"The coup took many by surprise. So too did the first internet shutdown in the coup’s early hours, the subsequent blocking of Facebook and later of Twitter and Instagram by the Ministry of Transport and Communication. On February 6, both landline and mobile internet access were almost completely shut down. They started working again on Sunday, February 7, 2 pm Myanmar Time when internet service providers (ISPs) received an order to turn internet access back on. Since February 15, shutdowns have occurred daily between 1-9 am.[1] As of February 10, a new draft ‘Cyber Security Law’ is circulating on social media. It has since been condemned in a statement by over 250 civil society organizations. In parallel to the protests, laws including the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, the Electronic Transactions Law[2], the Ward or Village-Tract Administration Law, and sections of the Penal Code have been amended by the military. One of the first people to be shot at, Ma Mya Thwet Thwet Khine, on February 19, succumbed to wounds sustained ten days prior. The violence used by the armed forces has escalated, particularly since the last weekend in February. These many changes within a short timespan illustrate the situation’s volatility. Staying connected, something digital networks promise, is crucial for those inside and outside Myanmar for coordination, news, and support. Yet, some means of engagement bear risks. This post first elaborates the risks associated with digital communications laid out in a Myanmar language resource. The post then applies this resource to the communications strategies of those outside Myanmar. Learning from those most experienced in avoiding digital pitfalls—those local to Myanmar—seems reasonable. Digital rights activists[3] and others have been adapting since at least 1994 (Houtman 1999: 2; see further Brooten, McElhone, and Venkiteswaran 2019b). Internet shutdowns and surveillance are nothing new, despite the current shutdowns’ unprecedented scale, with shutdowns in several townships in Rakhine and Chin State lasting from June 2019 to August 2020.[4] To illustrate the experience gained by local activists and other digital media users, the post relies on a Google Doc named “Risk Mitigation and Management Guide.pdf” (RMMG; in Myanmar) posted on Twitter by @myanmarido, Myanmar ICT for Development’s (MIDO) account, on the first day of the coup. MIDO is a civil society organisation founded in 2012 that aims to make information and communication technology (ICT) a force for social and political change. The file itself, however, names no author. It is much broader than this blog post and is aimed at people currently in Myanmar. In this post, the RMMG will be a) analysed to tease out its underlying concerns in Part 1 and b) consulted for practical advice insofar as it is relevant for those outside of—but engaging with—Myanmar in Part 2. The latter will be supplemented, where needed, by resources on issues the RMMG does not cover. Taking the author of the RMMG as a primary holder of digital security skills and knowledge regarding Myanmar, this post argues that their concerns should also matter for those engaged with Myanmar from the outside..."