Political History
Individual Documents
Description:
"Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing on Monday handed the Thiri Pyanchi titles and decorations to Hideo Watanabe, chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association.
Ultranationalist monk U Wirathu, once dubbed by Time magazine as the “Buddhist Bin Laden” and the Russian defense minister and his deputy were awarded the Thiri Pyanchi title in November last year. The honorary titles were awarded for “strenuous cooperation to bring about peace, development and prosperity in Myanmar”, according to the junta.
Watanabe could not attend the main ceremony in early January so the 90-year-old junta apologist received his title in Naypyitaw on Monday.
Joint secretary of the regime’s governing body, the State Administration Council, Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, who oversees torture chambers as the military intelligence chief, and Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Soe Htut were present. Watanabe also accepted a Thray Sithu title on behalf of former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso.
Min Aung Hlaing called Watanabe a “good friend” and thanked him for his efforts to “foster ties between the two countries and two armies, and attract Japanese investment into Myanmar”.
Watanabe vowed to promote bilateral friendship and boost the development of Myanmar and its military.
He thanked Min Aung Hlaing on behalf of Taro Aso who was busy with election preparation in Japan.
He visited deputy junta chief Soe Win and met the chairman of the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party U Khin Yi in November.
Watanabe, a former lawmaker in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, represents Japanese investors in Myanmar.
His ties with Min Aung Hlaing go back a decade. They met shortly before and after the military chief staged his coup in February 2021.
Following the military takeover, Watanabe told Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper that Min Aung Hlaing had not staged a coup but “done what he should have in accordance with the law”.
In late May 2021, as the number of civilians killed by the regime passed 800, Watanabe’s son Yusuke, who is secretary general of JMA, wrote in The Diplomat that Min Aung Hlaing’s coup was constitutional and Japan should continue to boost its “special relationship with the Tatmadaw”, meaning honorable military.
Watanabe insisted that he was not siding with the military but “didn’t want people to say that the military was suppressing and killing its own citizens”. He said he believed assurances that Min Aung Hlaing would bring genuine democracy to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Until the Myanmar military’s 2021 coup, assassinations involving guns were rare in the country, with the notable exception of the shooting of prominent lawyer U Ko Ni outside Yangon International Airport in 2017.
But since the putsch, assassinations involving guns have become increasingly common and are now happening on an almost daily basis.
Over 5,000 military sympathizers, alleged informants, members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), junta officials and employees have been killed since the coup, with another 4,000 injured, said junta boss Min Aung Hlaing at a meeting of the National Defense and Security Council on February 1.
Having failed to protect its supporters and workers, the junta is now attempting to remedy that by amending the Arms Act. A new policy issued by the regime’s Ministry of Home Affairs will allow junta supporters to hold weapons to protect themselves.
The military has already turned much of the country into a battlefield. Now it is bringing arms into society itself, a sign surely of more bloodshed to come.
Under the new policy, arms and ammunition will be issued to civilians who agree to participate in local security and law enforcement in their states and regions. In other words, the new policy will allow regime supporters to fight for the junta in plain clothes.
Citizens over the age of 18 will be issued licenses allowing them to hold five different types of weapons including pistols and hunting rifles. The arms are intended for USDP members, military supporters, former military personnel, administrators, and business owners.
“In the past, licenses to hold arms were only granted to prominent cronies like U Tay Za and U Aung Ko Win. Now it appears that weapons licenses will be given to many business people,” said a source close to the regime.
U Tay Za, a notorious arms broker and long-time military crony, used to buy arms from overseas and present them to generals who were close to him, added the source.
“Generals have some of the best foreign-made guns in the world. Every general has more than one gun, apart from the one issued to them by the Ka Pa Sa [the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defense Industries],” said the source.
In Myanmar, only the Ministry of Home Affairs is allowed to import weapons and ammunition, and citizens are prohibited from buying guns from abroad.
But it has been a long time since cronies were able to import weapons to present to generals or to use for hunting and shooting sports, said a source from the home affairs ministry.
“The weapons seized from Phyo Ko Ko Tint San were imported that way,” said the source.
Phyo Ko Ko Tint San, the son of U Tint San, the sports minister in U Thein Sein’s administration, was arrested on October 15, 2017, after two pistols and ammunition, as well as narcotics, were discovered in his backpack at Naypyitaw Airport. Police went on to seize more than 20 guns from his hotel, company offices and houses in Naypyitaw and Yangon. In 2020, Phyo Ko Ko Tint San was sentenced to 30 years to prison.
Under the new regime policy, pro-junta militias and security organizations will be allowed to hold pistols, rifles and automatic weapons with permits issued by the home affairs ministry. This is similar to the way the Myanmar military previously armed ethnic militias in Shan State to combat ethnic armed organizations operating there.
Since the coup, the regime has formed militias known as Pyu Saw Htee to fight the resistance in Sagaing, Magwe and Mandalay regions.
The move to arm civilians comes at a time when the junta is facing ever-growing resistance nationwide from People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations.
“This plan amounts to pushing military supporters into the killing fields. There will be more pre-emptive attacks and more bloodshed,” said a soldier who has joined the Civil Disobedience Movement.
Government employees, administrators and military supporters in the 37 townships where the regime has imposed martial law will be given priority in the issuing of gun licenses, according to information leaked from the home affairs ministry.
In the two years since the coup, weapons have already flooded into civilian society. Military supporters have publicly asked to be armed at junta press conferences so that they can respond to resistance attacks and the regime has now agreed to their demands.
Notorious ultranationalist and USDP member U Hla Swe has been urging the regime to allow supporters to have licensed guns.
He said in an interview that some junta-appointed ministers have asked him how they could acquire arms. He has said that he will apply for licenses to hold two guns.
“In fact, all the administrators, [junta-allied] politicians and business owners have guns already. And the regime is now making it legal by asking them to apply for licenses,” said a source in the capital Naypyitaw.
There have already been frequent firefights between junta officials, Pyu Saw Htee and PDFs in the resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region.
“Soldiers and police only come to wards during their patrols. They are usually in police stations and security outposts for the rest of the time. But ward administrators are always in their ward. So they face a greater security threat,” said one politician.
However, there is a risk that the new policy will backfire on the regime.
“They [junta supporters] face the risk of their guns being grabbed. And there is also the risk of officials defecting along with their guns,” said a striking police officer.
Police and ward administrators will know who has weapons in their areas, as people applying for the new gun licenses will have to apply to their ward administrators and local police first.
Eligible citizens will be allowed hold up to three different types of weapons per person under the new policy. Government employees will be permitted to hold an automatic weapon in addition to the three different types of gun.
Ammunition will also be issued. The new policy allows 50 bullets for each pistol and 100 bullets for each automatic weapon. Neither telescopic sights nor silencers will be allowed under the policy.
Retired lieutenant colonel and former National League for Democracy member U Kyaw Zeya wrote on his Facebook page: “I am not holding arms again at this age. I am happy to die if someone comes and kills me.”
“It is the duty of the Myanmar military to protect the people,” he added.
Military lobbyists are calling for arming all officials down to the level of 100-household administrators.
But there are concerns about the new guns being used to attack non-Buddhists, as the ultranationalist Buddhist association Ma Ba Tha are military supporters. And there are also concerns about the guns fueling an increase in crime.
The price of weapons on the black market along the Myanmar-Thailand border has increased by at least five times since the coup, according to arms experts.
“The price will increase again if the military issues the licenses,” said a weapon expert.
The military’s ordnance factories can produce both pistols and bullets, and they have the capacity to manufacture to order, said a striking soldier.
Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun has told pro-regime media outlets that the junta will legalize the establishment of weapons-manufacturing companies.
More than 3,000 civilians have died at the hands of the junta since the coup, according to a February 17 statement from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Now it seems that many more will die as a result of the regime’s new policy of issuing weapons to its supporters..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
464.38 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ယနေ့သည် ချင်းလူမျိုးများအားလုံး အလေးအမြတ်ထားသည့် ဂုဏ်ယူဖွယ် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် တစ်ရက် ဖြစ်သည်။ နှစ်စဉ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် ယနေ့တွင် စိန်ရတု အထိမ်းအမှတ် (၇၅) နှစ် တိုင်တိုင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် စိန်ရတု ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အား ချင်းလူမျိုးများနှင့် ထပ်တူထပ်မျှ အလေးထားဂုဏ်ယူပါကြောင်းနှင့် ပြည်ထောင်စု အတွင်းသာမက ကမ္ဘာ့အနယ်နယ်အရပ်ရပ်တွင် ရောက်ရှိ နေထိုင်ကြသော ချင်းလူမျိုးများ အားလုံး စိတ္တသုခ၊ ကာယသုခ နှစ်ဖြာပြည့်စုံပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာ ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ဗြိတိသျှကိုလိုနီလက်အောက်သို့ ချင်းပြည်မကျရောက်မီ ချင်းအမျိုးသားများသည် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်မှု၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ယဉ်ကျေးမှုစာပေ၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများဖြင့် သမိုင်းအစဉ်အလာ ကြီးမားစွာ အစဉ်အဆက် နေထိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။ဗြိတိသျှကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့အား ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံ ခုံခံတွန်းလှန်သည်မှစ၍ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်တွင် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးပြီး တောင်တန်းပြည်မ အတူတကွ လွတ်လပ်ရေး အရယူနိုင်ခဲ့သည်အထိ ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ ရဲရင့်မှု၊ စွန့်လွှတ် အနစ်နာခံမှုများသည် သမိုင်းတွင် ဂုဏ်ရောင်ပြောင်စွာ စွဲထင်ကျန်လျက်ရှိသည်။ အလားတူပင် နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ ဦးဆောင်ပေးဆပ် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေမှုများကို အထင်းသား မြင်တွေ့ နိုင်သည်။
၄။၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၉) ရက်နေ့မှ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့အထိ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ဖလမ်းမြို့တွင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနေ့ အောင်ပွဲသဘင်အခမ်းအနားနှင့် လူထုညီလာခံကြီးကျင်းပခဲ့သည်။ ထိုလူထုညီလာခံကြီးသို့ နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ စပ်ရွှေသိုက်၊ ချင်းရေးရာဝန်ကြီး ပူဝမ္မသူးမောင်း၊ ပြန်ကြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဦးညိုထွန်း၊ တိုင်းမင်းကြီး စည်သူဦးသိမ်းမောင်တို့အပြင် ချင်းဝိသေသတိုင်းတစ်ခုလုံးမှ ချင်းလူထုကိုယ်စားလှယ်များလည်း တက်ရောက် ကြသည်။ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့ လူထုညီလာခံကြီးတွင် တိုက်သူကြီးများအုပ်ချုပ်မှု စနစ်ဟောင်းမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီအုပ်ချုပ်မှု စနစ်သစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းရန် အဆိုကို တက်ရောက်လာသော ချင်းကိုယ်စားလှယ်ကြီးများမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းလမ်းတကျ မဲခွဲဆုံးဖြတ် အတည်ပြုနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
၅။အဆိုပါနေ့ကို အစွဲပြု၍ ၁၉၅၀ ခုနှစ် အောက်တိုဘာလ(၉) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပသော ချင်းရေးရာကောင်စီ အစည်းအဝေးတွင် တက်ရောက်လာကြသူများအားလုံးမှ ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် တညီတညွတ်တည်း သဘောတူ သတ်မှတ်အတည်ပြုခဲ့ကြသည်။ ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ ရိုးရာယဉ်ကျေးမှု ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများကို မပျောက်မပျက် ထိန်းသိမ်းပြီး ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် အခမ်းအနားများကို ကမ္ဘာ့နယ်ပယ် အရပ်ရပ်တွင် စည်းကားသိုက်မြိုက် ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ကျင်းပလာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တိုင်ပင် ဖြစ်သည်။
၆။အာဏာရှင်တော်လှန်ရေး အဆက်ဆက်မှသည် ယနေ့ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲနေသည့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးအတွင်း အသက်၊အိုးအိမ်၊စည်းစိမ် စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးဆပ်တိုက်ပွဲ ဝင်လျက်ရှိသော ချင်းအမျိုးသားအာဇာနည်များ၊ သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့်တကွ ချင်းပြည်သူများအားလုံးကိုလည်း လေးနက်စွာ အောက်မေ့ဦးညွှတ် အပ်ပါသည်။
၇။ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှု အပြည့်အဝရှိသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို ထူထောင်နိုင်ရန် ဘုံရန်သူ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းရန် အတူတကွ လက်တွဲပြီး “တသံတည်းညီ၊တချီတည်းရုန်း” ကြိုးစားလျှောက်လှမ်းကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းပြောကြားလျက် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် စိန်ရတု အထိမ်းအမှတ် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
314.15 KB
more
Sub-title:
A handwritten letter from inside the prison describes a two-day assault on more than 70 women using metal batons and tasers
Description:
"Several women incarcerated on politically motivated charges in Mandalay’s Obo Prison have been injured in recent physical assaults by guards, according to sources in contact with the inmates.
A Mandalay-based youth activist shared with Myanmar Now parts of a handwritten eyewitness account from inside the prison detailing the beatings and when they occurred. Titled “Oppressed Prisoners,” it was delivered to him through covert channels, and described a crackdown on detainees in two women’s wards that was perpetrated on February 3 and 4.
“[The letter says] that the male prison authorities charged into the ward and beat over 70 female political prisoners. They were also allegedly hit with slingshots,” he explained.
The activist said that the document also included a list of the prisoners who had been beaten and injured.
Among those subjected to the assaults was 20-year-old San Lin May, who was arrested in December 2021 after being accused of funding an urban guerrilla force. On February 3, she was convicted in a junta court of violating Section 50 of the Counterterrorism Law and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
The day after her sentencing, a source close to San Lin May’s family said that guards attacked inmates in her ward following a dispute between detainees and the prison authorities. They were reportedly armed with wooden and iron batons to which tasers had been attached.
During the episode of violence, her ear was at least partially cut off.
“They were all beaten indiscriminately… San Lin May was simply caught in the crossfire of the conflict,” the source said, adding that her wound had required five stitches. “We heard that the injury was serious, and we’re all deathly worried because we have not been able to make direct contact with [the prisoners].”
Another woman identified as having been beaten that day was Po Pyae Thu, a restaurant owner known for her philanthropy work and serving a lengthy sentence after being convicted by the military council of multiple politically motivated charges.
“It worried us a lot to see her name on the list,” a friend of Po Pyae Thu said. “It’s even worse because we have not heard any updates on her condition, nor have we had direct contact with her.”
A woman released from Obo Prison three months ago told Myanmar Now that the facility’s authorities treated political prisoners with “extreme hostility, out of spite” and that other criminal convicts were also encouraged to take part in the abuse.
“The worst thing I saw in prison was that [the guards] appointed several prisoners as administrators to ‘govern’ other prisoners: criminals that were sent to prison for dealing drugs or gambling were ruling over and torturing political prisoners,” she said. “On my first day in prison, I was beaten with a belt by another prisoner for absolutely no reason at all.”
A Mandalay lawyer assisting political prisoners in Obo told Myanmar Now in October last year that the inmates were “losing their rights every day,” noting that after being subjected to violence, they were typically denied medical care.
The All Burma Federation of Student Unions released a statement last August which also revealed that Obo’s political prisoners were being starved, beaten, and even electrocuted.
In June, at least two inmates of the prison were beaten to death with metal batons during a crackdown that also left at least 13 others injured, according to two lawyers.
Similar assaults were reported over the following months by released prisoners, including an attack on August 8—the anniversary of the start of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement—that resulted in at least one death.
Myanmar Now is unable to independently verify the incidents. The military has used health restrictions associated with the Covid-19 pandemic to deny visits to political prisoners, making it difficult to gather further information on the ongoing rights violations.
Nearly 14,000 people were still in junta prisons at the time of reporting, more than 3,000 of whom were women, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"If you’ve followed what’s happened in Myanmar the past two years, the photos of the Assumption Church in Chan Thar village probably won’t shock you. They show its 129-year-old belltower blackened by upward licks of smoke, a mound of grey ash at its entrance, smoke from the remains of a nearby convent rising against a cobalt sky. When soldiers set fire to the compound last month, it was only the latest in a cascade of desperately cruel acts, all with the aim of crushing resistance to the coup of 1 February 2021. They beheaded two men in the same Sagaing village last June.
Beheadings, shootings, beatings, airstrikes: horrors on near daily display for anyone wanting to look, alongside less gruesome strategies of arrest and harassment designed to punish civil disobedience and silence expressions of online and offline dissent. Religious buildings have been key targets: churches but also Buddhist monasteries, notwithstanding the generals’ claim to serve as Buddhism’s protector. Fire has been a key tool, as it was during the 2017 campaign against the Rohingya, which the US last year said constituted a genocide.
Satellite images of scorched villages show the situation most clearly. Some 30,000 structures are thought to have been burned since the coup—from Karen State in the east to Chin State in the west, where airstrikes in January sent hundreds fleeing across the mountainous Indian border. Just as this Christian-majority region has been a stronghold of the resistance, so the Chin diaspora have been key advocates labouring to raise Myanmar’s plight to international consciousness. In the run-up to the recent passage through Congress of the US Burma Act, which promises deepened sanctions and expanded aid, Chin churches across the American heartland showed videos instructing congregants on how to lobby their local representatives.
Catholic doctrine on the Assumption teaches that, at the end of her life, Mary was taken up—assumed—into heaven, her body and soul intact. There were Old Testament precedents; on account of his zeal, the prophet Elijah was taken up in a chariot of fire. Mary’s assumption is said to anticipate the future salvation of humanity. In Myanmar, many have taken salvation into their own hands. In 2021, once the initial waves of protest were met with bullets from the military, or Sit-Tat, and indifference from an international community that some hoped would be their saviour, the Spring Revolution took a guerrilla turn.
Across the country hundreds of People’s Defence Force (PDF) groups have been at war with the Sit-Tat ever since. Sagaing has been a hotbed, east of the Chin Hills and west of Mandalay. Once spared much of the cruelty that the Sit-Tat has for decades inflicted on Myanmar’s borderlands, this central Anya (or “upstream”) region is now also a target for collective punishment.
“They arrived around 8 a.m. on Saturday,” one Chan Thar resident told The Irrawaddy. “They torched houses the whole day. They then stayed in the church compound, and left this morning after torching the church.” It was the soldiers’ fourth arson attack in the village since last May, reducing its houses from 600 to fewer than forty. Its mostly Catholic population descend from Portuguese mercenaries and traders who arrived in the sixteenth century, centuries before the three Anglo-Burmese wars that brought Burma under the Raj.
The most famous of these Portuguese, the Lisbon-born Filipe de Brito, came via Goa and served the King of Arakan with such distinction that he was made Governor of the growing shipping port of Syriam—now Thanlyin, a township across the Bago River from today’s Yangon. Other Portuguese mercenaries joined him, as did Jesuit priests. Conversions followed. In 1602, de Brito went out on his own, coming into conflict not only with his former Arakan master but with the King of Ava, Anaukpetlun.
De Brito’s troops shared something of the Sit-Tat’s approach to religion, looting pagodas, destroying Buddha images, and melting down bells for weapons. When Anaukpetlun captured Syriam in 1613, his men impaled de Brito and marched hundreds of surviving Portuguese prisoners north to Ava. It was their descendants who, after generations of intermarriage, built the Assumption Church in 1894. Also a descendant is Cardinal Charles Bo, the current Archbishop of Yangon. Criticised for his ongoing dealings with the junta, Bo’s hosting of the coup leader Min Aung Hlaing at a recent Christmas Mass, only a month after soldiers burnt houses in the Cardinal’s own home village, came as little surprise.
More surprising perhaps are the findings of a recent report detailing the extent to which the Sit-Tat has become self-sufficient in the domestic production of many of the weapons it uses against its own people, as well as the degree to which this production is relying on raw materials supplied by companies from a dozen foreign countries. “The West, in lieu of arming the resistance,” one analyst wrote of the report’s implications, “could increase pressure on its allies in Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel and Singapore to end all support.”
From Filipe de Brito to Min Aung Hlaing, violence in Myanmar has long had an outside: connections to circuits of capital and commerce—and, occasionally, concern—extending from its Anya heartland to its maritime and mountain borders, and far beyond..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Review
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"• The junta has killed at least 2,688 civilians and arrested 17,573 as of 31 Jan. Burma now has 1,584,300 IDPs.
• The regime began to compile voter lists in preparations for its sham 2023 ‘election.’ Resistance groups attacked census agents in several locations, killing at least 13.
• The junta adopted a new Political Parties Registration Law that will allow the military-aligned USDP to run unchallenged and lead to the dissolution of the NLD.
• UNHCR reported that over 3,500 Rohingya attempted to flee Bangladesh and Burma by sea in 2022, up from 700 in 2021. At least 348 died or went missing; the highest figure since 2014.
• Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US announced new sanctions, but stopped short of sanctioning the junta's main cash cow..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
328.46 KB
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
The military believes that time is on its side in its high-stakes struggle with the National Unity Government.
Description:
"Feb. 1 marked the second anniversary of the coup d’etat that ousted the democratically elected National League for Democracy government in Myanmar. Since then the country has descended into a multi-front civil war and lost over a decade’s worth of sustained economic growth. Over half of the population is living in poverty, driving people back into opium production, which saw 88 percent growth in 2022.
The military junta has failed to provide either security or basic social services. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 2,890 people have been killed – but that doesn’t include casualties in the border areas where fighting is fiercer. The military has detained nearly 17,500 since the 2021 coup, emptying jails of convicts to make room for political prisoners.
On the anniversary Wednesday, the military defied the constitution, and refused to hand over power to a civilian care-taker government after two extensions of its emergency decree, instead extending emergency rule for another six months. Constitutional niceties are a low priority for a blood thirsty military regime hell-bent on establishing a monopoly of power.
That they don’t have sufficient security to hand over power is telling. The opposition National Unity Government (NUG) has out-performed by every measure. The civil disobedience movement continues to stage demonstrations and flash mobs every day across the country.
The NUG led a second Feb. 1 “silent strike” to humiliate the regime. The shadow government has hundreds of affiliated people’s defense forces (PDFs), which have tied the military down. They have done so with courage and technical innovation.
The generals in Naypyidaw should be very frustrated that they have not been able to terrorize the population into submission. The NUG clearly has legitimacy that they will never enjoy.
Nonetheless, the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally known, has a five-part theory of victory, and believes that time is on its side.
First, the military will continue to wage a violent campaign across multiple fronts to wear down opposition forces through a war of attrition.
The violence will be excessive and intentionally target civilians. We have seen this play out most ferociously in Sagaing and Magway, where ethnic Bamar resistance is both new and threatens the military’s long and vulnerable supply lines.
They will take advantage of the fact that the PDFs got over-extended in the rainy season, and have gone on the offensive with superior fire power now that the dry season has arrived.
Ramping up airstrikes
The junta will increasingly rely on artillery and air power. For the latter, the regime has increased their acquisitions, including buying five FTC-2000G and the first two of six SU-30s from China and Russia, respectively.
There’s been over 360 percent increase in airstrikes over the previous year. Mostly the regime has targeted civilian communities, but recently there was an escalatory attack on Camp Victoria, the headquarters of the Chin National Front that killed five
New howitzers and multiple rocket launched systems imported from China will give the junta the ability to hit the NUG and its ethnic allies from a distance.
And of course the junta will try to terrorize the population into submission: nearly 40,000 homes have been set on fire throughout the country, 27,000 in Sagaing alone.
Second, the junta will assiduously target the shadow government’s funding and logistics.
The National Unity Government takes great pride that they have raised over $100 million through online sales of military-owned properties and crypto-bond offerings. They have used crypto currencies, tethered to the U.S. dollar to move money, and created digital wallets.
The junta has put officers in all banks to monitor any transaction over 100,000 kyat ($45), hampered mobile payments platforms, and at a more primitive level, physically inspects phones to see if they have the NUG Pay app. They have sentenced people to a decade for making token donations to the shadow government or its affiliated militias.
Third, the military will focus on the opposition’s center of gravity: their alliance with key Ethnic Resistance Organizations. This is both the shadow government’s greatest strength and greatest vulnerability. No Bamar-led government has had better ties with the ethnic forces than the NUG, whom they see as offering the best hope of establishing a democratic federal republic.
While some ethnic armies have supported the shadow government from the start, including arming and training their militias, many more have taken a wait-and-see approach. Some, particularly those in Shan State, such as the United Wa State Army, have benefitted from the status quo as they churn out record amounts of illicit narcotics.
The junta is determined to prevent more from joining the shadow government, and thereby opening up a new front. While there have been skirmishes with the Arakan Army, an all out war seemed to have been avoided, as the latter realized it gained more autonomy by not fighting.
Going after urban guerillas
Though the junta invites ethnic armies to Naypyidaw to resume the National Ceasefire talks, there are fewer takers. But this remains a line of effort. The military regime assumes that, at one point, historical mistrust will cause rifts between the NUG and the ethnic armies. Until then, it seeks to deter and induce the ethnic armies to withhold support for the National Unity Government.
Fourth, the junta will focus on decimating the urban guerrilla forces. The military was not surprised to be fighting a multifront war against the ethnic armies, even if the proliferation of people’s defense forces caught them off guard. But the attacks by the Yangon and Mandalay urban guerrillas undermined their claim to have the situation under control in the eyes of the urban middle class, whom they desperately need to win over.
Urban guerrilla groups waged a systematic campaign in 2022, but their targets were often symbolic. There were only two operations that had real importance: the attempted assassination of the then-deputy head of the Central Bank of Myanmar and the killing of the CFO of MyTel, the largest and not coincidentally military-owned telecoms firm in the country.
But their attacks proved to be costly, with the importation of Chinese CCTVs and facial recognition software.
Fifth, the junta will hold “elections” by August, in an effort to legitimize their rule, taking a page out of the playbook written by Thailand’s generals in 2019.
They have announced the establishment of proportional representation, and the military will still receive 25 percent of parliamentary seats. Districts are being gerrymandered and the military controls the voter lists. The Union Election Commission has been purged of all pro-National League for Democracy figures, and is fully controlled by the military.
Over 1,100 NLD officials are imprisoned and many have been tortured to death.
The newly announced election law cripples the political opposition and allows the Union Election Commission to dissolve parties if it is declared unlawful or it has communications with “terrorist” organizations, doesn’t have offices or run candidates in 50 percent of the 330 townships; or compete in by elections, isn’t registered and has 100,000 listed members, or doesn’t deposit 100 million kyat ($43,727) at the military-owned Myanma Economic Bank.
While not everyone in the junta is convinced about the utility of elections, including Soe Win, Min Aung Hlaing believes they are the source of the regime’s legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the international community, many of whom will view even shambolic elections as “good enough”.
The military believes that time is on its side, and given the lack of concrete international support for the National Unity Government, and they might be right. The stakes are high for both sides, as we enter year three of a conflict that continues to drag Myanmar back to amongst the poorest and most unstable countries in the world..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1. NUG calls for sanctions on aviation fuel to save Myanmar people 23/01/2023...2. NUG conveys lunar new year greetings to PRC...3. NUG anticipates more cooperation with India as a future nation...4. Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun urges it is a high time for UN to raise a single voice to take actions against the terrorist SAC...5. NUG recognizes 33 online schools as interim basic education schools
23/01/2023...6. SAC atrocities in Mindat Township resulted in 4 civilian injuries, 2 religious and 10 houses destroyed 25/01/2023...7. People Security Body arrests drugs brokers and users in Depayin Township 24/01/2023...8. NUG establishes E-Police Service 20/01/2023...9. Defendant named in NLD office murder case 21/01/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.05 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update No.5/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.3 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Ever since the military first seized power in a coup in March 1962, Myanmar has been plagued by a vicious cycle of popular protests and violent repression—and, every time the people have risen up against the dictatorship, the men in green have managed to cling on to power. The question in 2023 is whether the ruling generals will succeed this time as well. What speaks for it is the remarkable unity that the military has always managed to maintain. There have been purges among the leaders of the armed forces and signs of dissent within the ranks, but, in the end, everyone in the military down to the private soldier has carried out the orders they have been given, no matter how brutal and inhumane.
The argument that it might be different this time is based on the sheer incompetence of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and those around him. Two years after they sent their tanks and troops into Yangon, Naypyitaw, Mandalay and other major cities and towns, they have yet to establish a functioning administration to replace the one they ousted. Ambushes of army convoys, bombings of public buildings, and assassinations of suspected military informants have become daily occurrences not only in the traditonally strife-torn frontier areas, but also, for the first time since the 1970s, even in the Myanmar heartland involving the majority Burmese population.
The situation has been exacerbated by a collapsing economy marked by a deteriorating exchange rate for the kyat, shortages of goods, rising prices of daily commodities—and the flight of capital to other countries. Owners of small and medium-sized businesses are transferring their assets to Thailand while the country’s immensely wealthy cronies are placing their money in financial institutions in Singapore and Dubai. No one wants to take the risk of having to depend on the erratic economic policies of an inept military regime, and whatever new, poorly thought out rules the generals may force upon the country’s own banks, which are untrustworthy even at the best of times. Compared to previous crises, it is clearly different this time. The situation has never been as bad as now, and, therefore, the final outcome of the power games that are being played out inside Myanmar is far more difficult to predict.
In March 1962, a 17-member junta called the Revolutionary Council (RC) led by General Ne Win seized power, but it was not until July that massive protests against the coup took place. At first, many people believed that it would be no different from 1958, when the military intervened and formed a caretaker government pending new elections. But as it became evident that this time the military was there to stay, thousands of Rangoon University students demonstrated—and were shot at by the military. Officially, 15 students were killed while eyewitnesses and independent observers put the total number of deaths at several hundred. And, in the early hours of July 8, Rangoon residents were awakened by an explosion that reverberated through the city. The military had dynamited the historic Students’ Union building, where the nationalists had gathered during the anti-colonial struggle in the 1930s, reducing it to rubble.
Disagreements over Ne Win’s new, disastrous socialist policies, which had turned the country into an economic wreck, and the role the military should play in politics, led a year after the coup to the resignation from the junta of Brigadier General Aung Gyi and the dismissal of Colonel Kyi Maung, who both became prominent actors in the 1988 pro-democracy movement. Two other junta members, Colonel Chit Myaing and Colonel Khin Nyo, were dismissed in 1964 and 1965. Many student activists took to the jungles and the mountains to join the insurgent Communist Party of Burma or, if they came from the country’s many non-Burmese nationalities, their respective ethnic rebel army. But Ne Win managed to consolidate his grip on power, and in 1974 an ostensibly civilian government led by the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) and dominated by former military officers was formed after holding a fraudulent referendum on a new constitution.
Not even renewed student protests followed by labor strikes in the mid-1970s—and more massacres of civilians—had any impact on how Myanmar was being run: it remained a dictatorship with Ne Win at the helm. The regime’s brutality, however, led to an abortive coup attempt initiated by Ohn Kyaw Myint, a young captain who had managed to gather some dissenting officers around him. But plans of the plot were leaked to the military authorities, and Ohn Kyaw Myint was arrested and executed in July 1977. What became known as “the Ohn Kyaw Myint affair” led to a massive purge within the military. Real and imagined accomplices were arrested, and among those sentenced to prison was General Tin Oo, a popular former army chief and defense minister. He got seven years of hard labor, accused of having had prior knowledge of the coup attempt. That was never proven, and the charge was no doubt politically motivated; protesters had shouted “Long live General Tin Oo!” when they demonstrated against Ne Win’s iron-fisted rule. Hundreds of mostly young people were killed when the soldiers opened fire on them, and, apart from Tin Oo, several other high-ranking officers were arrested and imprisoned. Tin Oo was released during a 1980 general amnesty and became a leader of the 1988 uprising and later chairperson of the National League for Democracy (NLD).
A far-reaching purge also occurred in 1983 when another officer, also called Tin Oo but no relation to the former army chief, was arrested. This Tin Oo, who had been trained by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the US-held island of Saipan in the Pacific Ocean, began his career as a powerful military intelligence chief and was once considered Ne Win’s heir apparent. Several other former intelligence officers, among them Colonel Bo Ni, who had been trained on Saipan as the same time as Tin Oo, were also purged. Ne Win is said to have believed that “MI Tin Oo”, as he was called, and his henchmen were building up a state within a state, and as such could pose a threat to the supreme leadership. MI Tin Oo was transferred from Insein Jail to Ye Kyi Aing top-security prison during the 1988 uprising. After it had been quelled, he was moved back to Insein and released in October 1989.
No uprising has been as widespread as the one in August-September 1988, and it was also put down with unprecedented brutality. Thousands—not hundreds as some academics and historians claim—were gunned down when the military sprayed automatic rifle fire into crowds of demonstrators. On Sept. 18, the BSPP government was replaced with a new junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but the military didn’t actually stage a coup to seize power, which it already had. It felt it had to intervene forcefully to shore up a bankrupt regime overwhelmed by popular protest. Thousands of pro-democracy activists fled to the borders with Thailand, China and India, where an armed resistance was organized. Exiled politicians, including some who had won seats in a May 1990 general election but were never allowed to assume office as the outcome of that election was ignored, formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). But an effective armed uprising never really materialized and the NCGUB was never recognized by any foreign power.
In 1997, the SLORC assumed the more palatable name of State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)—and, despite all the challenges it faced, the military remained remarkably united and continued to rule the country with impunity. The military’s staying power depended to a large extent on the activities of its secret police, by this time called the Directorate of the Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), which had spies and informants all over the country. Anyone suspected of having contacts with the opposition was likely to be arrested and tortured while in custody. The DDSI also kept a watchful eye on military officers who could be suspected of not toeing the military’s political line, and on the many Myanmar exiles who were living in Thailand, Europe, North America and Australia. The head of the DDSI from 1983 to 2004, General Khin Nyunt, became known for his willingness to use extreme brutality when dealing with political prisoners, and his close DDSI associate, Air Force Colonel Thein Swe, was appointed defense attaché at the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok. While there, he sent thugs to beat up exiled pro-democracy activists and, it is alleged, also ordered murders of persons deemed to be “enemies of the state”.
But, like MI Tin Oo and his men before him, Khin Nyunt and the coterie around him also became too powerful for their own good. In August 2003 he was appointed prime minister in the SPDC-led government and began to amass wealth, while also trying to raise his regional profile by becoming more of a public figure. In October 2004, he was “permitted to retire on health grounds”, the usual euphemism in the special lingo of the Myanmar military for being sacked. He was placed under house arrest and his right-hand man Thein Swe was sent to jail along with scores of former and serving DDSI officers. They were eventually released after his successor as Secretary-1 of the SPDC and later junta prime minister General Thein Sein became president in 2011. The DDSI was subsequently disbanded and replaced by the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs, commonly referred to by its Burmese acronym sa ya pha, an entity more directly under the control of the military’s supreme command.
Meanwhile, the first SLORC chairman, General Saw Maung, had resigned in April 1992 and been replaced by General Than Shwe. But that purge was not really political in nature. Saw Maung had become increasingly erratic, some would argue he had gone insane. His public speeches were incoherent and rambling, covering subjects such as dying tomorrow and sightings of Jesus in Tibet. He had also been seen at a military golf course in Yangon screaming “I am King Kyansittha!” in a reference to one of the rulers of the ancient Bagan empire whose name means “the remaining soldier” or “the one who was left behind.” Saw Maung died in oblivion and obscurity in July 1997.
Having got rid of Saw Maung and Khin Nyunt, Than Shwe was far more successful in building up a new military leadership. The old dictator, Ne Win, had died in 2002, mourned by no one, not even the military officers whose godfather he once was. Seeking to avoid the fate of his predecessors Ne Win and Saw Maung, Than Shwe decided to appoint not one, but three successors: his prime minister, Thein Sein, would become president after a sham election that was planned for November 2010, and another general, Shwe Mann, would head the military’s own political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which was formed 12 years after the 1988 uprising and the subsequent collapse of the BSPP. A weak and less-than-competent general, Min Aung Hlaing, was designated to take over as head of the military. But the plan failed when Shwe Mann went his own way and began to reach out to the NLD and its de facto leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He was removed as head of the USDP in August 2015 and, in April 2016, was sacked from the party along with 17 senior party members. Thein Sein, for his part, after becoming president in 2011 took a number of initiatives that led to a more open society, but he never became as popular as the military top brass had expected. He and the USDP lost the 2015 and 2020 elections to the NLD in landslides that the military failed to predict. In 2016, a new government took over most duties—except the crucial ministries of Defense, Home Affairs and Border Affairs, which remained in the sole hands of the military. And so did the military itself, an autonomous entity beyond any kind of parliamentary control or even oversight.
The NLD’s second successive election victory in November 2020 led to the February 2021 coup and, once again, the military misjudged the situation. A new, politically active and aware civil society had emerged during the 2011-2021 period of relative openness. People had also had enough of direct or indirect military rule, which had been the case from the 1962 coup to the 2015 election, and hence the NLD’s massive electoral victories. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had refrained from challenging the military’s political and economic power during her first term from 2016 to 2021, but the NLD’s overwhelming election win in November 2020 gave her a strong mandate to push for real democratic change. That could, in turn, have led to the generals’ risking retribution for the many crimes they committed during their decades in power. All army officers know where the skeletons of past atrocities are buried, both in the frontier areas and also in the urban centers, home to an emerging and growing middle class. Min Aung Hlaing is widely loathed across the population for his ruthless post-coup clampdown and killings, and he and his ilk know all too well that they either maintain power at any price or land in prison—or worse. As the saying goes, if they don’t hang together they fear they will hang separately. It is a combination of those fears and deeply entrenched economic interests that hold the military so tightly together and not, as some Western analysts have suggested, some underlying sense of patriotism or because officers have been hardened through battles in the field. And that also explains why, so far, no cracks have emerged within the military despite the violent, irrational and seemingly self-defeating orders being handed down by officers and carried out by seemingly unswervingly obedient foot soldiers.
At the same time, despite the similarities, what we are seeing today is not a repeat of 1962, 1976 or 1988. The military is suffering extraordinary losses on the battlefield, and soldiers are being killed not by some ethnic rebels but by their own Burmese countrymen. Their own relatives may also be part of the resistance, or have taken part in the Civil Disobedience Movement immediately after the coup. Will they remain forever loyal? And for how much longer will the cronies, on whose support the military depends, be willing to prop up a regime that is ruining their businesses? The exact amount of money leaving the country is not known, but is believed to be massive, and that kind of capital flight is not what the business community wants. Before the coup, Myanmar’s economic potential was substantial and there were hopes of serious economic development. Foreign companies were investing in Myanmar; now many of them are gone and there are no new investors. Min Aung Hlaing and his family may be doing just fine and even be willing to associate themselves with criminals in order to preserve their lavish lifestyles. It is now widely known that they have ties to Tun Min Latt, a drug trafficker who was arrested in Thailand in September last year. On the other hand, there are many others, even within the officer corps, who are not benefiting from the post-coup order and may, in exchange for promises of amnesty, be willing to assume the roles of Ohn Kyaw Myint and his comrades. But such a development also depends on the policies and actions of the anti-junta resistance, which is unlikely to become strong enough to defeat the military on the battlefield. Without a credible amnesty policy, few if any officers would be willing to turn against Min Aung Hlaing and his cohorts. The alternative, sadly, is that Myanmar will descend further into an economic, social and political abyss from which there is no way out..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
‘Amay Kyi,’ as her activist son’s friends called her, was a mother to many caught up in the deadly cycle of violence set in motion by Myanmar’s military
Description:
"Early one morning in October of last year, Kyi Kyi Myint, 55, found herself packed in among several other women at Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison. With a bag slung over her shoulder, she was waiting to drop off some food for her son, 37-year-old activist Lin Htet Naing, including a special treat of noodles in coconut milk.
It was far from the first time she had made such a delivery. Although it had been only four months since her son’s arrest, this was just his latest stint behind bars. The first was a decade and a half ago, when he was sentenced to three years in prison for his role in the 2007 Saffron Revolution. Then came two six-month sentences, both for opposing a new education law, in 2015 and 2020—with the latter ending just days before the military seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021.
So Kyi Kyi Myint was no stranger to Myanmar’s penal system. But as the mother of a prominent activist—better known to his comrades as James—she took it all in stride and did what she could to make the ordeal more bearable for her son.
This prison visit was to be her last, however. At around 9:30am on October 19, a series of blasts triggered an even deadlier barrage of bullets, killing eight people, including the woman known to her son’s activist friends as “Amay Kyi,” or Mother Kyi.
It is unclear whether Kyi Kyi Myint was killed by one of the two parcel bombs that went off inside the prison’s delivery reception area that morning, or by gunshots fired by panicked guards. What is known, however, is that an anti-junta guerrilla group calling itself the Special Task Agency of Burma claimed responsibility for the incident, which other regime opponents were quick to denounce. Some even expressed doubts about the professed identity of the group.
The perpetrators claimed that they were targeting prison officials; instead, they killed guards and civilian visitors. Even in a country exposed to nearly two years of endless bloodshed, many were shocked by the sheer senselessness of the attack.....
A maternal presence...
For James, the loss of his loving mother under these horrific circumstances was nothing less than devastating. After he learned that she was among the dead, he immediately sought permission to attend her funeral.
“The prison authorities denied his request because they said they couldn’t provide security for him,” said Min Thway Thit, a fellow activist and one of James’ closest friends.
In fact, no one from the family was able to pay their final respects to Kyi Kyi Myint. Her husband had died in 2015, and her younger son had fled the country in the wake of the coup. And soon after James was arrested, his wife Phyoe Phyoe Aung, who is also a well-known activist, left Yangon for a liberated area under the control of an ethnic armed group.
It was a sad end, then, for a woman who had always been there for her son and others dedicated to the cause of ending military oppression in Myanmar.
“She always followed her son no matter how far away they sent him,” recalled Phyoe Phyoe Aung, who added that her mother-in-law was not particularly political, but had great faith in James’ determination to do what was right for the country.
Although it was never easy for Kyi Kyi Myint to see her son become a prisoner for his convictions, his latest incarceration was the hardest for her, according to Phyoe Phyoe Aung.
“His last arrest left her heartbroken, because she heard from the activist community about how he was treated while he was being interrogated and after he was imprisoned,” she said.
For years, members of this community had found a rare refuge in the small restaurant that Kyi Kyi Myint opened in 2006 to help support her family. It was where many went for snacks, and for the comfort of her maternal presence.
“We always took pickled bean sprouts from Amay Kyi’s shop to eat at home,” said Min Thway Thit, recalling how the shop had become a popular meeting place for politically active young people.
In the end, however, it became yet another casualty of the coup, closing soon after a power grab that has thrown the entire country into a crisis that continues to spin out of control.....The taste of love...James lost his father when he was in prison in 2015, and was separated from his wife when she was pregnant with their second child in 2020. Both times, Kyi Kyi Myint attended not only to her son’s needs, but also to those of his closest loved ones. But none who knew her ever heard her complain about the burden of having to care for others.
When James was arrested again last year after being charged with incitement for speaking out against the coup, his two-year-old son was with him. The terrified toddler was also taken into custody by the soldiers who came for his father. It took Kyi Kyi Myint two days of pleading with the authorities to win her grandson’s release. It was a relief, and a small victory, to have him back in her arms, but she still grieved for her own adult son, whose life seemed more at risk now than ever before.
Others also worried about Kyi Kyi Myint’s safety. James’s friends urged her to leave Yangon for the border, where many others had gone to escape a regime that was becoming increasingly indiscriminate in its targeting of civilians.
“At first, she said she would consider it, but in the end she decided to stay. She said she wanted to be there for her son,” said Min Thway Thit.
“The incident at the prison happened a week after she made that decision,” he added.
It was love, and not the revolution, that kept Kyi Kyi Myint in Yangon. But ultimately, it was the misguided actions of a group that took her away from those who loved her.
The bitter irony of this fact will stay with James for the rest of his life. But while he will never again taste his mother’s cooking, he will always have the memory of her noodles in coconut milk to remind him of her belief in him, and in his generation’s struggle to finally free his country from military tyranny..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s oldest rebel group, the Karen National Union (KNU), was founded in 1947. Its armed wings, the Karen National Liberation Army and Karen National Defense Organization, are fighting the junta in Karen and Mon states and Bago and Tanintharyi regions.
Since the regime slaughtered hundreds of peaceful anti-coup demonstrators nationwide in 2021, the KNU has given military training and armed several thousand activists to fight the junta.
The KNU has revived its military campaign alongside newly formed resistance groups, including several people’s defense forces.
It says has engaged the regime more than 7,000 times, killing an estimated 5,500 regime troops and injuring around 5,000. It has reported hundreds of resistance deaths.
This month the KNU has stepped up raids on military headquarters and junta offices.
Meanwhile, it is working with the National Unity Consultative Council, a political coalition opposing the junta, and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) to establish a federal union.
The KNU’s communications chief Padoh Saw Taw Nee recently told The Irrawaddy about his hopes for 2023.
Following the coup, we displayed our clear resistance while some groups didn’t. But other groups still refuse to accept the regime in many ways.
We have no other option but to fight.
It becomes more clear with time that there is no alternative.
We are happy that other EAOs vowed in their New Year’s speeches to uproot the regime. This is welcome.
We have been openly fighting the regime.
We have engaged in more than 7,000 clashes over two years. We can’t de-escalate our revolution.
We must keep going until we win and increase efforts across military and political spheres.
What improvements can you report?
As we became used to the guerrilla tactics, there were ambushes, sniper attacks and some raids occupying junta outposts.
Now we are conducting more urban raids, like in Kawkareik.
This shows our growing confidence. We raided a military headquarters. We have never done this before. We raided three battalions at the same time. We could not do that before.
More raids like that will follow as our revolution grows in every sector.
How have you managed to conduct raids like that?
This regime and its predecessors have prepared poorly for many years. For the first time, we are receiving international support and broad domestic backing. In the past, the Bamar majority stayed away from politics and did not help.
Now people have become one flesh and blood as junta atrocities occur across the country. That is why our revolution has strengthened quickly.
Fighting is not the only way to demolish military institutions that have monopolized power for 70 years.
The institutions must be broken.
Many soldiers have joined us and there are many others inside the military who secretly support the people’s revolution in many ways.
This revolution is very different from previous movements.
We hear attacks in upper Myanmar were led by the KNU. Have you expanded beyond your traditional territory?
The dictatorship must be uprooted across the country, not just in our state. We have plans to connect with other resistance groups. There will be more joint operations.
The junta is using more airstrikes. How can you defend yourselves?
The terrorist regime is now committing unacceptable airstrikes on civilian targets. The junta is committing war crimes.
It shows the regime’s desperation.
We lack air-defense weapons so we must be aware of the threat from the air.
The terrorist junta regards both resistance forces and civilians as their enemy so we all must be alert all the time. We all need to dig bunkers.
We hope the international community will provide air-defense weapons. We are asking other countries to cut off supplies of aviation fuel for the regime.
We need anti-aircraft weapons and they need to arrive soon.
Will junta atrocities increase?
We can’t estimate how many more atrocities the junta will carry out.
[Junta leader] Min Aung Hlaing targets civilians as he has no choice. He regards the people as his enemy and he believes his enemies will be defeated if the people are destroyed.
We cannot predict how much more we will lose. We will never step away from the fight. Victory gets closer with every atrocity.
Freedom does not come for free.
Do you have a policy on the junta’s election plans?
Min Aung Hlaing has no room politically. He has failed to gain international recognition.
As a final attempt to win legitimacy, he will hold an illegal election. At that point, we will fight openly. We totally reject his fake general election.
The people must fight. No one will collaborate in his election and he won’t be able to raise his head if he can’t implement it. That is why his election must be defeated.
Does the KNU have an action plan against the election?
We announced at our public meeting on November 11 that we would oppose the junta’s election. There were Karen political parties at the meeting. This is a serious matter. Those who fail to follow our policy must be held accountable.
How much control does the KNU have in its territory?
Following the coup, the junta totally lost all administrative mechanisms in our territory.
The junta’s administrators struggle to survive in the towns.
Due to the civil disobedience movement of government employees, the regime cannot run rural schools and hospitals.
The junta can only respond militarily.
We need to consider our plans for governing after the revolution.
Has the revolution been successful?
It is hard to say how successful we have been. We can do many things politically, diplomatically and economically against the regime that we have never done in the past. We only have to strengthen our military connectivity with other groups.
Do you have a message for the people?
We have to keep pushing our revolution forward. We must remember that you get nothing for free.
Freedom comes with great difficulty and costs.
Rather than asking when we will succeed, we must think deeply about how we can all contribute to the revolution.
If we work hard together, we will succeed quickly.
I am very pleased with the people’s contribution and thank them.
We are pleased with the continuous support from our people amid suffering and crises. We will keep trying hard..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Federalism is being presented by many activists as the best option for a future democratic Myanmar – and with good reason. The formal sharing of power between a national government and regional administrations has worked well for some of the world’s most successful democracies, including Germany and Australia. It has also – and perhaps less successfully – been adopted where there is an acute division - religious, linguistic, cultural or ethnic - which needs to be addressed politically for the nation to survive. Belgium, Bosnia and Nigeria could be seen as examples.
Britain is not federal, indeed its largest constituent, England, remains one of the most highly centralised of major democracies. But it’s been heading down the devolution path in recent decades, establishing parliaments or assemblies for Scotland and Wales (and also reforming Northern Ireland’s assembly, though for different reasons). Some see that as a drift towards a federal system, which could also eventually encompass more autonomy for the poorer, largely post-industrial, English midlands and north. But a huge row over the rights of people who are trans-gender has put into question just how sincere and effective is Britain’s decentralisation of political power.
One of the main purposes of introducing regional decision making is to enable large and complex nations to accommodate diversity and so blunt separatist sentiment. That’s how it has worked in the world’s two major democracies.
Indian federalism has been a conspicuous success and an important factor in allowing a geographically, culturally and linguistically hugely diverse nation to prosper. That’s not an endorsement of the way India is governed, but a reflection of the manner in which power is divided between the Centre and the country’s constituent states. Separatist sentiment in the Kashmir Valley and in some parts of India’s north-east has led to insurgencies and brutal security crackdowns, and Delhi has been strongly criticised for failing to seek a political solution particularly in Kashmir. But broadly, federalism has kept India together.
The United States is a different story. Its political system is shaped by the legacy of a ruinous civil war in the 1860s to prevent secession by pro-slavery southern states. And it has one signal success: there is no secessionist movement of any political consequence anywhere in the US (except perhaps on the Caribbean island of Puerto Rico, which is US-ruled but whose citizens have no elected representatives in Congress).
Britain’s awkward embrace of devolution is more recent. In 1997, when Labour’s Tony Blair headed a reforming national government, the British Parliament agreed there should be referenda in Scotland and Wales to decide on whether to set up devolved assemblies there. Voters in both regions endorsed the idea and a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly (the difference in terms is important – the Welsh elected body was given less power than Scotland’s) were established the following year. The broad political consensus is that, in practical terms, devolution has worked fairly well.
Tony Blair’s devolution reforms were in part a response to increased nationalist sentiment in Scotland and Wales, and in part an attempt to forestall the growth of a powerful breakaway movement. In Scotland, that aim has failed. For the past fifteen years, Scotland’s First Minister has been a member of the Scottish National Party (SNP), a constitutional left-wing party which seeks an independent Scotland. The SNP is now by far the most popular political party in Scotland getting almost half the total vote. And it wants a referendum on independence (there was one in 2014, in which the people of Scotland voted by 55% to 45% against breaking away, but the pro-Europe SNP says Britain’s departure from the European Union requires a fresh vote).
But there’s a catch. A second referendum can only be authorised by the government and Parliament in Westminster – and there’s no prospect of that. So, there’s an uneasy stalemate between London and the Scottish capital, Edinburgh.
The political temperature is now approaching boiling point because of a row about trans rights. The Scottish Parliament has passed legislation – applicable only in Scotland – to make it easier for people who are trans-gender to get formal legal recognition of their new gender identity. The governing Conservative party in London disagrees with these reforms and argues that it conflicts with legislation passed by the Britain-wide Westminster Parliament. And for the first time since devolution was introduced a quarter of a century ago, the British government is using its reserve powers to block Scotland’s new law.
The Scottish nationalists argue that failing to respect a decision of the Edinburgh Parliament in an area where it has devolved authority is anti-democratic. The British Conservatives say that far from tearing up the devolution arrangement, London is simply exercising powers it was given under that dispensation. What started as a difference of opinion about trans rights is becoming a big constitutional bust-up.
The instinct to decentralise power and ensure that smaller regions enjoy real autonomy feels right. England has ten times the population of Scotland and almost twenty times that of Wales, and that overwhelming dominance made both smaller nations feel marginalised and ignored. But getting the balance right between centre and region is a difficult judgment. And there is the even trickier issue of how to respond when regional sentiment becomes a demand for complete separation.
This doesn’t mean that devolving power is wrong – just that it takes a lot of careful planning and even more political wisdom to make it work..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ် နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၈ ရက် နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သော အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်ကို ဆင်ခြင်ဉာဏ်မရှိသော အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးပြ၍ ကန့်ကွက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့်အပြင် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် မတရား အာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ လိုအင်ဆန္ဒကို စိုးစဉ်းမျှ အလေးထားမှုမရှိဘဲ ၎င်းတို့၏ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အာဏာနှင့် လူတစု၏ စည်းစိမ်ဥစ္စာကို ကာကွယ်ရန်အတွက် လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် လူမဆန်ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာမဲ့သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုပေါင်းစုံ ကျူးလွန်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ ကမ္ဘာအသိပင်ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် လက်နက်အားကိုး ဗိုလ်ကျစိုးမိုးခဲ့သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အပြီးတိုင် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းရေးအတွက် ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြီးကို ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ် နိုဝင်ဘာလတွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သော အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲကြီး၌ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ခံရသည့် ပြည်သူ့ဘက်တော်သား လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များနှင့်အတူ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ အားလုံးစုပေါင်းလက်တွဲ၍ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ အားပေးထောက်ခံမှုဖြင့် ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသည်။
၃။ ယခုအချိန်တွင် စိတ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ၊ ရုပ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ အဖက်ဖက်မှ ယိုယွင်းပျက်စီးနေပြီဖြစ်သည့် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ နိုင်ငံရေးထွက်ပေါက် ရရှိရန်အလို့ငှာ အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ကျင်းပနိုင်ရေးအတွက် နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် အပူတပြင်း ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသည်။
၄။ မိမိတို့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အခြေခံလမ်းညွှန်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိဉာဉ် အစိတ်အပိုင်း (၁)၊ နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းပြမြေပုံ အဆင့် (၁၁) အရ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလအတွင်းတွင် တိုင်းပြုပြည်ပြုညီလာခံကြီးကိုကျင်းပကာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံ ဥပဒေကို ရေးဆွဲအတည်ပြုပြဋ္ဌာန်းပြီး ထိုဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေတွင် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းထားသည့်အတိုင်း ပြည်ထောင်စုအဆင့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများကို ကျင်းပသွားရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ တချိန်တည်းတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုအဖွဲ့ဝင်ပြည်နယ်များ၌လည်း သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်နယ်ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ အသီးသီးနှင့်အညီ ပြည်နယ်အဆင့်၊ ဒေသန္တရအဆင့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများကို ကျင်းပသွားရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ တနိုင်ငံလုံးရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးအား အကြမ်းဖက် ဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ် မီးရှို့နေချိန်၊ လေကြောင်းဖြင့် ပြင်းထန်စွာ ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်နေချိန်တွင် ၎င်းတို့ နိုင်ငံရေးထွက်ပေါက်အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသည် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲသည် နိုင်ငံရေးအရသော်လည်းကောင်း၊ ဥပဒေကြောင်းအရသော်လည်းကောင်း တရားဝင်မှုမရှိသည့်အပြင် လွတ်လပ်၍ တရားမျှတသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ၏ စံတန်ဖိုးများနှင့် ညီညွတ်မှုမရှိကြောင်း သိစေအပ်ပါသည်။
၆။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အဖွဲ့အစည်းအသီးသီး၊ အင်အားစုအသီးသီးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထု တရပ်လုံးအနေဖြင့် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအတွက် ပြင်ဆင်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ခြင်းမပြုဘဲ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်သွားကြရန် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Federal Union Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
433.02 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ၂.၅.၂၀၂၂ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်မှ ဥပဒေအမှတ် (၂/၂၀၂၂) ဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဥပဒေအား အတည်ပြုပြဌာန်းခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၇.၆.၂၀၂၂ ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတရုံး၏ အမိန့်ကြေငြာစာအမှတ် (၁၂/၂၀၂၂) ဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ လက်အောက်ရှိ ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ ကို စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်း၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ် နယ်မြေများတွင် လုံခြုံရေးနှင့်တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးလုပ်ငန်းများအား ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၂။ ယခုအခါတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများတွင် သာမကပဲ နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံးရှိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့်လက်အောက်ခံများမှ ကျူးလွန် သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် ပြည်သူအချင်းချင်းကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအား မှတ်တမ်း တင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရန်နှင့် ပြစ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူ တရားခံများအား တရားဥပဒေ၏ ရှေ့မှောက် သို့ပို့ဆောင်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၁၄ (ခ)အရ ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ လက်အောက်တွင် E police station အား ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
87.84 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Resistance attacks on regime targets in Myanmar’s southern, eastern and central regions are likely to increase in the coming months as the country’s oldest rebel group has vowed to step up operations while saying fighting is only one way to end military rule.
“We need to speed up in both military and political affairs,” KNU communications chief Padoh Saw Taw Nee told The Irrawaddy.
The KNU was founded in 1947 and its armed wings, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and Karen National Defense Organization, are fighting the junta in Karen and Mon states and Bago and Tanintharyi regions. They are the most powerful ethnic armed organizations near the Thai border.
Fighting has already increased this year.
The KNLA and allied resistance groups attacked Battalions 32, 283 and 284 near the town of Kyainseikgyi in Karen State on January 4, while the junta was marking Myanmar’s Independence Day.
A battalion headquarters was seized and an infantry barracks, some officer’s quarters and vehicles were torched before junta airstrikes forced a retreat.
Karen forces claimed that 45 junta soldiers, including a battalion commander, were killed or wounded in the raids. Seven resistance troops were killed and 13 injured.
The KNLA and its allies raided Border Guard Force outposts along the Phayathonsu road in Kyainseikgyi Township in early January. Two outposts were seized, 90 regime soldiers died while nine resistance fighters were killed and 15 injured, the group said.
The attacks prompted junta shelling and airstrikes on civilian and resistance targets.
Since the 2021 coup and the subsequent killing of peaceful demonstrators nationwide, the KNU has trained and armed several thousand volunteers to fight the regime.
Its troops have also fought alongside newly formed resistance groups and coordinated with the civilian National Unity Government.
An estimated 5,500 regime soldiers have been killed and around 5,000 have been injured while hundreds of resistance fighters have died, Padoh Saw Taw Nee said.
Near-daily coordinated attacks by KNU forces and their resistance allies are reported across Karen, Mon, Bago and Tanintharyi.
“We need to uproot the military dictatorship not only in our state but across the country so we have plans to connect with other resistance groups,” Padoh Saw Taw Nee said.
In December the KNLA led attacked junta targets, including a district police office and an administrative office in Kawkareik. It claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties and seized weapons and ammunition.
Padoh Saw Taw Nee said: “There will be more urban attacks. We have said we will attack in various arenas.”
The KNU is also looking further afield.
The KNLA and Magwe resistance allies attacked a key junta airbase in Magwe Township using three improvised rockets.
Padoh Saw Taw Nee said at the time that three military aircraft were destroyed and at least eight regime troops killed.
Resistance fighters trained and assigned by the KNU are fighting with other groups across Magwe, Mandalay and Sagaing regions.
Meanwhile, the regime continues to kill civilians, loot and burn houses and attack civilian areas with shells and airstrikes and commit acts of sexual violence.
Since early January the regime has been escalating airstrikes in Sagaing Region and Chin, Kachin and Karen states, possibly in response to New Year’s speeches by ethnic armed organizations’ leaders vowing to uproot the dictatorship during 2023..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"One of the most unexpected developments in the struggle against Myanmar’s latest military dictatorship is the support for the resistance that has come from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). An ethnic armed organization (EAO), the MNDAA is based in Kokang in the far northeastern corner of Shan State in eastern Myanmar.
More than 90 per cent of Kokang’s population of approximately 150,000 people are ethnic Chinese of Yunnan descent, and the region’s cultural, personal and even political ties with China have always been strong. Given Beijing’s support for the junta that was installed after the February 2021 coup, it may seem surprising that the MNDAA is getting away with supporting the resistance to the regime. But, as a long-time observer of Myanmar politics, put it: “It looks to me as if the Chinese are working, as they often do, to keep a foot of some sort in all camps.”
The MNDAA has trained several groups of fighters from the pro-democracy resistance, which are loosely-banded together and known as People’s Defense Forces (PDF). Arms for the resistance have also been provided through the MNDAA and its close ally the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, a powerful EAO that is active in Palaung-inhabited areas of northern Shan State. The weapons, in turn, are Chinese-made and come from the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has had a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military since 1989, and therefore cannot be directly involved in the fight.
The flow of guns and the fact that no Chinese-made FN-6 Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), of which the UWSA has many, have been provided seems to indicate that the China is giving its tacit approval to the arms supplies, but with certain limitations. The PDFs need MANPADS urgently to protect themselves against the increasingly frequent airstrikes that the military regime has unleashed against resistance strongholds. But it wouldn’t look good if any of the Chinese-made planes in service with the Myanmar Air Force were shot down by Chinese-made MANPADS.
In this rather complicated context, it should also be remembered that this is not the first time that the MNDAA has been engaged in a conflict with the Myanmar military. The group was one of four EAOs that emerged from a mutiny among the rank-and-file of the once powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989. The others were the UWSA, the National Democratic Alliance Army in eastern Shan State, and the New Democratic Army in Kachin State. All four entered into, but did not sign, ceasefire agreements with the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but fighting broke out between the MNDAA and the Myanmar military in 2009. The MNDAA lost most of its territory, and an estimated 30,000 Kokang people fled across the border to Yunnan.
Most of them were able to return but, in February 2015, fighting resumed and between 40,000-50,000 refugees ended up in Yunnan. Massive airstrikes and artillery barrages were used. In a May 2015 article for Jane’s Defense Weekly, writer Anthony Davis described the offensive as “the largest war since Myanmar’s independence.” China cannot have been pleased with what happened in 2009 and 2015, and probably thought it wise to maintain good relations with the MNDAA. With its ethnic Chinese population, Kokang has always served as an unofficial buffer zone between China and Myanmar, as well as gateway for China’s influence in Shan State and beyond. Consequently, Kokang is of the utmost strategic importance to Beijing.
Kokang’s exact status has always been somewhat ambiguous. Prior to the arrival of the British in the then Burma, Kokang maintained a dual relationship between local chieftains and the Shan saohpa [sawbwa in Burmese] of Hsenwi to the west of the Salween River and with Chinese rulers to the east of the Salween. But under an 1894 agreement between Britain and China, Kokang was recognized as Chinese territory. However, a new agreement was reached in 1897 under which China had to cede Kokang to the British, who placed the region under the jurisdiction of North Hsenwi State and a local myosa, literally a ‘town eater’, or local tax collector, who also had other duties.
During World War II, Kokang’s status was changed again and, in 1951 it became a separate entity within the Shan States ruled by its own saohpa. His name was Yang Kyein-sai and he belonged to the Yang clan, the most powerful family in Kokang. His sister Yang Kyin-hsui, better known as Olive Yang, is perhaps the best-known of his siblings. She had her own armed militia and, in the 1950s, became involved in the opium trade, although her role in business and politics has been grossly exaggerated and even glamorized, perhaps because she was openly lesbian.
Some contemporary writers have elevated her to the status of an early LGBT activist and, even more imaginatively, as a superspy connected with various foreign intelligence agencies. In fact, Olive Yang’s main and only real claim to fame was that she was the first person to send opium in truck convoys down to the Thai border, rather than by the usual mule caravans. She traded opium with the remnants of the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces on the Thai-Shan State border, but had hardly any other significant connections with the outside world.
In 1960, Olive wanted to assume the title of saohpa of Kokang, a title still held by her brother, but she was detained by Myanmar’s central authorities from 1963 to 1968. She lived quietly in Yangon and Shan State after her release until 1989, when the then military intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt appointed her, ex-opium warlord Lo Hsing-han and Aung Gyi, a Sino-Burmese former army officer, to negotiate with the CPB mutineers in Kokang. She died in 2017 in Muse in northern Shan State.
Another Yang sibling, Yang Kyein-sein, aka Jimmy Yang, was far more important than Olive. He was elected MP for Kokang in 1950, a position he held until General Ne Win’s coup in 1962 and the end of Myanmar democracy. Jimmy Yang also founded the Burma Bank and was a prominent personality in politics and business throughout the 1950s.
He went underground after the coup and formed the Kokang Revolutionary Force which, in 1964, merged with two Shan groups to form the Shan State Army, led by Sao Nang Hearn Hkam, the widow of Myanmar’s first president Sao Shwe Thaike. But Jimmy soon broke away and served for a while as a manager of the long-gone Rincome Hotel in Chiang Mai. He later allied himself with the KMT in the opium business and with ousted Prime Minister U Nu in exile politics. Jimmy Yang left for Paris in 1973, but returned to Myanmar during a general amnesty in 1980. He died in Yangon in 1985.
Meanwhile at home in Kokang, crucial events took place which became a turning point in the modern history of the territory. In 1967, two of Jimmy Yang’s officers, Pheung Kya-shin and Pheung Kya-fu, traveled to China to ask for help. The Chinese introduced them to CPB exiles, who for several years had been planning a major push into Myanmar. On January 1, 1968, heavily-armed CPB units crossed into Myanmar at Möng Ko in northern Shan State. Five days later, the Pheung brothers and the force they commanded crossed into Kokang, which was overrun within days. Kokang and large parts of northern Shan State soon came under CPB control.
By the mid 1970s, the CPB had extended its ‘liberated area’ to encompass 20,000 square kilometers of land along Myanmar’s border with China. The problem, though, was that the CPB’s soldiers consisted almost exclusively of people from the mountains of northern and eastern Shan State, while orthodox, Maoist Bamar dominated the CPB’s political leadership. People like Pheung Kya-shin didn’t even join the CPB; he was content to be an army commander and local administrator in Kokang. Almost inevitably, this led to a mutiny, which began in Kokang in March 1989 and, in April, spread to the Wa Hills and other CPB-controlled areas.
At first it was believed that the CPB mutineers would link up with Myanmar’s other EAOs. But the SLORC was faster, and made the mutineers an offer they accepted without hesitation: keep your armies but don’t share your guns with the other EAOs, and you can also retain control over your respective areas and get involved in any kind of business. In the beginning that meant the trade in opium and its derivative heroin, but now commercial pursuits are more diversified and include tin and rare earth mining with China being the main market for exports.
Since the mutiny, Kokang has been transformed into a center for cross-border trade with China. Whereas during the CPB days there were only bamboo huts and a few bigger houses made of stone, high-rise buildings now loom over market places and shopping centers. There are even talks about building a high-speed railroad from China through the southern part of Kokang to Hsenwi, and then all the way to Mandalay and, eventually, Yangon and the port of Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State. Needless to say, Kokang’s recent development is more in tune with what the leaders in Beijing want, as China no longer exports communist revolution. Today it’s a question of trade, commerce and all kinds of influence over Myanmar’s internal affairs, be it the insurgencies and military affairs or mainstream politics and, most important, geopolitical concerns.
Pheung Kya-fu died in June 2017 at the age of 81 and Pheung Kya-shin on February 16, 2022. He was 94. With those old warlords gone, a new generation of Kokang leaders have taken over, but little is known about them. It is also not known how and when they invited PDF fighters to their area. But with Kokang commanders in charge it is certain that relations with China are bound to be strong. And will the PDFs be able to maintain their independence? Their main weakness is that the PDFs have no central command and no common strategy. They can easily end up being totally dependent on the stronger groups that train and equip them.
That means that the struggle for Myanmar’s future is as uncertain as it always has been: a never-ending civil war with more suffering for the people, who are now being bombarded by the Myanmar Air Force and ruled by an incompetent junta that has pushed the country close to an economic abyss. And much of it has to do with China’s desire to secure its control over the vital ‘Myanmar corridor’, which gives it access to the Indian Ocean and markets across the world.
As for Kokang, it will not be an easy task for anyone in power in Naypyitaw to establish some semblance of authority over that virtually autonomous territory. Like the Wa Hills to the south, it is a part of Myanmar that has never been under any effective, central governmental control — but which for a very long time has had much closer ties to China..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"16 January 2023: Companies from at least 13 countries, including in Europe, Asia and North America, have been enabling the Myanmar military to manufacture weapons used for human rights atrocities. They must stop doing business with the Myanmar military and associated entities immediately, if they have not done so already, said the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), in a new report on the Myanmar military’s in-country arms production and the global value chains that facilitate it. Weapons produced in Myanmar have been used and continue to be used by the military to commit widespread human rights violations that amount to the most serious crimes under international law.
The report, Fatal Business: Supplying the Myanmar Military’s Weapon Production, identifies companies domiciled in Austria, France, China, Singapore, India, Israel, Ukraine, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. They have been providing supplies that are critical to weapon production in Myanmar by the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries (DDI) at arms manufacturing factories commonly referred to as KaPaSa.
The report also maps out the locations of KaPaSa factories and their current production lines as well as other locations of strategic importance for the DDI’s weapon manufacturing. The Myanmar military has invested heavily over many years in building up its capacity to produce arms in-country, particularly small arms and light weapons, in response to embargoes and sanctions that have restricted its access to essential military supplies produced elsewhere.
“Foreign companies are enabling the Myanmar military – one of the world’s worst human rights abusers – to produce many of the weapons it uses to commit daily atrocities against the Myanmar people,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “Foreign companies and their home states have moral and legal responsibilities to ensure their products are not facilitating human rights violations against civilians in Myanmar. Failing to do so makes them complicit in the Myanmar military’s barbaric crimes.”
The report draws on a range of sources including leaked budget-related documents from the Myanmar military-controlled Ministry of Defence and the DDI, shipment records, interviews with individuals formerly associated with the Myanmar military and photographic evidence shared by them as well as open-source materials.
Through its investigation, SAC-M has identified companies supplying raw materials, parts and components, end-items, and high-precision Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines and associated technology to the DDI for the sustained production – both licensed and un-licensed – of weapons currently in its arsenal. The report also names front companies, including companies domiciled in Myanmar, and middlemen that enable the DDI to purchase products and services by brokering deals or otherwise acting as intermediaries for the DDI.
“Weapons produced at the Myanmar military’s KaPaSa factories have been used to commit human rights atrocities for decades,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “States must investigate and, if necessary, initiate administrative or legal proceedings against companies whose products we have identified as enabling the DDI to produce weapons used by the Myanmar military in its indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Foreign companies that profit from the suffering of the Myanmar people must be held accountable.”
Companies identified in the report may be contravening various export controls and other restrictive measures that apply in relation to Myanmar, the Myanmar military and companies associated with it. They may also be failing to uphold their international responsibilities to respect human rights under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Meanwhile, the home States of companies identified may be in breach of their obligations and duties under applicable international human rights and humanitarian law.
Over many years media and human rights groups have gathered extensive video and photographic evidence of DDI-manufactured weapons being used by the Myanmar military to commit gross human rights violations. This includes, for example, evidence of DDI-made weapons being used during lethal crackdowns on peaceful protests in response to the attempted coup of February 2021, and during the genocidal atrocities against Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. Companies involved in the provision or supply of essential products to the DDI may be found complicit in these and other atrocities committed by the Myanmar military.
“The Myanmar military has built a robust arms manufacturing industry that makes it largely self-sufficient in its ability to produce the small arms, light weapons and ammunition it uses to brutally suppress the Myanmar people,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “However, the DDI’s reliance on external supplies to sustain its weapon production means it is still vulnerable to external pressure. UN member states should do everything in their power to restrict the Myanmar military’s access to those supplies to protect the Myanmar people, including by adopting targeted sanctions against the KaPaSa, its leadership and its network of brokers.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
970.79 KB 225.84 KB
more
Sub-title:
Junta reportedly bombs Indian territory in fresh attacks on Chin Army
Description:
"(BANGKOK, January 12, 2023)—The Government of India should prevent Myanmar-junta fighter jets from accessing Indian airspace and take measures to protect ethnic-Chin and Indian civilians in border areas, said Fortify Rights today. On Tuesday and Wednesday, the Myanmar junta air force dropped bombs on both sides of the Myanmar-India border, killing five ethnic-Chin opposition soldiers and destroying civilian structures.
“New Delhi shouldn’t tolerate the junta’s incursions on its airspace, and Indian authorities should do everything in their power to ensure the security of civilians and border areas,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer of Fortify Rights. “India should be aware of the junta’s habit of violating its neighbors’ airspaces and terrorizing civilian populations and take action accordingly.”
The attacks reportedly began on January 10 at around 3:30 p.m., targeting Camp Victoria—the headquarters of the Chin National Front (CNF), an ethnic resistance organization—located in Myanmar’s Chin State, which abuts India’s Mizoram State. The bombing reportedly destroyed civilian housing and a health facility located inside Camp Victoria and killed five CNF soldiers, including two women.
Junta forces also reportedly dropped two bombs on the Indian side of the border, near Farkawn village in Mizoram State’s Champhai District, where thousands of ethic-Chin refugees have sought protection. No one was reported injured in Farkawn.
Leaked junta documents shared by the Chin Human Rights Organization on social media in November 2022 exposed alleged plans by the Myanmar junta to launch airstrikes on Camp Victoria. One document titled “Target List of CNF Headquarter” listed dormitories of soldiers, training facilities, leaders’ houses as well as civilian residences, hospitals, churches, and schools.
Anticipating potential attacks, in November 2022, a senior-ranking official in the CNF told Fortify Rights that the CNF had requested military support from the Indian government to increase security on the Myanmar-India border.
A few months back, in 2022, the Assam Rifles—border guard forces responsible for providing ground security in India’s Mizoram and Manipur states at the Myanmar border—withdrew from its post overseeing the Tiau River, which borders Myanmar in India’s Farkawn village. The junta bombed locations near the Tiau River this week.
In recent months, incursions by the Myanmar junta air force into the sovereign air space of both Thailand and Bangladesh have been reported.
According to the Royal Thai Air Force, on June 30, 2022, Myanmar junta aircraft crossed into Thai airspace over Phop Phra District in Tak Province, which is located on the Thailand-Myanmar border. Thai authorities reportedly detected a MiG-29 fighter jet belonging to the Myanmar military in Thai airspace, more than three miles into Thai territory. Reportedly, the incursion of the fighter jet and loud explosions across the border created panic among villagers in Thailand, prompting them to shelter in bunkers. In response to the junta’s incursions, Thai authorities deployed two F-16 fighter jets. Similarly, in late August 2022, the junta air force reportedly fired two rockets that landed less than 400 feet into Bangladeshi territory.
“The Myanmar junta is a threat to peace, including to the Myanmar people and civilian populations in neighboring states,” said Matthew Smith. “India must not allow the junta to continue destabilizing the region by using Indian airspace in its attacks and should support efforts to hold the junta accountable for its crimes.”
In the first six months after the Myanmar military launched its coup d’état, Fortify Rights and the Schell Center at Yale Law School documented crimes against humanity perpetrated by the military and police in Myanmar, including murder, imprisonment, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearances.
The junta’s systematic attack against the civilian population has forced tens of thousands from Chin State in Myanmar to Mizoram State, India. Although the Indian government reportedly ordered border security forces and the chief secretaries of the four northeastern states bordering Myanmar to prevent refugee inflows from Myanmar, as of July 2022, Mizoram State continues to host more than 30,000 Chin refugees. An estimated one-third of those sheltering in Mizoram State are located in the recently bombed Champhai District.
International humanitarian law—also known as the laws of war—is applicable to the situation in Chin State, which constitutes a non-international armed conflict. The laws of war are primarily defined by the Geneva Conventions, which provide fundamental rules to regulate the conduct of armed conflict and expressly guarantee the protection of civilians “against all acts of violence.” Under the laws of war, parties involved in the conflict are required to distinguish civilians and “civilian objects,” such as homes and hospitals that are not being used for military purposes, from combatants and “military objectives.” Both direct attacks and indiscriminate attacks that strike civilians and “civilian objects” are prohibited by the laws of war. “Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population” is further considered a serious violation of international humanitarian law that may constitute a war crime.
The Myanmar junta’s nationwide attacks on civilian populations amount to serious violations of international law and should be addressed by the United Nations Security Council, said Fortify Rights.
The U.N. Security Council has recognized that military coups, mass atrocity crimes, and cross-border refugee crises can threaten international peace and security and be a context for the Security Council to invoke its authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
On December 21, 2022, the U.N. Security Council adopted a historic resolution, denouncing human rights violations by the Myanmar military since the February 1, 2021 coup d’état. This was the first Security Council resolution on Myanmar since the country became independent in 1948, and while important, it failed to mandate action.
The Security Council should invoke its authority and pass a resolution to issue a global arms embargo against the Myanmar junta and refer the situation to the International Criminal Court, said Fortify Rights.
The Government of India should coordinate with Myanmar’s neighbors and other U.N. member states to block imports of aviation fuel to Myanmar, which would help prevent the junta’s deadly air strikes on civilian populations. The Indian government should also authorize cross-border humanitarian aid for internally displaced persons in Myanmar, and deprive the Myanmar military junta of weapons, dual-use technology, revenue, and political recognition, said Fortify Rights..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သော နှစ် (၆၀) ပြည့် တအောင်းအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်တွင် တအောင်းအမျိုးသား ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး စိတ္တသုခ၊ကာယသုခနှစ်ဖြာ ပြည့်စုံကြပါစေဟု ဦးစွာ ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။၁၉၆၃ ခုနှစ်မှစတင်၍ တအောင်းအမျိုးသားပြည်သူများသည် အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်ကို ရရာလက်နက်စွဲကိုင်ပြီး ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။နှစ်ပေါင်း (၆၀) တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးအတွင်း အသက်၊သွေး၊ချွေး၊စည်းစိမ်များစွာ ရင်းနှီးပေးဆပ် စွန့်လွှတ်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့သော တအောင်းအမျိုးသား သူရဲကောင်းအာဇာနည်များနှင့်တကွ တအောင်း ပြည်သူများအားလုံးကို လေးနက်စွာ ဦးညွှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့ စစ်တပ်မှ မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းယူမှု နောက်ပိုင်း တွင်လည်း ပလောင်ပြည်နယ်လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး/ တအောင်းအမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော် (PSLF/TNLA)သည် ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သော စစ်ကောင်စီအား အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရန် တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ဟန်ချက်ညီစွာလက်တွဲလျက် ခုခံတွန်းလှန် လျက်ရှိသည်။
၅။ယနေ့အချိန်အခါတွင် တအောင်းအမျိုးသားများနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး၏ မျှော်မှန်း တောင့်တချက်ဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အား အပြီးတိုင် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်သူများနှင့် အတူတကွ စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် အင်တိုက်အားတိုက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက် အောင်မြင်ပြည့်ဝနိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
151.98 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် ထူးမြတ်သော နှစ်(၆၀)ပြည့် စိန်ရတုနှစ်၊ တအာင်းအမျိုးသား တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် တအာင်းသွေးချင်းညီအစ်ကိုများနှင့်တကွ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူပြည်သားများ အားလုံး၏ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးရည်မှန်းချက်များ အမြန်ဆုံးပြည့်ဝကာ ဘေးရန်ကင်းဝေးပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ တအာင်းပြည်သူများသည် ၁၉၆၃ ခုနှစ်မှ စတင်ကာ တအာင်းအမျိုးသားတစ်ရပ်လုံး အတွက် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အခွင့်အရေး၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုတို့အတွက် ဖိနှိပ်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးနှင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံကာ တွန်းလှန်ခုခံရင်း ပေးဆပ်မှုတို့ဖြင့် စုပေါင်း အင်အား တည်ဆောက် ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် နှစ်ပေါင်း(၆၀)တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ တရားမဝင်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ နိုင်ငံတော်ပုန်ကန်မှုပြစ်မှုအား ကျူးလွန်ကာ တရားဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူထားသည့်အပြင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရက်စက်သောအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်လျက်ရှိခြင်းကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူများသည် နေ့စဉ် အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများ ဆုံးရှုံးနေရပါသည်။ မိမိတို့အားလုံး၏ ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သည့်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်အား ပြည်သူလူထုအားဖြင့် ဟန်ချက်ညီညီ ပူးပေါင်း ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေသည့် ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် တအာင်းပြည်သူများနှင့် အားလုံးသော တိုင်းရင်းသားများအတွက် သမိုင်းတွင် ကမ္ပည်းထိုးနိုင်မည့် တော်လှန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်မှုတို့အား ရဲရင့်သော သတ္တိ၊ ဇွဲ၊ ခွန်အား၊ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့နှင့်အတူ အသက်သွေးချွေးပေးဆပ်ကာ အမျိုးသားရေးတာဝန်တစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် ရင်ဆိုင်တော်လှန်နေကြသည်မှာ အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက် နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လူမဆန်သော လူသတ်အာဏာရှင်များအား အမြစ်ပြတ် တိုက်ထုတ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် မိမိတို့တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး၏ စုပေါင်းအင်အားနှင့် ညီညွတ်ခြင်း ခွန်အားတို့ဖြင့်သာ အောင်ပွဲသို့ လျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင်ကြမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး တပ်ဦးတွင် အတူယှဉ်တွဲပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော တအာင်းခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် တအာင်းပြည်သူများ၏ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှု၊ ပေးဆပ်မှုနှင့်ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်မှုတို့အတွက် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ဝမ်းမြောက်လျက် နှစ်(၆၀)ပြည့် တအာင်းအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့သဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူလေးစားစွာ ပေးပို့ အပ် ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
307.77 KB
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
604.35 KB
more
Description:
"The title of a luxury Bangkok condo and two Siam Commercial Bank passbooks belonging to the children of junta head and war criminal Min Aung Hlaing were among items confiscated during the arrest of Myanmar crony arms broker Tun Min Latt, Justice For Myanmar has revealed in a report today, based on the seizure record.
Tun Min Latt and three of his associates were arrested in dawn raids in Bangkok on September 17 and were indicted on December 13 on drug trafficking, money laundering and transnational organised crime charges.
Justice For Myanmar understands that Thai authorities have not seized the assets of Aung Pyae Sone and Khin Thiri Thet Mon, despite evidence linking them to Tun Min Latt’s alleged criminal activities.
The title documents for a number of properties were confiscated belonging to Tun Min Latt and associates in his network.
Among them, a four-bedroom condo in Belle Rama 9 belonging to Aung Pyae Sone, Min Aung Hlaing’s son.
Comparable condos in Belle Rama 9 are being advertised for close to US$ 1 million.
The Siam Commercial Bank passbooks belong to Khin Thiri Thet Mon, Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter.
The condo title and passbooks were in the possession of Tun Min Latt at the time of his arrest.
Min Aung Hlaing and his two children are sanctioned by the US and Canada.
The revelations come as Min Aung Hlaing has maintained a close personal relationship with Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who became Prime Minister after leading a military coup in 2014. Thailand provides substantial support to the illegal junta through the purchase of natural gas.
Justice For Myanmar urges Thai authorities to seize the assets of Aung Pyae Sone and Khin Thiri Thet Mon and investigate whether they have benefited from the proceeds of crime, and to block junta members, their families and enablers from accessing Thai banks and purchasing assets in Thailand.
Justice Myanmar calls on Thai banks to close accounts held by junta members, cronies and their families sanctioned in other jurisdictions.
Justice For Myanmar further calls on governments to urgently sanction financial enablers of the junta to cut its access to funds and block opportunities for generals and their families to profit from the illegal coup attempt and steal public assets from the people of Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The fact that Min Aung Hlaing’s children’s assets were in the possession of an international criminal should be a wake-up call to the Thai government and international community.
“Justice For Myanmar urges Thai authorities to seize Aung Pyae Sone and Khin Thiri Thet Mon’s assets and investigate whether they have benefited from the proceeds of Tun Min Latt’s alleged money laundering and drug trafficking and to hold them accountable for any violations of Thai law.
“The Myanmar military junta is both a terrorist organisation and a transnational criminal enterprise, working in partnership with criminal enablers like Tun Min Latt, who co-own a military-owned casino and has brokered arms while committing his alleged criminal activities.
“While the junta continues waging its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar, the families of junta members are hiding their stolen assets offshore, as they benefit from the military’s genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“Thailand and other governments must urgently block the transfer of stolen assets from Myanmar and close access to the international financial system for junta members and their families, or risk complicity in the junta’s international crimes and corruption.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
141.19 KB 89.02 KB
more
Description:
"1. Revolutionary forces urge civilians to boycott the SAC’s attempt to collect population information for the sham election.....2. Defence Ministry plans to expand its battalions.....3. LDF members provide healthcare services to those affected by arson.....4. Fire protection taskforce established in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region 3/1/2023.....5. NUG Prime Minister remarks victory only at hand due to the increased support from the international community.....6. The NUG announced that it will send reports to international organizations, including the United Nations, regarding the violent torture in Pathein Prison and will take action..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
553.63 KB
more
Description:
"National Unity Government weekly News Update (2/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.25 MB
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
855.38 KB
more
Description:
"(ဤသတင်းများကို သတင်းမီဒီယာများမှတစ်ဆင့်ကူးယူထားခြင်းနှင့် မြေပြင် ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ
ပေးပို့ထားသောအချက်အလတ်များကိုစုစည်းဖော်ပြထားခြင်းသာဖြစ်ပါသည်။)
မှတ်ချက်။ ။မြေပြင်တွင် ယခုတွေ့ရသည့်သတင်းအချက်အလက်များထက် ပို၍ ဖြစ်ပွားနိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.61 MB
more
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.39 MB
more
Sub-title:
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ တရားမဝင်အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ခြင်း မပြုရန် ကြေညာခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ဦးဆောင်သော အကြမ်းဖက်,ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် တရားမဝင် အတု အယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအတွက် ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၉) ရက်နေ့မှ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့အထိ (၂၃) ရက်တာ “တစ်အိမ်တက်ဆင်း” လူဦးရေစာရင်း ကောက်ယူသွားရန် ဆောင်ရွက်လျှက်ရှိသော်လည်း အချို့သောနေရာများတွင် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၇ ရက်နေ့ ကတည်းက စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်ကိုင်တုတ် ဖြစ်သော အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် လဝကအဖွဲ့များက လူဦးရေနှင့် သန်းခေါင်စာရင်းများကို အတင်းအကျပ်ကောက်ခံနေပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်း သိရှိရပါသည်။
၂။ အဆိုပါ အကြမ်းဖက်,ဖက်ဆစ် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တရားမဝင်အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီး ဌာနမှ အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်_
(က) ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၉) ရက်နေ့မှ (၃၁) ရက်နေ့အထိ အကြမ်းဖက်,ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တစ်အိမ်တက်ဆင်း လူဦးရေစာရင်း ကောက်ယူခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို ငြင်းဆန်၍ မပူးပေါင်းကြရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံ အပ်ပါသည်။
( ခ) တစ်အိမ်တက်ဆင်း မြေပြင်လူဦးရေစာရင်းကောက်ယူနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အားပေး အားမြှောက်ပြုဆောင်ရွက်ကြသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်,ဖက်စစ်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အုပ်ချုပ် ရေးအဖွဲ့များ၊ လဝကအဖွဲ့များနှင့် အခြားမည်သည့်ဒေါက်တိုင်မဆို အကြမ်း ဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေဖြင့် ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန် တရားစွဲဆို အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
293.32 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
612.5 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar military regime chief Min Aung Hlaing’s mania for the presidency is increasingly unchecked and, infuriatingly for the Myanmar people, grows more visible with each passing day.
In recent days, they have cringed at the sight of the coup leader dressed in presidential attire handing out decorations to those who have earned his favor, at commemorations of New Year and the country’s 75th Independence Day. Then, he attended a grand military review, putting on airs and posing as the country’s legitimate president.
In their eyes, Min Aung Hlaing has never been the country’s leader. Rather, they see him as merely a nasty impostor who grabbed power from the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government in a military takeover and began committing atrocities, including air strikes against civilians, killing more than 2,600 people so far for rejecting his rule.
Formally, Min Aung Hlaing has not yet been able to call himself Myanmar’s president—constitutionally, the holder of that position must be elected to it by the country’s parliament. In fact, he came to power via a coup that effectively abolished the legislature.
But he has long been, and remains, desperate to be the president. That’s why he staged a coup against the NLD despite party leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s offer to him of the vice presidency, or a new post as chairman of the Military Commission.
Right after the coup, he moved straight into the Presidential Residence.
Then, he tried to deceive the world by appointing himself prime minister, preferring to be regarded as a civilian leader, rather than the head of a coup, while maintaining the military chief positon. Since then he has rarely been seen in uniform. Instead, he jumped into presidential attire to greet incoming diplomats in front of the Sihasana Palin, or Lion Throne, a symbol of Myanmar’s sovereignty, in imitation of the country’s previous presidents.
His mania for the presidency moved into high gear last year when he presided over a grand military review in February, following in the footsteps of ex-president Thein Sein, a former general. In short, Min Aung Hlaing has done almost everything that Myanmar monarchs and presidents traditionally do—from his reverence for white elephants and obsession with rubies, to building and consecrating pagodas and churning out honorary titles.
During the grand military reviews and ceremonies to confer titles, he has worn the Salwel, a sash that is one of the regalia of the Myanmar president, mimicking the pose of Thein Sein when the latter was sworn in as president at the Parliament in 2011.
Min Aung Hlaing plans to hold a general election in August—a must if he is to convene the Parliament and be elected president of Myanmar.
In his speeches to mark New Year and the 75th anniversary of Independence Day, Min Aung Hlaing therefore stressed that his regime is working hard to hold the election nationwide, ignoring the fact that his regime is losing ground in many parts of the country.
Min Aung Hlaing may however push ahead with his plan and order the Union Election Commission appointed by him to postpone the voting in some electorates, citing security reasons.
Taking no chances, he has also suppressed the National League for Democracy (NLD)—which he still sees as a threat, even after imprisoning its leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—and is in the process of replacing the first-past-the-post electoral system with proportional representation to ensure there is no landslide victory for a single party.
Min Aung Hlaing also installed Khin Yi, who served as police chief under the previous regime and is known for his brutal crackdown on activists who protested against it, as chairman of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The party has been making moves to solidify its position ahead of the planned poll.
With the NLD boycotting the election, the USDP is much more likely to win a majority in the Parliament. With 25 percent of seats constitutionally reserved for the military, Min Aung Hlaing’s dream seems set to become a reality, as USDP members and military appointees would vote for him to become president.
Meanwhile, Min Aung Hlaing is required under the constitution to hand power back to the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) at the end of this month. The election must be held within six months of that date. To maintain the military’s grip on power ahead of its plan for a so-called election in August, he would form a “transition council” under his leadership.
All of which guarantees that military rule will not really end in six months, or beyond the planned election, which he will use to legitimize his presidency by any means..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
376.75 KB
more
Description:
"အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ၎င်းတို့ ပြင်ဆင်စိုင်းပြင်းနေသော “အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ”အတွက် “နိုင်ငံအတွင်းရှိ လူဦးစာရင်းမှန်ကန်ရေးအတွက် မြေပြင်ကွင်းဆင်း တိုက်ဆိုင်စစ်ဆေးရန်”ဟု ခေါင်းစဥ်တပ်၍ အကြိုမဲစာရင်းများကောက်ယူရန် ခြေလှမ်းပြင်လာခဲ့ပြီး သတ်မှတ်ကာလမှာ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၉ ရက်နေ့မှ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့အထိ (၂၃) ရက်တာ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အဆိုပါ ကိစ္စရပ်နှင့် စပ်လျဥ်း၍ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများမှ ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးသို့ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များတွင် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းမပြုကြရန်၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုများရှိပါက မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထား၍ သတင်းပေးပို့တိုင်ကြားရန်၊ မိမိတိုပတ်ဝန်းကျင်တွင် လူဦးရေစာရင်းကောက်ယူမှုအခြေအနေများကို Telegram Scout channel များသို့ဖြစ်စေ၊ သတင်းမီဒီယာများနှင့် သပိတ်အင်အားစုများ၏ လူမှုကွန်ရက် (Facebook) စာမျက်နှာများသို ဖြစ်စေ အချိန်နှင့် တပြေးညီ သတင်းပေးပိုကြပါရန်၊ အခြေအနေ အရပ်အရပ်ကြောင့် လူဦးရေစာရင်းပေးရပါကလည်း သတင်းအချက်အလက် အမှားများသာ ပေးကြရန် စသည်ဖြင့် ပန်ကြားနှိုးဆော်တိုက်တွန်းထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
153.69 KB
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
419.78 KB
more
Description:
"ငါတို့နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးသည် မည်သူ တဦးတယောက် တဖွဲ့တသင်း၏ အမွေအနှစ်မဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတဦးတယောက်တဖွဲ့တသင်း၏ ပုဂ္ဂလိကအပိုင် ပစ္စည်းမဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတဦးတယောက် တဖွဲ့တသင်းက ချုပ်ကိုင်အနိုင်သိမ်းယူ အကျိုးခံစားအပ်သော နိုင်ငံမဟုတ်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Federal Union Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
393.5 KB
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
471.75 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့တို့အား တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်မှုဖြင့် တွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ်၍ ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် လွတ်လပ်သော အချုပ်အခြာ အာဏာပိုင်နိုင်ငံအဖြစ် ရယူနိုင်ခဲ့ရာ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၇၅) နှစ်တိုင် ရှိခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အတိတ်တွင် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည့် နားလည်မှု၊ အမြော်အမြင်ကြီးမှုနှင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့သည် ယနေ့ အချိန်တွင်လည်း အထူးလိုအပ်လျက် မိမိတို့ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ စိတ်ဓာတ်နှင့် လမ်းစဉ်အတိုင်း အတူတည်ဆောက်လျှောက်လှမ်းကြမည့် အချိန်ပင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် ပြည်ပ၏ နယ်ချဲ့ဖိနှိပ်မှုမဟုတ်ဘဲ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထု အား ကိုလိုနီဖက်ဆစ်ပုံစံဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းနေသော အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များနှင့် အမြစ်တွယ် နေသည့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများက ညီညီညွတ်ညွတ် တွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းကာလ (၂) နှစ်နီးပါး ကြာမြင့်သည့်တိုင် မိမိတို့ ပြည်သူအချင်းချင်းကြားတွင် ပြိုကွဲယိမ်းယိုင်ခြင်းမရှိသည့် အခြေအနေတစ်ရပ်သည် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုကြောင့်သာ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ လွတ်လပ်ရေးကြေညာစာတမ်း အပိုဒ် (၅) တွင် “ငါတို့နိုင်ငံ တော်ကြီးသည် မည်သူ တဦးတယောက် တဖွဲ့တသင်း၏ အမွေအနှစ်မဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတဦး တယောက်တဖွဲ့ တသင်း၏ ပုဂ္ဂလိကအပိုင်ပစ္စည်းမဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတဦး တယောက် တဖွဲ့တသင်းက ချုပ်ကိုင် အနိုင်သိမ်းယူ အကျိုးခံစားအပ်သော နိုင်ငံမဟုတ်” ဟု ဖော်ပြထားသည့်အတိုင်း မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် မည်သည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်း၊ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များက လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရန်အပါအဝင် လူထုဆန္ဒ မပါသော ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းနှင့်သွေဖီသည့် မည်ကဲ့သို့သော ကြိုးပမ်းမှုမျိုးကိုမဆို အတူတကွ တားဆီးကာကွယ်သွားကြရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် ပြည်သူလူထုက ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်း ကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသော တရားဝင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ဆန္ဒသဘောထားကို ဦးထိပ်ပန်ဆင်လျက် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ဆန္ဒအရ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာမည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ အစည်းများ ရှင်သန်ခိုင်မာစေရေးကို နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၅။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးသည် လွတ်လပ်ခြင်း အနှစ်သာရများ အပြည့်အဝ ရရှိ ခံစားနိုင်၍ မိမိတို့ ဆန္ဒသဘောထားနှင့်အညီ တိုင်းပြည်၏ ကိစ္စအရပ်ရပ်တွင် ဖိနှိပ်မှုများနှင့် အကြောက်တရားကင်းစွာ မိမိတို့ကိုယ်တိုင် ပါဝင်ဆုံးဖြတ်နိုင်ရေးအပြင် ဖက်ဒရယ်စနစ်နှင့် ဒီမို ကရေစီစနစ်တို့ ထူထောင်ရှင်သန်ခိုင်မာရေးဖြစ်သည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးအားလုံး၏ ဘုံရည်မှန်း ချက်အား ဆက်လက် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး အားထုတ်ကြိုးပမ်းသွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း လေးနက်စွာ ထပ်လောင်းကတိပြုလျက် ဤ (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနေ့သဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
498.12 KB
more
Description:
"Today, 4th January 2023 is the 75th anniversary, the Independence Day. For sixty years, Myanmar suffered under the yoke of colonialism as a vassal state, during the era where more powerful nations took control over less powerful countries, subjugated, and exploited them, the world over. But due to the love for independence by the people and their endeavours, on Sunday 4th January 1948, (Myanmar calendar Waning day of Pyatho 9th 1309), on this auspicious day Myanmar was declared an independent country as Union of Myanmar.
Even though Myanmar’s military forces played a significant role, together with the people’s struggle, in gaining the country’s independence, they started to put their interests before country and after becoming inured with the taste of power, the military leaders started to systematically dismantle institutions and transform the country to their benefit using their military might. And our country’s history is littered with coup d’état, and putsches and country has been under the military yoke for longer.
But this is the era where the populace and the ethnic communities, together are not taking it lying down and are confronting a group of military dictators who are inhumane, excessive, and irrational compared to their predecessors, and who have illegally seized power from the people.
We convey this commemorative message by urging all the organisations representing the people, Ethnic Revolution Organisations, and the people to follow their New Year Resolutions of eradicating the military dictatorship and creating the Federal Democracy Union as a common goal and follow in the footsteps of our forebearers where they garnered the spirit to fight off a force much stronger. Together we will go forth with this zeal and spirit, and we will uproot this military dictatorship and gain a second independence..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
26.94 KB
more
Description:
"ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၄) ရက်နေ့သည် (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနေ့ ဖြစ်သည်။ အင်အားကြီးသောနိုင်ငံများက အင်အားနည်းသောနိုင်ငံများကို နယ်ချဲ့ခြင်း၊ ကိုလိုနီပြုခြင်းများ ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့စဉ်ကာလဖြစ်သဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်လည်း တိုင်းတစ်ပါးသားတို့၏ ကျူးကျော်နယ်ချဲ့မှုဒဏ်ကို ခံခဲ့ရပြီး နှစ်ပေါင်း (၆၀) ကျော် သူ့ကျွန်ဘဝဖြင့် နေထိုင်ခဲ့ကြရသည်။ သို့သော် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို မြတ်နိုးသောစိတ်ဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်ခဲ့မှုကြောင့် မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၀၉-ခုနှစ်၊ ပြာသိုလဆုတ် (၉)ရက် (အင်္ဂလိပ်သက္ကရာဇ် ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်)တနင်္ဂနွေနေ့တွင် ကောင်းမြတ်သန့်စင် မင်္ဂလာအပေါင်းနှင့် ပြည့်စုံသောအခါ၌ ဤငါတို့မြန်မာပြည်သည် လုံးဝလွတ်လပ်သော အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာပိုင် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီး အဖြစ်သို့ ရောက်ခဲ့ပြီဟု ကြေညာနိုင်ခဲ့ပေသည်။
ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ အင်အားဖြင့် မြန်မာ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို အရယူခဲ့သည့်သမိုင်းတွင် အဓိကကျသည့် အခန်းကဏ္ဍကပါဝင်ခဲ့သော မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်သည် မိမိတို့၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကိုရှေ့တန်းတင်သော၊ အာဏာယစ်မူးသော စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်တို့၏ စနစ်တကျ ဖျက်ဆီးမှု၊ ယင်းတို့လိုလားသည့် ပုံသဏ္ဍာန် ရိုက်သွင်းကာ ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးကို လက်နက်အားကိုး အနိုင်ကျင့်သည့် အလေ့အထကို စတင်ခဲ့မှုများ ကြောင့် သမိုင်းခေတ် အဆက်ဆက်တွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုများပေါ်ပေါက်ကာ ပြည်သူလူထု တစ်ရပ်လုံးသည် စစ်ကျွန်ဘဝကို ကျရောက်ဖြတ်သန်းခဲ့ရသည့် ကာလသည်လည်း ထပ်မံရှည်ကြာခဲ့ရပေသည်။
ယခုကာလသည်လည်း ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များထက် ပိုမို သိမ်ဖျင်းသော၊ ရိုင်းစိုင်းယုတ်မာသော၊ အသိဉာဏ်ဆင်ခြင်တုံ့တရားကင်းမဲ့သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်တစ်စုတို့က ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကို မတရားလုယူ သိမ်းပိုက်ပြီး တိုင်းပြည်၏ အနာဂတ်တစ်ခုလုံးအား နင်းခြေဖျက်ဆီးရန် ကြိုးစားနေခြင်းကို တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးက ခေါင်းငုံ့မခံပဲ ရင်ဆိုင်တုံ့ပြန်နေကြသည့် အချိန်ကာလဖြစ်သည်။
တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးရှိ ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားပြုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ ၊ ပြည်သူများ အားလုံး၏ နှစ်သစ်ကူးထုတ်ပြန်ချက်များ၊ ပြောကြားချက်များတွင် ထင်ရှားပေါ်လွင်လျက်ရှိသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်အမြစ်ဖြတ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ဖော်ဆောင်ရေး ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ကို မျက်ချေပြတ်မခံပဲ လူအင်အား၊ လက်နက်အင်အား မိမိထက် အဆပေါင်းများစွာသာလွန်သော တိုင်းတပါးနယ်ချဲ့များကို တော်လှန်စိတ်ဓာတ်များ လက်ဆင့်ကမ်းသယ်ဆောင်ပြီး ဇွဲခတ်ကာ မြန်မာ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို အရယူနိုင်ခဲ့သည့် သမိုင်းအောင်ပွဲ၏ အောင်စိတ်ကို နှလုံးသွင်းလျက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်အား အမြစ်ဖြတ်၍ ဒုတိယလွတ်လပ်ရေးကို အရယူပြီး နိုင်ငံသစ်ကိုထူထောင် နိုင်ကြရန် လက်ရှိ ရရှိလျက်ရှိသော စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုဖြင့် ရှေ့ဆက်ချီတက်သွားကြပါစို့ဟု အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
462.65 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing handed out decorations to honor his predecessors and ultranationalist Buddhist monk U Wirathu on New Year’s Day.
He honored the first post-independence dictator General Ne Win and his successors General Sein Lwin and Senior General Saw Maung last year and Daw Khin Sandar Win, Ne Win’s daughter, accepted the decorations for her father on Sunday.
Ne Win seized power in the March 2, 1962, coup and oversaw the country’s descent into the list of least-developed countries.
The children of Sein Lwin and Saw Maung also accepted decorations on the behalf of their fathers. Ne Win loyalist Sein Lwin was responsible for brutal crackdowns on student protesters and was dubbed the butcher of Rangoon during the pro-democracy uprising in 1988.
Saw Maung was also responsible for the brutal crackdown on the uprising as the military chief. He also ensured a fresh military takeover at the instruction of Ne Win to perpetuate military rule.
Min Aung Hlaing has handed honorary titles and medals to around 3,700 people over the past year.
Marking the 75th anniversary of Independence Day on Wednesday, Min Aung Hlaing credited Daw Aung San Suu Kyiv’s father General Aung San with gaining independence from the UK.
But he seized power from the elected 77-year-old leader, who has been given 33 years in prison on 19 charges.
A junta court sentenced Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to a further seven years in prison on December 30.
Among those receiving awards in Naypyitaw were the children of Ne Win loyalist, San Yu, president of Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Program Party, and former prime minister U Nu.
Also honored were U Kyaw Nyin and U Ba Swe, colleagues of Gen. Aung San, and post-independence political leaders.
The junta’s newspapers on New Year’s Day showed Min Aung Hlaing and his wife greeting Ne Win’s daughter Daw Khin Sandar Win and his grandson Kyaw Ne Win.
Daw Khin Sandar Win attended Armed Forces Day last year and Kyaw Ne Win’s Omni Focus Co Ltd is involved in junta plans to bring electric buses to Myanmar.
Daw Yin Yin Oo, an adviser to Min Aung Hlaing’s advisory body, received decorations on behalf of her father, Dr. Maung Maung, another Ne Win loyalist.
On Tuesday Min Aung Hlaing handed over the Thiri Pyanchi title to ultranationalist monk U Wirathu, who was dubbed the Buddhist Bin Laden in the early 2010s for his racial and religious hate speech. U Wirathu’s title honors his cooperation with the regime’s “peace, development and prosperity” program.
Last year, Min Aung Hlaing handed out 1,290 titles and medals on Independence Day, 877 on Armed Forces Day on March 27, 146 for Myanmar’s New Year on April 1 and thousands more in November and December, totaling nearly 3,700.
The golden medals cost more than 7 billion kyats (around US$33.3 million) of public funds..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Two years of emergency rule declared by Myanmar’s military after seizing power from an elected civilian government will end on Jan. 31. The expiry of emergency rule prompts the question of whether the military regime will hand power back to acting president U Myint Swe.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing will no doubt make moves to maintain the military’s grip on power ahead of its plan for a so-called election in August. According to sources in Naypyitaw, the regime is likely to form a “transition council” in which U Myint Swe will play a role.
The council will be formed this month amid a reshuffle of the regime’s current administrative body, the State Administration Council (SAC), the sources add. The junta chief will lead the council while the military continues to rule the country.
Under the 2008 Constitution, the National Defense and Security Council can declare a state of emergency for one year and renew the order twice for six months each time.
Min Aung Hlaing cited the 2008 Constitution in explaining his coup and is thus responsible for telling the country what will come after emergency rule. There is little doubt he will follow previous military rulers by changing the regime’s name while ensuring the same people in uniform remain in power. The same old tune played by previous regimes is set to be reprised by Min Aung Hlaing.
Meanwhile, the SAC has been preparing for a so-called election planned for August. The regime has replaced ward and village administrators at the grassroots level with members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). It is now compiling lists of voters and contacting former election commission members. The USDP has also been reorganized, with generals taking senior positions.
Signs point to the junta rigging the proposed election just as it did in 2010. There is no hope of a free and fair vote under a military regime that has launched a brutal crackdown on the popular uprising against its illegal power seizure. The chairman of the current junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) is also notorious for rigging the 2010 poll with so-called “early voting”. The international outcry that followed was led by then-US President Barack Obama, who condemned the junta for stealing the election.
The UEC has no constitutional mandate to cancel the result of a general election, but the junta-appointed electoral body went ahead and scrapped the 2020 vote after the National League for Democracy won by a landslide. Under the 2008 Constitution and election law, the UEC can handle individual complaints but is not authorized to void the result of an entire election.
The military had already violated the 2008 Constitution by seizing power in February 2021. It also broke its promise of reform and nation-building made before the 2010 election.
These days, Myanmar’s voters are well aware that military rule remains military rule no matter what name it takes..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
611.34 KB
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
509.71 KB
more
Description:
"ဤ ၂၀၂၃ နှစ်သစ်နှင့်အတူ သမိုင်းတလျှောက်တွင် အထူးခြားဆုံးသော စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှု၊ မတူ ကွဲပြားမှုများ၏ စုစည်းမှုအောက်မှ အားနည်းချက်များကို ဆင်ခြင်သုံးသပ် ပြုပြင် ထိန်းကျောင်းရင်း အားသာချက်များဖြင့် အတူတကွ ပေါင်းစပ်ရင်း ခွန်အားသစ်လောင်းလျက် မိမိတို့ လိုလားတောင်းတသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး ပီပြင်စွာ အမြန်ဆုံး ပုံဖော်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပန်းတိုင်အရောက် အတူတကွ ဆက်လက် လျှောက်လှမ်းကြပါစို့ ..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
297.6 KB
more
Source/publisher:
The Three Brotherhood Alliance
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
138.35 KB
more
Description:
"စကစ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို ပေးပို့လိုပါက
Telegram - info2mod
Email - [email protected]
သို့ ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။
မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
658.43 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ကရင်သက္ကရာဇ် ၂၇၆၂ ခုနှစ် ပြာသိုလဆန်း ၁ ရက်နေ့ ယနေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ကရင်နှစ်သစ်ကူးနေ့တွင် ကရင်လူမျိုးအားလုံး မင်္ဂလာအပေါင်းနှင့် ပြည့်စုံပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။နှစ်သစ်ကူးအချိန်အခါသည် နှစ်ဟောင်းတွင် ဖြတ်သန်းခဲ့ရသည့် အတွေ့အကြုံများကို ပြည်လည် ဆင်ခြင်သုံးသပ်ပြီး နှစ်သစ်တွင် သာ၍ကောင်းမွန်သော ကောင်းကျိုးများ ရရှိရန်အတွက် ခွန်အားသစ်များ မွေးဖွားရသည့် အချိန်ကာလဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နှစ်သစ်ကိုကြိုဆိုရင်း ကရင်လူမျိုးတို့၏ သမိုင်းအဆက်ဆက်က ဂုဏ်ဝင့်ထည်စွာဖြင့် လက်ဆင့်ကမ်းလာခဲ့သော စာပေ၊ ဂီတ၊ အနုပညာ၊ စားဖွယ်သောက်ဖွယ် စုံလင်စွာဖြင့် ပွဲလမ်းသဘင်များ ကျင်းပရမည့် အချိန်ကာလလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။သို့သော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဖိနှိပ်ချယ်လှယ်မှုများကြောင့် ကရင်ပြည်သူ မြောက်များစွာသည် ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံမှုမရှိဘဲ စိုးရွံ့ထိတ်လန့်စိတ်ဖြင့် သော်လည်းကောင်း၊ စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ဘဝဖြင့် သော်လည်းကောင်း ကရင်နှစ်သစ်ကူးနေ့ အချိန်အခါအား ဖြတ်သန်းနေကြရသည်ကို များစွာဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲ ရပါသည်။
၄။အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ဤပြည်ထောင်စုအတွင်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကြောင့် ဖြစ်တည်ခဲ့သော ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် သံသယများ၊ ပဋိပက္ခများကို အပြီးတိုင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြီး တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိသော စည်းလုံးငြိမ်းချမ်းသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး
တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ကရင်လူမျိုးများနှင့် အတူတကွအတူတကွ လက်တွဲလျှောက်လှမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၅။၂၇၆၂ ကရင်နှစ်သစ်တွင် ကရင်လူမျိုးအားလုံး ဝမ်းမြောက်ရွှင်လန်းပြီး ကရင်လူမျိုးတို့၏ ရည်ရွယ်ချက် များကို ဆောင်ကျဉ်းပေးသည့် အောင်မြင်မှုများ ရရှိနိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမင်္ဂလာ ပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Political History, Karen (cultural, historical, political)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
341.32 KB
more
Description:
"Executive Summary: The Myanmar Interim Arrangements Research Project (MIARP)
was funded by the Joint Peace Fund (JPF)1
, and implemented
between October 2017 and October 2018. Researchers spoke
to more than 450 people in Shan, Karen/Kayin and Mon States,
Tanintharyi Region, Naypyidaw, Yangon and Thailand, including confict-affected communities, representatives of Myanmar government and Army, leaders and members of Ethnic
Armed Organisations (EAOs), civil society organisations (CSOs),
political parties, diplomats and donors, and international aid
workers and analysts.
The term “Interim Arrangements” (ၾကားကာလအတြ߾္းေࠀာ߾္ရြက္ရ
မည့္အ߿ီအ߿ဥ္မ်ား) is a contested concept, meaning different
things to different stakeholders. The MIARP adopted the following working defnition of Interim Arrangements:
“Service delivery and governance in confictaffected areas, including the relationship
between EAOs and government systems, during
the period between initial ceasefres and a
comprehensive political settlement.”
Interim Arrangement refers to EAOs’ governance functions,
administrative authority and service delivery systems. The issue of which geographic areas are covered by Interim Arrangements is problematic. The Myanmar Army has pressed to
restrict EAOs’ service delivery and governance functions to
areas under armed groups’ exclusive control (which in most
cases have not yet been demarcated); on the ground however,
EAOs’ infuence and delivery of services and governance functions extend into areas where political and military authority
is mixed, and contested with the government and Tatmadaw.
In principle, the “interim” period extends until a comprehensive political settlement has been implemented, which given
recent setbacks in the peace process may take many years to
achieve. In the meantime, recognition of Interim Arrangements
refects the government’s acknowledgement of key EAOs’ political legitimacy and administrative responsibilities - at least,
for those groups which have signed the Nationwide Ceasefre
Agreement (NCA). One of the key recommendations of this
report is to support EAOs to exercise governance and administrative authority in a responsible and accountable manner.
The only offcial text referring to Interim Arrangements is
the October 2015 NCA. However, Interim Arrangements are
relevant in areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and
furthermore the NCA text fails to cover the full range of
meanings associated with the term.
Although Interim Arrangements are about more than the
NCA, Chapter 6 (Article 25) of this agreement does recognize
the roles of signatory EAOs in the felds of health, education, development, environmental conservation and natural
resource management, preservation and promotion of ethnic
cultures and languages, security and the rule of law, and illicit
drug eradication. The NCA allows EAOs to receive international aid, in coordination with the government. However, with
no agreed mechanism for addressing these goals through the
peace process architecture, the NCA has had limited impacts
on improving confict-affected communities’ access to equitable and effective governance and services. Furthermore,
on the ground in southeast Myanmar, government offcials
seem to regard EAOs primarily as service delivery actors, and/
or private companies, rather than legitimate governance and
administrative actors.
For many years, Myanmar’s larger EAOs have taken on governance and administration roles in their areas of control, often
delivering a wide range of services in partnership with CSOs.
In the southeast, groups like the Restoration Council of Shan
State (RCSS), Karen National Union (KNU) and New Mon State
Party (NMSP) are de-facto governments in relatively small pockets of territory. They also have infuence and provide some
services in wider areas of “mixed administration”, where EAO
authority overlaps with that of the government and Myanmar
Army. Between them for example, these three EAOs administer or support more than 2,000 schools, providing ethnic
language teaching to vulnerable children who would otherwise often be denied an education. They also work with local
partners to provide health services, access to justice and other
public goods.2
Similar arrangements exist in other parts of the country, both
in ceasefre areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and
in areas of on-going armed confict. For example, across much
of Kachin and northern Shan States, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and other EAOs provide elements of
governance, and life-saving if under resourced services to Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other highly vulnerable
communities.
There are three principal rationales for supporting Interim Arrangements:
1. Effective Interim Arrangements will provide the best outcomes for vulnerable and marginalised communities in
confict-affected areas. Rather than reinventing the wheel,
existing EAO and CSO service delivery systems should
be supported on a case-by-case basis, recognising best
practice (an “appreciative inquiry” approach). Meeting the
government’s targets for school enrolment and universal
health coverage for example, will depend on the work
of EAOs and affliated civil society actors, who should be
seen as partners in meeting critical needs and achieving
development goals. Chapter 3 explores how these issues
play out in relation to specifc sectors and issues.
2. Several of Myanmar’s EAOs (including NCA signatory and
non-signatory groups) enjoy long-standing political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent.
Supporting EAO governance regimes will counter perceptions of the peace process as a vehicle for state penetration
into previously autonomous areas, displacing existing EAO
authorities and services, without consulting local stakeholders. In order to be confict-sensitive, aid should be delivered in ways that do not undermine systems associated with
EAOs, to the beneft of the government (which is a party to
the confict). Timely peace dividends can best be provided
to vulnerable and marginalized communities by working
with existing and trusted local service delivery systems.
3. Interim Arrangements could be a key element in building “federalism from below” in Myanmar, supporting
effective local governance through equitable practices of
self-determination. The administrative functions and services provided by key EAOs (and their civil society partners) should be regarded as the building blocks of federalism in Myanmar - a political solution to decades of armed
confict which key stakeholders have endorsed.
It will be very diffcult for confict-affected parts of Myanmar
to move from the current mixture of service delivery systems
and governance regimes towards a formalized (federal) system, without better coordination, and substantial political
and technical negotiations. However, given the slow pace of
the peace process since 2016, Interim Arrangements have
been given relatively little attention.
Given that the Political Dialogue element of the peace process
appears stalled, it could be useful to identify a small number of
political priorities, to help deliver on ethnic stakeholders’ key
aims. These could be negotiated by EAOs (and political parties)
in a „fast track“ manner, resulting in a Union Peace Accord
that benefts both the government and ethnic stakeholders.
Areas for possible progress include education and language
policy (recognition of and funding for EAOs’ extensive school
systems; “mother tongue” teaching in government schools);
land issues (recognition of land title documents provided by
EAOs; revision of unjust land laws; compensation and restitution for people who have had their land unfairly taken); equitable natural resource management; and addressing forced
displacement – i.e. Interim Arrangements. This would not
prevent ethnic stakeholders from continuing to campaign for
federalism, including changes to the 2008 Constitution..."
Source/publisher:
Joint Peace Fund and Covenant Consult
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
14.2 MB (100 pages) - Original version
more
Sub-title:
Despite the Tatmadaw’s increasing viciousness, it appears unable to suppress resistance
Description:
"In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ended its decade-long, grudging tolerance of limited democracy by launching a coup, detaining Aung San Suu Kyi and other elected civilian politicians. Since then, its ruthlessness has only increased. The number of political prisoners has soared to more than 13,000. The junta has resumed executions for the first time in decades. The UN human rights chief, Volker Türk, said last Friday that the regime was using the death penalty to crush political opposition, expressing shock that 130 people have been sentenced to death by military courts behind closed doors. Many of the 1,700 people who have stood trial have been denied access to lawyers or relatives. Not one has been acquitted.
The pandemic, war in Ukraine and uprisings elsewhere have meant that the world has largely stopped paying attention to events in Myanmar, where the military is literally pursuing a scorched earth policy. It has razed villages that it accuses of supporting the opposition and has bombed hospitals, schools and even a concert. An estimated 1.3 million people are displaced and living in horrific conditions. It continues to add to the raft of convictions and prison terms for Aung San Suu Kyi. Rights groups report extrajudicial killings by soldiers and militias.
The assumption at first was that the military, long expert in suppressing stirrings of dissent and democracy, would soon reassert control. Even when some protesters took up arms – and the pro-democracy national unity government backed a “defensive war” – it seemed a hopeless endeavour, given their lack of money, equipment and training. Yet the resistance has been not only remarkably protracted but – under the circumstances – surprisingly effective. Civilian militias, working alongside some of the ethnic armed groups that were already battling the state, are carrying out attacks on military bases and in previously untouchable central areas. Soldiers are said to be quitting or defecting. The junta has also relied on Russia for much of its weaponry – though it can still count on China, India and others.
Each fresh abuse by the regime gives opponents reason to fight on – no one believes it will compromise. Elections are promised next year, but the power seizure resulted from the military’s repeated failure to win at the ballot box, and opponents are all locked up. The regime made a vague attempt at PR by releasing 6,000 or more prisoners last month, including a former British ambassador, Vicky Bowman. But some were detained again on the same day, and the total number of those held soon rebounded. The junta remains grotesquely self-serving, with its chief, Min Aung Hlaing, spending a reported $33m on honours to keep its friends on side – in the process awarding himself two titles, one of which comes with an elaborate gold and ruby medal.
Sanctions should remain carefully targeted at those in the regime and their families. Though supporters of the democracy movement praise the UK for taking the lead internationally, they believe much more must be done. They make a strong case for cutting off the supply of aviation fuel – used by the military even when it has supposedly been destined for civil flights. The junta’s increasing brutality, however, is a sign of fear as well as further evidence of its viciousness. Some of those struggling for democracy now speak not of a coup, but an attempted coup; thanks to the resistance, they say, it has not yet succeeded. They need more support to ensure that it does not..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The global problem of conflict and food insecurity
Conflict and food insecurity are intertwined: when one takes place, the other one usually follows. Several economic, environmental, political, or religious factors underlie armed conflicts. Every armed conflict bears tremendous human and environmental costs, but disruptions to food production and supply are often felt most immediately, with significant repercussions and flow-on effects. It is common that conflict-affected populations experience persistent hunger in the post-conflict setting as it takes time to reconstruct basic infrastructures, such as irrigation systems, roads, and marketplaces needed for the agricultural sector to operate.
When a civil war sparks between two or more warring parties, it has direct and indirect impacts on food and economic insecurity as well as environmental destruction. In Myanmar, opposing nationalisms, a fight for self-determination, and struggles over ethnic identity prolonged a civil war. The government brought to power by a military coup was characterized by its corrupt ruling regime, a lack of power-sharing, centralized political administration, and an ineffective constitution—all factors leading to the emergence of a civil war. The dominant warring party, the Myanmar military (Sit-Tat/Tatmadaw) seized land and controlled food to weaken opposition forces, especially culturally and politically marginalized groups. Deploying ‘scorched earth’ tactics are deliberately used in such wars. In a conflict state such as Myanmar, the sharp decline in food production is a result of the destruction of rural infrastructure, loss of livestock, deforestation, and the use of landmines and displacement. Consequently, countries heavily reliant on food exports from Myanmar are most vulnerable to this impact.
Introduction to Myanmar and the February 2021 Coup
Myanmar, a resource-rich and ethnically diverse country, has one of the longest civil wars in the world. Many ethnic groups have been fighting for self-determination since independence in 1948. The country experienced several military coups and was under authoritarian regimes. In 2010, it embarked on a political transition where a series of reforms were launched under a quasi-civilian government. In 2016, Myanmar had its first civilian government. Unfortunately, those days were short-lived and followed by a military coup took place in February 2021.
Myanmar is an agricultural-based country. The sector employs 70% of the rural population, and farmers play an important role in state-making. Their livelihoods, similarly, are the engine driving growth for rural development. Myanmar is also a major food supplier for neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand, Bangladesh and India.
There has been considerable resistance to Myanmar’s military in the months since the coup. Civilians took to the street in mass protests and stopped using government facilities and services. Schools were shut down, and government servants joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Boycotts were implemented against the military and military-back businesses. The international community also imposed targeted sanctions in response to the coup. Following a series of events, the economic, health, and financial sectors came close to collapse and unemployment surged. Myanmar’s youth or ‘Generation Z’ took up arms and established the People’s Defense Force (PDF) to uproot the junta regime.
This article discusses how the junta weaponizes food to weaken pro-democracy forces, deploying ‘scorched earth’ tactics to cause a sharp decline in food production, resulting in local starvation and threatening the regional food supply system. First, I explore the food supply chain mechanism in Myanmar. I highlight how policies related to food are developed in favour of generating government revenue, and at the expense of farmers’ welfare. Second, the article discusses the impact of the current country-wide conflict on hunger, specifically the way the junta uses food as a weapon against its opposition. Third, it looks at the state of food production in Myanmar and its impact on regional food security. I conclude by sharing some thoughts on how regional partners should hold the State Administration Council (SAC) accountable for atrocities committed.
Food supply chain mechanisms and the state in Myanmar
Myanmar’s food supply system has always been tightly controlled by the state. Land and agricultural policies have long determined farmers’ welfare and food accessibility. Burma’s first military coup in 1962, led by Ne Win, introduced the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism.’ Under the socialist system, farmers were forced to sell their farm products at low government-set prices as the government wanted to gain foreign exchange reserves through rice exports. As a result, farmers could not boost productivity, let alone scrape by for their own survival. This form of political intervention pushed them to sell rice on the black market. As food prices skyrocketed, village populations fell into extreme poverty. Due to the miscalculated economic strategy of the Ne Win government, Myanmar encountered economic stagnation and landed in the Least Developed Country list by 1987. The food crisis contributed to an uprising in 1988—this mass protest was brutally cracked down by General Than Shwe, the then-leader of the State Peace Development Council (SPDC).
The SPDC introduced the “Burmese Way to Capitalism” to recover the economy. Under this system, farmers were forced to take credit, which they paid back in the form of fixed portions of rice. This system ultimately trapped farmers in cycles of debt. Consequently, there was a sharp decline in purchasing power. People in hilly regions, such as Bago Yoma range, Shan Plateau and Arakan Yoma range, suffered the most as they had no alternative livelihoods. The State continued to control the food supply system, which suffered from major deficiencies in the distribution of food and further exacerbated political instability.
Ethnic conflict and oppression smouldered for years in various parts of the country. Fast forward to 2010, with a vision to hold nationwide ceasefire talks, the military-backed quasi-civilian government introduced a series of reforms, including the controversial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) law. Many farmlands were officially seized under the pro-business FDI law. Against a backdrop of a decades-long civil war and lack of concrete political settlements with ethnic groups, many issues remained unsolved under the 2016 elected government.
When the coup took place in February 2021, in a speech delivered in January 2022 by SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing, the idea of exporting rice to earn foreign income was once again put on the table. He impressed that “efforts must be made to achieve success in the yield of 100 baskets of paddy per acre. If so, paddy rice can be exported to earn foreign income. Local farmers will have increased income which will contribute to the better local circulation of money.”
Drawing on examples from Myanmar’s history of state policies and practices in the food and agricultural sector, it’s clear that military regimes of the past have prioritized generating foreign income from the sale of rice and other agricultural products to serve their own profits, rather than fostering the welfare of people and farmers. Deploying a centralized approach to control the food supply chain, the military regime is positioning itself to further weaponize food against its opponents and ordinary citizens in a bid to remain in power.
The impact of conflict on hunger and the junta’s use of hunger as a weapon
The coup has threatened food security in urban and peripheral areas, albeit in different ways. The combination of inflation, skyrocketing food prices and Covid-19 threatens access to quality food for most urban and rural populations. In urban areas, food insecurity and the rising unemployment rate has also contributed to rising criminal activity. As the prices of commodities increased sharply, the SAC has allowed trade associations to sell subsidised cooking oil in urban areas like Yangon. The urban poor line up for long hours to buy supplies at a lower price. The military has forced people to struggle for survival, so much so that they do not have time to deal with politics.
In rural areas, organized crime committed by the military includes destroying crops, stealing livestock and confiscating civilian property to weaken revolutionary resistance. International emergency food providers are not permitted to reach the most vulnerable displaced populations. Moreover, the State Administration Council (SAC) has started to block transportation routes (e.g., to Rakhine, Chin,Magwe, Sagaing and Thanintharyi) where there is ongoing intense fighting and local people are experiencing a severe shortage of food supplies.
This is not the first time the junta has weaponized food to serve themselves. The notorious ‘Four Cuts’ policy was introduced in the 1960s to fight against the Communist Party of Burma (CBP) and Karen National Union (KNU). This policy cut off food supplies to ethnic armed groups, along with funds, news, and new recruits. Local people living in ethnic areas fighting for self-determination have borne the brunt of this policy, resulting in high mortality rates during the ‘Four Cuts’ campaign.
This pattern of starvation continues to persist. In 2008, in order not to let the world see the regime’s preparation for a national referendum, the Tatmadaw banned most international relief efforts from entering the country when Cyclone Nargis left a trail of devastation in its wake. The cyclone wiped out food reserves, and as the authorities failed to provide for survivors, the death toll reached an astounding 140,000 people. In 2017, the Tatmadaw cut off food supplies to conflict-affected marginalized Rohingya communities. This was carried out by the state with the intention to starve particular ethnic groups, and under the Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court, it is considered a ‘crime against humanity’ and an act of genocide.
According to data for Myanmar (D4M) from 25 August 2022, a total of 28,434 houses were burned down by the military junta. A majority of casualties are located in Sagaing and Magway—both important hubs for the production of pulses and other food crops. The impact of this attack, once again, drove a sharp decline in production. These atrocities displaced farmers and transformed paddy fields into battlefields. As armed conflict breaks out across the country, there is no doubt that the whole supply chain has been severely disrupted.
Impacts of the conflict on regional food security
Food trade patterns directly correlate to the domestic food supply in various export countries. As Myanmar is a major exporter of rice to China and dried leguminous vegetables (DLV) to India, disruptions in trade also threaten those who rely on its supply to meet domestic consumption. The India-Myanmar border trade was supposed to resume after two years of Covid-19 restrictions, with many traders welcoming the opening of the border as it reduced smuggling activities in the borderlands. However, traders face great security concerns over trade routes as fighting intensifies in Myanmar’s border regions (such as Sagaing, where Kalay and Tamu towns are located). People fear that if the border opening is put off till 2023, this will have a negative impact on essential food supplies in India. Due to a lack of transparency and accountability during oppressive military regimes in the past, the data for exports of goods and services from Myanmar has remained undocumented. According to food trade data available from 2000 onwards, there has been a steady increase in demand for food products from Myanmar destined for China, Cambodia, India, Thailand, and other countries. It is important to note that the credibility of the data is hard to assess since it has been managed by different government administrations over the years.
How regional partners should hold SAC accountable for atrocities
Historical and contemporary examples from Myanmar demonstrate that various military regimes have consistently weaponized food to achieve their political agendas. Today, the junta continues to overlook the food insecurity challenges civilians face in the country. Controlling the profits of rice exports, the regime prioritizes generating foreign income to consolidate its own power. There is another way to interpret the trade deals between the junta and neighbouring countries: the junta is attempting to develop a niche market and control larger supply chains, thereby forging cooperation with like-minded allies to gain support and legitimacy.
If regional counterparts are serious about addressing the rapid onset of food insecurity, they must acknowledge the root causes of today’s political crisis. Prolonged hostilities not only drive domestic hunger but also undermine regional food security, especially in countries reliant upon Myanmar’s agricultural products. Therefore, regional counterparts should make all possible efforts to restore basic human rights and stability in Myanmar and enhance collaboration with governments that are finding ways to end the vicious cycle of hunger and war..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"An election is understood to mean “a formal and organized choice by vote of a person for a political office or other position.” Myanmar’s junta has claimed it will organize an ‘election’ for August 2023. Don’t call it what it isn’t. The junta’s event, whatever it is and looks like, will in no way be an election. If analysts, media, and diplomats use the term ‘election’, the onus is on them to justify and prove why and how exactly it wasn’t legitimate when in fact it wasn’t even what happened.
This isn’t just about semantics. It is about establishing the factual basis for what is transpiring in reality. Autocrats who co-opt democratic terms are very skillful at doing so to create a narrative that they are something they are not. The best way to prevent this is to stop allowing them to freely use words they have no basis for using. Simply put — democracies need to stop letting dictatorships co-opt the terminology of democracy. By not pushing back, and by not introducing new terminology that accurately describes what dictatorships are doing, it allows the autocrats of the world to claim legitimacy by dressing up their actions with words that should never have been used in the first place.
When Myanmar’s generals say “discipline flourishing democracy”, it means dictatorship. When Xi Xinping says there is a “Chinese-style democracy” and an “American-style democracy”, he is spouting utter nonsense. China under the Communist Party is a totalitarian dictatorship from top to bottom and in no way is a democracy. Even more onerously totalitarian and unquestionably not a democracy is North Korea, the so-called “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Claims of elections in such countries are nonsense. Having a ‘choice’ of one person picked by one party does not make for an election.
In Myanmar in 2008 a ‘referendum’ on the 2008 Constitution never happened. This was a coerced, fraudulent exercise that in no way reflected the will of the people or even marginally synced with the intentions of the term ‘referendum’. The fact that the exercise happened in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis highlights this point, namely that the exercise was coerced, predetermined, and never had any intention of representing the will of the Myanmar people. The sad thing is that because this term was used so extensively and became mainstream, including in international media, over the years it became, by default, accepted as what happened. This then lent unfortunate credence to the 2008 Constitution. The same is true for the 2010 election. Myanmar’s only free and fair elections in its modern history, even though problematic in important ways, were the by-elections starting in 2012 and the general elections of 2015 and 2020.
As regards the junta’s plans for a 2023 poll, commentators in the media, civil society or diplomacy that use terms and phrases like “sham elections” or “elections under military rule” unfortunately start the discourse from a disadvantage. They inherently force those rightly accusing dictators of being dictators to prove that the ‘election’ wasn’t good enough for this or that reason, when what happened wasn’t even an election in the first place. If one starts the conversation with a false term, it inherently lends legitimacy to whoever is claiming that term as being true. This approach became mainstream after being adopted by former United States President Donald Trump, when he called the 2020 US election “fraudulent”.
Words matter. They matter because they set narratives about what is happening or what will happen. By allowing the junta to use the term ‘election’ and to state that it will occur in August 2023, it catalyzes the wider international narrative about what’s happening in Myanmar. In simple terms, it creates the axis around which policy discourses begin to swirl about what to do as regards the country. Within Myanmar even if some fraudulent, coerced event occurs in August 2023 it will not actually do anything to stop the revolution against the junta because the Myanmar people have made it clear in a thousand ways that they do not accept a return to military rule. Internationally, though, the military regime is using this term to create the illusion of a clear “roadmap” of what the world can expect. While some countries have already called out the junta’s plans and said that they won’t accept the result of any ‘election’, other countries are clearly just waiting for the junta to declare the event a success, even if it will be the regime’s proxies and newly-retired generals who will ‘win’.
There is a story unfolding in Myanmar, but it does not match what the junta is saying. An August report from the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar highlighted that the junta only has stable control over 17 per cent of the country. The rest of the country is in active and escalating armed resistance against junta forces or is controlled by ethnic armed organizations that do not accept military rule in their areas, even if they maintain ceasefires with the military.
Hence, this is a country of approximately 55 million people in a sustained, committed revolution that’s focused on building a better future for themselves and future generations. It is not just about getting rid of the military or the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s myopic “returning to normalcy” tomfoolery, in other words a toxic quasi-democracy built around military paramountcy. It is about creating a fundamentally different country built around real federal democracy. As the National Unity Government’s Acting President Duwa Lashi La has so profoundly stated: this is the second war for independence. Myanmar’s people want to start afresh.
The world should stop accepting the Myanmar military’s use of the term ‘election’ completely because that is not what will happen. The military’s event — which will undoubtedly be preordained, coercive, highly violent and in no way an election in any meaning of the word — is not the pole around which the conflict in the country will be resolved. A better term doesn’t currently exist in the English language, but surely one needs to be created along the lines of “coerced deception”.
In essence, don’t accept the regime’s narrative that there is a pathway to peace and stability and that the key date is August 2023. There is a pathway to peace in Myanmar, but it means the complete defeat of the current military and the implementation of the roadmap articulated by the Federal Democracy Charter drawn up by the democratic resistance’s National Unity Consultative Council..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၂) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့အချိန်အခါ သမယတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားများအားလုံးနှင့်တကွ နိုင်ငံသူ၊ နိုင်ငံသားအားလုံး ရင်ဆိုင်ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေရသည့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား အသိ၊ သတိကြီးစွာဖြင့် ရင်ဆိုင်ရာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလတွင် ခွန်အား ပြည့်ဝစွာဖြင့် ဆက်လက်လျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင်ကြပါေစကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်ခံဘဝ ၁၉၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက် (မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်နေ့) တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများက ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေမူကြမ်းကို သပိတ်မှောက်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြရာမှအစပြုကာ အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ ဟူသော သမိုင်းဝင်နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် ကျောင်းသားသပိတ်သည် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးသို့ပျံ့နှံ့သွားခဲ့ပြီး အမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေးကြီးအသွင် ပြောင်းလဲသွားကာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးရရန်အတွက် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်ဓာတ်များ၊ သူ့ကျွန်မခံလိုသည့်စိတ်များ သန္ဓေတည် မွေးဖွားပေးခဲ့သော တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ ယခုအခါတွင်လည်း ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာ အာဏာကို ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒမဲဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးချယ်တင်မြှောက်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်တို့ဦးဆောင်သည့် ပြည်သူ့ အစိုးရထံမှ စစ်တပ်က လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် ရှင်သန် ထွန်းသစ်စ ဒီမိုကရေစီအသီးအပွင့်များသည် ဖျက်ဆီးခံခဲ့ရပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်မှစ၍ ယခု နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးခရီးတိုင် အာဏာရှင်များကို ရဲရဲဝံ့ဝံ့ ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ရင်း တိုင်းပြည်၏ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများကို လူငယ်များပီပီတက်ကြွပြီး လိမ္မာ ပါးနပ်စွာ ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိကြသည့် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များနှင့် တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် အသက်ပေးဆပ်သွား ခဲ့ကြသည့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများအား ဤနေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် အခါသမယတွင် ဂုဏ်ယူလေးစားစွာ ဂုဏ်ယူမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်၌ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင်ကွယ်ပျောက်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများ က နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ မျှော်လင့်တောင့်တခဲ့သော်လည်း မပြည့်ဝသေးသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံသစ်အိပ်မက်ကို လက်တွေ့ကျကျ ဖန်တီးပုံဖော်တည်ဆောက်နိုင်မည့်အခွင့်အလမ်းသည် ယနေ့ အချိန်အခါတွင် လက်တစ်ကမ်းအကွာသို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုး၏အကျိုးကို ထာဝရသယ်ပိုးလိုသည့် အမျိုးသာရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်များ အစဉ်ကိန်းအောင်းနေမည်ဆိုပါက မဝေးလှသော အနာဂတ်တွင် ပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးက ရည်ရွယ်ကြိုးပမ်းနေကြသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ် သည် ပေါ်ထွန်းလာမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၆။ လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်ထားသည့် အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်တပ်သည် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကျင်းပ၍ ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းမှုမှ ထွက်ပေါက် နည်းလမ်း အဖြစ် တရားဝင်မှုရှိသည့်အစိုးရအသွင်သဏ္ဍန်သို့ လှည့်ပြောင်းနိုင်ရန် စီစဉ်နေခြင်းကြောင့် အမျိုးသား အောင်ပွဲနေ့၏ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုအနှစ်သာရကိုအခြေခံကာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ သွေးခွဲမှု၊ လှည့်စားမှုများကို ရင်ဆိုင်ကျော်လွှားကာ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် အတူတကွ ဆက်လက်လက်တွဲ ကြိုးပမ်းသွားကြပါရန် လေးလေးနက်နက် တောင်းဆိုတိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။
၇။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် မဲဆန္ဒရှင်ပြည်သူများက ယုံကြည်စွာ အပ်နှင်းထားသည့် အခွင့်အာဏာကို တာဝန်သိစွာ ကျင့်သုံးလျက် တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုအတွက် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သောအနာဂတ်အား ဖန်တီးပုံဖော်ပေးရေး ဦးဆောင် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် ကဏ္ဍ အသီးသီး၌ ပြင်ဆင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပြီး တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံး၏ စုပေါင်းအားဖြင့် ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို အမျိုးသားရေး စိတ်ဓာတ်အပြည့်ဖြင့် အမြစ်ပြတ် တိုက်ထုတ် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြုလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
349.66 KB
more
Description:
"The number of currently detained political prisoners has reached more than 13,000, according to the latest figures from Assistance Association for Political Prisoners – Burma.
Under the previous military dictatorship pre 2010 the average was just over 2,000.
“Despite the record number of political prisoners, they barely get mentioned by governments and world leaders,” said Wai Hnin, Senior Advocacy Officer at Burma Campaign UK. “The fact that so many people have been jailed demonstrates the level of fear the Burmese military have of the people of Burma. The Burmese military are afraid for their survival and arrest anyone they see as a threat.”
The number of political prisoners is growing every day as the military continues to arrest peaceful protesters, interfaith writers, celebrities, civilians, and anyone opposing the attempted coup, which began on 1st February last year.
The military is not only carrying out the targeted arrest of individuals whom they might consider a threat because of their activities, but they are also conducting random mass arrests of civilians as a means of trying to instil fear and crush dissent.
The Burmese military has also started using the official death penalty for the first time in decades, executing 4 political prisoners in July 2022. Many more activists have been sentenced to death and are awaiting execution.
Political prisoners are usually held in military-controlled detention centres for a lengthy period before being charged and sent to prison. Many of them face brutal torture, harassment, rape, and sexual violence. Activists from the LGBTQ community face severe torture and harassment purely because of their sexual orientation.
The current number of political prisoners does not include civilians who have been forcibly disappeared in remote ethnic areas and people who have been unlawfully detained in military camps in ethnic areas, where documentation is difficult.
In addition, there is an unknown number of Rohingya political prisoners, who have been arrested and imprisoned for breaking laws and regulations specifically targeting Rohingya as part of the ongoing genocide they face.
Since 1 February, at least 80 journalists have been arrested for reporting on the human rights violations committed by the military. Many civil servants, including doctors, teachers, and nurses, have been arrested for participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
The military also issued warrants and revoked licences for many doctors and nurses for taking part in the CDM. After their release, they will have a criminal record, making it almost impossible to return to their jobs or find new jobs.
Currently, trials are being held inside prison out of public view, and families cannot attend. Trials in Burma are just formalities, and almost all of them will undoubtedly be sentenced under politically motivated charges. The Burmese military arrest, jail, torture and even kill many activists and civilians daily but people in Burma continue to stand up against them.
“These political prisoners bravely stood up against the military coup, but the world seems to have forgotten about them,” said Wai Hnin, Senior Advocacy Officer at Burma Campaign UK. “Many of them are just young students who should be in university but instead, they were brutally tortured and jailed for speaking out. The international community must speak out for these 13,000 political prisoners in Burma, and provide much needed support for families of political prisoners.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1. NUG seeks ASEAN’s support on serious roadmap for the future Myanmar prepared in the interest of entire region...2. NUG Foreign Minister remarks Myanmar people transform challenges posed by coup to opportunity by creating a new unity...3. NUG welcome EU and US sanctions against the military junta and its cronies (09/11/2022)...4. NUG urges ASEAN leaders to take 6 actions...5. NUG in partnership with ethnic revolutionary actors make efforts
to climate change mitigation, and natural resources utilization and conservation..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.12 MB
more
Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly News Update (29/2022)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.38 MB
more
Source/publisher:
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta'ang National Liberation Army, Arakan Army
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
174.18 KB
more
Description:
"More than 20 Myanmar junta troops were killed or injured in the last two days when People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) attacked regime targets in Bago, Mandalay and Tanintharyi regions and Chin, Kayah and Karen states.
Meanwhile, around 10 civilians were killed or injured in regime attacks.
The Irrawaddy has rounded up the following reports of significant attacks by PDFs and EAOs as well as regime atrocities.
12 junta soldiers killed in PDF ambushes, raid in Bago
At least 12 junta soldiers were killed and many others injured when PDF groups ambushed a military detachment and raided a junta camp in Nattalin and Taungoo townships in Bago Region on Thursday, claimed Bago Region-PDF.
Four soldiers were killed and seven others injured when PDF fighters from a PDF battalion of Tharyarwaddy District, Bago used land mines to ambush a military detachment of 50 soldiers between two villages in Nattalin Township at 10 a.m. on Thursday.
Six more regime troops were also killed and eight other forces injured when the military detachment was hit by mine ambushes by resistance groups on that afternoon, the PDF group claimed. After the ambushes, the regime forces retreated.
Two regime soldiers were also killed on that afternoon in Taungoo Township, Bago when Taungoo District PDF raided a camp of 20 regime forces in a village. No PDF casualties were reported in the ambushes and raid.
Four civilians burned alive by junta soldiers in Magwe
The remains of four civilians who had been bound and burned alive by regime soldiers and Pyu Saw Htee pro-regime militia members were found in a burned house in Anout Village in Tilin Township, Magwe Region on Thursday, said Yaw Defense Force-Tilin.
Regime forces stationed in the village burned some houses before leaving on Thursday. Six male villagers are also missing from the village, said YDF-Tilin.
Junta outpost bombarded in Kayah
The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) claimed on Thursday that it and two other resistance groups managed to bombard the Pon Chaung junta outpost on the border of Loikaw and Shadaw townships in Kayah State on Tuesday.
he junta outpost has been used to randomly attack nearby areas using heavy explosives.
Regime forces are believed to have been killed or injured when the outpost was directly hit by explosives fired by resistance forces, said KNDF.
A KNDF video shows the outpost being hit directly by explosives.
Regime forces ambushed with land mines in Mandalay
TGYR-Youth Guerrilla Counter Revolution said on Thursday that it and five other resistance group used 11 land mines to ambush regime forces stationed at Thargyin Village school in Ngazun Township, Mandalay Region on Wednesday night while they were patrolling between two villages.
Following the ambush, a shootout broke out between the regime forces and the resistance groups.
At 4:15 a.m. on Thursday, the resistance groups continued to ambush military reinforcements arriving in the clash area, using 12 additional land mines.
However, military casualties for both ambushes were unknown.
Seven junta troops killed in Tanintharyi
Seven regime forces were killed and four others seriously injured on Wednesday evening when PDF-Federal Column attacked a military convoy traveling to Dawei from Myeik Township in Tanintharyi Region, claimed the PDF group.
Amid the PDF’s ambush, the convoy fled without returning fire, the PDF group said.
Two junta soldiers injured by land mines in Karen
Two regime troops were seriously injured by land mines planted by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) on Thursday morning as junta soldiers from three military battalions were entering the Luukhoe area in Myawaddy Township, Karen State, said KNLA’s Cobra Column.
Five civilians including three children injured by junta attack in Karen
Two villagers and three children were injured in Hpa-an Township, Karen State on Wednesday when regime forces in a military convoy of 10 vehicles randomly opened fire on villages along the Hpa-an- Zarthapyin highway using both firearms and heavy explosives without being attacked, said the Karen National Union (KNU) on Thursday.
In the attack, a school building was also damaged, the KNU said.
Four ethnic Chin resistance fighters killed in Chin State
Four ethnic Chin resistance fighters were killed and another injured during an intense firefight with a military detachment in Hakha Township, Chin State on Thursday, said Zalen, a local media outlet.
A clash broke out between the regime forces and Chin Defense Force groups near a college in the township on Thursday afternoon.
Military casualties were unknown..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing said the prospect of a new election slated to be held next year depends largely on whether there is peace and economic recovery plus political stability in the country, in an interview with Russian news agency RIA.
His remark is viewed as implying that the election slated for August 2023 is not certain, considering that Myanmar’s economy is spiraling downward and the armed clashes in many parts of the country are expected to escalate once the rainy season is over.
When asked about the possibility of the election being delayed during the interview, which was published in junta-controlled newspapers, Min Aung Hlaing replied, “It is too early to discuss it because it is around five months [until emergency rule expires], and a decision has to be made depending on the situation.”
Under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution, the chief of the armed forces can impose emergency rule for one year, and renew it twice for six months each. Emergency rule has already been renewed twice, and will expire on Feb. 1 next year. The election must be held within six months of that date, under the Constitution.
Holding an election is also part of the junta’s five-point roadmap released after the bloody military coup. To prepare for it, the regime has been amending electoral laws and taking steps to replace the current first-past-the-post electoral system with the proportional representation (PR) system—a move that would overwhelmingly favor the military and its allied political parties.
Whether the election can be held as planned is open to question as the junta leadership including Min Aung Hlaing himself have repeatedly set out unrealistic preconditions for a free and fair election to take place, including that there must not be “pressure” on people, that it must be able to hold the election across the country, and that the armed conflicts must end before a vote is held.
Renowned political analyst U Than Soe Naing told The Irrawaddy he believes Min Aung Hlaing will hold the election no matter what in order to achieve his dream of becoming president.
“They will hold the fraudulent election in areas they can control, to prolong their rule—unless they are removed before it,” he said.
The junta’s planned PR system is designed to prevent the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) or any other democratic party from winning a landslide victory like the NLD did in the 1990, 2015 and 2020 general elections.
As the military already holds 25 percent of seats in the parliament under the Constitution, the PR system will enable Min Aung Hlaing to fulfill his presidential dream, as it will ensure the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and its allied parties win enough seats to officially put Min Aung Hlaing into the presidential residence. Smaller parties allied with the USDP did not win a single seat in the 2020 election.
According to the analyst U Than Soe Naing, even if the election can’t be held, Min Aung Hlaing might follow in the footsteps of his predecessor as dictator, Than Shwe, and scrap the 2008 Constitution and write a new one in order to cling to power..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"He must be the least known president in the world, tasked with the most difficult mission, one that other heads of the state around world aren’t faced with: Leading a revolutionary government that has vowed to uproot the ruling military dictatorship in Myanmar—one of the most notorious and ruthless regimes on this planet.
Officially, he is an acting president. But he can’t live in a presidential palace; he can’t work in a presidential office, either. Myanmar people have no idea where their president is. He was not elected through a vote but appointed by a legitimate, elected parliamentary body. He was also unknown to most of his fellow countrymen until recently, but they respect him and have embraced him as their head of state.
The government he leads is mostly made up of elected lawmakers from the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, whose government was ousted by the military coup last year, and their ethnic allies. While commanding support from a vast majority of Myanmar people, the government he leads challenges the legitimacy of Myanmar’s ruling military junta, which has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against the country’s entire population of more than 54 million people.
Meet Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG).
Who is Duwa Lashi La?
Duwa Lashi La, 72, is ethnic Kachin and a Christian. He was a one-time teacher at a public school in his native Mung Ji Village, northern Shan State. He studied law at Yangon University and worked as a prosecutor and law officer for 18 years. He speaks English, Chinese, Burmese and Shan, in addition to his mother tongue Kachin, and is also well-versed in other Kachin tribal languages.
Since the early 1990s, the father of four has taken the lead in diverse social enterprises and civil society organizations working for community development, education, healthcare, relief and social rehabilitation in conflict-torn areas in Shan and Kachin States.
He served as chairman of the Kachin National Consultative Assembly (also known as WMR), which is reportedly the most authoritative political body in Kachin State, till January 2021. And also for the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team (KPICT), which was formed by domestic and international Kachin organizations to advocate on behalf of the Kachin people in the wake of the coup.
Taking on the biggest task
Of the various leading roles Duwa Lashi La has played, the biggest of his life—serving as the country’s head of state—was also the most sudden.
It came at a regular meeting held between KPICT and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) in early April last year, two months after the coup.
At that time, the CRPH, the legislative body formed by elected representatives to the coup-dissolved parliament, was holding a series of meetings with the country’s ethnic groups and preparing to set up the NUG—an interim coalition government of democratic forces set up to challenge the regime.
The CRPH asked for three nominees for ministerial posts from KPICT at the meeting, and as they continued their discussion on the formation of the new government, the then KPICT chairman Duwa Lashi La gave his opinion on a draft proposal to keep Henry Van Thio, a retired major and vice president of the NLD government, as vice president in the NUG.
Henry Van Thio was reportedly detained during the coup along with other senior members of the ousted civilian government and placed under house arrest but the junta has not filed any charges against him.
Duwa Lashi La’s personal secretary, who requested not to be named, recalled to The Irrawaddy the meeting at which Duwa Lashi La responded, “Since we are making the revolution to bring down tyranny and build a new era, it is good not to include people who were involved in the military, and instead better to choose those with a vision of reform towards democracy and federalism.”
The CRPH agreed on this point and requested that he accept the position instead. The sudden offer was also overwhelmingly backed by KPICT members.
Duwa Lashi La made a phone call to his family telling them to be prepared for the upcoming situation and quickly accepted the offer.
“For him, accepting the role is bearing the responsibility that fell on his shoulders in this revolutionary time,” said his personal secretary, who has known him for years.
The personal secretary also shared that it is Duwa Lashi La’s determination that led him to make the decision immediately. Seeing the third coup in his lifetime, the 72-year-old is determined to free his country of military dictatorship.
Duwa Lashi La was appointed vice president on April 16 but is serving as acting president since Myanmar’s elected president, the NLD’s U Win Myint, has been in junta custody since the first day of the coup.
It was unexpected for many, including Ma May Sabe Phyu, a well-known ethnic Kachin human rights defender. She said she was surprised when she first found out that Duwa Lashi La was the acting president. More significantly, it also marked the first time in the country’s history that a member of the Kachin ethnic minority had taken the highest state position.
But as someone who already knew him, she believed he was the right choice. The people of Myanmar have also warmed to him and rallied around the NUG, which he heads, as their legitimate government.
Duwa Lashi La has also proven himself as a true leader forged in a perilous time for the nation.
He has proved his leadership by uniting the ministries of the NUG, which gathered people from diverse and inclusive backgrounds; keeping the cabinet functioning with a very limited budget; coordinating with armed resistance groups and ethnic armed groups; and challenging the regime on the diplomatic front.
The most secret President’s Office
What has surprised many is that he is operating the NUG, which is repelling Min Aung Hlaing’s regime, from inside the country.
Duwa Lashi La remains in the country knowing that he is the number one target of Min Aung Hlaing’s troops. His family, who are also on the targeted list, remain with him. After his appointment, large numbers of regime troops ransacked his family’s house in Lashio, Shan State in September last year in search of him and his family members. After failing to find them, they sealed off the property.
He and his team are based at an undisclosed location in a liberated area. His personal secretary, who is also the permanent secretary of the President’s Office, has observed after working closely with him for more than one and a half years that the hard-working president never complains or delays his tasks, despite never taking weekends or holidays off and maintaining a tight daily schedule.
Duwa Lashi La’s daily schedule starts at 5 a.m. The 72-year-old runs every morning to boost his stamina and concentration for the tasks that await him and which take up the whole day including cabinet meetings, consultations with more than 300 revolutionary forces under the NUG, engagements with international diplomats and reading reports on the situation inside the country and in the rest of the world, including the war in Ukarine.
He is not confined to his office. In May, he visited a frontline camp of a People’s Defense Force (PDF), the NUG’s armed wing, to hear the PDF fighters’ voices personally and better understand their needs.
A young PDF member based in the country’s western Chin State told The Irrawaddy that he felt encouraged to see the images of the acting president together with other PDFs.
“Seeing him together with our comrades was uplifting. I hope the President will visit our camp one day as well,” he said.
The appearance of Duwa Lashi La wearing a military helmet and vest and holding a friendly meeting with frontline resistance fighters contrasted sharply with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, who hasn’t even made one such visit to his frontline troops, who are giving their lives to satisfy his greed for power and wealth.
Furthermore, when he appears on air giving speeches to the nation, mostly in his Kachin attire, the acting president’s determination and belief in his mission to wipe out the military dictatorship is palpable, not to mention his words. With his stoic and resolute appearance, the stout Duwa Lashi La resembles a boulder—a stark contrast to regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, who appears on air with a shaky voice, looking desperate and restless.
Ko Tayzar San, one of the most prominent of Myanmar’s anti-regime protest leaders, also wrote on his Facebook account that, “Since I have seen the President on broadcasts, I have felt a sense of closeness as with my own uncle, and respect, admire and trust him.”
One of the most remarkable speeches Duwa Lashi La has made was the long-awaited declaration of a people’s defensive war on Sept. 7, 2021, calling on people to “revolt against the rule of the military terrorists led by Min Aung Hlaing in every corner of the country.”
“We will remove Min Aung Hlaing and uproot dictatorship from Myanmar for good,” he said, “and be able to establish a peaceful federal democratic union that fully safeguards equality and is long-aspired by all the citizens.”
The majority of Myanmar’s people, who have endured the regime’s atrocities, heartily embraced the announcement.
Much of Myanmar has already been in revolt since the military coup in February last year. The regime’s deadly crackdowns on protesters have forced many young people to take up arms. Even the regime has admitted that the declaration of war accelerated the ongoing armed struggle against it, with fighting intensifying across the country.
Now the regime has lost control of at least half the country to the NUG’s PDF groups and allied ethnic armed organizations, said the acting president in his state of the union speech on Wednesday, marking the first anniversary of the declaration of war against the junta. His statement was supported by the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar (SAC-M) a group of former UN experts on Myanmar. Their recent analysis finds that the NUG and resistance organizations have effective control over 52 percent of the territory of Myanmar.
“The National Unity Government is not a shadow government or a government in exile. It is the representative of the people’s revolution and resistance to the military junta, the combined forces of which control the majority of the country,” said Yanghee Lee of the SAC-M.
However, facing off against a well-equipped military using heavy weapons and air strikes against the civilian population, the people of Myanmar need physical assistance—and not just moral support.
Unlike Ukraine, which has received weapons and aid from a number of countries including the US and the UK to combat the Russian military, Myanmar’s armed resistance has received no material assistance from the international community and solely depends on people’s donations. As a result, the NUG is still struggling to fully arm all of its resistance forces across the country.
“I earnestly request technical support, arms and ammunition and finance for the people of Myanmar who are sacrificing their lives to fight against the fascist dictatorship,” Duwa Lashi La told the international community in his speech, while stressing the urgency of his appeal.
Prominent PDF leader Bo Nagar from Sagaing’s Pale Township told The Irrawaddy that he supports the president and NUG leadership and believes they are trying their best to overcome the obstacles they face, such as in providing arms to anti-regime resistance forces.
“One thing for sure is that the President and our government, the NUG, stood up when we were like orphans, and thus we accept their leadership,” he said.
Many elected lawmakers, ant-regime activists, resistance fighters and his compatriots at home and abroad share this positive assessment of Duwa Lashi La.
Prominent protest leader Ko Tayzar San wrote that the “People’s revolution led by people’s president must prevail.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The Chin National Front (CNF), a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, is fighting the military regime in western Myanmar’s Chin State alongside the resistance groups that have sprung up since last year’s coup.
It is also cooperating with the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) on both the political and military fronts. The CNF has been fighting the junta since a few months before the NUG declared a defensive war against the regime on September 7, 2021.
CNF spokesman Salai Htet Ni talked recently to The Irrawaddy about how the political and military situation in Chin State has changed over the past 18 months.
How has the CNF’s military strategy changed since it started fighting regime forces?
We now better understand their tactics and also better comprehend that collective strength is the key to victory. As for weapons, previously we had only rudimentary hunting rifles, but we now have better weapons such as automatic rifles. The chain of command has also improved. And our side has suffered fewer casualties, but junta casualties have increased.
Is the CNF now going on the attack against junta troops?
Clashes are occurring in various parts [of Chin State]. With better weapons, we are well-equipped to seize their [regime] outposts in the Chin Hills. But we mainly carry out guerilla attacks, ambushing them when they travel from one place to another. We fight by a combination of attack and defense.
How has the regime’s strategy changed over the past year?
Previously, junta forces attacked simultaneously in two or three places. They traveled along the Pakokku-Matupi Road to the Matupi headquarters [of the Myanmar military], while another column traveled the Kale-Gangaw Road to the military’s Hakha headquarters. But now they are fighting on only one front with large numbers of troops.
Why do you think the regime’s strategy has changed?
It is possible that they are now too undermanned to spread their forces out. And the junta troops that have come from other regions have little knowledge about the terrain in the Chin Hills. Previously, the military attempted to crush resistance groups one by one. But we fought back with combined forces.
There have been fresh clashes between the Arakan Army (AA) and the junta on the border of Rakhine and Chin states. How will that affect the revolution in Chin State?
The AA is one of the powerful ethnic armed organizations (EAO) in Myanmar. It appears that the regime will have to fight on a new exhausting front there. So the AA’s involvement in the fighting is a shot in the arm for our Spring Revolution, but a blow to the regime.
How much of Chin State does the CNF now control?
We can say that we – local resistance groups and civilians – now control over 70 per cent of the territory in Chin State. The regime has control only over towns and some main roads. We have assumed the responsibility for providing public services, including health and education, in the areas we control.
How is the relationship between the CNF and the NUG?
We maintain regular discussions with the NUG, and have been cooperating with it militarily and politically. We have been cooperating militarily under the Central Command and Coordination Committee [which includes leaders from the NUG and EAOs and engages with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) across the country]. There are some delays, but I can say that we are making progress.
The regime said it plans to hold an election next year. What is the CNF’s view on that?
The regime believes that holding an election is a way out of the political crisis it is facing. It is just to deceive the international community and to try and make the rule of the Myanmar military last forever. If the election takes place, all the efforts of civilians, EAOs and resistance forces will be in vain. So we totally denounce and oppose any new election staged by the regime.
We are fighting the regime to end the military’s role in Myanmar’s politics. We are not alone in working towards that end. This is the reason that people have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement and students have left the towns. It’s not just the election, we have to oppose whatever the regime does.
What do you want to tell the Myanmar people?
All the groups fighting the regime including EAOs, the NUG and PDFs have to continue to accelerate their efforts. We have to strengthen ourselves every new day and work together. I urge the people to continue to stay strong..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) has said that its People’s Defense Forces (PDF) and allied ethnic revolutionary organizations (ERO)) have effective control of more than half the country after a year of waging a people’s defensive war against the military regime.
In a speech on Wednesday marking the one-year anniversary of the declaration of a people’s defensive war against the junta, the NUG’s acting president Duwa Lashi La said that the regime has lost control of at least half the country, as the territorial dominance and military capabilities of PDFs and EROs has significantly strengthened and improved.
The acting president said that the NUG has formed over 300 PDF battalions nationwide, while other township public defense forces have been formed in 250 townships out of 330 across the country over the last year.
Public administration and judicial systems of the NUG have been established in 24 townships which are completely controlled by resistance forces. Education, health, municipal and social services have also been established by the NUG in the townships, the president said.
“Amid our territorial dominance and as our military capabilities have strengthened, the operations, territorial control and public administration of our partner EROs have significantly improved,” said Duwa Lashi La.
He added: “After one year of defensive war, the fascist terrorist military council no longer control half of the country’s territory.”
On Monday, the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), an independent group of prominent former United Nations (UN) human rights experts, said that their analysis has found that the NUG and resistance organizations have effective control over 52 per cent of Myanmar’s territory.
SAC-M said also that the Myanmar military can only claim to have stable control over 17 per cent of the country, as its rule is being actively contested elsewhere.
The group noted also that the regime is unable to govern and is reduced to being an occupying military force in a diminishing amount of territory.
Meanwhile, resistance organizations including the NUG, EROs, people’s administrative bodies, the Civil Disobedience Movement and other civil institutions are administering an increasing range of government functions and delivering services to millions of people.
“The world needs to wake up to the reality that a new Myanmar is already taking shape,” said SAC-M member Yanghee Lee, the former UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar.
She added: “The NUG is not a shadow government or government in exile. It is the representative of the people’s revolution and resistance to military junta, the combined forces of which control the majority of the country.”
Since the declaration of the defensive war against the junta last September 7, PDFs and EROs have escalated their attacks targeting junta forces and regime administrations across the country, including major cities.
Over 20,150 junta soldiers have been killed and another 7,000 wounded, while 1,500 resistance fighters have died in the clashes, said Duwa Lashi La. An increasing number of regime troops are also defecting.
Amid daily attacks from PDFs and EROs, the regime has stepped up its atrocities including the arbitrary torture and killing of civilians, massacres and burning people alive, extrajudicial killings of resistance detainees, using civilians as human shields, air and artillery strikes on residential areas, looting and burning houses, and acts of sexual violence.
As of Tuesday, 2,267 people have been killed by the junta and 15,416 people including democratically-elected government leaders have been arrested or detained since last year’s coup, said the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
Acting president Duwa Lashi La said that one of the NUG’s most important tasks is to hold the regime accountable for all the war crimes it has committed.
“The terrorist group must be punished for their crimes. We will definitely deliver truth and justice,” he said.
He also urged the international community and organizations to provide the necessary technical, military, financial and humanitarian support to the Myanmar people fighting for their freedom, democracy and equal rights.
Duwa Lashi La also urged the international community to cut off military and financial support to the junta..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Rebel ranks grow, presenting a viable threat to the military’s grip on power
Description:
"Over the past 18 months, the military junta has ruled Myanmar with extreme brutality, driving the country’s economy into the ground and creating a public health and refugee nightmare.
The army has been accused of widespread massacres and has jailed thousands, including opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. It has shown no mercy, recently executing four democracy activists, including one former lawmaker.
Although the military, which has ruled directly or indirectly since 1962, has reportedly massacred members of ethnic opposition groups as well as the Kachin and Rohingya minorities over the years, the executions were actually the first official death sentences carried out in Myanmar in more than 30 years.
The executions, in the face of condemnation by the international community and pleadings from officials from other Southeast Asian states, show that the military has fully embraced a scorched earth approach to its rule of the country. The military has shown it will brook no compromise, doesn’t care about how its neighbors view it and that it will spare nothing to remain in power, whether massacring civilian populations in the hinterlands of the country or executing more prominent activists.
The people of Myanmar believe the army has no interest in compromise and would rather see the country burn to the ground than give an inch. Consequently, these same people are stepping up their opposition.
As longtime Myanmar specialist David Scot Mathieson has noted, the fighting, which had erupted after the coup last year in more outlying areas, has now spread to cities, which are turning into potential sites for vicious urban warfare, as are parts of the country such as the Sagaing and Magwe regions that previously had experienced little fighting. Urban areas are poised to explode, making the likelihood of conflict even more intense.
And yet the military may be running scared despite the brutality of its rule. While the army boasts hundreds of thousands of soldiers and heavy weaponry from Russia, it is looking like it could possibly lose its grip on power. This would be a scenario that, in its wake, would leave great uncertainty but would undoubtedly be better for the people of Myanmar.
For one, the military underestimated the power of the guerillas, known as the People’s Defense Force. Many members of this group are from Myanmar’s heartland, who fled to the hinterlands after the coup and joined armed ethnic organizations. These guerillas have proven more effective at attacks on the military than the army imagined and have regularly cornered military convoys, launched effective attacks and captured several military bases, embarrassing the armed forces.
Furthermore, guerilla attacks on military officers and outposts in various parts of the country have been effective at striking fear into army personnel, sometimes undermining the military’s chain of command.
The army has responded to the insurgency with brutal tactics such as indiscriminate aerial bombings, burning of towns and other atrocities. However, such tactics are often ineffective against the People’s Defense Force, causing more of the population to turn against the army and join the guerillas
Meanwhile, the armed forces, which had managed for years to keep their troops isolated from the general public, with a parallel social welfare system and little interaction with the populace, now seem to be suffering a large number of defections from their ranks. Ordinary soldiers are beginning to recognize the army’s atrocities, in part because of the opposition’s effective social media campaigns targeting the military, and these soldiers are defecting to the People’s Defense Force or just leaving altogether.
Indeed, Myanmar’s armed forces are finding it difficult to recruit new officers and are struggling to fill military academies. This reflects a lack of morale in the army, and some analysts believe the number of soldiers on call in the military is far lower than the high estimates that are often given.
As morale drops, and more and more guerilla attacks successfully target officers, there may be a point at which the Myanmar military begins to splinter. The top brass will likely never give in — they would surely face an international tribunal for crimes against humanity — but the lower and middle-ranking levels of the military are looking much weaker against the People’s Defense Force and their partners in the armed ethnic organizations for more than a year. Although the military has access to weapons, the armed ethnic organizations also are becoming better armed than they were just a year ago, as is the People’s Defense Force.
Meanwhile, the exile National Unity Government has been making progress on a number of fronts. After a somewhat shambolic beginning, it has begun to organize itself and seems to have accepted that Myanmar will have to be a truly federal state in future — a conclusion that represents a major step forward. Its officials have met with senior leaders from the United States and other countries. Canberra has allowed the National Unity Government to open its own representative office in Australia, essentially a step toward Canberra dealing primarily with the government and increasingly alienating the junta. The French Senate and Czech Republic have also recognized the National Unity Government.
Some analysts have argued that the United States and other major democracies should openly recognize the National Unity Government — as well as arm Myanmar opposition forces — if the government in exile can provide a road map toward a future, democratic and federal Myanmar.
At the very least, the time has come for major democracies to recognize the National Unity Government diplomatically, since the military regime has shown it has no limit to brutality. And since the anti-junta forces are clearly holding their ground and the military is unaffected by sanctions and doesn’t appear interested in compromise, the opposition has a real possibility of ending military rule themselves..."
Source/publisher:
Japan Times
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"On August 26, BBC Bangla covered the Chin refugees living in India’s Mizoram State. BBC reporter Subhajyoti Ghosh visited several refugee camps and reported that nearly 31,000 Chin, who are ethnically related to the Mizo people of Mizoram, have fled Chin State for neighboring Mizoram since last year’s coup in Myanmar.
Moe Tallui, a primary school teacher in Myanmar, is one of the refugees who is facing an uncertain, precarious future. He is one of the many millions of Myanmar people whose future and dreams have been destroyed by the Myanmar military.
Similar tales of dashed hopes can be found in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. The Myanmar military’s 2017 campaign of ethnic cleansing in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State resulted in 760,000 Rohingya fleeing Rakhine for Bangladesh.
Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights, spoke with Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar on August 16. One Rohingya teacher told the commissioner how she had excelled at school in Myanmar and had a dream of becoming a doctor. But after being forced out of her country by the Myanmar military, she has instead spent the last five years in a refugee camp. “I still get emotional at night when I think of my dream. My Buddhist friends are now physicians in Myanmar,” she told Bachelet.
Typically, the purpose of a nation’s military is to defend the country from external threats. Since the coup, though, the Myanmar military has been targeting and killing its own people. The military continues to act as if it is a state within a state, despite supposedly being the servants of the people, hungry for power and ready to slaughter its own people to achieve that end.
History shows us that this desire for dominance originates with one person or group, such as the coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who then manipulates others to further their own interests.
Since the military takeover, the junta has killed at least 2,249 people, detained another 15,000 and burned down over 28,000 houses. The victims of the violence include many Bamar, the majority ethnic group in Myanmar and traditionally the people who make up the ranks of the army. The barbarity on display is beyond comprehension.
The hopes of the Myanmar people are being shattered by the violence of the military. Students are unable to continue their studies adequately. Teachers who support the Civil Disobedience Movement have been detained or even killed. Some educational institutions have been torched by the military regime.
Around 800,000 people have become internally displaced since the coup, with no idea when they will be able to resume their regular lives. To scare the population and break the links between the armed resistance and civilians, aid workers have been killed. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights found that the junta routinely commits substantial and severe violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.
With the military continuing to conduct raids in the Bamar heartland of Sagaing and Magwe regions and in Chin, Karen and Kayah states, the human rights situation is deteriorating all the time. Air and artillery strikes are increasingly being used against civilian targets: villages and the residential areas of towns. And now that clashes are breaking out in Rakhine State between the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military, the last region of the country that was relatively peaceful is now in danger of becoming home to armed conflict.
Rohingya communities have regularly found themselves caught in the middle of battles between the military and the AA, as well as being specifically targeted by attacks. There are still 600,000 Rohingya residing in northern Rakhine. The majority of them spend their days in camps for the internally displaced, where international organizations are prohibited from operating because of limitations put in place by the Myanmar military. If new battles start in Rakhine, the locals may end up in a similar situation to the civilians in Sagaing and Magwe regions and Chin, Karen and Kayah states.
So how can the Myanmar people get rid of the military that eats its own like a cannibal and which is causing the whole country to fall into ruin? There is only one solution and that is to eradicate all forms of inhumanity from the institution. A united Myanmar can destroy evil in any of its institutions. The moment has come for the Bamar, Kachin, Karen, Shan, Karenni, Arakanese and all the ethnic groups in Myanmar to band together and overthrow the tyranny of military dictatorship.
Myanmar’s beauty becomes apparent if you picture it as a united country. In every region of the nation, people from many different ethnic groups coexist. Equality amongst all peoples and religions is a stated goal of the civilian National Unity Government. Perhaps one day, Myanmar’s wealth of natural resources may enable the country to develop into an economic power in Southeast Asia.
The creation of a united Myanmar will lead to the realization of the Myanmar peoples’ aspirations. We hope that the people of Myanmar will unite to fight against the military oppressors by channeling their sorrow for their lost brothers and sisters into strength. Only then will they achieve victory and regain their freedom..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Reports suggesting Tatmadaw is becoming ‘desperate’ in face of adversity misread its remarkable cohesion, discipline and defiant resolve
Description:
"Born of Europe’s 19th century wars, it was a quip that neatly captured the difference between the hard-boiled Prussians of the north German plain and the fun-loving Viennese of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: the Prussian says the situation is serious but not desperate; the Viennese says it’s desperate but not serious.
Which of today’s Southeast Asian militaries would be most at home in the old Hapsburg capital is a matter of debate. But there should be no doubt that Myanmar’s military is stamped entirely in the Prussian mold.
Much as Western and some local pundits have deployed the word in recent commentary, “desperate” in the face of adversity is simply not in the DNA of the Myanmar armed forces, or Tatmadaw, that seized power in Naypyidaw early last year and has every intention of continuing to steer the nation’s destiny.
Indeed, the response of the military’s ruling State Administration Council (SAC) junta to challenges its leaders would undoubtedly view as more serious than anything faced in six decades of army rule needs to be recognized for what it is: a display of defiant resolve, a doubling-down on base-line political positions and an unwavering determination to crush popular revolt – all underpinned by a remarkable level of internal cohesion and discipline.
The SAC’s current intransigence is arguably grounded in at least two mindsets. At a day-to-day level, it is almost certainly fueled by the insulation of the “command bubble” – the intrinsic disconnect between a military high command directing strategy on big maps in air-conditioned war rooms and subordinate elements mired in the mud and blood of combat in the field.
Rigidly hierarchical militaries such as Myanmar’s, where bad news travels up the chain of command usually slowly and sometimes not at all, only exacerbate that separation and the distorted – even delusional – perceptions it can breed.
At a sub-conscious and undoubtedly more dangerous level is a deeply ingrained mindset peculiar to Myanmar’s armed forces in which the centrality of the military to the state makes it all but impossible to conceive of strategic retreat, let alone outright defeat.
Throughout the military’s ruling caste from the senior echelons of the officer corps to rank-and-file infantrymen is an unblinking assumption that there can be no Myanmar without the Tatmadaw; indeed, that in a perverse, almost mystic sense, Myanmar is the Tatmadaw.
As international pressure has mounted in recent weeks this proprietary and fundamentally xenophobic worldview has given rise at almost every turn to anger and belligerence rather than hesitancy or a willingness to compromise. Desperation is nowhere in sight inside the Tatmadaw.
The SAC’s response to efforts within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to push for real movement on the ill-starred Five Point Consensus of April 2021 has been dismissive, even contemptuous.
Diplomatic anger has been pointedly reinforced by defiant steps on the domestic front: the slapping of a further six-year sentence on toppled and imprisoned State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, the execution of four opposition activists in the face of international consternation and appeals, and most recently the jailing of the United Kingdom’s former ambassador Vicky Bowman and her husband Htein Lin on an immigration technicality.
At the international level, the SAC has been able to draw strength from high-profile recent visits from both Russian and Chinese foreign ministers, both of whose countries have pledged to support the Naypyidaw regime to weather the storm and ultimately prevail.
Preparations for elections scheduled for August 2023, meanwhile, have moved forward undeterred. Defined by the SAC as the preferred gateway to a return to “multi-party disciplined democracy” that guarantees the military a guiding role, largely unreported moves have involved the drawing up of voter registration lists and changes to the administrative map that will influence the electoral process.
The junta’s resolve has been no less striking on the battlefield. Remarkably, this year the rainy season which typically imposes a marked reduction in operations between May and October might as well not be happening as the military ratchets up the war.
Despite heavier than normal rainfall brought by this year’s monsoon, the operational tempo on the ground has scarcely slackened while air strikes by both Russian-built helicopter gunships and fixed-wing jets suitable for close air support (CAS) operations also increased in intensity through July and August.
Notable, too, has been the repeated resort to airmobile operations inserting small contingents of troops in Mi-17 transport helicopters supported by gunships into guerrilla-controlled territory mostly in the hard-fought western regions of Sagaing and Magway.
At the same time, the military has rolled out a new program to formalize and streamline local militia loosely known as Pyu Saw Htee into better organized and armed Peoples Security Teams (PSTs).
Drawn from pockets of traditional support such as the Myanmar Veterans Organization, the Fire Service, hardline Buddhist groups and activists from pro-military political parties, the PSTs are intended primarily to provide static security and free up regular security forces for offensive operations.
But while the generals are clearly gearing up a war that is certain to escalate in the dry season beginning at the end of the year, they are also no doubt aware of their most salient vulnerabilities in the field that the coup has only accentuated.
Undermanned and over-extended as never before, the army’s effective combat units are unlikely to number much more than 100,000 men stretched across a nationwide theater of operations from Putao in the far north of Kachin state to southernmost Kawthaung on the Andaman Sea.
And far more than defections, casualties are hemorrhaging those units daily, particularly in the western and eastern regions of the country where resistance mounted by anti-regime People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and their ethnic insurgent allies is increasingly well-armed and aggressive.
Wild claims from opposition sources that the security forces have lost nearly 10,000 men in the first half of 2022 can be safely dismissed as propaganda. But a sober analysis of the spread and frequency of hostilities this year suggests that on average the military is losing at least 20-25 men each day, either killed or seriously wounded.
That almost certainly conservative estimate translates to between 550 and 700 men each month – or around three to four Myanmar Army-sized battalions. Short of a regular and robust recruitment intake and efficient training regime, this level of attrition with the steady drain on morale it implies is simply not sustainable over the long term.
But as various leaked documents since last year indicate, recruitment into the regular services has dropped markedly since the coup, particularly at the critical level of junior and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), the glue that holds a combat unit together.
Whether current efforts to assemble PSTs can produce a reasonably effective urban security force capable of freeing up regular police and army battalions for the escalating war in the countryside is also a decidedly open question.
If Myanmar’s recent history is any yardstick, people’s militia units traditionally raised in areas of ethnic minority insurgency have never achieved any level of operational effectiveness or autonomy. It is doubtful whether hastily recruited, ill-trained PSTs in urban centers liable to daily bombings and shootings by underground resistance cells will do much better.
Yet to what extent Myanmar’s opposition forces can succeed in exploiting and building on these regime vulnerabilities over the coming months is far from obvious. Broad assessments are inevitably complicated by the sheer size and diversity of the country and by the stark absence of impartial reporting from any of its battlefronts.
Two facets of the mid-2022 balance of conflict are not in doubt though. First, PDF forces have successfully survived the military onslaught during the dry season months between January and May this year, marked by campaigns of raiding and wholesale pillaging and burning of villages that swept Sagaing, northern Magway and areas of eastern Kayah State and displaced tens of thousands.
Secondly, indications have emerged during the current monsoon season that notably better-armed and coordinated PDF forces are increasingly capable of pressuring the peripheries of regime-held township centers, and occasionally conducting sustained attacks on police stations and other hardpoints inside towns.
These assaults are frequently supported by aerial bombing deploying commercially available drones to drop small munitions.
At the same time – and despite the difficulties imposed by rainfall – the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to interdict road communications which began in mid-2021 has escalated sharply in recent months, most notably between key urban centers in the center and west of the country.
Matthew Arnold, one of the most perceptive independent analysts of PDF activity, notes that “the Mandalay-Monywa axis is turning into IED Avenue.”
The near-daily struggle to hold open that avenue linking central Myanmar’s largest city with the military’s Northwestern Command in Sagaing has centered largely on the townships of Chaung-U and Myinmu, where even large convoys are regularly attacked and military mine disposal (EOD) teams often operate under fire.
Apparently as the result of both PDF guerrilla tactics and rain, military operations have meanwhile become increasingly static and reactive. As offensive raiding and burning targeting PDF-dominated village communities during the dry season has waned, security forces have fallen back on random harassment and interdiction (H&I) fire from dug-in artillery and, when possible, better-targeted air strikes to relieve pressure on embattled strongpoints.
Quick-fix insertions of heliborne troops supported by gunships have, as noted, also increased, but usually appear to have been responses to PDF encroachments rather than offensive thrusts aimed at carrying the war to enemy base areas.
Limited by the availability of Mi-17 transport helicopters (typically two or three per mission) and thus manpower (around 30 soldiers to each helicopter), these airmobile forays appear seldom, if ever, to deal significant blows to an elusive enemy, let alone achieve sustainable gains.
The logic of this military dynamic is compelling: it suggests that short of a major injection of fresh manpower (that is nowhere in sight) or a willingness to free up existing manpower by prioritizing certain regions over others (a stark challenge to the military’s belief in its all-of-Myanmar mission), larger shifts on the battlefield may emerge sooner rather than later.
The coming year is likely to see the regime beginning to withdraw from exposed positions and possibly losing outlying townships in contested parts of Sagaing and Magway and in ethnic states on the national periphery.
Indeed, in western Rakhine and Chin states where the military’s ceasefire with the powerful Arakan Army (AA) all but collapsed in August, that process appears to have already begun with the army evacuating or losing a string of embattled positions at the end of the month and able to supply others only by air.
At the same time, as “IED Avenue” between Mandalay and Monywa suggests, the regime’s ability to secure key north-south communications arteries between Yangon and Naypyidaw and Mandalay and Myitkyina is also likely to emerge as a dangerous vulnerability and a further drain on manpower.
The threat is particularly real in the east of the country where elements of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) have reportedly moved out of the hills to reach the Sittang River, possibly crossing it near Kyauktaga on the old highway between Yangon and Naypyidaw. (The newer motorway lies 15 kilometers further west).
Any capacity by the KNLA and allied PDFs to operate on the west bank of the Sittang not only elevates the threat to north-south road and rail links but also implies an ability over time to establish bases in the Bago Yoma, the strategically critical spine of mountains that bisects central Myanmar.
Meanwhile in northeastern parts of Sagaing and adjacent southern townships in Kachin state, holding open the main highway and rail line to Myitkyina for military traffic is already a daily struggle that has forced a growing regime reliance on riverine convoys up the Irrawaddy. These, too, come under regular rocket fire from joint Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and PDF forces operating along the riverbanks.
Viewed strategically, these emerging challenges confronting Myanmar’s military junta represent a sea change set against the situation only a year ago, when the survivability of still fledgling PDFs in the face of overwhelming army firepower was in real doubt.
For at least the coming year, however, Myanmar’s escalating civil war will likely remain in the balance. As the military struggles to contain an array of growing threats on multiple fronts, it will continue to hold two crucial and interlocking advantages that resistance forces still lack and will almost certainly be unable to achieve: unity of command and unity of strategy backed by an instinctive and very Prussian determination to fight.
But whether these will be enough for the Tatmadaw to stem the rising onslaught remains anything but clear..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"It is delusional to think that the Myanmar junta’s No. 2 man will seize power from the junta boss and release the country’s detained civilian leaders.
But some observers like to imagine that deputy military chief Vice Senior General Soe Win would take it upon himself to purge junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, given all the mistakes he has been making.
But time and again, Soe Win has proved that he would never take such a step, and retains allegiance to his senior.
Since seizing power last year, Min Aung Hlaing has made two long trips to Russia. The first was in June 2021, just four months after the February coup, demonstrating his trust in his deputy.
He also made a long visit to Russia in July this year, but the coup some people dreamed of did not materialize. Soe Win’s loyalty to his senior means he has lost the opportunity to salvage his name from the list of coup co-conspirators.
Most importantly, while Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, as the junta chief, is taking the helm in managing the regime’s administrative affairs, his deputy Soe Win, as the deputy commander-in-chief of defense services and the commander-in-chief (Army), is responsible mainly for overseeing offensive operations against all armed groups ranging from ethnic armed organizations to People’s Defence Force groups (PDFs) to urban guerrilla units launching hit-and-run attacks against regime targets in the cities, according to military sources.
Over the past 18 months, Soe Win has proved to be a Min Aung Hlaing loyalist, committing himself to crushing all anti-regime forces by launching airstrikes and deploying combatants.
“The deputy military chief is responsible for [waging] the war. Thanks to Soe Win, Min Aung Hlaing has been able to maintain his position,” former captain Nyi Thuta, one of the first military personnel to desert the military, recently told The Irrawaddy. Captain Nyi Thuta formed the “People’s Goal” group to help military personnel wishing to join the Civil Disobedience Movement, and has contact with active personnel.
Aside from Soe Win, other top generals include Chief of General Staff (Army, Navy and Air) General Maung Maung Aye, Defense Minister General Mya Tun Oo, Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun, and Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo. But none of them are likely to want to risk their current status as well as the dominant position of the military, which has control over everything in Myanmar, to purge Min Aung Hlaing and hand power back to civilian leaders.
“The military officials do not like civilian rule, because their privileges were restricted,” said former captain Nyi Thuta.
Min Aung Hlaing’s subservient junior
Soe Win surprisingly secured the No. 2 position in Myanmar’s military over more senior generals, just like Min Aung Hlaing did.
Min Aung Hlaing was part of the 19th intake of the Defense Services Academy, while Soe Win was from the 22nd. When former military dictator Than Shwe stepped down, he made a surprising choice and handed the military to Min Aung Hlaing and Soe Win despite having many other generals to choose from.
Than Shwe’s thinking was that the military chief would have to retire after the five-year term of the first elected government. The deputy military chief would then have to lead the military to maintain its role during the power transfer to the second elected government, a follower of Than Shwe told The Irrawaddy.
“But then, Min Aung Hlaing breached that rule,” he said.
Min Aung Hlaing refused to retire after reaching 60 and had the retirement age extended through a directive of the defense council, which he controls. Since the putsch, he has made himself the country’s de facto military leader for life, while also removing the age restriction for the deputy military chief, in this case, Soe Win. In other words, Min Aung Hlaing unfairly blocked Soe Win from becoming the military chief.
But Soe Win seems to be comfortable and has apparently never thought about using his position to turn against his boss.
Besides being second in command of the entire armed forces, Soe Win is also commander-in-chief (Army), a position that is more powerful than those of his Navy and Air Force counterparts.
Rather, has has been busy attempting to crush the resistance for Min Aung Hlaing while sharing his political stand.
“He is content with being the second man. He is only too satisfied to drink and fight,” said a retired military officer.
In the not very distant past, in 1992, then deputy military chief General Than Shwe purged his senior, military chief Senior General Saw Maung, who had a mental disorder. He also objected to Saw Maung’s public statement that the army would return to the barracks after handing power over to a winning party in the 1990 election. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in the election but was not allowed to take power.
In Myanmar’s modern military history dating back to 1962, no deputy chief or other high-ranking military officer has ever seized power from his chief to hand it back to an elected government.
Soe Win, the silent killer
Soe Win holds the highest rank among his classmates from the 22nd intake. But he was not as popular as his friends. U Ye Htut, who served as the spokesman and information minister under the U Thein Sein’s government, was for a long time the best-known figure from the intake.
Other well-known individuals include retired Navy chief Admiral Thura Thet Swe, former Home Minister Lieutenant-General Kyaw Shwe, former Defense Minister Lieutenant-General Hla Min, Energy Minister U Zeya Aung and Lieutenant-General Yar Pyae, who leads the regime’s peace negotiation team.
Soe Win is known as an inscrutable and quiet man. But he is a silent killer. He is responsible for the ongoing violence against civilians and for the clearance operations against the Rohingya in 2017. The US-sanctioned officer does not seem to have any regrets about any of those atrocities.
“The deputy military chief has become even more active since the coup,” said a former military officer.
Soe Win was born in 1960. He joined the 22nd intake of the Defense Services Academy in 1976, and served in various positions including commander of Light Infantry Battalion 379 in Minbya in northern Rakhine from 1981 to 2001. He became a tactical commander at North-Western Command in 2003, the commander of the 10th Military Operations Command in 2005, and the commandant of the combat training school (Ba Htoo) in 2006. He was appointed the commander of Northern Command in 2008. In 2010, he was brought back to Naypyitaw as the chief of the Bureau of Special Operations and promoted to lieutenant general. He became the deputy military chief in March 2011.
Will Soe Win become military chief?
Min Aung Hlaing’s presidential dream is an open secret. If he were to take the presidency, he would only leave someone he can trust as the military chief. There is no one else except Soe Win. Though Lt-Gen Moe Myint Tun was previously widely tipped to be the next military chief, Min Aung Hlaing would not take Soe Win into the cabinet as vice president, a position that does not have any power, and leave the military to a young and inexperienced general.
The third-most powerful men, chief of general staff (Army, Navy and Air) General Maung Maung Aye and Defense Minister General Mya Tun Oo are from the 25th intake of the Defense Services Academy and neither is likely to become the military chief.
Soe Win has probably foreseen that the military chief position is waiting for him once Min Aung Hlaing steps down, and thus has no reason to want to purge Min Aung Hlaing.
Soe Win has kept a low profile and has made sure he does not appear to be ambitious.
In reality, he is a not only co-conspirator behind the coup and protector of Min Aung Hlaing, but also the key general overseeing the bloody military offensive against EAOs, PDFs and civilians in the country.
So, for those delusional people who have not already done so, it is time to discard any wishful thinking that Soe Win would stage a coup against Min Aung Hlaing, let alone hand power back to the ousted NLD government..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"A total of 17 civilians, including a child, have been killed in a Myanmar junta raid and airstrikes on a Sagaing Region village.
On Thursday around 60 regime soldiers, airlifted by helicopters, occupied Yin Paung Taing village in the south of Yinmabin Township after three Russian-made MI-35 helicopters attacked villagers using machine guns and rockets.
The villagers were preparing a meal for resistance fighters from Chin State. Many villagers and Chin People’s Defense Force members were trapped in the village while around 3,000 residents escaped.
Overnight most of the resistance members escaped after a shootout with regime forces.
On Friday, approximately 90 more regime reinforcements were dropped by helicopter and an MI-35 attacked after resistance groups tried to evacuate the trapped civilians.
On Sunday, regime troops left the village and residents found 17 bodies, including the remains of six people burned by troops.
Twelve were Yin Paung Tiaing villagers, according to residents and the Young Ranger Force (YRF), a resistance force.
Ko Bala of the group told The Irrawaddy on Monday that a 10-year-old girl and villager Daw Nwe Nwe, 52, were killed by helicopter bombs.
“We will live without any worry when we annihilate the regime. Until then there is nowhere safe for everyone,” he said.
Villagers Ko Thaw Phone Naing, 17, Ko Saung Win Latt, 40, U Mg Myint, 55, Ko Nyein Thu Aung, 24, Daw Yi Myint, 45, U Kyaw Win Swe, 73, and Ko Pwa Gyi, 45, who suffered from mental illness, were shot dead by troops.
Villagers Daw Khin Mya, 85, and Daw Ni, 62, starved to death while trapped in the village.
U Kyaw Hmawe, 67, died while fleeing junta airstrikes, according to the YRF.
Residents found five other bodies, one of which was confirmed as an ethnic Chin resistance fighter, a villager told The Irrawaddy.
Pro-regime Telegram channels reported last Friday that seven resistance fighters were killed and many firearms and ammunition were seized during the raid.
Regime forces torched about six buildings and many houses were bombed, residents said.
The troops took around 32 villagers as human shields as they raided villages in Pale Township on Sunday.
Shootouts broke out with resistance forces on Sunday.
The casualty numbers are unknown.
Since Thursday, around 7,000 residents from seven villages have fled their homes.
Amid repeated resistance attacks, regime forces have relentlessly committed atrocities, including the arbitrary killing of civilians, torturing and burning people alive, using civilians as human shields, air and artillery strikes on residential areas, looting and burning houses and acts of sexual violence..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ သြဂုတ်လ (၁၂)ရက်နေ့သည် ကရင်အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင် စောဘဦးကြီး နှင့်တကွ ကရင်ခေါင်းဆောင်များ ကျဆုံးခဲ့သည့် (၇၂) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အာဇာနည်နေ့ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤနေ့ရက်အချိန်အခါသည် ကရင်လူမျိုးတို့၏ သမိုင်းနှင့် ကရင်တော်လှန်ရေး သမိုင်းတွင် မေ့ပျောက်၍မရသော အောက်မေ့ဖွယ်နေ့ရက်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ဥက္ကဌစောဘဦးကြီးမှ ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည့် လမ်းညွှန်မူ (၄) ချက်ကို မဆုတ်မနစ်ကိုင်စွဲပြီး ကရင်အမျိုးသား တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် သာမက လွန်လေပြီးသော နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော်မှစ၍ မျက်မှောက်ခေတ် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအထိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်ခံပြီး ဦးဆောင် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လျက်ရှိသည့် KNU/KNLA အတွက် များစွာ လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူပါသည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြီး ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးက လိုလားတောင့်တခဲ့သော ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အခွင့်အရေးများကို အပြည့်အဝအာမခံချက်ရှိသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် သန္နိဌာန်ချထားသည့် အစိုးရဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ယနေ့တွင်ကျရောက်သော (၇၂) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ကရင်တစ်မျိုးသားလုံးနှင့်ထပ်တူ ကရင်အာဇာနည်အပေါင်းကို အောက်မေ့ အမှတ်ရပါသည်။ ကရင်တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်ကာ ကရင်လူမျိုး များနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံး လိုလားသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေး အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့ အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
298.31 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၄ ခုနှစ် ဝါခေါင်လပြည့်နေ့ (ခရစ်နှစ် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် သြဂုတ်လ (၁၁) ရက်) သည် မွန်အမျိုးသားများ၏ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်အတွက် လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ခြင်း (၇၅) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်သော နေ့ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် မြန်မာပြည်လွတ်လပ်ရေးရရှိပြီးနောက် မွန်၊ ရခိုင် နှင့် ကရင် စသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ နေထိုင်ရာသီးခြားပြည်နယ်များ သတ်မှတ်ဖော်ထုတ်ပေးရန်၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိသော ဖက်ဒရယ်စနစ်ထူထောင်ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် အတွက် “ခေတ်သစ်မွန်လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်” ကို နိုင်ပန်းသာ၊ နိုင်မောင်သိန်း (ခ) ဗိုလ်သိန်း နှင့် မွန်မျိုးချစ်လူငယ် (၂၇) ဦး တို့က ဦးဆောင်ပြီး ဇာသပြင်ကျေးရွာ၌ သန္ဓေတည်၍ “မွန်လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေး” ကို စတင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၁၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ဝါခေါင်လပြည့်နေ့၊ နံနက် (၆:၃၀) နာရီ ကို ဂုဏ်ပြု၍ မွန်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကျင်းပခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ရရှိခဲ့သော်လည်း အုပ်ချုပ်သူဗဟိုအစိုးရအဆက်ဆက်က တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးတို့၏ ရသင့်ရထိုက်သော ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု ထူထောင်ရေးကတိကဝတ် တောင်းဆိုချက်များအပေါ်တွင် လျစ်လျူရှုကာ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖြေရှင်းသည့်ယဉ်ကျေးမှု အမြစ်တွယ်ခဲ့သည်မှာ နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော် ပြီဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ ၂၀၂၁ ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီမှ မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းသည် နိုင်ငံရေးတွင် စစ်တပ်မှ ထာဝရဝင်ရောက်စွက်ဖက်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံက လိုလားသော ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကို ဥပေက္ခာပြု ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် လုပ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ သို့ဖြစ်၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ပြတ်သည်အထိ မွန်ပြည်သူများနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးအားလုံးမှ ပူးပေါင်းပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ထွန်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်တပ်မတော်ပေါ်ပေါက်ရေးအတွက် ဝိုင်းဝန်းကြိုးပမ်းကြရမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် မွန်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် တိုက်တွန်းလိုက်ပါသည်။
၅။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် မွန်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် မွန်တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ကျဆုံးလေပြီးသော မွန်အမျိုးသားအပေါင်းကို သတိရအောက်မေ့ပါကြောင်းနှင့် မွန်လူမျိုးများ၏ တန်းတူရေး၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အခွင့်အရေးများ ရရှိရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ထွန်းလာရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်များ အောင်မြင်ပါစေကြောင်း လေးနက်စွာဆန္ဒပြုလျက် သဝဏ်လွှာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
375.14 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ကရင်တိုင်းသားတို့အနေဖြင့် ကရင်ပြည်၏ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ တန်းတူညီမျှခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်တို့အတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည်မှာ နှစ်ပေါင်း ၇၀ ကျော်ပင် ကြာခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယနေ့သည် ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားများ ဖိနှိပ်ခံဘဝမှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် အစဉ်တစိုက် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကြရင်း ကျဆုံး သွားခဲ့ကြသူ စောဘဦးကြီးနှင့်တကွ ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားအာဇာနည်များအားလုံးကို အောက်မေ့ဂုဏ်ပြု သောအားဖြင့် နှစ်စဉ်ကျင်းပမြဲဖြစ်သည့် ၇၂ နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အာဇာနည်နေ့ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားတို့သည် ကိုလိုနီဖက်ဆစ်များကို တော်လှန်ရာတွင်လည်းကောင်း၊ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များအား တော်လှန်ရာတွင်လည်းကောင်း အရှုံးပေးသည်၊ လက်လျှော့ သည်ဟူ၍ မရှိဘဲ မားမားမတ်မတ်ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသူများ ဖြစ်ကြပါသည်။ နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ဖိနှိပ်လာခဲ့သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကြီးအား နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ ပြည်သူများက တခဲနက် ဆန့်ကျင် တော်လှန်နေကြသည့် ယခုအချိန်မျိုးတွင်လည်း ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားတို့သည် ညီနောင်တိုင်းရင်းသား များနှင့်အတူ လက်တွဲ၍ အသက်နှင့်ခန္ဓာအား ပေးလှူကာ ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲ ဝင်နေကြဆဲပင်ဖြစ်ပါ သည်။
၃။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပရှိ ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသားများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက် အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် အလွှာအသီးသီးမှ မိတ်ဖက်နိုင်ငံရေး၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ အား နွေးထွေးစွာ ကြိုဆိုပြီး ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ပေးမှုများသည် တော်လှန်ရေးအောင်မြင်ရန်အတွက် ကြီးမားသည့် တွန်းအားတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးကိုယ်စား ကျေးဇူးတင်စွာ မှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။ စစ်အုပ်စုကအမျိုးမျိုးဖိနှိပ်နေသည့်တိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး ယနေ့အချိန်ထိ အဓွန့်ရှည်၍ အားကောင်းနေခြင်းမှာ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ ညီညွတ်မှုကြောင့်ပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အနေဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်သူအာဏာရှင်တို့အား အညံ့မခံဘဲ ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသဖြင့် တော်လှန်ရေးလမ်းခုလတ်တွင် ကျဆုံးခဲ့ကြရသော လူမျိုးစုအသီးသီးမှ အာဇာနည် သူရဲကောင်းအပေါင်းတို့အား ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့်အတူ အလေးပြုပါကြောင်း ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် အောက်မေ့ဖွယ်နေ့တွင် ဝမ်းနည်းစွာ ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ အာဇာနည်မျိုး သေရိုးမရှိဟူသည့် စကားအတိုင်းပင် ပြည်သူ့အကျိုးကိုရှေးရှုလျက် ခံယူချက်အတွက် အသက်ပေး သွားခဲ့ကြသူ သူရဲကောင်းများ၏ စိတ်ဝိဉာဉ်များမှာ ပြည်သူတို့၏ စိတ်နှလုံးထဲတွင် အစဉ်အမြဲပင် ရှိနေမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ အာဏာရှင်ကိုဆန့်ကျင်ရင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ကြသည့် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ရဲဘော်များ၏ နိုင်ငံရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်ဖြစ်သည့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင်ပပျောက်စေရေးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး တန်းတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်နိုင်မည့် တရားမျှတပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်နိုင်ငံတော် တည်ဆောက် ရေးတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ဦးလည်မသုန် ကြိုးပမ်းသွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် ၇၂ နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အာဇာနည်နေ့ တွင် အခိုင်အမာ ကတိ သစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Karen (cultural, historical, political), Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
277.05 KB
more
Description:
"(၁) ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၂) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အာဇာနည်နေ့သို့ လေးစားစွာဖြင့် ဦးညွှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
(၂) ကရင်အမျိုးသားများ၏ အမျိုးသားရေးအရ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုမရှိစေရန်နှင့်နိုင်ငံရေးအရ တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေး ရရှိရန် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည့် ကရင့်အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီး စောဘဦးကြီးကျဆုံးခဲ့သည့် သြဂုတ်လ (၁၂)ရက်နေ့ကို ကရင်အာဇာနည်နေ့ဟု သတ်မှတ်ကျင်းပခဲ့ကြသည်။
(၃) ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်တွင် အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးအတွက် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်ကာ အသက်ပေးတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင် ခဲ့ကြသည့် ကရင့်အာဇာနည်များကို ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက အသိအမှတ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
(၄) ယနေ့မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်တွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကြောင့် ပြည်သူများခါးစည်းခံနေရသည့် ဒုက္ခများ ပြေလည် စေရန် ကရင်အမျိုးသားများနှင့်လက်တွဲညီညီဖြေရှင်းသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိပြုရင်း ဤ သဝဏ်လွှာကို တော်လှန်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်ဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Karen (cultural, historical, political), Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
163.18 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် သြဂုတ်လ (၁၀) ရက်နေ့သည် ကချင်တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် အသက်ပေး သွားကြသည့် ကချင်အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများကို အောက်မေ့သည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်ဖြင့် ပြုလုပ် သည့် (၄၇) နှစ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့ (Share Shagan Nhtoi) ဖြစ်ပြီး ကချင်တော်လှန်ရေး၏ သန္ဓေကို စုပေါင်းထမ်းရွက် ဆောက်တည်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ကချင်အမျိုးသား အာဇာနည်များအတွက် အောက်မေ့ဖွယ် နေ့ရက်တစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ကချင်လူမျိုးများ၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးတန်းတူညီမျှခွင့်အတွက် ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံ တာဝန်ထမ်းရွက်နေသော ကချင်တော်လှန်ရေး ဖခင်ကြီးများအား တော်လှန်ရေး မှေးမှိန်ပျောက်ကွယ်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ အာဏာရှင်များက ၁၉၇၅ ခုနှစ် သြဂုတ်လ အစောပိုင်းရက်များတွင် စနစ်တကျ လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ၎င်းဖြစ်ရပ်သည် ကချင်လူထုအတွက် ကြီးစွာသော ဆုံးရှုံးနစ်နာမှု ဖြစ်ခဲ့သလို၊ နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ပူဆွေးဝမ်းနည်းခဲ့ရသည့် ကြေကွဲဖွယ်ဖြစ်ရပ် တစ်ခုလည်းဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ ဤသို့ ဝမ်းနည်းဖွယ် ဖြစ်ရပ်ဖြင့် ကြုံတွေ့ခဲ့ပါသော်လည်း ကချင်တော်လှန်ရေးသည် ဦးမကျိုးခဲ့ဘဲ (၄၇) နှစ်တိုင်တိုင် ဆင့်ကဲပြောင်းလဲ တာဝန်ထမ်းရွက်မှုဖြင့် ကချင့်တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဦးဖြစ်သည့် KIO/KIA ကို ညီညွတ်စွာ စုစည်း၍ ဆက်လက် ဦးဆောင်ချီတက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်မှာ လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူဖွယ် ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်က တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးအရ ရပိုင်ခွင့် အခွင့်အရေးများကို လျစ်လျူရှုကာ လက်နက်အားကိုး အုပ်ချုပ်ခဲ့သော အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အပြီးသတ်ချေမှုန်းပြီး ကချင်လူမျိုးများအပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ အားလုံးလိုလားသည့် အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေး၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီကို အပြည့်အဝ အာမခံသည့် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်ရန် သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချထားသည့် အစိုးရဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် သြဂုတ်လ (၁၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက် သည့် (၄၇) နှစ်မြောက် ကချင်အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် ကချင် တမျိုးသားလုံးနှင့်အတူ ဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲရ သကဲ့သို့ ကချင်တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများနှင့် လက်တွဲကာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ဖြုတ်ချပြီး ကချင်လူမျိုးများ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးလိုလားသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်သွားရန် လေးနက်စွာ သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချထားကြောင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Kachin (economic, social, cultural, political), Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
377.05 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိတိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးအသီးသီးတွင် မိမိတို့လူမျိုးများ၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ တရားမျှတရေးနှင့် တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေးရရှိရေးတို့အတွက်သာမက ဖက်ဒရယ် ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေးတို့အတွက် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်အနစ်နာခံကာ သက်စွန့်ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများကို အောက်မေ့တသတန်ဖိုးထားဂုဏ်ပြုသည့် အနေဖြင့် အာဇာနည်နေ့အဖြစ်သတ်မှတ်ကြပါသည်။ ကချင်အမျိုးသားများ၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ထူထောင်ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်အတွက် ကချင်အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများကို မလိုမုန်းထားသူ ရန်သူတို့ဘက်မှ ကချင်တို့၏တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးစဉ်အား မှေးမှိန်ပျောက်ကွယ်စေလိုသောကြောင့် လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ရခြင်းခံရသည့်နေ့ကို အောက်မေ့တသသောအားဖြင့် ကချင်အာဇာနည်နေ့ အဖြစ်ကျင်းပခဲ့ကြသည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် ( ၄၇ ) နှစ်မြောက်သို့ရောက်ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံကို အင်္ဂလိပ်ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်လပ်ရေးရအောင်ကြိုးပမ်း စဉ်ကလည်း ကချင်တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ ဇာတိသွေး၊ ဇာတိမာန်နှင့် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်ဓာတ်အပြည့်ဖြင့် တွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ်ခဲ့ကြပုံကိုလည်း သမိုင်းတွင်အထင်အရှားပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ခေတ်အဆက် ဆက်၌မတရားဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်မှုများနှင့် တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေးတို့အတွက် ရဲဝံ့စွာဆန့်ကျင် တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ကချင်လူမျိုးများသည် ယခုအခါအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်စုအား ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေသည့် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးခရီးကြမ်းတွင်လည်း ဒီမိုကရေစီ အင်အားစုများနှင့်အတူတကွ ခိုင်မာစွာရပ်တည်ကာ အင်အားကောင်းသောတော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုကြီးအဖြစ် လက်တွဲကြိုးပမ်းနေသည့်အတွက် များစွာဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အနေဖြင့် ကချင်အာဇာနည် သူရဲကောင်းများ၏ဆန္ဒဖြစ်သည့် တောင်တန်းနှင့်မြေပြန့်မခွဲခြားဘဲ တန်းတူညီမျှရရှိမှု၊ လွတ်လပ် မှုနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုစသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစံချိန်စံညွှန်းများနှင့်ပြည့်စုံသော အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်အား အမြန်ဆုံးတည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေး ကချင်အပါအဝင် ပြည်ထောင်စုတိုင်းရင်းသားညီနောင်များနှင့်အတူ မဆုတ်မနစ်လက်တွဲ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည်ဟု လေးနက်ခိုင်မာစွာကတိသစ္စာပြုရင်း ယနေ့ ၁၀-၈-၂၀၂၂ ရက်နေ့တွင်ကျရောက် သည့် (၄၇) နှစ်မြောက် ကချင်အာဇာနည်နေ့သဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Kachin (economic, social, cultural, political), Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
263.27 KB
more
Description:
"လက်ရှိအခြေအနေမှာ မိမိတို့ကို လူမှုရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေးနဲ့ စစ်ရေးအရ သွေးခွဲနေတဲ့ အချိန်အခါဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် တော်လှန်ရေးသတိ အမြဲရှိနေရမည့် အချိန်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ် ဩဂုတ်လ ၉ ရက်နေ့မှာ ကျရောက်တဲ့ (၇၄)နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားခုခံတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ အခမ်းအနားသို့ ပေးပို့တဲ့ ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားတိုးတက်ရေးပါတီ၊ ပါတီဗဟိုဌာနချုပ်ရဲ့ သဝဏ်လွှာက ဆိုထားပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
529.97 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးနှင့်ကာကွယ်ရေး ကောင်စီ၏ (၃၀.၇.၂၀၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပသော အစည်းအဝေးဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အရ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးထံ စစ်တရားရုံးချုပ်နှင့်အကျဥ်းစစ်တရားရုံးချုပ် ဖွဲ့စည်းခွင့်အာဏာကို အပ်နှင်းလိုက်သည်။
၂။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးသည် အဆိုပါ စစ်တရားရုံးချုပ်နှင့်အကျဥ်းစစ်တရားရုံးချုပ် ဖွဲ့စည်းခွင့်အာဏာကို အရာရှိတစ်ဦးဦးသို့ အမိန့်စာဖြင့် လွှဲအပ်နိုင်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
98.82 KB
more
Description:
"1. NUG states not engaging with terrorist SAC is best means to
ensure safety and security of Chinese government assets...As the 7th Lancangg-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ meeting is planned to be held in July, 2022 and
in light of the fact that the military-led SAC is illegal,
the NUG has issued a call that the Myanmar army be
barred from any and all involvement in the LMC.
By permitting SAC’s troops to be based on their project
sites, Chinese companies are increasingly perceived by
local groups as aiding and abetting the enemy of the
people. The announcement added that the best means
for the Chinese government to ensure the safety and
security of its assets is to avoid them being used by
the military, thereby making it easy for pro-democracy
forces to protect Chinese assets, interests and workers
in the country.....2. President Duwa Lashi La calls on all parties to reject the SAC’s
election...Acting President Duwa Lashi La has called on all political
parties which wish to restore democracy and federalism
need to meet the people’s expectations and aspirations by
boycotting the faux-election which the SAC plans to hold.
The president went on to say that there should be strategic
cooperation between all pro-democracy actors to bring suc-
cess to the revolution. The president once again urged his
cabinet colleagues to make every effort for the revolution,
with special consideration made to security concerns and
the acute need for financial support in the Spring Revolu-
tion. He noted that sadly, humanitarian aid has yet to be
mobilised and distributed to many who have fled the atroc-
ities and terror of the SAC.
In the meeting, Prime Minister Mann Win Khaing Than re-
ported that local administrative mechanisms are already
well established and operating in Sagaing and Magway Re-
gions under the supervision of the central committee, and
have already shown substantial results. He added that dip-
lomatic, military, political effort and the people’s solidarity
are pushing the nation toward the complete eradication of
the military SAC.....3. one million THB support for
Battle of Oukarithta (4.7.2022)...The Anti-Coup Committee (Korea) announced a donation
of 1,000,000 THB (approx. $30,000) raised via the One Day
Challenge campaign to the NUG to support troops fighting to
liberate Oukarithta Station. The committee delivered support
to the KNDO commander General Nal Dar Mya, labeling the
donation as an NUG contribution to the troops.
The committee has been providing the NUG with the equiv-
alent of 100,000 USD every month since August 2021. Such
contributions are being used to develop and implement local
administrative activities in the NUG controlled-areas..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
3.53 MB 6.19 MB
more
Description:
"At a first glance, it seemed like a major achievement by a group of United States crime fighters. An undercover Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent posing as a narcotics and weapons trafficker had managed to secure evidence leading to the arrest of a leader of a Yakuza organized crime gang, as well as of three Thais of whom two have military backgrounds, over a plot to use drugs as payment for sophisticated US-made weaponry.
According to documents supplied by the DEA to a court in New York on January 19 and made public in April, three ethnic armies in Myanmar — the Karen National Union (KNU), the Shan State Army (SSA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — needed the weapons, including “ten FIM-92J Stinger surface-to-air-missiles”, automatic rifles and mortars for their fight against the Myanmar junta. The payment for the whole shipment would be 500 kilograms of methamphetamine and 500 kilograms of heroin or US$40 million, presumably in cash or by bank transfer. The court document also states that “the buyers would build an airstrip to receive delivery of the weapons by cargo plane.”
But to anyone familiar with the Golden Triangle drug trade, this sounds a highly unlikely story. The KNU has for more than a year been subjected to aerial attacks launched by the Myanmar Air Force, and so would need such MANPADS, or man-portable defense systems, but the group would not be able to produce any drugs to pay for them because it has never been involved in the narcotics trade, nor would it have US$40 million in its coffers.
The SSA, which here is the Shan State Army-South, the armed wing of the Thai-border based Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) [the rival SSA-North is based in northern Shan State and is the armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party], on October 15, 2015 became one of the signatories of what the Myanmar authorities call the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Thus, it is not engaged in any war with the Myanmar military.
The court document goes on to state that the UWSA needs the weapons because they are “fighting the government of Myanmar” but, as anyone following events in the country’s frontier areas knows, that is utterly incorrect. The UWSA has not signed the NCA but it has had an informal ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s central authorities since 1989. The Wa have a formidable armed force, probably as many as 20,000 or 30,000 men, but the only battles the UWSA has fought since 1989 are with the RCSS and its predecessor, the Möng Tai Army of the late druglord Khun Sa. And neither of those groups has or has had any aircraft that would have to be shot down. Although the UWSA is not fighting the Myanmar army, it keeps a vast arsenal of weapons to deter any attempt by central authorities to move into its areas along the Myanmar-China border — and that includes a significant number of Chinese-made FN-6 MANPADS. In other words, there is no reason why the Wa would want to buy expensive and more-difficult-to-use American Stingers.
Then there is the question of the airfield “the buyers” were supposed to build for the cargo plane that was going to deliver the goods to them. How on earth would that work? And how would any cargo plane loaded with heavy weapons be able to fly undetected through Thai airspace — which it would have to — then land at some clearing in the jungle and take off again? That detail alone lends credence to the suggestion by local sources in the area that this is nothing more than a cock-and-bull story. A closer look at the names mentioned in the court document also reinforces that conclusion.
The alleged “leader of the Yakuza transnational organized crime syndicate,” who was going to supply the weapons is identified as Takeshi Ebisawa and the document even has a picture of him showing one of the MANPADS at a meeting with the undercover DEA agent. But Yakuza is the common name for a wide range of minor, middle-sized and larger Japanese crime syndicates and the name of this particular group is not mentioned anywhere in the submission to the court. Regardless of the size of the group, the leader himself would in any way not be involved in such deals; that is something his underlings would do in order to give their boss plausible deniability if anyone is caught.
The question of the actual identities of the three Thai middlemen is also a mystery. One of them, Suksan “Bobby” Jullanan, is referred to as “a Thai air force general.” But the Royal Thai Air Force does not have any generals. The highest rank is that of Air Chief Marshal followed by an Air Marshal, an Air Vice Marshal and so on. The second Thai defendant, Sompak Rukrasaranee, is supposed to be “a retired Thai military officer.” But no former rank or name of the regiment he once, allegedly, belonged to are mentioned in the documents. The third, Somphop Singhasiri is identified only as “a Thai national.” And then there is a “CC-1”, or Co-Conspirator 1, who is not named but is described as “the chairman of the Restoration Council of Shan State.” That, of course, is Yawd Serk, who is not an underground figure or a fugitive from justice. He has taken part in several peace talks with the Myanmar military and traveled freely to and from Yangon as well as Naypyitaw.
Curiously, a fourth prospective buyer is also named in the documents: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group that was completely crushed by the Sri Lankan army in 2009. But the DEA seems to believe that the LTTE “continues to attract international financial support.” Apparently, Ebisawa had some contacts with an unnamed former LTTE official who — it is unclear — is either in prison in India or has been released due to efforts of the alleged Yakuza leader.
In the end, all that the DEA appears to have ended up with is the arrest of a talkative Japanese fraudster— and three Thai conmen who no one inside Myanmar seems to have heard of. That, in turn, raises the question whether pure incompetence and ignorance of the situation of the ground led to those arrests, of if there could be a more sinister agenda behind this remarkably implausible story. Could it even be the outcome of an interdepartmental feud within the US administration? That is an issue that has troubled Myanmar policymakers in Washington for decades. The US State Department has always been consistent in its support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces and opposition to autocratic, military rule. The DEA’s agents, on the other hand, have been much more willing to cooperate with the Myanmar military because they believe they are on the same side in the war on drugs — and despite that fact that much of the drug trade is carried out by local, government-recognized militias.
After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising and the massacres of demonstrators in Yangon and cities and towns all over the country, the then US ambassador Burton Levin was firm in his condemnation of the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and ordered his staff to cease regular meetings with the military authorities. The first to ignore those directives was DEA agent Gregory Korniloff, who was told to leave Yangon in December 1988 after making an unsuccessful attempt to arrange an unauthorized meeting with officials of the Myanmar military’s intelligence service. At the time, Korniloff was said to be eager to resume normal ties with the military leadership in Yangon, which he claimed had made significant headway in fighting the narcotics trade.
The controversy reached new heights in March 1991, when it was discovered that another Yangon-based DEA officer, Angelo Saladino, had authored a secret memorandum addressed to Myanmar’s powerful and ruthless intelligence chief, Major General Khin Nyunt. Dated March 15, 1991, the letter listed in detail the various ways that the Myanmar military might try to impress the US Government as well as United Nations agencies. It also provided specific suggestions on ways to “deprive many of Myanmar’s most vocal critics of some of their shopworn, yet effective weapons in the campaign to discredit [Myanmar’s] narcotics program.” Finally, Saladino recommended several options to the junta for silencing “its most biased critics.”
It took some time before Washington discovered the memorandum. When noises were made, Saladino reportedly flew back to the DEA’s headquarters in the US at his own expense. He managed to convince his superiors that he had not, after all, sent the memorandum to Khin Nyunt. A compromise was reached with the State Department: Saladino had his tour of duty in Myanmar officially curtailed but was allowed to serve out his term which only had a few more months to run.
It is too early to say whether history is repeating itself, but by dragging the KNU into this conundrum, the DEA is discrediting an ethnic group which is serving as host for hundreds of pro-democracy activists who, since last year’s February 1 coup, have sought refuge in the areas near the Thai border that the KNU controls. Many are involved in armed struggle, while others are running news and blog sites on the internet and getting support from the US government and private donors. How, and if, this court case will affect that support remains to be seen. But the DEA, eager to resume contacts with Myanmar’s military authorities, has done the pro-democracy movement a huge disservice — and on dubious grounds which will not have any impact on the flow of narcotics out of Southeast Asia.
Entrapment is illegal in most countries [but not the US] because law enforcement officers are supposed to fight crime, not encourage easily-duped individuals to commit ones. And all that the DEA has been able to produce when it comes to drugs is a photograph allegedly sent by Signal to or from Singhasiri (spelt Sanghasiri on the screengrab) showing a bag of Double UO Globe heroin which could have been taken anytime and even downloaded from the internet..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Drugs: regional and global, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was formed
on the 2nd of May 1957, nine years after the beginning
of Karenni National Resistance, prompted by the
invasion of independent Karenni State by the Union of
Burma government in 1948. The party was formed in Ka
Thoe Kee village, Lerpwakho District of Karenni to
provide political leadership for the resistance.
At its inception, KNPP was led by a 9-member Central
Committee that included a chairman, a secretary, and 7
members as follow:
1. Htaw Blo - Chairman
2. Samuel - Secretary
3. Mu Day (Biba Moo) - Member
4. Gay Hsoe (Law Oo) - Member
5. Thawthi Poe (Mee Ei) - Member
6. Kyaw Naing - Member
7. Ta Eh Poe - Member
8. Htoe Kho - Member
9. Kah Poe - Alternate Member
Just 4 months after its founding, KNPP saw its first
crushing test when Chairman Htaw Blo was assassinated
by his own bodyguard on September 28. After Htaw
Blo's assassination, Saw Maw Raw was elected chairman
in January 1958. However, after just two months of
service, he defected to the Burmese government. His
successor Chairman Mee Ei was killed in a battle in
Kwah Kee village in March 1959. The Second National
Congress in 1959 elected Kyaw Naing (Poe Kyaw) as the
4th chairman of the party. Unfortunately, he was
captured by the Burmese government troops during a
trip in 1960.
That turbulent period was the first 3 years of KNPP's
shaky and tragic experience. Yet the party persevered.
New generations of leadership emerged to take the
party to the next level of resistance and political
leadership and build a resistance organization that
worked shoulder to shoulder with its allies of ethnic
resistance organizations and faced its enemies with solid
principles and deadly force.
Yet more tests were to come. Perhaps the harshest of it
all was the largest split within KNPP in 1978 caused by
ideological differences among the party's leadership.
The split rocked KNPP at its core and shook its
foundation. However, it did not fall. The party reflected
and rebuilt to become stronger. It has continued to lead
Karenni resistance through political and military means
towards the realization of Karenni people's selfdetermination
and freedom from oppression and
federal democracy for all in Burma. KNPP has also
provided important administrative services in education,
health, and defense sectors, to name a few, in areas
where the Burmese military juntas have tried to
destroy.
With unwavering principles in its armed struggle, KNPP
was never shy to engage in peace talks. It had joined
such talks in the 1960s, 1990s, and between 2012 to
2020 for bilateral and nationwide ceasefire, either
collectively with allies or unilaterally. However, KNPP
would not take any offer of superficial peace as a
solution for the deep-rooted political problems in
Burma. As such, the Karenni resistance continues.
The 2021 coup ironically granted a new and rare
opportunity for KNPP to work with not only the Karenni
people statewide but also with various ethnicities and
groups across Burma to uproot the evil dictatorship
once and for all. KNPP takes this opportunity very
seriously by engaging all stakeholders domestically and
internationally on all fronts including humanitarian,
political, diplomatic, and military fronts. With the
mandate granted by the 14th Congress of KNPP in 2022,
the new leadership will continue the fight to uproot any
form of dictatorship and built a federal democratic
union together with the people..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
43.45 KB 486.32 KB
more
Description:
"KNPP expresses its deepest condolences for the passing of Khun Htun Oo, former Chairman of Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), who passed away on April 30, 2022 at the age of 79. Khun Htun Oo was a champion in the fight for equality, self-determination, and federal democracy in Burma. Losing Khun Htun Oo is a great loss not only for the SNLD but also for the Shan, Karenni and other peoples in Burma who strive for the noble causes he championed. Together with Khun Htun Oo’s family, members of SNLD, Shan nationals, and those who have worked with Khun Htun Oo for liberation from tyranny and the establishment of a federal democratic union, we, the KNPP, mourns the loss of such a great and irreplaceable leader.....
Headquarters.....
Karenni National Progressive Party..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni National Progressive Party
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karenni (Kayah) - cultural, political, Shan (cultural, historical, political) articles, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
102.11 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
910.04 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
971.66 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
731.87 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
757.11 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
747.37 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
630.78 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
346.85 KB
more
Description:
"Message from the Karenni National Defense Force on the occasion of the BPLA 1st Anniversary Day..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Nationalities Defense Force
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
125.75 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
378.3 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ(၁၇)ရက်နေ့တွင်ကျရောက်သော “ဝ”ပြည်နယ် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်မှု (၃၃)နှစ်ပြည့်သို့ ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ “ဝ”ပြည်သူများ၏အစဥ်အလာကြီးမားသော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်များကို အာမခံချက် အပြည့်အဝရရှိစေရန်လည်းကောင်း၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်စာပေ၊ ယဥ်ကျေးမှုနှင့်အထွေထွေလူမှုစီးပွားအခွင့်အလမ်း များ တိုးတက်မြင့်မားစေရန် အတွက်လည်းကောင်း “ဝ” အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် “ဝ” ပြည်သူများ သည် ၁၉၈၉ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ (၁၇) ရက်နေ့တွင် “ဝ” ပြည်သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ရေးပါတီ၊ “ဝ” ပြည်သွေးစည်း ညီညွတ်ရေးတပ်မတော်တို့ကို ထူထောင်ကာ အခက်အခဲများကြားတွင် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကို ကြိုးပမ်းတည်ဆောက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။ “ဝ” ပြည်နယ်၏ရရှိပြီးသော ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာအတူယှဥ်တွဲနေထိုင်မှုနှင့်လူမှုစီးပွားကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ တိုးတက် ဖွံ့ဖြိုုးမှုများ အဓွန့်ရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မာစေရန် “ဝ” အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့်“ဝ” ပြည်သူများ ဆထက် ထမ်းပိုးကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်းနှင့်အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို အုတ်မြစ်ချထူထောင်ရာတွင် အမြော်အမြင်ကြီးမားစွာဖြင့် ဦးဆောင်ပါဝင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
220.84 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
394.56 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
576.7 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
499.21 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
596.41 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
538.85 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
391.48 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
761.02 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
645.33 KB
more
Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
979.48 KB
more
Description:
"၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလတင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီးအတွင်းရှိ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်အချို့၏ ဥပဒေမဲ့သတ်ဖြတ်မှုဟု ယူဆရသည့် ဖြစ်စဥ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့ ပူးတွဲ၍ စစ်ရေးပြစ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး ဗဟိုကော်မရှင် ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
ကနဦးသိရှိချက်အရ အဆိုပါဖြစ်စဥ်သည် ဖောက်ခွဲရေးပစ္စည်းများ မှားယွင်းပေါက်ကွဲမှုက စတင်အခြေတည်ကာ လက်စားချေသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ကြောင်း စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုအရ သိရှိရပြီး အဆိုပါ ဖြစ်ရပ်ကို ကျူးလွန်သူများက ဖုံးကွယ်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကြောင်းလည်း သိရသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဦးသိန်းဦးမှ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်သွားမည့်အကြောင်းကို ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောကြားစဥ်က “အကယ်၍ ဒီစွပ်စွဲချက်ကသာ မှန်ကန်ခဲ့တယ် ဆိုရင်တော့ ကျင့်ဝတ်စည်းကမ်းချိုးဖောက်မှုနှင့် မလိုက်နာမှု တွေဟာ အင်မတန် စိုးရိမ်စရာကောင်းပါတယ်၊ ဒါ့အပြင် ဒီလိုမလျော်သြဇာသုံးခြင်းဟာ အပြစ်မဲ့တဲ့ အရပ်သား ပြည်သူတွေကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးရမည့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့တွေ အတွက် အမည်းစက်ဖြစ်သွားနိုင်ပါတယ်” ဟူ၍လည်းကောင်း၊ “ပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စဥ် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသည့် ကာလအတွင်းမှာပင်လျှင် ဥပဒေရဲ့အထက်၌ မည်သူမျှ မရှိစေရ” ဟူ၍လည်းကောင်း၊ “ယခု စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုတွင် မြေပြင်၌ အမှန်တကယ်ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သည့် အခြေအနေများနှင့် ယင်းကျူးလွန်မှု အတွက် မည်သူတွင် တာဝန်ရှိသည်ဆိုသည့် အမှန်တရားကို ဖော်ထုတ်သွားမည်” ဟူ၍လည်းကောင်း ကတိပြု ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
ဒေသခံကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ ခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးဖြစ်သည့် ဗိုလ်သံမဏိက ထိုသို့ သတ်ဖြတ်ရန် အမိန့်ပေးခဲ့မှုမျိုး မရှိခဲ့သော်လည်း အဆိုပါဖြစ်စဥ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ “တချို့သော လက်အောက်ငယ်သား တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်တွေ အနေနဲ့ကတော့ ဒေါသမထိန်းနိုင်လို့ ဒီလိုဖြစ်ရပ်မျိုးကို ကျုးလွန်မိတာ ဖြစ်နိုင်ကြောင်း၊ အပြစ်ရှိကြောင်း စစ်ဆေးတွေ့ရှိပြီး ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံရရင်လည်း ဒီဖြစ်စဥ်ရဲ့ အကျိုးဆက်တွေကို မိမိအနေနဲ့ ရင်ဆိုင်ဖို့ အဆင့်ပါပဲ” ဟု ပြောဆိုသည်။
အကယ်၍ ခိုင်လုံသောသက်သေများ စစ်ဆေးတွေ့ရှိခဲ့ပါက ပြစ်မှုစစ်ဆေးစီရင်ခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပြီး ပြစ်မှုထင်ရှားပါက ထိုက်သင့်သော ပြစ်ဒဏ်များ ချမှတ်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စဥ်ကာလ၌ ကျင့်သုံးရမည့် စစ်ဘက်ဆိုင်ရာ စည်းမျဥ်းစည်းကမ်းများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေများကို ဒေသခံကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ခေါင်းဆောင်များအား လေ့ကျင့်မှုများ၊ ရှင်းလင်းမှာကြားမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ စစ်မြေပြင်တွင် အပြစ်မဲ့အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများကို အသက်အန္တရယ်ပြုခြင်းနှင့် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း များကို လုံးဝ ခွင့်ပြုလိမ့်မည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရက အတိအလင်း ကြေညာထားပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Justice
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
190.24 KB
more
Description:
"Today marks the 77th anniversary of anti-fascist resistance day, where the people of Myanmar joined people all over the world to stand up to fascism. The military calls the day Armed Forces Day and celebrates it with a military parade. It is so disheartening and sad to see an institution that kills its own people celebrate itself on this day.
Exactly one year ago today, the Tatmadaw, the fascist forces, killed more than 100 unarmed civilians during brutal crackdowns across Myanmar. Of these, 11 were children. That was the day of terror that people of Myanmar will never forgive or forget. On that day, when they made “day of shame for the armed force”, the Tatmadaw or national armed forces died as a national institution and forever fell from the hearts and minds and respect of the people of Myanmar. Although it must be said that tragically, this massacre was not a surprise for an institution that has been killing ethnic minorities such as Karen, Karenni, Kachin, Chin, Shan, Mon, Rakhine and the Rohingya people for decades.
Together with our brothers and sisters, people of different ethnic groups, races and religions, the people of Myanmar once again need to unite against fascist forces and show our resistance. We must stay united and fight until we can rip out the military and their fascism root and stem. Together with the souls of our lost heroes, we will fight to the bitter end, and I believe we will achieve the future Myanmar where true federal democracy and freedom awaits us..."
Source/publisher:
Dr. Sasa via Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
23.52 KB
more