroads, the international community of democratic nations has a golden opportunity to guide and support its transition into a true democracy. This is not just a matter of international solidarity—it’s a strategic imperative. Committed to the ideals of freedom and democracy, the international community should not squander this chance to help Burma join the ranks of democratic nations within ASEAN. The time to act is now, with the understanding that assisting Burma can also help secure a more democratic, stable, and prosperous Southeast Asia. The ongoing efforts and resilience of the Burmese people, highlighted by the National Unity Government and ethnic resistance organizations, continue to press for a democratic breakthrough despite overwhelming challenges. References Asia Times; Myanmar’s faltering junta in a do-or-die offensive; By ANTHONY DAVIS; MAY 6, 2024; https://asiatimes.com/2024/05/myanmars-faltering-junta-in-a-do-or-die-offensive/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3Rlf8rgSwfWVL2aXQR-Pw07wXbQS84m22JwvUAHnstQlrMb4sZtbGbvK0_aem_ATGBQOsq5tUO7Y5cwLgNtO5xXmOfrcq9sp-waq8wTJM5coho6djbfKu2mL0txC24hiisKugIVW5HscciKAv28Npy Myanmar Now; Kachin fighters capture town in Myanmar’s far north; May 6, 2024; https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/kachin-fighters-capture-town-in-myanmars-far-north/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR2osNZAJy26K1r4455D4PiwCG_8qbxs20VRe1Gm Boq92ygFL9ruPowuL20_aem_ATHAkD-MALt5N8IxEgjdhOQRYwi_yJ-oOShSxchHTC3-L-54xgynqFSiWhRgV8H-a9kp8l29hem_ddNN2Dnj7K04 The Straits Times; Myanmar ethnic armed group says it captured hundreds of junta personnel in Rakhine; MAY 06, 2024: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/myanmar-ethnic-armed-group-says-it-captured-hundreds-of-junta-personnel-in-rakhine?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3Vdkf7kGTaQ-4zp08yQzDqo83JmnYNvirIHmsHpT1WBH44U7mxpxuTKTo_aem_AQW4TL-X0rGdlX2TsRJ85ZP_1_yWgja9gCRbDO4ke86QsDBdjNlcAKh17PskpzGFNBxCOJopARJVrNIaJnIGFpMC Nikkei Asia; Thai policy toward Myanmar must move forward; Pita Limjaroenrat; May 3, 2024; https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Thai-policy-toward-Myanmar-must-move-forward?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR166Toj4LuEBayD7l57O1GuMfp2ObO_fjUBoJVnTnrUejPIth0ul3zY2qU_aem_AQVtBB5Eskyd8C3OIw7R0G_gM2tWG7dlitO5GR5g6X0mo0s8W0CY2Ku78BRPtQYo3jXiNT286Pz_Yx0EGCRZtyJ- The Diplomat; Myanmar’s Revolution Has Entered a New, More Complicated Phase; By Tommy Walker; May 01, 2024; https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/myanmars-revolution-has-entered-a-new-more-complicated-phase/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1Jbv_hUm9PYyiNlOh41q3emRNkO1bsTQIw3Dzts0Tbjjf-QNQHIQmn0kg_aem_AQV9F8yzCsSGSyw0CYZ83FbAYLERu5KVpi3Vd58qfyy-9zf1psR0Jn9XuMyA4F4nk2QyMAcRY-B8G3PC2SDqwVz2 Nikkei Asia; U.S. ‘nonlethal’ aid for Myanmar’s ethnic armies likely to backfire; Michael Haack; April 29, 2024; https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/U.S.-nonlethal-aid-for-Myanmar-s-ethnic-armies-likely-to-backfire?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3PMzxkLqItIgcgVhm-wNgwtyFNiOi2P95bQerExTtNY-B_cgBDmxbmk3k_aem_AQWnRqIWfbc-zQtuCOaqPFxssmKDkofEd99H7Osa79ddNyThfkKqvefTH1BmXAhDwAhoADCJwYmN6BrlpB6iOfFF Statesman News Service | New Delhi; ASEAN needs longer-term approach to Myanmar; April 29, 2024; https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/asean-needs-longer-term-approach-to-myanmar-1503295136.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR2y0P3e9Tx8zzfTwFDf3p1XrLxF2PMsfE4M-T9WoU3c-UjNX0M_U7nMwuY_aem_AQVo9K5PtCXMZ0eq1KLDtHoseiuP-1PKH1-KT5W0NxAma0kKk1nyA7BXlsc_cnuK0Gt0fJOzVF9Zjz0YXYc6cDW0 Australian Institute of International Affairs; Addressing the 2021 Myanmar Coup: A New Strategy for ASEAN; By Dr Tun-Aung Shwe; 29 APR 2024; https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/addressing-the-2021-myanmar-coup-a-new-strategy-for-asean/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0U3QHLotJFX-WbZo7Vs7W8caHWk4kD8uEvZURkYE9MZKOx_cvwCCWYHvM_aem_AQWHBDfYkpfkKh9nZUNDREYWZAFpi6fXHhHJVw7uTAn8E8yfClfB257gWjddDRPvHv3_BxQYulZ3e5noIaUDr7QB The Irrawaddy; The Organic Logic of Myanmar’s Revolution; By Matthew B. Arnold; April 27, 2024; https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/the-organic-logic-of-myanmars-revolution.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR05w2aKdXt_B1ugwB5IlgGIXrTn8QzhUtBPfe5XY4n38X6prJMwsruM-5Y_aem_AQWwGGKGzsSm8GXNhjXnI7eH8UGor9Ah6ahup2JSBl1d4W8ad48yLyuHPOixtC_AEphp6QAusggmZKSuh54135j3 THEHILL.COM; Escalating Myanmar crisis rare opportunity for US-China cooperation BY LAURA KELLY UPDATED APRIL 26, 2024; https://www.fresnobee.com/news/politics-government/article288044985.html#storylink=cpy VOA; Myanmar junta slams US aid plan; By Ingyin Naing; April 23, 2024; https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-junta-slams-us-aid-plan/7581977.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0cCB3Y69iFfc6XyKT2lT4qMV_s9HJXuXzr9nNSRGiToRGLqTvdUGiMaPk_aem_AQWlgK86HL5LpNkH_VNDdl0UtgLA4vRAHLHqfd_rF7q9gDIqtPSAPBnsfoxoF8nvy8Myfz62Xwxj1n0jqXuNgpvz Deccan Herald; India needs to protect its strategic stakes in ‘unstable’ Myanmar; Gautam Mukhopadhaya: 20 April 2024; https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/india-needs-to-protect-its-strategic-stakes-in-unstable-myanmar-2987691?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0IN7Iu36_BOyjq2TI-iwrYB472BWSIIXpXGrz659y3baqw1DFndef_HT0_aem_AQW8NTCaD0sylHMcLzvAuGX6vJ9eghGOWpcTYabrk7l_Uc8q3KZRplaPrEQpZJIKMOkiAUxJYOdzS4Gd7n8GNNUU The Guardian; Myanmar’s lost generation: nation’s youth sacrificing futures for freedom; Guardian reporter in Myanmar; 14 Apr 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/15/myanmars-lost-generation-young-people-sacrifice-futures-for-freedom Times; Why China Stands to Gain from the Coup in Myanmar; BY IAN BREMMER; FEBRUARY 2, 2021; https://time.com/5935243/myanmar-coup-china/ Council on Foreign Relations; Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict; Lindsay Maizland; January 31, 2022; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#:~:text=Myanmar%2C%20also%20known%20as%20Burma%2C%20has%20suffered%20decades,starting%20in%202011%20spurred%20hopes%20of%20democratic%20reforms. CNN; Myanmar’s shadow government launches ‘people’s defensive war’ against the military junta; By Helen Regan and Kocha Olarn, September 7, 2021; https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/07/asia/myanmar-nug-peoples-war-intl-hnk/index.html The Diplomat; Life in Hiding: Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement; By Robert BociagaJune 22, 2021; https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/life-in-hiding-myanmars-civil-disobedience-movement/..."
Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-08
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Media Manipulation and Political Agendas: The Battle for Truth in Myanmar
Description/subject: "World Press Freedom Day was marked on May 3rd, during which the international community condemned the Myanmar military junta for its continued repression of independent media outlets and threats against journalists. It has been reported that since February 1, 2021, the military junta has arrested more than 80 journalists, with over 40 of them still in detention. Thus, it makes Myanmar the world’s second most dangerous place for journalists. Since they took power in 2021, the military junta has implemented severe measures to suppress independent media, including the cancellation of licenses, the seizure of media offices, and shutting them down. Moreover, journalists who dare to report independently are subjected to intimidation and threats, creating a climate of fear and censorship. Therefore, the military junta has undoubtedly breached the universal human rights although it has signed the international conventions on the protection and prevention of human rights violations. Of course, in a truly democratic country, journalists should have the right to report without fear of reprisal, protected by the rule of law. However, in authoritarian regimes like Myanmar, press freedom has been systematically undermined by the junta’s oppressive tactics. For example, the military junta exploits state-controlled media to disseminate propaganda, with leaders like Min Aung Hlaing and spokesperson Zaw Min Tun using official channels to manipulate public perception. Regarding this, psychologists argue that the consistent use of such behavior has the potential to legitimize and sustain additional authoritarian actions. While the junta uses media as a propaganda tool, it is vital to recognize that opposition organizations also use media to further their own ambitions. This dynamic converts the media into a biased tool serving competing interests, exposing the public to misinformation. This means that both the military junta and the National Unity Government (NUG) are guilty of this manipulation because they undermine the public’s trust and exacerbate societal divisions. An example of this is the failure to fulfill the NUG’s commitment to assist ethnic armed groups in their pursuit of federal democracy. For instance, the NUG’s pledges to support ethnic armed groups (EAOs) in achieving federal democracy, however, these have not materialized as promised. Instead, their declarations have led groups like the Karen and Chin to face heightened challenges including internal conflicts. These cases reveal the severe consequences due to the false information disseminated by the NUG. Again, the NUG’s assertion is that armed struggle is the only viable solution to the country’s crisis. This shows their disregard for peaceful political negotiations and human rights principles. However, it goes without saying that the misuse of information has far-reaching consequences for the entire population..."
Source/publisher: Shan Herald Agency for News
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-08
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Market Analysis Unit: Rapid Market Assessment - Southern Shan State (May 7, 2024)
Description/subject: "This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in Southeast Myanmar. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during April 9-16, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Security in/around markets declined in April, yet most markets monitored continued to operate; Customer traffic continued to ebb in Hsihseng, but elsewhere market activity was stable; Supply of food and NFIs grew worse in April, and Loikaw continued to struggle most to access supply; Supply of shelter and household NFIs worsened, and it was poorer than other product types; Shipping rates rose further Hsihseng and Loikaw, but they were stable in Pekon and Demoso; Concerns over security and poor cash access grew, and some retailers worried about their solvency. Regional Overview Market Functionality - Markets remained open, but security was poor and closures continued. Retailers continued operating daily, but three of four markets monitored were described as unsafe or very unsafe. Village markets in Loikaw and Pekon experienced closures, and infrastructure damage affected retail in Loikaw. Market Activity - Conflict continued to reduce market activity, and customer traffic dwindled in Hsihseng. Customer traffic was mostly unchanged in April. Some markets remained quieter than they once were (Loikaw, Hsihseng) while others still benefited from new customer arrivals in recent months (Pekon, Demoso). Availability of Goods - Supply worsened by mid-April, and shelter and household NFIs grew scarcer. Supply worsened at least somewhat in three of four markets monitored in April. Both food and NFI items became more scarce, although supply remained better for food items than for NFIs. Loikaw still had far worse access to supply than the other markets monitored. Transport & Logistics - Shipping costs continued to rise in Loikaw and Hsihseng. Inter-township shipping remained limited in Loikaw and Hsihseng, and this continued to drive up shipping costs; costs were stable in Pekon and Demosos. Sources of supply remained diverse and shifted as events unfolded (e.g., Hopong, Pinlaung, Aungban, Taunggyi, Nyaungshwe). Retailer Challenges - Poor security and cash access remained retailers' greatest challenges. Challenges related to safety and poor supply grew further in April, and poor cash access remained troubling as some retailers worried about solvency. Retail operations grew more difficult in Loikaw and Pekon in April. Possible Interventions - Hsihseng retailers felt they could increase supply with support. Fuel subsidies and safe transport corridors remained popular, but interest in infrastructure repair also grew in April amid reports of damage. Despite rising concerns about poor cash access, fewer retailers expressed interest in new loans..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-08
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Wednesday 8 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-08
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 7.59 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM8.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Wednesday 8 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-08
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 3.27 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 8.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Wednesday 8 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-08
Type: Individual Documents
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Size: 6.27 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Tuesday 7 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-07
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 6.43 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM7.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Tuesday 7 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-07
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 3.18 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 7.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Tuesday 7 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-07
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Denouncing the Biased Statement of the UNHRC and Failure of United Nations in Protecting All People of Arakan
Description/subject: "On April 19, 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Council's Chief Volker Turk issued a statement about Arakan (Rakhine) State in Myanmar. While the statement was trying to capture the general situation of Arakan State as a whole, it was disappointingly focused on protecting only a selective group of civilians rather than attempting to protect all the affected civilians in Arakan State. Since the fight restarted between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar’s military in November 2023, the Myanmar's military has been committing war crimes and a type of state-sponsored terrorism by daily bombings, shelling of towns and villages, and burning of thousands of houses. Innocent civilians from all walks of life are being affected across Arakan State. The United Nations Human Rights Council has been actively ignoring the atrocities and killings of civilians and failed to take any effective action to protect those constant bombings and killing of innocent civilians or even mentioned in their statements. Instead of protecting Rakhine people who are currently being targeted by Myanmar's military and military supported mobs and armed groups, the UN Human Rights Council’s biased and misinformed statement sounded stirring more misunderstanding and tensions among different communities in Arakan. More importantly, UNHRC has undermined the liberation movement of the people of Arakan and all people of Myanmar against the Military dictatorship. Therefore, • The Arakan American Community strongly denounces the UN Human Rights Council’s Biased Statement on Arakan State and UN Human Rights Council's Chief Volker Turk for misinformed and biased handling of Arakan State. • We demand the UN Human Rights Council’s Chief Volker Turk to take full responsibility for the violation of the code of ethics for the UN personnel and resign. • We also request the United Nations to take immediate actions that assure protection of all civilians in Arakan State. Hundreds of civilians have been killed in the bombings and shelling in the civilian areas and many towns have been burnt down to ashes by the Myanmar's military. The accountability needs to be clarified and restated correctly..."
Source/publisher: Arakan American Community
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-06
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: The analysis of political and military situation that would be likely to impact on Myawaddy clashes in Karen State
Description/subject: "The Karen National Union (KNU) is a long-standing ethnic resistance organization with a long history among the country’s ethnic resistance groups. In the beginning of the armed revolution in 1949, the KNU held a number of peace talks with successive Myanmar governments and military regimes. These included; the Anti- Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) led by U Nu’s government and the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) led by Ne Win to successive military juntas - the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Whenever these dialogues and peace talks were held with the successive military juntas, it resulted in rifts and dissent among the KNU. # Introduction A big split within the KNU in 1994 resulted in the emergence of the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA/DKBO). The DKBA collaborated with and were sponsored by the Myanmar military and guided attacks on the KNU, resulting in the fall of the KNU headquarters, Manerplaw, in January, 1995. From 1995 to 2010, conflict and killings between the Karen National Union and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, took place for more than a decade. In 2010, the Myanmar military reorganised the DKBA under their command into the Border Guard Force (BGF). Some of the DKBA forces resisted being reformed into BGF and continued as the DKBA This resulted in conflict with the Myanmar military, and an uneasy alliance with the KNU/KNLA. The DKBA did not re-affiliated with the KNU/KNLA and remains as a stand-alone organization still today. In 2012, a state-level ceasefire agreement was made between the KNU and a peace delegation led by Minister Aung Min representing the proxy military government led by former general, Thein Sein. The resulting Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, caused dissent within the KNU, materializing at the 15th KNU Congress, where leaders who were in favor with the National Ceasefire Agreement dominated. In 2015, the KNU withdrew from the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), and on October 15, a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed again. By the time the KNU made a state-level ceasefire agreement in 2012, its brigade-and-district levels were also directed to sign it. However, it was found that the KNU Brigade (5) of Mutraw District (Hpa-pun District) and Brigade (2) of Taungoo District were not involved in the ceasefire process. Since the end of the 15th KNU Congress, a great deal of political rivalries among the KNU leaders appeared – the group that accepted the NCA and the group that did not – but no major rifts had occurred within them. During the ceasefire period, a “Committee for Karen Armed Groups Unity”, sponsored by the KNU, which was comprised of 4 Karen armed groups – KNU/KNLA, BGF, DKBA, and the KNU/KNLA-PC led by Gen. Htin Maung (2007) – were formed in the interest of a national unity. The BGF leader, Saw Chit Thu, was the vice-chairman of the committee. In addition, during the signing of the NCA with Thein Sein government in 2015, each of three Karen armed groups – the KNU, DKBA, and KNU/KNLA-PC – signed the agreement together. After the signing, there was no longer armed conflict among them, and they worked together on special national days such as Karen New Year, Karen Martyr’s Day, Karen Revolution Day to name some. This arrangement was neither managed under a single group , nor was it under the leadership of the KNU. The KNU also did not make any attempts for political leadership, instead focused on preventing armed conflict between the groups. # The SLORC/SPDC’s military strategy or trap During the period of the military reign under its SLORC/SPDC from 2005, the military juntas stopped using its “eradication” strategy to suppress the Karen armed groups in Karen State. Instead, a “containment” strategy was applied, that trapped the Karen armed groups into being implicated in illicit drugs. As a result, drug production, distribution, and consumption had grown tremendously in Karen State in 10 years. After the KNU signed the NCA in 2015, the junta’s “containment” strategy made the KNU complicit in transnational crimes. After signing the NCA, the KNU was first offered car permits and largely open to international aid. The biggest ones were the Shwe Kokko New City project and KK Park Project, which opened the way for KNU leaders to become involved in crimes. Some KNU leaders, who did not accept the NCA, saw the Shwe Kokko New City project as a trap, and avoided being involved . After the 16th KNU Congress in 2017, leaders, who did not accept the NCA, were removed, while leaders, who accepted the government’s NCA, became more dominant in the KNU. The military regime had successfully expanded its ‘trap strategy’ not only to Shwe Kukko City in KNU Brigade (7) area, but to KK Park in Mehtawthalay in KNU Brigade (6) area. To implicate the KNU in transnational crimes, the military junta gave the KNU powers, as well as land renting, setting up a company, providing security, and making payments in advance for many years. #Recent Myawaddy fighting, the KNU’s challenges and opportunities After the military coup attempt in 2021, there was no possibility of the KNU-led peace talks based on the NCA agreement. As the KNU, however, had not officially announced that the NCA agreement was null and void, it must be considered that it continued to hold on. If the NCA agreement is declared null and void, the KNU might be concern the communication channel with the military regime would be cut off. It should also be noted Pado Mahn Nyein Maung, who is a member of the KNU Central Executive Committee, is also a member of the military appointed State Administration Council (SAC). At the same time, the KNU became deeply involved in the affairs of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the National Unity Government (NUG) who were formed from elected lawmakers in opposition to the coup. It is likely the KNU adopted a two-pronged strategy of cooperating with the NUG, while maintaining contact with the military junta. Similarly, the KNU had been leading revolutionary alliance groups for decades, but after the 15th KNU Congress in 2012, it withdrew from the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), this showed that the KNU lacked serious leadership on the coalition pro-democracy forces. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the KNU considered that the NUG, (as happened with the NCGUB that was formed in 1990 in response to the military’s failure to recognize the result of the election won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party), and that it would also fade away, and the military would be able to maintain its grip on power. In terms of strategy the KNU was also likely to control the balance of power between the SAC and the NUG. #The situation in which fighting broke out in KNU territory after the signing of the NCA agreement As mentioned above, after the NCA was signed in 2015, there were many disagreements and dissent between KNU leaders who accepted the NCA and those that did not. After the end of the 16th KNU Congress in 2017, a group, that did not accept the NCA, emerged. Named as the ‘KNU Concerned Group’, it gained support among some KNU/KNLA brigades and battalions, as well as being very close to Karen CBOs and CSOs. Following 17th KNU Congress in 2023, the ‘KNU Concerned Group’ faded away. In the past, the ‘KNU Concerned Group’ made political positions and statements in parallel with the KNU Central Committee. Since the signing of the state-level ceasefire agreement between the KNU and the Thein Sein USDP government in 2012, fighting stopped in many of the KNU brigades, but conflict continued in the KNU 5th Brigade area, especially from October 2020, when large bases of the military regime were attacked. After the military coup in 2021, the KNU 5th Brigade attacked and captured the military regime’s camp on March 27, and took and occupied three military strongholds within three months. Since 2021, the fighting in the KNU’s 5th Brigade has become more intense, with the military regime using jet fighters to launch airstrikes against the KNU. On the ground, the regime ordered hundreds of BGF forces to reinforce its troops. Once more it was Karen were engaged in fighting and killing each other. #The start of fighting in the KNU 6th Brigade area After the military coup in 2021, a great number of Myanmar young activists (Gen-Z) and CDM members arrived in the KNU 6th Brigade area, wanting to fight back against the military junta. They noticed there were various armed groups such as KNU, DKBA, KNU-KNLA-PC, and BGF, but at first, they did not seem to realize how they were different from one another. In particular, they did not seem to know that the BGF was under the direct command of the military junta – they considered Karen State’s Myawaddy, Lay Kay Kaw, Hpalu etc. as liberated areas. They became more cautious when the junta troops entered and carried out inspections in the area of Lay Kay Kaw. At that time, all three Karen armed groups had signed the NCA, therefore, there was no fighting at all in the area. The CRPH/NUG MPs also arrived in large numbers in the KNU 6th Brigade area. The KNU’s statements proved that people, who had arrived in KNU territory due to the 2021 coup attempt and subsequent violent crackdown and jailing of people protesting the coup and the overturning of the NLD’s massive election win, were accepted based on humanitarian grounds. The people arriving in the KNU resistance areas became dependent on the KNU for military training and weapons, so they could start fighting back against the military junta. Battalions under the command of the KNU provided military training. However, due to the fact that the KNU had signed the NCA agreement during the Thein Sein government’s control and had no political will to declare it null and void, the KNU seemed to be regulating the conditions for being engaged in fighting. Nevertheless, there had been fierce fighting in the area of the KNU 5th Brigade since March 2021, and the KNU managed to occupy military junta bases one by one. After the signing of the NCA in 2015, the KNU was able to stop the military offensive the KNU 5th Brigade launched against the military junta. The KNU headquarters, however, could no longer control it after 2021. Additionally, the young men, who arrived in the KNU 6th Brigade area, also showed their tremendous enthusiasm to fight against the military junta. The NUG’s Minister of Defense (NUG-MOD) joined forces with the KNU and began to discuss how to cooperate with the ethnic armed resistance groups to take military action in the South, North, and Central regions, etc., as well as discussing with the DKBA commanders, who did not accept the transformation of the DKBA into the BGF and fought back against the military junta, which resulted in the start of fighting in Hpalu area near Myawaddy. Similarly, fighting led by the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) also took place in Wale area. After that, there were armed clashes in Lay Kay Kaw area. The district chairman of the 6th Brigade had repeatedly issued letters of protest against the occurrence of such fighting in the 6th Brigade area, pointing out how much the NCA and the KNU 6th Brigade area along the Asian Highway were important. This is proof the NCA agreement had not been officially declared null and void even after the military coup attempt in 2021. Within the KNU controlled areas, the 6th Brigade was the one with the largest number of People Defense Forces (PDF), not only having a great number of armed forces, but also getting a lot of supports from the NUG and Myanmar diaspora. As a result, the young PDF fighters in the area of the KNU 6th Brigade had been armed enough in 3 years and were fully motivated to be engaged in fighting. The PDFs began to win as they joined forces with battle-hardened and experienced KNLA soldiers, demoralizing the military junta troops, who now saw themselves fighting superior soldiers. #How did the fighting in Myawaddy begin? Ethnic armed resistance groups – Arakan, Kachin, Chin, Karenni – had been occupying cities in their own regions during their attacks on the military regime’s bases. This posed the question why Karen armed groups had not been able to capture border towns close to their territory raised the question of what is the purpose of the KNU. I believed the combined Karen armed forces would be able to easily occupy, not only Myawaddy, but Hpa-an the Karen State capital, if all four Karen armed forces were united. The current Myawaddy fighting answers the question – “Why does it end in deadlock like this?’ The first reason is the ‘NCA trap’, and the second is the “containment” strategy. The main impact of the containment strategy is that the KNU has been implicated in transnational crimes. Before the 2023 KNU Congress, 68 Karen civil society organizations sent an open letter to the KNU, calling for the Congress to be held only after identifying and taking action against the leaders involved in the KK Park project. If failed to do so. The leaders of the KNU Central Executive Committee were urged to resign. However, the KNU Congress was held by dividing into three sections. In Section (3) where the KNU Central Executive Committee and Central Committee leaders were to be elected, the 5th Brigade and the 2nd Brigade boycotted the election. In brief, the KNU could no longer lead the coalition forces as before, and led to a great deal of crippling dissent within the organization over its political approach. The biggest crisis for the KNU was that they had been caught in the illegality trap of Shwe Kokko and KK Park projects. At the last 17th KNU Congress, the KNU formed an “investigation commission” to identify and take action against KNU leaders involved in the online gambling, money laundering and scam syndicate, but until now, no information has been made public. I believe KNU leaders should be at least aware that they had been framed by the military to be implicated in crimes. It’s likely that some KNU leaders failed to predict such a large political crisis. It is undisputable the KNU is facing a tremendous crisis today. The current crisis is not only for the KNU, but also for the BGF, led by its leader, Saw Chit Thu. It is time for both groups to decide which path they are taking. Notably, the BGF has a better control over its organization’s power – everyone follows orders and decisions – good or bad – made by its leader Chit Thu. Before the start of the recent Myawaddy fighting , Saw Chit Thu, claimed publicly that the BGF no longer wanted to kill Karen people, and changed the name of BGF to the “Karen National Army (KNA)”. Saw Chit Thu’s words were really aimed at providing only a simple person’s grasp of the political situation, because he, as a subordinate under the military regime, had not only spent two decades of armed conflict fighting Karen. Saw Chit Thu had also been the target of negative criticisms from Karen people at home and abroad. Before the Myawaddy fighting began, Saw Chit Thu, announced the BGF had transformed into the KNA, and when the battle was about to end, he revealed that there would no longer be a KNA, as he had reverted back to the BGF. It shocked and angered not only Karen people, but also the people of Myanmar. I was not surprised at all. The outcome of the Myawaddy fighting depended on two situations. I speculated that the military junta would have benefited most from these situations. It’s unquestionable that it would have gained 50 or 30 % of benefit from this fighting, But, it is hard to say the junta won the battle, even though benefited . The current Myawaddy battle was not a main target for the junta, but the illegal operations run out of Shwe Kokko. Reportedly, the military junta had promised China to eradicate the money laundering syndicate operating in KK Park and Shwe Kokko. If they failed to do so, the military occupation achieved by the Northern Alliance could be rapidly extended into the capital, Naypyidaw, with the support of China. The military junta, aware of the consequences if this was to happen, had made a rapid ceasefire agreement with the Northern Alliance, agreeing to share up to 70 % of the border trade income with the Northern Alliance. Similarly, the regime promised China to crack down on Shwe Kokko and the KK Park money laundering syndicate. If the Shwe Kokko was to be cleaned up, it’s unquestionable that the BGF leader, Saw Chit Thu, would also go. Facing these consequences, Saw Chit Thu immediately calculated and announced the BGF would transform into the KNA, angering the military regime. The regime approached and negotiated with either the KNU or the BGF during the battle of Myawaddy. Reports the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the junta officials met and discussed the elimination of online gambling, financial scams, money laundering activities on the border on April 26. It is understood may have China provided financial assistance to the regime to clean up Shwe Kokko and KK Park. Therefore, we can imagine · How will the resistance forces continue to work on the situation of the Myawaddy clashes? · What will happen if the Shwe Kokko is eradicated by the military junta? · What kind of crises the military junta will face if they fail to clear the Shwe Kokko. Remark – The contents in this article are the opinion of the columnist..."
Source/publisher: "Karen News"
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-06
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Title: Myanmar - Conflict and population displacement (UN RC/HC Myanmar, DG ECHO) (ECHO Daily Flash of 06 May 2024)
Description/subject: "The UN's Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim in Myanmar has released a statement marking a 'bleak milestone' in the country, with 3 million people now internally displaced. An intensification in conflict at the end of 2023 has led to displacement rising by 50% in just six months. 2.7 million of those displaced have fled their homes in the wake of the 2021 Myanmar military coup d'état. This means that displacement since the military takeover has increased by 900%. About a third of those displaced are children. There are 18.6 million people in need in Myanmar -- the fifth largest number globally. However, the UN's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), which requires USD 994 million in 2024, is only funded at 5%, severely limiting the response. With cyclone season approaching, additional resources are urgently needed to save lives. ECHO's initial allocation for Myanmar is EUR 19.9 million..."
Source/publisher: European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-06
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Monday 6 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-06
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 7.72 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM6.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Monday 6 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-06
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 3.79 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 6.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Monday 6 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-06
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Sunday 5 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-05
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 6.73 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM5.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Sunday 5 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-05
Type: Individual Documents
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Size: 3.22 MB
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Sunday 5 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-05
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Title: Opinion – Gendered Digital Repression in Myanmar’s Online Dissent
Description/subject: "Myanmar’s political history is riddled with violent military coups. On February 1, 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing took control of Myanmar and reverted the budding democracy into a violent authoritarian regime. This is the third time that a military took control of the country in post-independence Burmese history, 59 years after the first coup led by General Ne Win and 32 years after the second ordered by SLORC. As much as the country’s history is rife with brutal military regimes, it is also filled with the people’s revolutions to fight against military rule, the most prominent being the 8888 Uprising, the Saffron Revolution, and currently the Spring Revolution. The Spring Revolution is distinct from the previous revolutions in that it is the most durable anti-military political movement the country has ever seen. While both the 8888 Uprising and the Saffron Revolution lasted only for a few months, the Spring Revolution continues to gain momentum in 2024, more than three years after the most recent coup d’etat took place. Protracted conflict is still ongoing across the country. As of April 26, 2024, 4,946 civilians have been murdered by the regime, and 26,573 were arrested. Despite the violent crackdown, millions have taken to the streets to protest the military takeover. The ongoing Spring Revolution encompasses different actors and initiatives, including but not limited to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), frontline protests, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the People’s Defence Force (PDF). To strengthen cooperation across the different branches of the Spring Revolution, pro-democracy activists are increasingly relying on social media. Especially for women, social media has become a powerful space to express their political opinions and organize against the junta. To respond to the growing online resistance, the military government has implemented draconian measures of digital repression that actively persecute civilians who show support for the opposition online. Online violence against pro-democracy activists often translates into offline violence such as arrests and sexual violence. The Burmese military’s digital repression is highly gendered as women activists experience significantly higher rates of gender-based violence and persecution compared to their male counterparts. Authoritarian actions and responses to online dissent in Myanmar can be sorted into five categories: internet shutdowns, online censorship, surveillance, targeted persecution of online users, and social media manipulation and disinformation. However, women online activists in Myanmar also face specific forms of gender-based violence in addition to these five categories. Some examples of such gender-based violence include doxxing, abusive messages featuring sexist language, leaking intimate videos and images without consent, sexualized disinformation, threats of sexual violence, rape threats, and death threats. Different forms of sexualized repression have the most traumatic physical and psychological effects as these repression tactics subject women online activists and their families to societal shame. An overwhelming majority of gender-based online violence targeted at pro-democracy women is carried out by men. Women in Myanmar who express their political opinions on social media are targeted for doxxing at a much higher rate than politically active men online. Doxxing is particularly a gendered digital repression tactic in the context of Myanmar since many women activists who were doxxed by pro-military and male-identifying social media personalities, such as Han Nyein Oo and Ba Nyunt, have been arrested by security forces. The arrest comes with the additional danger of more gendered violence against women since mass rape of women and girls is systematically employed by the Burmese military. The gendered nature of the Burmese military government’s digital repression is worrisome because online violence against women serves as a significant barrier to their meaningful political participation. According to the 2023 Freedom House Freedom on the Net Report, Myanmar has one of the most digitally repressive regimes in the world, second only to China. Enabled by the political support of Russia and China, and equipped with international surveillance technologies, the Burmese regime is committing crimes against humanity targeted at individuals who speak out against the military rule on social media. Women bear the brunt of this targeted digital repression solely due to their gender. The case of Myanmar highlights how autocrats are leveraging social media as a political tool to not only react to but also proactively deter women’s online activism. Online repression tactics employed by the Burmese military might be appealing to other authoritarian governments for oppressing feminist dissent in their own countries. This somber potential, if realized, can further set back women’s rights in different authoritarian regimes at a highly alarming rate. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the international community to merely condemn gendered digital repression in Myanmar via statements and press releases. International stakeholders need to collaborate with civil society in Myanmar to provide women with robust training in digital security that will enable them to continue fighting for democracy in safer yet more creative and subversive forms of digital activism..."
Source/publisher: E-International Relations
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-04
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Saturday 4 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-04
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 6.05 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM4.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Saturday 4 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-04
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.28 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 4.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Saturday 4 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-04
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Statement by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. for Myanmar (3 May 2024)
Description/subject: "MORE THAN 3 MILLION PEOPLE FORCED TO FLEE THEIR HOMES IN MYANMAR. Myanmar has this week marked a bleak milestone with more than 3 million civilians now displaced nationwide amid intensifying conflict. The figure has jumped sharply, up by 50 per cent in just six months. Myanmar stands at the precipice in 2024 with a deepening humanitarian crisis that has spiraled since the military takeover in February 2021 and the consequent conflicts in many parts of the country, driving record numbers of people to abandon their homes seeking safety. Of the 3 million people who are currently internally displaced, more than 2.7 million people fled as a result of conflict and insecurity since the takeover. It is estimated that one third of those now displaced are children whose education and futures have been upended by conflict. Escalating flighting in many parts of the country, intensified since October 2023, has contributed to this rapid growth in displacement. Sadly, civilians not involved in the conflict pay the highest price across the country with many seeing no other option but to flee seeking safety. The 3 million displaced people are struggling to survive amid a widespread humanitarian crisis that has left a total of 18.6 million people in need. This is a million more than the previous year. Those in need include 6 million children. Chin, Magway and Sagaing in north-western Myanmar continue to host the highest number of those displaced at nearly 1.5 million people, while Kayah, Bago, Kayin, Southern Shan, Mon and Tanintharyi in the south-east account for more than 900,000. Another 356,000 people are displaced in Rakhine. Access to internally displaced people (IDPs) in these parts of the country, as well as other states and regions that are hosting IDPs, is critical. Already in 2024, humanitarians have reached nearly 950,000 people in need with humanitarian assistance, including almost half a million displaced people. But this is not enough. Gross underfunding is hampering response efforts, with less than 5 per cent of requirements received more than a quarter of the way into the year. With cyclone season fast approaching, additional resources are needed now to protect the most vulnerable and save lives..."
Source/publisher: UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-03
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Title: Safeguarding the lives of women and their newborns: A Midwife's Story of Resilience and Hope
Description/subject: "Daw San Win Phyu, a midwife with over 30 years of experience, embodies the spirit of dedication and care in the remote regions of Myanmar. At 68, her passion for her work is as strong as ever, driven by a profound commitment to safeguard the lives of mothers and their newborns. "I am always proud of myself for my dedication and commitment as a community midwife," she states with a warm smile. Working tirelessly both day and night, Daw San Win Phyu has become a guardian of health within her community. "As a midwife, I work day and night to provide health support for the people in the community," she explains. Her days are filled with providing antenatal care to pregnant women, sexual and reproductive healthcare including family planning for people in the community. She also provides mental health and psychosocial support, understanding the emotional and psychological challenges pregnant women face. Sometimes, she travels from one village to another, ensuring that no one is left without care. But it's often in the stillness of the night that her support is most urgently needed. "Sometimes I go out at night for emergency delivery. There have been nights when I was requested for delivery two to three times," she recounts. Despite the exhaustion that comes with such demanding work, the sight of a newborn baby’s face reinvigorates her spirit. "When I see the faces of new born babies, the weariness goes away," she shares, her eyes lighting up with the joy of life she helps bring into the world. In these remote areas, many locals face poverty and despair, making her presence as a midwife critical. "Many local people here are poor and in need of our support," she says. More than just a healthcare provider, she also offers words of encouragement and support, understanding that "a helpful word can be a powerful remedy." She continues, "I always encourage them and tell them not to worry since I am here to help them." Additionally, In these remote areas, many locals face poverty and despair, making her presence as a midwife critical. "Many local people here are poor and in need of our support," she says. More than just a healthcare provider, she also offers words of encouragement and support, understanding that "a helpful word can be a powerful remedy." She continues, "I always encourage them and tell them not to worry since I am here to help them." Mental health and psychosocial support are important for pregnant women in order to navigate the emotional challenges before and after delivery, ensuring they feel supported in every aspect of their well-being. Her role extends beyond maternal health care; Daw San Win Phyu is a vital link in promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights for the people in the community. "Regardless of my age, I am really passionate about sexual and reproductive health as well as the rights of women to access family planning services," she asserts. Her work is critical in these communities, where access to sexual and reproductive health information can significantly impact the quality of life and health outcomes. UNFPA, the United Nations sexual and reproductive health agency, has played a significant role in supporting midwives across Myanmar. In 2023, UNFPA expanded its midwifery program into humanitarian-affected regions such as Sagaing, Magway, Bago, and Kayin, while continuing to support existing clinics in Yangon, Mandalay, and Ayeyarwaddy Region. These efforts have not only helped to enhance the delivery of quality midwifery care but also fostered the development of midwifery networks that encourage collaboration among midwives, volunteers, and obstetricians and gynecologists. To further strengthen the capacities of midwives and other healthcare providers, UNFPA, in collaboration with its implementing partners, conducted three clinical skill-based training sessions focused on Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care (EmONC). These training sessions have been crucial in enhancing the skills of service providers working in the humanitarian affected areas, thereby improving maternal healthcare in emergency situations. Daw San Win Phyu's dedication exemplifies the critical role of midwives in improving maternal health, especially in remote and conflict-affected areas. Her story underscores the need for continued support and investment in midwifery services to ensure that every pregnancy is safe and every mother receives the care she deserves. Reflecting on her long career, Daw San Win Phyu feels a deep sense of fulfillment. "That’s why I am really honored to serve the people in need, particularly women from remote communities," she explains. Her life's work is not just about delivering babies; it's about delivering hope and resilience for the communities..."
Source/publisher: United Nations Population Fund (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-03
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (April 22 to 30, 2024) [EN/MY]
Description/subject: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from April 22 to 30, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Magway Region, Kachin State, Kayin State, Rakhine State, Chin State, and Mon State from April 22nd to 30th. Military Junta Troop committed to arresting the civilians and blackmailing the 2nd batch of Military Service in the Yangon Region, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, and Ayeyarwady Region. Military Junta arrested and used the local civilians as human shields in Magway Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State. Over 20 civilians died, and over 70 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 4 underaged children died, and 7 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-03
Type: Individual Documents
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Size: 275.45 KB 271.73 KB 1.84 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Friday 3 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-03
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 6.84 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM3.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Friday 3 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-03
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 2.93 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 3.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Friday 3 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-03
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Asia: 2024 Human Rights Press Awards
Sub-title: Top Prizes for Reporting on Suicide Among Afghan Women, Persecution in Myanmar
Description/subject: "(Taipei) – Today, marking World Press Freedom Day, Human Rights Press Awards in Asia announced the 2024 winners and runners-up. The seven categories of awards are administered by Human Rights Watch, the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Arizona State University, and the foreign correspondents clubs in both Thailand and Taiwan. Among the top winners are reporting on the rising number of suicides among Afghan women living under abusive Taliban rule; the persecution of religious minorities in Myanmar; and the Chinese government’s treatment of White Paper protesters who stood up against Covid-19 lockdowns. “The Human Rights Press Awards recognize journalists who are uncovering some of the most pressing rights issues in Asia,” said Tirana Hassan, executive director at Human Rights Watch. “In an era in which rising authoritarianism generates autocratic leaders and mass disinformation, the role of journalists in exposing the truth is more critical than ever. We are thrilled to honor these courageous reporters.” The seven categories of awards include the newly created “Newsrooms in Exile” category, as well as commentary, print, photography, video, audio, and multimedia. The winners will be honored at a ceremony in Taipei hosted by the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club (TFCC) on May 10, 2024. “We are honored once again to be administering the Human Rights Press Awards,” said Dr. Battinto L. Batts, Jr., dean of the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication. “As part of our Cronkite Global Initiatives, we are proud to help recognize outstanding human rights journalism throughout Asia and the world.” “It’s no coincidence that many winning entries are examples of brave journalism from Afghanistan, Hong Kong, and Myanmar, places where reporting has become increasingly difficult and dangerous,” said Thompson Chau, president of the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club. “The TFCC is honored to host the award ceremony in Taipei. Taiwan is an extraordinary place for a growing number of Asia-focused correspondents to live and work.” Frontier Myanmar and Zan Times shared the top prize in the inaugural “Newsroom in Exile” category for their reporting on Myanmar and Afghanistan, respectively. Frontier Myanmar’s report uncovered the Myanmar military’s oppression of the Bayingyi, Roman Catholics of Portuguese descent. Zan Times gathered data illustrating the dire reality of the growing numbers of Afghan women and girls choosing death as preferable to living under Taliban repression. “We're increasingly seeing media under threat in countries across Southeast Asia, which is why the new Human Rights Press Awards category for media in exile is so critically important,” said Phil Robertson, program committee chair at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT). “In countries such as Afghanistan and Myanmar, there needs to be greater recognition of journalists who bravely report human rights stories from the homeland they were forced to flee, and the FCCT is proud to be a part of that effort.” The award for multimedia went to Al Jazeera for its piece, “‘If I die, I die’: Pakistan's death-trap route to Europe,” documenting the dangerous journey young Pakistani men undertake in search of work in Europe and the suffering of their families left behind. The Initium won the investigative reporting prize in Chinese for its series on the anniversary of the White Paper Protest, featuring the lives and struggles of those who protested China’s “zero-Covid” lockdown policies in the wake of the pandemic. The Guardian won the investigative reporting prize in English for its work, “Revealed: Amazon linked to trafficking of workers in Saudi Arabia,” which exposed the plight of Nepali migrant workers enduring forced labor and discrimination in Saudi Arabia. The reporting revealed the complicity of major multinational corporations that fail to police their supply chains. Reporting on the Myanmar military’s airstrikes; abuses by the Bangladeshi elite police unit, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB); issues facing the LGBT community in Hong Kong; and a global private hospital group embroiled in a “cash for kidneys” racket all won honorable mentions..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-02
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Recognizing Journalists Living in Exile
Sub-title: Human Rights Press Awards Spotlight Exiled Newsrooms Reporting on Asia
Description/subject: "Around the world, journalists who have been forced to flee their countries have continued to report on their homelands, exposing ongoing human rights violations while living in exile. Today, May 3, is World Press Freedom Day. But independent media faces increasing threats from abusive governments and armed groups worldwide. In 2023, Reporters Without Borders reported a surge of requests for help from journalists being threatened because of their work. Last year, the organization provided financial assistance to 460 journalists who had to flee abroad; the top countries where it intervened were Afghanistan, Russia, Myanmar, and Palestine. The lives of journalists in exile can be rocky. They have too few resources, are forced to work from a distance, and often undertake their reporting at personal risk. They may face uncertain immigration status, digital harassment from foreign intelligence agencies operating abroad, and threats to their relatives remaining in their home country. That’s in addition to the ordinary difficulties of adjusting to life in a new country and often learning a new language. But more organizations are supporting journalists in exile, helping them form networks and continue their essential work. The Network of Exiled Media Outlets, together with the US-based International Center for Journalists, has created a toolkit for journalists in exile to share knowledge and best practices. The Europe-based JX Fund says it has supported more than 1,600 journalists who fled crisis regions in returning to work. The Afghanistan Journalists Support Organization works to boost communication among Afghan journalists worldwide, among other goals. Today, Human Rights Watch and its partners announced the recipients of the 2024 Human Rights Press Awards for outstanding reporting on human rights issues across Asia. For the first time, this year’s awards included the category of “newsrooms in exile.” Two media organizations won in this new category. Frontier Myanmar received the award for its coverage of how Myanmar’s military, steeped in Buddhist nationalism, has targeted Bayingyi, a Roman Catholic minority. Zan Times, a women-led publication covering rights abuses in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, received the award for its reporting on the increase in female suicides in the country. This new category of awards should draw much-needed attention to journalists in exile, so that more groups will support their crucial investigative reporting..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-02
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Trends - 2020 to 2024
Description/subject: "MIMU’s HDP (Humanitarian, Development and Peace Focus) Nexus “Who does What Where, When and for Whom” database, or 5W, is a tool tracking the implementation of humanitarian, development and peace focused projects to support coordination, planning and efficient use of resources. MIMU has conducted this exercise regularly in Myanmar since 2008. Information is currently compiled every six months based on reports provided voluntarily by contributing agencies. The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W shows: ➢ which organizations (WHO), ➢ are carrying out which activities (WHAT), ➢ in which locations (WHERE), ➢ project status – whether planned, ongoing or completed (WHEN) ➢ project beneficiary focus (for WHOM) – whether focused on IDPs, IDPs and host communities, other vulnerable communities or are aimed to create further resilience and development in communities. MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Products capture information on the presence of organisations and do not indicate the volume of assistance, the number of beneficiaries, or the extent to which needs are met or unmet. Summary The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Comparison report compares results from August 2020 to February 2024, looking particularly at the impact of events in early 2021 on agencies’ reported activities over time. 2021 saw a significant reduction in the number of reporting agencies and activities compared to the previous round in August 2020: Over 30% reduction in reporting agencies (from 213 agencies in Aug’ 2020 to 159/163 agencies in May/Oct 2021), mainly INGOs and NNGOs. 33% reduction in the number of projects reported countrywide (over 200 less projects) in 2021, with reductions mainly in Shan (over 100), Yangon (over 90) and Rakhine (over 60). A significant reduction in the number of activities reported as ongoing - 43,428 less activities in May 2021, mainly in Tanintharyi (84% reduction), Shan east (58%), Mon (57%), Shan south (55%) and Kayin (50%), and 35,930 less activities in Oct 2021, mainly in Rakhine (18%), Chin and Shan south (11% in each), Tanintharyi (10%), Kayin (9%), Shan north (8%) and Mon (7%). Suspension of activities was significant. The highest number of suspended activities were reported in May 2021 (19 times higher than in August 2020). 2023 and 2024 has seen increase in reporting agencies and reported activities compared to 2021: About 1,000 more village tracts/towns reported ongoing activities in 2023 and 200 more in 2024 (86%-78% of VTs/Towns around the country), mainly in Agriculture, Education, Health and Protection as compared to 2021. Less activities reported as suspended in 2024 (2% of total reported activities) compared to 2021 (around 10%) and Feb’ 2023 (1%) – this does not indicate however whether activities have ended/completed or resumed. Overall, despite the higher number of reporting agencies over the past 12 months: More activities were reported as “completed/ended” – 6,476 more completed/ended activities were found in Feb’ 2024 than Feb’ 2023. This change was particularly noted within Livelihoods activities, where one agency ended a project with a large number of micro credit activities in June 2023. A lower percentage of total activities were reported at VTs/Towns level as “ongoing” – 8% less ongoing activities reported as active (from 86% in Feb’ 2023 and 78% in Feb’ 2024) More suspended activities focused on Other Vulnerable Groups and IDP Focus (nearly 4 times increase in each group) in Feb’ 2024 compared to Feb’ 2023..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-02
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, 1 May 2024 - Myanmar [EN/MY]
Description/subject: "(excerpt) Myanmar An update from Myanmar: Our team on the ground tells us they are concerned by the spreading of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, especially in northern Rakhine State. We fully support community leaders in Rakhine State, especially women, and youth, who are coming together and redoubling efforts to promote social cohesion amid increasing signs of tension and the risk of communal violence re-emerging in the current very volatile context. Addressing the root causes of systemic discrimination and impunity in Rakhine State will be essential in establishing a sustainable pathway out of the current crisis facing Myanmar. The failure to do so will only fuel Myanmar’s vicious cycle of violence; that’s according to the UN team. And we have, of course, been consistent in condemning all forms of violence against civilians in Myanmar, and we reiterate our call for the protection of civilians, including aid workers, in accordance with international humanitarian law, for the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access..."
Source/publisher: UN Department of Global Communications
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-02
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Thursday 2 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-02
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 7.07 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM2.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Thursday 2 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-02
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 4.19 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 2.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Thursday 2 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-02
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 6.63 MB
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Wednesday 1 May, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-01
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 6.81 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM1.5.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Wednesday 1 May 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-01
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 2.89 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 1.5.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Wednesday 1 May 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-05-01
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 5.5 MB
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Title: Statement of Former Representatives of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) on the Child Rights Situation in Myanmar
Description/subject: "We, the former Representatives of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), strongly condemn the ongoing human rights catastrophe in Myanmar and urge the UN, ASEAN, and key governments to take urgent and appropriate corresponding measures. Over the past years, intensified fighting between the military and ethnic armed groups have left thousands of civilians killed, seriously injured, detained, and displaced from their homes and communities. Just recently, an airstrike on a school in Myanmar’s Karenni state killed four children and injured at least 15 others.[1] Another airstrike by the military also killed civilians, including nine children, as they gathered to attend church last January.[2] The attacks on civilians show no signs of stopping. The international community must turn its eye to what is happening in Myanmar. Attacks against schools, churches, and especially children are a grave violation of children’s rights and international humanitarian law. As of February 2024, more than 2.7 million people have been internally displaced in Myanmar and are living in unwarranted conditions. More than 18.6 people, including six million children, are in need of humanitarian aid in 2024 more than 18 times the number before the military takeover in 2021.[3] As a result, the number of children living in poverty has doubled from 4.7 million in 2017 to 9.9 million in 2022. The violence and horrendous attacks on civilians clearly violate the principles in the ASEAN Charter to which Myanmar is a signatory including the adherence to the rule of law, good governance, and respect for and protection of human rights. We reiterate the call to hold the Myanmar military accountable for the violence in Myanmar, to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to facilitate continuous dialogue among all concerned parties, and ultimately save and protect the children at all costs..."
Source/publisher: Child Rights Coalition Asia
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-30
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Tuesday 30 April, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-30
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 6.72 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM30.4.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Tuesday 30 April 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-30
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.71 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 30.4.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Tuesday 30 April 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-30
Type: Individual Documents
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Size: 5.85 MB
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Title: Permanent Scars : Torture of villagers under arbitrary detention by State Administration Council in Southeast Burma (January - December 2023)
Description/subject: "1. Introduction Since the 2021 military coup[1], human rights violations are being committed against villagers by armed actors in Southeast Burma[2] with increasing intensity. Among these violations, incidents of torture of civilians have seen an alarming increase: in 2023 alone, 33 incidents involving at least 37 victims were reported to KHRG, mainly perpetrated by the Burma Army.[3] This physical and mental violence is used by the State Administration Council (SAC)[4] as a weapon of war. Villagers in locally-defined Karen State[5] are particularly vulnerable to abuse, when continuously arbitrarily arrested and detained, as the SAC punishes and intimidates them in retaliatory violence, failing to adhere to international legal norms and the rules of war. This systematic abuse is impacting the security, livelihoods and freedom of movement of villagers, and causing severe injuries, fear and trauma. This briefing paper presents incidents of torture against villagers in Southeast Burma by the SAC and affiliated armed groups in the period between January to December 2023.[6] The paper begins with a brief overview of the context in which torture has been occurring across Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup. It then presents a factual summary of the incidents of torture in 2023, and discusses the trends identified in the reports received by KHRG, including the torture of civilians arbitrarily arrested on accusations of affiliation with armed resistance groups or to extract information about their activities; to intimidate and terrorise the population; and/or when forcing villagers to act as human shields or porters. The impact of torture on the communities is also presented. Finally, a security and legal analysis of the situation of these severe human rights violations is conducted, and policy recommendations are provided for stakeholders. 2. Contextual Overview: torture as a weapon of war in Burma For decades, villagers have been mistreated by the Burma Army who have sought to impose their political and military will over civilian populations across Burma. Civilians have long been targeted as part of the “four cuts” strategy, which aims to destroy links between insurgents, their families, and local villagers by severing supplies of food, funds, intelligence and recruits to armed resistance groups.[7] Amid the civil war, which has been intensifying in Karen State in the past three years, human rights abuses against civilians abound, including killings, air strikes on civilian areas, indiscriminate shelling, landmine usage, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, widespread displacement, severe livelihood challenges, and barriers to education and healthcare. The practice of arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC is widespread in Burma, with approximately 20,240 political prisoners under detention across the country.[8] Under detention, civilians are highly vulnerable to abuse, mistreatment, or dire detention conditions, as the SAC fails to adhere to international law regarding the protection of prisoners and disallow the monitoring of conditions by lawyers or outside observers.[9] In rural Southeast Burma, villagers are frequently arrested and detained by SAC authorities in army camps, police stations, prisons, and checkpoints. In addition, villagers are often detained by soldiers in villages, on their plantations, or even their homes. Amid the ongoing conflict and the continued impunity enjoyed by armed actors, villagers are immensely vulnerable to extrajudicial killing, torture and mistreatment when detained in any of these circumstances and places. The Burma Army has used torture for many decades, defined as the act of inflicting severe pain or suffering on someone to force them to do something or in punishment. Throughout the years, villagers have reported extreme torture including waterboarding, burning, cutting of body parts, hangings and burying underground, and torture has occurred both in detention facilities, in villages and forests, and sometimes publicly in charades of terror.[10] Some of these extreme methods are evident in the incidents documented in this briefing paper. Accusations of villagers being connected with armed resistance groups have been a common feature of torture in interrogation and punishment by the Burma Army throughout the many years of conflict. Ignoring international norms and regulations for the proper treatment of detainees, SAC soldiers inflict suffering on civilians under their captivity without recourse, to a degree which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity under customary international criminal law. 3. Factual summary: patterns of torture against villagers by the SAC and its impacts This section presents evidence of the torture of villagers in Southeast Burma involving the SAC and SAC-affiliated groups. Since the 2021 coup, KHRG has received reports documenting 52 incidents of torture against villagers by the SAC military across our operational area.[11] In 2023 alone, KHRG received 36 reports detailing 33 of those incidents, and involving 37 victims of torture. Incidents of torture mostly occurred during arbitrary arrests; villagers were tortured as part of interrogation to extract information related to military objectives. Torture was also used against villagers in punishment for their alleged affiliation with opposition groups, either for being relatives, informants, or supporters of those groups, including suspicion of supplying them with food and materials. On other occasions, the SAC military tortured villagers in an abuse of power, to intimidate, terrorise and instil fear. Finally, villagers were also subjected to torture whilst being forced to act as human shields or porters by armed actors. Some instances of armed resistance groups operating in Southeast Burma torturing villagers have also been reported to KHRG, usually against those accused of being spies for the SAC, excluded from this analysis.[12] a) Torture in interrogation to extract information During the reporting period, the SAC military frequently arbitrarily arrested or detained villagers to obtain knowledge of local armed resistance groups’ activities. These arrests often occurred in the aftermath of attacks by resistance groups, as SAC soldiers sought to collect information on those involved. Torture was used to extract information or force confessions, and detention conditions were often dire. These interrogations also frequently happened publicly in villages, at checkpoints, on roads, or even in villagers’ houses. Many villagers who were arrested by the SAC were also forcibly disappeared, removed from protective measures or observation of their health or welfare by relatives or lawyers.[13] Villagers are at risk of being detained and subjected to intimidation and torture as they go about their daily lives, as the following incidents attest to. On February 21st 2023, in search of People’s Defence Force (PDF)[14] members in the aftermath of fighting in the area, SAC soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[15] #603, led by Battalion Commander Hein San Htun, entered T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, Than Tuang Way Thaw area, in Taw T’Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. The SAC soldiers arrested eight villagers who were taken to Than Taung police station, in Than Taung Town, where they were interrogated, beaten and punched. The SAC soldiers burned villagers’ houses and confiscated villagers’ belongings, including clothes and five motorcycles, which they burned altogether. Later that day, five more villagers, three men and two women, from the same village were arrested by the SAC soldiers and questioned at the police station. All but one of the villagers were released shortly afterwards. As explained by a local person from T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, a young villager was taken to an SAC army camp where he was interrogated and tortured before eventually being released a few days later. Villagers assumed that the SAC had found incriminating evidence related to other youngsters, possibly PDF members, on his phone.[16] Villagers are arbitrarily arrested, and subsequently mistreated or tortured, in the aftermath of attacks against the SAC when soldiers search the area for those involved or who could have information on the attack. Travelling in the aftermath of attacks is therefore particularly dangerous for villagers. As explained by a victim of torture, that had taken place on January 6th 2023, in Dooplaya District: “They [the SAC] suspected me of being a spy. The fighting was happening when I returned to the village to feed my pigs. They suspected me of being a spy and arrested me. They asked many questions. They tortured me. I told them I was nothing [a civilian]. I told them I was a normal villager”. He added: “I was afraid but could not do anything. I did not know how to be afraid. I considered myself dead.” When the SAC interrogated him, he was kicked and stabbed by a knife several times.[17] On another instance on March 26th 2023, at about 3 pm, Saw[18] A---, an 18-year-old villager, from Aa--- village, Aaw P’Lah village tract[19], Hsaw Htee Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, was arrested by SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #20, who are based in Nyaunglebin Town, on suspicion of participating in a recent bomb attack along with six other villagers. Saw A--- was travelling by motorcycle to buy a duck to eat when he was arrested in Ba--- village. Saw A---’s mother, B---, was informed of her son’s arrest by other villagers living in Ba--- village. After hearing of the arrest, B--- and her husband went to find him: on March 27th at LIB #20 army camp and on March 28th, at Baw Bi police station. Saw A---’s parents had to provide the SAC soldiers with food and 20,000 kyat [9.50 USD[20]] for the cost of tea to be permitted to ask for information about their son. The SAC soldiers at Baw Bi police station told the victim’s parents not to worry about their son because he would be released soon after interrogation, if found not guilty. After he was released, Saw A--- explained to his mother about the brutal torture he had to endure: he was beaten in public relentlessly by the soldiers soon after his arrest before being taken to the police station, where he was again tortured during interrogation. Others from Ba--- village, who were also arrested along with Saw A---, reported that several villagers were also subjected to torture by the SAC.[21] On another instance on September 18th 2023, after fighting and air strikes in T’Ko Teh village tract, Waw Ray Township, Dooplaya District, a 50-year-old villager named U[22] C---, from Ca--- village, K’Leh T’Khon Teh village tract, was arrested by the SAC soldiers when he returned from a displacement site to his village to feed his livestock. After the arrest, the SAC soldiers beat and punched him. Due to the severe injuries caused, he had to undergo medical treatment.[23] Incidents of arrest and torture are also common at checkpoints. On November 16th 2023, a villager named Ko[24] D---, from Da--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC soldiers from Infantry Battalion (IB)[25] #559 and #560 at a checkpoint on the road near Ea--- village. Ko D--- had visited Ea--- village to purchase items for himself, and was detained on the road while returning home. The soldiers stopped and searched him and his motorbike, and interrogated him. During the search of his motorcycle, the SAC soldiers discovered 20 tablets of yaba[26] hidden inside the seat. When questioned about these tablets, Ko D--- informed the SAC soldiers that they were for his personal use while working. However, one of the SAC soldiers said: “You are lying. I know you bought these drugs for the PDF”. During the interrogation, the SAC soldiers beat the villager. After, one of the SAC commanders threatened Ko D--- by saying: “You can’t tell anyone about this. If you do and we see this news on social media, we will kill you”. Since this incident, Ko D--- has been afraid to travel, and cannot eat well. Ko D---’s wife informed KHRG that villagers were living with fear and concern about their security.[27] Many local villagers who have been impacted by the arrest and torture have been left with emotional distress and trauma. The escalation of arrests and torture in Southeast Burma has heightened villagers’ worry about being apprehended which is leading to fear of commuting to work or ensuring their livelihoods. b) Torture and physical abuse as punishment Villagers are arbitrarily arrested and detained often with no evidence provided for suspicion of affiliation with, or support to, local armed resistance groups; villagers are simply going about their daily lives. When detained on such accusations, SAC soldiers use intimidation, physical violence and other forms of mistreatment in punishment. Saw E---, a young villager from Fa--- village, T’Nay village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, was detained three times in November 2023 by the SAC, and at the end tortured to death. First, he was apprehended and detained at his farm, asked for his name and any military affiliation, and then forced along with some friends to guide SAC soldiers to Wa Wee Lay Road. The second time, he was arrested while travelling on a road with two friends, Maung[28] F--- and G---, and accused of having ties with Karen armed resistance groups after they were found carrying a battery with them, which villagers insisted was for personal use to charge their phones. The SAC soldiers gave these three young villagers 240,000 kyat [114 USD] and instructed them to purchase food for the soldiers in Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract. G--- was kept behind with the soldiers. Shortly afterwards, the soldiers were attacked by Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[29] soldiers. Maung F--- and Saw E--- were too afraid to return because of the fighting. The SAC soldiers thought the three young villagers were implicated in the attack, even accusing Maung F--- of being a KNLA officer. As punishment, G---, still detained by the SAC military, was severely tortured. The SAC soldiers burned his face with fire, stabbed a knife at his back, and beat his head. The soldiers told him: “You guys are Kaw Thoo Lei[30] soldiers [KNLA]. You see! When your friends were just released, they [KNLA] tried to attack us. […] If your friends do not come back and [KNLA] attack us [again], I will bury your body in a standing position.” The village head from Fa--- village negotiated with the SAC, who asked for the money they gave Maung F--- and Saw E--- in order to release G---. G--- was released the same day and needed treatment and medicine for his injuries. On November 24th 2023, at around 3 pm, Saw E--- was arrested one more time by this same SAC troop beside a plantation while he was going to meet his friends. He was detained alongside Saw H---, a villager from Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract, who had been arrested earlier; the two men were tied up together. Soon after he was detained, the SAC sergeant in charge gave soldiers knives and took Saw E--- to be tortured. They beat and kicked him and then cut out his eyes and cut his ears with knives. The soldier told him: “Last time [that Saw E--- was arrested], you took the money and after you left, you attacked us. And now, you come and sneak up on us again.” As they took out his eyes and cut his ears, they told him: “The eyes that snuck up on us and the ears that were eavesdropping.” During the torture of Saw E---, H--- was able to slip away and escape. He informed villagers in T’Nay area about what happened to Saw E--- and Fa--- villagers went to look for him nearby Meh Pray Hkee army camp. The SAC soldiers there told villagers that Saw E--- might had been killed during an attack by the KNLA and gave no more information.[31] Saw H--- had been arrested on November 22nd 2023 while he was herding his cows in Ga--- area. The SAC asked him questions and also accused him of having connections with the KNLA soldiers. Saw H--- recalled: “They [SAC soldiers] hit me with a machete and I was bleeding. They slapped me in the face. After that, they went to take a rope and tied me from the back. My hands were swelling, as the blood was not running [through]. It was so tight. I could not stand it anymore, so I asked the SAC sergeant to loosen the rope. I was a bit more comfortable when the rope was loosened.” He was tied up together with Saw E--- on that night, after two days of arrest. When SAC soldiers questioned and tortured Saw E---, Saw H--- untied the rope by scrubbing it and escaped into the forest. After his escape, he was not able to sleep for several days due to fear. Since then, villagers are afraid of being arrested by the SAC soldiers so they dare not going to their farmlands or hill fields to secure their livelihood.[32] On another instance, on the morning of July 9th 2023, villagers residing near the eastern part of the Pa Ra Lo river in Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, went to Kyauk Ta Ga Town to purchase food. SAC soldiers from LIB #264 detained them when they entered the town and apprehended 16 of the villagers, accusing them of transporting rice and other items to the PDF. Among the arrested villagers, three individuals were severely beaten by SAC soldiers, as reported by their family members. Despite being able to provide food for the detainees, the families were denied access to see them. During a subsequent meeting with village leaders on July 14th 2023, the family members expressed their desire to secure the release of the villagers but were too afraid to directly confront the SAC soldiers. In August 2023, these arrested villagers were released and many fled their villages, facing security concerns.[33] On September 11th 2023 from 5 to 6 am, there was a fighting between PDF troops and SAC, involving over 30 soldiers from the Infantry Battalion (IB) #285 marching to Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, Mergui-Tavoy District. After the fighting, the SAC indiscriminately conducted constant shelling into nearby villages and vicinities, up until 12:30 pm. This shelling resulted in the displacement of villagers. While fleeing, a 26-year-old villager named Maung K---from Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, was arrested by the SAC. The soldiers tortured Maung K--- to death. They also arrested other villagers and brought them to Pu Law Town’s police station. Some villagers were released after a while.[34] If a villager is arrested on suspicion of affiliation with an armed resistance group, it is common that their family members and close associates will also be targeted, in punishment. This creates much fear among villagers if a friend or family member is detained, regardless of any truth to the claims. In one incident in which a human rights defender was arrested, falsely accused of being PDF, and forcibly disappeared, his daughter feared being targeted herself: “After they arrested my father, I heard that SAC tried to look for the family members. They showed our pictures to people, and they asked people where we were. They also asked people about how many children my father has. They asked people whether we came back to Rb--- [the family’s hometown] or not. […] I think they wanted to arrest all my father’s family members because they wanted to make sure they could arrest every family member of my father. […] We have security concerns. We have to flee from place to place.”[35] c) Torture as intimidation or as an abuse of power Torture of villagers is also committed by the SAC and other affiliated armed groups with no clear military objectives discernible. These incidents can be seen as efforts to demonstrate that SAC soldiers have the power to act without fear of punishment from any legal mechanism. They can act with impunity, terrorise and intimidate villagers, and inflict pain on the civilian population, in a grave abuse of power. For instance, in April 2023, Saw L---, a 30-year-old resident of Ka--- village in the K’Moh Thway area, Ler Doh Soh Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC LIB #409, stationed at the Nga Pyaw Daw Wa checkpoint in Da Wei Town. Saw L--- was returning home by motorbike from escorting students to school in Da Wei Town. The SAC soldiers stationed at the checkpoint were intoxicated and called out to him, but he could not hear them due to the noise of a car engine and hence did not stop. Then, the SAC soldiers followed him by car and apprehended him in La--- village, located in the Htee Ler Klay area. Following his arrest, the SAC soldiers physically assaulted him using sticks. Saw L--- is an ordinary villager who earns a living by working on his hill field.[36] In another incident, on August 17th 2023, Saw Ta Dah Win, an officer of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[37] -affiliated with the SAC- tortured three villagers on a road located in Mee Kyain village tract, Hpa-an Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. The villagers were Saw M--- (49 years old), Saw N--- (23 years old) and Saw O--- (40 years old), from Na--- village, Mee Kyain village tract. These villagers work as daily labourers, selling gravel to support their livelihood. When the DKBA officer noticed a gravel pile obstructing the road during his travel to Ma--- place in Hpa-an Township, he confronted the villagers. Despite the villagers’ apologies and willingness to remove the gravel, the DKBA officer violently assaulted them. Saw M--- suffered a split lip from a wooden stick blow, and Saw N--- and Saw O--- were also repeatedly struck. This incident has left local villagers living in fear of similar mistreatment. The perpetrator, Saw Ta Dah Win, serves as an operation commander in a DKBA battalion led by Saw Bo Bee.[38] SAC soldiers also apprehended villagers whilst they were undertaking their livelihood activities in fields and plantations. For example, on October 7th 2023 at 4:30 pm, SAC soldiers arrested and assaulted Naw[39] P---, from Oa--- village, Ma Htaw village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District. She was arrested by the SAC soldiers at her farmland located in Thwah Hkoh Law area, while she was herding buffaloes. Naw P--- was taking care of her three buffaloes because she thought it was a higher risk for her sons and son-in-law to do the herding work during this time of intensified conflict. When apprehended by SAC soldiers, they asked her random questions trying to obtain information about any armed resistance activities in the area, pointing a gun at her chest. Naw P--- was then taken to see the SAC commander at the SAC base in a forest at Wa May Kyoh place. Naw P--- does not speak Burmese, so it was challenging to communicate with the SAC soldiers, but she managed to convey that she was alone and had simply been herding buffaloes. Despite this explanation, however, she was still mistreated, tied up the entire night in the forest, leaving her wet, cold, and deprived of food. Later, the SAC soldiers offered snacks, which she hesitantly accepted, fearing potential harm. On the next day, at dawn, she was released.[40] As has been demonstrated, villagers in Southeast Burma often face arrest and torture alongside other human rights violations by the SAC and affiliated armed groups whilst they are travelling, purchasing goods, or working. For villagers who must travel for their livelihoods, or to carry out other daily tasks, avoiding interactions with armed actors is impossible, especially since some events occur unexpectedly and there are many checkpoints on roads. Saw Q---, a 26-year-old villager from Pa--- village, A’Lu village tract, Kyeh Htoh Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, whose father was arrested whilst travelling for his livelihood as a day labourer, expressed his fears: “Before the coup, we could travel freely. We did not hear about arbitrary arrests. After the coup, we are afraid to go to A’Lu Lay. We are afraid when we are travelling. We are concerned about the fighting that is going to happen. Before the coup, our livelihood activities were fine. Yet, after the coup, our livelihood is restricted”.[41] d) Torture of villagers forced to act as human shields and porters The SAC arbitrarily arrests villagers to force them to act as human shields or forced porters, accompanying troops as they travel on foot through contested territory. These acts may indeed be seen as torture in themselves, such as the hard physical labour of being forced to carry heavy loads whilst at risk of being attacked by armed groups whilst travelling. Moreover, villagers being forced to act as human shields are often mistreated and physically abused whilst under detention. They are also forcibly disappeared, isolated and cut off from communication with others. In 2023 alone, KHRG documented 13 incidents of use of human shields and forced portering, involving at least 97 villagers.[42] In one reported incident, on March 20th 2023, 50 to 70 soldiers from SAC Light Infantry Division (LID)[43] #77 and other combined troops, entered Qa--- village and Ra--- village, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District. The soldiers arrested 22 villagers in total, including four children aged between 6 to 17. The SAC released six villagers (including two people with disabilities) and took the rest with them as human shields. These arrested villagers were tied up and were forced to walk in front of the SAC soldiers and threatened that they would be killed if KNLA soldiers were to attack on the way. The next day, two elderly villagers were released but 14 villagers remained detained including the three children. One villager taken as a human shield in this incident, Saw R---, explained: “After arresting us, they tied up our hands; 7-8 people in a set. They did not tell us where they were going to take us. They were so aggressive communicating with us so we dare not refuse to follow them once they arrested us. The soldiers said: ‘Don’t you dare to escape! If you do so, we will shoot you dead.’ How would we dare to escape when they are that aggressive? We dared not even move”. The SAC soldiers confined these arrested villagers in a classroom of Ra--- village school, locking the door. For five days, these villagers endured living, eating, sleeping, and using a trash bin as a makeshift toilet in the cramped room. Once a day, the SAC soldiers would open the door, allowing the detainees to clean their hands and legs, and bathe. The SAC soldiers hung their clothes in front of the classroom where the villagers were detained so it would be targeted if attacked by KNLA soldiers. On March 24th 2023, the SAC released all of the villagers by tying them up in the forest.[44] On July 9th 2023, SAC LIB #559 and #560, led by Commander Min Min Htun and based in the army camp in Ea--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, travelled to Da--- village. On their way, at around 9 am, they arrested Ko S---, a villager from Da--- village, and forced him to carry their ammunition. Ko S--- explained that he suffered from lower back pain and could not carry the bullets. Then, one of the SAC soldiers named Ko San Naing, told him: “Don’t talk nonsense. You have to carry bullets as we ask you to do so”, and continued to force him to carry their bullets. As they travelled, the SAC soldiers arrested whoever they saw on their way and took them as porters and human shields. Ko S--- reported to KHRG that the SAC arrested ten villagers in total, forcing them to carry their ammunition and walk in front of the soldiers. Among the arrested villagers were a three-year-old child and his mother. When they arrived at a plantation, owned by Ko T--- (a villager from Da--- village), they encountered Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA)[45] soldiers and fighting happened. The KTLA soldiers realised that there were also villagers with the SAC soldiers and so stopped firing guns and retreated. During the fighting, the SAC soldiers told the arrested villagers to crouch down but did not let them put down the ammunition they carried. None of the villagers were injured or hit by bullets during the fighting, nor were any of the soldiers. After the fighting, the SAC told the villagers: “You did a good job”, and released them all, leaving them to walk two hours home. Ko S--- stated: “They [SAC] would not have released us if any of their soldiers had died or had been injured.” Ko S--- and the other arrested villagers still feel afraid and panicked after being released: they worry and fear that they will be arrested again and killed.[46] Villagers who were released or who managed to escape captivity suffer afterwards from the trauma and face recovery from injuries sustained during the torture. After being taken as human shields by the SAC in March 2023, Qa--- and Ra--- villagers, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, expressed they were experiencing significant emotional distress. One of the victims from Ra--- village explained: “Because of this arrest, we were afraid, and one of the children got sick [with shock]; it seems that this child was very afraid. Some elders also had to take medicine after returning to the village.” The experience of being forced to act as a human shield is traumatic and this is compounded by the high frequency of these crimes: villagers know they may be targeted again. Some villagers who have been tortured and released need continued treatment due to their injuries. With the intensification of armed conflicts and difficulty working to get income, families are struggling to support the injured victims. 4. Analysis: Legal implications of the torture of villagers by the SAC Villagers in Southeast Burma are individually targeted, assaulted and tortured by SAC soldiers in order to extract information about armed resistance groups, punished for alleged affiliation with such groups, intimidated and terrorised, or dehumanised when captured as human shields or forced porters. Following attacks by armed resistance groups, villagers have been common targets of retaliatory violence, as the SAC violently seeks to extract information and locate resistance soldiers in and around villages. Civilians face constant insecurity, frequently attacked while in their villages, on their plantations or farms, or on roads when travelling for essential livelihood activities. Any potential contact with SAC soldiers puts villagers at risk of ill-treatment. SAC soldiers fail to respect the basic rights, dignity and integrity of civilians, treating them as enemies and legitimate targets. Endemic across the whole of Burma and escalating with increasing fervour, the incidents presented in this report are an aspect of the widespread and systematic arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC, who often entangle the lines between civilians, political enemies and military targets. Under detention, whether held temporarily at checkpoints or confined in prisons, villagers are at grave risk of ill-treatment and torture. Even detention in one’s home can involve beatings, intimidation, and other torturous violence. The scale of the abuse of power by the SAC against civilians demonstrates their confidence in their own impunity. Torture is defined under international law as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person to obtain information from them or a third party, to punish for an act committed, or suspected of having committed, to intimidate, coerce, or for any reason based on discrimination.[47] The protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is an absolute human right which upholds the individual’s right to the protection of his or her dignity and integrity, enshrined in Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[48] In the incidents detailed in this briefing paper, the SAC tortured villagers to extract information about local armed resistance attacks or activities, and punish villagers accused of being affiliated with or supporting local PDFs. Other incidents also included in this briefing paper as evidence encompass violence and ill-treatment at the hands of the Burma Army. Under international human rights law, these incidents evidence many violations of the 1948 UDHR,[49] including violations of villagers’ right to life, liberty and security, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, and freedom of movement.[50] The prohibition is further recalled by other universal and regional conventions.[51] Even though Burma is not a signatory to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as one of the most universally recognised human rights, the prohibition of torture has acquired status of customary international law, thus creating an obligation erga omnes, owed to and by all states, to act against those who torture, even if a state has not ratified the relevant treaty.[52] Moreover, under international humanitarian law (IHL), the targeting of civilians violates the fundamental principle of distinction between civilian and military targets in the conduct of hostilities, as enshrined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Articles 27 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians, and reaffirmed in Rule 1 of the ICRC Commentary of Customary IHL.[53] Any violation of these rights is qualified as a grave breach, allowing universal jurisdiction to bring the perpetrators to justice.[54] As further stated by Rule 90 of the ICRC Commentary, torture is prohibited in non-international armed conflicts, such as that occurring in Southeast Burma.[55] Moreover, Rule 156 of the ICRC Commentary qualifies torture as conduct that endangers protected persons and violates important values, such as by subjecting persons to humiliating treatment or forcing persons to undertake work that directly helps military operations of the enemy, as constituting war crimes.[56] Under international criminal law, exemplified by Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,[57] torture as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict needs to meet the requirement of the 1984 Convention Against Torture: i) the instrumental purpose of the criminal act, and ii) the act of torture must be committed by, or with the involvement, of a person in a position of authority (public official, de facto organ of a state, or other non-private capacity).[58] The SAC’s acts of torture against civilians for their alleged participation in or support of armed resistance groups meet the requirements to be qualified as war crimes. Torture may also constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) and, residually, (k) of the Rome Statute, when is committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population.[59] Notably, torture as a crime against humanity does not require an instrumental purpose, as the degree of aggression upon personal dignity and integrity is sufficient to make it a matter of international concern. Some of the incidents which occurred in the context of detention by the SAC may not have involved this purposive intent, but given their frequency and systematic nature, they may nevertheless amount to crimes against humanity. 5. Recommendations For international stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and regional and foreign governments: Acknowledge the serious crimes committed by the Burma Army leaders and avoid endorsing or legitimising the State Administration Council (SAC). This includes refraining from entering into agreements with them, granting them official recognition, and inviting them to participate in international forums and functions. Support local civil society and community-based organisations (CSO/CBOs) and ethnic service providers that prioritise human rights, and work with them to strengthen support systems for victims. Support local CSOs/CBOs to expand psychological support programmes -in all ethnic regions and languages- for survivors, their families, and the communities to help them cope with trauma, uncertainty and fear. Listen to and support local and civil society organisations in their efforts to document arbitrary detention and torture in Southeast Burma, advocate for victims’ rights, and provide comprehensive support to ensure the safety and protection of witnesses who come forward to testify about arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. This support should include relocation, psychosocial support, legal aid, and financial assistance. Support efforts to hold the Burma Army leaders accountable for their vast array of crimes in impartial and independent courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and foreign national courts with universal jurisdiction. Broaden the scope of international investigations to include torture and arbitrary detention faced by civilians residing in Southeast Burma. Raise international awareness of the crimes of torture and arbitrary detention in rural Southeast Burma and explore actionable measures to deter and address the occurrence of these crimes. Footnotes: [1] On February 1st 2021, the Burma (Myanmar) military deposed the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). The military transferred power to Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of Burma’s Armed Forces. Based on unproven fraud allegations, the Burma military invalidated the landslide victory of the NLD in the November 2020 General Election and stated it would hold new elections at the end of the state of emergency. Elected President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were detained, along with ministers, their deputies and members of Parliament. [2] In 1989, the then-ruling military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar without consultation from the people. KHRG prefers the use of Burma because it is more typically used by villagers, and since the name change to Myanmar is reflective of the military regime’s longstanding abuse of power. [3] The terms Burma military, Burma Army, and SAC are used interchangeably throughout this report to describe Burma’s armed forces. Villagers themselves commonly use Burma Army, Burmese soldiers, or alternatively the name adopted by the Burma military regime at the time -since the 2021 coup, the State Administration Council (SAC). [4] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma (Myanmar) and leads the Military Cabinet of Burma, the executive branch of the government. [5] Karen State, defined locally, includes the following areas: Kayin State, Tanintharyi Region and parts of Mon State and Bago Region. Karen State, located in Southeastern Burma, is primarily inhabited by ethnic Karen people. Most of the Karen population resides in the largely rural areas of Southeast Burma, living alongside other ethnic groups, including Bamar, Shan, Mon and Pa’Oh. [6] The present document is based on information received from February 2023 to February 2024. It was provided by community members in six out of seven districts of Karen State who have been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The code names do not correspond to the actual names or to coding used by KHRG in previous reports. [7] KHRG, Undeniable: War crimes, crimes against humanity and 30 years of villagers’ testimonies in rural Southeast Burma, December 2022. [8] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP Burma), ‘Political Prisoners Post-Coup’ monitoring as of 15th March 2024, available at: aappb.org/ [9] AAPP (Burma), Political Prisoners Experience in Interrogation, Judiciary, and Incarceration Since Burma’s Illegitimate Military Coup, March 2022, pp. 6-11 available at: aappb.org/?p=20734 [10] KHRG, Undeniable, above, December 2022. [11] KHRG operates in seven areas in Southeast Burma: Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton), Taw Oo (Toungoo), Kler Lwee Htoo (Nyaunglebin), Mergui-Tavoy, Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Dooplaya and Hpa-an. When KHRG receives information from the field, it organises data according to these seven areas. These are commonly referred to as ‘districts’ and are used by the Karen National Union (KNU), as well as many local Karen organisations, both those affiliated and unaffiliated with the KNU. KHRG’s use of the district designations in reference to our research areas does not imply political affiliation; rather, it is rooted in the fact that many rural communities commonly use these designations. For clarity, the Burmese terms for these districts are provided in brackets but do not correspond with the Burma (Myanmar) government administrative divisions. [12] For torture incidents committed by the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Kawthoolei Army (KTLA), for instance, see: KHRG, In the Dark: The crime of enforced disappearance and its impact on the rural communities of Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup, November 2023, pp.32-33. [13] KHRG, In the Dark, above, November 2023. [14] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army. [15] A Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) comprises 500 soldiers. Most Light Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw (or Burma Army) are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers, yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). LIBs are primarily used for offensive operations, but they are sometimes used for garrison duties. [16] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in March 2023. [17] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 20 [18] ‘Saw’ is a male honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name. [19]  A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village. [20] All conversion estimates for the kyat are based on the 18th March 2024 mid-market exchange rate of 1,000 kyat to USD 0.48 (taken from https://wise.com/gb/currency-converter/mmk-to-usd-rate). [21] Unpublished report from Kler Lwee Htoo District, received in August 2023. [22] ‘U is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name. [23] Unpublished report from Dooplaya District, received in September 2023. [24] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives. [25] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [26] Yaba, which means ‘crazy medicine’ in Thai, is a tablet form of methamphetamine. Introduced to East Asia during World War II to enhance soldiers’ performance, methamphetamine has become increasingly popular in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia Vietnam, and in Burma where it is typically manufactured; see “Yaba, the ‘crazy medicine’ of East Asia” UNODC, May 2008 and KHRG, “Chapter: Drug production, use and the social impacts in Southeast Myanmar since the January 2012 ceasefire,” in Truce or Transition: Trends in human rights abuse and local response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire, June 2014. [27] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in November 2023. [28] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name. [29] The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [30] The term Kawthoolei (or Kaw Thoo Lei) refers to Karen State as demarcated by the Karen National Union (KNU), but the exact meaning and etymology is disputed; see: Jonathan Falla, True Love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border, Cambridge University Press: 1991. [31] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024. [32] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024. [33] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 29. [34] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in September 2023. [35] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in April 2023. [36] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in June 2023 [37] In 1994, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) split from the KNLA over religious considerations. In 2010, the majority of DKBA troops transformed into BGFs, but one faction refused and changed its name to Democratic Karen Benevolent Army in 2012. In 2015, the DKBA Splinter Group split from this faction and reclaimed their original name, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. It is active in Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Hpa-an districts, and it has not signed the NCA. [38] KHRG, “Doo Tha Htoo District Incident Report: A DKBA operation commander tortured three villagers in Hpa-an Township (August 2023)”, December 2023. [39] ‘Naw’ is a female honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name. [40] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in November 2023. [41] Unpublished report from Doo Tha Htoo District, received in July 2023. [42] Since February 2021, KHRG has received at least 22 reports containing evidence of SAC soldiers using human shields, involving more than 564 villagers. See: KHRG, Shadow of Death: Use of civilians as human shields by the State Administration Council (SAC) in Southeast Burma since the coup, July 2023. [43] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Tatmadaw is commanded by a brigadier general, and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents . They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army). [44] KHRG, “Kler Lwee Htoo District Incident Report: Villagers arrested as human shields, and shelling and looting by the SAC in Moo Township, March 2023, October 2023”. [45] The Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) was founded on July 17th 2022 by Brigadier-General Nerdah Bo Mya. Nerdah Bo Mya, former Commander-In-Chief of the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), was dismissed by the KNU in 2022. KTLA operates in two districts in Southeast Burma, in KNU-controlled areas, namely Mergui-Tavoy and Dooplaya districts. In Dooplaya District, they operate in alliance with resistance armed groups. KTLA battalions in Mergui-Tavoy District are in conflict with both SAC and KNLA troops. [46] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in July 2023. [47] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1 [48] 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5. [49] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) [50] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3, Article 5, Article 9, Article 13. [51] 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7; and 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Art 14 [52] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Convention Against Torture’). [53] The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, Common Article 3: ‘Conflicts not of an international character’; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 27 and Article 32; ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 1: The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants, [54] 1949 Geneva Convention (IV), Article 146 and Article 147 [55] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 90: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. [56] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 156: Definition of War Crimes. [57] 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(i). [58] 1984 Convention Against Torture, Article 1 [59] 1998 Rome Statute, Article 7(1)(f) and (k)..."
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Date of entry/update: 2024-04-29
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Title: U.S. 'nonlethal' aid for Myanmar's ethnic armies likely to backfire
Sub-title: Increased violence would be costly for all parties
Description/subject: "Recent battlefield gains by Myanmar's resistance forces indicate that the military regime which seized power in February 2021 is on the defensive. Earlier this month, the junta lost control of Myawaddy, a trading center along the Thai border. Resistance groups also carried out drone strikes against targets in Naypyidaw, the capital, as well as the Defense Services Academy, near Mandalay. It is an appropriate time then to assess Western support for Myanmar's resistance. The conflict has strengthened ethnic armed groups, many of which were formed decades ago and are more ethnonationalist than democratic. How to handle these groups is a key issue for Washington, which is on the verge of implementing aid policies that risk exacerbating lethal divisions rather than promoting democracy. The U.S. cannot bet on the collapse of the military regime, which continues to control major population centers. Yet it has held back from offering military assistance to the resistance, especially after Washington's unproductive experience in Syria's civil war. But the terms on which Washngton is offering nonlethal aid in Myanmar risk creating the outcome it has been seeking to avoid. A $1.2 trillion funding package passed by the U.S. Congress last month raised this fiscal year's appropriation for Myanmar by 23% to $167 million. The expanded sum includes $75 million for cross-border aid and $25 million for nonlethal support to ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces fighting the regime. Washington has been here before. The language used in the appropriation was taken from a previous funding authorization relating to Syria, where nonlethal aid included body armor and intelligence about enemy troop positions. That appropriation led eventually to the covert deployment of lethal equipment. The immediate impact of the U.S. move will be to irritate Myanmar's neighbors, who will see it as an intensification of American involvement in the conflict. China has been hedging its bets by supporting both the military regime and several armed groups along the border. India and Thailand have also accepted military rule while allowing weapons and fighters to flow over their borders. None of them wishes to see greater U.S. entanglement. Implementing the nonlethal aid program will cause headaches for U.S. bureaucrats too. While the U.S. is ideologically driven to support democracies overseas, it is understood now in Washington that Myanmar is more complicated than it appeared when democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi drove the international narrative. The most powerful armed groups are organized along ethnic lines, entrenching long-standing differences about how to carve up Myanmar's territory. Alongside them are People's Defense Force groups, formed by urban youth in response to the regime's brutal crackdown on street protests and strikes. They started with no arms or military training and have been able to wage conventional warfare only with the aid of the ethnic armies. In the northwestern Sagaing region, where government forces recently have lost ground, every major assault on urban areas has been led by or involved significant participation by the Kachin Independence Army, the Chin National Defense Force or the All Burma Students' Democratic Front, which was formed after a 1988 uprising. The U.S. has taken note, and in an unprecedented public acknowledgement of engagement with the resistance, State Department Counselor Derek Chollet announced on social media platform X last month that he had met with the leaders of a coalition of armed Karen, Kachin, Karenni and Chin groups and had offered congratulations on their "extraordinary efforts to pursue a federal democracy in Burma." It is tempting for Washington to anoint the ethnic armed organizations as the new heroes of Myanmar. But the blood and soil nationalism that motivates them bears little resemblance to the Enlightenment values that are the pillars of the American republic. Even in aiming to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, such U.S. support is unlikely to make much difference given that Beijing is providing arms to both sides. The armed ethnic groups vary in their allegiance to democratic norms and the level of internal democracy within their ranks. But the harsh reality is that Myanmar is moving toward ethnic cantonization. The National Unity Government, a pro-democratic front largely operating from exile, has played a role in diplomacy and coalition building, but within Myanmar has had to rely mostly on the might of ethnic armies. Any peace settlement will have to reflect this balance of forces, which is likely to lead to the creation of ethnically based local administrations. It is not in the interest of the U.S. or of Myanmar for Washington to increase the level of violence by bolstering armed groups engaged in combat. Nor would the U.S. benefit from trying to goad China deeper into the fighting. While most of Southeast Asia gains from playing off China against the U.S., the most likely outcome in Myanmar would be more violence and death, creating the conditions for perpetual war. Some argue that splitting the country into many parts offers the best hope of a lasting peace, but recent violence between rival local councils in Chin state shows that division along ethnic lines is likely to lead to fresh complications. The hard fact is that this is not a conflict susceptible to quick and easy solutions, and any U.S. attempt to determine outcomes is likely to fail. Washington should spend its increased appropriation for Myanmar on humanitarian assistance and strengthening civil society, not supporting more fighting..."
Source/publisher: Nikkei Asian Review
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-29
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Title: Asean needs longer-term approach to Myanmar
Description/subject: "About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict.....About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict, the appointment of a special Myanmar envoy and the provision of humanitarian assistance – was agreed upon with the State Administration Council’s (SAC) senior general Min Aung Hlaing. The 5PC has since seen very limited progress. Airstrikes by the Myanmar military and fighting among various armed actors continue, leading to the displacement of more than 2.5 million people since the 2021 coup. Inclusive platforms for political dialogue have not materialized. While Indonesia created a new precedent of meeting with various stakeholders across Myanmar, the Asean chair’s one-year tenure remains too short for significant breakthroughs. Hitherto, observers have described Asean’s 5PC as “failed”, “toothless”, “not appropriate”, and a “dead pact” and have said Asean centrality is “in tatters”. Nonetheless, there are three useful features of the 5PC. It is deliberately capacious: its points (except naming the AHA Centre) remain broad with room for interpretation. It is not a peace plan and was crafted to avoid binding the actions of any successive chair. Second, the 5PC is what Asean member states believe gives Asean the standing to be involved in the Myanmar crisis. Many may disagree that any agreement from Min Aung Hlaing is required for Asean engagement, but it is nonetheless significant to Asean, committed to its principle of nonintervention. Without the 5PC, there would be no basis for Asean involvement. Third, the 5PC is a measure aimed at preventing major power rivalries around the Myanmar crisis by establishing a test case for Asean centrality. Consequently, the 5PC carries high stakes for Asean’s credibility in responding to the crisis through regional initiatives. Making progress on the 5PC is crucial. Successive Asean chairs face at least three main challenges. The first is discerning a mediumterm strategy for Asean’s engagement with Myanmar. The 5PC was designed to address the immediate aftermath of post-coup violence. But the desired “cessation of hostilities” will never come without a minimum acceptable medium-term strategy, accommodating the Myanmar people’s visions for the future. Here, half measures aimed solely at cease-fires will make no progress. Second are the limits of time and operating within the one-year Asean chair timeframe. Sensemaking and trust-building are massive undertakings, as Indonesia discovered through its painstaking efforts. The chair needs to understand facts, histories, and perspectives on the ground, then analyse the interests of domestic and regional actors, before finally devising its policies for the year. The first two stages might already take up the best part of five months, leaving a mere two to three months to craft its approach on Myanmar for the Asean summit. The third challenge is supplementing efforts at internal convening with external rallying. It must create space to bring together Myanmar stakeholders and simultaneously muster meaningful support from the international community. Between Myanmar, Asean and regional actors, there remains a wide gap of understanding. Many Myanmar stakeholders do not understand Asean’s processes and limitations, and many Asean member states do not fathom the complex relations and perspectives among the Myanmar groups. Asean must continue to create the space to learn from the various relevant Myanmar stakeholders and seek the support of the major frontline states, namely China and India, for its efforts. It is time to rethink the terms of the chair’s special envoy to enable Asean to deal with the aforementioned challenges. After three years, it is clear that no chair has the capacity to deal with the issue alone. In fact, it is unfair to leave the responsibility to the chair alone. Indonesia’s proposal of a troika mechanism is a nod towards the need for a sustainable, more permanent mechanism. In this respect, the creation of an Asean office on Myanmar follows sensibly. The office should focus on three main areas of the 5PC mandate – cessation of violence, delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitation of stakeholder dialogues – to create the spaces and conditions for a nationbuilding process. A troika-plus mechanism (one that includes key Asean countries that have the competence, leverage and persistence to engage) could see its members share a rotating coordinator role of the office, dividing up labour by issue, stakeholders or time periods. Importantly, the office must continue engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar, not only with the Myanmar military, as its main modus operandi. Finally, domestic engagement will have to be balanced with efforts on the external front, where the office could coordinate international envoys and rally support for Asean’s approach. A new United Nations special envoy has been appointed, and fresh coordination of envoys is needed. While the international community has given verbal support to Asean centrality, it must also be rallied to provide support through policy options, technical assistance, resources and political leverage. With a more permanent Asean office on Myanmar, a medium-term 5PC strategy can be built. This helps to avoid short-term, individual actions, such as elections organized by the junta or through the existing Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, that might derail medium-term objectives. The Asean strategy would ideally turn into a framework that coherently guides and shapes the chair’s efforts for the year and allows each chair to make piecemeal, sustainable progress on the crisis. This framework should outline how Asean, with the full support of the UN Security Council, can help to achieve three key objectives: (1) a humanitarian cease-fire, (2) a negotiated transition and (3) the establishment of an inclusive federal democracy in Myanmar. These objectives cover short, medium and long-term goals. New procedures for implementation and milestones to measure progress toward the objectives must be developed. As recently as December 2023, the 17th Asean Defense Ministers’ Meeting acknowledged the “need to develop concrete, practical and measurable indicators in support of the implementation of the FivePoint Consensus”. Thankfully, the 5PC is sufficiently broadly worded to allow flexibility in activities and implementation. The establishment of a permanent office in Myanmar, initiated by the current chair Laos, could be formalized by Malaysia and effected by the Philippines. The time to start is now. (The writers are, respectively, director of research at the Surin Pitsuwan Foundation, Thailand; head of the Department of International Relations and coordinator for the Myanmar Initiative Program at the Jakartabased Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and executive director of the Institute for Strategy and Policy, Myanmar.)..."
Source/publisher: The Statesman
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-29
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Title: Addressing the 2021 Myanmar Coup: A New Strategy for ASEAN
Description/subject: "ASEAN must shift away from its military-centric engagement with Myanmar. In doing so, it must embrace a process and posture that addresses underlying structural inequities. The 2021 Myanmar coup differs markedly from those in 1988 and 1962, facing strong domestic resistance and international condemnation. The National Unity Government (NUG), seen as legitimate, counters the military’s authority, underscoring the coup’s failure to secure control or legitimacy, rendering it more an “attempted” than a successful takeover. To maintain and enhance peace, security, and stability, and to further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region is one of the purposes of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Presently, a pivotal concern for ASEAN leadership pertains to discerning strategies to mitigate protracted armed conflict and engender sustainable peace within Myanmar. Concurrently, they must grapple with elucidating the underlying reasons for the ineffective implementation of the 5 Points Consensus (5PC) in resolving the Myanmar issue. The deficiency in realising the 5PC can be attributed to a myopic focus solely on the immediate conflict spurred by the attempted coup, as orchestrated by Myanmar’s military. This focus has hindered solutions addressing the key requisites for enduring peace in Myanmar. In order to adhere to a coherent course of action, ASEAN leaders are compelled to address three fundamental inquiries: Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation? Does the Myanmar military singularly possess the requisite capacity to stabilise and uphold the integrity of Myanmar? What are the underlying catalysts precipitating Myanmar’s protracted conflicts? Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation? The basic premise that the Myanmar military has the capacity to establish sustainable peace within the nation is questionable. The longstanding pattern of armed conflict in Myanmar, exacerbated by military coups and subsequent insurgencies, underscores the ineffectiveness of military rule in being genuine partners in fostering lasting peace. Since assuming power in 1958, and subsequently in 1962 and 1988, successive military regimes have failed to engage, let alone quell, armed resistance movements, leading to the proliferation of ethnic armed groups and protracted conflict over the past six decades. Despite sporadic attempts at peacemaking initiatives, such as ceasefires and negotiations, these efforts have largely been superficial and have failed to address the root causes of the conflicts. According to Bertil Litner, a prominent expert on the Myanmar Civil War, these peacemaking endeavours have primarily served to provide armed groups with temporary respite and economic opportunities for military leaders, rather than addressing underlying political grievances. A few weeks ago, renowned conflict scholar Johan Galtung passed away. Galtung long advocated for approaches that deepen understanding and generate creative, integrative solutions to the most complex of conflicts. For example, Galtung’s conflict triangle theory outlines the limitations of ceasefire agreements in achieving sustainable peace. Merely halting hostilities without addressing structural and cultural conflicts, this theory suggests, can only yield negative peace at best. The point here is that the Myanmar military’s historical approach to peacemaking has not fostered enduring stability and does not include peacebuilding approaches for longer-term transformative change to address the drivers of conflicts. To attain sustainable peace and justice in Myanmar, ASEAN leaders must listen to and engage with a range of Myanmar’s leaders, and work to adopt a comprehensive approach addressing direct, structural, and cultural aspects of the conflict. By acknowledging and addressing the multifaceted nature of the crisis, ASEAN can support and foster a conducive environment for lasting peace and stability in Myanmar. Is the Myanmar military one entity with enough strength to stabilise and preserve Myanmar? The assertion that the Myanmar military is the sole entity possessing sufficient capability to stabilise and safeguard the nation is unfounded. That the people of Myanmar have shown their rejection and resistance to military rule is well documented. Since 1 February 2021, during attempted military seizures of power, the nation witnessed annual widespread participation in silent strikes, underscoring public aversion towards military rule and its political entrenchment. Observable trends, such as dwindling enrolment rates at military academies and reports of coerced conscription among Myanmar’s youth further affirm the peoples’ disapproval of military involvement in governance. Recent events, notably the coordinated offensive launched in Northern Shan State on 27 October, 2024, have unveiled the true limitations of the Myanmar military’s capabilities and morale. Contrary to prior perceptions of invincibility, these events have exposed vulnerabilities within the military apparatus. Assertions propagated by the Myanmar military regarding its indispensable role in maintaining stability within the nation are now recognised as baseless bravado. The causes of Myanmar’s armed conflicts started from the era of the Burmese kings. The genesis of armed conflict in Myanmar can be traced back to several historical antecedents, beginning with the era of the Burmese monarchs. The entrenched autocratic system, characterised by its phenotypical brutality, instigated protracted wars between the Burmese kingdom and various ethnic groups such as the Mon, Shan, and Rakhine. These conflicts have endured across generations, perpetuating a cycle of violence and discord. The colonial period and the upheavals of the Second World War exacerbated pre-existing cultural tensions, further exacerbating interethnic hostilities, and entrenching exclusionary governance systems for inequitable recognition and power sharing. The journey towards Independence, marred by distrust between the dominant Burman ethnic group and minority ethnic communities, laid the groundwork for post-independence conflict. Today, Myanmar’s armed revolution is rooted in entrenched social conflicts, exacerbated by structural disparities. These encompass issues such as perceptions of federalism, resource allocation, territorial delineation, and the protection of ethnic and minority rights. The protracted armed conflicts spanning over 70 years, coupled with the oppressive, divisive tactics employed by the Myanmar military, perpetuate deep cultural and structural fault lines within the nation. Achieving sustainable peace in Myanmar necessitates addressing not only ceasefires but also the underlying structural and social conflicts. As this line of analysis suggests, giving primacy for peace leadership to the military is not going to be effectual for lasting peace. Engaging with Myanmar entails a multifaceted approach aimed at resolving chronic social tensions and fostering social cohesion across diverse ethnic and cultural divides. ASEAN leaders and the international community can look to the notable shifts in the dynamics of the situation in Myanmar led by a range of civil society, elected leaders, and EROs (ethnic revolutionary organisations) to help end the conflict. Contemporary Myanmar society exhibits distinct signs of transformation, such as a diminished reliance on the military apparatus, and a profound aversion to the divisive tactics of Burmanisation employed by the Myanmar military. This heightened awareness among the majority Burman populace, coupled with an increasing recognition of the suffering endured by ethnic minority communities residing in border regions, has catalysed a burgeoning sense of mutual understanding and empathy among Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups. Notably, the ongoing Myanmar Spring Revolution underscores a positive trajectory towards social cohesion, characterised by widespread sympathy and solidarity among the populace. Leaders of armed resistance factions, including the National Unity Government, evince a nuanced understanding of Myanmar’s structural conflicts and espouse a steadfast commitment to pursuing peaceful resolutions through dialogue. Myanmar’s protracted peace process stands firmly rooted, with concerted efforts directed towards addressing underlying structural inequities. At the forefront of the revolution’s objectives lies the imperative to dismantle the entrenched authoritarian grip of the Myanmar military, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a new federal democratic state. In this context, the responsibility falls upon ASEAN leaders and the international community to re-assess its military-centric engagement, where no durable solutions can be found, and engage meaningfully in the transformative processes for peace and justice in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-29
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Monday 29 April, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-29
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Monday 29 April 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-29
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Monday 29 April 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-29
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Title: The history of Cox’s Bazar is the history of the Rohingya
Sub-title: Exploring the historical nexus between Cox’s Bazar and the Rohingya
Description/subject: "While classical literature extensively documents the historical trajectory of Cox's Bazar, contemporary discourse often overlooks its intrinsic association with the Rohingya refugees. It is pertinent to acknowledge that the annals of Cox's Bazar are inherently intertwined with the Rohingya narrative. The incursion of Burmese forces into Arakan in 1784 precipitated a mass exodus of Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic communities towards the Ramu region (present day Cox’s Bazar), marking the inaugural instance of refugee influx into Cox's Bazar. Subsequently, in response to this humanitarian crisis, the British colonial administration dispatched Captain Hiram Cox to facilitate the settlement of displaced Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic people, in 1798. The eponymous nomenclature "Cox's Bazar" thus derives from Captain Hiram Cox, symbolizing the historical intervention undertaken to address the exigencies of displaced refugees. Prior to the year 1784, the geographical region presently identified as Cox's Bazar Sadar -- inclusive of its municipal boundaries -- alongside the Ukhiya and Teknaf sub-districts wherein contemporary refugee settlements are positioned, exhibited a notable absence of substantive human habitation. This area was characterized by sparse population density, with only a limited number of individuals inhabiting the territory corresponding to the current Ramu and Chakaria sub-district. It is to be noted that the territorial expanse comprising the entirety of the Chittagong Division, encompassing Chittagong, Cox's Bazar, Rangamati, Bandarban, Khagrachhari, Feni, Lakshmipur, Comilla, Noakhali, Brahmanbaria, and Chandpur districts, along with the present-day Rakhine State, was historically under the jurisdiction of Arakan -- an autonomous domain distinct from Myanmar and Bengal. The settlement and agricultural development of the entire Cox's Bazar district and the present-day Rakhine State of Myanmar were undertaken by the antecedents of the Rohingya populace. The vast tracts of land in these regions were previously uncultivated and sparsely inhabited. Following the Anglo-Burmese war in 1824 and with the implementation of British legislation such as the Waste Land Rules of 1839, 1941, 1863, and 1865, a substantial influx of individuals migrated to these areas with the intention of establishing residence and cultivation. This phenomenon bears resemblance to the governmental policies of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, wherein efforts were made to settle Bengali populations in the hill tracts of Bangladesh. It is imperative to acknowledge that the initial arrival of Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar was contemporaneous with the displacement of Rakhine ethnic groups, who were compelled to flee persecution stemming from the Burmese invasion. The vestiges of this historical displacement are discernible in the Burmese market locale within Cox's Bazar city, serving as a poignant testament to the shared heritage and collective tribulations endured by diverse communities in the region. Prior to the year 1784, the geographical region presently identified as Cox's Bazar Sadar exhibited a notable absence of substantive human habitation Rohingya ethnogenesis The Rohingya populace residing in the Arakan region is discerned as a distinctive nation or ethnicity, emanating from the amalgamation of disparate cultures, races, and societal vicissitudes over an extensive historical continuum spanning millennia. The Rohingya ethnic identity is the product of a heterogeneous confluence of migratory movements and cultural amalgamations. This amalgamation encompasses the historical influx of Arab traders and religious emissaries during the 7th to 9th centuries, Bengali migrants in the 15th century, Indian settlers during the 17th and 19th centuries, in addition to subsequent waves of Bengali, Chittagonian, and individuals from Portuguese, Moorish, Persian, Mughal, and Pathan backgrounds at various junctures in history. The Rohingya are recognized as indigenous owing to their possession of distinctive cultural mores, traditions, and values, which underpin their self-identification as a discrete socio-cultural entity. Despite their minority status within the national context, they persist as a coherent ethnic group within their domicile. The Rohingya population is deemed indigenous based on their preservation of distinctive cultural traditions, customs, and values, which distinguishes them as a separate entity within their nation, thereby meeting the criteria for indigenous status within contemporary anthropological discourse. People of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar It is of scholarly interest to highlight those elderly inhabitants, specially who are aged 70 years and older, within the regions of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, exhibit a tendency to eschew the usage of the term "Rohingya" when referring to Rohingya refugees, preferring instead to employ the appellation "Burmaiya," signifying individuals originating from Burma/Myanmar. One of the inclinations of this is that the senior citizens of Cox’s Bazar deemed themselves as Rohingya, ie the Rohingya citizen of Bangladesh and the refugees as the Rohingya citizen of Myanmar. It implies that the ethnicity is the same while their citizenships are different. One might argue, but there are some differences when it comes to language and culture. As we all know, language and culture evolve over a period of time. We don’t speak the same as we spoke, eg 20 years ago. Many of the terminologies have been incorporated in our culture due to cultural intermingling. As someone rooted in rural life of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong and exposed to various societal strata through familial and professional connections, I've observed striking parallels between the linguistic and cultural norms of marginalized communities in our villages and those of the Rohingya populace. While we've had opportunities for linguistic and cultural development, the Rohingya have faced constraints in this regard. The linguistic discourse prevalent among marginalized communities and rural agrarians in our villages three decades prior bears remarkable resemblance to the contemporary linguistic vernacular of the Rohingya populace The linguistic discourse prevalent among marginalized communities and rural agrarians in our villages three decades prior bears remarkable resemblance to the contemporary linguistic vernacular of the Rohingya populace, while the cultural paradigms embraced by the Rohingya community conspicuously parallel to those espoused within our societal milieu of three decades past. While we've had the opportunity to develop our language and culture over time, through education, exposure to media like Bollywood and Hollywood, and the incorporation of new words and cultures, the Rohingya have not had the same chances. That's the fundamental difference I've noticed. Historically, all countries in the world have borders with the same ethnic groups living on both sides of the border and Rohingya is no exception. Only difference is some Rohingya are Burmese by nationality, and some are Bangladeshi. The indigenous population of the Naga community residing within the territorial confines of India is recognized as Kachin within the borders of Myanmar, whereas the Indian Mijo ethnic group is designated as Chin within the corresponding geographical domain of Myanmar. Similarly, the autochthonous Shaan populace of Myanmar is denominated as Thai within the boundaries of Thailand. Those individuals acknowledged as Rakhine within the Rakhine State are identified by the appellations Mogh within the regions of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, and alternatively referred to as Marma within the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Although the Durand Line delineates the demarcation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it fails to segregate the Pashtun ethnicity across both nations, thereby preserving their ethnic identity notwithstanding the divergence in citizenship status. While national borders may be imposed to define the territorial sovereignty of individual states, the intrinsic ethnicity, along with its consequent ethnic affiliations and interrelations, persist beyond such delineations..."
Source/publisher: Dhaka Tribune
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-28
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Title: Myanmar junta leader struggles with setbacks and a democracy icon
Description/subject: "Mizzima Editorial Nobody envies the current predicament of Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Military positions are falling and soldiers are deserting. Generals within the ranks are grumbling. Even some of his supporters are upset at his performance and speaking out. If that wasn’t bad enough, the potential horror of a public-relations nightmare of Myanmar’s democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi possibly dying of heatstroke in a non-airconditioned “prison box” has prompted a scramble to rehouse her and the former president Win Myint, possibly in cooler and more salubrious living quarters, though their whereabouts have not been confirmed. There is the tut-tutting of the dragon to the north. It has not gone without notice that China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, recently met with former military regime strongman Than Shwe in Naypyidaw and members of the current junta with, no doubt, messages to “cool it” and seek solutions to the worsening Myanmar crisis that is threatening Chinese investments, infrastructure, trade and friendly relations. China is no fan of democracy but is certainly pragmatic. Min Aung Hlaing hangs out in his ivory tower in Naypyidaw, a city purportedly built with astrologers’ advice to protect the “men in green” from foreign invaders but in reality to protect them from their own irate people – Bamar and ethnic – living in the Golden Land. It is impossible to know what Min Aung Hlaing is thinking but it may be dawning on him that he made a grave mistake in the early hours of 1 February 2021 when he pulled the rug from under the duly-elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party and incarcerated its leaders. Now rumours are swirling that the junta may release some jailed members of the NLD, a party removed from registration ahead of what Min Aung Hlaing claims will be a “free and fair” – though “limited” – election in the not-too-distant future. Min Aung Hlaing – by ripping the reins from Suu Kyi’s hands – misjudged the Myanmar people, particularly Generation Z, who had got used to expanding freedoms brought in under the Thein Sein regime, and picked up by the democrats in the NLD, in the wake of the 2015 election. There is little doubt that he expected protests and then eventually a return to teeth-grinding normality as happened during previous challenges to military regime rule – particularly in 1988 and the early 1990s, and in the wake of the 2007 Safron Revolution. But Generation Z hit back under the banner of the Spring Revolution. Now, one by one, the military junta’s pawns are being removed from the chessboard, army positions falling, military colleagues growing doubtful, the failures adding up, leaving the power-hungry general with shrinking options, and an opposition of Spring Revolutionaries growing increasingly bold, knocking at the gates. But Min Aung Hlaing is wily. He will no doubt be hoping that he can play a game in which when “peace” is sought by Myanmar players and the international community, he and his generals will be at the negotiating table, with a clear intent to include his military in a future federal Myanmar. But such a stance is anathema to the Spring Revolutionaries who are seeking to tear down revered General Aung San’s hard-won creation and build a new “federal union” with the military slate swept clean..."
Source/publisher: "Mizzima"
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-28
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Title: Myanmar’s economy is still in free fall
Sub-title: Battlefield losses mount as the military junta has dragged the country back into poverty.
Description/subject: "While the Myanmar military regime’s battlefield losses throughout the country are grabbing headlines, the country’s dire economic crisis is further undercutting the junta’s capacity to wage war. Myanmar’s military has suffered significant battlefield losses throughout the country since an ethnic rebel army alliance launched Operation 1027 nearly six months ago, raising questions whether the military is able to retake lost territories. Fighting across eight distinct battle scapes, the military is unable to divide and conquer, and even its emphasis on first retaking the heartland of the ethnic majority Bamars, has faltered. In Sagaing, the junta has suffered significant setbacks and only recaptured one town. in southern Myanmar, two Mon resistance organizations agreed to work together as they prepare to go on the attack against the regime. The junta offensive to recapture Myawaddy, the largest border crossing with Thailand is another case in point. Despite the city’s strategic importance, the military’s counter-offensive has stalled, with their force being reportedly ambushed and harassed. While manpower issues have led to forced conscription, no less important is whether the regime is able to financially sustain its military operations. Myanmar is broke, because the junta has broken the economy since its February 2021 coup. The junta has eviscerated over a decade’s worth of economic growth. Between 2011 and 2019, Myanmar’s economy grew by an average 6% a year, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the region. Its poverty rate fell from 49% in 2005 to 25% in 2017. While the economy has recovered from its 2021 nadir, when GDP contracted by 18%, it’s still down 12% since the coup. The World Bank’s cautious scenario for 1% growth in 2024 seems beyond reach. Back into poverty The military has dragged the country back into poverty through their own incompetence. Today, over 50 percent of the population of 55 million people has fallen back into poverty. A recent United Nations Development Program report was more dire, citing field interviews that found 49.7% of respondents living on less than 76 U.S. cents a day. That number has doubled since 2017. The UNDP noted that the urban middle class has collapsed by 50% since the coup. Inflation remains extremely high, at over 18 percent; though it reached 29% in mid-2023, according to the World Bank. Food prices have gone up threefold since the coup, with rice up from 60,000 kyat per kilogram to 180,000. Firms, according to a World Bank survey, were operating at 56% capacity in 2023, down by 16% from 2022. That has diminished tax receipts. Indeed, all sources of revenue, except natural gas rents, are down since the coup, according to the regime’s own data. This has been in part due to the economic conditions as well as the NUG’s active campaign of product boycotts, the establishment of alternate lotteries, and a drive to have corporations put their taxes into escrow. Once cash cows, the two military-owned conglomerates Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd. and Myanma Economic Corporation are hemorrhaging funds. The former has since the coup failed to pay dividends to service members who are forced to invest a portion of their monthly salary. Foreign investment, other than that from opportunistic Chinese and Thai businesses, is fleeing the country. The once-thriving digital payments market is under intense military scrutiny, as they seek to control the flow of funds to the opposition. Border crossings lost The regime’s shortage of dollars has led to arbitrary currency controls, impacting importers and exporters. The kyat lost 16% of its value in the first quarter of 2024 alone, while the price of gold increased 22%. The war has hurt the economy in another way. Myanmar-Now reports that the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, only controls 11 border crossings, which has led to a sharp loss of customs duties. The Kachin Independence Army has captured the Lweje crossing in Kachin State, leaving only the modest town of Kanpaiktee under junta control. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army holds Chinshwehaw in Shan State, where the Chinese brokered an 80-20 revenue sharing agreement between them and the junta. Although the SAC still holds Muse, the main border crossing with China, the Three Brotherhood Alliance has surrounded the town and controls the roads to Lashio and has begun collecting taxes. The junta still controls Tachileik in southern Shan State, as well as a number of smaller crossings in Mon and Tanintharyi States. In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army’s consolidation of power in northern Rakhine and opposition advances in Chin state mean that the junta has lost control of several of the border crossings to India and Bangladesh. The loss of the Myawaddy, which has a population of 200,000, is an acute financial blow to the regime. With two bridges into Thailand’s Mae Sot, it was the largest border crossing in the country, accounting for $4.4 billion in trade since the February 2021 coup d’etat, roughly 23% of the country’s total trade. Reuters noted a sharp decline in trade, especially exports, from April 2023 to March 2024. Bilateral trade fell by over 40 percent to $1.15 billion. Hyperinflation threat While junta officials are still manning the border gates, the Karen National Union and local border guards forces are in control of much of the city, and have pledged to “implement our plan to establish our administration one step at a time,” including customs. The loss of border trade is so deleterious to the regime as their shortage of dollars – exacerbated by the U.S.-imposed sanctions on the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanma Investment and Commerce Bank, which handled Myanmar’s dollar transactions – has forced them to prioritize trade in local currencies. The SAC has desperately stepped up economic cooperation with any willing partners. On April 9, the government met with a Russian-led trading bloc to discuss economic cooperation, including trade, investment, direct payments and the opening of direct flights between Moscow and Yangon. Turning to the Eurasian Economic Commission is a sign of how few choices the regime has. What is not certain right now is the degree to which the illicit economy from areas controlled by pro-junta border guards forces is ebbing. Seeking to distance himself from Naypyitaw, Col. Saw Chit Thu recently rebranded his border forces as the Karen National Army. There is intense fighting now outside of Shwe Kokko, one of the major scam centers along the Thai border, though opposition forces have not taken the enclave. While the MNDAA has largely cooperated with the Chinese and helped return hundreds of Chinese fugitives, many of the scam centers along the Thai border – including KK Park I and II, as well as Family Park, Gate 25, Huanya, Xingua and Dongmei – remain open. The regime has scapegoated a number of senior-level economic officials, including its seventh-highest official, Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun, and his aide. But that’s all they were, scapegoats, no different than the other corrupt and incompetent generals who remain. Thus far, and defying predictions, the junta has not resorted to turning on the printing press at their banknote facility in Wazi. But as they become more cash strapped, they are likely to do just that. On top of all the human death and misery the generals have caused in the conduct of a war that has largely targeted civilians, the threat of hyperinflation looms..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-28
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar UN ambassador calls for international support amid political and economic crises
Description/subject: "The Myanmar Ambassador to United Nations Kyaw Moe Tun has called on the international community during the General Debate of the 2024 ECOSOC Financing for Development Forum in New York on 25 April to provide political and economic support for his country steeped in crisis. The following is his statement: Madam President, Myanmar aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the ASEAN, the LDCs the G77, and China respectively. Successful implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) and its seven action areas remains key to achieving the SDGs. The 2024 Financing for Sustainable Development Report highlighted fiscal constraints, debt distress and acute financing needs of many developing countries. The 4th International Conference on FFD should, therefore, strengthen international cooperation on addressing financing gaps, accelerate urgent actions to implement the 2030 Agenda and reform the international financial architecture. As embodied by the AAAA, individual member states bear the primary responsibility of paving their own path toward realizing sustainable development while the international community provides an enabling environment and complementary support. Unfortunately, in my country, Myanmar, the illegal military coup in February 2021 has dismantled our prospects of realizing the SDGs, even the future of our youth. The people of Myanmar are experiencing various grave sufferings due to the military junta’s atrocities. In this regard, I wish to highlight the following action areas of the AAAA in the country. Domestic Public Resources: The deteriorating economic situation, inflation, rising food prices, worsening humanitarian situation, and mass displacement have forced the population to focus more on survival over investment and growth. UNDP reported that almost half of the population was living below the national poverty line in 2023. The middle class is disappearing, indicating growing polarization in society. Moreover, the crowding out of human capital investment threatens to undermine the future re-emergence of the middle class. At the same time, the total breakdown of the rule of law and rampant corruption has exacerbated the illicit economy including online scams. UNODC reported that Myanmar became the world’s largest opium producer by the end of 2023. According to UNCTAD, up to $1,347 million in inward illicit financial flows have been generated from the potential exports of opiates. Domestic and international private business and finance: The World Bank reported that financial sector reforms have also stagnated and are in danger of being reversed after the illegal military coup. Microfinance institutions were impacted by the subsequent domestic banking crisis, affecting 5 million customers including many MSMEs. Besides, the recent unlawful forced conscription of the military junta has pushed many youth, including those working in the private sector, into hiding and fleeing the country. In conclusion, Madam President, Myanmar is currently at the intersection of political, economic, and developmental crises. Cooperation and effective assistance from the international community should be conflict-sensitive and tailored to the aspirations of our people. It is crystal clear that ending the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union is the only way forward to create a conducive environment to the successful implementation of the AAAA and the 2030 Agenda, above all to the peace and stability in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "Mizzima"
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-28
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: "The Mirror" ("Kyemon") - ကြေးမုံ - Sunday 28 April, 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-28
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 6.32 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM28.4.2024.pdf
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Title: "Myanmar Alin", - မြန်မာ့အလင်း - Sunday 28 April 2024
Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-28
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 3.52 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 28.4.24.pdf
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Title: "The Global New Light of Myanmar" Sunday 28 April 2024
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of entry/update: 2024-04-28
Type: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.41 MB
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