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Title: Myanmar Situation Update ( 21 - 27 February 2022)
Description: "The junta has threatened the Myanmar political parties of potential disbandment if they do not comply with its order to submit their financial accounts for inspection by 9 March 2022. The junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) has said that if the parties do not comply with the instruction, they would face legal action under Section 24 (c), (d) and (e) of the Registration of Political Parties Law. These provisions of the law carry potential punishments of a three-year suspension, having their operations halted and disbandment. The UEC has instructed the National League for Democracy (NLD), the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and two other parties to appear before 14 February to verify their financial accounts and expenses. Both the NLD and SNLD have not appeared yet the junta UEC has issued its warning on 23 February 2022. The EU announced its fourth round of sanctions against the junta, affecting 22 individuals and 4 entities including government ministers, a member of the State Administrative Council and members of the Union Election Commission, as well as high-ranking members of the junta Forces. Along with Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the Htoo Group, the International Group of Entrepreneurs, and Mining Enterprise 1 are among the list of those sanctioned. As regards the sanctioned entities, these are either state-owned companies providing substantive resources to the Tatmadaw, or private companies closely connected to the Tatmadaw's top leadership. The rights groups and the Myanmar civil society have been advocating for sanctions against MOGE in particular. Justice for Myanmar (JFM) welcomed the EU sanctions in a statement and said MOGE is the junta’s biggest single source of revenue, responsible for financing its terror campaign. Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob met with Cambodian Prime Minister and current Chair of ASEAN Hun Sen on a two-day visit to Cambodia that extended support to the visit of the ASEAN Envoy to Myanmar and stressed the importance of the implementation of the ASEAN five-point consensus that junta leader agreed in April 2021 in Jakarta. Malaysia has been very critical of Hun Sen’s visit to Myanmar in January without proper consultation of ASEAN leaders which led to the postponement of the ASEAN Foreign ministers meeting in Cambodia from January to February 2022. The Gambia’s case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice in The Hague has started with the first preliminary objections being heard. The Gambia has accused Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya in violation of the UN’s Genocide Convention. The junta’s legal team was led by the junta’s minister for international cooperation Ko Ko Hlaing and attorney general Thida Oo. The junta’s legal team delivered its preliminary objections and The Gambia responded. The junta also got attention in the past week for expressing its support to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. "No. 1 is that Russia has worked to consolidate its sovereignty”, Junta spokesman General Zaw Min Tun said, citing the reasons for the junta to support the action by Russia. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights situation in Myanmar Tom Andrews said that UN Security Council members China and Russia, as well as Serbia, have continued to supply the junta with weapons used to attack civilians since the coup. He further urged the Security Council to convene an emergency session "to debate and vote on a resolution to, at a minimum, ban those arms transfers that the Myanmar military is known to use to attack and kill Myanmar civilians". India for Myanmar Movement sent an open letter to the organizers of the 5th Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit in Sri Lanka, urging them not to invite coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to the summit. The open letter says that in December 2021 the Myanmar military was invited to take part in military exercises of BIMSTEC countries in India and there are records that Myanmar military representatives attended many of BIMSTEC meetings as country representatives. The summit is scheduled to be held on 30 March 2022. The latest UNHCR report on Myanmar revealed that the number of IDPs across Myanmar has reached a high of 453,000 since the coup. It also said there were an estimated 46,000 refugee movements to neighbouring countries and 980,000 refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar fled to neighbouring countries as of 31 December 2020. As of 25 February 2022, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) recorded that 1,582 people have been killed by the junta. 9,378 people are currently under detention. 84 have been sentenced to death and 1,973 are evading arrest warrants..."
Source/publisher: Asian Network for Free Elections (Bangkok)
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-02
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Title: Myanmar Democracy Activists Hold Rallies in Support of Ukraine
Description: "Braving the junta’s brutal crackdowns, democracy activists in Myanmar staged protests over the weekend to show solidarity with the people of Ukraine as they attempt to repel the ongoing invasion of their country by Russia. Dozens of young protesters holding pro-democracy banners and Ukrainian flags held flash-mob protests in Myanmar’s commercial hub Yangon, as well as in Dawei in Tanintharyi Region in the country’s deep south and Kachin State in the north on Sunday, as their civilian counterparts in Ukraine grabbed automatic rifles to push back the invading Russians. Myanmar has been under a military dictatorship since February last year. Since then the whole country has been resisting the regime by all means at their disposal, from peaceful protest to armed struggle. So far, more than 1,500 civilians have been killed by the regime. Until May last year, Ukraine had links with the Myanmar military, with arms exports and technology transfers. Despite this, the Russian invasion of the second-largest country in Europe last week has enraged Myanmar democracy activists, who feel a connection with Ukraine’s civilians as they take up arms to defend their land. On the surface, Sunday’s protests in Myanmar were a denunciation of military bullying and an offer of encouragement from one group of civilians who have been fighting for freedom and democracy to another. Beyond the moral support, however, Myanmar and Ukraine have a common enemy. To the Ukrainians, Russian President Vladimir Putin is their invader. To the Myanmar people, Russia is a close ally of the Myanmar regime, supplying it with military hardware, among other kinds of support. Raising a three-finger salute, Raymond, a member of the Democracy Movement Strike Committee (Dawei), said Myanmar’s anti-regime movement, known as the Spring Revolution, felt solidarity with the oppressed people of Ukraine. “We are inspired by Ukraine’s war in defense of democracy. Like them, the Myanmar Spring Revolution will continue to fight for our freedom until we win,” he said in a video. Behind him a group of young activists held placards reading “Glory to Ukraine” and “Putin Must Fail.” He said if Putin won in Ukraine, it would give a boost to the military regime in Myanmar and to the enemies of democracy everywhere. “The world is a scary place right now. But we’re all in this together, and when people unite we can accomplish anything. Slava Ukraini! Democracy must prevail!” he said. In Yangon, a more challenging environment for protesters, given the regime’s brutal crackdowns in the city, a group of young activists staged a flash mob protest, shouting anti-regime slogans and waving placards bearing slogans like “In Solidarity with Ukraine.” Fortunately, the protest was uninterrupted and protesters successfully dispersed. In Kachin State in Myanmar’s north, more than a dozen ethnic Kachin young people held a rally to show their support for Ukraine. Some rally participants painted their faces in the Ukrainian flag while others held placards reading “Save Ukraine” and “Stop War.” Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government said on Friday that it condemned the Russian war against Ukraine and its people, adding “Myanmar stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine.” While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been globally condemned, the Myanmar regime has taken a different approach. In an apparent attempt to show its gratitude to Russia for its support, the regime said Russia was acting to maintain its sovereignty and praised Moscow for what it called its role in balancing global power..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-28
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Title: Tatmadaw fighting a losing war in Myanmar
Sub-title: Myanmar military’s resort to bombing civilian populations as a counterinsurgency strategy is certain to backfire
Description: "Myanmar’s army has unleashed yet another wave of aerial bombings in the country’s spiraling post-coup civil war, a change in traditional counterinsurgency tactics that points more to military weakness than strength. Russian-made Hind-type attack helicopters fired rockets and machine guns once again this month while jet fighters dropped bombs on what appeared to be mainly civilian targets in eastern Kayah state where resistance to the coup has been particularly robust. One of the helicopters reportedly carried General Soe Win, number two in the junta and considered even more hardline than his boss, coup-maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. As many as 170,000 villagers have fled their homes and are seeking shelter in remote parts of the state that abuts the Thai border in a situation that threatens to tilt towards a new-era refugee crisis. Recent attacks by local resistance forces are believed to have motivated the Tatmadaw’s bombing campaign, which at the same time has raised hard new questions about the fighting ability of its increasingly stretched ground forces. Ground attacks with air support are common in counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere in the world, but until now have not been used much by the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s decades-long ethnic wars. In Kayah state, as in other parts of the country including Sagaing Division and Chin state, the military’s infantry was deployed first but was quickly withdrawn when it suffered heavy casualties. Then came random Tatmadaw bombings on villages and other population centers. To be sure, Myanmar military atrocities committed during campaigns in ethnic minority areas are nothing new. At the same time, the Tatmadaw was actually quite poorly armed despite having a battle-hardened and largely effective light infantry force. Its troops were constantly on the move during past conflicts against the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the northeast, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the north, and the Karen National Union (KNU) and other rebel groups along the Thai border. All that changed after a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988. The main fear at the time was that disgruntled soldiers might join the pro-democracy activists. Consequently, in order to prevent a split in the ranks, Myanmar’s top military leaders did everything in their power to keep at least the officer corps satisfied and loyal. Beginning in 1989, the then-ruling junta, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, spent more than a billion dollars procuring new, more sophisticated military hardware. It came primarily from China but also from Pakistan, Singapore and Israel. Most of it was materiel that would be of little use in counterinsurgency operations in remote and mountainous ethnic areas such as missile systems, huge tanks, armored vehicles, naval patrol boats, frigates and various kinds of radar equipment. Equally important was a decision to scrap the previous, unpopular system of constant rotations of regional commanders, a move implemented to ensure that no officer would build up his own power base in a certain part of the country. Myanmar’s military leaders also had to make sure that the urban dissidents did not link up with the ethnic rebels. Thousands of them did, but the KIA and KNU did not have enough weapons to share with the urban newcomers. But then came a mutiny in the CPB and the old mostly Burman, orthodox communists were driven into exile in China. The mutineers formed new ethnic armies, the strongest being the United Wa State Army, and the possibility of the kind of alliance that the Myanmar military feared became a reality. Talks between the ex-CPB mutineers and other ethnic groups did happen, but the Myanmar military moved faster and with more determination. Ceasefire deals were struck with the UWSA and other former CPB forces according to which they could retain their arms, remain in control of their respective areas and engage in all kinds of business as long as they did not attack the Myanmar military or share their weapons with other groups. By the mid-1990s, about 20 major and smaller ethnic armies that had depended on the CPB for arms supplies also made peace with the military government. The threat from the border areas had been neutralized. Those ceasefire agreements lasted for more than 20 years, meaning that an entire generation of Myanmar soldiers has no real combat experience. They are, as one in-the-know source said, better at parades showing off their new uniforms and guns than at actual combat. The officer corps was also given ample opportunities to earn money where they often accepted bribes and entered into dealerships with the country’s newly-rich businessmen who became infamously known as “the cronies.” That changed again when, in June 2011, the ceasefire with the KIA broke down. For the first time in more than a decade, major battles were fought in ethnic minority areas. Casualties were extremely heavy as the advancing infantry soldiers, who were poorly trained and had zero combat experience, were mowed down by KIA guerrillas. It became so bad that the Myanmar military had to withdraw its infantry and rely instead on helicopter gunships, attack aircraft and heavy artillery fired from a safe distance. That is what is happening again in Kayah state and other war zones that have mushroomed across the country since the military’s disastrous February 1, 2021, coup. As old and new conflicts spread and rage, old questions about the actual manpower strength of the Myanmar military are taking on new relevance. Australian Myanmar watcher and specialist on military matters Andrew Selth examined the issue in a piece published by the Sydney-based think tank the Lowy Institute on February 17. He quotes figures as high as 500,000 and even 600,000 that appeared in post-1988 think tank reports, but argues that they “were mistakenly based on theoretical projections by ambitious Tatmadaw [Myanmar military] planners.” It is beyond doubt that the Myanmar military embarked on an expansion and modernization campaign after 1988, when the total strength of the Myanmar military was believed to be around 186,000. By 2021, however, more realistic estimates were at around 300,000-350,000 — or perhaps as low as 250,000, or even 200,000. But according to Selth: “The key element here is not the total number of men and women in uniform, but the number of combat soldiers that the junta can put into the field. Most estimates cite 100,000-120,000.” In addition to that are 80,000 or so members of the national police, which, Selth writes, “has about 39 paramilitary security battalions, many of them made up of former soldiers.” By any measure, however, the Myanmar military now finds itself stretched thin on many fronts, including areas in the country’s central region that have not seen any serious combat since the 1970s. It is clear by now that the Tatmadaw cannot decisively defeat the scores, if not hundreds, of small and not-so-small resistance armies that have sprung up across the country since the coup. The possibility of a battlefield victory for those fervent but often rag-tag armies is also remote. They may have widespread popular support but are poorly armed and don’t seem to have a common, well-planned strategy beyond inflicting as many casualties on the Myanmar military and its junta officials as possible. For its part, the Myanmar military appears to be waging a war of attrition against resistance forces that aims ultimately to wear down their inexperienced and outgunned fighters. But given the grit and determination of the resistance, that is unlikely to be a winning strategy. What is more likely is that the wars will rage on for the foreseeable future, with the Myanmar military increasingly resorting to haphazard air power that will only cause more human suffering and dislocation among an already angry and disenfranchised population. The aerial bombardments in Kayah state will likely be replicated in other inflamed parts of the country in a counterinsurgency strategy that underscores the Tatmadaw’s underlying weakness and ensures more popular support for fast-rising anti-coup forces..."
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-24
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Title: The Dilemma Facing Myanmar’s National Unity Government
Sub-title: The country’s opposition shadow government faces a difficult choice between condoning attacks on civilians and promoting civilian immunity.
Description: "On October 29, the Pakokku People’s Defense Force (PDF), an anti-regime militia based in Magwe Region’s Pakokku township, carried out an attack targeting a local village administrator accused of collaborating with the military-led regime. The militia’s “ground operations team” killed the administrator’s wife and father, while the administrator himself managed to escape. In a statement issued on social media following the incident, the Pakokku PDF’s “officer of information and external relations” warned other administrators and supporters of the regime that should they fail to immediately cease their activities and cooperate with “the people,” they would be similarly targeted. Just one week prior to this incident, the National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow government to which the Pakokku PDF owes its allegiance, issued a statement urging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to recognize it as the legitimate representative government of Myanmar. One key reason the statement gave for recognizing the NUG over the military was that unlike the military, the NUG insists that “all defensive actions must respect international norms,” indicating its commitment to preventing atrocities against civilians amid its conflict with the junta. Yet, in the days following the October 29 operation carried out by the Pakokku PDF, no condemnation was issued by the NUG, nor were any condemnations issued for the numerous bombings and assassinations of regime-affiliated civilians carried out by other elements within the anti-regime movement. This contradiction between the anti-regime movement’s portrayal of itself to foreign observers and its actual operations on the ground is a significant obstacle in the NUG’s quest for international recognition. Some analysts, such as veteran Myanmar watcher Andrew Selth, have issued warnings to this effect, arguing that most governments would find it impossible to endorse the anti-regime movement’s actions. Yet, while it may be tempting to call the NUG out on its failure to prevent attacks on civilians, it should be noted that the NUG is simply in no position to enforce its aspirations of civilian immunity upon the movement’s actions. Rather, the onus may fall on the international community to empower the NUG in such a way that it can incentivize and enforce international norms. Desperate Tactics Amid Global Inaction The anti-regime movement did not resort to violence immediately following the coup of February 2021. Rather, the movement began as a series of widespread but non-violent protests that bore greater resemblance to similar pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and Thailand than they did to other armed insurgencies in the region. But violent escalations by the military soon forced the movement to adopt progressively harder-line tactics: as non-violent mass protests became unviable, they gave way to more radical forms of opposition. Today, much of the anti-regime movement consists of localized militia cells conducting bombings and assassinations targeting both the military and regime-affiliated civilians. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Amidst this escalation to violence, the anti-regime movement has continuously appealed for foreign countries and institutions – particularly the United Nations and ASEAN – to intervene on its behalf. These appeals have changed in tenor over the course of the conflict: the earliest iterations were hopeful calls for strong intervention, such as the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces under the aegis of the U.N.’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. Following months of perceived global inaction despite the regime’s lethal response, this hopefulness has since turned into anger, as highlighted by trending social media hashtags such as “#UselessASEAN.” The expectations of the movement have also been tempered, with the calls for military intervention having been replaced with calls for foreign governments to recognize the NUG and withdraw economic support for the regime. The uncharacteristic decision by ASEAN in October to exclude Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s military chief and de facto head of the current regime, from its annual summit was seen by the anti-regime movement as a step in the right direction, rekindling hope in the possibility of the NUG being recognized in the military’s stead. But even if ASEAN were to overcome its established stance of non-interference in order to recognize the NUG, it would then have to justify its recognition of a government that has enabled attacks on civilians. This is particularly difficult given that ASEAN’s exclusion of Min Aung Hlaing from its summit was predicated upon the regime’s failure to commit to ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, which includes the requirement for all parties to cease violent activities and to “exercise utmost restraint.” Attacks on Civilians and Insufficient Guidelines The difficulty ASEAN faces in recognizing the NUG is shared by all members of the international community: the prevalence and frequency of attacks against civilians carried out by the anti-regime movement, which the NUG represents, cannot be ignored. According to data published by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), at least 1,098 attacks against regime-affiliated civilians were carried out between February 1 and December 3 of last year. The targets of such attacks range from pro-regime administrators and civil servants to workers for electricity companies collecting bills on behalf of the regime. Family members of these individuals are often also targeted or treated as collateral damage. Most of the attacks are carried out via bombings of targets’ residences and workplaces, as well as assassinations. Some members of the anti-regime movement have claimed that these attacks are false-flag incidents carried out by the military to frame the movement for terrorism. Yet, the fact that various militia groups have claimed responsibility for most of these attacks renders such an explanation unconvincing. The NUG itself has indirectly enabled these attacks via the vague military guidelines it issued following its symbolic consolidation of affiliated militia groups last May. While these guidelines demanded that affiliated militia groups “must respect and practice the military ethics and codes of conduct with civilians under any circumstances” and that they had to comply “with the international military laws including Law of Armed Conflicts,” the NUG did not in fact provide any concrete guidelines on the definition and treatment of regime-affiliated civilians such as informants. Nor did it provide any guidance on whether the killings of targets’ family members were justified under its guidelines. In fact, the “Law of Armed Conflicts” that the NUG promised to comply with is a field of study rather than any specific treaty or international agreement to which its militias could be held to account, rendering its promise aspirational but vague to the point of uselessness. The NUG’s Dilemma It is unlikely that the NUG is unaware of either the actions of its affiliates, or of the role its vague guidelines play in enabling these actions. Why, then, does it not define and enforce its stance on civilian immunity further, especially when its international recognition as the legitimate government is at stake? Firstly, the NUG does not possess an operational command structure capable of regularly overseeing actions carried out by the militias. While some joint attacks have been organized between multiple militia groups allegedly under the oversight of the NUG, most attacks are planned and carried out by the individual groups. For example, an announcement issued by the Pakokku PDF on January 7 specifically stated that it only “occasionally” follows the military directives issued by the NUG. This, combined with the vague guidelines issued by the NUG, allows for the groups to determine for themselves the limits of their actions. Secondly, the anti-regime movement is not an ideological monolith led by the NUG. There is a disconnect between the aspirations declared by the NUG, and the on-ground realities faced by the militia groups. For example, on September 9 of last year, the NUG’s foreign minister stated in an interview that “targeting civilians is not the policy of the NUG or the PDF’s.” Yet, while the Pakokku PDF’s announcement on January 7 stated that it would do its “best not to tarnish the image of the revolution and to bring it into line with international law,” it did include the caveat that civilians such as “administrators, informants, and pro-regimes [sic] will have to be eliminated,” albeit “only when it is inevitable.” Furthermore, while the group seems to agree with the NUG’s aspirations not to target civilians, it opts instead to specify that it would only avoid targeting “innocent people” in its attacks. Given the role that civilian informants play in disrupting the operations of anti-regime militia groups, especially when such informants directly lead to arrests and killing of militia members, it is unsurprising that these groups are unwilling to sacrifice their operational effectiveness for the sake of presenting a sanitized image to the international community – especially an international community that has yet to substantially intervene in the conflict. It is thus likely that the NUG understands that such a demand would lead to widespread resentment amongst its affiliates, and possibly fracture the anti-regime movement. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Recognition with Conditions: A Potential Solution One potential solution to the NUG’s dilemma is to provide a concrete incentive for the militia groups. But such an incentive cannot be provided by the NUG alone. Rather, such a solution may have to rely on an ostensibly neutral international institution – namely ASEAN – to promise a roadmap towards recognition of the NUG, on the condition that its affiliate militias adopt concrete guidelines on civilian immunity. Given the urgency with which members of the movement have appealed for international recognition, it is likely that the legitimacy and support afforded by such recognition will outweigh the operational effectiveness militias would have to sacrifice in exchange. Such a solution does not necessitate that ASEAN plant its flag firmly in favor of the NUG. Rather, it highlights that following the failure of the military-led regime to comply with its Five-Point Consensus, ASEAN can pursue other avenues to promote the exercise of restraint in the ongoing conflict. Such a move can be used as leverage to pressure the regime into taking its commitment to the Five-Point Consensus seriously, lest it loses its seat at the table to the NUG. Such a solution is of course rife with obstacles. For one, there is no guarantee that even with the promise of international recognition, the NUG will be able to enforce guidelines on civilian immunity upon the larger movement. Furthermore, it would require that ASEAN member states present a unified front on the issue – a unity that has been called into question following Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s unilateral visit to Myanmar. However, it may also be the only way for the NUG to persuade the anti-regime movement into adopting concrete guidelines on civilian immunity. Failure to do so is likely to lead to further escalations in violence against civilians on both sides of the conflict..."
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-21
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Title: WHY WAIT, HUN SEN?
Description: "18 February 2022: Hun Sen has given up on trying to resolve the gravest crisis confronting ASEAN – Myanmar’s junta-made crisis – only seven weeks into his term as ASEAN Chair. He must therefore resign from the ASEAN position immediately, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). Speaking to foreign dignitaries, Cambodian Prime Minister, Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo (Lord Prime Minister and Supreme Military Commander) Hun Sen, said he would no longer make efforts to resolve the situation in Myanmar. He cited a lack of progress by the illegal Myanmar junta towards resolving the crisis it caused when junta leader Min Aung Hlaing attempted a coup in February last year. For more than a year, Min Aung Hlaing’s forces have waged a brutal campaign of terror on the people of Myanmar that has caused a humanitarian, political and economic catastrophe in the country and threatened the stability of the region. Having decided he is unable or unwilling to use his position to pressure the junta to end its violence and respect the democratic will of the Myanmar people, Hun Sen said he intends to simply wait out the remaining 10-months in his role as ASEAN Chair before passing on the responsibility to the President of Indonesia, who is next in line. “Hun Sen has finally realised that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing cannot be trusted and cannot be reasoned with,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “Unfortunately, in the time it took the Cambodian Prime Minister to arrive at this realisation, many more people were murdered, detained, and tortured by Min Aung Hlaing’s forces. The Myanmar people cannot wait another 10 months with Hun Sen doing nothing as ASEAN Chair. Hun Sen must stop his self serving personal adventurism and erratic acts, and seek support from other better placed ASEAN members to do the job. Otherwise, make way and resign now.” Hun Sen’s admission of failure comes after a series of blunders since he assumed the ASEAN Chairmanship. Min Aung Hlaing exploited a visit made by Hun Sen to Nay Pyi Taw in January to gain legitimacy for his illegal junta, and has refused to release Sean Turnell, Australian national and economic advisor to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, despite Hun Sen announcing that he had. Hun Sen was forced to backtrack and apologise for the statement. “We commend Hun Sen for his honesty in admitting his failure to make any headway at all with the junta in spite of his efforts,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “We can understand his sense of failure when he has been treated so disrespectfully and insultingly by Min Aung Hlaing, undermining his position as ASEAN Chair. However, the crisis can’t wait till next year to be resolved and so we point out to Hun Sen that he has no alternative, now that he’s acknowledged that he can’t make any progress, but to hand over the chair to Indonesia at once.” Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister for the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), Daw Zin Mar Aung, addressed counterparts at an ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting this week, and called for a more coordinated ASEAN approach towards dealing with the crisis. “The NUG Foreign Minister’s address to ASEAN stands in stark contrast to the belligerent junta,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “ASEAN’s most constructive, necessary and rightful partner in responding to the crisis has always been the NUG. ASEAN must exert real pressure on the junta now and engage meaningfully with the NUG if it is to prove to the world that it puts the will of the Myanmar people above all else. If Hun Sen is not going to do that, he must step aside...”
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-18
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Title: An NGO Worker’s Perspective: Fighting for human rights as democracy dies
Description: "Inspired by the ongoing series, ‘Chronicle of a coup’, Damien Riley (pseudonym) writes about his experiences at an NGO. (Editor’s note: This post is inspired by the ongoing “Chronicle of a Coup” series by Christopher Walker. This letter, however, is a separate and original contribution of Damien Riley (pseudonym). We encourage other authors to submit their own accounts.) “Tanks appear on city streets as fears of a possible coup continue”, read the news headline on my computer screen. It was Friday, January 29, and I was working at home on a sunny afternoon when I saw the ominous images of an olive-green armored vehicle in Bahan township. I shared the story’s link with my colleagues: I had worked for a local NGO for the last five years. We had a management meeting scheduled on Zoom for later in the day, and I wrote ahead, in what would become a gross understatement, saying, “This seems concerning.” Tensions between the National League for Democracy (NLD) party and the Myanmar military had been building for weeks. After a disappointing loss by its proxy parties at the polls in November 2020, the military had been harping on largely unfounded claims of election irregularities. With the new NLD government, emboldened by its democratic mandate, set to take office in the following week, these tensions were reaching a crescendo. Just days before tanks were in the street, a Tatmadaw spokesperson had refused to rule out a military coup when questioned about it by reporters. Swallowing doubts / January 29, 2021 At my job, we watched these developments closely because they would affect our work as a human rights NGO. During the democratic transition, we built grassroots networks, raised awareness about human rights to thousands, and developed relationships with legislators and government officials. For the NLD’s second term, we had an ambitious agenda of lobbying and advocacy planned. Our director joined the meeting that afternoon and informed us he was getting updates from persons knowledgeable of what was happening in Nay Pyi Taw. Negotiations between the military and the NLD were becoming extremely fraught. The news of tanks in the streets was not to be taken lightly. He then left our meeting to find out more. For me and my colleagues, there was a mixture of gloom and incredulous disbelief. As an organization, we had already overcome so much disruption and uncertainty because of Covid-19. Now were we on the brink of another disaster? Or were the tanks and murmurings of a coup just hype and theatrics? The previous year, Covid-19 had taught us not to underreact, and so we decided to stop our meeting, switch our communications to encrypted channels, and stock up on cash and food. I called an expat friend to cancel our dinner plans that evening. He reacted skeptically, saying his Myanmar colleagues were also following the news and told him that a coup wasn’t going to happen. As his friend, I advised him to be extra prepared. If there was no coup, we would have dinner another evening. In retrospect, memories of the weekend before the February 1st coup have become precious. They were the last moments before the world as we knew it was turned upside down. At the time in Yangon, daily life was beginning to return to normal, after months of Covid-19 shutdowns. More shops were opening up and people were increasingly going outdoors for exercise. Although I continued to receive updates that the discussions in Nay Pyi Taw were unsuccessful, I still doubted that these were a certain prelude to a coup. After all, pundits and experts had weighed in: The military would not violate its own undemocratic constitution, and, moreover, years of the democratic transition had created changes to the Tatmadaw’s avenues of control that were irreversible. As an example of the attitude of the times, just a month earlier Frontier Myanmar published an article that included the lines, “Myanmar today is a country of immense potential. While our nation may still be mired in poverty and conflict, we have a democratically elected government that has the capacity to bring about tremendous change.” As that final Sunday, January 31, came to a close, I reviewed notes of our management meeting and scheduled time in the coming week to discuss what we had not covered on Friday. I went to sleep that night blissfully unaware of the chaos to come. Rising fear and dread / February 1, 2021 At 8:00 am I woke up to find several missed calls from early in the morning. The normally green light on my internet router was red. Nothing was coming in through my phone’s cellular data. The phone line was dead too. I turned on my apartment’s television to see scrambled channels beaming back at me. Only MRTV, the state-run TV service, had a program playing on loop. It showed montages of soldiers and wide-angle footage of scenes around Nay Pyi Taw set to music. I wandered outside in the cool morning, making my way over to a busy street. There was a crowd in front of a KBZ bank, waiting to use the ATM. I overheard the security guard telling people in line that the connection was not working. This confirmed my suspicion that the internet was turned off everywhere. I returned home and settled into an uncomfortable wait. Over the next hours, phone service across Myanmar gradually returned, albeit unevenly. One of my colleagues called me. He told me he heard from people in his building that State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint were arrested, along with many NLD members. The words hit me with a jolt. Recalling the rumors that flew during the early weeks of the Covid-19 pandemic, my colleague’s voice carried these words with a tone of caution. I went by foot to my colleague’s downtown apartment and climbed up the stairwell of the low-rise cement building to his room, where the internet hotspot had begun working again. Immediately after connecting, my smartphone overflowed with updates and missed calls over messaging apps. The Irrawaddy bore the horrible truth on its front page: “Myanmar Military Seizes Power”. I got in touch with our director and a handful of our donors. The situation was urgent: dozens of CSO leaders, activists, and some political figures were flooding our phones with messages saying they were in danger and needed help. With a donor, I agreed to form a committee that would review and approve cases for my NGO to send support to. Hours passed quickly while I attended to these urgent tasks. As I worked, cars and buses drove in the streets below. It was the edge of downtown, and here people moved hastily along the sidewalk. It was approaching rush hour, and there was a nervous and expectant energy in the air. Soon MRTV’s evening news program would come on, and the military-controlled news service would confirm the coup. In the weeks and months to follow, I would be glued to my phone, and particularly to an encrypted messaging app that became standard among the people in our field. I waited to review more cases of activists in need of help. Most often, these were people needing places to hide and money to sustain them, and sometimes for their family members as well. Some were in jail and their colleagues submitted applications for money to pay their legal expenses. As mass violence against protests swept across Myanmar, the need increased. In some cases, they’d already been beaten or shot. Others were trying to flee the country. My daily work became a world of trying to help people in increasingly dire need, where we often communicated using pseudonyms, code-words, and idiosyncratic ways of verification. It all took place against a backdrop of rising dread and fear. What can a human rights NGO do? / The aftermath For a human rights NGO, the coup presented an existential crisis. Questions arose about the future of my organization’s programming and the viability of our work. As the violence worsened, the theory of change for large portions of our programming no longer made sense. Shots and small explosions could be heard almost every night in Yangon. Each neighborhood set up its own local security unit. Images on social media showed daily horrors. There were crackdowns on protesters, leaving dead bodies in their wake, and activists carried away by men with guns in the night. After 2 am, internet and phone services were shut off so that no one could warn you and no one could call for help. At my work, there would be no more trainings for the public, no more meetings with the government, no more advocacy campaigns about human rights. For the work that we could do, there was also a question of ethics. At what point does it become irresponsibly risky for our staff, partners, and beneficiaries? Within our organization, there was ambivalence about the right and responsible way forward. We were NGO workers, not soldiers. Even if a person was willing to carry out a dangerous assignment, should we commit them to do it? What was the standard for reasonable risk in this situation? Eventually some people resigned from work. No one could really sleep. Moreover, our operations became increasingly difficult due to financial reasons. Most banks were effectively closed due to the civil disobedience movement. Moreover, it was risky for a registered NGO to withdraw or transfer money using official bank accounts at all. We hatched schemes on how to move and manage our funds via alternate channels and methods, only to have to revise and later scrap them due to the escalating violence. While we waited for donors’ approval of our alternate plans, the situation would change, making the whole planning effort in vain. Adding to the calamity, there was no way to receive fund transfers from our donors outside of Myanmar. Some of our funds that we’d had transferred to us in February were stuck, unclaimed in our banks. If the situation was not resolved, we would eventually run out of money. I began asking for cash loans from donors with local offices – to no avail. Bank service gradually resumed, by appointment or by getting an all-too-rare queue number. Then the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) issued an order requiring banks to notify and seek CBM’s approval when NGO funds were withdrawn. After media organizations and other non-governmental organizations were raided, it was simply too dangerous to show up at the bank with our official documents. Moreover, conducting our activities while adhering to the financial documentation requirements of our donors became dangerously impractical. A tragicomic disconnect / The future Everyone was having to adapt, including our donors. In the NGO world, most donor-funding is restricted to project plans and comes with specific reporting obligations. Changing a plan or seeking an exception often was administratively laborious and required numerous justifications. Donors’ reactions to our rapidly changing needs after the coup ranged from being very flexible and understanding to being uncertain or unwilling to approve our requests. In the former case, fast approval meant we could mobilize the money we had on hand to move our staff to safety and buy the equipment we needed urgently. It also meant we could distribute financial support to partners and affected communities around the country who were resisting the coup. In the latter case, some change requests to donors went unanswered for weeks while their respective headquarters discussed and untangled the obligations they had to their back donors. This is because the donors funding NGOs in Myanmar are often NGOs or international NGOs themselves, functioning as intermediaries between “back donors” – often country donors, international organisations, or private philanthropists – and local organisations in Myanmar. This created many missed opportunities. For our NGO to carry out actions in the field, we had to wait for a window in which the situation on the ground was safe enough. The delay in donor approval meant that our implementing partners had to wait while evading police and soldiers. It caused immense frustration to all involved when an opportunity to act would arise but our project change request was still pending approval. In my view, the situation in Myanmar was deteriorating faster than the funders’ ability to respond, leaving NGOs like mine scrambling. While I appreciate that donors had difficult decisions to make, it was local NGOs bearing the brunt. Amid waiting for donor approvals, our operations crumbled and our safety was at risk. Unlike international NGOs, we did not have a headquarters with additional layers of support outside of the country. We were on our own, and we had to take greater risks to maintain our business continuity as an NGO. I will never forget frantically calling around to find space in a safe house for a staff member, while also explaining to an international donor why I could not get their money back on the rent payment for an office that was too unsafe to use. The problem was a tragicomic disconnect between funders trying to operate business-as-usual and the reality on the ground. The truth is that the consequences of the February 1st coup were not going to be quickly reversed. Too much blood was shed; a delicate social contract forged during Myanmar’s democratic transition in Myanmar had been shredded. Although far from perfect, Myanmar’s democratic pretenses between 2011 and 2020 were a foundation for much of the work of civil society in Myanmar. It was the premise on which so many development plans and investment decisions were made. That premise was now a rug that had been pulled from underneath our feet. Postscript / 12 months later Twelve months after the coup, half of the staff have left. Some staff quit out of concern for their safety; some joined the armed resistance; some fled across the border, and some no longer had duties to perform. Of the staff who remain working, there is a mixture of motivation to support the revolution, burnout from overwork and stress, and a resolve to carry on as normally as possible, either for family or due to lack of an alternative. Despite the challenges, our donors did not abandon us. While there was great urgency to act at the ground level in months after the coup, the contexts overseeing our funding were slower to adapt. Keeping hard copies of project documentation, getting signatures as verification, and only using organizational bank accounts are just some of the standard requirements when handling international development funds. But these are no longer safe and feasible for Myanmar human rights organizations. Our donors needed time to understand and accept the conditions we were working in. Trust from our donors and competence in our handling of projects were essential for continuing our partnership. Credit, however, largely goes to the extremely resourceful staff who work out of safe houses and remote locations, as well as to the partners – both organizations, networks, and individuals – who ensure the funds go where they are necessary and that actions are coordinated. Having survived 2021, there is a reason for hope. As the Burmese proverb goes, “Even the big wave goes under the boat, and even the high mountain is under the foot.” [လှိုင်းကြီးလှေအောက်၊ တောင်ကြီးဖ၀ါးအောက်]..."
Source/publisher: Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-17
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Type: Individual Documents
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Title: ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုခြင်း (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက်နေ့သို့ ပေးပို့သည့်သဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ လွတ်လပ်သည့်ပြည်ထောင်များက လွတ်လပ်၍ စစ်မှန်သောတန်းတူညီမျှမှုရှိသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုနိုင်ငံဟူသည့် ခေါင်းစဉ်အောက်တွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းမျှတစွာ အတူယှဉ်တွဲနေထိုင်ကြရန် “ပင်လုံစာချုပ်” ချုပ်ဆိုလျက် တောင်တန်းမြေပြန့် တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ ပေါင်းစည်းမှုစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို ပြသနိုင်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၇၅) နှစ်ပြည့် စိန်ရတုတိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူ များ၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ခြင်းပြယုဂ်ဖြစ်သည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့ခြင်း (၇၅) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက် သည့် သမိုင်းဝင်နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်မှစကာ ပင်လုံပဋိညာဉ်လမ်းစဉ်အပေါ် အခြေခံသည့် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကို အမြန်ဆုံးတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းအပ် ပါသည်။ ၂။ ဗြိတိသျှတို့၏ သွေးခွဲအုပ်ချုပ်မှုကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအကြား နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ သံသယများဖြင့် သွေးကွဲမှုများ ရှိခဲ့ကြသော်လည်း ဖက်ဆစ်ဂျပန်များအား တော်လှန်ကြရာတွင်မူ တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ဖက်ဆစ်ဂျပန်များကို တိုက်ထုတ်နိုင်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ဖက်ဆစ် ဂျပန်များ၏ လက်အောက်မှလွတ်မြောက်ပြီးနောက် နိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ကြိုးပမ်းကြချိန်တွင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့် ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းမှု၊ ပြည်သူများ၏ စည်းလုံးမှုဖြင့် ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၂၇ ရက်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို တစ်နှစ်အတွင်း လွတ်လပ်ရေးပေးရန် သဘောတူညီချက်များ ပါဝင်သည့် အောင်ဆန်း-အက်တလီ စာချုပ်ကို ချုပ်ဆိုနိုင်ခဲ့သော်လည်း ဗြိတိသျှတို့က အတ္တလန္တိတ် စာချုပ်ဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို သီးခြားခွဲ၍ ပေးရန်၊ တောင်တန်းဒေသများကို လွတ်လပ်ရေးမပေးသေး ရန် သွေးခွဲခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၃။ ၁၉၄၆ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလတွင် ရွှေတိဂုံဘုရားကုန်းတော် အလယ်ပစ္စယံ၌ ကျင်းပခဲ့သည့် ဖဆပလညီလာခံတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးလက်တွဲကာ လွတ်လပ်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်ကြရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများက ၁၉၄၆ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ ၁ ရက် မှ ၁၂ ရက် အထိ ပင်လုံမြို့တွင် ပထမအကြိမ် ညီလာခံအဖြစ် စုပေါင်းစည်းဝေး ကျင်းပခဲ့ ကြပါသည်။ ၄။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်အဖွဲ့ဝင်များသည် ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၈ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပင်လုံမြို့၌ ကျင်းပသည့် ဒုတိယအကြိမ် ပင်လုံညီလာခံသို့ တက်ရောက်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့ တွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး၏ စုစည်းညီညွတ်မှုဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို တောင်တန်းပြည်မ အတူတကွ ရယူကြရန်၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိသည့် စစ်မှန်သော ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီးတစ်ခု အတူတကွထူထောင်ကြရန် မျှော်မှန်းလျက် “ပင်လုံစာချုပ်” ကို ချုပ်ဆိုကာ ပြည်ထောင်စုတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ စည်းလုံးမှုအင်အားကို ပြသလျက် ဖက်ဒရယ်အုတ်မြစ် ကို ချမှတ်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ၅။ သို့သော်လည်း ဗိုလ်နေဝင်းက ပင်လုံစိတ်ဓာတ်အခြေခံမူလမ်းစဉ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ဖောက်ဖျက် လျက် ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖွဲ့စည်းအုပ်ချုပ်ပုံဆိုင်ရာအခြေခံဥပဒေကို စိတ်ကြိုက်ရေးဆွဲပြဋ္ဌာန်းခဲ့သည့် အတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ မူလအခွင့်အရေးများအားလုံးဆုံးရှုံးကာ ပြည်တွင်းစစ် စတင်ခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ထိုမှစကာ ၁၉၇၄ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ၊ ၂၀၀၈ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေစသဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့ စိတ်ကြိုက်ရေးဆွဲထားသည့် ဥပဒေများကို ပြဋ္ဌာန်းကာ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအား သွေးခွဲလျက် လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒကိုကိုင်စွဲကာ ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ၆။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေးအရ ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်လျက်ရှိသည့် ကြားမှပင် ပြည်သူတို့က တခဲနက် ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်သည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရတစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ထွက်လာကာ ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်ရန်အတွက် ပြည်ထောင်စုငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးညီလာခံ - ၂၁ ရာစု ပင်လုံအစည်းအဝေးများ ခေါ်ယူလျက် ဒီမိုကရေစီဖက်ဒရယ်ဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူညီချက်များ ချမှတ်၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုသဘောတူစာချုပ် အစိတ်အပိုင်း ၃ ခုအထိ ချုပ်ဆိုနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၇။ သို့သော်လည်း အတုအယောင်ဖက်ဒရယ်ကိုသာ ပေးလိုသော ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားကိုသာ ကြည့်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တစ်စုက ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၈ ရက်တွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သည့် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက တခဲနက် ထောက်ခံရွေးချယ်ခဲ့သည့် ပြည်သူ့ အစိုးရအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးလျက် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော် အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ ဥပဒေမဲ့လုယူသွားကာ နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအပေါ် လူ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာကို ညှိုးနွမ်းစေသည့် နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ မြို့၊ ရွာများအား မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ လေကြောင်းမှ ဗုံးကြဲခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူပိုင်ပစ္စည်းများအား မတရားလုယူခြင်း၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း အစရှိသည့် ပြစ်မှုများအား ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၈။ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အပြီးတိုင် ပပျောက်စေရန် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် စစ်အာဏာရှင် ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးမှ သန္ဓေတည်ခဲ့သည့် တော်လှန်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်များဖြင့် စုစည်း ညီညွတ် စွာ တိုက်ထုတ်ကြရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လက်နက်အင်အား အဆမတန်သာလွန်သည့် မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ခေါင်းဆောင်သည့် စစ်တပ်ကို တစ်နှစ်ကြာသည်အထိ အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်မပေးဘဲ ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများ များစွာ ရှိနေသည့်တိုင် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပမှ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက ကျရာကဏ္ဍအသီးသီးမှ အားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် တော်လှန်နေကြဆဲ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးအတွက် အသက်ပေးလှူသွားခဲ့ကြသော သူရဲကောင်းများအား ဝမ်းနည်းစွာ အလေးပြုပါကြောင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာမှတဆင့် အလေးအနက် မှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။ ၉။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့်လည်း ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ (၂၀၀၈ ခုနှစ်) ကိုအပြီးတိုင်ဖျက်သိမ်းကာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေငြာခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ခေါ်ယူကာ အဆိုပါဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို အတည်ပြုခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင် ပပျောက်ကာ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်တို့ကို အာမခံသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသည်အထိ ပြည်သူလူထုက လွှဲအပ်ထားသည့် အခွင့်အာဏာကို အလေးအနက်ပြုလျက် ထမ်းဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ပင်လုံစိတ်ဓာတ်ဖြင့် ကတိသစ္စာပြုလျက် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုခြင်း (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက်နေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-12
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Title: Myanmar watches a mother’s grief as junta soldiers claim another victim
Sub-title: Kyi says she begged soldiers to release her son, but they refused. Footage of her mourning beside his body has been viewed widely, just one of many similar stories
Description: "Kyi kneels on the ground, pleading for her son to wake up. Crouched beside a riverbank, she rocks back and forth, shaken with grief. Her son’s body, which has washed ashore, is motionless in the shallow water. One of his wrists is tied with rope. “My boy, I know it would be nice if you respond to me,” she cries. It’s a video that has been seen widely within Myanmar – one Facebook video has been viewed more than a million times – but is also a scene that is tragically common. Videos and evidence of military killings are continually shared online – adding to the vast files of evidence being collected by rights groups, but also to the daily trauma that people are faced with. Kyi’s son, Sin Pauk, was 28, a farmer and a caring son. “He was the only child and a very clever son to me,” Kyi tells the Guardian. He didn’t drink, smoke, or do drugs, she says, and was very religious. His death occurred after the army entered Kinsanpya village in Kanni, in the Sagaing region of western Myanmar on 30 January, forcing the villagers to flee. He had gone to feed his ducks and was one of seven people unable to get away in time, all of whom were arrested. Locals told Kyi that detainees were being kept on a boat by soldiers stationed inside the village that night. Kyi knew her son was among those being held. Despite the risk to her safety, she went back to the village to plead for his release. It is not possible for the Guardian to independently verify the accounts given. Kyi says she begged the soldiers, but they refused to let Sin Pauk go. She was not allowed to enter the boat to see him. The body of Sin Pauk was eventually found, about 5km (three miles) away, in the river near Ta On village. Two other villagers, including 60-year-old San Aung, were found separately at a riverbank near Kinsanpya village on 3 February. The rest remain missing. When her son’s body was found, he was wearing different clothes, Kyi said. His throat had been cut. “I wish they had the same karma as my son.” “I waited for him since he always comes home to me, whatever it takes,” says Kyi. “I know he won’t leave me.” Sin Pauk is one of more than 1,500 killed by the military since the coup last year. Last week, as the country marked the one-year anniversary of the military’s seizure of power, the violence continued unabated. In the Sagaing region alone, the military launched an airstrike on a graduation ceremony for recruits to an anti-junta armed group, killing civilians, according to a report by Radio Free Asia. Hundreds of homes have also reportedly been burned. The pace of atrocities perpetrated by the military, the dire security situation and unreliable communications pose major challenges for rights groups and journalists who try to document such events. Often, little is known about those who have been killed..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-10
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Title: Ready for war: my journey from peaceful poet to revolutionary soldier
Sub-title: Formerly an anti-war poet, Maung Saungkha has endured a harsh training regime to prepare for armed struggle against Myanmar’s military junta
Description: "Days after the military coup in February 2021, demonstrations erupted across Myanmar. The military responded by shooting unarmed protesters with live rounds. People were beaten, arbitrarily detained and imprisoned. On the frontlines of protests in Yangon in February and early March, I witnessed soldiers and police firing live rounds into crowds, and on 8 March, I was one of hundreds of protesters who were barricaded overnight on Kyun Taw Road in Yangon’s Sanchaung township, where soldiers and police went from house to house searching for people to arrest. Witnessing the military’s atrocities and campaign of terror from the frontline, I realised that the only way to fight back was through armed revolution. I am one of thousands of activists and young people from cities and towns across Myanmar to take up arms. Some joined existing armed groups – known as ethnic armed organisations – in the country’s border areas, where minorities have been fighting for self-determination for decades; others, like me, formed new revolutionary groups. In the first week of March, I travelled to an area of Myanmar’s borderlands and joined a group of 17 people in establishing the Bamar People’s Liberation Army on 17 April. As a poet and human rights activist, my revolutionary journey has been very tough. We must overcome our ego, homesickness and intellectual pride. Our trainers always told us that we must fight a revolution within ourselves before we can fight a revolution against others. Q&A What is the Reporting Myanmar series? During the three months of training, we ran drills and studied the battlefield and governance systems without rest from 4am to 10pm. To train our minds and bodies to become stronger, we were only allowed two meals a day, limited to five minutes, and we sometimes went days without eating. Outside food was also prohibited, and we were never able to fill our stomachs. “I spent more than six months in Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison. Recalling that time is like a nightmare I have endured days under the scorching sun without a sip of water; I have also stood to attention under heavy rain to the sound of harsh commands that felt like hot liquid iron being poured into my ears, and have experienced the feeling that blows with a cane could fall on my hips at any time. By the end of the training, my potbelly had disappeared and I had turned to skin and bones. I used to get tired just climbing three floors of stairs in my city apartment building; now, I am running up and down hilly jungle terrain. My mindset had also hardened. I had lived my entire life as an anti-war poet. But the former peacemaker who once could not stand even the sound of gunfire is now hungry for war. I believe we have no other choice. This month, in an alliance with an ethnic armed organisation, we began active combat with the military, which is continuing. My story as an activist goes back to around 2012. It was the early years of the country’s political transition, and I was elected as a representative under Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) for a youth working group in Yangon. In 2015, while campaigning for the NLD for November’s general elections, I was jailed under charges of defamation for writing a satirical poem about having a tattoo of the president, Thein Sein, on my penis. I spent more than six months in Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison. Recalling that time is like a nightmare. I was repeatedly interrogated, without breaks for eating, and subjected to mental torture. I was released in May 2016. It was just three months after the NLD government was sworn in to parliament, where they shared power with the military under the rules of a constitution drafted by the military in 2008. Since my release, I have continuously dedicated myself to promoting freedom of expression and equal rights. In 2016, I began advocating to amend the Telecommunications Law. Introduced in 2013, the law criminalised defamation over telecommunications networks and saw more than 250 people, including 37 journalists, charged during the NLD’s term. In January 2018, I founded Athan (Voice), a research-based activist organisation focused on promoting freedom of expression, media freedom and access to information rights in Myanmar. When I joined the NLD, it was with the hope and expectation that they could bring human rights and justice for everyone in Myanmar when they came to power. But in October 2018, I resigned from the party due to my different views from Aung San Suu Kyi on the state of press freedom in the country, and particularly her decision not to speak out for the rights of the Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who were jailed in relation to their coverage of the military’s massacre of 10 Rohingya people in Rakhine state. During the NLD’s five-year term, I openly criticised party leaders over oppression of minorities including the Rohingya, restrictions on press freedom and freedom of expression, a prolonged internet shutdown in Rakhine and Chin states, and their failure to speak out against human rights abuses openly committed by the military. I also played a leading role in numerous activist campaigns for the rights of journalists, activists and oppressed minority groups including the Kachin, Karenni, Arakanese and Rohingya. On 8 November 2020, the NLD again won a landslide victory in general elections, and the newly elected government was set to convene parliament on 1 February. The military, whose party suffered a humiliating loss, had refused to accept the election results, and its commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing had already warned that the military might “take action” if its claims of election irregularities were not addressed. Still, I didn’t really believe Min Aung Hlaing would dare to stage a coup. It became clear to me that the coup had happened at 4am on 1 February, when I received a call that two friends and fellow activists had been arrested by the military. Soldiers came to arrest me too, but fortunately I was not at home. “We also seek to ensure that, if Aung San Suu Kyi is released, that no political compromises are made in the name of stability On 11 February, I joined people from different ethnic groups, including the majority Bamar group to which I belong, in forming the General Strike Committee of Nationalities. We called for the repeal of the 2008 constitution and the establishment of a federal democratic union – demands that were eventually supported at the national level. On 1 April, a body of elected parliamentarians operating in exile announced the abolition of the 2008 constitution and establishment of an interim National Unity government based on a federal democracy charter. It marked the early stages of a shift in people’s mindsets. The public abandoned the idea that we must endure whatever the military does to us and make compromises according to the military’s demands. Instead, this Spring Revolution has shown a commitment to root out nationalism and religious extremism, and has also pushed to end gender discrimination, patriarchy and military dictatorship once and for all. Among the objectives of the Bamar People’s Liberation Army are to end the dominance of Bamar Buddhists over other ethnic groups and to strengthen the unity of Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups under a federal democratic union. We also seek to ensure that, if Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest, no political compromises are made under the name of state stability. If this Spring Revolution, in which people from all social strata have participated with unity and solidarity, cannot lead to the establishment of a new federal democratic union that can guarantee peace and democracy, then justice and equality will still be far off in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-09
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Title: Resist Myanmar’s digital coup: stop the military consolidating digital control
Description: "One year ago, as the Myanmar military sent tanks down the streets and rounded up government officials and activists, it shut down the internet, mobile phone networks, radio, and television channels. As it plunged the country into a communications blackhole, the junta launched concerted assaults at already threadbare protections online to throttle expression and information-sharing. Today, the military is ramping up efforts to cement authoritarian control of online space, alongside violent crackdowns, and serious human rights violations. This is a digital coup, and the world must resist. Internet shutdowns continue to be wielded to shroud serious human rights violations. Soon after the coup and lasting almost three months, the military imposed near-complete nationwide internet shutdowns — including nightly communications blackouts and online media and messaging platform bans. The people in Myanmar were not able to communicate with loved ones, share information, report on human rights violations, or seek help amidst an emergency. Contrary to the principles of net neutrality and the norm of a free internet, the junta lifted some disruptions to favor its own “white-list” of organisations and corporations that could access the internet, while the rest of the country suffered the consequences of these discriminatory and unequal shutdowns. The military continue to order regional shutdowns — particularly where active armed conflicts are ongoing, in attempts to conceal thousands of reports of assault, killings, arrests, detention, enforced disappearance, ill-treatment, torture, torching and gender-based violence committed by the junta. Control of telecommunications providers and abuse of surveillance technology expands monitoring and targeting of individuals. Reuters recently reported that the Myanmar military had privately approved the sale of Telenor Myanmar to M1 Group and military-linked Shwe Byain Phyu Group — with the latter as a majority shareholder. Should the sale go ahead, three of the four telecommunications providers operating in Myanmar would be directly controlled by the junta — including Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and Telecom International Myanmar Company Limited (MyTel). It can also be assumed that thereafter, all operators in Myanmar — including the fourth, Ooredoo — will activate surveillance technology within their networks, noting Telenor’s statement that its departure was due to “continued pressure” on operators to “activate intercept equipment and technology for the use of Myanmar authorities”. These targeted efforts will enable the military to bring all network services under its stranglehold and escalate abuses of privacy and security rights, through surveillance and related efforts. Yet, disturbingly, not a single telecommunications sector actor has implemented urgent data protection and privacy safeguards needed to protect their customers. Telenor Group, in particular, had earned people’s trust on the basis of their earlier commitments to human rights and public reporting on network shutdowns and military orders. These customers — including activists, journalists and other at-risk individuals — are now in danger of having their data transferred to a military-linked outfit through an irresponsible disposal of its business operations in Myanmar. Legal tools are abused to stifle individuals’ rights to expression, information, and privacy. By amending the Broadcasting Law and resurrecting a previously defeated Cybersecurity Law, the military will fortify censorship controls online. The amended Broadcasting Law effectively criminalises any speech deemed impermissible by the military on a wide range of media — including radio, television, audio and video social media posts, and websites — with up to three years’ imprisonment. Meanwhile, the draft Cybersecurity Law provides overbroad censorship and regulatory powers to the authorities — including the Ministry of Defence with its notorious record of committing abuses amounting to serious international crimes — to censor online content, order the furnishing of individuals’ personal data from internet service providers and control online platforms and services through onerous registration and licensing requirements. Not satisfied with the increasing trend of arrests for alleged illegal VPN usage, the draft Cybersecurity Law proposes to penalise VPN usage with up to three years’ imprisonment, further extinguishing one of the last tools of protection and security available to the people of Myanmar. Price hikes and onerous data provision requirements make it increasingly difficult for people to access the internet. In December 2021, in an attempt to price people out of telecommunication access, the military forced telecommunications operators to significantly hike up prices for data usage and phone calls, doubling the price of mobile data, and increasing the cost of phone calls by nearly a quarter — significantly impacting a population already struggling from a banking crisis. In January 2022, the increasing cost of connectivity was worsened by the junta’s 10% tax hike on mobile data service providers — which then increased customers’ prices further — and a 20,000 kyat (US$11) commercial tax on new SIM card activation, which exacerbated the already onerous requirements for SIM card registration. These manipulations now pose extortionate barriers to internet access for the average person in Myanmar, amidst a coup and a pandemic — when they need connectivity the most. Harassment and dissemination of incitement to violence online propagates fear and insecurity. Reports continue to emerge of military and military-linked personnel appropriating social media platforms to post hate speech and incite violence against individuals supporting opposition to the coup. From even before the coup, content moderation failures on platforms like Facebook and YouTube had accelerated hate speech and incitement to violence online. Pressure from civil society forced Facebook to take down hundreds of military-linked accounts and strengthen its mitigation measures. After being blocked from Facebook, increasing numbers of military and military-linked actors are now abusing less responsive services and platforms to amplify a regime of fear and abuse online, including through death threats on TikTok, and doxxing on Telegram. In contrast, the junta are conducting stop-searches of individuals’ devices which often result in arrests, detention, and assault, with impunity. While tech platforms meander in their mitigation measures, privacy and security violations proliferate. With a year of concerted effort to control and manipulate the online and offline lives of millions of people in Myanmar as groundwork, today, the junta’s digital coup is more violent and aggressive than ever — aimed at crushing remnants of the already razed rights to privacy, expression, information, association, and security. As the world watches on, the Myanmar military is very close to its goal of consolidating absolute control of digital spaces. The international community, technology companies, platforms, and network providers must stand with the people of Myanmar and resist the digital coup. We have an obligation to hold the Myanmar military accountable for the serious human rights violations it continues to commit. The international community must: Publicly condemn the Myanmar junta’s continued attacks on civic space and push back against assaults on rights — including to freedom of expression, information, association, privacy and security; Support calls for targeted sanctions against the military and against military-linked individuals and businesses, including sanctions aimed at restricting the sale and supply of dual-use surveillance technology Pressure companies to uphold international standards on responsible business; Continue and expand support for civil society, humanitarian and other actors working to defend human rights within Myanmar. Telecommunications and technology companies in Myanmar must: Immediately implement data protection and privacy safeguards to resist increasing attempts to extend surveillance, censorship, and abuse of rights; Conduct due diligence and pursue genuine public engagement when creating or changing their policies on data protection, content moderation, and others, pursuant to international human rights standards; and Implement policies informed by genuine public engagement and based on international human rights standards. Every day, the people of Myanmar continue to suffer escalating attacks in an environment of repression and violence. The coup is offline and online. The international and business community must resist. Continued inaction costs lives..."
Source/publisher: Access NOW
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-08
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Title: Pyidaungsu Hluttaw 3rd Regular Session’s Statement
Description: "One year ago, on 1 February, 2021 the terrorist military dictator Min Aung Hlaing seized state power using the armed forces as his personal militia and the regular functions of each parliament were not able to conduct after the coup. Therefore, the CRPH was mandated to perform the regular functions as the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw between regular sessions and today 5 February, 2022 is the one-year anniversary of the establishment of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). Twenty-six members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw were arbitrarily detained but it did not prevent the majority of the democratically elected representatives, from convening the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw virtually and lawfully and our MPs have performed our duties. The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw conveyed an emergency session, that has been followed by two regular sessions. The CRPH has undertaken the legislative functions-passing essential laws, amending laws and repealing odious laws. In addition, the CRPH has effectively engaged in international communication and cooperation with parliaments, parliamentary bodies, development partners and the international community. The CRPH conveys our acknowledgement to the members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw who continue despite the difficulties of oppressive conditions and in accord with the people’s trust, to serve the public with protective and welfare measures in either their constituencies or other destinations amidst the toughest time. During this one year, in coordination with the National Unity Government (NUG), local and international organizations as well as the people, the CRPH works to in support the civil service staff who are involved in the Civil Disobedience Movement, families of our fallen heroes amid the Spring Revolution Battle, displaced people due to the battles and military council’s pursuit to arrest them and with enhanced cooperation with the international community. - 2- 6. On behalf of the people of Myanmar, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw urgently requests the United Nations, the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) and ASEAN to stand with the Myanmar People for continued support and strongly calls for more economic and diplomatic sanctions on the military council, to help secure an immediate termination of its brutal torture and human rights violations against the Myanmar People. 7. In addition, to support the effective contribution to the people of Myanmar, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw calls for the international community to cooperate with the elected bodies such as the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and the National Unity Government and so that we the people of Myanmar can the complete elimination of the military dictatorship. Further to help provide humanitarian aid for the internally displaced people and refugees, assistance of Covid-19 prevention and control and necessary health care. 8. The Representatives of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw will continue to work with certainty in its roles, duties and responsibilities authorized by the people in building a new future federal democracy union. Furthermore, we shall continue to enact law to grant honorary awards for the CDM heroes and our fallen heroes of the Spring Revolution Battle. 9. Within this one year, the military council increased international sanctions such as economy and diplomacy, with exclusion from the regional and international community and are in a state of disintegration. Hence, the victory of our people will definitely be coming soon if we continue to endure only for a time. 10. The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw today reaffirmed their commitment to work to bring an eradication of the military dictatorship and to marching on the rigorous journey of revolution with the expectation of building pure Federal Democracy Union. On behalf of the people of Myanmar, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw gratefully acknowledges the contributions of all individuals and organizations such as internal and external donors, international community, international parliaments and countries around the world. 11. To ensuring that the inhumane military actions in stealing some state power is returned to the sovereign owners, the people and to building the Federal Democracy Union, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw invites the people, revolutionary forces, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), political parties, organizations, international and regional parliaments, organizations and individuals, and will continue closer cooperation together with all relevant parties..."
Source/publisher: The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-07
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Title: Poking the Bear: The Military’s Attempts at Pre-empting the Silent Strike
Description: "An anonymous Myanmar-based contributor details the junta’s recent efforts to undermine the organizing of protests. As the one-year anniversary of the military coup swiftly approached, people around the country were waiting to hear how anti-military activists would call upon us to commemorate that tragic date. We did not have to wait long. On January 22, the call so many had been hoping for came in the form of a post on social media. A silent strike was set in motion for February 1, with a request for the closure of all businesses and for people to stay at home. News of the strike spread quickly across the country by way of social media, phone calls, news outlets and word of mouth. Min Aung Hlaing, the self-proclaimed Prime Minister and head of the military junta’s organization, the State Administrative Council, and his cronies, did not take long to react. A week in advance of the planned strike they embarked on yet another campaign of terror against the people. According to a January 26 Myanmar Now article, the junta threatened that those who merely participated in the strike would suffer severe repercussions: “The military council responded to the call three days later by announcing that anyone found to be taking part in or promoting the silent strike would see their property confiscated and face multiple criminal charges. Those charges include Section 52a of the Counterterrorism Law, Section 124a and 505a of the Penal Code, and Section 33a of the Telecommunications Law. The terrorism charge carries a prison sentence of up to 10 years, and Section 124a—for sedition—carries a life sentence of 20 years. The other charges are accompanied by three to five years in prison.” With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the regime had, weeks ago, begun to take steps toward preventing any such resistance by the people. In December they announced that all internet providers, of both mobile data and WiFi, had to double the cost of their services. No explanation for the price hike was given. Increasing the cost of internet services would, of course, provide additional revenue for the military, but more insidiously, it would also reduce its affordability and thereby diminish internet communication, especially among the poor. Calculating that more action was needed, on January 8 the regime raised prices again to further discourage internet usage. This time they levied an additional tax on SIM cards. These phone cards, which previously cost 1,500 kyat, became subject to an additional commercial tax of 20,000 kyat—more than half an average week’s wages—amounting to an increase of 1,333 per cent. Further, internet service providers were hit with a tax increase of 15 per cent on their sales, which of course would be passed on to consumers. The regime, through its mouthpiece, the Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper, claimed the move was an effort to promote well-being among the youth because the new charges would reduce the “effects triggered by extreme use of internet services on the employment of the people and mental sufferings of [the] new generation [of] students.” No one was buying this except as some much-needed comic relief. The real reasons for those increases were to directly impede communications among the organizers of protest actions such as the strike, and among the people in general, as well as to further enrich Min Aung Hlaing and his partners in crime and corruption. But, still not satisfied, the junta continued pulling other levers. Ten days before February 1, the junta announced that electricity would be cut from 6 am to 6 pm for the three days immediately preceding the strike—January 29, 30 and 31—which means that during this three-day period there was no WiFi and no way for most people to charge their computers or phones—phones being the principal means by which the vast majority of the people access the internet. While over the years, and especially since the start of this latest coup, the citizens of Myanmar have grown accustomed to being without electrical service for hours at a time, this recent announcement heightened people’s concerns. No one doubted that this was merely another effort to prevent them from communicating and organizing in the days leading up to the strike. In another attempt by the regime to frustrate and crush the upcoming strike, on January 24, eight days beforehand, Myawaddy TV and MRTV—the junta’s television propaganda outlets—announced a new restriction: anyone caught in possession of a virtual private network (VPN) app would be subject to arrest, fines and a possible prison sentence of up to three years. A life sentence is possible if the owner has shared anything deemed to have incited people to participate in the upcoming strike, or referred to the military in a derogatory manner. News of this new law had recently been circulating in the media, but it was considered to be merely some proposed legislation made public for purposes of review. This, however, was at odds with what the junta’s TV stations were saying. On January 24, The Irrawaddy reported that it had access to a leaked copy of a draft of the legislation, and a cover letter, showing thatthe decision to enact the law had already been made. Whether or not this draft legislation had been ratified is of little consequence, because, ultimately, when anyone is stopped by police or soldiers and ordered to turn over their phone, the law will be interpreted at the end of their gun barrels. It bears mentioning that, since the coup’s onset, websites such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook—which are used by the vast majority of Myanmar’s population—and a host of other sites as well, have been blocked, and therefore anyone accessing these sites could only do so by using a VPN. So, in Mandalay and Yangon, and probably everywhere between, soldiers and police have been searching the phones of random pedestrians and motorists looking for their VPN apps. We have heard that those caught with the app on their phones are being given the option of arrest and certain prison time, or of bribing the arresting soldiers with a payment of 100,000 kyat (US$56) to make the problem go away. Clearly, as they have done so many times in the last year, the soldiers and police have created for themselves a tidy commercial enterprise on the backs and suffering of their fellow citizens. A few days before the strike we heard of a man who was stopped by soldiers. After seizing his phone, they discovered that he had been on Facebook. When asked how he had accessed the site without a VPN, the man, unable to provide a satisfactory answer, was promptly beaten. In another case, two people were stopped by soldiers and VPN apps were found on their phones. The soldiers simply confiscated the phones, undoubtedly either to sell or for their own personal use. Business owners who were unaware of the new law were posting on Facebook that they would support the strike by closing for the day. Consequently, many of them were tracked down, arrested for their posts, and had their establishments permanently shuttered and apparently expropriated. In addition, there have been reports from numerous areas that vehicles with loudspeakers mounted to their roofs were circulating through neighbourhoods warning people that should they participate in the strike they will be in violation of the law, and anyone sharing information about the strike on social media will be subject to arrest and imprisonment under the counterterrorism laws. On January 26, The Irrawaddy reported that these warnings were “an attempt to prevent the protest after the previous silent strikes saw the whole nation of over 54 million people stay out of sight for the day.” Police, soldiers and okkahtas, the military-appointed ward administrators, went from business to business, forcing owners to sign an agreement committing them to keeping their shops open on February 1, the day of the strike, and acknowledging that if they failed to do so they would suffer severe consequences. But everyone understood their dilemma. Even if they were forced to open, with everyone staying at home they wouldn’t expect any customers. So what then did the junta hope to gain by forcing shops and businesses to remain open? With no customers on the streets, what’s the point? Other than bolstering the junta’s delusion of normality, it simply makes no sense. These various efforts by the military regime, each of which required the marshalling of enormous human and material resources, demonstrates that the call for another general strike struck an extremely raw nerve. In his vain efforts to project legitimacy, particularly to the international community, General Min Aung Hlaing has announced time and again that he would “very shortly” have the “terrorists” under control and could ensure stability throughout the nation. However, stability seems to be getting further and further beyond his grasp. On February 1, empty streets, similar to those seen during the December strike, put the lie to the junta’s statements and became a major embarrassment. Desperate to avoid international disgrace, the regime has gone into overdrive in its efforts to crush the resistance, but its efforts will, in all likelihood, prove to be both insufficient and deficient. The amount of resources it amassed in hopes of forestalling the strike is a telling indication of how alarming this demonstration of resistance was to the regime, a fact that the Burmese people have carefully noted. The military’s heavy-handed and disproportionate tactics are a clear sign of its weakness and desperation. By moving forward with the strike, the Burmese people have shown the world that investments in Myanmar will never bring returns until there is genuine democratic stability, and that such stability is squarely in the hands of the people. Deserted streets across the country on the day of the strike, despite every effort by the military to quash it, should serve as a warning to those who continue to engage in business with the generals while the people of Myanmar suffer under these tyrants. Nonetheless, the people must not become complacent, because this regime will almost surely carry on in ways that defy morality and legitimacy. People need to prepare themselves for any and all possibilities. The regime led by Min Aung Hlaing and his cronies—which sanctions the bombing of innocent civilians, which tortures and burns to death young and old alike, which gang-rapes women, which loots and torches homes and entire villages, which murders indiscriminately—that regime accepts no constraints and recognizes no limits on its atrocities. How the military will respond now that the strike has successfully taken place is an unknown that should concern everyone. But attempts at terrorizing people have already proven ineffective in deterring them from their cause. This is especially true for those of Generation Z who have vowed to fight to the end. Recent attempts to cow the Burmese people into submission, as described above, will only act as an accelerant thrown upon their anger and resentment. It would do Min Aung Hlaing and his gang well, and the international community too, to heed the words of the many who have announced that they will “never back down,” that “this is the last time.” It remains to be seen who is poking whom..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-04
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Title: From ‘8888’ to ‘2121’: A New Generation of Resistance in Myanmar
Description: "This article is the latest in a Just Security series on the Feb. 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar, which brought together expert local and international voices on the coup and its broader context. The series is a collaboration between Just Security and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School). Today, Feb. 1, 2022, marks the one-year anniversary of the Myanmar military’s attempt to wrest political control of the country away from its elected officials. Not every military attempt to impose its will on a country is a generational moment, but this one was. The actions of the military (known as the Tatmadaw) last year sparked an unprecedented series of events that are still rippling across the nation. The resistance to the military’s attempt[1] to take control started with the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a mass movement led by youth and joined by workers who stayed home and consumers who boycotted military-owned businesses to protest the takeover. A movement on this scale has not been seen in a generation. Other developments over the past year are entirely unprecedented in Myanmar. This past year thus marks the end of one era and the beginning of a new one. The shape of that new era is still being determined by the people of Burma, who are writing their next chapter with each passing day. To understand the importance of Feb. 1, 2021 (“1221” or “2121,” depending on which date convention is used), we first must look back. For Burma followers, the start of the era proceeding 2021 can be traced to the 8888 Uprising (named for another significant date, Aug. 8, 1988, when that mobilization began), which saw a military crackdown against mass street protests across the country. The 8888 Uprising was the beginning of the end of the Ne Win era, a period of military rule which began decades earlier. Yet in the wake of 1988, the military dictatorship continued — first as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a name which aptly captured the mass human rights abuses perpetrated by this military junta, and then, with a 1997 rebrand, as the State Peace and Development Council. Despite these cosmetic tweaks, little else changed. The consolidation of power by Than Shwe as the main military strongman in the early 2000s only demonstrated the continued military dominance. Even after the 2008 constitution and three subsequent national elections, including 2010 which featured a boycott by the National League for Democracy (NLD), the military was ever present, and the hopes of a full transition to democracy and peace failed to materialize. (For a fuller discussion of the history of democracy movements in Myanmar, see here). Yet this post-1988 era was never really defined by the military leader as it had been during Ne Win’s time. Instead, the 1988 to 2021 period was defined by its opposition leader. When history is written in the years to come, it will be known as the era of Aung San Suu Kyi. From her “non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights” while under house arrest and her leadership of the NLD as it earned landslide national victories in 1991, 2015, and 2020, to her silence on the ongoing persecution and coordinated campaigns of violence against the Muslim Rohingya minority, Aung San Suu Kyi shaped this era of Burma in a way no other figure did. The lead up to the military’s attempted takeover on Feb. 1, 2021 did not presage how seminal a moment it would become for Myanmar. After the NLD won an overwhelming majority of the parliamentary seats in the November 2020 general election (396 out of 476 seats, a margin of victory even greater than in 2015 and reminiscent of a 1990 landslide victory for the party), the Tatmadaw laid the foundation to dispute the results. Just like after the 1990 election, which it never recognized, the military was intent on preventing the duly elected officials from taking their seats as representatives of the people. Throughout late 2020 and early 2021, the Tatmadaw alleged irregularities and poll fraud. Several nations, including the United States, warned that the Tatmadaw might attempt to seize power in the days leading up to Feb. 1. Despite these warnings, the military was able to successfully detain Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other NLD leadership on the morning of Feb. 1 (many of whom have since been criminally charged and sentenced in thinly veiled political persecutions). The Tatmadaw ordered an unconstitutional one-year state of emergency, and state television broadcasts announced that political authority had been transferred to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the State Administration Council. Looking back on the past year, it has been filled with familiar hallmarks of the Tatmadaw’s oppression: horrendous loss of life (conservatively at least 1,400 killed), countless arrests (estimates now run at nearly 8,800), and mass displacement. And as in eras past, the Tatmadaw has adopted these practices to retain power by whatever means necessary — including suppressing freedoms, curtailing rights, and terrorizing the population — and to fend off a burgeoning non-violent movement comprised of a new generation of leaders who have glimpsed the potential of democracy in Myanmar over the past decade. But the past year has also been different – and remarkably so – for it has signaled not only the end of an era but the emergence of a new one. A New Era The CDM The story of 2021 must start with the CDM — and the sea change that this movement represents among a generation that had not been born in 1988. Led by youth and women, the movement has used civil disruptions, work stoppages, and boycotts to hamper the Tatmadaw’s attempts to consolidate their power. In the process, the movement has signified not only a generational shift but a change in the representation and make up of political activity in Myanmar. For many Burmans (the major ethnic group), participating in the movement has also prompted a sort of revelation, causing them, for instance, to question the misinformation espoused for years by the military that historically marginalized ethnic nationality groups were a threat to Burma. For so long, the country has been defined by its divisions — but the CDM has represented something new and distinctive as it has embraced and celebrated Burma’s diversity as a strength instead of a weakness. The National Unity Government The National Unity Government (NUG), which was announced in April 2021 as a “shadow” or interim government, represents the country’s first unity Comprised of members of the NLD, ethnic nationality groups, and other minority parties, the creation of the NUG parallels, in governmental structures, the bridge created between Burman communities and ethnic nationalities by the grassroots organizing of the CDM. What stands out about the NUG is that it is not a government comprised wholly of the Burman-led NLD but one that at least symbolically bridges ethnic divides in new ways. Yes, there are legitimate questions on the depth of the unity, but this development nevertheless marks a first in Burma, and if it holds, it will define the new era in profoundly different terms from the previous one. During the 1990s through the first two decades of this century, there were calls for tripartite dialogue between the military, the NLD, and the ethnic nationalities, but never did the NLD unite with the ethnic groups in a government or other formal alliance. The NLD’s treatment of the Rohingya crisis — ignoring or exacerbating severe human rights violations — has left deep distrust. Even here, however, there have been signs of change over the past year. One of the NUG’s interim cabinet ministers issued a public apology to the Rohingya for the government’s role in oppressing the group, and the NUG announced a new policy in June promising to end human rights abuses against the Rohingya and grant them citizenship. Given past experience, caution is still warranted as to whether there will be follow through on these pronouncements, but this much is clear: the NUG represents a potentially new political era. The End of an Era The emergence of the CDM and the NUG as well as the simultaneous generational shift has also signaled the beginning of the end of the era of Aung San Suu Kyi and others from her generation. From a towering symbol for human rights and democracy as a Nobel Peace Prize winner to a defender, at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), of the military’s genocidal actions and now returning to house detention once again, feelings towards Aung San Suu Kyi have grown more complicated over the past few years to say the least. And while she and the NLD remain beloved by many in Burma, this last year has brought into stark relief the aging leadership of the party. While criminal sentences against the Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior NLD leaders still make the news, the base of power has begun to move beyond these elders. Transitions take time, but this one is underway. The End of the 2008 Constitution The 2008 Constitution enshrined military impunity and placed the Tatmadaw permanently beyond the reach of either civilian political control or judicial oversight. The February 2021 actions of the military ironically have caused a break with the Constitution that it wrote. Though the military allegedly attempted to force NLD President Win Myint to step down so they could take power under the veneer of legitimacy, his refusal and their subsequent attempt to seize power through force undermined the 2008 Constitution.In April, the predecessor to the NUG announced that the 2008 Constitution was no longer valid and promised a system with equal protections for all. A proposed replacement constitution, called the Federal Democracy Charter, was published with the announcement. Recently, a revised draft of the Charter was approved in a People’s Assembly held by a broad coalition (the National Unity Consultative Council or NUCC), confirming that the diverse membership of the NUCC considers the Charter to be the country’s interim constitutional document. While some have expressed skepticism, fearing that the lofty promises of equal protection are rhetoric without substantive, feasible strategies for improving the lives of ethnic and religious minorities, it is almost impossible to imagine a return to the 2008 Constitution. The End of a Failed Peace Process For the past decade, the Tatmadaw (and the NLD) consistently suggested to the world that efforts were ongoing to achieve lasting peace to conflicts in various border areas where ethnic nationalities tend to comprise the majority of the population and which have been in conflict with the Tatmadaw for decades. For example, in 2016 the Tatmadaw announced a “national” “ceasefire” agreement, a misnomer both because it did not involve all the major armed groups and because fighting has persisted and even intensified over the past decade. This past year has refuted the existence of any credible peace process, paving the way going forward for either ongoing conflict or, more hopefully, some entirely new peace initiative. ASEAN Slights Min Aung Hlaing The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been rightly criticized for failing to adequately respond to the military’s actions in Myanmar; none of the points in its five-point consensus plan from April 2021 to address the situation have seen significant progress. Yet during its October summit, ASEAN boldly excluded the Tatmadaw, and several countries at the summit directly criticized the military leadership. The issue of attendance remains unresolved, and expecting much more from ASEAN may be unrealistic with Cambodia — itself an autocracy — as the chair during the next year. Yet the fact that the group directly confronted the Tatmadaw in the way it did in October 2021 is unprecedented. It signals that ASEAN is keeping its options open as to where to place its allegiance in the new era and no longer blindly supporting the military. International Recognition In September of last year, the United States and China reached an informal agreement barring the Tatmadaw from being seated at the United Nations, undermining its attempts to gain international legitimacy. The General Assembly recently agreed to defer action on who would represent Myanmar at the United Nations, meaning that the current ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, who is loyal to the NUG and has in fact been “fired” by the Tatmadaw, will remain in place until the issue is resolved. While not a definitive win for either the NUG or the military, as with ASEAN keeping its options open, the recognition stalemate means that the military can no longer assume that its power grabs will lead to a place at the table internationally. Businesses Exit The old era included an opening up of the country to foreign direct investment, including to vast natural gas deposits in the early 1990s. The Tatmadaw benefited immensely from international investments, enjoying both material profits from partnering with international corporations to extract natural resources and gains in legitimacy that came with these partnerships. But in response to the deteriorating political and human rights situation over the past few months, Chevron (which bought Unocal, the original investor in Burma) and TotalEnergies (Total) announced earlier this year that they were withdrawing from Myanmar after 30 years. Woodside Petroleum followed Chevron and Total shortly thereafter, and other companies have pulled out as well. While this is not the only time businesses have exited the country, it is a dramatic reversal from the last ten years. Moreover, the inclusion of giants Chevron and Total in the exodus is a telling indication that even the most stalwart of holdouts from the previous era have broken with the military. The International Criminal Court and International Accountability While there has been significant progress around international accountability in Myanmar in recent years — from the Gambia’s case at the ICJ, to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) investigation, to the creation of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), to the acceptance by an Argentinian court of jurisdiction over crimes committed against the Rohingya — the NUG’s deposit of a letter with the ICC accepting jurisdiction by the Court for international crimes dating back to 2002 anywhere in the country is a major development. This letter signals the NUG’s commitment to join the international community, adhere to the rule of law, and address grave crimes throughout the country. The ICC should recognize the letter and authorize additional investigations beyond the Rohingya into international crimes, both historical and ongoing. Prospects for Conflict or Peace Despite these major developments and potential promise of this new era, many see a grim immediate prognosis defined by an escalation in violence as the conflict expands geographically and intensifies militarily. Predictably, civilians are likely to pay the largest price. The dominant view is also that for the foreseeable future, neither the military nor the NUG and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) can achieve outright military victory, raising the specter of a protracted and messy conflict. Nonetheless, as Myanmar enters this new era, a crucial question remains: what is the recipe that will change the balance of power to permanently end the Tatmadaw’s continuous destabilizing effects? After all, the destabilizing force in Burmese politics over the last 75 years has been the Burmese military. Despite three elections over the past decade, never have civilians been given genuine power to guide the country forward and never has there been a concerted effort to achieve a lasting peace across ethnic lines. With this in mind, possible paths toward such peace and stability will require the following elements. First, the CDM has the capacity to transform into a durable generational political movement that can continue to learn from its membership, evolve, and persist. The momentum behind this grassroots movement is reminiscent of the long-term political impacts of the civil rights movement in the United States and the struggle to end Apartheid in South Africa. In order to move Myanmar further forward (and away from military hegemony), the CDM’s core values of civilian power and celebration of the diversity of Burma must also persist, heralded by the youth leaders who see the opportunity for fundamental change. Second, as the NUG continues to gain legitimacy and implement initiatives like the National Unity Consultative Council, a body designed to expand the alliance against the junta and establish a roadmap for a federal democratic system, there is an open question about whether this new governing body will live up to its name. In one possible version of the future, the NUG’s eventual composition would reflect the leadership of the CDM, developing a new generation of political leaders who are committed to the “Unity” element of the NUG. The NUG has already taken certain steps in this direction, making an unprecedented public statement acknowledging the injustices suffered by Rohingya Muslims and promising that it will seek “justice and accountability” for the military’s crimes against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups. This move toward cross-ethnic solidarity in the highest levels of government will be key to establishing a new kind of durable peace in Myanmar. However, many NUG members come straight from the NLD, and traditional fissures of distrust between the NLD and ethnic nationality leadership could easily reemerge if the NUG does not commit seriously to the equality and unity of all peoples in Myanmar. The third critical factor in this equation is whether and how long the Tatmadaw can sustain its campaign of terror without cracking under the pressure. Desertions are reported by some as being at an all-time high, including both rank-and-file soldiers and officers. The Tatmadaw’s strategy to maintain nationwide control in the decades preceding the coup included a cycle of temporary ceasefires with certain ethnic groups, allowing the military to rotate its resources from suppression of one group to another. But because the military alienated nearly every group over the past year, ending many already tentative ceasefires, the Tatmadaw is now stretched thin trying to gain control in areas where it faces combined opposition from EAOs and representatives of the NUG’s Peoples Defense Force. With soldiers leaving the Tatmadaw to join the opposition and with additional collaboration between opposition forces, an increasingly desperate but still well-armed military has the potential to do enormous damage. The fighting is likely to get worse before it gets better, especially for civilians. However, this trend toward desertion combined with a unified civilian population sheds light on the cracks in the military’s grip. Finally, China, ASEAN, the West, and the international community writ large must align against the destabilizing force that is the Tatmadaw. China may speak more in terms of avoiding civil war (given its interest in stability). ASEAN may speak more in terms of political solutions and dialogue amongst all the parties (given its practice of non-interference). The West may speak more in terms of rights and sanctions. But the common interest of these players should be a permanent and durable solution with civilian rule in Burma. Such a solution would meet the interests of the key regional and international players to end the conflict, find a politically satisfying outcome, and uphold human rights and the rule of law. Like 8888, February 1, 2021, will be a date for the history books. Whether this next chapter of Myanmar’s history will bring an end to continued military rule and violent conflict and lead to a transition to democracy and peace is yet to be determined. As we mark the first anniversary of “1221” (or “2121”), however, one thing is clear: the events of the past year have reshaped Burma in fundamental ways, ushering in a new era with flickers of hope for true national unity at last..."
Source/publisher: Just Security (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-03
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Title: Myanmar’s UN envoy under fire for proposing ‘power share’ with military
Sub-title: Pro-democracy groups condemn Noeleen Heyzer’s comments in a TV interview, and maintain the junta is losing its grip
Description: "The UN special envoy to Myanmar has been widely rebuked for suggesting that pro-democracy activists should negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the country’s military, which is accused of atrocities including genocide. Almost 250 civil society organisations published a statement condemning the comments, warning they risked emboldening the military to commit “grave crimes with total impunity”. “These statements could set a dangerous precedent, that those who take control through brutal means – massacring, killing, raping, arresting, torturing, burning villages and people, targeting civilians using airstrikes and shelling – be welcomed to share power,” it said. The statement was signed by 247 local and national civil society groups including Progressive Voice, Women’s League of Burma and Union of Karenni State Youth. Noeleen Heyzer, the UN’s special envoy for Myanmar, provoked controversy during an interview with Channel News Asia when discussing ways to address the country’s crisis. Asked about the possibility of a power-sharing arrangement – an idea firmly opposed by the Myanmar people – Heyzer responded: “The point is, we have to start a process. And you can’t immediately come in with the ultimate solution of what you want. The military is in control at this particular time and something has got to be worked out. It could be a process,” she said. Heyzer added: “I know that many people, especially the young, are willing to die fighting for a total political transformation. Any political transformation requires a process and it is not going to happen overnight. And therefore I want them to have something to live for, not to die for. They need to negotiate what this power sharing could look like over a long term. And they have to be at the table.” The comments prompted a furious response from activists, who have been subjected to relentless violence by the military, which seized power from the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi a year ago. Many young people have taken up arms and joined local defence forces to fight for democracy. The office of the special envoy of the secretary general on Myanmar has since issued a statement to local media, claiming that Heyzer’s comments were misinterpreted. The special envoy had “never proposed power sharing as an option”, it said. The statement added: “The special envoy has emphasised in no uncertain terms that any peace process has to be led by the people of Myanmar.” Naw Hser Hser, of the Women’s League of Burma, a signatory of the joint statement, said the UN was growing distant from the calls of the people of Myanmar. “Ultimately, the people of Myanmar are realising that it is they themselves that will be the ones to succeed in this revolution,” she said. “Despite vehement calls from the people of Myanmar, the UN has yet to take action to stop the terrorist military’s grave crimes. One year has passed [since the coup] and the UN security council has issued only statements and even failed to hold an open meeting or issue a concrete resolution,” Naw Hser Hser added. The extreme violence used by the military to try to suppress opposition was a sign of its lack of control, she said. “In rural areas, they are losing ground, as local people’s defence forces and ethnic organisations control swathes of territory. New administrative structures, comprising the people, are being established at local levels, governing where the military cannot. They are far from being in control,” said Naw Hser Hser. Even before the coup, the military was guaranteed huge powers under the 2008 constitution, which granted it a quarter of all seats in parliament and control of key ministries, including home affairs and defence. Nonetheless, the military seized power on 1 February 2021, accusing Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) of voter fraud – an allegation that has been dismissed by observers. Zoya Phan, coordinator of the European Karen Network, said Heyzer’s comments had been made on the same day the military launched more airstrikes against civilians in south-eastern Karen state, also known as Kayin state. “The Burmese military was in a power sharing with the NLD-led government before the coup. However, the attacks against ethnic people didn’t stop,” said Zoya Phan, who is also campaigns manager for Burma Campaign UK. “With the Burmese military, our country will have no positive future,” she added..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-03
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Title: Message on the 73rd anniversary of Karen revolution day
Description: "Today is the 73rd Karen Revolution Day, which shows 73 years of struggle and bravery of the Karen people. The whole nation of Myanmar is united with the Karen people for the 73 years of struggle, for freedom, for self-determination, for federal democracy. The last 73 years of Karen’s sacrifice for freedom and the new Myanmar are appreciated by Myanmar. And today, we all have come together and united against authoritarianism and military dictatorship. We, together with Karen, have solidified our determinations to defeat this Junta and eradicate the military dictatorship once and for all, and replace the Tatmadaw with a modern military of Myanmar, a Federal Army. Once we do that, the second step will be to write the Constitution of Myanmar based on Federal democratic principles and self-determination for all the people of Myanmar, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, culture, and gender. And thirdly, together with our Karen brothers and sisters, revolutionaries, and visionary people, we will start building the Federal Democratic Union of Myanmar, where we all will be accessible to our future. We will all be free to our dreams. That’s where the peace, prosperity, and tomorrow is waiting for all the people of Myanmar. We thank all Karen people for all they have done for the last 73 years, and we cannot show enough appreciation to our hero’s martyrs for their sacrifices. They have been the frontline of our freedom and defenders of democracy for the last 73 years. For that, we thank you. May God bless the Karen people; may God bless the Karen Land..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-01
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Title: Statement by President Joe Biden Marking One Year Since the Coup in Burma
Description: "One year ago, the Burmese military denied the will of the people of Burma, overthrew the democratically elected government, and seized power in a coup d’etat. Since then, the regime has perpetrated countless brutal actions and committed unspeakable violence against civilians, including children. More than 1,500 people have been killed. Thousands have been unjustly detained or subjected to sham trials. Corruption is rampant. Civil conflict has worsened. The coup has caused immense suffering across Burma and undermined regional stability, while the leaders of the regime and their supporters seek to profit off the chaos they have created. And though millions across Burma are in desperate need of life-saving aid, the regime denies humanitarian access and attacks aid workers. We condemn these outrages and we are working closely with our partners and allies, including in ASEAN, to hold accountable all those responsible for the coup and attacks on civilians. The military regime must reverse course and release all those unjustly detained—including Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint, other democratically elected leaders, journalists, civil society leaders, activists, and foreign citizens. Humanitarian workers must be allowed unhindered access. And the regime should immediately engage in a meaningful dialogue with all parties to return Burma to its democratic path. As long as the regime continues to deny the people of Burma their democratic voice, we will continue to impose further costs on the military and its supporters. To the people of Burma: We have not forgotten your struggle. And we will continue to support your valiant determination to bring democracy and the rule of law to your country..."
Source/publisher: The White House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-01
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Title: လူထုအောင်ပွဲရသည်အထိ တော်လှန်ရေးအလံကို အမြင့်မားဆုံးလွှင့်ထူပြီး ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ကြ
Description: "အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူတန်းစား တော်လှန်ရဲဘော်အပေါင်းတို့ မိမိတို့ အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူတန်းစားများသည် သမိုင်းကြောင်းတလျှောက်လုံး ကိုယ့်ကြမ္မာကိုယ်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ လူ့ရပိုင်ခွင့်များ ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရပြီး မိမိတို့တိုင်းပြည်တွင်လည်း ပဒေသရာဇ်စနစ်၊ လူမျိုးကြီး ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ကိုင်မှုစနစ်၊ ဖက်ဆစ် စစ်ဝါဒီစနစ်များ ကြီးစိုးလွှမ်းမိုးကာ ပြည်သူ့လက်ထဲတွင်သာ ရှိရမည့် ပြည်သူ့အာဏာသည် မောင်ပိုင်စီးခံရလျက် အစဥ်လုယူခံထားခဲ့ကြရသည်။ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်သည် ၁၉၆၂ မှစ၍ ယနေ့အချိန်ထိတိုင် ၎င်းတို့ဖက်ဆစ်မိသားစုများ၊ နှီးနွှယ်ပတ်သက်နေသည့် စီးပွားရေးခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်သူများ စသည့် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားတခုတည်းအတွက်သာ တိုင်းပြည်၏ မြေပေါ်မြေအောက်၊ ရေပေါ်ရေအောက် သယံဇာတအရင်းအမြစ်များ၊ လူထုလုပ်အားကဲ့သို့သော လူ့စွမ်းအားအရင်းအမြစ်များ၊ တန်ဖိုးမဖြတ်နိုင်သော လူထု၏ အနာဂတ်နှင့်ကြမ္မာကို အဓမ္မနည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ဂုတ်သွေးစုပ် ချုပ်ခြယ်သိမ်းပိုက်ထားလျက်ရှိသည်။ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင်လည်း ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တကျော့ပြန် ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် အာဏာသိမ်းမှု တနှစ်ပြည့်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မိမိတို့တိုင်းပြည်၌ အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ၏ သမိုင်းကြောင်းတွင် မတရားမှုကို ခုံခံတွန်းလှန်လျက် တော်လှန်ရေး တိုက်ပွဲများအတွင်း သွေးသားနှင့် အသက်ခန္ဓာ ကို စတေးစွန့်လွှတ်ခဲ့ကြသည့် စံပြရဲဘော်များ၊ အညတရ သူရဲကောင်းများ များစွာပေါ်ထွန်းခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တကျော့ပြန် ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် အာဏာသိမ်းမှု တနှစ်တာအချိန်ကာလအတွင်း ၎င်းတို့၏ ပုံစံမျိုးစုံဖိနှိပ်မှုကြောင့် ပြည်သူ ၁၅၀၃ ဦးထက်မနည်း အသက်ခန္ဓာ စွန့်လွှတ်ခဲ့ရ ပြီးဖြစ်ကာ ၁၁၈၃၈ ဦးထက်မနည်းသော ပြည်သူများသည် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းကို ခံခဲ့ရသည်။ လူထု၏ စီးပွားရေး၊ စားဝတ်နေရေး တို့သည်လည်း ပိုမို၍ ဆင်းရဲတွင်းနက်လာကာ အငတ်ဘေးပြဿနာကို ကြီးကြီးမားမား ရင်ဆိုင်နေကြရသည်။ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ခါးပိုက်ဆောင်အဖွဲ့များဖြစ်သည့် ရဲ၊ ပျူစောထီး၊ အမျိုးသားရေး အမည်ခံ လက်မရွံ့ ဖက်ဆစ်လက်ပါးစေများနှင့် အခြားသောဖက်ဆစ်သစ္စာခံများ၏ ပြည်သူ့စည်းစိမ် မောင်ပိုင်စီးခြင်း၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ ညှဥ်းဆဲနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ နယ်မြေရှင်းလင်းရေးအမည်ခံ လက်နက်မဲ့ပြည်သူများထံ ကျူးကျော် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများကြောင့် မိမိနေရပ်မှ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ရသည့် ပြည်သူများစွာရှိခဲ့သလို အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသူ များစွာ ရှိသည်။ ဂျီနိုဆိုက်ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၎င်းတို့ လုပ်နေကြမြဲဖြစ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအဖြစ် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူအစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ကရင်နီ၊ ချင်း၊ စစ်ကိုင်း၊ မကွေး စသည့်ဒေသများတွင် ထပ်မံကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သေးသည်။ မိမိတို့ အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူတန်းစားတရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သည့် ဤသို့သော ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်ကို အမြစ်မှချိုးဖျက်ရန် အတွက်မူ လူထုလွတ်မြောက်ရေး တော်လှန်အလံကို အမြင့်ဆုံးလွှင့်ထူလျက် ရဲရင့်စွာ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ကြရုံမှတပါး အခြား မရှိပေ။ ထိုသို့တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရာတွင်လည်း အကြမ်းမဖက်ငြိမ်းချမ်းသော လှုပ်ရှားမှုများ၊ အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဖိအားပေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုများ၊ စစ်အုပ်စုအကျိုးစီးပွား ဖြတ်တောက်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုများ၊ လက်နက်ကိုင် ခုခံံတွန်းလှန် လှုပ်ရှားမှုများ စသည့် လူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုပုံသဏ္ဍာန် အသီးသီးတွင် ကဏ္ဍတခုချင်းစီကို စနစ်တကျ ပီပြင်စွာပုံဖော်ကာ ပေါင်းစပ်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရမည် ဖြစ်ပေသည်။ ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အုပ်စုနည်းတူပင် လူထုကို အစဥ်ဒုက္ခပေး ဂုတ်သွေးစုပ်နေမည့် ဖက်ဆစ်ဝါဒ၊ လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒ၊ မဟာ အုပ်စုကြီးဝါဒ၊ အဓမ္မအာဏာရှင်ဝါဒများကို တပါတည်း တိုက်ဖျက်နိုင်မှသာလျှင် ဖိနှိပ်ခံလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး မျှော်ကိုးသည့် ပြည်သူ့ဒီမိုကရေစီကိုရရှိကာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးပြည့်ဝပြီး ပြည်သူ့ကောင်းကျိုးချမ်းသာကို ပြည်သူသာလျှင် တည်ဆောက် နိုင်သည့် လူ့ဘောင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းကို ရရှိမည်ဖြစ်ပေသည်။ ထိုနည်းတူစွာပင် လူထုတော်လှန်ရေးကိုအဆိပ်ခတ်နေသော အယူအဆများဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် စေ့စပ်ညှိနှိုင်းရေးလမ်းစဥ်၊ လေယူရာယိမ်း မူဝါဒမဲ့လမ်းစဥ်၊ လူထုအားသတင်းအမှားပေးလမ်းစဥ်၊ ပုန်ကန်တော်လှန်မှုကို အရှိန်လျော့ကျစေမည့်လမ်းစဥ်များအား ဖောက်ပြန်ရေးနည်းနာများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကာ နင်းချေဖျက်ဆီးနိုင်မှသာလျှင် ကောင်းမွန်သော အလေ့အထများကို လူထုတိုက်ပွဲအတွင်း မျိုးစေ့ချနိုင်လျက် တော်လှန်ရေးသည် သန့်စင်ကာ ဂုဏ်ပြောင် ဂုဏ်ရောင် ရှိနိုင်ပေမည်။ အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ တော်လှန်ရဲဘော်များနှင့်အတူ လူထုတော်လှန်ရေးအလံတော်ကို အမြင့်ဆုံးလွှင့်ထူလျက် ရင်ဆိုင်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဟူသည့် GSC စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းစဥ်ကတည်းက ထားရှိခဲ့သည့် တော်လှန်ရေး သစ္စာအဓိဌာန်ကို ယနေ့တွင် ထပ်လောင်းကတိပြုလိုက်ပေသည်။ အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူတန်းစားတရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော ပြည်သူ့ကောင်းကျိုးချမ်းသာကို ပြည်သူသာလျှင် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်သည့် လူ့ဘောင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းဆီသို့ အရောက်သွားနိုင်ရန်အတွက်မူ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစံနှုန်းများ အခြေပြုလျက် လူထုလွတ်မြောက်ရေးတိုက်ပွဲအား မဆုတ်မနစ်တမ်း ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ကြပါစို့။ အဖိနှိပ်ခံများ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ကာ တော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆက်လက်သယ်ဆောင်ကြ..."
Source/publisher: General Strike Committee
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-01
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 514.52 KB
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Title: ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) ၏ ၉၁ နှစ်ပြည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်သို့ ပေးပို့သော သဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁၉၃၁ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သော ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် ၉၁ နှစ် တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နယ်ချဲ့ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီပညာရေး အစရှိသည့်တိုက်ပွဲများတွင် အဖိနှိပ်ခံပြည်သူလူထု၊ ကျောင်းသားထုနှင့် တသားတည်းရပ်တည်ကာ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်က ရတကသရဲဘော်များအား ကျွန်ုပ်တို့မှ အလေးအမြတ်ပြုပါသည်။ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) သည် စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းချိန်မှစ၍ ယနေ့တိုင်အောင် အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူထုနှင့်ရပ်တည်ကာ ဖိနှိပ်သူအပေါင်းကို တွန်းလှန်ခဲ့သည်မှာ အထင်အရှားပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်သည်လည်း အဖိနှိပ်ခံပြည်သူလူထုအကျိုး၊ ကျောင်းသားထုအကျိုးအတွက် ဆောင်ရွက်မည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အရပ်ရပ်တွင် ရဲဘော်တို့ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) နှင့် ဆက်လက်ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်လိမ့်မည် ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) အနေဖြင့် အဖိနှိပ်ခံကျောင်းသားထုအကျိုး၊ ပြည်သူလူထုအကျိုးအား ဆက်လက်သယ်ပိုးထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်မှ ဆန္ဒပြုရင်း သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: All Burma Federation of Student Unions
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-31
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 135.66 KB
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Title: ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂတည်ထောင်ခြင်း ၉၁ နှစ်ပြည့်အထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် ကျောင်းသားထုနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ တင်ပြသော အစီရင်ခံစာ
Description: "ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂတည်ထောင်ခြင်း ၉၁ နှစ်ပြည့်အထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် ကျောင်းသားထုနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ တင်ပြသော အစီရင်ခံစာ ဒေါင်းလုတ်ရယူရန် - https://bit.ly/33WPAwl ..."
Source/publisher: University of Yangon Students’ Union
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-31
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 1.25 MB
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Title: ၇၃ ကြိမ်မြောက် ကရင်အမျိုးသား တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့သို့ ကေအဲန်ယူ-ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး ဥက္ကဌ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး စောမူတူးစေးဖိုး မှ ပေးပို့သော သဝဏ်လွှာ
Source/publisher: Karen National Union
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-31
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 887.8 KB
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Title: ပထမအကြိမ်ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ၏ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်
Description: "၁။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် မည်သည့်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မဆို အပြီးတိုင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် အခွင့်အရေးများကို အပြည့်အဝ အာမခံချက်ပေးနိုင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ထောင်ရေးကို ဦးတည်လျက် ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက ကြီးမှူး၍ ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၂၇)ရက်နေ့မှ (၂၉)ရက်နေ့အထိ သမိုင်းဝင်‌ညီလာခံကြီးအဖြစ် အောင်မြင်စွာ ကျင်းပနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ၂။ ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံသည် နိုင်ငံရေးအရ အမြင့်ဆုံး ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် ချမှတ်ပေးနိုင်သည့် စုစည်းမှု ဖြစ်ပြီး အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအင်အားစုများ စုပေါင်း၍ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ လူမှုရေး၊ လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံမူများ၊ မူဝါဒများ၊ မဟာဗျူဟာများနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုဆိုင်ရာအစီအမံများ ညှိနှိုင်းဆွေးနွေး အတည်ပြု ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် ကျင်းပခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ၃။ ဤညီလာခံကြီးတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အပါအဝင် ရွေးကောက်ခံလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများ၊ သမဂ္ဂများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးများ၊ လူငယ်နှင့်လူနည်းစုဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အပါအဝင် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ လူထုသပိတ်လှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ကြားကာလ ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်/လူမျိုး ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီများမှ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဧည့်သည်တော်များနှင့် လေ့လာသူများ စုစုပေါင်း (၃၈၈)ဦး တက်ရောက်ခဲ့သည်။ ၄။ ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံတွင် အောက်ပါဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို အတည်ပြုဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ သည်။ (က) ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် အစိတ်အပိုင်း (၁) နှင့် အစိတ်အပိုင်း (၂) ကြားကာလ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေဆိုင်ရာအစီအမံကို အတည်ပြုသည်။ (ခ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ကို အစုအဖွဲ့ (၅) ဖွဲ့အား ကိုယ်စားပြုသည့် အစုအဖွဲ့ဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်း (၃၃) ဖွဲ့ဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်ပြီ ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အတည်ပြုသည်။ (ဂ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) အဖွဲ့ဝင်အစုအဖွဲ့များက ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို အတူတကွ ကတိကဝတ်ပြု သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချ၍ လက်တွေ့ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားကြရန် သဘောတူ အတည်ပြု(Ratify) သည်။ (ဃ) ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၁၆) ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီ၏ အဆိုပြုချက်ဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) က ဖွဲ့စည်းပေးခဲ့သော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ကို ဤပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ရှေ့မှောက်၌ ထပ်လောင်း အတည်ပြုသည်။ (င) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ၏ လုပ်ငန်းအစီရင်ခံစာကို အတည်ပြုသည်။ (စ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ၏ လုပ်ငန်းအစီရင်ခံစာကို ပြင်ဆင် ဖြည့်စွက်ချက်များနှင့်အတူ အတည်ပြုသည်။ (ဆ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC)၏ ဦးဆောင်မှု ခိုင်မာ အားကောင်းစေရန်၊ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်တာများ ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) အကြား လုပ်ငန်းများ ချိတ်ဆက်မှု ကောင်းမွန်စေရေးအတွက် လုပ်ငန်းလမ်းညွှန်နှင့် လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများ (Terms of Reference and Role) ကို ပြင်ဆင်ဖြည့်စွက်သွားရန် အတည်ပြုသည်။ (ဇ) ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်ကို ‌ထုတ်ပြန်ရန် အတည်ပြုသည်။ ၅။ အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ဂျီနီဗာသဘောတူညီချက် (Geneva Convention) အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဥပဒေများကို ချိုးဖောက်လျက် ပြည်ထောင်စုတဝှမ်းလုံးရှိ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအား ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့်နှင့် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုများအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ (Crimes Against Humanity)၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု (War Crimes) ကျူးလွန်မှုများ၊ လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ (Genocides) စသည့် ကျူးလွန်နေမှုမှန်သမျှကို ဤပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံကြီးက ပြင်းထန်စွာ ကန့်ကွက်ရှုတ်ချပြီး အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီအား ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီမှတဆင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာရာဇဝတ်မှုခုံရုံး (International Criminal Court) ၌ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။ ၆။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက အင်အားအလွန်အကျွံသုံး၍ မြေပြင်နှင့် လေကြောင်း စစ်ဆင်ရေးများဖြင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူလူထုများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်နေခြင်းနှင့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း ကျူးလွန်ခံနေရမှုများမှ အကာအကွယ်ပေးရန် အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်ချက်အရ ကရင်ပြည်နယ်၊ ကရင်နီပြည်နယ်၊ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ မကွေးတိုင်းနှင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းများတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာအာမခံမှုဖြင့် အရပ်သား ပြည်သူလူထုများအား အကာအကွယ်ပေးသည့် လုံခြုံသောနေရာများ (Internationally Guaranteed Civilians Protection - Safe Zones) ဖြစ်ပေါ်ရေးနှင့် လူထုအတွက် အရေးပေါ် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုအကူအညီများအား ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုက်အဝန်းမှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသွားရန် ဤညီလာခံကြီးက အလေးအနက် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ၇။ နိုင်ငံတကာအနေဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအား အသိအမှတ်မပြုဘဲ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ကိုသာ တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုရန် ဤညီလာခံက တောင်းဆိုတိုက်တွန်းသည်။ ၈။ သို့ဖြစ်၍ ပြည်သူလူထုများ၏ ဘဝလုံခြုံမှုရရှိစေရေး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်အတွက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည့် ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပရှိ လူမျိုးစုံပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးနှင့် စစ်ကောင်စီအား အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးတို့ကို ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အစွမ်းကုန် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်‌ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၉။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှ အပြီးတိုင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်‌ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ပုံသဏ္ဍာန်အမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့သူများ၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခံရသူများနှင့် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသူများအား ဤညီလာခံကြီးက အလေးအနက် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။ ၁၀။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါဝင် အာဏာရှင်မှန်သမျှ ဖယ်ရှား၍ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်ကို အာမခံသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်သည် အထိ စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု၊ စုပေါင်းညီညွတ်မှုအင်အားတို့ဖြင့် ဆက်လက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။ အရေးတော်ပုံ မုချအောင်ရမည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-30
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Title: Security Alert: Caution advised on the anniversary of the coup
Description: "THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN RANGOON IS TRANSMITTING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION THROUGH THE AMERICAN LIAISON NETWORK AS A PUBLIC SERVICE TO U.S. CITIZENS IN BURMA. PLEASE DISSEMINATE THIS MESSAGE TO ALL U.S. CITIZENS IN YOUR ORGANIZATION OR NEIGHBORHOOD. The Embassy is aware of potential rallies and a silent strike throughout Burma on February 1st and February 2nd, 2022, to protest the military’s February 2021 coup. The Embassy advises all Americans to avoid travel and outdoor activity on those days. The Embassy advises all Americans that the anniversary of the military coup could result in heightened tensions in Yangon and outlying areas. Recent explosions and attacks in Yangon present a serious threat to American citizens and may increase in frequency and intensity. In addition, a security response of unknown proportions may result. Roadblocks and security operations are a particular concern. The Embassy advises Americans to avoid public gatherings and limit their outside activities. Review your personal security plans and keep a low profile. Anticipate possible communication outages and have a plan in the event telecommunications become limited or unavailable. Advise family and associates of this possibility in advance. Always keep some form of communication with you, keep your electronic devices charged, and monitor local events. Maintain an adequate stock of food and water should you need to shelter in place for several days. Updates from the Embassy may not be readily accessible due to an outage during a crisis. The current Level 4 Travel Advisory is the highest level issued by the Department of State and advises U.S. citizens not to travel to Burma or to leave as soon as it is safe to do so. As a result of these conditions, if you experience an emergency, the U.S. Embassy has a very limited ability to provide assistance..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Embassy in Burma
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-29
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Title: Myanmar: Year of Brutality in Coup’s Wake
Sub-title: Governments Should Deny Abusive Junta Funds, Arms
Description: "(Bangkok) – Since the military coup on February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s junta has carried out a brutal nationwide crackdown aimed at suppressing widespread public opposition to its rule, Human Rights Watch said today. Concerned governments, including the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and Japan, should together block the junta’s access to foreign revenues from oil, gas, and other extractives that are funding its abusive rule. "How many more people does Myanmar’s military have to detain, torture, and shoot before influential governments act to cut off the junta from its flow of money and arms." - Brad Adams (Asia Director) Under the leadership of Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, junta security forces have carried out mass killings, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, and other abuses against protesters, journalists, lawyers, health workers, and political opposition members amounting to crimes against humanity. Military attacks in the country’s northwest and southeast have resulted in numerous war crimes. The nature of the security force crackdown – methodical, widespread, and systematic – reflects the junta’s countrywide policy of suppressing the opposition. “How many more people does Myanmar’s military have to detain, torture, and shoot before influential governments act to cut off the junta from its flow of money and arms,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “Myanmar’s people, who have not given up their fight for democracy in the face of daily atrocities, need to know they have the global community’s support.” On February 1, 2021, the military arrested the country’s elected civilian leaders, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, in early morning raids in the capital, Naypyidaw. In the ensuing weeks, millions of people across the country joined the anti-coup Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), peacefully protesting the junta through mass demonstrations and general strikes. Security forces responded with increasingly excessive and lethal force, including live ammunition, grenades, and so-called less-lethal weapons. Police and soldiers massacred protesters in cities and towns across the country. The security forces have killed nearly 1,500 people since the coup, including at least 100 children. “When they came at us, we had nothing,” said a protester attacked on March 3 in Yangon. “We didn’t have a stick. We didn’t have a knife. All we had was our chants and our three-finger salute.” On March 26, the junta’s MRTV channel warned protesters to “learn from the tragedy of earlier ugly deaths that you can be in danger of getting shot to the head and back,” and urged parents to deter their children from demonstrating: “Let’s not waste lives for nothing.” Security forces killed 160 people the next day. To contest the junta, in April, civilian members of parliament, ethnic minority representatives, and civil society activists formed a National Unity Government (NUG). In August, Min Aung Hlaing extended the one-year state of emergency, which the junta had declared on February 1, until 2023. The junta has arbitrarily detained over 11,000 activists, politicians, journalists, and others, according to the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners, and forcibly disappeared hundreds. Military tribunals have sentenced 84 people to death in summary proceedings that do not meet international fair trial standards. Detainees are frequently kept incommunicado, unable to contact relatives or legal counsel. Security forces have subjected many detainees to torture and other ill-treatment, including routine beatings, burning with lit cigarettes, prolonged stress positions, and gender-based violence. At least 150 people have died in custody, in many cases at military-run detention centers. “There was so much blood,” said a former detainee who was beaten during his eight-month detention. “I couldn’t even remember what I was there for. I couldn’t sit or stand. I kept wanting to faint. Maybe I did keep fainting.” The junta has arrested over 120 journalists, about 50 of whom remain in detention awaiting charges or sentencing. At least 15 journalists have been convicted, the majority under section 505A of the penal code, a new provision that criminalizes publishing or circulating comments that “cause fear” or spread “false news.” The junta stripped the media licenses of seven local outlets and banned satellite television. “I’ve had to get my whole family out,” one journalist said. “Myanmar is not a safe place for anyone with a moral compass.” Security force crackdowns spread beyond cities into rural and ethnic minority areas as resistance to the junta grew countrywide. The military continues to launch targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages, the United Nations has reported. Accounts from displaced people and aid workers suggest that the junta has continued to use the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. In some areas, recently formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other anti-junta armed groups fought alongside long-established ethnic armies against the junta’s military forces. In November, clashes were reported in every state and region in the country. On December 24, security forces summarily executed at least 39 people in Hpruso township, Karenni (Kayah) State, including four children and two staff members from the international aid organization Save the Children. Many of the victims were bound, gagged, and showed signs of torture, and some may have been burned alive. “It is one of the most shocking and depressing things I have ever experienced,” said a doctor responsible for performing autopsies on the victims. Since the coup, over 400,000 people have been internally displaced by fighting and unrest, primarily in the northwest and southeast, with an estimated 32,000 refugees fleeing to India and Thailand. The junta has deliberately blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions at risk, in violation of international humanitarian law. Troops have attacked aid workers, destroyed supplies, and blocked access roads and aid convoys, seemingly as a form of collective punishment against civilians in areas where junta rule is contested. According to the UN, the number of people needing assistance in the country has grown from 1 million before the coup to 14.4 million, including more than 5 million children. About 25 million people, or half the population, are estimated to be living below the national poverty line. The Myanmar healthcare system has effectively collapsed since the coup. With the junta cracking down on medical professionals for their role in the Civil Disobedience Movement, Myanmar has become one of the deadliest countries in the world to work in health care, according to data from the World Health Organization and Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition. “We have to fight and overcome this, otherwise our futures are lost,” said one young doctor. From February 1 to November 30, security forces allegedly killed at least 31 health workers and arrested 284. Security forces have beaten and shot medical staff providing care to injured protesters and forced clinics operated by nongovernmental groups to close, driving medics and volunteers to work underground in poorly resourced makeshift mobile clinics. While the US, Canada, UK, and EU member states have imposed targeted sanctions on junta leaders and military-controlled companies over the past year, the junta’s foreign currency revenue remains largely untouched, in particular from natural gas sales, its greatest source of funds. Governments should immediately impose sanctions to block the junta from accessing the US$1 billion in foreign revenue that gas projects generate annually, and tighten sanctions enforcement on other sources of foreign revenue from mining, timber, and transportation facilities. The UN Security Council should end its inaction borne of political gridlock, and urgently pass a resolution that institutes a global arms embargo on Myanmar, refers the military’s grave crimes before and since the coup to the International Criminal Court, and imposes targeted sanctions on the junta leadership and military-owned conglomerates. If China and Russia continue to oppose council action on Myanmar, they should face concerted global pressure for upholding the junta’s indefensible rights abuses. “The one-year anniversary of Myanmar’s military coup serves as a signpost of a deepening descent into crimes against humanity and humanitarian catastrophe that the US, EU, and others need to address,” Adams said. “These countries should at long last impose costs on the junta that are too great for the generals to bear.”..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-28
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Title: Hidden Genocide Practise of Burman and Diary of Major N’Chyaw Tang
Description: "The Wunpawng Migrated South crossing the rivers Kinsa Hka, Lam Taing Hka, and Nu Hka to finally reach Putao, From Putao they a pread East, West and South to this day we find Wunpawng in india ( Assam ), China ( Yunnan ) and in Shan states. TRADITION AND CULTURE:- Before the impact of the American Baptist mission-aries, the Wunpawng were animists and the practice of animism comes under clannish - kinship system, unlike the European Feudalism, the Wunpawng feudal Authority had boundary and subjected to kinahip-relation mutual arrangement, the society of the Wunpawng is closely coalesced under kinship-relationship with a common language conversant by all ethnics, The communities of Wunpawng have a pattern of rule of chiefs who worked out their relationship in kinship manner brought down from generation to generation. The Du Was ( Wunpawng Chiefs ) did not under take subordination among themselves, they understood that were equal, in respect to liberty, ownership of property and the right to resist oppression subjugation and aggression. No chief would single out hims elf and considered himself to bo senior or more powerful than the others because of his affluence. For this reason alone, there was not one chie f to promote himself as lord of the others Du Was, Thus in the history of Wunpawng people d o not have any king, the society had no central authority but communities as republics on equal and independent. The republic of Wunpawng land as emerged to day has never bear subordinated to any of the Burmese king. Even in 1884 when the British annexed upper Burma, the British administration was only set up Bhamo and Myitkyina Leaving for the most part, Kachin frontier areas to Du Was, to administers according to their traditional customary, it was only in 1932 after Burma was separated from India, did the British consider it was obligatory to take charge of the Du Was territories and classified them as scheduled kachin frontiers to be taken care of by the Governor of Burma it was no English men but the Americans who brought in civilization religion and Education to the Wunpawng, with Christian teaching and western education, the inherent nationalism whish Wunpawng fostered through ages is leaning towards western Democracy. MILITARY POTENTIAL AND CAPABILITY:- That during the seies of Rangoon in 1824 that Burmese king solicited wunpawng mercenaries to come to his did through the2 renawu Burmese General MAHA BANDOOLA many Wunpawng mercenaries fought for the Burmese king against the British india seroys, Bandoola was a Wunpawng by the name of BUN DU LA, the Burmans usually obliterated the right proper name to cancel authenticity, upserp ation is the common practice of the Burmans above all recognition and respect to Wunpawng sovereignty as and independent nation that Burmese king himself did present his majestic dress to Wunpawng chiefs, it is still with DAI HPA DU WA Hukawng District, and it is a salient fact indeed. It took the British decade to pacify the Wunpawng resisting spirit against s subordination to the British. In 1928 when the British government brought and freed the slaves, then only did the Du Was reconciled with the British authority and become vassals to the Governpr of Burma. With aptitude to military carcer, Wunpawng were drafted into military services. First, military police fprce, then Burma Army, and in world warI the Wunpawng military unit (Bhamo Battalion ) rank and file of 1589 strong were s ent to mediterranean theatre for active combat. In 1917, some 349 Wunpawng soldiera took part in Mesopotamia and Turkey battle frontline actions. A company strength was stationed in Egyt for garrison d uty, the total casualty of Wunpawng soldiers in world war I, was sixty dead and 113 wounded..."
Source/publisher: Major N’Chyaw Tang
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-26
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Title: New US Diplomatic Complex in Thailand Aimed at China and Myanmar
Description: "No one doubts that the American community in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai, which consists mostly of NGO workers, missionaries and retirees, needs consular services. But could that be the only reason why a massive, new United States (US) Consulate General is under construction at a cost of US$300 million? Due to be opened in 2023, the buildings of the diplomatic mission will sprawl over no less than 6.6 acres, or 26,709 square meters, of land in a business park on the outskirts of Chiang Mai. In a colorful, online brochure, the US Consul General in Chiang Mai describes the project as “a concrete sign of our long-term commitment to the people of northern Thailand and the future of our partnership” and the text goes on to state that the US Consulate General is “dedicated to serving the local American community or those wishing to travel to the United States”. While all of that may be accurate, Michael Vatikiotis, a Singapore-based British analyst, argues in an op-ed piece for Nikkei Asia on January 7 that Beijing sees the construction of a such a huge diplomatic complex only 500 kilometers from the Chinese border and even closer to Myanmar and Laos “as an attempt to reinforce existing US intelligence gathering capacity in northern Thailand”. Covert US activity of that kind would fit into the broader picture of geostrategic rivalries in the region. The rise of China as an economic and political superpower in Asia has been met by the formation of new alliances in the region. The first was the Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which was set up in 2007 and brings the US together with Japan, India and Australia. Then, on September 15 last year, the formation of AUKUS, or the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact, was announced with the specific purpose of coordinating activities in the spheres of “cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional underwater capabilities.” Under the terms of the pact, the US and the UK will help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Both pacts are widely seen as efforts to counter China’s influence in the contested South China Sea and the Chinese navy’s increasingly frequent forays into the Indian Ocean. That was not lost on Beijing, who especially condemned the establishment of AUKUS. Only two days after the announcement of the pact, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said the alliance risked “severely damaging regional peace… and intensifying the arms race.” He also criticised what he called “the obsolete Cold War… mentality” of the pact’s members and warned them that they were “hurting their own interests.” In an editorial published in the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Global Times on September 30, the rhetoric was even blunter and more vitriolic: “The three countries, drawing lines based on ideology, have built a new military bloc that will heighten geopolitical tensions. The international community rejects the Cold War and its divisions, but the US blatantly violates its political claims of not engaging in any new Cold War and gangs up with others to create a small Anglo-Saxon ‘clique,’ putting geopolitical self-interest above international solidarity. This is a typical Cold War mentality”. The editorial also warned of the danger of an escalating arms race: “The move will spur regional countries to accelerate the development of military capabilities, and even seek to break the nuclear threshold and increase the risk of military conflict. The US, on the one hand, hands out sanctions and suppresses some countries to pressure them not to develop nuclear capabilities, while on the other hand flagrantly transferring nuclear technologies to non-nuclear states. This is a typical double standard”. The Global Times editorial did not expand on the reference to the possibility of nuclear proliferation, and Australia will certainly not become a nuclear power just because it is about to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. But the harsh rhetoric shows how concerned China’s government is, and that the battlelines in the new Cold War are becoming clearer. China is seen as the enemy of a range of countries which consider themselves guardians of democratic values. Needless to say, there are also competing economic interests between China and its adversaries. An increasingly affluent Asia is a huge market for consumer goods and the region is rich in natural and mineral resources which many countries are eager to exploit. That competition can be seen also on land and it’s no coincidence that Chiang Mai has been chosen as a strategic listening post in the region. And in that regard, it appears that old ghosts have come alive again. The Americans first set up a diplomatic mission in Chiang Mai in 1950, and it was then mainly an intelligence station that coordinated support for nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, forces that had retreated into Shan State in eastern Myanmar after their defeat in the Chinese Civil War. A string of bases was established just across the border in Shan State and, to the north, along the Chinese border. The tiny airstrip at Möng Hsat opposite Thailand’s Chiang Rai province was transformed into a formidable air base capable of receiving C-46 and C-47 transport planes, which brought in arms, ammunition, and medical supplies. This dramatic build-up was a joint venture between the Republic of China’s Kuomintang government, which still controlled the island of Taiwan, and the US security authorities to encircle and try to reconquer the Chinese mainland. But the effort failed miserably. The Shan State-based “secret Kuomintang” army attempted on no less than seven occasions in the early 1950s to invade neighboring Yunnan Province in China, but was repeatedly driven back across the border. Then came the wars in Indochina, and the US consulate in Chiang Mai oversaw the gathering of human as well as signals intelligence in the region. Local agents were sent across the border and the Americans together with the Thais had an extensive network of listening posts in northern Thailand. The main such facility was located at Ramasun, 20 kilometers south of Udon Thani in northeastern Thailand. That base was first established in 1966 but then as an outpost for the main facility in Bangkok. In 1970, it was upgraded to an AN/FLR-9 Circular Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA) station, a large, circular array of Wullenweber antennas commonly referred to by the nickname “Elephant Cage” because its shape resembled an elephant kraal. The Ramasun facility picked up radio traffic from Laos, southern China and North Vietnam and monitored Chinese military movements in the region. Most importantly, it served as a military intelligence terminal for communications between the US and its various intelligence sites in Southeast and East Asia. A similar signals intelligence facility was established near Lampang, 108 kilometers south of Chiang Mai, for the specific purpose of monitoring radio traffic in northern Myanmar and Yunnan. American Chinese language experts translated intercepted messages into English, and Burmese-speaking Shans translated messages in Burmese into Thai and English. A major target at that time was the China-supported Communist Party of Burma (CPB). There was always the possibility of a linkup between the CPB and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), which would open a direct route for arms flowing down from China and into Southeast Asia. China’s plan at the time was to use Myanmar as a springboard to reach not only the CPT but, at least until the 1960s, communist movements in Malaya (now Malaysia) and Indonesia. The “Elephant Cage” at Ramasun was officially dismantled in 1976, a year after the end of the Indochina wars and, in 1975, Thailand also switched recognition to the People’s Republic of China from the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Americans withdrew and the Thais took over operation of the Ramasun and Lampang facilities. Over the years, the “Elephant Cages” became obsolete and, in May 1986, the very last of them, in Alaska, was decommissioned. Today, there are more advanced and sophisticated ways of monitoring movements in cyberspace, as well as on the ground. The current US mission in Chiang Mai is located in old buildings overlooking the banks of the Ping River. Some of them were built over a hundred years ago and then called the Chedi Ngam Palace, or the Beautiful Pagoda Palace. The compound once served as the residence of the last ruler of northern Thailand, Chao Kaew Nawarat, who died in 1939. After that it became government property and, eleven years later, the Americans moved in and turned it into a consulate. But it is important to remember that it remained a consulate until 1986 and only then became a Consulate General, or a proper foreign service mission. Before 1986, it was effectively an intelligence station, although it also provided consular services. It is anybody’s guess what roles the new US Consulate General will play when it opens its doors next year. Apart from the obvious — that people will go there to get visas, for cultural events and to visit its libraries — intelligence gathering will most certainly be a top priority. Myanmar-watching will remain one of the consulate general’s main tasks, albeit in a different context as China no longer exports revolution. But Beijing’s expanding economic empire requires political protection and therefore also influence in its neighboring countries. Myanmar is right there, between Thailand and China, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is China’s only direct access to the Indian Ocean. Already in 2017, China’s then Consul General in Chiang Mai, Ren Yisheng, talked about Beijing’s multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative, at the city’s university. Two years later, Ren attended a similar conference in Chiang Rai with the emphasis on development in the so-called Greater Mekong Sub-region, which includes parts of southern China, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. Even China appears to have made Chiang Mai and their Consulate General there a base for their plans for the region. Chinese boats with armed police, seen by this correspondent, are also now for the first time in history venturing down the Mekong River, almost as far as the riverine junction where Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet. That may not be perceived as a major threat to the region, but it is nevertheless a new development that China’s adversaries would be keen to monitor. And while the US has strongly condemned last year’s February 1 coup in Myanmar, China is cozying up to the generals. In August, China transferred US$6 million to Myanmar to be used for projects and programs within Beijing’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework, seemingly a tiny gesture but important in the broader scheme of things. Then there are the insurgencies inside Myanmar where China maintains close links with the United Wa State Army while its rival, the Restoration Council of Shan State, receives most of its supplies from Thailand. The new Cold War may not yet be as hot as the previous one sometimes was, but it is clear that the Americans and their Quad and AUKUS allies are building a bulwark against China and that the construction of a new US Consulate General in Chiang Mai is part of that strategy. But we can only wait and see what that means for the region — and especially for troubled and vulnerable Myanmar. There’s still a long way to go before we could see a return to the open confrontations of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. But, once again, Myanmar may well find itself in the midst of a geopolitical storm..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-24
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Title: Rise of Rakhine Rebels Poses Challenge for Myanmar Junta
Description: "While heavy fighting has been raging in Myanmar’s ethnic minority areas, and clashes between local resistance groups called People’s Defense Forces and the Myanmar military have occurred almost daily since last year’s coup, Rakhine State in the west of the country has been largely peaceful. The Arakan Army (AA), the state’s main rebel force, entered into an informal ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military several months before the February 1 coup and, so far, the truce seems to be holding. But much to the military’s chagrin the AA, or more specifically its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has used the peace to build up a separate administration in the state with its own judicial bodies, revenue department, public security branches and other governmental institutions. The military, on the other hand, is stretched on many fronts across Myanmar and can hardly afford to send the number of troops that would be required to re-establish control over Rakhine State. But it is a fragile ceasefire agreement and it is still a question of who would attack whom first and when. If the generals decide to open a new front in Rakhine State, they would be up against a formidable adversary. From humble beginnings in 2009, the AA has grown into one of Myanmar’s most potent rebel armies. It was originally formed by a group of youngish nationalists led by Twan Mrat Naing, then only 31, and recruits from the many ethnic Rakhine who work in the Hpakant jade mines in Kachin State. Initially trained by the Kachin Independence Army, they first saw combat in 2012 when the military launched a massive offensive against rebel bases along the Chinese border. Three years later, AA troops fought alongside soldiers from the Palaung militia, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in the Kokang area of Shan State in 2015. From then on, the AA grew rapidly and moved most of its operations to its home state of Rakhine. Thousands of young male as well as female nationalists flocked to join the AA, and bitter battles were fought with the Myanmar military. Twan Mrat Naing, now 43 and a Major-General, was born in the Rakhine capital Sittwe and studied law at university but left without getting a degree. In a recent interview with this correspondent, he emphasized the pride that many Rakhine feel for their state and its long and often turbulent history. Rakhine, formerly known as Arakan, was an independent Buddhist kingdom until it was invaded by the Burmese in late 1784 and then, the following year, annexed into the realm ruled by King Bodawpaya of the Konbaung Dynasty. Resistance against the occupation continued until the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824-1826. The Arakan region, along with Tenasserim [now part of Tanintharyi Region] in the southeast, became British possessions. Peace prevailed until World War II, when Myanmar was occupied by the Japanese — and that caused serious divisions within Arakan. Most Buddhist Arakanese sided with the Burma Independence Army — and hence the Japanese — while large segments of the Muslim population in northern Arakan remained loyal to Britain, the colonial power. Immense atrocities were committed by both sides, and those wounds have never completely healed. The departure of the British in 1948 led to a virtual civil war in Arakan. Muslim mujaheed guerrillas — they were then not yet called Rohingya — established bases along the border with East Pakistan and, originally wanted to join independent Pakistan. The Communist Party (Red Flag) (CP[RF]), led by Bonbauk, or “bomb thrower” Tha Gyaw, also battled government forces and so did U Sein Da, a former monk known as “the King of Arakan.” The main Communist Party of Burma (CPB) also established strongholds in Arakan, while breakaway militants from CP[RF] formed a separate Communist Party of Arakan (CPA) and wanted to establish their own people’s republic. Over the years, most of the insurgencies fizzled out. In 1961, the last 500 mujaheeds surrendered as the then U Nu government agreed to set up an autonomous area known as the Mayu Frontier Administration encompassing Maungdaw, Buthidaung and western Rathedaung townships, where Muslims are in a clear majority. General Ne Win’s coup d’etat in 1962 put an end to those efforts and some Muslims formed new groups, notably the Rohingya Independence Force which in 1975 became the Rohingya Patriotic Front. But those groups were small and their activities limited to publishing leaflets and newsletters from their offices in Chittagong, Bangladesh. “Bonbauk” Tha Gyaw had surrendered in 1955 and U Sein Da in 1958. The main CP(RF) leader Thakin Soe was captured in 1970 at his Than Chaung camp near the Arakan Yoma mountains. The CPB’s local leader Kyaw Mya left Arakan in 1979 and went to Bangladesh, where the Chinese embassy helped him to continue on to China and then down to the party’s main headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in Shan State. His successor as local leader of the CPB, Ye Tun, surrendered during a general amnesty in 1980, and so did CPA leader Kyaw Zan Rhee. On the Thai border, a small group called the Arakan Liberation Organization and Army had been formed in 1972, but it had only a handful of soldiers who were based at Kawmoorah, a Karen National Union stronghold north of Mae Sot. Peace seemed to prevail in Arakan, which was renamed Rakhine State in 1974, but then came the 1988 nationwide democracy uprising. Some of the old fighters, among them Kyaw Zan Rhee and “Bonbauk” Tha Gyaw, resurfaced, took part in the pro-democracy movement and formed an overground, legal party called the Arakan People’s United Organization. Another, and stronger, legal political party called the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) also emerged, and was led by Dr U Saw Mra Aung and the historian U Oo Tha Tun. The ALD took part in the 1990 general election but its MPs elect, like all the other elected politicians, were not allowed to take up their seats in Yangon. The elected National Assembly was never convened and instead a mainly military-appointed National Convention was convened to draft a new constitution. U Oo Tha Tun died in prison in 1991 and, in 1992, the ALD was banned. Against that backdrop — and given Arakan/Rakhine’s long history of resistance — it is hardly surprising that the new AA and the ULA have grown so fast and become what they are today. Or, as Myanmar specialist Martin Smith wrote in Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier, which was published by the Netherlands-based Transnational Institute in December 2019: “Among [the many Rakhine groups] only the ULA could be considered as new. But, as its supporters point out, the ULA includes members from other organizations and is the latest in a long line of armed Rakhine movements that date back to independence in 1948. As such, the ULA has quickly become the most powerful force in Rakhine nationalism in many decades.” But the armed wing, the AA, is also facing formidable challenges. The most obvious one is logistical: how to get guns and ammunition from rebel-held areas in Kachin and Shan State — where the main source of military supplies are — to Rakhine? During the fighting before the ceasefire agreement was struck, the AA showed that it had remarkable firepower and the Myanmar military suffered heavy casualties. But if fighting resumes, how can the AA’s troops be resupplied? The other issue would be how to relate to the state’s Muslim population. In recent years, an extremely militant group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has emerged. It launched several attacks on military and police outposts in 2016 and 2017 which, in turn, led to a massive counteroffensive and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to Bangladesh. ARSA should not be considered an indigenous group — it was formed by Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, a second-generation Rohingya. He was born in Karachi, Pakistan, and grew up in Saudi-Arabia, where he was groomed by Islamic fundamentalists. Ataullah has unleashed his fury even on what are supposed to be his own countrymen, among them Mohib Ullah, a Rohingya moderate and human rights activist, who was killed by ARSA in a refugee camp in Bangladesh on September 29, 2021. In a recent video, a visibly angry and agitated Ataullah exhorts his followers to “burn down” the dwellings of Rakhine Buddhists and “strike hard” against them. It may be easy for the AA to distance itself from ARSA, but the Rohingya question is bound to create controversies. While the AA and other Rakhine nationalists accept the fact that Muslims have been living in the area for centuries, and that many more settled in Arakan during the colonial era, they argue that most Rakhine consider the very name ‘Rohingya’ offensive and refuse to use it. According to their line of argument, it gives the impression that the Muslims are not a religious community but a distinct ethnic group, and, as some of the Rohingya claim, that they are the original inhabitants of the land. Rather offensively, nearly all political movements among the Rohingya also have a map of the entire Rakhine State in their emblems. Rakhine nationalists also argue that the name Rohingya was not used by anyone until the 1950s. Those who argue that there is separate Rohingya identity based in history usually quote a 1799 study by Scottish physician and geographer Francis Buchanan-Hamilton, who never went to Arakan but met some Muslims in the then capital Amarapura. He mentions that they referred to themselves as “Rooinga, or natives of Arakan” and then said little more. But, as Martin Smith points out: “After annexation [in 1826], the British do not appear to have used this name again. Muslims in Arakan were instead referred to by such terms as Arakanese Mohammedan, Bengali Muslim, Chittagonian, Kaman and Zerbadi…[and] it would be difficult to imagine a situation in modern-day Europe where discussions of citizenship or identity become based around the writings of an Asian traveler two centuries ago.” Be that as it may, but there are few questions in Myanmar today which are more than contested — and often heated — than disputes over the origin of the name Rohingya, and who and what they are. Internationally, the name Rohingya and their identity as such is almost universally accepted. But it’s an entirely different story in Myanmar, and then not only among the Rakhine. On this issue, most Burmans would be on the same side as the Rakhine nationalists. This year and next may reveal what the future holds for the new nationalist movement in Rakhine State. A lot depends on what happens in the rest of the country. On the one hand, the junta has not managed to consolidate its grip on the country and its coup last year may go down in history as the most unsuccessful attempt to seize power in modern Asian history. That works to the advantage of the ULA and its parallel administration as well as the resistance elsewhere in Myanmar. But, on the other hand, future developments depend on the extent to which the country’s abundance of resistance forces can coordinate their movements — and despite some alliances being forged — there is so far little evidence of that happening..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-20
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Title: Burma Briefing: Is Serbia still arming the Burmese military?
Description: "Serbia has a long and close relationship with the Burmese military. Is Serbia still arming the Burmese military? Since the Burmese military attempted to grab power through a coup on February 1st 2021 there have been unconfirmed rumours and reports of military contacts and Serbia supplying arms or equipment to the Burmese military. These reports have been given more credence by the fact that Serbia has had a close relationship with the Burmese military for decades, signed a defence co-operation agreement in 2015, and continued to supply arms and publicly discuss increased defence co-operation as recently as 2019. In June 2021 Serbia backed a UN General Assembly Resolution calling for the flow of arms to the military to be stopped, but also has a long track record of failing to bring its foreign policy into line with the EU as part of its EU membership process, including continuing to sell arms to the Burmese military despite an EU arms embargo. In August 2021 Burma Campaign UK wrote to the Serbian Embassy in the UK asking for clarification of Serbia’s current policy. We did not receive a response. Serbia must now clarify its policy. It must publicly state that it does now have an arms embargo in place, does not supply military equipment, technology or parts, and that it has ended defence co-operation with the Burmese military. Historically close relations The Serbian government boasts on its website that: “Since the first contacts in the 1950s, the two countries have had very close military and economic co-operation.”1..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-19
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Title: Myanmar Resistance Forces China-Backed Nickel Plant Shut Down
Description: "Three electricity pylons supplying the China-backed Tagaung Taung nickel-processing plant in Sagaing Region have been blown up this month, forcing production to halt. Tigyaing Township People’s Defense Force (PDF) said it blew up the pylons on January 7. The nickel project opened in July 2008 with a 20-year production-sharing contract between the No.1 Mining Enterprise of Myanmar and Chinese state-owned firm China Nonferrous Metal Mining (CNMC). With an investment of US$800 million, the project is the largest nickel production site in Myanmar with an annual production of 85,000 tonnes of ferronickel, according to the joint venture Myanmar CNMC Nickel. Around 5,000 tonnes of ferronickel ore each day is transported from the Mt Tagaung mine in Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region, to Tigyaing where the nickel is smelted. The Chinese Embassy in Yangon has reportedly complained to the parallel National Unity Government about the explosions but no details are known. Chinese mining companies in Myanmar are being called on to demonstrate greater social responsibility and accountability and withdraw their investments since last year’s coup. Activists have pushed for the closures of China-backed mines. A report by Publish What You Pay Australia — a coalition of 30 organizations campaigning for transparency and accountability in the extractive industries — said Chinese-backed mines were financially propping up the junta. The report, How Chinese Mining Investment Funds the Myanmar Military, released in November last year, said the Chinese-run Letpadaung, Sapetaung and Kyesintaung and Tagaung Taung mines paid an estimated US$725 million to the military during the 2020-21 financial year. Myanmar’s three largest mines are run by Chinese state-owned enterprises, Wanbao Mining Ltd and CNMC, with a slice of the profits flowing to the generals, said the report. It said Myanmar’s economy has been in freefall since the coup meaning the regime is increasingly reliant on oil and gas, gemstones and metal mining, often with heavy Chinese investment. More than 1,400 people have been killed by the junta since its takeover in February last year, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-19
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Title: The Revolution Will Succeed if the Myanmar People Are United
Description: "The Myanmar military raided Ohn Nauk Village in Sagaing Region’s Pale Township from January 10-12, employing four helicopters in an attempt to capture Pale People’s Defense Force (PDF) leader Bo Nagar dead or alive. Pale PDF has inflicted heavy casualties on junta troops under the leadership of Bo Nagar. The PDF leader was elsewhere during the raid. Bo Nagar spoke recently to The Irrawaddy about the fighting in his town. When did clashes break out between junta troops and local resistance fighters in Pale? We have been fighting them since around the end of April. Are you worried that the regime is employing large numbers of troops to capture you dead or alive? Yes, I have concerns. But I am also prepared for it. I have left behind those who I was attached to. Now, I have only the people to love and rely on. I have chosen to live for the people over my own life as the country is suffering. I know that there are risks. But even before I risked my neck, I had to sacrifice a lot. I know that there will be more dangers ahead. But I keep pushing ahead. Meanwhile, I have taught and nurtured young people as much as I can so that they can replace me if I die. So there are many people like me now even if I die. They are not yet a significant presence just because I am still here. But I want to say that there are many people like me now. I have concerns [about my safety]. Other people might also have concerns. But I try not to worry too much and I would like to urge the people not to worry. Junta forces recently raided Ohn Nauk Village on a tip that you were there. They even used four helicopters in the raid. What do you say about that? The military regime, after they have fought with us, knows how dangerous I am to them. And they also know through their military informants how much moral support I give to local people. So perhaps they [the junta] view me as their worst enemy. But even if they kill me, there are already many people like me. They [the regime] might not know that there are many people who can replace me now. Do you feel like the regime is attacking you personally? They seem to think that resistance will die away if I am killed. But I have inspired many young people, not only in my township but also in other parts of the country, to continue fighting injustice. The junta may be able to defeat me alone. But they cannot prevent the rise of a new generation of brave revolutionaries. The regime should understand that people loathe them as they are forced to bow down before them. So I urge the regime leaders and followers to surrender and apologize to the people for their sins. Although they are the villains of the country, they can still win the respect of the people in the end if they do apologize. What are your concerns for civilians in Pale? I have a lot of concerns for the people here. As I have built an organization that is concerned with all of Myanmar, I have to make many trips. Things happened in Pale during my first trip and, even though I was away, I was concerned about my town. I am concerned that civilians will be killed and tortured and that resistance fighters will be harmed. I have trained them mentally and physically as much as I can. Although I have left my township, I didn’t leave for my own safety. I went away to make preparations and to do what it takes to achieve liberty for our country. What do you say to people who are concerned about your safety? Don’t worry about me. Just worry that our country remains under the rule of the evil. What do you want to say about the resistance movement? This revolution was born out of our witnessing violence and brutality. There will inevitably be pain and difficulties, as the revolution was born out of the sufferings people have endured for too long. Please stay strong at this moment. There will be hardship in this revolution as we are facing the most unscrupulous people. Think about the hell-like consequences that we might have to face if this revolution fails. So please continue to take part in this revolution with bravery and dignity as citizens who are dutiful to their country and as parents who are dutiful to the younger generations. Once we are united, this revolution will reach its goal smoothly. The military regime is in chaos even though only a few people are fighting. Bearing that in mind, the whole country should rise and take an active part in this revolution..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-18
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Title: SERBIA MUST COMMIT TO ENDING ARMS SALES TO BURMESE MILITARY
Description: "Burma Campaign UK today publishes a new briefing paper, ‘Is Serbia Still Arming the Burmese Military?’, detailing the decades-long relationship between Serbia and the Burmese military. This includes arms sales and discussions on increasing defence co-operation taking place as recently as 2019. The briefing paper is available here. Serbia has not publicly stated that it has ended arms sales and its defence co-operation agreement with the Burmese military since the military coup on 1st February 2021. Serbia is supposed to align its foreign policy with the European Union as part of its membership process but has consistently continued to supply arms despite an EU arms embargo. The Serbian government did not respond to correspondence from Burma Campaign UK requesting clarification on their current policy. “Given its long track record of arming the Burmese military and ignoring human rights, Serbia must now state unequivocally that it has ended arms sales to the Burmese military,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. Burma was Yugoslavia’s first international customer for arms sales. Ne Win’s military dictatorship admired and was inspired by the so-called socialist policies of the Yugoslavian dictatorship and its non-aligned foreign policy. The two regimes became close allies. Yugoslavia was a major arms supplier to Ne Win’s dictatorship from the 1950s onwards, including jets and heavy artillery. That relationship continued after the break-up of Yugoslavia, with Serbia signing a defence co-operation agreement with the Burmese military in 2015. Since the military coup, Serbia has aligned itself with EU declarations on Burma, and supported a June 2021 UN General Assembly resolution calling for a halt to the flow of arms to the Burmese military. However, it has also broken with other European countries in its diplomatic approach, recognizing the military as the government of Burma by inviting them as the representative of Burma at a summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in October 2021. Calls for a global arms embargo have grown since the military coup, but with Russia and China likely to veto a UN Security Council resolution on an arms embargo, attention has moved to expanding the number of countries with unilateral arms embargoes. More than 70 of the 119 countries which backed the UN General Assembly Resolution do not have unilateral arms embargoes in place. Since the coup, South Korea and Japan have imposed arms embargoes and New Zealand has confirmed it bans the export of all military equipment and technology to Burma. Last week British Member of Parliament Rushanara Ali published a statement welcoming confirmation from the Turkish Ambassador in the UK that Turkey bans the export of military equipment to Burma. “The Burmese military has declared war against the people of Burma, cutting the supply of arms to the military is essential,” said Anna Roberts. “Serbia, as a long-term supplier of arms to the Burmese military, must now publicly commit to a complete ban on the sales of arms, equipment and technology.”..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-18
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Title: Pay Your Power Bill, Myanmar Soldiers Say, or Pay With Your Life
Sub-title: Facing a huge loss of revenue amid economic turmoil, the military has sent soldiers to act as debt collectors.
Description: "The schoolteacher had just gotten out of bed when four Myanmar army soldiers pounded on her door. Her electricity payment was overdue, they said, and ordered her to pay it immediately at the government power company office. The teacher, Daw Thida Pyone, asked what would happen if she refused. “One soldier pointed his gun at me and said, ‘If you choose your money over your life, then don’t go pay the bill,’” she recounted. She was so frightened she got goose bumps. She grabbed her money and went straight to the payment office, not even taking time to change out of her yellow and pink pajamas. After the Myanmar military seized power in a Feb. 1 coup, millions of people walked off their jobs in protest. Millions also began refusing to pay for electricity, an act of civil disobedience aimed at depriving the junta of a crucial source of revenue. Experts doubt that these efforts alone can bring down the regime. But eleven months after the coup, the military appears so desperate for cash that its soldiers have begun acting as debt collectors. For weeks, residents say, troops have been going door to door alongside power company workers to extract payments in major urban areas, including the nation’s two largest cities, Yangon and Mandalay. The soldier’s threat to Ms. Thida Pyone was part of a wider, violent crackdown as the regime has tried to crush street protests and the civil disobedience movement. Soldiers and the police have killed at least 1,466 civilians, including nearly 200 who died during torture at interrogation centers, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. At least 85 young protesters were shot in the head at demonstrations, the rights group said. The coup and subsequent crackdown also threw the nation’s economy into crisis as millions left their jobs in protest, including doctors, engineers, bank staff, power company employees and railway workers. Most have not returned. The economy had previously been projected to grow in 2021, but with the coup and the Covid-19 pandemic, the World Bank estimates that it contracted by more than 18 percent instead. The United Nations Development Program predicts that urban poverty rates will triple by early 2022, according to a December report based on a survey of 1,200 households. “A slide into poverty of this scale could mean the disappearance of the middle class — a bad omen for any rapid recovery from this crisis,” Kanni Wignaraja, director of the agency’s bureau for Asia and the Pacific, said in a statement accompanying the report. Myanmar’s currency, the kyat, has plummeted since the coup to less than half its previous value, driving up prices for imports such as fuel and cooking oil. Cash remains in short supply as people, lacking confidence in the banks, hoard kyat. Banks are no longer stocking even a handful of A.T.M.s. Customers who want their money must obtain a token online or make an appointment by phone; both are almost impossible to do. Most people get cash from their accounts by transferring it to a broker and paying a commission of as much as 7 percent. After a previous military regime began opening the country in 2010, Myanmar saw economic growth with increased international investment and a higher standard of living. The coup has undone this progress. “In the past 10 months, the country has lost all its gains from the past 10 years,” said U Hein Maung, an economist based in Myanmar. “The cost of doing business has increased substantially. There is a booming informal economy of drug trafficking, illegal logging, money laundering and other illegal businesses.” A decline in electricity payments, as well as tax revenues and international development assistance, has cost the regime about a third of the revenue that the previous government used to receive, he said. Many public services, like health care and schools, are barely functioning, and the regime has halted many longer-term programs reliant on state funding, such as infrastructure projects. “They are in zombie mode,” Mr. Hein Maung said. “They are functioning in the minimum viable way.” Nevertheless, the military is in a better position than the public to withstand the downturn. “The military has its own businesses and banks,” he said. “They can survive despite the fact that everything else has collapsed. And they have the guns, of course.” Myanmar’s shadow opposition government, the National Unity Government, has urged the public to stop paying for electricity. In September, it said that 97 percent of people in Mandalay and 98 percent in Yangon had done so, costing the regime $1 billion by that point. Ko Si Thu Aung, 24, who sells vintage clothes online, had not paid his bill since February in support of the civil disobedience movement. But on Christmas Day, soldiers came to his home and cut the power line. After two days without electricity, he decided he had no choice. “If there is no electricity, I can’t work,” he said as he stood in line with more than 300 others waiting to pay their bills at the office of the Mandalay Electricity Supply Cooperative. “I feel bad because our money will become bullets to kill people.” He said he would atone by donating more than the amount of his electricity payment to the People’s Defense Force, an anti-regime militia formed since the coup. Opponents of the regime have also targeted lesser revenue sources, such as motor vehicle payments, by not renewing driver’s licenses or car registration. Soldiers have begun trying to collect more money by stopping drivers at random and inspecting their documents. And revenue from the state-run lottery dropped to nearly zero after most of the public stopped buying tickets. Opponents also have mounted a boycott against companies owned by the military, which operates two vast conglomerates with more than 120 subsidiaries. Among those affected are military-owned beer producers, banks, a cigarette manufacturer, tourist hotels, an insurance company and the cellphone company Mytel, a joint venture with Vietnam’s defense ministry. In Mandalay, where the power goes out every day for hours at a time, the regime’s strong-arm campaign to collect electricity payments began in October. Power outages were common before the coup but recently have become longer and more frequent. The energy ministry blames the outages in part on a fourfold increase in the price of imported natural gas. Sometimes, in their effort to collect payment, troops sever the cables supplying power to individual homes. Dr. Wai Phyo Aung, 36, a Mandalay dentist, said soldiers came to his neighborhood at the end December and cut the power lines of residents with the largest outstanding bills. One man who took a photo of a soldier cutting a cable was arrested, he said. But he said he would refuse to give the regime any money. He has not paid his bill since the coup. “If they come to my house and cut the electricity, I don’t care,” he said. “I will never pay the bill. I don’t care even if they kill me. I won’t let my money kill citizens and feed the war dogs.” Ms. Thida Pyone, 39, who stood in the payment line in her pajamas, said she felt that she had no choice. “They are threatening people in all possible ways,” she said. “I feel guilty for paying the bill, but I am afraid they will kill me.”..."
Source/publisher: "The New York Times" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-16
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Title: Myanmar Events of 2021
Description: "The military coup on February 1, 2021, effectively ended the democratic transition under Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD was poised to return to power for another five years after winning landslide general elections in November 2020. Instead, under the military State Administration Council (SAC) junta led by Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, soldiers and police rounded up hundreds of members of parliament, including Aung San Suu Kyi and senior NLD party members, and held them in arbitrary detention for months, many of them in undisclosed locations. The military seized power making unfounded claims of widespread and systematic election and voter irregularities, although international and domestic election observers found that the election was “credible and reflected the will of the majority of the voters.” The junta brought multiple charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, including for corruption, incitement, and breaching the Official Secrets Act. Three of her deposed cabinet ministers and an Australian economic adviser also faced charges under the Official Secrets Act. Millions took to the streets across the country in largely peaceful protests to call for the military to relinquish power, while members of parliament, ethnic minority representatives, and civil society activists formed the opposition National Unity Government (NUG). The security forces responded by committing offenses amounting to crimes against humanity against the civilian population, including torture, severe deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances, rape and other sexual abuse, and inhumane treatment. Journalists, lawyers, medical personnel, anti-junta protesters, civil society activists, women, and many others continue to be at high risk of arbitrary arrest. Between February 1 and November 1, the police and military killed at least 1,200 protesters and bystanders, including approximately 75 children, and have detained over 8700 government officials, activists, journalists, and civil servants. On March 14, the junta imposed martial law in several townships across Yangon and began to enforce additional restrictions in other parts of the country. On May 13, the junta also imposed martial law in Chin State’s Mindat township after clashes between security forces and lightly armed opposition militias. Under martial law orders, direct authority over the townships was transferred to the respective regional military commanders. Since the coup, the military has intensified military operations against ethnic armed groups in some areas, such as Chin State. The military’s indiscriminate use of artillery and airstrikes has reportedly injured and killed civilians, damaged villages, including schools, and forced thousands to flee. Post-Coup Crimes against Humanity The security forces have engaged in widespread and systematic attacks on civilians throughout Myanmar, including killing protesters, enforced disappearance of opposition supporters, torture, sexual abuse, rape of some detainees, and mass political detentions. On February 21, 2021, the junta stated in the state’s Global New Light of Myanmar: “Protesters are now inciting the people, especially emotional teenagers and youth, to a confrontation path where they will suffer the loss of life.” Many of the 1,200 people killed by police and military since the coup were protesters and bystanders in cities and towns across Myanmar, including Yangon, Mandalay, Bago, Monywa, and other townships in Sagaing Region, Mindat township in Chin State, and many other locations. International human rights standards permit law enforcement officials to use lethal force only as a last resort when there is an imminent threat to life. But in numerous cases in 2021 reported by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, other human rights organizations, and media, security forces fired on demonstrators who were unarmed and posed no apparent threat. The UN reported that on March 3, security forces across the country fired live rounds at protesters, killing at least 38 and wounding more than 100. Killings were also reported in one day in Monywa, Sagaing Region; Myingyan and Mandalay, Mandalay Region; Salin, Magway Region; and Mawlamyine, Mon State, according to media reports. On March 13, authorities killed at least nine protesters, including five in the Sein Pan area of Mandalay, when security forces shot into a crowd. On March 14 in Hlaing Tharyar township, Yangon, security forces killed an estimated 66 people, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The MRTV news channel announced the day before Armed Forces Day, on March 27, that demonstrators “should learn from the tragedy of earlier ugly deaths that you can be in danger of getting shot to the head and back.” On March 27, security forces followed through on that threat by carrying out violent crackdowns on protesters in at least 40 towns and cities, killing dozens. On April 9, military personnel killed an estimated 82 people in Bago in a dawn assault on protesters’ barricades and encampments; exact figures have been difficult to determine due to a strong security presence and lack of access to the area by reporters or independent investigators. Many persons detained for taking part in pro-democracy demonstrations said after their release that security personnel tortured and otherwise ill-treated them and others in custody. Methods of torture included beatings, mock executions with guns, burning with cigarettes, and rape and threatened rape. The junta has taken into custody more than 100 politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, and protesters, and refused to confirm their whereabouts or conditions of detention in violation of international law. Security forces frequently detained family members, including children and older people, when they were unable to find the individual they sought to arrest. Threats to Rohingya Authorities have been committing the crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and severe deprivation of liberty against 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State. Most Rohingya had fled the country following the military’s campaign of killings, rape, and arson that resulted in crimes against humanity and genocidal acts in 2017. Approximately 130,000 Rohingya have been confined to open-air detention camps in central Rakhine State since being displaced by ethnic cleansing in 2012, in violation of their fundamental right to return home. They are denied freedom of movement in what amounts to arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of liberty. Following the coup, restrictions on humanitarian access increased, leading to preventable deaths and illnesses in Rohingya camps and villages. In late May, nine children reportedly died Rakhine State following an outbreak of acute watery diarrhea. Threats to Women’s and Girls’ Rights Women have led and taken part in mass protests as part of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against the junta. Female protesters were some of the first killed by security forces and arbitrarily detained. Many women reported being beaten by security forces during their arrests, and some reported credible allegations of sexual violence and humiliating treatment by security forces during their detention. Trafficking of women and girls remains a serious problem in Shan and Kachin States, where conflict and economic desperation has made them vulnerable to being lured to China under false promises and sold into sexual slavery and forced reproduction as “brides.” The NLD government, prior to the coup, was unable to pass the Prevention of Violence Against Woman Law. While the law had been criticized for falling well short of international standards, the absence of targeted legislation has stalled efforts to prevent gender-based violence, assist survivors, and bring perpetrators to justice. Freedom of Expression and Media As of October 25, Myanmar’s junta had arrested 98 journalists, 46 of whom remained in detention, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Six journalists had been convicted, including five for violating section 505A of the penal code, a new provision that makes it a crime to publish or circulate comments that “cause fear” or spread “false news.” In such prosecutions, “false news” appears to be any news that the authorities do not want to reach the public. On March 8, the junta stripped media licenses from five local outlets: Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), Khit Thit Media, Mizzima, Myanmar Now, and 7Day. On May 4, authorities banned two other outlets, the Kachin-based 74 Media and the Shan-based Tachileik News Agency, and also banned satellite television. Also, on May 4, authorities arrested US journalist Danny Fenster, the managing editor of Frontier Myanmar, and detained him on politically motivated charges. On November 12, a court sentenced him to 11 years’ hard labor, but he was permitted to leave the country on November 15. On June 30, the Ministry of Information issued a warning to journalists to stop describing the SAC as a “junta” or face prosecution. Internet Shutdowns In the weeks following the coup, the junta imposed nationwide internet shutdowns from 1 a.m. to 9 a.m., which were later lifted, but authorities continued to block many websites and throttled internet speeds throughout the year. Blocks to mobile data and networks also continued across 22 townships where anti-junta opposition resulted in heavy clashes between the Myanmar military and pro-democracy militia groups. Threats to Humanitarian Aid Increased fighting between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups in the border areas in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, and Shan States has increased strain on access and limited humanitarian aid to those areas. The UN said, in July, at least 3 million people needed humanitarian aid—an increase of 2 million since February 1—and food shortages were reported in parts of Chin and Rakhine States. Anti-Junta Militias Militias have formed around the country since the coup to oppose the junta and target security forces. Many of the militias have adopted the title of People’s Defense Forces, the same name the NUG adopted for the nationwide force it created. However, not all the recently formed People’s Defense Forces are linked to the NUG or take orders from its command structure. These militias began conducting small-scale attacks against the military in July. In Sagaing and Magway Regions and Chin State, intense fighting between the militias and the military reportedly killed hundreds of troops. The military responded with increased raids and by burning villages. Some militias have carried out unlawful bombings of buildings and targeted killings of civilian supporters of the military. On September 7, acting NUG President Duwa Lashi La declared a “defensive war” against the military junta. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Myanmar’s penal code punishes “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” with up to 10 years in prison and a fine. The opposition NUG reported that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people have been particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in custody. One transgender woman recounted after her release that she was raped in custody with an object, tortured, and severely beaten. Covid-19 and Attacks on Healthcare Workers By November 2021, just 13 percent of Myanmar's 54 million population was fully vaccinated. A total 17,998 deaths were recorded by the Ministry of Health between March 2020 and October 2021, although the actual numbers are likely much higher. The junta has harassed, arbitrarily arrested, and attacked medical professionals, sometimes as they treated injured protesters. Healthcare workers were early leaders of the opposition Civil Disobedience Movement and refused to work in government hospitals as a form of protest. In the nine months following the coup, at least 260 healthcare workers were attacked while trying to administer medical aid, and 20 killed. The AAPP said 76 remained in detention in September, and as many as 600 healthcare workers had outstanding arrest warrants against them. Many have been forced to work underground in makeshift mobile clinics to treat Covid-19 patients or have gone into hiding to evade arrest. The UN Country Team in Myanmar has said that attacks on healthcare workers have jeopardized the Covid-19 response and prevented patients from receiving health care. Key International Actors In February, the UN Human Rights Council held a special session and adopted by consensus a resolution deploring the removal of the elected government and calling for the unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained. A further resolution was adopted at the council’s March session “condemning in the strongest terms” the military deposition of the civilian government, and highlighting the need for accountability. In June, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution strongly condemning the February 1 coup. The General Assembly also made several important recommendations, including calling for all members states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar. The UN Security Council did not follow up and pass a legally binding resolution of its own that would impose a global ban on the transfer of weapons and dual-use technologies to Myanmar. Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have imposed targeted sanctions against Myanmar’s top military officials and members of the junta, conglomerates, and companies owned or controlled by the military. However, foreign governments did not impose sanctions on oil and gas revenues, the junta's main source of revenues. In October, the US Congress introduced the BURMA Act 2021, supporting authorization of further targeted sanctions and recommended the US government make a Rohingya genocide determination. The European Parliament also supported recognizing the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar and urged further EU sanctions against military-owned businesses. While the EU expressed support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a mediator with the Myanmar military, it also condemned the coup in “the strongest terms.” The UN-backed Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) is mandated to build case files to support efforts to hold individuals legally accountable for serious international crimes. The IIMM is “closely monitoring” events and is collecting evidence of such crimes committed following the coup, and said if substantiated, the alleged violations could amount to crimes against humanity. On April 24, ASEAN negotiated a five-point consensus plan with the military, and appointed Brunei diplomat Erywan Yusof as special envoy. The military’s failure to implement the five-point plan led ASEAN to exclude junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing from its October summit. At the International Criminal Court, the prosecutor is investigating Myanmar for the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution, based on the completion of these crimes in Bangladesh, an ICC member, following the 2017 ethnic cleansing campaign against the Rohingya. In July, citing Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, the NUG lodged a declaration with the ICC accepting the court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed in Myanmar since July 1, 2002. Gambia’s case alleging Myanmar’s violation of the Genocide Convention continued before the International Court of Justice, with Myanmar raising preliminary objections to the court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of Gambia’s application..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-14
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Title: Myanmar junta replaces air force chief amid bombing campaign - sources
Description: "Myanmar's military leader has removed the head of the air force, local media and four sources close to the armed forces said, replacing one of the most senior figures in a junta that has carried out bombing raids to try to crush resistance. The sources told Reuters that 57-year-old Maung Maung Kyaw, a general from an elite military background, had been ousted from the post he had held since 2018. Two of the sources said he was replaced on Monday by Htun Aung, who had been the air force's chief of staff. There was no public announcement that Maung Maung Kyaw had been removed and Reuters was unable to establish why junta leader Min Aung Hlaing had removed him. Military spokesman Zaw Min Tun did not respond to a request for comment on whether Maung Maung Kyaw had been removed. The spokesman was quoted by local news outlet Eleven Media as saying Maung Maung Kyaw had ended his service after a four-year term. Reuters was unable to contact Maung Maung Kyaw directly, and requests for comment through the military received no response. Since the coup on Feb. 1 last year in which an elected government was overthrown, and during the protests that followed the coup, the air force has been used to ferry troops around Myanmar to quell opposition. Witnesses say the air force has also been used for bombing raids that have killed civilians. The junta has not commented on the allegations. It says it does not target civilians, only "terrorists". The junta, which has jailed ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi and most of her allies, calls the opposition forces loyal to her deposed government "terrorists". The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a human rights group, says more than 1,400 people have been killed in violence since the coup, including those killed in bombing raids. The junta disputes the reported number of casualties. Maung Maung Kyaw was the subject of a Reuters investigation last year that revealed his family members, including his son and nephew, were part of a young generation of military families with business interests including supplying the armed forces. Photos and postings on social media – showing parties at expensive venues in Singapore and trips to Bangkok, London and Santorini – showed his family members enjoying a lifestyle far out of reach for the vast majority of Burmese. Maung Maung Kyaw, who has had sanctions imposed on him by the United States over his role in the coup, did not respond to questions Reuters sent to the military before publication of its investigation. In recent weeks, aerial bombardment of the town of Loikaw in eastern Kayah state, bordering Thailand, where ethnic armed groups have joined forces with newly formed anti-coup armed organizations, has forced thousands of people to flee. Opponents of the junta say Myanmar's military has sustained heavy losses during the fighting. The junta has not commented on the reports that it has suffered heavy losses..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-13
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Title: Cambodia shelves first ASEAN meeting over attendance 'difficulties'
Description: "Cambodia said on Wednesday it had postponed a meeting of foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) scheduled for next week, because some ministers had expressed “difficulties” in attending. The meeting was the first under Cambodia's chairmanship of the 10-member bloc, which comes amid divisions on how to deal with reut.rs/30NQFot the military that seized power in Myanmar last year and has led a bloody crackdown on thousands of its opponents. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen met Myanmar's military ruler reut.rs/3ngcp4w Min Aung Hlaing last week, the first such visit by a head of government, sparking concern that it could undermine international efforts to isolate the junta. “The postponement is because of many ASEAN ministers are having difficulties to travel to join,” Cambodia foreign ministry spokesperson Koy Kuong told reporters, without elaborating. Asked separately by Reuters which ministers could not attend the Jan 18-19 meeting in Siem Reap and why, Koy Kuong said he “can’t speak for them”. Under Brunei's chairmanship, ASEAN late last year took the unprecedented step of sidelining reut.rs/3n0roOZ Min Aung Hlaing from its annual leaders' summit over his failure to honour commitments he made towards ending violence and starting a dialogue process. The exclusion reut.rs/3jwe8k4 angered the junta, which said outside powers had pressured ASEAN to break its own code of consensus and non-interference. Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia had backed excluding the junta. Cambodia, however, is taking "different approaches", reut.rs/3K36kC4 its foreign minister, Prak Sokhonn, and said on Saturday, while denying that Hun Sen's visit was an endorsement of the Myanmar military. Prak Sokhonn was expecting to be appointed special ASEAN envoy to the Myanmar situation at the Siem Reap meeting. On Saturday, he criticised the previous envoy, Erywan Yusof, as being unproductive in insisting on access to ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been convicted in recent weeks of several offences, including incitement.
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-12
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Title: Cambodian Leader Draws People’s Fury as He Arrives in Junta-Ruled Myanmar
Description: "Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen turned out to be an unwelcome visitor to Myanmar as he began his two-day trip to the country on Friday, his arrival strenuously denounced by the people of the Southeast Asia nation for his engagement with the Myanmar regime, which has killed more than 1,300 people since seizing power last year. Hun Sen landed in Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw on Friday morning for a two-day visit at the invitation of the country’s coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. He met with the general and ……………., becoming the first foreign leader to meet the junta leadership since the coup. Many fear his visit will confer on Min Aung Hlaing and his junta the legitimacy they have so far failed to establish, as Cambodia currently holds the rotating chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which Myanmar belongs. They also questioned how someone with a record as a notorious violator of human rights could hold the junta to account for its abuses. Since the moment it was announced last month, Hun Sen’s visit has been denounced by critics who warned his unilateral initiative could have far-reaching consequences for ASEAN, potentially undermining the regional bloc’s credibility to mediate a political solution. Relations between ASEAN and Myanmar turned sour last year when the bloc excluded Min Aung Hlaing from its summit over his failure to implement a peace plan known as the Five Point Consensus, which he had agreed with the regional group. The agreed steps include an immediate cessation of violence in the country and allowing the bloc’s special envoy to visit, among others. Hun Sen responded that he was just trying to bring Myanmar back into the ASEAN fold and urged his critics not to pre-judge his visit, adding that his goals were “not far from” the consensus. His assurances failed to appease many in Myanmar, however. His visit has met with a level of denunciation unprecedented for a visiting foreign dignity. A few days before his visit, a series of explosions occurred near the Cambodian Embassy in Yangon. Across the country, people have staged protests against his visit, holding placards reading, “We Don’t Need You Hun Sen,” and “You are Not Welcomed to Myanmar” while stepping on portraits of him. Hundreds of anti-junta groups issued a statement urging Hun Sen to call off the visit. On the eve of his departure for Naypyitaw, Hun Sen experienced the condemnation up close and personal as Myanmar people flocked to his Facebook page to post angry comments about his visit under his 41st wedding anniversary post. Many left comments such as “Shame on You” or “We don’t need you Mr Hun Sen , you’re not welcome” accompanied by memes portraying Min Aung Hlaing and Hun Sen. Another said, “You dictator is ruling Cambodia against the will of Cambodians. Now trying to support Burmese military to be the same. Sorry your days are numbered.” Hun Sen’s visit coincides with an escalation of the regime’s attacks on armed resistance forces, mainly made up of civilians who reject the regime’s rule in the country’s southeastern Kayah State. Shortly before his visit, the Cambodian prime minister discussed developments in Myanmar via phone with Indonesian President Joko Widodo. The president later said in a Twitter post that during the call he reiterated clearly Indonesia’s position on the importance of implementing the five-point consensus to bring democracy back to Myanmar through inclusive dialogue. “Should there be no significant progress on the implementation of 5PCs [the five-point consensus], Myanmar should only be represented by non-political level at ASEAN meetings,” he posted on Wednesday. On Friday, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the parliamentary wing of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), said military leaders who commit human rights abuses and other violations should be isolated, adding that engaging with them could have no positive outcomes for Myanmar and its people. “We reiterate our call for cooperation only with the legitimate institutions, including the CRPH comprising those elected by the people of Myanmar, and the NUG,” it said in its announcement. Human Rights Watch said Hun Sen’s meeting as ASEAN chair with Myanmar’s military leadership is an affront to the people of Myanmar, who strongly oppose the visit. Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said Hun Sen’s decision to meet, without preconditions, the leaders of Myanmar’s military will only lend underserved international legitimacy to the junta. “A unilateral visit by Hun Sen is doomed to not yield solutions, especially if he won’t meet and confer with the representatives of the people elected to parliament in the November 2020 election, such as the National Unity Government, which has the support of most elected MPs,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-07
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Title: Myanmar: 20 civilians reported killed in latest military attack in rebel hotspot
Description: "Around 20 civilians have been killed and nearly 40 homes destroyed in a Myanmar village, according to local media, the latest in a series of massacres allegedly committed by the military. The victims of the attack in late December were found in the north-eastern Sagaing region, and included four men 60 or older, online news outlet Myanmar Now reported. The military seized power in a coup in February last year, creating a political crisis that has developed into a civil war marked by extreme brutality by security forces. Sagaing was one of the first areas where civilians rose up in armed rebellion after the military slaughtered hundreds of peaceful protesters. The region has seen armed clashes, multiple massacres and military airstrikes. According to Myanmar Now, the military occupied Natchaung village in late December, with resistance groups compiling a list of victims on 31 December. The year ended with a number of other violent incidents. The military allegedly massacred more than 30 civilians in Kayah State on Christmas Eve, near the border with Thailand, including women, children and two members of international humanitarian organisation Save the Children. While the United Nations called for a “thorough and transparent investigation into the incident”, state media dismissed the reports as a “plot … drawn up based on their whims and fancies”. A spokesperson for the Kayah state police, a revolutionary force formed by officers who defected after the coup, said during a press conference that they had received missing person reports of 42 people, but have confirmed 31 deaths. A doctor said many of the bodies bore signs of torture. Fighting also broke out in Karen state in December after military forces entered territory controlled by an ethnic armed group sympathetic to the pro-democracy movement, arresting political dissidents in hiding. Thousands fled as fighting spread throughout the state, with many seeking refuge in Thailand, where an estimated 6,000 still remain with limited access to basic necessities..."
Source/publisher: Dozens of homes reported destroyed in junta attack in north-eastern Sagaing region, one of the first areas where civilians rose up
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-06
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Title: Burma Independence Day
Description: "On behalf of the United States of America, I extend my support for the people of Burma as they celebrate their Independence Day on January 4. We honor the people of Burma who are striving to restore an inclusive path to democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law for all people in the country. The United States remains committed to the people of Burma, who will not give up hope for a better future, even as they suffer horrific abuses by the regime. We reiterate our call for the military regime to cease immediately the use of violence, release all those unjustly detained, and return Burma’s path to a genuine and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher: United States Department of State
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-03
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Title: The Much Misunderstood Wa of Myanmar and China
Description: "Stories from an Ancient Land: Perspectives on Wa History and Culture By Magnus Fiskesjö Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2021, 314 pages. US$145 (hardcover), US$33.03 (Kindle) The Wa, who live on both sides of the Myanmar-China border, are probably Southeast Asia’s most misunderstood—and often maligned—ethnic minority. Over the years, they have been described as wild headhunters, communist rebels, drug traffickers and puppets of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In Myanmar, many people seem to believe that they are a kind of Chinese when they are, in fact, a Mon-Khmer tribe related to the Palaung of northern and eastern Shan State. This book by US-based Swedish anthropologist Magnus Fiskesjö, therefore, is a very welcome contribution to a better understanding of the Wa. Although his field work was done almost exclusively on the Chinese side of the border, his accounts of Wa culture and history, and the group’s troubled relationship with the Chinese state, should be essential reading for anyone interested in peace along the common border. And that is especially important now, given the United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s position as the strongest and best-equipped ethnic armed group in the country at a time when Myanmar is descending into chaos. They have not, so far, played any direct role in domestic politics and they are not fighting the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. But several groups that are, among them the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army, and to a lesser extent the Kachin Independence Army, have benefited from arms, ammunition and other equipment supplied by the UWSA. The Wa in Myanmar have never been controlled by any central authority. During the British time, colonial presence consisted of little more than a few field officers on the outskirts of the hills, and occasional flag-marches up to the border to show the Chinese where their designated territory supposedly ended. After independence, the Wa Hills were ruled by local chieftains and warlords, and, in some parts, remnants of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, forces that had retreated across the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists during the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949. Then, in the early 1970s, the Wa Hills were taken over by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which established a base area covering most of the border mountains. In 1989, the rank-and-file of the CPB’s army, which included thousands of Wa fighters, mutinied against the ageing, staunchly Maoist leadership of the party, drove them into exile in China, and established their own army, the UWSA. Today, the 20,000-30,000-strong UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party, rules the Wa Hills without any central government interference. Their area is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. On the Chinese side, the situation has historically been equally complex. The emperors in Beijing had no jurisdiction over the Chinese Wa Hills, and contacts with the Wa were limited to some merchants who had dealings with them in opium, silver and salt. That changed after 1949, when the PLA moved into the Wa Hills to counter the Kuomintang’s attempts to reenter southern China from their clandestine bases in northeastern Shan State. As Fiskesjö explains, many Wa, who feared the Chinese, then fled into the Myanmar Wa Hills. But, by and large, the PLA treated the local population relatively well because they needed the Wa’s knowledge of terrain in order to secure the border areas, and depended on them for intelligence, even across the border into the Wa Hills of Myanmar, where the Kuomintang had bases. After a few years of comparative leniency, and as soon as the Kuomintang threat had been eliminated, the Chinese introduced a new, and unwelcome, social and political order. Weapons in the possession of Wa villagers, who were used to being armed because they depended on hunting, were confiscated and according to Fiskesjö all paraphernalia associated with head-hunting were destroyed. Drum houses, the main social institution in any Wa village, were torn down, their log drums were thrown out or burned and “the major rituals of the past were abandoned. Chief ritualists and other leaders were demoted, marginalized, or even prosecuted.” Wa elders Fiskesjö spoke to regarded 1958 as the key watershed, “since in that year the Chinese policy shifted from reconciliation to enforcement.” Even the Wa had to become Chinese communists and were herded into people’s communes. But what about head-hunting and opium? According to Fiskesjö, head-hunting as well as poppy appeared “in the Wa lands relatively recently.” Opium, Fiskesjö writes, “was seized upon as a new source of wealth…as a profitable but illicit crop, it could be grown with impunity only in these mountains, well away from the interference of states.” And that happened in the late 19th and early 20th century, presumably because there was then a huge demand for the drug in China. As for head-hunting, in the past bodies of dead tigers were placed outside villages to scare away potential enemies; but “after the wars of the mid-19th century, and with the spread of modern firearms [tigers] have now become scarce…[and] in a way humans replaced tigers as the most dangerous adversary of the land.” Long lines of posts, or a nog in Wa, with dry, whitened skulls on display lined the paths leading into villages and “served as a key Wa weapon of deterrence, legible as such by alien soldier-observers like the British and the Chinese.” The only place where Fiskesjö’s analysis goes astray is when he describes the arrival of the CPB in the Myanmar Wa Hills. He writes that “the Chinese-supported [CPB], equipped with modern weaponry, moved from central Burma into Wa country in the late 1960s.” In fact, the CPB takeover of the border areas came after more than a hundred Myanmar communists, who had been living in exile in China since the early 1950s, came across the border on January 1, 1968 accompanied by a few hundred Kachin, followers of the early rebel leader Naw Seng, who had retreated independently into China at about the same time—and thousands of heavily armed Red Guard volunteers from China who were sent to fight alongside their Myanmar comrades. The first incursion took place at Möng Ko in the north, far from the Wa Hills, and it was not until the early 1970s that the CPB, with Chinese assistance, took over the Wa Hills. The plan was to establish a “liberated area” along the border and from there push down to the Myanmar heartland, where poorly equipped CPB units were still holding out in places like the Pegu Yoma north of Yangon, and pockets in Sagaing Division, the Arakan Hills and Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi). That plan failed as the Tatmadaw realized that it could only contain, not defeat, the “new” CPB forces on the Chinese border—of whom the vast majority soon consisted of Wa conscripts—and, therefore, concentrated its efforts on wiping out the old strongholds in central Myanmar. That strategy proved to be successful and the last of the old major bases, those in the Pegu Yoma, were overrun in 1975. The number of Pegu Yoma survivors who made it to the new, northeastern base area was minimal. When I was at the then CPB headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in 1986-1987, I was able to meet only two such veterans. But Fiskesjö is correct in saying that the imposition of CPB rule over the Wa Hills led to the annihilation of “the long-standing Wa autonomy, or, more precisely, what remained of Wa autonomy after World War II, when parts of the Wa lands became the battleground of Chinese Kuomintang forces on the run from the lost cause of their civil war in China.” Fiskesjö goes on to explain how “the broad assault on Wa cultural and political traditions under the [CPB] in some ways was even more drastic than what occurred in Chinese-annexed Wa territory.” Indeed, the “new” CPB treated the Wa as little more than cannon fodder in their struggle to reach central Myanmar, where the party’s future, if any, would have lied. It is significant that the CPB chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin left his headquarters at Panghsang only to go to China, and, on a few occasions, to Möng Ko. He never even once visited a Wa village inside the CPB-controlled base area to talk to the people there. The outcome of the CPB’s failure to reach the Myanmar heartland was that it became isolated in a remote mountain area where they did not belong and had never intended to stay. That, in turn, led to the 1989 mutiny, in which the CPB’s Wa troops stormed Panghsang and the Myanmar communists, once again, had to seek refuge in China. But this time, China had changed its policy. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, the Myanmar communists were not allowed to engage in any kind of politics, and had to survive on pensions provided to them by Chinese authorities. In one of the most powerful chapters in the book, Fiskesjö describes how commercial entrepreneurs in modern times have built theme parks where supposed head-hunting paraphernalia are on display, and visitors can stay in newly-built huts and watch “wild Wa tribesmen” perform “exotic” dances which have no resemblance to Wa traditions. The much-promoted Wa “hair dance”, where young Wa women toss their long hair back and forth, is one such invention. One of those “China Folk Cultural Villages” in Shenzhen opposite Hong Kong is called “Windows of the World, where young Wa dancers also work — but they perform there as Africans, New Zealand Maoris, and American Indians.” It is no wonder many Wa feel exploited and resent being looked down upon by the Chinese—and that strained relationship, as well as the past Wa history of being oppressed by the Chinese Communist Party, is something most foreign observers have overlooked. The UWSA today may be heavily dependent on the Chinese for trade, and its vast and sophisticated arsenal made up almost entirely of weapons procured in China. But that does not mean that relations between China and the Wa in Myanmar are as smooth as people think. And drugs? Fiskesjö outlines the history of poppy cultivation in the Wa Hills but, as an anthropologist, does not dwell on today’s trade in narcotics. There is no doubt that the UWSA built up its now well-developed, autonomous area in Myanmar with profits from the trade in opium and heroin, and, more recently, methamphetamines. But it would also be fair to say that the organization’s relative wealth today is based on a number of other sources of income as well. Tin mining and the extraction of rare earth metals are believed to be more lucrative than the trade in narcotics. The price of the book, US$145, may make most people interested in the topic reluctant to buy it, but there is also a more affordable Kindle version of this groundbreaking study. Read it—it is well worth it. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-08
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Title: Canada gravely concerned over Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint convictions
Description: "December 6, 2021 - Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement on the convictions in the trial of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint in Myanmar: “Canada condemns the convictions of Myanmar’s detained, democratically elected civilian leadership, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. Today’s convictions follow trials that met no standard of impartiality and are emblematic of the regime’s blatant disregard for human rights and judicial independence. “Judicial independence is fundamental to the rule of law and essential for any democratic and accountable government. “Canada is deeply concerned over recent events in Myanmar, including the regime’s use of lethal force against unarmed and peaceful protestors and civilians, as well as its ongoing arrests and detentions of protestors, politicians, civilians, civil society activists, journalists and pro-democracy leaders. Over the past few days, these events have led to several deaths, injuries and detentions by military forces. “Canada calls for the release of all those arbitrarily detained, including political prisoners, as well as the immediate cessation of violence. Canada also calls for the utmost restraint to be exercised by all parties. “Canada reiterates its full support for the ongoing efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy, in close cooperation with the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General.”..."
Source/publisher: Government of Canada
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-07
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Title: BURMA COUP WATCH FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER 2021: Junta vows to wipe out resistance; conflict numbers tell the story
Description: "During 1 Feb–26 Nov, there were 6,675 armed clashes and attacks on civilians, a 632% increase from the same period in 2020. The junta’s crimes resulted in a massive increase in displaced persons, including around 50,000 just in Chin, Sagaing, and Magway since May 2021. Junta courts handed down lengthy sentences to high-profile NLD leaders. Sham trials against Aung San Suu Kyi moved forward, but the court delayed two verdicts without explanation. Junta military courts sentenced 21 people to death and 29 to life in prison. The junta ordered its soldiers in Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Mandalay Regions to shoot at any male passenger on a motorbike..."
Source/publisher: ALTSEAN-BURMA
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-03
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Title: Statement on the decision of U.N. Credentials Committee - ကုလသမဂ္ဂအရည်အချင်းစစ်ကော်မတီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်နှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description: "1. We, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), warmly welcome the decision on rejection of Myanmar Military Junta's nominated representative to the United Nations at the U.N. Credentials Committee dated 1 December 2021. On behalf of the Myanmar people, we greatly appreciate the decision and hard work of the Ambassador Mrs. Anna Karin Enestrom of Sweden, Chairwoman of the committee and its members. 2. Political, economic and diplomatic sanctions on the military junta rendered by global communities and countries are pivotal and effective actions to terminate brutalities of military junta, the absolute collapse of military dictatorship and to restore Democracy in Myanmar. 3. Furthermore, with the expectation and aspiration of the Myanmar people, we reiterate and call for the member states to support the affirmation of the Credentials Committee's decision at the upcoming 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Hence, we urge you to ensure Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun as the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations who stands with the entire people of Myanmar in this critical time.....၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သည့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂစိစစ်ရေးကော်မတီ၌ အကြမ်းဖက်မြန်မာစစ်ကောင်စီက အမည်စာရင်းတင်သွင်းထားသည့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂ တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကိုယ်စားပြုခွင့်မပြုကြောင်း ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ဝမ်းမြောက်စွာဖြင့် ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ကော်မတီဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ဆီဒင်နိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ကုလ သမဂ္ဂ သံအမတ်ကြီး Mr. Anna Karin Enestrom နှင့် ကော်မတီ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအား မြန်မာပြည်သူများ ကိုယ်စား များစွာကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။ ၂။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များရပ်တန့်ရေး အပါအဝင် စစ် အာဏာရှင်များအပြီးတိုင်း ကျဆုံးရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးတို့အတွက် ကမ္ဘာနိုင်ငံများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ထိရောက်သည့် နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေးနှင့် သံတမန် ရေးပိတ်ဆို့မှုများသည် အရေးပါသည့် ကူညီဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၃။ ထို့ပြင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ကြီးမားသော မျှော်လင့်ချက်နှင့် ဆန္ဒသဘောထားများအရ ကော်မတီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အား ၇၆ ကြိမ်မြောက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံ၌ အတည်နိုင်ရေး ဆက်လက်ကူညီပေးရန် အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများအား တိုက်တွန်းတောင်းဆိုပါသည်။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ ခက်ခဲသည့် အချိန်တွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့နှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည်ပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုကိုယ်စားပြုနေသည့် သံအမတ်ကြီး ဦးကျော်မိုးထွန်းအား ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ အမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် ဆက်လက်ထားရှိနိုင်ရေး ရပ်တည်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-02
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Title: No One Left Behind?
Sub-title: Covid-19 and the Struggle for Peace and Justice in Myanmar
Description: "The peoples of Myanmar are presently struggling with three grave challenges: a coup, conflict and Covid-19. This new TNI briefing analyses how these three crises have unfolded, leading to health system collapse, a new cycle of humanitarian emergency and deepening political divisions within the country. Taking a narrative approach, the report focuses on the consequences of state failure, the impact of Covid-19 and the actions taken by different military, political and civil society actors during a time of national breakdown. Special attention is paid to community perspectives, the plight of at-risk populations, the neglect of ethnic conflict, the issues of peace and justice, political and health schisms, international dilemmas, and the attendant challenges in addressing Covid-19. Great suffering has already occurred. But the vision must be that the Covid-19 response serves as a model for equality and inclusion rather than regression and division. Health is a human right for everyone, and this primacy must not be lost sight of amidst political breakdown in the country. Key Points Following the assumption of power on 1 February 2021 by the military State Administrative Council, Myanmar has slid into ever-deeper crisis. Compounding the worsening situation is a new wave of Covid-19 infections that have spread to all parts of the country. Every sector of society has been affected. With the government’s health system all but collapsed, the peoples of Myanmar have been thrust into the precarious position of addressing the pandemic with little or no assistance. The three “Cs” – covid, coup and conflict – have come together in a terrible collision. During 2020, the looming scale of the crisis indicated the need for cooperation between the key actors in national politics to combat the disease. Even before the SAC coup, Myanmar did not have a response capacity that covered the whole country. For its part, the National League for Democracy administration pledged a policy of “No One Left Behind”. This promise was not delivered by the authorities, and United Nations calls for a global “Covid ceasefire” were not acted upon. The peoples of Myanmar are now paying a heavy price. Testing was fragmentary, the security forces disrupted non-governmental programmes in the ethnic conflict-zones, and an equitable system of vaccine rollout was not prepared. Instead, the socio-political landscape became dominated by the rivalry between the two leading actors in national politics: the NLD, which won the November 2020 general election; and the national armed forces (Tatmadaw), which seized control of government on 1 February. A perfect storm was created, and the health crisis has exponentially worsened since the SAC takeover. In one of the poorest countries in Asia, there are huge limitations in health infrastructure, medical supplies, human resources, monitoring, personal protective equipment and emergency response to address Covid-19. Communities from every ethnic background lack access to essential health facilities and reliable information about the virus. Adding to the emergency, the country is in the midst of one of its most volatile periods of political turbulence since independence in 1948. Covid-19 is not the only crisis facing the country. Rather, its emergence – and the inability to cope – have further exposed the political failings and long-standing need for peace, reconciliation, consequential reforms, and end to military rule..."
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-30
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Title: Burma/Myanmar - Junta Watch
Description: "This week, the Myanmar military regime’s propaganda machine went into overdrive over the arrest of an ex-NLD lawmaker accused of planning attacks against the junta, even as coup leader Min Aung Hlaing was shunned from two more international summits. It also sentenced 21 young people to death and claimed to support the media despite its record of persecuting journalists, among its other activities. Regime steps up propaganda after arrest of ex–NLD lawmaker The military regime has intensified its smear campaign against the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), its legislative body the CRPH and its armed wing the People’s Defense Force (PDF), following the arrest of former National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmaker U Phyo Zeya Thaw, who allegedly masterminded deadly attacks on regime targets in Yangon, along with dozens of civilian resistance fighters. “Terrorists from the CRPH, NUG and PDF terrorist groups are destroying schools, hospitals, government offices, public buildings, houses, roads and bridges, in addition to the brutal killings of Buddhist monks, teachers, civil servants and innocent civilians across the country,” reported the junta-controlled English-language newspaper Global New Light of Myanmar in an issue from this week. Other state-owned newspapers Myanma Alinn, Kyemon and military mouthpiece Myawady have been featuring daily updates on what they call the “list of casualties caused by terrorist attacks.” So far the list includes the names of some 240 people the regime says were teachers, Buddhist monks, ward administrators and clerks. The newspapers also feature a separate list of some 500 education and health facilities and markets allegedly damaged by the PDF, and another list of some 400 roads and bridges, detailing when, where and how they were blown up. Yet another list published on Nov. 26 included the names of 26 state-owned banks and 41 private banks the regime claims were attacked with improvised explosives by PDF groups. The headlines of the reports misleadingly state that the attacks occurred between Feb. 1 and late November, but the NUG and PDF were not even formed until some two-and-a-half months after the coup. Coup leader shunned from China-ASEAN Summit, Asia-Europe Meeting Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing was excluded from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) on Nov. 25, marking the third time in two months he has been sidelined from an international summit. Prior to ASEM, he was barred from attending the China-ASEAN Summit on Nov. 22 to commemorate the 30th anniversary of bilateral relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. He was also excluded from an ASEAN summit after he failed to implement the regional bloc’s five-point consensus. China wanted to invite Min Aung Hlaing to the annual China-ASEAN summit but the regional grouping objected. His exclusion cost Min Aung Hlaing an opportunity to present his narrative of the military takeover to Chinese President Xi Jinping and other regional leaders, and, more importantly, an opportunity to claim legitimacy for his regime. On the other hand, his absence saved state leaders from regional countries from having to listen to a lot of nonsense, thus enabling them to focus on other important issues. The regime said nothing about their leader’s absence from the China-ASEAN Summit. Junta files corruption charge against former investment minister The military regime brought a corruption charge against U Thaung Tun, who served as minister of investment and foreign economic relations under the ousted civilian government, on Nov. 23, alleging that he rented government-owned land in Yangon to a company at below the market rate. U Thaung Tun, who was also a national security adviser and chairman of the Myanmar Investment Commission, has been detained since the Feb. 1 coup. He served as Myanmar’s ambassador to Washington, Geneva, New York and Brussels under the former military regime. Following the coup, the regime named U Aung Naing Oo as the new head of the Investment and Foreign Economic Relations Ministry. Coincidentally, the ex-military officer served as the ministry’s permanent secretary under U Thaung Tun, under the ousted civilian government. Regime convenes Security, Peace and Stability and Rule of Law Committee State Administration Council (SAC) chairman Min Aung Hlaing chaired the sixth meeting of the Security, Peace and Stability and Rule of Law Committee on Nov. 23. At a glance it seems the SAC just held a regular meeting on security affairs. But it is important to note that the meeting was held five days after the arrest of former National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmaker U Phyo Zeya Thaw. Significantly, junta media only published a summary of the meeting; after other high-level meetings, they have reported every word uttered by the coup leader. However, given the latest developments, there can be no doubt that the meeting discussed ways of stepping up the junta’s fight against urban guerillas and PDF groups. Young people accused of killing junta-appointed administrators sentenced to death In an attempt to threaten potential opponents, junta tribunals on Nov. 23 sentenced to death 21 anti-coup activists who allegedly killed administrators and an alleged military informant in Yangon’s South Dagon Township and Dagon Seikkan Township, where the regime has imposed martial law. In April, the regime handed its first death sentence since its February coup. Nineteen people—18 men and a woman—from Yangon’s North Okkalapa Township were given the death sentence for allegedly attacking two junta soldiers. Junta leader claims to recognize Fourth Estate while oppressing media Hypocritically, the junta leader, who has ordered bans on several independent media outlets and arrested dozens of journalists, said on Nov. 24 that he recognized the media as the Fourth Estate of the country, as the new members of the Myanmar Press Council took oaths before him. Just one month after the coup, the regime revoked the publishing licenses of five media outlets. Some media agencies were raided and dozens of journalists were detained at their offices or homes or while covering anti-regime protests and some were charged with high treason and terrorism for doing their jobs. Currently, some 50 journalists remain under detention with press freedom being increasingly restricted. The regime has reconstituted the Press Council since its coup. New chairman U Ohn Maung, a poet who goes by the pen name Myinmu Maung Naing Moe, is a former lieutenant colonel and won several national literature (poetry) awards under the previous military regimes. The new vice chair, U Myo Tun, a poet and writer going by the pen name Maung Sein Naung (Lewe), was formerly a captain at the Directorate of Public Relations and Psychological Warfare of the Defense Ministry. However, general readers are unlikely to have heard of these two so-called men of letters. KNU organizes military training with NUG support, junta says The regime’s Myawady TV said on Nov. 25 that Myanmar’s oldest autonomy-seeking revolutionary group, the Karen National Union (KNU), had organized military training for civilian resistance forces with the support of the country’s shadow National Unity Government in areas under the group’s control in the southern part of the country. Based on information extracted during interrogation of 20 people arrested for attacks on regime targets, it said the brigades 1,2,3,5 and 6 of the KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), offered the training, gave shelter to those evading arrest by the regime and supplied arms to groups engaged in urban guerrilla warfare in a number of cities and towns in the country. The KNU signed a peace deal with the government in 2015 but denounced this year’s coup and, following the military’s crackdowns on protesters, launched attacks on regime bases in the country’s south. The junta retaliated with air strikes, causing thousands of civilians to flee. The regime’s official naming of the KNU as supporters of a civilian resistance movement against it may herald more attacks on the Karen armed groups in the near future, as the junta has been intensifying its crackdowns on the civilian resistance..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-29
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Title: Alert: Possible Security Threat in Yangon
Sub-title: THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN RANGOON IS TRANSMITTING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION THROUGH THE AMERICAN LIAISON NETWORK AS A PUBLIC SERVICE TO U.S. CITIZENS IN BURMA. PLEASE DISSEMINATE THIS MESSAGE TO ALL U.S. CITIZENS IN YOUR ORGANIZATION OR NEIGHBORHOOD.
Description: "The Embassy is aware of non-specific threats broadcast on social media warning civilians to avoid the Myanmar Plaza shopping mall, located on Kabar Aye Pagoda Road, Yangon. Given possible retaliatory action and security force response, and out of an abundance of caution, all Americans are advised to avoid Myanmar Plaza and adjacent areas. The Embassy advises all Americans that recent developments could result in heightened tensions in Yangon and outlying areas. Recent explosions and attacks in Yangon present a serious threat to American citizens and may increase in frequency and intensity. In addition, a military response of unknown proportions may result. Roadblocks and military operations have become more prevalent. The Embassy advises Americans to avoid public gatherings and limit their outside activities. Review your personal security plans and keep a low profile. Always keep some form of communication with you and monitor local events. Maintain an adequate stock of food and water should you need to shelter in place. Please have a plan in the event telecommunications become limited or unavailable. Advise family and associates of this possibility in advance. Updates from the Embassy may not be readily accessible due to an outage during a crisis. The current Level 4 Travel Advisory is the highest level issued by the Department of State and advises U.S. citizens not to travel to Burma or to leave as soon as it is safe to do so due to the greater likelihood of life-threatening risks. As a result of these conditions, if you experience an emergency, the U.S. Embassy has a very limited ability to provide assistance..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Embassy in Burma
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-27
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Title: Military Atrocities and Civilian Resilience: Testimonies of injustice, insecurity and violence in Southeast Myanmar during the 2021 coup
Description: "Since the February 1st 2021 military coup, the human rights situation in Myanmar has seriously deteriorated. The State Administration Council (SAC) headed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has engaged in systematic violence against civilians and stripped away the few key civil and political protections that the already problematic 2008 Constitution was supposed to guarantee, further opening the door for widespread human rights violations. The SAC’s treatment of citizens as enemies of the state and its unrelenting efforts to crush all opposition have resulted in widespread violence and the loss of lives during this first six months of the coup. The SAC has shot and killed peaceful protesters, bombed rural villages forcing thousands to flee, deprived people of access to health services and information, and turned the law against the people of Myanmar to arrest, detain, and torture at will. As future returnees could potentially face similar In highlighting the human rights violations that have occurred since the February 1st coup, this report presents the degrading security situation and humanitarian crisis that civilians in Southeast Myanmar are currently facing. It also presents the hopes and struggles of rural villagers and civilians, to show how, despite the increased insecurity that they face, they continue to seek out ways to counter a military regime they know to be both illegal and unjust. Most importantly, this report seeks to ensure that the experiences and concerns of rural ethnic villagers are not just heard but addressed. Overview Interviews conducted by KHRG reveal the level of violence that the SAC undertook against protesters, and the ways in which protesters have continued to voice their opposition to the coup in the face of increasing brutality and repression by the state military. Protesters recounted stories of fear and insecurity as they encountered the ruthless response of the SAC to civilian opposition, yet equally expressed a strong sense of hope and an unwavering commitment to upholding the fight for democracy and freedom from oppression through to the very end. These interviews also highlight the efforts of civilians to support and sustain each other as protesters and those engaged in civil disobedience sought refuge and protection. This report also presents the escalation of insecurity in rural ethnic areas, where the Myanmar military has long used violence against civilian villagers as a key strategy in waging war against ethnic armed actors. Although conflict and attacks had been ongoing in certain parts of Southeast Myanmar even prior to the coup, the shifts currently taking place reflect a complete disregard for human rights and signal a return to a “four cuts” approach that, as independent researcher Kim Joliffe has highlighted, “treats civilians not just as ‘collateral damage’ but as a central resource in the battlefield”. Although some areas in Southeast Myanmar have experienced little to no fighting, others have endured an ongoing onslaught of attacks and fighting since the coup. It is estimated that, as of June 23rd, close to 177,000 villagers in Southeast Myanmar, including 50,000 in Kayin State, have been displaced since the February 1st coup (with over 140,000 still experiencing displacement as of August 23rd). KHRG also received a growing number of reports of direct attacks on civilians, including targeted killings, forced labour, looting and confiscation. That, combined with the SAC’s use of the COVID-19 pandemic as an additional weapon of war, has left rural villagers at-risk from multiple forms of attack. What is evident in both rural and urban areas is not just the increase in acts of violence since the coup, but that the SAC has sought to legitimise its own abusive actions and inscribe in law the deprivation of fundamental human rights. The Myanmar military, in ousting the newly elected civilian government, not only illegally seized power by making unsubstantiated claims about election fraud, but also set about instituting legislative changes that would effectively legalize state-based repression and its own use of excessive force against civilians. Similarly, the SAC is using the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and calls for ceasefire to then give itself permission to undertake whatever measures it deems necessary to “keep the peace”. Although the SAC announced a unilateral ceasefire on its part since April 2021, it also stipulated that it would continue to respond to “actions that disrupt government security and administration”, thus authorizing its own military offensives. Since the coup, it has repeatedly accused other armed actors of failing to honor peace commitments, and to label any groups that oppose the SAC as terrorists. From the outset, it has also used the COVID-19 pandemic, citing the Natural Disaster Management Law, to justify arrests. It has limited access to information about the health crisis, and more recently to vital medical care, using the pandemic as a political weapon against the public as well as ethnic armed groups. With ongoing displacements, a worsening COVID-19 pandemic, and the SAC blocking national and international aid organisations’ access to critical areas, the humanitarian crisis has become dire, placing many in life-threatening situations. Methodology This report is based on interviews conducted with rural villagers as well as with participants in the protests and Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) who fled to KNU-controlled areas for their safety. KHRG began conducting interviews shortly after the February 1st coup, through the first week of June 2021. A total of 133 interviews were conducted, covering a wide range of topics related to the coup. Forty-nine of those interviews were with people who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement, many of whom had either fled to their home village in Southeast Myanmar or been provided refuge in a KNU-controlled area. This report also draws on raw data reports prepared by KHRG researchers working in local communities within KHRG’s operational area. The raw data for this report covers the period from the beginning of February through the end of July, thus the first six months of the coup. Over 100 raw data submissions were used for this report. Key Findings Chapter 1: Protests After the February 1st coup, protests erupted throughout Myanmar in both urban and rural areas, often drawing tens of thousands of people in large cities, and/or uniting hundreds of villages in rural areas, all voicing their opposition to the coup and military dictatorship. Although peacefully engaging in the right to freedom of expression, civilian protesters became the target of repression and violence at the hands of the military regime. Since the military overthrew the civilian government on February 1st 2021 and declared a state of emergency allowing for the transfer of all legislative, executive and judicial power to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services, it has also instituted laws and policies that restrict or suspend the fundamental rights of citizens. In particular, it has enacted legislative changes that undermine freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the right to privacy. Although in contravention of international law, these legislative reforms, along with the declaration of a state of emergency, are specifically being used to silence and criminalise any and all forms of dissent. Despite the peaceful nature of the protests, SAC security forces cracked down on the protests using excessive violence, including brutally beating and torturing protesters as well as shooting at them using both rubber and live bullets. Hundreds of protesters have been killed and thousands more injured as a direct result of violence by SAC security forces. “In joining the protests in Yangon and Mandalay, it is like we pick straws over who will die in the street [joining the protests is like a deadly game of chance]. They [police] can shoot people at any time if they want. In fact, they shot people. Many people have already died. They [police] never gave a warning to people before cracking down on the protests.” --Maung E---, a university student in Yangon KHRG conducted interviews with a number of SAC soldiers and police officers who had joined the Civil Disobedience Movement, and who confirmed the use of excessive force and violence by security forces during the protests. In some cases, this was violence that they had witnessed, but in other cases, it was violence that they were ordered to undertake as part of their security activities surrounding the protests. “When there was a protest in Hledan, Yangon we would break up the mass gathering. There was a total of 50 of us. Six of us had real guns [machine guns] including me. We had to fire live rounds [against protesters]. Our bullets are not meant for shooting innocent civilians.” --A police officer based in Bilin Township, Doo Tha Htoo District As the SAC responded to the protests with increased violence, the protesters adopted more varied protest strategies and also developed self-protection strategies in an attempt to make themselves less vulnerable to injury, violence and arrest by security forces. SAC security forces have also engaged in arrests without providing the reason for the arrest and without allowing access to legal counsel or communication with family members. Likewise, family members and friends of detainees have often been unable to access information about why they were arrested, where they are detained, how they are doing, whether they are alive or dead and other critical information about court proceedings. “Laws are from their mouth [decided solely by the SAC] because whatever they say is considered law [toward the civilians]; they can kill, they can arrest, they can detain and they can do whatever they want [by the order of SAC authorities]. There is no rule of law. Every action they have been practicing is against the civilians.” --A young teacher from Hpa-an Town Chapter 2: The Civil Disobedience Movement On February 2nd 2021, healthcare workers across Myanmar walked off their jobs to express their opposition to the military coup. This form of protest quickly spread to other branches of public service, eventually turning into a nationwide, large-scale Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). While CDM participants in general spoke of the desire for democracy, a return to civilian government, and the hope of undermining the SAC by shutting down the wheels of government, SAC security forces (police and military) who joined the CDM also cited unjust and unlawful orders as motivating factors. The CDM participants with whom KHRG conducted interviews faced major barriers to joining the movement, making it clear that a decision to join could have life-threatening consequences. Since joining the CDM, participants have experienced livelihood issues, increased risks and restrictions, as well as threats of arrest and attack by the SAC against themselves and their family members, leading many to go into hiding. “I also worry for my family’s security because of the actions that the Burmese military has done. If they cannot arrest me, they will target my family. I heard that they will threaten my wife. I heard that they will harm my family.” --A CSO worker from Ayeyarwady Region KNU local leaders have been attempting to provide security and necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing for CDM participants who have reached KNU-controlled territory, leading CDM members, protesters and human rights activists to flee to KNU territory seeking protection. Informal networks and local community support have also been particularly strong, with some civilians seeing this as their best way to contribute to the movement. “Ordinary people like us do not need to participate in the CDM. We just have to support those who do participate in the CDM. The situation happening now is not right, so we have to support them. We have to care for them and we have to give them food, and support them in what they need. They are working for us as well.” --Saw Y--- from Ta Naw Th’Ree Township, Mergui-Tavoy District Chapter 3: Militarisation and a return to violence The security situation in rural areas of Southeast Myanmar rapidly degraded during the first six months following the military’s seizure of power. Since the military coup, human rights violations have steadily increased, as have displacements and threats of injury and death to civilians in rural areas. Just the news of the military takeover led many villagers to begin preparing for the possibility of fighting, and thus displacement, and for the re-emergence of the kind of human rights abuses that they had suffered in the past. “Some people dare not to stay at home anymore. They go to stay at their huts. Those who are living close to the road dare not to sleep at their houses. They heard that Tatmadaw soldiers will patrol so they are afraid and go to sleep in other places. Then, they come back to their houses in the morning. Some people hide food in the jungle. If anything happens, they can go and hide there and they will have food.” --A missionary in Dooplaya District Increased ground attacks in some areas began shortly following the military takeover but the airstrikes in Karen State, which began on March 27th, marked a pivotal moment in the escalation of fighting and attacks, and have contributed to a growing climate of insecurity that recalls earlier periods of military abuse. t is extremely difficult to estimate the total number of displacements due to conflict since the February 1st military coup. UNHCR, which is working on relief operations, estimated 47,700 in Kayin State, and another 1,100 in Mon State. The figures are likely much higher given the poor access to IDP sites and displacement information in many areas, and the variable nature of displacements, which can be recurring or extended, and can vary from several days to several months or longer. One of the biggest problems continues to be access to aid. Due to both COVID-19 and increased insecurity following the coup, many international stakeholders are no longer operating on the ground in some areas. Even attempts by local stakeholders to provide support to IDPs have met with opposition by the SAC. “We will be shot dead so no boats dare to run. We dare not go to send rations for the IDPs. The supplies are accumulating on the Thai side. The boats from the Thai side do not go to the Myanmar side because they are afraid they will be shot by SAC soldiers.” --A boat driver interviewed by KIC While airstrikes and fighting have led to large-scale displacements and a growing humanitarian crisis, the human rights situation has also degraded with an increase in abuses (like forced labour, targeted killings, looting and arbitrary arrest) that had curtailed following the NCA. Areas that have faced less fighting and attacks have still been heavily affected by the overall climate of insecurity. Aside from witnessing the movement of troops and reinforcement of troops and supplies in their region, many villagers noted increased patrolling by armed soldiers. Another cause of concern for villagers in some areas has come from the emergence of various militia groups. Since the coup, the SAC has been appointing new members who are former Tatmadaw soldiers. They are rotating between different areas within the village tract, and have been appointed specifically to monitor the activity of villagers and the local KNU. “We only dare to criticise the military coup secretly within our family because there are many junta spies that [report] people who criticise and disagree with the military government to the police.” --An interviewee from Dooplaya District Since the coup, there has been renewed insecurity and threats to freedom of movement for villagers. The military has been checking travelers and making arrests, which has increased fear surrounding travel. KHRG has received an increasing number of reports about landmine accidents since the military coup. Despite ongoing calls on the Myanmar government and all ethnic armed groups to halt the use of landmines and to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, the planting of new landmines continues to take place. Chapter 4: COVID-19 since the coup The lack of testing and reporting by the Ministry of Health and Sports (MoHS) has not been able to conceal the fact that, as of early July, COVID-19 cases have skyrocketed and Myanmar is facing a serious humanitarian crisis. Since the announcement of the coup, KHRG has received multiple reports that most of the prevention measures that had been set up to protect villagers from the spread of the virus to rural areas were no longer being adhered to. The lack of accurate information about COVID-19 since the SAC took power has contributed to the sense that COVID-19 was no longer something villagers needed to be concerned about. “Since the military coup, even in our village and at the national level, people didn’t continue thinking about COVID-19 anymore. I myself didn’t continue thinking about it anymore.” --A village secretary in Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District The SAC has not only continued to provide inaccurate information, it has also restricted access to resources and services, and prevented other key actors from helping manage the spread of the virus and address the health needs of the people of Myanmar. Prior to the coup, the NLD government had been working to acquire COVID-19 vaccines, and began making plans for rolling out vaccinations. Because it is now the military government taking over this process, rural villagers are refusing the vaccination due to distrust of the military. “[W]e worry that the Myanmar military will mix something into the vaccine. […] So no one dares to get the vaccine.” --A villager from T’ Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District Chapter 5: Challenges to peace, democracy, and development The coup has had devastating effects on all aspects of daily life in Myanmar, creating impacts as individualised as lack of access to the internet and as widespread as a downturn in the national economy. By eroding possibilities for peace, democracy and development, these problems have touched the lives of all civilians, but have impacted rural villagers in particular ways. The coup involved not just a wider shift from elected civilian government to military dictatorship but also a replacement of local administrators with SAC-selected individuals. Replacing elected leaders with military-appointed ones not only serves to further undermine the democratic process, it erodes relationships of trust between local communities and the administrators that are supposed to serve and represent them. “Everything depends on the village administrator, because no matter how much you protect your village, if the village administrator works under the military government you can’t do anything. He will simply send information to the SAC.” --A villager from Ta Naw Th’Ree Township, Mergui-Tavoy District The coup has had harsh impacts on Myanmar’s economy, at both the individual and national levels. Civilians across Southeast Myanmar are experiencing job loss, higher prices on necessities, restrictions on travel, and loss of access to telecommunication systems, all of which are increasing food and livelihood insecurity. The CDM has had a large impact on education in Southeast Myanmar. After the SAC seized power, many teachers in government schools joined the CDM, so most of the government schools have had to close. Even when the SAC reopened some government schools on June 1st 2021, there was a shortage of both teachers and students. There have also been heavy impacts on access to healthcare. There are approximately 30,000 physicians in Myanmar, and about 20,000 work for the government hospitals. As a response to the coup, approximately 75 percent of those working in government facilities have joined the CDM and refused to work. “If people need to go for an operation and they are not allowed to go […] they will just die.” --Naw O--- from Moo Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District The coup has also had an impact on access to information, through telecommunication interruptions and SAC control of news and media outlets. Telecommunication interruptions are particularly serious in rural areas where information is already limited to what people can access through their phone. Chapter 6: Moving forward Although there may have been early confidence that the Spring Revolution would be successful, there have been increasing divides regarding how the fight should go on. Many stressed the importance of continuing the fight until the end, and the need for more government staff to join the CDM. Others noted the lives already sacrificed. “People from Myanmar have died many times already. Therefore, we must not feel hesitation to die this time [for this cause]. If we are afraid to die this time [for this cause] and just do nothing about it [military dictatorship], our lives will be dead forever.” --An interviewee from Kawkareik Town For some, the coup has served as an awakening since it highlighted the oppression that ethnic minorities have faced at the hands of the military, as well as the level of violence the Myanmar military is capable of. In the eyes of many, a political solution involving negotiation with the military regime is not possible. Despite the sense that negotiation would not benefit civilians, some believe that the way forward is still through peaceful means. Others spoke of the necessity for well-planned self-defense and carefully executed offensives involving the collaboration of both the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and EAOs. Several interviewees highlighted the need for full inclusion of minority voices in any strategies and plans for moving forward. A strong emphasis was also placed on the need for a federal democracy that allows for self-determination as the only means of ensuring ethnic minority rights and equality. “I protested for my country to be free from military dictatorship, for my country to become a real federal democracy and for the ethnic minorities to receive equal rights. If we don’t have equal rights in this country while we are living in this country, there is no reason we could consider ourselves citizens of Myanmar.” --A KECD teacher in Dooplaya District Conclusion Information continues to pour in regarding incidents of violence, with increasing stories of torture, forced labour and killings in rural Southeast Myanmar. Fighting and attacks continue and are becoming more widespread. Many facing displacement are still not receiving support, and some have reported having little left to eat. Displacements are ongoing and the possibility of seeking refuge across the border in Thailand remains limited. Reports of illness-related deaths are being submitted, yet villagers are unsure whether this is due to COVID-19 or some other illness, since there is little availability of testing or medical care. Ethnic minorities want their voices to finally be heard, but also to be supported as they stand up for their own rights and for equality and justice. “We have had [in the past] to solve whatever we face in our own way and suffer it by ourselves. Therefore, people think no one will stand with or for them when they have any problems or face anything. […] [I]t is critical that civilians feel that they are being supported by others, that they are not alone in this fight. They need others to stand with them and beside them.” --An interviewee in Kawkareik Town Recommendations To the State Administration Council (SAC) Immediately step down and hand over power to the National Unity Government (NUG). End the crackdown, arrests and targeted attacks on protesters and CDM participants. Cease the halting and seizure of medical and humanitarian supplies intended to alleviate the COVID-19 and other humanitarian crises in Southeast Myanmar. Reverse the suspension of Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of the Citizens (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 5/ 2017). Revoke amendments to the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law, the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (SAC Law Nos 3/2021, 5/2021 and 6/2021). End interruptions to communication services and the suppression of media freedom since this is a violation of the right to access information. Cease attacks on civilian areas, as well as patrols and military transports through, in or near villages or livelihood areas; demilitarise areas close to villages and farms by removing troops and camps. Stop all forms of forced labour, including using villagers as human shields, porters, and navigators; and refrain from making arbitrary demands on local communities such as demanding the use of their vehicles, boats or other property for military purposes. End arbitrary and illegal taxation practices, as well as the confiscation of civilian property for military and personal use. Ensure compliance with international humanitarian standards and human rights law; and end impunity by ensuring that any armed actor who has violated the rights of any person is held accountable for abuses in fair and transparent investigations and judicial processes in independent and impartial civilian courts. Put an end to clearance operations, as well as activities, commonly termed the “four cuts strategy”, that prevent civilian access to food, communication, aid and other basic necessities. To international organisations, NGOs, funding agencies, and foreign governments Refrain from giving any legitimacy to the military junta and from recognising them in any international forum. Exclude the SAC as a partner for the distribution of aid. Urge UN agencies in Myanmar to take a clear and strong position in responding to the situation on the ground, and to use all possible resources to limit the human rights abuses and violations undertaken by the SAC. Provide financial and technical support as needed for the NUG, including on international human rights laws and standards and other matters of governance. Consult and sign MoUs with the NUG and EAOs to address the unfolding humanitarian crisis across the country. Support a UN Security Council resolution on a global arms embargo. Diversify international funding distribution so that more funding is made directly available to non-state actors, particularly ethnic service providers and civil society organisations, regardless of their registration status. Prioritise methods of service delivery and communication that rely on local CSOs/CBOs and ethnic service providers that have the ability and networks (due to consistent access and trust from the community) for local implementation of support programmes. Recognize the complex logistics of service delivery and be willing to contribute to solutions proposed by local CSO/CBOs and ethnic service providers. Mitigate the impacts of displacement, armed conflict and insecurity on livelihood through increased support and initiatives that reduce the vulnerability of small farmers and day labourers. Support EHOs and other non-state health actors, both regarding COVID-19 prevention and treatment (including screening/testing and the running of quarantine facilities), and the provision of other essential health services in rural areas. Urge Myanmar’s neighbours to ensure that their authorities do not deny entry to people crossing the border seeking refuge; and encourage them to work with cross border organisations to develop support and protection services for those seeking refuge. Provide neighboring countries with the necessary resources and technical assistance to provide humanitarian aid, including for COVID-19, for the people from Myanmar who are fleeing the military violence. Engage with Myanmar’s neighbours to ensure the passage of aid to Myanmar, in particular through cross border aid organizations and local civil society organizations already operating in the area. Advocate for the release of political prisoners, including political actors, protesters, activists, human rights defenders, journalists and their family members. Insist that the Security Council refer Myanmar to the ICC or set up an ad hoc tribunal to ensure all perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and mass atrocities are prosecuted and that justice is attained for victims and survivors. To the SAC and EAOs/EAGs Put an immediate halt to the planting of landmines and ban all further use of landmines; mark all areas contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and inform the local communities of these locations for their safety. Comply with international humanitarian standards and human rights law, particularly with regard to the protection and safety of civilians..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-24
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Title: Call on INTERPOL to ban the illegal junta from representing Myanmar at its General Assembly
Description: "To: Kim Jong Yang, INTERPOL President; Jürgen Stock, INTERPOL General Secretary; the INTERPOL Executive Committee and INTERPOL Member Countries Subject: Call on INTERPOL to ban the illegal junta from representing Myanmar at its General Assembly Dear INTERPOL President Kim Jong Yang INTERPOL Vice Presidents Benyamina Abbad and Šárka Havránková INTERPOL General Secretary Jürgen Stock INTERPOL Executive Committee Delegates Khaled Jameel Al Materyeen Ahmed Nasser Al-Raisi Jean-Jacques Colombi Rogerio Galloro Robert Guirao Bailén Destino Pedro Olushola Kamar Subair Jannine Van den Berg and Member Countries We, the undersigned 259 organizations, call on INTERPOL to immediately ban the Myanmar military junta from representing Myanmar as a member of INTERPOL. We demand you ensure that the military junta is excluded from the upcoming 89th INTERPOL General Assembly and all benefits and future cooperation that membership entails. According to media reports, the Myanmar military junta’s police force is currently representing Myanmar in INTERPOL and its members, led by the Head of Police and Deputy Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant-General Than Hlaing, will act as delegates for the Myanmar government at the INTERPOL General Assembly. This is a matter of grave concern to us and raises serious credibility issues for INTERPOL itself for the following reasons: The military junta does not represent the government of Myanmar. The international community has refused to recognise the military junta as the legitimate government of Myanmar and has prevented members of the military junta from participating in international forums including the UN General Assembly, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) and the ASEAN Summit. The attempted coup on 1 February 2021, under the leadership of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing by violent means violated the Myanmar Constitution, international law and the principle of rule of law. The head of the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar recently stated that since the attempted coup the Myanmar military junta’s widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population amounts to crimes against humanity. The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, composed of international experts including former members of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar and a former Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, has recently argued that, in addition to crimes against humanity, the Myanmar military is engaging in terrorism and should be classified as a terrorist organization. General Than Hlaing, as the junta’s Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and Chief of Police, is directly responsible for decision making concerning repressive policies and violent actions committed by police against peaceful demonstrators and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma. For this and other reasons, Lt. General Than Hlaing has been placed by the European Union under a travel ban and asset freeze as of 3 March 2021. Targeted sanctions against Lt. General Than Hlaing also remain in place by the US, UK, and Canada (overview with links here). Lt General Than Hlaing has been appointed to lead operations in Chin State. Escalating military attacks against civilians there and in Sagaing and Magwe Regions have caused rights groups to draw similarities to “clearance operations” used to violently oppress the ethnic Rohingya population – now at issue in the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice INTERPOL’s vision is to connect police for a “safer world” and to support security for the world’s citizens. The people of Myanmar are in dire need of safety and security. The single biggest threat to their security is the Myanmar military junta, who is attempting to represent Myanmar in INTERPOL and use the General Assembly as a platform for political gain and international legitimacy. This will embolden the Myanmar military to continue to commit international crimes with blanket impunity. We note that countering the threat of terrorism is the first of INTERPOL’s seven Global Policing Goals, and INTERPOL has a responsibility to counter and disrupt terrorism wherever it occurs, including in Myanmar. We draw your attention to condemnation by the UN Security Council regarding the junta following the February 2021 coup, including a November 2021 statement by the Council’s President Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez citing “deep concern at further recent violence across Myanmar”. We note that upholding human rights is central to INTERPOL’s mandate. We implore you to meet the commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated in Article 2 of the Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL. Recognizing the Myanmar military junta, responsible for systemic and grave human rights violations would be a clear violation of this article. We appeal to you to adhere to INTERPOL’s commitment to political neutrality stated in Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution. Awarding an unlawful military junta that lacks domestic and international recognition with legitimacy would violate this article, and amount to a partisan intervention that would embolden the military to continue to commit international crimes with total impunity. Instead of legitimizing the military junta through INTERPOL membership, we appeal to you to uphold international law by supporting the ongoing investigation at the International Criminal Court concerning crimes of genocide against the Rohingya, and future investigations, to bring all perpetrators of Myanmar atrocities to account. The Myanmar military must be recognized as a terrorist organization, not recognized as representatives of the Myanmar people who are the very victims of the junta’s daily barrage of violence that INTERPOL aims to protect. We therefore call on INTERPOL to: Ban the Myanmar military junta from INTERPOL, including the 89th General Assembly. Support efforts to bring Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Lt Gen Than Hlaing and all other perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice by identifying and arresting suspects. Take all measures available to prevent the Myanmar military junta’s continued acts of terrorism by disrupting terrorism movement and tracing and disrupting their international revenue and arms supply networks. At this fragile and crucial time in Myanmar, INTERPOL and their member countries must act in the interests of the safety and security of Myanmar people, victims and survivors of crime and in accordance with international law and norms..."
Source/publisher: 259 Civil Society Organizations
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-22
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Title: Myanmar junta is a ‘criminal gang’ and must be excluded from Interpol, say activists
Sub-title: Interpol confirmed a Myanmar delegation was due to attend its General Assembly in person but refused to name the delegates
Description: "More than 250 rights groups and charities have called on the international police agency Interpol to exclude a top figure in Myanmar’s junta from its General Assembly on Tuesday, echoing similar calls last week by the National Unity Government (NUG). Lt-Gen Than Hlaing, the junta’s deputy home affairs minister and head of the Myanmar Police Force, will lead Myanmar’s delegation for the three-day assembly in the Turkish city of Istanbul. The US, Canada, the EU, and the UK have sanctioned Than Hlaing for his role in overseeing the junta’s murderous crackdown on opponents to the February 1 military coup. In a letter addressed to Interpol’s leadership and member countries, 259 groups said the junta’s participation in the agency created “serious credibility issues”. The letter is signed by organisations including ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, the Burma Human Rights Network, Civicus, the International Trade Union Confederation, the Karen Organization of America and Progressive Voice. “Instead of legitimising the military junta through Interpol membership, we appeal to you to uphold international law by supporting the ongoing investigation at the International Criminal Court concerning crimes of genocide against the Rohingya, and future investigations, to bring all perpetrators of Myanmar atrocities to account,” the letter said. Last week, 106 South Korean civil society groups wrote to Interpol President Kim Jong Yang to propose that the agency instead invite members of the underground NUG, which was founded to challenge the legitimacy of the junta. “Interpol is giving legitimacy to the Myanmar military junta and working against the will of the Myanmar people,” said Kinam Kim, a lawyer with Korean Civil Society in Support of Democracy in Myanmar, one of the groups behind the letter. “This must be condemned,” he added. “If the Korean government does not veto the participation of these criminals in the Interpol General Assembly, then they are going against their own commitment to discontinue cooperation with the Myanmar military junta.” In a statement to Myanmar Now, Interpol confirmed that Myanmar was due to attend the assembly on Tuesday but that “the final list of member countries actually in attendance will not be available until the event opens.” The agency also declined to confirm the names of the Myanmar delegates. “It is the decision of each member country to provide details of their delegation,” it said. The assembly would be held in-person and “only individuals actually in attendance can be considered delegates and vote on resolutions,” the statement said, adding that Interpol’s constitution forbids interventions of a political, military or racial character. Myanmar Now contacted several Interpol member countries for comment on Than Hlaing’s participation and to ask if they are taking steps to prevent junta representatives from attending the assembly. Both the Australian Federal Police, the New Zealand Police and Norwegian Police Directorate confirmed their attendance at the General Assembly but would not comment on Myanmar's participation. A spokesperson for the Swedish Police Authority said that some Interpol member countries are undemocratic and acknowledged there had been concerns about members using the organisation for political purposes. “All the joint actions we, the Swedish Police Authority, support or participate in, are thoroughly considered in terms of compliance with human rights,” the spokesperson said. “Furthermore, we believe that standing outside the Interpol would be less effective as it would weaken our measures to combat cross-border crimes.” A spokesperson for the UK’s National Crime Agency said that “membership of Interpol is a matter for Interpol Secretariat General (IPSG), guided by the General Assembly” and that “all members are entitled to attend” the assembly. A spokesperson for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would not comment on Myanmar's participation in INTERPOL but said that "attending annual meetings, such as the INTERPOL General Assembly, allows us to build relationships with our international partners and work closely with law enforcement agencies around the world. These relationships are fundamental to our ability to ensure Canada responds to globalized threats." The US Department of Justice declined to comment. Myanmar Now also contacted officials in Ireland, the Netherlands, the Maldives and the Gambia but did not receive a response. Khin Ohmar of Progressive Voice said that member police forces have human rights responsibilities and therefore need to proactively prevent Myanmar’s junta from participating in Interpol. "The Myanmar Police Force is under the direct control of the illegitimate military junta, which is a criminal gang and a perpetrator of cross-border crime,” she said. “Allowing these international criminals to be part of Interpol only emboldens them to continue to perpetrate crimes with impunity.” ..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-22
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Title: Ex-Lawmaker Accused of Planning Attacks Against Myanmar Junta Arrested
Description: "Former National League for Democracy lawmaker U Phyo Zeya Thaw, who has been accused of masterminding deadly attacks on regime targets in Yangon, was arrested by junta forces during a raid on the outskirts of the city on Thursday. The arrest came after a monthlong manhunt for the 40-year-old former parliamentarian, whom the regime accuses of supporting local civilian resistance forces and orchestrating several fatal hit-and-run attacks on junta troops in Yangon in recent months. The regime claimed the covert attacks include incidents in which soldiers manning security checkpoints in the city have been sprayed with bullets, and the deadly shooting of four police officers on board a Yangon Circular Rail train in August, among others. Prior to his arrest, the regime charged U Phyo Zeya Thaw under the Counter-Terrorism Law and the Public Property Protection Act. There has not yet been any official announcement about the arrest, which comes as the regime steps up its hunt for members of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)—a network of local civilian resistance groups—in Yangon. Late last month, the regime arrested veteran Myanmar democracy activist Ko Kyaw Min Yu, better known as Ko Jimmy, one of the leaders of the 88 Generation Students Group. It claimed that he was the leader of Operation Moonlight, which it said was a series of planned attacks in the city to be carried out by a PDF group. Another 47 suspects were also arrested in Yangon this month. The junta’s mouthpiece Myawady News said they were involved in the attacks in Yangon masterminded by the ex-lawmaker and others. Sources close to the matter confirmed the raid and U Phyo Zeya Thaw’s arrest, saying “his laptop was also seized.” That means information about the resistance forces opposing the regime, and their supporters, has potentially been exposed, raising the likelihood of more arrests. Following the junta’s brutal crackdowns on anti-coup protesters, Myanmar has seen deadly attacks by civilian resistance fighters on regime targets including administration offices, police stations and army convoys. The junta has accused ousted NLD lawmakers and party members of masterminding most of the attacks. U Phyo Zeya Thaw served as an NLD MP in the Lower House of Parliament from 2012 to 2020. Prior to that, he made his name as a member of Acid, Myanmar’s first hip-hop band. Acid emerged in 2000, when the young Myanmar audience was growing bored of the country’s mainstream rock music and looking for something new. Their debut release—Beginning—was the first rap album by local musicians and propelled the band to nationwide stardom, as well as paving the way for other Myanmar hip-hop artists. After the junta’s Feb. 1 coup and its subsequent crackdowns on peaceful anti-regime protesters, U Phyo Zeya Thaw went into hiding but appears to have been active against the junta. As he didn’t stand for Parliament in the 2020 poll, he is unlikely to be a member of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, a group of ousted elected NLD lawmakers that the military regime has branded a terrorist organization..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-19
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Title: Fighting Intensified as Civilian Forces Clash With Myanmar Junta
Description: "More than 80 junta soldiers and 14 civilian resistance fighters were reportedly killed during clashes with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) in Sagaing and Magwe regions during three days this week. The Irrawaddy could not independently verify any of the reports. On Friday, a fierce clash between regime forces and several civilian resistance groups, including fighters from Chin State, occurred in Saw Township, Magwe Region. In the firefight, the regime used helicopters to bombard civilian forces, the groups said, providing video evidence. Saw PDF said on Friday that there were at least 20 military casualties and some civilian fighters were killed or injured. “The junta attacked us and military reinforcements are arriving. The whole area is under attack from the junta. The junta is using helicopters,” a Yaw Defense Force (YDF) representative told The Irrawaddy. On Wednesday, 14 civilian fighters and 10 regime troops were killed in a firefight with the YDF near Htanpinkone village in Tilin Township, Magwe Region, according to the YDF. On Wednesday and Tuesday, the YDF in Tilin claimed five displaced civilians were killed by regime forces in the township. A police officer was allegedly killed and a police captain wounded when the Gangaw PDF attacked the police on a motorbike in Kanywar village, Gangaw Township in Magwe Region on Thursday evening. After the incident, the police raided the village and burned down seven houses, according to residents. “Villagers had to flee as police opened fire on everything they could see, injuring a villager,” a resident told The Irrawaddy. About seven houses and two motorbikes were destroyed by the police and a cow was shot dead, the resident said. On Thursday afternoon, a fierce shootout was reported at a police station in Yesagyo Township, Magwe Region, in a raid by two civilian resistance groups. After an hour-long firefight, the attackers occupied the police station, said the Yesagyo PDF. In the shootout, two junta police were killed and another two wounded while the other police officers fled. Yesagyo PDF said it burned down the police station after seizing police equipment, including an air gun, ammunition, a laptop and motorbikes. On Thursday, two junta troops were killed when Yesagyo PDF ambushed a military vehicle using two landmines. On Nov. 13, four resistance forces, including Yesagyo PDF, occupied and burned down a police station in the township after another battle with junta police. Fighting has been reported in Kale Township, Sagaing Region, since Tuesday when regime force killed three Kale PDF medics and detained nine of its female members. On Thursday, Kale PDF attacked the regime troops who seized its members while they were based in Nagarpwat village, Kale Township. Kale PDF said it ambushed military reinforcements trying to reach Nagarpwat using three landmines, killing about 15 troops. After the ambushed, regime forces attacked nearby Chinsai village and torched 10 houses, the PDF said. On Wednesday, the combined Kale PDF and Chin National Defense Force attacked regime troops who raided a PDF camp and detained the nine PDF medics. In the fighting, 17 junta soldiers were killed and one civilian fighter injured in junta shelling, the group said. Two junta soldiers were killed and three others wounded when a combined resistance force attacked junta sentries in Tahan ward, Kale Township. Around 15 junta soldiers were reportedly killed in ambushes and firefights with resistance groups in Tigyaing, Ye-U and Katha townships, Sagaing Region, on Thursday and Wednesday, according to the parallel National Unity Government’s ministry of defense. The military regime is facing increasing attacks from PDFs and ethnic armed groups across the country..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-19
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Title: EU General Statement – United Nations 3rd Committee: after adoption of the Resolution on the Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar
Sub-title: 17 November 2021, New York – European Union General Statement at the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly Third Committee after the adoption of the Resolution on the Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar: A/C.3/76/L.30 Rev.1
Description: "Mr. Chair, I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The resolution adopted today is the result of the cooperation between the EU and the OIC. We welcome and appreciate this joint endeavour, which allows us to remind the world, through the General Assembly, that appalling crimes, including reported war crimes and crimes against humanity, have been committed against Rohingya and persons belonging to other minorities in Myanmar. These crimes, committed in particular after October 2016, require truth and accountability. Their root causes remain to be addressed. The atrocities that have been taking place in Myanmar are a poignant reminder to all humanity. The same military leadership who oversaw the crimes against the Rohingya is now leading the junta. The same military leadership staged the 1 February coup and is now reported to orchestrate the military build-up in the central and northwestern part of Myanmar, and give orders to the security and armed forces to kill, torture, imprison, employ sexual violence, including rapes, and shell villages, hospitals, and schools. All acts that are violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The EU condemns in the strongest terms these acts and continues to call for immediate cessation of violence and for justice and accountability for human rights violations The EU hereby calls for bringing the perpetrators to justice. The current situation in Myanmar also suppresses hopes for the voluntary, safe and dignified and sustainable return of more than 900,000 Rohingya who have found refuge in Bangladesh. There is not on one side the question of the Rohingya and on the other side the repression of people opposing the military takeover; they are the two sides of the same bloodstained coin. The strong language in the resolution, reflecting the recent deterioration of the overall human rights situation in Myanmar after the 1 February coup, confirms that. The military coup on 1 February 2021 forcibly overthrew the civilian government in blatant violation of the will of the people, expressed by the 8 November 2020 elections, with important humanitarian, social, economic consequences. The European Union reiterates its strong condemnation of the coup and of the grave human rights violations committed by the Myanmar armed forces against all the people of Myanmar since then, and wishes to express its unequivocal support for all the people of Myanmar, including Rohingya and other minorities, and their democratic aspirations and for the democratic transition in Myanmar. This requires restoring and strengthening inclusive democratic institutions and processes, refraining from violence and arbitrary detentions, and ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law. The continued flow of arms into Myanmar also gravely undermine human rights and should be stopped immediately. In this context, the EU welcomes the recent appointment of the new Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Myanmar, reiterates its full support to her mandate, and encourages her further engagement and inclusive dialogue with all relevant stakeholders. The European Union continues to call for the immediate and full implementation of the commitments made at the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in April, setting out the “Five Point Consensus”. The EU will continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to ensure a peaceful resolution of the current crisis that will ensure the country’s swift return to a democratic path..."
Source/publisher: Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations - New York
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-18
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Title: Announcenment of the National Unity Consultative Council of Myanmar
Description: "အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (National Unity Consultative Council - NUCC) ၏ ဖွဲ့စည်းမှု၊ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုတို့နှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် (တိုင်းရင်းသားဘာသာစကား) ကချင်၊ ကယန်း၊ ကရင်၊ တအာင်း၊ ပအို့ပ်၊ မွန်၊ ရှမ်း..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-16
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Size: 4.69 MB (Original version), 1.31 MB (Reduce version) - 16 pages
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Title: Chronicle of a Coup: February 22 & 26, 2021
Description: "Editor’s Note: This post is the first installment in an ongoing series, Chronicle of a Coup, comprised of reports, dating from February 22 and written from within Myanmar, which together sketch one person’s first-hand account of the weeks and months following the February 1 military coup. The impressions of Christopher J. Walker (pseudonym), the primary correspondent, are occasionally paired with those of family, friends, and colleagues. Christopher’s copious reports, which are still being written, will be posted weekly, on Fridays for the foreseeable future, and are available in chronological order here. Tea Circle is grateful to Christopher for sharing his personal account of life under military rule in Myanmar, and to Mathieu Lukas (pseudonym), his friend and amateur editor. Recognizing that Christopher’s voice is one of many, we encourage other authors to submit their own accounts, which might be written independently, or in conversation with the other letters posted here. Tea Circle is also currently accepting Burmese-language submissions, including those describing everyday experiences since the coup. We welcome others to join this ongoing conversation. An ominous morning | February 22, 2021 Every morning, beginning at 5:15, itinerant pe byouk-, nambya– and rice-sellers walk through the various quarters calling out the names of the foods they are peddling. But today, not one of them is to be seen. 5:30 – By this time, those who sell from pushcarts are in the street out front preparing their carts and wares for the day’s business. This morning there is none of that. 5:45 – By now the call to morning prayers would have been broadcast from the mosque over a loud public address system. Today it’s dead quiet. Strangely, even the roosters and other birds are largely silent. 6:30 – This street serves as an outlet for our quarter. Usually, at this hour scores of private cars and taxis would be coming through. So far today I have counted five. And judging by the markings on the vehicles, they are being driven by supporters of the civil disobedience movement. As I look up and down the street, all the parking spaces, except one, remain occupied. The trishaw stations at either end of the street are empty; even they seem closed for the day. There are no newspaper delivery boys. 7:00 – An elderly woman returns from shopping, but her basket is empty. Obviously the market and its shops are closed. In the distance, not a single commuter train can be heard, but this is no longer unusual since the railway workers have been on strike for more than a week. 7:45 – I walk over to the main commercial district. Every shop is shuttered except for three that are preparing small food packets to hand out for free to demonstrators. Many businesses in this area are protected during the night by private security guards, some of whom, ordinarily, would still be lingering around after their shifts. Today, they have all disappeared. People are angry with the military, very angry. During the night graffiti artists again expressed their indignation in written format. This time they used oil paint, which is not so easily cleaned off. Painting on the pavements has become commonplace. Yesterday in the late afternoon, in twelve-foot letters, a neighbourhood volunteer work party repainted a statement of their displeasure on the main road. What amazes me is that this was done in broad daylight: the painters were protected by citizens who kept the police at bay. Protesters, easily identified by their white, black or sometimes red clothing, are beginning to leave their apartments and are headed to the various local staging points before continuing to the main assembly areas. Today, a Monday, is a day of national strikes. Offices and businesses will be closed. A message has come that the internet will be shut down until 1:00 pm, apparently to discourage strike and demonstration organisers. But this will have minimal effect because everyone has a cellphone and information spreads quickly. (Typically, the internet has been down from 1:00 to 9:00 am every day anyway. While it has, at times, been operating outside of these hours, service is frequently intermittent or dreadfully slow. The only reason that the junta tolerates the internet is that institutions and businesses now rely on it in order to function. This was not the case in 1988 or 2007 when there were no internet providers or cellphones, and the vast majority of people had no telephones even in their homes.) To date the military has done everything it can to incite riots, but for the most part, people are aware of this and are not “biting.” I earnestly hope that they will continue in this way. I just received word that protesters are being discouraged from demonstrating in the town centre because they can easily be trapped there. There is a widespread fear that starting today police and soldiers have orders to shoot at them. (I had first-hand experience of this tactic in 2007 when I and others were hemmed in by soldiers, and people were beaten and fired upon.) 9:00 – Surprise! The internet is working. 9:15 am – From my window I can see large groups of protesters advancing toward the centre of town, in spite of the danger. Security | February 26, 2021 As you can probably imagine, communication has been one of the more challenging things for me in the past few weeks. At issue is my safety as well as that of those around me. These days anyone can be imprisoned for the most spurious of reasons. Friends have been of great comfort and help in keeping my communications safe. At this point I feel reasonably secure, having several layers of security built in with multiple devices, ISPs, passwords, phone numbers, email addresses, etc. This in itself creates numerous challenges as I try to recall passwords, and which computer or device, SIM card or phone number I use for which transmission. I have tiny pieces of paper hidden all over, not just in my apartment but in other places too. And of course I have to remember where those are! Now that I feel reasonably safe, I shall try to write more regularly and geared more to what you are unlikely to see in the media. No doubt some of you will think that I shouldn’t do this, but it is something I really must do. I promise to use the utmost caution. What I ask, in fact encourage, is that everything I send be shared with as many others as possible. Every day I experience guilt and frustration because there is so little that I can do to help. However, one thing that I can do is try to explain what life here now is like, the struggles and fears that the Burmese face each and every day. Few of us know what it is like to go to bed with an intense fear that tonight trucks full of soldiers might pull up in front and take me away, or awake with the thought that I survived another night. I subject myself to this because it is important that others know what is actually happening here and what the people of Myanmar are going through. The daily news cannot possibly cover it all. I believe that the more people elsewhere know of the situation, the more likely it is that outside assistance will come. Without pressure and support from sources abroad, the struggle here will become all the more difficult. A simple act can be powerful. A case in point: On day two of the coup an apparently famous American singer named Rihanna posted a message on Twitter expressing her support for the Burmese people. I have no idea whatsoever who this person is, but everyone here was happy to get her message. The response and gratitude were amazing. The Burmese desperately want the rest of the world to know of the injustices and violence visited upon them daily. They are pleading for assistance from the United Nations, the U.S., U.K., Australia and Japan. Whenever a representative of any of these countries speaks out, here it gets everyone’s attention and appreciation. Most understand that support from abroad is vital for their civil disobedience movement (CDM) to be successful. … I just got interrupted. A neighbour, a woman in her 80s, came from across the street to deliver a meal to us. She is doing this for all those in our quarter who have supported the CDM, and in memory of a person who was recently shot and killed by soldiers. I gratefully attempted to refuse her offer hoping that she would pass it on to others who are more needy and worthy, but she wouldn’t hear of it. … More than ever I have to look for the positives in all of this, and one is that people have grown closer and more patient with each other. These are incredibly sad times here. I just cannot figure out how such things can happen. Tears start to well up as I think of it. To turn my back on what is occurring is something I could never live with. I must do what I can. People’s bravery, courage and commitment are truly incredible. Most impressive is their commitment to a nonviolent movement. I have not seen a single example of violence on the part of the CDM demonstrators, although I’ve heard that in some parts of the country it is slightly different. I have heard too that folks in other areas have suffered the worst kinds of torment and brutality, so can understand their frustration and anger. How far can people be pushed? On one occasion I witnessed a hundred or so protesters throwing plastic water bottles at retreating police trucks, and a few times I saw bricks and stones thrown at police. Twice I saw people using slingshots. And I do see more and more people carrying sticks, but these are rather for defensive purposes. I have never seen nor heard of a single instance when anyone was struck by a demonstrator. When speaking with people I always mention the great importance of remaining peaceful, and to a person they understand and agree. At times 5,000-kyat men have come into our quarter to cause trouble, and been caught by our new local security team. The 5,000-kyat men are spies and provocateurs hired by the Tatmadaw, the military, often felons and drug addicts freed from prison in exchange for their “services.” They are used to infiltrate the quarters to gather information, to cause diversions by committing acts of vandalism such as breaking windows and lighting fires, and to assault demonstrators in an attempt to provoke them to violence and provide an excuse for soldiers to attack. As a deal-sweetener, they are supposedly paid 5,000 kyat, about US$3.25, for each assignment. I have seen these provocateurs detained and questioned by our local team. As angry as the local security volunteers were, they never once harmed these people in any way. I once saw the police return to their barracks apparently forgetting two of their vehicles that were left in a throng of protesters. No one laid a finger on either one. Elsewhere in the world, how long would those vehicles have lasted before they were engulfed in flames? Groups of police or soldiers typically include a photographer. In one situation, the police left an area but their photographer somehow didn’t realize it and quickly found himself alone. A dozen CDM demonstrators surrounded and began photographing him. They didn’t hurl any abuse, nor did they in any way threaten or detain him. When they finished, they just left him to hurry off. In many other places such an opportunity would have resulted in the policeman being badly beaten, or worse. It is now 9:45 on a Friday morning. In various quarters across town, the police have already begun arresting and shooting people. Previously, this would only happen in the afternoon or under the cover of darkness. At the same time, 100 metres from my window, thousands are beginning to march as they do every day. These are the kinds of things that I see and hear, and do my very best to report as objectively as possible. How long the demonstrators’ peaceful and commendable responses will keep up is anyone’s guess. We all have a breaking point. I am so very exhausted. My brain is painfully full. I apologize that my writing is so poor—my sixth-grade grammar teacher would be very disappointed. I’m sorry, but I cannot bear to go through this report again. I shall send it as is, knowing that you will understand. Now, as I finish, police have appeared in our quarter. I don’t know what they are up to. Two nights ago the local citizens took control of the offices of the oakkahta, the elected head of the quarter. Now I am told that police have retaken them. Eventually they leave, and I hear one of my neighbours say, “It’s OK. Tonight we will take them again.” တို့အရေး တို့အရေး Dote ayae, dote ayae. Our cause, our cause..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-13
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Title: RECONCILIATION: A WAY OF DOING MISSION IN MYANMAR
Description: "The dissertation argues reconciliation as a way of doing mission in Myanmar. The see-discern-act method of research is used. The study has three parts. First, the study critically reflects on the context of reconciliation by diagnosing the present reality and situation of the country. Related information and data are collected from different fields of study. The research identifies the main obstacles to peace, harmony, and reconciliation as civil war, socio-ethnic conflict, religious violence, militarism, political unrest, fragmentation, poverty and corruption. Second, the research discerns and evaluates the challenge of reconciliation. It accesses the research problem from interreligious and multicultural perspectives in search of the possible solutions. If Myanmar will not have a future without reconciliation, the Church must be part of working on reconciliation in order to build that future. The research finds out that mission as reconciliation is possible by upholding spiritual ideals, which are found in Myanmar, such as harmony, nonviolence, peace, truth, justice, forgiveness, and healing. Mission is promotion of the spiritual ideals for reconciliation. Third, the dissertation proposes reconciliation as mission. Apart from the traditional scope of human-God-nature reconciliation this study extends a new frontier of spirits-ancestors-cultures-religions reconciliation. The research proves that reconciliation is more a mission, a religious act, and a spiritual virtue than a strategy, a political program, a secular concern, and a civic project. Therefore, the Church must do mission as ministry of reconciliation in many areas, at various levels, and according to its capacity. When reconciliation is adopted as a way of doing and being in mission the Church walks the path to a new way of being Church as communion through reconciliation.....ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: To pay homage to God, Dharma, Sangha, Teachers, and Parents is the fivefold Burmese socio-religious teaching (annandaw annanda nga pa) which the researcher is deeply obliged to fulfill for the accomplishment of his research. Fr. Edgar G. Javier, SVD his professor and advisor, first and foremost, fully deserves this homage in a special way for his great enlightenment and accompaniment. Gratefulness goes to Dr. Mike Lambino for editing this dissertation and for his kind corrections to the text. Professors who teach the student in the doctoral class deserve the greatest gratitude for all their noble gift of Dharma of intellectual support which surpasses all other gifts. Archbishop Paul Zinghtung Grawng (Archbishop emeritus of Mandalay), Bishop Philip Lasap Za Hawng (Bishop of Lashio), and Cardinal Charles Maung Bo (Archbishop of Yangon) deserve this homage for their various helps in conducting this research. Colleagues and friends of the student are given “a big thanks” for their critiques, suggestions, and insights in the process of this research writing. All the personnel of Institute for Consecrated Life in Asia (ICLA), and the librarians of Loyola School of Theology (LST), St. Vincent School of Theology (SVST), Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC), Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT) and St. Joseph Major Seminary (SMS) are fully acknowledged for the academic support in this research. Special gratitude is due to the Institute of Missiology Missio e.V. (MWI) for the scholarship for this study. Likewise, the anonymous supporters are graciously thanked for their generosity..."
Source/publisher: Maung John
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-13
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Title: The young generation risking all to topple the Myanmar junta
Description: "The knife that carved through Gue Gue’s abdomen wasn’t exactly meant for pulling out her inflamed appendix. But it was the only one available in the sweltering jungle clinic, a bumpy ride over mountainous terrain from her guerrilla training camp. There was no option for general anesthesia to put her under, so Gue Gue was conscious for the operation. The former tour guide, a stylish 26-year-old who listed her interests on Facebook as “Traveling, Adaptive Hiking, Dance, Writing, Gymnastics, Fashion Photography, Listening to Music, and Reading,” tried to keep her mind focused on all the work she had yet to do and not the surgery. “They were cutting the muscle like we are chopping pork,” said a friend who was there. Gue Gue had no regrets, she said later, except about the jagged red mark left behind. “I really don’t want any scars!” she said, laughing. “After the revolution, I’ll go and remove my scar with a laser.” Only a few weeks earlier, on an April evening, Gue Gue had slipped out of her family home in Mandalay, an ancient royal city careening into the 21st century, with shiny new malls, snappily dressed students and hipster cafes. Carrying a single change of clothes, she left behind the home where she had lived with her parents as the baby, the youngest daughter, well-loved and comfortable. She was going to fight the junta, and not just with words. Since Myanmar’s military seized power in a coup on Feb. 1, toppling the civilian government, Gue Gue had seen many of her peers killed by troops on the streets of her hometown as they chanted democracy slogans. Hopes that the international community would respond to the military’s mounting brutality with practical action had fizzled. For her, and thousands like her, the only option was force. “I have family. I have dreams. I have things that I want to achieve. I want to travel. I want to write. I want to study,” Gue Gue said a few weeks before her operation in the jungle, in the first of a series of interviews over several months. Two other people, and video and photo footage shared with Reuters, confirmed the outline and many of the details of her story. Because she still hasn’t healed from her ad hoc surgery, she hasn’t yet been involved in any fighting. But she says she is ready. “I sacrificed all this and joined this training with only one ambition: that we must win.” Two faces of the resistance The men and women rebelling against Myanmar’s junta vow to be the last generation to live under the boot of the country’s military. This, they say, is the “final battle” to root out the army, which has been the most powerful institution in the country since it became an independent nation in 1948. The military has withstood popular uprisings and civil war for decades, including the mass uprising in 1988 that led to the emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi as a human rights icon. It is a fight that has in a few short months made guerrilla fighters of university lecturers, day laborers, I.T. workers, students and artists and forced countless young men and women into a life on the run. Some, like Gue Gue, who had never considered herself particularly political until the bloodbath on the streets in the wake of the coup, are in clandestine rebel training camps. Hundreds of armed outfits have popped up across the country, according to an October report by the International Crisis Group, many calling themselves People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). A famous poet formed one. Beauty queens and actresses who were wanted by the authorities for supporting the protests re-emerged on social media in areas controlled by armed groups, posting pictures with rifles slung over their shoulders. Others, like a skinny 32-year-old librarian named Tayzar San, have been hiding in cities, organizing clandestine demonstrations, funneling money to striking workers and strategizing. A young man who once spent his spare time buried in books – as often Burmese romance novels as nonfiction political tracts – he now lives out of a backpack, moving from apartment to apartment to evade the authorities who have put a $5,600 bounty on his head. By September, he said, he hadn’t seen his wife and daughter in seven months. The utterly changed worlds of Gue Gue and Tayzar San paint a portrait of sacrifice and resolve in a young Burmese generation who, unlike their parents, grew up in a world of smartphones and greater political freedoms. Many are willing to pay any price, including their lives, to overthrow a junta that they say threatens to take them back to a darker past. Speaking in October, army chief and coup leader Min Aung Hlaing said the junta, which has vowed to hold elections within two years, was working on a five-point plan to reach a “true union based on democracy and federalism.” He said the leadership was working to “change the country peacefully.” In a message to Reuters responding to detailed questions, the junta’s “True News” information unit said, “We have no plan to answer meaningless questions.” At stake is the fate of a country of 55 million people that once looked to be on its way to becoming Asia’s newest semi-democratic state, a nation on the crossroads of India and China rich with natural resources, considered a frontier market for foreign investors and a keystone in U.S-led efforts to counter Chinese power in Southeast Asia. It is one of the bloodiest chapters yet in a decades-long struggle to shrug off a series of military dictators who have waged some of the world’s longest-running civil wars, displaced millions of people and consigned multiple generations to poverty and dashed dreams. Since Myanmar, then Burma, won independence from colonial Britain seven decades ago, it has known less than 25 years of civilian governance. Successive juntas ruled the country from 1962 until 2011, when Gen. Than Shwe appeared to step back and hand limited powers to a civilian government. It was a managed process that reserved vast political influence under the constitution for the military. Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been imprisoned in her home for 15 years, was freed to participate in elections and, in 2015, won them. In the years following, Suu Kyi drew criticism for standing by the military as they carried out what the United Nations termed a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya Muslim minority. Testifying in the Hague, where Myanmar faces charges at the International Criminal Court, she admitted that war crimes may have been committed but denied genocide, saying Rohingya had “exaggerated” the extent of abuses against them. But her government made some steps toward weakening military power and attracting foreign investment. The Myanmar kyat became Asia’s best-performing currency, and the World Bank was predicting economic growth in the country despite the COVID-19 pandemic..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-12
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Title: AAPP Press Release: 10,000 Documented Detentions Since 1 February
Description: "This morning AAPP documented the detention of 10,000 civilians by the military Junta in its crackdown on the pro-democracy struggle. These are mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, friends, and other loved ones who chose to resist an illegitimate 1 February coup attempt. Yet, these are only 10,000 individuals documented by AAPP. Our organization knows there are many more. On April 24, the military told an ASEAN leaders’ summit 9,948 had been detained and 4,511 were already released. But the so-called SAC tries deception with unconditional releases. On June 30, the military said they would release 2,342 protestors, although only 370 have been identified. Again, on October 18, announcing 5,636 would be released. However, AAPP has confirmed 4,075, with only 1,199 identified. All of those released were forced to sign 401(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, threatening them with harsher sentences in any future arrest. According to these past announcements by the Junta, 12,489 political detainees have been released since the coup. But there is a crater sized gap between reality and what this Junta tells the world. As of November 11, at least 150 have been killed in custody, some within 24 hours through brutal interrogation methods, others locked in an overcrowded jail and denied necessary medical treatment during a pandemic. Yet all the detained will be mentally and physically tortured. Even those they take hostage when their relatives cannot be found. 244 people have been arrested as hostages since the coup, 194 of them remain detained. The youngest is an infant under 1-years-old. As of our sources, prison conditions are ruthless, with corruption everywhere. There is not enough quality food to eat or space to sleep. Detainees need to pay bribes to avoid degrading or harsh labor, denied even the most basic human dignity. Fundamentally, the 10,000 civilians arrested were not criminals, they are students, doctors, journalists, teachers, striking workers, politicians, lawyers, civil servants. People who do not want a return to harsh authoritarian rule. ASEAN’s ‘Five-Point Consensus’ to deal with the [military inflicted] political, economic, and social crisis ignored the escalating numbers of political prisoners. The first talking point must be the unconditional release of all political prisoners, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint. Arbitrary detentions began this illegitimate coup, the continued existence of political prisoners is the barometer of democracy in Burma. As long as there are political prisoners there can be no national reconciliation..."
Source/publisher: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-11
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Title: U.N. Security Council urges end to Myanmar violence
Description: "The U.N. Security Council expressed deep concern on Wednesday over increased violence across Myanmar and in a rare statement, agreed by the 15-members, called for an immediate end to fighting and for the military to exercise utmost restraint. There are reports of a buildup of heavy weapons and troops in Chin state, suggesting an imminent army attack to flush out militia groups formed after the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government in a coup on Feb. 1. “The Members of the Security Council expressed deep concern at further recent violence across Myanmar. They called for an immediate cessation of violence and to ensure the safety of civilians,” the statement said. Myanmar’s junta has made no comment on the situation in Chin, a volatile border region that has become a forefront of resistance against military rule. Myanmar has been paralyzed by protests and violence since the coup, with the junta struggling to govern and facing armed resistance from militias and ethnic minority rebels allied with a shadow government that it calls “terrorists”. “The Members of the Security Council ... reiterated their deep concern at developments in Myanmar following the declaration of the state of emergency imposed on 1 February and their call on the military to exercise utmost restraint,” said the statement, drafted by Britain. “They encouraged the pursuance of dialogue and reconciliation in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar,” the statement said. The council also called for full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all people in need and the protection, safety and security of humanitarian and medical personnel..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-11
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Title: Access Denied: The Myanmar Military Junta’s Deprivation of Lifesaving Aid in Karenni (Kayah) State
Description: "Since the deadly military coup d’état in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military junta has killed, tortured, and otherwise persecuted civilians, forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands nationwide. In Karenni State—also known as Kayah State—rather than ensure humanitarian aid reached civilians in need, the junta arbitrarily arrested aid workers, destroyed civilian food stocks and non-military objects, prevented the delivery of food and medical supplies at military checkpoints, and delayed or denied administrative approvals for local, national, and international aid organizations. This flash report finds that these ongoing acts may constitute war crimes. While military-led attacks on civilians increase and impunity for atrocity crimes is further entrenched, the military junta continues to deny any wrongdoing. To ensure lifesaving aid for an increasing number of civilians forcibly displaced in the country, this report recommends that Thailand, India, China, and Bangladesh authorize agencies to deliver cross-border humanitarian aid to Myanmar, directly as well as through community-based partners.
Source/publisher: "Fortify Rights"
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-10
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Title: How Myanmar Junta Chief Uses Richardson’s Visit to Boost His Image
Description: "After his visit to military-ruled Myanmar last week, ex-US diplomat Bill Richardson boasted that his trip had achieved its aims: the release from prison of a local ex-employee of his; increased access to humanitarian aid and vaccines for Myanmar; and resumption of Red Cross visits to the country’s prisons. The former New Mexico governor described his trip to the country, with which he has had a long involvement dating back to 1994, as a humanitarian visit. Though his visit was made on a private basis, he was the first prominent US figure to meet Myanmar coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who is under US sanctions for masterminding the killing of more than 1,000 people who opposed his ousting of the country’s democratically elected government in February. Richardson has no love for Myanmar’s detained pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Nor does Min Aung Hlaing, who placed her under house arrest at the time of the coup. So the two men had that much in common when they met and talked for 90 minutes. Talking to the Associated Press about his Myanmar trip, Richardson said he was satisfied with what he had accomplished. So, it’s worth asking what Myanmar junta got out of Richardson’s visit, apart from humanitarian aid and vaccines, as he claimed. In short: a significant propaganda boost. The junta chief’s meeting with Richardson was psychologically important, allowing the general to deceive his military officers and soldiers into believing that he was paid a visit by “a former diplomat” from the US—the arch critic of his regime. Perfect timing According to sources, it took two months to plan the trip with the assistance of some former military intelligence officers who knew Richardson. However, it should be noted that the timing of the visit was most convenient for the regime, coming just as Min Aung Hlaing was licking his wounds after being shunned at a regional summit he had been desperate to attend. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, refused his presence at the meeting over his failure to honor commitments to take steps to ease the political crisis sparked by his coup. As he had counted on the support of his regional neighbors, the group’s exclusion of him was a big blow for Min Aung Hlaing. On Nov. 2, just five days after the ASEAN summit’s conclusion, Richardson was ushered into the Credentials Hall of the office of the regime’s governing body, the State Administration Council, in Naypyitaw to be received by Min Aung Hlaing. Prior to the coup, the hall, dominated by a gilded throne—a symbol of Myanmar’s sovereignty—at the Presidential Residence was where the country’s presidents welcomed international dignitaries, from US President Barack Obama to Chinese leader Xi Jinping to newly arrived diplomats to the country. Richardson may be the first non-state figure to be received in the room. Next day, Richardson must have been thrilled to see a picture of their meeting splashed over the front page of the junta’s mouthpiece newspaper with the headline: “State Administration Council Chairman Prime Minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing receives former governor of New Mexico State of USA.” However, the regime’s special treatment of Richardson had an ulterior motive. Some retired Myanmar military officers who worked for the previous regime said the photo of the ex-diplomat paying a courtesy call to Min Aung Hlaing in the grand hall—with Richardson in a chair and Min Aung Hlaing perched on an ornate, gilded sofa in front of the throne—evoked a feeling of an ancient Myanmar king receiving a foreign visitors. Richardson, meanwhile, appears subdued in the photo. At the same time, the military’s propaganda mill swung into high gear. The Irrawaddy was told that military commanders have been ordered to share the picture on their social media accounts. They have told their subordinates and their family members to do the same, to create the impression, especially in military circles, that despite international criticism and exclusion by ASEAN, the regime still has friends. This time, American! Information bubble Some may find it hard to believe that it could be so easy for the regime to delude its people, especially in the mobile internet age. Since the coup, access to news from independent media has been largely banned for officers, soldiers and their families living inside army quarters. Their Facebook accounts are monitored to “prevent disintegration of the unity of the Tatmadaw” (Myanmar’s military). They are only allowed to read the regime’s papers and watch the military’s Myawady Channel; all other information available online from independent local news outlets is dismissed as fake news from “state-destroying media”. Amid this blanket information blackout, the regime can filter the information they want to feed to the troops. So, when the junta published the picture of Richardson meeting with Min Aung Hlaing in the Credentials Hall, the majority of people in the military, who have little familiarity with Richardson, would simply think that their boss had a VIP visitor from the US, a country that has long supported Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement and rarely had warm relations with the Tatmadaw. The former governor told the AP that he was realistic enough to realize that some might try to exploit his presence. Of course, Min Aung Hlaing used him not only for propaganda, but also to raise the spirit of his troops, who have been demoralized by the nationwide popular hatred directed at them for their deadly crackdowns on anti-coup protesters. To add to their dismay, the regime’s soldiers are growing increasingly fatigued and insecure due to the growing and ever more deadly civilian armed resistance against them. To keep his boys’ spirits high, Min Aung Hlaing needed to show them he has friends and is not isolated, especially after ASEAN’s snub. Richardson, as an American, turned out to be the perfect choice. Unsurprisingly, the ex-US diplomat’s meeting with the Myanmar coup leader has drawn a barrage of criticism, especially from human rights campaigners who said Richardson had given the junta an air of legitimacy—a claim he rejected. However, when offering his impressions of Min Aung Hlaing, the ex-diplomat sounded like a spin doctor, describing the blood-soaked dictator as “cordial” and “open to more contact,” likely paving the way for others who are similarly clueless about Myanmar’s misery under Min Aung Hlaing and who blindly think that isolating the regime is not the answer to the Myanmar crisis. Talking up his achievements during the trip as “mild progress”, Richardson said he was optimistic and hopeful that it might lead to a better situation. He has also, no doubt, earned the gratitude of Min Aung Hlaing, for arriving in a time of need and turning out to be quite useful—at least when it comes to deceiving his boys in uniform into believing that their chief is not a lonely and isolated figure..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-10
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Title: Myanmar’s junta blocked from attending global climate summit
Sub-title: The decision marks the second time the military’s representation has been rejected by the UN.
Description: "Myanmar’s military regime has been snubbed once again on the international stage, this time by the organizers of the United Nations climate change conference, who turned its five-person delegation away at the door to the summit in Glasgow, Scotland, this week. The move to bar the delegation comes just a month after reports that the U.N. credentialing committee delayed acceptance of the junta’s appointed envoy to the General Assembly as part of a U.S.-China-brokered deal that would have the representative of Myanmar’s deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) government “take a low profile” until a formal decision is made later this year. Sources close to the military government recently told RFA’s Myanmar Service that Hla Maung Thein, the junta’s director general of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, had planned to send a five-member delegation to the Oct. 31 to Nov. 12 conference, known as COP26. The group was to be led by Ambassador Tun Aung Kyaw of the Myanmar Embassy in London. However, Myanmar pro-democracy groups learned of the plan and protested the junta’s inclusion, which they said would allow it to raise its international profile despite its violent repression at home of opponents to its Feb. 1 coup. Kyaw Swa Tun, a third secretary at the Myanmar Embassy in Washington, told RFA that the delegation had been denied entry to the 192-member nation conference when it arrived in Glasgow. “The military council was trying to get [global] recognition. A delegation of five people, led by the junta’s Ambassador Tun Aung Kyaw and Councilor Chit Win, traveled to Glasgow,” he said. “At the U.N. there is a group that accepts nominations and there’s another group that deals with credentials. At the time of the nomination of the five, travel expenses were paid by the U.N. nominating group. However, the credentials group rejected their nomination and so they were not allowed to attend the meeting and had to return home from Scotland.” It was not immediately clear which group or individual objected to the junta’s participation at the COP26. Junta representatives were even barred from taking part in the conference virtually. RFA learned that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had paid for the travel expenses of at least three of the five delegates when the junta was initially invited. RFA was unable to contact the UNFCCC for comment on the decision to block the junta from attending the conference. Nine months after the Feb. 1 coup, the junta’s security forces have killed 1,252 civilians and arrested at least 7,091, according to the Bangkok-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Many of the deaths and arrests have occurred during crackdowns on anti-junta protests. The junta claims it unseated the NLD government because the party had engineered its victory in the 2020 election through widespread voter fraud, though international observers rated the vote legitimate. Military leaders have yet to present evidence backing up their allegation, and protests against the regime continue. ‘A victory for the people of Myanmar’ Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) said it had also attempted to send a delegation to COP26 but was rejected. “As we all know, our government was formed on behalf of the people, so I think U.N. officials should recognize our government’s representation and allow us to attend such major conferences,” NUG Deputy Foreign Minister Moe Zaw Oo told RFA. “Otherwise, our country will miss a lot of opportunities because of non-participation at meetings on important issues,” he added, saying that the NUG would continue its efforts to represent Myanmar on the world stage. Moe Zaw Oo said the decision to ban the junta from attending the climate conference was “a victory for the people of Myanmar.” “They are trying to attend U.N. meetings, but U.N. officials and host countries are also working to prevent them from being represented,” he said. “It will teach them the lesson that an organization that does not represent the people will not be allowed to attend such meetings.” Arkar Myo Htet, an NLD lawmaker, said refusing the junta representation at COP26 was a blow to the military regime. “It is a blessing for our uprising and our people that the junta was not allowed to attend such an important conference,” he said. “This shows that the global community stands with our people. … The military is slowly failing in the international arena.” Attempts by RFA to reach junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment regarding the delegation were not successful..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-10
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Title: Oct 25–Nov 7, 2021 Summary of SAC human rights violations in Karenni State and Pekhon Township
Description: "During the past two weeks, SAC troops have scaled up military operations in Pekhon and Demawso townships, in an attempt to secure control of the main access roads from southern Shan State to Loikaw, and from Loikaw to southern Karenni State. SAC troops have shelled directly into towns and villages, killing and injuring civilians and damaging numerous buildings. Hundreds more SAC troops have been deployed from Naypyidaw to try and sweep out resistance forces in the hills west of Pekhon town. On October 25, SAC troops fired artillery shells and shot guns at Lud Mae Taw Catholic church in San Pya 6 mile, Demawso township. They also indiscriminately shelled into Mar Ner Plaw quarter in Demawso township, damaging a house there. On October 26, combined KA and KNDF troops clashed with SAC troops travelling between Htu Lwi Belar village and Ngwe Taung Ywa Thit village in Demawso township. 10 SAC soldiers were killed and 2 military trucks damaged. On October 26, Pekhon PDF troops and other Karenni forces clashed with SAC troops camped near Katheh village in Gone Hsone village tract, Pekhon township, causing one of the PDF soldiers to be injured. The SAC then indiscriminately shelled into Katheh village, injuring 3 villagers. On October 27, the SAC again indiscriminately shelled into Katheh village in Pekhon township damaging five houses and a local clinic. On October 29, Moe Bye-based LIB 422 battalion indiscriminately shelled into and around Moe Bye town, killing a woman from Sigan 2 quarter and injuring a man from Pau Oo 2 quarter; and also killed a villager in his farm near the town. On October 30, SAC troops carrying out operations between Loikaw town and Moe Bye town set fire to stacks of harvested paddy along the roadsides. On October 31, SAC troops shot at two villagers from an IDP camp in Demawso township while they were returning to their village to get rations, luckily causing no injury. SAC troops also burned down several houses in Ngu Plau quarter in Demawso township, according to a Demawso PDF statement. Moreover, SAC troops fired shells into Daw Tama Nge village in Demawso township, injuring one villager and damaging some houses. On November 1, SAC troops patrolling from Shwe Yauk quarter in Demawso township indiscriminately shelled into Daw Nga Khan quarter 2 in Demawso township, damaging a community-owned store and 3 houses..."
Source/publisher: Karenni Civil Society Network
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-10
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Title: Myanmar Regime to Charge Detained Activist With High Treason, Terrorism
Description: "Myanmar’s military regime has announced five charges against a detained veteran student activist—including high treason and violating the counter-terrorism law—for allegedly masterminding a campaign of guerrilla warfare against the junta in the country’s biggest city, Yangon. U Kyaw Min Yu, a member of the ’88 Generation Students Group and popularly known as Ko Jimmy, was arrested late last month when regime soldiers raided his hideout in northern Yangon. He was seriously injured during the arrest. Regime mouthpiece Myawady TV did not announce the arrest until Sunday night, about two weeks after it happened, showing Ko Jimmy with his hands tied behind his back and kneeling before a haul of seized firearms and ammunitions. It said he will be charged with high treason; violating the Counter-Terrorism Law; violating the Unlawful Association Act; violating the Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act; and incitement. If found guilty, the veteran student leader faces at least 30 years’ imprisonment. He could face the death penalty, as Myanmar’s terrorism law allows the death sentence in some cases. In its announcement, the junta said Ko Jimmy was the political and security adviser of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the shadow National Unity Government (NUG). The CRPH was formed by elected lawmakers from Myanmar’s formerly ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) in the wake of the February military coup, and the NUG is its offshoot. The regime has branded both as terrorist organizations. The junta said Ko Jimmy was the leader of Operation Moonlight, under which eight “huge” missions were to be carried out in Yangon in the wake of the NUG’s nationwide call on Sept. 7 to revolt against the regime. Since the NUG’s war declaration, Myanmar has seen growing armed resistance against the regime across the country, causing serious casualties to the junta. Yangon has been no exception with deadly hit-and-run attacks on regime soldiers. The Sunday statement said Operation Moonlight had completed three missions as of last month in Twantay, Insein and Hlegu townships. “The remaining Mission 4, Mission 5, Mission 6, Mission 7 and Mission 8 were planned to be conducted in Yinkin, Mingaladon, Dala, Thakayta, Dagon Myothit (South) and Hlinethaya townships,” it said. In collaboration with other resistance groups in the city, the regime said, those involved in the operation had launched separate attacks in Yangon since May, targeting schools, killing administrators and regime collaborators, and attacking state-owned buildings and private banks..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-09
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Title: One-Year Anniversary of November 8 General Elections in Burma
Description: "One year ago, Burma held multiparty elections to select a new government. Independent observers reported that the elections, despite some concerns, were credible and reaffirmed the commitment of the Burmese people to democracy. The military’s coup on February 1 sought to overthrow the will of the people and erase the outcome of that credible election. The military’s subsequent and ongoing violent crackdown has further undermined human rights and fundamental freedoms and reversed a decade of progress toward a genuine democracy that the people of Burma clearly sought and still seek. On the anniversary of the November 8 election, we honor the people of Burma striving to restore democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in their country, including more than 1,300 innocent people who have lost their lives in that struggle. The United States is committed to promoting justice and accountability for these and other abuses by the regime. Today, we reiterate our call for the military regime immediately to cease violence, release all those unjustly detained, and return Burma’s path to a genuine and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher: United States Department of State
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-09
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Title: As Suu Kyi stands trial, her judge—and Myanmar’s judiciary—come under scrutiny
Sub-title: The judge who will decide the NLD leader’s fate may not be your average apparatchik, but don’t expect any surprises when he reaches his verdict
Description: "In a country notorious for the opacity of its justice system, Ye Lwin is a rare bird: a judge who is not just a faceless cog in a machine that routinely does the bidding of Myanmar’s military. Currently serving as a judge in Naypyitaw’s Dekkhina District Court, he has presided over a number of high-profile cases, including those against Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the country’s ousted civilian government. Most recently, he was the lead justice in a two-judge panel that last week sentenced Win Htein, a patron of the deposed ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to 20 years in prison for sedition. But it was more than three years ago that he first came to prominence, both for his role as information officer during the trial against the killers of Ko Ni, Suu Kyi’s long-time legal advisor, and as the judge who found two Reuters reporters guilty of violating the Official Secrets Act for their reporting on military atrocities committed in Rakhine State. Now presiding over Suu Kyi’s trial under the same colonial-era law, Ye Lwin’s reputation for coming down hard on defendants is hardly reassuring. But that hasn’t stopped lawyers who have seen him in action from expressing a grudging respect for him. In the case against Win Htein, for instance, he betrayed no obvious prejudice against the defendant of his defence team, according to Myint Thwin, the lead lawyer for the 79-year-old NLD stalwart. “The judge was just doing his job. He didn’t stay to look at Win Htein. He just left the court after handing down the sentence,” he said, adding that Ye Win allowed the team to practice “their full rights to defend” their client. But that will be little comfort to Suu Kyi, who is under no illusions about her chances of receiving a fair trial under the regime that seized power on February 1. When Myint Thwin, who happened to speak with the NLD leader the day before Win Htein was sentenced, informed her that his client was facing up to 20 years in prison, she jokingly responded: “I think it could be longer for me.” Unexpected praise Described by some colleagues as “charismatic” and a good communicator, Ye Lwin is also widely seen as a judge who takes his responsibilities seriously. “In general, I would say that he is quite trustworthy. He is not the kind of person to get caught up in corruption scandals,” said a retired court officer familiar with Ye Lwin’s career, which began more than two decades ago. But it is probably his reputation for being approachable, rather than his apparently unimpeachable integrity, that has made the 50-year-old Ye Lwin a suitable pick to handle cases that have attracted both national and international attention. “He was not a difficult person to talk to,” said one reporter who covered the Ko Ni assassination trial for a foreign news outlet. “Even if he didn’t want to answer a question, he would just try to walk around it, rather than getting angry.” As the person charged with explaining the verdict in that case, Ye Lwin faced a barrage of questions about why two of the defendants did not receive heavier sentences. While the two convicted killers, Kyi Lin and Aung Win Zaw, were both given the death penalty, the accused mastermind, former military intelligence captain Zeyar Phyo, received only five years for destroying evidence, while a fourth defendant, Aung Win Tun, got off with just three years for harbouring an offender. Ye Lwin’s considerable communication skills were on full display as he tried to justify these decisions. But when the name of another suspect—Lin Zaw Tun, a retired army colonel and former aide to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing who went on to win a seat in parliament for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party—was raised, Ye Lwin knew better than to test the limits of his abilities as a public speaker. “I am just relaying the information on the court’s actions today regarding the case as an information officer. I have already described in detail regarding all the findings and comments in today’s report. I have no other comment to give on this case,” he said calmly as he brought his press briefing to an end. Even his handling of the case against Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo earned Ye Lwin praise from an unlikely quarter: a police officer whose testimony as a witness for the prosecution exposed a conspiracy to frame the two defendants. When former police captain Moe Yan Naing testified that Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo had been set up, it nearly destroyed the case against them. But rather than attempting to silence him, Ye Lwin allowed Moe Yan Naing to speak. “He did not dismiss my statement. He accepted it as evidence. But in the end, my testimony had no impact on the sentence given to the two reporters,” said Moe Yan Naing, who was later imprisoned for speaking the truth on the stand. Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who had written an investigation into a massacre of 10 Muslim men and boys in northern Rakhine State’s Maungdaw Township in September 2017, were both given seven-year sentences under Section 3(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act, but were later released on a pardon. The judiciary since the coup Myanmar’s judiciary is led by Tun Tun Oo, who has been the chief justice of the Union Supreme Court since 2011. Under the 2008 Constitution, the former military officer (who is not to be confused with Tun Tun Oo, the attorney general who was replaced after the coup in February) can remain in his current position until he reaches the age of 70. In his case, that means he can serve as the country’s top judge for five more years. But having a former officer in charge of Myanmar’s highest court is not the only way the military exerts its influence over the country’s judicial system. Indeed, since it first seized power nearly six decades ago, the military has steadily stripped the courts of any vestige of the independence they once had. Aung San Suu Kyi, who was appointed to lead a parliamentary “rule of law” committee months after winning a seat as an MP in a 2012 by-election, has long stressed the need to re-establish the independence of courts as a key pillar of democratic rule. “My party has repeatedly emphasized rule of law because of the very fact that our judiciary is far from independent. It is a mere tool of the executive. That means not just that the judiciary is undemocratic, but the executive is undemocratic as well and the legislature, too, is undemocratic,” she said in a TED Talk in July 2014. Now, however, she is once again a captive of the generals, who have not hesitated to use their complete control over the courts to deprive her and all other opponents of their regime of their most fundamental rights. Currently facing a total of 11 charges, she was not even allowed to have some of her defence lawyers present during the first hearing of her trial under the Official Secrets Act. She faces a sentence of up to 14 years in prison on that charge alone. This decision sends a clear signal that Ye Lwin, who is presiding over that case, has no intention of breaking with decades of judicial subservience to the will of the military. Another attorney who has crossed paths with Ye Lwin several times declined to make any comment on his character based on what he has seen in court. In the end, he said, it doesn’t matter what kind of person he is: He will do what is expected of him, as he has done in every other case he has been involved with. “He did what he had to do during those court hearings. But he may hand down verdicts that we are not happy with at the end of the day,” said the lawyer, who asked to remain anonymous. Even Moe Yan Naing, who was so impressed by Ye Lwin’s willingness to hear him out when he presented damning testimony of wrongdoing by the authorities, recognized that it was unlikely that he would show such even-handedness under the country’s current circumstances. “Most of judiciary matters were beyond our control even when we had a president. Now that we’re under a dictatorship, things can only get worse,” said the former police captain..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-07
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Title: Win Htein to act as witness for deposed civilian leaders
Sub-title: The patron of Myanmar’s ousted ruling party was sentenced to 20 years in prison for sedition late last month
Description: "The legal defence team for Myanmar’s detained civilian leaders plans to call Win Htein, a senior figure from the ousted ruling party who was sentenced to 20 years in prison for sedition late last month, as a witness, court sources told Myanmar Now. Lawyers for ousted State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint came up with the plan after deciding not to call other witnesses due to fears that they could be targeted by the country’s coup regime for testifying in favour of the deposed leaders, the sources said. Suu Kyi faces a total of 11 charges, including incitement, corruption, and violations of the colonial-era Official Secrets Act, that could land her in prison for decades if convicted. Win Myint is standing trial for incitement and breaching health restrictions during last year’s election campaign. Until now, their lawyers have had to base their cases solely on the testimony of the two defendants. However, they have recently submitted a request to call Win Htein, who is a patron of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), to the stand as a witness, the sources said. Win Htein was given the maximum sentence of 20 years in prison on October 29 after being found guilty of sedition under Section 124a of the Penal Code. He was due to be transferred from the Naypyitaw Detention Centre to Mandalay’s Obo Prison after his sentence was handed down, but the transfer has reportedly been delayed in case he has to return to court to testify on behalf of Suu Kyi and Win Myint. Legally, there is no reason that someone who has already been convicted can’t act as a witness in other lawsuits, according to Thein Oo, the justice minister of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG). “The law does not stipulate that someone who has been convicted cannot testify as a witness. Defence lawyers have the right to call anyone who can prove the innocence of the accused,” he said. The junta’s anti-corruption commission has accused Suu Kyi of taking bribes while she was in office. Last month, the former Yangon chief minister under her ousted government, Phyo Min Thein, testified in court that he paid her $600,000 in cash and gave her 11.4kg of gold in exchange for protection and support for his businesses. Thein Oo told Myanmar Now that as a patron of the NLD, Win Htein had influence over the party’s choice of chief ministers and monitored their performance in office. This knowledge would make him a suitable witness to defend Suu Kyi’s innocence, he said. “If U Win Htein is allowed to testify [in the corruption case], we can see how much of Phyo Min Thein’s testimony is actually accurate,” the NUG justice minister said. The court is also expected to hand down verdicts in the incitement cases against Suu Kyi and Win Myint later this month. It was still unclear at the time of reporting if Win Htein would also be testifying in these cases. A spokesperson for the junta could not be reached for comment. Win Htein was among the few top NLD leaders who was not detained in the early hours of February 1 as the military toppled Myanmar’s elected government. Later the same morning he used his freedom to excoriate the military and urged the public to resist the coup during interviews with journalists. Min Aung Hlaing acted “without thinking of what is right and wrong,” he told reporters, adding: “I feel pity for him.” He was arrested at his home in Yangon three days later. According to his lawyer Myint Thwin, Win Htein said he made the comments on the day of the coup because, as a leader of the ruling party, he felt responsible for communicating the unfolding situation to the country..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-07
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Title: Idle in the Face of Catastrophe: The Coup and the Need for Structural Reform within the UNSC
Description: "Introduction The 2021 coup in Myanmar spotlighted the inability of the United Nations Security Council (hereafter UNSC) to uphold its primary responsibility, “the maintenance of international peace and security,” which entails mass atrocity prevention. For months after the coup, I joined millions of peaceful protesters across Myanmar, taking to the streets and calling on the UNSC to invoke its ‘Responsibility to Protect’—“a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution” that was unanimously adopted by United Nations (UN) member states at the 2005 World Summit. With respect to invoking this Responsibility to Protect (R2P), expectations from the resistance movement primarily revolved around humanitarian intervention or at least coordinated sanctions and embargoes. A tyrannical crackdown by Myanmar’s military and countless atrocities later, the situation has escalated from a coup into a full-blown humanitarian crisis. But much to the dismay of protesters, the UNSC has yet to go beyond a statement of condemnation when it comes to addressing the deteriorating situation in my country. The reason for this inaction transcends intent—it is a direct consequence of UNSC’s structure, and UNSC reform is, therefore, the remedy. Since its first meeting on January 17, 1946, the UNSC has evolved little despite seismic shifts in geopolitical realities. Structurally unchanged since its inception, the Council is comprised of 15 seats: 10 nonpermanent seats whose appointees are elected for two-year terms, and five permanent seats held by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, and the United Kingdom. The permanent seats wield veto power, allowing them to block UNSC resolutions regardless of the degree of support from the rest of the Council. Criticisms of the UNSC by international actors and proposals to change its institutional design have echoed across the globe since the end of the Cold War. The bulk of such scrutiny is directed towards the UNSC’s tendency to give unequal weight to differently positioned member states’ national interests and let the political interests of individual member states get in the way of resolving humanitarian crises. Accordingly, calls for reform are primarily connected to the “antiquated” concept of the veto held by the permanent five seats (the P5) and its inability to “reflect 21st-century realities.” The UNSC’s efforts to resolve humanitarian crises in the 21st century have been mostly ineffective. This is because vetoes and a fundamentally unequal electoral system for seats are conducive to hegemony, or the inflexibility or inability to adapt to change, due to the dominance of a select few member states. Though the membership structure was initially established with the hope it would allow competing geopolitical superpowers to keep each other in check, it has recently achieved the opposite by allowing actions that go against the founding ethos of the Council to go unchecked. The structure of the UNSC needs reform to address the needs of and contribute to a new world that has developed with the coming of the 21st century: an arguably more egalitarian world order that places emphasis on holding those in power accountable for their actions. The UN Charter obligates the UNSC to respond to the crisis in Myanmar, but the UNSC nevertheless cannot respond to the ongoing catastrophic situation because of its organizational structure. The UNSC has ‘failed’ Myanmar and consequently its founding ethos by showing what internally prevented the Council from responding. Structural reform could prevent future inactions. A Neorealist Look at the Security Council To understand why the UNSC’s structure is inefficacious, one must first establish why the Council holds an obligation under the UN Charter to respond to humanitarian crises: for this, the UNSC response to the Myanmar crisis serves as an ideal case study. The UNSC is given under Chapter V, Article 24 of the Charter of the UN, “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” It is also responsible—under Chapter I, Article I—for “the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” The actions of the State Administration Council and its military wing, the Tatmadaw, following the February 1 coup in Myanmar can objectively be interpreted not only as threats to and breaches of the peace but also acts of aggression. Appropriately, the demands of Myanmar’s protesters have centered around invoking the aforementioned UN Charter articles—in addition to the Responsibility to Protect agreement—in relation to the actions of the Tatmadaw. Since its February coup, the Tatmadaw has been responsible for the extrajudicial killings and the torture of peaceful protesters, regime critics, and journalists. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners has confirmed that 1,139 people have been killed by the Tatmadaw and 6,891 are still detained as of September 28, though “the actual number of fatalities is likely much higher.” According to Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2021, the Tatmadaw’s “arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, and killings” of political dissidents was in addition to its “campaign of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity against the ethnic Rohingya.” This obligation is also present beyond the Charter due to the aforementioned R2P principle, in which the UN unanimously agreed to “halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The mass incidence of one-sided violence and persecution perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against an indefensible population undoubtedly warrants a response by the UNSC, as it did during the Rwandan Genocide, the Kosovo War, and the Syrian Civil War. If an international response is warranted, and the UNSC is under obligation by its founding Charter and R2P to administer it, why doesn’t the UNSC do so? The answer to this question may seem obvious, but to properly address it, we must delve into the power dynamics of the Council and the intentions of its members. We can do this by using neorealism as a lens to look at the UNSC. Neorealism contends that the system of international politics is defined by its ordering principle (anarchy), units of the system (nations), and the distribution of capabilities (the number of superpowers within the system). The international order—and the UN—is by nature a decentralized system in which nations have equal rights and use egoism to make decisions that further their national interest and maximize their relative gains in power. These relative gains are important for member states due to the security dilemma—a theory that contends that member states maximize relative gains and minimize relative losses in power to protect themselves from potential threats to their survival and economic wellbeing. Through a neorealist lens, votes “for” or “against” UNSC resolutions can be viewed as member states’ attempts to maximize their power and ensure their geopolitical and economic survival. Resolution A/RES/75/287 on the conflict in Myanmar during the UN General Assembly’s 75th session is an example of this. The 119 member states who voted to adopt the resolution did so because they stand to benefit from condemning the military coup, whereas the vote against (by Belarus) can be seen as motivated by ideological alignment with Myanmar’s State Administration Council. The 36 abstentions can be viewed as a refusal to take a position because joining a bloc could damage these states’ pre-established economic or diplomatic ties. The General Assembly’s structure allows for a balance of power in which nations pursue interests but the majority always prevails. When this is not the case, the international system can become more unstable and less efficient. In the UNSC, an uneven distribution of capabilities makes the decisions of certain member states far more consequential. The distribution of capabilities refers to the number of member states that possess an abundance of economic, nuclear, and military capabilities, making them superpowers. The distribution of capabilities, and accordingly, power, in the UNSC is concentrated in the P5 seats that wield veto power. From a critical perspective, the concept of permanent membership or vetoing may seem fundamentally unequal or unjust. But through neorealism, one can see how in an order where countries compete to further their interests and ensure survival, countries with the greatest capabilities hold the most power and will unequivocally exercise it. Hence, it becomes quite evident that the structure of the UNSC is a direct consequence of global power dynamics. This structure served the world well in a bipolar post-WWII era. But with the rise of China marking the dawn of a multipolar system, the UNSC structure that once reflected the balance of power may be obsolete and a deterrent to peace and security. The Importance and Challenges to UNSC Alignment on Myanmar UNSC alignment on the situation in Myanmar is much more crucial than alignment in the General Assembly due to the binding nature of resolutions in the UNSC. In accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter, resolutions passed in the UNSC under Chapter VII—Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression— require member states to​​ “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” In essence, in any other UN organ, a resolution is a recommendation, but in the UNSC, a resolution is a mandate of sorts. This gives the UNSC the ability to enact whatever countermeasures it desires against the State Administration Council. The United Nations General Assembly, its President, the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoy to Myanmar have condemned the SAC’s coup and urged “decisive action” on the matter, but nothing tangible can be done until the UNSC is aligned. Furthermore, statements of condemnation and support do little to boost the morale of the Myanmar population that has visibly grown tired of waiting for the UN to take action. The Burma Campaign UK reflects this in its statement: “The Burmese military consists of people who are soldiers, not diplomats. They respect strength, not statements. What might be considered something of major diplomatic significance by many UN members may be perceived as insignificant by these authoritarian generals.” Since February 2, 2021, countless pleas to the UNSC echoed by millions of Myanmar protesters have gone unanswered: it is due time to start discussing structural reform to the UNSC so that action can be taken in the future. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have engaged in double-vetoing responses to humanitarian crises by citing the violation of national sovereignty and interference in internal affairs. Coincidentally, the vast majority of these vetoes initiated by Russia and followed by China have been in response to resolutions concerning conflicts that have Russian military involvement, such as the Syrian Civil War, the War in Donbas, and the Russo-Georgian War. In regards to the situation in Myanmar, the UNSC met informally in March to release a statement initiated by the United Kingdom: “Members of the Security Council expressed deep concern at the rapidly deteriorating situation and strongly condemned the use of violence against peaceful protesters and the deaths of hundreds of civilians, including women and children.” It was evident that the veto was still used by the P5, albeit in a de facto capacity: Beijing blocked western countries from including a “readiness to consider further steps” in the statement because it alluded to a possibility of sanctions. Beijing also blocked the use of the word “killing,” suggesting “deaths” instead. Moscow tried to block the statement several times because it did not condemn the “the death of security forces.” Needless to say, Russia and China have extensive ties to Myanmar’s Tatmadaw—China supplied 48% and Russia supplied 15% of Myanmar’s total arms imports between 2016 and 2020. It indeed seems that a council created to maintain international peace and security has constantly undermined its founding principles and the resources at its disposal because a single—or sometimes two—nations exploit their vetoing rights without justification. With its mishandling of the Myanmar crisis, the UNSC is facing mounting pressure to stop remaining idle. At the 47th Session of the United Nations Humans Rights Council, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet demanded that the UNSC not “fail the country (Myanmar) a second time” by allowing for an “all-out attack against the civilian population” and a “multi-dimensional human rights catastrophe.” The UNSC’s inaction on Myanmar, however, not only enabled “an escalation in violence” that led to “horrific consequences for civilians,” as Bachelet said, but it also showed dictators all around the world that the international community will not hold them accountable. In the 21st century, the UNSC needs to uphold its founding ethos and be an enforcer of international peace, given that the Council is fully able to collectively authorize the use of force if necessary. This should not apply to two-sided conflicts, and mediation is preferable when an issue is complex in nature. However, in humanitarian crises in which an indefensible population is attacked, the use of force and immediate humanitarian intervention should be on the table. To ensure prudence when administering force, however, the UNSC needs to reform such that there is a rational distribution of power and five nations with diametrically opposed ideologies do not have the final say. Proposals for UNSC Membership Reform Member states previously formed alliances to call for structural reform of the UNSC by citing a need to reflect a fair distribution of power, coherency with the multipolar geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, and changes in sources of UN funding. In addition to these goals, reform could also prevent future inactions like the response towards the Myanmar coup from occurring. One type of proposal for UNSC reform is membership reform, which is amending the amount of permanent or nonpermanent seats in the councils, or who holds those seats. The objective of such a proposal is to give fair representation to member states by assigning seats in a manner that prioritizes geographic balance. The most prominent of these proposals was laid down in the five-year progress report In Larger Freedom spearheaded by Kofi Annan, and Uniting for Consensus, also called the Coffee Club, spearheaded by the Italian Republic. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the In Larger Freedom report on March 21, 2005 to the General Assembly. It contained four sections that Annan thought were of concern to the Assembly: Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear, Freedom to Live in Dignity, and Strengthening the United Nations. The final section—Strengthening the United Nations—was a recommendation to revitalise the UNSC by expanding the number of members from 15 to 24 so that it would be more “broadly representative of the international community” and “reflect the geopolitical realities of today.” Annan laid out two plans to achieve this: Model A and Model B. Model A would create six permanent and three nonpermanent seats. By contrast, Model B would create eight new “four-year renewable seats” and one more nonpermanent seat. Uniting for Consensus, on the other hand, was a movement founded in 1995 by Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, and Egypt to counter the bid for permanent seat expansion made by the G4 nations. The Coffee Club proposed that the UNSC should be expanded with nonpermanent members. They made a formal proposition at the 59th Session of the General Assembly in 2005 to expand the number of nonpermanent members from 10 to 20, also citing the need for a more “equitable geographical distribution.” Neither suggestion for UNSC reform was enacted. These proposals for membership reform could have allowed for a more stable UNSC, by creating a more equal distribution of power via a greater number of either nonpermanent, permanent, or renewable seats. In particular, Annan’s Model A could have allowed for less P5 hegemony due to the granting of permanent seats, and thus veto power, to six non-P5 member states. However, both these proposals fail to address the single issue that has repeatedly impaired the Council’s ability to administer humanitarian intervention during crises: the veto. Membership expansion does not allow the Council to annul a veto due to the conditions of Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter, no matter how much Consensus exists against a veto by other member states. A veto issued by China or Russia against humanitarian intervention in Myanmar would trump any wider consensus if there were a formal resolution on the matter. Due to China and Russia’s ideological alignment with the State Administration Council and many other draconian regimes, they are also likely to veto resolutions encouraging humanitarian intervention. Thus, for the UNSC not to fail Myanmar and nations with similar crises in the future, reform must occur to regulate the veto in reference to the principles of the Charter, or the veto should be abolished altogether. Veto Reform: Abolition or Regulation? In its annual report, Amnesty International’s Secretary-General Salil Shetty accused the veto as being a means for P5 member states to promote their political self-interest or geopolitical interest above the interest of “protecting civilians.” Similarly, at the 73rd General Assembly Session, Indian delegate Syed Akbaruddin—backed by the G4—declared that “Naysayers cannot be allowed to cast a dark shadow over the entire membership and hold the overwhelming majority back.” Both these individuals draw attention to a sophism: in the 21st century, the veto contradicts the fundamental precepts of international relations. Given that nations are inclined to oppose measures that could impede their national interests regardless of their international consequences, why must we pretend that certain nations are moral authorities, befitting an ability to single-handedly trump the majority? Why is the vote of a sole diplomat so consequential as to enable the killings of ethnic minorities and protesters in Myanmar? Any discussion of UNSC reform must include the question of the veto, for equal representation means nothing if the UN is unable to uphold its promises of peace and security. Calls for the abolition of the veto have long been echoed by non-P5 member states during General Assembly sessions. Kuwait, representing the Arab Group, condemned the arbitrary use of veto power by claiming “use of the veto reflects the purely political interests of permanent Council members.” Sierra Leone, representing the African Group, is “opposed in principle to the veto,” outlining a need to progress towards “effective democratic multilateralism.” Italy, representing the aforementioned Coffee Club, is open to “abolishing veto power” in addition to its proposal of membership expansion. Mongolia, Singapore, Argentina, Colombia, Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, and Malaysia—in addition to the aforementioned African and Arab groups—also vehemently oppose the use of veto power. The opposition to the veto generally stems from perceiving it as hegemonic, undemocratic, and a “contradiction” of the UN Charter, whose preamble states that the UN affirms the “equal rights” of “nations large and small.” However, a significant number of nations also advocate for the abolition or regulation of the veto not due to inequality but its inefficacy during crises. Use of the veto power has come under scrutiny in regards to the conditions that ensued subsequent to the Myanmar coup: namely “mass atrocity,” “crimes against humanity,” “war crimes,” and “genocide.” Estonia and even P5 member UK seem to be in favor of the withholding of veto power in such conditions. This position against veto use stems from a belief that humanitarian crises should be dealt with in a manner that is independent of the interests of individual member states. If the Council worked this way, a formal resolution of a binding nature taking decisive action to alleviate the crisis in Myanmar could have easily made its way into the chambers of the UNSC—because the prospects of such wouldn’t be interdicted by Chinese or Russian de facto vetoes in preliminary discussions. This is evident because resolution A/RES/75/287 in the General Assembly condemning the SAC was adopted with a majority voting for, showing that if the UNSC did equitably represent the collective interests of member states—or in the absence of the veto—a resolution on Myanmar could have passed in the UNSC too. A proposal by the President of the French Republic in 2013 suggests an alternative to altogether abolishing the veto: the regulation of veto issuance. France proposes that P5 members should voluntarily self-regulate by not issuing vetos in the event of “mass atrocities.” This could pave the way for the UNSC to act on issues like the murder of over 800 civilians and airstrikes on villages in Myanmar, as “crimes against humanity and large-scale war crimes” are considered to be in the same class of crises as “mass atrocities” by France. This may seem like a pragmatic and efficient solution to the question of responding to humanitarian crises, but this opens up the possibility for ambiguity in the interpretation of “mass atrocities.” Because the proposition is for self-regulation, Russia or China could simply refuse to acknowledge the existence of “massacres” by deeming the conflict to be of a two-sided nature or declare a blatant coup to be a mere “cabinet reshuffle” as they did in the past. If any sort of regulation were to be brought about in the UNSC to keep veto power in check, it needs to scrutinize a veto on a case-by-case basis so that P5 nations can be held accountable by the wider Council. This would certainly allow the SC to respond to humanitarian crises, as arbitrary vetoes could be objectively deemed impermissible by a collectively more prudent Council. Conclusion Myanmar’s crisis is well-positioned to be a feasible opportunity for multilateral cooperation. Domestically, the crimes against humanity are blatantly one-sided and the democratic resistance movement is clearly aligned with UN values, thus streamlining the possibility of UNSC alignment. In addition, the Myanmar crisis has also shown that attempts to engage in track one diplomacy or condemnations by the UN do not work against a regime whose only real interest is self-preservation. The crisis has also added an extra dimension to the question of structural reform of the United Nations Security Council. Firstly, the cases of mass murder, torture, rape, and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar have shown the world the consequences of idleness. The UNSC is fully authorized under Article 42 of the UN Charter “to use force to maintain or restore international peace and security,” but their inability to do so was what exactly enabled the escalation of the situation in Myanmar into a mass atrocity. A resolution calling for humanitarian intervention or the coordination of targeted sanctions may have served to decrease the incidence of crimes against humanity, but because the prospects of such a resolution have been struck down, an indefensible population has been forced to defend themselves and a full-fledged civil war is taking shape. Secondly, it ensures perpetrators of crimes against humanity across the world that they will not be held accountable as long as they have diplomatic ties to a nation with a P5 seat. Moscow indirectly enabled the Tatmadaw’s General Min Aung Hlaing to carry out mass killings unencumbered consequent to their military ties, as it did before with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Learning from Myanmar, the UN should recognize that states with veto power are inclined to block interventionist resolutions if they perceive them as threats to the expansion of their relative power in the international system and that the presence of the veto is always going to withhold any active response to humanitarian crises. The UNSC was supposed to represent the best of humanity when it was founded after the Second World War, now it is time for the Council to honor the founding ethos. The Council should take an active role in the prevention of atrocities by either holding P5 nations accountable for arbitrary veto issuances or abolishing the veto altogether..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-04
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Title: Myanmar’s junta kills off all economic hope
Sub-title: Coup and chaos have devastated the economy with GDP set to fall 18% and half the population plunged into poverty by 2022
Description: "As Myanmar descends deeper and deeper into civil war, a conflict driven by nationwide resistance to the military’s disastrous democracy-suspending coup, the economy is taking the brunt of the chaotic collateral damage. The February 1 coup sparked countrywide labor strikes, runs on banks and now rising warfare punctuated by bomb blasts in key urban areas including the commercial capital of Yangon. That’s all put the economy in a tailspin while raising stability risks that have caused a growing number of foreign investors to either suspend or abandon their operations and outlays, many committed earlier on the belief Myanmar’s “last frontier” market was moving in a new hopeful democratic direction. The opposite has happened since the coup. According to the World Bank’s Myanmar Economic Monitor, the economy contracted a whopping 18% in the year period spanning October 2020 to September 2021. The bank predicted the number of people living in poverty is likely to more than double by the beginning of 2022, compared to 2019 levels. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) predicted back in April, before the full impact of the coup had been registered, that the Covid-19 pandemic and political instability would by next year plunge almost half of Myanmar’s 54 million population into poverty, reversing gains made over the past 16 years. The country’s dire economic straits is being reflected in the Myanmar currency, the kyat, which has lost more than 60% of its value since the coup. The official exchange rate on February 1 was 1,395 kyat to the US dollar but the money changers who are still operating are now asking for anywhere between 2,700 to 3,000 kyats per greenback. The sharp depreciation is driving up prices on fuel and food, with gasoline prices nearly doubled and a 48-kilogram bag of rice up 40% since the coup. Those economic pressures are raising concerns about the stability of the banking sector, which was already laden with non-performing loans before the coup and collapse of the economy. The regime has imposed hard limits on the amount account holders at banks may withdrawal daily, including at ATMs. Aung Naing Oo, the junta’s minister for investment and foreign economic relations, blamed “foreign-backed sabotage” for the country’s rising economic plight in an October 19 interview with Reuters. However, the minister did not specify which foreign powers were allegedly sabotaging the economy, or how. The minister also claimed that Myanmar’s foreign reserves stand at $6.04 billion; the World Bank estimated foreign reserves at $7.70 billion in March. But it is impossible to gauge the accuracy of those figures, nor do they indicate the junta’s true underlying financial position. Myanmar’s recent history – notably the economic collapse that followed the military’s brutal 1988 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters — shows the Tatmadaw has a remarkable ability to stay in power in the face of economic and financial calamity. Economists and academics familiar with the Tatmadaw’s ability to survive past crises note that much of Myanmar’s economy transacts in black and otherwise illicit markets, and thus revenues and profits do not appear in official statistics or are recorded by international economic monitoring outfits like the World Bank. The Tatmadaw controls large swathes of the economy through its controlled Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, massive conglomerates that are engaged in everything from banking, industrial parks, shipping, real estate, sugar factories, tobacco companies and supermarkets. The US has imposed targeted sanctions on the conglomerates since the coup, though it’s not clear if and how those punitive measures have crimped the junta’s commercial interests. The conglomerates are not the only economic resource keeping the regime afloat, far from it. The Tatmadaw is known to be deeply involved in the nation’s sprawling black economy, illicit gains that are often funneled to top generals and officers to maintain their loyalty and underwrite the political status quo. According to the international environmental watchdog Global Witness, the jade trade in Myanmar’s far north is worth more than US$30 billion annually, representing nearly half of the country’s GDP. “The industry buoys the weapons trade and enriches military officials, including the son of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing… Aung Pyae Son,” Global Witness stated in a June report, which added: “the generals enrich themselves and war continues to rage, the environment and the people who depend on it pay the ultimate price.” Much of the jade trade is conducted off the books mainly Chinese buyers making bids and purchases on their mobile phones, far away from the mines in Myanmar’s north and market places on the Chinese border. More insidiously, the illegal narcotics trade is also known to be worth billions of US dollars per year. While Myanmar’s production of opium and its derivative heroin has declined in recent decades due to reduced demand in China and Southeast Asia, methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs have replaced the old drugs. Most of the narcotics are still being produced in Shan state and, to a lesser extent, Kachin, Kayah and Karen states, while the main manufacturers and dealers are local Tatmadaw-allied militia forces known as pyithusit. It is impossible to quantify the total value of the narcotics trade, as it is conducted in an even more clandestine manner than the jade trade, but it is likewise believed to top $30 billion. The military is also believed to be involved in lucrative and largely unregulated exports of gold, primarily to China, the total value of which is unknown. Despite all those hidden reserves and revenues, it remains to be seen how the current social, political and economic crisis will play out. The withdrawal of major foreign investors whose outlays were, directly and indirectly, enriching top generals and their subordinates is bound to have hit many where it hurts most. In July, Norway’s telecom giant Telenor announced that it was selling its mobile operations to the M1 Group, a Lebanese investment firm, but the transaction was deemed invalid due to non-compliance with local regulations. Telenor’s decision was apparently prompted by a demand that it had to install invasive technology that would allow the Tatmadaw to freely eavesdrop on user communications. Reports have indicated the firm has completely written off its $782 million investment in the country. Other companies that have pulled out, or are in the process of doing so, include the French renewable energy firm Voltalia and Japanese beverage company Kirin, which has written off its $193 million investment in the country since the coup. Japan’s Suzuki announced shortly after the coup that it was suspending production at its two factories, which produced 13,300 vehicles in 2019, mainly for the local market. Several global clothing suppliers have also ceased producing in Myanmar, among them Italy’s Benetton. Within days after the coup, Amata, Thailand’s largest industrial estate developer, suspended work on a $1 billion project on the outskirts of Yangon that was designed to kickstart more modern manufacturing in the country. The junta may have enough resources, guns and money to survive in the months ahead. But that could change if or when the junta’s coffers start to run dry, meaning less trickle-down of resources to mid-ranking officers as well as the rank and file. Morale inside the Tatmadaw is reported to be lower than ever, as soldiers are not only fighting against ethnic insurgents in frontier areas but also their own kin, the ethnic Bamars in the Myanmar heartland. Whether the confluence of battlefield losses and economic decline starts to crack military cohesion is yet to be seen. But it’s by now plain for all to see, including inside the Tatmadaw, the spiraling economic disaster caused by a coup that could have been avoided by sharing rather than grabbing power from Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected democratic government..."
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-04
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Title: The Need to Review Mon Politics: An Eight-Month Journey under Dictatorship
Description: "In the 2020 general election, the Mon Unity Party made a strong showing, encouraging hopes of a political breakthrough. These were abruptly ended by the February coup of the State Administration Council. Since this time, Mon politics have become divided. Amidst countrywide breakdown, some leaders have accepted cooperation with the SAC, others declare support for the opposition National Unity Government, while others urge caution for the Mon people. Kun Wood analyses the dilemmas facing the Mon movement, explaining why lessons from history need to be learned. The political backdrop It has been eight months since the military coup in Myanmar, and the situation remains very serious. Mon State is one territory in the country that has suffered greatly from this crisis. Social, economic, healthcare and education systems have broken down; the people are facing daily difficulties in their livelihoods; and many lives have been lost. The generals are good at talking but take no actions for the benefit of the people. Meanwhile the country is sinking ever deeper into poverty. In the meantime, the struggle to bring down dictatorship is continuing in line with the desire of the people for democracy. But dead bodies are the only measure that have increased in the country. The third wave of the Covid-19 pandemic occurred at the same time as the military coup. But, since the military rulers prepared nothing for the pandemic, many people have died; the generals only sought advantage. The whole country has suffered from the negative consequences, and Mon State is suffering as well. The result eight months after the coup are tears, grief, homelessness, the deaths of innocents, broken families, a lost young generation, and countless fallen stars who died before their time. The Mon Unity Party is one of the political organisations that collaborated with the military State Administration Council after 1 February 2021. Different people have given various criticisms. In the 2020 general election, a large number of the Mon people supported the Mon political movement, and there were good results. After over 60 years of civil war, the 2020 polls were considered to mark a historic turning-point in Mon politics. At the time of the election, the Mon people were proud to vote for Mon parties. They declared that the ballots of the Mon people are for the Mon nationality cause. As a Mon, it was an honour for them to vote for a Mon party. It is not wrong to say that the 2020 election was considered a most beautiful painting in Mon politics. Unfortunately, the new military regime discoloured this painting in a very short time. The reason why the Mon people voted for a Mon party, the MUP, was because the two main nationality parties joined together before the polls to create a power-base to take the Mon movement forward. In Mon politics, this unification was regarded as a foundation to build a future federal nation for the Mon people in which they can achieve their demands for the rights to self-determination and ethnic equality. Equally important, these two parties were brought together by joint efforts among different sectors in Mon society, including Buddhist monks, intellectuals, community leaders and youth groups who overcame various challenges. Unfortunately, the leadership of the national armed forces (Tatmadaw) seized control of the government for the whole country on 1 February after claiming that there had been election fraud by the National League for Democracy. Following the coup, the generals approached different political parties to form a coalition. Most of the nationality parties refused to join them, but there were some parties that agreed to do so. Among these parties, the MUP – which is supposed to represent the Mon people and their aspirations – accepted this collaboration. Since this time, the MUP decision has caused great disagreement within the party and many members have left. The outcome is felt not only within the party but it has also had huge impact in Mon communities as well. Two groups have appeared: those who thought the decision was right and those that could not accept it. Since unity is needed for the strength of the Mon people, this split and diversity of views have become a weakness. The Thanlwin Bridge and Mon political dilemma Eight months after the military coup, many people are considering whether the subsequent course of events has proven the MUP decision wrong or right. Following its alliance with the new regime, the party were given one seat at the union level and one at the state level under the SAC. On 1 June, in one new initiative, they renamed the bridge which connects Mawlamyine and Belu Island from the “General Aung San Bridge” to “Thanlwin Bridge”. The name, though, that the Mon people prefer is “Ramanya”, a traditional term for Mon State.* The reasons for this compromise change to Thanlwin, which is the river name, were given as pragmatic. As is recognised, Mon State is made up of different nationalities, and there are different political perspectives as well. No matter what the differences are, it is important that the vision of building a future federal state together must be the same. But, if there are no common goals or firm positions, the future of the Mon people will be swept away in the tide of current politics. Thus a question arises: how can Mon political parties guarantee that their decisions are made on the basis of “do no harm” to their people? As long as I can remember, Mon politics have been struggling up until now. In 1995, after the New Mon State Party made a ceasefire agreement with the military government of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, Tatmadaw bases were expanded, people’s land was grabbed and many human rights violations carried out. As a result, although political dialogue has been held several times in the intervening years, the right to self-determination and federal state that the Mon people truly want still seem far away. For the moment, it remains uncertain why the MUP is collaborating with the SAC. But it is sure that the Mon people do not want the Tatmadaw to be in their homeland for even a second. Nobody will be happy if the land that they inherited from their ancestors is grabbed and becomes military-owned property. But, since Mon issues are about Mon people, how can we resolve the political crisis that we are facing? Do we continue living according to the desire of dictators and under their orders? Or do we move forward, without self-interest, along with other nationality peoples so that our future generation will fully enjoy federal democracy? Although our paths and approaches to reach our goal may be varied, it is essential that our objectives are the same. It is necessary to learn the strengths and weaknesses of different peace and political processes, and new steps should be taken. Unity of the Mon people is the power of the Mon people. Economics Before the military coup, people in Myanmar had already been struggling with their jobs and businesses due to the first and second waves of the Covid-19 pandemic. There were fewer job opportunities for the daily-wage workers, and it was not easy to have a meal each day. Many families were facing difficulties in their livelihoods due to the closure of markets, workplaces, transport and other facilities around the country. After the military coup, the third Covid-19 wave followed, increasing the struggles of the ordinary people. Prices rose further as well as the number of jobless persons. Compounding the crisis, daily-wage workers face renewed difficulties due to travel restrictions imposed by the SAC. In some areas, families also lost their sources of income from wages earned from illegal immigration to Thailand, where many jobs have also been lost. Following the NMSP’s 1995 ceasefire, people had been persuaded with the prospect of economic opportunities. However, until now, many working people are still struggling to even have regular meals. In the past, the fishery sector was the type of business which supported the economy of Mon State. But because of travel restrictions, it is presently difficult for people to come and buy products as well as for local people to go and sell their products. The worries in many communities are only increasing. There are also many concerns over land. A recent case is the confiscation of farmlands for the airport project on Kaleguak Island, Ye township. Although the project is being implemented following the military coup, the affected communities have not been paid as yet. Said a local resident: “It is very difficult for us. We have been using the land on this island for our livelihoods since the time of our ancestors. But they came and confiscated the land, but we have heard nothing about compensation.” There is thus a dilemma. Many lands have been confiscated with the purpose of expanding military camps, but very few people have received compensation. The economy is failing, but few people are receiving support. How do we solve these problems? Who should we ask to help us? Healthcare After the coup on 1 February, healthcare workers across the country decided not to work under the military regime, and many of them joined the Civil Disobedience Movement. There are hospitals but no health workers, and the health system has continued to deteriorate. Consequently, since the third Covid-19 wave is significantly worse than the first and second waves, many people have died who could otherwise have been treated. Among those suffering, many are people living in Mon State. The collapse of the health system has become a perfect storm in many communities. Although people feel sick, the hospitals and clinics are shut down. In the past, there were many humanitarian organisations and charity groups that provided aid to local communities. But they, too, face challenges and delays in delivering services due to the SAC crackdown. Even though they are willing to help, they face security oppression. As a result, many lives have been lost during the past few months through the combination of a lack of treatment, medicines and SAC restrictions. This raises the question of the MUP, which is cooperating with the SAC, and what they have achieved so far. They explained that they joined hands with the regime in order to improve the situation for the Mon people and prevent them from being harmed. But the Mon people are now in trouble, so how can they help? For the moment, the Mon people are having to work in their own ways to protect themselves from the Covid-19 pandemic. To do this, they are undertaking their own fundraising and programmes to get the necessary medicines and supplies that will be used for the benefit of their own communities. Presently, there is no other way. Social affairs The current social and political situation in Mon State is not about being red (NLD) or green (Tatmadaw). There are many organisations with different colours. This creates a situation where people do not know who to trust. There are people who support the red and who like the green. Among them, there are people who support alignment with the military SAC and people who are against it. The MUP’s Nai Layi Tama, for example, was appointed as a Mon State economic minister. There have also been killings due to political violence in Mon State as well as cases of suicide since the SAC coup. According to a report by Lagoon Eain, 411 people were arbitrarily detained amidst protests during the Myanmar Spring Revolution that followed the military takeover. Mon State politics and society remain very unstable. The peace process and New Mon State Party It is now a quarter of a century since the NMSP ceasefire with the then SLORC government. Leaders chose to talk peace at the table instead of killing one another. The NMSP has been following this peace agreement until now, avoiding conflict as much as possible. However, although it has been 26 years since the ceasefire, neither the NMSP nor Mon people have achieved their goal of federal democracy and the right to self-determination. Negotiating, however, with a military ruler is like people talking to each other while an unleashed tiger is still moving about. This is not just the Mon experience. According to the Pa-O National Organisation, which has also been involved in peace negotiations: “The current peace process is dark now and we don’t see any light. In the past, we could see a sparkle of light.” The humanitarian and internally-displaced situation Shortly after the coup, the third wave of the Covid-19 pandemic occurred. Internally-displaced persons from Mon areas have fled from civil war many times and, even with the 1995 ceasefire, many could not return home. Since the February coup, the dream of IDPs to return has been pushed back even further. In the past, if there was fighting, they could flee and take refuge in Thailand or in a border area. But in the current crisis, it is very difficult to travel and nobody wants to accept IDPs any more. Who, then, will take responsibility for the IDPs not to be homeless again? With the spread of the third wave, villages have been locked down, and there are people who cannot afford even a regular meal. The crisis means that it is more important for them to find food rather than to be afraid of Covid-19. As there is lockdown between villages, it is hard for people to work outside of the displacement camps. The health crisis for the IDPs is also very serious. It is difficult for households in the camps to buy preventive masks and, if somebody contracts Covid-19, they have no choice but to remain at home, risk spreading the virus and face potential death. Health treatments are rarely available. A community member from Chaung Phya, an IDP camp in Ye township, described the IDP plight: “It costs about 1000 Kyat for one mask. We can’t afford to buy it. We can buy a meal for our family with that 1000 Kyat. We just go and cut bamboo shoots and banana trunks everyday, but that is not sustainable. It is our hope that the disease will disappear quickly. We have no paddy and we have to buy rice. Now, all the prices have risen and it is really difficult for us.” In this situation, local communities have been struggling against the humanitarian emergency as best they can. Since the coup, however, commodity prices have increased rapidly while the price of local products, such as lemons and bananas, has fallen even lower than before. Said a local resident: “Now, we are not sure whether we have to be afraid of Covid-19 or not. We normally went to the hospital whenever we are sick and we could get treatment. But currently, it is like we are challenging death. We don’t know who to rely upon. Our future is very uncertain.” Conclusion In Mon politics, it is a time to question whether other people are leading us or are we following other people. Is it because of ethnicity? And why are the politics of “divide and rule” always working? Along with these questions, it is time to review the peace process for the whole country in the light of the military coup. There are many points of view and analysis among the Mon people. In the current crisis, it is like walking but not moving forward, and there is a concern that our way will be lost altogether sooner or later. For many reasons, Mon politics are now in a very unpredictable situation. Therefore it is necessary to review past activities and, from this, learn and prepare for the future. It also important not to blame each other but to work together for the common good. Future generations in Mon State must enjoy a brighter future. In many respects, the present situation repeats the moment when the Mon people tried to merge two different parties into the MUP. If the current differences in Mon politics can be rectified, then there is hope for a better future. If we are to achieve equality, the right to self-determination and federal democracy along with other nationality peoples, it is essential that we are united among ourselves. No matter how hard the journey is, if we can eradicate racism and work together with other peoples, then we can surely achieve our goal. In summary, it is the duty of both the Mon people and their leaders to ensure that our identity does not disappear and that we remain free from oppression. If we are united and living in harmony, our goals will be in sight and remain very close to us. * The naming of this bridge, which opened in 2017 under an administration led by the National League for Democracy, is controversial. General Aung San was the father of the NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi. After its opening, Mon people continued to lobby for a name, such as Ramanya, that signifies Mon land and identity. “Kun Wood” is the pseudonym for an activist engaged in Mon national and political affairs. She has been working on community development and the right to land for ethnic nationality peoples since 2006. She has carried out research on customary tenure in different parts of the country..."
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-04
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Title: Richardson, Myanmar Junta Chief Share a Dislike for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
Description: "At first glance, it was a meeting between a former US ambassador to the UN and the Myanmar military junta chief in the country’s capital, Naypyitaw. To some politically aware souls, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s reception of Bill Richardson on Tuesday appeared significant: The former New Mexico governor is, after all, the first US non-state figure to pay a visit to the Myanmar regime, which has been shunned internationally for seizing power from the democratically elected government of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup in February, and for its subsequent deadly crackdowns on anti-regime protesters. It raised more than a few eyebrows to see the coup leader welcoming the former US diplomat after repeatedly turning away ASEAN’s special envoy, who was appointed by the bloc to help find a resolution to the post-coup turmoil. Myanmar is an ASEAN member. In fact, the two men who met in the Diplomatic Hall of the regime’s office on Tuesday have something in common: Both seek to keep Myanmar’s ousted democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi out of the country’s politics. Since day one of the coup on Feb. 1, she has been detained—along with the country’s President U Win Myint—by Min Aung Hlaing and charged in 11 absurd criminal cases. If found guilty of all charges, the 76-year-old would spend 102 years behind bars. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is a towering political figure who has been highly revered by the majority of the country’s people for the sacrifices she has made on behalf of the Myanmar democracy movement since 1988. Her political popularity has been unrivaled since then. Take her National League for Democracy (NLD)’s electoral victories in 1990, 2015 and 2020. One of her missions has been to root out the military’s long involvement in the country’s politics—which dates back to 1962—because it’s simply undemocratic. Unsurprisingly, she has been a thorn in the generals’ side. Richardson, a onetime friend and supporter of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, clearly stated his stand against her on the first day of the coup in a Twitter post. “The Myanmar military must show the utmost restraint in any further use of force. B/C of Suu Kyi’s failure to promote Democratic values as Myanmar’s de facto leader she should step aside & let other Myanmar democratic leaders take the rein w/ international backing and support,” he tweeted. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Richardson’s friendship dates back to 1994, when she was under house arrest and he was one of her first visitors outside of her immediate family. When her NLD government established an advisory board to help solve the Rohingya issue in 2017, the former New Mexico governor was among five prominent international figures appointed to it. However, he became a hater of the State Counselor the following year when he abruptly quit the body after clashing with her over his attempt to secure the release of two Reuters journalists detained for their reporting on a massacre of Rohingya committed by the army. The military chief at the time was—and remains—the current coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing. Richardson said at the time that the panel was engaged in a “whitewash” of military atrocities and he did not want to be part of “a cheerleading squad for the government” led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he accused of lacking “moral leadership” in her handling of the crisis. More than two years later, the former US diplomat met with the general who bears ultimate responsibility for the soldiers’ atrocities against the Rohinyga. It would be interesting to know whether the former governor tried to raise the issue with Min Aung Hlaing, as his Richardson Center also works for the wellbeing of Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh. Richardson said his Myanmar trip this time was a humanitarian mission to discuss pathways for the humanitarian delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, medical supplies and other public health needs. The State Department said the trip was not an effort sponsored by or on behalf of the US government, but added, “We hope his trip contributes to improve humanitarian access (to the country).” While the humanitarian issue is important for Myanmar, the US shouldn’t forget that the root causes of the crisis were mostly political and sparked by the coup. So, we shouldn’t expect any positive outcomes from the meeting of these two birds of a feather. Another interesting question is whether he asked the regime for permission to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Allowing the detained State Counselor to meet with foreign diplomats seems to be a very sensitive issue for the junta. The ASEAN special envoy’s visit to the country has been blocked by the regime as he made the same request. On Wednesday, the regime’s No. 2 leader, Vice Senior General Soe Win, insisted that allowing a foreigner to meet someone charged with crimes was unlawful. Currently all eyes are on the case of Danny Fenster, a US journalist detained by the junta for incitement since May, as Richardson is known for his previous attempts to negotiate the release of international hostages and US citizens in rogue nations around the world. Given his previous efforts on behalf of the Reuters journalists—and no doubt looking to maintain his “negotiator” reputation—it is reasonable to assume the ex-governor tried his luck with the regime to secure the release of the journalist, as well as that of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Australian economic adviser Sean Turnell, who has been detained since February and is accused of breaching the country’s Official Secrets Act. It is known only to Richardson whether he requested the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—if only for the sake of their former friendship..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-04
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Title: US Hopes Richardson’s Quiet Visit Can Produce Results
Description: "News of former US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson’s visit to conflict-torn Myanmar has not generated excitement among the public. Reports suggest that Richardson is scheduled to meet the regime’s health and foreign ministers, and that he is likely to meet coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The Biden administration welcomed former New Mexico governor Richardson’s private mission as a possible way of speeding up the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Myanmar. “Governor Richardson has extensive experience working on humanitarian issues,” the US State Department said. “While this is not an effort sponsored by, or on behalf of, the United States government, we hope his trip contributes to improved humanitarian access.” “The humanitarian and health needs in Burma are extraordinary,” it said, using Myanmar’s other name. “We continue to call on the military regime to cease its violence, release those unjustly detained, allow unimpeded humanitarian access, and ensure the safety of health and humanitarian workers,” AP quoted it as saying. In a statement announcing his trip, the ex-governor said his nonprofit organization, The Richardson Center, had a long history of involvement in Myanmar, but he did not mention the coup or provide details on whom he planned to meet. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres was aware of the mission, according to Richardson spokesperson Madeleine Mahony. In a visit to Myanmar in 1994, the former US congressman met with high-ranking junta officials including then Secretary One Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, who was at the time the country’s feared military intelligence chief. Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt was then in his mid-50s and a protégé of former dictator General Ne Win. During that trip, Richardson was allowed to meet with detained democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at her lakeside residence, becoming the then dissident’s first non-family visitor since 1989. Through Richardson—as well as a correspondent from The New York Times who was allowed in to interview her—the democracy icon was able to get her message out to the world. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who had made repeated calls for dialogue with her captors, told Richardson during their meeting, “I don’t see any problem with sitting down with anybody.” Following the visit, Richardson remarked, “I think the future of Burma will be determined by two people—Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi.” In his second visit to Myanmar, Richardson had less success, as the junta refused to allow him to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Then, to the surprise of the world, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was freed in 1995, though she would return to house arrest some five years later. Throughout the turbulent years that followed, Richardson maintained strong ties with both U Khin Nyunt and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and as the country began to open up, Richardson came back to Myanmar. In 2018, he was appointed to an international panel set up by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government to address the Rohingya crisis, but later resigned over what he called a “whitewash” of military atrocities. Richardson said at the time that he did not want to be part of “a cheerleading squad for the government” led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he accused of lacking “moral leadership” in her handling of the crisis. Richardson has remained in touch with both the current regime’s advisers and U Khin Nyunt’s former fellow intelligence officers. Khin Nyunt and his entire intelligence apparatus were purged in 2004. After the Myanmar military overthrew Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government and detained her in February this year, Richardson said in a tweet that was widely shared by military regime supporters: “Because of Suu Kyi’s failure to promote Democratic values as Myanmar’s de-facto leader she should step aside & let others take the rein with international backing and support.” Richardson has shown he is capable of cultivating durable friendships with both Myanmar’s military leaders and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, though in the case of the latter it ended on a sour note. This time, should the junta leaders decide to allow him to meet the detained State Counselor, we may be in for a playback of Richardson’s 1994 visit..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-02
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Title: Former US Diplomat Bill Richardson to Visit Myanmar
Description: "Former US diplomat Bill Richardson will arrive in military-ruled Myanmar on Monday on a private mission and meet with some regime officials. The ex-New Mexico governor said in a statement that he is on a humanitarian trip in coordination with his contacts in Myanmar. “We are visiting the country to discuss pathways for the humanitarian delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, medical supplies, and other public health needs,” he said. The statement didn’t mention whom he would meet during the visit, but The Irrawaddy has learned that during his stay in Myanmar, Richardson will meet regime-appointed Health Minister Dr. Thet Khine Win and Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin. The Southeast Asian country has been in political turmoil and plagued by deadly violence and civil unrest since the military staged a coup in February by toppling the democratically elected government led by the country’s de facto leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. So far, the junta has killed more than 1,000 people who opposed its rule. Following the takeover, the US imposed sanctions against the ruling military leadership and their family members while suspending a trade deal with the country. Richardson is the first US non-state figure to engage with the regime. The former New Mexico governor’s last visit to the country was in 2018 as a member of an international panel set up to help resolve the Rohingya crisis. But he abruptly quit the body after clashing with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on a related issue—his attempt to secure the release of two Reuters journalists detained for their reporting on a massacre of Rohingya committed by the army. When the Myanmar military staged a coup in February, Richardson tweeted: “Because of Suu Kyi’s failure to promote Democratic values as Myanmar’s de-facto leader she should step aside & let others take the rein with international backing and support.” Richardson’s visit this time coincides with the junta’s detention of American journalist Danny Fenster, who was arrested in May and has been charged with incitement for spreading false information. Given his previous efforts, it’s not clear whether the ex-governor will try his luck with the regime and attempt to secure the release of the journalist. The ex-governor will be joined on the trip by Cameron Hume, former US ambassador to Indonesia, South Africa and Algeria; and two officials from the Richardson Center..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-01
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Title: More than 160 homes burn down in junta shelling of Chin State town
Sub-title: Two of Thantlang’s churches also caught fire, and some 20 children are feared to be trapped in an orphanage in the besieged town
Description: "Amid an escalation of both armed resistance to military rule and reprisals from the junta forces, Myanmar army troops shelled the largely deserted western Chin State town of Thantlang on Friday, causing fires that destroyed more than 160 of the town’s 2,000 homes. The attack came after a junta soldier was shot dead at 9:30am by the Chinland Defence Force (CDF)—which has been monitoring the situation in Thantlang—after members of the local resistance group said they saw him looting a shop. In retaliation for the killing, the junta’s armed forces occupying the area shot at least 10 rounds of artillery into the town, which started fires upon exploding. Within an hour, several troops had arrived at the location at which the soldier was killed and also began torching houses “for no reason,” a CDF spokesperson said. “They walked into the town at around 10:30am and torched the houses at random,” the spokesperson from the CDF’s Thantlang chapter told Myanmar Now. By 5pm, at least 40 houses had burnt down, with the fires continuing to burn throughout the night, he said. A man who lives near Thantlang told Myanmar Now that there was “still smoke coming out” of the town on Friday evening. By 9am Saturday morning, the fire had died down but homes were still smoldering, according to the Zalen news outlet. The Thantlang CDF took note of the estimated 160 houses that were destroyed and at the time of reporting were still notifying the homeowners, the group’s spokesperson said. The Church on the Rock, the Presbyterian church, and a building attached to the Thantlang Baptist Church—the town’s largest congregation—also caught fire in the shelling, the Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO) said in a statement on Friday night. International non-profit organisation Save the Children also reported that their local office in Thantlang was destroyed in the fire. Nearly all of Thantlang’s 8,000 residents fled following military assaults that destroyed 18 homes and a government building in September. This too was seen as a retaliation against the public and the resistance after an attack by the CDF and the Chin National Army on a junta base reportedly killed some 30 soldiers. Thousands of the civilians displaced from Thantlang have been taking shelter in villages along the India-Myanmar border, with others crossing into India’s Mizoram State. At least three people, including two elderly women, were known to have stayed behind in Thantlang after others had fled. Myanmar Now was unable to contact them on Friday after the military shelling. In their Friday statement, CHRO reported that more than 20 children and their teachers had stayed behind in an orphanage located at the entrance to Thantlang and remained trapped. “The extensive destruction of civilian property, carried out wantonly and not justified by any military necessity, represent war crimes and grave breaches of international humanitarian law,” CHRO’s Salai Za Uk Ling said in the statement. . Salai Issac Khen, a former municipal minister of Chin State under the National League for Democracy administration ousted in Myanmar’s February 1 coup, condemned the shelling on Friday in a Facebook post blaming the military for the destruction after rumours circulated that the residents of Thantlang were somehow responsible for the blaze. “It is not easy to build a house in the Chin hills. The Chin people do not have any reason to torch their own homes,” he wrote. On Sunday, junta mouthpiece the Global New Light of Myanmar accused the PDF burning the homes in Thantlang and committing “terrorist acts.” Military council spokesperson Gen Zaw Min Tun also said in a statement on Sunday that the local PDF—encouraged by the shadow National Unity Government and living “under the cover of [the] people”—had started the fire and that the military was unable to extinguish it. In September 2017, following a scorched earth military campaign against the Rohingya population of Rakhine State—south of Chin State—the Myanmar army and government infamously accused the fleeing Rohingya of burning down their own homes. The claim was widely dismissed by the refugees themselves, human rights groups and the international community, and later submitted to a UN court as evidence of genocide. “The military council will go down in history as responsible for this fire in Thantlang today,” Salai Issac Khen wrote, and urged all ethnic Chin members of the military council to “immediately resign.” Around 200 troops from the military’s Light Infantry Division 11 and Light Infantry Battalion 269 based in the Chin State capital of Hakha have been stationed on a hill overlooking Thantlang, according to the CDF. “We will take our town back,” the Thantlang CDF spokesperson said. The Myanmar military deployed thousands of troops to northwestern Myanmar, including Chin State and Sagaing and Magway regions, earlier this month. The move appears to be preparation for a concerted push to crush the resistance movement that has inflicted heavy casualties on the junta’s army. Myanmar’s Permanent Representative to the UN Kyaw Moe Tun said on Friday in an address to the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly’s 76th session that “decisive timely action” by the UN on the country’s situation was “well overdue,” and highlighted the most recent military assault on Thantlang as evidence of the deteriorating conditions in Myanmar. “All people, I repeat all people in Myanmar, are suffering every day, every hour, every minute from atrocities, crimes against humanity committed by the military and some even brutally killed,” Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun said. “Your serious attention to basic rights of all people and your action to prevent all people from such atrocities is seriously needed,” he said. Editor’s Note: This article was updated on October 31 to include reference to the junta’s report and their spokesperson’s statement on the fire..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-31
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Title: Summit Snub a Setback for Myanmar Junta but Its Eyes Are on China, Not ASEAN
Description: "The decision of ASEAN to block coup-maker and junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from attending its ongoing summit, which started Tuesday and ends on Thursday, has taken the world by surprise. ASEAN does not normally make any decision that could be seen as “interference” in one of its 10 member states’ internal affairs. The military-appointed Foreign Ministry in Naypyitaw issued a statement saying that the decision “was done without consensus and was against the objectives of ASEAN.” Junta spokesman Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, not surprisingly, blamed foreign powers for the snub, claiming that the United States and the European Union had pressured ASEAN to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from the online meeting. But it may be much ado about nothing because the leaders of Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, are in the long run unlikely to pay much attention to what ASEAN does or doesn’t do. The generals’ decision to join the grouping in 1997 had more to do with finding allies in their altercations with critical Western powers than a desire to change their ways. There is, in fact, only one foreign power that has the power and the means to influence and manipulate the internal situation in Myanmar: the People’s Republic of China. China is also the only neighboring country that has fundamental strategic and economic interests in Myanmar—and it is prepared to do whatever it takes to protect those interests. We all know about the multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Described as a global infrastructure development strategy, it includes investments in nearly 70 countries worldwide as well as some international organizations, such as those engaged in protecting the environment and even wildlife. The aim is evidently to connect China with the outside world in a way that has never been done before and, ultimately, make China the world’s foremost superpower. But it is often forgotten that this policy of finding new outlets for trade with the outside world predates the BRI—and that it was first conceived in the 1980s in relation to Beijing’s plans to exert a new kind of influence in Myanmar. I have written a lot about this in the regional and international media, but it’s worth reminding readers of an article outlining those plans which I have quoted numerous times in the past. The article appeared, at the time almost unnoticed, in the Beijing Review as early as Sept. 2, 1985. Titled “Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,” it was written by the former Vice Minister of Communications Pan Qi and outlined, in detail, the possibilities of finding an outlet for trade from China, through Myanmar, to ports at the coast of the Indian Ocean. Pan mentioned the Myanmar railheads of Myitkyina in Kachin State and Lashio in northeastern Shan State as possible conduits for the export of Chinese goods. But he refrained from mentioning that all relevant border areas were then not under central Myanmar government control. At that time, nearly the entire, 2,192-km Sino-Myanmar frontier was actually controlled by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and other non-state armed groups who had ties―political, ethnic or both―to China. But by early 1987, the Tatmadaw had managed to recapture a few CPB strongholds along the frontier, including the booming border town of Panghsai, where the fabled “Burma Road” crosses into China at Wanding, east of the city of Ruili. At the same time, the Chinese, whose policies had changed dramatically since the Cultural Revolution, had already begun to penetrate local markets through an extensive economic intelligence reporting system within Myanmar. This network monitored the availability of domestically manufactured Myanmar products, as well as the nature and volume of illegal trade from other neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India. China could then respond to the market conditions by producing goods in its state sector factories. Before long, more than 2,000 carefully selected items were reported to be flooding the Myanmar market. Chinese-made consumer goods were not only made deliberately cheaper than those from other neighboring countries, but were also less expensive than local Myanmar products. Then, in March-April 1989, to the surprise of many, the hill tribe rank and file of the CPB’s army mutinied and drove the party’s Maoist leadership into exile in China. The mutiny came after years of simmering discontent between the hill tribe cannon fodder, who had been forcibly recruited into the CPB’s army, and the ageing Burman intellectuals who were still clinging to their orthodox Maoist ideals. The government in Yangon quickly and shrewdly exploited the mutiny: the leaders of the new forces that emerged from the ashes of the old CPB, primarily the United Wa State Army (UWSA), were promised that they could engage in any kind of business, if they agreed to a ceasefire with the government. The most potent military threat to the regime was neutralized, and, as a result, the cross-border trade flourished—and so did the newly won friendship between the leaders of two of Asia’s most repressive regimes. At the same time, China could, through its peculiar two-tier foreign policy, maintain government-to-government relations not only with the ruling military, but also party-to-party relations with Myanmar’s many ethnic armed groups, including the UWSA. In more recent years, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has established relations with both the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy. It is important for the leaders in Beijing not to put all their eggs in one basket because no one knows who will rule, or be influential, in Myanmar in the future. In the early 1990s, I was at Jiegao, a small enclave of Chinese territory on the south side of the Shweli River opposite Muse and saw a giant monument showing four figures wheeling a circular object between them, their determined faces pointing south. The Chinese characters on the base say “Unite, Blaze Paths, Forge Ahead!” Or, in more mundane terms: “Southeast Asia, here we come!” There was no doubt that the monument and the message on its base appeared provocative to people in Myanmar. In the early 1990s, there was little more than bamboo huts and rice fields in the Jiegao enclave. But today, 25 years later, Jiegao is full of high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, and stores selling all kinds of wares. There is also a huge jade market where buyers from all over China come to shop for the precious stone, which is found in its imperial green form only in northern Myanmar. Every morning—until the COVID-19 pandemic forced a closure of the border—caravans of trucks laden with Chinese consumer goods left Jiegao through a border gate for points beyond Muse: the towns of Lashio, Mandalay and Yangon, and even as far as Moreh on the Indian border. Not only Myanmar but also northeastern India was being flooded with cheap Chinese merchandise. And not far from Ruili are pipelines through which oil and gas are being transported from the Myanmar coast to Yunnan. It is not clear when the border will be open for trade again, but given the strategic importance of what’s now known as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Beijing is not likely to abandon its long-term plans for Myanmar and the region. Myanmar is the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to Indian Ocean ports, bypassing the contested South China Sea as well as the congested Malacca Strait. The CMEC is one of the most important pillars of Xi’s BRI; without it, China would not be able to fulfill its plans for global dominance. For that very reason, whatever government is in power in Naypyitaw, China would court it in order to safeguard those strategic interests. Beijing may prefer a like-minded authoritarian regime, but we also have to remember that it was State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who signed up to the BRI when she attended the Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017. But how—and where—do the ethnic armed groups, with which China also maintains close relations through its security services, fit into the picture? If we venture further back in history, and then before Pan Qi wrote his article for the Beijing Review, Myanmar was also of utmost strategic importance to Beijing, but then at a time when China wanted to export revolution, not consumer goods. The CPB’s 20,000-sq.-km base area along the Sino-Myanmar border was there not only to support the intended revolution in Myanmar, but also to serve as a springboard from where Maoist communism, the CPC hoped, would spread to other parts of Southeast Asia. The mastermind behind that plan was Kang Sheng, a dreaded hardliner who, during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s, worked for China’s internal security and intelligence apparatus—and was in charge of the CPC’s contacts with fraternal Maoist parties in Asia and beyond. The plan—and CPB Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin told me this when I interviewed him at the party’s Panghsang headquarters in 1987—was to link up with the Communist Party of Thailand’s (CPT) guerrillas; the Communist Party of Malaya, which was led by Chin Peng, a hero of the struggle against the Japanese during World War II; the Communist Party of North Kalimantan (the Malayan communists did not recognize the Malaysian Federation, so there was a separate communist party in Sarawak and Sabah); the once powerful Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI); and, eventually the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), actually a tiny Maoist party led by Edward Fowler Hill, a fairly prominent lawyer and barrister. Thakin Ba Thein Tin and Hill met in Beijing, relations with Chin Peng were maintained through intermediaries in Kunming, and CPT activist stayed in Panghsang until they returned to Thailand in 1983. When I was at Panghsang in 1986-87, I saw a concrete well with Thai writing on it, built by CPT cadre. When I was out in the field with the CPB’s troops, I heard numerous stories about “the Indonesian comrades” and their exploits. Among them were two daughters of PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, who was killed in Indonesia in 1965. The CPC had sent a dozen or so PKI militants, who happened to be in China in the 1960s, down to the CPB’s base area where they were going to learn guerrilla warfare. CPB leaders told me they were used as radio operators during battles with the Tatmadaw when messages could not be encrypted. The Tatmadaw interceptors did now know what they were saying—because they spoke in Bahasa Indonesia. The PKI militants had left when I was there, and I was told they had gone into exile in the Netherlands and Canada. Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s return to the political fold, China changed its policy towards the region. However, whether China wants to export revolution or expand and protect commercial interests, to safeguard and even control the “Myanmar corridor” has always been of vital importance to Beijing’s security planners. In the past, the epicenter for that policy was Panghsang. Today it is Jiegao. But the ethnic armed organizations are also important. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw. Significantly, when President’s Office Minister Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project at Letpadaung northwest of Mandalay, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China… we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.” Aung Min was right, but by “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, whose weaponry and vast quantities of ammunition had been supplied by the UWSA. The Kachin Independence Army has also benefited from some support from the UWSA, but not to the same extent as the other groups in what is usually referred to as the Northern Alliance. While the UWSA is not engaged in any fighting itself, it has become a major source of the weaponry that is being used in the war in northern Myanmar. The Chinese may be denying giving any material support to the UWSA and indirectly supporting its allies, but what the Wa have received from China is not the kind of equipment that “falls off the back of a truck”, or could be sent to them by some local officials in Yunnan. The deliveries were almost certainly directed from the highest level of China’s intelligence and military authorities in Beijing. And it is no secret that Chinese security officials have had several meetings with representatives of the Northern Alliance—and told them not to fight too close to the border or to damage the oil-and-gas pipelines. The CPC’s position above the government as well as the military, the People’s Liberation Army, in the Chinese hierarchy explains why China could publicly praise Myanmar’s now collapsed peace process while quietly providing the UWSA with heavy weaponry. Support for the UWSA and its allies serves as a “stick” in Beijing’s relationship with Myanmar, while diplomacy and promises of aid and investment are the “carrot.” In the official rhetoric in Beijing as well as Naypyitaw, relations between China and Myanmar have always been characterized by pauk-phaw, a Burmese word for siblings, but nothing could be falser than that cliché. Sino-Myanmar relations have always been anything but brotherly, and decades of history show us how China plays games with Myanmar to achieve whatever strategic goals the leaders in Beijing might have. Forget about ASEAN’s actions, statements and awkward attempts at exercising influence. It is China and its plans and strategic maneuvers that count. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-28
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Title: Veteran Diplomat Noeleen Heyzer Appointed UN Special Envoy to Myanmar
Description: "A former under-secretary-general of the United Nations who had warm relations with Myanmar’s previous regime and their proxy government has been appointed as the new United Nations special envoy on Myanmar. On Monday, UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the appointment of Noeleen Heyzer as the successor to Christine Schraner Burgener, who was appointed in 2018 when the post was first created, mainly to tackle the Rohingya Muslim issue in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, in partnership with the country’s government. The newly appointed 73-year-old Singporean will not only inherit the main mission but also her predecessor’s failed task of trying to persuade Myanmar junta leaders to engage in dialogue to settle the ongoing political and social turmoil caused by the coup in February. At a press conference last week, the outgoing Schraner Burgener said the regime would not be ready for compromise because they didn’t react to her “proposal for dialogue.” “I’m sure my successor will try to do the best,” she said. Trained as a social scientist, Heyzer has also served as the UN secretary-general’s adviser for Timor-Leste to support peace-building and sustainable development. As a former head of the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Heyzer is no stranger to Myanmar. She visited the country several times under the previous military regime, which ruled Myanmar until March 2011, and knows well the poverty endured by many in the Southeast Asian country. She was also a supporter of the country’s transition to democracy, which was halted by the coup. When the then regime was reluctant to allow international relief assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, which wreaked havoc in the country’s Irrawaddy Delta area in 2008, killing more than 130,000 people, the then head of ESCAP was also involved in getting aid delivered to those in need by organizing a post-Nargis recovery conference in Bangkok. After the then junta released Myanmar’s popular democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in late 2010, the UN official stepped up her dialogue with the generals for the sake of the country’s development, telling them, “We can bring the best minds here to work with you,” according to Thant Myint-U latest book The Hidden History of Burma. Then she invited Nobel Prize-winning US economist Joseph Stiglitz to Myanmar to hold a talk for civil society representatives and government officials, including then Prime Minister U Thein Sein, who would become the country’s president a few months later in the regime’s proxy government. Thant Myint-U served as an adviser to President Thein Sein. Heyzer has good relations with Daw Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). When the news of her would-be appointment as the special envoy circulated, some elected lawmakers—since ousted by the coup—welcomed it, expressing hope that she would be able to break the political impasse. You may also like these stories: Myanmar Regime Shuns ASEAN Summit, Citing Limited Participation Thai Foreign Policy at a Low Point, Experts Say Junta Forces Suffer Heavy Losses in Weekend Resistance Attacks Across Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-26
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Title: Myanmar Must Turn Sorrow into Strength: Wife of Detained Activist
Description: "Myanmar’s junta seized veteran political activist Ko Jimmy, also known as Kyaw Min Yu, a prominent 88 Generation Student leader, on Saturday night in Yangon for his anti-regime activism. Ko Jimmy, 52, sustained a severe head injury during the arrest at Pin Lon Hnin Si villa in North Dagon Township. His wife Daw Nilar Thein, another leading 88 Generation Students figure who also took part in the 1988 pro-democracy movement as a university student, has been in hiding elsewhere for her anti-junta activism. She is worried about her husband’s health and says, “the regime must take all responsibility for whatever happens to him”. Ko Jimmy has been evading arrest since February. The junta issued arrest warrants for him along with Ko Min Ko Naing, another prominent 88 Generation figure, and a few others on Feb. 13 for alleged incitement. The junta has killed nearly 2,000 people, detained more than 9,000 others and tortured those in captivity and committed gross human rights violations against civilians resisting military rule. By THE IRRAWADDY 25 October 2021 Myanmar’s junta seized veteran political activist Ko Jimmy, also known as Kyaw Min Yu, a prominent 88 Generation Student leader, on Saturday night in Yangon for his anti-regime activism. Ko Jimmy, 52, sustained a severe head injury during the arrest at Pin Lon Hnin Si villa in North Dagon Township. His wife Daw Nilar Thein, another leading 88 Generation Students figure who also took part in the 1988 pro-democracy movement as a university student, has been in hiding elsewhere for her anti-junta activism. She is worried about her husband’s health and says, “the regime must take all responsibility for whatever happens to him”. Ko Jimmy has been evading arrest since February. The junta issued arrest warrants for him along with Ko Min Ko Naing, another prominent 88 Generation figure, and a few others on Feb. 13 for alleged incitement. The junta has killed nearly 2,000 people, detained more than 9,000 others and tortured those in captivity and committed gross human rights violations against civilians resisting military rule. The Irrawaddy spoke to Ma Nilar Thein, who was also a political prisoner under a previous military regime, about Ko Jimmy, her concerns and her message to those opposing the regime. How much do you know about Ko Jimmy since his arrest? I have heard that he is in Mingaladon Military Hospital. He is being watched. Do you know about his head injury? I’m not sure how he got his head injury. You said two people escaped. What did they say about his arrest? Two young people escaped while junta forces were breaking down the door. They do not know what happened after that. They said there were a lot of troops. There was a rumor Ko Jimmy was arrested with weapons. I do not know. Why was he still in hiding in Yangon? There are a lot of people in hiding in Yangon knowing they face arrest any day. People are in hiding, avoiding arrest and trying to keep anti-regime activities going. It has been eight months. People in Yangon move around. We knew the risks when we joined the pro-democracy movement. We are doing our best. Not only people inside the country but those aboard are also fighting the dictatorship. People are doing different things in different ways. It is important to try to stay safe while doing what you can. But we all know we are no longer safe anywhere. Some think it is safer in liberated areas [controlled by ethnic armed groups]. But people there are fleeing the war. They face different problems. How worried are you about Ko Jimmy and yourself? If we are arrested by the junta, we know we will be tortured and maybe killed as we have heard many stories over the past eight months. We are all worried about everyone in captivity. Our concerns reduce slightly when we hear someone has arrived alive in prison. We are worried about him. We heard many things but we can’t confirm anything. I’m worried about him. Does he have a lawyer? No. We won’t hire any lawyer because we will not cooperate with those who arbitrarily arrest people, act with injustice and manipulate cases. People are saddened by the arrest of Ko Jimmy. You have been involved in this revolution and been freed from detention. Would you like to share any message with the people? Ko Jimmy has been arrested. Before that, our beloved and respected Generation Z, our other dear comrades and student unions members have been arrested in many places. There are deaths. We have to turn these sorrows into strength and we will continue to work to overthrow the dictator. The more we face such difficulties and pain, the more determined we are to work harder to overthrow this dictator..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-25
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Title: Myanmar junta arrests 88 Generation leader Ko Jimmy
Sub-title: A warrant for the former student leader’s arrest had been issued in February, shortly after the military seized power
Description: "Kyaw Min Yu, a veteran pro-democracy activist also known as Ko Jimmy, was arrested by junta forces on Saturday night in Yangon’s North Dagon Township, according to his wife. Nilar Thein confirmed to Myanmar Now that her husband had been arrested and wrote on Facebook that his life was in danger. “The military council must take responsibility for anything that may happen to him after the arrest,” she wrote. It was unknown at the time of reporting where he was being held. Spokespersons for the military junta could not be reached for comment on Sunday. According to the pro-regime news outlet People Media, Ko Jimmy was arrested in connection with a shootout that took place in a residential neighbourhood in North Dagon on Saturday night. Citing a resident of the area, People Media said the clash began when regime forces entered Pinlon Housing to conduct a raid. Several other people were also arrested, and a number of weapons were seized, it added. The military issued an arrest warrant for the 52-year-old activist on February 13 for allegedly inciting unrest and threatening “public tranquillity” for writing social media posts critical of the February 1 military coup. A warrant was also issued at the same time for Min Ko Naing, another prominent figure involved in the student-led “four-eights” uprising of August 1988. Ko Jimmy, who is also a writer, was imprisoned that year for his political activities and not released until 1996. In 2007, following the Saffron Revolution, he was arrested again and held until 2012. As of Saturday, Myanmar’s military junta had arrested a total of 9,175 opponents of the coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Of these, 7,016 are still in regime custody..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-24
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Title: Myanmar: over 100 political prisoners re-arrested after release by military
Sub-title: Activists say issuing further charges to freed prisoners was ‘mental torture’ for families
Description: "More than 100 political prisoners freed following a supposed amnesty in Myanmar were re-arrested shortly after their release according to a rights group, in what activists have likened to “mental torture” for the detainees and their families. Some relatives, who had waited outside prisons expecting to be reunited with their loved ones, managed to catch a glimpse of them at the gates, before they were handcuffed and taken away. Others spent hours together, only to be separated again. The Myanmar junta, which has been repeatedly condemned for detaining thousands of its critics, including children, promised a major release of political prisoners on Monday. It stated it would pardon 1,316 people and drop charges against 4,320 people who had “participated in protests”. The military, however, gave no details of who would be freed, or what the terms of release would be. Human Rights Watch has since described the releases, which have taken place over the past week, as “limited in scope”. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma (AAPP), an advocacy group, has confirmed that 324 people have been freed. More than 7,031 political prisoners are still being held in detention, according to AAPP Burma. This includes anyone suspected of criticising or questioning the February military coup – from medics, to journalists, politicians and activists. AAPP said it was aware of 110 cases where people were issued with further charges and re-arrested after their supposed release. Ma Zin Mar, who lives in central Myanmar and spoke under a fake name, was told by a lawyer that her sister would be among those released this week. She waited outside the prison and saw her sister walk free. Then, she watched as her sister was handcuffed and placed in a car by plainclothes officers. “When this car drove outside of the prison compound, I ran after the car and asked them what happened. They said that they were bringing her to the police station. We followed to the police station and asked to meet my sister, but we were not allowed. We were so worried about her health,” she said. Ma Zin Mar had spent that day cheering up her mother, telling her that her sister would soon be free. She had been so happy to see her walk out of prison. “We are so depressed now. It is now even hard to breath.” Her mother, she added, was depressed and lying in bed. Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a prominent democracy activist, described the re-arrests as “complete mental torture of the family members and for the political prisoners.” There have been widespread reports of torture inside Myanmar prisons, and some of those who have been released this week have described harrowing treatment at the hands of security forces. A young democracy activist, who also spoke anonymously, said that during interrogations, which took place before he was transported to prison, detainees had no choice but to use toilet water to drink or wash their faces. He was arrested for possessing banners and posters opposing the military coup. “They [the military] even put guns in our mouths. And they threatened us a lot. They asked us to dig graves for ourselves. Also, I have seen other people get tortured and they were even vomiting because of the severity of the torture. Some people lost their teeth,” he said, speaking anonymously for fear of arrest. Prison, he said, had felt like paradise in comparison. He added that he cannot feel happy, even though he has been released. He lives in fear of being arrested again. He also worries for the many others left behind in prison. “Some of them got arrested for sharing a Facebook post, or they beat pots and pans [a protest act], or they got arrested as their phones were searched by the soldiers on the road. They did no crimes,” he said. The junta appeared to be releasing prisoners who had been charged under section 505a, a sweeping law that is used by the junta to punish anyone who criticises the coup or the military. However, many face multiple charges, and so remain in prison. The announcement of the prisoner release came just days after Min Aung Hlaing, the junta chief, was excluded from a regional summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) over his failure to commit to de-escalating the country’s crisis. Shunlei Yi said that she believed the announcement had been in response to the pressure from neighbouring countries. “They see these leaders as their like minded people,” she said, referring to Asean, which has a tradition of non-interference and rarely condemns its members over human rights issues. David Mathieson, an independent analyst formerly based in Myanmar, said that regardless of whether the release had been planned for some time or driven by the Asean decision, the snub by neighbouring countries would have stung. “They’re status-obsessed people, the leaders of the SAC [State Administrative Council junta],” he said. However, he added that the prisoner releases, which appear far more limited than promised, were unlikely to impress anyone in the international community. “A lot of diplomats [should say]: ‘you said that you were going to release all these people – where are the lists and where is this happening? … You’re promising something like this and completely reneging on it. We can’t trust anything that you say from now on, which really limits the ability to construct mediation with you.’”..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-22
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Title: The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era
Description: "Emerging as the first act of defiance after the military coup on 1 February 2021, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is a general strike mobilisation spearheaded by hundreds of thousands of civil servants. The CDM has become the centre of focus for all parties involved in the post-coup era in Myanmar. To those opposing the coup and the military, the CDM is not only an anti-coup campaign but also a foundation from which to replace the military-controlled administrations. For the military and its supporters, the CDM was a surprise, and represents a threat to maintaining coercive and central power in the post-coup era—a threat that needs to be dealt with through the strongest measures available. The civil disobedience campaign in Myanmar comprises a wide range of forms including banging pots and pans, street protests, refusal to pay bills, and boycotting state-sponsored lottery and military-affiliated businesses. However, this report, which can be downloaded by clicking on the cover image below, mainly focuses on the actions and roles of CDM civil servants, locally known as the CDMers, as the civil disobedience campaign is widely referred to the act of civil servants pledging not to work under the military. The report explains the CDM in three different phases—emergence, growth, and consolidation—by highlighting the significant developments, campaigns, and relationships among key political actors and organisations involved; it also explains the measures taken against the CDM by the military to consolidate its grip. The coup was almost universally unpopular, sparking mass protests and boycotts against military-affiliated businesses, but also creating renewed fighting with several ethnic armed organisations, including signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The Emergence of the Civil Disobedience Movement Mobilisation of politicians and activists to launch the civil disobedience campaign was vital, but the movement began with healthcare workers refusing to go to work on the day after the coup. In his first interview with the local media on 1 February, U Win Htein, a patron of the NLD, urged the public to initiate a non-violent movement to protest against the coup, referring to the civil disobedience movement of India led by Mahatma Gandhi. A group of medical doctors from Mandalay created a network and launched the online campaign by circulating a statement condemning the military coup. A day after the coup, healthcare workers from about forty hospitals, medical institutes, and COVID-19 testing centres announced their decision to join the movement and stop work indefinitely. Growing popularity of the Civil Disobedience Movement The CDM gained momentum with the onset of street protests. The “CDM” and “Don’t go to office, break away” became some of the most popular slogans of the anti-coup demonstrations across the country. While some portrayed the CDM as the best bulwark in defense against the military-rule, others went further in describing the CDM as a silver bullet that could entirely end the military’s dominance in politics. The health and education sectors have the highest volume of CDM participation. About 90% of the total number of healthcare workers reportedly joined the CDM in the first month after the coup. In some states and regions, 50 to 65 percent of teaching staff joined the movement. The participation of civil servants from three military-controlled ministries—Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Border Affairs—has attracted much public attention. In some townships in Yangon and Mandalay, CDM participation among ward offices is as high as 100%. Moreover, at least 2,000 soldiers and police have reportedly joined the movement as of mid-August. However, all of them are low-ranking, with the highest rank being an acting police colonel and army major, proving the military’s leadership is less likely to split. The movement was nominated for the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize by six academics in Norway. It is estimated that more than 410,000 of about one million civil servants have participated in the CDM since the coup. Consolidating the Civil Disobedience Movement Having witnessed the deadly crackdown and impact of the CDM, the CDMers and tech-savvy youth have resorted to various tactics, including controversial online “Social Punishment” campaigns, to grow and sustain the movement. For the National Unity Government (NUG), an alternative government to the State Administration Council formed by the military, the CDM is perceived as the most important pillar in boosting domestic support; some CDM participants have become leaders of the NUG. The CRPH and civil society organisations have set up networks across the globe to finance CDM participants, despite the military’s strict control over banking systems. With the assistance of the CDMers, there have been efforts to develop alternative administrative mechanisms to challenge the military’s rule, which are most evident in education and heath sectors. Defectors from the security forces have also been known to conduct training for the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), liaising with others keen to defect, and leaking information about military affairs to the press and the NUG. In Kayah (Karenni) State, groups opposing the coup formed a state police force comprised of 300 CDM police as part of an alternative governing force. Military’s Responses Surprised by the impact and popularity of the CDM, the military has used all the tools at its disposal to weaken and co-opt the movement. The military at first only asserted authority through intimidation and warnings via their subordinates and lure the civil servants with promotions and benefits. When the movement grew exponentially, soldiers and police carried out lethal and extra-lethal violence to crackdown on the movement. As of May, more than 140,000 teaching staff were suspended. At least 252 attacks were carried out against healthcare workers and medical facilities, resulting in 25 deaths by 31 July. Hundreds of CDMers and supporters have been charged and more than 70 of their family members have been taken hostage by the military. In mid-August, more than 150 people, including 48 doctors, were still in custody in connection with the CDM and many of them were reportedly sexually abused, beaten, or tortured to death..."
Source/publisher: New Mandala
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-21
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Title: Senior NLD Official, Prominent Myanmar Comedian Freed Alongside Activists, Journalists
Description: "A National League for Democracy (NLD) official and other party members, around a dozen journalists, student activists, a writer, a comedian and a few striking civil servants were among those released under Monday’s amnesty order. Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing on Monday announced the regime’s decision to free over 1,300 people jailed for participating in anti-coup protests and more than 4,300 detainees who were facing trial on incitement charges for their anti-regime activism. The amnesty followed an announcement by ASEAN that Min Aung Hlaing would not be invited to its annual summit later this month after the regional bloc’s call to end the ongoing violence in Myanmar in April was ignored. NLD information secretary released Monywa Aung Shin’s wife, Daw Kay Thwe Moe, told The Irrawaddy the detained politician returned to the family on Monday evening. Monywa Aung Shin was arrested by regime forces at his home in Yangon’s Tamwe Township at around 4:30 a.m. on Feb. 1, the day the junta overthrew the democratically elected NLD-led government. He was one of around 150 senior NLD leaders and Central Executive Committee members, prominent activists, writers and monks who were arrested on the first day of the coup. Since then, the whereabouts and condition of the 76-year-old politician had remained unknown to the family until his release. In an interview with local media outlet DVB news, Monywa Aung Shin said he was kept at a military interrogation center in Mingalardon Township and no charge was filed against him, despite his being detained for over eight months. Several NLD members and elected lawmakers remain in detention. And some of those who were included on the release list on Monday were rearrested for allegedly having connections with the parallel National Unity Government, its parliamentary committee and the People’s Defense Force, according to sources. The junta has brought several charges, from bribery to incitement, against NLD leaders including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint, chief ministers and the party’s elected parliamentary speakers. Some journalists freed As of late Tuesday afternoon, the release of around a dozen journalists had been confirmed. Those included three journalists from Myitkyina Journal, one each from 74 Media and Kachin Wave, three from DVB who were sentenced to prison terms, and three from Mizzima including its co-founder Ma Thin Thin Aung and one reporter from Mon State. Ko Aung Kyaw, the recently released DVB reporter, said that during his detention he was interrogated and tortured, and also forced to labor in prison, according to DVB. He was violently arrested on March 1 after he livestreamed police and soldiers shooting at houses and destroying possessions of civilians during their crackdown. He also reported that a pregnant woman in Myeik had been beaten and her home looted by security forces. He was convicted of incitement and sentenced to two years in June. He said that more than a hundred dissidents remained in Myeik Prison. Writer, comedian released Well-known comedian U Zaganar was also released on Monday, according to his friends. The comedian, who was in and out of prison under the previous military regime for his pro-democracy activism following the 1988 uprising, was detained at his home in Tamwe Township, Yangon Region in April. No reason has been given for his abduction this time. Writer and media trainer Ma Tu Tu Tha and a member of her family who were arrested at their home in Thanlynn Township in Yangon were released on Tuesday. According to local residents, soldiers and police searched her house and arrested four, including her son, brother and one of their friends during an overnight guest inspection. Activists among the released According to a local media report, two ethnic Kachin youth political activists, Lum Zawng and Seng Nu Pan, were released from Myitkyina Prison on Tuesday. Ma Shwe Yupar Linn, Ko Lin Htet, Ko Kyaw Min Tun and Ko Soe Htet Oo from the University Students Unions Alumni Force were also freed from Insein Prison on Tuesday after six months of detention for their anti-regime activism. Junta tactic According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), an activist group recording killings and arrests of junta forces, more than 9,000 people have been arrested since the coup. The group described the detainees’ release as a tactic of the junta to stop international condemnation. “These releases will not end the coup,” the AAPP said in a recent report. The group called for the unconditional release of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and all political prisoners, and the restoration of the democratically elected leaders to their positions. As of Oct. 18, at least 1,181 people had been killed by junta forces and 131 had been tortured to death, according to the AAPP. “Action must be taken against those who committed arbitrary arrests and torture. Moreover, the junta must take full responsibility as perpetrators, apologize and institute reparations for those arbitrarily detained and physically and mentally tortured,” the AAPP said. The 5,600-odd people freed under Monday’s amnesty were warned that if they are rearrested they will have to serve the rest of their original sentences, as well as any additional sentence. “If they commit crimes again, they will have to serve the remaining sentences in addition [to the old one],” said a junta statement accompanying the prisoner release. UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews said in a statement released after the announcement of the amnesty that the release of detainees is clearly not because the junta has had a change of heart, but because of the pressure on it. He urged sustained pressure to deny the junta money, weapons and legitimacy, saying this is the best way the international community can support the people of Myanmar, as the arbitrary arrest and persecution of those exercising their fundamental human rights continues..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-19
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Title: Myanmar Military Struggles to Adapt to New Kind of Conflict
Description: "Bomb blasts not only in major cities like Yangon, Mandalay and Naypyitaw, but also in smaller upcountry towns, ambushes on army convoys, gun battles in Magwe and Sagaing regions, and, across the country, assassinations of suspected military informants. While it is too early to describe the violence that has broken out in the Myanmar heartland since the Feb. 1 coup as a full-scale civil war, the military, known as the Tatmadaw, has for the first time in decades had to fight armed rebels in areas far away from the country’s traditional trouble spots in the ethnic-minority-inhabited frontiers. It is an entirely new kind of conflict that the Tatmadaw is not used to fighting and, therefore, incapable of containing. It is, for instance, doubtful whether its intended attacks on the rebel forces—which amount to indiscriminate firing into inhabited areas because the soldiers are unable to locate them—will have any effect other than further alienating and radicalizing a population that previously only demonstrated peacefully against the coup. Myanmar’s new kind of armed conflict differs also in many other respects from the old wars against ethnic rebels in the border areas, as well as the fighting in the heartland in the years immediately after independence from Britain in 1948. Myanmar’s ethnic insurgents have always been organized along strict military lines, which makes them unique in a global perspective. Unlike rebels in other countries, they are dressed in distinct uniforms with insignia showing their ranks. Myanmar’s ethnic rebels look more like regular armies and control and administer areas, and have camps complete with barracks, parade grounds and makeshift office buildings. The Burman militants who after independence resorted to armed struggle against central authorities were not that well-organized. But they also established huge base areas which they governed and from there launched attacks on government positions. That applied to smaller groups like militants from the People’s Volunteer Organization, a paramilitary force formed by General Aung San after World War II that rebelled after independence, and various bands of mutineers from the Tatmadaw—but mainly to the once powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Communist strongholds attacked Soon after the outbreak of the civil war in 1948—and at that time, it was an all-out civil war—the CPB established strongholds in the Pegu Yoma mountains north of Yangon, in the Irrawaddy Delta, the Arakan Yoma, Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi), and upper Sagaing Division (now region). It was also active in and around Pyinmana, where the party organized farmers in struggles and strikes against landlords and moneylenders. At one stage, the cabinet of the then prime minister, U Nu, was referred to as “the Yangon government” because it did not control much more than the then capital itself. Karen rebels battled in the eastern mountains and in the Irrawaddy Delta for independence. In northern Arakan (now Rakhine State), Muslim rebels known as mujaheeds fought for accession to Pakistan (Bangladesh was then the eastern part of Pakistan.) Smaller groups of Karenni and Mon rebels had their own armed bands in areas near the Thai border. Nationalist Chinese, or Kuomintang, forces that had been defeated by the communists in the Chinese civil war, had bases in northern and eastern Shan State from where they tried, unsuccessfully, to re-enter China and foment an uprising against Mao Zedong’s government. In the late 1950s, a rebellion broke out among the Shan and, in the early 1960s, the Kachin organized one of the strongest ethnic resistance armies in Myanmar. While the Tatmadaw never managed to defeat the ethnic rebels in the border areas, it was more successful fighting the CPB. By the late 1950s, the CPB’s forces had been more or less contained to the Pegu Yoma with smaller units holding out in the mountains of northwestern Arakan, the jungles of Tenasserim, and the Pinlebu area in upper Sagaing. The Kuomintang, meanwhile, had been driven across the border to Thailand and no longer poses any serious threat to national security. Myanmar’s communist insurgency would also have been over—had it not been for the People’s Republic of China. In 1968, CPB soldiers, of whom many were Chinese Red Guard volunteers accompanied by Burman political commissars, poured across the border with China into northern Shan State. They soon recruited local tribesmen to fight for them and, within a couple of years, a new and very different CPB base area had been established. It encompassed more than 20,000 square kilometers of territory adjacent to China, stretching from Panghsai and Mong Ko in northernmost Shan State, to Kokang and the Wa Hills, and down to the mountains north of Kengtung. The “new” CPB had its own administration in those areas—and was much better armed than the “old” CPB. During the decade 1968-1978, China poured in more arms, ammunition and other supplies to the CPB than to any other foreign communist resistance movement outside Indochina. But the CPB never intended to stay in the wild mountains on the Chinese frontier. The plan was to push down to the Pegu Yoma and other strongholds in central Myanmar and, eventually, take over Yangon. The Tatmadaw realized that, and also concluded that it would not be able to defeat the new, well-equipped forces. Hence, the Tatmadaw decided to contain the CPB in the northeast — and to wipe out what remained of the CPB in central Myanmar. In that way, the CPB would never be able to seize power. That strategy was clever and it worked. The Irrawaddy Delta region and some smaller strongholds were “pacified” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A massive offensive was then launched against the Pegu Yoma. The CPB camps there were overrun in 1975 and the civilian population in and around the mountain range was resettled in other parts of central Myanmar. After that, there was no more fighting in the Myanmar heartland against the CPB. Karen rebels who had also been active in the Pegu Yoma and the Irrawaddy Delta lost their bases there as well, and the survivors retreated to the Thai border. It was only in 1991 that the Karen National Union (KNU) managed to send some troops to re-enter a Karen-inhabited area in the Irrawaddy Delta. Unexpectedly for the Tatmadaw, Karen rebels, who had come from the Thai border, were seen digging trenches and stockpiling guns in the Bogalay area only some 140 km southwest of Yangon. The Tatmadaw responded with fury using newly acquired Chinese aircraft and gunboats. The then commander of the Tatmadaw’s infantry, General Than Shwe, led the campaign, which was codenamed Operation Storm and led to the KNU troops in the area being eliminated—but at a heavy price for the civilian population, who suffered badly during the onslaught on the rebels. Villages were bombed and, among those killed, most were ordinary villagers, not insurgents. Ceasefire with the Wa After the fall of the Pegu Yoma, insignificant CPB units managed to hold out in northern Arakan and in Tenasserim, but the party had become isolated in its base area in the northeast, where it did not belong and never had any intention of staying. That, in turn, led to a mutiny within the non-Burman, mainly Wa but also Kokang, rank-and-file of the CPB’s army in 1989. The old CPB leadership was driven into exile in China while its former forces were reorganized into ethnic armies, the strongest of which became the United Wa State Army (UWSA). But rather than fighting, it entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw soon after the mutiny. Since then, rather curiously, the UWSA has become stronger and better equipped than the CPB ever was—and its guns and other supplies have been obtained from China. While the UWSA is not doing any fighting on its own, it has shared some of its weaponry with other ethnic armies such as the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and, to a lesser extent, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Those armies are fighting the Tatmadaw, but the powerful Arakan Army (AA), which has also benefited from UWSA arms supplies, has distanced itself from all other resistance armies in Myanmar. The AA says it wants to regain the independence the old Arakan kingdom lost to the Burman kings when they occupied the area in 1785. With that aim in mind, the AA has not established any liberated areas but, instead, built up a parallel administration in Rakhine State. That, briefly, was the situation until the Feb. 1 coup. The new Burman resistance fighters are supposed to be organized into a loose alliance called the People’s Defense Force (PDF). That umbrella organization is considered the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), which was set up by ousted MPs and other politicians after the Tatmadaw staged its coup and formed a junta called the State Administration Council (SAC). But it is uncertain how much coordination there is between the different PDFs and, in addition to those, there is an abundance of other local resistance forces that operate independently. But all in all, the anti-SAC resistance is active mainly in Magwe, Sagaing, Ayeyarwady, Mandalay and Tanintharyi regions, where there has been no heavy fighting for decades. Fighting has also flared up in Chin and Kayah (Karenni) states, ethnic areas which before the coup were the scene of only low-intensity conflicts. PDF/ethnic alliance The PDFs in the far north are allied with the KIA, whose soldiers have even accompanied groups of Burman resistance fighters in raids outside the boundaries of Kachin State. By doing so, the KIA is hoping to draw Tatmadaw units away from its besieged bases in Kachin State, a military strategy that seems to have had the desired effect. The Tatmadaw now appears to be gearing up for major offensives in Magwe Region and Chin State, not in the far north. The outcome of the fight against the PDF is uncertain, as the Tatmadaw cannot employ the same tactics as it did against the CPB. The new-era rebels, unlike the CPB in central Myanmar in the old days, do not have any “liberated areas” with camps that can be overrun. And they cannot be contained in the border areas because those are controlled by the KIA and other ethnic armies. In rural areas, it is a hit-and-run game while, in the towns, Myanmar is for the first time in history facing urban guerrillas—and the Tatmadaw has zero experience of that kind of warfare. It is also a question of what kind of resources the Tatmadaw can throw into battling this new kind resistance. An offensive in one part of the country could lead to more rebel activity, ethnic as well as Burman, in other states and regions. The Tatmadaw will be stretched thin on many battlefronts at a time when the morale of its troops is already low. Constant ambushes and bomb attacks along roads which only a year ago were considered safe have taken their toll on the soldiers’ willingness to fight—and that applies to all corners of the country. According to local, non-partisan civil organization workers, Tatmadaw units in Karen State have even resorted to reporting phantom battles to their high command in Naypyitaw. They claim that they have captured Karen rebel camps and outposts when no such attacks occurred, and to have been engaged in battles that never took place. It is impossible to say what the extremely complex situation that the coup has caused will lead to. In the worst-case scenario, it could cause a fragmentation of Myanmar with no one able to hold the country reasonably well together. Dissent within the ranks of the Tatmadaw could also led to coups or coup attempts with extremely uncertain outcomes, even a repeat of the mutinies and chaos that prevailed in the wake of independence in 1948. But gone is the cautious optimism that many, falsely it turned out, felt after the Tatmadaw decided to open up the country in 2011. False hopes on the part of the Tatmadaw because it had not expected the massive rebirth of the National League for Democracy—and a development that was misinterpreted by mostly foreign pundits who seemed to believe that the generals had gone through some democratic awakening experience. In the end, it was inevitable that the Tatmadaw would intervene and try to reassert power. We are now experiencing the disastrous consequences of that fateful decision. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-18
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Title: Myanmar protesters freed as military says 5,600 prisoners will be released
Sub-title: Announcement follows junta chief being barred from summit over failure to commit to de-escalation
Description: "Myanmar’s military has announced plans to release more than 5,000 prisoners, days after the junta chief was blocked from attending an upcoming regional summit over his failure to commit to de-escalating the country’s crisis. A total of 5,600 people arrested or subject to arrest warrants for taking part in anti-coup protests since the military seized power in February would be released, it was announced on state TV on Monday. Late into the evening the first of the prisoners were released. It was not immediately clear how long it would take for all those scheduled for release to be freed. More than 7,300 political prisoners – including medics, elected politicians, journalists and protesters – are being held, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) Burma, an advocacy group that tracks the arrests. In cases where the military’s targets cannot be found, security forces have instead abducted their relatives, including children, the UN special rapporteur for the country, Tom Andrews, said last month. Many rushed immediately to find out if their relatives or friends would be released following the announcement. A woman from Yangon, who spoke anonymously, was among those who went to the prison to search for information about her sister, a journalist detained in August. The family had not been able to visit her sister since the arrest, she said. “We received a letter that says she is healthy and OK. We didn’t hear any other news.” The letter had asked for the family to send her a newspaper to read; they tried to pass one to prison staff, but are unsure if she received it. “We hope for her freedom. But we can’t expect too much,” she added. Another woman whose two younger brothers were arrested separately, in May and July, said she too was trying to find out if they would be released. Both were in their 20s, she said. “There is no reason to thank [the military]. We even want to curse them. Many of my friends and two brothers are arrested, so there is no reason to thank them.” At least 1,178 have been killed in the military’s deadly crackdowns, according to AAPP Burma, including 131 people who were killed in detention. There have been widespread reports of torture in prisons. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), which has led international efforts to negotiate, agreed a five-point plan with the military to de-escalate the crisis in April. This included an agreement that Asean would send an envoy, Brunei’s second foreign minister, Erywan Yusof, to the country to mediate. However, he cancelled his trip this week after the military announced he would not be permitted to meet Aung San Suu Kyi. The bloc decided to exclude the junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing, from its upcoming summit, which will be attended by Joe Biden, due to the lack of progress. The decision was a rare rebuke from Asean, which maintains a non-interference policy, and is a major blow to the junta’s hopes of gaining greater legitimacy internationally. Minn Khant Kyaw Linn, a 23-year-old student activist whose friends were killed during the spring revolution protests this year, said the international community should not be fooled into believing the military’s pledges. “This army also tortured and arrested innocent people. We demand the international community to take action on this army,” he said. Among those being held is the American journalist Danny Fenster, who has been in detention since his arrest on 24 May. AAPP said in a statement that the prisoner release was intended as “a form of distraction for the foreign governments” and that it was no coincidence that the announcement came days after Asean’s decision to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from its gathering. “The junta will continue to refuse to be transparent about the individual persons released, and who remains detained. Released prisoners from 18 October may include some political prisoners but the intention is not to relax repression,” AAPP said. “If the junta wanted to make concessions, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint and all political prisoners would be released unconditionally, and the democratically elected leaders reinstalled.”..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-18
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Title: NUG welcomes ASEAN’s decision to exclude Myanmar junta from summit
Sub-title: In a statement, the shadow government also offered to make its own recommendations for a ‘non-political’ representative
Description: "Myanmar’s shadow government said on Monday that it welcomed a decision by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) not to allow the country’s military chief to attend a summit of the regional grouping later this month. In a statement, the National Unity Government (NUG) called the move an “unprecedented and positive step” and urged the bloc to ensure that not only junta members, but also “any individuals and organisations” associated with the regime, are barred from the summit. “ASEAN must ensure the Myanmar representative can objectively represent the interests of Myanmar and its people,” the NUG said in its statement. “We stand ready to provide recommendations for [a] non-political representative for ASEAN’s evaluation and consideration,” it added in response to the bloc’s announcement that it would invite an alternative representative for Myanmar to the summit. On Saturday, Asean’s current chair Brunei announced that junta chief Min Aung Hlaing would not be invited to the upcoming summit due to his regime’s failure to implement a five-point consensus reached between the junta and the regional grouping in April. Military spokesperson Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun called the decision “disappointing” and remarked that the regional association’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states had been weakened due to “external pressures and other reasons,” according to a report by the BBC’s Burmese-language service. The NUG said, however, that the military had taken advantage of the principle to prevent meaningful engagement to resolve Myanmar’s current political crisis as it continued to try to consolidate control over the country “by force and violence.” “The junta has betrayed not only its own people but also the leadership of ASEAN,” the NUG statement said. In a 13-minute televised address on Monday, Min Aung Hlaing accused the NUG, the ousted lawmakers’ Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and some ethnic armed groups of inciting violence and sabotaging the military’s efforts to restore peace and stability since the April consensus. “We still have to solve this till today,” he said, arguing that opponents of the regime are chiefly responsible for the ongoing violence in the country. “No one has been trying to prevent and stop their violence, but they have demanded that we solve those problems. ASEAN should help us deal with that,” he added. Regarding last week’s postponement of a planned trip to Myanmar by ASEAN’s special envoy to the country, Erywan Yusof, the junta chief said that further negotiations would be needed before the visit could go ahead. In his address, Min Aung Hlaing also said that those currently serving prison sentences or still in custody facing charges for their involvement in protests would soon be released. Later in the day, the junta announced plans to release 1,316 convicted detainees and drop charges against an additional 4,320 individuals, including some who are still at large, on “humanitarian grounds.” However, those who receive the regime’s clemency will also be required to sign a pledge stating that they agree not to take part in anti-regime activities, the announcement said..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-18
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Title: Why ASEAN finally took a stand on Myanmar
Sub-title: Regional bloc has a bevy of good reasons to block junta representatives from attending this month's summit meeting
Description: "Has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the first time foregone its longstanding policy of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of one of its ten member states by blocking a representative of Myanmar’s junta from attending the bloc’s upcoming summit in Brunei? And, if so, why? Is it concern over a February 1 coup and the brutal repression of massive public opposition to the military power grab, which has left more than a thousand dead and many more who have been arrested and tortured? Or is it simply a face-saving gesture from a regional bloc that has come under increasing criticism for being ineffective and therefore is losing its credibility at a time when global superpowers are playing a rising role in the region’s power politics? ASEAN is heavily dependent, especially on what may come after the pandemic, on the goodwill of the US and other Western nations that in no uncertain terms have condemned Myanmar’s coup and urged the bloc to do more to restore normalcy in the country. Myanmar demonstrators have also condemned the bloc for its inactivity and set ASEAN flags alight at public protests in the old capital of Yangon. To be sure, ASEAN can hardly be described as a gathering of liberal democracies. The bloc’s current chair, Brunei, is an absolute monarchy. Two of its members — Vietnam and Laos — are communist-ruled one-party states. Cambodia is governed by Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has recently outlawed the political opposition and in the process made the country into an even harsher autocracy. Singapore also lacks fundamental freedoms when it comes to the media and civil rights and Malaysia is best described as a semi-democracy. Rodrigo Duterte, the president of the Philippines, is known for his disdain of the media and all opposition to his rule. In Thailand, the military has staged several coups to oust elected governments and retains an outsized political role despite 2019 elections. That leaves, ironically given its history of autocratic rule, Indonesia as the most, some would argue the only, democratic ASEAN member. ASEAN’s two cardinal principles, non-interference and consensus, have until now made it impossible for the bloc to take any decisive action when there has been trouble in or between its non-democratic member states. But it is also clear that ASEAN leaders are running out of patience with the Myanmar junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC). Its leader and now self-appointed prime minister, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, paid a one-day visit to Jakarta on April 24, where he and his ASEAN partners agreed on what was called “a five-point consensus” comprising calls for an immediate cessation of violence and the exercise of utmost restraint and a dialog among all parties concerned to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. It was also decided to appoint a special envoy by the ASEAN chair to “facilitate mediation in the dialogue process” and to provide humanitarian assistance through AHA, the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management. Even Min Aung Hlaing agreed that the special envoy and his delegation should be given the right to visit Myanmar and there meet with “all parties concerned.” ASEAN’s decision to prevent junta representatives from participating in the summit, which is scheduled to take place on October 26-28 via videoconference, was explained in a statement issued at the bloc’s foreign ministers’ meeting — also online — on October 15. While noting “the principles enshrined in the ASEAN charter”, meaning non-interference, the ministers stated that “the situation in Myanmar was having an impact on regional security as well as the unity, credibility and centrality of ASEAN as a rules-based organization.” ASEAN would, therefore, “invite a non-political representative from Myanmar to the upcoming Summits.” Who that “non-political” individual will be is unclear, nor how and by whom he or she would be appointed. The junta’s response was that it had cooperated on the five-point consensus by accepting the appointment of Brunei’s Foreign Minister Erywan Pehin Yusof as ASEAN’s special envoy — and that it had distributed aid delivered through AHA “to those in need.” But the envoy was not allowed to meet the deposed and detained president Win Myint and state counselor Aung San Suu Kyi because they are facing criminal charges in Myanmar courts. In other words, the SAC has closed the door to any dialogue with the ousted leaders and opponents to military rule. The Myanmar foreign ministry also remarked that Myanmar “hopes that he [the ASEAN envoy] will be able to avoid actions from anyone with the intention of putting politically motivated actions and pressures on Myanmar.” SAC has always claimed that it assumed power constitutionally, because the president had decided to hand over power to the generals, which he has the right to do under the country’s 2008 constitution. According to the SAC, the military-appointed First Vice President Myint Swe, a retired lieutenant-general, had taken over the presidency from Win Myint, who the military body claimed had resigned for health reasons. But during court testimony on October 12, Win Myint let it be known that he was in good health. According to his lawyer Khin Maung Zaw, the military had tried to force him to relinquish his post hours before the February 1 coup by warning him he could be seriously harmed if he refused. Win Myint replied that he “would rather die than consent”, the lawyer stated in an English language text message sent to reporters. That undermined any SAC claim of legality, even under the 2008 constitution, which was drafted under the auspices of the military. ASEAN’s initiative to block Myanmar appears to have been taken by Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah who, on October 6, even said that his country is ready to consider holding dialogue with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) — consisting of ousted MPs and other opposition figures — if SAC does not fully cooperate with the five-point consensus. Indonesia’s outspoken Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi went even further in a Twitter message on October 15 that said Myanmar “should not be represented at the political level until Myanmar restores its democracy through an inclusive process.” But, regional security analysts argue, ASEAN’s annoyance with the SAC’s intransigence and the bad rap the bloc has received because of Myanmar’s membership may not be directed solely by concerns about democracy and human rights. Malaysia and Indonesia have for years been at the receiving end of a flood of Muslim Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. According to UNHCR, at the end of August, there were 179,390 refugees and asylum seekers registered with the international body in Malaysia. Of those, 102,990 are Rohingyas, 22,470 Chins (a mainly Christian minority) and 29,390 from other ethnic groups from conflict-affected areas in Myanmar. Although the exact number is unknown, thousands of Rohingya refugees have also ventured in rickety boats to Indonesia. Attempts to have them repatriated have failed; neither Malaysia nor Indonesia is in a position to integrate the high number of people fleeing oppression and persecution in Myanmar. The February 1 coup has also been bad for intra-ASEAN business. Singapore exported US$2.7 billion worth of goods to Myanmar in 2020, mainly mineral fuels, oil, electronics and machinery. But companies from Singapore and other ASEAN members may now face sanctions and boycotts for dealing with Myanmar. Trade with Vietnam was also booming before the coup, with Vietnamese companies investing in real estate and a huge new modern shopping mall in Yangon. Mytel, one of Myanmar’s top telecom operators, is a joint venture between the military-controlled Myanmar Economic Corporation and Viettel, which is owned by the Vietnamese military. Vietnam, hardly a democracy, would not normally have cared about a military takeover in a foreign country, but the Vietnamese can hardly be pleased to see their co-owned communication towers being blown up by anti-junta protestors and other investments being ruined because of the coup. No serious observer of the post-coup situation in Myanmar believes that the SAC would ever engage in a meaningful dialogue with Win Myint, Aung San Suu Kyi and other ousted — and now detained — leaders. So ASEAN is stuck with an ostracized member that had dragged its reputation in the mud and there is little it can do about it than what it has done already: wait and see what happens next. In true ASEAN manner, the foreign ministers’ statement “reiterated that Myanmar is an important member of the ASEAN family” so Myanmar should be given “the space to restore its internal affairs and return to normalcy.” But not many will be holding their breath on that one. Myanmar is in turmoil, and there is very little ASEAN can do about it apart from symbolic summit snubs..."
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-18
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Title: Honest, Brave, Hardworking: Myanmar’s Detained President Has Always Put Country First
Description: "“I would rather die than resign.” This was the response of President U Win Myint when two senior army officers told him to resign on health grounds on the morning of the military coup on Feb. 1 and threatened him with harm if he refused. U Win Myint testified about the circumstances of his detention during a court hearing in Naypyitaw on Oct. 12. The regime has filed several charges against him since his detention. “He was then told that he could be harmed if he refused, and was told to reconsider. He replied that he had faced dangers along the way and faced the risk of death,” lawyer U Khin Maung Zaw said, recounting U Win Myint’s testimony to the court. U Win Myint also told the two military officers to act in line with the 2008 Constitution and not to stage the coup. Though President U Win Myint, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Naypyitaw Mayor Dr. Myo Aung were detained on the day of the military takeover on Feb. 1 and have been isolated since then, the regime has charged them with incitement over a statement condemning the coup that was issued by the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s Central Executive Committee a few days after their detention. While U Win Myint’s testimony has won loud applause from many in Myanmar, the response to another detained senior NLD member, Yangon Region Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein, has turned out to be just the opposite. In the eyes of many, U Phyo Min Thein’s political career ended the moment he testified that he bribed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi with more than 11 kg of gold and US$600,000—a claim that angered and disappointed many in the country. “When there are violent political storms, U Win Myint is prepared to row with his hands if there is no oar. U Phyo Min Thein belongs to those who want to hitch a lift,” said political analyst U Than Soe Naing. A true people’s representative U Win Myint has won four electoral races on the NLD ticket—in the general elections in 1990, 2015 and 2020, and in a by-election in 2012. Born in Danubyu Township of Ayeyarwady Region, U Win Myint was trained as a lawyer. He has engaged in politics for more than 30 years since the pro-democracy movement in 1988, joining the NLD in its early days. Like many other politicians of the time, U Win Myint ended up in prison after the military refused to honor the results of the 1990 general election. Back then, he was offered large sums of money and a permit to import a car, a rare luxury at the time, if he resigned from the NLD. But he chose prison over the money, and not even the lousy food and terrible conditions in prison could shake his faith. “U Win Myint is imbued with all four attributes of a politician—bravery, honesty, industriousness and humility,” remarked U Than Soe Naing, who has known U Win Myint for two decades. When the NLD boycotted the military-orchestrated general election in 2010, U Win Myint stood firmly with the party line. And when he was elected to Parliament alongside Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the 2012 by-election, he was the youngest member of the NLD’s Central Executive Committee. When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed to the Committee for Rule of Law and Stability in the Lower House in the same year, U Win Myint served as the committee’s secretary, and the two worked together more closely. “He seems to be meticulous and uncompromising, but he is very cooperative and hard-working, both in the party and the government,” said NLD lawmaker U Bo Bo Oo. Stony-faced Speaker One question on voters’ minds ahead of the 2015 election was who would serve as Myanmar’s president if the NLD won, as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was constitutionally barred from taking the country’s top job. Myanmar’s military and their allied parties expressed doubts as to whether the NLD had a person capable of assuming the presidency. In response to the criticisms, U Win Myint, speaking in a pre-election debate program organized by media outlet DVB, implied in his comments that no one could do a worse job of managing the country than the military, saying, “Every bird is as beautiful as a vulture.” After the NLD won a majority in the 2015 poll, U Htin Kyaw became president, and U Win Myint, due to his legal knowledge, was elected Lower House Speaker. He was 66 at the time. As Parliament Speaker, U Win Myint was not liked even by fellow NLD lawmakers, as he never hesitated to complain about any lawmaker—regardless of what party they were from—for any act deemed to be inappropriate, including reading journals during parliamentary sessions. He often confronted ministers when they failed to give clear answers to lawmakers’ questions. It was the first civilian government since 1962, and U Win Myint shrewdly managed the Parliament to avoid friction between military-appointed representatives and elected lawmakers, according to political analysts. “There could have been problems, should there have been constant friction between elected lawmakers and the military appointees. The problem, I mean, is that there could have been a coup back then,” U Bo Bo Oo said. U Win Myint did not show any bias toward his party when he was in charge of the Lower House, said Shan Nationalities League for Democracy chairman U Sai Nyunt Lwin. “When I asked how he was doing as the Parliament Speaker, he said it was an ‘unspeakable’ trouble,” said U Sai Nyunt Lwin. U Win Myint’s daughter married while he held the Parliament Speaker role, but he insisted that no wedding gifts would be accepted. The politician also earned plaudits for his handling of land issues for farmers. Lowly politician to President After two years as the Parliament Speaker, U Win Myint became the President in March 2018 after U Htin Kyaw retired on health grounds. Anti-graft efforts were stepped up after he assumed the presidency, both in the administrative and judicial branches. One of the most significant reforms was to bring the General Administration Department, which had been overseen by the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs, under civilian oversight. However, the military transferred the department back to the Home Affairs Ministry after the coup. “He has not changed his stance along the way from a [rank-and-file] politician to a president,” said U Than Soe Naing. No fault can be found with U Win Myint throughout his political journey to the presidency, said politicians and political analysts. “We believe he will remain firm in his stance. And we should praise him for that,” U Sai Nyunt Lwin said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-16
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Title: The Layers of Legal Development in Myanmar
Description: "When lawyers, law professors or government officials in Myanmar today are asked what kind of legal system Myanmar has, the resounding response is that it is a ‘common law’ system.1 This advice is received as music to the ears of donors and investors from common law countries, who presume that the ‘common law’ has the same meaning everywhere and that this will facilitate future legal transplants of common law models. Although Myanmar has a legal system derived from a British colonial model, it has developed significantly since then. There remain some similarities with its common law heritage, such as that judges and lawyers follow judicial precedent where it exists, but in many areas of law it is virtually nonexistent (see Tun Zaw Mra, this volume; Tun, this volume). To really understand what kind of legal system Myanmar has and how it operates today, it is necessary to look beyond the ‘common law’ label. There is a need to carefully reconsider the wider history of its legal institutions, the patterns of law making and the role of law makers. In this chapter, I respond to this challenge by surveying the layered legal history of Myanmar. This is not to suggest that Myanmar is somehow less than a common law legal system but, rather, to emphasise the diversity of legal institutions and legal practice within the common law world and recognise that Myanmar has not always been a part of it. My approach stresses multiple, and at times conflicting, layers of development in order to refute the perception that law reform has occurred alongside what has been perceived by some outsiders as the ‘big bang’ of political reforms since 2011. This allows us to consider the complexity inherent in the legal institutions within an ostensibly ‘common law’ system, and the ruptures, road bumps and sharp bends that obstruct the road to reform. Like many other colonies, Burma experienced the devastating effects of British imperialism. Its experience of British colonialism was the shortest in Southeast Asia,2 and this meant that the colonial legal system did not evolve over a long period of time but was largely imported from British India. The legal system also developed in ways distinct from other former British colonies because at independence it was one of only two former colonies to reject the British Commonwealth, and this severed ties with the courts and legal profession in England. The fact cited most often to emphasise Myanmar’s distinct context is, however, that its military has dominated the political sphere for decades (Egreteau and Jagan 2013: 9), which means that the armed forces have exerted significant influence over the legal system since 1962. Keeping this in mind, I seek to explore how judicial and legal institutions relate to political developments, as many other Asian legal studies scholars such as Lev have done (Lev 2000: 161). Specifically I examine the origins of the law in Myanmar, the key influences on the development of the modern system and the direction it has taken. While each successive regime issued reassurances about the continuity of laws, the reality is that, following independence, laws were often superimposed on a fragile constitutional order and used to justify violence, exploitation and military rule. This does not mean that law was irrelevant or meaningless but rather that we need to take a closer look in order to understand what law means in authoritarian settings (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008) and the ways in which remnants of these legal nightmares overshadow the present reform efforts. The Origins of Burmese Law The area that we know today as Myanmar was ruled by a series of different kingdoms. The first to be established by the Burmans was known as the Kingdom of Bagan. While there were interregnums between some kingdoms, the period of the kings clearly ended with the downfall of the Konbaung dynasty in 1885. Prior to this, a distinct legal culture had developed over time in Burma (Huxley 2008: 184). The primary sources relevant to our understanding of pre-colonial legal culture in the area date to the twelfth century and contain inscriptions with records of judicial disputes.3 These sources indicate that a body of written law known in Burmese as dhammathat was used in the adjudication of cases.4 Lammerts has classified the dhammathat into two types: ‘manual texts’, or compilations of bodies of knowledge; and, ‘narrative texts’ that contain a full legal story from beginning to end (Lammerts 2010: 208–28). It was the second style of narrative texts that characterised the dhammathat and distinguished it from other types of written law in pre-modern Burma (Lammerts 2010: 366). The dhammathat have been described as a ‘manual of instruction’ for judges, whose legal authority was derived from their ‘moral and educational’ credentials (Lammerts 2010: 434, 492). They do not easily equate to a common law understanding of law reports, legislation, codifications of law or religious texts (Huxley 1988–89: 24). In addition, records and texts from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries demonstrate that court cases and other literature also made reference to other recognised sources of law. These include pyat-hton, which were essentially compilations of judge-made precedent; yazathat, that is, law made by the king (Lammerts 2010: 3); canonical and non-canonical Jātaka and related Buddhist narratives; and vinaya, monastic law, which in pre-modern Burma was, in certain instances, applied also to the laity (see generally Lammerts 2010).5 The dhammathats are generally structured around 18 major titles of law. These 18 titles comprise criminal, personal and economic matters; dhammathats also contain extensive rules on legal procedure, kingship and monastic law (see generally Lammerts 2010). The history of their reception is complex6 but until the eighteenth century dhammathat was generally regarded as a form of law that originated in Buddhist tradition and was preserved and passed down unaltered by legists and kings. After the eighteenth century Burmese legal scholars increasingly argued that dhammathat should also be understood as a product of human law making to foster social prosperity so that merit making could be undertaken. Up until the colonial era dhammathat was regarded as authoritative Buddhist literature, on a par with, and, according to some authors, even included in, the Buddhist canon (Lammerts 2013). The kings, some of whom are now memorialised in imposing statutes at the capital city of Naypyidaw, sought to conquer local kingdoms and propagate Buddhism. They included the first main king, Anawratha (1044–77); King Bayinnaung (1551–81), who achieved unrivalled expansion of power; and King Alaungpaya (1752–60), who was the first to sign an agreement with a foreign power, England (Steinberg 1982: 18–24). The king was the head of the Hluttaw, the Supreme Council of State. The Hluttaw fulfilled numerous roles, including as a legislative chamber, a ministerial cabinet, and a court that had civil and criminal jurisdiction, and could hear appeals from lower courts (Kyaw Yin 1968: 62). Some kings have been noted for the significant legal reforms they undertook, such as King Mindon (1853–78), who initiated changes to the court system of administration and improved social infrastructure (Thant Myint U 2004: 109–29). King Mindon also introduced regulations to combat corruption, and facilitate greater specialisation by the courts, dividing them into civil and criminal jurisdictions (Yi Yi 1962: 11–19). As this legal tradition developed, a unique legal profession emerged, 7 which was already established in at least the twelfth century (E Maung 1951: 15). Law advocates were known by the term she-ne, which aptly captures the role of lawyers as advocating on behalf of their clients because it literally means ‘those who stand in front’ (Huxley 1994: 219). This rich legal tradition and its profession of ‘tradition bearers’ came to an abrupt end in the 1880s (Huxley 2008: 199). The onset of colonialism led to the intentional decimation of a highly literate and professional legal culture (Huxley 1998). The social, political and legal customs and traditions established and developed during the period of the kings was profoundly disrupted and displaced by the Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–26, 1852–53 and 1885), which were the result of both internal factors and external developments in the region. In the early 1800s, tensions rose between British and French colonial powers in Southeast Asia, and their rivalry and battle for ‘supremacy’ in the region led to the Anglo-Burmese Wars (Furnivall 1948: 70). The British embarked on what became known as the First Anglo-Burmese War in order to cement the boundaries of British India. This led to the signing of the Treaty of Yandabo, ceding parts of southern and western Burma to the British, and the annexation of the Rakhine and Tenasserim regions. Mr Maingy, the first Commissioner of Tenasserim, set about establishing a judicial system but proceeded on the misguided assumption that all decisions of the Burmese courts were merely ‘arbitrary’ (Furnivall 1991: 22). The British were not content with the Yandabo concessions, and after launching the Second Anglo-Burmese War of 1852, Rangoon and other parts of Lower Burma were ceded to them. British authorities then began to take steps to flesh out a legal system that they intended would consolidate territorial rule. In 1866 the Chief Commissioner was given power to enforce the laws of India in Burma but did not have power to promulgate laws (Donnison 1953: 29). It was not until 1872, however, that the first Judicial Commissioner of Burma, Douglas Sandford, was appointed and took over judicial powers from the Chief Commissioner (Furnivall 1960: 12). In the same year, court decisions began to be reported for the first time, with the publication of the Selective Lower Judgements of Lower Burma. The ultimate demise of the monarchy and its system of law in Burma occurred as a result of the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885. King Thibaw, the last king of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), and his family were captured by the British and shipped off to India. One effect of this final stage of the annexation of Burma to British India was to subsume it under the foreign common law tradition..."
Source/publisher: Melissa Crouch
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-16
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Title: A SITE FOR MINDFUL (RE)DEFINITION: THE INDEPENDENT CONTEMPORARY ART SCENE OF MYANMAR
Description: "“Under socialism, we were completely isolated. The Op Art [Optical Art] movement of the 1960s passed by without us even being aware of it.”1 The quote is from artist and writer Ma Thanegi: political activist in the 1980s, she served jail for three years after the people’s uprising of 1988 in Myanmar.2 Today, she is mostly known for her deep knowledge about Myanmar’s culture that she shares through her written contribution to it. What she finds the most surprising about Myanmar though, is that changes occurred so unexpectedly fast after 2010.3 The first political shift of 2010–2011 after decades of military regime was a few years later reaffirmed through free and fair elections at the end of 2015, generating a new, transitional era.4 Significant metamorphoses in a country’s life never leave impact on a single level. It is a disruptive period for society, and for the different communities within one society – for better or worse. Based in Yangon between 2014–2015, as an art historian and curator, it appeared that the so called independent (contemporary) art scene was conveying the visible and palpable signs of a new epoch. My fieldwork started with the simple aim to have a better understanding of the fine art / visual art scene, but with the lack of available material, I was soon interviewing gallerists, through them artists and other actors of the scene, to gain an overview of its activity. It was striking that one had to “investigate” in order to find those places and creators. It was an existing scene, active, vibrant and engaged, but hidden, modest and fragile. Having later directly cooperated with some of the actors of the scene, being involved in some projects as organizer and consultant, allowed me a further insight into the network of independent actors coordinating the scene. The origin of the present research and study ensued from a concern over what the delicate net built by the independent art scene would face when encountering the powerful international art market. Currently, in the sort of “void” generated by the gradual withdrawal of the Censorship Regime (officially since 2012) and the slow evaporation of an autocratic narrative in daily life, “culture” as one, insoluble whole – as it was defined for decades from “above” – began to grow small branches, as nuances come slowly into consideration.5 The contrast between Myanmar’s isolated self, prior to the political shift and the context brought by the early global twenty-first century, implicative of an increasing and accelerated experience with the international scene, forecasted a challenging stage. My approach at the beginning of the present research was to consider the simple facts, or the simple non-existent facts: the consequences of Myanmar not having an operating institutional visual art system or structure that could balance the impact of a greater international exposure that the art scene was to face. Advancing in the research, it became more obvious that the institutional system I was looking for, existed through the alternative infrastructure that the independent (contemporary) art scene has brought to life, and how crucial substance it represented within the cultural sphere in regard of a sustainable approach and a genuine voice in the upcoming period. Research questions, Hypothesis, Outcome In a later phase, the research questions were then reframed as follows: What are the values of the independent contemporary art scene’s art practices and infrastructure in relation to the official narrative in power? How and why a superimposed art historical and heritage approach allows a deeper understanding in this regard? What role can the independent contemporary art scene play within the cultural field and in a broader sense, in society, during this present period of transition? How can the independent art scene maintain its own perspective and why is the scene’s sustainability so important if improvements are made at a higher, governmental level in terms of institutionalization? The study reflects a hypothesis which understands the independent contemporary art scene as a mindful site for an alternative discourse within society and which contributes to the (re)definition and (re)access of absent artistic, and so cultural narratives, as well as to the maintaining of the art scene’s integrity and continuity. I argue that as a counterbalance of the encapsulated, immovable and still dominant official set, the independent scene, very much alive, represents a genuine agenda through its artistic practices and infrastructure, coherent with the intrinsic cultural frame and context of Myanmar. The alternative discourse enabled by the scene being a flexible, and inclusive site is crucial for free expression, for building curiosity, but also for creating an open dialogue within society’s diversity and allow the narratives that were consciously or unintentionally deleted by the official discourse to (re)surface. As an outcome, the research to offers a “written photograph,” 6 a mechanism of smart practices based on existing projects that can serve as a reading tool, a sort of map to the independent 6 “Observations enable the researcher to describe existing situations using the five senses, providing a ‘written photograph’ of the situation under study,” Expression mentioned in: Kawulich, “Participant Observation as a Data 4 contemporary art scene’s intrinsic site and its activity. It contains some further, specific suggestions that may complete the working frame and can be developed in the future as potential individual plans of action. The “written photograph” may also be a tool for completing the “spaces of original possibles”7 for additional research. Methodology Participant observation could be the best term to describe the quality of the conducted fieldwork which served as a basis for the research.8 I intentionally superimposed the discourses of art history and heritage to be able to provide a more holistic approach that shifts from a conventional analysis and perhaps brings more questions to the surface than answers. The reason is that except for few texts, the accessible literature in English about the independent contemporary art scene, if taken as a comprehensive attempt to address its activity, accentuates its dynamics in line of a pre-existing regional–global format strictly through a contemporary art terminology. 9 My belief is that to understand the scene’s role and potential in the current cultural, transitional arena, it needs to be detached from an external context and merits an attempt to be visualized in relation to the ground it is connected to. This ground has been shaped for centuries by social and religious order before the latter was disrupted by colonial rule, followed by decades of a dominant narrative imposed by a military regime. In the recent past, the artistic scene has also evolved in its own cultural, social context towards which it had an ambiguous standpoint not being an “authorized voice.” The hypothesis unfolding through the Collection Method.”, herself quoting: Erlandson, David A.; Harris, Edward L.; Skipper, Barbara L. & Allen, Steve D. (1993). Doing naturalistic inquiry: a guide to methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 7 Referring to Pierre Bourdieu, “The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed.” 8 Methodology of Participant Observation, in: Kawulich, “Participant Observation as a Data Collection Method,” 2. 9 Nathalie Johnston’s close insight of the past almost one decade of the Myanmar art scene was a turning point in my fieldwork. Her text (Johnston, “Intuitive Acts: The Evolution of Myanmar Contemporary Performance Art.”) about contemporary performance art in Myanmar (accessed November 2016) is one of the few written texts in English that attempts to vindicate pre-conceptions about the Myanmar contemporary art scene and focus on its evolution within its own context. 5 research is supported by a one-year fieldwork, the constant monitoring of the scene through the media, individual discussions with the independent scene’s actors and the feedback of a recent survey; meanwhile the study relies on a personal assumption embedded in a Western academic approach and an undeniable art historical terrain. The research experience cannot level a fully insider approach, and language barrier is an aspect that prevents an access to some nuances enclosed between the layers of other disciplines’ research too. The awareness of not being able to probably capture all threads at once is maintained throughout the study, especially as most of the concepts, time-frames, processes have to be further investigated individually; having said that, the angle proposed by the study may contribute to an ongoing dialogue precisely by bringing forward a – potential – semi-external reading. Sources The primary source for the study, fieldwork conducted between Spring 2014–Spring 2015, mainly in Yangon but not exclusively, entailed a series of interviews with artists, gallerists, curators, art experts from the country or from the region – either recorded or annotated; some of them were processed in the forms of articles and publications on different media platforms.10 This is complemented by archival material collected through this period including photo documentation of events and spaces, along with fieldnotes. The secondary literature was partly processed in Yangon – mainly publications nowhere else available. The second phase of processing was undertaken during the research in Budapest. A quantitative survey analysis in a form of a questionnaire was included in the research – the study comprises a subchapter 10 Gallery guide / short articles regularly published between September 2014-April 2015: Kálmán, “Gallery Guide - Myanmore.”, regular articles on the independent art scene published locally in In Depth Magazine: Kálmán, “My Paintings Are Not Beautiful (San Minn).”; Kálmán, “Show Me Your Hands And I’ll Tell You Who You Were (Htein Lin).”, Kálmán, “A Road Paved by Solid Concepts Meeting Artist Po Po.”, Kálmán, “Red, Black and Back (Aung Myint).”, and on a Hungarian art portal, Kálmán, “Iola Lenzi Interjú I., II. : ‘A Kortárs Művészet a Társadalmi Változás alakítója’; ‘Ellenérzéseim Vannak a Művészeti Piaccal szemben’ (Iola Lenzi Interview I, II: ‘Contemporary Art Asthe Driver for Social Change’; ‘I Rather Keep Away from the Market.’” 6 dedicated to its details and methodology (II.D., App. 1). The outcome as a mechanism of smart practices framed by the last subchapter (III.B.) is embedded in a regional angle through the short cases provided in subchapter III.A.2. The terminology regarding the art scene needs in almost every case clarification as many concepts are being (re)defined now by the scene and remain debatable, hence the necessity of a separate glossary. The web-references are abundant besides academic sources as it is sometimes the only source for English reference. Theoretical framework The study’s theoretical framework can be attached to two main approaches: critical heritage studies and (contemporary) art history. There is also an additional layer provided by postcolonial and Southeast Asian studies. In respect for the critical heritage approach of the study, I would like to mention Rodney Harrison and Laurajane Smith. Rodney Harrison defines heritage as a “dynamic process which involves competition over whose version of the past, and the associated moral and legal rights which flow from this version of the past, will find official representation in the present.”11 Two inter-related dynamic forces enter the understanding of heritage according to Harrison, a top- down, official approach, and a bottom-up, unofficial one, constituted by a local level. Critical heritage studies investigate these two processes, the relation between them. The present study wishes to approach as a start the case of the independent contemporary art scene partly through this scheme by understanding these processes framed around the notion of culture, and more properly fine art / visual art in the context of Myanmar. Harrison’s suggestion for a new dialogical model aims a broader approach between heritage and the “overwhelming presence of the past”: it “implies an ethical stance in relation to others, and a belief in the importance of acknowledging and respecting alternative perspectives and worldviews as a condition of 11Harrison, Understanding the Politics of Heritage, 8. 7 dialogue, and provides a way to connect heritage with other pressing social, economic, political and environmental issues of our time.”12 Through this approach, Harrison expects to offer an alternative to the “troubled late-modern” relationship with memory and the modernist binaries of cultural and natural which he finds underlied by the tangible / intangible division. It is in order to complete this frame that the notion of Living Heritage Approach is added independently of Harrison’s approach in the aim of generating a nuanced view of the cultural context relating to the independent contemporary art scene of Myanmar. Laurajane Smith on her side, nearly a decade before Harrison’s critical approaches published her “uses of heritage.” “At one level heritage is about the promotion of a consensus version of history by state-sanctioned cultural institutions and elites to regulate cultural and social tensions in the present. On the other hand, heritage may also be a resource that is used to challenge and redefine received values and identities by a range of subaltern groups.” Smith interprets the notion of a hegemonic “Authorized Heritage Discourse” (AHD) dependent on the specialist bodies’ power and institutionalized “in state cultural agencies and amenity societies.” This discourse is a synthesis of nation-narratives and aesthetic judgment of the expert; it is a self-referential discourse.13 The major challenge of the AHD is that it marks out who is entitled to speak in the name of the past.14 Smith’s approach helps situating the official narrative in regard of the position the independent scene holds. From an art historical point of view, the study stays within the frames of contemporary..."
Source/publisher: MA Thesis in Cultural Heritage Studies: Academic Research, Policy, Management.
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-16
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Title: Myanmar President Reveals Details of his Arrest
Description: "Ousted President U Win Myint appeared at a special court in Naypyitaw on Oct. 12 to face incitement charges over a National League for Democracy (NLD) central executive committee (CEC) statement condemning the Feb. 1 coup. State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and former Naypyitaw Mayor Dr. Myo Aung also appeared at the court for the same charge. President U Win Myint for the first time revealed details of his detention on the morning of the Feb. 1 coup during his testimony. He said the military tried to force him to step down before the coup but he refused. The president’s lawyer, U Kyi Win, told The Irrawaddy about his first public comments since he was detained. What did President U Win Myint testify about his detention? The court asked his age, address and occupation. He said he was 70 but that he didn’t even know where he was being held and that he lived at the presidential residence until Feb. 1. And he said his occupation was president, which suggested he still considered himself to be the president. He said soldiers entered his bedroom at around 5am on Feb. 1. He said he took his medicines, said his prayers, got dressed and went with them. He was taken to the President’s Office and was asked to wait outside his office. Two generals asked him to resign on health grounds. He said he was in good health and would not resign. One of the generals asked him to reconsider his decision, saying he could be harmed. He said he would rather die than resign. He told them to act lawfully and not to stage a coup. He was taken back to his presidential residence. At the residence, many soldiers had seized communication devices from the building. At noon, he was told he would have to move within three days. So he and his family started packing. He said he was moved to a house in the ministers’ neighborhood on Feb. 4. He was moved again on May 23. He didn’t know where it to. Many soldiers were waiting for them at the new house. He said he lost contact with the outside world on Feb. 1 and there was no television or newspapers. He said it was unreasonable to charge him over the NLD statement which was issued after his detention and that he was not guilty. Was he detained with his family? All we know is he said he packed with his family. We assume they are still together. To what extent will his testimony impact the case? The prosecutors have charged him under Article 505(b) of the Penal Code for incitement. They cannot prove he was involved in the NLD statement. The prosecutor failed to submit evidence. In Myanmar, prosecutions can’t proceed unless the prosecutor can submit evidence. The president cited Article 64 of the Constitution: “If the president or vice-presidents are members of a political party, they shall not take part in its party activities.” He said he strictly followed Article 64 and had not engaged in the party’s activities since he assumed the presidency. He said the accusation that he was involved in the NLD’s statements on Feb. 7 and Feb. 14 was unsubstantiated because he was detained on Feb. 1. He said the charge was therefore baseless. He said they only charged him because he was on the NLD’s CEC. We heard the prosecutor asked him about the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, National Unity Government and People’s Defense Forces. What was his response? Prosecutors asked him if he knew about the organizations. He said he didn’t because he had been isolated since Feb. 1. Did Daw Aung San Suu Kyi instruct you to inform the public about the testimonies made in court? Yes. She said the public must be informed about the trial. Trials are supposed to be held in public. She said people should know if a trial is unfair. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi asked us to release the testimonies. What is your legal assessment of the case? Legally, [U Win Myint] did not violate the law. The prosecution cannot prove he was involved with the statements..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-14
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Title: Myanmar’s Detained President Exposes Illegality of Coup in Court Testimony
Description: "Court testimony from Myanmar’s ousted civilian President U Win Myint on Tuesday showed that commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing breached the military’s own 2008 Constitution when he seized power on Feb. 1. On multiple occasions over the past eight months, whether in meetings with members of the State Administration Council (SAC) he chairs, or at gatherings with his subordinates, the commander-in-chief has repeatedly claimed that there was no coup on Feb. 1 and that the military takeover was carried out “constitutionally”. However, on Tuesday, the 70-year-old detained President, testifying in his own defense, told a court in Naypyitaw that early on the morning of the takeover, two military generals entered his room at the Presidential Residence in Naypyitaw and tried to force him to resign from his post on the grounds of ill health. According to his lawyer, the President told the court that the officers threatened him, saying that if he did not do as they instructed he would come to “harm”. U Win Myint told the generals that he would rather die than consent to their proposal, the lawyer added. The President said he told the generals that he was not concerned about being harmed, and that things should be handled as per the law and not by staging a coup, his lawyer said. The first public revelation of the circumstances of President U Win Myint’s detention came as he personally defends himself against an incitement charge brought by the regime over statements released by his National League for Democracy (NLD) urging the public to resist the coup. The same charge has also been brought against detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD chairwoman, and detained Naypyitaw Mayor U Myo Aung. A lawyer told The Irrawaddy that Tuesday’s court testimony from the President has emerged as the strongest confirmation yet of assertions made by both local and international legal experts that the military takeover was unconstitutional. According to Article 417 and Article 418 of the 2008 Constitution, in the event that a state of emergency is to be declared in the country, the President must announce the order in coordination with the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). The President then transfers the government’s executive, legislative and judicial powers to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces. However, a few hours after the country’s civilian leaders including President U Win Myint and State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were arrested on Feb. 1, the military convened an NDSC meeting. Former general U Myint Swe, the military-appointed vice president, attended the meeting as “acting president” and declared the country to be under a nationwide state of emergency for one year. Then, he immediately transferred the country’s legislative, administrative and judicial powers to the commander-in-chief. Trying to force the sitting president to resign by using threats could be seen as coup maker Min Aung Hlaing’s desperate attempt to make his takeover constitutional. The charter’s Article 73 (a) states that one of the two vice presidents—the one who won the second-highest number of votes in the presidential election—shall serve as Acting President “if the office of the President falls vacant due to his resignation, death, permanent disability or any other reason.” In other words, the two senior military officers’ suggestion that U Win Myint quit his position for health reasons was nothing more than a pretext to make the coup legal. However, given the then president’s refusal to resign, it’s hard to say that Article 73 provides valid support for U Myint Swe’s acting presidency, let alone the coup. “The President has notified the entire nation as well as the world, through the court, that the takeover violates the Constitution,” the lawyer said. The President’s words clearly reveal the commander-in-chief and his fellow generals to be criminals who have committed high treason, he said. “It is the strongest evidence that they committed high treason as [it comes from] the head of state himself,” the lawyer said. Lawyers in Myanmar have called for the prosecution of the coup leaders for high treason, which carries the death sentence. Amid these calls, the SAC led by coup leader Min Aung Hlaing has amended the country’s high treason law in an attempt to guarantee impunity for the military leaders who seized power in February. While the original Article 121 of the Penal Code says anyone who “attempts or otherwise prepares by force of arms or other violent means to overthrow the organs of the Union or of its constituent units established by the Constitution” is guilty of high treason, the coup leader has amended it so that only unconstitutional use of force of arms constitutes high treason, meaning it is acceptable to use force of arms as long as it is done in line with the Constitution. However, lawyers said that because the takeover was carried out in breach of the Constitution, every order, every appointment and removal of an official, and all changes to the law made by the junta are illegal. Myanmar has been in political and social turmoil since the military overthrew the civilian government and seized control. Since the coup, the junta has killed at least 1,167 people including protesters, politicians, activists, bystanders and children, and arrested more than 8,890 in an effort to suppress opposition to the regime..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-13
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Title: Myanmar’s Ousted President Told Army Officers He Would Rather Die Than Resign on Day of Coup
Description: "Myanmar’s ousted civilian President told army officers he would rather die than consent to their order that he resign from his post on the day of the military coup in February, a court heard Tuesday. The circumstances of President U Win Myint’s detention on the morning of Feb. 1, when the military seized power from the country’s democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government, were revealed for the first time by the former head of state himself during his testimony to a court in Naypyitaw. The junta has filed several charges against U Win Myint, who has been under house arrest since the coup. On the morning of the takeover, two very senior army officers entered his room at the Presidential Residence in Naypyitaw and attempted to persuade him to resign from his post on grounds of ill health, his lawyer quoted him as telling the court. The President turned down their proposal, saying he was in good health. “The officers warned him the denial would cause him much harm but the President told them he would rather die than consent,” said lawyer U Khin Maung Zaw. Since the coup, a number of NLD government leaders including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have been detained and charged by the junta. The ousted President is seen as an important ally of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and is the vice chairman of the NLD. Among the cases filed against U Win Myint is a charge of sedition, based on the NLD’s post-coup statements urging the people of Myanmar to resist military rule, and an allegation that he breached COVID-19 restrictions during the campaign period ahead of last year’s general election. Speaking in his own defense in the sedition trial on Tuesday, the former president—who is himself a lawyer—told the court that the accusations against him were groundless, as he had been held incommunicado. Therefore, he said, the statements allegedly released by the NLD were issued without his knowledge, even though his name appeared on them. A loyal NLD member, longtime democracy activist dating back to 1988 and former political prisoner, U Win Myint served as Myanmar’s 10th President from 2018 until the coup. Prior to assuming the presidency, the 69-year-old served as Lower House Speaker when the NLD took office in 2016 after its landslide victory in the 2015 general election. During his speakership, he earned the respect of many lawmakers for his strong leadership and impartiality, but was hated by military appointees in the Parliament. As President, U Win Myint was known for his strong political will and efforts to tackle corruption and reform the country’s weak judicial system. Throughout his political career, he was elected four times, most recently in 2020..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-13
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Title: Ousted Myanmar President says army tried to force him to resign hours before coup
Description: "Myanmar's deposed President testified on Tuesday that the military tried to force him to relinquish power hours before its February 1 coup, warning him he could be seriously harmed if he refused, according to his lawyer. The testimony of Win Myint -- his first public comments since he was overthrown -- challenges the military's insistence that no coup took place, and that power had been lawfully transferred to the generals by an acting President. Win Myint was testifying alongside Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel peace laureate and de facto government leader before the coup, at their trial on Tuesday on charges including incitement, stemming from letters bearing their names that were sent to embassies urging them not to recognize the junta. Win Myint, who was Myanmar's head of state, told the court in the capital Naypyidaw that senior military officials approached him on February 1 and told him to resign due to ill health. "The president turned down their proposal, saying he was in good health," defense lawyer Khin Maung Zaw said in an English-language text message sent to reporters, citing his testimony. "The officers warned him the denial would cause him many harm but the president told them he would rather die than consent." A spokesman for Myanmar's ruling military council did not answer calls seeking comment on Tuesday. Khin Maung Zaw said the defense rejected the charges against Win Myint and Suu Kyi as they were being held incommunicado. Win Myint and Suu Kyi have both dismissed multiple charges against them as false. The defense lawyer, representing them both, said Suu Kyi had suggested Tuesday's testimony be made public. Myanmar has been torn by violence and economic paralysis since the army intervened to prevent Suu Kyi forming a new government, three months after her party was re-elected in a landslide. The generals said that election was marred by fraud, threatening the country's sovereignty. The vice president, Myint Swe, a former army officer, was sworn in as President on February 1 and immediately handed power to the military to oversee a state of emergency. The junta has not publicly disclosed how Myint Swe assumed the presidency from Win Myint..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK) via "CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-13
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Title: Power, Civil Society, and an Inchoate Politics of the Daily in Burma/Myanmar
Description: "Burma/Myanmar’s postcolonial elites have established a military-state with hybrid-imperial structures, characterized by high despotic but low infrastruc- tural modes of power, and fueled by rent-extraction. Given the resulting eviscera- tion of opposition political groups, citizens understand explicit politics as dangerous. That said, cleavages between state and the polity afford vast space for “civil society” groups (CS) to form and operate. CS stabilize the political economy by managing citizen needs; conversely, CS stand as a wedge between state and masses, (potentially) constructing spaces to coordinate and magnify potential demands. Yet CS currently err toward managing needs. Opposition must politicize Burmese masses and CS through idioms that interface with CS’s material tasks—a “politics of the daily”—encouraging them to make, collec- tively, a multiplicity of non-adversarial demands. This may compel the state to pivot and seek new bargains, at which point elite advocacy-oriented CS can provide progressive policy reforms. The paper will examine recent inchoate social-political movements in Burma for models of this politics. AFTER A TUMULTUOUS FOUR years for Myanmar—punctuated by mass protests in September 2007, the devastation of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, and a con- tentious national election in November 2010—by early 2011 many Burma- watchers were left wondering if those epic events amounted to sound and fury signifying nothing.1 Indeed, they had anticipated that 100,000 protesters and a mismanaged natural disaster would subsequently lead to the cracking of the ruling military regime and a transition to democracy (OSI 2007). Instead the ruling military-state junta created a proxy civilian party, presided over an election beset with fraud and intimidation, and installed a “new” government. This effectively normalized the 2008 Constitution and closed the book on the coun- try’s last democratic poll, which had been held in quasi-abeyance for two Elliott Prasse-Freeman ([email protected]) is Founding Research Fellow at the Human Rights and Social Movements Program at the Carr Center for Human Rights and an Advisory Board Member with the Sexuality, Gender, and Human Rights Program at Harvard University. 1 Contrary to popular understanding, both “Burma” and “Myanmar” have always been used by those native to the space, the former typically in colloquial speech, and the latter mostly in the formal written language. To consciously avoid the binarism ascribed to the use of one over the other in English (where “Burma” signifies solidarity with the opposition, while “Myanmar” endorses the regime), this paper will use them interchangeably. decades.2 Most ethnic groups put down weapons to reluctantly rejoin this politi- cal process (Smith 2006), while the principal opposition, the National League for Democracy (NLD), remained irreconcilable and was officially dissolved as a con- sequence. When its leader, Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, was finally released from house arrest, her political activities were initially declared “illegal” and she was threatened with reincarceration.3 Actors on the outside, too, were ineffectual in their central focus on effecting democratic change: U.N. mediation was repeatedly unsuccessful, and neither sanctions nor punitively low foreign aid4 directly coerced the junta into capitulation (Pedersen 2008, 232). China (Steinberg 2001a, 223–39), ASEAN (Tonkin 2008, 3–4), and India contin- ued to support the junta economically and covet it strategically, providing exter- nal cover from Western coercion. But beyond this, internal political challenge appeared anemic; the military-state maintained an effective monopoly over explicit political expression. And yet, despite its effective weathering of these paroxysms (protest, emer- gency, election), the military-state then began showing stunning signs of reform: by late 2011, political prisoners had been freed, the unheard-of phenomenon of public pressure leading to a change in policy (the halting of the Myitsone mega-dam project) had occurred, and the same Suu Kyi—threatened only months before to avoid politics—had been allowed to run for parliament. When this article went to print, debate was raging over what the changes signi- fied, if anything at all. Sanguine observers heralded nothing less than a new dawn in Myanmar (ICG 2011), while wary counterparts insisted that the superficial “reforms” risked papering over deeper consolidation of military control (Zarni 2011). How to reconcile these two stories? Rather than adjudicating between them, this article seeks two orthogonal objectives: first, to make the apparent contradic- tions explicable by describing the system of political economy and social regu- lation that has developed in the sixty years since independence. The second objective will be to argue that these political events risk capturing the attention of internal and external actors alike, when more important lessons generated by the events perhaps lay elsewhere. The paper will argue that recent events have illuminated actors that heretofore had been flying below the radars of many observers and policymakers: whether organizing protests, pulling bodies out of lakes, or delivering civic education seminars, civil society groups (hereafter “CS”) are literally and figuratively everywhere in Burma (Heidel 2006). As such, exploring how they function can stimulate a new way of seeing the challenges facing Myanmar: instead of making state-to-state or “international community”-to-state politics the only ways to contest an authoritarian regime, Burmese CS provide a window through which we can penetrate an opaque pol- itical economy and inform us about the way life (in the villages and urban slums) actually functions, and can also demonstrate how an alternative politics may contest the status quo. Myanmar scholars—including in a recent issue of this journal (Thawnghmung 2011)—are increasingly mining these political spaces and practices, exploring daily experiences of average citizens. This article hopes to continue this conversation, contributing to determining what role these largely forgotten actors can play in driving change from within. Indeed, if the government is serious about reform, these forgotten actors will be seminal in channeling and shaping it; if the government is not, these actors will need to emerge to help compel change. METHODOLOGIES Against simplistic binary descriptions—totalitarian accounts in Burmese commentary and classic authoritarian portrayals in political science—I describe Burma’s political space as incorporating multiple particular governmentalities (Foucault 2007); I examine those by exploring (a) the institutions or actors that de facto govern subjects (states, customary leaders, CS representatives, businesses, spiritual guides, etc.); (b) the modes that those forms of governance take (“rights”-based, negotiated bargains, implicit deals, etc.); therefore (c) the kinds of relationships that develop (patron/client, state/citizen, corporation/ employee, NGO/“partner,” “international community”/victim); through which (d) power then flows to produce, regulate, punish, discipline, or expel subjects. And finally (e) how the different zones constituted by these different fields of governmentality, with their respective intensities, intersect with and hence influ- ence one another to create a broader system or assemblage (Deleuze and Guatarri 1987 [1980]). Taking up each of these permutations is beyond the scope of any single paper, but this methodological framework informs the project. Indeed, only by more precisely understanding this system can collective political attitudes become comprehensible and social space at Myanmar’s periph- eries and within its interstices become apparent, thereby contextualizing current CS actions and animating our ability to perceive the form this potential takes. To accomplish this, inter alia, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 150 members of 61 Burmese CS and/or political organizations in December 2009 and January 2010. Organizations were identified through referrals, and cross-referenced with NGO lists compiled by the Burma Library (in Mae Sot, Thailand) and Local Resource Center in Yangon, respectively, to ensure adequate coverage. Organizations are kept anonymous due to their sensitive activities. Finally, two conceptual deviations from classic civil society conceptualizations attend my use of CS. First, I define CS as those groups making social decisions outside of direct state control and without ambition toward capture of, or partici- pation in, the state. I avoid language such as “individuals coming together” to “make collective decisions” because I neither imply quasi-democratic or even necessarily collaborative decision making, nor do I suggest that individuals are what drive CS decisions. Instead, CS often take on institutional conscious- nesses and logics that act recursively on those people who constitute them (Zizek 2008, 167). Second, CS will be used plurally—signifying a multiplicity of organizations—and will also imply an alternative space that CS both constitutes (by virtue of its operation) and enters into..."
Source/publisher: The Journal of Asian Studies (Vol. 71, No. 2)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-12
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Title: Myanmar Under the Tatmadaw: Much Has Changed Since 1988
Description: "I and many other journalists who covered the 1988 pro-democracy uprising felt a sense of déjà vu when, once again, the Tatmadaw’s tanks rolled into major cities and cracked down brutally on protesters while some embittered activists took to the borders to fight and to form a government working mostly in exile. Is it happening again? Will there be another few decades of harsh military rule, resistance and suffering? Will the men in green ever come to their senses and realize that they are destroying the country, not “saving” it? On closer reflection, however, there are some fundamental differences between the situation today and that of 33 years ago. First of all, digital media has changed the world, and Myanmar is no exception. In 1988, the internet and smartphones did not exist and we who covered the uprising from Bangkok had to depend on shaky and often faulty landlines. It all began on Aug. 8,1988—hence “8888”—with massive demonstrations all over the country. The military was called out to suppress the uprising and did so brutally. Thousands of people—yes, thousands, not hundreds as some chroniclers claim—were gunned down in the then capital Yangon and elsewhere. When that failed to cow the public into submission, the Tatmadaw withdrew from the streets and public view, hoping that it would create the kind of chaos it would need to step in and “restore order”. And that was exactly what it did on Sept. 18, when a junta called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed power and another massacre of protesters took place. During that month, from mid-August to Sept. 18, Myanmar actually enjoyed its first month of intellectual freedom since the initial military takeover in 1962. After more than two decades of strict governmental control of the media, new lively papers emerged, some daily and others intermittent. By the end of August, Yangon alone had nearly 40 independent newspapers, magazines and journals full of political commentaries, biting satires and cartoons ridiculing the ruling elite. They had fanciful titles such as the Light of Dawn, Liberation Daily, Scoop, New Victory, the Newsletter and so on. Some were handwritten and photocopied or mimeographed, while others had access to professional printing presses, often free of charge because their owners wanted to show that they also supported the movement for democracy. Despite the use of English titles for many of the publications, they were in the Burmese language, published locally in Yangon, Mandalay, Mawlamyine, Pathein and elsewhere, and it was rare that the information they contained reached the outside world. The same was true of photographic images. Many Myanmar photographers took excellent pictures and those were also published locally. One of them is Htein Win, and thanks to him there is evidence of the events of 1988. An experienced photographer, in 1974 Htein Win had also photographed the student demonstrations triggered by the funeral of the Myanmar former secretary general of the United Nations, U Thant. But very few international press photographers were inside the country, among them Alain Evrard from Belgium and a Japanese photographer who used the name Ryo Takeda. Takeda photographed demonstrators kneeling before soldiers and urging them not to shoot, while Evrard took the most iconic picture of the suppression of the 1988 uprising: a shot of a Tatmadaw officer leading an attack on a group of demonstrators — and soldiers carrying guns with bayonets charging the crowd. Evrard had to hide his film rolls in his underpants and smuggle them out of Myanmar. Once in Bangkok, days after the event, he could have his film developed and prints made. A few videotapes, all on VHS, also reached Bangkok, but they were of very poor quality. Sporadic demonstrations continued for a while after the formation of the SLORC and the imposition of draconian martial law measures, but the Tatmadaw was soon in near-total control of cities and towns and even major villages. But an estimated 10,000 activists, most of them young, fled to areas along Myanmar’s borders which were under the control of various ethnic rebel armies. On November 1, they formed the All Burma Students Democratic Front and organized themselves along military lines and dressed up in uniforms with insignia. The hope was that they, together with their ethnic allies, would defeat the Tatmadaw militarily. Then came the May 1990 election, which, to the surprise of many, was free and fair. The National League for Democracy (NLD) scored a landslide victory, capturing 392 of the 485 seats that were up for grabs (of a total of 492; elections were not held in seven constituencies) while the Tatmadaw-supported National Unity Party scored a mere 10 seats. But that Pyithu Hluttaw, or National Assembly, was never convened. Instead, the SLORC eventually decided to form a constituent assembly consisting of about a hundred MPs-elect and 600 delegates handpicked by the Tatmadaw. When it became clear a couple of months after the May 1990 election that the SLORC was not going to honor the outcome and began arresting MPs-elect, some fled to the Thai border along with other NLD activists. In December 1990, they formed what they called the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s cousin U Sein Win, an elected MP, as prime minister. A loose alliance was formed with the ABSDF and some of the ethnic rebels. Internationally, there was widespread condemnation of the mass killings and arrests in 1988 as well as the SLORC’s decision to ignore the results of the 1990 election. But, at that time, there were almost no foreign investors in Myanmar. One of the few was Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen, a German firm that was involved in arms production and had personal connections with the then dictator General Ne Win. There was, in other words, very little at stake economically for the outside world, including Myanmar’s immediate neighbors. Looking back at those events which took place three decades ago, it is evident that we are now dealing with an entirely new situation with different dynamics internally, regionally and internationally. After the 2010 election, the Tatmadaw decided to allow a high degree of freedom of expression, and that lasted until the Feb. 1 coup. But during those 10 years, tech-savvy young people known as Generation Z became masters at using the internet—and many of them are still active after the coup. Today, nothing happens in Myanmar without it being disseminated worldwide on Facebook and other social media. People also communicate with each other relatively safely via digital platforms, some of which are encrypted. In real, crude and brutal terms, more people were gunned down by the Tatmadaw in 1988 than today, but the documentary evidence was never there. Some, but not as many as in 1988, have resorted to armed struggle—but in a way that Myanmar has not seen in recent history. The military-structured ABSDF soon fell apart because of factional infighting, some resulting in activists killing other activists. There was an acute shortage of weapons and even medical supplies. Many fell sick with malaria and other diseases contracted in the jungle. The dream of an armed uprising from the borders never materialized. The erstwhile ABSDF militants trickled back to their old hometowns, or ended up in exile in the US, Australia and Europe. This time, there is armed resistance as well, but it includes urban guerrilla warfare of a kind not seen in Myanmar before. Bombs are exploding on an almost daily basis in cities and towns all over the country, even in the old capital Yangon and the new one, Naypyitaw. Suspected Tatmadaw informants are being assassinated and militants are blowing up military-owned property like Mytel communication towers. Local resistance forces, which are active also in the Burman-dominated heartland, have ambushed Tatmadaw convoys with guns and homemade bombs. And the Tatmadaw today is no longer the highly disciplined fighting force it was in the 1980s and before. Judging from reports from inside the country—and then not only from internet activists—the Tatmadaw has suffered heavy casualties with hundreds of dead and many more wounded. Furthermore, the old NCGUB never managed to attract anything that could be interpreted as recognition. It became redundant after 2010 and was dissolved two years later. The new National Unity Government (NUG) has the backing of several MPs who, unlike those in 1990, have actually served as MPs, and that of Myanmar’s representative to the United Nations, U Kyaw Moe Tun. Informal meetings have been held with representatives of foreign governments. On Oct. 5, the French Senate extended what can be seen as a recognition of the NUG, and the European Parliament passed a similar resolution a day later. And, as The Irrawaddy reported on Oct. 6, Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah has issued a warning to the junta in Naypyitaw, the State Administration Council (SAC), that his country will hold talks with the NUG if the generals fail to cooperate with a recently appointed special envoy of ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a fellow member. But the deciding factors could be what certainly did not exist in 1988: a once thriving local business environment and foreign investors. Strikes and military crackdowns have been bad for business. The World Bank forecasts in its July report an 18 percent annual decline for Myanmar’s economy, nearly double what was predicted in March. Other estimates are even more dire; Global credit rating agency Fitch Solutions, for instance, expects a contraction of 20 percent or more. In short, the economy is on the verge of collapse, and the blame for that lies entirely with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to oust the elected government and seize absolute power. Regional trading partners like ASEAN and China may not care about democracy and human rights, but they don’t want to see their investments go up in smoke over the Myanmar battlefield. China has invested heavily in Myanmar’s fledgling industry and in infrastructure projects such as a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State. High-speed railroads are on the drawing board, and so are plans to dredge the Irrawaddy River for trade. Chaos is the last thing the Chinese would want to see in Myanmar. Singapore exported US$2.7 billion worth of goods to Myanmar in 2020, mainly mineral fuels, oil, electronics and machinery. Trade with Vietnam was also booming before the coup and Vietnamese companies have invested in real estate and a huge new shopping mall in Yangon. Mytel is a joint venture between Tatmadaw-controlled Myanmar Economic Corporation and Viettel, which is owned by the Vietnamese military. Vietnam, hardly a democracy, would not normally have cared about a military takeover in a foreign country, but the Vietnamese can hardly be pleased to see their co-owned communication towers being blown up, and other investments being ruined because of the coup. So will the new junta survive? The old SLORC was never under the same pressure at home or internationally as the SAC. But, in the end, it depends on what will happen inside the Tatmadaw when—and it seems inevitable—Myanmar sinks even deeper into economic, social and political crisis. But what will come in place of SAC, if it falls, is impossible to predict. What can be said with certainty, though, is that Min Aung Hlaing and his henchmen had probably not anticipated any of this when they decided to launch their ill-fated coup on Feb. 1. What the generals could get away with in 1988 is not possible in 2021. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-11
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Title: Re-thinking Myanmar’s Political Regime: Military rule in Myanmar and implications for current reforms
Description: "Since first coming to direct political power in 1958, Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) has dominated the country’s politics and controlled the state apparatus. 2 Despite a series of challenges to its rule, the Tatmadaw has been able to constantly reinvent itself and, ultimately, to reassert its dominance over Burmese society. Cycles of popular protests, economic and political crises, and dissatisfaction with military rule failed to overthrow or undermined the military’s organizational coherence. The most tangible outcome of the 1988 public protest movement and its suppression was the collapse of Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP). For it was those events that permitted the Tatmadaw to return Myanmar to direct military rule under the ostensible leadership of the State Law and Order Council (SLORC), later renamed as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The SLORC/SPDC regime effectively crushed protests, arrested opposition leaders, and began a process of rebuilding the military to become the most competent and formidable institution in the country with uncontested control over the state apparatus (ICG 2001: 24; ICG 2011; Kyaw 2009: 272). Given its dominance, it is thus puzzling that the SPDC self-elected to dissolve itself and allow the formation of a nominally-civilian government in 2011. By 2012, this new government has declared its intention to liberalize Myanmar and has introduced a series of dramatic changes that permit expanded pluralism, economic freedoms, and freedom of the press. 3 This paper examines the historical development of the Tatmadaw as an organizational actor since its rise to power in 1962. It seeks to understand and clarify the significance of recent reforms in which the Tatmadaw appears to have ceded powers. In so doing, two prominent approaches to regime change are considered in turn. First, the game theoretic model that focuses on the personalities of reformers and challengers in explaining why authoritarian regimes reform. While such frameworks offer helpful insights in the dynamics of political change, they nevertheless fall short in explaining why changes are taking place at an institutional/regime-level. This paper will thus focus on a chronological path-dependent approach that traces the organizational evolution of the Tatmadaw and identifies how it sought to strategically reposition itself vis-à-vis society. By adopting regime typologies introduced in the works of Linz and Stepan (1996), this paper will argue that current developments should be seen as a diminished form of authoritarianism. The conclusion discusses the present situation and its implications for the country’s trajectory of political development. The paper’s main claim is that the ongoing dramatic reforms introduced since mid-2011 should not be understood simply as an exit strategy by the military to retreat from national politics. On the contrary, this paper suggests that ceding dominance is in fact an evolving strategy by the Tatmadaw to continue consolidating its organizational powers and to institutionalize its influence over government, though without the responsibility for the direct administration of the state. The Tatmadaw no longer governs directly and reforms have increased political competitiveness on the national stage. 4 Be that as it may, the Tatmadaw has designed various mechanisms to safeguard its interests. It has done so through the creation of what Linz and Stepan referred to as “reserve domains” (1996: 67). Hence, while there is no doubt that major changes in Myanmar are underway, it is premature to assume this entails a fundamental realignment of political power, let alone a transition to consolidated democracy. Game theoretic perspectives on Myanmar’s transition Much of the popular reports on current liberalization efforts in Myanmar have explained recent changes by essentially adopting a classical game theory model. Many Myanmar watchers and popular press for example have examined current political transition as a strategic game between regime softliners/reformers versus hardliners with a particular focus on the elite actors (Callahan 2012, Fuller 2012, Jagan 2012, Kyaw 2012, Tin 2012). For example Kyaw Yin Hlaing explains that in the absence of intervention from the retired Than Shwe, some officials within the new government have emerged labeling themselves as liberals while calling for further liberalization of the country’s political economy (Kyaw 2012: 209). Similarly, Callahan (2012: 122) argues that despite having hand-picked his successors, Than Shwe have now “lost the ability to control the [reform] process from behind the scenes.” She credited this as a long-held “pent-up pressure” from Than Shwe’s subordinates that are now well placed to “push the envelope” and essentially curb the “once-boundless policy-making powers” of the Tatmadaw. Under this model, game theorists argue that democratization is possible for authoritarian regimes when moderates from both the ruling elites and the opposition compromise and work together in other to prevent backlashes from their respective hardliners (Przeworski 1992: 105-53; Linz and Stepan 1996: 61). Additionally, according to Linz and Stepan (1996: 65), military authoritarian regimes that are hierarchical in nature are among the most likely regime types to allow this type of transitional path towards democratization, as the “military as institution” views the cost of maintaining the “military as government” as too high, thus would eventually compromise and allow liberalizing reforms as an exit strategy for the “military as institution.”5 Though the hardliner versus moderate argument certainly gives a plausible explanation of how a regime can democratize, it nevertheless falls short of articulating why a consolidated military regime, which is in a position of strength both as an institution and as government, would choose to liberalize. It is certainly important to understand the role of elite “reformers” such as President Thein Sein and Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann and how they have coordinated for a push for liberalization of Myanmar’s political economy, yet it is also vital to note that they were both key members of the preceding SPDC regime and the Tatmadaw, and neither individual previously demonstrated that they would push for further political reforms in a post-SPDC state.6 What then allowed these actors to change the “rules of the game” and thus effectively reposition themselves as liberals in a reforming regime? As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 21) point out, in authoritarian regimes, “no transition can be forced purely by opponents against a regime which maintains the cohesion, capacity, and disposition to apply repression.” Additionally as Huntington (1991: 114) suggests one must examine the “continuum in terms of the relative importance of the governing and opposition groups as the source of democratization.” However, in the case of Myanmar, in the absence of any effective and unified political opposition that could realistically topple and replace the military regime (Mya 1992: 146- 59; Kyaw 2008: 128-9), current political reforms are led from the top-down by military elites as part of a “transformation” process (Huntington 1991: 114). Given the non- democratic credentials of the Tatmadaw’s long authoritarian rule over Myanmar, current attempts to “transform” the regime should not be understood as an attempt to introduce a top-down transition towards a Western-style liberal democracy per se, but rather as a strategy for the military to prolong its continued dominance over the state apparatus, as well as to ensure that the core interests of the military are preserved. 7 When the Tatmadaw first took direct control of the state apparatus in 1962, the Revolutionary Council (1962-1971) under the leadership of General Ne Win attempted to transform Myanmar by purging all forms of pluralism to ensure the primacy of the Tatmadaw as the only potent political force responsible for the affairs of the state. At the height of the Ne Win regime, the Tatmadaw attempted to regulate all aspects of social life but was unable to achieve absolute domination over its population and was constantly challenged by armed insurgencies on the peripheries suggesting that the regime was at best an “arrested totalitarian” regime. Additionally, the regime elites were disillusioned and lacked commitment to the proclaimed Burmese Way to Socialism ideology (Kyaw 2003: 35). Subsequently, in order for the Tatmadaw to regain control and support for the state, the arrested-totalitarian authoritarian regime began to co-opt traditional non-state actors that had “roots in society before the establishment of the regime” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 44). This led the regime to seek support from the very actors, for example private businesses and monastic organizations, that it had initially aimed to purge, thus modifying the character of the Tatmadaw as government. The result was the establishment of the de jure BSPP single-party state apparatus, whereby the party was theoretically leading the Tatmadaw (Taylor 2009a: 317). However, the inability of the authoritarian BSPP regime to further correct problems brought about by its grossly mismanaged economy finally led to the collapse of order thus paving way for the re-emergence of an authoritarian military SLORC/SPDC regime which was no longer committed to the socialist vision of its BSPP predecessors. Though the SPDC was able to preserve some sort of peace and stability for nearly two decades, the mass protests of 2007, popularly referred to as the “Saffron Revolution,” indicated that the SPDC’s rule had not fundamentally led to a sustainable state-societal relationship.8 The 2007 crackdown of the mainly urban protests saw the return of order and the re-silencing of the regime’s critics. However, it also signaled that a re-negotiation of the socio-political order between the state and its society was long overdue. In order to understand this evolutionary development of the shifting attitude between the state and its society, the evolution of the Tatmadaw as the state apparatus will be traced including why reforms in the current context came about as a calculated top-down process that was designed to preserve the interest of the Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher: Southeast Asia Research Centre and The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-11
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Title: Heart and Soul
Description: "David Eubank, who is originally from Texas, lives in the jungles of the Karen state near the Thai-Myanmar border, along with his wife and children. The Karen people have been fighting the Myanmar military for decades, in the world’s longest civil war. Since the military coup on 1 February, the Karen Nation Union has sided with a people’s uprising demanding democracy is restored, and has launched attacks on the military. The army has responded with bombings that have displaced tens of thousands of people. David has seen first-hand what has happened. Hundreds of young protesters have fled to ethnic areas, including into the area David is working in. His group, The Free Burma Rangers, has provided survival and medical training to some of these young people who want to continue fighting to restore democracy. He is also part of an underground railway helping to smuggle out politicians, artists and activists who are on the military’s wanted list. David takes us on a mission through the jungle to get aid to civilians caught up in the conflict..."
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-10
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Title: PRESS RELEASE: Burmese diaspora, local CSOs inside Burma, community-based organizations, and civil society organizations sent a letter to the U.S. Congress to urgently support and pass the BURMA Act
Description: "Media contact: Myra Dahgaypaw, U.S. Campaign for Burma (718) 207-2556 Soe Reh, Karenni-American Association (832) 526-2849 Jan Jan Maran, Global Movement for Myanmar Democracy (GM4MD) (571) 620-9163 Washington, DC, October 6, 2021) – Today, 242 Burmese diaspora groups, local CSOs in Burma, community based organizations, and civil society organizations in the U.S. and around the world sent a letter to the U.S. Congress to urgently support and pass the BURMA Act, which was introduced by Chairman Meeks (D-NY), Senator Cardin (D-MD), and Representative Chabot (R-OH) on Tuesday, October 5th. The BURMA Act was warmly welcomed yesterday as a vital next step in supporting the people of Burma and holding their perpetrators, the junta and its military, accountable for the countless human rights abuses committed daily. The introduction and eventual passing of the BURMA Act will show strong U.S. leadership in alleviating an increasingly dire situation in Burma by holding the junta accountable with targeted sanctions and providing vital aid to the people of Burma. Ending the military’s cycle of impunity will not only prevent further violence, but will aid in creating safer conditions for all people in the country. The human rights violations committed by the Burmese military since the February 1st Coup are well documented by the CSOs on the ground and international organizations. For decades, the Burmese military incited conflict across Burma and waged a campaign of violence against ethnic minorities. Since February, the level of violence escalated to include the people of central Burma in targeted waves of human rights violations to silence any opposition and force the people into submission. Congress must take decisive action to hold the Burmese military accountable for their grave crimes and support impacted communities by urgently voting to pass the BURMA Act. Burma’s ethnic communities in the U.S. have friends, family, and loved ones that are directly affected by the military coup. The people of Burma deserve sustainable peace, security and political stability after years of human rights abuses and a lack of justice. “The people of Burma have waited far too long for tangible action like the Burma Act, which was introduced yesterday by Chairman Meeks, Senator Cardin, and Representative Chabot. We now need other members of Congress to step up and co-sponsor the bill in order for it to pass successfully. With U.S. leadership taking the initiative to help and support the people, as well as taking the necessary actions to hold the junta accountable for its brutal crimes; hopefully, the rest of the international community will follow suit.” – Myra Dahgaypaw..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Campaign for Burma
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-08
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Title: Chairman Meeks, Senator Cardin, and Rep. Chabot Introduce BURMA Act
Description: "Washington, DC – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory W. Meeks (D-NY), House Foreign Affairs Asia-Pacific Subcommittee Ranking Member Steve Chabot (R-OH) and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) introduced the “Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2021” or BURMA Act. The legislation condemns the actions taken by the Burmese military during its February 1 coup d’état and its aftermath. By authorizing targeted sanctions against the Burmese military, the State Administrative Council, as well as their affiliated entities and conglomerates, the bill holds accountable those responsible for the perpetration of the coup and the ensuing atrocities that have claimed over a thousand lives. In light of the growing crisis in Burma, the legislation also authorizes support for civil society and humanitarian assistance and calls on the State Department to issue a genocide determination for the persecution of the Rohingya. “It has been eight long months since the Burmese military staged its illegal and illegitimate coup, reversing years of reform and Burma’s fragile transition to democracy. Despite diplomatic pressure from the United States and the international community, the Burmese military has refused to cease its violence, release those unjustly detained, or participate in meaningful dialogue with local stakeholders. The United States must do more to support and protect the Burmese people and send a clear signal to the Burmese military,” said Chairman Meeks. “The Burmese military’s coup in February, and the ongoing atrocities that have followed, continue to be a direct attack on the people of Burma and their basic desire for self-government. Self-government is not some sort of temporary arrangement or gift from the military. The people of Burma have had enough of military rule and, to their credit, have courageously stood up for their legitimate democratic aspirations. As a longtime champion of human rights in Burma, I’m proud to join Chairman Meeks to introduce this legislation which will authorize a forceful response to these heinous crimes,” said Representative Chabot. “As the death toll continues to rise, the United States must not be indifferent to Burma’s fate. Horrible atrocities have been committed against minority groups, including the Rohingya, which has led more than one million to flee as refugees. Our bicameral legislation aims to hold responsible the military leaders and others who have ravaged this nation and committed crimes against humanity. We stand in solidarity with the people of Burma and condemn the violence that has been perpetrated against them,” said Senator Cardin. A copy of the BURMA Act of 2021 can be found here. Key elements of the legislation include: Authorization to impose sanctions on individuals and entities who helped stage the February 1 coup d’état and are responsible for the subsequent repression of fundamental freedoms, human rights abuses, use of indiscriminate violence towards civilians, and other gross atrocities. Authorization to prohibit the import of precious and semi-precious gemstones from Burma into the United States. Authorization for a new position at the State Department, a Special Coordinator for Burmese Democracy, to promote an international effort to impose and enforce multilateral sanctions on Burma and coordinate United States Government interagency efforts on Burma. Authorization for support to civil society and for humanitarian assistance in Burma, Bangladesh, Thailand, and the surrounding region. Call for the Department of State to make a genocide determination with regards to the persecution of the Rohingya. Call for the United States to pressure the United Nations to take more decisive action with regards to Burma..."
Source/publisher: House Foreign Affairs Committee
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-06
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Title: Why Myanmar's current democracy movement lacks global support
Sub-title: Few states have the appetite to invest in a force dominated by Aung San Suu Kyi's ousted party
Description: "We are facing crimes against humanity. We are facing a humanitarian catastrophe. Yet the world has ignored us. They have closed their eyes." Such was the plaintive cry of Dr Sasa, minister for international co-operation in Myanmar's shadow National Unity Government (NUG), in a recent interview. He was referring to the situation in his country after the military ousted the incoming democratically elected administration headed by Aung San Suu Kyi on February 1, since which, according to the UN Special Rapporteur Thomas Andrews, more than 1,100 people have been killed, over 8,000 arbitrarily detained, and at least another 230,000 forcibly displaced. Dr Sasa is correct, if one were to go by the nugatory coverage of the trial of Ms Suu Kyi on what are widely considered to be trumped-up charges, including inciting public unrest and corruption. There was a time when the military's treatment of Ms Suu Kyi – they kept her under house arrest for a total of 15 years and allegedly even attempted to assassinate her – provoked international outrage. But the legions of human rights defenders are not flocking to the former democracy activist's banner any more. At one level, this seems unfortunate. "Junta-controlled military forces had killed protesters in the street, murdered civilians in their homes, beaten individuals to death and tortured people to death in their homes," said Mr Andrews in a submission to the UN's Human Rights Council late last month. "The junta also continued to deny the existence of the Rohingya ethnic minority while denying them citizenship, freedom of movement and other fundamental rights." The problem is that similar atrocities and far, far worse occurred while Ms Suu Kyi was the country's de facto head of government from 2016 to 2021. Her dwindling band of apologists may point out that it was not her, but the military – over which she had no effective control – that committed what most of the world believes to be acts of ethnic cleansing against the Muslim Rohingya minority in western Myanmar between 2016 and 2019. But Ms Suu Kyi as good as denied that such events took place at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2019, labelling accusations of genocide as “incomplete and misleading”. She and her National League for Democracy (NLD) administration were complicit in these crimes. The relative lack of sympathy for Myanmar's democracy movement – even though the NLD won an overwhelming majority of the vote in both 2015 and 2020 – is therefore hardly surprising. Ah, some will say, but the NUG is different. It is far more inclusive, both of the country’s numerous armed ethnic groups and now, potentially, of the Rohingya too. Indeed, in June, it did promise a new citizenship act that would base “citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens”. But this is all too convenient. The NUG is dominated by the NLD. When it was in government, the latter had every opportunity to stop or attempt to stop the slaughter of the Rohingya. To reach out a bloody hand to them now may be too little, too late. One has to ask how genuine the move is, in any case. Would the NLD have extended citizenship rights if the military had not taken over? Given its past record, that seems extremely unlikely. And here is the really unpalatable issue. Speakers at the UN Human Rights Council called for “the military regime to respect the will of the people expressed in the November 2020 election”, and that is a sentiment with which I would agree in theory. Regular readers will know that I have always argued for the rights of people to choose representatives of whatever stripe they will, regardless of whether I or anyone else disapprove of their politics. But there is a limit. And when the democratically expressed will of the people is to return to power a party of genocide enablers, I find myself well past that limit. Clearly I am not alone – hence the apparent reluctance of democracy champions around the world to rally to the NLD-led NUG’s side. "Far, far worse occurred while Aung Suu Kyi was the country's de facto head of government from 2016 to 2021 So here is my prediction: Dr Sasa is right. As long as the disruption and violence in Myanmar are contained within its borders, the world will to all intents and purposes continue to ignore the junta’s suspension of democracy. Of course there will be debates and resolutions passed at the UN and elsewhere, the Association of South-East Asian Nations – of which Myanmar is a member – will continue to attempt to broker a solution, probably fruitlessly, and China will carry on keeping its options open by maintaining relations with both the military and the NLD. The junta will have to manage border issues; 15,000 people have already crossed into India since the coup. They’ll have to live with sanctions and a shredded economy. However, they can also scan the horizon and see that there is no state with the appetite to take the kind of intervention necessary to force them from power. The world has lived with Myanmar being an authoritarian military regime for most of its post-independence existence. It can and will do so again. If the country’s pro-democracy movement wants to ask why, they have only themselves to blame, for they have stripped themselves of whatever moral authority they once possessed. After all, the difference between those “complicit in genocide and responsible for genocide” – as the former UN special rapporteur Yanghee Lee said – is only a matter of degree. So why, some would ask, should they come to the aid of one set of pariahs over another?..."
Source/publisher: "The National"
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-06
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Title: Myanmar on a military-made road to disaster
Sub-title: Myanmar military is waging war on civilian populations in a brutal campaign to seek and destroy new people's defense forces
Description: "What began as carnival-like protests against Myanmar’s military takeover on February 1 has since morphed into a vicious nationwide insurgency that has hit areas of the nation that had seen no armed confrontations between rebels and state forces for decades. Brutal repression and massive atrocities committed by the military, known as the Tatmadaw, have underscored its reputation as the nation’s most loathed institution at a time when it has seized absolute power and appointed a new, non-elected government. At the same time, the country is being ravaged by the Covid-19 pandemic and a faltering economy the World Bank this month predicted will contract by at least 18% in 2021. The percentage of the population living in poverty is expected to rise to 48.2% by 2022, nearly double the 24.8% recorded in 2017. And while a darling of the Western aid community after introducing political and economic reforms beginning in 2010 and resulting in historic 2015 elections, Myanmar has resumed its previous pariah status. By any measure, the country appears to be heading for a disaster of unparalleled proportions. Eight months ago, millions of people took to the streets in virtually every city, town and major village across the country. Youth in fanciful costumes, some dressed as contestants in beauty pageants or as ghosts carrying placards saying “the military is scarier than us”, voiced their strong opposition to the coup. Older protesters, inspired by the Generation Z youngsters, dressed in pre-Buddhist temple robes met for religious ceremonies reminiscent of those during Myanmar’s fabled nat pwes, or spirit festivals, asking deities for help to get rid of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other coup maker generals — and then cast evil spells on them. At one point, almost the entire nation was on strike. But the situation took a turn for the worse when the Tatmadaw began shooting mainly peaceful demonstrators. Specially-trained snipers picked out the youngest in the crowds in order to get their brutal message across. At the end of March, Min Aung Hlaing even said in a televised speech: “You should learn from the tragedy of earlier ugly days that you can be in danger of getting shot to the head and back.” Today, after more than a thousand demonstrators have been killed and thousands more remain in military custody, small-scale protests continue in the old capital Yangon, the central city of Mandalay and other places. But expressions of dissent are changing as anti-junta forces increasingly detonate bombs on military and military-affiliated targets in urban areas and assassinate junta-aligned officials and their suspected informants. New rebel forces, known as people’s defense forces (PDFs), are battling the Tatmadaw primarily in Sagaing, Mandalay and Magwe regions as well as Chin and Kayah states. While they often started their hit-and-run attacks with rudimentary hunting rifles and slingshots, many now possess automatic rifles and are inflicting heavy casualties on the Tatmadaw. Unable to locate the new generation rebels, the Tatmadaw has resorted to shooting indiscriminately into villages from helicopters and with heavy artillery, looting homes at random, killing civilians for no apparent reason and burning property such as motorcycles, cars and livestock. Some of the new-age rebels’ weapons have been captured from the police and Tatmadaw, while others have been supplied by ethnic rebels, namely Kachins in the north and Karen and Karenni on the Thai border in the east. Myanmar’s many long-running ethnic rebellions have also been revitalized since the coup. In Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has gone on the offensive and even expanded its area of operation to northern Sagaing and Mandalay regions, where it is working with local PDFs. When Min Aung Hlaing visited the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina on September 19, he stayed for only one day and security reasons was forced to cancel a planned trip to Putao in the far north. The Irrawaddy, a Myanmar website, reported on September 21 that dozens of young people took to the streets in Myitkyina shouting “Min Aung Hlaing, don’t you feel ashamed to come to Kachinland? Get out of Kachinland!” Kachin civil society organizations, meanwhile, have slammed the Tatmadaw-appointed Kachin state chief minister Khet Htein Nan, calling him a traitor to the Kachin people. The deteriorating security situation nationwide prompted the US embassy in Yangon to post an alert on its website on September 25 warning of “potential attacks” that may be carried out not only in the old capital but also in Mandalay and the new capital Naypyitaw “in the coming months.” Internationally, Myanmar’s only remaining friends are its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) partners, Russia and China. But even China is playing a double game to hedge its bets. While Beijing recently supplied US$6 million in aid to the ruling junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), in Naypyitaw, it has also reaffirmed Chinese Communist Party “party-to-party relations” with the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi who led the now military-toppled government. China’s recent deal with the US to delay which government should represent Myanmar at the United Nations – the coup-installed government or the National Unity Government (NUG) comprised of ousted politicians – further underscored Beijing’s double game. Moreover, China has given nearly 13 million doses of its Covid-19 vaccines to Myanmar’s military-controlled health authorities and an undisclosed number of the same shots to people in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups, including in Kachin and Shan states and Wa-controlled areas. The vaccinations were reportedly conducted by Chinese medics who entered and then left the areas. Several rebel groups, primarily the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army among the Palaungs of northern Shan State, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army in the southwest, and, to some extent, the KIA are armed with Chinese-made weapons provided by the United Wa State Army, a group with links to China’s security agencies. China is also known to have told those groups not to fight near the oil and gas pipelines it has constructed from Myanmar’s coast on the Bay of Bengal to the China’s southern province of Yunnan, or disrupt other Belt and Road Initiative-related investments in Myanmar. The Tatmadaw had probably not anticipated any of this when it seized power on February 1. At the same time, the generals appear determined to cling to power at any cost, probably realizing that it would be held accountable for the atrocities it has committed before and, especially, after the coup, if it were to fall. To survive mounting international sanctions and boycotts and its own gross economic mismanagement, the Tatmadaw is attempting to tighten its grip on the lucrative jade trade, a multi-billion industry centered on the jade mines in and around Hpakant in Kachin state. According to a report issued by the international environmental watchdog Global Witness and quoted by Al-Jazeera on June 29, the coup could turn the income from jade exports, mainly to China, “into a ‘slush fund’ for the military and source of political patronage to prop up the military regime.” The Hpakan area has turned into a war zone since the coup, with KIA forces ambushing the Tatmadaw and even capturing some of its outposts, thus making it much less secure to mine for jade there. But, according to reports compiled by Global Witness in 2015 and this year, among those making profits from the jade trade is Kyaing International Gems Company, which is owned in part by Kyaing San Shwe, one of the sons of senior general Than Shwe, Myanmar´s dictator from 1992 to 2011. Meanwhile, Min Aung Hlaing’s son Aung Pyae Sone plays a role in the military’s control of the sale of dynamite in Hpakan, which is needed to extract the jade from the ground. On March 10, Aung Pyae Sone was placed under US sanctions along with his sister, businesswoman Khin Thiri Htet Mon. The survival of SAC hinges on such connections and income, but if it fails to satisfy Tatmadaw leaders other than those in immediate power an internal coup cannot be ruled out. But observers monitoring the Tatmadaw say there is no guarantee that whoever dared to take such a drastic move would have a more liberal outlook than Min Aung Hlaing and his top brass allies. To the contrary, the uncharismatic Min Aung Hlaing is seen by some top soldiers as weak and that even harsher methods are needed to quell the spreading dissent. Any significant split in the Tatmadaw, some suggest, could lead to a full-scale civil war and even greater humanitarian disaster. But whatever happens next in Myanmar’s evolving tragedy, it is becoming increasingly evident that Min Aung Hlaing and his military allies opened a Pandora’s box of disasters when their tanks rolled into Naypyitaw and Yangon on February 1..."
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-27
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Title: Persecution and Politics: Interview with a Rakhine Law Student in Myanmar
Description: "The military coup in Myanmar has destabilized most of the country, but many in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, one of its poorest, see little difference between the old democratic regime and the military dictatorship. The Rakhine, or the Arakanese, have suffered through British and Japanese colonialism, poverty, exploitation, and human rights violations. An 18 month-long internet blackout, political disenfranchisement, violent military crackdowns, a lack of proper humanitarian aid, and poverty have contributed to the apathy felt by many ethnic Rakhines with respect to the new military dictatorship’s destruction of democratic traditions and institutions. Under the pretense of eradicating a local military group known as the Arakan Army which fights for Rakhine self-determination, the Burmese military has devastated the region while the democratic government turned a blind eye. JURIST has interviewed an ethnic Rakhine law student in order to better understand the persecution of ethnic Rhakines in Myanmar and their quest for independence. This interviewee will not be publicly identified due to ongoing security concerns. For more information on the latest developments, please follow our Myanmar coverage. 1) Tell us about the Rakhine people and your traditional home in the Rakhine State. The Rakhine State is a coastal territory in Southeast Asia. It is a mountainous area, bound on the west by Bangladesh. Legend holds hat the history of Rakhine dates back to 6,000 BC during the course of which has included rich cultural and literary traditions, and strong military protection. But the glory came to an end in 1785, after the invasion of the Burmese king. At present, there is a population of more than three million in Rakhine, from seven different ethnic groups, which combined make up the Arakanese, or the people of the Arakan Land. Most of the Rakhines live in Rakhine State, though there are also people of Arakanese descent in various other parts of Myanmar and India. 2) Being Rakhine in Myanmar, have you ever experienced discrimination or improper treatment because of your ethnicity? Historically, we Rakhines sought unity with other ethnic groups within the union of Myanmar. This attitude was reflected by the fact that the Rakhines banded together with other tribes of Myanmar in the anti-colonial fights against the British and Japanese. But ultimately our efforts seemed only to lead to broken promises and exploitation. Over time, we felt strongly that we were not being treated as equals by other parts of Myanmar. This seems to be related to the desire of others to exploit the abundance of natural resources in Rakhine State; geographically speaking, our land has all that it needs to become an economically important region; but most people who aren’t farmers in the region are jobless, and have to go abroad in search for work. Despite its wealth of natural resources, the Rakhine State has, over time, become one of the poorest states in the country, and all of our key sectors, from education, to health, to the economy, are in decline. There is no industry zone and most of the locals are jobless. They have to go elsewhere in the country or abroad in search of jobs. Poverty and illiteracy are proliferating, causing conditions to continue to fall. While the country amasses wealth from our natural gas, many parts of the Rakhine State are lacking in such basic essentials as electricity. The Rakhines feel like they don’t belong in their own country. In recent years, there has also been violence and enormous casualties and other problems in the Rakhine State. In particular, there was an internet blackout in the region, starting in June 2019, that set records because it lasted two whole years. During that time, there were many human rights violations by the military, a lack of information amid the rise of the COVID-19 pandemic, and as most of the country went online for their studies during the health crisis, young Rakhine people lost access to their education because it was impossible to take classes online during that time. The locals felt like they were in a different world compared to the other states of Myanmar. 3) How would you describe the relationship between the Burmese government and the Rakhine people in Arakan State in the two or three years before the military coup? Much of the current trouble started in 2015, when the National League for Democracy (NLD; [ed: Myanmar’s then-ruling party]) Government appointed one of their party delegates, Nyi Pu, as chief minister of the Rakhine State despite what appeared to be a landslide win in local elections for a representative of the Arakan National Party (ANP). In the aftermath, there were many battles between the Arakan Army and the federal military in Rakhine, and the locals had to flee for safety. The Parliament rejected proposals to provide much-needed resources for Rakhine refugees. The NLD Government claimed to be practicing democracy in Myanmar, but from our perspectives, they seemed to be misusing their authority. There were even allegedly personal threats made against government representatives who sought aid for the Rakhine people. These tensions continued into 2017 and 2018, at which point violence escalated and atrocities proliferated. On the 21st of June 2019, internet access was shut down in the Rakhine State, prompting many university students to protest, a lot of whom ultimately faced charges and imprisonment. Between military violence, arrests, and refugee status, so many civilians of the Rakhine State suffered, with no help from the government. In fact, it was worse than that; the NLD Government not only failed to lend a helping hand effectively but also restricted donations and supplies from the organizations saying that they needed to ask for permissions from the authorities first. Another worrying trend included the interrogations and arrests of many young boys who the Burmese military accused of having had connections with the Arakan Army. Reports of torture and even deaths abounded. For instance, a local carpenter, Zaw Win Hlaing, was arrested, and then was beaten so harshly that he developed a kidney condition that killed him. To make matters even worse, many such cases weren’t even reported because of the internet blackout. In July 2019, during a visit to a Rakhine township, [then-State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi] delivered a speech in which she said it was inconsiderate and cowardly to seek change with the use of weapons. While she didn’t mention the Arakan Army by name, it was obvious to the Rakhine People who she was referring to. The speech caused an uproar, locally. The local people felt that as a leader, she should have understood that oppression was the root cause of all of these issues, and she should have properly addressed the underlying problems, not just attempted to cast blame. It later emerged that the [then-] State Counsellor’s administration had ordered the military to “crush” the local Rakhine fighters. Against this backdrop, she praised federal military forces for their efforts in the Rakhine State, while as far as I know she never said a word of sympathy toward the Rakhine refugees. When social media caught wind of all of the troubles in the Rakhine State, our compatriots blamed the Rakhines and the Arakan Army. Since then, there has been a broad feeling of bitterness toward the government and the people of mainland Myanmar. So I think it can be said that the NLD Government was partially to blame for our lacking sense of belonging in our country. 4) How did Rakhine people react to the 2020 elections and the NLD victory? On a whole, the Rakhine people felt the 2020 elections were unfair. Only the residents of four of the 17 towns in the Rakhine State were allowed to vote. While this policy was blamed on armed conflict, things were relatively calm in some of the towns where people were deprived of this right. Furthermore, there was relatively low voter interest in the region compared to the 2015 elections, probably due in part to the sluggish information flow caused by the internet shutdown, and campaign limitations caused by the pandemic. Not to mention the the 2015 elections did not instill confidence that our votes would matter. All that said, I wouldn’t say there was a particularly strong local reaction to the NLD’s 2020 victory in large part because of compromised access to information; between the internet blackout and limited access to news, many people in the Rakhine State didn’t even know so many towns were unable to vote. 5) How do the Rakhine people feel about the military coup? Generally speaking, for the Rakhine People, the military coup doesn’t represent significant change, because the oppression we faced under the NLD Government and the Military were effectively one and the same. To us, it feels like we’re under the same dictatorship, but that’s now being led by a different figure head. 6) Would you support the return to power of Aung San Su Kyi? To be honest, most Rakhines have no interest in the return to power of Aung San Su Kyi due to bitterness over her decision to side with the military during our conflict. In recent years, she has ignored oppression and injustice in our region, opting instead to work with the military. We do hope eventually that Myanmar will end up with a government that prioritizes fairness and equality for people of all ethnicities. 7) What is Arakan Army doing now? Has the regional conflict subsided? The Arakan Army has not faced combat in several months. From what I understand, our regional military leadership has become the de facto authority of the Rakhine State, and is focused for the time being on state-building exercises, related to everything from public health and combating drug abuse, to technology initiatives and so on. 8) What do you hope the future will hold for the Rakhine people? We don’t know what might happen in the future or how long this period of unrest will endure in Myanmar. The Burmese government in exile (National Unity Government; NUG) lacks both the de facto and de jure power to improve matters in the country. We all hope this will be the very last dictatorship our country will endure, and that ultimately, members of all ethnicities will one day be able to celebrate our achievements together. If the revolution is a success and a federalist government is formed, I am optimistic that matters will improve. Furthermore, I have faith that we will continue to seek our independence. 9) Do you think that Rakhine will declare independence? Locals believe that the independence of Arakan fully depends on the Arakan Army, which, as mentioned before, has gained de facto power in some parts of Rakhine, and is thus in control of local administrations, the judiciary and more. And they are acting quickly; in some provinces, they have already implemented their new policies. Of course we believe that if the army gains more and more power, they may consider a declaration of independence, building an independent nation. We hope that if this happens, this secession will take place under good terms with Myanmar. 10) How do you think Rakhine Independence would affect the Rakhine people, Myanmar and Southeast Asia as a whole? Of course there will be growing pains any time a territory secedes from a country it has been a part of for a long time. Of course we may suffer some difficulties because of how intertwined our systems of education, economics and more are with those of mainland Myanmar. But we believe these difficulties will be worth it. Furthermore, we have a lot to offer the the region; we have excellent industrial potential, and a wealth of natural resources, including natural gas, which will help us from an international commerce perspective..."
Source/publisher: JURIST
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-25
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Title: WSU Myanmar students share personal stories amid military coup
Sub-title: Situation in Myanmar worsening following Feb. 1 coup; children being targeted
Description: "WSU Myanmar students and alumni are urging their family back home to stay hopeful as the Myanmar military coup that started on Feb. 1. continues. Thaw Zin Naing Civil engineering major Thaw Zin Naing came to the U.S. in May 2016, in pursuit of a higher education. Now only a year away from graduating, the future of his education is uncertain. Naing said the state of his country greatly affects his mental health and education. Along with the stress of the coup, Naing also lost his father eight days after the conflict started due to unrelated health reasons. His remaining family was forced into hiding because of his mother’s role as a student leader in the 1988 Myanmar uprising. While no longer off the grid, they have been forced to lie low and close their business to keep her identity a secret. Naing is unable to receive money from his family for his tuition as the Myanmar military is currently in control of the nation’s banks. WSU placed a hold on his tuition. But if Naing is unable to pay the fees by this December, he will no longer be a student at WSU. He plans on making a crowdfunding account in the near future to help pay his tuition but is having doubts about whether he can raise the money. Naing stressed that while he and his peers struggle, so many other people in Myanmar are losing their homes and loved ones and need the help even more. He said the lack of media coverage led to an absence of knowledge and aid. “It’s a long fight,” he said. “It’s already been eight months. I just hope they can hang on until the military buries themselves.” Sandi Win Thu A few months ago, Sandi Win Thu’s family found themselves in hiding, on the run and at times under direct gunfire, according to a Daily Evergreen article. Since then, Thu, biological sciences doctoral student, said her family reached some level of safety and she has continuous contact with them. She said the only thing that kept her going the last few months is talking to family every day to make sure they are safe. Thu said this is the second year Myanmar has no schooling available. The nation did not have the same access to virtual opportunities as students in the U.S throughout the pandemic. The military continued to keep schools closed in 2021, leaving many without proper education. Thu is very worried for her younger sister and her education as she continues to miss out on another year of school. She said she wants people back home to keep their heads high and to not lose hope. “I don’t want them to be afraid to go back to the academic way,” Thu said. Thu encourages her peers and the WSU community to help by spreading the word in order to gain support and aid for those fighting in Myanmar. To the people in Myanmar, Thu said she wishes they stay safe, stay healthy and do not lose hope. Wint Mon Mon Kway WSU alumni, Wint Mon Mon Kway, said the military’s control over Myanmar’s health care led to many unnecessary deaths resulting from COVID-19 and other diseases. Medical resources are either extremely limited or expensive leaving many people without options for adequate health care. She said those who have contracted COVID-19 had a difficult time obtaining proper oxygen supply, leading to more deaths. Kway said her country is no longer safe for the youth following the military’s takeover. Children are being targeted, with many being arrested or shot. Kyaw began applying to universities in the U.S. for her brother hoping it will get him away from the crisis. She manages her mental health by ignoring the news. Instead, Kway said she gets her information through her parents to avoid any corrupted media. She tries not to focus too much on the state of Myanmar but is concerned about the possibility of war. For now, Kway said she is focusing on her career first so that she can give back to her country later. Garmanie Kyaw Swar Tun Garmanie Kyaw Swar Tun, senior public relations major, said when the military initially cut off communications, he just kept thinking about the “what ifs.” His parents struggled to fund his education but were able to get some help from friends in the U.S. Tun said half of his friends growing up are brainwashed by the military. While he cut off contact with anyone holding those ideals, his father is unable to do the same. The coup majorly affected the Myanmar economy and the success of his father’s business. In order to continue making an income, Tun’s father is forced to stay in contact with military personnel. Tun said that after months of unrest, people feel they can no longer fight against the daily routine of shootings in the streets and bombings. He said the military’s use of weapons desecrated places that once were considered safe. “Where I used to go out, where I used to play around, where I used to eat,” he said. “We can’t even go out.” Tun said he hopes the coup ends soon and the country returns to what it was before. He wants people to know how beautiful and rich Myanmar can be; the country controlled by the military is not the same he once knew. “Never give up on hope. We’ve been under the military for 60 years and this is our chance to win,” he said. “This is our endgame. Either they win or we win.”..."
Source/publisher: The Daily Evergreen
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-22
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Title: ASEAN delivers medical support for COVID-19 response to the People of Myanmar
Description: " ASEAN, led by its Secretary-General Dato Lim Jock Hoi, handed over USD 1.1 million worth of medical supplies and equipment ready to be distributed by the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) for immediate support to the COVID-19 response, in a handover ceremony held virtually today. The delivery of the first batch of ASEAN’s Humanitarian Assistance in Myanmar was a follow up to the Pledging Conference held on 18 August. The items delivered in this batch were supported by the Governments of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and Temasek Foundation International. In his remarks, Dato Lim Jock Hoi underscored the importance of the initiative to showcase the solidarity in the spirit of ‘One ASEAN, One Response’ to extend a helping hand to the people of Myanmar in the realisation of a people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN Community. He thanked the four donor countries and Temasek Foundation International, and expressed his confidence that the assistance would alleviate the sufferings of the people of Myanmar in this critical time. He further called for other countries to contribute to the humanitarian efforts for Phase 1 urgently and Phase 2 at a later stage. The next batch for Phase 1 is expected to be provided by support from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Singapore and Viet Nam, along with other donor countries and organisations. The Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, Dato Erywan Pehin Yusof, in his recorded remarks further emphasised that COVID-19 pandemic is “the common enemy” that has exposed the vulnerabilities not only of our socio-economic structures, but the fragility of human life. In his remarks, he urged the international community to continue giving support and complement ASEAN’s efforts, further highlighting that the “provision of humanitarian assistance is a true reflection of the “ASEAN Way”, and demonstrates our commitment to help our ASEAN family when they are in need”. The Executive Director of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre), representatives of ASEAN Member States, donor countries and other organisations attended the ceremony. Contributing to the implementation of the “Five Point Consensus” on Myanmar agreed at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in April this year, the ASEAN’s Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar aims to address the most pressing humanitarian needs of the people of Myanmar. The AHA Centre, as the operational lead, facilitates the delivery of assistance. Meanwhile, the MRCS, as a local partner, supports ASEAN by providing last mile distribution of the medical supplies and equipment to the communities in need in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Jakarta)
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-17
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