"By focusing on the situation of journalists from Burma (Myanmar) living in exile in Thailand, this article explores the consequences of political violence on the development of indigenous journalism in a multiethnic state. Drawing on data gathered from participant observation and in-depth interviews with Burmese journalists in Thailand and along the border between Thailand and Burma, the research examines how local journalists are struggling to develop a context-appropriate model for media development that adequately addresses their need to deal with disagreement and difference in a context of political violence. The research calls into question the relevance of the dominant U.S. approach to “objective” journalism. In this often dangerous context, the definition of concepts such as unity, media independence, and censorship must be seen as provisional and contested, given the various pressures brought to bear on journalists. The model of journalism arising organically in this context is influenced by the recent surge in foreign funding for journalism training yet borrows elements of the normative, objective model and the model of peace journalism. The inappropriate nature of imported journalistic ideologies, however, suggests the need for a more complex model of media development in such complicated and conflictual contexts.....Violence and Ethnicity in Burma: Home to the world’s longest-running civil war, Burma is characterized by great ethnic diversity, with more than 100 different languages and dialects identified (Smith, 1999).2 Population statistics are generally unavailable, and contentious when they are, because there has been no attempt to take a count of the population since the British census in 1931 (Smith, 1991). The 1974 Constitution identifies seven divisions and seven ethnic states—Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan. There are several other large minority groups in the country, as well as many Chinese, Tamils, Bengalis, and others of Indian origin. The most recent figures available, from 1983, list the majority Burmans as constituting 69% of the population (Steinberg, 2001). Annexed by Britain in stages between 1824 and 1886, Burma was governed at first as a province of India. The British divided its administration in Burma into two divisions: Ministerial Burma in the central area of the country, and the Frontier Areas, in which the ethnic minority groups were given autonomy to govern themselves. During World War II, the Burmans fought with the Japanese against the Allies while the hill peoples such as the Karens and Kachins stayed loyal to the British. The British exacerbated existing tensions between the various groups by using ethnic minority soldiers to police the Burmans agitating for independence in central Burma. After independence in 1948, civil war broke out between ethnic minority groups and the Burman government, and Burma experienced only a few years of civilian rule before a coup brought the military into power in 1962 under the leadership of General Ne Win. Despite reshuffling of personnel over the years, the military has remained firmly in power, and political violence has been a defining characteristic of its rule. Worsening economic conditions throughout the 1970s and 1980s, along with the regime’s abuses of its own people, led to the massive protests in 1988. Initially led by students, the demonstrations eventually involved hundreds of thousands of civilians who took to the streets. The Burmese military reacted with violence, gunning down thousands of people during the protests, which with few exceptions were nonviolent.3 The uprisings eventually led to a coup and the takeover by a reshuffled military under the name the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). At the time of the 1988 uprisings, nearly 20 insurgent forces were active over about one third of the country, controlling vast rural areas (Smith, 1995), and it is estimated that perhaps 60% of Burma’s land area, home to only 10% of the population, was not secured by the government (Steinberg, 2001, p. 186). The ethnic insurgencies and the government’s counterinsurgency operations have led to massive numbers of casualties4 and to the pattern of violence perpetuating long-standing distrust, especially between the Burmans and the non-Burmans, although factionalism is also widespread within the Burmese opposition groups.5 Shortly after taking power in 1988, the SLORC began arranging ceasefires with ethnic nationality groups, who would agree to stop fighting in exchange for government promises of more assistance with development in education, health care, transportation, and infrastructure (Steinberg, 2001). These two things together—the ceasefires and their relationship to infrastructural development—offered the government a cloak of legitimacy despite its status as an international pariah after the bloodshed of 1988. Yet many ethnic minority leaders believed, as did Hkun Okker, president of the Pa-O People’s Liberation Organization, that the military regime got the upper hand by making deals with groups individually. The military regime cleverly recognized that the ethnic power has a major role to play in Burmese politics, so immediately they picked up the armed ethnic groups and they spread out their power. . . . They recognized that he who rules the ethnics, rules Burma. (Hkun Okker, personal communication, July 5, 2000) Nevertheless, the resistance gained new impetus in 1988 when the border-based ethnonationalist movements were joined by thousands of Burman student activists who fled the country in the crackdown after the uprisings. Burma’s revolutionaries, so energized back then, have continued to struggle; however, after close to two decades since the 1988 uprisings, they now recognize how slow the process of genuine social and political change can be. The Burmese opposition today must be understood as a dynamic, ever-negotiated “movement” of groups constantly slipping into and out of tensions and alliances. In general terms, the movement is widely conceptualized as having, on the one hand, an “ethnic” element, a coalition of minority groups with the shared goal of a dignified measure of self-determination for the ethnic nationalities within multiethnic Burma. The opposition’s most visible element, however, is the Burman majority, primarily concerned with the development of democratic governance. Despite much genuine agreement and cooperation between Burman and ethnic nationality groups, significant tensions remain. The actions of the current incarnation of the military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), have added to the volumes already dedicated to documenting abuses by the Burmese government. Human Rights Watch (2005) sums up the current regime’s abuses in this way:6 The SPDC restricts the basic rights and freedoms of all Burmese... [and] continues to commit systematic, widespread, and well-documented abuses in ongoing conflicts with ethnic minority rebel groups, including extrajudicial executions, rape, torture, forced relocation of entire villages, and forced labor. As of late 2004, an estimated 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma alone, and at least 240 villages have been destroyed, relocated or abandoned since 2002. Some 2 million Burmese have moved to Thailand, including 145,000 refugees living in camps. (n.p.) In addition to the struggle for their survival, Burma’s ethnic minority groups are concerned about preserving their cultures, especially because many are convinced the military regime is conducting a campaign to “Burmanize” the country. The SPDC promotes an (apolitical) cultural diversity by celebrating public ethnic minority cultural performances while committing abuses against these peoples in the rural areas. Meanwhile, the ceasefires between the regime and various ethnic factions continue, although with much mutual suspicion. In addition to the violence perpetrated against ethnic minority peoples, much attention is paid to the ongoing detention of Burma’s democratic leader and 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi. Beginning with her arrest before the country’s 1990 elections, which were won by the opposition in a landslide but subsequently ignored by the regime, to her release from house arrest in 1995, rearrest in 2000, release in 2002, and rearrest in 2003, her detentions have garnered international media attention. Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest as of this writing. It is within this context of political violence against dissident Burmans and ethnic minorities that the Burmese opposition in exile is attempting to transform patterns of behavior that have led to such a factionalized, militarized pattern of leadership. Media, and especially journalism, are seen as key components in the transition to a more open and transparent democratic process and a reduction in political violence. I have seen the Burmese media in exile develop in impressive ways since my first contact with Burmese activists when I lived in Thailand as a volunteer teacher in a camp of refugees from Burma from 1989 to 1992. It is this development, a result of and also in tension with foreign assistance for media development, that is the focus of this research..."