Political History
Individual Documents
Description:
"1. The Ministry of Defence of the National Unity Government is doing its utmost to establish the military chain of command between the People’s Defence Force and Regional People’s Defence Organisations and to establish a People’s Defence Force that fights for the security and justice of the people and that codes of conduct and rules of engagement are adhered to all the time while undertaking the people’s defensive revolution.
2. The Ministry of Defence is in the process of educating and issuing directives to the People’s Defence Force to avoid targeting the public and mitigate harm by following the code of conduct and rules of engagement and to treat suspects and prisoners humanely and interrogations done lawfully.
3. On 26th November 2021, 6 villagers from La Poh, including Ko Htike Maung and four others were wrongfully executed by members of the Yinmabin People’s Defence Force (YMB-PDF) led by Bo Thanmani. This was reported to the Ministry of Defence as a missing person incident.
4. On 3rd December 2021, the Ministry of Defence decided to form an investigation committee to probe into the Yinmabin missing person incident and a preliminary inquiry was initiated. Then together with specialists in law from the Ministry of Justice, the investigative central committee was expanded to establish a War Crime Investigative Central Commission. This investigative central commission is in the process of investigating not only the Yinmabin case, but all other related incidents and war crimes. Despite difficulties in communication, all efforts are being made to examine all related cases so that those responsible are brought to justice and justice recompensed to those affected.
5. The War Crime Investigative Central Commission filed an interim report to the National Unity Government on 17th March 2022, after a fact-finding official inquiry into Bo Thanmani, leader of the Yinmabin-PDF, 11 members of the families affected and eighth witnesses. The investigation is to continue with further examination of other witnesses and suspects.
6. Facts from the interim report:
(A) Ko Htike Maung and six other villagers from La Poh village were wrongfully killed. The six villagers were from the Hero Tiger PDF group.
(B) The investigation also found that in addition to the 6 villagers, 2 firemen, 1 driver and one young male, who were there to help a wounded fireman were also killed.
(C) The crimes were committed by certain members of the village defence force under the leadership of Yinmabin PDF Bo Thamani.
(D) The preliminary findings are that the incident took place as a result of misunderstanding and grudges held between the two groups.
7. As soon as the investigation is completed by the War Crime Investigative Central Commission, the National Unity Government will take appropriate action upon those who committed the crime. The NUG will not allow any other judgement to the findings of this incident.
8. The National Unity Government supports the essence of the people’s defensive revolution and in so doing will safeguard the security and safety of the people and justice will be brought to bear upon any person or organisation causing harm to the public in accordance with the law.
9. All the People’s Defence Force have a duty to abide by the codes of conduct, rules of engagement and a soldier’s oath of office. They are also all duty bound to avoid harming the citizens..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Political History
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Format :
pdf pdf
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90.79 KB 471.65 KB
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Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့အခါသမယသည် မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ နယ်ချဲ့ဖက်ဆစ်များကို တွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ် နိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအပေါင်း၏ အောင်ပွဲဖြစ်သော (၇၇) နှစ်မြောက် ဖက်ဆစ် တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တိုင်းပြည်လွတ်လပ်ရေးရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အသက်သွေးချွေးများ ဖြင့် ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသော တော်လှန်ရေး ခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် သူရဲကောင်းများအား အောက်မေ့ သတိရဂုဏ်ပြုလျက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံး ရည်မှန်းကြိုးပမ်းနေသည့် ငြိမ်းချမ်း၍ တိုးတက်သော အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို အမြန်ဆုံး ရယူတည်ဆောက် နိုင်ပါစေကြာင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ကူညီရယူပေးနိုင်သည်ဟု ကျူးကျော်ဝင်ရောက်လာသော ဖက်ဆစ် ဂျပန်များအား ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းဦးဆောင်သော ဗမာ့တပ်မတော်၊ နိုင်ငံရေး အင်အားစုများနှင့် ပြည်သူများက တစ်တိုင်းပြည်လုံးအတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် ပါဝင်တော်လှန်တိုက်ထုတ်ခဲ့ကြကာ ထို တော်လှန်ရေးသူရဲကောင်းများအား ဂုဏ်ပြုသောအားဖြင့် ၁၉၄၅ ခုနှစ်မှ စတင်၍ တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ အဖြစ်ကျင်းပခဲ့ကြပြီး ၁၉၅၅ ခုနှစ်တွင်မူ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက ပြည်သူလူထုပါဝင်မှုသမိုင်းကို မှေးမှိန်စေရန် တပ်မတော်နေ့အဖြစ် ပုံဖျက်သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက် ဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ခဲ့သည့် ဗမာ့တပ်မတော်သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တစ်စု၏ အသုံးချခံ အဖွဲ့ အစည်းတစ်ခုအဖြစ် ရောက်ရှိသွားခဲ့ရပြီး နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို အဓမ္မနည်းဖြင့် အကြိမ်ကြိမ် သိမ်းယူခဲ့ကာ တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုးအပေါ် ဗိုလ်ကျစိုးမိုး ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရန် ကြိုးစားခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် နိုင်ငံသည်လည်း ဖွံ့ဖြိုးမှုအနိမ့်ကျဆုံးသော နိုင်ငံအဖြစ် ရောက်ရှိခဲ့ရပါသည်။
၄။ ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် လူသတ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်နှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်လူတစ်စု ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်သည် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒဖြင့် ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရထံမှ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို လက်နက် အားကိုးဖြင့် သိမ်းယူခဲ့ပြီး နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်း၌ ဥပဒေမဲ့ဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ရည်ရွယ် ချက်ရှိရှိ ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိခြင်းကြောင့် ကျောင်းသား၊ လူငယ်၊ အလုပ်သမား၊ လယ်သမားများ အပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက နယ်ချဲ့ဖက်ဆစ်များကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်သည့် နည်းတူ ပြန်လည်ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေရချိန် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ဆယ်စုနှစ် ၇ ခုကျော်ကြာ ၎င်းတို့အာဏာတည်မြဲရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက်သာ ရှေးရှုသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်လူတစ်စုကြောင့် မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်သည် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ယုံကြည် ကိုးစားမှုကို လုံးဝပျက်သုဥ်းသွားပြီဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် စက်ဆုပ်ရွံရှာဖွယ် အကြမ်းဖက် အဖွဲ့အစည်း တစ်ခုသို့ ရောက်ရှိသွားပြီ ဖြစ်ခြင်းကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ် စောင့်ရှောက်ပေးနိုင်မည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုတပ်မတော်ကြီးကို ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်မတော်၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများဖြင့် တည်ထောင်ဖွဲ့စည်းသွားရန် အထူးလိုအပ်နေပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်း ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် မီးမောင်းထိုးပြ လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၆။ နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြာ စစ်တပ်၏ နိုင်ငံနှင့် လူမျိုးအပေါ်၌ လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက် ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကြောင့် အသက်ပေါင်းများစွာ ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရပြီး ယနေ့ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် လည်း ပြည်သူ ၁၇၀၀ ကျော်ကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ၁၂,၉၇၀ ကျော်ကိုလည်း ဥပဒေမဲ့ ဖမ်းဆီး ထိန်းသိမ်းထားလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်း ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကြောင့် ပြည်နယ်နှင့် တိုင်း အသီးသီးရှိ ပြည်သူများသည် အိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာ၍ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်နေရပြီး နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်း ဖြစ်ပွားလျက်ရှိသည့် တိုက်ပွဲများသည် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်၏ ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ခြင်း၏ အကျိုးဆက်ပင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၇။ ယနေ့ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးမှတစ်ဆင့် မိမိတို့မျှော်ရည်မှန်းသည့် အနာဂတ်ပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်ရန်ဆိုသည်မှာ အတ္တကြီးသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ စနစ်ဆိုးအား အမြစ်ပြတ်ခြေမှုန်းပြီးမှသာ ဆက်လက်လျှောက်လမ်းနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယင်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အပြီးတိုင် တွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်း သားပြည်သူတို့က အတူတကွ လက်တွဲကြိုးပမ်းကာ မိမိတို့၏ ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်အား ကြိုးပမ်းတည်ဆောက်သွားရမည့် အချိန် အခါကောင်းပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၈။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ နိုင်ငံရေး/ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများ၊ ထောက်ပို့အင်အားစုများနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတို့အကြား တူညီသော ဆန္ဒကို အခြေခံ၍ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ကျရာကဏ္ဍများတွင် တက်စွမ်းသရွေ့ ကြိုးပမ်း ထမ်းရွက်နေခြင်းကြောင့် ယနေ့တော်လှန်ရေးသည် အတိုင်းအတာတစ်ခုအထိ အောင်မြင်ခဲ့ပြီး ပြင်းပြသော စိတ်ဆန္ဒ၊ ခိုင်မာသော တွဲလက်များဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏ တော်လှန်ရေးအောင်ပွဲဆီသို့ ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းသွားကြပါစို့ဟု လေးနက်စွာ တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤ (၇၇) နှစ်မြောက် ဖက်ဆစ် တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
455.44 KB
more
Description:
"ယနေ့သည် ဖက်ဆစ်တော်လှန်ရေးအောင်လံတော်အောက်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ အားလုံး စုပေါင်းအင်အားဖြင့် လှည်းနေလှေအောင်းမြင်းဇောင်းမကျန် သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်စွာ ဖက်ဆစ်နယ်ချဲ့ စစ်ဝါဒီများအား မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှတွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ်ခဲ့သော ၇၇ နှစ်မြောက်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ အခါသမယဖြစ်သည်။
လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင်လည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းလုံးရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးအပေါ် လက်နက် အားကိုးဖြင့် ဂုတ်သွေးစုတ်အနိုင်ကျင့်ဖိနှိပ်ဗိုလ်ကျနေသော တစ်ကျော့ပြန် ဖက်ဆစ်ဝါဒီ စစ်မိစ္ဆာများကို ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားသွေးချင်းညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများအားလုံး အတူတကွလက်တွဲပြီး နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ခုခံဆန့်ကျင် တွန်းလှန်ကာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိနေချိန်ဖြစ်သည်။
တိုင်းပြည်လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်ပမှ ကျူးကျော်လာသော ဖက်ဆစ်ဂျပန်တို့အား တွန်းလှန် တိုက်ထုတ်ရာ တွင်လည်းကောင်း၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှရေး တို့အတွက် ပြည်တွင်းရှိ ဖက်ဆစ်ဝါဒီ စစ်မိစ္ဆာများကို ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရာ တွင်လည်းကောင်း အသက်ကိုပဓာန မထားဘဲ စွန့်လွှတ်စွန့်စား ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသူများ အားလုံးကို အစဉ်အမြဲ ဦးညွှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုလျက်ရှိသည်။
ဖက်ဆစ်တော်လှန်ရေးကိုဆင်နွှဲရာတွင် ဗမာ့တပ်မတော်တစ်ခုတည်းက ဦးဆောင်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ခြင်း မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများ၊ အရပ်ဖက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ရဟန်းရှင်လူကျောင်းသားပြည်သူများအားလုံး အတူတကွ လက်တွဲ၍ ပူးပေါင်းတော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသဖြင့် ဖက်ဆစ်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ဟု သတ်မှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုနည်းတူ လက်ရှိနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆင်နွှဲရာတွင်လည်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့်အတူ တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ သမဂ္ဂများ၊ အရပ်ဖက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ သပိတ်ကော်မတီများ၊ နယ်ပယ်စုံမှ အသိပညာရှင် အတတ်ပညာရှင်များ၊ အနုပညာရှင်များ၊ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ အားလုံးက ဟန်ချက်ညီညီ ခုခံတော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လျက် ရှိသောကြောင့် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအဖြစ် ကမ္ဘာက အသိအမှတ်ပြုထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်ပွဲရချိန်တွင် မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ ဖက်ဆစ်ဝါဒီ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို အပြီးတိုင် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ရှင်းလင်းဖယ်ရှားနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်သာမက ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီးကို လွတ်လပ်ခြင်း၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းခြင်း၊ တန်းတူညီမျှခြင်း၊ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ခြင်းများဖြင့် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်မည်
ဖြစ်သည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော ၇၇ နှစ်က ဖက်ဆစ်ဂျပန်တို့ကို တစ်မျိုးသားလုံး၏ ညီညွတ်မှုအင်အားဖြင့် အောင်မြင်စွာ တွန်းလှန် တိုက်ခိုက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည့် အမွေခံကောင်းကို ဆက်ခံလျက် ယနေ့အချိန်တွင်လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသား ညီအစ်ကို မောင်နှမ များအားလုံးက ဖက်ဆစ် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်စွာ တွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ်ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
376.13 KB
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Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (PDF)နှင့် ဒေသဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအကြား စစ်ဘက်ကွပ်ကွဲမှု တည်ဆောက်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံစစ်ပွဲ ဆင်နွဲနေစဉ်ကာလအတွင်း စစ်ဘက် စည်းမျဉ်း၊ စည်းကမ်းများနှင့် ကျင့်ဝတ်များလိုက်နာပြီး ပြည်သူတို့၏ ဘဝလုံခြုံမှုနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့အတွက် တော်လှန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေသော ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ ဖြစ်လာစေရေး အားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် တည်ဆောက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၂။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များအား အရပ်ဘက်ပစ်မှတ်များနှင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ ထိခိုက်နစ်နာစေမည့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို ရှောင်ရှားကြရန်နှင့် အကျဉ်းသားများ၊ သံသယရှိသူများကို စစ်ဘက် စည်းမျဉ်း၊ စည်းကမ်းများ၊ အရပ်ဘက်ဥပဒေများနှင့်အညီ စစ်မေးထိန်းသိမ်းကြရန် ပညာပေးခြင်း၊ ညွှန်ကြားချက်များ ထုတ်ပြန် လိုက်နာစေခြင်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၃။ (၂၆.၁၁.၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ဒေသကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့တစ်ခုဖြစ်သည့် ဗိုလ်သံမဏိ ဦးဆောင်သော ယင်းမာပင် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ဝင် အချို့က ကိုထိုက်မောင်အပါအဝင် လာပို့ကျေးရွာသား (၆) ဦးနှင့် အခြား (၄) ဦးအား မှားယွင်းစီရင်ခဲ့သော မှုခင်းတစ်ရပ်ပေါ်ပေါက်ခဲ့ပြီး ယင်းကိစ္စအတွက် လူပျောက်မှုအဖြစ် ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနထံ တိုင်ကြားမှုကို လက်ခံရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။
၄။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ယင်းမာပင် လူပျောက်တိုင်ကြားမှုအတွက် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ (၃) ရက်နေ့ တွင် စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး ကော်မရှင်တစ်ရပ် ဖွဲ့စည်းရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ကနဦးစုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ထို့နောက် စစ်ရေးပြစ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး ဗဟိုကော်မရှင် တစ်ရပ်အား တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ ဥပဒေပညာရှင်များဖြင့်ပေါင်းစပ်၍ တိုးချဲ့ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည်။ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး ဗဟိုကော်မရှင်သည် အထက်ဖော်ပြပါ ယင်းမာပင်အမှုအပါအဝင် ဆက်စပ်အမှုများ၊ စစ်ရေးပြစ်မှုများအား ဆက်သွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခက်အခဲများစွာကြားမှ ကြိုးပမ်း၍ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးပြီး တာဝန်ရှိသူများ၊ ကျူးလွန်သူများအား အရေးယူနိုင်စေရန်နှင့် နစ်နာသူများအား တရားမျှတမှု ခံစားရရှိနိုင်စေရန် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၅။ စစ်ရေးပြစ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး ဗဟိုကော်မရှင်သည် ပျောက်ဆုံးနေ သူများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ယင်းမာပင်ပြည့်သူကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ ခေါင်းဆောင် ဗိုလ်သံမဏိ၊ နစ်နာသူမိသားစုဝင် (၁၁)ဦးနှင့် အခြားသက်သေ (၈) ဦးကို စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးခဲ့ပြီး ကြားဖြတ်အစီရင်ခံစာနှင့် သုံးသပ်တွေ့ရှိချက်များအား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသို့ (၁၇.၃.၂၀၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် အစီရင်ခံတင်ပြခဲ့သည်။ ကျန်ရှိနေသေးသော သံသယရှိသူများ နှင့် သက်သေများကိုလည်း စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုပြုလုပ်ရန် ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၆။ ကြားဖြတ်အစီရင်ခံစာနှင့် သုံးသပ်တွေ့ရှိချက်များအရ
(က) လာဘို့ရွာမှ ကိုထိုက်မောင်အပါအဝင် ကျေးရွာသား (၆) ဦးကို မှားယွင်းစွပ်စွဲ သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး အဆိုပါ (၆) ဦးမှာ Hero Tiger PDF အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ ဖြစ်သည်ဟု သိရှိရသည်။
(ခ) အဆိုပါ ကျေးရွာသား (၆) ဦးအပြင် မီးသတ်ရဲဘော် (၂) ဦး၊ ကားမောင်းသူ (၁) ဦးနှင့် ခြေထောက်ဒဏ်ရာရနေသော မီးသတ်ရဲဘော်အား ကူညီရန် လိုက်ပါလာသည့် လူငယ်တစ်ဦး တို့လည်း သတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရသည်ဟု စစ်ဆေးတွေ့ရှိရသည်။
(ဂ) ဤသတ်ဖြတ်မှုကို ယင်းမာပင်ဒေသ ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ ခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးဖြစ်သော ဗိုလ်သံမဏိ၏ လက်အောက်ခံ ကျေးရွာကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ဝင်အချို့က ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု စိစစ်တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
(ဃ) ဤအမှုအခင်းသည် ဒေသခံကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ (၂) ဖွဲ့အကြား နားလည်မှုလွဲမှား အငြိုးအတေးထားမှုများကို အကြောင်းပြု သည်ဟု ကနဦး စီစစ်တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၇။ စစ်ရေးပြစ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးဗဟိုကော်မရှင်၏ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုပြီးစီးသည်နှင့် ပြစ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူများအား လိုအပ်သော အရေးယူမှုများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းသို့ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေး အရေးယူမှုများကို နာခံခြင်းမရှိဘဲ မိမိတို့ စိတ်တိုင်းကျစီရင်မှုများကို လုံးဝခွင့်ပြုမည် မဟုတ်ပါ ။
၈။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် တရားသဖြင့်တော်လှန်သော ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်၏ အနှစ်သာရဖြစ်သည့် ပြည်သူတို့၏ ဘဝလုံခြုံမှုနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုကို ရှေးရှု၍ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများကို ထိခိုက်မှု မရှိစေရန်အလို့ငှာ ပြစ်မှုကျူးလွန်သည့် မည်သည့်အဖွဲ့အစည်း၊ မည်သည့်ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ကိုမဆို ဥပဒေများနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၉။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် စစ်ဘက်ဆိုင်ရာကျင့်ဝတ်များ၊ စစ်ပွဲဆိုင်ရာစည်းမျဉ်းများ၊ စစ်သည်တော် ကျင့်ဝတ် စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းများနှင့် သစ္စာအဓိဌာန်(၄)ချက်ကို လိုက်နာကြရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုအား ထိခိုက်စေ သည့် မည်သည့်လုပ်ရပ်မျိုးကိုမဆို ရှောင်ရှားကြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-26
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2022-03-26
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"In the early years of Myanmar’s independence, March 27 was called Resistance Day. It was held to commemorate the day in 1945 when Aung San and the soldiers of his Burma National Army turned their guns against their former Japanese allies. But perhaps in an attempt to honor the military and not offend the Japanese, it was in the mid-1950s changed to Resistance Day (Armed Forces Day), a name that was retained until the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, when it became Armed Forces Day (Resistance Day) and, under the rule of former dictator General Than Shwe, only Armed Forces Day. The crucial event in 1945 was mentioned only in passing, and, when the celebrations were held for the first time in the new capital Naypyitaw on March 27, 2006, columns of soldiers marched past newly erected, larger than life statues of the three most prominent warrior kings in Myanmar history: Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya.
That those dead kings are a living force was clear from the speech Than Shwe delivered on that day: “Our Tatmadaw [armed forces] should be a worthy heir to the traditions of the capable tatmadaws established by the noble kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya.” Democratic reforms were certainly not on his mind, a fact reflected in the name of the new capital. “Naypyitaw” means “capital” or “place of a king” in old-fashioned usage. Even “tatmadaw” literally means “royal force.”
Anawratha was the founder of the first Burmese, or Myanmar, Empire in 1044 AD, while Bayinnaung was the country’s most celebrated warrior king. During his reign, which lasted from 1551 to 1581, he conquered most of the Irrawaddy plain, parts of the Shan plateau and territories as far east as Chiang Mai in present day Thailand. Alaungpaya reigned in the 18th century and was the first king of the Konbaung Dynasty, the third and the last of the Myanmar empires. Myanmar’s military rulers have never explained why the date March 27 would bind those three kings together, but today, the armed forces as an institution, not any past resistance against the Japanese occupiers, is what matters. It could be equally important to maintain a blemish-free relationship with the Japanese right wing, which in the post-independence era—and especially after the 1962 coup—has had cordial ties with the Myanmar military.
In 1954, Myanmar signed a peace treaty with Japan and, as part of the agreement, Tokyo agreed to pay US$200 million in war reparations as well as an annual grant of US$5 million for technical assistance. That assistance continued even after democracy was abolished in 1962 and replaced by military rule. Given the economic decline that followed General Ne Win’s 1962 coup and the introduction of the so-called “Burmese [Myanmar] Way to Socialism”, many scholars argue that the Ne Win regime would have folded without it.
Tokyo’s willingness to continue economic assistance to Myanmar could be attributed to the influence of an informal lobby in Japan. For many years, it was led by Nobusuke Kishi, prime minister from 1957-60, and his private secretary and son-in-law, Shintaro Abe, foreign minister from 1983-86. Shintaro Abe’s son, Shinzo Abe, was prime minister from 2006-07 and again from 2012-20.
Another influential Japanese belonging to the Myanmar Lobby was Tadashi Ohtaka, Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar from 1987-90 and whose wife served as chairperson of the Japan-Burma Association (now renamed the Japan-Myanmar Association). During his tenure as ambassador, Ohtaka was the only diplomat given regular access to the then dictator, Ne Win. The Japan-Burma Association counted among its members 11 Japanese trading companies allowed to operate in Yangon and various companies involved in aid projects in the country.
Following years of economic decline, Myanmar’s economy took a slight turn for the better in the 1970s because of rapid expansion in agriculture and increased foreign assistance, mainly from Japan. Myanmar was the eighth-largest recipient of Japanese aid in the 1960s; by 1980, it had become the fourth-largest. Japanese aid peaked at US$244 million, or 6.3 percent of all Japanese overseas assistance. With Japanese aid pouring in for civilian projects, the dictatorship could spend more money and resources on building up the armed forces. By the time of the 1962 coup, there were about 100,000 soldiers under Ne Win’s command. In the 1980s, the number had increased to approximately 190,000. More indigenous defense industries were established, and new weapons were produced with assistance from Fritz Werner, a German company.
By the mid-1980s, a new economic crisis was looming in Myanmar. Japanese aid had kept the country afloat, but, in the end, it failed to revitalize inefficient, state-run enterprises. Worse, Myanmar’s foreign-debt level went through the ceiling. In March 1988, the Japanese decided that economic pragmatism had to take precedence over longstanding personal ties. Tun Tin, then minister of planning and finance, was told during a visit to Tokyo that Japan would reconsider its relations with Myanmar unless fundamental economic reforms were instituted. That was the first time the Japanese unilaterally demanded policy changes on the part of an aid recipient, underlining the importance Tokyo placed on its special relationship with the Myanmar government.
Japan’s new policy on aid, cut off months later in response to the killing of thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators, apparently rocked Myanmar’s generals. Japanese pressure is widely believed to be the main influence behind the then junta’s decision to scrap the “Burmese Way to Socialism” and adopt more market-friendly policies. The opportunity to restore relations came at the time of Emperor Hirohito’s funeral in February 1989. According to Myanmar expert David Steinberg: “In order to avoid having the Burmese sit beside unrecognized delegations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, a decision was made on Feb. 17 to recognize the new [military] government.”
That also opened the floodgates for more Japanese involvement. Western sanctions and boycotts had left a vacuum filled by China, which much to Tokyo’s chagrin replaced Japan as Myanmar’s closest foreign ally. In May 1990, the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s First Southeast Asia Division, Maraharu Kohno, stunned Myanmar’s pro-democracy activists and exiles in Japan by saying at a lecture in Tokyo, “Can we automatically equate military rule with human-rights repression?…I’m not sure [in any case] that repression of human rights in Myanmar is as extensive as reported in the West…because Myanmar has not yet reached the stage of democracy. National security should come first.” Japan may have refrained from funding new aid schemes, but it allowed old ones to continue and support was also provided through UN projects in the country. In 2003, the Japanese even invited Myanmar’s military intelligence chief-turned-prime minister, General Khin Nyunt, to attend the Japan-ASEAN Summit in Tokyo.
No real change took place until after the 2010 election and ex-General Thein Sein’s appointment as president in February 2011. Japan along with Western countries normalized relations with Myanmar. The informal Myanmar Lobby went to work again, and a key person all along has been Yohei Sasakawa. In 2013, the then Shinzo Abe government appointed him Special Envoy of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar, a post he has retained even after Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s ill-fated attempt to seize power on Feb. 1 last year.
Sasakawa is the son of Ryoichi Sasakawa, once a far-right politician who flew to Italy in 1939 to meet his personal hero, Benito Mussolini. Years later, he expressed regret about not meeting another European leader at that time: “Hitler sent me a cable asking me to wait for him, but unfortunately I didn’t have time.” Ryoichi Sasakawa was imprisoned by the Americans after World War II, but released in 1948 when the occupiers needed the extreme right to counter Japan’s leftist movement.
In the 1950s, Ryoichi Sasakawa managed to secure a monopoly on the only legally permitted gambling in Japan: motorboat racing. As a result, he became immensely wealthy, continued to back extreme right-wing causes, and built up a charity, now called the Nippon Foundation, which gave vast amounts of money to the World Health Organization to help eradicate leprosy. The once-Class A War Criminal in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo became a philanthropist and passed away in 1995 at the age of 96. By then, his son Yohei, after serving as chairman of the Japan Motorboat Racing Association, had become president of the Nippon Foundation.
The Nippon Foundation has been involved in several, largely unsuccessful, attempts to get some kind of peace process going between the military and Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organizations while the Japanese government has cultivated links with the military top brass. In October 2019, Min Aung Hlaing visited Japan at the invitation of Japan’s Ministry of Defense. Japan also initiated a program in which cadets from Myanmar receive combat training, which continues even after last year’s military intervention. On March 20 last year, Human Rights Watch said in a statement: “It’s mind boggling that Japan is providing military training to Myanmar cadets at the same time as its armed forces are committing crimes against humanity against Myanmar’s people.” A spokesman for the Japanese Ministry of Defense, however, told Reuters that any move to cut the partnership with Myanmar’s military could result in China winning more clout. Shinzo Abe is no longer Japan’s prime minister but his younger brother, and Nobusuke Kishi’s grandson, Nobuo Kishi, currently serves as minister of defense.
In December 2021, the 87-year-old former cabinet minister and chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Association, Hideo Watanabe, who once campaigned to bring billions of dollars of investment from some of Japan’s leading companies to Myanmar, urged Tokyo to endorse the new military regime. He caused an even bigger outrage than the Defense Ministry spokesman by saying that Min Aung Hlaing has “grown fantastically as a human being,” while praising his “democratization efforts.”
Watanabe’s son Yusuke Watanabe managed on May 26 last year to get an opinion piece published by the website The Diplomat in which he argued that “Japan must position itself as a bridge between the Tatmadaw and the United States and other democratic countries rather than blindly aligning itself with the Western policy of regime change… Leveraging its decades-long economic cooperation, Japan can now directly work with the Tatmadaw to reverse China’s geoeconomic influence.” He also wrote that he is one of the few foreigners who is “in constant contact with Myanmar’s current de facto leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing…my enduring engagement with him underscores Japan’s near century-long special relationship with Myanmar.”
That “special relationship”—when it comes to aid, investment and involvement in the so-called peace process—has so far resulted in little more than making sure that the Myanmar military remains firmly entrenched in power. Than Shwe and now Min Aung Hlaing may conveniently forget to dwell on the anti-Japanese resistance in 1945 and, instead, praise the old warrior kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya, because they know full well that it is the Japanese far-right that since 1962 has been a main benefactor and supporter of continuous military rule in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-25
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Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Military History
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-24
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-23
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
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2022-03-21
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"Today marks the 34th anniversary of Chin Revolution Day, a day on which we honour the bravery of those Chin who fought for their self-determination and national rights, for the dream of freedom and federal democracy. Today also marks the formation of the Chin National Front/Army (CNF/A) in 1988.
The Chin people have been fighting for their rights since the British colonial period. Following independence, Chin people participated in democratic government which was tragically taken from them and all of Myanmar when the dictator Ne Win staged his coup in 1962 and seized power from the democratically elected federal government. Ever since then, the Chin, a major ethnic group in Myanmar, and overwhelmingly Christian, have been subject to widespread ethnic and religious persecution. The continuous oppression, abuse and attacks on the Chin people are predominantly committed by Myanmar military and police, who frequently violate the rule of law. Chin people are often subjected to forced labor, arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings – crimes whose perpetrators are never brought to justice. This has resulted in a mass of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, especially India. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has conducted several interviews with refugees from Chin to document the abuse which has taken place in Chin state by the military. It is due to this ongoing abuse and torture, that the CNF and its armed branch, the Chin National Army (CNA), were first formed and gained momentum during the 8888 uprising. And the fight against the fascist military continues till today, in which Chin people have shown their determination and willingness through CNF/A, Civil Disobedient Movement (CDM), several local Chinland Defense Forces (CDF)to carry the fight through to the end, never giving up on the dreams of self- determination, freedom and federal democracy.
Our Chin brethren, together with all other Myanmar people, share our mutual goal of achieving true self-determination and federal democracy by eradication of the genocidal military and repressive dictatorships. We must stay united and fight until we can rip out the genocidal military and their fascism root and stem. To my fellow Chin brothers and sisters, I want to thank you all for your bravery and I want to send my sincere wish that the sufferings of Chin people will end with the fall of the genocidal military, and that we will achieve the future Myanmar where true self-determination, freedom and federal democracy awaits us.
May God bless Chinland, May God bless Myanmar and May God bless Ukraine..."
Source/publisher:
Dr. Sasa via Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Chin history, Political History, Anti-coup protesters, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-20
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"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦး (Chin National Front) ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ခြင်း ၃၄ နှစ် မြောက်နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်အချိန်အခါသာမယတွင် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးမှ ရဲဘော်၊ ရဲဘက်များအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ် နှစ်ဖြာကျန်းမာလုံခြုံကြပါစေကြောင်းဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းရင်း နှုတ်ခွန်းဆက်သအပ်ပါသည်။ ၁၉၈၈ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ ၂၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် စတင်ခဲ့သည့် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်သည့်နေ့သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ်ပပျောက်ရေး၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုဆိုင်ရာ ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အမှတ်သညာနေ့ရက်လည်းဖြစ်ပေသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁၂ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၌ ပါဝင်လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့သည့် လွတ်လပ်သည့် ချင်းတောင်တန်းဒေသသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးရရှိလာသည့်အခါ ပြည်ထောင်စုအဖွဲ့ဝင် ချင်းဝိသေသ တိုင်းအဖြစ် ပါဝင်လာခဲ့သည်။ သို့ရာတွင် ၁၉၅၈ ခုနှစ်တွင် အိမ်စောင့်အစိုးရပေါ်ပေါက်လာခြင်း၊ ၁၉၆၂ ခုနှစ် တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို တပ်မတော်မှသိမ်းပိုက်ရယူလိုက်ခြင်းနှင့် ၁၉၉၀ ပြည့်နှစ် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလာဒ်ကို တပ်မတော်မှ ငြင်းပယ်လိုက်ခြင်းစသည်တို့ကြောင့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများအပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံ ထူထောင်ရေးရည်မှန်းချက်သည်လည်း မှေးမှိန်ပျောက်ကွယ်သွားခဲ့ရသည်။
၃။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် တပ်မတော်ကနိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို ထပ်မံလုယူလိုက်သည်သာမက အာဏာသိမ်းယူမှုကို အကြမ်းမဖက်ဆန့်ကျင်ကြသည့် နိုင်ငံသူ၊ နိုင်ငံသား တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအား အကြမ်းဖက်နှိမ်နင်းခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူများ၏အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို လုယူဖျက် ဆီးခြင်း၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းစသည်တို့ကိုပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိရာ ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးသည် ပြည်သူ နှင့်အတူရပ်တည်၍ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီကို ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ခြင်းတွင် ပါဝင်ဦးဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည်ကိုတွေ့ရှိရ၍ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများကိုယ်စား များစွာကျေးဇူးတင်ဂုဏ်ယူလျက်ရှိကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုသည်။
၄။ ဤ (၃၄) နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးအား ခေါင်းဆောင်မှု
ပေးခဲ့ကြသည့် အဆက်ဆက် သောခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့်တကွ (၃၄) နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦး၏ဦးဆောင်မှုအောက်တွင် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်အသက်ပေးတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ချင်းအမျိုးသမီး၊ အမျိုးသားများအားလုံးကို ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ဦးညွတ်အလေးအမြတ်ပြုပါကြောင်းဖော်ပြရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
340.63 KB
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Description:
"၁။ အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်ကို ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ရင်းဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိသည့် ချင်းပြည်ထောင် တည်ထောင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးတို့အတွက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးကို ဖွဲ့စည်း၍ လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေး စတင်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ (၃၄) နှစ် တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူများ မျှော်မှန်း တောင့်တနေသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံးတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ပါစေ ကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ဘာသာစကားပေါကြွယ်ဝကာ သူ့ကျွန်မခံလိုသည့်စိတ်ဓာတ်၊ နယ်ချဲ့ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး စိတ်ဓာတ်နှင့် အမျိုးသားရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်တို့ ပြည့်ဝသော ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများသည် မိမိ တို့၏ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ တော်လှန်ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်များအတွက် အသက်ပေါင်းများစွာ ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ ကြရပါသည်။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်သော ဒီမိုကရေစီတိုက်ပွဲများအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသော ချင်း တိုင်းရင်းသားသူရဲကောင်းများအား လေးစားစွာ ဦးညွတ်ကြောင်း ယနေ့တွင် ထပ်မံပြောကြား လိုပါသည်။
၃။ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ၊ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ လူမဆန်သည့် လုပ်ရပ်များဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အာဏာကို မတရားသိမ်း ယူခဲ့ကြသည့်အတွက် တနိုင်ငံလုံးတွင် စစ်တလင်းပြင် ဖြစ်ခဲ့ရပြီး တော်လှန်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ် နိုးကြွားသော ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ထိခိုက်မှုအများဆုံးဖြစ်ခဲ့ပြီး ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့သည်လည်း ဥပဒေမဲ့ ဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်ခံနေရခြင်း၊ နေအိမ်နှင့် ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုတို့ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့နေခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် ဘေးလွတ်ရာသို့ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ရင်း အခက်အခဲများစွာဖြင့် ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့နေရပါသည်။
၄။ ထိုကဲ့သို့သော အခက်အခဲ၊ ဒုက္ခများစွာဖြင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေကြရသော်လည်း စစ်အာဏာရှင် ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးအတွက် တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဦးတွင် ရဲရင့်ပြင်းပြသော စိတ်ဓာတ်၊ ခိုင်မာသော ယုံကြည်ချက်၊ ဖြောင့်မတ်သော ဦးတည်ချက်များဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းကသာမက ကမ္ဘာ့ကပါ ယုံကြည်လေးစားစွာ အားပေးထောက်ခံခြင်း ရရှိထားနိုင်သည်အထိ ကြိုးစားလျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင် ခဲ့သည့် နိုင်ငံရေး၊ တော်လှန်ရေးဦးဆောင်သူများနှင့် ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတို့၏ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုအား လေးစားစွာ အသိအမှတ်ပြု ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ (၃၄) နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ ပြည်သူ များအားလုံး အတူတကွ လက်တွဲကာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏အဓိက ရည်မှန်းချက်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ကျဆုံးရေးကို ကြိုးစားဆောင်ရွက်ကြရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူ အားလုံးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်တို့ အာမခံချက်ရှိသည့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံးအကောင်အထည်ဖော် တည်ဆောက် ကြပါစို့ဟု အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History, Chin history
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
235.59 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ(၂၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၃၄) နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ သို့ ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့တို့၏ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုမှ လွတ်မြောက်သည့်အခါ တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး အေးအတူ ပူအမျှ၊ တန်းတူညီမျှ ၊ အတူတကွ စုပေါင်းနေထိုင်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုတစ်ခု တည်ထောင်ကြရန် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်တွင် အခြားတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ ပါဝင်လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့သော်လည်း ပင်လုံ စာချုပ်၏ အနှစ်သာရများဖြစ်သော အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေး၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကြမ္မာကိုယ် ဖန်တီးပိုင်ခွင့်များကို ငြင်းပယ်ခံခဲ့ရသည့်အတွက် ၁၉၈၈ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ(၂၀)ရက် နေ့တွင် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦး (CNF/CNA)ကို တည်ထောင်လျက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ထောင်ရေး၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာ ကိုယ်ဖန်တီးခွင့် ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်ဖြင့် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတို့၏ တော်လှန်စစ် ကို ညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် စတင်ဆင်နွှဲခဲ့ကြကာ အဆိုပါ နေ့ရက်ကို အထိမ်းအမှတ် ပြုလျက် “ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့” အဖြစ် ဂုဏ်ပြုသတ်မှတ် ထားခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ထောင်ရေး ရည်မှန်းသော နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး ကာလအထိ တော်လှန်ရေးအဆက်ဆက် တွင် ဦးဆောင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့သော ချင်းပြည်နယ် အမျိုးသား၊ အမျိုးသမီးများ၊ ချင်းခေါင်းဆောင်များ အပေါင်းအား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၃၄) နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့၌ ဦးညွှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုလိုက်ပါသည်။
၄။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ဆီသို့ မျှော်ရည်လျက် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံ တွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို ဆင်နွှဲရာတွင် ချင်းအမျိုးသာတပ်ဦး/ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်မတော် (CNF/CNA) နှင့် ချင်းပြည်သူများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့ (EROs)များနှင့် လက်တွဲလျက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ချုပ်ငြိမ်း သည်အထိ အတူတကွ ပူးပေါင်း၍ ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ ဆက်လက်ပါဝင် ထမ်းရွက် လိမ့်မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်ပါကြောင်း နှင့် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတို့၏ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ကို ဤသဝဏ်လွှာဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ပြု အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-20
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236.24 KB
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-19
Grouping:
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Format :
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Size:
598.99 KB
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့် သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
713.63 KB
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
358.01 KB
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Description:
"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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Format :
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389.01 KB
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Description:
"(၁) ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ(၁၆)ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော (၇၃)ကြိမ်မြောက် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပါးအပ်ပါသည်။
(၂) ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားများသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ(NUG)၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံ ကောင်စီ(NUCC)၊ အခြားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပနိုင်ငံအသီးသီးရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံတို့နှင့်အတူ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေးတွင် တစိုက်မတ်မတ် ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည့်အတွက် များစွာဝမ်းမြောက်မိပါသည်။
(၃) ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ယနေ့နိုင်ငံသားအားလုံး တွေ့ကြုံခံစားနေရသည့် အကျပ်အတည်းပေါင်းစုံကို ပအိုဝ်းညီကို၊မောင်နှစ်မများနှင့်အတူ လက်တွဲညီညီ ရင်ဆိုင်ဖြတ်ကျော်သွားနိုင်မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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145.34 KB
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"၁။ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် ထူးခြားသော သမိုင်းအစဉ်အလာကို အကြောင်းပြု၍ ကျေးဇူး တရားကို ဖော်ညွှန်းရန် ကျင်းပသည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ အခါသမယတွင် ညီနောင် ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်တကွ နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းမှီတင်းနေထိုင်ကြသော တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူအပေါင်း ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အပေါင်းမှ ကင်းဝေး၍ ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ပါး ကျန်းမာရွှင်လန်းပါစေ ကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။လွန်ခဲ့သောနှစ်ပေါင်း (၂၅၀၀) ကျော်က ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့၏ ဂုဏ်ကို မြှင့်တင် ပေးခဲ့ပြီး တောက်ပသော ခေတ်ကာလအနာဂတ်ကို ဖန်တီးပေးခဲ့သည့် သူရိယစန္ဒာမင်း၏ ကျေးဇူး တရားကို ဖော်ညွှန်းရန် ထိုမင်း၏မွေးနေ့ဖြစ်သည့် တပေါင်းလပြည့်နေ့ကို ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ရန် တောင်းဆိုခဲ့ကြပြီး လွတ်လပ်ရေးရပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားတို့၏ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်အဖြစ် စတင်ကျင်းပလာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ (၇၃) နှစ်တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများသည် ကိုယ်ပိုင်စာပေ၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှု၊ ရိုးရာဓလေ့များ ပိုင်ဆိုင် ထားပြီး ဘာသာတရားကို အထူးအလေးထားသော လူမျိုးများဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသား ခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုတွင် စိတ်အားထက်သန်စွာ ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြပြီး ပင်လုံ စာချုပ် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးရာတွင် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်၊ သထုံစော်ဘွား ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဦးဖြူသည် ပအိုဝ်း တိုင်းရင်းသားများ ကိုယ်စား ပါဝင်ရေးထိုးခဲ့ပါသည်။
၄။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်တစ်စုသည် မတရားသဖြင့် လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ နိုင်ငံ တော်၏ အာဏာကို သိမ်းယူခဲ့ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတို့အား ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ဖမ်းဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ တစ်နှစ်ကျော်ကာလသို့ ရောက်ရှိလာခဲ့ပြီး နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းတွင် ဆိုးဝါးသော အခြေအနေများ တွေ့ကြုံခံစားနေကြရပါသည်။ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်တွန်းလှန်ရေးတွင် ကျရာတာဝန်များ ထမ်းဆောင်ရင်း တက်ကြွစွာ ပါဝင်အား ဖြည့်လျက်ရှိသည့် ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်း သားတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍကို လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူစွာ တန်ဖိုးထားပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြာ တိုင်းပြည်အား လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်အာဏာ ရှင်များကြောင့် တိုင်းပြည်သည် အဖက်ဖက်မှ ယိုးယွင်းပျက်စီးခဲ့ရပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူ တို့သည်လည်း စီးပွားရေး၊ လူမှုရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေး စသည့်တို့တွင် ဆင်းရဲကြီးစွာ ခံစားခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ယနေ့အချိန်သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များအား အပြီးတိုင် တိုက်ထုတ်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ အတွက် တန်းတူ ညီမျှခြင်းနှင့် ဟန်ချက်ညီသော လူမှုအသိုက်အဝန်းအတွက် အာမခံချက်ရှိသော အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး အတူတကွ လက်တွဲညီစွာ ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် အချိန်အခါကောင်းပင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၆။ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၃) နှစ်မြောက် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ ဦီးတည်ချက်များမှ တဆင့် ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအားလုံးက အတူတကွ လက်တွဲကာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ကျဆုံးရေးနှင့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် တူညီသော ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် ဘုံပန်းတိုင်ဆီသို့ ကြိုးစားချီတက် ရှေ့ဆက်ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် ၇၃ နှစ်မြောက် မူးနီခို ပအိုဝ်း (ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့) အချိန်အခါသာမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ၌ရောက်ရှိနေထိုင်နေကြသော ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသမီး၊ အမျိုးသားများအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာလုံခြုံ၍ ဘေးရန်အပေါင်းမှကင်းကွာကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလိုက်ပါသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် မတ်လတွင် ဖလပလအစိုးရ၏ မြေယာခွဲဝေရေးမူဝါဒကို လက်မခံနိုင်ကြသော သထုံဒေသရှိ ပအိုဝ်း လယ်သမားတစ်သောင်းကျော်သည် ပအိုဝ်းတောင်သူအဖွဲ့ချုပ်၏ဦးဆောင်မှုအောက်၌ သထုံမြို့ ရေကျော်ဘုန်းကြီး ကျောင်းတွင် လူထုစည်းဝေးကြီးတစ်ရပ်ကျင်းပခဲ့သည်။ ယင်းစည်းဝေးကြီးတွင် မြေယာခွဲဝေရေးမူဝါဒကို ပြန်လည် ရုပ်သိမ်းပေးရေးအပါအဝင် မိမိတို့လူမျိုးအမည်ကို “တောင်သူ” ဟု ခေါ်ဆိုရေးသားခြင်း မပြုဘဲ “ပအိုဝ်း” ဟုသာ ခေါ်ဆိုရေးသားပေးရန်တောင်းဆိုခဲ့ကြသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ၁၉၄၉ ခုနှစ်ကစပြီး တပေါင်းလပြည့်နေ့တွင် ပအိုဝ်းလူမျိုးများ ကျင်းပလေ့ရှိသည့် ကောက်သစ်ပူဇော်ပွဲနေ့ကို ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ်ပြောင်းလဲကျင်းပရန်ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့သည်။
၃။ ပအိုဝ်းလူမျိုးများသည် လွန်ခဲ့သည့်နှစ် ၃၀၀၀ ဝန်းကျင် (ဘီစီ ၁၀၀၀ ဝန်းကျင်ကတည်းကပင်) မျက်မှောက် ခေတ် မွန်ပြည်နယ်၊ သထုံဒေသ၌အခြေချနေထိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ဌာနေတိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးဖြစ်သည်။ နှစ်သုံးထောင် ကြာဖြတ်သန်းလာခဲ့သည့် သမိုင်းတစ်လျှောက် နိုင်ငံရေးအရ ချိုခြင်း၊ ခါးခြင်းအစရှိသည့် အတွေ့အကြုံပေါင်း မြောက်များစွာကို ရင်ဆိုင်ခဲ့ကြပေမည်။ ထို့အတူ နှစ်ပေါင်းသုံးထောင်ကြာ နိုင်ငံရေးအခင်းအကျင်းမျိုးစုံအောက် တွင် ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံဖြတ်သန်းလာခဲ့သည့် ပအိုဝ်းလူမျိုးများ၏ ကြံ့ခိုင်မှုနှင့် ဇွဲလုံ့လများကို ချီးကျူးဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပေသည်။
၄။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် တပ်မတော်က နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို ထပ်မံလုယူသိမ်းပိုက်ရန် ကြိုးစား လာခဲ့သောအခါ ပအိုဝ်းလူမျိုးများစွာက လက်မခံဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ယခုအခါ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှကို ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသားဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်လိုကြသည့် ပအိုဝ်းအင်အားစုများအနေဖြင့် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားဖက်ဒရယ်ကောင်စီ (Pa-O National Federal Council) ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုအောက်၌ အတူတကွစုစည်းပြီး၊ လက်တွေ့ကျသည့်နိုင်ငံရေးအခင်းအကျင်းထဲသို့ ဝင်ရောက်ဆင်နွဲနေကြသည်ကိုတွေ့ရှိရသည့်အတွက်လည်း များစွာဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူမိပါသည်။
၅။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် ၇၃ နှစ်မြောက် “မူးနီခိုပအိုဝ်း” (ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့) မှစ၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး၊ စစ်မှန်သောဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ပအိုဝ်း အမျိုးသမီး၊ အမျိုးသားများပါဝင်ဆင်နွဲနေကြသောလွတ်မြောက်ရေးကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ လျင်မြန်စွာ ပြီးမြောက်အောင်မြင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Political History
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Format :
pdf
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370.22 KB
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
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Size:
97.92 KB
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
662.11 KB
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"၁။ စစ်ရေးပြစ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး ဗဟိုကော်မရှင်သည် လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပွားနေသော စစ်ဘက်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအား စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးလျက်ရှိပြီး ပြစ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူများကို ဖော်ထုတ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိသည်။
၂။ စစ်ဘက်ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျူးလွန်သည်ဟု စွပ်စွဲခံရသူများကို စစ်ဆေးစီရင်နေစဥ် အချိန်အတွင်း လိုအပ်ပါက ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် အမိန့်နှင့်ညွှန်ကြားချက်များထုတ်ပြန်၍ စစ်ဘက်တာဝန်များမှ ယာယီရပ်ဆိုင်းထားမည်။
၃။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအနေဖြင့် စစ်သည်တော်ကျင့်ဝတ် ၊ စစ်ဖက်ဆိုင်ရာကျင့်ဝတ်များနှင့် သစ္စာအဓိဌာန် (၄)ချက်ကို လိုက်နာကြရန်နှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုအား ထိခိုက်စေသည့် မည်သည့် လုပ်ရပ်မျိုးကိုမဆို ရှောင်ရှားကြရမည်။
၄။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များသည် တော်လှန်ရေးရဲဘော်ရဲဘက် အချင်းချင်း စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ကြရန်နှင့် အပြန်အလှန် ထိန်းကျောင်းသွားကြရန်လည်း အထူးလိုအပ်သည်။
၅။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များသည် ရန်သူ့သတင်းပေးများ၊ စစ်သုံ့ပန်းများကို ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် သက်သေအထောက်အထား စာရွက်စာတမ်းများ ထားရှိရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများကို ထိခိုက်မှုမရှိစေရန် အထူးဂရုပြု ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်။
၆။ စစ်ရေးပြစ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး ဗဟိုကော်မရှင်သည် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများကို ထိခိုက်မှု မရှိစေရန်အလို့ငှာ ပြစ်မှုကျူးလွန်သည့် မည်သည့်အဖွဲ့အစည်း၊ မည်သည့် ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ကိုမဆို ဥပဒေအရ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
၇။ ပြည့်သူကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအပါအဝင် အများပြည်သူတို့အနေဖြင့် အဆိုပါ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများကို ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးကြရန်နှင့် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအား အောက်ပါလိပ်စာများသို့ သတင်းပေး တိုင်ကြားနိုင်ကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-14
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2022-03-14
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""ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ် (၆)လပြည့် အစီရင်ခံစာ” ကို ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-13
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2022-03-14
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-13
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2022-03-13
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-12
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2022-03-12
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-11
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2022-03-11
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-10
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2022-03-10
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-09
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2022-03-09
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-08
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2022-03-08
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"The Myanmar junta has revoked the citizenship of 11 well-known opposition figures including ministers of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), which is leading the revolutionary movement against its rule, along with a veteran student leader and social media influencers.
In an announcement made on Friday night, the junta said it had terminated the citizenship of the 11 individuals under the military-drafted 1982 Citizenship Law because they have allegedly fled Myanmar and harmed the interests of the country.
Among those singled out for citizenship revocation—a move that appears to be unprecedented—are some of the most prominent faces of the NUG including its Health and Education Minister Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, Defense Minister U Yee Mon, Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung, and Home Affairs and Immigration Minister U Lwin Ko Latt.
They are joined by Minister of Human Rights U Aung Myo Min, Minister of International Cooperation Dr. Sa Sa, Minister of Communications, Information and Technology U Htin Lin Aung, and Deputy Minister of Women, Youths and Children Affairs Daw Ei Thinzar Maung.
The NUG was formed by elected lawmakers from the National League for Democracy (NLD) who were prevented from taking their seats when the military staged a coup on Feb. 1 last year, along with their ethnic allies, as the legitimate government. It seeks to challenge the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint were nominated to retain their positions in the NUG.
NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung told The Irrawaddy the law under which the group’s citizenship was revoked should be repealed and rewritten, as it was drawn up for political purposes by the military and extremist nationalists under the previous regime.
She dismissed the coup maker’s revocation of their citizenship under the repressive law as an on-paper announcement that had no real-world significance.
Veteran student leader U Min Ko Naing and social medial influencers Myo Yan Naung Thein and Ei Pencilo also had their citizenship revoked on Friday.
The junta said in its announcement that it would identify additional perpetrators and take the same action against them.
Daw Zin Mar Aung said the junta’s acts of repression would only make the revolutionary movement stronger.
“This will be the end game for them. And for us, this is a battle that we must win,” she added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-07
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Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"မှတ်ချက်။ ။ မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။.."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-06
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"မြေပြင်သတင်းတာဝန်ခံများနှင့်သတင်းဌာနများမှ ဖော်ပြလာသော အချက်အလက်များအပေါ် အခြေခံပြုစုထားသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-05
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2022-03-05
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"Sixty years is considered an auspicious life cycle in many countries in East Asia. After weathering five rounds of 12 zodiac signs, one enters a state of revered age, with the social respect and wisdom those advanced years are supposed to bestow. It is a happy event.
On March 2, Myanmar may commemorate, but not celebrate, the 60th anniversary of the 1962 military coup that brought the Myanmar military into power it has never relinquished. The completion of that life cycle is supposed to be a celebratory event. On this occasion it is not. Through direct rule by decree, by inventing three political parties under its authority, by writing a constitution and then coercing its acceptance, by empowering itself through legal procedures under the 2008 constitution, and by manipulating electoral results, the military has remained in effective control over those societal elements it regards as essential to its interests. On the cusp of its 60th anniversary, it extended its domination through last year’s disastrous February 1 coup. The perpetuation of its influence and authority, however much disputed by the populace, will continue, forcing the state into further decline.
Six decades of military control, three generations, may set some sort of sad regional or world record for military-controlled governance. When not enforcing its self-determined mandate by direct authority, it founded three political parties to do its bidding: the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the National Unity Party, and the Union Solidarity and Development Party. None of them had even the semblance of democratic authority. All had very substantial active duty or retired military personnel in positions not only of leadership but among the ranks as well.
The year 1962, however, was not the origin of military power in Burma. It came with independence in 1948 and countering ethnic and political rebellions. The first “constitutional coup” in 1958, in which the military took power with the forced approval of the civilian government that was facing civil war within the ruling party, lasted 18 months. It was autocratic in its control but generally well-regarded, as it stemmed political and economic decline. At the close of that period, the military stepped down and allowed free elections in which its favored party lost, and U Nu ruled for about two years until the 1962 coup. That may be a unique instance of military-induced unmanaged elections.
But military rule does not mean stasis. Deterioration of the state began shortly after the 1962 coup when the “Burmese Way to Socialism” failed, as did a 1988 people’s revolution against the military. Even the military, while in control, from about 2010 began to realize the need for change and reform, and the efforts by President and former general U Thein Sein were well received both domestically and internationally. He did little, however, to placate ethnic minority rebellions and calls for a federal administrative structure, but progress was evident including broader rights for its citizens and the sharing of some power in 2016 with the elected opposition, the civilian-led National League for Democracy (NLD).
The international media has called attention to the recent worldwide waves of military coups, especially in Africa, citing Myanmar as one of a group. But to attribute Myanmar’s fourth coup in 2021, following those of 1958, 1962 and 1988, as simply an example of a worldwide trend is to misunderstand the nature of the internal problems facing the state. History tempers and shapes current dilemmas and requires analysis. Myanmar has unique issues that must be addressed.
Ethnically diverse Myanmar has been held together by the military tenaciously, and often crudely and unthinkingly, trying to control the country against the vociferous tendencies of various ethnic peoples with justified beliefs that they have been maltreated and denigrated by the ethnic Bamar majority government. The articulated primary objective of the military has always been national unity. Yet their inept actions have weakened the chance of achieving the very goals that it set for the state. There is no indication that they have changed their approach.
Ironically, the present coup has forced the NLD civilian opposition that won the November 2020 elections to expand what observers regard as their previous reluctance to pursue federal minority power. Its National Unity Government has brought more ethnic representation into its tentative opposition organization, but even if it were to assume power, how much of that would remain is questionable.
Although the military has promised a return to multi-party politics in 2023, most observers believe that whatever electoral system evolves, it will be manipulated, and whatever parties are permitted to run, it will not be a true democratic state; the military will assure that its control would continue to protect its, and what it regards as the state’s, interests. Elections alone do not a democracy make.
Foreign observers should recognize that the amelioration or solution to Myanmar’s governance problems will not come from external interventions. Humanitarian aid should be forthcoming at this dire time. But they should understand that this coup has historical roots that will affect the future, and whatever that future may be, the military will play some important role. But the Burmese peoples, including the military, must ensure that this role is appropriate for a modern state in which the people and their rights are the basis on which government and authority must be built.
David I. Steinberg is distinguished professor of Asian studies emeritus, Georgetown University. He was resident in Burma during the first and second military coups..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-02
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Category:
Military History, Political History, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Myanmar military’s resort to bombing civilian populations as a counterinsurgency strategy is certain to backfire
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"Myanmar’s army has unleashed yet another wave of aerial bombings in the country’s spiraling post-coup civil war, a change in traditional counterinsurgency tactics that points more to military weakness than strength.
Russian-made Hind-type attack helicopters fired rockets and machine guns once again this month while jet fighters dropped bombs on what appeared to be mainly civilian targets in eastern Kayah state where resistance to the coup has been particularly robust.
One of the helicopters reportedly carried General Soe Win, number two in the junta and considered even more hardline than his boss, coup-maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
As many as 170,000 villagers have fled their homes and are seeking shelter in remote parts of the state that abuts the Thai border in a situation that threatens to tilt towards a new-era refugee crisis.
Recent attacks by local resistance forces are believed to have motivated the Tatmadaw’s bombing campaign, which at the same time has raised hard new questions about the fighting ability of its increasingly stretched ground forces.
Ground attacks with air support are common in counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere in the world, but until now have not been used much by the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s decades-long ethnic wars.
In Kayah state, as in other parts of the country including Sagaing Division and Chin state, the military’s infantry was deployed first but was quickly withdrawn when it suffered heavy casualties. Then came random Tatmadaw bombings on villages and other population centers.
To be sure, Myanmar military atrocities committed during campaigns in ethnic minority areas are nothing new. At the same time, the Tatmadaw was actually quite poorly armed despite having a battle-hardened and largely effective light infantry force.
Its troops were constantly on the move during past conflicts against the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the northeast, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the north, and the Karen National Union (KNU) and other rebel groups along the Thai border.
All that changed after a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988. The main fear at the time was that disgruntled soldiers might join the pro-democracy activists.
Consequently, in order to prevent a split in the ranks, Myanmar’s top military leaders did everything in their power to keep at least the officer corps satisfied and loyal.
Beginning in 1989, the then-ruling junta, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, spent more than a billion dollars procuring new, more sophisticated military hardware.
It came primarily from China but also from Pakistan, Singapore and Israel. Most of it was materiel that would be of little use in counterinsurgency operations in remote and mountainous ethnic areas such as missile systems, huge tanks, armored vehicles, naval patrol boats, frigates and various kinds of radar equipment.
Equally important was a decision to scrap the previous, unpopular system of constant rotations of regional commanders, a move implemented to ensure that no officer would build up his own power base in a certain part of the country.
Myanmar’s military leaders also had to make sure that the urban dissidents did not link up with the ethnic rebels. Thousands of them did, but the KIA and KNU did not have enough weapons to share with the urban newcomers.
But then came a mutiny in the CPB and the old mostly Burman, orthodox communists were driven into exile in China. The mutineers formed new ethnic armies, the strongest being the United Wa State Army, and the possibility of the kind of alliance that the Myanmar military feared became a reality.
Talks between the ex-CPB mutineers and other ethnic groups did happen, but the Myanmar military moved faster and with more determination.
Ceasefire deals were struck with the UWSA and other former CPB forces according to which they could retain their arms, remain in control of their respective areas and engage in all kinds of business as long as they did not attack the Myanmar military or share their weapons with other groups.
By the mid-1990s, about 20 major and smaller ethnic armies that had depended on the CPB for arms supplies also made peace with the military government. The threat from the border areas had been neutralized.
Those ceasefire agreements lasted for more than 20 years, meaning that an entire generation of Myanmar soldiers has no real combat experience. They are, as one in-the-know source said, better at parades showing off their new uniforms and guns than at actual combat.
The officer corps was also given ample opportunities to earn money where they often accepted bribes and entered into dealerships with the country’s newly-rich businessmen who became infamously known as “the cronies.”
That changed again when, in June 2011, the ceasefire with the KIA broke down. For the first time in more than a decade, major battles were fought in ethnic minority areas. Casualties were extremely heavy as the advancing infantry soldiers, who were poorly trained and had zero combat experience, were mowed down by KIA guerrillas.
It became so bad that the Myanmar military had to withdraw its infantry and rely instead on helicopter gunships, attack aircraft and heavy artillery fired from a safe distance. That is what is happening again in Kayah state and other war zones that have mushroomed across the country since the military’s disastrous February 1, 2021, coup.
As old and new conflicts spread and rage, old questions about the actual manpower strength of the Myanmar military are taking on new relevance. Australian Myanmar watcher and specialist on military matters Andrew Selth examined the issue in a piece published by the Sydney-based think tank the Lowy Institute on February 17.
He quotes figures as high as 500,000 and even 600,000 that appeared in post-1988 think tank reports, but argues that they “were mistakenly based on theoretical projections by ambitious Tatmadaw [Myanmar military] planners.”
It is beyond doubt that the Myanmar military embarked on an expansion and modernization campaign after 1988, when the total strength of the Myanmar military was believed to be around 186,000. By 2021, however, more realistic estimates were at around 300,000-350,000 — or perhaps as low as 250,000, or even 200,000.
But according to Selth: “The key element here is not the total number of men and women in uniform, but the number of combat soldiers that the junta can put into the field. Most estimates cite 100,000-120,000.”
In addition to that are 80,000 or so members of the national police, which, Selth writes, “has about 39 paramilitary security battalions, many of them made up of former soldiers.”
By any measure, however, the Myanmar military now finds itself stretched thin on many fronts, including areas in the country’s central region that have not seen any serious combat since the 1970s.
It is clear by now that the Tatmadaw cannot decisively defeat the scores, if not hundreds, of small and not-so-small resistance armies that have sprung up across the country since the coup.
The possibility of a battlefield victory for those fervent but often rag-tag armies is also remote. They may have widespread popular support but are poorly armed and don’t seem to have a common, well-planned strategy beyond inflicting as many casualties on the Myanmar military and its junta officials as possible.
For its part, the Myanmar military appears to be waging a war of attrition against resistance forces that aims ultimately to wear down their inexperienced and outgunned fighters. But given the grit and determination of the resistance, that is unlikely to be a winning strategy.
What is more likely is that the wars will rage on for the foreseeable future, with the Myanmar military increasingly resorting to haphazard air power that will only cause more human suffering and dislocation among an already angry and disenfranchised population.
The aerial bombardments in Kayah state will likely be replicated in other inflamed parts of the country in a counterinsurgency strategy that underscores the Tatmadaw’s underlying weakness and ensures more popular support for fast-rising anti-coup forces..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2022-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Political History
Language:
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Description:
"ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့တွင် ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပနေရာအသီးသီး၌ ရှိနေကြသော ချင်းလူမျိုးများအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ပါးကျန်းမာချမ်းသာကြပါစေကြောင်းဆုတောင်းပါသည်။
ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ဆိုသည်မှာ နယ်ချဲ့ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး၊ အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုအပါအဝင်၊ နယ် မြေဒေသအလိုက် မျိုးနွယ်စုအကြီးအကဲများအုပ်ချုပ်သည့်စနစ်အစား ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်ဖြင့် အစားထိုး ကျင့်သုံးရန် ချင်းတစ်မျိုးသားလုံးက မိမိတို့၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်ကို အပြည့်အဝအသုံးပြု၍ ရွေးချယ် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြ သည့် သမိုင်းဝင်ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်ခဲ့မှုများကို ဖော်ညွန်းသည့်နေ့ရက်ဖြစ်သည်။
ချင်းတောင်တန်းဒေသသည် ကချင်တောင်တန်းဒေသ၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ရှမ်းပြည် (Federated Shan States)၊ ဗမာပြည်မ (Ministerial Burma) တို့နှင့်အတူ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့ပြီး၊ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံ အခြေခံဥပဒေအရ ပြည်ထောင်စုအဖွဲ့ဝင်ပြည်ထောင်တစ်ခုဖြစ်လာခဲ့သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ချင်းပြည်နှင့်ချင်းလူမျိုး များသည် ပြည်ထောင်စုမြန်မာနိုင်ငံကိုတည်ထောင်ဘက် ပြည်ထောင်တစ်ခု၊ လူမျိုးတစ်မျိုးဖြစ်ပေသည်။ ချင်း လူမျိုးများသည် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ပြည်ထောင်စုအရေး ကျရာကဏ္ဍမှတာဝန်ကျေပွန်ခဲ့ကြသူများဖြစ်သည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ထပ်မံအာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးစားခဲ့သည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် အာဏာသိမ်းယူမှုကို အကြမ်းမဖက် ဆန့်ကျင်ကြသည့် နိုင်ငံသူ၊ နိုင်ငံသားများစွာ အပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်နှိမ်နင်းခြင်း၊ ရက်စက်စွာဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူများ၏အသက်အိုးအိမ်ကို ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ အလွန်အကျွံစစ်အင်အားဖြင့် ထိုးစစ်ဆင်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူတို့၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများကို ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်းချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းအစရှိသည်တို့ကို နေ့စဉ်ရက်ဆက် ကျုးလွန်လျက်ရှိပြီး ချင်းလူမျိုးများ အပါအဝင် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက ရရာနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေကြရချိန်ဖြစ်သည်။
စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပြီးသတ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြီး ချင်းနယ်မြေများလွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို ဆင်နွဲနေကြသည့် ချင်းပြည်ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့အသီးသီး၏ ထူးချွန်ပြောင်မြောက်စွာ စွန့်လွတ်စွန့်စား တိုက်ပွဲ ဝင်နေမှုများကိုအထူးလေးစားဂုဏ်ပြုပါကြောင်းနှင့် ၎င်းတို့အတွက် တတ်နိုင်သည့်ဘက်မှ ပါဝင်ကူညီလှူဒါန်း ပေးနေကြသော ပြည်တွင်းနှင့်နိုင်ငံတကာရှိ ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၊ ချင်းအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများကို အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း အလေးအနက်ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့မှစ၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ ချင်း အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် စစ်မှန်သောဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုနိုင်ငံတော်တည်ဆောက်ရေး အတွက် ချင်းအမျိုးသမီး၊ အမျိုးသားများ၏ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ လျင်မြန်ပြည့်စုံစွာပြီးမြောက် အောင်မြင်နိုင် ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political, Political History
Language:
Format :
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371.2 KB
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Description:
"ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုခြင်း ၇၅ နှစ်ပြည့်အထိမ်းအမှတ် အခွန်တံဆိပ်ခေါင်းများထုတ်ဝေမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း။
၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရုံးခွန်အက်ဥပဒေကို ၁၈၇၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အိန္ဒိယအက်ဥပဒေအမှတ် (၇) ဖြင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတံဆိပ်ခေါင်းအက်ဥပဒေကို ၁၈၉၉ ခုနှစ် အိန္ဒိယအက်ဥပဒေအမှတ် (၂) ဖြင့်လည်းကောင်း စတင်ပြဌာန်း ကျင့်သုံးခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များ ပါဝင်သော ပင်လုံ ညီလာခံ၌ ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သည်မှာ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၂) ရက်နေ့ ယနေ့တွင် (၇၅) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုခြင်း ၇၅ နှစ်မြောက်အထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ၂၀၀ ကျပ်၊ ၃၀၀ ကျပ်၊ ၁၀၀၀ ကျပ်၊ ၅၀၀၀ ကျပ်နှင့် ၅၀၀၀၀ ကျပ်တန် အခွန်တံဆိပ်ခေါင်းများ စတင် ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချပေးမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည့် တံဆိပ်ခေါင်းခွန်ထိုက်သင့်သော စာချုပ်စာတမ်းတစ်ခုခုကို ချုပ်ဆိုသူ မည်သူမဆို စာချုပ်မချုပ်ဆိုမီ သို့မဟုတ် စာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုချိန်တွင် တံဆိပ်ခေါင်းများကို ကပ်နှိပ်အသုံးပြုသွားရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ အခွန်တံဆိပ်ခေါင်းများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်တွင်းအခွန်များဦးစီးဌာန Website ဖြစ်သည့် http://ird.nug-mm.net မှတဆင့် အသေးစိတ်စုံစမ်းဝယ်ယူနိုင်ပါသည်။
စီမံကိန်း၊ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of publication:
2022-02-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Political History
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Format :
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"တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးက လိုလားတဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို အမှန်တကယ်တည်ဆောက်နိုင်တဲ့အထိ NUCC အနေနဲ့ မဆုတ်မနစ်ကြိုးပမ်းလုပ်ဆောင်မယ်လို့အလေးအနက် ကတိပြု
ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁၂ ၊ ၂၀၂၂
စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေး၊ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံ ကတိကဝတ်နဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပဋိညာဉ် အခြေခံမှုတွေအပေါ်အခြေပြုတဲ့ ညီညွတ်ရေး၊ ကတိကဝတ်တွေကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရေး၊ လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒချုပ်ငြိမ်း ရေးတွေကို ဖော်ဆောင်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးက လိုလားတဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို အမှန်တကယ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်တဲ့အထိ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ - NUCC က မဆုတ်မနစ် ကြိုးပမ်းလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမှာဖြစ် တယ်လို့ အလေးအနက်ကတိပြုကြောင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုတဲ့ ၇၅ နှစ်မြောက်နေ့အတွက် ပေးပို့တဲ့ သဝဏ်လွှာမှာ ဖော်ပြလိုက်တာပါ။
အစိုးရ အဆက်ဆက်က ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်တွေကို ချိုးဖောက်ကာ သမိုင်းတလျှောက် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဖိနှိပ်အနိုင်ကျင့်ခဲ့မှုတွေ၊ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုတွေအတွက် မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ - NUCC အနေနဲ့လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးကို လေးနက်စွာတောင်းပန်တယ်လို့ ဖော်ပြထားပါတယ်။
ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်တွေ၊ အစိုးရတွေက ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ခွဲခြားဖိနှိပ်မှုတွေ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်တဲ့ ရာဇဝတ်မှုတွေနဲ့ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုတွေ၊ လူမျိုးသုဉ်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုတွေကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့မှုနဲ့ပတ်သက်ပြီး နစ်နာသူများအား အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရကယနေ့ ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရတရပ်ဖြစ်တာနဲ့အညီ တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု အပြည့်ဖြင့် တောင်းပန်ပြီး လုပ်ဆောင် သင့်တဲ့ ကိစ္စရပ်တွေကို ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား လုပ်ဆောင်သွားဖို့လည်း တိုက်တွန်းထားတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။
အစိုးရအဆက်ဆက်က ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်ကို ဖော်ဆောင်ဖို့ ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ကြတာကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတို့ရဲ့ နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရမှုတွေကို ယနေ့ကာလ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ တော်လှန်ရေးရဲ့ ဦးဆောင်မှုအခန်းကဏ္ဍမှာ ပါဝင်နေသော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ- NUG အပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုတွေက ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းသိမြင်နေမှာလို့ ပြောထား ပါတယ်။
ဒါအပြင် အဲဒီလို ထပ်မံမဖြစ်ပွားစေဖို့နဲ့ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်တွေကို တိကျစွာဖော်ဆောင်ရန်မှာ လွန်စွာမှ အရေးကြီး တယ်ဆိုတာနဲ့ တိုင်းရင်း သားပြည်သူတွေ လိုလားတဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီးကိုလည်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၊ ပင်လုံကတိ ကဝတ်နဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်အတိုင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်သွားရန် လိုအပ်တယ်လို့လည်း ဖော်ပြထားတာ တွေ့ရပါတယ်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီအနေနဲ့ကတော့ စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ်နဲ့ အာဏာရှင် စနစ်မှန်သမျှ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းမှသာလျှင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်နိုင်မှာဖြစ်တယ်လို့လည်း ထောက်ပြထားတာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-02-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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pdf
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Description:
"၁။ လွတ်လပ်သည့်ပြည်ထောင်များက လွတ်လပ်၍ စစ်မှန်သောတန်းတူညီမျှမှုရှိသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုနိုင်ငံဟူသည့် ခေါင်းစဉ်အောက်တွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းမျှတစွာ အတူယှဉ်တွဲနေထိုင်ကြရန် “ပင်လုံစာချုပ်” ချုပ်ဆိုလျက် တောင်တန်းမြေပြန့် တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ ပေါင်းစည်းမှုစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို ပြသနိုင်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၇၅) နှစ်ပြည့် စိန်ရတုတိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူ များ၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ခြင်းပြယုဂ်ဖြစ်သည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့ခြင်း (၇၅) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက် သည့် သမိုင်းဝင်နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်မှစကာ ပင်လုံပဋိညာဉ်လမ်းစဉ်အပေါ် အခြေခံသည့် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကို အမြန်ဆုံးတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းအပ် ပါသည်။
၂။ ဗြိတိသျှတို့၏ သွေးခွဲအုပ်ချုပ်မှုကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအကြား နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ သံသယများဖြင့် သွေးကွဲမှုများ ရှိခဲ့ကြသော်လည်း ဖက်ဆစ်ဂျပန်များအား တော်လှန်ကြရာတွင်မူ တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ဖက်ဆစ်ဂျပန်များကို တိုက်ထုတ်နိုင်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ဖက်ဆစ် ဂျပန်များ၏ လက်အောက်မှလွတ်မြောက်ပြီးနောက် နိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ကြိုးပမ်းကြချိန်တွင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့် ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းမှု၊ ပြည်သူများ၏ စည်းလုံးမှုဖြင့် ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၂၇ ရက်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို တစ်နှစ်အတွင်း လွတ်လပ်ရေးပေးရန် သဘောတူညီချက်များ ပါဝင်သည့် အောင်ဆန်း-အက်တလီ စာချုပ်ကို ချုပ်ဆိုနိုင်ခဲ့သော်လည်း ဗြိတိသျှတို့က အတ္တလန္တိတ် စာချုပ်ဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို သီးခြားခွဲ၍ ပေးရန်၊ တောင်တန်းဒေသများကို လွတ်လပ်ရေးမပေးသေး ရန် သွေးခွဲခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။ ၁၉၄၆ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလတွင် ရွှေတိဂုံဘုရားကုန်းတော် အလယ်ပစ္စယံ၌ ကျင်းပခဲ့သည့် ဖဆပလညီလာခံတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးလက်တွဲကာ လွတ်လပ်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်ကြရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများက ၁၉၄၆ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ ၁ ရက် မှ ၁၂ ရက် အထိ ပင်လုံမြို့တွင် ပထမအကြိမ် ညီလာခံအဖြစ် စုပေါင်းစည်းဝေး ကျင်းပခဲ့ ကြပါသည်။
၄။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်အဖွဲ့ဝင်များသည် ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၈ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပင်လုံမြို့၌ ကျင်းပသည့် ဒုတိယအကြိမ် ပင်လုံညီလာခံသို့ တက်ရောက်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့ တွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး၏ စုစည်းညီညွတ်မှုဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို တောင်တန်းပြည်မ အတူတကွ ရယူကြရန်၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိသည့် စစ်မှန်သော ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီးတစ်ခု အတူတကွထူထောင်ကြရန် မျှော်မှန်းလျက် “ပင်လုံစာချုပ်” ကို ချုပ်ဆိုကာ ပြည်ထောင်စုတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ စည်းလုံးမှုအင်အားကို ပြသလျက် ဖက်ဒရယ်အုတ်မြစ် ကို ချမှတ်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။
၅။ သို့သော်လည်း ဗိုလ်နေဝင်းက ပင်လုံစိတ်ဓာတ်အခြေခံမူလမ်းစဉ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ဖောက်ဖျက် လျက် ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖွဲ့စည်းအုပ်ချုပ်ပုံဆိုင်ရာအခြေခံဥပဒေကို စိတ်ကြိုက်ရေးဆွဲပြဋ္ဌာန်းခဲ့သည့် အတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ မူလအခွင့်အရေးများအားလုံးဆုံးရှုံးကာ ပြည်တွင်းစစ် စတင်ခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ထိုမှစကာ ၁၉၇၄ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ၊ ၂၀၀၈ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေစသဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့ စိတ်ကြိုက်ရေးဆွဲထားသည့် ဥပဒေများကို ပြဋ္ဌာန်းကာ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအား သွေးခွဲလျက် လူမျိုးကြီးဝါဒကိုကိုင်စွဲကာ ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။
၆။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေးအရ ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်လျက်ရှိသည့် ကြားမှပင် ပြည်သူတို့က တခဲနက် ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်သည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရတစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ထွက်လာကာ ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်ရန်အတွက် ပြည်ထောင်စုငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးညီလာခံ - ၂၁ ရာစု ပင်လုံအစည်းအဝေးများ ခေါ်ယူလျက် ဒီမိုကရေစီဖက်ဒရယ်ဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူညီချက်များ ချမှတ်၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုသဘောတူစာချုပ် အစိတ်အပိုင်း ၃ ခုအထိ ချုပ်ဆိုနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၇။ သို့သော်လည်း အတုအယောင်ဖက်ဒရယ်ကိုသာ ပေးလိုသော ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားကိုသာ ကြည့်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တစ်စုက ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၈ ရက်တွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သည့် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက တခဲနက် ထောက်ခံရွေးချယ်ခဲ့သည့် ပြည်သူ့ အစိုးရအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးလျက် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော် အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ ဥပဒေမဲ့လုယူသွားကာ နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအပေါ် လူ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာကို ညှိုးနွမ်းစေသည့် နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ မြို့၊ ရွာများအား မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ လေကြောင်းမှ ဗုံးကြဲခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူပိုင်ပစ္စည်းများအား မတရားလုယူခြင်း၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း အစရှိသည့် ပြစ်မှုများအား ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၈။ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အပြီးတိုင် ပပျောက်စေရန် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် စစ်အာဏာရှင် ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးမှ သန္ဓေတည်ခဲ့သည့် တော်လှန်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်များဖြင့် စုစည်း ညီညွတ် စွာ တိုက်ထုတ်ကြရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လက်နက်အင်အား အဆမတန်သာလွန်သည့် မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ခေါင်းဆောင်သည့် စစ်တပ်ကို တစ်နှစ်ကြာသည်အထိ အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်မပေးဘဲ ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများ များစွာ ရှိနေသည့်တိုင် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပမှ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက ကျရာကဏ္ဍအသီးသီးမှ အားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် တော်လှန်နေကြဆဲ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးအတွက် အသက်ပေးလှူသွားခဲ့ကြသော သူရဲကောင်းများအား ဝမ်းနည်းစွာ အလေးပြုပါကြောင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာမှတဆင့် အလေးအနက် မှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၉။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့်လည်း ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ (၂၀၀၈ ခုနှစ်) ကိုအပြီးတိုင်ဖျက်သိမ်းကာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေငြာခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ခေါ်ယူကာ အဆိုပါဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို အတည်ပြုခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင် ပပျောက်ကာ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်တို့ကို အာမခံသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသည်အထိ ပြည်သူလူထုက လွှဲအပ်ထားသည့် အခွင့်အာဏာကို အလေးအနက်ပြုလျက် ထမ်းဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ပင်လုံစိတ်ဓာတ်ဖြင့် ကတိသစ္စာပြုလျက် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုခြင်း (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက်နေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-02-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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Format :
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522.96 KB
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Description:
"Message from Chairman Gen. Saw Mutu Say Poe on the 74th Karen National Day..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of publication:
2022-02-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karen National Union (KNU), Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Format :
pdf
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715.59 KB
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Description:
"In the year since the Burma military attempted to launch a coup, it has critically harmed millions of lives, the national economy, rule of law, natural resources, and governance.
Armed clashes and attacks on civilians rose by 762%. Just in January 2022, there were more of these incidents than during the entire year preceding the attempted coup.
ALTSEAN-Burma has tracked the most important updates during this time in its online thematic Coup Trackers, and summarized these updates by publishing a Coup Watch briefer each month. This special edition of the Coup Watch draws on these tools to provide a one-year overview..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-BURMA, Burma Human Rights Network, Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, Initiatives for International Dialogue, International Federation for Human Rights, Progressive Voice, US Campaign for Burma and Women Peace Network
Date of publication:
2022-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Anti-coup protesters, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
1.26 MB (Original version), 606.6 KB (Reduce version) - 10 pages
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Description:
"၁။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင်များကောင်စီ (Federal Health Professional Council – FHPC) ကို တော်လှန်ရေးကာလဖြစ်သည့် ကြားကာလနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလတွင် ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင် လုပ်သားအင်အားစုများအားလုံး၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကို တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှုအပြည့်ဖြင့် ဖော်ဆောင်ပေးရန် တိုင်းရင်းသားကျန်းမာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ဆေး ပညာရှင်များ၊ ပညာရပ်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းအသီးသီးမှ ကိုယ်စားပြုသူများဖြင့် (၁-၁၂-၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင်များကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ် လုံးက အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်း မရှိသော အာဏာသိမ်း နိုင်ငံတော်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကောင်စီ (State Administration Council – SAC) က တရားမဝင် ဖွင့်လှစ်သင်ကြားလျက်ရှိသည့် ဆေးနှင့် ဆေးနှီးနွှယ်တက္ကသိုလ်များ၊ သူနာပြုနှင့်သားဖွားသင်တန်းကျောင်းများကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုမည် မဟုတ်ဘဲ ၄င်းတို့ကပြုလုပ်သော အရည်အချင်းဆန်းစစ်မှုစာမေးပွဲများ၊ အတန်းတင်စာမေးပွဲများနှင့် ဘွဲ့လက်မှတ်များကိုလည်း လက်ခံအသိအမှတ်ပြုမည် မဟုတ်ပါ။
၃။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင်များကောင်စီသည် အာဏာသိမ်း နိုင်ငံတော်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ကောင်စီ (SAC) အလိုကျ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသော ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနလက်အောက်ရှိ Non CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ဆရာ၊ ဆရာမများကို ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပရှိ တက္ကသိုလ်များတွင် ဝင်ခွင့်လျှောက်ထားခြင်း၊ အလုပ်အကိုင်များ လျှောက်ထားခြင်းများ မပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန် နိုင်ငံတကာ သံရုံးများနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပတက္ကသိုလ်များသို့ အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းများ ဆက်လက်ပေးပို့လုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင်များကောင်စီသည် ကြားကာလနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကာလများတွင် ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားအင်အားစုများ၏ နစ်နာမှုများကို ကြားနာစစ်ဆေးပြီး ခုခံကာကွယ်ပေးရန်၊ ကျင့်ဝတ်သိက္ခာများ လိုက်နာထိန်းသိမ်းရန် ပျက်ကွက်မှုများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ပြုပြင်တည့်မတ်ပေးရန်နှင့် သင့်တင့်လျောက်ပတ်သည့် အရေးယူမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တာဝန်ရှိသည့်အလျောက် ပြည်သူ့ဘက်တွင် မရပ်တည်ဘဲ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအပေါ်တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များ ဆက်တိုက်ကျူးလွန်နေသည့် အာဏာသိမ်း နိုင်ငံတော်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကောင်စီ (SAC) ၏ အလိုကျဆောင်ရွက်နေသော ကျန်းမာရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနလက်အောက်ရှိ Non CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ဆရာ၊ ဆရာမများကို ပြင်းထန်စွာ အရေးယူမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Federal Health Professional Council
Date of publication:
2022-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-09
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"၁။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင်များကောင်စီ (Federal Health Professional Council – FHPC) ကို တော်လှန်ရေးကာလဖြစ်သည့် ကြားကာလနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလတွင် ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင် လုပ်သားအင်အားစုများအားလုံး၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကို တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှုအပြည့်ဖြင့် ဖော်ဆောင်ပေးရန် တိုင်းရင်းသားကျန်းမာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ဆေးပညာရှင်များ၊ ပညာရပ်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းအသီးသီးမှ ကိုယ်စားပြုသူများဖြင့် (၁-၁၂-၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆေးကောင်စီ (Myanmar Medical Council - MMC) သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆေးကောင်စီ ဥပဒေ (၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်)၊ အခန်း (၂)၊ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များတွင် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းထားသည့် “အရည်အသွေး ပြည့်ဝ၍ ထိရောက်မှုနှင့် လုံခြုံမှုရှိသော ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုကို နိုင်ငံအတွင်း မှီတင်းနေထိုင်ကြသူအားလုံး ခံစားခွင့်ရရှိစေရန်၊ ဆရာဝန်များ၏ ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာကို ထိန်းသိမ်းမြှင့်တင်နိုင်စေရန်၊ ကောင်းမွန်သော ဆေးကုသမှုပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ဖြစ်ထွန်းစေရန်’’ အစရှိသည့် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ခြင်း မရှိသည့်အပြင် ဆရာဝန်များအပါအဝင် ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်ဖိနှိပ်နေသည့် အာဏာသိမ်း နိုင်ငံတော်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကောင်စီ (State Administration Council – SAC) ၏ လက်ကိုင်တုတ်အဖြစ် ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း ရပ်တည်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆေးကောင်စီ (MMC) သည် ကောင်စီ၏ တာဝန်နှင့် လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်များကို အလွဲသုံးစားပြုပြီး ဆရာဝန်များနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများအပေါ် အာဏာသိမ်း နိုင်ငံတော်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကောင်စီ (SAC) အလိုကျ ဖိနှိပ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေမှုများကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ကျန်းမာရေးပညာရှင်များကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ပြင်းထန်စွာကန့်ကွက်ရှုတ်ချပြီး အဆိုပါဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်ဆောင်ရွက်နေမည်ဆိုပါက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆေးကောင်စီ (MMC) ၏ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌနှင့် အလုပ်အမှုဆောင်အဖွဲ့ဝင်များကို ပြင်းထန်စွာ အရေးယူသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Federal Health Professional Council
Date of publication:
2022-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History, Public Health, Health, right to: standards and mechanisms
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Formerly an anti-war poet, Maung Saungkha has endured a harsh training regime to prepare for armed struggle against Myanmar’s military junta
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"Days after the military coup in February 2021, demonstrations erupted across Myanmar. The military responded by shooting unarmed protesters with live rounds. People were beaten, arbitrarily detained and imprisoned.
On the frontlines of protests in Yangon in February and early March, I witnessed soldiers and police firing live rounds into crowds, and on 8 March, I was one of hundreds of protesters who were barricaded overnight on Kyun Taw Road in Yangon’s Sanchaung township, where soldiers and police went from house to house searching for people to arrest.
Witnessing the military’s atrocities and campaign of terror from the frontline, I realised that the only way to fight back was through armed revolution.
I am one of thousands of activists and young people from cities and towns across Myanmar to take up arms. Some joined existing armed groups – known as ethnic armed organisations – in the country’s border areas, where minorities have been fighting for self-determination for decades; others, like me, formed new revolutionary groups.
In the first week of March, I travelled to an area of Myanmar’s borderlands and joined a group of 17 people in establishing the Bamar People’s Liberation Army on 17 April.
As a poet and human rights activist, my revolutionary journey has been very tough. We must overcome our ego, homesickness and intellectual pride. Our trainers always told us that we must fight a revolution within ourselves before we can fight a revolution against others.
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During the three months of training, we ran drills and studied the battlefield and governance systems without rest from 4am to 10pm. To train our minds and bodies to become stronger, we were only allowed two meals a day, limited to five minutes, and we sometimes went days without eating. Outside food was also prohibited, and we were never able to fill our stomachs.
“I spent more than six months in Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison. Recalling that time is like a nightmare
I have endured days under the scorching sun without a sip of water; I have also stood to attention under heavy rain to the sound of harsh commands that felt like hot liquid iron being poured into my ears, and have experienced the feeling that blows with a cane could fall on my hips at any time.
By the end of the training, my potbelly had disappeared and I had turned to skin and bones. I used to get tired just climbing three floors of stairs in my city apartment building; now, I am running up and down hilly jungle terrain. My mindset had also hardened. I had lived my entire life as an anti-war poet. But the former peacemaker who once could not stand even the sound of gunfire is now hungry for war. I believe we have no other choice.
This month, in an alliance with an ethnic armed organisation, we began active combat with the military, which is continuing.
My story as an activist goes back to around 2012. It was the early years of the country’s political transition, and I was elected as a representative under Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) for a youth working group in Yangon.
In 2015, while campaigning for the NLD for November’s general elections, I was jailed under charges of defamation for writing a satirical poem about having a tattoo of the president, Thein Sein, on my penis. I spent more than six months in Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison. Recalling that time is like a nightmare. I was repeatedly interrogated, without breaks for eating, and subjected to mental torture.
I was released in May 2016. It was just three months after the NLD government was sworn in to parliament, where they shared power with the military under the rules of a constitution drafted by the military in 2008.
Since my release, I have continuously dedicated myself to promoting freedom of expression and equal rights. In 2016, I began advocating to amend the Telecommunications Law. Introduced in 2013, the law criminalised defamation over telecommunications networks and saw more than 250 people, including 37 journalists, charged during the NLD’s term.
In January 2018, I founded Athan (Voice), a research-based activist organisation focused on promoting freedom of expression, media freedom and access to information rights in Myanmar.
When I joined the NLD, it was with the hope and expectation that they could bring human rights and justice for everyone in Myanmar when they came to power. But in October 2018, I resigned from the party due to my different views from Aung San Suu Kyi on the state of press freedom in the country, and particularly her decision not to speak out for the rights of the Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who were jailed in relation to their coverage of the military’s massacre of 10 Rohingya people in Rakhine state.
During the NLD’s five-year term, I openly criticised party leaders over oppression of minorities including the Rohingya, restrictions on press freedom and freedom of expression, a prolonged internet shutdown in Rakhine and Chin states, and their failure to speak out against human rights abuses openly committed by the military.
I also played a leading role in numerous activist campaigns for the rights of journalists, activists and oppressed minority groups including the Kachin, Karenni, Arakanese and Rohingya.
On 8 November 2020, the NLD again won a landslide victory in general elections, and the newly elected government was set to convene parliament on 1 February. The military, whose party suffered a humiliating loss, had refused to accept the election results, and its commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing had already warned that the military might “take action” if its claims of election irregularities were not addressed. Still, I didn’t really believe Min Aung Hlaing would dare to stage a coup.
It became clear to me that the coup had happened at 4am on 1 February, when I received a call that two friends and fellow activists had been arrested by the military. Soldiers came to arrest me too, but fortunately I was not at home.
“We also seek to ensure that, if Aung San Suu Kyi is released, that no political compromises are made in the name of stability
On 11 February, I joined people from different ethnic groups, including the majority Bamar group to which I belong, in forming the General Strike Committee of Nationalities. We called for the repeal of the 2008 constitution and the establishment of a federal democratic union – demands that were eventually supported at the national level.
On 1 April, a body of elected parliamentarians operating in exile announced the abolition of the 2008 constitution and establishment of an interim National Unity government based on a federal democracy charter. It marked the early stages of a shift in people’s mindsets.
The public abandoned the idea that we must endure whatever the military does to us and make compromises according to the military’s demands. Instead, this Spring Revolution has shown a commitment to root out nationalism and religious extremism, and has also pushed to end gender discrimination, patriarchy and military dictatorship once and for all.
Among the objectives of the Bamar People’s Liberation Army are to end the dominance of Bamar Buddhists over other ethnic groups and to strengthen the unity of Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups under a federal democratic union.
We also seek to ensure that, if Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest, no political compromises are made under the name of state stability.
If this Spring Revolution, in which people from all social strata have participated with unity and solidarity, cannot lead to the establishment of a new federal democratic union that can guarantee peace and democracy, then justice and equality will still be far off in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Human Rights Defenders
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"၆၁ နှစ်ပြည့်ကချင်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် မြစ်ကြီးနားမြို့နယ်အခြေခံပညာကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂသို့ ပေးပို့သောသဝဏ်လွှာ
ဗဟိုအလုပ်အမှုဆောင်အဖွဲ့
ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ..."
Source/publisher:
University of Yangon Students’ Union
Date of publication:
2022-02-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-05
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"This article is the latest in a Just Security series on the Feb. 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar, which brought together expert local and international voices on the coup and its broader context. The series is a collaboration between Just Security and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School).
Today, Feb. 1, 2022, marks the one-year anniversary of the Myanmar military’s attempt to wrest political control of the country away from its elected officials. Not every military attempt to impose its will on a country is a generational moment, but this one was. The actions of the military (known as the Tatmadaw) last year sparked an unprecedented series of events that are still rippling across the nation. The resistance to the military’s attempt[1] to take control started with the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a mass movement led by youth and joined by workers who stayed home and consumers who boycotted military-owned businesses to protest the takeover. A movement on this scale has not been seen in a generation. Other developments over the past year are entirely unprecedented in Myanmar. This past year thus marks the end of one era and the beginning of a new one. The shape of that new era is still being determined by the people of Burma, who are writing their next chapter with each passing day.
To understand the importance of Feb. 1, 2021 (“1221” or “2121,” depending on which date convention is used), we first must look back. For Burma followers, the start of the era proceeding 2021 can be traced to the 8888 Uprising (named for another significant date, Aug. 8, 1988, when that mobilization began), which saw a military crackdown against mass street protests across the country. The 8888 Uprising was the beginning of the end of the Ne Win era, a period of military rule which began decades earlier. Yet in the wake of 1988, the military dictatorship continued — first as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a name which aptly captured the mass human rights abuses perpetrated by this military junta, and then, with a 1997 rebrand, as the State Peace and Development Council. Despite these cosmetic tweaks, little else changed. The consolidation of power by Than Shwe as the main military strongman in the early 2000s only demonstrated the continued military dominance. Even after the 2008 constitution and three subsequent national elections, including 2010 which featured a boycott by the National League for Democracy (NLD), the military was ever present, and the hopes of a full transition to democracy and peace failed to materialize. (For a fuller discussion of the history of democracy movements in Myanmar, see here).
Yet this post-1988 era was never really defined by the military leader as it had been during Ne Win’s time. Instead, the 1988 to 2021 period was defined by its opposition leader. When history is written in the years to come, it will be known as the era of Aung San Suu Kyi. From her “non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights” while under house arrest and her leadership of the NLD as it earned landslide national victories in 1991, 2015, and 2020, to her silence on the ongoing persecution and coordinated campaigns of violence against the Muslim Rohingya minority, Aung San Suu Kyi shaped this era of Burma in a way no other figure did.
The lead up to the military’s attempted takeover on Feb. 1, 2021 did not presage how seminal a moment it would become for Myanmar. After the NLD won an overwhelming majority of the parliamentary seats in the November 2020 general election (396 out of 476 seats, a margin of victory even greater than in 2015 and reminiscent of a 1990 landslide victory for the party), the Tatmadaw laid the foundation to dispute the results. Just like after the 1990 election, which it never recognized, the military was intent on preventing the duly elected officials from taking their seats as representatives of the people. Throughout late 2020 and early 2021, the Tatmadaw alleged irregularities and poll fraud. Several nations, including the United States, warned that the Tatmadaw might attempt to seize power in the days leading up to Feb. 1. Despite these warnings, the military was able to successfully detain Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other NLD leadership on the morning of Feb. 1 (many of whom have since been criminally charged and sentenced in thinly veiled political persecutions). The Tatmadaw ordered an unconstitutional one-year state of emergency, and state television broadcasts announced that political authority had been transferred to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the State Administration Council.
Looking back on the past year, it has been filled with familiar hallmarks of the Tatmadaw’s oppression: horrendous loss of life (conservatively at least 1,400 killed), countless arrests (estimates now run at nearly 8,800), and mass displacement. And as in eras past, the Tatmadaw has adopted these practices to retain power by whatever means necessary — including suppressing freedoms, curtailing rights, and terrorizing the population — and to fend off a burgeoning non-violent movement comprised of a new generation of leaders who have glimpsed the potential of democracy in Myanmar over the past decade.
But the past year has also been different – and remarkably so – for it has signaled not only the end of an era but the emergence of a new one.
A New Era
The CDM
The story of 2021 must start with the CDM — and the sea change that this movement represents among a generation that had not been born in 1988. Led by youth and women, the movement has used civil disruptions, work stoppages, and boycotts to hamper the Tatmadaw’s attempts to consolidate their power. In the process, the movement has signified not only a generational shift but a change in the representation and make up of political activity in Myanmar.
For many Burmans (the major ethnic group), participating in the movement has also prompted a sort of revelation, causing them, for instance, to question the misinformation espoused for years by the military that historically marginalized ethnic nationality groups were a threat to Burma. For so long, the country has been defined by its divisions — but the CDM has represented something new and distinctive as it has embraced and celebrated Burma’s diversity as a strength instead of a weakness.
The National Unity Government
The National Unity Government (NUG), which was announced in April 2021 as a “shadow” or interim government, represents the country’s first unity Comprised of members of the NLD, ethnic nationality groups, and other minority parties, the creation of the NUG parallels, in governmental structures, the bridge created between Burman communities and ethnic nationalities by the grassroots organizing of the CDM. What stands out about the NUG is that it is not a government comprised wholly of the Burman-led NLD but one that at least symbolically bridges ethnic divides in new ways.
Yes, there are legitimate questions on the depth of the unity, but this development nevertheless marks a first in Burma, and if it holds, it will define the new era in profoundly different terms from the previous one. During the 1990s through the first two decades of this century, there were calls for tripartite dialogue between the military, the NLD, and the ethnic nationalities, but never did the NLD unite with the ethnic groups in a government or other formal alliance.
The NLD’s treatment of the Rohingya crisis — ignoring or exacerbating severe human rights violations — has left deep distrust. Even here, however, there have been signs of change over the past year. One of the NUG’s interim cabinet ministers issued a public apology to the Rohingya for the government’s role in oppressing the group, and the NUG announced a new policy in June promising to end human rights abuses against the Rohingya and grant them citizenship. Given past experience, caution is still warranted as to whether there will be follow through on these pronouncements, but this much is clear: the NUG represents a potentially new political era.
The End of an Era
The emergence of the CDM and the NUG as well as the simultaneous generational shift has also signaled the beginning of the end of the era of Aung San Suu Kyi and others from her generation. From a towering symbol for human rights and democracy as a Nobel Peace Prize winner to a defender, at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), of the military’s genocidal actions and now returning to house detention once again, feelings towards Aung San Suu Kyi have grown more complicated over the past few years to say the least. And while she and the NLD remain beloved by many in Burma, this last year has brought into stark relief the aging leadership of the party. While criminal sentences against the Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior NLD leaders still make the news, the base of power has begun to move beyond these elders. Transitions take time, but this one is underway.
The End of the 2008 Constitution
The 2008 Constitution enshrined military impunity and placed the Tatmadaw permanently beyond the reach of either civilian political control or judicial oversight. The February 2021 actions of the military ironically have caused a break with the Constitution that it wrote. Though the military allegedly attempted to force NLD President Win Myint to step down so they could take power under the veneer of legitimacy, his refusal and their subsequent attempt to seize power through force undermined the 2008 Constitution.In April, the predecessor to the NUG announced that the 2008 Constitution was no longer valid and promised a system with equal protections for all. A proposed replacement constitution, called the Federal Democracy Charter, was published with the announcement. Recently, a revised draft of the Charter was approved in a People’s Assembly held by a broad coalition (the National Unity Consultative Council or NUCC), confirming that the diverse membership of the NUCC considers the Charter to be the country’s interim constitutional document. While some have expressed skepticism, fearing that the lofty promises of equal protection are rhetoric without substantive, feasible strategies for improving the lives of ethnic and religious minorities, it is almost impossible to imagine a return to the 2008 Constitution.
The End of a Failed Peace Process
For the past decade, the Tatmadaw (and the NLD) consistently suggested to the world that efforts were ongoing to achieve lasting peace to conflicts in various border areas where ethnic nationalities tend to comprise the majority of the population and which have been in conflict with the Tatmadaw for decades. For example, in 2016 the Tatmadaw announced a “national” “ceasefire” agreement, a misnomer both because it did not involve all the major armed groups and because fighting has persisted and even intensified over the past decade. This past year has refuted the existence of any credible peace process, paving the way going forward for either ongoing conflict or, more hopefully, some entirely new peace initiative.
ASEAN Slights Min Aung Hlaing
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been rightly criticized for failing to adequately respond to the military’s actions in Myanmar; none of the points in its five-point consensus plan from April 2021 to address the situation have seen significant progress. Yet during its October summit, ASEAN boldly excluded the Tatmadaw, and several countries at the summit directly criticized the military leadership. The issue of attendance remains unresolved, and expecting much more from ASEAN may be unrealistic with Cambodia — itself an autocracy — as the chair during the next year. Yet the fact that the group directly confronted the Tatmadaw in the way it did in October 2021 is unprecedented. It signals that ASEAN is keeping its options open as to where to place its allegiance in the new era and no longer blindly supporting the military.
International Recognition
In September of last year, the United States and China reached an informal agreement barring the Tatmadaw from being seated at the United Nations, undermining its attempts to gain international legitimacy. The General Assembly recently agreed to defer action on who would represent Myanmar at the United Nations, meaning that the current ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, who is loyal to the NUG and has in fact been “fired” by the Tatmadaw, will remain in place until the issue is resolved. While not a definitive win for either the NUG or the military, as with ASEAN keeping its options open, the recognition stalemate means that the military can no longer assume that its power grabs will lead to a place at the table internationally.
Businesses Exit
The old era included an opening up of the country to foreign direct investment, including to vast natural gas deposits in the early 1990s. The Tatmadaw benefited immensely from international investments, enjoying both material profits from partnering with international corporations to extract natural resources and gains in legitimacy that came with these partnerships. But in response to the deteriorating political and human rights situation over the past few months, Chevron (which bought Unocal, the original investor in Burma) and TotalEnergies (Total) announced earlier this year that they were withdrawing from Myanmar after 30 years. Woodside Petroleum followed Chevron and Total shortly thereafter, and other companies have pulled out as well. While this is not the only time businesses have exited the country, it is a dramatic reversal from the last ten years. Moreover, the inclusion of giants Chevron and Total in the exodus is a telling indication that even the most stalwart of holdouts from the previous era have broken with the military.
The International Criminal Court and International Accountability
While there has been significant progress around international accountability in Myanmar in recent years — from the Gambia’s case at the ICJ, to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) investigation, to the creation of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), to the acceptance by an Argentinian court of jurisdiction over crimes committed against the Rohingya — the NUG’s deposit of a letter with the ICC accepting jurisdiction by the Court for international crimes dating back to 2002 anywhere in the country is a major development. This letter signals the NUG’s commitment to join the international community, adhere to the rule of law, and address grave crimes throughout the country. The ICC should recognize the letter and authorize additional investigations beyond the Rohingya into international crimes, both historical and ongoing.
Prospects for Conflict or Peace
Despite these major developments and potential promise of this new era, many see a grim immediate prognosis defined by an escalation in violence as the conflict expands geographically and intensifies militarily. Predictably, civilians are likely to pay the largest price. The dominant view is also that for the foreseeable future, neither the military nor the NUG and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) can achieve outright military victory, raising the specter of a protracted and messy conflict.
Nonetheless, as Myanmar enters this new era, a crucial question remains: what is the recipe that will change the balance of power to permanently end the Tatmadaw’s continuous destabilizing effects? After all, the destabilizing force in Burmese politics over the last 75 years has been the Burmese military. Despite three elections over the past decade, never have civilians been given genuine power to guide the country forward and never has there been a concerted effort to achieve a lasting peace across ethnic lines. With this in mind, possible paths toward such peace and stability will require the following elements.
First, the CDM has the capacity to transform into a durable generational political movement that can continue to learn from its membership, evolve, and persist. The momentum behind this grassroots movement is reminiscent of the long-term political impacts of the civil rights movement in the United States and the struggle to end Apartheid in South Africa. In order to move Myanmar further forward (and away from military hegemony), the CDM’s core values of civilian power and celebration of the diversity of Burma must also persist, heralded by the youth leaders who see the opportunity for fundamental change.
Second, as the NUG continues to gain legitimacy and implement initiatives like the National Unity Consultative Council, a body designed to expand the alliance against the junta and establish a roadmap for a federal democratic system, there is an open question about whether this new governing body will live up to its name. In one possible version of the future, the NUG’s eventual composition would reflect the leadership of the CDM, developing a new generation of political leaders who are committed to the “Unity” element of the NUG. The NUG has already taken certain steps in this direction, making an unprecedented public statement acknowledging the injustices suffered by Rohingya Muslims and promising that it will seek “justice and accountability” for the military’s crimes against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups. This move toward cross-ethnic solidarity in the highest levels of government will be key to establishing a new kind of durable peace in Myanmar. However, many NUG members come straight from the NLD, and traditional fissures of distrust between the NLD and ethnic nationality leadership could easily reemerge if the NUG does not commit seriously to the equality and unity of all peoples in Myanmar.
The third critical factor in this equation is whether and how long the Tatmadaw can sustain its campaign of terror without cracking under the pressure. Desertions are reported by some as being at an all-time high, including both rank-and-file soldiers and officers. The Tatmadaw’s strategy to maintain nationwide control in the decades preceding the coup included a cycle of temporary ceasefires with certain ethnic groups, allowing the military to rotate its resources from suppression of one group to another. But because the military alienated nearly every group over the past year, ending many already tentative ceasefires, the Tatmadaw is now stretched thin trying to gain control in areas where it faces combined opposition from EAOs and representatives of the NUG’s Peoples Defense Force. With soldiers leaving the Tatmadaw to join the opposition and with additional collaboration between opposition forces, an increasingly desperate but still well-armed military has the potential to do enormous damage. The fighting is likely to get worse before it gets better, especially for civilians. However, this trend toward desertion combined with a unified civilian population sheds light on the cracks in the military’s grip.
Finally, China, ASEAN, the West, and the international community writ large must align against the destabilizing force that is the Tatmadaw. China may speak more in terms of avoiding civil war (given its interest in stability). ASEAN may speak more in terms of political solutions and dialogue amongst all the parties (given its practice of non-interference). The West may speak more in terms of rights and sanctions. But the common interest of these players should be a permanent and durable solution with civilian rule in Burma. Such a solution would meet the interests of the key regional and international players to end the conflict, find a politically satisfying outcome, and uphold human rights and the rule of law.
Like 8888, February 1, 2021, will be a date for the history books. Whether this next chapter of Myanmar’s history will bring an end to continued military rule and violent conflict and lead to a transition to democracy and peace is yet to be determined. As we mark the first anniversary of “1221” (or “2121”), however, one thing is clear: the events of the past year have reshaped Burma in fundamental ways, ushering in a new era with flickers of hope for true national unity at last..."
Source/publisher:
Just Security (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-02-03
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar, Political History, Military History
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Source/publisher:
People's Defence Force - Kalay
Date of publication:
2022-02-01
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2022-02-01
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Title: ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) ၏ ၉၁ နှစ်ပြည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်သို့ ပေးပို့သော သဝဏ်လွှာ
Description:
"၁၉၃၁ ခုနှစ် ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သော ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် ၉၁ နှစ် တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နယ်ချဲ့ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီပညာရေး အစရှိသည့်တိုက်ပွဲများတွင် အဖိနှိပ်ခံပြည်သူလူထု၊ ကျောင်းသားထုနှင့် တသားတည်းရပ်တည်ကာ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်က ရတကသရဲဘော်များအား ကျွန်ုပ်တို့မှ အလေးအမြတ်ပြုပါသည်။
ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) သည် စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းချိန်မှစ၍ ယနေ့တိုင်အောင် အဖိနှိပ်ခံလူထုနှင့်ရပ်တည်ကာ ဖိနှိပ်သူအပေါင်းကို တွန်းလှန်ခဲ့သည်မှာ အထင်အရှားပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်သည်လည်း အဖိနှိပ်ခံပြည်သူလူထုအကျိုး၊ ကျောင်းသားထုအကျိုးအတွက် ဆောင်ရွက်မည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အရပ်ရပ်တွင် ရဲဘော်တို့ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) နှင့် ဆက်လက်ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်လိမ့်မည် ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရတကသ) အနေဖြင့် အဖိနှိပ်ခံကျောင်းသားထုအကျိုး၊ ပြည်သူလူထုအကျိုးအား ဆက်လက်သယ်ပိုးထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ဗကသများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်မှ ဆန္ဒပြုရင်း သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
All Burma Federation of Student Unions
Date of publication:
2022-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"၁။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် မည်သည့်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မဆို အပြီးတိုင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် အခွင့်အရေးများကို အပြည့်အဝ အာမခံချက်ပေးနိုင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ထောင်ရေးကို ဦးတည်လျက် ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက ကြီးမှူး၍ ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၂၇)ရက်နေ့မှ (၂၉)ရက်နေ့အထိ သမိုင်းဝင်ညီလာခံကြီးအဖြစ် အောင်မြင်စွာ ကျင်းပနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
၂။ ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံသည် နိုင်ငံရေးအရ အမြင့်ဆုံး ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် ချမှတ်ပေးနိုင်သည့် စုစည်းမှု ဖြစ်ပြီး အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအင်အားစုများ စုပေါင်း၍ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ လူမှုရေး၊ လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံမူများ၊ မူဝါဒများ၊ မဟာဗျူဟာများနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုဆိုင်ရာအစီအမံများ ညှိနှိုင်းဆွေးနွေး အတည်ပြု ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် ကျင်းပခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ ဤညီလာခံကြီးတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ အပါအဝင် ရွေးကောက်ခံလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများ၊ သမဂ္ဂများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးများ၊ လူငယ်နှင့်လူနည်းစုဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အပါအဝင် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ လူထုသပိတ်လှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ကြားကာလ ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်/လူမျိုး ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီများမှ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဧည့်သည်တော်များနှင့် လေ့လာသူများ စုစုပေါင်း (၃၈၈)ဦး တက်ရောက်ခဲ့သည်။
၄။ ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံတွင် အောက်ပါဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို အတည်ပြုဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ သည်။
(က) ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် အစိတ်အပိုင်း (၁) နှင့် အစိတ်အပိုင်း (၂) ကြားကာလ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေဆိုင်ရာအစီအမံကို အတည်ပြုသည်။
(ခ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ကို အစုအဖွဲ့ (၅) ဖွဲ့အား ကိုယ်စားပြုသည့် အစုအဖွဲ့ဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်း (၃၃) ဖွဲ့ဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်ပြီ ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အတည်ပြုသည်။
(ဂ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) အဖွဲ့ဝင်အစုအဖွဲ့များက ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်ကို အတူတကွ ကတိကဝတ်ပြု သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ချ၍ လက်တွေ့ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားကြရန် သဘောတူ အတည်ပြု(Ratify) သည်။
(ဃ) ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၁၆) ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီ၏ အဆိုပြုချက်ဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) က ဖွဲ့စည်းပေးခဲ့သော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ကို ဤပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ရှေ့မှောက်၌ ထပ်လောင်း အတည်ပြုသည်။
(င) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ၏ လုပ်ငန်းအစီရင်ခံစာကို အတည်ပြုသည်။
(စ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ၏ လုပ်ငန်းအစီရင်ခံစာကို ပြင်ဆင် ဖြည့်စွက်ချက်များနှင့်အတူ အတည်ပြုသည်။
(ဆ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC)၏ ဦးဆောင်မှု ခိုင်မာ အားကောင်းစေရန်၊ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်တာများ ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ (NUG) အကြား လုပ်ငန်းများ ချိတ်ဆက်မှု ကောင်းမွန်စေရေးအတွက် လုပ်ငန်းလမ်းညွှန်နှင့် လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများ (Terms of Reference and Role) ကို ပြင်ဆင်ဖြည့်စွက်သွားရန် အတည်ပြုသည်။
(ဇ) ပထမအကြိမ် ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်ကို ထုတ်ပြန်ရန် အတည်ပြုသည်။
၅။ အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ဂျီနီဗာသဘောတူညီချက် (Geneva Convention) အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဥပဒေများကို ချိုးဖောက်လျက် ပြည်ထောင်စုတဝှမ်းလုံးရှိ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအား ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့်နှင့် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုများအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ (Crimes Against Humanity)၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု (War Crimes) ကျူးလွန်မှုများ၊ လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ (Genocides) စသည့် ကျူးလွန်နေမှုမှန်သမျှကို ဤပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံကြီးက ပြင်းထန်စွာ ကန့်ကွက်ရှုတ်ချပြီး အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီအား ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီမှတဆင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာရာဇဝတ်မှုခုံရုံး (International Criminal Court) ၌ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
၆။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက အင်အားအလွန်အကျွံသုံး၍ မြေပြင်နှင့် လေကြောင်း စစ်ဆင်ရေးများဖြင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူလူထုများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်နေခြင်းနှင့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း ကျူးလွန်ခံနေရမှုများမှ အကာအကွယ်ပေးရန် အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်ချက်အရ ကရင်ပြည်နယ်၊ ကရင်နီပြည်နယ်၊ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ မကွေးတိုင်းနှင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းများတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာအာမခံမှုဖြင့် အရပ်သား ပြည်သူလူထုများအား အကာအကွယ်ပေးသည့် လုံခြုံသောနေရာများ (Internationally Guaranteed Civilians Protection - Safe Zones) ဖြစ်ပေါ်ရေးနှင့် လူထုအတွက် အရေးပေါ် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုအကူအညီများအား ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုက်အဝန်းမှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသွားရန် ဤညီလာခံကြီးက အလေးအနက် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။
၇။ နိုင်ငံတကာအနေဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအား အသိအမှတ်မပြုဘဲ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ကိုသာ တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုရန် ဤညီလာခံက တောင်းဆိုတိုက်တွန်းသည်။
၈။ သို့ဖြစ်၍ ပြည်သူလူထုများ၏ ဘဝလုံခြုံမှုရရှိစေရေး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်အတွက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည့် ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပရှိ လူမျိုးစုံပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးနှင့် စစ်ကောင်စီအား အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးတို့ကို ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အစွမ်းကုန် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၉။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှ အပြီးတိုင်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ပုံသဏ္ဍာန်အမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့သူများ၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခံရသူများနှင့် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသူများအား ဤညီလာခံကြီးက အလေးအနက် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၁၀။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါဝင် အာဏာရှင်မှန်သမျှ ဖယ်ရှား၍ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်ကို အာမခံသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်သည် အထိ စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု၊ စုပေါင်းညီညွတ်မှုအင်အားတို့ဖြင့် ဆက်လက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။
အရေးတော်ပုံ မုချအောင်ရမည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-30
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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"The Wunpawng Migrated South crossing the rivers Kinsa Hka, Lam Taing Hka, and Nu Hka to finally reach Putao, From Putao they a pread East, West and South to this day we find Wunpawng in india ( Assam ), China ( Yunnan ) and in Shan states.
TRADITION AND CULTURE:- Before the impact of the American Baptist mission-aries, the Wunpawng were animists and the practice of animism comes under clannish - kinship system, unlike the European Feudalism, the Wunpawng feudal Authority had boundary and subjected to kinahip-relation mutual arrangement, the society of the Wunpawng is closely coalesced under kinship-relationship with a common language conversant by all ethnics, The communities of Wunpawng have a pattern of rule of chiefs who worked out their relationship in kinship manner brought down from generation to generation. The Du Was ( Wunpawng Chiefs ) did not under take subordination among themselves, they understood that were equal, in respect to liberty, ownership of property and the right to resist oppression subjugation and aggression. No chief would single out hims elf and considered himself to bo senior or more powerful than the others because of his affluence. For this reason alone, there was not one chie f to promote himself as lord of the others Du Was, Thus in the history of Wunpawng people d o not have any king, the society had no central authority but communities as republics on equal and independent. The republic of Wunpawng land as emerged to day has never bear subordinated to any of the Burmese king. Even in 1884 when the British annexed upper Burma, the British administration was only set up Bhamo and Myitkyina Leaving for the most part, Kachin frontier areas to Du Was, to administers according to their traditional customary, it was only in 1932 after Burma was separated from India, did the British consider it was obligatory to take charge of the Du Was territories and classified them as scheduled kachin frontiers to be taken care of by the Governor of Burma it was no English men but the Americans who brought in civilization religion and Education to the Wunpawng, with Christian teaching and western education, the inherent nationalism whish Wunpawng fostered through ages is leaning towards western Democracy.
MILITARY POTENTIAL AND CAPABILITY:- That during the seies of Rangoon in 1824 that Burmese king solicited wunpawng mercenaries to come to his did through the2 renawu Burmese General MAHA BANDOOLA many Wunpawng mercenaries fought for the Burmese king against the British india seroys, Bandoola was a Wunpawng by the name of BUN DU LA, the Burmans usually obliterated the right proper name to cancel authenticity, upserp ation is the common practice of the Burmans above all recognition and respect to Wunpawng sovereignty as and independent nation that Burmese king himself did present his majestic dress to Wunpawng chiefs, it is still with DAI HPA DU WA Hukawng District, and it is a salient fact indeed. It took the British decade to pacify the Wunpawng resisting spirit against s subordination to the British. In 1928 when the British government brought and freed the slaves, then only did the Du Was reconciled with the British authority and become vassals to the Governpr of Burma. With aptitude to military carcer, Wunpawng were drafted into military services. First, military police fprce, then Burma Army, and in world warI the Wunpawng military unit (Bhamo Battalion ) rank and file of 1589 strong were s ent to mediterranean theatre for active combat. In 1917, some 349 Wunpawng soldiera took part in Mesopotamia and Turkey battle frontline actions.
A company strength was stationed in Egyt for garrison d uty, the total casualty of Wunpawng soldiers in world war I, was sixty dead and 113 wounded..."
Source/publisher:
Major N’Chyaw Tang
Date of publication:
1980-00-00
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-26
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Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Kachin history, Kachin (economic, social, cultural, political)
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"No one doubts that the American community in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai, which consists mostly of NGO workers, missionaries and retirees, needs consular services. But could that be the only reason why a massive, new United States (US) Consulate General is under construction at a cost of US$300 million? Due to be opened in 2023, the buildings of the diplomatic mission will sprawl over no less than 6.6 acres, or 26,709 square meters, of land in a business park on the outskirts of Chiang Mai. In a colorful, online brochure, the US Consul General in Chiang Mai describes the project as “a concrete sign of our long-term commitment to the people of northern Thailand and the future of our partnership” and the text goes on to state that the US Consulate General is “dedicated to serving the local American community or those wishing to travel to the United States”.
While all of that may be accurate, Michael Vatikiotis, a Singapore-based British analyst, argues in an op-ed piece for Nikkei Asia on January 7 that Beijing sees the construction of a such a huge diplomatic complex only 500 kilometers from the Chinese border and even closer to Myanmar and Laos “as an attempt to reinforce existing US intelligence gathering capacity in northern Thailand”.
Covert US activity of that kind would fit into the broader picture of geostrategic rivalries in the region. The rise of China as an economic and political superpower in Asia has been met by the formation of new alliances in the region. The first was the Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which was set up in 2007 and brings the US together with Japan, India and Australia. Then, on September 15 last year, the formation of AUKUS, or the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact, was announced with the specific purpose of coordinating activities in the spheres of “cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional underwater capabilities.” Under the terms of the pact, the US and the UK will help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines.
Both pacts are widely seen as efforts to counter China’s influence in the contested South China Sea and the Chinese navy’s increasingly frequent forays into the Indian Ocean. That was not lost on Beijing, who especially condemned the establishment of AUKUS. Only two days after the announcement of the pact, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said the alliance risked “severely damaging regional peace… and intensifying the arms race.” He also criticised what he called “the obsolete Cold War… mentality” of the pact’s members and warned them that they were “hurting their own interests.”
In an editorial published in the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Global Times on September 30, the rhetoric was even blunter and more vitriolic: “The three countries, drawing lines based on ideology, have built a new military bloc that will heighten geopolitical tensions. The international community rejects the Cold War and its divisions, but the US blatantly violates its political claims of not engaging in any new Cold War and gangs up with others to create a small Anglo-Saxon ‘clique,’ putting geopolitical self-interest above international solidarity. This is a typical Cold War mentality”.
The editorial also warned of the danger of an escalating arms race: “The move will spur regional countries to accelerate the development of military capabilities, and even seek to break the nuclear threshold and increase the risk of military conflict. The US, on the one hand, hands out sanctions and suppresses some countries to pressure them not to develop nuclear capabilities, while on the other hand flagrantly transferring nuclear technologies to non-nuclear states. This is a typical double standard”.
The Global Times editorial did not expand on the reference to the possibility of nuclear proliferation, and Australia will certainly not become a nuclear power just because it is about to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. But the harsh rhetoric shows how concerned China’s government is, and that the battlelines in the new Cold War are becoming clearer. China is seen as the enemy of a range of countries which consider themselves guardians of democratic values. Needless to say, there are also competing economic interests between China and its adversaries. An increasingly affluent Asia is a huge market for consumer goods and the region is rich in natural and mineral resources which many countries are eager to exploit.
That competition can be seen also on land and it’s no coincidence that Chiang Mai has been chosen as a strategic listening post in the region. And in that regard, it appears that old ghosts have come alive again. The Americans first set up a diplomatic mission in Chiang Mai in 1950, and it was then mainly an intelligence station that coordinated support for nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, forces that had retreated into Shan State in eastern Myanmar after their defeat in the Chinese Civil War. A string of bases was established just across the border in Shan State and, to the north, along the Chinese border. The tiny airstrip at Möng Hsat opposite Thailand’s Chiang Rai province was transformed into a formidable air base capable of receiving C-46 and C-47 transport planes, which brought in arms, ammunition, and medical supplies. This dramatic build-up was a joint venture between the Republic of China’s Kuomintang government, which still controlled the island of Taiwan, and the US security authorities to encircle and try to reconquer the Chinese mainland. But the effort failed miserably. The Shan State-based “secret Kuomintang” army attempted on no less than seven occasions in the early 1950s to invade neighboring Yunnan Province in China, but was repeatedly driven back across the border.
Then came the wars in Indochina, and the US consulate in Chiang Mai oversaw the gathering of human as well as signals intelligence in the region. Local agents were sent across the border and the Americans together with the Thais had an extensive network of listening posts in northern Thailand. The main such facility was located at Ramasun, 20 kilometers south of Udon Thani in northeastern Thailand. That base was first established in 1966 but then as an outpost for the main facility in Bangkok. In 1970, it was upgraded to an AN/FLR-9 Circular Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA) station, a large, circular array of Wullenweber antennas commonly referred to by the nickname “Elephant Cage” because its shape resembled an elephant kraal. The Ramasun facility picked up radio traffic from Laos, southern China and North Vietnam and monitored Chinese military movements in the region. Most importantly, it served as a military intelligence terminal for communications between the US and its various intelligence sites in Southeast and East Asia.
A similar signals intelligence facility was established near Lampang, 108 kilometers south of Chiang Mai, for the specific purpose of monitoring radio traffic in northern Myanmar and Yunnan. American Chinese language experts translated intercepted messages into English, and Burmese-speaking Shans translated messages in Burmese into Thai and English. A major target at that time was the China-supported Communist Party of Burma (CPB). There was always the possibility of a linkup between the CPB and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), which would open a direct route for arms flowing down from China and into Southeast Asia. China’s plan at the time was to use Myanmar as a springboard to reach not only the CPT but, at least until the 1960s, communist movements in Malaya (now Malaysia) and Indonesia.
The “Elephant Cage” at Ramasun was officially dismantled in 1976, a year after the end of the Indochina wars and, in 1975, Thailand also switched recognition to the People’s Republic of China from the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Americans withdrew and the Thais took over operation of the Ramasun and Lampang facilities. Over the years, the “Elephant Cages” became obsolete and, in May 1986, the very last of them, in Alaska, was decommissioned. Today, there are more advanced and sophisticated ways of monitoring movements in cyberspace, as well as on the ground.
The current US mission in Chiang Mai is located in old buildings overlooking the banks of the Ping River. Some of them were built over a hundred years ago and then called the Chedi Ngam Palace, or the Beautiful Pagoda Palace. The compound once served as the residence of the last ruler of northern Thailand, Chao Kaew Nawarat, who died in 1939. After that it became government property and, eleven years later, the Americans moved in and turned it into a consulate. But it is important to remember that it remained a consulate until 1986 and only then became a Consulate General, or a proper foreign service mission. Before 1986, it was effectively an intelligence station, although it also provided consular services.
It is anybody’s guess what roles the new US Consulate General will play when it opens its doors next year. Apart from the obvious — that people will go there to get visas, for cultural events and to visit its libraries — intelligence gathering will most certainly be a top priority. Myanmar-watching will remain one of the consulate general’s main tasks, albeit in a different context as China no longer exports revolution. But Beijing’s expanding economic empire requires political protection and therefore also influence in its neighboring countries. Myanmar is right there, between Thailand and China, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is China’s only direct access to the Indian Ocean.
Already in 2017, China’s then Consul General in Chiang Mai, Ren Yisheng, talked about Beijing’s multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative, at the city’s university. Two years later, Ren attended a similar conference in Chiang Rai with the emphasis on development in the so-called Greater Mekong Sub-region, which includes parts of southern China, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. Even China appears to have made Chiang Mai and their Consulate General there a base for their plans for the region.
Chinese boats with armed police, seen by this correspondent, are also now for the first time in history venturing down the Mekong River, almost as far as the riverine junction where Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet. That may not be perceived as a major threat to the region, but it is nevertheless a new development that China’s adversaries would be keen to monitor. And while the US has strongly condemned last year’s February 1 coup in Myanmar, China is cozying up to the generals. In August, China transferred US$6 million to Myanmar to be used for projects and programs within Beijing’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework, seemingly a tiny gesture but important in the broader scheme of things. Then there are the insurgencies inside Myanmar where China maintains close links with the United Wa State Army while its rival, the Restoration Council of Shan State, receives most of its supplies from Thailand.
The new Cold War may not yet be as hot as the previous one sometimes was, but it is clear that the Americans and their Quad and AUKUS allies are building a bulwark against China and that the construction of a new US Consulate General in Chiang Mai is part of that strategy. But we can only wait and see what that means for the region — and especially for troubled and vulnerable Myanmar. There’s still a long way to go before we could see a return to the open confrontations of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. But, once again, Myanmar may well find itself in the midst of a geopolitical storm..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, China-Burma-US relations
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"Three electricity pylons supplying the China-backed Tagaung Taung nickel-processing plant in Sagaing Region have been blown up this month, forcing production to halt.
Tigyaing Township People’s Defense Force (PDF) said it blew up the pylons on January 7.
The nickel project opened in July 2008 with a 20-year production-sharing contract between the No.1 Mining Enterprise of Myanmar and Chinese state-owned firm China Nonferrous Metal Mining (CNMC).
With an investment of US$800 million, the project is the largest nickel production site in Myanmar with an annual production of 85,000 tonnes of ferronickel, according to the joint venture Myanmar CNMC Nickel.
Around 5,000 tonnes of ferronickel ore each day is transported from the Mt Tagaung mine in Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region, to Tigyaing where the nickel is smelted.
The Chinese Embassy in Yangon has reportedly complained to the parallel National Unity Government about the explosions but no details are known.
Chinese mining companies in Myanmar are being called on to demonstrate greater social responsibility and accountability and withdraw their investments since last year’s coup.
Activists have pushed for the closures of China-backed mines. A report by Publish What You Pay Australia — a coalition of 30 organizations campaigning for transparency and accountability in the extractive industries — said Chinese-backed mines were financially propping up the junta.
The report, How Chinese Mining Investment Funds the Myanmar Military, released in November last year, said the Chinese-run Letpadaung, Sapetaung and Kyesintaung and Tagaung Taung mines paid an estimated US$725 million to the military during the 2020-21 financial year.
Myanmar’s three largest mines are run by Chinese state-owned enterprises, Wanbao Mining Ltd and CNMC, with a slice of the profits flowing to the generals, said the report.
It said Myanmar’s economy has been in freefall since the coup meaning the regime is increasingly reliant on oil and gas, gemstones and metal mining, often with heavy Chinese investment.
More than 1,400 people have been killed by the junta since its takeover in February last year, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Political History
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"The Myanmar military raided Ohn Nauk Village in Sagaing Region’s Pale Township from January 10-12, employing four helicopters in an attempt to capture Pale People’s Defense Force (PDF) leader Bo Nagar dead or alive. Pale PDF has inflicted heavy casualties on junta troops under the leadership of Bo Nagar.
The PDF leader was elsewhere during the raid. Bo Nagar spoke recently to The Irrawaddy about the fighting in his town.
When did clashes break out between junta troops and local resistance fighters in Pale?
We have been fighting them since around the end of April.
Are you worried that the regime is employing large numbers of troops to capture you dead or alive?
Yes, I have concerns. But I am also prepared for it. I have left behind those who I was attached to. Now, I have only the people to love and rely on. I have chosen to live for the people over my own life as the country is suffering. I know that there are risks. But even before I risked my neck, I had to sacrifice a lot. I know that there will be more dangers ahead.
But I keep pushing ahead. Meanwhile, I have taught and nurtured young people as much as I can so that they can replace me if I die. So there are many people like me now even if I die. They are not yet a significant presence just because I am still here. But I want to say that there are many people like me now. I have concerns [about my safety]. Other people might also have concerns. But I try not to worry too much and I would like to urge the people not to worry.
Junta forces recently raided Ohn Nauk Village on a tip that you were there. They even used four helicopters in the raid. What do you say about that?
The military regime, after they have fought with us, knows how dangerous I am to them. And they also know through their military informants how much moral support I give to local people.
So perhaps they [the junta] view me as their worst enemy. But even if they kill me, there are already many people like me. They [the regime] might not know that there are many people who can replace me now.
Do you feel like the regime is attacking you personally?
They seem to think that resistance will die away if I am killed. But I have inspired many young people, not only in my township but also in other parts of the country, to continue fighting injustice. The junta may be able to defeat me alone. But they cannot prevent the rise of a new generation of brave revolutionaries.
The regime should understand that people loathe them as they are forced to bow down before them. So I urge the regime leaders and followers to surrender and apologize to the people for their sins. Although they are the villains of the country, they can still win the respect of the people in the end if they do apologize.
What are your concerns for civilians in Pale?
I have a lot of concerns for the people here. As I have built an organization that is concerned with all of Myanmar, I have to make many trips. Things happened in Pale during my first trip and, even though I was away, I was concerned about my town.
I am concerned that civilians will be killed and tortured and that resistance fighters will be harmed. I have trained them mentally and physically as much as I can. Although I have left my township, I didn’t leave for my own safety. I went away to make preparations and to do what it takes to achieve liberty for our country.
What do you say to people who are concerned about your safety?
Don’t worry about me. Just worry that our country remains under the rule of the evil.
What do you want to say about the resistance movement?
This revolution was born out of our witnessing violence and brutality. There will inevitably be pain and difficulties, as the revolution was born out of the sufferings people have endured for too long. Please stay strong at this moment. There will be hardship in this revolution as we are facing the most unscrupulous people.
Think about the hell-like consequences that we might have to face if this revolution fails. So please continue to take part in this revolution with bravery and dignity as citizens who are dutiful to their country and as parents who are dutiful to the younger generations.
Once we are united, this revolution will reach its goal smoothly. The military regime is in chaos even though only a few people are fighting. Bearing that in mind, the whole country should rise and take an active part in this revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"Were Inya Lake an animate being, it could tell many stories about Myanmar’s politics. The famous lake in Yangon has witnessed the way Myanmar’s politics has been shaped by its residents, from the prestigious Yangon University, the birthplace of Myanmar’s independence struggle, to the residences of Myanmar’s dictatorial and democratic leaders.
From Myanmar’s first military dictator Ne Win to democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, their lakeside residences have been intertwined with Myanmar’s politics.
Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is one of the landlords in the upmarket village neighborhood on Inya Lake. And he has two. Min Aung Hlaing did not have a house of his own in an affluent neighborhood in the commercial capital Yangon until he was handpicked by former dictator Senior General Than Shwe to become the military chief in 2011. But in the next five years, he managed to acquire two residences in the Inya Lake neighborhood worth billions of kyats (millions of US dollars).
One of his residences is known as 14 Inya, located at No. 14 Inya Road. Another is at 6 ½ Mile, close to the Lotte International Hotel and not far from Kan Thar Yar Hospital, in which he has a financial interest.
Until 2014, the coup leader stayed at 14 Inya whenever he came to Yangon, but since 2015 he has preferred to stay at the 6 ½ Mile residence, according to striking military personnel.
The 14 Inya residence used to be a military guesthouse, commonly known as the military intelligence guesthouse, where military leaders received foreign diplomats and ethnic armed organization leaders.
One of the prominent figures who visited the location was the late leader of the Karen National Union (KNU) General Saw Bo Mya, better known as Bo Mya. Military intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt received him at the guesthouse, according to a former military intelligence officer.
In his heyday as the military spy chief in the 1990s, Khin Nyunt would celebrate Thingyan, the water festival that marks Myanmar’s New Year, at the guesthouse together with military leaders and artists.
But since 2011, Min Aung Hlaing has made the guesthouse his own mansion.
“When Senior General Than Shwe stepped down, he asked [then] General Min Aung Hlaing if he had a house in which to live in Yangon. [Min Aung Hlaing] said he did not, so that guesthouse was given [to him],” a former lieutenant general from the previous military regime told The Irrawaddy.
Min Aung Hlaing and military leaders at the opening ceremony of Kan Thar Yar Hospital in December 2017.
The guesthouse was then sold to Min Aung Hlaing at a price much lower than the market rate at the time and transferred from military ownership to Min Aung Hlaing’s private ownership, said the former lieutenant general.
Today, the property is valued in the millions of US dollars—something Min Aung Hlaing could not afford with his own official remuneration package.
Not content with the 14 Inya residence, Min Aung Hlaing had the residence at 6 ½ Mile transferred to his private possession. It was created from three compounds previously owned by the military and used to house serving major generals dating back to the time of late military dictator Ne Win.
One of Min Aung Hlaing’s two residences on Inya Lake is near the Lotte Hotel.
Before the military’s headquarters was moved to Naypyitaw, the last occupants of those three compounds were joint adjutant-generals Major General Maung Nyo and Major General Kyaw Win, and deputy air defense chief Major General Kyi Win.
The compounds were left vacant after the three moved to serve at Naypyitaw military headquarters. Following the relocation of the headquarters, some military-owned properties were sold or leased to businesses and individuals.
Min Aung Hlaing purchased the three compounds and started building a mansion there in 2014. It is not known how much he paid for the compounds. Real estate agents said a plot of land is worth millions of US dollars in that particular neighborhood.
The mansion was built by IGE Co. owned by U Nay Aung, the elder brother of Myanmar’s Navy chief Admiral Moe Aung, according to a striking government employee from Yangon.
Nay Aung and Moe Aung are the sons of U Aung Thaung, the former Industry Minister who was notorious as the most corrupt official in the former military regime. The military leased the land on which the Lotte Hotel now sits to IGE in 2012..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-17
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"အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်ခံ ကျောင်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့မှ ဖွင့်လှစ်သော ဘွဲ့ကြိုသင်တန်း အသီးသီးသို့ တက်ရောက်သည့် ကျောင်းသူ/သားများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်..."
Source/publisher:
University of Medicine1, Yangon Interim University Council
Date of publication:
2022-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-17
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
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အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးကာလအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ နေပြည်တော်၊ ရန်ကုန်မြို့တော်၊ မန္တလေးမြို့တော်စည်ပင်သာယာရေးကော်မတီများ၏ မြေအရောင်းအဝယ်ဆိုင်ရာ လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များအားလုံး တရားဝင်မှုမရှိကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်
Description:
"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ အာဏာကို မတရားသောနည်းလမ်းဖြင့် အတင်းအဓမ္မ သိမ်းယူထားသော၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ(CRPH)က အကြမ်းဖက် အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် တရားဝင်ကြေညာခြင်းခံထားရသော၊ ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် မည်သည့်နိုင်ငံကမျှ တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုထားခြင်းမရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းတစ်ခုသာဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်ခံ စည်ပင်သာယာရေးကော်မတီများသည် စည်ပင်သာယာ ပိုင်မြေများကို ရောင်းချခြင်း၊ ဂရံဖောက်ခြင်းများ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေကြောင်းသိရှိရသည်။ နိုင်ငံပိုင်မြေ၏ မူလပိုင်ရှင်သည် နိုင်ငံတော်တွင်မှီတင်းနေထိုင်ကြသော နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် ပြည်သူလူထုအား ကိုယ်စားပြုမှု အလျဉ်းမရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ယင်း၏ လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် အဆိုပါမြေများအား စီမံခန့်ခွဲ ရောင်းချပိုင်ခွင့် မရှိကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် သတိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက အာဏာသိမ်းထားသည့်ကာလအတွင်း နေပြည်တော်၊ ရန်ကုန်မြို့တော်၊ မန္တလေးမြို့တော်စည်ပင်သာယာရေးကော်မတီများက မြေကွက်များရောင်းချခြင်း၊ ဂရံထုတ်ပေးခြင်းများသည် တရားဝင်မှု လုံးဝမရှိသော ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်သာဖြစ်၍ အဆိုပါမြေကွက်များကို ဝယ်ယူခြင်း၊ ဂရံထုတ်ယူခြင်း၊ တဆင့်ရောင်းချခြင်းများ မပြုလုပ်ကြရန် တားမြစ်ပြီး ပြည်သူ့အာဏာ ပြည်သူ့လက်ဝယ်ပြန်လည်ရောက်ရှိသည့် အချိန်ကာလတွင် အဆိုပါ မြေများအား ပြည်သူပိုင်မြေအဖြစ် ပြန်လည် သိမ်းယူသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကာ ဝယ်ယူသူများ၊ ရောင်းချသူများနှင့်တကွ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သူများအားလုံးကို ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သတိပေးလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Political History
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Facing a huge loss of revenue amid economic turmoil, the military has sent soldiers to act as debt collectors.
Description:
"The schoolteacher had just gotten out of bed when four Myanmar army soldiers pounded on her door. Her electricity payment was overdue, they said, and ordered her to pay it immediately at the government power company office.
The teacher, Daw Thida Pyone, asked what would happen if she refused. “One soldier pointed his gun at me and said, ‘If you choose your money over your life, then don’t go pay the bill,’” she recounted.
She was so frightened she got goose bumps. She grabbed her money and went straight to the payment office, not even taking time to change out of her yellow and pink pajamas.
After the Myanmar military seized power in a Feb. 1 coup, millions of people walked off their jobs in protest. Millions also began refusing to pay for electricity, an act of civil disobedience aimed at depriving the junta of a crucial source of revenue.
Experts doubt that these efforts alone can bring down the regime. But eleven months after the coup, the military appears so desperate for cash that its soldiers have begun acting as debt collectors.
For weeks, residents say, troops have been going door to door alongside power company workers to extract payments in major urban areas, including the nation’s two largest cities, Yangon and Mandalay.
The soldier’s threat to Ms. Thida Pyone was part of a wider, violent crackdown as the regime has tried to crush street protests and the civil disobedience movement. Soldiers and the police have killed at least 1,466 civilians, including nearly 200 who died during torture at interrogation centers, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. At least 85 young protesters were shot in the head at demonstrations, the rights group said.
The coup and subsequent crackdown also threw the nation’s economy into crisis as millions left their jobs in protest, including doctors, engineers, bank staff, power company employees and railway workers. Most have not returned.
The economy had previously been projected to grow in 2021, but with the coup and the Covid-19 pandemic, the World Bank estimates that it contracted by more than 18 percent instead.
The United Nations Development Program predicts that urban poverty rates will triple by early 2022, according to a December report based on a survey of 1,200 households.
“A slide into poverty of this scale could mean the disappearance of the middle class — a bad omen for any rapid recovery from this crisis,” Kanni Wignaraja, director of the agency’s bureau for Asia and the Pacific, said in a statement accompanying the report.
Myanmar’s currency, the kyat, has plummeted since the coup to less than half its previous value, driving up prices for imports such as fuel and cooking oil.
Cash remains in short supply as people, lacking confidence in the banks, hoard kyat. Banks are no longer stocking even a handful of A.T.M.s. Customers who want their money must obtain a token online or make an appointment by phone; both are almost impossible to do. Most people get cash from their accounts by transferring it to a broker and paying a commission of as much as 7 percent.
After a previous military regime began opening the country in 2010, Myanmar saw economic growth with increased international investment and a higher standard of living. The coup has undone this progress.
“In the past 10 months, the country has lost all its gains from the past 10 years,” said U Hein Maung, an economist based in Myanmar. “The cost of doing business has increased substantially. There is a booming informal economy of drug trafficking, illegal logging, money laundering and other illegal businesses.”
A decline in electricity payments, as well as tax revenues and international development assistance, has cost the regime about a third of the revenue that the previous government used to receive, he said.
Many public services, like health care and schools, are barely functioning, and the regime has halted many longer-term programs reliant on state funding, such as infrastructure projects.
“They are in zombie mode,” Mr. Hein Maung said. “They are functioning in the minimum viable way.”
Nevertheless, the military is in a better position than the public to withstand the downturn.
“The military has its own businesses and banks,” he said. “They can survive despite the fact that everything else has collapsed. And they have the guns, of course.”
Myanmar’s shadow opposition government, the National Unity Government, has urged the public to stop paying for electricity. In September, it said that 97 percent of people in Mandalay and 98 percent in Yangon had done so, costing the regime $1 billion by that point.
Ko Si Thu Aung, 24, who sells vintage clothes online, had not paid his bill since February in support of the civil disobedience movement. But on Christmas Day, soldiers came to his home and cut the power line. After two days without electricity, he decided he had no choice.
“If there is no electricity, I can’t work,” he said as he stood in line with more than 300 others waiting to pay their bills at the office of the Mandalay Electricity Supply Cooperative. “I feel bad because our money will become bullets to kill people.”
He said he would atone by donating more than the amount of his electricity payment to the People’s Defense Force, an anti-regime militia formed since the coup.
Opponents of the regime have also targeted lesser revenue sources, such as motor vehicle payments, by not renewing driver’s licenses or car registration. Soldiers have begun trying to collect more money by stopping drivers at random and inspecting their documents.
And revenue from the state-run lottery dropped to nearly zero after most of the public stopped buying tickets.
Opponents also have mounted a boycott against companies owned by the military, which operates two vast conglomerates with more than 120 subsidiaries. Among those affected are military-owned beer producers, banks, a cigarette manufacturer, tourist hotels, an insurance company and the cellphone company Mytel, a joint venture with Vietnam’s defense ministry.
In Mandalay, where the power goes out every day for hours at a time, the regime’s strong-arm campaign to collect electricity payments began in October.
Power outages were common before the coup but recently have become longer and more frequent. The energy ministry blames the outages in part on a fourfold increase in the price of imported natural gas.
Sometimes, in their effort to collect payment, troops sever the cables supplying power to individual homes.
Dr. Wai Phyo Aung, 36, a Mandalay dentist, said soldiers came to his neighborhood at the end December and cut the power lines of residents with the largest outstanding bills. One man who took a photo of a soldier cutting a cable was arrested, he said.
But he said he would refuse to give the regime any money. He has not paid his bill since the coup.
“If they come to my house and cut the electricity, I don’t care,” he said. “I will never pay the bill. I don’t care even if they kill me. I won’t let my money kill citizens and feed the war dogs.”
Ms. Thida Pyone, 39, who stood in the payment line in her pajamas, said she felt that she had no choice.
“They are threatening people in all possible ways,” she said. “I feel guilty for paying the bill, but I am afraid they will kill me.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The New York Times" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-01-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"The military coup on February 1, 2021, effectively ended the democratic transition under Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD was poised to return to power for another five years after winning landslide general elections in November 2020. Instead, under the military State Administration Council (SAC) junta led by Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, soldiers and police rounded up hundreds of members of parliament, including Aung San Suu Kyi and senior NLD party members, and held them in arbitrary detention for months, many of them in undisclosed locations.
The military seized power making unfounded claims of widespread and systematic election and voter irregularities, although international and domestic election observers found that the election was “credible and reflected the will of the majority of the voters.”
The junta brought multiple charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, including for corruption, incitement, and breaching the Official Secrets Act. Three of her deposed cabinet ministers and an Australian economic adviser also faced charges under the Official Secrets Act.
Millions took to the streets across the country in largely peaceful protests to call for the military to relinquish power, while members of parliament, ethnic minority representatives, and civil society activists formed the opposition National Unity Government (NUG). The security forces responded by committing offenses amounting to crimes against humanity against the civilian population, including torture, severe deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances, rape and other sexual abuse, and inhumane treatment. Journalists, lawyers, medical personnel, anti-junta protesters, civil society activists, women, and many others continue to be at high risk of arbitrary arrest.
Between February 1 and November 1, the police and military killed at least 1,200 protesters and bystanders, including approximately 75 children, and have detained over 8700 government officials, activists, journalists, and civil servants.
On March 14, the junta imposed martial law in several townships across Yangon and began to enforce additional restrictions in other parts of the country. On May 13, the junta also imposed martial law in Chin State’s Mindat township after clashes between security forces and lightly armed opposition militias. Under martial law orders, direct authority over the townships was transferred to the respective regional military commanders.
Since the coup, the military has intensified military operations against ethnic armed groups in some areas, such as Chin State. The military’s indiscriminate use of artillery and airstrikes has reportedly injured and killed civilians, damaged villages, including schools, and forced thousands to flee.
Post-Coup Crimes against Humanity
The security forces have engaged in widespread and systematic attacks on civilians throughout Myanmar, including killing protesters, enforced disappearance of opposition supporters, torture, sexual abuse, rape of some detainees, and mass political detentions. On February 21, 2021, the junta stated in the state’s Global New Light of Myanmar: “Protesters are now inciting the people, especially emotional teenagers and youth, to a confrontation path where they will suffer the loss of life.”
Many of the 1,200 people killed by police and military since the coup were protesters and bystanders in cities and towns across Myanmar, including Yangon, Mandalay, Bago, Monywa, and other townships in Sagaing Region, Mindat township in Chin State, and many other locations. International human rights standards permit law enforcement officials to use lethal force only as a last resort when there is an imminent threat to life. But in numerous cases in 2021 reported by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, other human rights organizations, and media, security forces fired on demonstrators who were unarmed and posed no apparent threat.
The UN reported that on March 3, security forces across the country fired live rounds at protesters, killing at least 38 and wounding more than 100. Killings were also reported in one day in Monywa, Sagaing Region; Myingyan and Mandalay, Mandalay Region; Salin, Magway Region; and Mawlamyine, Mon State, according to media reports. On March 13, authorities killed at least nine protesters, including five in the Sein Pan area of Mandalay, when security forces shot into a crowd. On March 14 in Hlaing Tharyar township, Yangon, security forces killed an estimated 66 people, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
The MRTV news channel announced the day before Armed Forces Day, on March 27, that demonstrators “should learn from the tragedy of earlier ugly deaths that you can be in danger of getting shot to the head and back.” On March 27, security forces followed through on that threat by carrying out violent crackdowns on protesters in at least 40 towns and cities, killing dozens.
On April 9, military personnel killed an estimated 82 people in Bago in a dawn assault on protesters’ barricades and encampments; exact figures have been difficult to determine due to a strong security presence and lack of access to the area by reporters or independent investigators.
Many persons detained for taking part in pro-democracy demonstrations said after their release that security personnel tortured and otherwise ill-treated them and others in custody. Methods of torture included beatings, mock executions with guns, burning with cigarettes, and rape and threatened rape.
The junta has taken into custody more than 100 politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, and protesters, and refused to confirm their whereabouts or conditions of detention in violation of international law. Security forces frequently detained family members, including children and older people, when they were unable to find the individual they sought to arrest.
Threats to Rohingya
Authorities have been committing the crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and severe deprivation of liberty against 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State. Most Rohingya had fled the country following the military’s campaign of killings, rape, and arson that resulted in crimes against humanity and genocidal acts in 2017.
Approximately 130,000 Rohingya have been confined to open-air detention camps in central Rakhine State since being displaced by ethnic cleansing in 2012, in violation of their fundamental right to return home. They are denied freedom of movement in what amounts to arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of liberty.
Following the coup, restrictions on humanitarian access increased, leading to preventable deaths and illnesses in Rohingya camps and villages. In late May, nine children reportedly died Rakhine State following an outbreak of acute watery diarrhea.
Threats to Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Women have led and taken part in mass protests as part of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against the junta. Female protesters were some of the first killed by security forces and arbitrarily detained. Many women reported being beaten by security forces during their arrests, and some reported credible allegations of sexual violence and humiliating treatment by security forces during their detention.
Trafficking of women and girls remains a serious problem in Shan and Kachin States, where conflict and economic desperation has made them vulnerable to being lured to China under false promises and sold into sexual slavery and forced reproduction as “brides.”
The NLD government, prior to the coup, was unable to pass the Prevention of Violence Against Woman Law. While the law had been criticized for falling well short of international standards, the absence of targeted legislation has stalled efforts to prevent gender-based violence, assist survivors, and bring perpetrators to justice.
Freedom of Expression and Media
As of October 25, Myanmar’s junta had arrested 98 journalists, 46 of whom remained in detention, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Six journalists had been convicted, including five for violating section 505A of the penal code, a new provision that makes it a crime to publish or circulate comments that “cause fear” or spread “false news.” In such prosecutions, “false news” appears to be any news that the authorities do not want to reach the public.
On March 8, the junta stripped media licenses from five local outlets: Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), Khit Thit Media, Mizzima, Myanmar Now, and 7Day. On May 4, authorities banned two other outlets, the Kachin-based 74 Media and the Shan-based Tachileik News Agency, and also banned satellite television.
Also, on May 4, authorities arrested US journalist Danny Fenster, the managing editor of Frontier Myanmar, and detained him on politically motivated charges. On November 12, a court sentenced him to 11 years’ hard labor, but he was permitted to leave the country on November 15.
On June 30, the Ministry of Information issued a warning to journalists to stop describing the SAC as a “junta” or face prosecution.
Internet Shutdowns
In the weeks following the coup, the junta imposed nationwide internet shutdowns from 1 a.m. to 9 a.m., which were later lifted, but authorities continued to block many websites and throttled internet speeds throughout the year. Blocks to mobile data and networks also continued across 22 townships where anti-junta opposition resulted in heavy clashes between the Myanmar military and pro-democracy militia groups.
Threats to Humanitarian Aid
Increased fighting between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups in the border areas in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, and Shan States has increased strain on access and limited humanitarian aid to those areas. The UN said, in July, at least 3 million people needed humanitarian aid—an increase of 2 million since February 1—and food shortages were reported in parts of Chin and Rakhine States.
Anti-Junta Militias
Militias have formed around the country since the coup to oppose the junta and target security forces. Many of the militias have adopted the title of People’s Defense Forces, the same name the NUG adopted for the nationwide force it created. However, not all the recently formed People’s Defense Forces are linked to the NUG or take orders from its command structure.
These militias began conducting small-scale attacks against the military in July. In Sagaing and Magway Regions and Chin State, intense fighting between the militias and the military reportedly killed hundreds of troops. The military responded with increased raids and by burning villages. Some militias have carried out unlawful bombings of buildings and targeted killings of civilian supporters of the military.
On September 7, acting NUG President Duwa Lashi La declared a “defensive war” against the military junta.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Myanmar’s penal code punishes “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” with up to 10 years in prison and a fine.
The opposition NUG reported that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people have been particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in custody. One transgender woman recounted after her release that she was raped in custody with an object, tortured, and severely beaten.
Covid-19 and Attacks on Healthcare Workers
By November 2021, just 13 percent of Myanmar's 54 million population was fully vaccinated. A total 17,998 deaths were recorded by the Ministry of Health between March 2020 and October 2021, although the actual numbers are likely much higher.
The junta has harassed, arbitrarily arrested, and attacked medical professionals, sometimes as they treated injured protesters. Healthcare workers were early leaders of the opposition Civil Disobedience Movement and refused to work in government hospitals as a form of protest. In the nine months following the coup, at least 260 healthcare workers were attacked while trying to administer medical aid, and 20 killed. The AAPP said 76 remained in detention in September, and as many as 600 healthcare workers had outstanding arrest warrants against them. Many have been forced to work underground in makeshift mobile clinics to treat Covid-19 patients or have gone into hiding to evade arrest. The UN Country Team in Myanmar has said that attacks on healthcare workers have jeopardized the Covid-19 response and prevented patients from receiving health care.
Key International Actors
In February, the UN Human Rights Council held a special session and adopted by consensus a resolution deploring the removal of the elected government and calling for the unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained. A further resolution was adopted at the council’s March session “condemning in the strongest terms” the military deposition of the civilian government, and highlighting the need for accountability.
In June, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution strongly condemning the February 1 coup. The General Assembly also made several important recommendations, including calling for all members states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar. The UN Security Council did not follow up and pass a legally binding resolution of its own that would impose a global ban on the transfer of weapons and dual-use technologies to Myanmar.
Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have imposed targeted sanctions against Myanmar’s top military officials and members of the junta, conglomerates, and companies owned or controlled by the military. However, foreign governments did not impose sanctions on oil and gas revenues, the junta's main source of revenues.
In October, the US Congress introduced the BURMA Act 2021, supporting authorization of further targeted sanctions and recommended the US government make a Rohingya genocide determination. The European Parliament also supported recognizing the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar and urged further EU sanctions against military-owned businesses. While the EU expressed support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a mediator with the Myanmar military, it also condemned the coup in “the strongest terms.”
The UN-backed Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) is mandated to build case files to support efforts to hold individuals legally accountable for serious international crimes. The IIMM is “closely monitoring” events and is collecting evidence of such crimes committed following the coup, and said if substantiated, the alleged violations could amount to crimes against humanity.
On April 24, ASEAN negotiated a five-point consensus plan with the military, and appointed Brunei diplomat Erywan Yusof as special envoy. The military’s failure to implement the five-point plan led ASEAN to exclude junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing from its October summit.
At the International Criminal Court, the prosecutor is investigating Myanmar for the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution, based on the completion of these crimes in Bangladesh, an ICC member, following the 2017 ethnic cleansing campaign against the Rohingya. In July, citing Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, the NUG lodged a declaration with the ICC accepting the court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed in Myanmar since July 1, 2002.
Gambia’s case alleging Myanmar’s violation of the Genocide Convention continued before the International Court of Justice, with Myanmar raising preliminary objections to the court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of Gambia’s application..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-01-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Articles and reports about the NLD, Political History
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Some of the victims died on the spot after being shot by regime troops, while others showed signs of being torture to death
Description:
"Junta troops have killed at least five civilians and two resistance fighters in three Sagaing Region townships so far this week, according to local sources.
On Monday, two unarmed civilians were shot dead near a bridge in Sagaing Region's Htigyaing Township. They were travelling to the village of Kyarhnyat in Mandalay Region's Thabeikkyin Township, some 70 km away from Htigyaing, a resident of the area told Myanmar Now.
The victims, both men in their late 30s, were killed near a military checkpoint where villagers are routinely harassed by soldiers, said the source, who did not want to be identified.
“It happened at around 8pm. They were heading back to the village on a motorcycle when the soldiers started shooting,” he said.
One man was killed instantly as he attempted to flee, but the other, who was shot first, managed to call his family before dying, he added.
“He told them to come pick him up, but that was all he was able to say,” said the villager, who is close to the victim’s family.
Earlier in the day, the bodies of two other men who were taken into custody at the same checkpoint late last week were found on the side of a nearby road.
The men, both aged 23, were members of a local resistance group called the Eagle Army, the group’s leader, Bo Chit, told Myanmar Now.
“The bodies were badly disfigured. One had been shot in the head, but the other was covered with bruises and didn’t have any bullet wounds,” he said.
There were also signs of extreme abuse on the bodies of two civilians who were killed during a military raid on Chanthar, a village in Ye-U Township, on Monday, local sources reported.
The raid, which was carried out by around 130 junta troops at around 10am, forced most of the village’s inhabitants to flee, but the two victims were among several people who were unable to escape in time, the sources said.
A villager who found the bodies of the two middle-aged men said that both had stab wounds to their chests, while one also had a crushed skull.
According to the source, three other local men were also tortured before the troops left on Tuesday.
The village remains empty, he added, as residents feared that the troops could open fire with heavy artillery again, as they did the day before.
This is the third time that Chanthar has come under attack since last April.
Late last month, at least seven civilians were killed after the military used five helicopters to carry out a raid on the nearby village of Yae Myet.
On Tuesday, another village came under attack in Kalay Township. At least one civilian was killed and three others were injured, local sources reported.
Thasi, a village on the Kalay-Gangaw road, was raided by more than 120 uniformed troops and others in plainclothes at around 7am, the sources said.
Most of the village’s roughly 1,000 inhabitants had fled ahead of the raid, but several people were still there when the regime forces arrived, they added.
According to a local woman who spoke to Myanmar Now at around 3:30pm on Tuesday, the village’s residents remain vulnerable to attacks by members of the pro-military Pyu Saw Htee militia who took part in the raid.
“We’ve had to flee again, because the Pyu Saw Htee started terrorising us even in the woods. Things are looking very bad here,” she said.
At least 20 civilians were found dead earlier this month following airstrikes on the village of Natchaung, which is also located on the Kalay-Gangaw road.
Myanmar’s junta has denied targeting civilians in its ongoing offensives against anti-regime groups operating in Sagaing Region and other parts of the country.
In a recent interview with the BBC, the regime’s spokesperson, Zaw Min Tun, blamed resistance forces for the high number of civilian casualties.
“There have been several occasions where they [resistance fighters] blended in with the civilians and ambushed the army. Our security forces have been trying to manage this situation,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-01-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
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Description:
"Myanmar's military leader has removed the head of the air force, local media and four sources close to the armed forces said, replacing one of the most senior figures in a junta that has carried out bombing raids to try to crush resistance.
The sources told Reuters that 57-year-old Maung Maung Kyaw, a general from an elite military background, had been ousted from the post he had held since 2018.
Two of the sources said he was replaced on Monday by Htun Aung, who had been the air force's chief of staff.
There was no public announcement that Maung Maung Kyaw had been removed and Reuters was unable to establish why junta leader Min Aung Hlaing had removed him.
Military spokesman Zaw Min Tun did not respond to a request for comment on whether Maung Maung Kyaw had been removed. The spokesman was quoted by local news outlet Eleven Media as saying Maung Maung Kyaw had ended his service after a four-year term.
Reuters was unable to contact Maung Maung Kyaw directly, and requests for comment through the military received no response.
Since the coup on Feb. 1 last year in which an elected government was overthrown, and during the protests that followed the coup, the air force has been used to ferry troops around Myanmar to quell opposition.
Witnesses say the air force has also been used for bombing raids that have killed civilians. The junta has not commented on the allegations. It says it does not target civilians, only "terrorists".
The junta, which has jailed ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi and most of her allies, calls the opposition forces loyal to her deposed government "terrorists".
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a human rights group, says more than 1,400 people have been killed in violence since the coup, including those killed in bombing raids. The junta disputes the reported number of casualties.
Maung Maung Kyaw was the subject of a Reuters investigation last year that revealed his family members, including his son and nephew, were part of a young generation of military families with business interests including supplying the armed forces.
Photos and postings on social media – showing parties at expensive venues in Singapore and trips to Bangkok, London and Santorini – showed his family members enjoying a lifestyle far out of reach for the vast majority of Burmese.
Maung Maung Kyaw, who has had sanctions imposed on him by the United States over his role in the coup, did not respond to questions Reuters sent to the military before publication of its investigation.
In recent weeks, aerial bombardment of the town of Loikaw in eastern Kayah state, bordering Thailand, where ethnic armed groups have joined forces with newly formed anti-coup armed organizations, has forced thousands of people to flee.
Opponents of the junta say Myanmar's military has sustained heavy losses during the fighting. The junta has not commented on the reports that it has suffered heavy losses..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"Cambodia said on Wednesday it had postponed a meeting of foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) scheduled for next week, because some ministers had expressed “difficulties” in attending.
The meeting was the first under Cambodia's chairmanship of the 10-member bloc, which comes amid divisions on how to deal with reut.rs/30NQFot the military that seized power in Myanmar last year and has led a bloody crackdown on thousands of its opponents.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen met Myanmar's military ruler reut.rs/3ngcp4w Min Aung Hlaing last week, the first such visit by a head of government, sparking concern that it could undermine international efforts to isolate the junta.
“The postponement is because of many ASEAN ministers are having difficulties to travel to join,” Cambodia foreign ministry spokesperson Koy Kuong told reporters, without elaborating.
Asked separately by Reuters which ministers could not attend the Jan 18-19 meeting in Siem Reap and why, Koy Kuong said he “can’t speak for them”.
Under Brunei's chairmanship, ASEAN late last year took the unprecedented step of sidelining reut.rs/3n0roOZ Min Aung Hlaing from its annual leaders' summit over his failure to honour commitments he made towards ending violence and starting a dialogue process.
The exclusion reut.rs/3jwe8k4 angered the junta, which said outside powers had pressured ASEAN to break its own code of consensus and non-interference.
Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia had backed excluding the junta.
Cambodia, however, is taking "different approaches", reut.rs/3K36kC4 its foreign minister, Prak Sokhonn, and said on Saturday, while denying that Hun Sen's visit was an endorsement of the Myanmar military.
Prak Sokhonn was expecting to be appointed special ASEAN envoy to the Myanmar situation at the Siem Reap meeting.
On Saturday, he criticised the previous envoy, Erywan Yusof, as being unproductive in insisting on access to ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been convicted in recent weeks of several offences, including incitement.
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Sub-title:
Without access to electricity or water and with military attacking Loikaw from the ground and air, half of the township’s population flees
Description:
"The military carried out an airstrike on Loikaw, Karenni (Kayah) State on Tuesday, dropping seven bombs from two fighter jets on the capital’s Maing Lone ward in just over 15 minutes before 6pm, locals said. All of the explosives detonated.
Located 120 miles from the junta capital of Naypyitaw, Loikaw Township has been the site of intensifying fighting between resistance forces and the Myanmar army since January 7.
On January 6, the military council cut off access to electricity in several wards, including Maing Lone; the entire township has been without power since January 9. Without electricity, the water supply and wifi services had also stopped, locals said.
“The primary problem that we have right now is the scarcity of the water supply. We no longer get water from the city development committee and the water purification factories have stopped operating, so we don’t have much drinking water left either,” a local man told Myanmar Now on the condition of anonymity.
He added that the only way to access the internet in Loikaw was through mobile data from military-operated telecommunications providers MPT and Mytel.
“The downtown area still has telephone and mobile internet services but there have been several glitches,” he explained.
Locals from Maing Lone, Pan Kan and Ywar Tan Shey wards started fleeing on January 8 as the military shelled the township from the ground and air amid the utilities shutdown.
Karenni media reports estimated on Tuesday that around 30,000 people—half of Loikaw’s population—had fled their homes. At the time of reporting, locals told Myanmar Now that the number who had left may have been as high as 90 percent of the town’s residents.
“Most of the people who remain in the township are those who stayed behind to protect their homes against thieves, those who are stranded in monasteries, those who could not afford to travel, and those who couldn’t find transportation,” the local man said.
Several empty homes Maing Lone ward had been broken into and looted, with thieves reportedly seen carrying stolen items away on 12-wheeled trucks.
“They even stole entire cars, motorcycles and electricity generators and refrigerators. We didn’t dare to go take pictures of them, so we have no photos,” an eyewitness told Myanmar Now.
The anti-junta People’s Defence Force chapter in Loikaw issued a statement on Tuesday warning that serious action would be taken against the thieves.
An officer from the second battalion of the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) said that the most recent clashes have been concentrated in Maing Lone and Daw Au Khu wards.
Battles have also continued to break out in the nearby townships of Demoso and Shadaw this week, with the military deploying both jets and heavy artillery.According to a KNDF report, around 40 junta soldiers, three members of the allied resistance forces, and six civilians had been killed in the battles in Loikaw and Demoso on January 7 and 10.
The number of people killed on Tuesday could not be confirmed at the time of reporting.
Those who remain in Loikaw are concerned that in the coming days, basic necessities like rice and oil will no longer be available.
“We can see that the flow of commodities has been cut off and that the basic commodities have become very scarce,” the first local said.
It could not be confirmed whether junta restrictions had officially been implemented on the importing of goods into the township, but few trucks dare to deliver supplies amid the ongoing fighting.
“The shop owners closed all of their shops and fled. There are only two to three shops that remain open now. Even so, I think they, too, are going to flee after they’re all sold out. Because all the shops are closed, commodity trucks don’t come into the town anymore,” another local woman said.
She added that displaced persons in neighbouring townships also rely on these shops to meet their basic needs, and the shortages would be felt by communities fleeing the fighting throughout the region..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Karenni State, Internal displacement/forced migration of Karenni villagers, Political History
Language:
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Description:
"The People’s Defense Force (PDF) raided a labor camp in Sagaing Region’s Tamu Township on Monday, killing the prison governor, his wife and 11 police officers, commanding officer Bo Ba Hman of Tamu PDF Battalion 1 told The Irrawaddy.
Two PDF fighters died and four others were also injured in the early Monday morning raid, which ended in a shootout, he added.
“We raided the camp and had gained the upper hand. Some of [the prison guards had been incapacitated]. But then, the prison governor ordered [the guards] not to surrender even if he died. He switched off the electricity, which led to confusion. Then [prison guards] from the guard tower opened fire with a machine gun and both sides were hit in the hail of machine gun fire,” said Bo Ba Hman.
One of the four injured PDF fighters suffered serious injuries, but was not in critical condition, and only one of the bodies of the killed PDF fighters could be retrieved, he said.
“We didn’t have a plan to go this far. We only intended to take control of them and seize their weapons. But things happened unexpectedly and resulted in casualties,” he said.
The labor camp is located some 3.2 km to the east of Wut Shu Village in Tamu. It was established in 1991, and was the first labor camp to be built in Kabaw Valley.
The camp housed a number of political prisoners detained by the military regime after last year’s coup. The attack on a labor camp is believed to be the first of its kind since the coup in Myanmar, though other junta targets are often attacked by resistance groups.
Tamu, a town on the Myanmar-India border, was one of the first towns to take up arms against the military regime. The Tamu PDF Battalion 1 said it would also attack government departments operating under the junta’s administration.
“We will have no more mercy for departmental employees working for the regime as well as military informants and Pyu Saw Htee [militia groups trained and armed by the regime],” said Bo Ba Hman.
“We had invited them to join the civil disobedience movement. But they didn’t join no matter how much we requested, and they have gotten worse. If we still treat them with consideration, our revolution will never reach its goal.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
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Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၁၂ ရက်နေ့သည် တအာင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများက စစ်အာဏာ ရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို လက်နက်စွဲကိုင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည့် (၅၉) နှစ်မြောက် တအာင်းအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေး နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ဖြစ်သဖြင့် ဤနေ့မှစကာ တအာင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများ နှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ် လုံး၏ အန္တိမပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးကို အမြန်ဆုံးရရှိနိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ တအာင်းအမျိုးသားတစ်ရပ်လုံး အဖိနှိပ်ခံဘဝမှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို အာမခံသည့် တအာင်းပြည်နယ်တည်ဆောက်ရေး၊ အမျိုးသားကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် ကို အာမခံသည့် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုနိုင်ငံ တည်ဆောက်ရေးတို့အတွက် ၁၉၆၃ ခုနှစ် မှစတင်ကာ ယနေ့အချိန်ထိ အသက်၊ သွေး၊ ချွေးတို့ကို အရင်းတည်၍ လျှောက်လှမ်းလျက်ရှိသော တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးကြမ်းတွင် တအာင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားအပေါင်းတို့၏ ညီညွတ်မှုအင်အားနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး စိတ်ဓာတ်သည် အလွန်လေးစားဖွယ်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ဦးစွာ ချီးကျူးဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၃။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို တစ်ခုတည်းသော အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာပိုင်စိုးသည့် အုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်ပုံစံရရှိရေး ပုံဖော်လာခဲ့ကြသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ အနိုင်ကျင့်ဖိနှိပ်ခဲ့မှုများ၊ တရားမျှတမှု မရှိသည့် နိုင်ငံရေး မူဝါဒများကြောင့် တအာင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများသည် စစ်ဘေးစစ်ဒဏ်ကို နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ခံစားလာခဲ့ ကြရသော်လည်း လူထု၏ ထောက်ခံမှု၊ တအာင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့၏ ပေးဆပ်မှု၊ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှု အင်အားတို့ကို အရင်းခံလျက် ယခုအချိန်ထိ တအာင်းတော်လှန်ရေးအလံသည် တပ်ဦးတွင် လွှင့်ထူနိုင် ဆဲဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ COVID-19 ကပ်ရောဂါ ကျရောက်နေသည့် ယခုလိုကာလမျိုး၌ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူ များကို မငဲ့ဘဲ ကိုယ်ကျိုးသပ်သပ်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို မတရား လုယူသွားကာ လူထုကို ဥပဒေမဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်ဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအား လက်နက်ကိုင်၍ တော် လှန်ကြသည့် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် တအာင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့၏ ကူညီပံ့ပိုးမှုများနှင့် ပါဝင် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများသည် အလွန်ပင်တန်ဖိုးကြီးမားသည့် အင်အားစုဖြစ်သည်ကို တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူ အားလုံးကိုယ်စား လေးစားစွာ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ၊ နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် ပြည်သူ များအားလုံးတို့၏ ညီညွတ်လှစွာသော စုပေါင်းအင်အားကို အခြေတည်လျက် မြန်မာ့နွေဦး တော်လှန် ရေး၏ ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ဖြစ်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုး အကြွင်းမဲ့ ပျက်သုဉ်းရေးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအားလုံး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာအတူယှဉ်တွဲနေထိုင်သွားနိုင်မည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် တည်ဆောက်ရေးတို့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား အားလုံးနှင့်အတူ ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်း ကတိပြုလျက် ဤ တအာင်းအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေး (၅၉) နှစ်ပြည့် သဝဏ်လွှာ အား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-12
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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"11 January 2022: Myanmar’s would-be dictator Min Aung Hlaing has once again shown himself to be unrepentant and unaccountable to anyone after meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). The meeting occurred while junta forces were launching airstrikes and intensifying offensives in ethnic areas and only two days before State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi received a further four-year prison sentence for bogus charges including possessing unlicensed walkie talkies and allegedly violating coronavirus protocols while campaigning.
Prime Minister Hun Sen undertook an ill-advised and contested visit to Naypyitaw to meet with Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on 7 and 8 January 2022. The visit was condemned by the Myanmar people, Myanmar and Cambodian civil society and ASEAN parliamentarians, on the grounds that it would be instrumentalised by Min Aung Hlaing to seek legitimacy for his illegal junta. That is what happened.
Prime Minister Hun Sen failed to consult or engage with democratic leaders President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, or other members of the National Unity Government. A joint statement issued after the visit by Prime Minister Hun Sen and Min Aung Hlaing did not once mention the cause of Myanmar’s current suffering – Min Aung Hlaing’s failed coup – and sought to deflect concern away from the nation-wide crisis to focus on the protracted civil wars between the military and Myanmar’s ethnic nationalities.
“The joint statement issued by Prime Minister Hun Sen and Min Aung Hlaing is manifestly duplicitous, having been drafted with clear intent to stymie ASEAN efforts and mislead the international community as to the reality of the conflict in Myanmar,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “It is an affront to the people of Myanmar and to ASEAN, to which we take great exception.”
The joint statement implicitly praised the junta for declaring a year-long “ceasefire” between the military and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). Yet, junta forces were launching airstrikes and intensifying offensives in ethnic areas, displacing a reported 10,000 people from Loikaw, Kayah state, at the very same time that the meeting was taking place.
“Handing down the verdict and sentencing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi now, after having been delayed two or three times and barely two days after the Prime Minister’s visit, cannot be seen as anything but a deliberate, carefully timed attack on the Prime Minister designed to show him who’s in charge,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “If Hun Sen accepts this insult without response, he will be fatally wounded in his role as ASEAN Chair barely as he begins his term, and his influence and authority will be shredded for the full year ahead. The decision today is a direct challenge to Hun Sen: who calls the tune in ASEAN, the Chair or Min Aung Hlaing?”
Cambodia will hold the ASEAN chairmanship throughout 2022. The National Unity Government of Myanmar has publicly stated its commitment to working in partnership with ASEAN towards resolving the junta-made political, economic and humanitarian crises and its readiness to engage constructively with the new Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar.
“It seems the only person fooled by Min Aung Hlaing’s attempt to dress himself up as a rational civilian leader was Prime Minister Hun Sen,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “What was already clear to everyone else is that the only way forward for the ASEAN Chair in responding to the crisis is not through publicity seeking actions but proper engagement with all stakeholders– including the National Unity Government, EAOs and democracy groups, within the parameters already agreed by ASEAN — and in coordination with the newly appointed UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General.
Prime Minister Hun Sen undertook a foolish initiative but, having done so, the onus is now on him to get results. He cannot afford to let Min Aung Hlaing’s insult to his honour stand. As ASEAN Chair, he must lead an initiative to engage all parties in Myanmar without exception in developing a way forward that will ensure a democratic, peaceful, inclusive Myanmar. He must bring all ASEAN pressure to bear on the military junta, including through diplomatic, economic and security isolation if necessary, to secure an immediate end to the violence and the release of all political prisoners. So, what now, Hun Sen?..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-01-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-11
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"A court in Myanmar has sentenced ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi to four more years in prison, in the latest of a series of trials.
She was convicted for the illegal possession and import of walkie-talkies and breaking Covid-19 rules.
Ms Suu Kyi was first convicted in December, and given a reduced jail sentence of two years.
She has been detained since a military coup last February and faces about a dozen charges, all of which she denies.
Her trials have been widely condemned as unfair.
The charges in the latest case stem from when soldiers searched her house on the day of the coup by forces led by army chief General Min Aung Hlaing. The devices they say they discovered are presumed to have been used by her security guards, resulting in a conviction widely viewed as no more than a tactic to justify detaining her.
Monday's trial in the capital, Nay Pyi Taw, was closed to the media and Ms Suu Kyi's lawyers have been barred from communicating with the media and public.
Last month the Nobel laureate was found guilty of incitement of dissent and breaking Covid-19 rules, in what was condemned as a "sham trial" by UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet.
BACKGROUND: The general who returned Myanmar to military rule
AS IT HAPPENED: Myanmar coup: What happened and why?
PROFILE: Democracy icon who fell from grace
In response to Monday's sentencing, Human Rights Watch called the legal proceedings a "courtroom circus of secret proceedings on bogus charges... so that (Aung San Suu Kyi) will remain in prison indefinitely".
The statement by the group's deputy Asia director Phil Robertson also accused the military of securing convictions "in a kangaroo court on the flimsiest, politically motivated charges", and said it was "running roughshod over the human rights of everyone, ranging from Suu Kyi... to the Civil Disobedience Movements activists on the street".
The military's seizure of power in Myanmar (also called Burma) last February came months after Ms Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won November 2020 general elections by a landslide.
The military alleged voter fraud in the victory, however independent election observers have said the elections were largely free and fair.
The coup triggered widespread demonstrations and Myanmar's military has cracked down on pro-democracy protesters, activists and journalists.
Ms Suu Kyi is one of more than 10,600 people to have been arrested by the junta since February, with at least 1,303 others killed in the demonstrations, according to the monitoring group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
The latest sentence brings her total prison term so far to six years, but were she convicted of all the charges she faces, she could spend the rest of her life in detention.
The 76-year-old, who has not been seen in public since her house arrest, still faces several more serious charges - of corruption, election fraud and breaking the official secrets act.
Whether she actually spends any time in jail depends on what the military wants to do with its most famous prisoner, the BBC's Jonathan Head says.
The ruling junta still faces widespread opposition; parts of the country are now engulfed in armed conflict, and the economy is near collapse.
Neighbouring countries are seeking a negotiated end to the conflict. So far they have made little progress, but if they do, our correspondent says it is likely such talks would at some point have to involve Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains very popular.
An icon who fell from grace
Aung San Suu Kyi spent nearly 15 years in detention at the hands of the military between 1989 and 2010, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her work to bring democracy to Myanmar.
Her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in 2015, but she was prevented from becoming president herself by rules excluding those with foreign national children from holding that office. She was widely regarded as the de facto ruler of the country.
However her reputation abroad was severely damaged by the way she handled the Rohingya crisis, which started in 2017.
EXPLAINED:What you need to know about the Rohingya crisis
In 2019 Ms Suu Kyi appeared at the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) to defend her country against accusations of genocide..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2022-01-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-10
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Military History, Political History
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"A special court set up by the Myanmar junta in Naypyitaw sentenced detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to an additional four years’ imprisonment on Monday in three cases against her, including alleged illegal possession of walkie-talkies and breaching COVID-19 restrictions.
Sources close to the court told The Irrawaddy that the sentences comprised two years’ imprisonment for the illegal import of walkie-talkies under the Export Import Law; one year for the possession of these devices under the Telecommunications Law; and two years for the COVID-19 charge under the Natural Disaster Management Law.
The first two sentences are to be served concurrently.
The verdicts in the cases were announced after two hearing postponements last month.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 76, who has been detained since the day of the Feb. 1 coup, has now been given a total of six years in prison by the junta.
The court handed her a four-year sentence on Dec. 10 on charges of sedition and breaching COVID-19 restrictions. On the same day, the junta leader commuted the prison sentence to two years.
She is facing another seven charges including alleged corruption and breaching the Official Secrets Act. She faces a potential combined prison term of over 100 years on all of the charges, which are widely viewed as trumped-up, politically motivated and an attempt by the junta to exclude her from Myanmar politics.
Junta forces raided Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence in Naypyitaw in the early morning hours of Feb. 1 ahead of the coup, without a search warrant, and claimed to have found illegally imported walkie-talkies, which they said were used by her security forces.
Five police officers testified as prosecution witnesses in the two cases. But their testimony as to where and from whom they seized the walkie-talkies differed, sources close to the court said.
Today’s verdict on the breach of COVID-19 regulations is based on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s door-to-door visits to party members ahead of the 2020 elections.
Since last month’s verdicts, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has appeared in court wearing a prison uniform: a white top and brown longyi.
The junta has barred all five of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers from speaking to the media since October, so details of the court hearings as well as her whereabouts are unknown to the public..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-10
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"In a New Year’s message, U Thein Nyunt, a member of the State Administration Council (SAC)— the governing body of the military regime—wished death and destruction upon the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) as well as its legislative body, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF).
“Myanmar is going through a war for the cause of ‘nationalism’ between patriots and those under foreign influence. My wish is that the foreign invaders and traitors will be totally defeated in the New Year,” the turncoat wrote in his New Year’s greetings published in the junta-controlled newspapers.
U Thein Nyunt was previously a member of the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s Central Executive Committee. When the NLD boycotted the 2010 general election, he left the party and co-founded a new one, the National Democratic Force. He later resigned from the party and ran as an independent in the 2010 poll, winning a seat in the Lower House. He later founded the New National Democracy Party (NNDP). He contested the 2015 poll as the NNDP chair, but lost the race to the NLD.
He has since allied himself with the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and spent the years prior to the coup finding fault with the NLD government. In the run-up to the 2020 election, he made statements encouraging a military coup. He again suffered defeat in the 2020 vote, but became a member of the SAC following the takeover. He has always tried to curry favor with Min Aung Hlaing, seconding whatever he says at regime meetings.
On Karen New Year’s Day, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing wished the Karen people well. It was rank hypocrisy—the general ordered airstrikes on Karen villages last month, bringing devastation to the lives of thousands.
Since Dec. 15, Myanmar’s military has carried out ground and aerial attacks on Lay Kay Kaw and surrounding areas in Karen State’s Myawaddy Township near the Thai border, claiming that PDF fighters were taking shelter there. The attacks have forced more than 10,000 locals from their homes and across the border into Thailand.
Only the regime’s media acknowledged Karen New Year’s Day with any energy. The occasion went unmarked even in relatively peaceful Yangon and Ayeyarwady regions, which are home to large Karen populations.
Min Aung Hlaing eyes electoral ‘reform’ to maintain grip on power
In his message on Myanmar’s 74th annual Independence Day, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing articulated the merits of the proportional representation (PR) electoral system, which he said would allow all-inclusive and wide representation in Myanmar.
In the first-past-the-post system that has been practiced to date in Myanmar, candidates who win a majority of votes in their constituencies are elected lawmakers. Under the PR system, parties receive parliamentary seats proportional to the percentage of votes they win in an election. Calls by the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party and its allied parties to switch to PR have become louder since last March, one month after the coup.
Obviously, Min Aung Hlaing is preaching the advantages of PR not because of its benefits for Myanmar, but because it would benefit the military and himself personally.
With the military-drafted constitution guaranteeing 25 percent of seats in the legislature for Myanmar’s military, its proxy USDP and allied parties only need to secure an additional 26 percent of total seats to form the government. However, after they failed to do so in both the 2015 and 2020 elections, they knew they would never be able to take control of the parliament and the government unless PR is introduced.
The military regime, after annulling the results of the 2020 general election in July, said it would hold a new election in August 2023, but to Myanmar people, that is nothing more than a tall story.
Hun Sen: Myanmar’s Unwelcome Visitor
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen arrived in Naypyitaw on the morning of Jan. 7 on a visit opposed by Myanmar’s people, who fear it will lend legitimacy to coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, given that Cambodia currently holds the rotating chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. The dictatorial Khmer ruler is the first foreign leader to visit the head of the Myanmar junta since the military seized power in February last year.
Junta leader honors his deputy and regime supporters
To mark Myanmar’s Independence Day on Jan. 4, Min Aung Hlaing conferred titles on military officials including his deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win, and military supporters including well-known Buddhist monks.
The coup leader, who himself had the title Maha Thray Sithu bestowed on him by his military seniors earlier in his career, conferred the title Thray Sithu on his deputy, and other titles on various military officials who are in one way or another involved in the ongoing brutal crackdown on anti-regime protesters and killings of civilians.
Among the other title recipients were Major Naing Bo Bo, who rammed a vehicle into anti-regime protesters in Yangon’s Kyimyindaing in December, and well-known Buddhist monks Ashin Chekinda and U Tilawkar Biwonsa. The latter is the chief monk of the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, an ultranationalist group known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha.
The honorary orders are traditionally awarded to individuals who have done great work for the country. This year, however, the awards went to supporters of Min Aung Hlaing.
Other recipients included Dr. Aung Kyaw Win, the husband of the regime’s Social Welfare Minister Daw Thet Thet Khaing, and U Aung Min Kyaw Thu, the vice chairman of pro-military nationalist group the Young Men’s Buddhist Association. Posthumous honors were conferred on ward administrators and regime employees who were killed for allegedly being military informants.
Junta admits it did not expect armed resistance from civilians
Regime spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun admitted in an interview with the BBC on Dec. 5 that the military had not expected armed resistance from civilians.
“Tatmadaw is facing challenges. The main challenge is mine attacks and sneak attacks by resistance fighters disguised as civilians,” Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun added.
Myanmar civilians initially responded to the coup with peaceful demands that democracy be restored in the country. However, after their protest columns were hit by live bullets and grenades and many of their comrades shot dead in late February and March, they came to realize that taking up arms was the only answer if they were to defeat the regime.
Since then, hundreds of resistance groups known collectively as the PDF have sprung up across the country, fighting the regime in both urban and rural areas of Myanmar.
In the cities, junta soldiers who had shown no mercy for unarmed protesters have tasted fear. Fatal guerrilla attacks by resistance fighters have forced junta soldiers to duck behind sandbags and barbed wire mesh fences.
Even as the regime has branded the resistance fighters as terrorists and launched a series of manhunts across the country, everyone can see that attacks on regime targets have only increased in Yangon and elsewhere..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-09
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
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"Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen turned out to be an unwelcome visitor to Myanmar as he began his two-day trip to the country on Friday, his arrival strenuously denounced by the people of the Southeast Asia nation for his engagement with the Myanmar regime, which has killed more than 1,300 people since seizing power last year.
Hun Sen landed in Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw on Friday morning for a two-day visit at the invitation of the country’s coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. He met with the general and ……………., becoming the first foreign leader to meet the junta leadership since the coup.
Many fear his visit will confer on Min Aung Hlaing and his junta the legitimacy they have so far failed to establish, as Cambodia currently holds the rotating chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which Myanmar belongs. They also questioned how someone with a record as a notorious violator of human rights could hold the junta to account for its abuses.
Since the moment it was announced last month, Hun Sen’s visit has been denounced by critics who warned his unilateral initiative could have far-reaching consequences for ASEAN, potentially undermining the regional bloc’s credibility to mediate a political solution.
Relations between ASEAN and Myanmar turned sour last year when the bloc excluded Min Aung Hlaing from its summit over his failure to implement a peace plan known as the Five Point Consensus, which he had agreed with the regional group. The agreed steps include an immediate cessation of violence in the country and allowing the bloc’s special envoy to visit, among others.
Hun Sen responded that he was just trying to bring Myanmar back into the ASEAN fold and urged his critics not to pre-judge his visit, adding that his goals were “not far from” the consensus.
His assurances failed to appease many in Myanmar, however. His visit has met with a level of denunciation unprecedented for a visiting foreign dignity.
A few days before his visit, a series of explosions occurred near the Cambodian Embassy in Yangon. Across the country, people have staged protests against his visit, holding placards reading, “We Don’t Need You Hun Sen,” and “You are Not Welcomed to Myanmar” while stepping on portraits of him. Hundreds of anti-junta groups issued a statement urging Hun Sen to call off the visit.
On the eve of his departure for Naypyitaw, Hun Sen experienced the condemnation up close and personal as Myanmar people flocked to his Facebook page to post angry comments about his visit under his 41st wedding anniversary post. Many left comments such as “Shame on You” or “We don’t need you Mr Hun Sen , you’re not welcome” accompanied by memes portraying Min Aung Hlaing and Hun Sen. Another said, “You dictator is ruling Cambodia against the will of Cambodians. Now trying to support Burmese military to be the same. Sorry your days are numbered.”
Hun Sen’s visit coincides with an escalation of the regime’s attacks on armed resistance forces, mainly made up of civilians who reject the regime’s rule in the country’s southeastern Kayah State.
Shortly before his visit, the Cambodian prime minister discussed developments in Myanmar via phone with Indonesian President Joko Widodo. The president later said in a Twitter post that during the call he reiterated clearly Indonesia’s position on the importance of implementing the five-point consensus to bring democracy back to Myanmar through inclusive dialogue.
“Should there be no significant progress on the implementation of 5PCs [the five-point consensus], Myanmar should only be represented by non-political level at ASEAN meetings,” he posted on Wednesday.
On Friday, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the parliamentary wing of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), said military leaders who commit human rights abuses and other violations should be isolated, adding that engaging with them could have no positive outcomes for Myanmar and its people.
“We reiterate our call for cooperation only with the legitimate institutions, including the CRPH comprising those elected by the people of Myanmar, and the NUG,” it said in its announcement.
Human Rights Watch said Hun Sen’s meeting as ASEAN chair with Myanmar’s military leadership is an affront to the people of Myanmar, who strongly oppose the visit.
Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said Hun Sen’s decision to meet, without preconditions, the leaders of Myanmar’s military will only lend underserved international legitimacy to the junta.
“A unilateral visit by Hun Sen is doomed to not yield solutions, especially if he won’t meet and confer with the representatives of the people elected to parliament in the November 2020 election, such as the National Unity Government, which has the support of most elected MPs,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-01-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"Within the 11 months, from the military coup on February 1 till December 31, 2021, the Myanmar junta troops killed 163 Chin people.
Among the deaths were 87 civilians (including 13 women) and 76 members from Chin resistance forces. Among them, three were killed by landmines planted by the Tatmadaw and the bodies of eight civilians were not recovered. Seven were either burned to death or killed in a fire caused by the troops.
Some victims were killed when the Myanmar junta troops violently attacked on peaceful protesters and others lost their lives when the Military Council deployed heavy artillery and airstrikes indiscriminately against innocent civilians. Some were arbitrarily arrested and tortured to death, some even burned to death. In addition to killing innocent civilians without any reason, the junta troops carried arson attacks, planted landmines, and fired heavy weapons into civilian neighbourhoods. The Tatmadaw clearly appears to target the Chin civilians intentionally to create fear among the population.
The Myanmar Military Council’s systematic attacks and killings of civilians are clearly crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Myanmar Military Council must be held accountable for its crimes.
The ICA urges the Tatmadaw to immediately cease targeting civilians, their houses, and belongings, and to cease killing innocent people, particularly women and children and to refrain from indiscriminate firing and using heavy artillery against the civilian population.
The ICA also calls on the international community to intervene and increase pressure on the Myanmar junta to cease its military operations and human rights violations against the Chin People.
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၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းသည့်အချိန်မှစ၍ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ (၃၁) ရက်နေ့အထိ (၁၁) လ တာ ကာလအတွင်း စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သည် ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသား (၁၆၃) ဦးအား သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
သေဆုံးသူများတွင် အမျိုးသမီး (၁၃) ဦး အပါအဝင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၈၇) ဦးနှင့် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များမှ (၇၆) ဦး အထိ ရှိပါသည်။ ထိုအထဲတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ မီးရှို့သတ်ဖြတ်မှုကြောင့် သေဆုံးသူ (၇) ဦး၊ အလောင်းပြန် မရသည့် အရပ်သား (၈) ဦး နှင့် မိုင်းထိ၍ သေဆုံးသူ အရပ်သား (၃) ဦးထိ ပါဝင်ပါသည်။
စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်မှ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုအပေါ် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒပြနေသည့်အရပ်သားများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက် တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးမှုနှင့် စစ်ကြောရေးအတွင်း ညှင်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ မီးရှို့သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ လူနေအိမ် များနှင့် အပြစ်မဲ့အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားကာ လက်နက်ကြီးများဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ခြင်းနှင့် လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးကြရခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သည် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား အကြောင်းမဲ့ သတ်ဖြတ်သည့်အပြင် ကျေးရွာလူနေအိမ်များအတွင်း လက်နက်ကြီးများဖြင့် ရမ်းသန်းပစ်ခတ် မီးရှို့ခြင်းနှင့် လူနေရပ်ကွက်များ၊ အရပ်သားများကျင်လည်ကျက်စားရာနေရာများတွင် မိုင်းထောင်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း တို့ကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ကျူးလွန်လျက် ရှိသည်။
စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားကာ စနစ်တကျ တိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းတို့သည် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့်ပြစ်မှုနှင့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ကျူးလွန်နေကြောင်း ထင်ရှားနေပေသည်။
စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သည် ၎င်းကျူးလွန်သည့် ပြစ်မှုများအတွက် တာဝန်ခံရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း နှင့် အရပ်သား ပြည်သူ များ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်အပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားခြင်း၊ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအား တိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း တို့အား ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရန် ချင်းရေးရာအဖွဲ့ချုပ်မှ အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းသည်။
ချင်းရေးရာအဖွဲ့ချုပ်သည် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝန်းအား စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်၏ ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားကာ စစ်ဆင်ရေးဆောင်ရွက်နေမှုနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများ အား ရပ်တန့်စေမည့် ထိရောက်သော အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် ထပ်မံတောင်းဆိုသည်။
ဆက်သွယ်ရန်: [email protected], +919362634715..."
Source/publisher:
Institute of Chin Affairs
Date of publication:
2022-01-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-06
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Chin (Zo) discussion groups, Political History, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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Source/publisher:
NCA-S EAO
Date of publication:
2022-01-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-06
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"The 74th Anniversary of Independence Day Speech by The Acting President of the National Unity Government, Duwa Lashi La
January 4, 2022
Respected citizens and people of Myanmar,
I am greatly honored to deliver a speech to you all, the citizens, ethnic nationalities, and the people, on this occasion of the 74th anniversary of Independence Day of the Union of Myanmar.
Although it has been 70 years since we were free from colonial rule, it is sad that we are still under the slavery of military dictatorships and harshly suffering their violence and suppression.
Although the state could retain its sovereignty, the freedom of the people, the owner of that sovereignty, has been lost under consecutive coups and we are still struggling for it.
The visions and values of the architects of Independence have truly been reflected in the Independence declaration.
Article 5 of the declaration clearly states, “The New Republic of Burma is also established upon the principle of Burmese unity, not by blood, tribe, or faith, but by a unity that speaks with one voice, representing many.”
However, the Myanmar military has outrightly violated the principles and values of the Independence Declaration, and they hold the country as their hostage as if it is their own and are taking advantage of it; thereby, enslaving the country.
As long as the owners of the sovereignty of the country lose their rights, we cannot say the country has achieved its independence.
In the last 60 years, the military has staged a coup four times and has revealed their true colors of fascism. The attempted coup on February 1, 2021, was the ugliest incident in history. All Myanmar people and the international community have seen that the military is using several inhumane ways to repress, torture, kill and commit crimes against the people. This terrorist military no longer deserves to be called the Army as they degraded themselves into the enemy of the people and terrorists.
For now, the people have only one choice. That is to launch a defensive war, a war that all people can take part in different ways, against the military to completely remove the military dictatorship. We can call it a struggle for the second independence.
On last new year's days, I saw a piece of news in which the terrorist military leader said, "This year, we are going start a new step of the peace process and we invite all stakeholders to dialogue for peace."
An attempted coup has trampled hopes of peace. They have destroyed peace and the future of the country. The reason they are releasing such news while they are facing defeats in all areas – in politics, military, and defeats – is no other reason except than to find their political exit, to dither, to deceive the international community, and to confuse the resistance forces. They are also deceiving people by saying that they are going to host an election in 2023. The election held by the military group will not reflect the will of the people, but it also will not be a free and fair election. Trusting this deceitful military will result in dithering the people's revolution processes.
In fact, the war criminals who are stained with the people's blood should not be sent to political dialogues. They should be sent to domestic and international criminal courts. The National Unity Government will always welcome the military personnel who detests the military's atrocities, who believe that their responsibility is to protect the country, not to be involved in politics, even though you may still be under the terrorist leadership at the moment.
In the National Unity Consultative Council, a platform where all the political forces who want genuine federal and democracy gather together, we have confirmed the Federal Democratic Charter that includes a political road map for the future of the Union of Myanmar. The National Unity Government will follow this charter and continually move forward and implement it as in the road map.
The most important thing at the moment is, based on the objectives of ending the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union, all political forces including the EAOs, should build unity and get involved in people's revolution. The revolution that has sacrificed many lives in the last 11 months will see a new change in 2022 and, have no doubt, we will achieve the people's victory.
As in the Declaration of the Independence which states, “The Burmese people, have here made a solemn declaration of Burmese Independence and of the principles upon which the New Republic of Burma is founded and will be governed”, I would like to urge you to let us tenaciously work together until we free ourselves from military slavery and bring back freedom, equality, and justice for the people who are the original owner of the sovereignty.
Our cause shall triumph!..."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of publication:
2022-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-04
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"After being under British rule for 124 years, our people were able to regain our independence on the 4th of January, 1948. This was achieved due to great sacrifices in lives, blood and sweat of ethnic national leaders and all ethnic nationals, and led by General Aung San, all of whom showed unflagging determination and intense patriotism. Right from that time, the people of myanmar aspired to have a democratic federal union in the country. They worked hard to build a peaceful and prosperous Union of Myanmar.
The sovereign power of the nation belongs to the people of Myanmar, yet now we see that at this time our independence, that our ancestors fought so hard for, has been taken away by the corrupt, lawless and illegitimate military junta that has removed the legitimate elected representatives of Myanmar and destroyed the people’s freedom and democracy.
General Aung San once said that, “The armed forces are meant for this nation and this people, and it should be such a force having the honour and respect of the people. If instead the armed forces should come to be hated by the people, then the aims with which this army has been built up would have been in vain.“ General Aung San’s fears have been realised, and we are faced with a new battle for independence from the dictatorship of Min Aung Hlaing and his henchman.
In her speech in 1988 Daw Aung San Su Kyi also quoted her father, “We must make democracy the popular creed. We must try to build up a free Burma in accordance with such a creed. If we should fail to do this, our people are bound to suffer. If democracy should fail the world cannot stand back and just look on, and therefore Burma would one day, like Japan and Germany, be despised. Democracy is the only ideology which is consistent with freedom. It is also an ideology that promotes and strengthens peace. It is therefore the only ideology we should aim for.”
She continued to say: “That is what my father said. It is the reason why I am participating in this struggle for freedom and democracy in the footsteps and traditions of my father. To achieve democracy the people should be united. That is very clear. It is a very plain fact. If there is no unity of purpose we shall be unable to achieve anything at all. If the people are disunited, no ideology or form of government can bring much benefit to the country. This must be firmly fixed in the minds of the people. If there is no discipline, no system can succeed. Therefore our people should always be united and disciplined.”
So on this 74th Independence day I wish to reiterate that we all must work together in unity to regain our independence once again. We have achieved much so far in our struggle against the military junta. We are closer now to our original goals of independence, freedom and federal democracy. We will achieve these goals through unity, determination, and discipline. If we do this, and maintain our efforts, before long this revolution will succeed..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-04
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"၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို နယ်ချဲ့ဗြိတိသျှတို့က မတရားသိမ်းပိုက်၍ ဖိနှိပ်ခဲ့မှုအပေါ် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက တော်လှန်ရေးဖြင့် တွန်းလှန်ကာ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာပိုင် လွတ်လပ်သော နိုင်ငံအဖြစ် ကမ္ဗည်းတင်နိုင်ခဲ့သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ဖြစ်သည့် (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနေ့အခါသမယတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများ အားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ပါး ကျန်းမာအေးချမ်းကာ လွတ်မြောက်ခြင်း၏ အနှစ်သာရကို ပြည့်ပြည့်ဝဝ ခံစားရပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာ ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ တိုင်းတပါးသားတို့၏ အုပ်ချုပ်စိုးမိုးမှုအောက်တွင် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ကျရောက်ခဲ့ရာမှ တိုင်းရင်းသားအပေါင်း၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်မှုဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြန်လည်ရယူနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး “နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးသည် မည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက် တစ်ဖွဲ့တစ်သင်း၏ အမွေအနှစ်မဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတစ်ဦး တစ်ယောက် တစ်ဖွဲ့တစ်သင်း၏ အပိုင်ပစ္စည်းမဟုတ်၊ မည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက် တစ်ဖွဲ့တစ်သင်းက ချုပ်ကိုင် အနိုင်သိမ်းယူ အကျိုးခံစားအပ်သော နိုင်ငံမဟုတ်” ဟု တိတိပပ ကြေညာခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ သို့သော် တိုင်းပြည်အနာဂတ်နှင့် နိုင်ငံသူ၊ နိုင်ငံသားတို့၏ လူနေမှုဘဝ အဆင့်အတန်း ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးကို မငဲ့ဘဲ အာဏာလောဘနှင့် အတ္တကြီးသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့က လက်နက် အားကိုးဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းယူခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် နိုင်ငံအတွင်း နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြာ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး မရရှိခဲ့ဘဲ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးမှုနောက်ကျသော နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံအဖြစ် ရောက်ရှိသွားခဲ့ပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော ၁၀ စုနှစ်များ အတွင်း တိုင်းပြည်၏ လူမှုစီးပွားဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသာယာသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး ဝိုင်းဝန်းကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကြသော်လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများက လွတ်လပ်၍ တရားမျှတသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှတဆင့် ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ပြည်သူ့ အစိုးရထံမှ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ခေါင်းဆောင်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်မှ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ခေတ်သစ်ကိုလိုနီပုံစံ အဓမ္မသိမ်းယူခဲ့ပါသည်။
၄။ အကြမ်းဖက် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်သည် နိုင်ငံ၏ ဥပဒေများကို ဖောက်ဖျက်ကျူးလွန်ပြီး အာဏာသိမ်းယူခဲ့သည်သာမက ဥပဒေအား လိုသလို အဓိပ္ပါယ်ဖွင့်ဆိုကာ မမှန်မကန် စွပ်စွဲ၍ ဖမ်းဆီးထောင်ချခြင်း၊ ဥပဒေမဲ့ ဖမ်းဆီးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူတို့၏ အိုးအိမ်နှင့် ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကို သိမ်းပိုက်ခြင်း၊ ခိုးယူခြင်း၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ်၌ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံသားတို့၏ အခြေခံအခွင့်အရေးတို့အား ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးခြင်းစသည့် လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်း ဖက်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်နေခြင်းကြောင့် ဆုံးရှုံးသွားသော လွတ်လပ်ခြင်း၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းခြင်းနှင့် အခွင့် အရေးတို့အတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက ကမ္ဘာတွင် မကြုံစဖူး ညီညွတ်သော ပြည်သူ့ တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး တစ်ရပ်ကို ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသည်မှာ လွန်စွာ ဂုဏ်ယူလေးစားဖွယ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ လွတ်လပ်ရေးရရှိရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့စဉ်က ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့တို့က နည်းအမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် သွေးခွဲ ခဲ့သော်လည်း အခက်အခဲအမျိုးမျိုးကြားမှ တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ မဆုတ်မနစ်သော ဇွဲလုံ့လနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများ၏ ညီညွတ်မှုတို့ကြောင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေး ရယူနိုင်ခဲ့ ပါသည်။ ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် ဖက်ဆစ်တို့၏ နည်းလမ်းအတိုင်း အကြမ်းဖက် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်က တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအကြား သွေးခွဲခြင်းနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးအရှိန်ကျသွားစေရန် လုပ်ကြံ သတင်းအချက်အလက် အမှားများဖြင့် ပုံဖျက်ခြင်းတို့ကို စနစ်တကျ လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်းကြောင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများနှင့် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက အမျှော်အမြင်ကြီးစွာဖြင့် အထူးသတိထား ရှောင်ရှားရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။
၆။ မိမိတို့ ရည်မှန်းထားသည့် တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုး အနာဂတ်အတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသာယာပြီး တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေးများနှင့် အခြေခံနိုင်ငံသားအခွင့်အရေးများအတွက် အာမခံချက် အပြည့်အဝ ရှိသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ ကွယ်ပျောက်သွားရန် အထူးအရေးကြီးပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်သည်အထိ ယခုကဲ့သို့ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာ ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းသွားရန် ထပ်မံ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၇။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် တည်ရှိနေသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ ကျူပင်ခုတ် ကျူငုတ်မကျန်အောင် အမြစ်ဖျက်ခြေမှုန်းကာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီး တည်ဆောက်ရေးတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ကိုယ်စွမ်းဉာဏ် စွမ်းရှိသရွေ့ မဆုတ်မနစ် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ပြည်သူ့ထံမှ ဆင်းသက်လာသည့် အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို ပြည်သူတို့ထံသို့ ပြန်လည်အပ်နှင်းနိုင်ရေး ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင် ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း လေးနက်ခိုင်မာစွာ ကတိသစ္စာပြုရင်း ဤလွတ်လပ်ရေးနေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာ ကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-04
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Individual Documents
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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"On behalf of the United States of America, I extend my support for the people of Burma as they celebrate their Independence Day on January 4.
We honor the people of Burma who are striving to restore an inclusive path to democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law for all people in the country. The United States remains committed to the people of Burma, who will not give up hope for a better future, even as they suffer horrific abuses by the regime. We reiterate our call for the military regime to cease immediately the use of violence, release all those unjustly detained, and return Burma’s path to a genuine and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher:
United States Department of State
Date of publication:
2022-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
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"We are determined to put human rights at the center of our foreign policy, and we reaffirm this commitment by using appropriate tools and authorities to draw attention to and promote accountability for human rights violations and abuses, no matter where they occur.
The United States appreciates the coordinated actions taken today by the United Kingdom and Canada under their respective sanctions programs to target Burmese military actors responsible for violence and repression. We also welcome the close coordination with the EU, UK, and Canada last week on our strongest sanctions package to date on Belarus, which jointly imposes costs on the Lukashenka regime for its continued repression of the Belarusian people. The United States looks forward to continuing our partnerships with allies, partners, and civil society alike in defending human rights and promoting accountability and good governance.
In further recognition of Human Rights Day 2021, the Department is designating 12 officials of foreign governments under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 2021. This law provides that in cases where there is credible information that officials of foreign governments have been involved in a gross violation of human rights or significant corruption, those individuals and their immediate family members are to be designated publicly or privately and are ineligible for entry into the United States.
The Department of State is designating under Section 7031(c) the following individuals for their involvement in gross violations of human rights:
Abel Kandiho, Major General and head of the Chieftancy of Military Intelligence within the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces, for his involvement in a gross violation of human rights, namely torture. Kandiho was also designated this week by the Department of the Treasury under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program in connection with serious human rights abuse.
Shohrat Zakir, Erken Tuniyaz, Hu Lianhe, and Chen Mingguo, current and former senior PRC officials in Xinjiang, China for their involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely arbitrary detention of Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. Shohrat Zakir and Erken Tuniyaz were also designated today by the Department of the Treasury under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program in connection with serious human rights abuse.
Ihar Kenyukh and Yauheni Shapetska, heads of the notorious Akrestsina Detention Center in Minsk, Belarus, for their involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely the torture and/or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 9, 2020 presidential election.
Benazir Ahmed, current Inspector General of the Bangladesh Police and former Director General of Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and Miftah Uddin Ahmed, Lieutenant Colonel and former commanding officer of RAB Unit 7, for their involvement in a gross violation of human rights, namely the May 2018 extrajudicial killing of Teknaf City Municipal Councilor Ekramul Haque in Teknaf, Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh. The RAB, Benazir Ahmed, and five other officials were also designated today by the Department of the Treasury under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program in connection with serious human rights abuse.
Chandana Hettiarachchi, a Sri Lankan naval intelligence officer, for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely, the flagrant denial of the right to liberty of at least eight “Trincomalee 11” victims, from 2008 to 2009. Sunil Ratnayake, a former Staff Sergeant in the Sri Lanka Army, for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely the extrajudicial killings of at least eight Tamil villagers in December 2000. The designation of these two Sri Lankan individuals is not the only action we are taking in support of accountability for gross violations of human rights in Sri Lanka.
Mario Plutarco Marin Torres, a former governor of Puebla, Mexico, for his involvement in a gross violation of human rights in Mexico, namely, the arbitrary detention of journalist and human rights defender Lydia Cacho in December 2005. We commend Mexican authorities for arresting Marin Torres in February on torture charges.
Additionally, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is imposing sanctions on 15 individuals and 10 entities including for roles in serious human rights abuse and repression across several countries. A complete list of the Department of Treasury’s additional actions can be found here https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0526 . These designations underscore our support for human rights and commitment to promoting accountability for human rights abusers and violators the world over..."
Source/publisher:
United States Department of State
Date of publication:
2021-12-10
Date of entry/update:
2021-12-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Political History
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"Stories from an Ancient Land: Perspectives on Wa History and Culture
By Magnus Fiskesjö
Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2021, 314 pages. US$145 (hardcover), US$33.03 (Kindle)
The Wa, who live on both sides of the Myanmar-China border, are probably Southeast Asia’s most misunderstood—and often maligned—ethnic minority. Over the years, they have been described as wild headhunters, communist rebels, drug traffickers and puppets of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In Myanmar, many people seem to believe that they are a kind of Chinese when they are, in fact, a Mon-Khmer tribe related to the Palaung of northern and eastern Shan State.
This book by US-based Swedish anthropologist Magnus Fiskesjö, therefore, is a very welcome contribution to a better understanding of the Wa. Although his field work was done almost exclusively on the Chinese side of the border, his accounts of Wa culture and history, and the group’s troubled relationship with the Chinese state, should be essential reading for anyone interested in peace along the common border. And that is especially important now, given the United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s position as the strongest and best-equipped ethnic armed group in the country at a time when Myanmar is descending into chaos. They have not, so far, played any direct role in domestic politics and they are not fighting the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. But several groups that are, among them the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army, and to a lesser extent the Kachin Independence Army, have benefited from arms, ammunition and other equipment supplied by the UWSA.
The Wa in Myanmar have never been controlled by any central authority. During the British time, colonial presence consisted of little more than a few field officers on the outskirts of the hills, and occasional flag-marches up to the border to show the Chinese where their designated territory supposedly ended. After independence, the Wa Hills were ruled by local chieftains and warlords, and, in some parts, remnants of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, forces that had retreated across the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists during the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949.
Then, in the early 1970s, the Wa Hills were taken over by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which established a base area covering most of the border mountains. In 1989, the rank-and-file of the CPB’s army, which included thousands of Wa fighters, mutinied against the ageing, staunchly Maoist leadership of the party, drove them into exile in China, and established their own army, the UWSA. Today, the 20,000-30,000-strong UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party, rules the Wa Hills without any central government interference. Their area is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies.
On the Chinese side, the situation has historically been equally complex. The emperors in Beijing had no jurisdiction over the Chinese Wa Hills, and contacts with the Wa were limited to some merchants who had dealings with them in opium, silver and salt. That changed after 1949, when the PLA moved into the Wa Hills to counter the Kuomintang’s attempts to reenter southern China from their clandestine bases in northeastern Shan State. As Fiskesjö explains, many Wa, who feared the Chinese, then fled into the Myanmar Wa Hills. But, by and large, the PLA treated the local population relatively well because they needed the Wa’s knowledge of terrain in order to secure the border areas, and depended on them for intelligence, even across the border into the Wa Hills of Myanmar, where the Kuomintang had bases.
After a few years of comparative leniency, and as soon as the Kuomintang threat had been eliminated, the Chinese introduced a new, and unwelcome, social and political order. Weapons in the possession of Wa villagers, who were used to being armed because they depended on hunting, were confiscated and according to Fiskesjö all paraphernalia associated with head-hunting were destroyed. Drum houses, the main social institution in any Wa village, were torn down, their log drums were thrown out or burned and “the major rituals of the past were abandoned. Chief ritualists and other leaders were demoted, marginalized, or even prosecuted.” Wa elders Fiskesjö spoke to regarded 1958 as the key watershed, “since in that year the Chinese policy shifted from reconciliation to enforcement.” Even the Wa had to become Chinese communists and were herded into people’s communes.
But what about head-hunting and opium? According to Fiskesjö, head-hunting as well as poppy appeared “in the Wa lands relatively recently.” Opium, Fiskesjö writes, “was seized upon as a new source of wealth…as a profitable but illicit crop, it could be grown with impunity only in these mountains, well away from the interference of states.” And that happened in the late 19th and early 20th century, presumably because there was then a huge demand for the drug in China. As for head-hunting, in the past bodies of dead tigers were placed outside villages to scare away potential enemies; but “after the wars of the mid-19th century, and with the spread of modern firearms [tigers] have now become scarce…[and] in a way humans replaced tigers as the most dangerous adversary of the land.” Long lines of posts, or a nog in Wa, with dry, whitened skulls on display lined the paths leading into villages and “served as a key Wa weapon of deterrence, legible as such by alien soldier-observers like the British and the Chinese.”
The only place where Fiskesjö’s analysis goes astray is when he describes the arrival of the CPB in the Myanmar Wa Hills. He writes that “the Chinese-supported [CPB], equipped with modern weaponry, moved from central Burma into Wa country in the late 1960s.” In fact, the CPB takeover of the border areas came after more than a hundred Myanmar communists, who had been living in exile in China since the early 1950s, came across the border on January 1, 1968 accompanied by a few hundred Kachin, followers of the early rebel leader Naw Seng, who had retreated independently into China at about the same time—and thousands of heavily armed Red Guard volunteers from China who were sent to fight alongside their Myanmar comrades.
The first incursion took place at Möng Ko in the north, far from the Wa Hills, and it was not until the early 1970s that the CPB, with Chinese assistance, took over the Wa Hills. The plan was to establish a “liberated area” along the border and from there push down to the Myanmar heartland, where poorly equipped CPB units were still holding out in places like the Pegu Yoma north of Yangon, and pockets in Sagaing Division, the Arakan Hills and Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi).
That plan failed as the Tatmadaw realized that it could only contain, not defeat, the “new” CPB forces on the Chinese border—of whom the vast majority soon consisted of Wa conscripts—and, therefore, concentrated its efforts on wiping out the old strongholds in central Myanmar. That strategy proved to be successful and the last of the old major bases, those in the Pegu Yoma, were overrun in 1975. The number of Pegu Yoma survivors who made it to the new, northeastern base area was minimal. When I was at the then CPB headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in 1986-1987, I was able to meet only two such veterans.
But Fiskesjö is correct in saying that the imposition of CPB rule over the Wa Hills led to the annihilation of “the long-standing Wa autonomy, or, more precisely, what remained of Wa autonomy after World War II, when parts of the Wa lands became the battleground of Chinese Kuomintang forces on the run from the lost cause of their civil war in China.” Fiskesjö goes on to explain how “the broad assault on Wa cultural and political traditions under the [CPB] in some ways was even more drastic than what occurred in Chinese-annexed Wa territory.”
Indeed, the “new” CPB treated the Wa as little more than cannon fodder in their struggle to reach central Myanmar, where the party’s future, if any, would have lied. It is significant that the CPB chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin left his headquarters at Panghsang only to go to China, and, on a few occasions, to Möng Ko. He never even once visited a Wa village inside the CPB-controlled base area to talk to the people there.
The outcome of the CPB’s failure to reach the Myanmar heartland was that it became isolated in a remote mountain area where they did not belong and had never intended to stay. That, in turn, led to the 1989 mutiny, in which the CPB’s Wa troops stormed Panghsang and the Myanmar communists, once again, had to seek refuge in China. But this time, China had changed its policy. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, the Myanmar communists were not allowed to engage in any kind of politics, and had to survive on pensions provided to them by Chinese authorities.
In one of the most powerful chapters in the book, Fiskesjö describes how commercial entrepreneurs in modern times have built theme parks where supposed head-hunting paraphernalia are on display, and visitors can stay in newly-built huts and watch “wild Wa tribesmen” perform “exotic” dances which have no resemblance to Wa traditions. The much-promoted Wa “hair dance”, where young Wa women toss their long hair back and forth, is one such invention. One of those “China Folk Cultural Villages” in Shenzhen opposite Hong Kong is called “Windows of the World, where young Wa dancers also work — but they perform there as Africans, New Zealand Maoris, and American Indians.”
It is no wonder many Wa feel exploited and resent being looked down upon by the Chinese—and that strained relationship, as well as the past Wa history of being oppressed by the Chinese Communist Party, is something most foreign observers have overlooked. The UWSA today may be heavily dependent on the Chinese for trade, and its vast and sophisticated arsenal made up almost entirely of weapons procured in China. But that does not mean that relations between China and the Wa in Myanmar are as smooth as people think.
And drugs? Fiskesjö outlines the history of poppy cultivation in the Wa Hills but, as an anthropologist, does not dwell on today’s trade in narcotics. There is no doubt that the UWSA built up its now well-developed, autonomous area in Myanmar with profits from the trade in opium and heroin, and, more recently, methamphetamines. But it would also be fair to say that the organization’s relative wealth today is based on a number of other sources of income as well. Tin mining and the extraction of rare earth metals are believed to be more lucrative than the trade in narcotics.
The price of the book, US$145, may make most people interested in the topic reluctant to buy it, but there is also a more affordable Kindle version of this groundbreaking study. Read it—it is well worth it.
Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-12-07
Date of entry/update:
2021-12-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Wa (cultural, political, economic), China-Burma relations, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
https://nugmyanmar.org
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၂/၂၀၂၁)
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက်
ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်သူများကို ကားဖြင့်တိုက်၍ အကြမ်းဖက် ဖမ်းဆီး၊ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများနှင့်
ပတ်သက်၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း
၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက်နေ့မနက်တွင် ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ ကြည့်မြင်တိုင်မြို့နယ်အတွင်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ လျှပ်တပြတ်သပိတ်အဖြစ် ဆန္ဒပြနေသည့် လူငယ်များကို အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုက စစ်ကားဖြင့် အနောက်မှ အလစ်အငိုက် ဝင်ရောက်တိုက်ခိုက်ပြီးနောက် သေနတ်ဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်သတ်ဖြတ် အကြမ်းဖက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ဖြိုခွင်းမှုကြောင့် ဆန္ဒပြလူငယ်အချို့ကျဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး အများအပြား ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်နေသည့် ပြည်သူ ၁၁ ဦးကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရသည့် ပြည်သူများမှာ အမှန်တရား၊ တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တန်းတူညီမှျမှုတို့အတွက် ရဲရဲရင့်ရင့် ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်နေကြသည့် မိမိတို့ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ရင်သွေးများလည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ အကျည်းတန်သော စက်ဆုပ်ဖွယ်ဖြစ်ရပ်များသည် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်၏ လက်နက်ကိုင် အနိုင်ကျင့်လိုသည့် ဖုံးဖိမရသော အမူအကျင့်၊ အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူမှန်သမျှကို ကြိုက်သလို သတ်ဖြတ်နိုင်သည်ဟုခံယူထားသည့် စစ်တပ်၏ အင်မတန်နိမ့်ကျ၊ လူ့ကျင့်ဝတ်မဲ့မှု၏ ပြယုဂ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ထိုသို့သော သတ္တိကြောင်ပြီး ယုတ်မာရိုင်းစိုင်းသည့် ပြစ်မှုမျိုးကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယခုအကြိမ်သည် ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်မဟုတ်ပါ။ အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အဖြစ်အပျက်များသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနက မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသည့် အလားတူဖြစ်စဉ်များဖြစ်ပါသည်။
• ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၂၇ ရက်နေ့ မြိတ်မြို့တွင် ဆန္ဒပြသူတစ်ဦး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု တပ်ဖွဲ့က ကားဖြင့် ဝင်တိုက်ပြီး ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်။
• မေလ ၂ ရက်နေ့ ရွေဘိုမြို့တွင် ရွှေဘိုပင်မသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း လူစုနေစဉ် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှာ လူအုပ်ထဲသို့ ကားဖြင့် ဝင်တိုက်ခဲ့ပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒပြသူများကို ဖမ်းဆီးသွားခဲ့သည်။
• မေလ ၆ ရက်နေ့ မွန်ပြည်နယ်၊ ချောင်းဆုံမြို့နယ်တွင် ဆိုင်ကယ်တစ်စီးကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုတပ်ဖွဲ့မှ ကားဖြင့်တိုက်ကာ ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သဖြင့် ဆိုင်ကယ်စီးလာသူ ပြည်သူတစ်ဦး အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည်။
• မေလ ၂၁ ရက်နေ့ ကချင်ပြည်နယ်၊ မြစ်ကြီးနားမြို့နယ်တွင် ထင်ရှားသည့်ကချင်တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူ ၂ ဦးဖြစ်သော ဒေါ်ဆိုင်းနူးပန်နှင့် ဦးလွမ်းဇောင်း အပါအဝင် လူငယ် ၃ ဦးကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု တပ်ဖွဲ့က သေနတ်ဖြင့်ပစ်၊ ကားဖြင့်တိုက်၍ ဖမ်းဆီးသွားခဲ့သည်။
• မေလ ၂၈ ရက်နေ့ မန္တလေးမြို့တွင် သံဃသမဂ္ဂသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်းကို ကားဖြင့်တိုက်ကာ ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သဖြင့် သံဃာနှစ်ပါး ဖမ်းဆီးခံခဲ့ရသည်။
• ဧပြီလ ၁၅ ရက်နေ့ မုံရွာမြို့တွင် သပိတ်ခေါင်းဆောင် ကိုဝေမိုးနိုင်ဦးဆောင်၍ အာဏာရှင်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ဆိုင်ကယ်သပိတ်ပြုလုပ်နေစဉ် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုတပ်ဖွဲ့က အရပ်သား အိမ်စီးကားဖြင့် တဖက်ယာဉ်ကြောမှ မောင်းနှင်လာကာ ကားနှင့်တိုက်၍ ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်။ ကိုဝေမိုးနိုင် ဆိုင်ကယ်လဲကျသွားသောအခါ ၎င်းတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ ကားပေါ်မှ ဆင်း၍ ဝိုင်းဝန်းရိုက်နှက်ကာ ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်။
• ဇွန်လ ၆ ရက်နေ့ မန္တလေးမြို့တွင် လူငယ်သုံးဦးစီးနင်းလာသည့် မော်တော်ဆိုင်ကယ်အား အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုမှ ကားဖြင့်ဝင်တိုက်ခဲ့သဖြင့် လူငယ်နှစ်ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။
• ဇွန်လ ၁၆ ရက်နေ့ မန္တလေးမြို့တွင် မန္တလေး မဟာမိတ်တပ်ပေါင်းစု သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း လူစုနေကြစဉ် ဆန္ဒပြသူများ၏ ဆိုင်ကယ်များကို ကားဖြင့် ဝင်တိုက်ခဲ့သဖြင့် ဆန္ဒပြသူအများအပြား ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရခဲ့ကြသည်။
• အောက်တိုဘာ ၂ ရက်နေ့ မန္တလေးမြို့တွင် မန္တလေး သံဃသမဂ္ဂ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်းကို ကားဖြင့် ဝင်တိုက်ပြီး ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သဖြင့် သံဃာ ငါးပါးနှင့် ဆန္ဒပြ ပြည်သူ သုံးဦး အဖမ်းဆီးခံခဲ့ရသည်။ ထိုတစ်နေ့တည်းမှာပင် LGBT အရေးတက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှား သူတစ်ဦးဖြစ်သော စူးရှရှင်းသန့်ကို ဆိုင်ကယ်မောင်းနေစဉ် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ကားဖြင့်တိုက်ကာ ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့ပြီး စစ်ကြောရေးသို့ ခေါ်ဆောင်သွားခဲ့သည်။
• အောက်တိုဘာလ ၁၈ ရက်နေ့ မန္တလေး၊ မဟာအောင်မြေမြို့နယ်တွင် လူငယ် ၆၀ ခန့်စုဝေး၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်နေစဉ် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုတပ်ဖွဲ့မှ ကားဖြင့် ဝင်တိုက်၍ ဖြိုခွဲခဲ့ပြီး ဆန္ဒပြသူ ၁၀ ဦးကို ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်။
၃။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒပြသူများကို ကားဖြင့် တိုက်၍ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းသည် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ စုဝေး စီတန်းလှည့်လည်ခွင့်ဆိုသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို ချိုးဖောက်ရုံသာမက အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ထိုလုပ်ရပ်များအပေါ် ပြင်းထန်စွာရူတ်ချသည်။
၄။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏တရားဝင်အာဏာအပ်နှင်းခြင်းခံထားရသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH) နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ(NUG)တို့က စစ်ကောင်စီသည် အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့ အစည်းဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကြေညာထားပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ နိုင်ငံတကာရာဇဝတ်မှုကျုးလွန်မှုများနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ နိုင်ငံတကာခုံရုံး များတွင် အပြစ်ပေးစီရင်နိုင်ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းနေမှုအား ယဉ်ကေျးသည့်၊ လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းစံချိန်စံနှုန်းများကို လေးစားလိုက်နာ သည့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းတစ်ခုလုံးက ဝိုင်းဝန်းပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ပေးကြရန် လိုအပ်သည်။ ထို့ပြင် အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များကျူးလွန်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးဆောင်ရွက်ချက် များနှင့်အညီ ကိုင်တွယ်အရေးယူကြရန် တောင်းဆိုသည်။
၅။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို ပြည်သူများက အသိတရားရှိရှိဖြင့် ကာကွယ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။
၆။ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုတစ်ခုစီအတွက် ကျူးလွန်သူတစ်ဦးချင်းစီတိုင်းကို အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အချက်အလက်အထောက်အထားများ ရှာဖေွခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ ရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံး၊ တရားရုံးမျာမှတစ်ဆင့် အရေးယူနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးစားခြင်းဖြင့် တရားမျှတမှုကို ပြည်သူနှင့်လက်တွဲ၍ ဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက သန္နိဌာန်ပြုသည်။
၇။ အဖိုးတန်လှတဲ့ ပြည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်ချင်းစီရဲ့ အသက်ပေါင်းများစွာကို ယခုလိုရက်စက်စွာ သတ်ဖြတ်ခံနေရခြင်း၊ ပညာသင်ပြီး ကိုယ့်ဘဝတိုးတက်ရေး၊ တိုင်းပြည်တိုးတက်ရေး ကြိုးစားရမည့် လူငယ်များ လမ်းပေါ်တွင် ဆန္ဒပြရင်း သေကျေကြရခြင်း၊ မိဝေးဖဝေး လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးတိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရင်း ပင်ပန်းဆင်းရဲ ခံကြရခြင်း ၊ မတရားဖမ်းဆီး ခံရကာ စစ်ကြောရေးတွင် ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက်ခံရပြီး အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခံရခြင်းများအားလုံး အမြန်ဆုံးအဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အားလုံးတွင် တာဝန်ရှိပါသည်။
၈။ ထို့ကြောင့် တရားမျှတမှုအတွက်၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုအတွက်၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံး တန်းတူညီမျှမှုအတွက် တောင်းဆိုနေသည့် ပြည့်ရင်သွေးများကို ယခုကဲ့သို့ လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင် များအား အပြီးတိုင်အမြစ်ဖြတ် အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်စေရေး ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ နိုင်ငံအဝန်းတွင်ရှိသည့် ပြည့်ရင်သွေးလူငယ်များနှင့် ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး၏ ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ရမှုများ ၊ ဆက်လက်ပေးဆပ်နေရမှုများ အလဟဿ မဖြစ်စေရန်အတွက် သမိုင်းကပေးသောတာဝန်ကို ဦးထိပ်ရွက်ဆင်၍ အဆုံးသတ်ထိ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဟု ထပ်လောင်းကတိသစ္စာပြု အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2021-12-05
Date of entry/update:
2021-12-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Political History
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"The bodies of a 23-year-old female medic and two male members of the Kale People’s Defense Force (PDF) were found at a camp which was raided by junta troops last Tuesday in Kale Township, Sagaing Region.
The civilian resistance group said victims were Biak Rem Chin, Cher Thang Puia and Ram Mawia.
Biak Rem Chin, also known as Chin Chin, was providing medical training at the camp. She had been shot in the forehead while Cher Thang Puia and Ram Mawia showed signs of torture on their faces.
During the raid, the junta captured nine female medics at the base and their condition remains unknown.
The three deaths mean the numbers killed by the military regime is at least 1,281, reported the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which records killings and arrests by the junta. The group estimated that the actual number of victims is much higher.
According to the AAPP’s latest report, junta forces have killed around 50 civilians so far this month, including five teenagers, bystanders, villagers, a striking teacher and a hostage.
High-school teacher U Zaw Min Aung, 40, who joined the civil disobedience movement by refusing to work under the regime, was tortured to death in interrogation hours after being detained in Myin Thar village, Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region.
He was seized with another civilian on the night of Nov. 17 and accused of having links to PDFs.
Ko Ye Aung, who was seized as a hostage in Kyauktada village in Mandalay Region was tortured to death during interrogation, the AAPP said.
On Nov. 12, Ko Myint Naing and Ko Ye Aung, the father and uncle of a young activist who faced an arrest warrant for incitement, were detained. The next day, Ko Ye Aung’s family was told to retrieve his body, which was apparently covered in torture injuries.
Junta forces have detained more than 10,000 people, while nearly 2,000 people face arrest warrants.
Numerous relatives of wanted activists have been taken hostage by the junta.
The AAPP said the 13-year-old son of National League for Democracy member U Htay Aung was seized when junta forces could not find him.
On Nov. 13 morning, the junta seized the wife of U Thein Naing Tun and a young philanthropist named Ko Thein Zaw as hostages in Taung Tha Township, Mandalay Region, when troops failed to find former village administrator U Thein Naing Tun and two other wanted people..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-11-22
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
Language:
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Sub-title:
Fears for the safety of nine medics captured by regime forces last week have grown amid evidence that three others detained at the same time were tortured to death
Description:
"Regime forces who captured 12 members of the Kalay People’s Defence Force (PDF) during a raid last week tortured three of them to death and used the other nine as human shields, according to a member of the group.
The bodies of two men found dead at a base that was overrun by junta troops last Tuesday had multiple face injuries, while a woman believed to have been killed the day after the raid had a bullet wound in her forehead, Kalay PDF member Victor said.
“The injuries on one of the male bodies suggest that his face was beaten with a rock until he died,” said Victor, who added that the bodies were recovered two days after the raid.
The male victims were identified as Cher Thang Puia, 27, and Ram Mawia, 26. The 23-year-old female victim, Baik Rem Chin (aka Chin Chin), was providing medical training at the base, located in southwestern Kalay Township, when it was raided.
Yati Ohn, a friend of the murdered woman, expressed concern for the safety of nine other young women captured at the Kalay PDF Battalion 3 base the same day.
“I am very worried for the lives of those girls. The military council has no regard for human rights standards or international laws and may subject them to psychological and physical torture,” said Yati Ohn, who leads a team of medics.
“I would like to request help from both international and local organizations,” she added.
A coalition of local resistance forces that clashed with the soldiers following the raid said that they later retreated to avoid harming the hostages, who they said were being used as human shields.
It is believed that the women, whose photos went viral after they were posted online by the junta last week, are currently being held at the headquarters of the military’s Kalay Regional Operations Command (ROC).
“We heard that all nine were taken to Kalay and then to the ROC headquarters,” said Victor.
According to the Kalay PDF, nearly 30 junta soldiers were killed during three days of fighting early last week. Two of its members were also injured by shelling, but remain in stable condition, the group said.
The base that was raided was the closest one to Kalay, according to PDF member Victor, who said that it was easily captured because there were few troops there at the time of the raid.
“The security at the base was lowered as several of our troops had been sent to the frontlines,” he said. He added that the regime failed to obtain any sensitive information.
Residents of Kalay reported a number of clashes late at night last Thursday.
“There was an explosion at around 11pm and then it got worse. We heard consecutive gunshots. There was also a clash at the Kalay police station. Gunshots could be heard all over town. It only stopped after midnight,” said a local man.
Myanmar Now was unable to determine which group the military was fighting that night.
On Friday, the Kalay PDF released a statement warning civilians to avoid using the Kalay-Gangaw road.
The military has dramatically increased its presence in Sagaing Region and Chin State since mid-October, when it launched a new offensive, dubbed Operation Anawrahta, to crush resistance to the regime that seized power in February..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2021-11-21
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Political History
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Description:
"More than 80 junta soldiers and 14 civilian resistance fighters were reportedly killed during clashes with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) in Sagaing and Magwe regions during three days this week.
The Irrawaddy could not independently verify any of the reports.
On Friday, a fierce clash between regime forces and several civilian resistance groups, including fighters from Chin State, occurred in Saw Township, Magwe Region.
In the firefight, the regime used helicopters to bombard civilian forces, the groups said, providing video evidence.
Saw PDF said on Friday that there were at least 20 military casualties and some civilian fighters were killed or injured.
“The junta attacked us and military reinforcements are arriving. The whole area is under attack from the junta. The junta is using helicopters,” a Yaw Defense Force (YDF) representative told The Irrawaddy.
On Wednesday, 14 civilian fighters and 10 regime troops were killed in a firefight with the YDF near Htanpinkone village in Tilin Township, Magwe Region, according to the YDF.
On Wednesday and Tuesday, the YDF in Tilin claimed five displaced civilians were killed by regime forces in the township.
A police officer was allegedly killed and a police captain wounded when the Gangaw PDF attacked the police on a motorbike in Kanywar village, Gangaw Township in Magwe Region on Thursday evening.
After the incident, the police raided the village and burned down seven houses, according to residents.
“Villagers had to flee as police opened fire on everything they could see, injuring a villager,” a resident told The Irrawaddy.
About seven houses and two motorbikes were destroyed by the police and a cow was shot dead, the resident said.
On Thursday afternoon, a fierce shootout was reported at a police station in Yesagyo Township, Magwe Region, in a raid by two civilian resistance groups.
After an hour-long firefight, the attackers occupied the police station, said the Yesagyo PDF.
In the shootout, two junta police were killed and another two wounded while the other police officers fled.
Yesagyo PDF said it burned down the police station after seizing police equipment, including an air gun, ammunition, a laptop and motorbikes.
On Thursday, two junta troops were killed when Yesagyo PDF ambushed a military vehicle using two landmines.
On Nov. 13, four resistance forces, including Yesagyo PDF, occupied and burned down a police station in the township after another battle with junta police.
Fighting has been reported in Kale Township, Sagaing Region, since Tuesday when regime force killed three Kale PDF medics and detained nine of its female members.
On Thursday, Kale PDF attacked the regime troops who seized its members while they were based in Nagarpwat village, Kale Township.
Kale PDF said it ambushed military reinforcements trying to reach Nagarpwat using three landmines, killing about 15 troops. After the ambushed, regime forces attacked nearby Chinsai village and torched 10 houses, the PDF said.
On Wednesday, the combined Kale PDF and Chin National Defense Force attacked regime troops who raided a PDF camp and detained the nine PDF medics. In the fighting, 17 junta soldiers were killed and one civilian fighter injured in junta shelling, the group said.
Two junta soldiers were killed and three others wounded when a combined resistance force attacked junta sentries in Tahan ward, Kale Township.
Around 15 junta soldiers were reportedly killed in ambushes and firefights with resistance groups in Tigyaing, Ye-U and Katha townships, Sagaing Region, on Thursday and Wednesday, according to the parallel National Unity Government’s ministry of defense.
The military regime is facing increasing attacks from PDFs and ethnic armed groups across the country..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-11-19
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
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Description:
"October 7. 2021• The military soldiers murdered a villager of Htipawsoe Village, Pharuso Township, Karenni
State (Kayah State) for no valid reason. There were totally 80 civilians being killed by
brutal firing of the military-led State Administration Council (SAC) in Karenni State.
• In Loikaw Township, Karenni State, the reckless and disproportionately firing of the SAC
armed forces had resulted one dead, and 7 wounded people including two underaged
teenagers.
• Over 50 troop members of the military were reportedly raiding along the three villages of
the TaingNet Village Tract situated 10 miles away from Depayin Township, Sagaing Region
and destroyed public properties in these villages for several times. There are TaingNet
Village, MyinTant Village, and Kyi Ywa Kone Village in the TaingNet Village Tract.
• The SAC troop members raided and set fire on the Min Tan Village, Myaing Township,
Sagaing and murdered three civilians who were trying to extinguish the fire.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
October 8. 2021
• The SAC armed forces riding along the Hukaung-Leedo Road, Kachin kidnapped a young
people from Naung Mee Village to use as a hostage and to prevent them from having
attacked while they were passing from Shaduzut to Dunban.
• The SAC forces bombed a Baptist Church where community members of the Chaung Kwa,
Kalay Township, Sagaing were hiding.
• In Thayarkone Village, Kalay Township, Sagaing Region, there were 4 people being
arrested, and 4 house burnt down by the military armed forces.
• Two villagers were dead due to the firing of the SAC forces in Thaung Pyin Nge Village, Ye
Oo Township, Sagaing.
October 9, 2021
• There was a strife between SAC armed forces and KNDF troops for 5 minutes in Sanpya
(6) miles Village, Demawsoe Township, Karenni State, and two military soldiers were
wounded, followed by retreating of the military forces. This was due to the firing of the
KNDF members who witnessed 2 villagers being abducted by the military forces, one of
which was murdered by the SAC forces.
• The SAC armed forces’ 2 jets bombed the area around Mine Naung Village, Indawgyi area,
Moe Nyin Township, Kachin State in around 11 AM for at least 4 times.
• There were totally 17 civilians including one 10 years old child being abducted by the
military forces in Htichaik Township, Sagaing.
• In Sawpyar Village, Thayetchaung, Tahnintharyi Region, the Pyu Saw Htee, a pro-military
group that is engaging in violence activities against the peaceful civilians, arrested a
woman and her two-year-old and six-year-old children as hostages as they failed to arrest
her husband.
• The SAC forces abducted and killed NLD party supporter and teacher U Thein Zaw in
Mattayar Tonwship, Mandalay Region.
• In Taungnoo Township, Bago, the SAC forces abducted U San Kyi, a trustee board member
of the Shwe San Taw Pagoda and murdered in a hour.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The military armed forces raided the Taung Pyin Nge Village, Ye Oo Township, Sagaing
and murdered two PDF troop members by burning down them.
• In Wanbe Inn Village, Pinlebu Township, Sagaing Region, the terrorist 33rd Light Infantry
Division of the SAC forces stormed the house, shop of U Tin Pe and house of U Myint Kyaw
(a village tract administrator) and destroyed public properties in other village.
• In Myin Chan Township, Mandalay Region, a certain worker of old-stuff selling shop was
reportedly dead yesterday morning after being beaten by the Pyu Saw Htee group.
• The SAC armed forces and its allied BGF 1014 force had killed a villager in the street nearby
the monastery, Meebone Village, Takaung Boe Village Tract, PharAnn Township, Karen
State.
October 11. 2021
• The SAC forces abducted and killed rubber workers in Lonephaw Village, Kawthaung
District, Tahnintharyi Region.
• In Htekyaik Township, Sagain, the military armed forces stormed the Latha Village and
murdered some PDF members and innocent civilians.
• The terrorist SAC forces raided and burnt down the Done Dit Village, Ayardaw Township,
Sagaing.
October 12. 2021
• In ZayaKone Village, Myaing Township, Sagaing, the SAC armed forces burnt down the
poultry farms located in eastern part of the village, and took sheep and goats forcibly.
• In Lonephaw Village, Kawthaung, Tahnintharyi Region, the military forces shot 11-years
old Mg Thiha Aung and abducted 20 villagers.
October 13, 2021
• The terrorist military troops set fire on four house and church in a village located 4 miles
away from the Falang Tonwship, Chin State.
October 10. 2021
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The SAC forces burnt down the house belonging to the NLD party’s information officer
living in SanOo Village, Taungthar Township, Mandalay.
• In Ngamyaung Taung Village, Myaing Township, Sagaing, the military forces stormed and
burnt down 10 huts.
• The Catholic Church was damaged due to the artillery firing of the military troops in
Pharusoe Township, Karenni State.
• The SAC armed forces killed a young people drilling petroleum in Kani Village,
Kyaukpantaung Township, Mandalay Region.
October 14. 2021
• According to the local, 8 villagers of the Laungpyae Village were missing, and 2 were
murdered by the SAC forces who were travelling to Thapauk Village from Laungpyae
Village along forest trails, Min Kin Township, Sagaing Region.
• The SAC armed forces burnt down a church and 4 houses out of 10 houses in Ralti Village,
Falang Township, Chin State yesterday and set fire on the rest 6 houses as well.
• The military troops burnt down the Thlanrawn Village located 8 miles away from Falang
Township, Chin State.
• Two innocent civilians were reportedly murdered by the SAC forces in Tuphei Village,
Falang Township, Chin State yesterday.
October 15. 2021
• The SAC forces fired guns in and around the villages, urban areas of Kayen Township,
Yangon State around 21:00 yesterday.
• The military troops beat the IDPs who were returning to check their house in Phawgune
Village, Mone Koe Township, Shan State.
• There were over 60 civilians including one elderly woman being abducted in Ingapu,
MaUpin Township, Ayeyarwady Region within a week.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The SAC forces stormed the Aung Moe Village, KanChaung Village Tract, Yinmarbin
Township, Sagaing Region and abducted at least 10 villagers forcibly.
• Two villagers of KanNet, Myaing Township, Magway Region were arrested and their houses
destroyed by the military forces.
• The SAC forces murdered the 5 IDPs or villagers in Laungpyae Village, Min Kin Township,
Sagaing.
• Totally 21 civilians were arrested by the SAC forces during the armed conflict period in
Khin Oo Township, Sagaing Region.
October 16.2021
• In Matupi Township, Chin, the SAC armed forces murdered six-years old child and a
woman and certain man were dead due to the mine set up by the armed forces.
• In Mokepalin Village, Waw Township, Bago, Ma Moe (or) Ma Khaing Khaing Soe was shot
dead by the military armed forces after she opened the door when the forces knocked the
door around 12 AM yesterday.
October 17. 2021
• In Taungpyaut Village Tract, Thayet Chaung Township, Tahnintharyi Region, over 5000
civilians were fleeing from their villages (9 villages) due to the reckless firing of the SAC
armed forces.
• In Kyauk Kar Village, Monywa Township, Sagaing, CDM village administrator U Nyi Nyi Win
and his twin U Ko Ko Win were shot dead by the unidentifiable armed group.
• A certain civilian of Laung pan Ward, Matupi Township, Chin were dead due to the mine
set by the SAC forces when he went to his farm.
• 20 years-old M Phyu Mar Tun (or) Ma Phyu Mar was abducted by the military armed forces
for allegedly communicating with the PDF.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• Ko Myo Swe from Shwe Ku Tasu Village, Khin Oo Township, Sagaing was arrested and
killed by the military for allegedly being a member of PDF.
• A civilian in Demawsoe Township was dead due to the min set by the military forces.
• The disabled person in Pin Zin Village, Wetlet Township, Sagaing was abducted by the
military troop members.
• The SAC troops fired gun to the traveler in the tollgate, Pakokku Bypass Road, Magway.
• A house belonging to the protester woman in Letkokepin Village, Salingyi Township,
Sagaing was destroyed by certain group of people.
• In Maha Aung Myay Township, Mandalay, 20 protesters from Mandalay youth Strike were
wounded as the SAC armed forces dispersed the crowds by firing the guns.
• A registered lawyer in Alaykone Village, Dawei Township, Tahnintharyi was abducted by
the military armed forces.
• The SAC troops fired 15 heavy artilleries to the Tee myar Village, Muse Township, Shan
State.
• Totally 9 civilians from KyaungSin Village, Babae Seint Village, and Pyingyi Village, Maung
Ma Kan Town, Tahnintharyi Region were abducted by the SAC forces.
• Totally 3 civilians including NLD Ward administrator U Thet Hlaing were arrested in
Taungnoo Township, Bago Region.
• The military armed forces unlawfully abducted a youth in Kamyaing check point, Dawei
Township, Tahnintharyi Region.
• Houses were burnt down and properties inside the church were destroyed in Falang
Township, Chin State.
October 19, 2021
• The SAC armed forces destroyed public properties, dissembled the solar plate, and killed
the cows, sliced the tight leaving behind the rest by resting in 23 miles post, Mindat
Township, Chin State.
October 18. 2021
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The military armed forces stormed the houses belonging to the villagers and stole the
precious things in Kawlin Township, Sagaing Region.
• A youth in Panmaw Village, MyaukOo Township, Rakhine was arrested by the SAC troops
for allegedly communicating with the PDF.
• Ko Min Min Soe (an aerospace engineer), a detainee of the SAC was dead during the
interrogation process.
• The NLD party office was bombed in Myeik Township, Tahnintharyi Region.
• The military troops arrested two civilians who came to the Yesagyo Bus Station to bring
delivery items in Magway.
• A video clip featuring a civilian being beaten during training sessions of the SAC forces in
Ayardaw Township, Sagaing Region was out to the public.
• In Ramthalo Village, Falang Township, Chin, the military armed forces raided over 100
civilians houses and stole rice and pets.
• The SAC troop members burnt down 13 houses including a church in Tharanraw Village
situation along the Falang-Haka Road, Chin State.
• The military armed forces reportedly stationed in Ywathit Village, Kawkayeik Township,
Karen and prevented totally 50 villagers from going out of the village.
• The military truck loaded with soldiers fired the guns around the Haka Township, Chin
State.
October 20. 2021
• In Yephyu Township, Dawei District, Tahnintharyi Region, one was dead, and 5 civilians
were arrested due to the firing of the military troops.
• The SAC forces forcibly arrested over 30 young people after their informer was killed in
Pathein Township, Ayeyarwady Region.
• The military troop members abducted 3 local youths including an university student in
Taungnoo Township, Bago Region.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The civilians’ houses including former NLD administrator' house were burnt down by the
military armed forces in Thitkyin Gyi Village, Ayardaw Township, Sagaing.
• In AungLan Township, Magway, the SAC forces murdered one local and abducted 3
civilians.
• NLD party office was reportedly bombed by certain group of people and caused damaged
to the 5 houses located around the office.
October 21. 2021
• The SAC armed forces abducted 2 civilians from Kan Gyi Village, Kan BaLu Township,
Sagaing for allegedly possessing guns and reportedly killed them in ChatTin Village.
• Three civilians were arrested while they held their father funeral.
October 22, 2021
• Three men were forcibly arrested by the military troop members in Thayet Chaung
Township, Tahnintharyi Region.
• Six civilians were abducted within a week in Hlegu Township, Yangon.
• 5 dead bodies were found in Ziphyupin Village, Yekyi Village Tract, Matayar Township,
Mandalay where the SAC forces raided the areas.
• The farmers working in their fields around armed manufacturing factory were forced to
leave the area in Nyaung Htaik Village, Ushitpin Township, Bago.
• The military troops arrested workers from a garage and cemetery and brought them as
hostages as they travelled from Haka to Htantalan Township, Chin.
• In BaOh Village, Khin Oo Township, Sagaing, the SAC forces and Pyu Saw Htee group
stormed the area and caused two causalities and one wounded at foot.
• The reckless firing of the military forces caused Ko Aye Min who was out to go shopping
dead by hitting bullets at his chest.
• The military troops stationed in a monastery behind the Demawsoe police station, Karenni
State fired the artilleries toward the downtown areas and many house were ruined.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• One local from Wetchaung Village, Tahnintharyi Township, Tahnintharyi Region was shot
dead by the military troops and they disposed the dead body in front of his house.
• The SAC armed forces members beat and took money of 4 lakh from a farmer who
returned to the village after selling cows in Kyauk Selay Village, Matayar Township,
Mandalay.
• The SAC forces and the Pyu Saw Htee group stormed the tea shop located in the PaNalae
Village, along the Launglone-Dawei Road, and U Nay Nay and U Ohn Ni were dead while
4 civilians were wounded.
• In Pearl Township, Sagaing Region, the military armed forces kidnapped two underaged
young people and asked their parent to give them 1.5 million kyats to get youth released.
• The SAC forces raided the Shwe Saryee Village, Butalin Township, Sagaing and murdered
3 villagers.
October 23. 2021
• One youth who was seriously beaten by the military forces in ZiHon Village Tract, PutaO
Township, Kachin State was dead on October 19.
• One woman was injured due to the artillery firing of the SAC forces to the Yezwa Town,
Matupi Township, Chin.
• The military troops murdered three villagers including Koo Aung San Thu, Ko Zaw in Paline
Village, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region.
• 20 years-old brain underdeveloped youth was murdered and disposed the dead body in
Paling Village, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region.
• A prominent leader in 1988 uprising movement, Ko Jimmy was arrested forcibly.
October 24, 2021
• In Phalone Village, Sintkaing Township, Mandalay Region, the SAC forces murdered one
youth for not stopping the motorbike as they asked to do so.
• In Moebyal Township, Shan, the reckless firing of the SAC forces caused one dead and 6
civilians wounded.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The NLD party office was bombed around evening in Thaton District, Mon State.
• Two CDF members were dead due to the min set by the SAC armed forces.
October 25, 2021
• The terrorist armed forces stationed in Tharanlo Village, Falang Township, Chin fired the
houses insides the villages with the heavy artilleries on October 23, 2021
• Many houses were ruined due to the firing of the military soldiers stationed in Htonebolay
Monastery, Thaton Township, Mon State.
• It is reportedly learnt that the military troops abducted Daw Mar Mar Thet, and her 7-years
old grandchild and the rest of the family members for not being able to arrest Ma Pan Ei
Phyu (a daughter of Daw Mar Mar thet). Around 8 AM on October 24, the SAC forces also
abducted her brother Mg Aung Thet Phyo and her sister Ma Thet Thet Hlaing including her
7 years-old son.
• Around 12:46 PM, there was a gun firing in RC2 premise, Hlaing Township, Yangon and
one car was attacked by two cars loaded with soldiers not in uniform.
• A 44-years old woman were shot dead due to the firing of heavy artillery by the 422th light
infantry battalions based in Moe byal Township, Shan State, and moreover two underaged
children were wounded.
• The military troops having more than 50 soldiers raided the Shaukkha Village, Ayardaw
Township, Sagaing evening yesterday and burnt down some houses, killing a cow with
the gun.
October 26. 2021
• In Dawei Township, Tahnintharyi Region, the Pyu Saw Htee group threaten the civilians
to join the military supporting campaign and if not they will be killed.
• The SAC armed forces destroyed the Catholic Church situated in Sanpya 6 miles,
Demawsoe Township, Karenni State intentionally.
• 8 houses were burnt down to ashes by the military forces in Tarl Village, Falam Township,
Chin State.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• In Dawei Township, Tahnintharyi Region, the SAC forces inspected the passerby by
checking their phones and abducted 3 young people.
• The military forces stormed the houses in Thalanral Village, Falam Township, Chin State.
• The military troop members came to the Yone Pin Kone Village, WetLet Township, Sagaing
with 3 private cars and raided the 10 houses.
• After bomb explosion in front of the No.2 police station in Meiktihla Township, Mandalay,
the SAC forces abducted about 20 local people evening.
• The Pyu Saw Htee group raided the U Kyaw Win, a former village administrator of Nan Oo
Village Tract, Yesagyo Township, Magway and took some money from the house.
• In Gaungkwee Village, Myin Chan Township, Mandalay Region, the SAC forces had caused
one dead as they beat the couple who was having a quarrel.
• The military armed forces did reckless firing to the wards of the Phwe Kone Township,
Southern Shan State.
• In Mawlamyine Township, Mon State, Daw Nwe Nwe Aung, a Pyithu Hluttaw MPs who was
having an agreement with SAC was arrested by the military troop members at her house.
• The SAC armed forces raided the Kyopinthar Village, PaungTe Township, Bago around 4
AM and murdered one local youth.
• In Ngathaine Chaung Township, Ayeyarwady Region, one monk was dead and one young
novice was wounded due to the reckless firing of the military forces.
October 27. 2021
• The SAC forces murdered one youth around 11 AM in Phyu Township, Taungnoo District,
Bago Region.
• The military troops were reportedly arresting locals, and taking their properties in MaUPin
Township, Ayeyarwady Region.
• In Ayeyarwady Region, a 68-year-old U Inn Hoke, a detainee in Myauing Mya prison with
the illegal charge of so-called 505 (A) was reportedly dead.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• In Ayardaw Township, Sagaing Region, the SAC forces raided and burnt down the houses
in ShaukKha and nearby Villages.
• There was an explosion in the YBS (20) bus stationed in front of gas station in Hlaing Thar
Yar Township, Yangon and 4 youths were reportedly abducted.
• Two young Kachin people living in a hired apartment in Sar Theik Street, Daw Pon
Township, Yangon were arrested by the military troops around evening on October 26.
• In East Mawtone Village, Tahnintharyi Township, Ko Min Min Thu (or) HarNi, a NLD party
youth member was abducted by the SAC armed forces and was dead during the
interrogation process.
• The NLD party office in Thayet Chaung Township, Tahnintharyi Region was reportedly
bombed early morning on October 27, 2021.
October 28, 2021
• Two youths were abducted by the military troops after firing the gun in Marlar Nwe Street,
Metta Nyunt Ward, Tamwe Township, Yangon Region.
• In Mandalay, NLD regional office that has been sealed by the SAC was bombed.
• The SAC troops had flied over the Tanze, and Kyun Hla Township, Sagaing Region by firing
military ammunition down the area and by using Jet plan.
• Totally 15 civilians from Chan Thar Village, Ye Oo Township, were abducted by the military
forces.
• 19 villagers from Shwe Pyi Aye Village located in Phak hone Township, border of Shan and
Karenni State were abducted and used as hostages, covering their eyes with clothes by
the SAC troops.
• It is reportedly learnt that the community members were fleeing from the villages as they
had learnt that their villages were set on fire by the military armed forces in Shwe Pyi Aye
Village, Pha Kone Township, Southern Shan State.
• The military armed forces had stormed the Kapaung Village, Tanze Township, Sagaing for
five times.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The SAC armed forces bombed NLD party office located in Ward 5, Pathein Township,
Ayeyarwady Region.
• In Moenyin Township, Kachin, the military troops raided the Chan Tha Village and
abducted and inspected 15 villagers to figure out where a member of parliament stayed,
and some were released.
• The SAC forces abducted 3 NLD party youth members, one of which was dead in the East
Mawtone Village, Tahnintharyi Township, Tahnintharyi Region.
• 5 villagers from YeLeKalay Village, Maupin Tonwship were arrested and their money were
taken away by the military troops.
• The NLD party office in Ingyin Myaing Ward, Kyun Hla Township, Sagaing Region was
reportedly destroyed.
• The terrorist SAC forces forcibly took 4 barrel of oil and 1 million kyats from huge boat in
Katha Township, Sagaing.
• The military forces murdered the released political prisoner Ko Kyaw Naing Htun in
Magway Township, Magway Region.
• The military troops killed U Myo Lwin for allegedly being a father of PDF member, and for
not being able to get his son arrested in Yangon.
• In Moebywal, Shan State, one man was dead, 6-years old child wounded due to the firing
of the military armed forces.
October 30. 2021
• The SAC forces raided the Lalar Lu Village, Khin Oo Township, Sagaing and killed one
innocent civilian and abducted 8 people.
• It is reportedly learnt that the SAC forces illegally sealed off the house belonging to the
Dr. Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong, a minister of NUG and leader of CDF in Hakha Township,
Chin State.
October 29. 2021
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The military troops stormed the houses in Kyin Kyae Village, Windwin Township, Meiktihla
District, Mandalay and took the valuable things forcibly.
October 31. 2021
• The SAC forces murdered 2 civilians in Ngu Palaw Ward, Demawsoe Township, Karenni
State and burnt down some houses.
• The NLD party office in Mawlamyine Township was reportedly bombed and destroyed.
• One IDP was shot dead due to the firing by the military troops when IDPs were returning
to their houses to bring food in Ngy Palaw Ward, Demawsoe Township, Karenni State.
• In Nyaungshwe Township, Southern Shan State, one Catholic priest was reportedly
threatened by the SAC forces for allegedly supporting PDF.
• In HlwaSin Village Tract, Pyay Township, Bago, community members were fleeing as the
military troops raided the village after they killed administrator Ko Aye Soe.
• One dead boy was reportedly disposed in the field by the SAC forces in In Ngote To Village,
Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region.
November 1, 2021
• The military troops and police forces searched and abducted CDM staff and arrested the
respective family members as the hostages if they failed to get CDM staff arrested.
• In Gwaypin Village, Chauk Township, Magway, the military forces tortured and murdered
private school owner Ko Wai Phyo Htun and his two brothers were reportedly in the
interrogation camp and their lives were being threatened.
• The SAC armed forces stormed the Myitsone, Myittha, Shwe Lone, Thukatipa and Sin
Laung Kan Villages located in border areas between Myaing, Yesagyo Township, Sagaging
and killed one people, abducted 15 civilians, while thousands of villagers were fleeing
their houses.
November 2, 2021
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• Ko Than Htike Zin, 20-years old, was released from Myitkyinar prison, Kachin and 15 days
after that, he was being arrested by the SAC forces again for allegedly stealing the
motorbikes.
• In corner of Phayarni road, Monywa Township, Sagaing, three young people riding the
motorbike were shot dead by the SAC forces as they did not stop the motorbike though
they were asked to do so.
• The military troops came and burnt down the house of Ko Wai Yan Soe, a member of
Dawei Strike Committee located in Sitpyal Village, Launglone Township, Tahnintharyi
Region.
• In Thayet Kan Village, Khin Oo Township, Sagaing, three civilians were murdered by the
terrorist SAC on November 1st, 2021.
November 3. 2021
• About 8:00 PM, two young people living in Seik Mu Village Tract, Pharkant Township,
Kachin were forcibly arrested and another youth was also abducted by forcing the
abductees to contact that youth.
• In Chaungkwa Village, Kalay Township, Sagaing, 4 houses, motorbike repair shop, and rice
storage hut were burnt down by the military troops.
• One man was reportedly shot dead around 4:15 PM yesterday on the street of Ho Moon
Ward, Muse Township, Shan State.
• The SAC forces abducted the CDM teacher U Win Lwin on November 1, in ShweBo Village,
Sint Kaing Township, Mandalay and his family was reportedly informed of his dead body
being disposed on November 2, 2021.
• The terrorist SAC had attempted to take control of the areas along Kalay-Kantgaw Road
and one woman was dead due to the firing of heavy ammunition to the villages located
around the road.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The military forces reportedly stormed the Natchaing, Natmyaine, Helote, and Chaungkwa
Villages located 15 miles away from Kalay Township, Sagaing and all villagers were fleeing
from their villages.
• The SAC forces in Shan State set fire on the houses in Hlwe Wae Village, Phakone
Township.
November 4. 2021
• Three houses were burnt down as the SAC forces set fire on the Hlwe Wae Village, Phakone
Township, Shan State.
November 5. 2021
• The SAC forces reportedly collected royalties from small-scali gold mine workers in the
Htaw Tha Village, Maw Leik Township, Sagaing.
• There was an explosion around the B.E.H.S (2) where the SAC troops stationed in Tanze
Township, Sagaing, and Daw May Zin Kyaw, a mother of 2-years old child was shot dead
due to the firing of the SAC troops.
• The SAC forces have increasingly abducted university students and civilians across the
country and Ko Thwin Ko Aung, a Chairman of Basic Worker Union was sentenced to 3
years imprisonment with the charge of so-called 505 (A) while Ko Sithu Aung Tin, a former
secretary of the Dagon University Student Union was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
• The military troops reportedly beat and abducted a certain man living in the 4th floor of
the apartment before the Pizzamaru shop located in BaHo Street, Sanchaung Township,
Yangon.
• There was a continued armed conflict in KaungEi Village, Phakone Tonwship, Shan-
Karenni border area, and many civilians’ houses were destroyed by the reckless firing of
the SAC forces.
• The military troops with holding guns arrived the ShweHlay Village, Chaung Oo Township,
Sagaing Region.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team
• The military forces abducted a father and a son in BaHo Street, Sanchaung Township,
Yangon.
• The SAC forces arrested Yangon Education University student and his mother living in
Pantaung Township, Pyay District, Sagaing for allegedly supporting the PDF.
• In Monywa Township, Sagaing, a vendor shop-owner Ko Kyaw Zin Htun (or) Ko Gwato was
forcibly arrested by the military troops.
November 6. 2021
• In Ayardaw, and Tanze Townships, Sagaing Region, the innocent civilians were being
beaten by the SAC forces for no apparent reasons and one drinking water factory owner
was shot dead.
• The SAC armed forces reportedly raided the house belonging to the owner of the famous
Mandalay Myint Myin Khin snacks.
• The military forces abducted 8 civilians including 5 social workers or volunteers in
Wakema Township, Ayeyarwady Region.
• The SAC armed troops murdered 2 women and 3 men who were back from their field in
the Ohbo Village, Myaing Township, Magway Region.
• Totally 6 suspected people were abducted by the SAC forces in Ye Township, Mon State.
• A journalist based in Myaung Mya Tonwship was abducted by the military forces for
allegedly composing a poem about the Tantalang township being burnt down in Chin
State.
This report is prepared by compiling news and information published/collected by new agencies and on
ground information team...."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2021-11-06
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
480.81 KB 2.77 MB
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Description:
"The dissertation argues reconciliation as a way of doing mission in Myanmar. The
see-discern-act method of research is used. The study has three parts.
First, the study critically reflects on the context of reconciliation by diagnosing the
present reality and situation of the country. Related information and data are collected
from different fields of study. The research identifies the main obstacles to peace,
harmony, and reconciliation as civil war, socio-ethnic conflict, religious violence,
militarism, political unrest, fragmentation, poverty and corruption.
Second, the research discerns and evaluates the challenge of reconciliation. It
accesses the research problem from interreligious and multicultural perspectives in search
of the possible solutions. If Myanmar will not have a future without reconciliation, the
Church must be part of working on reconciliation in order to build that future. The
research finds out that mission as reconciliation is possible by upholding spiritual ideals,
which are found in Myanmar, such as harmony, nonviolence, peace, truth, justice,
forgiveness, and healing. Mission is promotion of the spiritual ideals for reconciliation.
Third, the dissertation proposes reconciliation as mission. Apart from the
traditional scope of human-God-nature reconciliation this study extends a new frontier of
spirits-ancestors-cultures-religions reconciliation. The research proves that reconciliation
is more a mission, a religious act, and a spiritual virtue than a strategy, a political
program, a secular concern, and a civic project. Therefore, the Church must do mission as
ministry of reconciliation in many areas, at various levels, and according to its capacity.
When reconciliation is adopted as a way of doing and being in mission the Church
walks the path to a new way of being Church as communion through reconciliation.....ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: To pay homage to God, Dharma, Sangha, Teachers, and Parents is the fivefold
Burmese socio-religious teaching (annandaw annanda nga pa) which the researcher is deeply
obliged to fulfill for the accomplishment of his research.
Fr. Edgar G. Javier, SVD his professor and advisor, first and foremost, fully deserves
this homage in a special way for his great enlightenment and accompaniment.
Gratefulness goes to Dr. Mike Lambino for editing this dissertation and for his kind
corrections to the text.
Professors who teach the student in the doctoral class deserve the greatest gratitude
for all their noble gift of Dharma of intellectual support which surpasses all other gifts.
Archbishop Paul Zinghtung Grawng (Archbishop emeritus of Mandalay), Bishop
Philip Lasap Za Hawng (Bishop of Lashio), and Cardinal Charles Maung Bo (Archbishop of
Yangon) deserve this homage for their various helps in conducting this research.
Colleagues and friends of the student are given “a big thanks” for their critiques,
suggestions, and insights in the process of this research writing.
All the personnel of Institute for Consecrated Life in Asia (ICLA), and the librarians
of Loyola School of Theology (LST), St. Vincent School of Theology (SVST), Myanmar
Council of Churches (MCC), Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT) and St. Joseph Major
Seminary (SMS) are fully acknowledged for the academic support in this research.
Special gratitude is due to the Institute of Missiology Missio e.V. (MWI) for the
scholarship for this study. Likewise, the anonymous supporters are graciously thanked for
their generosity..."
Source/publisher:
Maung John
Date of publication:
2016-03-18
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History
Language:
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Sub-title:
Coup and chaos have devastated the economy with GDP set to fall 18% and half the population plunged into poverty by 2022
Description:
"As Myanmar descends deeper and deeper into civil war, a conflict driven by nationwide resistance to the military’s disastrous democracy-suspending coup, the economy is taking the brunt of the chaotic collateral damage.
The February 1 coup sparked countrywide labor strikes, runs on banks and now rising warfare punctuated by bomb blasts in key urban areas including the commercial capital of Yangon.
That’s all put the economy in a tailspin while raising stability risks that have caused a growing number of foreign investors to either suspend or abandon their operations and outlays, many committed earlier on the belief Myanmar’s “last frontier” market was moving in a new hopeful democratic direction.
The opposite has happened since the coup. According to the World Bank’s Myanmar Economic Monitor, the economy contracted a whopping 18% in the year period spanning October 2020 to September 2021. The bank predicted the number of people living in poverty is likely to more than double by the beginning of 2022, compared to 2019 levels.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) predicted back in April, before the full impact of the coup had been registered, that the Covid-19 pandemic and political instability would by next year plunge almost half of Myanmar’s 54 million population into poverty, reversing gains made over the past 16 years.
The country’s dire economic straits is being reflected in the Myanmar currency, the kyat, which has lost more than 60% of its value since the coup. The official exchange rate on February 1 was 1,395 kyat to the US dollar but the money changers who are still operating are now asking for anywhere between 2,700 to 3,000 kyats per greenback.
The sharp depreciation is driving up prices on fuel and food, with gasoline prices nearly doubled and a 48-kilogram bag of rice up 40% since the coup.
Those economic pressures are raising concerns about the stability of the banking sector, which was already laden with non-performing loans before the coup and collapse of the economy. The regime has imposed hard limits on the amount account holders at banks may withdrawal daily, including at ATMs.
Aung Naing Oo, the junta’s minister for investment and foreign economic relations, blamed “foreign-backed sabotage” for the country’s rising economic plight in an October 19 interview with Reuters. However, the minister did not specify which foreign powers were allegedly sabotaging the economy, or how.
The minister also claimed that Myanmar’s foreign reserves stand at $6.04 billion; the World Bank estimated foreign reserves at $7.70 billion in March. But it is impossible to gauge the accuracy of those figures, nor do they indicate the junta’s true underlying financial position.
Myanmar’s recent history – notably the economic collapse that followed the military’s brutal 1988 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters — shows the Tatmadaw has a remarkable ability to stay in power in the face of economic and financial calamity.
Economists and academics familiar with the Tatmadaw’s ability to survive past crises note that much of Myanmar’s economy transacts in black and otherwise illicit markets, and thus revenues and profits do not appear in official statistics or are recorded by international economic monitoring outfits like the World Bank.
The Tatmadaw controls large swathes of the economy through its controlled Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, massive conglomerates that are engaged in everything from banking, industrial parks, shipping, real estate, sugar factories, tobacco companies and supermarkets.
The US has imposed targeted sanctions on the conglomerates since the coup, though it’s not clear if and how those punitive measures have crimped the junta’s commercial interests.
The conglomerates are not the only economic resource keeping the regime afloat, far from it. The Tatmadaw is known to be deeply involved in the nation’s sprawling black economy, illicit gains that are often funneled to top generals and officers to maintain their loyalty and underwrite the political status quo.
According to the international environmental watchdog Global Witness, the jade trade in Myanmar’s far north is worth more than US$30 billion annually, representing nearly half of the country’s GDP.
“The industry buoys the weapons trade and enriches military officials, including the son of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing… Aung Pyae Son,” Global Witness stated in a June report, which added: “the generals enrich themselves and war continues to rage, the environment and the people who depend on it pay the ultimate price.”
Much of the jade trade is conducted off the books mainly Chinese buyers making bids and purchases on their mobile phones, far away from the mines in Myanmar’s north and market places on the Chinese border.
More insidiously, the illegal narcotics trade is also known to be worth billions of US dollars per year. While Myanmar’s production of opium and its derivative heroin has declined in recent decades due to reduced demand in China and Southeast Asia, methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs have replaced the old drugs.
Most of the narcotics are still being produced in Shan state and, to a lesser extent, Kachin, Kayah and Karen states, while the main manufacturers and dealers are local Tatmadaw-allied militia forces known as pyithusit.
It is impossible to quantify the total value of the narcotics trade, as it is conducted in an even more clandestine manner than the jade trade, but it is likewise believed to top $30 billion. The military is also believed to be involved in lucrative and largely unregulated exports of gold, primarily to China, the total value of which is unknown.
Despite all those hidden reserves and revenues, it remains to be seen how the current social, political and economic crisis will play out. The withdrawal of major foreign investors whose outlays were, directly and indirectly, enriching top generals and their subordinates is bound to have hit many where it hurts most.
In July, Norway’s telecom giant Telenor announced that it was selling its mobile operations to the M1 Group, a Lebanese investment firm, but the transaction was deemed invalid due to non-compliance with local regulations.
Telenor’s decision was apparently prompted by a demand that it had to install invasive technology that would allow the Tatmadaw to freely eavesdrop on user communications. Reports have indicated the firm has completely written off its $782 million investment in the country.
Other companies that have pulled out, or are in the process of doing so, include the French renewable energy firm Voltalia and Japanese beverage company Kirin, which has written off its $193 million investment in the country since the coup. Japan’s Suzuki announced shortly after the coup that it was suspending production at its two factories, which produced 13,300 vehicles in 2019, mainly for the local market.
Several global clothing suppliers have also ceased producing in Myanmar, among them Italy’s Benetton. Within days after the coup, Amata, Thailand’s largest industrial estate developer, suspended work on a $1 billion project on the outskirts of Yangon that was designed to kickstart more modern manufacturing in the country.
The junta may have enough resources, guns and money to survive in the months ahead. But that could change if or when the junta’s coffers start to run dry, meaning less trickle-down of resources to mid-ranking officers as well as the rank and file.
Morale inside the Tatmadaw is reported to be lower than ever, as soldiers are not only fighting against ethnic insurgents in frontier areas but also their own kin, the ethnic Bamars in the Myanmar heartland. Whether the confluence of battlefield losses and economic decline starts to crack military cohesion is yet to be seen.
But it’s by now plain for all to see, including inside the Tatmadaw, the spiraling economic disaster caused by a coup that could have been avoided by sharing rather than grabbing power from Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected democratic government..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2021-11-03
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"At first glance, it was a meeting between a former US ambassador to the UN and the Myanmar military junta chief in the country’s capital, Naypyitaw.
To some politically aware souls, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s reception of Bill Richardson on Tuesday appeared significant: The former New Mexico governor is, after all, the first US non-state figure to pay a visit to the Myanmar regime, which has been shunned internationally for seizing power from the democratically elected government of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup in February, and for its subsequent deadly crackdowns on anti-regime protesters. It raised more than a few eyebrows to see the coup leader welcoming the former US diplomat after repeatedly turning away ASEAN’s special envoy, who was appointed by the bloc to help find a resolution to the post-coup turmoil. Myanmar is an ASEAN member.
In fact, the two men who met in the Diplomatic Hall of the regime’s office on Tuesday have something in common: Both seek to keep Myanmar’s ousted democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi out of the country’s politics.
Since day one of the coup on Feb. 1, she has been detained—along with the country’s President U Win Myint—by Min Aung Hlaing and charged in 11 absurd criminal cases. If found guilty of all charges, the 76-year-old would spend 102 years behind bars. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is a towering political figure who has been highly revered by the majority of the country’s people for the sacrifices she has made on behalf of the Myanmar democracy movement since 1988. Her political popularity has been unrivaled since then. Take her National League for Democracy (NLD)’s electoral victories in 1990, 2015 and 2020. One of her missions has been to root out the military’s long involvement in the country’s politics—which dates back to 1962—because it’s simply undemocratic. Unsurprisingly, she has been a thorn in the generals’ side.
Richardson, a onetime friend and supporter of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, clearly stated his stand against her on the first day of the coup in a Twitter post.
“The Myanmar military must show the utmost restraint in any further use of force. B/C of Suu Kyi’s failure to promote Democratic values as Myanmar’s de facto leader she should step aside & let other Myanmar democratic leaders take the rein w/ international backing and support,” he tweeted.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Richardson’s friendship dates back to 1994, when she was under house arrest and he was one of her first visitors outside of her immediate family. When her NLD government established an advisory board to help solve the Rohingya issue in 2017, the former New Mexico governor was among five prominent international figures appointed to it.
However, he became a hater of the State Counselor the following year when he abruptly quit the body after clashing with her over his attempt to secure the release of two Reuters journalists detained for their reporting on a massacre of Rohingya committed by the army. The military chief at the time was—and remains—the current coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing.
Richardson said at the time that the panel was engaged in a “whitewash” of military atrocities and he did not want to be part of “a cheerleading squad for the government” led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he accused of lacking “moral leadership” in her handling of the crisis.
More than two years later, the former US diplomat met with the general who bears ultimate responsibility for the soldiers’ atrocities against the Rohinyga. It would be interesting to know whether the former governor tried to raise the issue with Min Aung Hlaing, as his Richardson Center also works for the wellbeing of Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh.
Richardson said his Myanmar trip this time was a humanitarian mission to discuss pathways for the humanitarian delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, medical supplies and other public health needs.
The State Department said the trip was not an effort sponsored by or on behalf of the US government, but added, “We hope his trip contributes to improve humanitarian access (to the country).”
While the humanitarian issue is important for Myanmar, the US shouldn’t forget that the root causes of the crisis were mostly political and sparked by the coup. So, we shouldn’t expect any positive outcomes from the meeting of these two birds of a feather.
Another interesting question is whether he asked the regime for permission to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Allowing the detained State Counselor to meet with foreign diplomats seems to be a very sensitive issue for the junta. The ASEAN special envoy’s visit to the country has been blocked by the regime as he made the same request. On Wednesday, the regime’s No. 2 leader, Vice Senior General Soe Win, insisted that allowing a foreigner to meet someone charged with crimes was unlawful.
Currently all eyes are on the case of Danny Fenster, a US journalist detained by the junta for incitement since May, as Richardson is known for his previous attempts to negotiate the release of international hostages and US citizens in rogue nations around the world. Given his previous efforts on behalf of the Reuters journalists—and no doubt looking to maintain his “negotiator” reputation—it is reasonable to assume the ex-governor tried his luck with the regime to secure the release of the journalist, as well as that of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Australian economic adviser Sean Turnell, who has been detained since February and is accused of breaching the country’s Official Secrets Act.
It is known only to Richardson whether he requested the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—if only for the sake of their former friendship..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-11-03
Date of entry/update:
2021-11-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ မြောက်ပိုင်းနှင့် အနောက်မြောက်ဒေသ တခုလုံးအား ကြီးမားသည့်ထိုးစစ်ဆင်ဖို့အတွက်
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် “အနော်ရထာစစ်ဆင်ရေး”1 ဟုခေါ်ဆိုသော စစ်ဆင်ရေးတရပ်ကို ပြင်ဆင်ဆောင်ရွက်
နေသည်ကို တွေ့ရသည်။2 ဤစစ်ဆင်ရေးကြောင့် ယင်းဒေသအတွင်းနေထိုင်သည့် လူထုများအနေဖြင့်
ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သည့် နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့်ရှိပြစ်မှုကြီးများ (လူသားဖြစ်မှုကို ဆန့်ကျင်သောပြစ်မှု၊ လူမျိုးတုံး
သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု) မလွှဲမသွေ ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့ လာရနိုင်ဖွယ်ရှိသည်။
၂။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ စစ်ရေးမဟာဗျူဟာအရ ဒေသတခုခုအား စစ်ဆင်ရေးနယ်မြေ
အဖြစ်သတ်မှတ်သည့်အခါ အခြားဒေသများ၌ စစ်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု၊ တိုက်ပွဲဖော်ဆောင်မှုများကို လုံးဝနီးပါး
သို့မဟုတ် လုံးဝ ဆိုင်းငံ့ထားပြီး စစ်ဆင်ရေးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်လေ့ရှိသည်။3 ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ပွင့်လင်းရာသီ၌
1 ဒေသကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် PDF တွေ ကြုံလာရမယ့် အနော်ရထာ စစ်ဆင်ရေး။ အောက်တိုဘာ ၁၉ BBC သတင်းဌာန။
https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma-58976376?fbclid=IwAR1dbUcKxa1Ztxl629naJ5a6Nagam7ErrRGesUa5xwKq-
1nlue3m_nyn80
2 ပလက်ဝဘက်မှ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ ကန်ပက်လက်၊ မင်းတပ်နှင့် စစ်ကိုင်တိုင်းဘက်သို့ ရေ့ေွှ ပြာင်း။ ပလက်ဝမြို့တွင ်
ယာယီတပ်စွဲထားသည့် တပ်မ (၁၁) ၊ (၅၅) နှင့် (၇၇) မှ လက်အောက်ခံတပ်ရင်းတချို့ စက်တင်ဘာလ (၁၉) ရက်က
စစ်ကားအစီး ၃၀ ကျော်ဖြင့် ပလက်ဝမြို့ ကင်းချောင်းဝမှတဆင့် ဆမိးလမ်းကြောင်း အတိုင်း ကန်ပက်လက် မြို့ဘက်ခြမ်းသို့
တက်သွားကြသည်။ Mizzima သတင်းဌာန။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ၊ စက်တင်ဘာ ၂၁ရက်။
https://www.facebook.com/216265185075061/posts/4793130514055149/?sfnsn=mo
Myanmar: UN expert fears spike in atrocities amid reports of troops massing in north
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?LangID=E&NewsID=27693
3 ၁၉၈၀ ကာလနောက်ပိုင်း မြန်မာစစ်တပ်က ဗကပကို အမြစ်ပြတ်တိုက်ခိုက်ချေမှုန်းဖို့အတွက် ကေအိုင်အိုအပါအဝင်
မြန်မာပြည် တောင်ပိုင်းအခြေပြုလှုပ်ရှားသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲအတုများ ပြုလုပ် ကျင်းပခဲ့ပြီး
စစ်ရှိန်လျော့ချခဲ့သည်။ ၁၉၈၉ ခုနှစ် ဗကပ ပြိုကွဲသွားပြီးနောက်၊ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်က မြန်မာပြည်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ
တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် တဖွဲ့ပြီးတဖွဲ့ အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲမှုများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်တောင်ပိုင်း အခြေစိုက်
တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များအား အပြင်းအထန် ထိုးစစ်ဆင်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၁၁ ခုနှစ် ကချင်ပြည်နယ် နှင့်
ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်း၌ ကေအိုင်အိုနှင့် တကျော့ပြန် စစ်ပွဲဖြစ်သည့်အခါ မြန်မာပြည်တောင်ပိုင်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသား
ခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် ပြည်နယ်အဆင့် အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲမှုများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် ၂၀၁၈ ခုနှစ် နောက်ပိုင်း
မြန်မာပြည် အနောက်ဘက် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း ရခိုင့်တပ်တော် (အေအေ) အား အပြင်းအထန် ထိုးစစ်ဆင်နွှဲသည့်အခါ
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ မြောက်ပိုင်းနှင့် အနောက်မြောက်ပိုင်းဒေသအား ကြီးမားသည့် အနော်ရထာစစ်ဆင်ရေး မစတင်မှီ
မြန်မာပြည်ရဲ့ အရှေ့မြောက်ဖျားဒေသ၊ အနောက်ဘက်ဒေသများ၌ အခြေပြုလှုပ်ရှားသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသား
ခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့တချို့နှင့်တွေ့ဆုံပြီး4 စစ်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု လုံးဝနီးပါး ဆိုင်းငံ့ထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။5 ဤသည်မှာ
ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုအခြေခံကနေ ဖိနှိပ်တဲ့ စစ်ဆင်ရေးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်နေခြင်းသာ ဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ နိုင်ငံတကာစစ်ဥပဒေ (ဂျီနီဗာကွန်ဗင်းရှင်း) ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး သာလွန်စစ်အင်းအားအသုံးပြု6၍
အရပ်သားလူထုအပေါ် သိမ်းကျုံးတိုက်ခိုက်7 လာနိုင်သည့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ အနော်ရထာစစ်ဆင်ရေးအား
ဥပဒေအထောက်အကူပြုကွန်ရက် အနေဖြင့် အပြင်းအထန်ကန့်ကွက်လိုက်သည်။
၄။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ စစ်ဆင်ရေးကြောင့် ယင်းဒေသအတွင်းနေထိုင်သော ဒေသခံပြည်သူလူထုများက
ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သည့် နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့်ရှိပြစ်မှုကြီးများမလွှဲမသွေ ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့ လာရနိုင်သည်။
ယင်းသို့သော အခြေအနေဆိုးများမှ ကြိုတင်ကာကွယ်မှု ပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အင်အားစု အသီးသီးထံသို့
အောက်ပါအတိုင်း တိုက်တွန်းတောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
(က) လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခအတွင်း လိုက်နာရမည့် ဂျီနီဗာကွန်းဗင်းရှင်း
အား အပြည့်အဝလေးစားလိုက်နာဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းတောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
(ခ) စစ်ဆင်ရေးဒေသအတွင်းနေထိုင်သည့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများရဲ့ အသက်လုံခြုံမှုနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ
ထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွှတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် ဒေသ
အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အာဏာပိုင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် လူမှုကယ်ဆယ်ရေးအသင်းအဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် ကြိုတင်ပြင်ဆင်
ဆောင်ရွက်ထားနိုင်ဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
(ဂ) နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့် ဆိုးဝါးပြင်းထန်သည့် ပြစ်မှုကြီးများအား ကျူးလွန်သူများကို ပြည်တွင်းနှင့်
နိုင်ငံတကာအဆင့်တရားရုံးများ၌ ထိရောက်စွာအပြစ်ပေး အရေးယူနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်တွင်း ပြည်ပ
ဥပဒေအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ လူထုအသင်းအဖွဲ့များ၊ သတင်း မီဒီယာများနှင့် အင်းအားစုအသီးသီးတို့
မြန်မာပြည် တောင်ပိုင်းတွင် လုံးဝ အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲထားနိုင်ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်မြောက်ပိုင်းအား ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှု
အရှိန်လျော့ချထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
4 အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက် ဧပြီလ (၇) (၈) ရက်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် မြန်မာပြည်အရှေ့မြောက်ဖျားဒေသရှိ
အင်းအားကြီး လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့ ဖြစ်သည့် ဝသပ နှင့် ရှမ်းပြည်တိုးတက်ရေးပါတီ SSPP တို့နှင့်တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ကြသည်။
အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအုပ်စုသည် ဝ အပါအဝင် မြောက်ပိုင်းမဟာမိတ်တပ်ဖွဲ့နှင့် ဆက်တိုက်တွေ့ဆုံ။
5 မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် မြန်ပြည်အရှေ့မြောက်ဖျားဒေသရှိ အင်းအားကြီးတိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်များနှင့် လွန်ခဲ့သည့်
နှစ်ပေါင်း သုံးဆယ်ကျော် ကတည်းက အပစ်အခတ်ရပ်စဲထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည့်အပြင် မြန်မာပြည်အနောက်ဘက်ခြမ်း၌ ၎င်းတို့အား
စစ်ရေးအရ ခြိမ်းခြောက်နိုင်သည့် ရက္ခိုင့်အမျိုးသားအဖွဲ့ချုပ်/ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်နှင့်လည်း ၂၀၂၀ နှစ်ကုန်းပိုင်း မှစပြီး
အပစ်အခတ် ရပ်စဲထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
6 The principle of proportionality in attack.
7 Indiscriminate attack.
အနေဖြင့် လိုအပ်သောစီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို ချမှတ်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ဖို့ တိုက်တွန်း တောင်းဆို
အပ်ပါသည်။
(ဃ) တိုင်းရင်းသားခုခံစစ်ဆင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များအနေဖြင့် ခေတ်
အဆက်ဆက် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုအခြေခံကနေ ဖော်ဆောင်နေသည့် ဖိနှိပ်သော
မဟာဗျူဟာစစ်ဆင်ရေးအား တညီတညွှတ်တည်း ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ကြဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းတောင်းဆို အပ်ပါ
သည်။
(င) မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အား ဘဏ္ဍာရေး၊ စစ်လက်နက်၊ နည်းပညာ နှင့် သံတမန်ရေးအရ တနည်းတဖုံဖြင့်
ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနေသည့် နိုင်ငံများ၊ ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အစုအဖွဲ့များ နှင့် လူပုဂ္ဂိိုလ်များ
အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်နှင့် လုံးဝ အဆက်အသွယ်မပြုလုပ်ကြဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းသည်။
ဥပဒေအထောက်အကူပြုကွန်ရက်..."
Source/publisher:
Legal Aid Network
Date of publication:
2021-10-28
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Political History
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"The decision of ASEAN to block coup-maker and junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from attending its ongoing summit, which started Tuesday and ends on Thursday, has taken the world by surprise. ASEAN does not normally make any decision that could be seen as “interference” in one of its 10 member states’ internal affairs. The military-appointed Foreign Ministry in Naypyitaw issued a statement saying that the decision “was done without consensus and was against the objectives of ASEAN.” Junta spokesman Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, not surprisingly, blamed foreign powers for the snub, claiming that the United States and the European Union had pressured ASEAN to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from the online meeting.
But it may be much ado about nothing because the leaders of Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, are in the long run unlikely to pay much attention to what ASEAN does or doesn’t do. The generals’ decision to join the grouping in 1997 had more to do with finding allies in their altercations with critical Western powers than a desire to change their ways. There is, in fact, only one foreign power that has the power and the means to influence and manipulate the internal situation in Myanmar: the People’s Republic of China.
China is also the only neighboring country that has fundamental strategic and economic interests in Myanmar—and it is prepared to do whatever it takes to protect those interests. We all know about the multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Described as a global infrastructure development strategy, it includes investments in nearly 70 countries worldwide as well as some international organizations, such as those engaged in protecting the environment and even wildlife.
The aim is evidently to connect China with the outside world in a way that has never been done before and, ultimately, make China the world’s foremost superpower. But it is often forgotten that this policy of finding new outlets for trade with the outside world predates the BRI—and that it was first conceived in the 1980s in relation to Beijing’s plans to exert a new kind of influence in Myanmar. I have written a lot about this in the regional and international media, but it’s worth reminding readers of an article outlining those plans which I have quoted numerous times in the past.
The article appeared, at the time almost unnoticed, in the Beijing Review as early as Sept. 2, 1985. Titled “Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,” it was written by the former Vice Minister of Communications Pan Qi and outlined, in detail, the possibilities of finding an outlet for trade from China, through Myanmar, to ports at the coast of the Indian Ocean. Pan mentioned the Myanmar railheads of Myitkyina in Kachin State and Lashio in northeastern Shan State as possible conduits for the export of Chinese goods. But he refrained from mentioning that all relevant border areas were then not under central Myanmar government control.
At that time, nearly the entire, 2,192-km Sino-Myanmar frontier was actually controlled by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and other non-state armed groups who had ties―political, ethnic or both―to China. But by early 1987, the Tatmadaw had managed to recapture a few CPB strongholds along the frontier, including the booming border town of Panghsai, where the fabled “Burma Road” crosses into China at Wanding, east of the city of Ruili. At the same time, the Chinese, whose policies had changed dramatically since the Cultural Revolution, had already begun to penetrate local markets through an extensive economic intelligence reporting system within Myanmar. This network monitored the availability of domestically manufactured Myanmar products, as well as the nature and volume of illegal trade from other neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India. China could then respond to the market conditions by producing goods in its state sector factories. Before long, more than 2,000 carefully selected items were reported to be flooding the Myanmar market. Chinese-made consumer goods were not only made deliberately cheaper than those from other neighboring countries, but were also less expensive than local Myanmar products.
Then, in March-April 1989, to the surprise of many, the hill tribe rank and file of the CPB’s army mutinied and drove the party’s Maoist leadership into exile in China. The mutiny came after years of simmering discontent between the hill tribe cannon fodder, who had been forcibly recruited into the CPB’s army, and the ageing Burman intellectuals who were still clinging to their orthodox Maoist ideals. The government in Yangon quickly and shrewdly exploited the mutiny: the leaders of the new forces that emerged from the ashes of the old CPB, primarily the United Wa State Army (UWSA), were promised that they could engage in any kind of business, if they agreed to a ceasefire with the government.
The most potent military threat to the regime was neutralized, and, as a result, the cross-border trade flourished—and so did the newly won friendship between the leaders of two of Asia’s most repressive regimes. At the same time, China could, through its peculiar two-tier foreign policy, maintain government-to-government relations not only with the ruling military, but also party-to-party relations with Myanmar’s many ethnic armed groups, including the UWSA. In more recent years, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has established relations with both the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy. It is important for the leaders in Beijing not to put all their eggs in one basket because no one knows who will rule, or be influential, in Myanmar in the future.
In the early 1990s, I was at Jiegao, a small enclave of Chinese territory on the south side of the Shweli River opposite Muse and saw a giant monument showing four figures wheeling a circular object between them, their determined faces pointing south. The Chinese characters on the base say “Unite, Blaze Paths, Forge Ahead!” Or, in more mundane terms: “Southeast Asia, here we come!” There was no doubt that the monument and the message on its base appeared provocative to people in Myanmar. In the early 1990s, there was little more than bamboo huts and rice fields in the Jiegao enclave. But today, 25 years later, Jiegao is full of high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, and stores selling all kinds of wares. There is also a huge jade market where buyers from all over China come to shop for the precious stone, which is found in its imperial green form only in northern Myanmar.
Every morning—until the COVID-19 pandemic forced a closure of the border—caravans of trucks laden with Chinese consumer goods left Jiegao through a border gate for points beyond Muse: the towns of Lashio, Mandalay and Yangon, and even as far as Moreh on the Indian border. Not only Myanmar but also northeastern India was being flooded with cheap Chinese merchandise. And not far from Ruili are pipelines through which oil and gas are being transported from the Myanmar coast to Yunnan.
It is not clear when the border will be open for trade again, but given the strategic importance of what’s now known as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Beijing is not likely to abandon its long-term plans for Myanmar and the region. Myanmar is the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to Indian Ocean ports, bypassing the contested South China Sea as well as the congested Malacca Strait. The CMEC is one of the most important pillars of Xi’s BRI; without it, China would not be able to fulfill its plans for global dominance. For that very reason, whatever government is in power in Naypyitaw, China would court it in order to safeguard those strategic interests. Beijing may prefer a like-minded authoritarian regime, but we also have to remember that it was State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who signed up to the BRI when she attended the Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017.
But how—and where—do the ethnic armed groups, with which China also maintains close relations through its security services, fit into the picture? If we venture further back in history, and then before Pan Qi wrote his article for the Beijing Review, Myanmar was also of utmost strategic importance to Beijing, but then at a time when China wanted to export revolution, not consumer goods. The CPB’s 20,000-sq.-km base area along the Sino-Myanmar border was there not only to support the intended revolution in Myanmar, but also to serve as a springboard from where Maoist communism, the CPC hoped, would spread to other parts of Southeast Asia. The mastermind behind that plan was Kang Sheng, a dreaded hardliner who, during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s, worked for China’s internal security and intelligence apparatus—and was in charge of the CPC’s contacts with fraternal Maoist parties in Asia and beyond.
The plan—and CPB Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin told me this when I interviewed him at the party’s Panghsang headquarters in 1987—was to link up with the Communist Party of Thailand’s (CPT) guerrillas; the Communist Party of Malaya, which was led by Chin Peng, a hero of the struggle against the Japanese during World War II; the Communist Party of North Kalimantan (the Malayan communists did not recognize the Malaysian Federation, so there was a separate communist party in Sarawak and Sabah); the once powerful Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI); and, eventually the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), actually a tiny Maoist party led by Edward Fowler Hill, a fairly prominent lawyer and barrister.
Thakin Ba Thein Tin and Hill met in Beijing, relations with Chin Peng were maintained through intermediaries in Kunming, and CPT activist stayed in Panghsang until they returned to Thailand in 1983. When I was at Panghsang in 1986-87, I saw a concrete well with Thai writing on it, built by CPT cadre. When I was out in the field with the CPB’s troops, I heard numerous stories about “the Indonesian comrades” and their exploits. Among them were two daughters of PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, who was killed in Indonesia in 1965. The CPC had sent a dozen or so PKI militants, who happened to be in China in the 1960s, down to the CPB’s base area where they were going to learn guerrilla warfare. CPB leaders told me they were used as radio operators during battles with the Tatmadaw when messages could not be encrypted. The Tatmadaw interceptors did now know what they were saying—because they spoke in Bahasa Indonesia. The PKI militants had left when I was there, and I was told they had gone into exile in the Netherlands and Canada.
Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s return to the political fold, China changed its policy towards the region. However, whether China wants to export revolution or expand and protect commercial interests, to safeguard and even control the “Myanmar corridor” has always been of vital importance to Beijing’s security planners. In the past, the epicenter for that policy was Panghsang. Today it is Jiegao.
But the ethnic armed organizations are also important. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw. Significantly, when President’s Office Minister Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project at Letpadaung northwest of Mandalay, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China… we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.”
Aung Min was right, but by “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, whose weaponry and vast quantities of ammunition had been supplied by the UWSA. The Kachin Independence Army has also benefited from some support from the UWSA, but not to the same extent as the other groups in what is usually referred to as the Northern Alliance. While the UWSA is not engaged in any fighting itself, it has become a major source of the weaponry that is being used in the war in northern Myanmar.
The Chinese may be denying giving any material support to the UWSA and indirectly supporting its allies, but what the Wa have received from China is not the kind of equipment that “falls off the back of a truck”, or could be sent to them by some local officials in Yunnan. The deliveries were almost certainly directed from the highest level of China’s intelligence and military authorities in Beijing. And it is no secret that Chinese security officials have had several meetings with representatives of the Northern Alliance—and told them not to fight too close to the border or to damage the oil-and-gas pipelines.
The CPC’s position above the government as well as the military, the People’s Liberation Army, in the Chinese hierarchy explains why China could publicly praise Myanmar’s now collapsed peace process while quietly providing the UWSA with heavy weaponry. Support for the UWSA and its allies serves as a “stick” in Beijing’s relationship with Myanmar, while diplomacy and promises of aid and investment are the “carrot.”
In the official rhetoric in Beijing as well as Naypyitaw, relations between China and Myanmar have always been characterized by pauk-phaw, a Burmese word for siblings, but nothing could be falser than that cliché. Sino-Myanmar relations have always been anything but brotherly, and decades of history show us how China plays games with Myanmar to achieve whatever strategic goals the leaders in Beijing might have. Forget about ASEAN’s actions, statements and awkward attempts at exercising influence. It is China and its plans and strategic maneuvers that count.
Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-10-27
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, ASEAN-Burma relations, China-Burma relations, Political History
Language:
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Description:
"“Under socialism, we were completely isolated. The Op Art [Optical Art]
movement of the 1960s passed by without us even being aware of it.”1
The quote is from artist and writer Ma Thanegi: political activist in the 1980s, she served jail
for three years after the people’s uprising of 1988 in Myanmar.2 Today, she is mostly known
for her deep knowledge about Myanmar’s culture that she shares through her written
contribution to it. What she finds the most surprising about Myanmar though, is that changes
occurred so unexpectedly fast after 2010.3
The first political shift of 2010–2011 after decades
of military regime was a few years later reaffirmed through free and fair elections at the end of
2015, generating a new, transitional era.4
Significant metamorphoses in a country’s life never leave impact on a single level. It is a
disruptive period for society, and for the different communities within one society – for better
or worse. Based in Yangon between 2014–2015, as an art historian and curator, it appeared that
the so called independent (contemporary) art scene was conveying the visible and palpable
signs of a new epoch. My fieldwork started with the simple aim to have a better understanding
of the fine art / visual art scene, but with the lack of available material, I was soon interviewing gallerists, through them artists and other actors of the scene, to gain an overview of its activity.
It was striking that one had to “investigate” in order to find those places and creators. It was an
existing scene, active, vibrant and engaged, but hidden, modest and fragile.
Having later directly cooperated with some of the actors of the scene, being involved in some
projects as organizer and consultant, allowed me a further insight into the network of
independent actors coordinating the scene. The origin of the present research and study ensued
from a concern over what the delicate net built by the independent art scene would face when
encountering the powerful international art market. Currently, in the sort of “void” generated
by the gradual withdrawal of the Censorship Regime (officially since 2012) and the slow
evaporation of an autocratic narrative in daily life, “culture” as one, insoluble whole – as it was
defined for decades from “above” – began to grow small branches, as nuances come slowly
into consideration.5 The contrast between Myanmar’s isolated self, prior to the political shift
and the context brought by the early global twenty-first century, implicative of an increasing
and accelerated experience with the international scene, forecasted a challenging stage.
My approach at the beginning of the present research was to consider the simple facts, or the
simple non-existent facts: the consequences of Myanmar not having an operating institutional
visual art system or structure that could balance the impact of a greater international exposure
that the art scene was to face. Advancing in the research, it became more obvious that the
institutional system I was looking for, existed through the alternative infrastructure that the
independent (contemporary) art scene has brought to life, and how crucial substance it
represented within the cultural sphere in regard of a sustainable approach and a genuine voice
in the upcoming period. Research questions, Hypothesis, Outcome
In a later phase, the research questions were then reframed as follows: What are the values of
the independent contemporary art scene’s art practices and infrastructure in relation to the
official narrative in power? How and why a superimposed art historical and heritage approach
allows a deeper understanding in this regard? What role can the independent contemporary art
scene play within the cultural field and in a broader sense, in society, during this present period
of transition? How can the independent art scene maintain its own perspective and why is the
scene’s sustainability so important if improvements are made at a higher, governmental level
in terms of institutionalization?
The study reflects a hypothesis which understands the independent contemporary art scene as
a mindful site for an alternative discourse within society and which contributes to the
(re)definition and (re)access of absent artistic, and so cultural narratives, as well as to the
maintaining of the art scene’s integrity and continuity. I argue that as a counterbalance of the
encapsulated, immovable and still dominant official set, the independent scene, very much
alive, represents a genuine agenda through its artistic practices and infrastructure, coherent with
the intrinsic cultural frame and context of Myanmar. The alternative discourse enabled by the
scene being a flexible, and inclusive site is crucial for free expression, for building curiosity,
but also for creating an open dialogue within society’s diversity and allow the narratives that
were consciously or unintentionally deleted by the official discourse to (re)surface.
As an outcome, the research to offers a “written photograph,”
6
a mechanism of smart practices
based on existing projects that can serve as a reading tool, a sort of map to the independent
6
“Observations enable the researcher to describe existing situations using the five senses, providing a ‘written
photograph’ of the situation under study,” Expression mentioned in: Kawulich, “Participant Observation as a Data
4
contemporary art scene’s intrinsic site and its activity. It contains some further, specific
suggestions that may complete the working frame and can be developed in the future as
potential individual plans of action. The “written photograph” may also be a tool for completing
the “spaces of original possibles”7
for additional research.
Methodology
Participant observation could be the best term to describe the quality of the conducted
fieldwork which served as a basis for the research.8
I intentionally superimposed the discourses
of art history and heritage to be able to provide a more holistic approach that shifts from a
conventional analysis and perhaps brings more questions to the surface than answers. The
reason is that except for few texts, the accessible literature in English about the independent
contemporary art scene, if taken as a comprehensive attempt to address its activity, accentuates
its dynamics in line of a pre-existing regional–global format strictly through a contemporary
art terminology.
9 My belief is that to understand the scene’s role and potential in the current
cultural, transitional arena, it needs to be detached from an external context and merits an
attempt to be visualized in relation to the ground it is connected to. This ground has been shaped
for centuries by social and religious order before the latter was disrupted by colonial rule,
followed by decades of a dominant narrative imposed by a military regime. In the recent past,
the artistic scene has also evolved in its own cultural, social context towards which it had an
ambiguous standpoint not being an “authorized voice.” The hypothesis unfolding through the
Collection Method.”, herself quoting: Erlandson, David A.; Harris, Edward L.; Skipper, Barbara L. & Allen, Steve
D. (1993). Doing naturalistic inquiry: a guide to methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
7 Referring to Pierre Bourdieu, “The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed.”
8 Methodology of Participant Observation, in: Kawulich, “Participant Observation as a Data Collection Method,”
2.
9 Nathalie Johnston’s close insight of the past almost one decade of the Myanmar art scene was a turning point in
my fieldwork. Her text (Johnston, “Intuitive Acts: The Evolution of Myanmar Contemporary Performance Art.”)
about contemporary performance art in Myanmar (accessed November 2016) is one of the few written texts in
English that attempts to vindicate pre-conceptions about the Myanmar contemporary art scene and focus on its
evolution within its own context.
5
research is supported by a one-year fieldwork, the constant monitoring of the scene through the
media, individual discussions with the independent scene’s actors and the feedback of a recent
survey; meanwhile the study relies on a personal assumption embedded in a Western academic
approach and an undeniable art historical terrain. The research experience cannot level a fully
insider approach, and language barrier is an aspect that prevents an access to some nuances
enclosed between the layers of other disciplines’ research too. The awareness of not being able
to probably capture all threads at once is maintained throughout the study, especially as most
of the concepts, time-frames, processes have to be further investigated individually; having
said that, the angle proposed by the study may contribute to an ongoing dialogue precisely by
bringing forward a – potential – semi-external reading.
Sources
The primary source for the study, fieldwork conducted between Spring 2014–Spring 2015,
mainly in Yangon but not exclusively, entailed a series of interviews with artists, gallerists,
curators, art experts from the country or from the region – either recorded or annotated; some
of them were processed in the forms of articles and publications on different media platforms.10
This is complemented by archival material collected through this period including photo
documentation of events and spaces, along with fieldnotes. The secondary literature was partly
processed in Yangon – mainly publications nowhere else available. The second phase of
processing was undertaken during the research in Budapest. A quantitative survey analysis in
a form of a questionnaire was included in the research – the study comprises a subchapter
10 Gallery guide / short articles regularly published between September 2014-April 2015: Kálmán, “Gallery Guide
- Myanmore.”, regular articles on the independent art scene published locally in In Depth Magazine: Kálmán,
“My Paintings Are Not Beautiful (San Minn).”; Kálmán, “Show Me Your Hands And I’ll Tell You Who You
Were (Htein Lin).”, Kálmán, “A Road Paved by Solid Concepts Meeting Artist Po Po.”, Kálmán, “Red, Black
and Back (Aung Myint).”, and on a Hungarian art portal, Kálmán, “Iola Lenzi Interjú I., II. : ‘A Kortárs Művészet
a Társadalmi Változás alakítója’; ‘Ellenérzéseim Vannak a Művészeti Piaccal szemben’ (Iola Lenzi Interview I,
II: ‘Contemporary Art Asthe Driver for Social Change’; ‘I Rather Keep Away from the Market.’”
6
dedicated to its details and methodology (II.D., App. 1). The outcome as a mechanism of smart
practices framed by the last subchapter (III.B.) is embedded in a regional angle through the
short cases provided in subchapter III.A.2. The terminology regarding the art scene needs in
almost every case clarification as many concepts are being (re)defined now by the scene and
remain debatable, hence the necessity of a separate glossary. The web-references are abundant
besides academic sources as it is sometimes the only source for English reference.
Theoretical framework
The study’s theoretical framework can be attached to two main approaches: critical heritage
studies and (contemporary) art history. There is also an additional layer provided by
postcolonial and Southeast Asian studies.
In respect for the critical heritage approach of the study, I would like to mention Rodney
Harrison and Laurajane Smith. Rodney Harrison defines heritage as a “dynamic process which
involves competition over whose version of the past, and the associated moral and legal rights
which flow from this version of the past, will find official representation in the present.”11 Two
inter-related dynamic forces enter the understanding of heritage according to Harrison, a top-
down, official approach, and a bottom-up, unofficial one, constituted by a local level. Critical
heritage studies investigate these two processes, the relation between them. The present study
wishes to approach as a start the case of the independent contemporary art scene partly through
this scheme by understanding these processes framed around the notion of culture, and more
properly fine art / visual art in the context of Myanmar. Harrison’s suggestion for a new
dialogical model aims a broader approach between heritage and the “overwhelming presence
of the past”: it “implies an ethical stance in relation to others, and a belief in the importance of
acknowledging and respecting alternative perspectives and worldviews as a condition of
11Harrison, Understanding the Politics of Heritage, 8.
7
dialogue, and provides a way to connect heritage with other pressing social, economic, political
and environmental issues of our time.”12
Through this approach, Harrison expects to offer an
alternative to the “troubled late-modern” relationship with memory and the modernist binaries
of cultural and natural which he finds underlied by the tangible / intangible division. It is in
order to complete this frame that the notion of Living Heritage Approach is added
independently of Harrison’s approach in the aim of generating a nuanced view of the cultural
context relating to the independent contemporary art scene of Myanmar.
Laurajane Smith on her side, nearly a decade before Harrison’s critical approaches published
her “uses of heritage.” “At one level heritage is about the promotion of a consensus version of
history by state-sanctioned cultural institutions and elites to regulate cultural and social
tensions in the present. On the other hand, heritage may also be a resource that is used to
challenge and redefine received values and identities by a range of subaltern groups.” Smith
interprets the notion of a hegemonic “Authorized Heritage Discourse” (AHD) dependent on
the specialist bodies’ power and institutionalized “in state cultural agencies and amenity
societies.” This discourse is a synthesis of nation-narratives and aesthetic judgment of the
expert; it is a self-referential discourse.13 The major challenge of the AHD is that it marks out
who is entitled to speak in the name of the past.14 Smith’s approach helps situating the official
narrative in regard of the position the independent scene holds.
From an art historical point of view, the study stays within the frames of contemporary..."
Source/publisher:
MA Thesis in Cultural Heritage Studies: Academic Research, Policy, Management.
Date of publication:
2017-06-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Political History, Society and Culture, Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Court testimony from Myanmar’s ousted civilian President U Win Myint on Tuesday showed that commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing breached the military’s own 2008 Constitution when he seized power on Feb. 1.
On multiple occasions over the past eight months, whether in meetings with members of the State Administration Council (SAC) he chairs, or at gatherings with his subordinates, the commander-in-chief has repeatedly claimed that there was no coup on Feb. 1 and that the military takeover was carried out “constitutionally”.
However, on Tuesday, the 70-year-old detained President, testifying in his own defense, told a court in Naypyitaw that early on the morning of the takeover, two military generals entered his room at the Presidential Residence in Naypyitaw and tried to force him to resign from his post on the grounds of ill health.
According to his lawyer, the President told the court that the officers threatened him, saying that if he did not do as they instructed he would come to “harm”.
U Win Myint told the generals that he would rather die than consent to their proposal, the lawyer added.
The President said he told the generals that he was not concerned about being harmed, and that things should be handled as per the law and not by staging a coup, his lawyer said.
The first public revelation of the circumstances of President U Win Myint’s detention came as he personally defends himself against an incitement charge brought by the regime over statements released by his National League for Democracy (NLD) urging the public to resist the coup.
The same charge has also been brought against detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD chairwoman, and detained Naypyitaw Mayor U Myo Aung.
A lawyer told The Irrawaddy that Tuesday’s court testimony from the President has emerged as the strongest confirmation yet of assertions made by both local and international legal experts that the military takeover was unconstitutional.
According to Article 417 and Article 418 of the 2008 Constitution, in the event that a state of emergency is to be declared in the country, the President must announce the order in coordination with the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). The President then transfers the government’s executive, legislative and judicial powers to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces.
However, a few hours after the country’s civilian leaders including President U Win Myint and State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were arrested on Feb. 1, the military convened an NDSC meeting. Former general U Myint Swe, the military-appointed vice president, attended the meeting as “acting president” and declared the country to be under a nationwide state of emergency for one year. Then, he immediately transferred the country’s legislative, administrative and judicial powers to the commander-in-chief.
Trying to force the sitting president to resign by using threats could be seen as coup maker Min Aung Hlaing’s desperate attempt to make his takeover constitutional. The charter’s Article 73 (a) states that one of the two vice presidents—the one who won the second-highest number of votes in the presidential election—shall serve as Acting President “if the office of the President falls vacant due to his resignation, death, permanent disability or any other reason.”
In other words, the two senior military officers’ suggestion that U Win Myint quit his position for health reasons was nothing more than a pretext to make the coup legal.
However, given the then president’s refusal to resign, it’s hard to say that Article 73 provides valid support for U Myint Swe’s acting presidency, let alone the coup.
“The President has notified the entire nation as well as the world, through the court, that the takeover violates the Constitution,” the lawyer said.
The President’s words clearly reveal the commander-in-chief and his fellow generals to be criminals who have committed high treason, he said.
“It is the strongest evidence that they committed high treason as [it comes from] the head of state himself,” the lawyer said.
Lawyers in Myanmar have called for the prosecution of the coup leaders for high treason, which carries the death sentence.
Amid these calls, the SAC led by coup leader Min Aung Hlaing has amended the country’s high treason law in an attempt to guarantee impunity for the military leaders who seized power in February.
While the original Article 121 of the Penal Code says anyone who “attempts or otherwise prepares by force of arms or other violent means to overthrow the organs of the Union or of its constituent units established by the Constitution” is guilty of high treason, the coup leader has amended it so that only unconstitutional use of force of arms constitutes high treason, meaning it is acceptable to use force of arms as long as it is done in line with the Constitution.
However, lawyers said that because the takeover was carried out in breach of the Constitution, every order, every appointment and removal of an official, and all changes to the law made by the junta are illegal.
Myanmar has been in political and social turmoil since the military overthrew the civilian government and seized control.
Since the coup, the junta has killed at least 1,167 people including protesters, politicians, activists, bystanders and children, and arrested more than 8,890 in an effort to suppress opposition to the regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-10-13
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Military History, Political History
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"Note: These entries will gradually be annotated. Furthermore, an entry is only included once,
regardless of wider relevance. Eventually, all entries will be cross-listed to indicate other
areas where a particular piece of research might be of use.
This list has been compiled chiefly from direct surveys of the literature with
additional information supplied by the bibliographies of numerous and various
sources listed in the present bibliography. Additional sources include submissions
from members of the BurmaResearch, EarlyBurma, and SEAHTP egroups, as well as
public domain listings of personal publications on the internet.
DISCLAIMER: This bibliography is solely a guide or survey to the literature. No
claim is made for the accuracy or completeness of the information provided in this
bibliography. The information provided is intended only as an initial survey of the
literature. This site and its owner do not accept any responsibility for problems
resulting from the use of the information provided. All information should be verified
elsewhere. Suggestions are always welcome. Please note that newspaper and
newsletter aricles will not be included in this list, as most are short pieces or extracts
from already, or eventually to be, published works.
© 2002 Michael W. Charney
All rights reserved. This bibliography may be downloaded, copied, or printed, in
whole or in part, solely for academic, non-profit purposes only and only under the
following conditions: (1) the title page, containing full compilation and copyright
information, must be retained and remain the only title page and (2) this bibliography
must not be altered in any way. This is an end-user arrangement: this bibliography
may not be recirculated or reposted, either in hardcopy or in electronic form.
Downloading or copying this bibliography constitutes a binding agreement to the
above-mentioned terms and conditions. For more information, contact Michael W.
Charney at [email protected].
I. Archaeology & Pre-Pagan Era
I. A Pre-Pagan: General
Forbes, C. J. F. S. Legendary History of Burma and Arakan. Rangoon, Government Press. 1882.
Despite the title there is very little here on Arakan [M.W.C.].
Ito, Toshikatsu. “Cotton Production and the Dry Areas in Mainland Southeast Asia From the 6
th
to the
9
th Centuri[es].” In Fukui Hayao (ed.),The Dry Areas of Southeast Asia: Harsh or Benign
Envrionment? (Kyoto: Kyot University, 1999): 95-105.
Luce, G. H. Phases of Pre-Pagán Burma: Languages and History. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1985.
Luce, G. H. “The Advent of Buddhism to Burma.” In L. Cousins and A. Kunst (eds.). Buddhist Studies
in Honour of Miss. I. B. Horner. (Dordrecht, 1974): 119-137.
Movius, Hallam L., Jr. “Stone Age in Burma.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 32
(1943): 341-393.
San Nyein, U. “Nyaunggan Bronze Age.” In Proceedings of the Myanmar Two Millenia Conference,
15-17 December 1999 (Yangon: Universities Historical Research Centre, 2000): III, 1-9.
Stargardt, Janice. Tracing Through things: The Oldest Pali Texts and the Early Buddhist Archaeology
of India and Burma. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. 2000.
Than Tun. “Prehistoric Researches in Myanmar.” In Traditons in Current Perspective: Proceedings of
the Conference on Myanmar and Southeast Asian Studies, 15-17 November 1995, Yangon
(Yangon: Universities Historical Research Centre, 1996): 25-29.
I. B. Pre-Pagan: Upper Burma
Aung-Thwin, Michael. "Burma Before Pagan: The Satus of Archaeology Today." Asian Perspectives
25 (1982-83): 1-21.
Brown, G. "The Origin of the Burmese." Journal of the Burma Research Society 2.1 (1911): 1-8.
Burney, Henry. “Discovery of Buddhist Images with Deva-nagari Inscriptions at Tagaoung, the
Ancient Capital of the Burmese Empire.” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (1836): 157-
164.
Grant-Brown, W. F. "The Pre-Buddhist Religion of the Burmese." Folklore 32 (1921): 77-100.
Luce, G. H. “Old Kyaukse and the Coming of the Burmans.” Journal of the Burma Research Society
42.1 (1959):. 75-109.
Luce, G. H. "Davaravati and Old Burma." Journal of the Siam Society 53 (1965): 9-25.
Miksic, John. “Cities in Ancient Myanmar: Orthogenetic or Heterogenetic?” In Proceedings of the
Myanmar Two Millenia Conference, 15-17 December 1999 (Yangon: Universities Historical
Research Centre, 2000): III, 21-38.
Myint Aung, U. "The Capital of Suvannabhumi Unearthed?" Shiroku 10 (1977): 41-53.
Nay Thaung, Daw, et al. “The Record of the First New Finding on the Occurrence of Anthropoid
Primates? Pilopithecus in Myanmar.” Myanmar Historical Research Journal 3 (December 1998):
1-6 + plates.
Charney (comp.) 9
Ni Ni Myint, Daw. “ Report on Recent Archaeological Finds in Budalin Township: Sagaing Division.”
Myanmar Historical Research Journal 3 (December 1998): 7-9 + plates.
Nitta, Eiji. "The Situation of the Neolithic Culture of Padah-lin Caves in the Context of Southeast
Asian History." In Okudaira, Ryuji, Saito, Teruko, & Than Tun (eds.), Burma and Japan: Basic
Studies on their Cultural and Social Structure (Tokyo: The Burma Studies Group[Japan], 1987):
161-168.
Tin Thein. “ Primates of Pondaung.” Myanmar Perspectives 2.4 (1997): 66-69.
I.C. Pre-Pagan: Lower Burma & the Pyu
Aung Thaw. (ed.). Reports on the Excavations at Beikthano. Rangoon: Sarpay Beikman. 1968.
Gutman, Pamela. “ The Pyu Maitreyas.” In Traditons in Current Perspective: Proceedings of the
Conference on Myanmar and Southeast Asian Studies, 15-17 November 1995, Yangon
(Yangon: Universities Historical Research Centre, 1996): 165-178.
Luce, G. H. "The Ancient Pyu." Journal of the Burma Research Society 27 (1937): 239-253.
Luce, G. H. "Rice and Religion: A Study of Old Mon-Khmer Evolution and Culture." Journal of the
Siam Society 53 (1965): 139-153.
Sao Saimöng Mangrai. “ Did Sona and Uttara come to Lower Burma?” Journal of the Burma Research
Society 59 (1976): 155-164.
Shorto, H. L. “ The Gavampti-Tradition.” In Himansu Bhusan Sarkar (ed.). R. C. Majumdar Felicitation
Volume (Calcutta 1970): 15-30.
Stargardt, Janice. The Ancient Pyu of Burma. Vol. I: Early Pyu Cities in a Man-made Landscape.
Cambridge: 1990.
Stargardt, Janice. “ Hydraulic Works and Southeast Asian Polities.” In David G. Marr & A. C. Milner
(ed.), Southeast Asia in the 9
th
to 14
th Centuries (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies): 23-37.
I.D. Pre-Pagan: Western Burma
Ali, Syed Murtaza. "Chandra Kings of Pattikera and Arakan." Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan
6 (1961): 267-274.
Banerji, R. D. "Unrecorded Kings of Arakan." Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (New Series) 16
(1920): 85.
Ghosal, S. N. "Missing Links in Arakan History." In M. E. Haq (ed.). Abdul Karim Sahitya-Visarad
Commemorative Volume; Essays on Archaeology, Art, History, Literature and Philosophy of
the Orient. (Dacca: 1972): 255-266.
Ghosh, J. C. "The Candra Dynasty of Arakan." Indian Historical Quarterly 7 (1931): 37-40.
Gutman, Pamela. "Ancient Arakan (Burma) With Special Reference to its Cultural History Between
the 5th and 11th Centuries." Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, 1976.
San Shwe Bu. "A Votive Tablet Found at Akyab." Journal of the Burma Reearch Society 8 (1918): 39-
40.
San Shwe Bu. "The Legend of the Early Aryan Settlement of Arakan." Journal of the Burma Reearch
Society 11.2 (1911): 66-69..."
Source/publisher:
Michael W. Charney (SOAS)
Date of publication:
2002-09-26
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Documents on social and economic history, Historical research, Bibliographies and online documents of individual Burma/Myanmar scholars, Political History
Language:
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"Burma/Myanmar’s postcolonial elites have established a military-state with
hybrid-imperial structures, characterized by high despotic but low infrastruc-
tural modes of power, and fueled by rent-extraction. Given the resulting eviscera-
tion of opposition political groups, citizens understand explicit politics as
dangerous. That said, cleavages between state and the polity afford vast space
for “civil society” groups (CS) to form and operate. CS stabilize the political
economy by managing citizen needs; conversely, CS stand as a wedge between
state and masses, (potentially) constructing spaces to coordinate and magnify
potential demands. Yet CS currently err toward managing needs. Opposition
must politicize Burmese masses and CS through idioms that interface with
CS’s material tasks—a “politics of the daily”—encouraging them to make, collec-
tively, a multiplicity of non-adversarial demands. This may compel the state to
pivot and seek new bargains, at which point elite advocacy-oriented CS can
provide progressive policy reforms. The paper will examine recent inchoate
social-political movements in Burma for models of this politics.
AFTER A TUMULTUOUS FOUR years for Myanmar—punctuated by mass protests in
September 2007, the devastation of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, and a con-
tentious national election in November 2010—by early 2011 many Burma-
watchers were left wondering if those epic events amounted to sound and fury
signifying nothing.1 Indeed, they had anticipated that 100,000 protesters and a
mismanaged natural disaster would subsequently lead to the cracking of the
ruling military regime and a transition to democracy (OSI 2007). Instead the
ruling military-state junta created a proxy civilian party, presided over an election
beset with fraud and intimidation, and installed a “new” government. This
effectively normalized the 2008 Constitution and closed the book on the coun-
try’s last democratic poll, which had been held in quasi-abeyance for two
Elliott Prasse-Freeman ([email protected]) is Founding Research Fellow at the Human Rights and
Social Movements Program at the Carr Center for Human Rights and an Advisory Board Member with the
Sexuality, Gender, and Human Rights Program at Harvard University.
1
Contrary to popular understanding, both “Burma” and “Myanmar” have always been used by those
native to the space, the former typically in colloquial speech, and the latter mostly in the formal
written language. To consciously avoid the binarism ascribed to the use of one over the other in
English (where “Burma” signifies solidarity with the opposition, while “Myanmar” endorses the
regime), this paper will use them interchangeably.
decades.2 Most ethnic groups put down weapons to reluctantly rejoin this politi-
cal process (Smith 2006), while the principal opposition, the National League for
Democracy (NLD), remained irreconcilable and was officially dissolved as a con-
sequence. When its leader, Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, was finally
released from house arrest, her political activities were initially declared
“illegal” and she was threatened with reincarceration.3 Actors on the outside,
too, were ineffectual in their central focus on effecting democratic change:
U.N. mediation was repeatedly unsuccessful, and neither sanctions nor punitively
low foreign aid4 directly coerced the junta into capitulation (Pedersen 2008, 232).
China (Steinberg 2001a, 223–39), ASEAN (Tonkin 2008, 3–4), and India contin-
ued to support the junta economically and covet it strategically, providing exter-
nal cover from Western coercion. But beyond this, internal political challenge
appeared anemic; the military-state maintained an effective monopoly over
explicit political expression.
And yet, despite its effective weathering of these paroxysms (protest, emer-
gency, election), the military-state then began showing stunning signs of reform:
by late 2011, political prisoners had been freed, the unheard-of phenomenon of
public pressure leading to a change in policy (the halting of the Myitsone
mega-dam project) had occurred, and the same Suu Kyi—threatened only
months before to avoid politics—had been allowed to run for parliament.
When this article went to print, debate was raging over what the changes signi-
fied, if anything at all. Sanguine observers heralded nothing less than a new dawn
in Myanmar (ICG 2011), while wary counterparts insisted that the superficial
“reforms” risked papering over deeper consolidation of military control
(Zarni 2011).
How to reconcile these two stories? Rather than adjudicating between them,
this article seeks two orthogonal objectives: first, to make the apparent contradic-
tions explicable by describing the system of political economy and social regu-
lation that has developed in the sixty years since independence. The second
objective will be to argue that these political events risk capturing the attention
of internal and external actors alike, when more important lessons generated
by the events perhaps lay elsewhere. The paper will argue that recent events
have illuminated actors that heretofore had been flying below the radars of
many observers and policymakers: whether organizing protests, pulling bodies
out of lakes, or delivering civic education seminars, civil society groups (hereafter
“CS”) are literally and figuratively everywhere in Burma (Heidel 2006). As such,
exploring how they function can stimulate a new way of seeing the challenges
facing Myanmar: instead of making state-to-state or “international
community”-to-state politics the only ways to contest an authoritarian regime,
Burmese CS provide a window through which we can penetrate an opaque pol-
itical economy and inform us about the way life (in the villages and urban slums)
actually functions, and can also demonstrate how an alternative politics may
contest the status quo. Myanmar scholars—including in a recent issue of this
journal (Thawnghmung 2011)—are increasingly mining these political spaces
and practices, exploring daily experiences of average citizens. This article
hopes to continue this conversation, contributing to determining what role
these largely forgotten actors can play in driving change from within. Indeed,
if the government is serious about reform, these forgotten actors will be
seminal in channeling and shaping it; if the government is not, these actors
will need to emerge to help compel change.
METHODOLOGIES
Against simplistic binary descriptions—totalitarian accounts in Burmese
commentary and classic authoritarian portrayals in political science—I describe
Burma’s political space as incorporating multiple particular governmentalities
(Foucault 2007); I examine those by exploring (a) the institutions or actors that
de facto govern subjects (states, customary leaders, CS representatives,
businesses, spiritual guides, etc.); (b) the modes that those forms of governance
take (“rights”-based, negotiated bargains, implicit deals, etc.); therefore (c) the
kinds of relationships that develop (patron/client, state/citizen, corporation/
employee, NGO/“partner,” “international community”/victim); through which
(d) power then flows to produce, regulate, punish, discipline, or expel subjects.
And finally (e) how the different zones constituted by these different fields of
governmentality, with their respective intensities, intersect with and hence influ-
ence one another to create a broader system or assemblage (Deleuze and
Guatarri 1987 [1980]). Taking up each of these permutations is beyond the
scope of any single paper, but this methodological framework informs the
project. Indeed, only by more precisely understanding this system can collective
political attitudes become comprehensible and social space at Myanmar’s periph-
eries and within its interstices become apparent, thereby contextualizing current
CS actions and animating our ability to perceive the form this potential takes.
To accomplish this, inter alia, I conducted semi-structured interviews with
150 members of 61 Burmese CS and/or political organizations in December
2009 and January 2010. Organizations were identified through referrals, and cross-referenced with NGO lists compiled by the Burma Library (in Mae Sot,
Thailand) and Local Resource Center in Yangon, respectively, to ensure adequate
coverage. Organizations are kept anonymous due to their sensitive activities.
Finally, two conceptual deviations from classic civil society conceptualizations
attend my use of CS. First, I define CS as those groups making social decisions
outside of direct state control and without ambition toward capture of, or partici-
pation in, the state. I avoid language such as “individuals coming together”
to “make collective decisions” because I neither imply quasi-democratic or
even necessarily collaborative decision making, nor do I suggest that individuals
are what drive CS decisions. Instead, CS often take on institutional conscious-
nesses and logics that act recursively on those people who constitute them
(Zizek 2008, 167). Second, CS will be used plurally—signifying a multiplicity
of organizations—and will also imply an alternative space that CS both constitutes
(by virtue of its operation) and enters into..."
Source/publisher:
The Journal of Asian Studies (Vol. 71, No. 2)
Date of publication:
2012-05-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Civil Society, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Social and Cultural History, Political History
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"I and many other journalists who covered the 1988 pro-democracy uprising felt a sense of déjà vu when, once again, the Tatmadaw’s tanks rolled into major cities and cracked down brutally on protesters while some embittered activists took to the borders to fight and to form a government working mostly in exile. Is it happening again? Will there be another few decades of harsh military rule, resistance and suffering? Will the men in green ever come to their senses and realize that they are destroying the country, not “saving” it?
On closer reflection, however, there are some fundamental differences between the situation today and that of 33 years ago. First of all, digital media has changed the world, and Myanmar is no exception. In 1988, the internet and smartphones did not exist and we who covered the uprising from Bangkok had to depend on shaky and often faulty landlines. It all began on Aug. 8,1988—hence “8888”—with massive demonstrations all over the country. The military was called out to suppress the uprising and did so brutally. Thousands of people—yes, thousands, not hundreds as some chroniclers claim—were gunned down in the then capital Yangon and elsewhere. When that failed to cow the public into submission, the Tatmadaw withdrew from the streets and public view, hoping that it would create the kind of chaos it would need to step in and “restore order”. And that was exactly what it did on Sept. 18, when a junta called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed power and another massacre of protesters took place.
During that month, from mid-August to Sept. 18, Myanmar actually enjoyed its first month of intellectual freedom since the initial military takeover in 1962. After more than two decades of strict governmental control of the media, new lively papers emerged, some daily and others intermittent. By the end of August, Yangon alone had nearly 40 independent newspapers, magazines and journals full of political commentaries, biting satires and cartoons ridiculing the ruling elite. They had fanciful titles such as the Light of Dawn, Liberation Daily, Scoop, New Victory, the Newsletter and so on. Some were handwritten and photocopied or mimeographed, while others had access to professional printing presses, often free of charge because their owners wanted to show that they also supported the movement for democracy.
Despite the use of English titles for many of the publications, they were in the Burmese language, published locally in Yangon, Mandalay, Mawlamyine, Pathein and elsewhere, and it was rare that the information they contained reached the outside world. The same was true of photographic images. Many Myanmar photographers took excellent pictures and those were also published locally. One of them is Htein Win, and thanks to him there is evidence of the events of 1988. An experienced photographer, in 1974 Htein Win had also photographed the student demonstrations triggered by the funeral of the Myanmar former secretary general of the United Nations, U Thant.
But very few international press photographers were inside the country, among them Alain Evrard from Belgium and a Japanese photographer who used the name Ryo Takeda. Takeda photographed demonstrators kneeling before soldiers and urging them not to shoot, while Evrard took the most iconic picture of the suppression of the 1988 uprising: a shot of a Tatmadaw officer leading an attack on a group of demonstrators — and soldiers carrying guns with bayonets charging the crowd. Evrard had to hide his film rolls in his underpants and smuggle them out of Myanmar. Once in Bangkok, days after the event, he could have his film developed and prints made. A few videotapes, all on VHS, also reached Bangkok, but they were of very poor quality.
Sporadic demonstrations continued for a while after the formation of the SLORC and the imposition of draconian martial law measures, but the Tatmadaw was soon in near-total control of cities and towns and even major villages. But an estimated 10,000 activists, most of them young, fled to areas along Myanmar’s borders which were under the control of various ethnic rebel armies. On November 1, they formed the All Burma Students Democratic Front and organized themselves along military lines and dressed up in uniforms with insignia. The hope was that they, together with their ethnic allies, would defeat the Tatmadaw militarily.
Then came the May 1990 election, which, to the surprise of many, was free and fair. The National League for Democracy (NLD) scored a landslide victory, capturing 392 of the 485 seats that were up for grabs (of a total of 492; elections were not held in seven constituencies) while the Tatmadaw-supported National Unity Party scored a mere 10 seats. But that Pyithu Hluttaw, or National Assembly, was never convened. Instead, the SLORC eventually decided to form a constituent assembly consisting of about a hundred MPs-elect and 600 delegates handpicked by the Tatmadaw.
When it became clear a couple of months after the May 1990 election that the SLORC was not going to honor the outcome and began arresting MPs-elect, some fled to the Thai border along with other NLD activists. In December 1990, they formed what they called the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s cousin U Sein Win, an elected MP, as prime minister. A loose alliance was formed with the ABSDF and some of the ethnic rebels.
Internationally, there was widespread condemnation of the mass killings and arrests in 1988 as well as the SLORC’s decision to ignore the results of the 1990 election. But, at that time, there were almost no foreign investors in Myanmar. One of the few was Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen, a German firm that was involved in arms production and had personal connections with the then dictator General Ne Win. There was, in other words, very little at stake economically for the outside world, including Myanmar’s immediate neighbors.
Looking back at those events which took place three decades ago, it is evident that we are now dealing with an entirely new situation with different dynamics internally, regionally and internationally. After the 2010 election, the Tatmadaw decided to allow a high degree of freedom of expression, and that lasted until the Feb. 1 coup. But during those 10 years, tech-savvy young people known as Generation Z became masters at using the internet—and many of them are still active after the coup. Today, nothing happens in Myanmar without it being disseminated worldwide on Facebook and other social media. People also communicate with each other relatively safely via digital platforms, some of which are encrypted. In real, crude and brutal terms, more people were gunned down by the Tatmadaw in 1988 than today, but the documentary evidence was never there.
Some, but not as many as in 1988, have resorted to armed struggle—but in a way that Myanmar has not seen in recent history. The military-structured ABSDF soon fell apart because of factional infighting, some resulting in activists killing other activists. There was an acute shortage of weapons and even medical supplies. Many fell sick with malaria and other diseases contracted in the jungle. The dream of an armed uprising from the borders never materialized. The erstwhile ABSDF militants trickled back to their old hometowns, or ended up in exile in the US, Australia and Europe.
This time, there is armed resistance as well, but it includes urban guerrilla warfare of a kind not seen in Myanmar before. Bombs are exploding on an almost daily basis in cities and towns all over the country, even in the old capital Yangon and the new one, Naypyitaw. Suspected Tatmadaw informants are being assassinated and militants are blowing up military-owned property like Mytel communication towers. Local resistance forces, which are active also in the Burman-dominated heartland, have ambushed Tatmadaw convoys with guns and homemade bombs. And the Tatmadaw today is no longer the highly disciplined fighting force it was in the 1980s and before. Judging from reports from inside the country—and then not only from internet activists—the Tatmadaw has suffered heavy casualties with hundreds of dead and many more wounded.
Furthermore, the old NCGUB never managed to attract anything that could be interpreted as recognition. It became redundant after 2010 and was dissolved two years later. The new National Unity Government (NUG) has the backing of several MPs who, unlike those in 1990, have actually served as MPs, and that of Myanmar’s representative to the United Nations, U Kyaw Moe Tun. Informal meetings have been held with representatives of foreign governments. On Oct. 5, the French Senate extended what can be seen as a recognition of the NUG, and the European Parliament passed a similar resolution a day later. And, as The Irrawaddy reported on Oct. 6, Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah has issued a warning to the junta in Naypyitaw, the State Administration Council (SAC), that his country will hold talks with the NUG if the generals fail to cooperate with a recently appointed special envoy of ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a fellow member.
But the deciding factors could be what certainly did not exist in 1988: a once thriving local business environment and foreign investors. Strikes and military crackdowns have been bad for business. The World Bank forecasts in its July report an 18 percent annual decline for Myanmar’s economy, nearly double what was predicted in March. Other estimates are even more dire; Global credit rating agency Fitch Solutions, for instance, expects a contraction of 20 percent or more. In short, the economy is on the verge of collapse, and the blame for that lies entirely with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to oust the elected government and seize absolute power.
Regional trading partners like ASEAN and China may not care about democracy and human rights, but they don’t want to see their investments go up in smoke over the Myanmar battlefield. China has invested heavily in Myanmar’s fledgling industry and in infrastructure projects such as a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State. High-speed railroads are on the drawing board, and so are plans to dredge the Irrawaddy River for trade. Chaos is the last thing the Chinese would want to see in Myanmar.
Singapore exported US$2.7 billion worth of goods to Myanmar in 2020, mainly mineral fuels, oil, electronics and machinery. Trade with Vietnam was also booming before the coup and Vietnamese companies have invested in real estate and a huge new shopping mall in Yangon. Mytel is a joint venture between Tatmadaw-controlled Myanmar Economic Corporation and Viettel, which is owned by the Vietnamese military. Vietnam, hardly a democracy, would not normally have cared about a military takeover in a foreign country, but the Vietnamese can hardly be pleased to see their co-owned communication towers being blown up, and other investments being ruined because of the coup.
So will the new junta survive? The old SLORC was never under the same pressure at home or internationally as the SAC. But, in the end, it depends on what will happen inside the Tatmadaw when—and it seems inevitable—Myanmar sinks even deeper into economic, social and political crisis. But what will come in place of SAC, if it falls, is impossible to predict. What can be said with certainty, though, is that Min Aung Hlaing and his henchmen had probably not anticipated any of this when they decided to launch their ill-fated coup on Feb. 1. What the generals could get away with in 1988 is not possible in 2021.
Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-10-11
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History, Military History, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders
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"Since first coming to direct political power in 1958, Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) has
dominated the country’s politics and controlled the state apparatus.
2 Despite a series of
challenges to its rule, the Tatmadaw has been able to constantly reinvent itself and,
ultimately, to reassert its dominance over Burmese society. Cycles of popular protests,
economic and political crises, and dissatisfaction with military rule failed to overthrow or
undermined the military’s organizational coherence. The most tangible outcome of the
1988 public protest movement and its suppression was the collapse of Ne Win’s Burmese
Socialist Program Party (BSPP). For it was those events that permitted the Tatmadaw to
return Myanmar to direct military rule under the ostensible leadership of the State Law
and Order Council (SLORC), later renamed as the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC). The SLORC/SPDC regime effectively crushed protests, arrested opposition
leaders, and began a process of rebuilding the military to become the most competent and
formidable institution in the country with uncontested control over the state apparatus
(ICG 2001: 24; ICG 2011; Kyaw 2009: 272). Given its dominance, it is thus puzzling that
the SPDC self-elected to dissolve itself and allow the formation of a nominally-civilian government in 2011. By 2012, this new government has declared its intention to
liberalize Myanmar and has introduced a series of dramatic changes that permit expanded
pluralism, economic freedoms, and freedom of the press.
3
This paper examines the historical development of the Tatmadaw as an organizational
actor since its rise to power in 1962. It seeks to understand and clarify the significance of
recent reforms in which the Tatmadaw appears to have ceded powers. In so doing, two
prominent approaches to regime change are considered in turn. First, the game theoretic
model that focuses on the personalities of reformers and challengers in explaining why
authoritarian regimes reform. While such frameworks offer helpful insights in the
dynamics of political change, they nevertheless fall short in explaining why changes are
taking place at an institutional/regime-level. This paper will thus focus on a chronological
path-dependent approach that traces the organizational evolution of the Tatmadaw and
identifies how it sought to strategically reposition itself vis-à-vis society. By adopting
regime typologies introduced in the works of Linz and Stepan (1996), this paper will
argue that current developments should be seen as a diminished form of authoritarianism.
The conclusion discusses the present situation and its implications for the country’s
trajectory of political development.
The paper’s main claim is that the ongoing dramatic reforms introduced since mid-2011
should not be understood simply as an exit strategy by the military to retreat from
national politics. On the contrary, this paper suggests that ceding dominance is in fact an
evolving strategy by the Tatmadaw to continue consolidating its organizational powers
and to institutionalize its influence over government, though without the responsibility
for the direct administration of the state. The Tatmadaw no longer governs directly and
reforms have increased political competitiveness on the national stage.
4 Be that as it may, the Tatmadaw has designed various mechanisms to safeguard its interests. It has done so
through the creation of what Linz and Stepan referred to as “reserve domains” (1996: 67).
Hence, while there is no doubt that major changes in Myanmar are underway, it is
premature to assume this entails a fundamental realignment of political power, let alone a
transition to consolidated democracy.
Game theoretic perspectives on Myanmar’s transition
Much of the popular reports on current liberalization efforts in Myanmar have explained
recent changes by essentially adopting a classical game theory model. Many Myanmar
watchers and popular press for example have examined current political transition as a
strategic game between regime softliners/reformers versus hardliners with a particular
focus on the elite actors (Callahan 2012, Fuller 2012, Jagan 2012, Kyaw 2012, Tin 2012).
For example Kyaw Yin Hlaing explains that in the absence of intervention from the
retired Than Shwe, some officials within the new government have emerged labeling
themselves as liberals while calling for further liberalization of the country’s political
economy (Kyaw 2012: 209). Similarly, Callahan (2012: 122) argues that despite having
hand-picked his successors, Than Shwe have now “lost the ability to control the [reform]
process from behind the scenes.” She credited this as a long-held “pent-up pressure” from
Than Shwe’s subordinates that are now well placed to “push the envelope” and
essentially curb the “once-boundless policy-making powers” of the Tatmadaw.
Under this model, game theorists argue that democratization is possible for authoritarian
regimes when moderates from both the ruling elites and the opposition compromise and
work together in other to prevent backlashes from their respective hardliners (Przeworski
1992: 105-53; Linz and Stepan 1996: 61). Additionally, according to Linz and Stepan
(1996: 65), military authoritarian regimes that are hierarchical in nature are among the
most likely regime types to allow this type of transitional path towards democratization,
as the “military as institution” views the cost of maintaining the “military as government” as too high, thus would eventually compromise and allow liberalizing reforms as an exit
strategy for the “military as institution.”5
Though the hardliner versus moderate argument certainly gives a plausible explanation of
how a regime can democratize, it nevertheless falls short of articulating why a
consolidated military regime, which is in a position of strength both as an institution and
as government, would choose to liberalize. It is certainly important to understand the role
of elite “reformers” such as President Thein Sein and Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann
and how they have coordinated for a push for liberalization of Myanmar’s political
economy, yet it is also vital to note that they were both key members of the preceding
SPDC regime and the Tatmadaw, and neither individual previously demonstrated that
they would push for further political reforms in a post-SPDC state.6 What then allowed
these actors to change the “rules of the game” and thus effectively reposition themselves
as liberals in a reforming regime?
As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 21) point out, in authoritarian regimes, “no transition
can be forced purely by opponents against a regime which maintains the cohesion,
capacity, and disposition to apply repression.” Additionally as Huntington (1991: 114)
suggests one must examine the “continuum in terms of the relative importance of the
governing and opposition groups as the source of democratization.”
However, in the case of Myanmar, in the absence of any effective and unified political
opposition that could realistically topple and replace the military regime (Mya 1992: 146-
59; Kyaw 2008: 128-9), current political reforms are led from the top-down by military
elites as part of a “transformation” process (Huntington 1991: 114). Given the non-
democratic credentials of the Tatmadaw’s long authoritarian rule over Myanmar, current
attempts to “transform” the regime should not be understood as an attempt to introduce a top-down transition towards a Western-style liberal democracy per se, but rather as a
strategy for the military to prolong its continued dominance over the state apparatus, as
well as to ensure that the core interests of the military are preserved.
7
When the Tatmadaw first took direct control of the state apparatus in 1962, the
Revolutionary Council (1962-1971) under the leadership of General Ne Win attempted to
transform Myanmar by purging all forms of pluralism to ensure the primacy of the
Tatmadaw as the only potent political force responsible for the affairs of the state. At the
height of the Ne Win regime, the Tatmadaw attempted to regulate all aspects of social life
but was unable to achieve absolute domination over its population and was constantly
challenged by armed insurgencies on the peripheries suggesting that the regime was at
best an “arrested totalitarian” regime. Additionally, the regime elites were disillusioned
and lacked commitment to the proclaimed Burmese Way to Socialism ideology (Kyaw
2003: 35).
Subsequently, in order for the Tatmadaw to regain control and support for the state, the
arrested-totalitarian authoritarian regime began to co-opt traditional non-state actors that
had “roots in society before the establishment of the regime” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 44).
This led the regime to seek support from the very actors, for example private businesses
and monastic organizations, that it had initially aimed to purge, thus modifying the
character of the Tatmadaw as government. The result was the establishment of the de jure
BSPP single-party state apparatus, whereby the party was theoretically leading the
Tatmadaw (Taylor 2009a: 317). However, the inability of the authoritarian BSPP regime
to further correct problems brought about by its grossly mismanaged economy finally led
to the collapse of order thus paving way for the re-emergence of an authoritarian military
SLORC/SPDC regime which was no longer committed to the socialist vision of its BSPP
predecessors. Though the SPDC was able to preserve some sort of peace and stability for nearly two
decades, the mass protests of 2007, popularly referred to as the “Saffron Revolution,”
indicated that the SPDC’s rule had not fundamentally led to a sustainable state-societal
relationship.8
The 2007 crackdown of the mainly urban protests saw the return of order
and the re-silencing of the regime’s critics. However, it also signaled that a re-negotiation
of the socio-political order between the state and its society was long overdue. In order to
understand this evolutionary development of the shifting attitude between the state and its
society, the evolution of the Tatmadaw as the state apparatus will be traced including
why reforms in the current context came about as a calculated top-down process that was
designed to preserve the interest of the Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher:
Southeast Asia Research Centre and The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
Date of publication:
2012-12-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-10-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History
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"The decision by Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) to declare a “defensive people’s war” against the military junta that usurped power in Naypyitaw on Feb. 1 has not been met with much sympathy from the international community. The British ambassador designate to Myanmar, Pete Vowles, tweeted on Sept. 7 that his country “supports peaceful efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar. We strongly condemn the coup’s coup and brutality, we call on all parties to engage in dialogue.”
Two days later, The Irrawaddy quoted the US Embassy in Yangon as stating that they encourage “all sides to be peaceful and to avoid an escalation of violence.” Chris Sidoti, a member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, an independent group of international experts, told Reuters on Sept. 8 that “Violence is the cause of the suffering of the people of Myanmar, it is not the solution…We empathize with the NUG, but we fear for what will happen as a result of this decision.”
ASEAN has proposed a four-month ceasefire to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid and is also encouraging a dialogue between the junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), and its opponents. The Australian government, which before the coup had a bilateral Defense Cooperation Program with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military), has repeatedly urged the SAC to engage in a dialogue and somehow believes that ASEAN can play a constructive role in solving the crisis in Myanmar.
No one in his or her right mind would be against a dialogue leading to a peaceful solution to Myanmar’s escalating civil wars between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed organizations and now also a host of new resistance armies which are active not in border areas but in the country’s heartland. But it is recklessly naïve to believe that the Tatmadaw, with or without foreign encouragement, would be even remotely interested in engaging in such a dialogue. Exchanging views and reaching compromises have never been on the generals’ agenda. They have always believed in military might and demanded surrender from their opponents. But if a peaceful solution to Myanmar’s many conflicts is not possible, what’s the alternative? Does the NUG and its armed wing, the loosely organized People’s Defense Force (PDF), and its ethnic allies have any chance of defeating the mighty Tatmadaw?
As all the readers of The Irrawaddy are aware, I’ve been writing about Myanmar’s civil war for more than four decades. During that time, I have also on numerous occasions seen the Tatmadaw in action and also been in the middle of two major battles in the frontier areas. The first was in the Naga Hills in December 1985 when the Tatmadaw launched an early morning attack on the headquarters of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland in northwestern Sagaing Region (then Division). It is quite possible that my presence there was a major reason why the Tatmadaw decided to move troops across those remote and rugged hills and attack. The battle was fierce because troops from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were there, and that made a difference from fighting the poorly armed Naga. But, in the end, the Tatmadaw captured the camp. I and other survivors had to flee and hide in the jungle for days before it was possible to move to more secure locations.
The second time was at the battle of Hsi-Hsinwan in northern Shan State in November 1986. I was in a trench together with commanders of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) when their “people’s army” attacked a Tatmadaw position on the top of the mountain. Hundreds of CPB soldiers had been mobilized for the fight, which began at dawn. I have never seen such an arsenal anywhere in Myanmar’s war-torn areas. The CPB’s troops were equipped with 120mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, machine-guns and automatic rifles.
The Tatmadaw camp was blown to pieces and casualties were severe, but the few surviving troops refused to surrender. I did, though, meet a wounded soldier who had been captured by the CPB. I had witnessed the fight from the CPB’s side, but, as I wrote about the encounter in my book Land of Jade: “I was disappointed at not being able to interview him. I would at least have liked to tell him that I had been impressed by the fighting spirit of his unit.”
In those days, the Tatmadaw was also an extremely brutal force committing numerous and often unspeakable atrocities on the civilian population in the frontier areas. I had learned that from many interviews with villagers and other victims of Tatmadaw cruelty. At the same time, it was actually quite poorly armed — but, despite all that, a battle-hardened and largely effective light infantry force. Soldiers were constantly on the move and there were fights against the CPB, the Karen on the Thai border, the Kachin in the far north and other pockets of resistance in ethnic minority areas.
All that changed after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. The main fear within the Tatmadaw leadership was that disgruntled soldiers might join the pro-democracy activists and that, in turn, would be the beginning of the end of military-dominated rule in Myanmar. Consequently, in order to prevent a crack in the ranks, everything was done to keep at least the officer corps satisfied. Beginning in 1989, the Tatmadaw spent more than a billion dollars on procuring new, more sophisticated military equipment. It came primarily from China but also from Singapore, Pakistan and Israel. Most of it, however, was materiel that Myanmar did not actually need, such as missile systems that would be of little use in counter-insurgency operations, huge tanks, armored vehicles, naval patrol boats and various kinds of radar equipment. It was simply toys for the boys and the troops also got new, smart uniforms. Before long, Myanmar’s own defense industries began producing new infantry rifles to replace the old, heavy G-3 which was based on German designs.
Equally important was a decision to scrap the previous, unpopular system of constant rotations of regional commanders, which had been done in order to make sure that no such officer built up his own power base in a certain part of the country. And then came a series of ceasefire agreements between the Tatmadaw and a number of ethnic rebel armies. The Wa, the Kachin, Khun Sa’s drug army, the Mon and Pa-O and others made peace with the Tatmadaw. Those agreements, initiated by intelligence chief Gen. Khin Nyunt, were struck in order to prevent a link-up between the urban dissidents and the ethnic rebels, which could have proven disastrous for the junta that took over power on Sept. 18, 1988. It worked. Only a few pro-democracy activists remained with the Karen National Union, the only sizable ethnic army that refused to enter into a truce with the Tatmadaw.
But, to be on the safe side, the size of the Tatmadaw was increased dramatically. The three services — the army, the air force and the navy — amounted to no more than 195,000 men before 1988. Nearly all of them belonged to the army; the air force as well as the navy were very small and, many would argue, almost insignificant. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and other international think-tanks, the army has now 507,000 men, the air force 23,000 and the navy 19,000, so altogether 549,000 in total. Those think-tanks may have grossly overestimated the strength of the Tatmadaw because most units are undermanned and many troops may exist only in official reports from the field.
Be that as it may, it is undeniable that the strength of the Tatmadaw in terms of manpower and equipment is way above that of the 1980s. But, because of the old ceasefire agreements, which lasted for nearly two decades, that also means that a generation of troops have very limited fighting experience. They are, as a source said, better at parades showing off their new uniforms and guns than at combat. And then, the embrace of the market economy that followed the 1988 uprising gave the officers ample opportunities to earn vast amounts of money. As one Myanmar source wrote on social media: “the army officers are only interested in taking bribes and making business deals with the cronies, they don’t want to fight battles anymore, they joined the army to get rich quickly.” Or, as a retired Tatmadaw officer once told me: “luxury when I was in the army consisted of a badminton set and a bottle of army rum, and I was a colonel. Now even captains and lieutenants have more than one car, several sets of golf clubs, and at least two mistresses. And they don’t have to fight.”
That changed again when, in June 2011, the ceasefire with the KIA broke down. For the first time in more than a decade, major battles raged in an ethnic minority area. I was at the KIA headquarters in Laiza in December 2012 and I was astonished to observe the poor performance of the Tatmadaw. In the beginning, they sent in the infantry, which was poorly trained and had zero fighting experience. Casualties were extremely heavy as the advancing Tatmadaw troops were mowed down by KIA guerrillas. It became so bad that the Tatmadaw had to withdraw its infantry and rely instead on its Russian-supplied helicopter gunships, attack aircraft and heavy artillery fired from bases far from the KIA’s positions. According to credible reports from Yangon at the time, some officers paid bribes to avoid being sent to Kachin State to fight. This was not the Tatmadaw I saw in the 1980s.
Then came another fierce war in Rakhine State as a new rebel force, the Arakan Army (AA), rose up in arms. Tatmadaw dead and wounded numbered in the thousands, including some senior officers. And, again, the infantry’s poor performance prompted the Tatmadaw to resort to air power, firing indiscriminately into villages where they thought the AA would be present — but to no avail. Today, the AA and its civilian wing run a de facto parallel government in Rakhine State. The AA is closely allied with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, a Palaung force, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which is made up of fighters from Kokang, an area in northeastern Shan State dominated by ethnic Chinese. Judging from independent reports, those three armies, called the Brotherhood Alliance, have fought what appear to be numerous successful battles with the Tatmadaw. According to a November 2020 paper published by the United States Institute of Peace, “Myanmar has not experienced this intensity of fighting in decades.” Nor has it suffered such heavy casualties.
The big question now is: What’s next? Today, the Burmese-dominated Tatmadaw is sent out to gun down people not only from the ethnic minorities but also their own kin in parts of the country where there has been no insurgency since the years immediately after independence in 1948. That, and the casualties they are evidently suffering even there, must have a devastating effect on the morale of the troops. For the first time in decades, there are now speculations about possible rifts within the Tatmadaw. If NUG sources are to be believed, more than 2,000 security personnel, most of them policemen but also soldiers, have defected to the pro-democracy movement.
None of those reports can be independently verified, but it is clear that something that has never happened before is brewing within the Tatmadaw. It remains to be seen whether the NUG’s “defensive people’s war” will accelerate that process — or have the opposite effect, namely to make the Tatmadaw close ranks even more firmly than before. A main problem is that many officers and even private soldiers must be acutely aware of what they have done when it comes to corrupt practices and atrocities they have committed. They may fear that a change could mean that they would be held accountable for all that — and the brutality that the Tatmadaw now has unleashed in towns and villages all over the country is almost unprecedented.
What began as carnival-style protests immediately after the coup became something entirely different when the police and the Tatmadaw began killing peaceful protesters. Such brutality breeds resistance, and that is what we are seeing in Myanmar today. In any case and whatever the future will be, forget about “dialogues” and futile attempts at urging the two sides to refrain from violence..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-09-13
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Political History
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"The shadow National Unity Government’s (NUG) declaration of war earlier this week against the military regime has echoes of 1949, when armed organizations rebelled against the government, occupied half the country and fought the Myanmar military.
With NUG Acting President Duwa Lashila calling on civilian resistance fighters to target the junta and its assets and for ethnic armed organizations to join the fight against the regime, the NUG is hoping to unify anti-coup forces to fight the junta in more effective fashion.
But just a few months after Myanmar gained its independence in 1948, several armed organizations took up arms against the then Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government over ideological conflicts and racial tensions. At that time Myanmar’s population was 17 million, compared to around 54 million today.
The Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the then armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) – which was established before independence – rebelled against the government after their demand to be allowed to secede from the Union was denied. The KNU was also at odds with the government over the Karen peoples’ territorial boundaries within the Union.
Two Karen battalions from the Myanmar military – one based in Pyay and the other in Taungoo in today’s Bago Region – as well as ethnic Karen police joined the KNDO. Other leftist units in Myanmar’s military including Battalions 1 and 3, based respectively in Thayet in today’s Magwe Region and Mingalardon in Yangon, and some Bago-based units also rebelled against the government.
The military-published history of internal insurgency in Myanmar said that there were only around 2,000 officers and men left in Myanmar’s military at the time.
Anti-government groups, which also included different factions of communists, were stronger than the Myanmar military because they had weapons left behind after World War II and also because the defecting units took their arms with them when they joined the revolt.
Troops from the Communist Party of Burma, which had a force of between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters, occupied towns in today’s Ayeyarwady, Bago, Mandalay and Magwe regions, including Hinthada, Pyinmana, Yamethin, Myingyan and Pakokku.
Meanwhile, the white-band faction of the People’s Volunteer Organization, which was formed by independence hero General Aung San from war veterans as his own paramilitary force for the independence struggle, occupied towns in central Myanmar.
The KNDO, which was believed to have at least 10,000 soldiers, occupied Mawlamyine and Thaton in Mon State, in collaboration with the Mon National Defence Organisation. By early 1949, the KNDO had taken control of Mandalay, Pyin Oo Lwin, Taungoo, Pathein, Meiktila and several other towns before its troops reached and occupied Insein Township in the north of Yangon.
Between February 1 and May 22 in 1949, the KNDO was able to retain control of Insein, posing a great threat to the central government in Yangon.
Amid the chaos, government employees went on strike across the country, which was ultimately counterproductive as it gave the government a breathing space. “At the time, the Union government was completely broke. Fortunately, government employees came out on strike across the country. We didn’t even have the money to pay their salaries,” said the then Prime Minister U Nu.
Yangon was surrounded by the vanguards of armed groups. The government was unable to control the rebellion around the country and was struggling to hold Yangon. Some international newspapers even started referring to the U Nu government as the ‘Yangon Government’.
“The Union of Myanmar (then Burma) was rocked violently throughout 1948 and until April 1949,” wrote U Thant, a civil servant in the U Nu government who would later become United Nations Secretary-General, in his book Journey to Pyithawthar.
As Myanmar’s military units were short of weapons, U Nu had to fly to New Delhi to seek help from his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru. Only after Nehru provided arms was the AFPFL government able to start reoccupying the towns taken by the rebels.
U Nu’s government was also helped by the fact that the different armed groups were no longer collaborating because of their different political objectives. By 1950, the government had retaken control of most of the occupied towns. But more armed groups would later emerge and, over the next 70 years, Myanmar would continue to suffer from insurgencies until today’s civil war..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-09-10
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Political History, Karen National Union (KNU)
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"Author’s note: The following is a summary and post-coup adaptation of a longer article in Journal of Contemporary Asia entitled “Revisiting the wages of Burman-ness: Contradictions of privilege in Myanmar,” which was accepted for publication in October 2020, and which elaborates these points in detail.
The February 2021 military coup that has shaken Myanmar and ended the country’s fraught experiment with liberal transition has left millions of Burmese furious and disgusted. But despite hundreds of protesters slaughtered by the military and thousands more infected by a COVID-19 wave exacerbated by military negligence, those feelings have not metastasized into generalized despair. This seems, in part, because activists and the public writ large have sublimated their opprobrium and anger into political projects: specifically, rather than only condemning the coup and demanding a return to the earlier status quo, popular movements have interpreted the seizure of power by the sit-tat[1] as implicit commentary on the contradictory conditions of the earlier democratic moment. Some protestors thus sought to push beyond an earlier imaginative failure. This became clear symbolically when, early in the uprising, protesters began spontaneously eschewing the red of the National League for Democracy (NLD), donning black instead, therein indicating the necessity of a new politics.
And while many have retained faith in an NLD-centered politics, other protesters – in particular activists such as Ei Thinzar Maung (now NUG Deputy Minister for Women and Youth) and Thinzar Shunlei Yi – have made it explicit that a new politics is necessary. This politics, they say, must address inter-ethnic injustice that had for years been brushed aside by the very same democratic leaders, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been deposed. She had, after all, patronizingly told ethnic minorities to sacrifice their interests for the nation, aligned with the military in its negotiations with ethnic armies, and provided the sit-tat cover by defending it against charges of genocide while denying its campaign of mass rape. By contrast, an outpouring of popular discourse, much rendered in street protest signs, implicitly repudiated those positions, addressing the collective failure for the polity’s majority – the Burmans – to care for inter-ethnic issues. Many identified how the military had revealed that it ultimately viewed all of its subjects as subject to brutal domination; as one popular sign put it: “First they came for the Karen, and we didn’t speak out. Then they came for the Rohingya, and we didn’t speak out. Now they are coming for ALL OF US.” Others addressed themselves to ethnic groups, Rohingya included, apologizing either for not believing reports about abuse and genocide, or not taking action. Many endorsed trans-ethnic solidarity (See Figure 1); others directed anti-coup energies not just at the State Administrative Council (SAC) that had seized power, but at a more general “Burman chauvinism” (See Figure 2).
But even as conversations on Burmese Facebook focused on how Burmans must acknowledge and apologize for past abuses, there has been a perceptible gap between self-flagellation and material steps that would precipitate substantive change. Nowhere has this been registered more starkly than in comments by ethnic nationality subjects who have expressed skepticism that these declarations of solidarity would translate beyond the struggle against the SAC. To take one example, after Min Ko Naing, in an early outline of what would become CDM, which he sketched on 2 Feb and which his comrades passed to one of us, exhorted everyone to “beg the ethnics” (see Figure 3), an online commentator questioned the sincerity of his commitment to equality, adding: “When things are ok for you again, you will forget about us.”[2]
This leaves a burning question: if this is indeed an inflection point in how ethnic justice is considered by many in Myanmar, and if Burmans are in fact interrogating the privileges they have enjoyed, how can these be translated into substantive political programs that will transform a future society? Specifically, how effective can we expect such performances of apology and acknowledgment to be in bringing along those Burmans who support right-wing Burman Buddhist movements? Will they feel they have much to apologize for? Moreover, if we consider those who do not endorse such ideologies but who have nonetheless been excluded from the largesse of Myanmar’s “development” over the past decade, are they likely to suddenly identify ethnic others as brothers and sisters rather than threats to their livelihoods and social reproduction who are “jumping the queue” (see Figure 4).
As these hypotheticals suggest, apologies and the acknowledgment of unearned benefits – what we call “liberal privilege theory” – may founder against entrenched realities in Myanmar and remain feel-good performances of virtue signaling that, while able to absolve guilt, leave inequality firmly intact. In what follows, we draw on our recent article, “Revisiting the wages of Burman-ness: Contractions of privilege in Myanmar,” published in Journal of Contemporary Asia, to describe facets of this theory and how it plays out in Myanmar studies scholarship, before turning to a radical strain of privilege theory to advance an argument for why this more radical articulation of privilege has the potential to fundamentally redress entrenched Burman chauvinism.
Reconsidering Liberal Privilege Theory
The analytic of “Burman privilege” has been popularized in Myanmar studies circles through the influential article “The Wages of Burman-ness” by Matthew Walton. Walton begins by outlining a theory of white privilege, as it has been used in the United States, to conceptualize unearned material benefits – “wages” – that white people enjoy by dint of the US’s structurally-entrenched and long-unacknowledged white supremacy. He then identifies the parallels between American whites and Burmans, while adding that it is particularly challenging for Burmans to perceive these benefits because they too have been oppressed by Myanmar’s military governments and because many are not aware of the disproportionate suffering endured by ethnic members of the polity. One of Walton’s particular insights, for instance, is how he identifies the subtle false equivalence that Suu Kyi draws between Burman and ethnic nationality suffering under the sit-tat:
Not only does [Suu Kyi] effectively ignore the historically real and continuing effects of ethnic conflict, she does not acknowledge the disparities in sacrifice and suffering experienced by non-Burman ethnic groups. She asks them to put aside their own experiences of injustice and oppression to follow her plan (Walton 2013:16).
There is much to recommend in Walton’s article, particularly given that it was published nearly a decade ago. And his focus on Burmans is refreshing especially given the amount of blame put on ethnic groups for desiring autonomy and dignity. As Walton puts it, “Burman dominance and privilege can be overcome only through active struggle and repudiation by Burmans” (21) who are “the only group in a position to challenge structures of Burman privilege” (22).
But ultimately, because Walton takes Burman privilege as an un-analyzed outcome, such privilege appears as the aggregate product of individual bias – bias that can be excised from the body politic by the righteous actions of individual Burmans. And while we can think of important actions that such individuals can take that might change the minds of some – standing up against hate speech, challenging propaganda, encouraging people to know more about the history and perspectives of ethnic people – a question is whether such actions are enough. There is a risk they amount to allowing people to apologize for their privilege while doing little to change it. Moreover, even if self-examination was widespread and led to changed attitudes, the reality remains that given the skewed distribution of resources from earlier historical eras, whether there would be any real mechanism for redressing economic inequalities. This is ultimately why such an approach to racial/ethnic inequality remains liberal. For “liberal antiracist analysis,” writes Harsha Walia (2021: 13), “obsessed with superficial representation and flag-waving, purposefully fails to interrogate the material structures upending racism.”
Radical Privilege Theory
Walton’s thesis thus ultimately offers a false promise that Burman privilege can be resolved without addressing those economic inequalities. Walton’s theory falls short not simply because economic justice is entwined in racial justice, but because capitalist class relations play a large role in generating those racial cleavages. This is the main thesis of the alternative and unfortunately somewhat displaced version of radical privilege theory articulated by W.E.B. DuBois more than a century ago, and since expanded upon by the Black radical feminist tradition, including the Combahee River Collective, Audre Lorde, bell hooks, and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor. And it is from this radical perspective that critics of racial privilege have identified whiteness as what scholars Noel Ignatin and Ted Allen call a “bourgeois poison” offered to all whites, but ultimately “utilized as a weapon by the ruling class to subjugate” not just non-whites, but poor whites as well.[3] More specifically, a material/ideological “wage” is offered to those interpellated into the dominant race/ethnicity – enticing even poor and otherwise exploited members to identify with and defend racialized class rule to the point of betraying their own interests – leaving them to defend a capitalist system that leaves them worse off. In other words, while a poor Burman might receive additional scraps from the proverbial table – in terms of having his culture exalted, in terms of her gaining a mild advantage in labor markets – these benefits pale in comparison to the benefits poor Burmans might gain by joining with non-Bama ethnics to reject the entire exploitative system.
Having clarified the radical theorization of racial/ethnic privilege, we can turn to Myanmar to assess the theory’s analytical usefulness in this otherwise different context.
Revisiting Ethnic History through Radical Privilege Theory
In his article, Walton describes a long history of ethnic Burman chauvinism, one present during the anti-colonial struggle, which was waged, he has it, along specifically Burman ethnic lines. Walton argues that 1930s-era nationalist group Dobama Asiayone (“We Burmese Association”)—which he uses as a synecdoche for the entire nationalist movement—sought “to promote what [it] saw as ‘Burmese’ culture (in reality, Burman culture)” (Walton 2013: 8). But he bases this claim on a misreading of the 2000 article “The Concepts of Dobama (Our Burma) and Thudo-Bama (Their Burma) in Burmese Nationalism, 1930-1948” by Japanese scholar Kei Nemoto. In his misreading, Walton asserts that the Dobama fostered a racialized Burman against an internal enemy—the thudo-Bama (“Those Burmese”), which Dobama members “saw as collaborators with the British colonialists” (ibid). However, Nemoto stresses the mutability, rather than the fixity, of the concept of Burman, which was constructed in terms of vague nationalism and socialism. Moreover, Nemoto makes clear that the key distinction dividing dobama and thudobama was that between those who worked for the nation and those who did not. Here the thudobama were “the Burmese people who collaborated with the colonial regime” (Nemoto 2000: 1) – particularly Indians, Chinese, and kabya (those of mixed heritage who wanted to be white). And while traditional Burmese proverbs and literature presented upland tribes as “uncivilized,” such figures were incompatible with those performing the machinations resented by the thudobama. Moreover, as scholar Phyo Win Latt has identified in recent historical research, not only did the Dobama Asiayone include Rakhine, Shan, Indian, and so forth, but the figure of the “dobama Muslim” existed as a way to describe a patriotic Burmese Muslim. He argues that “Dobama” should be seen as an adjective describing a kind of conduct, a way of behaving, rather than a noun indexing an ethnic essence.
We would like to advance a humble provocation here: that “Burman” is more open than scholars have asserted—less rigidly reified in the ascriptive sense— but that its openness derives from its formation as a class-inflected hegemonic category. In this sense, “Burman-ness” operates even more effectively than does whiteness as a racialised category of class privilege, as it makes itself more available for entry of “non-Burmans” initially outside of it.
In particular, we argue that it was only in the post-Independence era that Burman-ness as a privileged social category became constructed against that of other ethnic nationalities—a process that was tied up in the particular dynamics of post-colonial capitalism. Indeed, not only were residents of Indian and Chinese ancestry dispossessed, and much of that property transferred to lowlanders (read: Burmans), but Nu’s independence government pursued a project of capitalist modernization in which Burmanization was inseparable from industrialization. Ne Win subsequently worked to establish state capitalism under military rule and further marginalize Indians and Muslims. With those groups marginalized, “development” in Burma was mostly enacted in the lowlands, and what little was brought to non-Burman spaces was still encoded as Burman: roads and bridges were icons of military state expansion rather than belonging to the nation.
“Burman” came to be linked with ideas of national progress, modernity, and development within Myanmar, while the non-Burman minorities went from being the backwards-but-assimilable cousins, to those who were impeding the march “toward a more modern and developed nation.” Propaganda and conventional wisdom in the lowlands had it that upland ethnic minorities undermined development either directly (by trying to leave the country and take resources with them), or indirectly (by causing trouble, which justifies military-state authoritarianism, which perpetuates civil war, which prevents development).
The result, for the social category “Bama,” was a clearer distinction from ethnic nationalities, even as the category remained incorporative. We argue that Burman-ness should best be understood as an identity that has a broad semiotic range, partaking of classic (if vaguely defined) “ethnic” indices, and privileged class-inflected expressions simultaneously. Put more clearly, in certain contexts (such as in rural villages) Burman-ness can be expressed through: modes of speaking (Burmese); worshipping (Buddhism); working (agrarian-based livelihoods); tracing genealogy (kinship); adorning the body (clothing, face cream, tattoos); and naming (having a “Burmese” name). Against this “strong” version of Burman-ness, however, significant deviation is permitted in relatively cosmopolitan contexts (urban areas). Numerous colleagues and informants, who are at least nominally non-Burman, have conveyed to us that they act as Burmans in their daily lives. As one puts it:
For people like me who live in cities and don’t speak an ethnic minority language, don’t have ethnic minority names and who are Buddhists, I don’t think it would be a problem to identify ourselves as “Bamar” in the first place…. I am Bamar… but also Mon, Pa-O, and Chinese.
Further, this particular informant stresses that asking what he really “is”—either Burman or non- Burman—misconstrues his lived mutability: that it is both/and rather than either/or.
As the now-moribund “transition” of the 2010s increased inequality – not only making more wealth available but fueling dispossession and destroying livelihoods for many poor people – ethnicity became more potent as a means of securing one’s life. This is at least one explanation for the rise of MaBaTha as a trans-ethnic movement (provided those ethnicities were over-coded as being predominantly Buddhist) that provided populist succor to the alienated and marginalized “Burman.”
What to do?
In his 1963 novel, Yoma Taikbwe, ethnic Chin author Bhamo Tin Aung highlighted the challenges for inter-ethnic solidarity building against an historical backdrop of political economic inequality, particularly between the Burman lowlands and ethnic minority uplands.[4] But while not to be taken for granted, such solidarity, Bhamo Tin Aung suggests, is both possible and necessary for any collective emancipatory project. In a similar vein, we encourage here a more explicit discussion of political economic inequality as the material conditions of possibility for enduring ethnic division in Myanmar. From this perspective, durable inter-ethnic solidarity in the struggle against military rule requires explicit critique of the liberal politics that preceded the February 2021 coup—a politics that purposefully failed to interrogate the material structures upholding ethnic inequality.
Ultimately, however, the failure of pre-coup liberal politics to deal with material inequality in Myanmar hurt not only ethnic minority upland villagers, but poor Burmans in the lowlands as well. For this reason, a serious project of political economic restructuring—involving land reform, nationalization of military holding companies, and significant redistribution of wealth, for example—has the potential to address the material structures upending inequality, both between the lowlands and uplands, and between elite and marginalized populations within the lowlands. While such policies will not ineluctably lead to improved inter-ethnic relations, a politics – building on Burma’s rich leftist tradition – that stresses how average Burmese subjects of every race and religion have more in common among themselves than with economic elites – even those of their own ethnicity – that have raided the country for decades, just may..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2021-09-09
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"The acting president of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) expressed confidence that the international community would back the NUG’s declaration of war on the country’s military regime, as it was a necessary step.
The NUG declared war on the regime on Tuesday, with acting President Duwa Lashila calling on citizens to “revolt against the rule of military terrorists led by [coup leader] Min Aung Hlaing in every corner of the country” while setting out dos and don’ts for everyone concerned.
“I believe that our neighboring countries, ASEAN countries, the United Nations and all other countries in the world understand that we do it out of necessity based on the country’s current situation,” he said in a speech to the country.
The announcement came one week before the opening of this year’s session of the UN General Assembly in New York, and several days after regional bloc ASEAN’s special envoy called for a four-month ceasefire to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid in the country.
Formed in April largely by elected lawmakers from the ousted National League for Democracy government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and their ethnic allies, the parallel government has enjoyed popular support at home and abroad. Many Myanmar people see it as their legitimate government, while the regime has branded it a terrorist organization.
The NUG’s Tuesday call for armed struggle nationwide will go down in history as Myanmar’s “Second Resistance Day”; the first marks the start of the country’s armed resistance to Japanese fascists in 1945. This time the people of Myanmar are being called to revolt against the generals who have been oppressing and killing their own citizens—the very people whom they are supposed to protect.
Much of Myanmar has already been in revolt since the military coup in February. The regime’s deadly crackdowns on its protesters forced many young people to take up arms. The shadow government’s declaration of war on Tuesday could accelerate the ongoing armed struggle against the junta to another level, with fighting expected to intensify across the country.
In his speech to the country on Tuesday, the acting president urged members of the civilian armed groups known as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to “target to control the military junta and its assets in their respective areas.”
The call to arms could make things significantly more difficult for the regime’s forces, who until now have mainly been faced with resistance from the country’s ethnic armed groups, mostly in far-flung areas. Now their battlefields will be in both urban and rural areas, as the PDFs, who have received weapons training from ethnic armed groups, are scattered across the country. The regime’s soldiers were already detested by the people for their brutality against civilians, and will now be extremely vulnerable to all kinds of deadly attacks by civilians as soon as they step outside the gates of their regiments.
Acting President Duwa Lashila also instructed PDF members to carefully protect the lives and properties of the people while strictly following orders, as well as rules of engagement, in contrast to regime soldiers, who have rampaged through civilian areas and committed crimes like arbitrary killings and arrests during their raids.
In addition to instructing the PDF members, the acting president issued general instructions covering the safety of the people.
“All citizens should avoid unnecessary travel and mind your personal safety. Save necessary supplies and medications. Assist the PDFs and their allies,” he said.
Mindful of the importance of collaborating with the country’s ethnic armed organizations—Kachin and Karen groups have been attacking regime troops in solidarity with the anti-regime movement—Duwa Lashila, who is himself an ethnic Kachin, called on all ethnic armed organizations to immediately launch attacks on the regime’s troops by any means, while maintaining full control in their areas. He also called on ethnic armed forces that are allied with the regime, like the Border Guard Forces and people’s militias, to join with the people and attack the people’s enemy.
“This revolution is a just revolution, a necessary revolution for building a peaceful country and a federal Union,” he said.
In his speech, the acting president also urged all civil servants working for the regime not to go to their offices, and called on all soldiers and police to join the PDFs immediately and report to the NUG.
He did not forget to address one group that has been among the PDFs’ most common targets—the various levels of regime-appointed local administrators. In his speech he urged that “all the military-appointed administrators at different levels of administration immediately leave your positions.”
Since the regime began cracking down on protesters, the administrators and their offices at the village and ward level—the primary elements of the government administrative system in Myanmar—have been killed, torched and bombed. So far, several dozen local officials at least have been killed and the attacks continue.
The acting president also said the NUG would recognize all those who sacrifice their lives and possessions in this revolution as national heroes and heroines.
“Based on the people’s unity, creativity, intelligence, passion and persistence, the revolution period will [be] shorter,” he said.
Following the NUG’s call for war on Tuesday, some PDF groups, student organizations and ethnic armed groups supported the announcement, while clashes between regime troops and ethnic armed groups as well as resistance groups were reported here and there across the country..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-09-07
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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Description:
"Maung Moe Thu, a prominent writer, director and former political prisoner who worked closely with detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the founding of the National League for Democracy (NLD), died peacefully aged 85 at his Yangon home on Wednesday.
He took an active part in the pro-democracy movement in 1988 as the secretary of the writers’ union together with former major and well-known writer Maung Thaw Ka and journalist Hanthawaddy U Win Tin. He was a member of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s inner circle during the founding of the NLD.
He actively worked for the party, collecting donations to rent an office, finding artists to draw the party’s flag and accompanying Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in her campaigns.
When she was put under house arrest for the first time on July 19, 1989, Maung Moe Thu was taken to Insein Prison for the first time together with journalist Maung Wuntha and U Win Htein because of the party slogan: “Let’s always defy any law that oppresses the people.”
He was released in 1992 but the military regime barred him from engaging in any form of artistic expression. As a supporter of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, he was detained for a second time under Article 5 of the Emergency Provision Act in 1996 and spent four years in prison. He was allowed to attend his wife’s funeral in December 1999.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told him at the funeral: “Neither of us has been dutiful to our spouses.”
Some eight months earlier, her husband, Michael Aris, died in England. Aris repeatedly tried to visit before he died but was denied a visa.
After his release from prison in 2000, Maung Moe Thu worked as an editor and columnist for magazines and painted. He was affectionately referred to as Bagyi Moe or Uncle Moe while staying involved in literature, movies, art, sculpture, music and politics. He served as consultant editor for the D-Wave Journal published by the NLD and patron of the Hanthawaddy U Win Tin Foundation.
He directed numerous films and videos and wrote scripts. He wrote many poems, novels and translated books with Leon Uris’ 1958 bestseller Exodus his most popular translation..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-09-02
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Articles on the NLD, Political History
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Current Position of PPST members
Description:
"Some troops of the KNU, Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed group, restarted fighting with the Myanmar military prior to the coup, but this intensified after February 1. The KNU has offered sanctuary and military training to anti-coup activists and overrun army bases in their areas of operation to demonstrate its solidarity with the anti-coup movement. The CNF has also actively collaborated with locally-formed People’s Defense Forces to resist the military’s brutal assault on the pro-democracy protests in Chin state. That has provoked a brutal reaction from the junta, which has ferociously retaliated with airstrikes.
The internal political dynamics inside the signatory bloc are profoundly complex. The RCSS/SSA-S, one of the largest groups among the NCA signatories, has been reluctant to stand decisively with one side – whether the junta or the anti-coup movement – although its leader, Yawd Serk, has vocally protested the coup and supported the anti-coup movement since February 1. Myanmar analyst David Scott Mathieson pointed out that “it is more likely that Yawd Serk is prevaricating, waiting to see which side will prevail so he can cut a deal with them”. In the six months since the military takeover, the RCSS/SSA-S has focused more on fighting other ethnic groups, such as the TNLA and SSPP/SSA-N, than with the junta as it seeks greater control of territory and resources.
Meanwhile, other groups in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), the coordinating body of the NCA signatories, are tentatively working with the regime or have remained silent on the coup. The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Karen National Liberation Army/Peace Council (KNLA/PC) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) met with the junta’s council in April, while the Arakan Liberation Party together with KNLA/PC attended the Armed Forces Day parade on March 27. Recently, Naing Hong Sa, the chairman of the NMSP changed the tone to call for unity between the ethnic armed groups and the Bamar people fighting the military dictatorship but it is not clear yet what the NMPS’s attitude will be going forward. The All Burma Student’s Democratic Front, Pa-O National Liberation Army and Lahu Democratic Union have remained quiet on the coup. As a bloc, the PPST officially declared the temporary cessation of the NCA implementation and peace negotiations with the junta on July 7. Moreover, Yawd Serk stepped down as the head of the PPST.
In its latest statement issued on 5th August, however, the PPST did not even mention the phrase federal democratic union despite typically – albeit feebly – having recited that mantra in all its past statements. The KNU and some smaller groups may still believe in the federal vision. Padoh Saw Taw Nee, the KNU’s foreign affairs head, told the author that “the KNU leadership still firmly believes in federalism as they know historically and empirically that it is the best way for the country”. But he admitted that even some Karen people are suspicious as to whether federalism will be the best option for them. Some ethnic armed groups, especially smaller ones, in the signatory bloc have been struggling for their survival instead of thinking about the political future of the country, and some have become disillusioned with the concept of federalism in the current tumultuous period.
This point is obviously reflected in the response of the ethnic armed organizations (EAO’s) to the federal democracy charter drafted by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw formed by the deposed parliamentary members of the NLD. The federal democracy charter released on March 31 received muted and reserved approval from the EAO’s. PPST spokesperson Colonel Khun Oakkar said “NCA signatory EAO’s welcome the federal democracy charter, but need time to examine the finer details” immediately after its release. So far, there have been no official endorsement from those EAO’s. AA chief Maj. Gen. Tun Myat Naing was more open in his response to the federal promises made by the Bamar politicians, saying that “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people but, after they came to power, they didn’t keep their promise”.
Myanmar and Federal Discourse
The failure of the NLD to keep that promise is one of the key reasons for the suspicions of the ethnic minorities about the federal goal, and one of the main obstacles to forging an inter-ethnic alliance in the current anti-coup struggle. The word ‘federalism’ has been politically taboo in Myanmar since the 1962 coup, with the then coup leader General Ne Win justifying the military takeover by citing the risk of Myanmar disintegrating or fragmenting territorially due to the federal proposals of the ethnic minorities. Under military rule, the use of the word ‘federalism’ could lead to a lengthy term of imprisonment. The word was only revived as a dominant political discourse following the political opening up of 2011, especially in peace negotiations with the EAO’s. The Myanmar military, which has long been inimical to the concept of federalism, eventually agreed to establish a federal system in the country but the military’s interpretation of federalism is within the framework of the 2008 constitution. In the first 21st century Panglong conference held in August-September 2016, the military tried to assert that the 2008 constitution was written with federal characteristics, and took a firm stand on its position to uphold the military-drafted constitution.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD, reiterated federalism as a political solution to Myanmar’s longstanding ethnic conflicts after her party’s entry into parliament in 2012. However, the NLD’s position on federalism is very general and vague and its leaders have rarely articulated any detailed policy on this controversial political concept. U Tun Myint (Taung Gyi), a veteran politician who attended the 1948 Panglong Conference, once wrote a letter criticizing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for her failure to articulate the NLD’s policy on federalism. When he asked her during a meeting in 1989 “whether the new union that your party’s statement talks about building up in the future is federal or unitary”, she retorted, “We just referred to the Union. Federal or unitary systems are theory and they are different from practice. Now, I could not say exactly what type of Union it will be. It will be negotiated in the national conference and I will accept what everyone else agrees to”. U Tun Myint suggested that the NLD, as a leading party of Myanmar, should have a detailed policy on how the future union will be formed instead of accepting and following agreements of others. [U Tun Myint (Taung Gyi), “A piece of brick and a grain of sand of a Shan politician”, pp. 533-542]
The NLD’s lack of a detailed policy on federalism was echoed by other analysts two decades later. In its 2015 manifesto, the NLD stated its goals as “the establishment of a federal democratic union based on the principles of freedom, equal rights and self-determination … through solidarity with all ethnic groups”. In two speeches during a campaign tour for the 2015 election to the Pa-O autonomous zone in Shan State, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi reportedly referred to a “federal Union” no fewer than 31 times. But after the NLD came to power, it failed to take the necessary steps to advance the federal future. The NLD government in 2015 surprised many by appointing its representatives and party members as the chief ministers of all the states and regions, even where the NLD had won a minority of state seats, without consultation with its once-allied ethnic parties. Ethnic political leaders have been critical of the NLD’s policy of going it alone, saying it does not augur well for the move towards a federal Union.
That was exacerbated by the deteriorating relations between the NLD and the ethnic minorities due to the NLD’s missteps to impose its political hegemony through Burmanization and centralization projects. The NLD tried to impose its political hegemony in ethnic regions by erecting statues of General Aung San, father of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and a key political symbol of the NLD, in Kayah State and other states with sizeable ethnic minority populations. The plan to erect the statue sparked opposition and protests in Kayah and the NLD’s local officials made the situation worse by violently cracking down on the demonstrations. There were also protests in Mon State when the NLD decided to change the name of a bridge in Mawlamyine to the General Aung San Bridge. During the NLD’s reign in power, its intentional silence about, and sometimes tacit endorsement, of the military’s brutal offensives in ethnic regions also triggered resentment among the ethnic minorities toward the NLD’s promises of federalism. It is fair to say that the AA and the Rakhine people have become disillusioned with the idea of federalism since the NLD’s time in power.
On the other hand, the diverse ethnic political forces have not delivered much thought to the precise institutional arrangement of any federalist state. Most of the EAOs prefer a more decentralized federal union, in which the ethnic states have a high degree of autonomy and self-determination consistent with the 1947 Panglong agreement. However, as the veteran analyst Bertil Lintner once wrote, they need to answer the questions of “What kind of federal union would they (EAO’s) want? How should power be divided between the states and the central government? What exactly is the ‘federal army’ some of the groups have talked about?” In the political and academic spheres, different federal systems such as the territorial, ethnic, symmetric, asymmetric, dual, cooperative and creative have been proposed and discussed, but so far no consensus has been reached. The multi-ethnic inhabitants of the states and the recent initiatives by certain groups such as AA in favor of confederation have complicated the issue even more, and now the coup has further aggravated the situation.
Ultimately, the military’s coup has put the country on a path towards becoming a failed state running the risk of disintegration and territorial fragmentation. Without political solidarity among the diverse political and ethnic groups or a shared political vision, the anti-coup movement is highly unlikely to overcome the current political crisis of the country.
Federalism has been much anticipated as a shared political vision to forge political solidarity between the pro-democracy and federal proponents. However, at this crucial moment, the attraction of federalism has been woefully diminishing even among its former champions and there are obviously growing tendencies toward confederation and separate states. The coup has definitely put Myanmar into a political black hole, but the future of the country looks even bleaker, particularly due to the lack of consensus among the anti-junta political stakeholders on the vision they are striving for and on the future country they are trying to build up. Myanmar will continue to head only in a dire direction if the shared vision on the future of the country is not revamped and re-envisioned soon.
Ye Myo Hein is the executive director of the Tagaung Institute of Political Studies and a fellow with the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-09-02
Date of entry/update:
2021-09-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Political History
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