Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Individual Documents
Description:
"The deputy commander of the North Eastern Command, Brigadier General Tin Tun Aung, was killed after being severely wounded in a rocket attack on the hilltop base he had retreated to in Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State, resistance sources said.
The brigadier general oversaw the defense of the city with Colonel Thant Htin Soe – Commander-in-Chief of the North Eastern Command – following the coordinated attack on the city by the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies that began on July 3.
Brig-Gen Tin Tun Aung and his troops shifted their defense position to Lashio City Hall on July 23 and 24 before retreating to a hilltop base on July 25.
However, a military informant tipped off resistance fighters that he had moved to a new position and the MNDAA swiftly launched a rocket attack on the hilltop base on July 25, a resistance source told The Irrawaddy.
“Within 30 minutes after telling the revolutionary groups the location of the junta’s deputy commander, the MNDAA attacked the hilltop base with 107mm rockets,” the source explained.
The head of the northern Shan State Police Force, Colonel Hla Min, was killed in the rocket attack and Brig-Gen Tin Tun Taung sustained serious injuries, the source said.
The brigadier general’s death was confirmed by a military informant on Sunday, the source said.
The MNDAA and its allies seized the hilltop base on July 27.
The MNDAA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched Operation 1027 on October 27 last year. The coordinated offensive steamrolled through northern Shan State and was closing in on its goal of liberating the region from the regime’s military when a China-brokered ceasefire halted its progress in January. The operation resumed on July 3 with attacks on regime bases in Lashio township.
The MNDAA and its allies are poised to assert complete control over Lashio after seizing the headquarters of the junta’s North Eastern Command on Thursday.
Intense clashes continued on Tuesday as resistance groups fought to take the regime’s remaining military bases in the city.
On Saturday, the MNDAA announced the formation of a commission to rebuild and administer the city.
Since June 25, another Brotherhood Alliance member, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, has been fighting junta troops west of Lashio, in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region, along with other resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces under the command of the civilian National Unity Government.
Since Operation 1027 resumed, ethnic armies and allied resistance groups have captured six towns and cities, including the Lashio, and about 100 junta bases, including several battalion headquarters, in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Human Rights Defenders
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Description:
"The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) on Saturday announced rules for its troops in Lashio after claiming to have seized the northern Shan State capital and formed a commission for its administration on Thursday.
The commission will handle administrative matters and reconstruction work, it said.
The statement by the MNDAA, aka the Kokang army, ordered its troops not to occupy or enter houses in Lashio unless militarily necessary, not to seize civilian vehicles, not to ask for money or resources from civilians, and not to levy tax from individuals or entities during the martial law period.
The MNDAA and allies began advancing on the northern Shan State capital, which hosts the junta’s Northeastern Military Command, early this month. The Command oversees the regime’s military activities up to the Chinese border.
On Thursday, the ethnic army claimed a historic victory, marked by the first seizure of a Command headquarters and capital by an ethnic armed group since the 2021 coup.
However, local reports indicate fighting is ongoing between Kokang forces and junta troops who remain in the town.
The junta has denied that the town and command headquarters have fallen.
Over the weekend, the MNDAA released photos of its soldiers celebrating victory in front of army bases, government offices and the town hall in Lashio.
A local observer said most of the town was under MNDAA control on Monday, bar small pockets of fighting.
“That’s why the MNDAA announced its administration,” he said.
Town residents couldn’t be reached due to a telecommunications outage.
The MNDAA statement also warned of punishment for any violations of human rights, cautioning MNDAA troops to treat prisoners of war and those who had surrendered according to rules of conflict.
The MNDAA attacked Lashio despite calling a unilateral truce in northern Shan State two weeks ago while the Communist Party of China held its Third Plenary Session.
China, which neighbors Shan State, had brokered a ceasefire in mid-January after the MNDAA and its Brotherhood Alliance allies overran most of northern Shan State, including border trade towns.
In Saturday’s statement, the MNDAA said it would “end the fighting as early as possible” and “do its best to bring about peace” in response to Beijing’s mediation.
The MNDAA did not respond to a request for comment on Monday.
On Saturday, the United Wa State Army entered Lashio to protect its liaison office and possessions in the town, its spokesperson Nyi Rang said.
The UWSA sought permission to enter from both the MNDAA and the regime but would not take part in the conflict, he added.
“UWSA troops are not going to intervene, cooperate or give support to the warring groups,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Non-Ceasefire Groups
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Sub-title:
Families are growing increasingly concerned about not being able to contact relatives.
Description:
"Northern Myanmar is experiencing a communications blackout that has cut Kachin state’s population off for 10 days, residents told Radio Free Asia on Tuesday, with telecoms providers promising to restore services but declining to say why they were down.
Junta officials have at times shut down telecommunication links in different parts of the country since seizing power in a 2021 coup, usually in response to a security crisis, often leaving victims of violence isolated and unable to call for help.
But residents who have left Kachin state said that while there has been fighting between the military and anti-junta insurgents over recent months, there did not seem to be a particular reason for the military to cut phone lines and mobile services in all 18 of the state’s townships since July 21.
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The junta has not made an announcement about the blackout. Myo Swe, director of the junta’s Ministry of Transport and Communications, blamed telecommunication operators for the failure but told Radio Free Asia he didn’t know why the services were down.
That is little comfort for families increasingly worried about being cut off from loved ones.
“I don’t know what’s going on,” said one woman in Myanmar’s main city of Yangon who has family in the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina.
“I still can’t connect with my family … I can’t even wire money to them,” said the woman, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals.
Junta-affiliated telecommunication operators that provide services in the region, Myanma Post and Telecommunications, known as MPT, and ATOM, both told RFA that they were working to restore services but did not give a reason for the blackout.
Since Myanmar’s coup, junta officials have introduced increasingly strict measures to crack down on dissent, such as prohibiting the use of virtual private networks, or VPNs, and decreasing broadband speed nationwide.
As of July 22, the internet is inaccessible in 249 areas across the country due to direct military action, according to data collected by the Myanmar Internet Project, a civil society organization monitoring internet access. The Sagaing region has been the hardest hit by restrictions, followed by Kachin and Chin states..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-07-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Defenders
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Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has suffered another humiliating defeat and more territory losses since the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies and allies resumed Operation 1027 on June 25.
The Brotherhood’s Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), plus resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), are attacking the regime in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region.
In the past month, the junta has lost around 100 bases, several military battalions including North Eastern Command headquarters, and at least six towns including northern Shan State’s capital, Lashio.
Below, The Irrawaddy highlights the significant gains made by the armed resistance in phase two of Operation 1027.....
Fall of Nawnghkio town.....The TNLA and allied groups including Mandalay People’s Defense Forces managed to take effective control of Nawnghkio town in northern Shan State on the second day of attacks after Operation 1027 resumed on June 25.
The TNLA and allies claimed complete control of Nawnghkio Township on July 10 after seizing its last remaining junta position, Missile Battalion 606 headquarters.
Nawnghkio Township is located next to Pyin Oo Lwin, the garrison town in Mandalay Region that houses the junta’s Military Defense Academies. Nawnghkio town is also strategically located on the Mandalay-Lashio-Muse Highway, a vital Myanmar-China trade route. The town is located 56 km north of Pyin Oo Lwin.....Kyaukme Town.....The TNLA and allied resistance groups took effective control of Kyaukme town after seizing all junta positions in the early days of Operation 1027’s resumption. The town is 51 km north of Nawnghkio and also strategically located on the Mandalay-Lashio-Muse Highway.
The TNLA has not yet claimed complete control of Kyaukme town amid continued attacks on a remaining junta position outside the town......Singu Town.....Mandalay PDF and local allies took complete control of Singu Township and Singu town in northern Mandalay Region on July 20 after around 20 days of attacks on regime targets in the township.
Singu, 91 km north of Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, is the first town seized by Mandalay PDF. The town is also strategically located on the east bank of the Irrawaddy River.....Mandaya Township....Mandalay PDF, the TNLA and allies have seized around 30 junta bases and police stations including Air Defense Battalion 1024 headquarters in Madaya Township, threatening neighboring Mandalay city, where the junta’s Central Command is based.
The resistance attacks have prompted the junta to tighten security in Mandalay city.
Mandalay PDF and allies recently seized a junta base at Alpha Cement Factory in Madaya, 30 km north of the junta’s Central Command......The fall of ruby town, Mogoke.....The TNLA and allied PDFs took complete control of Mogoke town in northern Mandalay Region on July 25 after a month of attacks. Mogoke is known as “Ruby Town” for mines that produce some of the world’s finest red gemstones.
Mogoke neighbors Singu Township, which was seized by Mandalay PDF on July 20. The town also shares borders with Monglon and Mongmit towns, which have also fallen to the TNLA and allied resistance.....Mongmit town.....The TNLA and allies seized effective control of Mongmit town in northern Shan State in mid-July. Intense clashes are still ongoing in Mongmit Township as resistance groups attack the remaining regime bases outside the town in order to take complete control of the township.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied resistance groups briefly took control of Mongmit in January before the junta retook the town after in a heavy offensive.
Mongmit is an hour’s drive from Mogoke town, which has been captured by the TNLA and allied PDFs.....Northern Shan State’s capital and North Eastern Command .....The MNDAA (or Kokang army) and allied groups seized almost all of Lashio town, the capital of northern Shan State, last week after 23 days of attacks on frontline junta bases and battalion headquarters defending the capital.
The ethnic army also claimed to have captured the junta military’s North Eastern Command headquarters in the capital. This would be the first military regional command headquarters seized by the resistance, marking a major milestone in the popular uprising against the regime following the military coup in February 2021.
North Eastern Military Command oversees operations across northern Shan State, including areas on the Chinese border.
Intense clashes are ongoing in the capital Lashio as the MNDAA and allies attack the remaining junta position.
The MNDAA on Saturday announced the formation of a commission which will handle administrative matters and reconstruction work in Lashio..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
more
Sub-title:
From the chaos of the conflict in Shan State, the United Wa State Army has emerged as a potentially decisive force.
Description:
"On the morning of July 28, a convoy of soldiers from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) drove through Lashio, the capital of the northern Shan State and home of the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Regional Command, taking control of the administration under the pretext of peacekeeping. This occurred amid renewed fighting in northern Shan State, as the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed groups launched the second phase of its Operation 1027 offensive, massing their forces around Lashio. Without firing a single shot, the UWSA has gained control of three additional townships in Shan State since October 2023 – Hopang, Pan Lon, and Tangyan – and likely more in the coming weeks.
Sources in Naypyidaw indicate that the military State Administration Council (SAC) has agreed to have the UWSA and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) step in as peacekeepers to prevent the renewed conflict from spilling over into other parts of Shan State. This indicates the SAC’s inability to maintain control and the potential total collapse of its authority in northern Shan State. The key question is: what are the strategic aims and implications of the UWSA’s entry into Lashio? To answer that question, here are five things you need to know about the UWSA, what it stands to gain from the northern conflict, and the broader regional implications.
A Role Model and Political Leadership
As the largest of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, the UWSA, which controls two non-contiguous territories in Shan State and has as many as 30,000 soldiers under arms, is widely viewed as a model and a source of inspiration for other ethnic organizations in Myanmar. “We have ambitions that are nothing less than Wa State,” said Twan Mrat Naing, leader of the Arakan Army (AA), during celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of the UWSA’s founding in Pangsang, the UWSA’s capital, in 2019. Newly formed ethnic armed groups are now drawing similar inspiration from the AA and its battlefield successes in Rakhine State since the launch of Operation 1027.
The UWSA has also established itself as a political leader among the 20-odd ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar. At the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference convened by Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in 2017, the group submitted a proposal for a confederation model as part of an ethnic coalition known as the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). Led by the UWSA, the FPNCC’s policy reflects the interests of the UWSA in two key ways: first, it advocates self-determination and authority over local security forces within designated areas until the establishment of a future federal system; and second, it advocates the creation of a security system that prioritizes local authorities and the self-defense of autonomous states through the formation of ethnic armies. This forms the foundational document of its political leadership. This significant demand for a parallel peace and political dialogue process in 2017 seemed ambitious at the time. However, seven years after the proposal, with the central administration at its weakest in decades and ready to negotiate, it appears achievable.
The FPNCC, which also includes the AA, SSPP, Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), is now Myanmar’s largest ethnic coalition. It includes more than half of all EAO combatants in Myanmar and operates from the banks of the Mekong River to the Bay of Bengal. The FPNCC has held regular meetings since the 2021 coup, with a clear framework and vision and clear political demands. Since the military takeover, no other ethnic coalition has hosted summits or regular meetings on this scale or presented a clear political position like the FPNCC. De facto leadership of the FPNCC has made the UWSA the most politically influential armed group in Myanmar, a role historically contested by the Karen National Union and the KIA.
The existing FPNCC’s political framework differs significantly from the federal charter formulated by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). This difference is evident not only in the political process, but also in terms of fundamental visions, security arrangements, and relationship with the union administration. With its strength and influence, the FPNCC is unlikely to agree to participate in either junta or NUG processes, instead choosing to chart its own course.
Wa State and Vision
Using the FPNCC as a platform, the UWSA has aligned its political aspirations with the FPNCC’s principles. In addition to this, the UWSA submitted two other documents in 2017: a proposal for a consultation process with the Myanmar government over the creation of an autonomous Wa State from the territories under the UWSA’s control and a proposal for a new ceasefire agreement. These documents illustrate the UWSA’s inspiration and vision for Wa State.
These proposals left open the question of what exactly constitutes Wa State. This has again become a live question in the current context, which the UWSA is hoping it can use to extend its territory as much as possible. Taking advantage of the weak central administration, it has already created buffer areas around UWSA-administered areas. The critical issue is whether it can link the central Wa State, which lies along the border with China, with southern Wa State, along the Thai border, over which it established control in the 1990s while fighting against a Shan insurgency alongside the Myanmar military. In its 2017 proposal for a new Wa State, the UWSA requested the inclusion of Kengtung township in eastern Shan State. This would link the southern and central Wa States, turning the eastern part of Shan State into an exclave under direct UWSA control. The UWSA attempted this territorial expansion in 2016. In September of that year, a force of 1,000 UWSA troops marched toward Mong La, an area under the control of the NDAA, creating tensions with the NDAA. A settlement with the NDAA was reached following talks between the UWSA leadership and Aung San Suu Kyi’s government.
All of this is to say that the UWSA’s territorial ambitions extend beyond the current status quo. Linking the southern and northern parts of Wa State is a crucial aim. Having been granted permission by the SAC to mobilize in northern Shan State, the UWSA will undoubtedly seize the opportunity to expand its areas of influence and control. Given these territorial aspirations, and the UWSA’s influence over the Three Brotherhood Alliance, particularly the MNDAA, since the start of Operation 1027, the UWSA now exerts possibly decisive influence in a long arc from the China-Myanmar border in the north of Shan State to the Thailand-Myanmar border in the south. This makes it the most influential and capable EAO in Myanmar’s modern history.
The Strategic Stalemate
In making its decisions, the UWSA has tended to act cautiously. In general, it has sought to maintain the status quo between the central administration, rival EAOs, and China. This strategic posture has been evident in its response to the coup and Operation 1027 offensive. While not directly involved, the UWSA has indirectly supported the MNDAA during the operation, for which the MNDAA leadership expressed gratitude in January.
By avoiding conflict with the SAC and maintaining its distance from the NUG, the UWSA has upheld its neutrality, at least officially. This neutrality has allowed the UWSA to increase its influence amidst the stalemate in the Shan State, not only among FPNCC members but also with those in southern Myanmar that are seeking supplies and arms. By preserving a relationship with the military junta and avoiding outright conflict, the UWSA’s strategic approach seems to have paid off, positioning it as a leading political entity in northern Myanmar. This unique position allows it to mediate the relations between various EAOs and the junta administration, as evidenced by the SAC’s request for the UWSA to deploy its forces in Tangyan and now in Lashio.
Despite the UWSA’s entry into Lashio, its FPNCC allies, particularly the MNDAA, are continuing their siege of the city, and the TNLA persists in its offensive in northern Shan State and parts of Mandalay Region. The critical question is whether the UWSA will allow its own alliance to become uncontrollable, potentially challenging its political influence and disrupting the new status quo. Alternatively, the UWSA might seek to maintain a stalemate in northern Shan State. Regardless of its chosen path, it is certain that the UWSA will continue to have a significant impact on Myanmar politics for the foreseeable future.
New Leadership, Rising Kingdom
The UWSA’s strategic shift is being driven by a new generation of leaders. Young and energetic leaders in their 30s and early 40s, including Zhao Ai Nap Lai (son of Zhao Nyi-lai) and Bao Ai Kham (son of Bao Youxiang), were introduced in strategic meetings with the MNDAA in April. Zhao Ai Nap Lai has succeeded his father as general secretary and head of the Politburo, while Bao Ai Kham is the UWSA’s new deputy general secretary.
These leaders, part of the generation that witnessed the fall of the Communist Party of Burma (from which the UWSA was created in 1989), bring different visions, views, and objectives. They lead the UWSA with heightened nationalism, seeking to preserve their legacy while seizing any opportunities that present themselves. However, their political ambitions may necessitate a recalibration of the UWSA’s decades-long strategy of maintaining the status quo and stalemate in the region, given the evolving political and regional context.
As China’s power grows and Myanmar’s central administration weakens, the UWSA is actively seeking a new status quo that can maximize its influence. This context is reminiscent of the rise of new kingdoms. With substantial tin deposits, rare earth elements, control over a critical juncture of Southeast Asia’s largest drug trafficking route, and the ability to produce small arms, the UWSA possesses the resources needed to achieve its strategic goals. Importantly, the Wa State territories straddle the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and are relevant to the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation platform, both of which are crucial to China’s strategic expansion in mainland Southeast Asia.
Influencing and Threats to Thailand
Given that it is considered a natural ally of China, the UWSA maintains a close relationship with Beijing and the provincial administration in Yunnan. The UWSA’s influence in the heart of the Mekong region extends Chinese influence deep into Myanmar and down to the border with Thailand.
As the UWSA grows more powerful, its political model will become more attractive to other EAOs. If Chinese efforts to mediate the current conflict secure formal autonomy and territorial concessions for the UWSA, other groups along Myanmar’s borders might adopt the UWSA’s approach and choose to come under greater Chinese influence. This development could undermine all dialogue processes initiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the establishment of local administrative processes by the NUG and other ethnic Interim Executive Councils, which enjoy the backing of Western countries. The UWSA’s expansion along the Thai-Myanmar border means that states and entities influenced by China could soon surround Thailand. This new player in the region poses a critical question: Is Thailand, the last remaining U.S. ally in mainland Southeast Asia, prepared for this expansion?..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2024-07-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Description:
"Dr. Tayzar San, the first protester to take to the streets in Mandalay after the military coup on February 1, 2021, recently returned to the city amid heightened security. He held a protest in the city, advocating for a coordinated people’s movement alongside military resistance.
The military council charged him with defamation, searched his home in Mandalay, and even raided and destroyed Shwe O-ya village in Sagaing Division, where he was born.
The Irrawaddy interviewed Dr. Tayzar San about the current political situation as the armed resistance advances on Myanmar’s second largest-city, Mandalay, home to the junta’s Central Military Command.
What is your view on the penetration by resistance forces into Mandalay Region under the second phase of Operation 1027?
The junta’s primary advantage is supposedly its military capability, which includes the air force, and its ample supply of weapons and ammunition.
Despite these advantages, it is clearly losing. In the first wave of Operation 1027, it lost control of many major cities and international border trade terminals. As a last resort, it is defending Yangon, Naypyitaw, and Mandalay regions while taking up defensive positions elsewhere.
Some may also be aware that the parallel NUG government is calling phase two of Operation 1027 the ‘Shan-Man’ operation (‘Man’ for Mandalay). We see steps being taken to penetrate into the Mandalay area, which is a junta center of military and economic strategy.
Revolutionary forces now control the town of Singu, less than 50 miles (80km) from Mandalay. Massive waves of attacks have penetrated areas close to Mandalay. The second phase of Operation 1027 aims to capture the enemy’s heart through military efforts.
What do you think about resistance efforts to draft an interim political agenda for Mandalay Region as the offensive advances?
TZ: A successful revolution requires a coordinated effort involving politics, the military, and people’s movements. The current period, before the fall of the military dictatorship, can be called the interim period. The NUG’s official name is the Interim National Unity Government. Once the revolutionary period ends and the dictatorship falls, we will enter a transitional period.
Only after the transitional period can we achieve the true federal union which we hope for. In the current revolution period, we must attack the junta politically, militarily, and through people’s movements, on one hand. On the other, it is crucial for revolutionary and political forces to stay united and coordinated, to strengthen the revolution.
This is essentially the interim political plan for Mandalay Region. It is a federal movement to support the ongoing revolution and connect with us. Our aspirations are to form a new federal state.
Interim political plans are being crafted for all revolutionary political forces in Mandalay Region to collaborate in the revolutionary effort.
This process is not new. It began about a year ago, and involves the parliament, administrations, defense forces, people’s strike forces, CDM forces, activists, and political parties, collaborating on these efforts.
We are now forming a working committee to draft an interim political plan for Mandalay Region. It is not wrong to say that it is aimed at supporting the advance of the revolutionary movement.
With revolutionary forces controlling more areas, frictions have emerged between local communities and groups such as defense forces, People’s Administration Forces, People’s Security Forces, and the PDFs. How should this issue be handled?
This issue was not very apparent in 2021-2022 due to revolutionary forces’ limited control of territory.
Now, they have significantly increased their dominion in areas like Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magway regions.
Consequently, they must implement administrations as well as social services such as education and health. Essential pillars like a legal system and associated mechanisms must also be formed to maintain the rule of law.
Who is responsible and currently working on this?
The NUG. It has started developing mechanisms and forces including People’s Administration Forces, People’s Security Forces (PSF) for police operations, and the community-based armed resistance People’s Defense Forces for militia duties. Other mechanisms and revolutionary organizations like the PDF, which have permanent combat responsibilities, were developed, too.
Meanwhile, we are seeing more incidents due to friction between these organizations and local communities. In other words, it’s natural. In place of the enemy junta, which no longer exists in those areas, these organizations have become governing forces that are providing security. That’s why we are seeing more friction and disputes with local communities.
Friction is also more frequent among revolutionary organizations, such as between separate PDFs, between People’s Administrative Forces and People’s Security Forces, between these organizations and strike organizations, and between the PDFs and local armed forces that have not yet integrated with the NUG.
I always emphasize that this revolution is a people’s revolution. In civilian terms, these forces include doctors, nurses, schoolteachers, palm tree climbers, farmers, masons, carpenters, trishaw drivers – all kinds of people united by their opposition to authoritarianism.
What I want to say is that many of these individuals may lack the skills or experience required in their current administrative roles. They had to take on these roles for the revolution, and now bear security responsibilities. In fact, all these individuals are also revolutionaries.
However, as their ability to control territory increases, it becomes crucial for administrators to acquire the necessary skills, knowledge, and capabilities related to administration.
That is why we are continuously urging the NUG to improve its organizations and mechanisms and to follow the right path. This is vital.
There are codes of conduct for armed forces and administrators, and there are manuals and publications for martial ethics and administration. It is essential to speak, practice, and act in line with these ethics and codes of conduct.
Similarly, the public also bears a responsibility. It has a duty to regulate all revolutionaries and revolutionary organizations. If both the NUG, to whom we have entrusted this responsibility, and the people on the ground supervise these revolutionary forces, we hope these revolutionary organizations will adhere more closely to the relevant ethical rules.
This revolution has progressed this far because it is people-focused. If revolutionary organizations and revolutionaries trigger unhappiness and frustration among the public, firstly, the people will become disappointed with the revolutionaries. Gradually, the public will become indifferent to the revolution, which will significantly hinder the revolution’s success. Therefore, it is crucial that we don’t let this happen. Prevention is better than cure.
These are the reasons why it is imperative for all revolutionary organizations to adhere strictly to the codes of conduct. I would like to emphasize that now is the time to build a strong and fair chain of command and administration to strengthen each organization.
Friction and disputes also exist between ethnic armed groups that are currently attacking the junta. There are also conflicts between local communities. Do you have any thoughts on this?
Myanmar’s political problem didn’t arise yesterday or within the last three or four years of the Spring Revolution. It has been a problem for over 70 years. There are numerous issues spanning these decades that we need to resolve and negotiate, including demarcation of borders.
To give a clear example, there are many ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State. Between these groups, there are sometimes minor frictions.
However, one thing is certain: our common enemy is very apparent, which is the military dictatorship that seeks to monopolize control of the country. We will work together to end this common enemy. When there is no more common enemy, we should, as comrades and friends, negotiate and find peaceful solutions for the issues between us, while treating these conflicts as friendly conflicts. I fully believe that solutions will be found.
During this revolution, if the minor frictions and disputes between groups are handled carefully with wisdom, with full awareness and discipline among the leadership, I believe they can be resolved.
But if frictions increase, the public will become disappointed with the revolution and the revolutionary organizations. This would benefit no one except perhaps the dictators. It is crucial for all involved to consider this point carefully.
A photo of you with Arakan Army chief General Twan Myat Naing has surfaced on social media. Tell me more about this picture and your visit to armed resistance areas.
During this revolution, traveling has been a key activity for me. In central Myanmar, I have been to regions like Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magwe, as well as areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations. During my visits to Kachin and the northern and eastern Shan states, I also met with leaders of ethnic armed organizations and became familiar with them. I had the opportunity to meet General Twan Myat Naing, the chairman of the United League of Arakan (ULA/AA), and we posted a photo.
We all have a common enemy and a shared goal. We are comrades heading toward this common goal. Naturally, during this revolutionary period, we cannot reveal everything. I believe the public understands this.
Over the past three years of revolution, it is very clear that our hearts have grown closer and more united. After the dictatorial system that has plagued our country for over 70 years is gone, it will be peaceful. I would like to convey to the public that we will be able to build a new country in a new era, with a new system where people are treated as equals and secular laws flourish.
How do you analyze the junta’s efforts to hold a national election amid the escalating offensives of revolutionary groups?
The root cause of all the people’s movements and armed revolution in Myanmar is the coup d’état. All the people of Myanmar, including critical thinkers, simply seek peace and want to live peacefully. No one wants to experience conflict and see their towns and villages being destroyed.
Now, the military activity that the junta once considered advantageous is no longer beneficial to the regime. The international community has not accepted its rule, and the junta has become completely discredited in the eyes of the public. Now, it appears that the junta is looking for an exit by holding a fake election.
We desire democracy and will not reject legitimate elections, as they are an integral part of a democracy. But will the junta’s planned poll be a truly democratic election? I am certain it will not. Just look at the registration process for political parties to participate in the election. What types of parties are allowed to register? Can these parties ensure a truly independent election process?
Lastly, under what legal framework will the junta hold the election? It will definitely be conducted under the 2008 (military-drafted) constitution. We all know the nature of the 2008 constitution. The junta will proceed according to the undemocratic laws that it has crafted.
Our Spring Revolution aims to build a true federal democratic union. The fake election being planned by the junta cannot resolve Myanmar’s political problems. It will only complicate these problems further. The public won’t accept it either. I want to state that this election will only be a political charade to prolong the military dictatorship’s existence.
How do you view China’s current involvement in Myanmar’s political and military issues?
We have presented and discussed these issues many times with our neighbor, China, which we will coexist with for as long as the world exists. Frankly speaking, the people of Myanmar are completely disappointed with China’s current position and are very unhappy about it.
I always tell China that the goal of federal democracy which Myanmar people are striving for today aligns with China’s national interests. As long as the authoritarian system continues, Myanmar will suffer from conflicts, and China’s border will not be stable. Nowhere will be stable. If Myanmar is unstable and not peaceful, it will not benefit China. There will be no advantages.
The root cause of all the instability in Myanmar is the coup and the authoritarianism. If you want to see Myanmar as a peaceful neighboring country, the dictatorship must end. We want to present this issue as an extremely serious matter to China.
Looking at the history of China-Myanmar relations over the past 70 years, the relationship of true kinship was at its strongest when governments representing the people in Myanmar were elected. Therefore, on behalf of the Myanmar people, I once again urge China to stop supporting the dictatorship as soon as possible. Otherwise, I want to clearly state, the people of Myanmar will harbor even greater resentment towards the Chinese government.
What message do you want to convey to the public about the current political and military situation?
The military progress is evident. Enemy camps, cities, and villages controlled by the enemy have been captured, and wave after wave of military offensives (by resistance forces) are advancing. However, the main message to the public is that we cannot rely solely on military tactics. Over more than three years of revolution, we have come this far due to well-balanced collaboration between people’s movements and military actions.
Collaboration between people’s movements and military actions which involved CDM activities, strike activities, and international diplomatic efforts have all contributed to the revolution’s rapid progress. To achieve our endgame and goal quickly, it is crucial to balance military efforts with people’s movements and uprisings.
We believe that all individuals are revolutionaries. We are all revolutionaries, and the people are the revolution’s supporters. They are not mere spectators or passive supporters. Every citizen is a revolutionary.
Therefore, the people must actively participate in the revolution. The endurance and stamina of the people is the key to the revolution’s success. Thus, it is time to accelerate the development of community-wide movements, such as boycotts and financial warfare. I urge the public to continue the movements and uprisings to drive the final battle..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders
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"Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing has had his former Navy chief arrested for failing to obey his orders during the fighting in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, sources told The Irrawaddy.
Admiral Zwe Win Myint, formerly Navy Commander-in-Chief, submitted his resignation after disobeying Min Aung Hlaing’s order to attack Arakan Army (AA) troops deployed in hotels on Myanmar’s premier beach, Ngapali, in Thandwe Township without using artillery.
Min Aung Hlaing ordered Zwe Win Myint to use landing craft to transport troops to the beach, but told him that artillery must not be used, said a source.
“AA troops have taken up positions in the hotel zone. There are also snipers. Min Aung Hlaing ordered that they be cleared. The navy chief said he could, but he proposed that artillery be used first to suppress the enemy before sailors land on the beach in landing craft. Min Aung Hlaing didn’t accept that, for fear that the hotels would be damaged by the artillery,” a naval officer who asked for anonymity told The Irrawaddy.
Ngapali Beach is where Myanmar’s cronies have built their most lavish resorts. There are 64 hotels and resorts on Ngapali Beach and most of the grandest ones are owned by tycoons with close ties to the leaders of Myanmar’s successive military regimes, from the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which ruled from 1988 to 2011, to the current State Administration Council.
The Russia-Myanmar Association for Friendship and Cooperation and Treasure of Ngapali Development Co. Ltd, which is a local company according to the regime, signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a luxury seafront apartment project and cooperate in the tourism sector in Ngapali Beach.
Association president Anatoly Bulochnikov met junta boss Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on Jan. 30, reportedly to discuss tourism and trade with Myanmar’s largest arms supplier.
“If we only use landing craft to land on the beach without artillery support, we all would die,” said the naval officer.
Min Aung Hlaing has also refused to bomb Thandwe, the native town of his wife, Kyu Kyu Hla.
Zwe Win Myint was arrested on July 8 for disobedience and was replaced with Vice-Admiral Htein Win.
Htein Win was part of the 29th intake of Defense Services Academy. He served as the commander of Mawrawaddy naval base in Tanintharyi Region’s Yebyu Township, and became the Chief of Staff (Navy) in January..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role
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"YANGON—Fighters from Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic minority armed group have moved into a strategic town fought over by the junta and another ethnic armed group for weeks, they and the military said on Sunday.
Fighting has rocked Lashio in northern Shan State since early this month after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) renewed an offensive against the military.
On Thursday the MNDAA claimed it had captured the town of around 150,000 people and the military’s northeastern command there—a claim denied by the junta.
On Saturday the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—another ethnic minority armed group with greater manpower—moved personnel into Lashio to “protect” its properties there, its spokesman told AFP.
The UWSA is the best-equipped of Myanmar’s dozen or so ethnic rebel groups, with close ties to China, which analysts say supplies much of its weaponry.
It has so far stayed out of the fighting sparked by the military’s 2021 coup, which reignited decades-old conflicts with some ethnic minority groups.
“Security members from Wa State entered into Lashio town on the night of the 27th to protect our external relations office and properties in Lashio Township,” UWSA spokesman Nyi Rang told AFP.
“Before entering the town, we informed both sides which are fighting and entered smoothly with their approval.”
Wa personnel in Lashio “are not going to intervene, cooperate nor give support to the groups which are fighting,” he said.
He did not say how many UWSA fighters were now in the town, or how long they would stay.
The military had “been informed in advance” about the move, the junta’s information team said in a statement, without giving details.
Military sources told AFP on Sunday that the northeastern command was still under its control.
AFP was unable to reach a spokesman for the MNDAA for comment.
The loss of Lashio and the regional military command would be a huge blow from the junta, which has lost territory to the MNDAA and other armed groups in recent weeks.
In January the MNDAA captured the city of Laukkai near Myanmar’s border with China after around 2,000 junta troops surrendered, in one of the military’s biggest defeats in decades.
South of Laukkai, the Wa region remains virtually locked-off, ringed by checkpoints and tight internal controls, and uses the Chinese yuan and internet services.
China is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta, but analysts say it also maintains ties with armed ethnic groups in Myanmar that hold territory near its border.
Beijing was “paying close attention to the situation in northern Myanmar” and urged a halt to the fighting, foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning told a press conference on Thursday.
Neither the junta nor the MNDAA have released casualty figures from the fighting in Lashio, which broke out on July 3.
Local rescue groups say dozens of civilians have been killed and wounded..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Various groups
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Sub-title:
Beijing will not abandon the regime and sees the military as part of a future political settlement.
Description:
"Chinese frustration with Min Aung Hlaing appears to be heightening, as the junta prepares to issue another six-month extension of its emergency decree on Aug. 1 and ignores Beijing's calls to seek a political solution.
Beijing has sent multiple signals that this is unacceptable and that the military government must prepare to hold elections as an off-ramp to the political crisis.
While some observers saw Beijing’s hand in Min Aung Hlaing’s seizure of power on Feb. 1, 2021, the coup really went against core Chinese interests, leading to political instability, a breakdown in the national cease-fire agreement, and the further stalling of the key projects Myanmar-China Economic Corridor and port in Kyaukphyu.
Beijing failed to endorse the coup, pressured the junta to not dissolve the National League for Democracy, the then ruling and recently re-elected party of Aung San Su Kyi, and backed ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus for ending the conflict. In March 2022, Beijing appointed a special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun.
By mid-2022, however, it seems as though China had come to the conclusion that the opposition National Unity Government and their alliance of ethnic resistance organizations would be unable to prevail. Beijing stepped up their engagements with the junta.
But even with Chinese diplomatic and political support, the generals were unable to consolidate power. Operation 1027, launched by an alliance of ethnic armies in late 2023, led to the junta’s loss of significant amounts of territory along the border with China in Shan state.
The Kachin Independence Army’s subsequent offensive led it to now control all border crossings in that state.
On Jan. 10, Beijing negotiated a ceasefire in northern Shan state. Yet, the junta continued their air and long range artillery attacks, prompting China, in a show of force, to stage live fire military exercises on the border in April.
Pushing for an off ramp
Frustration with the junta’s military and economic incompetence is mounting.
To be clear, Beijing has never trusted Min Aung Hlaing, whom they are said to view as incompetent and an embarrassment.
Chinese leaders have consistently denied him an invitation since the coup, including to the sparsely attended third Belt and Road Initiative Forum in Beijing in October 2023.
Beijing appears more convinced that Min Aung Hlaing is unable to stabilize the country, no matter what, and has been more vocally pushing for elections as an off ramp to the military’s self-made crisis.
There have been a number of high-level delegations in the past few months.
The one that piqued the most interest was that of former president Thein Sein. In a very obvious slight to Min Aung Hlaing, Thein Sein received an audience with Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping and was described by foreign minister Wang Yi as an “old friend”.
Despite China’s concerns about Thein Sein’s transition to democracy after 2010, they look back on the former army chief and president as a competent leader who protected China’s interests. This presents a stark juxtaposition with Min Aung Hlaing.
While Singapore’s Channel News Asia reported that Wang had conveyed Beijing’s call for Min Aung Hlaing to resign, this was never confirmed.
But China has clearly increased its calls for elections to be held this year, and appears to see Thein Sein as an appropriate transitional figure, accepted by the international community and ASEAN in the past.
Pressing for elections
China invited Soe Win – deputy commander of the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself – to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Green Development Forum in early July.
He was the highest ranking SAC official invited to China, though in a multilateral, not bi-lateral setting.
While Soe Win’s goal was to secure further military and diplomatic assistance, Beijing saw the meeting as another opportunity to speak directly to the junta leadership and press for a firm date for elections.
In mid-July, China invited a delegation of political parties, led by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP, whose routing in the November 2020 election led to the coup.
But rather than commit to elections, the SAC continues to dither.
On June 25, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the Lunar New Year would become a national holiday – a pathetic attempt to curry favor with Beijing.
The SAC will hold elections only from a position of strength, which is possible only with Chinese military assistance.
According to the UN Special Rapporteur and a forthcoming report from the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar, China continues to sell arms and deploy technicians to Myanmar’s military defense industries. It has also provided software and technical support to monitor telecommunications.
Despite Chinese pressure, Min Aung Hlaing shows absolutely no signs of stepping aside.
On July 20, he assumed the acting presidency, in addition to his role as army chief, Prime Minister, and head of the SAC.
RELATED STORIES
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Myanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta
Ethnic army overruns junta command center in Myanmar’s Kokang region
Enter China’s proxy
Despite Chinese admonishment, the junta is about to extend the emergency decree by an additional six months. There are even some reports that under Chinese pressure, Min Aung Hlaing will cede the acting presidency to Thein Sein in August.
Yet, defying China is unlikely to play well for Min Aung Hlaing.
When Phase 2 of Operation 1027 began in June, China put far less pressure on the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the tripartite insurgent force that has led the campaign. Although China negotiated a ceasefire on July 20, it didn’t last a day.
China has held back since then, as the alliance member Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army took over parts of Lashio and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army took Mogoke.
The junta’s air attack on Laukkaing on July 14 is going to antagonize China further.
Rather than the junta, China is increasingly relying on another proxy, the United Wa State Army, to check the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s advances.
In western Myanmar, where China’s bid Belt and Road Initiative projects are, China is clearly dealing with the new reality on the ground.
While the Arakan Army has not taken Kyaukphyu, it has effectively surrounded China’s special economic zone in that Rakhine port city. Any future development there will necessarily entail negotiations with the Arakan Army, the third Brotherhood Alliance member..
If there is one area of ongoing cooperation, it’s assistance in shutting down some of the online scam centers and the return of Chinese nationals.
Indeed, between September 2023 and June 2024, 5,482 Chinese citizens were handed over to Chinese police, according to Chinese state media.
Although many of those were handed over by Myanmar police, an increasing number have been handed over by ethnic armies, who are proving themselves to Beijing to be more competent partners than the junta.
China is clearly fed up with the junta.
They will not abandon the regime, despite its losses, and Beijing sees the military as part of a future political settlement.
China is inherently cautious, and its notion of sovereignty as a pillar of international relations makes it very hard for them to abandon Naypyitaw in favor of an opposition government and loose coalition of ethnic resistance organizations.
But China has always had direct relations with the ethnic armies, especially those along its border, and it will continue to leverage those relations to pressure Naypyitaw.
Beijing has made their preference for a negotiated settlement through elections abundantly clear. The only ones who are missing this message are the generals, who are cocooned in their fortress capital and oblivious to their mounting battlefield losses..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-07-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"BANGKOK —
The United Nations’ special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has told VOA he welcomes Thailand’s plans for a task force to help Thai banks vet business with Myanmar’s military regime for possible arms deals.
Thailand announced the task force last week, nearly a month after a report by Andrews exposed the lead role Thailand’s banks have taken in financing arms purchases for the military regime that ousted Myanmar’s elected government in 2021. The civil war that has followed has claimed thousands of civilian lives.
“It’s a real step in the right direction” and a sign “that Thailand is really taking this seriously and efforts are being made to stop these weapons transfers,” he said in a Saturday interview.
His report, Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar, says international sanctions have helped slash the regime’s purchase of weapons through the global financial system by one-third from the 2022 to 2023 fiscal years, which runs April to March, to some $253 million.
The report says those sanctions have also driven most of the regime’s arms-related banking away from Singapore, which clamped down on its banks’ weapons business with Myanmar last year, to Thailand. While the regime’s weapons financing through Singapore over the past fiscal year tumbled from $260 million to $40 million, it says, those through Thailand doubled to $120 million, the most of any country.
Andrews said he hopes the task force will help Thailand follow Singapore’s lead in slashing its arms-related banking with Myanmar’s military regime, which the U.N. and others have accused of war crimes in its bid to put down a growing armed and civil resistance.
“The action that we saw from Singapore was extremely important. And now the process that Thailand is engaged in … is part of an important momentum that I’m hopeful will cut off the means by which the junta can continue to commit these gross human rights violations,” he said.
“We know that as the junta continues to suffer losses, it is responding by intensifying its attacks on innocent people,” he added. “So, it is very important that any and all efforts to stop this be conducted with a great sense of urgency, and I’m hopeful that this task force will convene and act quickly and urgently to address this crisis.”
‘The human rights agenda’
A spokesman for the Myanmar regime could not be reached for comment. The military has previously denied targeting civilians and claims to be taking proportionate action against “terrorists” to restore peace and order.
In its announcement last week, Thailand said its Anti-Money Laundering Office and the Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, would be setting up the task force to help commercial lenders investigate transactions that may be linked to weapons purchases for Myanmar’s regime and avoid the taint of any human rights abuses.
In the wake of Andrews’ report, representatives of the Thai banks it named told a meeting of the national security committee of Thailand's House of Representatives that they lacked the capacity to probe all their transactions with Myanmar for possible weapons deals.
The Thai government has not said when the task force would convene or exactly what types of transactions with Myanmar would be off-limits from now on.
A spokesman for the foreign affairs ministry, which announced the task force, said officials will be holding more talks with Andrews before deciding whether and how to urge the banks to change their behavior.
The government has not come out against facilitating any and all arms deals with Myanmar’s military regime, the spokesman, Nikorndej Balankura, told VOA last week.
“But Thailand attaches great importance to the human rights agenda, and of course we do not support the use of violence. So, if we know for sure that the transactions that took place [are] to purchase weapons, our stance would be definitely not to support that,” he said.
Thailand’s goals of kickstarting a sluggish economy, developing its financial sector and repairing its international reputation since emerging from years of military rule itself will give the new task force a strong incentive to stamp out the country’s role in Myanmar’s arms deals. That’s according to Sean Turnell, an economist and senior fellow at Australia’s Lowy Institute with a focus on Myanmar and Southeast Asia, who spoke with VOA.
Thailand may choose to tread more softly than Singapore and avoid telling its banks to cut the Myanmar junta’s lenders off outright, Turnell said.
“But one could imagine a regulator suggesting quietly to a bank that they regulate that, you know, maybe it’s not such a good idea to be doing business with them,” he added.
Looking for alternatives
Turnell also served as an economic adviser to the civilian government ousted by Myanmar’s military and now advises the National Unity Government, a shadow government vying to kick out the junta. He said Myanmar’s military regime will try to find other countries to help finance its arms purchases should Thailand shut it out, the way it turned to Thailand after Singapore clamped down.
“Definitely there will be other takers; they’ll find their way through the cracks. But every time you have to do that you lose some of your ability to do that sort of financing,” he said.
With each move, he said, the regime will have to turn to less globally connected and reputable banks that will charge higher fees, possibly even bribes and kickbacks, for their services.
“As soon as you start leaving major financial centers and major international banks, it just becomes more and more difficult to get these sorts of transactions going,” Turnell said.
Getting shut out of one country after another could also push Myanmar’s military regime into settling more and more of its arms purchases informally, for instance with cash and barter trades that come with their own costs and limitations, Turnell added.
“I’m not sure how many countries are going to want to barter jet fuel for beans and pulses,” said Jared Bissinger, an economist and visiting fellow in the Myanmar program at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, in an interview with VOA.
With the exception of only natural gas, dried beans have been Myanmar’s main export in recent years, according to World Integrated Trade Solution, a trade data aggregator developed by the World Bank.
“I’d imagine they will continue seeking out ways to make transactions via banks and intermediaries in a range of countries that are less cooperative with enforcement of sanctions,” Bissinger said.
“But this takes time, effort, and money. So, there is certainly some value in the disruptions and resource denials that sanctions cause. Sanctions are a bit of a game of whack-a-mole,” he said, where a problem is solved in one place only to reemerge someplace else.
"But it still hurts the mole when it gets whacked,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-07-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
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Description:
"AFM-CN/2024/01/STM
We, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People's Republic of China, gathered on the occasion of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) Plus One Session with China in Vientiane, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on 26 July 2024;
DEPLORING the mass civilian casualties caused by landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the region, and cognisant of the serious threat that landmines and other ERW pose to the safety of the people as well as to economic and social development;
APPLAUDING the tremendous efforts and achievements made by landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States on mine action in recent years;
NOTING that many ASEAN Member States are still facing diverse challenges, including in carrying out humanitarian demining efforts along the border areas, in putting an end to landmines and other ERW threats;
HIGHLIGHTING the importance of addressing humanitarian aspects of landmines and other ERW through a coordinated and integrated approach;
ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to promote mine action cooperation;
RECOGNISING the role of ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) in promoting ASEAN’s efforts to address the issue of landmines and other ERW for interested ASEAN Member States and raise awareness of the danger of landmines and other ERW among affected communities;
ALSO RECOGNISING that strengthening mine action cooperation is crucial for sustaining peace, security, stability, prosperity and sustainable development of the region;
APPRECIATING the valuable support that China has provided to some landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States since 1998 as well as ARMAC, which highlights ASEAN and China's friendship and cooperation, while taking note of China’s vision to build a peaceful, safe and secure, prosperous, beautiful, and amicable home in the region; and
REAFFIRMING the commitment to advance ASEAN-China relations by forging closer cooperation in line with important documents such as the Joint Statement of the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development and the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2021-2025) and its Annex to Advance the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership;
WE HEREBY:
Emphasise the importance of humanitarian mine action, enhance people’s awareness of the danger of landmines and other ERW, accelerate the restoration of the residual contaminated land, provide appropriate medical and rehabilitation assistance to the victims, and allow people to return to their homeland in dignity, safety and security;
Integrate humanitarian mine action into the sustainable development agenda of the region, advance regional and cross-border cooperation and resource mobilisation, including exploring various financial instruments for mine action, and enhance the cost-effectiveness of resources;
Optimise existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action, and carry out more practical cooperation in areas such as personnel training, standard setting and joint exercise, to enhance the capacity of ASEAN Member States for mine action;
Support the work of ARMAC including in advancing cooperation on the use of technology in demining to further reduce the risk of human casualties, promoting innovation, enhancing the effectiveness of mine action operations, convening regional high-level and technical working group meetings, encouraging the active participation of multiple stakeholders, and promoting the sharing of experience and achievements;
Strengthen cooperation with United Nations (UN) agencies such as the UN Mine Action Service and the UN Development Programme, actively explore South-South and trilateral cooperation, and call on all parties to step up support to landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States, including through ARMAC; and
Enhance closer communication and coordination between ASEAN Member States and China at the UN to promote cooperation on mine action that contributes to the maintenance of peace, security, stability, development, and prosperity in the region and the world..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication:
2024-07-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"An AFP article published ahead of this week’s meeting of Southeast Asian foreign ministers in Laos quotes a diplomat as saying: “The center is still solid under the junta.”
The Southeast Asian envoy who was planning to attend the event went on to warn that Myanmar could “become a failed state.”
This is the main misperception about Myanmar’s revolution that diplomats cling to, whether they are based in Yangon, Bangkok or elsewhere in Southeast or South Asia. It is not just the view of the anonymous Southeast Asian diplomat quoted in the report. It is safe to say it is a diplomatic dogma.
It seems that quite a number of diplomats, mission staff and other international workers in and around Myanmar don’t really live there. Instead, they are ensconced in their own narratives, and they feed these narratives to each other. Through various donors, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and consultancy firms, they commission “research” and “analytical reports” that echo their misperceptions and dogmas.
They sound like they live in echo chambers that completely removes them from reality in Myanmar.
None of these diplomats or international staff say much about the total incompetence of Myanmar’s junta. The State Administrative Council, the moniker the junta has given itself, has done nothing well. It has three accomplishments: mismanagement, failure and a more than three-year-long crime spree.
This does not seem to register in the echo chamber, even though the crime spree includes mass murder among its atrocities.
Diplomats and international “experts” do not talk much about the junta’s daily atrocities and other crimes. Civilians are the prime target of Myanmar’s military. In three years, over 3 million people have been driven from their homes. Most of the population has been driven into poverty.
Not a single day passes without the junta bombing a market, a monastery sheltering refugees, a school, hospital or a residential area. The sole purpose is to destroy and terrorize.
However, in the circles where diplomats and international “experts” compare notes, this is hardly mentioned, as if they accept this as completely normal.
Instead, they talk about their worries that Myanmar could become a “failed state” if the revolution succeeds and the people prevail over the junta.
The diplomats and international “experts” do not shy away from long discussions about the weaknesses and incompetence of the National Unity Government, but they avoid talking about the crimes and incompetence of the military regime, as well as the obvious fact that it is crumbling. The junta and its military are still regarded as the credible and inevitable partner of any future “solution” in Myanmar, which may be why it must be seen as “solidly in control of the center” despite all the defeats that it is rapidly accumulating across the country.
Another widely shared talking point in the diplomatic bubble is that ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) will “for sure stop fighting once they secure control over their own territory.” Every single statement or speech from ethnic revolutionary leaders says the opposite. They keep repeating that they are committed to removing the military dictatorship. For three years, EROs have been training, equipping and fighting in tandem with People’s Defense Forces. They are spilling blood together.
Month by month, allied EROs and PDF liberation forces are becoming increasingly capable and strategic in squeezing faltering junta troops from three sides: from the west and southwest, from the north, and from the east and southeast.
Since October 2023, coordinated offensives by liberation forces have been unrelenting. Once advances by resistance forces in one theater of war abate, an advance starts immediately from another direction as resistance forces elsewhere reposition themselves and build up supplies for another offensive.
If one talks with senior ERO leaders, one can hear only their deep historical experience and determination.
Here’s what one told me:
“It is not possible to trust the Myanmar military. They will always break all the promises and deals they make when they are weak. As soon as they become a bit stronger, they come back to attack, occupy, kill, rape, burn and plunder. We have had more than enough experience with them. Now, when the Bamar population is in rebellion against the junta, we see a historic opportunity to liberate the country, and we will not miss that opportunity.”
What he said was not unique.
However, diplomats and international “experts” cocooned in their echo chambers know better. Nothing can persuade them that EROs are not focused only on the narrow self-interest of taking control of territory and establishing their own states, without any care about what happens in Burma proper and without concern about who occupies Naypyidaw.
In the diplomatic bubble, the talk is about “possible future fragmentation.” This is seen as the biggest threat Myanmar faces. It is a bigger threat than the devastation Min Aung Hlaing and his junta have delivered: Three years of destruction. The annihilation of civilians, villages, towns and cities. The unrelenting attacks on the body and soul of a nation are occurring in front of our eyes.
Among diplomats, this is not a matter of concern or conversation.
Inside the bubble, the focus is on the imaginary disintegration of the country in the future, not the destruction Myanmar’s military is inflicting now.
Last but not the least, those in the bubble are behaving as if China’s electoral manipulation plan is inevitable. Many feel they need to jump on the election train so they can be well-placed in the queue to welcome the new “elected” government.
It does not matter that it is very uncertain whether any election will take place at all. It does not matter that, even if an electoral farce is staged, it will only cover one third of the territory and be completely manipulated and falsified. Still, it seems, everybody in the bubble is ready to welcome the “opening” and “opportunity that should not be missed.”
The usual rationalization of those arguing that the junta is “too strong to fall” is that appeasing the Myanmar military is the only solution to stop further fighting, achieve a ceasefire, bring back stability and reduce civilian suffering.
This argument is nothing but shamefully dishonest. It does not recognize that it is not revolutionary forces that are causing civilian suffering. It is primarily the SAC’s intentional targeting of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure that is creating civilian suffering.
Myanmar’s neighbors have done absolutely nothing to reduce the capacity of the junta to target civilians.
They have applied little real pressure on the SAC to stop it from targeting civilians. India and China are still providing the junta with weapons. Thailand is paying the junta money for gas that the junta uses to continue funding its war of terror against the civilian population.
Myanmar’s neighbors and the whole of ASEAN have not even provided meaningful humanitarian aid to millions of internally dispersed persons. They have not provided shelter for civilian victims of war, which would be adequate for the size of the humanitarian catastrophe. Instead, neighbors preferred to create an invisible but effective cordon sanitaire to protect themselves from refugees and other spillover effects.
It is much more correct to conclude that when diplomats in the bubble talk about concern for the civilian population if the war continues, they are in reality concerned about the possibility of the final fall of the military-as-regime.
Myanmar’s neighbors and other ASEAN countries are not able to imagine the Myanmar state without a military-as-regime. They think that without a military-as-regime there will be no central authority, and in their minds that means chaos and state failure (currently they call it “fragmentation” or “Balkanization”).
So they say that the junta is still “solid in the centre” (which it is not) and that the military “cannot fall” (which it can), because that is their wish. They would like to have the junta solid in the center and they do not want the military to fall.
So they create all those disillusioned, out-of-touch narratives and repeat them in their echo chamber.
The consequence is that Myanmar’s neighbors and international “experts” are not ready for the probable fall of the SAC because they fear it. They remain blinded by their denial of reality..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-26
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Fighting continues in Lashio after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) reportedly seized two-thirds of the northern Shan State capital.
Residents said junta shelling and airstrikes continued on Friday.
Lashio’s Northeastern Command headquarters was occupied on Thursday morning, the first junta command hub to fall to anti-regime forces since the 2021 coup.
The MNDAA and its allies since July 3 have seized around five junta battalion headquarters and other bases around the city.
Sources said junta troops have spread through Lashio in smaller units while the airport, Lashio Motel and university are controlled by the MNDAA.
U Han of a rescue team based in Lashio said: “Junta troops are spread through residential areas, endangering civilians.”
He said five male bodies were found near Mansu pagoda in western Lashio but rescue teams could not retrieve their bodies.
“They were killed by shelling but we cannot get close and cannot identify them,” U Han said.
The MNDAA urged residents not to panic and said business as usual would soon return while it urged its troops not to break the law.
It said its police would combat online scam gangs operating in Lashio and that a civilian administration would be established to fund residents to reconstruct their damaged houses.
A Lashio resident said: “The junta troops are like guerrillas, hiding behind buildings and houses and using civilian areas as shelters.”
The junta has yet not admitted that Lashio has fallen.
U Nay Myo Zin, a former army captain, posted on Facebook about the death of Brigadier General Tin Tun Aung, the deputy chief of the junta’s Northeastern Command, blaming his death on his refusal to surrender to the MNDAA.
Most Lashio residents have left the city, according to rescue groups.
A Shan civil society organization member said remaining civilians were increasingly at risk during the current street fighting.
A communications blackout was hampering rescue efforts, he added.
“We are very concerned for the safety and the humanitarian situation,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-26
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Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Junta troops retreating from Thandwe Township to Gwa Township in Rakhine State blew up a bridge between the two towns on Wednesday to impede the progress of Arakan Army (AA) troops who were pursuing them, according to residents.
“Half of Chin Kwin Bridge remained on Tuesday, but they destroyed the entire bridge early Wednesday morning,” a resident who arrived at the scene on Wednesday morning told The Irrawaddy.
The bridge is located near Kyeintali town 56 km from Thandwe town, on the only route that civilians can use to flee from Thandwe to Gwa. Part of the Thandwe-Gwa-Yangon Road, the route is used for trade and for patients who need to go to Yangon for healthcare services not available in Rakhine.
A trader who supplies groceries in Thandwe said: “The situation is getting worse. We can’t send supplies without that bridge. I filled a tuk-tuk with food to send to Thandwe, but I can’t send it now.”
One Gwa resident said: “I heard around 80 junta soldiers were deployed at a monastery near a bridge in Sap Thwar Village a few days ago. Junta soldiers have built bamboo fortifications outside checkpoints.”
The regime has set up checkpoints at three important locations in Gwa Township including on Gwa-Yangon Road, residents said.
Three overland routes link Rakhine with other parts of the country. The regime is using a road through the mountains in Gwa Township in the southernmost part of Rakhine to send reinforcements from Ayeyarwady Region to Thandwe Township, which is 128 km from Gwa.
Fighting has been raging in the hotel zone in Mya Pyin Ward and Jeiktaw Village, the junta’s last base in Ngapali Beach.
The two sides clashed in at least four locations in Mya Pyin and Jeiktaw on Wednesday, according to residents.
At least six civilians were killed and several others injured when the regime shelled villages where displaced people were taking shelter this week, residents said.
Fighting has been raging in Ngapali Beach since early June. The AA has seized Thandwe Airport, Light Infantry Battalion 566 and Infantry Battalion 55, and much of the popular beach. It is now focused on attacking the last remaining junta position on the southern tip of the beach. The regime is defending it with air and naval support..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-26
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Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Karen National Union (KNU) and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) expressed sadness about the death of the group’s former vice-chairwoman Padoh Naw Zipporah Sein, recognizing her as a revolutionary hero.
Naw Zipporah Sein, 69, died of cancer on Wednesday afternoon at her home in the Thai border town of Mae Sariang.
The country’s oldest armed revolutionary group said she dedicated her life to liberating the Karen people and to serving the community. The KNU said, “may her legacy of courage and commitment continue to inspire us all”.
The NUG said the death of Padoh Naw Zipporah Sein was a loss for the whole country, not only for her community.
The NUG said she was the first leader to declare that the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was void after the 2021 coup and pledged support to the civilian government.
Naw Zipporah Sein led the KNU’s Concerned Group which abandoned the NCA and recognized the NUG, sharing its vision for a federal union.
The daughter of KNU commander-in-chief, General Tamla Baw, she served the organization as a school teacher, women’s rights activist, general secretary and vice-chair.
From 1988 to 2008, she was general secretary of the Karen Women’s Association, dealing with refugee issues.
Naw Zipporah Sein was awarded the Women’s Peace Prize by the Women’s Organization Network in 2014.
Messages of condolences spread on social media.
Saw Kapi, a Karen educational rights advocate, said: “Naw Zipporah Sein’s legacy extends beyond her political achievements. She was an inspiration and a role model for countless Karen women and girls who saw her as a symbol of strength and possibility. Her leadership and courage have left an indelible mark on the Karen struggle for self-determination and principled politics.”
He praised her role ahead of the signing of the 2015 NCA as the head of the KNU delegation in negotiating a ceasefire agreement with Thein Sein’s transitional government.
Her ability to navigate the complex and often treacherous negotiations was a testament to her skill, patience and unyielding commitment to the Karen cause, Saw Kapi added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The ethnic Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and allied resistance groups claimed to have seized the junta military’s North Eastern Command headquarters in northern Shan State’s capital Lashio on Thursday morning.
It is the first military regional command headquarters to be seized by anti-regime resistance forces, marking a major milestone in Myanmar’s fight against the regime since it grabbed power in a coup in early 2021.
One of 14 junta military regional commands scattered across the country, the North Eastern Command oversees military operations across northern Shan State, including areas near the Chinese border.
The MNDAA on Thursday announced it had taken control of the command headquarters after 23 days of fighting in what it called a “historic victory.”
Lashio itself has yet to be completely seized, however, as clashes are still going on in parts of the city, sources close to resistance forces on the ground told The Irrawaddy.
Maung Saungkha, the founder of the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, which is fighting alongside the MNDAA, wrote on his Facebook on Thursday that the resistance groups only needed to finish seizing a few remaining junta positions and to capture regime forces trying to flee the city.
The fall of the junta’s North Eastern Command, the regime’s stronghold in northern Shan State, leaves the junta’s garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin, home to its Defense Services Academy, vulnerable to resistance attack. The academy is Myanmar’s answer to West Point.
Alongside several resistance groups, the MNDAA, a member of the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies that launched the highly successful Operation 1027 offensive in northern Shan State in October last year, resumed its attacks on frontline junta bases and military battalions defending Lashio on July 3.
It took just a little over three weeks for the ethnic alliance and allied resistance forces to seize around five junta battalion headquarters and frontline bases in and around Lashio.
A total of 317 junta soldiers including a lieutenant colonel, two majors and five army captains from regime bases defending Lashio surrendered to the MNDAA on Sunday, the ethnic army said.
The city is almost empty as most residents fled in the early days of the resistance operation, but some people remain trapped there, according to local rescue groups.
Meanwhile, fierce clashes have broken out in Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mongmit townships in northern Shan and Singu, Madaya and Mogoke townships in northern Mandalay Region, where the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—another member of the Brotherhood Alliance—are fighting alongside resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the command of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). They resumed fighting on June 25 as part of Phase 2 of Operation 1027.
The TNLA and PDF groups took complete control of Mogoke, Myanmar’s major ruby hub, in northern Mandalay Region on Wednesday after a month of fighting against junta forces.
As part of Operation 1027, Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also taken complete control of Singu Township, 91 km north of Myanmar’s second-biggest city Mandalay, where the headquarters of the junta’s Central Command is based.
Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also managed to seize around 30 junta bases including the junta’s Air Defense Battalion Headquarters in Madaya Township next to Mandalay city. With the PDF attacks threatening Central Command, the regime has tightened security in Mandalay city.
The TNLA and PDF groups have also taken control of Kyaukme and continue to attack regime bases outside the town. Kyaukme is located next to Nawnghkio.
Since the resumption of Operation 1027 on June 25, the ethnic alliance and allied resistance groups have seized around 90 junta bases including around 10 battalion headquarters and the North Eastern Command, and have taken control of five towns in northern Shan and northern Mandalay.
However, towns under the control of the ethnic alliance and PDFs are at risk of being bombarded by the junta as it seeks to avenge its losses. Military-backed pro-junta Telegram channels are eagerly urging the military regime to incinerate all the towns it has lost, by bombing them from the air.
Together with several resistance groups, the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing hundreds of junta bases, command centers and 24 military battalion headquarters as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China in its first phase.
The operation was halted on Jan. 10 after the ethnic alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime, but fighting resumed last month after the ceasefire collapsed..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s military regime has placed former senior military leaders—including ex-dictator Than Shwe and former President Thein Sein—under surveillance, sources close to the matter said.
They confirmed that current junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has directed his security forces in Naypyitaw to monitor not only the retired senior leaders of the previous regime and the quasi-civilian government that followed it, but also members of their households.
Others under watch include the previous regime’s No. 2, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe Mann, who was chief of the general staff of the Myanmar armed forces under the Than Shwe regime, which ruled Myanmar from 1992 until early 2011.
The Irrawaddy has learned they have been under watch since a few days after Thein Sein’s three-day trip to China in late June, during which he attended commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Chinese government’s foreign relations principles. He met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the event.
Following the trip, Channel News Asia reported that “a source told CNA that Wang had asked Thein Sein to persuade Min Aung Hlaing to hand over power and form an interim government to pave the way for elections.”
Thein Sein briefed Min Aung Hlaing after his China visit, local media reported.
Within 10 days of Thein Sein’s visit, China hosted General Soe Win, deputy chief of the State Administration Council (SAC—the junta’s formal name) and commander-in-chief of the army. Since then, speculation has been rife and rumors have swirled about the purpose and larger significance of the visits. Among the rumors are that Min Aung Hlaing will be removed and that a counter-coup is looming.
The sources said the former president’s trip may have raised suspicions among some leaders of the current regime, especially Min Aung Hlaing.
“Since then he no longer trusts anyone. He’s afraid of being removed,” a source said.
The new security arrangements came just days before the SAC announced that Min Aung Hlaing had assumed the position of Myanmar’s acting president. Critics said the move was unconstitutional, and it has raised anger and strong reactions among the public as well as in the pro-military camp.
In 2002, Than Shwe placed former Myanmar dictator and ex-general Ne Win under house arrest, along with his grandsons and his favorite daughter and son-in-law, on charges of attempting to stage a coup and split the armed forces..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"July 25 (Reuters) - A rebel army in Myanmar said on Thursday it had seized control of a major regional military headquarters near the border with China, in what could be the biggest recent defeat for a ruling junta that is battling to contain a widening revolt.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) said it had taken the strategic city of Lashio in northern Shan State, about 120 km (75 miles) from the Chinese border, after 23 days of fighting with government troops.
"Our army has won a decisive victory and is now clearing out the remaining enemy troops. The city is now declared completely liberated," it said in a statement shared by its mouthpiece on social media, urging the public to remain calm and comply with its administration of the city.
Reuters could not independently verify the group's claim and a spokesperson for Myanmar's junta did not respond to calls seeking comment.
The MNDAA is among several ethnic minority rebel groups fighting to repel the military from what they consider their territories, in a loose alliance with an armed resistance movement that has waged a nationwide campaign to undermine the junta's rule.
The conflict has morphed into a civil war that represents one of the biggest challenges to Myanmar's well-equipped military in its combined five decades of rule. More than 2.6 million people are displaced, according to the United Nations.
The military, which seized back power in 2021 after a decade of tentative democracy, has been stretched by fighting on multiple fronts across the country of 53 million people, hampering its ability to govern and manage a crippled economy.
The junta has described its opponents as "terrorists" seeking to destabilise the country.
The MNDAA launched its latest offensive after the recent collapse of a ceasefire brokered by China, which has been concerned about fighting at its border and its impact on trade.
China's foreign ministry on Thursday urged all sides to cease hostilities, enter into dialogue and ensure Chinese businesses and nationals were unharmed.
"We will continue to encourage peace and push for talks," spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular briefing.
Online news outlet Myanmar Now quoted the commander of another armed group fighting alongside the MNDAA as confirming the capture of the regional command headquarters at Lashio.
According to an analysis earlier this year by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, the junta has no effective control of Myanmar, having lost authority over townships covering 86% of the country and two-thirds of the population..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2024-07-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The ethnic Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and People’s Defense Force groups under the command of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) on Wednesday took complete control of ruby hub Mogoke in northern Mandalay Region after around 30 days of attacks on Myanmar regime targets.
Mogoke, 189 km north of Myanmar’s second-biggest city Mandalay, has become the third town seized by PDFs and ethnic rebel armies during Phase 2 of their successful anti-regime offensive Operation 1027.
“We completely seized the last remaining strategic military base and another junta base at Phaung Taw Oo pagoda. Now, we have taken complete control of the whole town,” TNLA spokeswoman Lway Yay Oo told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday.
Viral videos and photos show Mogoke’s residents warmly welcoming TNLA and PDF troops entering the town after defeating the last junta bases on Wednesday.
After the fall of the town, junta-backed pro-military Telegram channels eagerly urged the military regime to incinerate the whole of Mogoke with aerial bombardments.
On Saturday, TNLA ally Mandalay People’s Defense Force and local resistance groups took complete control of neighboring Singu Township in Mandalay after around 20 days of attacks.
Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also seized around 30 other junta bases including the Air Defense Battalion Headquarters in Madaya Township next to Mandalay city.
Along with several resistance groups including Mandalay PDF, the TNLA, a member of the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies, resumed Operation 1027 on June 25 by attacking regime targets in several townships in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region.
As part of the operation, TNLA and Mandalay PDF took complete control of Nawnghkio town in northern Shan on July 10.
Meanwhile, several other resistance groups led by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), another member of the ethnic alliance, have been attempting to seize Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State, since July 3.
Intense fighting continued to be reported in Lashio city on Wednesday after some battalion headquarters and frontline bases around the town were seized by the resistance group.
During the second phase of the operation since June 25, the ethnic alliance and allied resistance groups have seized around 90 junta bases including around 10 battalion headquarters and have taken complete control of three towns in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region.
They also have effective control of Kyaukme and Mongmit towns in northern Shan, though they do not yet claim to have fully captured them as they continue to attack remaining junta positions outside the towns.
Alongside several resistance groups, the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing hundreds of junta bases including command centers and 24 battalion headquarters as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The operation was halted on Jan. 10 after the ethnic alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime, but resumed last month when the ceasefire collapsed..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Shan State, Kachin State, and Mon State from July 15th to 21st. The Military Junta Navy attacked heavy artillery on the villages along the Ayeyarwady River in Singu Township, Mandalay Region. Political prisoners from Insein Prison, Yangon Region, were relocated to Thayawaddy Prison and Kyaikzagaw Prison, Bago Region.
Over 40 civilians died, and nearly 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Over 30 civilians were arrested, and over 10 were killed by the arrest of the Military Junta within a week..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-07-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"In Myanmar’s Buddhist society, while monks are highly revered as moral authority figures, they have also long been a political force—in British colonial times, during previous military regimes, and continuing with monks’ anti-regime activism today.
To give you a better understanding of the Myanmar Buddhist clergy’s history of defying authoritarian regimes, The Irrawaddy presents our October 2007 cover story, reposted here as part of our new section, “Stories That Shaped Us”. In the section, we will reintroduce you to significant and important stories we have published on Myanmar politics, culture, history, ethnic issues, international relations and more to provide context and help you grasp the nuances and complexities of the issues Myanmar is facing today.
Enjoy the read—we will be back with more!
The Lord Buddha shunned worldly affairs, but in his teachings he stressed the need for good governance and good rulers in the practice of politics.
The Buddha said: “When the ruler of a country is just and good, the ministers become just and good; when the ministers are just and good, the higher officials become just and good; when the higher officials are just and good, the rank and file become just and good; when the rank and file become just and good, the people become just and good.”
If these admonitions are followed by the large community of monks—the Sangha—in predominantly Buddhist Burma, the lingering “love lost” relationship between the country’s military rulers and its monks should be no surprise.
Over the last two decades, Burma’s Sangha community, officially estimated to number around 400,000, has had an uneasy relationship with the ruling generals, who have imprisoned several prominent, politically active monks or pongyis. It is estimated that since the present military regime came to power in 1988, about 300 monks have been defrocked and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.
Monks, considered “sons of Buddha,” are the biggest institution in Burma after the armed forces, which number more than 400,000 soldiers and police.
In their close contacts with the common people and during their morning alms rounds of local households, the monks witness firsthand the suffering and poverty of ordinary Burmese citizens. They have a very clear picture of the deteriorating situation in Burma.
More importantly, they probably have a better network, connections and influence than politically active students, who are constantly watched, imprisoned or forced into exile.
Who could imagine that these monks, living quietly in monasteries and studying Dhamma, would ever plan to rebel against the repressive regime? Yet history has shown that monks have long played a pivotal role in politics and that they would indeed dare such a bold and dangerous undertaking.
The role of political pongyis is controversial and potentially threatening to the ruling elite, although there has been a continuing debate on whether monks really should involve themselves in politics.
The Early Rebellion
Monks were involved in early outbreaks of resistance against British colonization, joining lay people in taking up arms against the British after seeing King Thibaw sent into exile.
Monks have their resistance martyrs—U Ottama, for instance, who led 3,000 rebels in the Salin area a year after the invasion of Mandalay. The rebel monk, also known as Bo Ottama, was captured and hanged by the British in 1889.
Interestingly, historians noted that monks who took up arms voluntarily defrocked themselves first, following the precept forbidding monks to take lives.
Another martyr, Saya San, who was an ex-monk, led a peasant uprising in Tharrawaddy opposing the tax system imposed by the British. Burma’s colonial masters sent 10,000 troops to quell the rebellion, capturing Saya San and sending him, too, to the gallows.
One of the top Burmese lawyers who defended Saya San at his trial was Dr Ba Maw, who later became head of state in Burma’s Japanese-backed government.
Not all monks advocated armed struggle. Two who preached nonviolent resistance, U Wisara and another monk named U Ottama, spent many years in prison for their opposition to colonialism and their names have joined the list of independence heroes.
U Ottama, a globe-trotting, well-respected monk from Arakan State, was a powerful speaker whose calls for independence were featured in the national newspaper Thuriya. He once famously told the British Governor Sir Reginald Craddock to go home to Britain, in a speech that landed him in prison.
Like U Ottama, U Wisara was imprisoned several times for his public speeches and died in jail in 1929 after 166 days of a hunger strike. His prison sentences included terms of hard labor, and he was also defrocked.
Both monks became an inspiration to activists and students involved in the independence movement.
Scholar Michael Mendelson wrote in his “Sangha and State in Burma,” that all politically active monks tended to be labeled by the colonial authorities as “political agitators in the yellow robes.” Interestingly, a similar term is used by Burma’s current leaders to describe protesting monks.
Historians wrote that the British authorities were surprised to learn the influential role of the Sangha community, and soon after the invasion of 1885 they abolished the position of “Supreme Patriarch,” or Thathana-baing.
In former times, Burmese kings appointed Thathana-baing to govern the Sangha community and made them responsible for doctrinal instruction and discipline of all monks. But the position wasn’t accepted by the entire Sangha. The progressive Shwegin sect was one group that rejected it. Sectarianism created controversy and bitter rivalry among monks.
During the Kon-Baung period in the 18th century, conflicts arose within the Sangha over how the monastic robes were supposed to be worn, and two conflicting sects arose—the so-called Ton Gaing and Yon Gaing.
The Burmese scholar Tin Maung Maung Than records that the Toun-goo and early Kon-Baung dynasties were drawn into the rivalry by their royal patronage of one party or the other. In 1782, King Bodawphaya intervened in the controversy by siding with Ton Gaing.
One experienced colonial political officer, Col Edward Sladen, conversant with the power of the Sangha, advised British authorities to maintain the Thathana-baingsystem in order to head off conflicts in governing the predominately Buddhist country.
The role of Thathana-baing was undoubtedly a complicated one, involving a direct link between the monarchy and the Sangha. The Thathana-baing wielded influence and could even intervene in state affairs. One respected abbot even persuaded King Mindon to abandon corvée labor for his irrigation projects. It’s ironic that the current regime argues that forced labor is a feature of Burmese tradition and a means of making merit.
After independence, however, the influence of Buddhism and the Sangha went into decline, except for a period under the late prime minister U Nu, a devout Buddhist.
U Nu himself was ordained as a monk several times and rarely exploited Buddhism for his own political ends. Under his government, the Sixth Great Buddhist World Council was held in 1954, and he also created the Buddha Sasana Council.
Tin Maung Maung Than noted in his book, “Sangha Reforms and Renewal of Sasana in Myanmar: Historical trends and Contemporary Practice”: “Because of various Gaing and sectarianism U Nu failed to take effective reforms in spite of institutionalization of Buddhism within the state superstructure and notwithstanding the holding of the Sixth Buddhist Synod in 1954.”
U Nu also attempted to legalize Buddhism as the state religion in 1961. The attempt was considered to be a misguided policy, and it anyway failed to materialize as U Nu was ousted by Gen Ne Win one year later.
Ne Win regarded monks as a potential opposition and he developed a different strategy to control them. In the mid-1960s, his regime called a Sangha conference to issue monks with identification cards. Young monks and abbots stayed away from the gathering.
It wasn’t until 1980 that Ne Win succeeded in containing the monks by establishing a “State Sangha Nayaka Committee,” after a carefully orchestrated campaign to discredit the Sangha. Part of the campaign was to discredit a famous monk, Thein Phyu Sayadaw, who was accused of romantic involvement with a woman. He was defrocked.
Before the campaign, intelligence officers and informants of the government infiltrated the temples as monks and gathered information about monks and abbots.
Some well-known abbots, including Mahasi Sayadaw, an internationally respected monk who was invited by U Nu in 1947 to teach Vipassana meditation, were also targeted in the campaign.
Anthropologist Gustaaf Houtmann wrote in his paper “Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics” that the regime had “distributed leaflets accusing Mahasi of talking with the nat spirits, and it was claimed that the Tipitaka Mingun Sayadaw, Burma’s top Buddhist scholar, had been involved in some unsavory incident two years after entering the monkhood.” Both monks were victims of their refusal to cooperate with the regime.
A number of scholars and historians noted, however, that some abbots accused and charged by the government were indeed involved in scandals and had romantic relationship with women or nuns.
The regime’s campaign sometimes took bizarre forms. Rumors were circulated, for instance, suggesting that one Rangoon monk, U Laba, was a cannibal. Several famous abbots were implicated in scandals and were either defrocked or fled to neighboring Thailand. Ne Win successfully launched a “Sangha reform”—also known as “Cleaning Up the Sangha.”
The government managed to get some recognition from elderly Buddhists by forming the Sangha Committee. But Ne Win did not pretend to be a devout Buddhist. He rarely participated in Sangha meetings and held few religious ceremonies during the 26 years of his rule. Unlike current leaders, he was rarely seen with monks.
During the 1988 uprising, however, his government asked the Sangha Committee to help restore order, and senior monks appeared in live television broadcasts appealing to the public for calm.
In August, 1988, days after the massacre in Rangoon, monks expressed sorrow for the loss of life, but—to the surprise of many—they also appealed to the regime to govern in accordance with the 10 duties prescribed for rulers of the people. The appeal failed to calm the public mood, but the message did remind many Burmese of the “10 duties of rulers”—the monks were telling Ne Win to be a good ruler.
On August 30, the Working People’s Daily reported: “1,500 members of the Sangha marched in procession through the Rangoon streets and gathered in front of the Rangoon General Hospital emergency ward, where they recited “Metta Sutta” in memory of rahans (monks), workers and students who fell in the struggle for democracy.” Many young monks were among the demonstrators.
For many Burmese, the struggle for democracy is not yet over and the discord between the Sangha and the ruling generals remains strong.
Unlike Ne Win and U Nu, the generals who came to power in 1988 openly and audaciously schemed to buy off the Sangha community. They have also claimed to be protectors of the Sangha, although their motive is to gain political legitimacy.
Aside from holding numerous merit-making ceremonies, offering hsoon and valuable gifts to monks, the military leaders are launching well-publicized pagoda restoration projects throughout Burma. Nevertheless, confrontations between rebellious monks and the authorities continue.
In Mandalay in 1990, troops fired on the crowds, killing several people, including monks. Angered by the military’s brutality, Mandalay monks began a patta ni kozana kan, refusing to accept alms from members of the armed forces and their families.
The same action has now been taken by monks in several provinces after authorities beat protesting monks in Pakokka, central Burma.
“Patta ni kozana kan” can be called in response to any one of eight offences, including vilifying or making insidious comparisons between monks, inciting dissension among monks or defaming Buddha, the Dhamma or the Sangha.
A “patta ni kozana kan” campaign can be called off if the offended monks receive what they accept as a proper apology from the individuals or authorities involved. This procedure involves a ceremony held by at least four monks inside the Buddhist ordination hall, at which the boycott would be canceled.
Some monks in Burma may believe that the “patta ni kozana kan” of 1990 is still in effect, since they haven’t yet received any proper apology—only a harsh crackdown. At that time, monks refused to attend religious ceremonies held by military officials and family members.
In one incident, the Mandalay Division commander at the time, Maj-Gen Tun Kyi, who later became trade minister, invited senior monks and abbots to attend a religious ceremony but no one showed up. Military leaders realized the seriousness of the boycott and decided to launch a crackdown.
In Mandalay alone, more than 130 monasteries were raided and monks were defrocked and imprisoned. As many as 300 monks nationwide were defrocked and arrested.
Former political prisoners recalled that monks who shared prison quarters with them continued to practice their faith despite being forced to wear prison uniforms and being officially stripped of their membership of the Sangha.
Several monks, including the highly respected Thu Mingala, a Buddhist literature laureate, and at least eight other respected senior abbots, were arrested. Thu Mingala was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.
Apart from being stripped of their robes, imprisoned monks in Mandalay were forced to wear white prison uniforms and were taunted with nicknames instead of being addressed with their true titles, according to former political prisoners.
One year later, in 1991, the then head of the military junta, Snr-Gen Saw Maung, suffered a nervous breakdown and retired for health reasons. Buddhist Burmese still say this was punishment for his maltreatment of the monks.
The 1990 crackdown divided the Sangha community. The late Mingun Sayadaw, who was secretary of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, was ridiculed by young monks for not supporting the boycott campaign. He was at one time called “senior general Mingun Sayadaw,” and when he visited one temple in Mandalay young monks reportedly saluted him.
Today, while rebellious monks are prepared to go to prison, many senior monks and abbots are allowing themselves to become government tools by accepting gifts and large donations from the generals. By cuddling up to the ruling generals, these elderly abbots can no longer speak for the Sangha community at large, let alone comment on the suffering of the Burmese people. The divisions between abbots and young monks have inevitably widened.
The generals, on the other hand, won’t give up easily. In one spectacular bid to win the hearts and minds of the people, they borrowed a Buddha tooth relic from China and toured the country with it and also held a World Buddhist Summit.
In 1999, military leaders renovated Shwedagon Pagoda, after the Htidaw, the sacred umbrella, had been removed amid reports of minor local earthquakes. Local people said the spirits of Shwedagon had been upset with the removal of the Htidaw. Restoration of the pagoda complex did nothing to help the generals’ image, though.
The generals have also applied “divide and rule” strategies in dealing with the Sangha community and the opposition.
In 1996, the regime accused the National League for Democracy of infiltrating the Sangha with the aim of committing subversive acts against the authorities. The generals obviously did not want to see opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi developing too close a relationship with the monks.
In an attempt to neutralize the political role of Suu Kyi, the government sent a famous, London-based monk, Dr Rewatta Dhamma, to visit the detained opposition leader in 1995. Claiming to be a peace-broker between Suu Kyi and the generals, the monk shuttled between her and top leaders. But his mission failed and he returned to London. Skeptics believe the generals had merely used U Rewatta in a bid to persuade Suu Kyi to relinquish politics.
Ironically, the regime leaders publicly accused Suu Kyi of being a communist and of sacrilege because she had said in a campaign speech that “any human being can become a Buddha in this life.”
Soon after her release from her first term of house arrest in 1995, Suu Kyi immediately traveled to Karen State, followed by infuriated intelligence officers. She went there to make an offering to “Thamanya Sayadaw.”
Traditionally, temples have provided hiding places for activists, and in 1988 monks offered shelter to fugitives from the intelligence authorities.
At one time, the regime even placed restrictions on opposition members, preventing them from ordaining as monks. Like universities and schools, politically active monasteries are under heavy surveillance.
The widely respected abbot Bhaddanta Vinaya, known as Thamanya Sayadaw because he lived on Thamanya Hill, was involved in projects to help villagers in the area, work that was shunned by the generals.
He was revered not only for the mystical powers he was said to possess, but also because of his refusal to kowtow to the regime leaders. He once famously refused to accept the gift of a luxury vehicle from the then powerful intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt.
Khin Nyunt could not buy Thamanya.
It may indeed be wrong to assume that Burma’s regime leaders are devout Buddhists. The generals and their families seem to place more trust in astrology and numerology than in Buddhist ritual. They treasure white elephants and lucky charms and are constantly seeking advice from astrologers.
Birds of a feather, such as the generals and their chief astrologers, not only flock together but fall together, too. Ne Win’s family astrologer, Aung Pwint Khaung, was arrested in 2002 when the former dictator and his family were charged with high treason.
Khin Nyunt’s chief astrologer, Bodaw Than Hla, was imprisoned after the former Prime Minister and Military Intelligence chief was toppled in 2004.
Many Burmese may find it hard to believe that their military leaders are actually preserving Buddhism. Even when they are building pagodas and erecting Buddha images, the projects are based on astrological predictions and readings.
Who, for instance, advised Ne Win to ride a wooden horse on his aircraft and to ask the pilot to circle his birthplace nine times? Who advised him to issue banknotes in denominations of 45 and 90 kyat?
Who advised Khin Nyunt to dress up in women’s clothing, complete with the signature flower that Suu Kyi wears, in order to steal power from “the Lady”? Who told Than Shwe to move his capital to central Burma?
It certainly wasn’t a belief in Buddhist tenets. Nor does Buddhism permit the military to beat, defrock, imprison and kill monks.
The decline of Buddhism and the rise of militarism in Burma are a source of concern for the people of Burma. Thus, it is no surprise to hear social critics and political pongyismaintain that the generals who kneel down before images of Buddha are the real threat to Buddhism and Dhamma..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"UN experts demanded more attention from the international community and called for immediate and decisive actions.
The 56th session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC 56) took place in Geneva, Switzerland from 18 June to 12 July 2024, which had two Interactive Dialogues (IDs) on Myanmar: the ID with the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights on his report (A/HRC/56/23) on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities (ID HC) on 18 June; and the ID with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on his oral progress report (ID SR) on 4 July 2024. The SR Myanmar has also published two conference room papers prior to the ID: “Courage amid Crisis: Gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar” (HRC/56/CRP.8) and “Banking on the Death Trade: How banks and governments enable the military junta of Myanmar” (HRC/56/CRP.7). A resolution tabled by OIC was adopted on 10 July (A/HRC/RES/56/1) without vote.
ID HC
Opening the ID, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, presented his report saying that Myanmar was “being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime” and that “the disintegration of human rights continues at breakneck speed.” Highlighting terrifying situation faced by the Rohingya and Rakhine communities, worsening humanitarian situation and displacement, and stories of horrific war tactics and extreme measures taken by the military such as indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, forced conscription and other brutal atrocity crimes, HC stressed “the urgent need for leadership and influence to halt this catastrophe”, for accountability, end of violence as well as the denial of humanitarian aid. Reporting on the efforts of Myanmar civil society and Human Rights Defenders and emerging local governance structures, he stressed on the need for more attention, investment, political will and action from all parties, pointing out the need for “an urgent rethink of how we can respond collectively to this unmitigated crisis”, including the call for ASEAN to go beyond its 5PC and for “all anti-military armed groups to ensure the protection of civilians, defectors and surrendees at all times.”
ID SR
Opening the ID, the SR stressed to the Council on the need for its attention and action saying that “there are opportunities available to your governments right now that would make an enormous difference in how and when this crisis comes to an end.” By presenting his oral progress report as well as two conference room papers, the SR further reported on continued military airstrikes on civilian targets; sexual and gender-based violence against women, girls and LGBT people committed by the military and other groups; extremely dire situation in Rakhine, especially faced by both Rohingya and Rakhine communities; military procurement by the junta through transactions facilitated by foreign backs; among others. Pointing out that “actions taken by the international community to isolate the junta and degrade its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar are working”, the SR called for more and immediate action from the international community. In closing, he stressed to the Council that “the tide is turning in Myanmar, the junta is on its heels, and the opportunity to take decisive action is now.”
CCPR Centre at the HRC 56
The Centre submitted a written statement to the HRC 56 and presented oral statements during the ID HC and ID SR. The Centre also co-sponsored a side event on 4th July organised by Permanent Missions of Liechtenstein, Albania, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Slovenia, Switzerland, as well as Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), International Commission of Jurists and Human Rights Watch. At this event, focused on ways to combact impunity, both the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and the Deputy Head of the IIMM joined as speakers. Prior to the HRC 56, the Centre also published a briefing paper on the situation of civil and political rights in Myanmar (January – April 2024) in English, French and Spanish, as well as its findings paper of the HRC 55 discussion on Myanmar. The Centre’s database on what countries are saying about Myanmar at HRC was also updated reflecting on the analysis of discussion up to HRC 55. Following HRC 56, the Centre also updated the list of silent countries on Myanmar at HRC..."
Source/publisher:
Centre for Civil and Political Rights
Date of publication:
2024-07-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Intense clashes are ongoing in northern Shan State despite a four-day unilateral ceasefire declared by the ethnic Brotherhood Alliance on Sunday, according to the ethnic alliance and residents.
The Brotherhood’s Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) called a halt to the fighting while the Communist Party of China holds a meeting.
However, clashes continued in the northern Shan State of Lashio on Monday, with reports of civilian casualties caused by shelling.
On Sunday night, five civilians were killed and two others including a Buddhist monk were injured when blasts ripped through a monastery and surrounding residential ward in Lashio, according to residents. Another civilian was shot dead nearby at a military checkpoint.
Clashes continued to break out at Light Infantry Battalion 507 headquarters in Lashio.
“My whole family fled the town earlier and I was left to look after my house. Fighting continued to break out and civilians were killed by shelling last night. So, I left the town this morning,” a Lashio resident told The Irrawaddy on Monday.
“I think the aim of the unilateral ceasefire is to allow remaining residents to leave the town. The situation in the town may worsen after the ceasefire.”
On Monday, the junta airlifted more troops, weapons and ammunition into Lashio while parachuting weapons and ammunition to frontline soldiers around the city, according to local Shan media reports. A video posted online shows crates being parachuted over Lashio.
The TNLA said clashes broke out when regime troops attacked its forces at three locations in Kyaukme Township despite the ceasefire.
It said junta forces also used drones and artillery to bombard areas around two villages in Nawnghkio on Monday.
A junta hilltop artillery base also shelled a residential ward and villages in Mogoke Township, northern Mandalay Region on Monday night, killing a mother and her child and injuring four civilians, according to the TNLA and local media reports.
The junta has responded to the renewed resistance offensive in northern Shan by bombing the capital of Kokang Self-Administered Zone, Laukkai, which is under MNDAA control.
The airstrikes have killed one civilian, injured several others and damaged civilian buildings including hotels, according to MNDAA media wing The Kokang News.
The Brotherhood Alliance of the MNDAA, TNLA and Arakan Army (AA), launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State on October 17 last year, seizing hundreds of junta frontline bases, commander centers and 24 battalion headquarters, as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The operation was halted on January 10 after the ethnic alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime.
The TNLA and MNDAA resumed the operation in northern Shan on June 25 after junta forces violated the ceasefire by repeatedly bombarding TNLA territory in early June.
Along with local resistance groups including the Mandalay People’s Defense Force under the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), the TNLA is attacking the regime in northern Shan and northern Mandalay Region.
MNDAA-led forces have been attempting to seize Lashio since July 3.
Phase 2 of Operation 1027 has seen the ethnic alliance and allies seize more than 80 junta bases, including almost a dozen battalion headquarters, while taking control of Kyaukme and Nawnghkio towns and a large part of Mogoke, known as ruby town..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma -- offensives
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Sub-title:
Two are dead, including a child, following an airstrike as the junta battles for control of Mogoke town.
Description:
"Junta forces have tightened security in Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, while shelling civilians elsewhere in the region, after coming under renewed attack from an alliance of insurgent forces battling to end military rule.
A shell killed a seven-year-old boy and a woman in her 30s after it exploded in a residential area of Mandalay region’s Mogoke town on Monday evening, residents told Radio Free Asia Tuesday.
Another four-year-old girl and a 60-year-old woman, as well as a woman and man both in their 30s, are in critical condition, said one Mogoke resident, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons.
“A child and a grandmother were seriously injured by shrapnel that hit them in the neck,” he said. “It was not easy to send them to the hospital, so they were treated at home by people who have some medical knowledge.”
The shells were fired from a junta camp on Strategic Hill in eastern Mogoke, a ruby-mining town about 200 km (120 miles) north of Mandalay city.
Over half the town’s population has fled after fighting intensified between junta troops and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, which has taken control of western Mogoke, residents said.
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The TNLA is part of an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance launched an offensive last October, codenamed Operation 1027 for the date it began, and pushed back junta forces in several regions.
After a five-month ceasefire ended on June 25, the TNLA, and allied forces attacked junta camps in Madaya, Singu and Mogoke townships in Mandalay region, and Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns in Shan state to the east.
Stepping up Security
The TNLA and its allies have also turned their attention to junta bases near Mandalay region’s capital, causing the military to step up security in Mandalay city, residents said.
One city resident, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. told RFA that after Operation 1027 resumed in late June, the junta had increased the number of outposts around Mandalay and its historic palace.
“We’re getting a sense that the areas around the palace are more secure. They also installed heavy weapons on top of Mandalay Hill and also on Yankin Hill,” he said. “Security has been increased a lot. If there was a place with four or five soldiers before, there are about 10 soldiers now.”
Troops are also stationed on top of high-rise buildings in the city’s Chanmyathazi township, one resident said, also asking for anonymity to protect his identity.
“The junta troops are stationed on the top floors of Ma Ma-29 and No. 49 buildings,” he said, adding that soldiers also occupied buildings in the Myayenanda, and Aungpinlel neighborhoods, as well as Mandalay’s industrial zone. “The troops asked residents to leave in order for soldiers to be stationed there.”
Army personnel are also stationed in Inwa (Inn Wa) town, 32 km (20 miles) south of Mandalay city, which is close to a junta air force base, he added.
On Monday, the junta closed the Mandalay-Madaya Road after fighting with allied rebel forces near Madaya township’s Kyauk Ta Dar village, which is just 27 km (17 miles) away from Mandalay city.
According to the Mandalay People’s Defense Force, the group had captured 25 junta camps in Madaya township and 11 in Singu township as of July 7.
RFA called Mandalay region’s junta spokesperson Thein Htay for more information on increased security and the attack on Mogoke, but he did not answer phone calls..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-07-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Description:
"Over three years since the February 2021 coup, the enormous momentum gained by the popular armed resistance is reinforcing the narrative that Myanmar’s military, once recognized as one of Southeast Asia’s strongest armies, can be defeated. The international community, spanning Myanmar’s neighbors to Western powers, now realizes that the fall of the military is no longer impossible, though far from inevitable.
Many observers and analysts remain skeptical that the resistance, with its scattered operations, can deal a final blow to the mighty military, citing the lack of historical precedent. But Myanmar analysts have moved on from their initial assessment – that an uncoordinated resistance armed with makeshift weaponry would be short-lived and only worsen the toll on civilian lives. The emerging consensus is that Myanmar is fragmenting as civil war tears the country apart.
The current discourse consists of a wide variety of views and perspectives, ranging from Myanmar’s political history to economic realities; the current crisis to centuries-old Burmese societal values; and military tactics on both sides to the politics of resistance forces (ethnic armies and People’s Defense Forces) and the Myanmar military.
However, little attention has been paid to the personal aspirations and struggles of the man at the top, the commander-in-chief and coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing.
The man most responsible for current crisis
Studies of Myanmar’s precarious civil-military relations, and military vs democratic doctrines, are worth analyzing to better understand the current crisis. Based on Myanmar’s political nature, no one would argue that one person is more important than the institution he or she represents. Min Aung Hlaing was therefore rowing against the tide when he staged a coup widely understood as a solo decision driven by his personal aspirations and paranoia. Thus, Min Aung Hlaing and his motivations cannot be ignored in whatever scenarios we envision for the country’s future.
For this reason, the question that needs to be raised is not whether foreign governments will have to deal with future statelets in Myanmar, or whether Myanmar people would accept such fragmentation, or even if a negotiated settlement can be reached between ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs), the junta, and the civilian National Unity Government plus the ousted National League for Democracy.
The pressing question is what actions Min Aung Hlaing would take if any of these scenarios were to materialize. How would the junta chief react to these scenarios, and what would be the best choices for him? And most importantly, how would Myanmar’s people, political leaders, EROs and the wider international community hold him accountable for his heinous crimes to pave the way to a better future for Myanmar?
Coup was the only exit for Min Aung Hlaing
From the coup leader’s perspective, it would have been difficult to imagine that any alternative except a coup could guarantee his position, legacy, wealth, family, and even his life. As dark clouds loomed over Naypyitaw in late 2020, the future looked bleak for the military chief. The people’s leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had won another landslide election victory and was not swayed by Min Aung Hlaing’s relentless petitions to betray her campaign promise and make him president of the country.
The military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was considering radical reforms after humiliating defeats in the 2015 and 2020 elections – reforms which would effectively limit free access for military top brass. Also, the International Court of Justice was likely to convict Min Aung Hlaing for genocide in Rakhine in 2017.
The coup-leader could not trust that his stone-faced generals, loyal to their old chief Than Shwe, would defend him against the ICJ charges, fearing instead that they might push for his downfall.
Yet while all these facts were apparent, most Myanmar observers failed to see the choices facing Min Aung Hlaing and therefore underestimated the possibility of a coup. The consensus prior to the putsch was that Min Aung Hlaing was doomed, the military had been defeated again, and democracy had prevailed. The possibility of a coup was widely dismissed as too politically and economically costly.
However, just as a drowning man will clutch at a straw, Min Aung Hlaing found the devasting consequences of a coup preferable to being charged at the international court, betrayed by his generals, and living in shame minus a legacy or wealth. The protracted armed conflict that followed was evidently the least of his concerns.
Masking personal interests with military narratives
Despite being unpopular both within and outside the military, Min Aung Hlaing is a seasoned general who understands his institution well. Amid the bitter realization of his own shortcomings, his strategic choice was to flex his power through his institutional mandate, which he earned through obedience to his seniors rather than any military acumen.
Than Shwe, the old chief, appeared to believe that his young and obedient generals, particularly Min Aung Hlaing, would play along with his plans to retire in 2016 and allow a new elected government to take over, with deputy commander-in-chief Soe Win following suit at the 2020 election. These arrangements would have cemented the military’s role in politics, backed by a constitutionally secured 25% seats in Parliament plus control of military-affiliated ministries and economic holdings.
But in that case, why did the other top generals not consider Min Aung Hlaing’s coup as personally motivated? Likely because the generals also prioritized their personal interests over their old boss’s plan. The top generals’ betrayal of institutional interests may appear naïve, but this was a game of personal survival – it was now or never for them.
Consequently, with their limited worldviews and lack of imagination for better alternatives, Min Aung Hlaing and the top generals resorted to their last option: reopening the old playbook of military dictatorship and using violence and terror to enforce submission to their rule.
Although Min Aung Hlaing and his generals have tried to disguise their personal interests behind a mask of military narratives, institutional fears, and objectives, the institution itself seems to be fighting back. Continuing military defeats and resistance gains appear to have sparked shock and awe among soldiers and military supporters. Many have blamed long-term corruption and weak leadership. Few however seem to realize that Min Aung Hlaing and his generals’ pursuit of personal interests at the cost of their institution is the main reason for the failures of junta ground troops.
Weak link in longstanding military dictatorships
Min Aung Hlaing’s unpopularity has spilled over into China, the target of multibillion-dollar online border scams protected by the junta. As Beijing’s frustration with the scams peaked, China cracked down with little concern about embarrassing Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. Worried for his own survival, the junta boss promptly purged his generals to please his powerful neighbor. The move apparently exacerbated mistrust for the coup-maker among his generals. While it may be too early to say that the interest-based alliance among the generals is disintegrating, arrests of old regime loyalists and frequent purges of the junta cabinet betray widening cracks that are further undermining the military institution.
At this point, loyal members of the military face a dark future looming over their institution. Neither of the two scenarios – a resistance victory or Min Aung Hlaing and his self-serving generals maintaining power – offer hope.
The end of Min Aung Hlaing
Since he sparked the crisis, it is reasonable to assume that Min Aung Hlaing will be instrumental in ending it. More than three years after his coup, with tens of thousands of civilians killed or arrested, the junta boss remains mired in a rising tide of bloody crimes.
Any scenario – a negotiated settlement brokered by the international community, or a decisive resistance victory to establish federal democracy – would be intolerable for Min Aung Hlaing.
And anyone considering a possible power-sharing arrangement with the military, as seen from 2010-2021, must address the role of Min Aung Hlaing. Given the long list of atrocities and other crimes he has ordered and the numerous enemies that surround him, he would not be afforded the kind of impunity that his predecessor Than Shwe enjoyed. The people would be reluctant to accept any pardon, even if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political elites offered one. A formal pardon and return to ordinary life would be accompanied by widespread fury and threats against his and his family’s life. And for a military general who dragged the country into chaos just to save himself, the threats would be real, not a case of paranoia.
To settle the disputes, it may be practical for all stakeholders to place the blame on Min Aung Hlaing as the sole enemy of Myanmar’s people. Burmese history has a precedent for this: When several independence leaders including Aung San were assassinated in 1947 amid intense political rivalries and ideological debate, U Saw was singled out for blame and duly executed; the country moved on.
In the ongoing crisis, as well as betraying the military’s institutional interests, Min Aung Hlaing has created more enemies than all his predecessors combined managed in their lifetimes. He failed to secure any ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations, as his predecessors had done. He has alienated traditional military loyalists such as USDP supporters and religious fanatics. He has overseen plunging morale among soldiers, thereby losing battles on the ground. He also stands on the verge of being charged with genocide and facilitating the online scam industry. He has wrecked the economy, shrinking the share of the pie for military cronies both old and new. It is difficult to imagine any reasonable person defending him when his time comes.
The fall of Min Aung Hlaing is only a matter of time. However, all stakeholders, including the Myanmar military itself, must ensure that his ousting does not go to waste. All well-meaning peace efforts – for the delivery of humanitarian aid, release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political prisoners, cessation of violence, five-point consensus, and engagements with statelets as an entry point to ending the conflict – have proved to be less effective than focusing on the one man solely responsible.
Many would argue that a country like Myanmar needs a strong military. However, do the country and the military need Min Aung Hlaing? Even in a negotiated settlement, would Min Aung Hlaing put his institution’s interests above his own survival?
Could condemning this one man, who has caused insufferable pain to millions of Myanmar people and brought the worst crisis in the country’s history, be a good starting point to unite all stakeholders and people to end the current conflict in Myanmar?..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"China invited two high-profile figures from Myanmar to visit recently, with former President Thein Sein flying to Beijing on June 27 and General Soe Win, deputy chief of the current junta, following him a week later, visiting Qingdao.
Since Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Thein Sein, speculation has been rife and rumors have swirled about the purpose and larger significance of the visits.
The week of Thein Sein’s visit saw a renewal of fighting between ethnic armies and junta forces in northern Shan State after a Chinese-brokered truce collapsed, while in Rakhine State, where China has built a deep seaport and a terminal for its oil-and-gas pipeline project, the Arakan Army continues to gain territory and push the Myanmar military back.
The official reason for Thein Sein’s visit was to attend an event in Beijing commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Declaration of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence—a set of principles laid out by China in the early days of communist rule governing the country’s foreign relations. It was his first foreign trip since the military seized power over three years ago, plunging the country into turmoil.
Even before Thein Sein arrived back to Naypyitaw the rumors were flying thick and fast, and they have yet to stop. One has it that China seeks to nudge the junta into forming a transitional government including some ministers from the 2011-16 quasi-civilian government led by Thein Sein. According to another, China asked Thein Sein to persuade coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to step down.
Here is my take.
First, China believes Min Aung Hlaing is incompetent and incapable of holding the country together, and has lost patience with him. But Min Aung Hlaing will not leave his post voluntarily and cannot be persuaded to do so.
Second, China is working on Thein Sein, possibly sounding out his opinions and the possibility of his re-entering politics at some point in the future. But is this realistic? Thein Sein is infirm and frail. He would need political backing to fix things in Myanmar. Could he persuade Min Aung Hlaing to step down? No.
Some have floated a scenario in which Thein Sein would guide a transition to civilian rule after an election in 2025—assuming one can be held. One question that arises from this approach is whether—assuming Aung San Suu Kyi is released—Thein Sein would be able to work with her as a “political guiding force” to restore calm to the nation. Or is that sheer fantasy?
Third, analysts say that China doesn’t want to see the junta extend its emergency rule yet another time. And China is not alone in this. Myanmar’s other neighbors also want to see an end to this process of repeated extensions of junta rule.
One thing that must be understood is that Min Aung Hlaing will not leave national politics unless he is forced to do so.
At the meeting between Wang Yi and Thein Sein, China no doubt repeated its commitment to the two countries’ “paukphaw”, or sibling, ties (seemingly its favorite phrase when discussing ties with Myanmar) and expressed a desire to see stability restored in its southern neighbor. For his part, it seems a safe bet that Myanmar’s former president delivered a plea from the regime that China intervene with the ethnic armies to halt the war in the north—underscoring China’s influence and the outsize role it plays in the Myanmar conflict.
Over the last two weeks unverified reports have emerged that China has asked the junta to hold talks with several key players including detained State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and powerful ethnic armed leaders.
The regime leader reportedly rejected the proposal, insisting that Suu Kyi is a criminal and thus he can’t talk to her. Regarding the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), Min Aung Hlaing reportedly said that they have been officially invited to join talks under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement guidelines.
Upon hearing this reply, not only China but also Myanmar’s neighbors were not pleased.
Soe Win’s surprise trip
China’s invitation to Gen. Soe Win surprised many. While the hardliner second-in-command’s alleged orders to bomb innocent civilians make him responsible for the deaths of many innocent people since the coup, he has no political ambitions.
Min Aung Hlaing (Defense Services Academy Intake 19) and Soe Win (DSA Intake 22) are known to be at loggerheads, but Soe Win does not dare challenge his boss’s leadership.
Some analysts have even speculated that China wants to see Min Aung Hlaing removed. Does it follow that it wants to see Soe Win replace him? For the time being, Min Aung Hlaing isn’t going anywhere. Min Aung Hlaing and Soe Win are both war criminals. Whichever of them leads the nation, they are doomed to failure.
On his first official visit to China since the 2021 coup, Soe Win did not go to Beijing, rather he traveled to Qingdao to attend the Green Development Forum organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
There, he discussed border stability, security for Chinese investments in Myanmar, elimination of online scam operations, promotion of trade and the proposed election, junta media said.
Soe Win met Shen Yueyue, vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and president of the SCO’s Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Commission.
Needless to say there was no mention of China’s pending massive arms shipment to the junta during the meeting with Shen.
Wa: Wild card in the war in the north
Only a few days after Soe Win came back from China, the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) deployed troops to Tangyan town in northern Shan State—a strong indication of the Wa’s goal of expanding its territory.
Wa spokesman Nyi Rang said the UWSA negotiated with the regime to allow it to deploy troops in Tangyan after residents called for protection from fighting between the junta and the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies. Negotiated with Myanmar’s regime? This is interesting.
Nyi Rang said: “It is a preventive measure to stop the conflict in northern Shan State from spreading to Tangyan. We maintain our neutrality and reject conflict. We want peace and stability in Tangyan and believe our deployment will be constructive in every aspect.”
So the regime gave the greenlight to the Wa to enter Tangyan?
This move coincided with Soe Win’s visit to China. It is likely that Chinese officials and Soe Win discussed the situation in northern Shan State, including the position of the Wa. Chinese officials have reportedly asked the Myanmar military to elevate the political status of the Wa in order to ease the armed conflict in the north.
Indeed, the Wa, backed by China, are kingmakers in the conflict in the north and suspected of backing (as well as providing arms to) the Brotherhood Alliance, which comprises the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The alliance is now seriously threatening Lashio, where the regime’s Northeastern Command is based.
Granting a new political status to the Wa could be a way for the regime to ease the ethnic offensive in the north, where its troops continue to suffer losses.
Expansion of territory
In January 2024, a few days after the ceasefire agreement brokered by China was reached between the three northern ethnic armies and the regime, the junta agreed to the Wa’s demand for administrative control of Hopang and Panlong towns in northern Shan State.
The transfer of the two towns to Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army expands the Wa Self-Administered Region east of the Salween River.
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and United Wa State Party were established after ethnic Wa soldiers split from the Communist Party of Burma on April 17, 1989 and signed a ceasefire with the then military regime.
What the Wa call “northern Wa State” is officially classified in the 2008 military-drafted constitution as the Wa Self-Administered Region, also known as Special Region 2. This region’s capital is Panghsan, also known as Pangkham, and it is made up of Mongmao, Monglin and Mongpauk districts and Pangkham Special Township, an area covering around 1,500 square kilometers.
Today the UWSA is the most powerful EAO in Myanmar. It has maintained a ceasefire with successive governments, but refused to sign the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
Wa leaders have also said that Wa State will not secede from the Union, but the UWSA will manage its state independently except for national defense and diplomatic relations.
With the previous military regime’s approval, the UWSA also expanded its territory to include Monghsat District on the border with Thailand in southern Shan State, and around 80,000 to 100,000 ethnic Wa resettled there. Now the district is referred to as “southern Wa State”, also known to the UWSA as Military Region 171, and some 9,000 UWSA fighters are stationed there. Clearly, the Wa want their territory in southern Shan State to be combined with the northern areas and recognized officially as Wa State.
And the winner is …?
Last week, Min Aung Hlaing surprised everyone, declaring Chinese New Year a national holiday amid the renewed fighting near the border with China.
This is the first time in Myanmar’s history that a foreign festival has been officially recognized as a public holiday. Until now, apart from internationally recognized days like New Year’s Day, only national anniversaries, religious holidays such as Christmas and Eid, and some commemorations associated with the major national ethnicities such as traditional Karen New Year’s Day, have been observed.
The junta’s official explanation was that Chinese New Year is a public holiday in Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and in many other countries around the world. In truth, there is no ASEAN-wide tradition of observing Chinese New Year. While Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia do officially mark it, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Laos and Brunei do not, and Vietnam has its own Tet Lunar New Year holiday.
At any rate, the primary reason—as spelled out in a regime statement—for the move is that “Myanmar wants to deepen the Pauk-Phaw relations with China,” according to the regime statement.
It has been reported that China’s outgoing ambassador, Chen Hai, proposed the official recognition of the day to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing during the embassy’s Lunar New Year celebrations in February.
Observers commented that the move reflects a level of dependence on Beijing unprecedented in the 76 years since Myanmar gained independence. The decision is certainly controversial and has caused unease among Myanmar citizens including military personnel.
No wonder Myanmar people often now jokingly refer to their country as the “Chinese Republic of the Union of Myanmar”!
China’s “provinces” or “protectorates” in northern Myanmar will no doubt be celebrating Chinese New Year. For instance, the MNDAA on Sunday officially announced that it would stop fighting for four days (from July 14 to 12 a.m. on July 18), saying in a statement that “at the time of the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China, all combat troops were required to stop active offensive” operations.
Now, with the northern ethnic forces closely connected to China gaining more territory and overtaking military outposts and pushing through to the interior of the country, the regime’s dependence on China will only deepen.
China’s geostrategic and economic interest are enormous in Myanmar, including oil-and-gas pipelines, railroads, deep-water seaports on the Bay of Bengal, border trade and access to the Indian Ocean.
In Myanmar’s quagmire there are many losers, but it’s obvious who the winner is—and it’s unquestionably not the Myanmar people.
Is it too early to wish my countrymen a Happy Chinese New Year?..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Delivered by Ambassador Robert Wood, Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs, on behalf of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of Albania, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union and its Member States, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
We are deeply concerned by the escalation of violence and conflict and credible reports of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law across Myanmar that are deepening the humanitarian crisis. Recent reports indicate the Myanmar regime has taken deliberate steps in Rakhine State to use internally displaced persons (IDP), many of whom are Rohingya, as human shields amid the conflict. We are particularly concerned by reports indicating the regime has placed landmines around IDP camps and appears to have taken steps to use these camps as military bases. There are also credible reports of forced recruitment of persons, including children, belonging to ethnic minorities by the Myanmar Armed Forces in particular and other parties, which risk further fueling inter-communal tensions and aggravating the humanitarian situation.
These concerning developments follow a range of reports of other violations and abuses, particularly by the Myanmar Armed Forces, including indiscriminate aerial bombardments of civilians and civilian objects, burning of civilian homes, attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities, and restrictions on humanitarian access. These practices are unacceptable.
Since the regime’s violent military coup in February 2021 and attack on the Myanmar population, the number of people in humanitarian need has risen from 1 million to 18.6 million. More than 2.9 million have been newly displaced, including 66,000 people who have sought protection in neighboring countries, adding to the more than 1 million Rohingya refugees who fled before the coup. We highlight the importance of all countries respecting the principle of nonrefoulement. We reiterate our commitment to support safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation when conditions allow. We also reiterate the call for full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to all people in need, including women, children, and members of ethnic and other minority populations.
We urge the Myanmar Armed Forces in particular and all parties concerned in Myanmar to de-escalate violence, respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, and to protect civilians. We recall our demands for the full implementation of UNSC resolution 2669 (2022). We reiterate our full support for ASEAN’s central role and for the appointment of Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Julie Bishop. We reiterate calls to engage in constructive and inclusive dialogue to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-07-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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One person died and 10 were injured in the attack on a Shan state town.
Description:
"A rebel army in eastern Myanmar announced a four-day ceasefire shortly after a town under its control was hit by junta airstrikes, residents said.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, captured Laukkaing, or Laukkai, town in northern Shan state on Sunday, after which the junta hit back, residents said.
A resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told Radio Free Asia that a fighter jet fired at several hotels and residential areas in Laukkaing for 20 minutes, killing a civilian and wounding others.
“What we know is that the person who died was a guest staying at the Full Light International Hotel. More than 10 people were injured,” he said. “At the moment, civilians are not allowed to enter the area because it’s being cleared.”
MNDAA newspaper, The Kokang, identified the victim as a 37-year-old man named Wang. It said several other hotels were damaged in the attack.
Most Laukkaing residents are sheltering in their homes and closing their businesses for fear of more airstrikes, witnesses told RFA.
RFA phoned MNDAA spokesperson Li Kya Win and its head of external relations, Gen. Phone Win Naing, for more details on the fighting but they did not answer calls.
A reporter also attempted to contact Shan state’s junta spokesperson Khun Thein Maung and national junta spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment, but those calls also went unanswered.
However, a junta account on social messaging app Telegram said Laukkaing was bombed because some MNDAA leaders were living in the town.
The MNDAA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance that launched Operation 1027 last October to seize territory from the junta. It said it had captured seven towns, including Chinshwehaw, Hseni and Kunlong since Operation 1027 began and was implementing its own administration, regional development, education and health sectors.
In January, China brokered a state-wide ceasefire between junta and alliance forces, bringing them together for talks in the Chinese city of Yunnan in May. At the time it said it was concerned fighting would affect border stability and trade between the two countries.
Three Brotherhood Alliance members the Ta’ang National Liberation Army broke the ceasefire in late June, blaming junta airstrikes for the resumption of hostilities. Since then, the alliance has captured dozens of bases across Shan state and Mandalay region.
The MNDAA said the latest ceasefire will run from Monday through Thursday, although residents said both armies have continued to fire weapons near Laukkaing. In a statement Sunday, it said the ceasefire was called as a result of China’s concerns, although it didn’t specify what those concerns were.
Since the resumption of Operation 1027, alliance forces have been trying to seize control of Lashio, the capital of northern Shan state, where fighting has raged for weeks and killed over a dozen civilians.
Political analyst Than Soe Naing said the junta attack on Laukkaing was probably in retaliation for that attack.
“[The MNDAA] took part in Operation 1027, in the second wave of the Spring Revolution. The next thing that happened was that the junta's most important town, Lashio, was targeted and attacked by four military columns,” he said. “I believe the junta bombarded Laukkaing in response to that.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-07-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Notes:
AWD cases are reported in two township in Thaketa , Dawbon Township, Yangon. Infection initially start in Insein Township and spread to other Townships. More cases are found in Thaketa Township and now spreading more. In Yangon region, there are 77 hospitalization cases till 17 July 2024. There are also unconfirmed reports of AWD in other states and regions. The general perspective of situation is deteriorating.
Sources for data marked as Other
https://www.mohs.gov.mm/page/19764
Description
The primary affect is the shortage of ORS, preventive items, low health knowledge which directly impact the community. The secondary effects are the overburden of hospitalization, low number of health care personal due to the breakdown of health system and potential loss of life..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies, Myanmar Red Cross Society via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-07-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The extraordinary arc of failure of Myanmar’s military has gone from coup and crack-down to the brink of regime crack-up.
When seizing power in February 2021, the military expected to consolidate power and crush resistance. Instead, the junta’s violence pushed popular opposition to become revolution and civil war. The military’s hold on Myanmar shrinks as it suffers a ‘succession of humiliating defeats’.
The spreading authority of rebel groups mean Myanmar’s government no longer controls most of the country’s international borders. The military dictatorship holds less than 50 percent of the country.
As the centre’s grasp on the country weakens, one possibility is that the centre collapses. The implosion prospect is about more than battlefield defeats but goes to the junta’s internal cohesion and vanishing legitimacy.
The junta head, Min Aung Hlaing, will be keeping a Caesar-like ‘et tu’ eye on his fellow generals. The daggers may not be plunged into his toga, but defeat makes any strongman disposable. This is not the coup Min promised. The shock and awe effects are on the military.
Southeast Asia has shifted from apprehension about what Myanmar’s junta would do to astonishment at its ebbing control.
In her new role as the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar, the former Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop must deal with a loathsome regime that is losing. And a weak government can be as dangerous, in different ways, as a government confident in its power.
The experience of the envoys that have gone before her shows Bishop has little immediate chance to get the military to reduce violence or to get a serious dialogue, as the veteran diplomat Scot Marciel observes:
The Myanmar military, in addition to being xenophobic, misogynistic, dishonest, and brutal, is by nature uncompromising and absolutely committed to maintaining political power. This is true even in the face of significant resistance gains, a worsening economy, and a severe humanitarian crisis. For its part, the broad resistance—and arguably the population at large—is dead-set on removing the military from power and unlikely to accept anything short of that.
Bishop shares with countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations an excruciating dilemma of diplomacy: does Myanmar’s regime still have the capacity to act as a normal government, to negotiate in good faith, to change policy if needed and even offer concessions to strong opponents? A failing government battered by military defeats is so focussed on the struggle it has little capacity for much else. The military’s draft of men between the ages of 23 and 31 is the action of a scrambling government—more grim desperation than resolute determination.
To maintain lines to the junta, Bishop and ASEAN must be relatively polite. For a blunt call on what the region sees unfolding, turn to ASEAN’s ‘in principle’ 11th member, Timor-Leste. Its president, Jose Ramos-Horta, no stranger to popular resistance and military struggle, judges: ‘This is the first time in the history of Myanmar when the military are not winning and will not win. They are losing.’
Ramos-Horta says a junta facing collapse must crawl to the negotiating table:
Efforts have to be intensified to mediate this conflict. Otherwise, it gets out of control. It spirals out of control. And then it will be far more difficult to bring back law and order and a solution. Thus, because the military is very, very weak, on the point of implosion, there is an incentive for them to talk. Someone has to bring all the parties together. No preconditions.
Ramos-Horta’s ‘implosion’ call is more description than prediction. The centre has already lost much. Balkanisation is no longer a possibility; it’s what has happened to Myanmar. The Oxford dictionary of politics describes balkanisation as ‘the division of a state into smaller territorial units. The term tends to imply a policy of “divide and rule”, whereby the strength of a united country is diluted by the creation of internal division.’ Myanmar’s balkanisation sees lots of divide and limited rule.
Even the junta is talking about the country being ‘split into various parts’. Myanmar’s reality today is revolution and balkanisation. The military cannot win; its task is not to lose. The dark forecast is for more years of war. The Crisis Group’s Richard Horsey sees a fragmented Myanmar becoming a confederation of autonomous ethnic zones:
Even in some Burman-majority regions, the idea of de facto self-rule is gaining momentum, and local communities, organizations, and armed resistance groups are starting to put the administrative building blocks in place. All this threatens to leave Myanmar as a collection of statelets, with a rump state at the centre.
Deep into the wars they willed, Myanmar’s junta and Russia’s Vladimir Putin vie for the dreadful honour of committing the worst strategic blunder of this decade. Both were revisionist efforts at resurrection: seeking to remake the Soviet empire or recover the military’s traditional control of Burmese life. Putin’s delusional megalomania and the junta’s delusional desperation were back-to-the future gambles that turned to war. Reaching for the old historical role instead turns into historic blunder.
The bloody prize of the greatest strategic disaster of the decade is the only achievement in sight for Myanmar’s military. Putin’s war does not yet threaten his hold on Russia. Myanmar’s junta has smashed the country as the regime staggers towards its own ruin..."
Source/publisher:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Date of publication:
2024-07-17
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Galloping inflation over the past few months has pushed Myanmar people toward God. The link between piety and prices? “Oh My God” is the frequent response when the cost of everything from food and fuel to pharmaceuticals rises every four or five days.
A chicken egg that cost 120 kyats before the 2021 coup is now 360 kyats. A duck egg has jumped from 200 kyats to 500 kyats. The same goes for cooking oil, rice, tomatoes, cabbage, white radish, chicken, pork and prawns. There is no food whose price has not shot up.
In Yangon, the long lines of people queuing to buy palm oil recall Ne Win’s era, when necessities including rice were rationed. Customers must show their citizenship ID under a regime diktat to prevent people from queuing twice for extra cooking oil. Mobile shops selling subsidized cooking oil at 6,000 kyats per viss (around 1.6 kilos), half the market price, are crowded and sell out quickly.
Satirical cartoons on social media depicting people snatching cabbages from markets are not entirely an exaggeration.
Cabbage, water spinach and eggs were once common on the dining tables of low-income households. But under Min Aung Hlaing’s rule, even middle-class families sigh heavily at their prices.
Shopping may be an enjoyable pastime elsewhere, but not for Myanmar people. The scramble for household provisions is a daily torment for most housewives.
Low-quality rice has surged from 2,000 kyats per viss (2.13 kilos) before the putsch to more than 5,000 kyats. Higher-quality grain is something only well-off families can afford now. I was left speechless when junta boss Min Aung Hlaing told an 8 pm news broadcast a few days ago that Myanmar was exporting surplus rice.
An aunt of mine complains about the soaring price of sea fish she buys to feed street dogs. Min Aung Hlaing’s coup has increased hardship even for stray animals.
Meanwhile, power outages force me to use canister gas to cook my children’s lunch. Cooking gas prices have also gone up recently, but charcoal prices are not cheap either. I am also muttering “Oh My God!”
But price hikes are not the only problem. Certain goods are also becoming scarce.
I entered a store to buy chicken seasoning powder a couple of days ago but found none on the shelves. The salesgirl who knows me as a regular customer told me in a low voice to wait while she fetched some from the storeroom. When I told my wife about it in surprise, she said chicken seasoning had been unavailable for weeks.
At a City Mart supermarket, I discovered that Ovaltine nutrition drink was being rationed at two packets per customer. When I said I needed three packets for my grandparents, the cashier kindly sold me two packets and the third with a separate receipt. I realized that Ovaltine might be out of stock too.
After months searching for Gillette Foamy shaving cream at popular shopping centers, I finally tracked down two bottles at a pharmacy. Logic told me to grab both, but the needs of my two young kids come first. Diaper prices are also increasing.
The prices of pharmaceuticals have skyrocketed too. Patients risk further damage to their health when they hear the prices of pills they need. “That medicine is out of stock” is a common refrain at pharmacy counters these days. My wife has had to get used to her stomach pain, as Kremil-S antacid is often out of stock.
I can’t help cursing Min Aung Hlaing. However, we urban residents are at least more fortunate than compatriots elsewhere, who are forced to abandon their belongings and businesses as they flee junta air raids and artillery barrages.
Inflation, shortages of consumer goods, serious power outages, and a crime wave of theft, mugging and pickpocketing have become part and parcel of life in towns. Adding to the general deterioration are the unlicensed buses that are back on Yangon’s streets. The rogue vehicles are notorious for driving dangerously as they scramble for passengers.
Women wearing sling bags on their shoulders are no longer safe in Yangon. The mugging epidemic also targets phones, bikes and electric bikes. Public bus drivers frequently warn passengers to “take care of their phones and purses” – a sign that pickpockets are on board.
Rogue bus drivers exhort commuters to pray to God as they speed to overtake public buses and taxis. They also provide a source of extra income for traffic police and soldiers, with “bus bribes” now a familiar sight in Yangon.
Out on the streets, Yangonites are in constant fear that junta soldiers will stop them and check their phones. You can be arrested for using a virtual private network (VPN) or storing photos deemed politically sensitive or offensive to the regime.
Walking in downtown Yangon, the din of diesel generators rattles your ears and the stink from overflowing garbage cans gives you a headache.
Fine restaurants like Japanese eatery Gekko that attracted both local and international customers have shut down since the coup.
The regime claims foreign arrivals have increased, but tourists are a rare sight in Yangon. The flocks of foreigners that you saw at Shwedagon Pagoda, outside Yangon City Hall, in Chinatown, and on buses to and from the airport are a thing of the past.
Both urban and rural areas of Myanmar have been in turmoil since the coup.
No guest likes to visit a troubled home.
Every morning, my wife tells me, “Why don’t you play Paritta [Buddhist chant believed to ward off misfortune or danger] on your computer?”
But I know it will take more than chanting to lift the curse of military rule..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Economic History
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Description:
"There is a fundamental difference between Western and Chinese peacemaking efforts in Myanmar. Western governments, NGOs, and think-tanks produce lengthy, well-crafted reports, and some even organize workshops and study trips for what they call “stakeholders.” The Chinese, on the other hand, have an extensive intelligence network throughout Myanmar, and they are a major supplier of military hardware to the Myanmar military, while several resistance forces are equipped with Chinese-made guns obtained through the United Wa State Army (UWSA). In that way, China has leverage over the Myanmar military as well as ethnic armed organizations. And the Chinese are not involved in Myanmar’s internal affairs for entirely altruistic reasons. They want to secure their geostrategic interests in the region, the main one being access to the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, Myanmar has become a playground for well-paid Western peacemakers and analysts who seem to believe that they are in a position to “engage” the military as well as the opposition, armed or otherwise, with the aim of holding talks so that all the parties involved in the conflicts can meet and sort out their differences “peacefully”. The Indians, Myanmar’s second largest neighbors next to the Chinese, have a far more realistic approach to the issues. Like the Chinese, they are also motivated by geostrategic concerns. They realize what the Chinese, their main regional adversaries, are up to in Myanmar and are countering this by following a similar course of action: friendly relations with Naypyitaw – and informal contacts with the opposition. But India has nowhere near the same level of influence – or muscle – inside Myanmar as China, and its efforts have yielded few positive results.
Myanmar’s importance to China as an outlet to the region is not new; it is China’s foreign-policy priorities that have changed since the time of the old chairman, Mao Zedong. In the past, when China wanted to export revolution, Myanmar was the main springboard from which Maoist-style rebellion would spread to Southeast Asia and the region. Today, Beijing wants to export consumer goods and import oil and gas, and, once again, Myanmar serves as its most coveted entranceway to the world beyond China’s southern borders.
China first became involved in Myanmar’s internal conflicts when Naw Seng, a Kachin rebel, crossed into Yunnan with 500 of his men in 1950. They were given shelter in Guizhou province, but not allowed to engage in political activities. A few years later, another group of rebels, this time from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), trekked into China, and were allowed to settle in Sichuan, where they received political training. But, like Naw Seng’s Kachins, they were told to refrain from Myanmar-related political activities. At that time, the Chinese had good relations with Myanmar, but they also had a major security concern: thousands of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers had, after their defeat in the Chinese civil war, set up bases in eastern and northeastern Shan State, from where they launched cross-border raids into Yunnan.
In a tacit agreement with the then U Nu government, a total of 20,000 soldiers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the border between Sipsongpanna in southern Yunnan and Kengtung state in January 1961. In human waves, they swept down across the hills surrounding Möng Yang, Möng Wa and Möng Yawng. The campaign, codenamed the “Mekong River Operation,” broke the back of the KMT in northeastern Myanmar. Beaten Nationalist Chinese forces retreated towards Möng Pa Liao on the Mekong River, where 5,000 Myanmar soldiers launched an attack. The KMT’s base was captured without much resistance – but when the Myanmar troops marched in, they found large quantities of US-made arms and ammunition. When the news hit the newspapers in Yangon, rowdy demonstrations were held outside the US embassy, then on Merchant Street. Neither the Myanmar government nor the Chinese, however, have ever acknowledged that the PLA formed the core of the force that drove the KMT out of the eastern border areas.
Myanmar’s cordial relations with China came to an end when Gen. Ne Win staged a coup to oust the elected U Nu government on March 2, 1962. The Chinese, long wary of the ambitious and unpredictable general, for the first time allowed the CPB exiles to print and publish propaganda material. They were mostly urban intellectuals without military backgrounds, so the Chinese brought them together with Naw Seng’s warriors, and the nucleus of a new CPB army was formed. Teams were sent to the Myanmar border to identify possible infiltration routes, and, inadvertently, Ne Win’s junta provided the Chinese with an opportunity to connect the exiles in China with the remnants of the poorly equipped CPB forces which at that time were holding out in old strongholds like the Pegu Yoma mountains north of Yangon. In July 1963, the junta invited all rebel groups in the country to a “peace parley” in Yangon, and promised them safe passage to and from the meetings regardless of the outcome. Twenty-nine of the exiles in China also flowed in on special planes from Beijing, ostensibly to take part in the talks.
Predictably, the talks broke down in November because the junta offered no more than “rehabilitation” if the rebels, communists and ethnic fighters surrendered. But only two of the “Beijing returnees,” as they were called, went back to China; the rest joined the forces in the Pegu Yoma and assumed de facto leadership of the party at home. They had brought with them radio equipment from China, and a direct link was established between the exiles in Sichuan and the Pegu Yoma. Anti-Chinese riots in Yangon in June and July 1967 provided the Chinese with the pretext they needed to launch their push across the border. That happened on January 1, 1968, and the CPB established a new base area in the northeast. In the beginning, most of the forces consisted of Chinese volunteers and it was only when the Wa Hills were occupied in the early 1970s that the CPB gained a truly indigenous fighting force. Many ethnic resistance armies, eager to benefit from the supply of Chinese weapons, forged alliances with the CPB. But whatever guns they received had to be provided by the CPB; nothing came directly from China.
The CPB collapsed when ethnic Wa soldiers rose in mutiny in 1989 – and China had adopted a new foreign policy. The UWSA, which emerged from the ashes of the CPB, maintains a close relationship with China’s security services and is better armed and equipped with weapons obtained from China than the CPB ever was. And, again, other ethnic resistance armies have also benefited from the supply of Chinese weaponry but, as before, the guns have come from China’s main ally inside Myanmar, now the UWSA. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw.
Significantly, when then President’s Office Minister U Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China … we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.” By “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, among them the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Kokang, another former CPB force. The MNDAA returned to armed struggle in February 2015 after having entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military in 1989, and has now assumed a leading role in ongoing battles in northern Shan State. China, predictably, has denied any involvement in that conflict, but the fact remains that most of the MNDAA’s weaponry – and that of its allies, among them the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – have been supplied by the UWSA. At the same time, the Myanmar Army is using its Chinese-supplied weapons to fight the resistance. The UWSA, however, does not send soldiers to take part in the current battles.
China appears to believe that its interests are best served by playing both sides in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. But it is not in China’s interest to see the emergence of a strong, peaceful, democratic and federal Myanmar. As long as Myanmar is weak, China can play official games of being a “friendly neighbor” as well as “peacemaker” and use a carrot-and-stick approach with whatever government is in power: trade coupled with investment on the one hand and indirect support for the ethnic armies on the other. If Myanmar ever became exactly that – strong, peaceful, democratic and federal – China would be the first to lose. The leverage China has today inside Myanmar would be gone. But then China does not want to see the situation get totally out of hand either, because that would mean serious instability in the frontier areas and, most likely, a flood of refugees across the border. Typical examples of China’s unique role in the conflicts occurred in late June and early July, when former President Thein Sein was invited to Beijing. Ironically, Thein Sein’s trip was planned to coincide with the 70th anniversary of “The Declaration of the Five Principles of Co-Existence” which was worked out by China – and India, then friends – in 1954. One of those is non-interference, but no country has interfered more blatantly in Myanmar’s internal affairs than China. Thein Sein met foreign minister Wang Yi and, reportedly, urged China to help bring peace to Myanmar, knowing full well that China is the only outside country that has any clout over the ethnic armies. It was noteworthy that the Chinese invited Thein Sein, a less controversial personality than the hugely unpopular junta-boss, Sn. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Had he been invited, it would most probably have caused an anti-Chinese backlash in Myanmar. But then, on July 6, Min Aung Hlaing’s deputy, Gen. Soe Win, went to China, not to Beijing but to Qingdao in Shandong Province to attend “the Green Development Forum” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and he was met at the airport by a local representative of the Communist Party of China. China had taken a cautious step forward towards establishing full relations with the junta, and then on a less informal party level.
Myanmar’s future depends on what China will do next – and if India will assume a more pro-active role. Squeezed between the two giants of Asia, which are also bitter enemies, Myanmar’s troublesome geographic location has now become a bigger problem than it ever was. Seen in that context, Western peacemakers are irrelevant sideshow artists. Finnish, Swiss, Norwegian and Australian organizations and an obscure outfit called the Joint Peace Fund are once again quietly sniffing around Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, hoping to “engage” them and reactivate the idea of talks with the military. But all they can hope to achieve is to persuade various UN agencies to issue statements condemning the atrocities perpetrated by the present junta and call for peace. But the UN is as impotent as the West when it comes to influencing the Myanmar military. Since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, dozens of rapporteurs and special envoys have come and gone, and the military has always ignored their often critical reports. The UN’s current secretary general, António Guterres, pledged at a news conference on February 5, 2021 – only four days after the coup – that “the United Nations will do everything it can to unite the international community and create conditions for the military coup in Myanmar to be reversed.” But the only actions Guterres has taken since then are a series of statements urging the military to refrain from using violence against civilians. And UN agencies continue to cooperate with military authorities in Naypyitaw while whatever humanitarian aid they have provided has been channeled through junta-controlled entities..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-12
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Communist Party of China (CPC) has invited Myanmar’s military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party, People’s Party, Arakan Front Party (AFP) and Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (SEDP) to pay a seven-day visit to China.
The invitation by China’s ruling party to the four parties – members of a working group of parties registered under the junta’s election commission – comes after junta chief Min Aung Hlaing again vowed to hold the long-delayed election next year.
The coup leader has repeatedly failed to hold the promised election after ousting the elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and annulling the 2020 election results that secured the NLD a second term. The junta has imprisoned senior NLD members and dissolved the party.
Myanmar people have condemned the election plan as a ruse to legitimize military rule that has brutalized their lives since the 2021 coup. The poll plan has also been dismissed as a sham by much of the international community, including the United States.
However, China – the junta’s major ally and arms supplier – has offered to assist the process.
According to the invitation seen by The Irrawaddy, a 17-member delegation from the four parties will visit China from 20 to 27 July.
The trip aims to strengthen relations between the CPC and Myanmar’s political parties, the invitation stated. The delegation will consist of seven representatives from the military proxy USDP and three each from the People’s Party (PP), AFP and SEDP.
Airfares and expenses will be borne by the Chinese side, the invitation added. The delegation will travel to Yunnan and Qinghai for field studies and talks with Chinese experts on rural development and the Belt & Road Initiative, it said.
People’s Party leader U Ko Ko Gyi confirmed that he would be among three PP representatives in the delegation.
“Our ties with the CPC have existed since the PP’s founding,” he told The Irrawaddy, adding that he would not comment on the trip until after the visit, as he does not know what will be discussed yet.
U Ko Ko Gyi told the pro-junta Eleven Media outlet that his party’s delegation would discuss stability and restoring democracy in Myanmar while explaining to Chinese officials the fear and insecurity people face due to armed conflict.
Former general Thein Sein, whose quasi-civilian government ceded power to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s party following landmark elections in 2015, left the country for the first time since the coup to visit China last month.
Junta deputy chief Soe Win followed in his footsteps a few days later to explain election preparations to Chinese officials.
Igor Blazevic, a human rights campaigner and Myanmar expert, commented that China is pushing for an election to shore up the junta as a viable, if weak, central government.
The giant neighbor is exerting pressure and offering incentives to military elites to proceed with votes in territories still under junta control, he added.
This raised the likelihood that Myanmar would see a “Chinese election” heavily influenced by Beijing.
“This is nothing but very serious meddling in the internal matters of a neighboring state,” Blazevic said.
The four parties’ participation in Chinese preparations for the junta’s election amounted to high treachery, he added.
The junta last year dissolved 40 political parties including the NLD, whose leaders including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remain in regime prisons.
Myanmar boasted more than 90 political parties at the 2020 election. So far, the junta’s election body has approved registration applications of 49 parties..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-12
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Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Desk Review Findings.....
• Lack of multisectoral needs and analysis hinders MPC scale*
• Limitations on tracking CVA means data does not exist on MPC growth over time
• MPC design is inherently basic needs approach = context selected sector objectives and outcomes
• MPC provides opportunities to increase reach and enhance outcome monitoring across sectors
‘the impact of multi-purpose cash should not be measured in isolation and should instead focus on what
combinations of assistance and modalities can create synergistic impacts’ (UNHCR) and broader quality
humanitarian action (CALP..."
Source/publisher:
Asia-Pacific Regional Cash Working Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-07-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
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"The breakdown of a China-initiated ceasefire in northern Shan State, and the advance of ethnic resistance armies in the same area, have highlighted two crucial issues for the future of Myanmar: the nature and aims of Chinese peacemaking, and what the re-establishment of a federal system akin to that which the country enjoyed prior to the 1962 military coup should look like. China is evidently the only outsider power that is in a position to exercise real influence over some of the ethnic armies as well as the Burmese military. And although most resistance groups, armed or otherwise, say they are in favor of a “free, democratic and federal Myanmar,” none one these has addressed what the status of ethnic minorities within their areas would, or should, be. Would it really bring decades of ethnic strife to an end if the existing seven ethnic minority states – Shan, Kachin, Chin, Karen, Mon, and Karenni (Kayah) – were granted genuine autonomy, the majority Burmans were left to govern the other seven regions, and the union territory around Naypyitaw became common ground for everyone?
The problem is that Chin State is perhaps the only “ethnic state” with only one major “ethnic group”. But, even so, the Chin have no lingua franca; mutually unintelligible dialects are spoken in different parts of the state. In Kachin State, there has always been a huge Shan community , and migration from other parts of Myanmar means that ethnic Kachins have become a minority in their state. And then there is the question of whether the Lisu and Nung-Rawang identify themselves as Kachins? Most Karen, meanwhile, live in Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) Region, not in Karen State in the east, which has Shan, Burman and other communities as well. In Mon State, it is hard to say who is what because most urban Mon are Burmanized and the state capital Mawlamyine has an ethnically and religiously very mixed population. Karenni (Kayah) State has large Shan, Padaung, and Pa-O communities. The population of Rakhine State in the west consists of Buddhist Rakhine (Arakanese), Muslim Rohingya and Kaman, and tribal people in the highlands.
And then there is Shan State, the largest and ethnically most diverse state where several non-Shan peoples – among them the Wa, the Palaung, the Kokang Chinese, and the Pa-O – want their own states or, at least, to be self-governing. The main complication can be observed in the north where Shan, Palaung, and Kachin groups have overlapping claims, and their respective armies have throughout the history of the civil war frequently clashed over territory. The Wa already control a de facto self-governing state spanning more than 20,000 square kilometers in the eastern mountains. Their United Wa State Army (UWSA) is allied with the Shan State Army (SSA) of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), but has fought battles with the SSA/SSPP’s rival, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), whose army is also called the Shan State Army. In the south, the Pa-O rose in rebellion in the late 1940s, not to fight the central government but against the power of the Shan saohpas, or princes.
The original SSA, which was set up in 1964 and in 1971 formed a political wing called the SSPP, made a point of having other nationalities among its ranks to show that it was fighting for the entire Shan State. There was a Kokang Chinese unit and several Palaung battalions, and it had Kachin and Wa officers. The RCSS, on the other hand, promotes a strongly ethnocentric, Shan-Buddhist identity. Since an above-ground Shan political party, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, was formed in 1988, the SSA/SSPP has also become more Shan nationalistic. The near-absurd complexity of the situation in Shan State could be illustrated by the example of late Ta Kalei, an ethnic, Christian Karen who wore Buddha amulets and headed a Pa-O rebel army which was allied with the once powerful Communist Party of Burma.
So, what a future federal Myanmar, and, especially, Shan State, would look like is very much an open question. There are, however, some similarities between Shan State and India’s northeastern state of Assam (which was historically a Shan-ruled kingdom). In the years after India’s independence from Britain in 1947, Assam consisted of all areas east of the Siliguri Neck with the exceptions of the old princely states of Manipur and Tripura. Like the Shan, the Assamese dominated the lowlands and various hill peoples lived in the surrounding highlands. But following years of insurgency, the Naga Hills in the east were separated from Assam and, in 1963, became the state of Nagaland. The Mizo area south of Nagaland also saw a rebellion against the Indian state, and peace efforts resulted in the formation of the union territory of Mizoram in 1972, which in 1987 was proclaimed a state. In 1972, the Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills also became a separate state called Meghalaya. Assam then had to move its capital Shillong, which was located in what was to become Meghalaya, to Dispur near Guwahati, the main city in the lowlands. In 1972, the Northeast Frontier Agency, which consisted of the northern areas of Assam bordering China, became the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh, and, in 1987, a state. All that remains of Assam are the lowlands around the Brahmaputra River.
The “Balkanization” of Assam did not come about without discontent among the majority Assamese, but it was the price they had to pay for peace. Would the Shan be willing to accept a similar solution to their internal, ethnic conflicts? With all likelihood, no. But, if there won’t be separate states for the non-Shan peoples of Shan State, what could a solution look like? A “confederation” of smaller, ethnic entities? Autonomous districts within the state? But that has been rejected by the Wa, who already have a self-governing territory that for all intents and purposes is being governed separately from the rest of Shan State. A similar development appears underway in Kokang, where the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army has wrested control over most territory and established its own administration.
And what would happen to Kachin State? Some Shan, supported by the authorities in Naypyitaw, are already arming themselves to fight the Kachin Independence Army. Even if there is peace in that part of the country, the local Shan as well as Burman and Rakhine migrants, and most likely also the Lisu and the Nung-Rawang, would be opposed to attempts to establish a Kachin-dominated state government. Would a future Karen State consist of the present state as well as Karen-dominated areas in Ayeyarwady Region? Should the Rohingya minority in northern Rakhine State have their own state, or could the Mayu Frontier District, which existed for them between 1961 and 1964, be recreated? And how many from the Buddhist Rakhine majority would be willing to accept either solution to the ethnoreligious antagonism in their state?
There are no easy ways of solving Myanmar’s decades-long ethnic conflicts, and it is not only the leadership of the supposedly unified resistance, called the National Unity Government, that has been unable, or unwilling, to provide workable alternatives to the present order. The foreign peacemakers, who descended on Myanmar in droves during the period of relative openness from 2011 to 2021, held seminars and workshops on catchy topics such as “peacemaking,” “dialogue patterns,” “good governance,” and “reconciliation,” which had little or no relevance to the bitter realities on the ground in the conflict areas. Millions of dollars were wasted on fatuous exercises, suggesting inapplicable solutions modelled on entirely different kinds of peace processes elsewhere in the world. In the end, those efforts raised false hopes, caused confusion, and have only served to aggravate already existing problems and conflicts.
In the broader scheme of things, those foreign groups were and still are irrelevant because there is only one outside power that has the leverage that is needed to put pressure on the military as well as major ethnic armies. And that, of course is China. Unlike the Western peaceniks, China has vital geostrategic interests in Myanmar and will do everything in its might to get what it wants, namely, to secure the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor from the southern province of Yunnan to the Indian Ocean. And that corridor consists of already constructed gas- and oil-pipelines, upgraded highways, and plans for high-speed railroads leading to deepwater ports on the Bay of Bengal. China’s interests are also economic as it has become a major investor in Myanmar and its biggest trade partner.
Contrary to the expectations of many, the junta State Administration Council (SAC) in Naypyitaw is not about to fall, but if it did, that would only mean the beginning of a process to find realistic and workable solutions to a host of challenges related to ethnicity and governmental structures. And any post-SAC administration would also have to find ways to deal prudently with its two giant neighbors: China, which wants to control Myanmar, and, not to be overlooked, India, which, without much success so far, wants to keep Chinese influence at a bare minimum. Other outside actors such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, ASEAN, Canada, Australia, Norway, and Switzerland, which at various times have tried to play roles in Myanmar’s internal affairs, lack the means as well as the manipulative skills to be of any decisive importance..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, and Shan State from July 1st to 7th. The Military Junta used the civilians as human shields and searched mines on Monywa-Mandalay Road. The Military’s ward and village Administrators asked for the money under the reason of Military Service Law. The Military’s Minister of Labor said that will stop the workers who go to foreign countries with visiting visas (PV) and working on July 6th.
Almost 30 civilians died, and nearly 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 under-aged children died, and 4 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-07-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
Junta falling back to urban-based porcupine strategy, leaving it vulnerable to rebel attacks on supply chains that aim for regime collapse
Description:
"In major cities around Myanmar’s war-torn borderlands, a pattern is emerging. From Myitkyina and Bhamo in northern Kachin state to Lashio in northeastern Shan, and Sittwe, on the Bay of Bengal in the west, the Myanmar Army is pulling back into urban bastions shielded by air power, artillery and plentiful supplies of ammunition.
Driven by eight months of serial defeat at the hands of ethnic minority insurgent armies, the country’s embattled State Administration Council (SAC) junta is shifting slowly but surely to what can best be described as a porcupine strategy – curling up on itself behind an array of lethally sharp quills.
Whether this war plan offers a viable path for regime survival will likely be decided in the coming months as what began early this year in the ethnic borderlands becomes an increasingly nationwide phenomenon. Indeed, in central Myanmar, the porcupine’s shift towards the national heartland has already begun.
Since June 25 ethnic Palaung insurgents of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and their ethnic Bamar People’s Defense Force (PDF) allies have begun pressing army forces back toward Mandalay, Myanmar’s ancient royal capital, with offensives in Madaya township immediately north of the city and towards Pyin Oo Lwin, home to the military’s prestigious Defense Services Academy (DSA) that overlooks Mandalay from hills to the east.
The military’s grinding retreat into apparently impregnable urban strongholds is a less conscious strategy than a chaotic response to an aggressive advance of resistance forces that shows no sign of easing. But even if enforced rather than planned, the emerging urban porcupine offers three distinct layers of advantage.
Militarily, it invites the opposition to come down from the hills and jungles of the borderlands and meet the army on the plains and rice paddies around large cities where the army’s overwhelming superiority in artillery, armor and air power will be most lethally effective. Provided it can be concentrated to effect, such firepower stands to decimate ill-equipped and loosely coordinated PDFs.
Politically, the SAC’s grip on urban areas maintains control over the majority of Myanmar’s population and offers the foundations for fresh elections planned for next year – the only viable exit strategy for a military that has been trapped in a catastrophic political cul-de-sac since the coup of February 2021.
Diplomatically, meanwhile, if some form of electoral process – however transparently constrained and flawed – can be staged, the pseudo-civilian administration that emerges may manage to buy the military sufficient time to win at an internationally-brokered negotiating table what it currently risks losing on the battlefield.
Certainly, Myanmar’s key neighbors, China, India and Thailand, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc more generally will waste little time in endorsing the polls and expanding engagement with any administration dressed in civilian longyis rather than military khakis. Once that engagement gathers traction, it seems likely enough that the West will slowly, if grudgingly, fall into line.
The overarching question for the coming year is whether the SAC’s porcupine strategy anchored on the cities of the populous national heartland can sustain a military stand-off for long enough to ensure the military’s ongoing central role in Myanmar’s governance that it sees as its prerogative.
At the beginning of the rainy season of 2024, it would be foolhardy to suggest a clear answer. There is certainly nothing inevitable about the survival of a beleaguered military regime overstretched and exhausted by unprecedented challenges that continue to mount.
Conflict endgames in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 and Afghanistan in 1992 and 2021 point to an irrefutable lesson: well-equipped militaries enjoying foreign backing but anchored on the defense of shrinking urban enclaves can be overwhelmed by ubiquitous and relentless resistance forces to the point of disintegration and collapse.
Equally, there is nothing preordained about the success of Myanmar’s federal-democratic resistance. Despite enjoying wide popular support, the “Spring Revolution” continues to lack the most important prerequisites for revolutionary victory: a vanguard political party capable of imposing strategic coherence and direction, charismatic leadership able to inspire and rally, and an external backer willing to provide material and diplomatic support.
Two strategic approaches
Against this fluid backdrop, two key variables will be critical in shaping Myanmar’s chaotic battlespace over the coming year. Unknowns today, both will be on full display by the beginning of 2025.
First, and perhaps the more crucial, is the extent to which opposition forces adopt a direct or indirect approach towards the SAC’s porcupine strategy.
A direct approach would involve PDF forces, either affiliated with the National Unity Government (NUG) or independent of it, attempting to launch attacks on large urban centers and risk being slaughtered in front of the military’s big guns with potentially disastrous implications for resistance morale that since 2021 has weathered three and half years of conflict remarkably well.
The NUG’s Ministry of Defense’s tendency to date has typically been to compensate for what it lacks in material resources and effective command and control with politically rousing calls for “victory within a year.” There is no guarantee that the MoD, where real military experience is in short supply, will not continue to press ahead with calls for stirring but unrealistic objectives.
By contrast, an indirect approach would involve a multi-pronged effort aimed at dividing and exhausting already depleted regime forces. Requiring only minimal coordination, the primary operational focus would not be around urban areas but rather – and especially in the coming months – on the strategic road, rail and riverine lines of communications that connect them.
In short, a war for the roads needs to precede any war for the cities. By triggering internal collapse through blocked supply routes, resistance forces could avoid the need for a war for the cities. It was not by chance that in the examples from Indochina and Afghanistan noted above, all three capitals of Saigon, Phnom Penh and Kabul, and most provincial centers, fell to anti-government forces with little or no fighting.
The topography of central Myanmar offers a remarkably favorable setting for such a strategic approach. Main north-south lines of communication along the Ayeyarwaddy and Sittaung river valleys are hemmed in to the west by mountains of the Arakan Yoma and Chin Hills, to the east by the Karen hills and along the central spine of the country by the Bago Yoma.
What begins with small-unit hit-and-run ambush and harassment escalates into a war of attrition along lines of communication and supply lines critical for the delivery of crucial fuel and munitions. The process sees an incumbent regime being drawn into exhausting and costly operations to hold open and then re-open major arteries while being forced to abandon minor roads and lose smaller towns for lack of troops to defend them.
To a degree, such a strategy has already emerged by default over the past dry season along the major highway connecting SAC-held centers in the southern Tanintharyi panhandle along the Andaman Sea coast and with escalating sabotage of the Yangon-Mawlamyine and Yangon Mandalay railway lines.
But achieving strategic traction in the coming months would undoubtedly require larger mobile resistance units severing roads for days at a stretch; ambushing in strength and at points of their own choosing regime response units; and then disappearing into nearby hills before repeating the process elsewhere.
Such tactics would mirror operations launched in early 1944 by British Chindit columns operating behind the lines of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Indaw region of northern Sagaing, which cut its supply routes to lethal effect.
Other elements of an indirect approach would include mounting pressure on outlying townships in which the regime lacks the manpower to retake once lost, and destabilizing guerrilla attacks inside major cities where the SAC is already facing daunting economic strains and, before long, the challenge posed by large restless populations.
The ethnic variable
The second variable hinges on a decision that the leaderships of key ethnic resistance organizations, most notably Kachin, Karen, Ta’ang and Rakhine, will need to make soon if they have not already done so.
Historic in its ramifications, that decision hinges simply on what approach better serves the long-term interests of any ethnic community in relation to who holds power in the country’s Bamar heartland.
One option would involve increased support for allied PDFs in the shape of munitions, advisors and training that could fuel an indirect strategy and decisively tip the military balance against the SAC, likely ushering in an interim administration centered on the NUG.
The alternative would be based on an assessment that ethnic interests are better served by formalizing with the SAC an autonomy already largely won on the battlefield while accepting the risk of leaving an unreformed if weakened military in the national driving seat.
In mid-late 2024, the reality is almost certainly that either a wait-and-see or a hedging approach on the part of the ethnic armies would be objectively more likely to favor the survival of the SAC porcupine than the success of under-equipped and ill-directed PDFs.
These variables will play out against the backdrop of the military’s Achilles Heel: its manpower shortfall. What has been a persistent problem over the past two decades with infantry battalions typically numbering around 200 men rather than the prescribed 827 is today a crisis with potentially terminal implications.
The frantic scramble to accelerate conscription since the introduction of the People’s Military Service Law last February has given the lie to the Wikipedia mythology of a 350,000-400,000 strong Tatmadaw—figures, which to the extent they were ever true, emerged from calculations based on units at full strength and included the military’s notoriously bloated tail of non-combat branches – administrative, commercial, technical and medical.
Today, almost all credible assessments of the army’s combat-capable strength made by Myanmar and foreign analysts coalesce around a figure somewhere between 70,000 and 90,000 troops.
The shortfall in raw numbers is exacerbated by two factors. The first is structural: a pattern of penny-packet battalion-size deployments across 14 regional military commands driven by the essentially political need to garrison the population of the entire country, not least in ethnic regions, rather than defend against foreign aggression.
The second driver, highlighted by recent dry season campaigns in Rakhine and Kachin states, is operational: a stubborn unwillingness to temporarily surrender territory in the interest of regrouping forces for counteroffensives.
The result, again and again, has seen isolated battalions or larger tactical operations commands (TOCs) fighting until they have either been overrun or surrender while the hemorrhaging of numbers continues apace.
Indeed, the military now faces the risk that current battlefield losses may soon be outpacing the advertised 5,000 man-per-month rate of induction of new conscripts – even assuming draftees with no combat experience have some enthusiasm for the fight.
A resistance strategy targeted squarely over the rest of this year on corridors of communication and supply rather than SAC-held urban porcupines would be well-calculated to act as a further accelerant to the army’s escalating manpower crisis.
Whether such a strategy will be adopted, however, or whether Myanmar’s key ethnic armies, whose role on the national stage is now decisive, will be willing to support it is anything but guaranteed..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2024-07-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"With Myanmar regime’s emergency rule expiring at the end of this month, the junta’s second-in-command Soe Win discussed preparations for a general election with Chinese officials on Sunday.
On his first official visit to China since the 2021 coup, Soe Win arrived in Qingdao on Saturday to attend the Green Development Forum at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
On Sunday, he met Shen Yueyue, vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and president of SCO’s Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Commission.
Junta media said they discussed border stability, security for Chinese investments in Myanmar, elimination of online scam operations, promotion of trade and the proposed election.
The deputy minister for natural resources, Min Thu, and Myanmar’s ambassador to China, Tin Maung Swe, also attended the meeting.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has promised an election next year and China has offered to assist the process.
Min Aung Hlaing has not visited China since the 2021 coup.
Soe Win’s only previous official visit was to Russia.
Former president Thein Sein last month visited Beijing to mark the adoption of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, which established Communist China’s foreign policy. The ex-general met Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Observers say Soe Win may have discussed the ongoing fighting in northern Shan State which will also dominate the National Defense and Security Council’s meeting that will be held in late this month to extend the junta’s emergency rule..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, China-Burma relations
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Description:
"One of Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic minority groups battling the military government said it captured an airport serving the country’s top world-class beach resort, marking the first time resistance forces have seized such a facility.
Residents of the area in the southern part of the western state of Rakhine, along with local media, also reported the seizure of Thandwe Airport, also known as Ma Zin Airport, about 260 kilometers (160 miles) northwest of Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city.
It's the latest major setback for the military government that took power in 2021 after ousting the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Armed resistance to military rule is taking place in much of the country, led by pro-democracy militants as well as guerrilla groups affiliated with ethnic minorities.
The Arakan Army said in a statement on the Telegram messaging app on Sunday night that it had recovered the bodies of more than 400 soldiers from the recent fighting in the area, as well as a cache of ammunition. The Associated Press could not independently verify the claims by the group, which in the past have been disputed.
The seizure of the airport, one of six in Rakhine, would appear to open the way for the rebels to seize Rakhine’s coastal region, even as they consolidates control over much of the northern part of the state.
The Arakan Army is the military wing of the Buddhist Rakhine minority, which seeks autonomy for Rakhine state from Myanmar’s central government. It has recently also called itself the Arakha Army.
Since November last year, the group has been on the offensive and has gained control of nine of 17 townships, along with one in neighboring Chin state. It is also part of an armed ethnic alliance that launched an offensive last October that gained strategic territory in the country’s northeast on the border with China.
Ngapali, a 7-kilometer (4-mile) long beach on the Bay of Bengal had been getting attention from international tourism but development stalled due to COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict that followed the army takeover.
Sporadic fighting in villages near Ngapali beach on the Bay of Bengal since April has halted flights to the airport, which serves the beach resort, and most of the 46 hotels and guest houses were shut down.
A Ngapali hotel executive who had recently escaped the area told The Associated Press on Monday his staff had fled the property.
A travel agent in the town of Thandwe, about 5 kilometers (3 miles) east of Ngapali, told the AP that she had heard the sound of the fighting coming from outside of the town, but the situation inside was quiet with no guerrillas in the immediate vicinity.
Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of fear for their safety..."
Source/publisher:
Associated Press (New York) via "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Sub-title:
School buildings are often targeted by indiscriminate airstrikes or shelling from artillery.
Description:
"More than a quarter – or about 13,700 – of Myanmar’s 48,753 public schools have been closed due to the country’s civil war, the military junta’s Ministry of Education said.
In western Chin state, which has seen fierce fighting since the 2021 military coup d’etat, only 38 schools out of some 1,500 are still open, according to figures released by the ministry.
In neighboring Sagaing region, where the coup triggered an insurgency by members of the majority Burman community in Myanmar’s heartland, more than 4,200 schools have been closed.
Junta troops often target civilian homes and other buildings – including schools – during or after ground battles with insurgents.
“Children have suffered a lot in education,” said U Htay, a resident of Ma Taw village in Sagaing’s Mingin township. “They have lost their dream. We see that their potential to become outstanding citizens is being destroyed.”
Most schools remain open in the commercial capital of Yangon and nearby Ayeyarwady region, the ministry said.
The shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, has opened more than 4,300 schools nationwide in areas controlled by insurgent forces. NUG was formed by pro-democracy politicians and allies following the coup.
But even those schools have been targeted by the junta’s indiscriminate airstrikes, the NUG’s deputy minister for education, Sai Khine Myo Tun, told Radio Free Asia.
Intense fighting in eastern Kayah state has also put students at risk. But the Karenni state Interim Executive Council has still opened more than 400 schools there since 2021, the council said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Children, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
Language:
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Description:
"Since October 2023, resistance forces in Myanmar have gained territorial control across different parts of Myanmar. Expanded resistance has been accompanied by increased losses for the Myanmar military. Myanmar’s de facto authorities have routinely punished civilians they view as supporting the opposition, a trend that has worsened since October 2023 as they lose ground to resistance forces across the country.
Escalating armed conflict has led to deepening humanitarian need, high poverty levels, violence against civilians, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and civilian casualties. These recent shifts are challenging the delivery of aid to the most vulnerable.
To address the losses to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and mass desertions in the Myanmar military, on February 10, 2024, Myanmar’s de facto authorities reactivated an old law requiring young men and women to enlist in the military. Reports indicate forced conscription into the junta’s ranks, using threats and violence for enlistment. Fear of conscription has driven large numbers of individuals—especially young men—to seek safety in neighboring countries and internally in different parts of the country. Forced recruitment by other parties to the conflict, including EAOs and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), are also being reported.
Rohingya populations are particularly vulnerable to conscription due to a long history of persecution, limited mobility, and limited access to aid. In Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State, the Rohingya population faces increasingly brutal abuses at the hands of both the military and the Arakan Army (A.A.), a powerful ethnic armed group in Rakhine State. In recent weeks, the A.A. has seized control of several townships in Rakhine, including northern Rakhine, leading to the displacement of thousands of people and increased tensions between Rakhine and Rohingya communities. More than 200,000 people have been displaced in Rakhine since clashes between Myanmar armed forces and AA resumed in November 2023, and the delivery of essential supplies and aid items remains restricted as Myanmar’s junta blocks major roads and waterways.
For Rohingya, conscription is just one element of the continued persecution they face. Both the A.A. and the Myanmar armed forces (MAF) are allegedly forcing Rohingya to join their ranks, generating immense fear of having to fight alongside the armed actors responsible for abuses to their communities.
With their movement restricted in Rakhine State, Rohingya are forced to seek safety in makeshift shelters, including in public buildings like schools. A.A.-MAF clashes are expected to continue resulting in attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In addition to violence, populations in Rakhine face telecommunication and internet restrictions that prevent civilians from contacting loved ones amid the conflict, contributing to the isolation that allows for ongoing human rights violations.
The violence and oppression are reminiscent of what Rohingya experienced at the hands of the military back in 2017, which triggered the mass exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya into neighboring Bangladesh. United Nations (U.N.) officials said they have received recent reports of serious human rights abuses. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called for an immediate end to the violence and for all civilians to be protected without any distinction based on identity.
Unfortunately, these events are not confined to Rakhine State—almost all parts of the country are facing human rights violations and continued access restrictions. In a country already experiencing immense humanitarian needs, these conflict dynamics only deepen suffering while the essentials for life, such as food, medical treatment, and shelter, go unmet.
Recommendations
The people of Myanmar are highly resilient and adaptable, but they should not have to face this alone. Despite access and funding challenges, humanitarian organizations continue to use diverse and complementary modalities and localized access strategies to reach people in need, often at great risk. These approaches need additional funding and continued donor flexibility to support adaptive programming to meet the rapidly increasing needs on the ground. Donor governments are responsible for ensuring sufficient funding and appropriate risk-sharing mechanisms for the humanitarian response plan, which is currently funded at only 12%.
The international community must stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and take swift action to address the growing humanitarian needs and insecurity. International actors have a significant role to play in helping address and end the rising insecurity, violence, and repression. The U.N. must put in place strong and permanent humanitarian leadership in Myanmar for sustainable humanitarian engagement and outcomes.
U.N. Member States must uphold obligations under international law to facilitate the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar and strongly advocate with all parties to the conflict to adhere to international human rights and humanitarian law. The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) should ensure open and regular briefings on the situation in Myanmar and monitor the progress of UNSC Resolution 2669. The Human Rights Council should swiftly condemn all human rights abuses and violations against Rohingya, Rakhine, and other communities by the Myanmar military and other parties to the conflict. Principled engagement with diverse stakeholders at the national and regional levels must be strengthened to ensure a holistic response to the Myanmar crisis..."
Source/publisher:
InterAction
Date of publication:
2024-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Throughout the first week of July, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) observed worrying patterns of violence against women and girls in target areas of Mon State, Karen State and the Tanintharyi region.
At the end of June, HURFOM’s latest volume of ‘Voice Up’ also presented evidence of the rise in targeted gendered attacks. Further, a new report released by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on the gendered impacts of the coup found, “The threat of sexual and gender-based violence is a dark shadow that follows women, girls, and LGBT people throughout Myanmar.”
Over the last week alone, a woman died, and three others were injured after artillery shelling by the junta’s police station in Pala Town, Pu Law Township, Myeik District, Tanintharyi Region, on June 28th. The shelling occurred without any prior fighting. At 9 AM, the junta’s police station in Pala Town launched two artillery shells. One of the shells hit and exploded near a shop at the three-way intersection in Pala Town.
Daw San Yu, a woman in her 40s who was inside the shop, died due to the explosion. Another two women a man who was near the shop, were also injured. Earlier in June, an artillery shell fired by the military junta’s naval headquarters in Mawrawaddy exploded on a house in Yar Phu village, Yebyu Township, killing four family members, including an infant.
On June 29th, a novice monk was killed, and a woman was injured by artillery fire from Battalion 310 in Thane Zayat Township, Kyaik Hto Township, Mon State. According to locals, a shell fired by Artillery Battalion 310 under junta control struck the Dhamma Duta Monastery, causing casualties.
This incident followed a similar tragedy on June 14th, when a shell fired by Artillery Battalion 310 exploded, killing a 14-year-old girl named Ma Nandar Lin and injuring a one-and-a-half-year-old girl named Shwe Zin Lay. On the same day, four people, including two monks, were injured by artillery fire from junta troops in the village of Kha Kwal.
Furthermore, Artillery Battalion 310 and other military units under junta control frequently launch artillery shells into villages where civilians live. On June 3rd, an artillery mortar landed in Mok Kha Maw village in Thane Zayat, injuring a resident. On June 2, artillery fire destroyed two houses in Wa Duk Kwin village in Thane Zayat.
The ongoing rise of attacks against women, children and young people should be of significant concern to the international community. The lack of justice referral pathways in Burma has made it impossible for justice and accountability. Further, transparent, coordinated, and decisive calls must be organized in collaboration with local organizations to ensure evidence of the junta’s crimes can be tried in international legal systems..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2024-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"On the evening of July 7 in 1962, soldiers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Sein Lwin of the then General Ne Win’s military regime carried out a bloody crackdown on student protests on the Rangoon University campus in Yangon.
The government announced that 16 students were killed and 86 injured. Eyewitnesses, however, said that more than 100 were killed. The July 7 crackdown also led to the dynamiting of the Student Union building on the campus – a historic building that had played an important part in Myanmar’s independence struggle – the next day, as Gen. Ne Win said he had suspected it was a hotbed of rebel associates, referring to communists.
Known as the “July 7 Crackdown,” the massacre and demolishing of the building go down in Myanmar’s modern history as one of the regime’s most brutal crackdowns on the student movement.
In 2012, The Irrawaddy’s English Edition Editor Kyaw Zwa Moe had a chance to talk to U Hla Shwe, who was a secretarial member of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions during the July 7 crackdown. He narrowly escaped the bloody crackdown that day. At the time, he was an editor of “Oway Magazine” published by the Rangoon University Student Union. U Hla Shwe was arrested six times since 1959, spending 24 years in prison for his political activism. He died of COVID-19 in July 2021 at the age of 84.
In this commemorative report for the 62nd anniversary of the July 7 crackdown, The Irrawaddy is publishing a conversation between Kyaw Zwa Moe and U Hla Shwe. During the interview at U Hla Shwe’s Yangon home 12 years ago, they discussed the role played by student unions in Myanmar’s politics and what role they can play to encourage reforms. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Kyaw Zwa Moe: You were a student union leader in 1962. There were protests on July 7 that year. At about 5 am the next day, the Rangoon University Student Union Building was blown up. What happened that day?
U Hla Shwe: The regime didn’t dynamite the student union building because of the student protests the day before. The main reason for blowing up the building was that when the military staged a coup in March of that year, all the political parties in the country were silent. Only the student unions spoke out.
KZM: The political parties supported the coup?
HS: Yes. They were silent about the [junta’s] killings. Student unions, student movements and student leaders have a long history. Since the first student strike in 1920, students never wanted to be a threat to political power. Students did not organize to take political power. We only demanded peace, fundamental human rights and democracy, for which we have struggled and made sacrifices.
KZM: You said political parties were silent about the coup then. So, is it fair to say the regime viewed students as its main enemy after they protested?
HS: We protested when the civilian government was forced to transfer power to the Myanmar military for six months the first time. We also protested when power was transferred to the military the second time by amending Article 116 of the 1947 Constitution … and we protested the military coup in 1962.
Political parties like the Myanmar Socialist Program Party and others emerged in fresh form after the coup. Some parties, especially the major left-wing political party, the National United Front, openly supported the coup.
No one was with us. Even after the killing [of university students], they were still silent. No one spoke out. Only a peace group led by Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing spoke out. Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing called it a tragic event in Myanmar’s history.
KZM: Where were you when the student union building was blown up? How did you hear the news?
HS: Two weeks beforehand we had scheduled a meeting of students on July 6 [to discuss] the 22 hostel regulations imposed by the Ne Win regime. At the time, they were even stricter than those in prison.
I had been at Mandalay Hostel since my second year [and] served as the secretary and chairman of the hostel management. All the students there behaved well. The regime limited the time for tea, lunch and dinner, baths, access to electricity and going outside. Students were not allowed to visit each other’s rooms after 9 pm. So, they were not happy.
Unfortunately, the electricity went out on the night of July 6. As you know, it is usual for students to make a commotion when the electricity goes off. But that night, students were furious, and they broke book shelves, desks and beds and threw them to the ground and burned them. Then, they made torches and marched in circles around the university campus for the whole night [in protest].
We waited at the gates and told the [protesters] not to go outside of the university campus. They dispersed only at around 3 am. The meeting had started at 11 am [on July 6] and ended at 1 pm the following day. It ended peacefully and students dispersed. Only three student union leaders spoke at the meeting, explaining why they opposed the new hostel regulations.
Myanmar military soldiers came to arrest us at 2 pm [on July 7]. Security forces then known as the special police, and police from the special branch, entered the university campus from Thaton Street and University Avenue. The three student leaders who spoke at the meeting – Ko Tin Tun, Ko Thet and Ko Ba Shwe Lay – were arrested. Tensions arose after the arrests and students returned to the student union building from their hostels. When the police came to arrest us, we fled and went into hiding.
I was hiding in Marlar Hostel and left there around 7 pm. Student leader Ko Tun Kyi and I stayed overnight on Kan Lan Street near Inya Lake. We could feel how powerful the explosion was from there. We went to bed at around 1 am [on July 8]. I was awakened by the loud noise. At first, I didn’t know what was happening. I had not expected that they would do it.
Ko Tun Kyi was older than me. He was already a doctor. I saw him weeping, and I was shocked. I asked him what happened. He said they must have destroyed our student union building. The impact of the explosion was so strong that I woke up.
KZM: What happened next?
HS: There were around 60 student leaders [at Pinya Hostel]. They were key student leaders, especially those from All Burma Federation of Student Unions (known by the Burmese acronym as Ba Ka Tha) and the Confederation of University Student Unions (known by the Burmese acronym as Ta Ka Tha), gathered at Pinya Hostel. We discussed how to respond in the East, West, North and South districts of Yangon. Then, we dispersed.
KZM: Did you go to see the student union building after it was blown up?
HS: We couldn’t go. The military opened fire from 6.15 pm [on July 7]. They fired wherever they saw lights on in the university campus.
KZM: Were students inside the student union building on July 8? How many were killed?
HS: Nobody knows exactly. Only the then-regime knows.
I issued three demands on the 50th anniversary of the July 7 event. The first demand is that an investigation committee be formed with fair-minded representatives and the results of their investigation made public. The second demand is that the student union building be rebuilt and used as a museum of the student movement in Myanmar. The third demand is for the July 7 monument erected by student leaders to be rebuilt. The monument was destroyed by the authorities in 1963.
KZM: People have been talking about the culprit responsible for dynamiting the student union building. General Ne Win and Brigadier-General Aung Gyi were named as the main culprits. Brig-Gen Aung Gyi said in his books that he had received approval from Gen. Ne Win to dynamite the building. Who do you think was the main culprit?
HS: Whenever we talk about the July 7 incident … there is a rumor among people who talk about the 7 July incident [that] if Gen. Ne Win is the No. 1 culprit, then Brig-Gen Aung Gyi is the No. 2 … and if Brig-Gen Aung Gyi is the No. 1 culprit, then Gen. Ne Win is the No. 2. If you ask me, I believe this.
But objectively, there was a commanding unit in the military then. It consisted of Major Kyaw Soe, the chairman of the national security and administration committee, a role similar to the prime minister. Another man is Lieutenant-Colonel Sein Lwin. He was not a member of the commanding unit. His troops were deployed outside Yangon University to curb the students. He was the head of either Battalion 4 or Battalion 5 … I don’t remember clearly … but both battalions provided personal security for Gen. Ne Win. He was responsible for the shooting.
KZM: That’s why Sein Lwin earned the name “Butcher of Yangon.”
HS: Yes, it is. He directly commanded the troops on the ground and gave the order to shoot.
KZM: Student unions have been banned since the destruction of the student union building in 1962. They emerged again only decades later, in 1988, but they were unofficial. Still, when a student union issued a statement in 1988, it had considerable influence on students. Twenty years later, how much influence do you think student unions retain?
HS: Since the 1920 student strike, student unions, student leaders and student movements have been at the forefront of the fight against colonial rule. This is history. We are not exaggerating this because we participated in student movements. Student unions, student leaders and student movements were at the forefront of Myanmar’s independence struggle. They were also at the forefront of the peace process and the fight against the military dictatorship after independence.
Over the 63 years since independence, the main problems were civil war and the military dictatorship. We students risked lives and imprisonment to end the civil war and the military dictatorship. Student unions have a long history. The agitator of Myanmar’s independence struggle was student unions. The first political generation of Myanmar [citizens] who led Myanmar’s independence struggle between 1906 and 1948 came from student unions. The Dobama Asiayone [We Burmese Association] and the General Council of Burmese Associations were not yet formed.
Gen. Aung San, Dr Hla Shwe, Thakhin Nu, U Kyaw Nyein, U Ba Swe and so on were from the first political generation. They led the student movement first, before leading the nationalist movement and the independence struggle. In our time, students engaged in the struggle for peace and democracy. Student unions have never asked for power.
Why have they killed students? We have not been allowed to organize a memorial for July 7 over the past 50 years. [Authorities] still ban a memorial. Why are they so afraid of student unions and student movements? Students are a popular force. People are behind the students. Military regimes in successive periods fear that students and people will cooperate and threaten their grip on power.
KZM: Students were at the forefront of the independence struggle and the fight against military dictatorship. But it is the politicians who take the lead role in the political movement. In 1988, students led the pro-democracy protests. But it was the political parties, including the National League for Democracy, that worked for political reforms. You also established a political party called The People’s Progressive Party. Politicians take over responsibility from students. There have been some political changes today [in 2012]. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is in the Parliament, and the government is not entirely a military government. There have been reforms. What role can student unions play now?
HS: If we compare now with the parliamentary democratic period before the 1962 coup … you can see there has been repression since 1988. There has been no space for student unions and the opposition since 1988. Only a few dissidents can speak out under [such] harsh repression. As you know, universities are built in remote places. It takes hours to get to a university. This is not coincidental.
They separate students so that they can easily suppress them. Students today face harsher repression than we did. Back in our time, university degrees did not guarantee a job either, but things are worse today. University students need to pay extra tuition now. Back in our time, there was no tuition.
We should not view students just as they are. They are the new generation. Both the government, the Union Solidarity Development, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi must understand this. Students are the new generation who will shape the future of Myanmar. They will serve as teachers, doctors and so on. Holding a hostile attitude toward them amounts to [undermining] the future of your country. We can’t view them as an enemy. We have to hand over the military and political responsibilities to this new generation.
Military chiefs talk as if it is the Myanmar military that loves the country most. This is wrong. People just dare not to complain about it for fear of reprisal. The new generation must be able to learn peacefully and live well. But, the civil war has not yet ended and we have yet to enjoy full democracy. Many people live in grinding poverty. Many poor families in urban areas survive on just 1,000 kyats for a meal. You can see extremely crowded buses at the north-south Dagon junction in the evenings. The country can’t be more primitive..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-07
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Military History
Language:
more
Description:
"GENEVA —
A prominent human rights expert is calling on governments to end the billion-dollar arms trade with Myanmar’s military, which is “helping sustain the junta’s brutal campaign of violence against civilians across Myanmar.”
In a report to the U.N. human rights council Thursday, Thomas Andrews, special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, accused international finance systems of helping Myanmar procure the weapons that have “enabled attacks on civilians” and have killed, maimed and displaced thousands of people.
Since the military junta toppled the country’s democratically elected government in February 2021, the U.N. human rights office reports at least 5,280 civilians, including 1,022 women and 667 children, “have been killed at the hands of the military.”
Additionally, the agency reports at least 3 million people have been displaced — “the vast majority still without proper shelter,” and more than 20,000 political prisoners remain in detention.
Andrews told the council that in the two years ending March 2024, the Myanmar military has purchased $630 million in weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials through the international finance system.
The special rapporteur identified 16 foreign banks that have facilitated transactions related to military procurement by the junta, noting that the junta and its cronies have worked to obscure the specific nature of the transactions “including by setting up military front companies.”
He referenced a report he issued last year, “The Billion Dollar Death Trade,” in which he identified Singapore as the junta’s third largest source of weapons and related materials.
Because of that report, he told the council that “to its credit, the government took immediate action and launched an investigation of my findings. I am very pleased to report that the junta’s purchase of military supplies from Singapore dropped by nearly 90 percent since the publication of that report.”
“Unfortunately, military procurement through Thailand has moved in the opposite direction,” he said, underscoring the junta imported nearly $130 million in weapons and military from Thailand-registered suppliers, “more than double the total from the previous year.”
He observed, however, “It is important to note that as was the case with Singapore last year, I found no evidence that the government of Thailand was involved or even aware of these transactions,” adding that he was hopeful Thailand based entities, including its banks “will no longer be facilitating the transfer of weapons and weapons materials to the military junta.”
Andrews called on financial institutions to stop facilitating transactions with banks that are controlled by the military junta and for governments to sanction those junta-controlled banks, including Myanmar Economic Bank.
The special rapporteur garnered support from member states, including the United States, for his appeal.
“We applaud Singapore for taking action to cut arms supplies to the military and call on others to follow suit,” Michele Taylor, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Council, said during the council’s interactive dialogue.
“We urge the Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to prevent future atrocities, including by reinforcing this body’s call to cut off the military’s access to jet fuel, and to support efforts to find a peaceful and just resolution to the crisis,” she said.
Andrews said the people of Myanmar need and deserve the support of the council and governments. He emphasized they also need international action, “not only because of the military junta’s relentless attacks on the people of Myanmar, but because there are opportunities available to your governments right now that would make an enormous difference in how and when this crisis comes to an end.”
“The tide is turning in Myanmar, the junta is on its heels, and the opportunity to take decisive action is now,” he said, pointing out that civilian resistance forces are gaining ground.
He said the government’s military bases are falling, tens of thousands of troops “have been lost to casualties, surrender, or defections,” and the economy is being squeezed.
“In response, the junta is doubling down on its brutal attacks on civilian populations,” he said. “Junta leaders appear committed to destroying the country that they cannot control.”
He said the world must not allow that to happen.
“We now have clear evidence that actions taken by the international community to isolate the junta and degrade its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar are working.
“But more must be done and done now to build on this progress including strategic coordination between all governments who support human rights to stop the flow of sophisticated weapons of war that are being used to attack innocent Myanmar civilians,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-07-06
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Thousands of residents fled the capital of northern Shan on Friday morning after the ethnic armies encircling it continued bombarding the headquarters of the junta’s Northeastern Military Command in Lashio’s center on Thursday, residents of the city said.
They fled after a dozen residents of Lashio were killed by shelling and drone bombs on Thursday.
One resident of the city told The Irrawaddy that shells and bombs had hit residential wards and killed residents. “That is why people are leaving the city [and] many others are sheltering in monasteries,” the resident said.
At least 12 residents, including children, were killed on Wednesday and Thursday when their houses were hit by heavy explosives. More people were injured, and several homes were destroyed.
Another Lashio resident told The Irrawaddy that most evacuees fled residential wards adjacent the headquarters of the regime’s Northeastern Military Command, which is being shelled and bombed by drones. Most of those fleeing the city are traveling to Taunggyi, the capital of southern Shan State, and Mandalay Region.
Fighting intensified near the city this week as the ethnic armies that control most of Lashio Township closed in on it.
The families of the junta officers stationed in Lashio were reportedly evacuated to Naypyitaw by helicopter on Thursday.
Fighting broke out across Lashio Township on Tuesday night when the members of the Brotherhood Alliance – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arkan Army – launched simultaneous attacks on regime bases in the township.
The alliance has reportedly captured several junta bases outside Lashio city, but has yet to officially comment on the status of the battle for Lashio.
The TNLA said that it had captured the junta’s Shwe Tharyar military base in northern Shan State’s Mongmit Township along with its ally, the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (PDF). The PDF is under the civilian National Unity Government. The TNLA said it also attacked a military base at a bridge crossing the Dohktawaddy River (also known as Myitnge River) in northern Shan State’s Hsipaw Township.
Intense clashes between regime forces and the TNLA were reported in nearby Mandalay Region’s Mogoke town, the country’s ruby hub, on Thursday.
Clashes intensified in the northern Shan State’s Nawnghkio Township on Thursday as the TNLA, Mandalay PDF and Danu People’s Liberation Army continued their attempt to capture the headquarters of the junta’s Missile Battalion 606.
The TNLA accused the junta of using chemical weapons to defend the headquarters of the missile battalion. It said resistance troops exposed to the chemicals are suffering from breathlessness, nausea, extreme agitation, fatigue, and low blood oxygen.
The junta has frequently been accused of turning to chemical warfare when its troops face losses on the battlefield.
The Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 against the regime in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing 24 battalion HQs, hundreds of bases, around 20 towns and trade routes with China before a ceasefire was brokered on January 10 by Beijing.
Before the ceasefire, the alliance had encircled Lashio.
The TNLA resumed the operation on June 25 after repeated junta bombardments of territory it controls.
As of Thursday, the TNLA and allied PDFs had seized about 40 junta bases, including several battalion HQs in three townships in northern Shan State – Kyaukme, Mongmit and Nawnghkio – and three others in upper Mandalay Region – Madaya, Mogoke and Singu. They have also taken control of Kyaukme and Nawnghkio towns as well as large parts of Mogoke town..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-05
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Shortly after the Myanmar military staged a coup on February 1, 2021, it began brutalizing, imprisoning and killing individuals at peaceful protests throughout the country.
The ruthless treatment of civilians by the military and police did not go unnoticed, with photos and reports of their actions published widely. The reports deeply affected many soldiers and police, triggering a surge of defections.
Since the coup, a total of 12,341 junta personnel – 3,015 soldiers and 9,326 police – have defected to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), according to the People’s Embrace, a group helping defectors.
Military defections peaked in 2021, but the People’s Embrace now expects another surge as soldiers abandon their positions “amidst the escalating war, especially in the Kachin, Karen, and Karenni regions.”
Also spurring defections is February’s enforcement of the conscription law, dictating mandatory military service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27.
Seven former soldiers shared their reasons for defecting and their experiences afterward in interviews conducted in safe houses and secure locations in Thailand. Their motivations for joining the Myanmar military were also discussed. The interviews were conducted in February, with follow-up sessions when additional information became available.
Aged from 22 to 39, the interviewees had spent between four and 22 years in the military, achieving ranks ranging from private to major.
For safety, all names used in this article are pseudonyms and specific locations are not mentioned.
Refuge from poverty
The defectors said they joined the Myanmar army as teenagers or in their early 20s. All but one was motivated by refuge from unemployment and the education, skills training, and other perceived long-term benefits of military life.
Bo Pyay joined the army aged 17 to escape unemployment.
“There was little prospect of getting a job to earn my living. At that time, the country was somewhat peaceful and the military offered more education and job opportunities.”
Khant Tun had no special interest in the army but needed a career after college.
Zeya Hein entered the military in 2014. “There was a positive perception of the military during that time. The economy was bad and it was difficult to find a job after high school.”
Lin Aung enlisted mostly out of despair. With no family to assist him, he was unable to find employment and needed to support himself.
“I had no other good options to earn a living.”
However, while entering the army was easy, exiting was a different story.
One defector signed an agreement to serve five years but was barred from leaving when he completed his term.
“This happens to the majority of soldiers,” he said.
Lin Aung thought he could join for one or two years to see if he liked it and then leave if not.
“I was not told how difficult it would be to leave,” he said.
A common reason for staying in the military is financial survival. Lin Aung enlisted in 2020 but stayed on even after the 2021 coup.
“Even though I realized how the military was treating the people and ruling the country, I couldn’t see a way to survive on my own,” he explained.
The defectors interviewed had various roles and duties in the army.
Bo Pyay worked on a project to produce cluster bombs during his decade as a soldier.
Thawda Win described his role as support, transporting ammunition to soldiers in the field. Support roles do not always mean being out of harm’s way, and his deliveries exposed him to life-and-death situations. On one occasion, his supply convoy was ambushed by resistance forces, and he narrowly escaped with his life.
Thawda Win now shares his expertise with the People’s Defense Force (PDF), providing guidance on weapons maintenance, storage, transportation, and related subjects, highlighting how defectors are valuable to the resistance.
Turning point
Many soldiers want to defect, but fear for their personal safety and the potential harm it could bring to their families act as significant deterrents.
Others have succumbed to military indoctrination, regulation and control.
They look to the army for benefits in terms of both status and wealth.
Pyae Mg recalled both senior officers and subordinates declaring that Min Aung Hlaing was not tough enough in fighting “insurgents” and advocating hanging for anyone who resisted the military.
“Most of the soldiers in my company felt this way and that’s why I realized that I couldn’t stay in the military.”
Interviewees gave various reasons for defecting, but certain ones were mentioned frequently.
Safety was a major concern when weighing the consequences of defecting. The Washington Post recently reported accounts of punishment meted out to defectors who are caught, including testimony from a defector saying he was tortured. The interviewees said they deliberated over their own safety as well as potential retribution against their families when contemplating defection.
Casual mistreatment of soldiers was a factor, too.
“Everyone in the military should be treated with respect regardless of rank. Due to abusive conditions imposed by the higher ranks on lower ranks, the military is failing,” said an army captain who defected.
A former private said he was often bullied and overloaded with duties.
“I didn’t have enough time to eat or sleep.”
Each said that defecting was an individual decision.
“My grandmother was blinded by the military’s bombs,” said another. “That‘s when I decided to leave the army.”
When asked if the success of resistance operations 1027 and 1111 affected their defection decisions, no specific event or battle was mentioned. However, interviewees conceded that the anticipated outcome of these ongoing operations – the collapse of the entire army – was a factor in their decision.
People’s Embrace continues to assert there is a limited window of opportunity for soldiers to defect, declaring “Stand with the people before it’s too late!” However, none of the interviewees was aware of a time limit for defecting.
One former senior officer had this advice for would-be defectors: “Have a strong determination to defect because the road is not an easy one.”
Another former high-ranking officer said that not enough was being done to attract others to defect, especially since officers often have “valuable and secret” military information. The incentives on offer are not attractive enough for them to consider leaving their posts, he added.
Defector organizations conduct a rigorous process before soldiers are accepted. The vetting process varies and was different for almost everyone interviewed.
A defector’s journey from their base to safety in a resistance-controlled area is not straightforward and can be filled with danger. It can take days to reach a defector organization’s representative, with creativity and cunning required to evade roadblocks, patrols and checkpoints.
Life after defection
Once they reach safety, defectors’ living conditions are typically spartan.
Pyae Mg lives in a small, one-room apartment with three others. Thawda Win and his wife stay in the lobby of a four-story safe house that houses a mix of single men and families. He said defectors are permitted to stay in their safe house for three months but can ask for an extension if they still can’t find alternative accommodation.
Defectors are also expected to find jobs. Some find casual jobs lasting a day or two, but the work is not consistent. People’s Embrace says it does not have the capacity to help defectors find jobs.
By some estimates there are over a million Myanmar migrants and war refugees in Thailand, and defectors are fortunate if they reside within the support network of a Myanmar-centric community.
The defectors interviewed expressed gratitude for financial support from Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG). Each defector is currently paid 700 baht per month, or 1,400 baht if accompanied by a spouse. The sum may be small, but it’s vital for survival.
Difficulties faced by both defectors and Myanmar refugees are numerous. Most cannot speak the local language and they all lack official recognition by the Thai government.
One defector summed up what others had said:
“I would like more support from organizations that help defectors. I realize this is not easy, but I would like the NUG to give me documents for a legal stay, a work permit, and not to be harassed by Thai police.”
Most defectors face a precarious existence in Thailand, with little money, no legal protection, and often forced to live under new identities.
Venturing outside their safe house or small community puts them at risk of police harassment. Defectors also fear the Burmese military asking Thai authorities to deport them.
Despite their long and perilous journeys to freedom, all the interviewees expressed gratitude for the defection process.
In a follow-up interview, Lin Aung explained how difficult life was for him now. Basic sustenance is an issue, and day-to-day living is stressful. Jobs are hard to find, and he worries about his dire living conditions and when they will change. Yet he has no misgivings about his decision.
“No matter how hard it is, I don’t regret leaving the Myanmar military.”
The defectors wanted the world to know that they joined what they believed was “the people’s army.”
When they realized that the military was no longer serving civilians but instead harming them, they defected to the people’s side..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-05
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta violence, atrocities and bombings have claimed 1,076 civilian lives in the first half of this year, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).
In retaliation for battlefield losses, the junta has escalated airstrikes and shelling of non-military targets, such as villages, schools, hospitals, markets, displacement camps and religious sites resulting in mounting civilian deaths.
The AAPP, the activist group which monitors junta arrests and killings, said this year until June 30, Sagaing Region witnessed the highest number of deaths with 313, followed by Rakhine State with 259 fatalities.
Junta shelling caused 318 deaths and airstrikes claimed 308 lives, it said.
The AAPP reported that 348 of those killed were female, 15 members of religious orders were among the dead and 30 were from the education sector.
The regime arrested nearly 27,000 civilians and killed over 5,300 people since the 2021 coup, according to the AAPP.
Myanmar’s anti-regime ambassador to the United Nations, U Kyaw Moe Tun, wrote to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres about civilian suffering in Myanmar on June 27.
“I would like to reiterate again that the people of Myanmar desperately need immediate and decisive action from the international community,” he wrote.
U Kyaw Moe Tun called on the international community to cut the flow of weapons, jet fuel and money to the junta, which would immediately save lives in Myanmar.
“Decisive timely action from the UN, in particular the UN Security Council, is well overdue…I with a very heavy heart appeal to the international community in particular the Security Council to take concrete action now to save the lives of the people of Myanmar by putting humanity first,” the ambassador said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-07-05
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"WASHINGTON —
Access to independent media has been tightly restricted in Myanmar since the military coup in 2021. But now, the junta is also blocking VPNs, in what analysts say marks an escalation in censorship.
The military — also known as the Tatmadaw — is now actively blocking virtual private networks, or VPNs, which help internet users bypass restrictions to access websites, as well as social media and messaging platforms.
Analysts believe the junta may be using technology from a Chinese company to enforce the blocks.
The move "poses a major threat to press freedom, activism and the ability of people to hold their government accountable," said Simon Migliano, head of research at Top10VPN. The London-based organization tests the security of VPNs and researches internet and tech security.
Block limits access to information
The junta has threatened to block VPNs since it overthrew the civilian-led government more than three years ago. In late 2021, the Tatmadaw drafted, but did not enact, a cybersecurity law that could punish people with three years in prison if they used a VPN without official permission.
The blocks, which began in late May, have dire consequences for internet freedom in Myanmar, where opposition to the military and its coup has largely been organized online, according to Migliano.
"The VPN crackdown in Myanmar severely restricts citizens' access to independent and accurate information, reinforcing government control over the flow of information," Migliano told VOA.
Several news outlets have reported that security forces are stopping people at random to inspect their phones for VPN apps. Around two dozen people were arrested and fined in early June after police found VPNs on their cell phones.
In addition, Myanmar's Transport and Communications Ministry has blocked access to Facebook, Instagram, X and WhatsApp, according to media reports.
Myanmar's military did not reply to VOA's request for comment.
Myanmar's military is seeking to control the flow of information as a way to control the country, say experts.
"They really want to control the narrative and spread their propaganda," Wai Phyo Myint, a Myanmar analyst at the digital rights group Access Now, told VOA.
Experts say junta seeks 'digital dictatorship'
The VPN crackdown is the latest example of what a group of United Nations experts in 2022 called the junta's efforts to establish a "digital dictatorship."
"There's a battle in the digital space," one digital rights activist told VOA. The individual, who is from Myanmar but moved to Thailand after the coup, requested anonymity for security reasons.
Part of the reason the military may have taken so long to target VPNs is because blocking is more difficult and expensive than other forms of censorship, according to Oliver Spencer, an expert on free expression in Myanmar.
The military has already consolidated control over the country's telecommunications companies, imposed scattered internet shutdowns, revoked media licenses, and arrested dozens of journalists. The repressive environment led many independent news outlets to flee into exile.
"They basically cracked down on the internet in all the ways that they could do more easily," Spencer said. That means blocking VPNs was the last main step the military could take to prevent the country's people from accessing websites and platforms that the Tatmadaw would rather hide from them, according to Spencer.
Citing leaked documents, the activist group Justice for Myanmar reported in June that the military's enhanced censorship system uses technology from the Chinese network security company Geedge Networks to block VPNs.
The Beijing-based company did not reply to VOA's email seeking comment.
With this technology, authorities create a list of all known VPN domains and IP addresses they want blocked, according to Migliano. The simplest way to circumvent the block is to cycle through various VPNs, because some still work sporadically, Migliano added.
Demand for VPNs has on average been more than 1,000% higher than it was in the month before the crackdown, according to research by Top10VPN. The largest uptick was on May 30, when demand was 2,333% higher, Top10VPN reported.
Violence perpetrated by Myanmar's military against those resisting the coup means that not having access to independent, accurate information can be a matter of life and death, said Washington-based Wai Phyo Myint, Asia Pacific Policy Analyst for the AccessNow.
In many cases, crucial information such as how to find safe places to avoid the military "got cut because of the VPN ban," she said. That's particularly concerning given the gravity of the violence perpetrated by the military, which stands accused by rights groups of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity since the coup.
Spencer estimates that the crackdown now means that there are "millions and millions" of people who have no access to any information or any way to communicate electronically.
"Instead of just attacking the media, which they've done until now, [the junta are] actually attacking the ways that the general public can communicate and can access information," Spencer said. "It's probably one of the largest attacks on freedom of expression in Myanmar since the coup."..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-07-05
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
Language:
more
Description:
"LONDON, Jul 3 2024 (IPS) - Myanmar’s army, at war with pro-democracy forces and ethnic militias, must know it’s nowhere near victory. It recently came close to losing control of Myawaddy, one of the country’s biggest cities, at a key location on the border with Thailand. Many areas are outside its control.
The army surely expected an easier ride when it ousted the elected government in a coup on 1 February 2021. It had ruled Myanmar for decades before democracy returned in 2015. But many democracy supporters took up arms, and in several parts of the country they’ve allied with militia groups from Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, with a long history of resisting military oppression.
Setbacks and violence
Army morale has collapsed. Thousands of soldiers are reported to have surrendered, including complete battalions – some out of moral objections to the junta’s violence and others because they saw defeat as inevitable. There have also been many defections, with defectors reporting they’d been ordered to kill unarmed civilians. Forces fighting the junta’s troops are encouraging defectors to join their ranks.
In response to reversals, in February the junta announced it would introduce compulsory conscription for young people, demanding up to five years of military service. An estimated 60,000 men are expected to be called up in the first round. The announcement prompted many young people to flee the country if they could, and if not, seek refuge in parts of Myanmar free from military control.
There have also been reports of army squads kidnapping people and forcing them to serve. Given minimal training, they’re cannon fodder and human shields. Rohingya people – an officially stateless Muslim minority – are among those reportedly being forcibly enlisted. They’re being pressed into service by the same military that committed genocide against them.
People who manage to cross into Thailand face hostility from Thai authorities and risk being returned against their will. Even after leaving Myanmar, refugees face the danger of transnational repression, as government intelligence agents reportedly operate in neighbouring countries and the authorities are freezing bank accounts, seizing assets and cancelling passports.
Conscription isn’t just about giving the junta more personnel to compensate for its losses – it’s also part of a sustained campaign of terror intended to subdue civilians and suppress activism. Neighbourhoods are being burned to the ground and hundreds have died in the flames. The air force is targeting unarmed towns and villages. The junta enjoys total impunity for these and many other vile acts.
The authorities hold thousands of political prisoners on fabricated charges and subject them to systematic torture. The UN independent fact-finding mission reports that at least 1,703 people have died in custody since the coup, likely an underestimate. Many have been convicted in secret military trials and some sentenced to death.
There’s also a growing humanitarian crisis, with many hospitals destroyed, acute food shortages in Rakhine state, where many Rohingya people live, and an estimated three million displaced. Voluntary groups are doing their best to help communities, but the situation is made much worse by the military obstructing access for aid workers.
International neglect
In March, UN human rights chief Volker Türk described the situation in Myanmar as ‘a never-ending nightmare’. It’s up to the international community to exert the pressure needed to end it.
It’s by no means certain the military will be defeated. Adversity could lead to infighting and the rise of even more vicious leaders. One thing that could make a decisive difference is disruption of the supply chain, particularly the jet fuel that enables lethal airstrikes on civilians. In April, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution calling on states to stop supplying the military with jet fuel. States should implement it.
Repressive states such as China, India and Russia have been happy enough to keep supplying the junta with weapons. But democratic states must take the lead and apply more concerted pressure. Some, including Australia, the UK and USA, have imposed new sanctions on junta members this year, but these have been slow in coming and fall short of the approach the Human Rights Council resolution demands.
But the worst response has come from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Ignoring reality and civil society’s proposals, ASEAN has stuck to a plan it developed in April 2021 that simply hasn’t worked. The junta takes advantage of ASEAN’s weakness. It announced compulsory conscription shortly after a visit by ASEAN’s Special Envoy for Myanmar.
ASEAN’s neglect has allowed human rights violations and, increasingly, transnational organised crime to flourish. The junta is involved in crimes such as drug trafficking, illegal gambling and online fraud. It uses the proceeds of these, often carried out with the help of Chinese gangs, to finance its war on its people. As a result, Myanmar now ranks number one on the Global Organized Crime Index. This is a regional problem, affecting people in Myanmar’s neighbouring countries as well.
ASEAN members also have an obligation to accept refugees from Myanmar, including those fleeing conscription. They should commit to protecting them and not forcing them back, particularly when they’re democracy and human rights activists whose lives would be at risk.
Forced conscription must be the tipping point for international action. This must include international justice, since there’s none in Myanmar. The junta has ignored an order from the International Court of Justice to protect Rohingya people and prevent actions that could violate the Genocide Convention, following a case brought by the government of The Gambia alleging genocide against the Rohingya. The UN Security Council should now use its power to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court so prosecutions of military leaders can begin.
China and Russia, which have so far refused to back calls for action, should end their block on Security Council action, in the interests of human rights and to prevent growing regional instability..."
Source/publisher:
Inter Press Service
Date of publication:
2024-07-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Camps for people displaced by war have also been evacuated, residents said.
Description:
"Rivers in northern Myanmar swollen by torrential rain have burst their banks, forcing about 10,000 people, including many displaced by war, to flee, while many others have been trapped on their roofs by the rising waters, relief workers told Radio Free Asia on Monday.
Heavy rain in Kachin state has led to floods in four townships along the banks of the Irrawaddy and N’mai rivers, forcing residents to seek shelter in monasteries and elsewhere on higher ground.
"Every neighborhood is flooded. It could be worse than the record set in 2004,” said one relief worker in the state capital, Myitkyina, referring to the last severe flooding in Myanmar’s northernmost state 20 years ago.
“There are lots of people affected,” said the aid worker, who declined to be identified in fear of reprisals by the military authorities for speaking to the media.
RFA called Kachin state’s junta spokesperson, Moe Min Thein, for information on rescue efforts but calls went unanswered. A junta-backed newspaper, The Global New Light of Myanmar, reported that relief operations were underway and nine evacuation facilities had opened in Kachin state since Sunday.
Overflowing rivers forced residents from their homes in Tanai, Waimaw, Chipwi townships, and parts of Myitkyina, which is on the west bank of the Irrawaddy.
Collapse at notorious Myanmar rare earth mine kills 15 people
At Myanmar camp for displaced hundreds struggle as rainy season looms
Five dead, 20 missing in Myanmar landslide
Camps for people displaced by weeks of fighting between the autonomy-seeking Kachin Independence Army insurgent group and junta forces in Waingmaw, Chipwi and Myitkyina townships were also flooded, with their inhabitants forced to find higher ground, witnesses said.
There were no immediate reports of deaths in the latest flooding but landslides, partly triggered by the heavy rain, have recently killed at least 35 people in rare earth mines in Chipwi township.
By 9:30 a.m. on Monday, the Irrawaddy river had risen four feet (1.2 meters) above its critical level, and was still rising by about three inches every hour, Naing Linn Htwe, chief of the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology, said in a statement.
Some residents of Myitkyina have taken refuge from the swirling, murky waters on the roofs of their homes.
"We’re trapped,” one resident stuck on a roof told RFA. “The water is almost as deep as the height of a man.”
“In my household, there are three kids and two elderly people and rescue hasn't come yet, but they said they would. They said they’d run into some difficulties on the way.”
To the south, residents in river-side communities in the Sagaing, Magway and Ayeyarwady regions, which are also on the Irrawaddy, are fretting that the inundation will soon reach them..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-07-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Flooding in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"This Incident Report describes events occurring in Kyeh Htoh (Kyaikto) Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District, on October 22nd 2023. On the early morning of October 22nd , State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #2 shelled 81mm mortar rounds into C--- village, Nghet Pyaw Taw village tract. One of the mortar rounds landed in a villager’s house and injured three civilians. The injured villagers were sent to Kyaikto hospital to receive treatment, and one was later transferred to Thaton hospital, due to the severity of his injuries.
Excerpt
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On October 22nd 2023, at around 7 am, the State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #2, from Thaton Town army camp [which is based at Let Pan Pin temporary camp in C--- village] shelled 81mm mortar rounds [in the area], and [one of] the mortar shells landed in C--- village, Nghet Pyaw Taw village tract, Kyeh Htoh (Kyaikto) Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, in Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled area. As the SAC shelled several rounds of mortar, a villager named Saw D--- went under his [stilt] house to hide from the mortars. At that time, one of the mortar shells exploded on the top of his house and injured Saw D---, along with two women who were hiding under the house. In total, three people sustained injuries. The names of the two injured women are Naw E--- and Naw G---.
While Naw E--- was handing out invitations [for a funeral ceremony], she heard the sound of mortar shelling, so she went to hide under Saw D---’s house and was injured along with Saw D---. Similarly, while Naw G--- was waiting for the ‘line car’ [pick-up truck, used as a shared taxi] to go to Kyaikto Town, she heard the sound of mortar shelling and went to hide under Saw D---’s house. Then, she was injured along with Naw E---.
The shrapnel from the shell hit and was embedded inside Saw D---’s right arm and broke his bone. The mortar shrapnel hit Naw E---’s right arm, but she did not sustain severe injuries. Naw G--- was injured on her head, and she sustained life-threatening injuries. These three villagers were sent [by local villagers] to the nearby hospital which is Kyaikto Hospital [run by the SAC]. However, Kyaikto hospital did not admit Saw D--- [as they were not adequately equipped to treat his injuries] and then, he was transferred to Thaton hospital [run by the SAC]. [As of January 2024,] Saw D--- had not fully recovered from the injuries yet.
While Saw D--- was being treated at the hospital, he received a total of 150,000 kyats [71.33 USD] in cash from [two] local humanitarian groups. After this incident, Saw D--- expressed: “It will be better if they [SAC soldiers] don’t conduct shelling like this again. Then, the villagers will live peacefully. Now, we dare not sleep as we don’t know when they will conduct shelling”. He added: “Since I was injured, I have not been able to work, and it causes challenges for my livelihood”..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"YANGON—Former Myanmar President Thein Sein departed for an official visit to China on Thursday, Beijing’s embassy in Yangon said, in his first foreign trip since the military seized power three years ago.
Former general Thein Sein, 79, ruled Myanmar from 2011 to 2016 as the reformist president of a quasi-civilian government which ceded power to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi following landmark elections.
He later retired to the military-built capital Naypyitaw and has largely stayed out of the public eye since.
On Wednesday Thein Sein met China’s ambassador and discussed “the situation in Myanmar and cooperation between the two countries,” the embassy in Yangon posted on its Facebook page.
Ties between the junta and Beijing—a major ally and arms supplier—frayed last year over the junta’s failure to crack down on online scam compounds in Myanmar’s borderlands.
The compounds were staffed by citizens of China and other countries who were often trafficked and forced to work swindling their compatriots in an industry analysts say is worth billions.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has not visited China since the 2021 coup that plunged the country into turmoil.
The Southeast Asian nation has seen widespread fighting since the military coup ended democratic rule.
Myanmar is a vital piece of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s flagship US$1-trillion project that includes maritime, rail and road projects in Asia, Africa and Europe.
But progress in Myanmar has been hampered by the conflict since the military coup.
Last year an alliance of ethnic minority armed groups seized swathes of territory in Shan State along the border with China’s Yunnan province..."
Source/publisher:
Agence France-Presse (Paris) via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military
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"President Joseph R. Biden
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 200500
Dear President Biden,
We, the undersigned 228 organizations, including the ethnic and religious minorities of Burma, are deeply concerned by the upswing in aerial attacks carried out by the Burmese junta since the start of the coup. These airstrikes target heavily populated areas, taking the lives of civilians, and completely destroying crucial public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. We urge you to take and coordinate action immediately and implement harsher sanctions that will effectively hold the military junta accountable for this blatant violation of international law and cut off its fuel and weaponry supply.
Since the start of the coup in 2021 until now, the Burmese junta has carried out at least 1,427 airstrikes across Burma, killing over 434 civilians. Countrywide data on reported airstrikes reveal the junta’s increasing reliance on aerial strikes over time. In 2023, the International Institute for Strategic Studies found that the military conducted, on average, at least 49 airstrikes monthly. This was 25% higher than 2022 when the military conducted at least 39 average monthly aerial attacks. Airstrikes are expected to double this year, unless immediate action is taken. These aerial attacks occur in civilian spaces, even when there are no resistance groups present, nor fighting occurring.
Organizations have been sounding the alarm since 2022, when the military intentionally bombed an outdoor concert in October, killing over 80 civilians. The limited action from the U.S. and the international community has only encouraged more aggressive attacks to continue over the years, resulting in mass destruction and suffering. Around the same time in 2023, the military attacked an IDP camp, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children. This year, in February 2024, the junta went as far as to conduct airstrikes on schools, taking the lives of children and teachers.
We appreciate that after receiving a letter from organizations urging the ban on jet fuel last year, the U.S. has taken some actions in targeting the junta’s access to jet fuel, including sanctions on part of the Asia Sun Group business network that was importing fuel into Burma. However, these sanctions have been limited and more is needed. The U.S. has yet to make extensive use of the regulatory determination it used last August emphasizing that selling aviation fuel to Burma was a sanctionable offense.
Additionally, this year, the UN adopted a resolution for states to refrain from supporting aviation fuel trade and sale. As a responsible member state, the U.S. must only further demonstrate unwavering commitment and strict adherence to this resolution. This involves placing comprehensive aviation fuel sanctions, which only Canada has accomplished at the moment. The U.S. however can demonstrate its own leadership in this matter and fulfill its international obligations by participating in a complete aviation fuel embargo.
To prevent these devastating attacks, it is imperative that the United States further lead coordinated action within the international community to cut off the junta’s ability to purchase aviation fuel and supplies. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur showed that the junta’s imports of aviation fuel increased in 2023, including fuel imported through Asia Sun network. More must be done. Targeted sanctions must have harsher penalties and stronger enforcement. Otherwise, these international allies will continue to sell and transport aviation fuel to the junta which will be used to target and kill civilians.
We recognize and thank you for the actions you have taken thus far to support the people of Burma. However, as organizations that have connections, indirect and direct, with those on the ground in Burma, we know that the United States needs to do more. Please regard the junta’s aerial attack as a devastating warning of what is to come for the people of Burma should the military continue to have unchecked access to fuel and other supplies. The United States holds the power and influence to create change – please ensure that this power is not wasted.
We ask for the specific actions below:
Sanction international companies that sell aviation fuel supplies to the military junta. While smaller Burmese entities can be easily replaced, major international entities would face severe repercussions and serious obstacles to their ability to supply the military.
Bar any entity from providing shipping insurance, transport, storage facilities, or other shipping services to companies selling aviation fuel to the military, its allies or affiliated companies. The most effective way of disrupting the flow of aviation fuel is to prevent ships from picking up cargo or accessing ports by withholding insurance and services.
Impose full sanctions on the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), as the European Union has already done. Sanctions on MOGE itself, not just on MOGE officials, would cut off one of the junta’s largest revenue streams and have the greatest impact on stopping the junta’s campaign of lethal violence in the country.
Hold the Burmese junta accountable for their clear violations of international law and active war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and mass atrocities..."
Source/publisher:
228 Organizations via Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Sanctions, Business and the Military
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"This Short Update describes events occurring in Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District in February 2024. On February 21st 2024, a State Administration Council (SAC) helicopter, from Toungoo air base, conducted an air strike on K--- village, Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract, Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township. Four villagers were injured, including two children, and an 85-year-old woman was killed. One injured victim was transferred to Naypyidaw city for treatment, where her leg was amputated. The SAC helicopter also conducted an airstrike on M--- village, Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract, Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township. In that incident, five villagers were injured and three villagers were killed, including two 8-year-old children. The air strike also damaged houses and plantations and killed livestock. There had been no fighting or armed forces’ movement in or near the village since the first quarter of 2023. Villagers feel devastated, traumatised and aggrieved.
Air strike in K--- village, Htee Day village tract
On February 21st 2024, at 2 pm, an State Administration Council (SAC)2 helicopter from Toungoo air base, located at the SAC Southern Command Headquarters (Ta Pa Ka) in Toungoo Town, dropped bombs on K--- village, section 3, in Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract,3 Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. [Previously,] there had been no fighting or movement of armed forces in or near the village since the first quarter of 2023. Due to the air strike, four K--- villagers were injured by shrapnel, and an 85-year-old woman named Daw4 L---, also from K--- village section 3, died immediately due to injuries to her head, abdomen, and chest. Daw L---’s skull was broken, and her abdomen perforated, expelling her intestines. A 35-year-old woman, named Daw C---, was injured on her leg and required an amputation. The other three injured villagers were Daw T---, a 35-year-old woman; Ma S---, a 12-year-old girl; and a child (unknown name), who is one-and-a-half years old. They are all ethnic Bamar5 and Buddhist. These four injured villagers were transported by car to [a hospital in Yay Tal Shay Town, Bago Division. The hospital in Yay Tal Shay Town lacked resources to treat Daw C---, who required an amputation, so she was transferred to a hospital in] Naypyidaw city, which is [approximately] four hours away. [The injured villagers did not receive any support from any humanitarian organisation to cover treatment costs].
In addition, two houses, belonging to villagers named U 6 O--- and U J---, were hit by the shrapnel. Both villagers are Buddhist and of Bamar ethnicity, ages unknown. Some domestic animals were injured and died as well: a medium-sized cow, one dog, and some chickens died, three cows were injured, and two dogs lost their legs. Crops were destroyed due to the bomb [explosions] and shrapnel. [As explained by local villagers to the KHRG researcher,] the villagers feel devastated, traumatised, and aggrieved after experiencing the air strike..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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1.12 MB 577.55 KB 452.51 KB
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Sub-title:
One would think that Myanmar’s revolutionary moment would create relationships of solidarity between local NGOS performing essential work and their international donors. But the authors’ research shows that Myanmar organisations feel hampered by the continuation of an approach focused on compliance and mistrust.
Description:
"Apart from causing widespread suffering, economic collapse and conflict, the February 2021 attempted coup in Myanmar has also brought an upheaval amongst international aid agencies engaged in the country. International NGOs, UN agencies and bilateral donors have long been active in Myanmar supporting humanitarian and development programming. But the military’s attempted takeover has meant that international agencies have had to shift their approach.
In the days after the attempted coup, almost all aid agencies ceased their direct cooperation with the new military-controlled State Administrative Council (SAC) regime. But they also had to shift their approach to the way projects are delivered on the ground. With greater instability around the country, there has been significant growth in direct partnerships with Myanmar civil society organisations, who are implementing most humanitarian and advocacy related programs.
Amid the context of Myanmar’s revolution, this shift has brought the relationship between international aid agencies and humanitarian and advocacy groups into focus. International agencies have directed more of their resources to partnerships with local organisations, who are often working in extremely risky situations. We could assume that there might therefore be a strong sense of solidarity between Myanmar civil society leaders and their international supporters as they work together to support vulnerable populations in the country. Local organisations are in critical need of support in their work, and international agencies are providing important funding.
Why, then, are there a growing number of studies revealing strong criticism by those local organisations of their international partners? Why do these organisations say that there is a lack of solidarity, and that they are lacking appropriate support from international agencies in the post-coup context? International aid agencies have long received criticism from Myanmar groups. Yet why is there now, in the context of Myanmar’s revolution, such strident criticism of international aid agencies?
Criticism of the approach of international aid agencies around the world is not new. Many critics of partnerships between international and local aid agencies point toward the problem of a broader neoliberal system that favours the power of external organisations over local ones. Partnerships are also often characterised by overt neoliberal processes of competitive grants and subcontracting, or more subtle hierarchical dynamics based on maximising efficiency.
All of this may be true—but these conventional explanations of the breakdown of aid partnerships are often rather generic, and do little to illuminate the context-specific perspectives of local organisations. We think that there is more at play in understanding frictions in local–international aid partnerships in Myanmar and more attention needs to be given to the interpretations of local actors and how they reveal local expectations and practices of reciprocity.
In research published recently at the Journal of Contemporary Asia we draw on interviews with civil society leaders and aid agency representatives in Myanmar between August and November 2022. Rather than perceiving a relationship of solidarity, we found that in the volatile revolutionary environment in Myanmar, international aid agencies are often perceived by Myanmar agency leaders as self-interested and compliance-focused, while lacking confidence in the capacity of Myanmar aid organisations.
These negative perceptions of international agencies are obviously informed by everyday pragmatic challenges for Myanmar groups. But we think that well-known overlapping notions of sedana (goodwill), parahita (charity), and metta (loving kindness)—which are prominent in everyday language around aid in Myanmar—also inform Myanmar organisation leaders’ expectations of reciprocity in their relationship with international aid agencies.
These values place a moral and ethical overlay on interpretations of aid partnerships beyond the project-based and contractual relationship that characterises the formal realm of aid programs. Myanmar NGO leaders therefore often construct their own local organisations as deserving and committed partners whilst international aid agencies are often constructed as self-preserving and compliance focused.
While concerns about international aid agency engagement with Myanmar organisations are longstanding, the context of revolution and instability has sharpened these critiques considerably. The new existential challenges to organisations and aid workers themselves have raised the stakes in aid partnerships and brought diverging discourses into greater clarity.
Myanmar’s revolutionary context
Before looking specifically at the perceptions of international agencies by Myanmar civil society leaders, it is important to understand Myanmar’s revolutionary context, and how the many new challenges for local organisations have accentuated expectations in their partnerships with international agencies, in a way that is different to pre-coup aid partnerships.
In the years of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government before the coup, civil society groups faced ongoing challenges. The NLD government was considerably more restrictive of their speech and operations than had been initially hoped. But compared to the extreme recent restrictions by the SAC, the NLD era presented a far more stable and congenial environment for international–local agency partnerships.
There are now profound everyday challenges for Myanmar aid organisations, both at a personal and organisational level. “The whole country is in fear,” said one Myanmar civil society leader in a September 2022 interview. “Every day we are threatened and don’t have a free mind anymore. We have to struggle and take risks to rebuild our country and support each other. If not, we will never escape from fear”. Those participants operating in SAC-controlled areas of the country reflected on the daily scrutiny they faced from authorities; for example, through being questioned at checkpoints, having telephones and computers searched, and even having a CCTV camera installed in an organisation’s office.
Another Myanmar organisation leader operating in SAC-controlled areas told us in September 2022 that “I am not sure how we can maintain momentum while the military is continuously suppressing the people and using very violent means every day”. Legal changes by the regime—including to Section 505A of the Penal Code, criminalising making comments that “cause fear” or spread “false news,” including on social media—have made it easier for authorities to target local organisation staff.
Despite all these operational risks and challenges, many Myanmar humanitarian and advocacy organisations continue to work with communities and with actors engaged in the revolution. Some organisation leaders have also become part of the National Unity Government’s administration and policy-making mechanisms, which entails further significant personal risk. Yet leaders often framed their motivation in moral terms and their desire to continue their work despite the personal sacrifices and dangers that they faced. Given the risks that these individuals and organisations are taking, it is understandable that their leaders have expectations that their international supporters will be willing to act in solidarity.
Self-interested and compliance focussed?
Yet due to their decisions since the coup to protect their own programmes and staffing, international agencies are often perceived by Myanmar leaders as self-interested—the antithesis of sedana (goodwill) and metta (loving kindness). They also construct international agencies as being overly focused on compliance—lacking confidence in the parahita (charity) worthiness and capability of local organisations.
In our research there were some positive reflections on the role of international organisations. But these positive interpretations tended to come from participants with short-term or less direct experience of partnerships with international aid agencies. Most participants from Myanmar organisations had longer-term and more intensive interactions with donors, UN agencies, and international NGOs, and they presented far less sanguine interpretations of international support.
Rather than acting in solidarity, one leader reflected in an October 2022 interview that “a disappointing thing is that [international NGOs] are focusing more on their survival”. Another Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader interviewed in the same month said, “They give priority to their survival, survival of their offices, continuing to pay the salary to themselves and to their staff”. The perception of international agencies as lacking sedana was made explicit by another Myanmar organisation leader:
For some internationals…as soon as they heard the news about a small bomb blast or gunshot in the area, their head office did not allow their staff to go to these areas. But…we have to keep working for those communities… So, we are asking, “Though you are saying that you want to provide emergency support, you don’t do it when it is needed” … The sedana is not the same (interview, October 2022)
In a context where local organisation staff and leaders faced everyday risks, some participants also perceived that Myanmar organisations were not treated as deserving support for their work, but rather as sub-contracted partners within externally defined programs. Heavy financial and project reporting requirements in turn implied that Myanmar organisations should not be trusted to deliver projects. “Capacity building” was portrayed by several participants as being more about compliance, and making processes easier for the international partner, than developing the effectiveness of local organisation programs. As a Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader explained in an October 2022 interview:
Our criticism is that the capacity building is just to comply with their project needs. They teach us about financial management so that they don’t have any trouble when the report goes to the donor … More for their compliance, more for their safety and security, and for their risk management … It is the “capacity to comply”.
Fostering relationships of solidarity between international and Myanmar humanitarian organisations requires practical change in terms of easing overly onerous compliance processes. Such suggested policy changes have been outlined in recent research papers. But relations of solidarity also require mindset change amongst international agencies. Local organisation leaders are seeking acknowledgement from international agencies about the sacrifices they are making in their work, and hoping for greater international efforts to support growth and strengthening of their organisations and vision, rather than simply demanding compliance with bureaucratic systems.
In the midst of the fear and extreme challenges since the 2021 coup, many organisation leaders are seeking relationships of solidarity with international organisations. Every day, many Myanmar civil society leaders put themselves and their colleagues at risk by continuing to run humanitarian or advocacy programs.
Yet there are diverging expectations about reciprocity between Myanmar and international agencies. Where many local leaders have expectations of engagement characterised by sedana, parahita and metta, they often perceive international organisations as the antithesis of this—as self-interested and overly focussed on compliance. These differences in expectations are fuelling ongoing frustration..."
Source/publisher:
New Mandala
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"When National League for Democracy patron U Tin Oo died on June 1, many mourned his passing. He was one of the few military chiefs held in high esteem in Myanmar. His funeral was held on June 5.
Unlike many other Myanmar military generals, who earned medals for gallantry in battle against ethnic revolutionary organizations that were fighting for equality and self-determination, U Tin Oo earned his Thura title for the commitment he demonstrated in driving Kuomintang Chinese nationalist troops out of Myanmar.
Among the politicians of national significance who have died since independent Myanmar’s first coup in 1962 are the country’s first president, Sao Shwe Thaik (died 1962); the third United Nations secretary general, U Thant (1974); the country’s first prime minister, U Nu (1995); former military chief Saw Maung (1997); and the country’s first military dictator, Ne Win (2002).
Sao Shwe Thaik and U Thant died while U Ne Win was in power. U Nu, Ne Win and Saw Maung died while former military dictator Than Shwe was in power. All of them including U Tin Oo should have been honored with a state or military funeral, but they weren’t.
A state or military funeral is meant to pay final tribute to a public figure who has rendered outstanding service to the military or to Myanmar.
U Tin Oo was a respected public figure who deserved to be honored with a state funeral, having rendered meritorious service to protect the country as a military officer, and striven as a politician to initiate a better political system in the country.
Far from honoring him, the regime did not even allow his colleagues, jailed civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ousted President U Win Myint, to pay their final respects to U Tin Oo. It was like barring children from attending the funeral of their parents, intended to add to the psychological torment the regime has inflicted on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint.
U Tin Oo’s death notice was published in a junta-controlled newspaper. The notice on Page 31 of the June 2 issue of Myanma Alin newspaper measured 6.5 square centimeters, comprising just 8.7 percent of the page. The death notice for an ordinary citizen next to U Tin Oo’s notice measured 8.8 square centimeters (11.6 percent of the page).
In other words, Min Aung Hlaing showed his disrespect for U Tin Oo by only allocating a small space in the state-owned newspaper he now controls.
This is not strange. Min Aung Hlaing’s predecessors Ne Win and Than Shwe harbored similar grudges against their enemies and rivals.
Public figures who died during Ne Win’s reign
After staging the coup in March 1962, Ne Win became the first military dictator in Myanmar since the country’s independence.
Sao Shwe Thaik, who had served as Myanmar’s first president from independence in 1948 to 1952, was arrested following the coup. He died in prison of unknown causes some eight months after his arrest.
U Thant was the first Asian to serve as the UN secretary general. He was also the third UN secretary general, serving a 10-year term from 1961 to 1972. After he passed away in November 1974, his body was brought back to Myanmar. University students and the public demanded a state funeral for U Thant, but Ne Win refused and imposed a clampdown on student protesters in what later became known as the “U Thant incident”.
Public figures who died during Than Shwe’s reign
U Nu, Saw Maung and Ne Win died while Than Shwe was in power. If he wished, Than Shwe could have arranged at least military funerals for his predecessors Saw Maung and Ne Win. But he didn’t.
Ne Win was the most powerful and feared person in Myanmar for decades. It was probably karma that resulted in him being placed under house arrest before his death by Than Shwe, his handpicked successor.
Ne Win appointed Than Shwe as deputy military chief in 1985 before appointing him military chief in 1992, replacing Saw Maung. Than Shwe owed a debt to Ne Win, who put him on the throne.
Than Shwe never repaid that debt, instead ordering the arrest of Ne Win in 2002 and placing him under house arrest for the remaining months of his life. Ne Win was cremated the same day he died without fanfare at a ceremony attended by a handful of close relatives. Only two days after Ne Win’s death, Than Shwe put his death notice in a small column in the state-owned newspapers.
Dictators’ grudges
Unsurprisingly, dictators arrest those whom they view as threats to their power. But they should not hold grudges against opponents who have died.
Myanmar’s military dictators, being Buddhists, have had many pagodas built for the promotion of Buddhism. But they barely follow the Buddha’s teachings at all.
Successive military leaders from Ne Win to Than Shwe to quasi-civilian government leaders to Min Aung Hlaing have all wanted themselves to be considered promoters of Buddhism, on the same plane as the Myanmar monarchs of centuries past. This desire can be seen in their building of pagodas and religious buildings in a manner that was typical of the old monarchs.
Ne Win had the Maha Wizaya Pagoda built near the famous Shwedagon Pagoda. Than Shwe had Uppatasanti Pagoda, a replica of Shwedagon Pagoda, built in Naypyitaw. Current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing had the colossal Maravijaya Buddha statue built in Naypyitaw. And to surpass his seniors, he made sure the statue was the tallest of its kind in the world.
All of them have striven to show that they can do better than their predecessors, and have demonstrated no desire to honor or appreciate them.
What does the future hold for living military leaders?
Former military dictator Than Shwe, former president and ex-general Thein Sein, former parliament speaker and ex-general Shwe Mann, former prime minister and ex-general Khin Nyunt and current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing are still alive.
They might want to have at least a military funeral after they die. However, considering the previous examples, a military funeral is something they can dream about, but shouldn’t hope for.
But there is still a chance for them. If current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing apologizes and returns power to the people (and if the former generals are willing), the future government may consider organizing appropriate funerals for “remorseful” former military leaders..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
At least four civilians were killed and 10 wounded in airstrikes, residents said.
Description:
"An ethnic minority rebel force that recently ended a five-month ceasefire with the military said on Thursday it had captured 26 junta-occupied camps in two days of fighting in northeast Myanmar’s Shan state.
The Ta’ang National Liberation Army, one of three forces in the Three Brotherhood Alliance that launched Operation 1027 in October, resumed fighting across northern Shan state and Mandalay regions on Tuesday.
In January, Chinese officials brokered a ceasefire between the three allied armies and junta forces as the fighting began to pose a risk to Chinese economic interests across the country.
On Wednesday and Thursday, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, captured camps in northern Shan state’s Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Mongmit and Hsipaw townships and Mandalay region’s Mogoke township, the group said in two statements.
Seventeen junta soldiers under the Kyaukme-based Operations Command Headquarters surrendered on Wednesday and the fighting was still going on, said TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo.
“We’re still taking control of some of the camps. I’m not sure what the next step is because fighting is still fierce in those townships,” she said. “The military council is using heavy artillery and air strikes.”
The TNLA, along with allied militias of pro-democracy activists called People’s Defense Forces, have captured eight army camps, including one artillery position, in Kyaukme township, 13 camps in Nawnghkio township and five camps in Mogoke township. Twenty junta troops had been killed but the TNLA did not disclose any casualties among anti-junta forces.
On Thursday morning, the TNLA and its allies launched attacks on two junta infantry battalions in the ruby-mining Mogoke township, the TNLA said. Allied fighters came from People’s Defense Force-Mandalay, the Danu People’s Defense Force and the Northern Shan State Alliance Army.
One resident of Mogoke town told Radio Free Asia that fighting erupted on Wednesday evening when junta forces launched at least seven air attacks on the outskirts of the town at around 8:30 p.m.
“Houses were shaking when they bombed the villages,” said the resident who declined to be identified for security reasons. “Bombs also landed in some city neighborhoods. The plane flew above us over and over again, dropping bombs for about 45 minutes. No one dared to go outside.”
Some residents were wounded in the airstrikes, he said, adding that many people were facing food shortages due to the closure of shops.
IMG_20240627_160514_921.jpg
TNLA joint forces on the front lines in Kyaukme, northern Shan State on June 26, 2024. (TNLA)
Many civilians in Kyaukme township have fled because of the conflict, said another resident, adding that four civilians were killed and at least 10 were wounded in airstrikes on Wednesday.
“We heard the sound of shots fired from junta camps 501 and 502,” said the second resident, who also declined to be identified. “People have started to move. The fighting isn’t over.”
The junta has not released any information about the conflict. Calls to the military’s spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, went unanswered on Thursday..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Non-Ceasefire Groups, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Description:
"
International banks are playing a significant role in the Myanmar military junta’s ability to carry out its systematic and deadly assault on its people, a new United Nations-backed report has found.
Thai banks have now become the main source through which the Myanmar military is buying weapons and military supplies – including parts for helicopter gunships – used to support its three-year civil war that has devastated the country and killed more than 5,000 civilians, the UN special rapporteur on human rights Tom Andrews said in a new report Wednesday.
Since seizing power in a coup in February 2021, the military has been fighting a deepening war against ethnic armed groups and people’s resistance forces across Myanmar. In recent months it has faced significant losses of territory and troops.
As it contends with widespread public opposition and an economic crisis that has sparked soaring levels of poverty, the junta has increased airstrikes and attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, displacing more than 3 million people.
The military’s brutal campaign of violence has prompted Western nations to impose wide-ranging sanctions on military leaders, family and cronies, state-owned companies, banks, and jet fuel suppliers.
“The junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), is counting on two primary resources from abroad: weapons and money,” Andrews said in the report.
The report, “Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar,” found that 16 banks in seven countries have processed transactions linked to the military’s procurement in the past year.
Weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials secured by the junta from abroad reached $253 million between April 2023 and March 2024, the report said.
“By relying on financial institutions that are willing to do business with Myanmar state-owned banks under its control, the junta has ready access to the financial services it needs to carry out systematic human rights violations, including aerial attacks on civilians,” Andrews said.
However, the volume of weapons and military supplies purchased by the junta through foreign banks has decreased by a third from 2023, with exports from Singapore dropping dramatically, according to the report.
“The good news is that the junta is increasingly isolated,” Andrews said. “The bad news is that the junta is circumventing sanctions and other measures by exploiting gaps in sanctions regimes, shifting financial institutions, and taking advantage of the failure of Member States to fully coordinate and enforce actions.”
The Thai connection
Singapore-based entities were Myanmar’s third largest source of weapons and military materials. But following a government investigation, the flow of weapons materials to Myanmar from Singapore-registered companies dropped by nearly 90% compared to the previous year.
In 2022, Singapore-based banks facilitated more than 70% of the junta’s purchases passing through the banking system. By 2023, that had dropped to under 20%, the report found.
Looking for other financial institutions, the junta found neighboring Thailand.
Between 2022 and 2023, exports of weapons and related materials from Thai-based entities more than doubled, from $60 million to nearly $130 million last year.
“Many SAC (junta) purchases previously made from Singapore-based entities, including parts for Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters used to conduct airstrikes on civilian targets, are now being sourced from Thailand,” the report said.
Siam Commercial Bank is among the Thai banks that have played a “crucial role” in the shift, the report found. In 2022, the bank facilitated just over $5 million in transactions relating to the military, by 2023 that figure ballooned to more than $100 million, according to the report.
CNN has reached out to Siam Commercial Bank for comment on the report but has not received a response.
A spokesperson for Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told CNN, “we have seen the report and are looking into it.”
“Many countries have been named and certainly these are countries where the majority of financial transactions in the region would pass through,” the spokesperson said in a statement.
“Our banking and financial institutions follow banking protocols as any major financial hub. So we will have to first establish the facts before considering any further steps.”
Andrews said it was “critical” that “financial institutions take their human rights obligations seriously and not facilitate the junta’s deadly transactions.”
In addition, sanctioning the networks supplying jet fuel to the junta and the military’s “go-to bank” Myanma Economic Bank, “could play a decisive role in helping to turn the tide in Myanmar and saving untold numbers of lives,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The Myanmar junta is cutting millions of people off from the world by banning the use of many Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) – the last remaining tool for accessing blocked social media apps, messaging platforms, and thousands of websites. In parts of Myanmar, people continue to suffer from one of the world’s longest, most widespread, and pervasive internet shutdowns — already an enormous barrier to getting access to vital information or reporting serious human rights violations. If the global community continues to be silent, Myanmar will soon be behind a digital iron curtain just as severe as China’s or Iran’s.
Who’s behind the digital iron curtain project?
According to local media reports, the project to intercept VPN traffic on internet gateways coming to Myanmar is led by Brigadier General Lu Mon, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC). The departments responsible are MOTC’s Information Technology and Cyber Security Department and the military’s Directorate of Signals.
A company called Mascots Technologies and Telecommunications Company Limited is involved in implementing the ban, according to information shared in a military-run Telegram channel called Sit Thadin Military News.
Justice for Myanmar (JFM) reports that the junta began using a new web surveillance and censorship system at the end of May 2024. The system reportedly allows the military to “intercept and decrypt web traffic and block applications and websites, including the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs).” According to JFM, the system uses technology from Jizhi (Hainan) Information Technology Company Limited, also known as Geedge Networks. Notably, one of Geedge Networks’ founders, and its chief scientist, is Fang Binxing, known as the “father of China’s Great Firewall.”
The military has previously ordered licensed telecommunications and internet service providers to block websites. To ensure compliance, they would often do unannounced checks.
Impact of the VPN ban: what we know so far
Internet traffic volume to many sites, including Facebook, has significantly dropped since the ban was imposed on May 30. Using a VPN to access the internet securely and privately has become increasingly risky. Police have been doing random phone checks, arresting people under anti-terrorism laws if they catch them with Facebook or VPN apps on their phone.
Since the coup started in 2021, the military has been building a massive surveillance infrastructure. It has activated intercept technologies in telecommunications infrastructure, installed a network of CCTVs all over the country, and enacted surveillance-enabling regulations on SIM and IMEI registration. With this recent VPN ban, the people have lost secure communication channels and their ability to hide their online footprints.
The junta has banned many VPNs, including popular ones such as Psiphon and Nord. It is clear that the military will block more in the near future. Local digital rights groups report that VPN access varies from one platform to another, paid and free alike. It is extremely difficult to track what is working and what is not, as conditions shift every day. Since most of the free VPNs are no longer working, millions who cannot pay for premium accounts have already lost secure, private access to the internet.
The international community must act now!
To push back against this recent authoritarian move from the Myanmar junta, the international community must:
Make a collective public call for the military to stop banning VPNs and cease all other internet restrictions in Myanmar so that people can continue to securely access the internet as part of their ability to exercise fundamental rights and freedoms.
Coordinate with global tech companies, VPN providers, social media companies, and other companies in the telecom industry to deploy options/ possible technology that can be made available to those who are facing challenges connecting safely to the internet as a result of the ban.
Develop a coordinated action plan to cut off or prevent financial, technical, and other forms of support that benefit the military’s massive digital surveillance and censorship infrastructure.
Deepen its efforts to stop the sale/technical transfer of dual-use surveillance technologies, censorship tools, and mass data-collecting infrastructure to Myanmar.
Through regular engagement with local CSOs, collect data and evidence against companies involved in providing tools and services to the Myanmar military that are being used to violate people’s rights – and hold them to account using various measures and before all available remedy mechanisms..."
Source/publisher:
Access Now
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"For Immediate Release
Today, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) releases the second update in the “Voice Up” series, which provides a gendered overview of the human rights situation in target areas of Southeastern Burma, including Mon State, Karen State, and the Tanintharyi region. The report covers violations against women and children who have been impacted by the junta’s ongoing attacks against civilians between March and May 2024. The first update was published at the beginning of March 2024.
Before the attempted coup in Burma on 1 February 2021, HURFOM had published similar content in a bulletin-style format under the title ‘Voice Up.’ All of the cases documented by HURFOM fieldworkers show the strength of women and children in the wake of great adversity.
Our most recent findings indicate a worsening trajectory of complete and utter disregard for civilian life by the Burma Army. A total of at least twenty women were injured, sixteen were killed, and eighteen were arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained. Several of those killed were in their homes at the time of indiscriminate firing by the junta. Landmines also continue to pose a devastating risk that robs innocent people of their mobility and freedom of movement. Landmines are hidden, increasing the risk of their detonation.
For example, on the morning of March 11th, a distressing incident occurred in Zahar village, Dawei Township, where Daw Hnin Mu, age 60, tragically stepped on a landmine while tending to her garden. The explosion resulted in the amputation of her right leg. This incident, among others, is further evidence of the deprival of everyday rights and freedoms in Southeastern Burma and across the country.
Nonetheless, women remain steadfast and unwavering in their commitment to see a democratic Burma that includes gender equality. Their voices must be amplified across all political and social spaces to ensure their participation goes beyond tokenism and translates to meaningful change. Women are among the majority of those displaced and have suffered immensely at the hands of a brutal, power-hungry regime which has failed to steal their spirit.
HURFOM urges the international community to act swiftly to respond to women’s challenges and fund their efforts as long-time, reliable providers in their communities. Their roles as leaders have transcended gender norms and dispelled harmful gender stereotypes. Recognition of their bravery must extend to advocacy for protection pathways and transitional justice. Donors must also end long-time funding barriers and support their leadership and organizing with localized approaches.
Women continue to spearhead change, respond quickly to crises, and resist injustice, even during deeply challenging times. The second issue of this report is indicative not only of their struggles but also of their unwavering perseverance and determination..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
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897.07 KB
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Description:
"The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and its allies have reportedly seized Nawnghkio town and many regime positions in nearby Kyaukme town in northern Shan State.
Junta administration offices fell in Nawnghkio and regime artillery strikes targeted residential areas of the town on Wednesday morning, residents told the Shan media.
The TNLA on Wednesday said it attacked the junta’s Light Infantry Battalion 115 outside the town. It is also attacking Artillery Battalion 352 and Sakhan Tha hill outside Kyaukme, the TNLA said.
A Kyaukme resident told The Irrawaddy: “Clashes continue and civilians are trapped in the town. There is a power and phone blackout.”
]Four members of a Kyaukme family were killed by junta shelling of their home, Shan News reported, citing residents.
On Tuesday, two civilians were reportedly killed by regime shelling of residential areas.
The TNLA said it attacked a junta hilltop base in Mogoke Township, northern Mandalay Region, on Wednesday.
Mogoke residents told The Irrawaddy that the junta is using airstrikes to defend the hilltop base. People’s Defense Forces stopped civilians approaching the clash site in Mogoke.
The revival of Operation 1027 follows repeated junta violations of the January 10 China-brokered ceasefire with the Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the TNLA. The armed group reported numerous bombardments of its territory this month.
Three TNLA troops and a 10-year-old were killed and eight others injured, including four soldiers, by junta shelling and airstrikes, the armed group said.
The Brotherhood Alliance, which also includes the Arakan Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, launched Operation 1027 – named after its start date of October 27 – against the junta in northern Shan State.
It seized 24 junta battalion headquarters and command centers and hundreds of frontline bases during the operation. The junta lost control of more than half of northern Shan State, including around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The operation was halted on January 10 after the Brotherhood Alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Non-Ceasefire Groups
Language:
more
Sub-title:
A rise in crime in southeast Myanmar is putting stress on already struggling systems.
Description:
"Myanmar’s ethnic minority insurgent groups are grappling with a growing problem as they take over larger areas from junta forces in a surge of fighting since a 2021 coup: how to maintain law and order with few resources and while under constant threat of attack.
The Karen National Union, or KNU, controlling areas of Kayin state, is among the groups dealing with rising violent crime rates, especially offenses against minors, while struggling to maintain governance amid battles with junta forces.
“When there is conflict, there is not a normal situation. Whoever commits crimes like this, they have a lot of chances to flee,” said KNU spokesperson Saw Taw Nee, highlighting the difficulties in prosecuting offenders amid the chaos of war.
The conflict has displaced more than 229,000 people in Kayin state alone, according to the U.N. and amidst the turmoil, the KNU’s justice system has been pushed to its limits, resulting in controversial measures to combat heinous crimes.
Saw Taw Nee confirmed that “two or three” death sentences had been carried out in recent years, but declined to comment further, citing a lack of knowledge on the details. The KNU’s Department of Judiciary did not respond to requests for comment from Radio Free Asia.
In January 2024, a 60-year-old man was sentenced to death for raping two 12-year-old girls. This followed a 2022 case where two men received death sentences for the rape and murder of sisters aged 9 and 12.
These cases underscore the KNU’s resort to capital punishment, despite criticism from human rights organizations.
“As a human rights organization, we utterly condemn capital punishment in all circumstances,” said Saw Nanda Hsue of the Karen Human Rights Group. However, he acknowledged the complex reality in the “absence of proper mechanisms to hold civilian perpetrators accountable.”
The challenges faced by the KNU are not unique. Other political organizations opposing military rule and trying to administer civilian populations, such as the United League of Arakan and the Karenni Interim Executive Council, struggle with similar issues.
A source asking to be cited as an observer of the Arakan Army insurgent force, part of the United League of Arakan political group, told RFA that the group did not have enough lawyers or judges, and “very inadequate” infrastructure and facilities while prisons are at a constant risk of being attacked by junta troops.
“As [they gain] more controlled area and more population, the ULA will definitely face an increase in all types of cases,” the source said in a statement. “In some areas, gender-based violence and sexual assault cases might be more heard [in the] public domain.”
He told RFA he was not aware of any recent executions under the United League of Arakan.
Huge caseload
Similarly, the Karenni Interim Executive Council in Kayah state has begun training police forces to handle an increase in looting of homes abandoned because of the conflict, and petty crimes, as well as security for civilians, said John Quinley, director of Fortify Rights. Quinley interviewed members of the police force, who told him about the shortage of both facilities and personnel.
“They said, ‘you know, it’s really difficult. We have airstrikes and artillery fire in this area almost on a daily basis. But we’re also trying to get these guys that are trying to steal goods from houses,’” he said.
“Even the amount of judges that you have is fairly limited and their caseloads are really high, and so you just have a lot of petty crime, you have also other cases that are related to prisoners of war or related to crimes that maybe the resistance forces committed that need to go through the courts, so it’s just really quite a big caseload.”
Ethnic minority political groups and their armies are increasingly taking over areas that have been devastated by the battles in which control over them was won.
“If you’re dealing with towns and villages that have been bombed out ... the courthouse is gone, the jails are gone, what they use for detention, and then once the sentences have been issued, prisons just simply aren’t available,” said Jonathan Liljeblad, an associate professor at Australian National University’s College of Law.
The United League of Arakan’s handling of more than 4,000 cases in recent years may soon be dwarfed by the growing caseloads across all areas controlled by ethnic minority organizations potentially leading to a bigger crisis in their makeshift justice systems.
“There’s a lot of challenges, like how to maintain the rule of law in our territory, especially prisons and the capacity of our people,” said the KNU’s Saw Taw Nee.
“We are still in a struggling time for our rights and liberties, so we could not focus on the specific issues like that,” he said in reference to the death penalty..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Recent military air attacks pushed the Three Brotherhood Alliance to respond, insurgents said.
Description:
"Fighting broke out in northeast Myanmar on Tuesday as a five-month ceasefire brokered by China between junta forces and ethnic minority insurgents fell apart, with clashes including air strikes by military jets, residents of the area told Radio Free Asia.
An official in the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, insurgent force said the fighting in Shan state started because of attacks by junta forces on their positions.
“Fighting erupted around 5 a.m. and can still be heard,” said one resident of the area, about 220 km (140 miles) northeast of the city of Mandalay.
“Fighter jets shot and bombed near the side of Kyauk Kyan village,” said the resident who declined to be identified for security reasons. “The villagers have fled. We can’t leave through Kyauk Kyan because the road is closed and there’s fighting there.”
The TNLA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance of insurgent factions that launched an offensive in October and made significant gains against junta forces, especially in areas of Shan state near the border with China.
Chinese officials brokered a ceasefire between the insurgent alliance and junta forces on Jan. 11 and organized talks between the rivals in May in the Chinese city of Kunming. Sources with knowledge of the talks said China was keen to protect its economic interests on the border and in Rakhine state on the coast.
The other two members of the insurgent alliance are the Arakan Army, from Rakhine state, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, based on the Chinese border.
Airstrikes in recent weeks
A TNLA statement on Tuesday said the junta has repeatedly violated the January truce over the last two weeks by conducting airstrikes and drone and artillery attacks in Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mogoke townships in Shan state.
The TNLA will defend itself if the junta continues to use airstrikes and heavy weapons, said the group’s general secretary, Major Gen. Tar Bone Kyaw.
The TNLA’s head of information, Lway Yay Oo, told RFA that the fighting began after junta troops attacked their camps.
“Fighting broke out with the junta army at the intersection of Nawnghkio’s Ohn Ma Thee village and Kyaukme’s Nyein Chan Yay Kone village,” she said.
Junta jets struck on the outskirts of Nawnghkio town, near an army camp at Kyauk Kyan village, residents said.
Fighting spread to the villages between Nawnghkio and Mandalay region’s Pyinoolwin, along a 56 km (35 mile) stretch of road where junta troops were attacking villages by air.
TNLA forces surrounded Kyaukme town while junta troops were shelling them from the camps in the town, residents said.
Two civilians were killed and four others were injured when the shells dropped in neighborhood No. 8 and in Kyaukme township’s Tilin ward, according to a volunteer for war-displaced persons.
“The official death toll is two until now,” the volunteer said. “But casualties are expected to be higher.”
A death toll report hasn’t been received from nearby Man Hkar village, which faced a barrage of artillery shells. Artillery attacks also hit two other villages, he said.
Could grow wider
The junta has yet to release any information about the renewed fighting. RFA called its national spokesperson, Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for comment but he did not respond.
A former military officer told RFA that the resurgence of fighting in northern Shan state is likely aimed at reducing pressure on the Arakan Army.
“This will prevent the military from sending reserve troops to Rakhine state,” he said.
However, political analyst Than Soe Naing said the renewed fighting could grow into a wider effort to capture more towns.
“The TNLA will decide if they take control of Kyaukme and Lashio townships,” he said. “If they continue to fight to control these townships, MNDAA will also join in the offensives.”
The junta appears to be preparing for wider conflict as well. Earlier this month, troops used bulldozers and other heavy equipment in northern Shan State to make several key roads impassable as the TNLA and MNDAA began to reassemble forces.
The main road to Kyaukme was one of the roads that was destroyed and blocked. As a result, the cost of transporting goods into the area has nearly doubled, one truck driver said.
“I no longer wish to continue. There’s no profit left,” he said. “Crossing the creek now costs about 700,000 kyats (US$180), including payment to both sides.”
The military junta has also imposed restrictions on the transportation of rice, edible oil, medicine and fuel into the area, according to several sources who have traveled through the area.
That has led to a severe shortage of items like meat, fish and medicine, a shop owner in Hseni said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Various groups
Language:
more
Description:
"The Arakan Army’s capture of Rakhine State’s Thandwe Airport on Sunday puts the ethnic army just steps away from Myanmar’s most valuable beach – seven kilometers of fine white sand stretching between turquoise sea and palm-fringed forest – and puts many of the country’s most brazen cronies in an unenviable position.
Will the tycoons who turned their military ties into riches, including the son of junta boss Ming Aung Hlaing, try to negotiate with a rebel army to save their assets?
Ngapali Beach is where Myanmar’s cronies built their most lavish resorts. Its gateway is Thandwe Airport, just 30 minutes away.
The fall of the airport means the loss of the prized beach, which is also famous for watching the sun set over the Bay of Bengal.
The airport was used by the regime to reinforce troops, and send in weapons and supplies from Ayeyarwady Region and southern Shan State. That’s no longer possible. Without the airport’s runway, Thandwe Township is only accessible by two roads that weave through the Arakan Mountains: Gwa-Ngathaingchaung and Taungup-Padaung. Both roads leave convoys prone to ambush. Moreover, the arrival of the monsoon season makes it treacherous to send more troops and supplies by sea to protect the crony beach.
There are 64 hotels and resorts on Ngapali Beach and most of the grandest ones are owned by tycoons with close ties to the leaders of successive military regimes, from the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which ruled from 1988 to 2011, to the current State Administration Council.
Amazing Ngapali Hotel was built on land leased from the military by Aung Myo Min Din, who has personal ties to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing and his wife Kyu Kyu Hla. Aung Myo Min Din was Kyu Kyu Hla’s pupil when he was a high school student and reportedly has an open invitation to Min Aung Hlaing’s home.
Hoteliers say Aung Myo Min Din also bought Max Hotel from crony Zaw Zaw for Min Aung Hlaing’s son Aung Pyae Sone. Max Hotel, now rebranded as Ananda Hotel, is adjacent to Amazing Ngapali Hotel. Local residents also say Aung Pyae Sone is its owner.
The Pristine Mermaid Ngapali is owned by Nandar Aye, a daughter of the deputy junta chief of the previous junta, Maung Aye. The Htoo Group of Companies, owned by crony and arms broker Tay Za, reportedly built the hotel for her for free.
Tun Naing Shwe, son of former junta chief Than Shwe, owns the Thande Ngapali Hotel.
Arch crony Aung Ko Win owns the Jasmine Ngapali Resort through his Kanbawza (KBZ) Group of Companies, which includes KBZ Bank. The resort’s guests include Min Aung Hlaing. In January of last year, it hosted the 8th High-Level Committee Meeting between the Myanmar and Thai armed forces. Participants included General Chalermphon Srisawasdi, Chief of the Defence Forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.
Ngapali’s Aureum Palace is owned by Tay Za’s Htoo Group of Companies Za, while its Jade Marina Hotel is owned by crony Ne Win Tun, the leader of a Pa-O militia with ties to the junta’s military, through his Ruby Dragon Co.
Other, less flamboyant cronies, also bought or built resorts on Ngapali Beach.
This may be why the regime tried so hard to hang on to the seven-kilometer strip of white sand. It even sent reinforcements from the Aung Zeya Column to Thandwe in early June. The column is advancing towards Myawaddy along the Thai border in Karen State with the goal of retaking the vital border town.
The Arakan Army defeated the junta soldiers and police protecting the airport and the beach. Reports say more than 100 junta soldiers and police surrendered. Others fled to the bases of nearby battalions in Thandwe Township. Both Light Infantry Battalion 566 and Infantry Battalion 55 have bases there.
The Arakan Army told both battalions to surrender after it seized Thandwe Airport.
The 5th Military Operations Command in Taungup is the nearest battalion to Thandwe, but Taungup is surrounded by Arkan Army troops. The regime is not in a position to regroup its soldiers in Rakhine to send reinforcements to Thandwe.
If the Arakan Army takes Ngapali Beach, Myanmar’s cronies will face a stark choice: abandon their assets or negotiate with a rebel army to save them..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Business and the Military
Language:
more
Description:
"MESSAGE FROM THE HEAD OF THE MECHANISM
The conflict in Myanmar continues to intensify and spread across the country, resulting in ever-increasing suffering inflicted upon the civilian population. People of various ethnic groups and religions have been injured and killed in their homes, schools and places of worship. Villages have been burned and houses destroyed. Thousands have been arrested and killed or tortured in detention. In the past six months, over three million people were forced to flee their homes.
The Mechanism is closely monitoring attacks on civilians across the country, including in the recent upsurge in fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. We are speaking to victims and witnesses of violent events and analyzing information that we have received to assess if crimes against humanity or war crimes have been committed. From the violence and destruction of property in Buthidaung Township to the alleged torture and killing of more than 70 people in Byaing Phyu village, we are looking at potential crimes committed regardless of the ethnic group or affiliation of the perpetrators or the victims.
Conducting our investigations without access to crime scenes is an enormous challenge. The Myanmar military has ignored numerous requests from the Mechanism for access to the country and specific information. We recently issued a statement on our latest request for information concerning the capture and burning alive of two young men in Magway Region, in the hope that publicizing a request about such a heinous crime might lead to a response.
Without access to Myanmar and with regular internet blackouts that restrict the flow of information from affected areas, the Mechanism relies to a great extent on courageous civil society organizations to provide us with information about crimes and connect us to witnesses. At our second Civil Society Dialogue last month, representatives of organizations shared their challenges securing funding, recruiting staff and dealing with their own trauma amid increased threats to their security. We noted their recommendations on how the Mechanism could better respond to the realities on the ground, and we are currently assessing what modifications we might make to our working methods.
The Mechanism is grateful to everyone who shares evidence and testimonies with us. We use this information to objectively investigate and to build criminal cases against those perpetrators most responsible for serious international crimes. This includes crimes committed by Myanmar security forces and members of armed groups. Just as we are sharing evidence with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina, I am optimistic that the evidence we collect and analyze of other crimes will one day be used to bring justice for the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
1.34 MB 1.45 MB
more
Sub-title:
Mass civilian casualties are likely as a desperate regime terrorizes the Bamar heartland with fire bombs.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta expected to consolidate power within a few days of their Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat. Nearly three-and-a-half years on, they continue to lose territory. They never had any legitimacy to lose.
The military have always acted as if time was on their side. But that’s no longer the case, and there are signs that the junta is moving with urgency – in ways that will bring even more suffering and indiscriminate killing upon the majority Bamar heartland.
First, the churn of senior officers has intensified as junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing replaces under-performing officers with eager and ambitious sycophants. In the latest reshuffle, some 30 officers were reassigned; five major generals were relieved of their command.
Min Aung Hlaing remains in control and Soe Win, rumored to have been injured by an opposition drone strike, is back. If there is opposition within the ruling State Administrative Council, the formal name for the military junta, to their leadership, it has not made itself manifest.
Second, the economy continues to weaken, hobbled by soaring inflation, a devalued currency, capital flight, and a collapse in foreign investment. Food insecurity is growing, with a benchmark basket of staples having gone up 270% since the coup.
A sharp downturn in government revenue collection also limits the junta’s ability to wage a prolonged conflict. The unlikelihood of a recovery in the near term is forcing the junta to be more aggressive.
Third, given losses on the ground and defections, the military has stepped up their reliance on aerial bombardment and long-range artillery strikes.
Airstrikes terrorize population
Between January and May, the regime launched nearly 2,000 airstrikes, largely against civilian targets. While insufficient to retake or hold territory, airstrikes are meant to crush public support for the opposition.
Given the limited number of aircraft, tempo of operations, and shortage of spare parts, air attacks have exceeded predictions, but this is not sustainable in the long-term.
Fourth, the junta is throwing additional resources into holding the cities.
The military may have lost effective control over half of the country, including 60 towns and small cities, but they still control nearly two-thirds of the population of 55 million.
The military launched an offensive to retake Loikaw, the Kayah state capital which Karenni National Defense Forces had partially taken in early 2024. The military has taken partial control but efforts to reinforce its troops from Hsihseng township in southern Shan state have met with resistance.
Likewise, while the Arakan Army now controls almost the entire north of Rakhine state, the junta has been reinforcing troops in the state capital Sittwe by sea, making the city’s fall unlikely in the near term.
Urban operations remain very costly for the opposition. A recent plot to target Min Aung Hlaing, during the opening of a Japanese-funded bridge, resulted in the arrest of a 13-member cell.
Ceding the borderlands
It's important to also look at what the junta is doing to better position itself for the next phase of the conflict. There are operational and logistical moves underway.
Short on personnel and resources, the military has largely ceded the ethnic dominated regions along the borders for the short term.
The military’s losses in the border regions are enormous. Ethnic resistance organizations and people’s defense forces have captured 218 military camps between January to May 2024. The conquests included 63 in Rakhine, 103 in Kachin, 19 in Shan, 12 in Kayin, eight in Chin, four in Mandalay, three in Mon, two in Tanintharyi, and one each in Kayah, Magee, Bago, and Sagaing.
The Irrawaddy online news site reported that opposition forces have taken 74 battalion headquarters around the country, as well as one of 12 military region headquarters.
The resistance controls most of the border regions and almost all border crossings. The Kachin Independence Army recently captured their state’s final crossing.
The military’s priority is the Bamar heartland, and they have fought with intensified ferocity in Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, and other regions to crush ethnic Burmese opposition.
Once that is achieved, the military will no longer worry about vulnerable supply lines across the country’s central dry zone and can then mount counter-offensives in each region, at a time of their choosing; a return to their traditional divide and conquer strategy.
Critical roads and border towns
That leads to the second major junta initiative: The military is determined to regain control over the critical roads to Muse and Myawaddy, the major trading cities on the Chinese and Thai borders, respectively.
The military has been making slow, yet determined progress through the Dawna mountains to retake control over the Asia Highway 1 to Myawaddy on the Thai border. The opposition has put up stiff resistance, but the military has thrown a lot of troops into this.
The junta has recently stepped up air and drone attacks in northern Shan state against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), despite a Chinese-brokered ceasefire.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies reportedly sent a delegation to Naypyidaw to protest the ceasefire violations. But, the junta appears to be building up their forces in Lashio, northern Shan’s largest city, for an offensive to reopen Highway 3 to Muse. It has destroyed roads to block TNLA reinforcements.
Facing shortages of foreign exchange, the military has stepped up domestic arms production.
Largely located in the Bamar heartland around Magwe, these defense factories have remained out of reach of the opposition National Unity Government and the ethnic resistance organizations.
In addition to small arms and munitions, these factories also produce 250-lb and 500-lb gravity dropped bombs.
Mass civilian casualties
In a forthcoming report, the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar, an independent expert group, documents China’s assistance in producing new munitions. China North Industries Group (NORINCO), the sprawling state-owned conglomerate, appears to have provided prototypes and manufacturing processes to produce fuel air explosive (FAE) aerial bombs.
Often referred to as thermobaric weapons, the bombs are believed to have been dropped on Pa Za Gyi village in Sagaing, in April 2023, an attack that killed more than 165 people, including children.
The report, which is a follow up to a January 2023 study on the Tatmadaw’s defense production capabilities, finds that China has also dispatched technicians to assist in production.
Given the military’s strategy of terrorizing the population into submission, the junta should be expected to increase their use of these indiscriminate weapons, with the likelihood of mass civilian casualties.
The domestic arms production does not mean there has been no new imported weaponry. Reuters documented the deployment of Chinese drones into the SAC’s ranks. Local production of Chinese-designed drone-specific munitions has already started.
The military will continue to train drone operators and integrate them into their front-line units. This was seen on June 19, when a military drone attacked a TNLA position in northern Shan state, killing four people.
Another prong of the renewed campaign is the junta’s intensification of their conscription program, as well as the call-up of retired officers.
Despite the opposition’s targeted killing of over 80 conscription administrators, the military appears to be on track to meet its monthly target of 5,000. RFA-Burmese has reported that preparation for the conscription of women has begun in the Tanintharyi and Bago regions.
While the majority of the conscripts are hastily trained and poorly motivated, and veterans can be as old as 67, they free up experienced personnel and can be used as human shields and porters.
In war, quantity is its own quality.
The junta’s continuing build up of logistics and personnel point to more assaults in the Bamar heartland and an intensified offensive to retake border trade routes..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"YANGON, MYANMAR —
A Myanmar ethnic armed group has seized the country's most popular beach resort town, with junta troops holed up in a nearby airport, military and local sources told AFP on Tuesday.
Clashes have rocked western Rakhine state since the Arakan Army attacked the military there in November, ending a ceasefire that had largely held since the 2021 military coup.
For days, fighting has raged around Ngapali beach in the south of the state, where upmarket resorts dot the pristine, palm-fringed sands of the Indian Ocean.
The town of Thandwe, a few kilometers from the beach and home to the local airport, was largely deserted as of Monday, a resident who fled that day told AFP.
"Almost everyone in the town has fled... Very few people are now in Thandwe," said the resident, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
"A rocket shell landed in the town yesterday. We also heard continuous heavy artillery shelling."
A military source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP security forces had retreated to the airport and were in control of the site.
A local hotel owner who was no longer in the town told AFP his staff said the military had carried out airstrikes near the airport on Monday.
His employees told him there were "some army and police trapped inside the airport building."
AFP was unable to reach a junta spokesman for comment and has contacted an Arakan Army spokesman.
Thandwe airport has been closed since early this month as Arakan Army fighters launched attacks in the area.
Analysts say many of the hotels and resorts at Ngapali are owned by businessmen close to the junta or are part of the military's sprawling business empire that includes gems, tourism, tobacco and real estate.
Since launching its offensive in November, the Arakan Army has seized territory along the border with India and Bangladesh, piling further pressure on the junta as it battles opponents elsewhere across the Southeast Asian country.
State capital Sittwe is one of the few holdouts for junta troops in Rakhine state.
The Arakan Army, which says it is fighting for autonomy for the state's ethnic Rakhine population, has vowed to capture the city, home to an India-backed deep sea port and around 200,000 people..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Junta police and government employees have left Thandwe as the fighting between the regime and the Arakan Army (AA) moves closer to the town in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, Thandwe residents said.
While initial reports suggested that police had surrendered to the AA at noon on Sunday, a resident close to Police Department staff said police had fled the town in plain clothes along with their weapons.
“They didn’t surrender. They fled to Gwa. There was a rumor that the two sides were exchanging fire after the AA troops attacked the police station. In fact, police just fired some shots as they were getting into their vehicles to flee,” he said.
Another Thandwe resident said a department employee told him that senior police officials had ordered police officers in the town to leave.
“Municipal staff and Immigration Department staff were told Sunday not to sleep in the town and to get as far as 10 miles [16 km] away from the town. So, they fled hastily overnight. They did not even take their belongings,” the resident told The Irrawaddy.
Guards at Thandwe Prison were released from their duties at noon on Sunday, according to a source close to the prison. It is not clear if the prisoners were freed.
Thandwe residents and Rakhine State-based media outlets reported the AA had seized Thandwe Airport on Sunday, but pro-junta Telegram channels dismissed the reports. Thandwe residents fled the town on Sunday and Monday for fear of junta air raids.
An unexploded bomb dropped by a junta jet hit a house in No. 1 Ward in Thandwe town on Monday morning.
Fighting broke out in Thandwe Township on April 13..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink met with a senior Myanmar regime naval officer in Vietnam last week, according to a source familiar with the meeting.
Kritenbrink was in Hanoi on June 21 and 22 on a visit to promote a strategic partnership between the two countries and their support for “a free and open Indo-Pacific region”, according to the State Department.
During the visit, Kritenbrink met with Commodore Kyaw Lin Zaw, a Myanmar regime naval commander, in Hanoi. The Irrawaddy has learned that another US official and the senior diplomat at the US Embassy in Myanmar, Chargé d’Affaires Susan Stevenson, joined the meeting. But the agenda of the meeting is unknown.
The US State Department would neither deny nor confirm the meeting when asked about it by The Irrawaddy.
A State Department spokesperson said the US continued “to deploy all diplomatic tools” at its disposal to press the Myanmar military regime to change course, adding that the US policy on the country has not changed.
“We continue to make clear to the military regime—including through limited private channels—that it must end its violence against the people of Burma, release those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the will of the people for a return to the path of progress and an inclusive, representative democracy,” the spokesperson said.
Since the military coup in Myanmar 2021, the US has ramped up economic and political pressure on the junta while engaging with leaders of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement, including the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and other political, ethnic and religious stakeholders.
In June last year, the US leveled sanctions against Myanmar’s Ministry of Defense and two banks—Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB)—used by the junta to purchase arms and other goods in foreign currencies.
The US has also supported the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s five-point peace plan for Myanmar. However, the junta has failed to implement the plan, which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country. The junta had killed more than 5,300 people as of Monday.
In May, Kritenbrink underscored the US’ close coordination with ASEAN to support Myanmar’s path to inclusive democracy, in line with ASEAN’s peace plan, during the 36th annual ASEAN-US Dialogue in Washington. The dialogue was joined by Thet Win, chargé d’affaires at the Myanmar Embassy in Washington. Kritenbrink called for the military regime to immediately end the violence, release those unjustly detained, and allow unhindered humanitarian access to all those in need.
NUG Deputy Foreign Minister U Moe Zaw Oo said that despite the US’ engagement with the NUG, it had no information about Kritenbrink’s meeting with the junta official in Hanoi and was not notified about it.
On Saturday, when Kritenbrink was in Hanoi, the State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Robert S. Gilchrist met with NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min as well as U Moe Zaw Oo.
During the meeting, the ministers urged the US to take more action against the regime and provide support to the Myanmar people that would be directly effective, the NUG said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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The air force apparently bombed a monastery under the control of junta forces by mistake.
Description:
"Myanmar junta forces killed 17 people in an airstrike on a monastery where people were taking shelter from fighting after insurgents battling to end military rule attacked a nearby army camp, members of anti-junta militia groups told Radio Free Asia on Monday.
The junta’s air force launched the attack on Saturday night on a monastery in Nant Thar village in the central region of Sagaing, killing a monk and 16 other people including three members of the same family, they said.
Sagaing has seen unprecedented levels of violence since a 2021 military coup triggered an insurgency by pro-democracy activists who formed People’s Defense Forces around the country to confront the military.
Junta forces have been accused of razing villages, carrying out mass shootings and bombing villages indiscriminately as they hunt for members of the People’s Defense Forces.
The airstrike in Indaw township followed an attack on a junta camp carried out by an alliance of fighters including members of the Indaw People’s Defense Force, the Kachin Independence Army, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, and other groups, activists said.
Nant Thar has two monasteries, one under the control of rebel forces and another occupied by junta forces, said an official of the anti-junta Indaw Revolution group, who declined to be identified for security reasons.
“People were called to the monastery and locked down by the junta troops when fighting erupted and the jet then bombed the monastery at midnight while people were locked down,” the group official said.
“They must have wanted to bomb the monastery on the mountain,” he said, referring to the monastery controlled by anti-junta forces. “They dropped the bombs on their own monastery by mistake.”
The military has not released any information about the incident and calls to Sagaing region’s junta spokesperson, Nyunt Win Aung, for more information went unanswered.
Junta troops have cut communication links to the village, a frequent tactic after big attacks.
More than 10 people, including children, were wounded, the Indaw Revolution official said, adding that some were in critical condition.
The dead were cremated on Monday, he said.
The village has been largely empty since April last year when anti-junta forces repeatedly attacked the military camp in Nant Thar, which is on a major road, residents said. But junta troops had prevented remaining residents from leaving, including those killed on Saturday, they said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Description:
"Many people claim to know what’s happening in northern Rakhine State, but judging by the statements and counter-statements and different figures, no one really knows and most people are seeing the situation through their selective lenses and echo chambers with the truth somewhere in the middle.
On March 26 I wrote an article for the Irrawaddy entitled, “Myanmar’s Junta Plays Both Rakhine and Rohingya for Fools” and in the last paragraph I said,
“Desperately trying to survive in Rakhine State with a large defeat looming, the junta is fomenting ethnic divide as fast as possible. The question is how deep the reconciliation between Rakhine and Rohingya is, to what extent they will see through and reject the junta’s games, and to what extent they will allow themselves to be the junta’s puppets again.”
Judging by social media, the junta has been successful. Extreme, contradictory points of view are dominating and drowning out moderate voices. This was of course the junta’s intention and they have 70 years of experience in psychological warfare. Many of the X posts accuse the Arakan Army (AA) of any crime they can think of, including genocide, while conveniently failing to mention any of the junta’s crimes. One suspects that some of these are actually junta-controlled X accounts. Unfortunately, many members of the Rohingya diaspora and activists have joined this chorus, with the AA responding with racist tweets and anger that escalates the tension.
There is a lack of empathy and understanding on all sides. By empathy I don’t mean sympathy, although it can lead to that. I mean putting oneself in another person’s position and trying to understand how they feel, think and what motivates them; the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another. One may still strongly disagree, but empathy enables one to better strategize how to respond to others. The prominent emotional condemnation approach drowns out moderate voices and puts people in a corner from which they tend to come out fighting, especially if they are proud and nationalistic.
The junta approach is, “If we can’t have it, we will destroy it physically and socially.” They started by forcing Rohingya to protest against the AA in Buthidaung and Sittwe. This angered many Rakhines, including, it seems, the AA leadership, who ignored the fact that the junta forced them to protest. Then the junta ironically conscripted Rohingya people who they don’t recognize as citizens and in fact tried to eliminate them in 2017. This increased the AA sense of betrayal as they had supplied many Rohingyas with aid and safety in their areas. The inconvenient truth that some Rohingya joined the Myanmar military voluntarily didn’t ease the tensions and AA chief Tun Myat Naing’s tweets demonstrated anger and a lack of empathy.
The Rohingya have suffered from most people in Myanmar; successive military governments, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Rakhines and the apathy of those not actively persecuting them, so many don’t feel it is their revolution. One Rohingya on social media scoffed, “What revolution!” For some Rohingya it is just a matter of choosing what they see will be the best option for them. Some choose the Special Administrative Council because they think it will win and it gives them food, uniforms and guns.
From the AA leadership’s point of view, they had provided the Rohingya with humanitarian aid and protection and were betrayed when some Rohingya joined the junta and fought them. The majority of Rohingya support the revolution and many have joined the AA administration, police and even military voluntarily, but Tun Myat Naing fell into the trap of communal blame and some of the AA troops dished out communal punishment. This of course caused condemnation and accusations, even of genocide, from mainly members of the Rohingya diaspora and activists, which in turn angered the AA leadership even more. The junta inflamed this by making inflammatory statements on social media posing as Rohingya. There seems to have been a lack of empathy by some activists towards the AA leading to an inappropriate heavy-handed approach by the AA. Putting the nationalistic AA in a corner is not going to achieve much except trouble.
In addition, the high levels of international and national attention civil society organizations (CSOs) put solely on the Rohingya have alienated Rakhine CSOs. Even before Buthidaung, hundreds of non-Rohingya were killed in airstrikes and hundreds of thousands left with inadequate shelter as the monsoon started with very few international groups taking note, never mind responding. This happened in 2013 when international aid organizations focused on the Rohingya, causing resentment from Rakhines and harming communal relations. Rakhines didn’t know of the UN rapid needs assessments! All they saw was World Food Program trucks passing their villages going to Rohingya villages.
Maungdaw is in focus at the moment. There are Rohingya, Rakhine, Hindus, Maramagris and Dainets trapped in Maungdaw. The AA warned people to leave from June 14. It seems that those with money have fled irrespective of ethnicity. Some rich Rohingyas have even moved to Yangon. Some Rohingya from villages have already fled to safer places within Maungdaw township. The question is why have some people of various ethnicities stayed in Maungdaw. After talking to Rohingya, Rakhine and Mararagris, it appears people are staying for various reasons, such as lack of information, fear of leaving their homes unprotected, lack of money, fear of junta check points, and fear of being attacked by Rohingya junta fighters or the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army which perversely is supporting its old enemy the Myanmar Military. Old people are generally the most reluctant to move. There were Rohingya villages in AA areas they could have fled to. In fact, some Rohingya villages have charged those fleeing to pass them. It is not clear if they also charged Rohingya or just other ethnicities.
Now people are trapped in Maungdaw and I hear AA is trying to rescue them. A Rakhine journalist now in Bangladesh said,
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from June 15th to 21st. The Military Junta used drones and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region and Mon State. The political prisoners from O-Bo Prison, Mandalay Region, and Kyaikmaraw Prison, Mon State, were relocated. The head of the Prison who works under The Military threatened, arrested, and tortured the female political prisoners, and over 80 people were injured in Daik-U Prison, East Bago Region. The Military arrested the civilians who sold and wore the flowers on the birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on June 19th.
Almost 20 civilians died, and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. The Military Junta arrested over 280 civilians within a week. 3 civilians died in the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-06-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Thailand is the only ASEAN country, sharing a substantial 2,401-kilometer border with Myanmar, receiving many Myanmar migrants for employment, education, and property investments over time. With a shared Buddhist heritage, both countries have similar festivals, food and languages, helping to build a close friendship socially, culturally and also, economically.
Since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, the Thai government has refrained from openly supporting Myanmar’s democracy movement against the junta, while Thai people and civil society groups express solidarity. Moreover, humanitarian assistance for the increasing numbers of Myanmar refugees at the borders remains insufficient and most importantly, irregular refugees and migrants are being forcibly repatriated to Myanmar where violence, torture and mandatory military service law await. Many Myanmar youths are relocating to Thailand to escape conscription and apply for educational visas; yet stricter visa restrictions are being imposed. This raises the question of whether Thailand has become a frenemy to Myanmar people amidst these difficult times.
The Unclear Stance of the Thai government Towards Conflict and Myanmar Politics
The Thai government under the Prayut administration maintained close relations with the Myanmar military after the 2021 coup and continued its business-as-usual cooperation, and so did the recent Sretha government in 2024.
The two militaries have a long-standing relationship in joint border patrols and military cooperation and practices. When the Thai military gained control back in politics after the 2014 coup, this led to a closer and more supportive relationship in bilateral military cooperation after the abandonment of a ‘buffer state’ policy towards Myanmar. Consequently, in 2022 Pornpimol Kanchanalak, being a convicted lobbyist in the U.S was appointed as a special envoy to Myanmar to shape Thai-Myanmar foreign policies together with Don Pramudwinai, Thai foreign minister. So, Thai foreign policies sway more to maintaining good relationships with the military-backed State Administration Council (SAC), given their shared economic interests. Recently, two militaries cooperated in taking a patrol along the Thai-Myanmar border near Mae Sot, which showed significantly good relationships even as conflicts escalate in Myanmar.
Besides strong military ties, Thailand also has significant economic reliance on Myanmar’s resources, particularly natural gas supplies for electricity generation and investments in the Thai company PTT. In early 2024, the two countries decided to enhance their economic cooperation during the visit of U Chan Aye, SAC’s representative to Thailand. Moreover, investments in PTT company for oil and natural gas increased to 89.209 billion baht for 2024-2028, and reportedly, tripled its initial investment of 33.3 billion baht to 93.5 billion baht in 2023 alone because PTT has been ensuring energy security for domestic consumption and reducing foreign currency risk. In 2021, 15% of natural gas consumption was fulfilled by Myanmar’s energy supply; so Thailand has been hesitant to risk this energy source by taking a stance against the junta. Besides PTT, Thai companies have invested over $11 billion in 154 projects in Myanmar, ranking itself as the third largest investor. These companies are likely hoping to benefit from other foreign companies pulling out from Myanmar and to capitalize on economic opportunities and expand their economic presence. Therefore, the Thai government is unlikely to sever ties with the SAC government due to said economic interests.
In over 3 years of civil war after the 2021 military coup, despite the Thai government having several meetings with the SAC and being a supportive friend, the talk between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Myanmar military facilitated by the Thai government was the first political engagement between the Thai government and revolutionary ethnic resistance organisations from Myanmar. That was also because KNU’s occupation of the Myawaddy border township affects border trade and trade revenues for the Thai government. As a result of the occupation, fighting in Myawaddy led to a big influx of refugees crossing the border into Mae Sot, with daily numbers reaching around 4,000 people, and also disrupted border trade for days—this was a concern for Thailand due to its reliance on stable economic activity. This suggests that the Thai government will never hold talks or meddle as a mediator in Myanmar people’s democratic efforts with revolutionary ethnic resistance groups unless their economic and security interests are threatened.
Nonetheless, border areas play a significant role in encouraging Thailand to become such an active player in conflict resolution as a moderator for peace talks between the SAC and revolutionary forces. This signals the importance of Thailand’s role in Myanmar’s revolutionary efforts to end internal conflicts and can be a way for both revolutionary parties and international communities to leverage Thailand’s interests to support democratic efforts in Myanmar, promoting a positive outcome for all involved parties.
Humanitarian Challenges at Thai-Myanmar Border and Forced Repatriation
After the military coup, it saw a big influx of Myanmar people fleeing violence and persecution from the junta at the border areas. Approximately, 20,000 new refugees are finding sheltering in rural border areas of Thailand, staying in inadequate conditions such as Temporary Safety Areas (TSA). Many of them live in doorless bamboo houses exposed to environmental and health hazards such as malaria, coupled with the lack of food, and the malnourishment in infants and pregnant women. Also, the lack of documentation exposes people to high risks of arrest, detention, and deportation—not to mention, the shortage of job opportunities for refugees and educational prospects for children. Moreover, local Thai authorities and villages do not seem to welcome these refugees because they perceive them as threats to local job opportunities and development.
Thailand, despite not being a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, has provided humanitarian assistance to refugees in seven temporary shelters and camps across Thai-Myanmar borders. With the country’s Anti-Torture Act not clearly defining the term ‘refugee’, newly arriving refugees encounter several humanitarian challenges, especially detention and deportation, including the lack of access to healthcare services, shelter and food. Asylum Access Thailand reports that the National Screen Mechanism is leaving out new refugees who are in real danger of persecution and violence and fails to protect and accommodate these individuals at the borders.
The humanitarian crisis has now reached a new level of danger, such that there are 754,000 internally displaced persons in states and regions bordering Thailand as of February 2024, with expectations that the number of refugees will increase. Many escaped to nearby Thailand for only one purpose: to flee violence, air strikes, and military attacks. However, many of them are being forced to return to conflict zones despite the high-security risks they face in Myanmar. Thai authorities forced new refugees and IDPs back to Karenni State where airstrikes and severe conflicts are escalating. Therefore, the Thai government must stop immediately forced returns because these refugees may face persecution, torture, violence or any forms of ill treatment by the junta, violating the principle of non-refoulement.
More Restrictions on Visa Applications for Myanmar Citizens
The Thai government has implemented even more visa restrictions for Myanmar citizens. Myanmar migrant workers are now required to go back to their home country to extend their visas after 4-year contracts, even though they used to be able to extend their books at their same workplace domestically. At the same time, the SAC announced that no Myanmar migrant worker will be allowed to work abroad anymore, and eligible youths must serve in the military under the compulsory military service law. This new visa restriction which was probably a SAC request to the Thai government has triggered plenty of risks such as forced military service, high-security risks for eligible youths, detention, and torture upon their return to Myanmar for visa extensions.
Besides work visas, Myanmar youths who are at risk of forced military service and arbitrary arrests are fleeing to Thailand for safety rather than going to civil war for the junta. Many have applied for non-immigrant educational visas through language schools and universities, but their visa applications are being rejected on the ground by the Thai Immigration Bureau. On the other hand, Thai immigration authorities deny visa restrictions to Myanmar applicants—which is the opposite of the reality on the ground, especially in Chiang Mai. Many students are being asked to apply for education visas in Thai embassies outside of Thailand such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, which most students cannot afford due to the high travel and accommodation costs. Moreover, Myanmar youths and people without any legal documents who irregularly flee to Thailand in search of safety and freedom are reportedly being forced to return to Myanmar by Thai local police and the Royal army at the borders.
These new restrictions clearly disadvantage Myanmar citizens fleeing from the junta’s violence, putting them at high risk of persecution and violence. The Thai government has not only failed to help Myanmar people, but seem to be actively blocking every opportunity for Myanmar refugees to seek safety. These developments point to indications that the Thai government is not supportive of Myanmar people’s revolution for democracy and peace.
Is Thailand a Frenemy to the Myanmar people?
There are 1.5 million Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, and they comprise 52 percent of migrant workers in Thailand. Myanmar students are the second largest group after Chinese students in Thailand, a number which has increased in the post-coup period. Myanmar people’s natural resources have long supported Thailand’s domestic economy and business companies. All of these contribute towards foreign income, tax revenues, royalties, cheap labour, and further, even boosted domestic Thai economic enterprises. Even so, the Thai government withholds support for the Myanmar revolution and the human rights of Myanmar citizens. As a close neighbour of Myanmar, this is an act of negligence towards Myanmar citizens.
The Thai military and government are still friends with the SAC-led military, given their close historical military relations and deep economic interests. However, it is indeed a frenemy towards Myanmar people and the Spring Revolution even though Thai citizens stand by Myanmar people. For example, in the early months of the coup, Kasit Piroma, the former Thai foreign minister, called for the Thai government’s full support for Myanmar citizens suffering violence from the junta and warned that Thailand must be a friend to Myanmar people —especially during their time of desperate need for protection and assistance. Moreover, Pita Limjaroenrat, a former Prime Minister candidate, clarified his stance on Myanmar revolution that the Thai government must help Myanmar people and revolutionary forces in their democratic revolution, and force the junta to adhere to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, from Thailand’s Future Forward Party, has also articulated a similar position.
The Thai government must immediately end its support to the Myanmar military by all means and take the side of Myanmar people in the revolution—help them to live free from fear and violence, with the understanding that the reliance on the junta and the SAC for economic interests is not a sustainable long-term solution. Otherwise, it will always be a frenemy to Myanmar people in the revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2024-06-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Standing tall beneath the same stars, but the look in their eyes was not as bright as we are. Sleeping in the warm-soft bed while the cries of the innocent pierce the night. I was around 15 when the TV screen showed the puffy eyes of the hijabi US citizen woman desperately asking for justice in that superpower country. At that moment, with my whole life raised by an Islamic family, my teenager’s mind built a level-1 madness towards Islamophobic people.
According to Georgetown University, Islamophobia is an extreme fear of and hostility toward Islam and Muslims which often leads to hate speech, hate crimes, as well as social and political discrimination. With it placed as the second most widely practiced religion in the world after Christianity, Islam, subjectively, remains the most hated religion in the world, at least in the West. The phrase of this term is not as simple as people being hateful towards Muslim people but it occurs to become serious and rumbling the humanity of today’s society. Islamophobia was recognized as a significant issue of concern in a 2011 meeting of the League of Arab States, a key ally, and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (Gallup, n.d.).
The Starting Point of Islamophobic
As the 9/11 incident appeared to be so-called the beginning of the islamophobia trend, however, this phobia term and propaganda towards Islam started in the middle-ages era and heavily pointed to the Crusades event that negative notions about Muslims were spread during this time to encourage Islamic wars and win over citizens of Europe as the Christian leader tried to subjugate the Muslim-ruled land in the Middle East region (Kulik, 2024). Major period jumped to the Renaissance era where the expansion of the Ottoman Empire was also the time of the journey of Islamophobia in which many scholars believe that fear is buried in the minds of Europeans within the potential influence of Islamic countries (Kulik, 2024).
The hyperbola badly portrayed of Muslim people in the Ottoman Empire period has been embedded long ago amongst the West scholars and remains still until today. The misconception of those Western intellectuals and the world against Islam is when they view Islam as the bearer of a dominant civilization that seeks to colonize other civilizations, which often depicts Islam in the eyes of the world as a so-called ‘destroyer’ of the world.
The 9/11 incident, which was short for September 11, where it is the most fatal terrorist strike in American history was a suicide incident carried out by 19 terrorists connected to the Islamic extremist organisation al-Qaeda against American targets (Bergen, 2003). The mid-year gift in the quite regular year left a big-hole trauma for Americans where according to the 9/11 Museum, around 2,900 people were killed beyond New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania triggering enough for them to even build a national museum for this incident in the middle of crowded-hectic New York City. Since then, Islamophobia headlines – which have actually never lighted down – seem to have found the momentum to speak out even louder where the hate over Muslim people pierced the media at that time.
Human Rights Violations Against Muslim People
The mass use of Islamophobia trend was taking it too far to get into the serious stage where they are taking the basic human rights out of Muslim people. Too serious that even myself already gotten used to the human rights violation news against Muslims. Still struggling in the West, in the purported most beautiful country along with its language, France, ironically, served the highest number of islamophobia that even reached to disrupt the human rights of the Muslim people. France’s law restricted Muslim women from using headscarves (hijab) in classrooms in 2004 wherein further years, which in 2010, marked the passing of legislation in France that outlawed face-covering apparel in public, mostly targeting burqa-wearing women (Hajjat & Mohammed, 2023). The bad portrayed and the effort of the past legislation that harms Muslim people, especially women, are coming from France’s highest hierarchy itself, the prime minister, Emanuel Macron, who stated that headscarves or hijab does not align with France values (Al Jazeera, 2021).
Took almost 5,000 miles from France, in China, which took place in northwestern China, Uyghur is the place where many innocent Muslim people were tortured in the practice of ethnic cleansing. China is known for using communism as its form of government. But since 2017, The so-called re-education camp is home to between 800,000 and 2 million Uyghurs and other Muslims, including ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks. China has received many curses from the international world for the re-education camp where it conducts to have violated human rights through maltreatment, rape, torture, and in certain cases, a genocide in which most of the victims are women.
Not so far away from China, in the Southeast Asia region, in Myanmar for specific, the Rohingya case has been a serious issue for a long time. The discrimination towards the minority ethnic of the Muslim people has been running since the 1970s forcing them to flee to other states. Though many Rohingya have centuries-old roots in Myanmar, they remain considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In 2017, the military campaign initiated by the Myanmar government resulted in the forced migration of seven hundred thousand Rohingya. The government denies allegations made by rights groups that the government is responsible for genocide against the Rohingya (Albert & Maizland, 2020). The discrimination and the torture towards Rohingya people include the number of killings, enforced displacement, and sexual assault.
International Efforts to Combat Islamophobia
As this crisis is already taking it to a serious stage, the solution must also be serious. According to the 2011 meeting of the League of Arab States, alongside the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), Islamophobia is considered a significant concern that needs to be tackled. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghane, in her report, stated the increase of hate towards Islam is the weak policies of diversity in which states are the responsible ones who should bring up the policies that promote diversity and freedom of expression, Ghane added.
In taking this concern into significant step, as many governments already passed legislation for anti-hate-crime by doing public awareness campaigns about Islam, the UN with 60 Member-States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as the sponsors formulating the International Day to Combat Islamophobia which take the date on 15 March. This international day demands an international discussion on the growth of a culture of peace and tolerance built on respect for human rights and religious diversity.
Nevertheless, as the international world already puts efforts into reducing the hatred of Islam, after all, we can’t deny that there will always be people who will hate Islam even though there is already a lot of external intervention to combat this ‘phobia’. If we look through the wider glasses, other religions also received hate from the other parties, might be worse, such as anti-semitism (hate towards Jews). At the end of the day, the world cannot be fully at peace, at least for now, with seeing many kinds of hateful to each other..."
Source/publisher:
"Modern Diplomacy"
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Since the military coup in 2021, the regime’s military has faced an unprecedented armed revolt, not only from long-established ethnic revolutionary organizations, but also from newly formed armed resistance groups across the country.
The military has suffered historic losses and humiliating defeats, losing one Military Regional Command (MRC), three Military Operations Commands (MOCs), seven Border Guard Police battalions and 63 of 545 military battalion HQs, as well as more than 2,500 frontline bases including tactical headquarters and frontline headquarters of military divisions.
As a result of these defeats, around 60 towns have fallen into the hands of anti-regime resistance groups across the country.
Based on reports and ground information, The Irrawaddy has compiled a list of the junta military headquarters and divisions that have been occupied by the anti-regime groups.
Northern Shan
During the approximately three-month-long Operation 1027 launched by the Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful armies – the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – and allied resistance groups in northern Shan State, the junta lost hundreds of frontline bases as well as 24 military battalion headquarters including military command centers. As result, it lost control of more than half of northern Shan State, including many towns and vital trade routes with China.
Eradicated junta bases in northern Shan
Thirteen military bases have not yet been defeated.
Rakhine State
As part of Operation 1027, the AA has been conducting a large-scale offensive against junta targets in Rakhine State and Paletwa Township in neighboring Chin State since Nov. 13 last year. The ethnic rebel army has managed to eradicate 36 headquarters of military and police battalions, including military command centers, as well as hundreds of frontline junta bases including tactical strongholds.
After seizing around 11 towns or townships, the ethnic army now controls more than half of Rakhine State. Intense clashes are ongoing in Rakhine, as the AA is attempting to seize towns in the south of the state. Meanwhile, the junta is fortifying Rakhine State’s capital Sittwe, as the AA is poised to attack the capital soon.
Eradicated junta battalion headquarters
Twenty junta bases, including the headquarters of Sittwe Military Region, Military Operations Command 5 and the Western Regional Military Command, have not yet been defeated.
Kachin State
Since the 2021 coup, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been engaged in fighting against the junta. The rebel army has also provided military training to thousands of anti-regime activists, who have gone on to become members of the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). Alongside the PDFs, the KIA is attacking the military regime not only in Kachin State, but also in upper Sagaing Region and neighboring Shan State.
The ethnic army has seized several hundred frontline junta bases, as well as a number of towns and eight military battalion headquarters across Kachin State and some areas in northern Shan State. Currently, the KIA is attacking junta bases in Waingmaw Township next to Kachin State’s capital Myitkyina.
Forty military bases including MOC 3 have not yet been defeated.
Karen State
Thousands of clashes between the regime and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), have been reported in Karen State. The country’s oldest ethnic army has also trained several thousand anti-regime activists, who have gone on to join the PDF.
Alongside the PDF groups, the KNLA has been fighting the regime in Karen and Mon states and Tanintharyi and Bago regions. The ethnic rebel army has also seized hundreds of junta frontline bases and five military battalion headquarters in Karen State.
Recently, KNLA and PDF forces briefly took control of the vital trade town of Myawaddy near the Thai border, after defeating the military headquarters nearby. Currently, the junta is conducting a major offensive, Operation Aung Zeya—which it has called a “state-level operation”—against the KNLA and PDF in Myawaddy, but junta troops engaged in the operation have been stuck in the Daw Na Mountains for about two months and have suffered heavy losses due to resistance attacks.
During the fighting with the AA in 2019-20, the division was assigned to conduct military operations in Paletwa and Mindat townships in southern Chin State. When the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State and Rakhine State, the headquarters of Military Division 11 relocated to Mrauk-U Township in northern Rakhine State and conducted military operations along the Kaladan River from Chin State’s Paletwa Township to Mrauk-U.
Brigadier General Min Min Tun, the commander of the division, was killed during fighting with the AA in Mrauk-U Township on Jan. 7, 2024. All 10 battalion headquarters under Military Division 11 were defeated during the fighting with the AA, while the division’s deputy commander and all of its military strategists were either killed or captured.
2. Military Division 22
The military division was assigned to conduct military operations against the AA in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships in northern Rakhine State in 2019-20. Following the 2021 coup, the division was assigned to military operations in the Kawkareik and Kyondoe areas in Karen State, where it was badly defeated by Karen resistance groups and allied PDFs. It no longer leads military operations, but has been involved in Operation Aung Zeya targeting Myawaddy along with military divisions 55 and 44.
3. Military Division 33
The headquarters of the military division is based in jade mining hub Hpakant in Kachin State, and its battalions are deployed to nearby villages. It sent two battalions to conduct military operations in Chin Shwe Haw in northern Shan State during Operation 1027. The entire Light Infantry Battalion 13 was eradicated by the alliance after being airlifted to Chin Shwe Haw in late October 2023.
The division lost its frontline bases around the jade mining hub during offensives by the KIA and allied PDF groups. The remaining bases and troops of Military Division 33 are currently fighting the KIA and PDFs.
4. Military Division 44
The frontline headquarters of the division is located in Myawaddy near the Thai border in Karen State. After it was defeated by Karen resistance and PDF groups during the fighting for the Mount Lat Khat Taung outpost near Myawaddy, the military division’s commander, Brigadier General Win Naung Soe, was replaced with military strategist Colonel Aye Min Naung, who was promoted to brigadier general.
However, Aye Min Naung was killed along with other senior officers during a trip to a military tactical base in Thingyan Nyi Naung near Myawaddy when their chopper was shot down by Karen resistance forces. After his death, Colonel Soe Min Htut, the deputy commander of MOC 13, was appointed as the commander of Military Division 44.
However, due to his incompetent command during the battle for Myawaddy in April 2024, Soe Min Htut was replaced with Colonel Nyi Nyi Thwin, a former instructor at the junta’s Defense Services Academy. The division continues to suffer defeats and has yet to return to full troop strength.
5. Military Division 55
Before the launch of Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, a military tactical unit and four battalions of Military Division 55 were based in Hpasawng Township, Karenni (Kayah) State, while the division’s frontline headquarters were in Mrauk-U Township, Rakhine State. With the launch of Operation 1027, the whole division was assigned to military operations in the Kokang region in northern Shan State.
After suffering defeats, around 850 of the division’s troops, including its commander Brigadier General Zaw Myo Win and 89 other military officers, surrendered to the MNDAA on Jan. 4, 2024. After being handed over to the junta, Brig-Gen Zaw Myo Win was handed a death sentence by a junta military tribunal for surrendering to the ethnic army. The junta then appointed MOC 8 strategist Major Aung Soe Min as the commander of Military Division 55.
Currently, Division 55 is leading the Aung Zeya Operation against the Karen resistance and allied PDF groups in Myawaddy Township alongside the remaining troops of military divisions 22 and 44 as well as two tank battalions, a missile battalion and two artillery battalions. However, the troops conducting the operation have been halted in the Daw Na mountains range and have been suffering heavy defeats for over 50 days.
6. Military Division 66
Following the military coup in February 2021, the division was assigned to military operations in Karenni State. After suffering heavy defeats to Karenni resistance attacks, its operational duty was transferred to MOC 2. However, Division 66 has been assigned as a reserve unit to Loikaw Region Military Command in Karenni State’s capital Loikaw, most of which is under the control of Karenni resistance groups.
7. Military Division 77
The division lost troops during operations in northern Shan State in 2015-16 and Rakhine State in 2019-20. However, it managed to replenish its ranks in 2020. When the junta military staged the coup in 2021, the military division was assigned to security duty in Yangon and Bago.
When anti-regime armed resistance emerged in upper Myanmar, the military division’s headquarters were relocated to northern Sagaing Region and it has conducted military operations against resistance groups there since October 2021. The military division has suffered only light losses. Currently, two tactical units of the miliary division are operating in upper Sagaing Region and another tactical unit is operating in northern Magwe Region near the border with Chin State.
8. Military Division 88
Since the military coup in 2021, the military division has been assigned to the Bhamo area in Kachin State. Its headquarters is in Momauk Township near Bhamo. A military tactical unit and three military battalions of the division are based in Katha Township. The division’s commander Brigadier General Min Htut Oo was killed during a clash with the KIA in the Kone Law area in Momauk Township on March 20. All of its frontline bases except the battalions at Bhamo and Momauk towns were defeated by the KIA, which is currently conducting offensives against the last junta bases in the towns.
9. Military Division 99
The military division has been assigned to the Mongkoe area in northern Shan State since ethnic armies resumed fighting there in 2015-16. Its commander Brigadier General Aung Kyaw Lwin was killed at a strategic hilltop base in Mongkoe during Operation 1027 on Oct. 29, 2023. It also lost strategic frontline bases and military strategists.
The junta appointed Brigadier General Soe Hlaing as commander of the military division on Dec. 10, 2023. Currently, its headquarters, a strategic unit and four military battalions are based in Muse near the Chinese border. Another strategic unit of the military division is assigned to security duty in Mogoke Township in upper Mandalay Region. Another strategic unit comprising three military battalions has been assigned to Kachin State’s Bhamo Township since April 1. The military division has been assigned as an auxiliary force, as it is no longer tasked for operational duty.
10. Military Division 101
In 2017, the division’s headquarters were based in Namhsam Township, northern Shan State, and it conducted military operations in the Palaung Self-Administered Zone in the area. In 2023, a strategic unit of three military battalions under the division was assigned to military operations in Magwe Region. The division’s commander Brigadier General Min Min Tun was arrested by the TNLA during a clash in Namhsam on Dec. 15,2023.
The junta appointed Major Myint Shwe from the Office of the Chief of the Military Staff in Naypyitaw as the new commander of Military Division 101.
The division was assigned to Namshan, Kyaukme and Nawnghkio townships in northern Shan State during Operation 1027.
Currently, it is tasked with security duty for the junta’s garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region and adjacent Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships in northern Shan State. A strategic unit under its control is operating in Magwe Region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s regime has admitted its troops killed a 78-year-old Buddhist monk on Wednesday after junta media claims of a resistance ambush were contradicted by another monk at the scene.
Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa, a retired member of the State Sangha Nayaka Committee, the highest Buddhist authority in Myanmar, was shot dead by junta troops near Mandalay International Airport in Tada-U Township, Mandalay Region.
The junta media initially accused resistance groups of killing the abbot of Win Neinmitayon Monastery in Bago Region with a landmine.
Another monk, Bhaddanta Gunikabhivamsa, the abbot of Kanthonhsint Buddhism Learning Center in Mingaladon Township, Yangon, and the driver U Kyaw Win were injured in the attack.
Bhaddanta Gunikabhivamsa said in an online video for a wake where Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhiwamsa lay in state on Thursday in Bago that junta soldiers in a truck opened fire on their car.
He said the soldiers admitted that they thought the car contained resistance fighters.
Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun admitted on Friday that regime troops were responsible.
“Our security forces in a truck shouted at the vehicle and fired warning shots to make it pull over. Security personnel opened fire on the moving vehicle from behind,” he said.
The spokesman said senior officers were conducting an inquiry and action would be taken..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role, Burmese social and political culture
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"IN BRIEF:
On its 15th anniversary, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) faces criticism for its inaction against human rights abuses in member states. The AICHR's outdated terms of reference and avoidance of challenging state sovereignty limit its effectiveness. This is highlighted by its silence during major incidents of human rights abuse, lack of a complaint mechanism, and the individualistic approach taken by representatives, leading to concerns about its future relevance and impact in the region.
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The year 2024 marks the 15th anniversary of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). While the endorsement of human rights is vital, the AICHR leaves a lot to be desired. In its 15 years it has done little in word or in deed to prevent human rights abuses and must evolve to effectively tackle these issues in the region.
The AICHR drafted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which was adopted in 2012 at the 21st ASEAN Summit. It is considered by many advocates and scholars to fall short of basic international standards of human rights. It embodies principles of sovereignty and non-interference, but most importantly identifies duties that are as important as rights. It also uses the language of human rights understood in the context of ‘regional particularities’. This language is reminiscent of the discredited ‘Asian values’ debate, a less than stellar beginning for the human rights mechanism.
George Yeo, former Singaporean foreign minister, once remarked that while the AICHR did not have teeth, it ‘at least [has] a tongue, and a tongue will have its uses’. But Yeo’s words have rung hollow. Since the AICHR’s establishment, ASEAN has faced four major incidents of human rights abuses, and in each case did not speak up or issue a single collective statement.
The AICHR did not condemn the 2014 coup in Thailand or call for the restoration of democracy. Thailand’s representative at the time, Dr Seree Nonthasoot, went as far as to say that ‘we all know AICHR has a tacit agreement not to discuss such an issue’.
During and after the 2017–2018 mass expulsion and alleged genocide of the Rohingya from Rakhine State, in which over 1.2 million Rohingya were displaced, the AICHR again did not raise a single question to Naypyidaw. Indonesian and Malaysian AICHR representatives issued statements, but only in their individual capacity.
Upon becoming president of the Philippines in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte announced a ‘War on Drugs’. Subsequent violence, much of which was allegedly perpetrated by state officials, led to the death of over 12,000 people as reported by Human Rights Watch.
When the Myanmar military seized power in the February 2021 coup, the AICHR again did nothing. Instead, former AICHR representatives issued a statement of condemnation and called for return to democratic processes in the country. Since the coup, Myanmar has spiralled ever deeper into conflict and civil war.
This silence raises concerns about the effectiveness of the AICHR as a regional human rights mechanism. The AICHR’s Terms of Reference dictate that it operates according to the region’s method of doing business, the ‘ASEAN Way’. The ASEAN Way centres on principles of state sovereignty, non-interference and consultation and consensus for decision-making. This essentially gives every ASEAN member a veto over all agendas and initiatives — meaning the AICHR is held to the standard of the region’s most troublesome member.
AICHR representatives, while nominally independent, often view themselves as government representatives instead of national representatives. This leads representatives from conservative states especially to view their role as protecting their governments rather than their people.
Another barrier to effective action is that the AICHR lacks a complaints mechanism, breaking the link between people and the member states at a collective level. At an individual level, national representatives receive complaints and forward these onto national bureaucracies. So far, Dr Seree Nonthasoot and Indonesia’s representative Yuyun Wahyuningrum have done so and both received no response to their complaints. These representatives, as well as others, have played active roles — but always as individuals and not as part of an AICHR collective.
AICHR’s Terms of Reference state that the terms ‘shall be reviewed every five years’, but after 15 years no revision has taken place, limiting future prospects. In 2019, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to convene a high-level panel to study and propose revisions to the AICHR’s mandate. As of June 2024, only Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have nominated representatives.
It can only be inferred that some ASEAN states are content with how the AICHR performs. The AICHR was never intended to be a powerful body or to challenge state power. It has not interacted with the UN human rights system or national bodies. The AICHR operates alone at the regional ASEAN level, carrying out activities of limited impact while providing a veneer of human rights legitimacy.
It is difficult to see the relevance of the AICHR in its current form or any measurable impact on the people of the region. But it is commendable for ASEAN states to endorse the establishment and maintenance of a human rights mechanism. With the human rights agenda of the West now fading, China’s rise in the region and ASEAN’s democratic backsliding, it is unclear whether the AICHR will ever evolve and become a beacon of hope and protection for people in the region. Only time will tell..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2024-06-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"For those looking to engage with the Myanmar military regime, make no mistake: The men in uniform are blatant liars. I repeat: They don’t deserve your trust at all.
The latest reminder of their cunning nature came with their attempted cover-up of the deadly shooting of a senior Buddhist monk by junta soldiers two days ago, in which they accused an anti-regime People’s Defense Force (PDF) group of the killing.
But their lie was exposed in a video in which a monk who was with the victim at the time of the incident said the regime soldiers chased them down in a truck and fired a volley of shots at the car carrying the monks, leaving the senior monk dead.
The surviving monk’s revelation of course left junta boss Min Aung Hlaing red-faced. He has proclaimed himself the protector and promoter of Buddhism in Myanmar, only for his soldiers to shoot dead a 78-year-old monk who was a retired member of the country’s highest Buddhist authority.
More importantly, the junta’s attempt to shift the blame by accusing a PDF group of a killing it had nothing to do with should be viewed with the utmost seriousness, as it’s a grim reminder of just how fundamentally dishonest the Min Aung Hlaing-led Myanmar military regime really is.
If they are prepared to lie so blatantly about such a killing, what does it say about their other claims, such as their justification for the 2021 coup—that they acted in response to “vote rigging” in the 2020 general election? Should we believe it?
Absolutely not. International observers praised the election as free and fair, and within days of the coup the world witnessed the anger of disenfranchised Myanmar voters nationwide, who flooded the streets shouting “Respect our votes!”
Are we to believe the regime’s repeated statements that it is working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to implement the bloc’s five-point peace plan for Myanmar?
Think about the 3 million people who have been internally displaced by the junta’s bombings and arson attacks since the regime agreed to follow the plan in April 2021, not to mention the junta’s killing of more than 5,000 people for their anti-regime activism. If the junta is implementing the peace plan, why are there so many internally displaced people and why are civilians still being killed? One of the plan’s requirements is that the junta act to stop the violence.
Should we believe the junta’s claim that it seeks peace with ethnic armed groups as it wages war in ethnic areas? What about their purported attempts to repatriate Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, even as they recruit Rohingya to fight the Arakan Army, which enjoys overwhelming support among Rakhine people?
More than three years after he seized power, should we believe Min Aung Hlaing’s frequent justification for the ongoing military rule in Myanmar—that his army has “temporarily” assumed responsibility for the state in line with the constitution?
His recent announcement that he will hold an election next year deserves similar skepticism. You can’t hope for anything positive from a poll organized by an army that stole power from a civilian government based on a false claim of electoral fraud.
Everything Min Aung Hlaing and his regime says must be taken with more than a few grains of salt—everyone in the Myanmar military junta was born to lie. Their cover-up of the shooting of the monk is the latest reminder that the Myanmar regime is totally untrustworthy.
Internationally, now is the time for anyone who is eager to engage in or who has partnered with the regime—from India to China to other neighboring countries or even some others in the West—to ask themselves some difficult questions, starting with “Should I believe them?” It’s a question they should be asking out of their own self-interest.
Just a reminder: Befriending a liar will do you no good in the long term, and only an evildoer listens to wicked lips..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Since its founding in 2022, the Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Governance (IHRDG) – an interdisciplinary faculty under Spring University Myanmar (SUM) – has hosted an annual speaker series aimed at promoting research and awareness about Myanmar. In 2023, the seminar series ran monthly from August to December and featured a diverse speaker line-up from scholars around the world. Although the presentations spoke on a wide variety of issues – ranging from the historical marginalization of the Rohingya to digital oppression tactics of the SAC – what they shared was an emphasis on contemporaneous political trends and real-world policy implications. In this report, I will briefly summarize each event and reflect on some overarching lessons.
The first lecture of the year, titled “Revisiting the Polity: The Making and Remaking of the Rohingya Identity in Myanmar” (3rd August 2023) was presented by Dr. Kazi Fahmida Farzana, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Sharjah (UAE). Demonstrating how the Rohingya ethnic identity has been continuously constructed and reconstructed by consecutive military regimes in Myanmar, Dr. Farzana emphasized that the imposition of a “fixed” identity against various ethnic minorities has been a recurring strategy of successive military regimes since the 1960s. Ideologically, the Myanmar state has effectively subscribed to Buddhist and Burmese nationalism against minority ethnicities to marginalize, exclude, and – in the case of the Rohingya – expel entire ethno-linguistic groups. For example, state policies are often constructed against the backdrop of one unchanging tactic: to (re)define and control ethnic boundaries, as evidenced by the classification of 135 national ethnicities that excluded minority groups like the Rohingya. The exclusion of the Rohingya (amongst others) from this official list is self-contradictory. As Dr. Farzana notes, some Rohingya scholars say the Rohingya ethnicity was excluded on the basis of their Islamic faith, not ethnicity per se. It is worth noting that Rohingya were recognized as part of a British-promised “Muslim National Area” before 1948, promises that never materialized after independence despite the British conscription of Rohingya and other Arakanese Muslims to fight the Burmese.
After Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948, the military government excluded Rohingya from the ethnic integration of the new Myanmar by stating Rohingya were not qualified to be an integral part of Myanmar because they supported Britain, defining their military involvement as a betrayal to the Burmese people. The resulting power imbalance is still visible in the post-2021 political dynamics, including in the Rohingya repatriation project from Bangladesh.
The second event of the series – on 7 September 2023 – was a panel discussion on labor politics in post-coup Myanmar, featuring two Myanmar researcher-activists (Khin Thazin Oo and Ko Maung) and chaired by Stephen Campbell, an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Both speakers employed class analysis in their discussion of labor politics and have published extensively on labor rights issues in Myanmar and abroad. Their research shed light on Myanmar’s political dynamics since the 2021 military coup, with a practical focus on labor rights, protest mobilization, and everyday workers’ struggles. Indeed, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) was started by labor unions in the industrial zones in Yangon after the February 1 coup . By focusing on the experience and agency of people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, the research challenges elitist accounts that privilege high-profile political and military figures in favor of a “history from below” of present-day Myanmar in the Spring Revolution. This recognizes and spotlights the impact of ordinary people in challenging and transforming post-coup conditions. The purpose of this panel is to employ the concept of labor politics more broadly, expanding it beyond the limited Burmese term that can be translated as “affairs of the state” (နိုင်ငံရေး). However, the presenters emphasized the personal experiences of ordinary people. Such accounts include Myanmar’s domestic migrant workers in Singapore supporting the People’s Defense Force (PDF), the unwaged and largely, unacknowledged, social reproductive labor of women who sustained the Spring Revolution, and the workers’ role in organizing CDM in the industrial zones of Yangon, Mandalay and other major cities since the coup. The labor force has been driving the Spring Revolution and wholeheartedly supporting People’s Defense Forces (PDF) since day one, even though many struggles to support their own family.
The third event, featuring Dr. Shona Loong from the University of Zurich, was titled “A Country with Many Histories: Myanmar’s Diverse Geographies of War and Everyday Life” (5 October 2023). Contrary to dominant strands in conflict studies which demonstrate theories and underlying factors about how armed conflict shapes social processes, Dr. Loong’s long-term ethnographic research in Myanmar demonstrates that the opposite is equally true. Drawing on both pre- and post-coup research, especially in Karen State and the Salween Peace Park, the talk highlighted how the impacts of conflict are geographically diverse, thus challenging dominant (and often Bamar-centric) historical narratives. Another important theme was that of community resilience amidst the violence of military junta. Three years on since the coup began, it continues to negatively affect livelihoods and living conditions, giving rise to increased human rights violations against civilians across Myanmar. However, people continue to fight to put an end to impunity. The session concluded with reflections on the limitations facing Myanmar studies researchers, recognizing the need for a nuanced insight into Myanmar’s complex socio-historical landscape from different community perspectives. The presentation offered new perspectives on approaches for how ethnic armed groups could potentially evolve toward restoring federal democracy in Myanmar.
The fourth event, presented by Professor Ardeth Thawnghmung on 2nd November 2023, was titled “Challenges in Researching Local Governance Structures in Post-Coup Myanmar.” This ongoing research highlights the complexity and heterogeneity of how local government officials – all the way down to the village and ward levels – and their mechanisms for coping with rising post-coup violence. Driven by the nature of localized interpersonal relations, these coping strategies have continued to flexibly evolve in tandem with on-the-ground changes, as many local administrations were partially or completely taken over by pro-democracy armed groups like Rathedaung township of Arakan State, Myanmar. Dr. Thawnghmung’s original research methodologies underscored a need for research in contemporary Myanmar to become more innovative and localized. As a result, new research projects in Myanmar would become ever more subjective (i.e. based on relations of trust) but also more reliant on local researchers, thus shifting the epistemic power balance from the people’s government to the military junta. Similarly, her project’s findings demonstrate that conflicts in Myanmar have become increasingly localized due to the collapse of central authority, which necessitates a re-thinking in strategy by national and international policymakers in how local administrators can play a role in preventing violence – both now and in the future.
The final event of the series, titled “Scrutinizing Digital Repression: Policing Mobile Money in Myanmar,” by Vox, Bradley, and Gar explored the significance of mobile money, banking systems, and digital freedom for daily life in post-pandemic Myanmar. Facing increased regulation and surveillance under a repressive military regime, many people in Myanmar have had their digital rights curtailed. The three speakers presented preliminary results from their ongoing research, examining the role of online financial systems in state surveillance and their contribution to the rise of techno-authoritarianism in Myanmar. The speakers emphasized alternative methods, including decentralized critical infrastructures, as a way to enhance digital security and freedom. The research also revealed the institutionalization of the violation of digital rights and rights to privacy in Myanmar, calling for potential policy improvements once a roadmap to federal democracy is possible. This could mitigate the gap between oppressive legislation and democratic agencies, relieving the suffering of Myanmar civilians for decades.
The 2023 IHRDG Seminar Series on Myanmar Studies yielded valuable lessons for students, scholars, activists, and pro-democracy movements. Firstly, it underscored the persistent use of identity manipulation by successful military regimes to marginalize ethnic groups, as evidenced by the Rohingya Genocide. Furthermore, the focus on labor politics in the post-coup period highlighted the pivotal role of grassroots movement and ordinary people, challenging elitist narratives. Dr. Shona Loong’s insights emphasized the geographical diversity of conflict impacts and the resilience of communities in their heterogeneous and creative responses to ongoing crises. Prof. Thawnghmung’s research showcased the evolving coping strategies of local governance structures in response to post-coup violence, emphasizing the need for innovative, localized research approaches. Finally, the examination of digital repression highlighted the importance of safeguarding digital rights and proposed policy improvements for a future federal democratic union of Myanmar. These lessons reaffirm the significance of a nuanced, grassroots-oriented approach in addressing Myanmar’s complex socio-political landscape.
Note: The 2023 IHRDG Seminar Series was generously funded by the IDRCs Knowledge for Democracy Myanmar (K4DM) initiative. All views expressed in this post and by the various speakers are solely their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of IDRC or Spring University Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2024-06-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s National Unity Government and Karenni State Government should investigate killings and cooperate with international justice mechanisms
(DEMOSO and BANGKOK, June 20, 2024)–The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) and the Interim Executive Council (IEC) of Karenni State should investigate the killings of three women and their three children and hold the perpetrators of the killings accountable, said Burma War Crime Investigation (BWCI) and Fortify Rights today.
A new joint investigation by BWCI–a community-based human rights organization in Myanmar–and Fortify Rights found that the Myanmar military captured seven civilians during a military operation in Shadaw Township, Karenni State on February 5, 2024. Although one man escaped, three women—including a pregnant woman—and their three children were killed during an armed clash between the Myanmar army and ethnic resistance fighters.
The civilians killed were identified as Soe Mae, 50, Law Mae, 45, and Ma Mae Mo, 33, who was pregnant, Nang Khin, 7, Baw Reh, 5, and Li Reh, 3.
“Wartime killings of civilians should be thoroughly investigated and perpetrators held accountable,” said Swe Lin, a researcher from BWCI. “The NUG and the IEC are well-placed to investigate the killings of civilians and work alongside international investigators. Resistance forces fighting against the junta should actively seek to protect civilians and work to support victims and ensure accountability for crimes.”
The killings took place during a battle between the Myanmar military and resistance fighters, including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the Karenni Army (KA) near the village of Daw Ka Tel located northeast of Shadaw town in Shadaw Township.
In June 2024, BWCI and Fortify Rights spoke with members of IEC and NUG and shared the findings of their investigation. A member of the IEC said they are concerned about “any killing of civilians” and would investigate and charge perpetrators from the Myanmar military or Karenni forces who are responsible for crimes.
Between February and June 2024, BWCI and Fortify Rights interviewed 11 people, including a Myanmar military prisoner of war (POW) in the custody of the KNDF, a survivor of the incident who escaped, relatives of victims, two medical doctors, and a soldier from KA. BWCI and Fortify Rights also analyzed and reviewed photographs and videos taken by resistance fighters of the dead bodies on February 6, 2024. BWCI and Fortify Rights’s investigation could not independently verify the perpetrators of the killing.
According to the witnesses, on February 5, 2024, Myanmar junta soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion 249 detained the group of seven civilians who were hiding in a small house on top of a hill. The Myanmar military POW interviewed by BWCI and Fortify Rights also confirmed that soldiers from his unit detained the civilians.
Describing the incident, a 20-year-old Karenni man who escaped after being captured together with the women and children by the Myanmar military soldiers said:
I was working in the forest in the mountains and was resting for one or two days afterward. That was the same time when the [Myanmar military] soldiers came, and I was detained. The military caught me and other women and [children].
He went on to describe what happened after the junta soldiers detained the group:
[The Myanmar soldiers] tied me up with white nylon rope. … I was worried, of course. Capture means death. … [I was] thinking, when would I die? But nothing could be done. When they first arrived and captured me, they kicked me in the head and hit me with their gun. One [soldier] took out a knife and threatened to cut my ear off.
The man explained that the soldiers forced him to walk ahead with a few soldiers, while women and children were behind with other soldiers. When the soldiers began exchanging fire with the resistance troops, he escaped. He said:
There was active shooting. Because of that, they could not capture me again, and I escaped. …When I walked a bit far in front of the military, I ran. [The children and women] were left behind. … I ran, and the rest shouted. [The soldiers] shouted that I escaped and started shooting. … I ran and didn’t look back. I could only hear the screams [of the young girls]. They were shouting, “Please let us go,” and “We want to go back home.” I heard the girls screaming. It could be when they were shot and killed. When I escaped, I went to the farming field. When I got back to the displaced camp, I met with people who released me from the tied ropes.
Although he managed to escape, his niece was among those killed.
A KA resistance fighter who was part of the battle described the scene:
We had the area surrounded, with our forces both down the hill and on top. The [junta] troops were climbing up the middle, split into two units, unaware we were there. We started firing as they climbed towards us. As soon as the fighting started, we heard women screaming and thought the [junta soldiers] had brought their families. But it turned out they were [captured] civilians.
The KA resistance fighter told BWCI and Fortify Rights how he heard screams from the battle ground, saying:
I heard [screams], but we had no idea who [the civilians] were or how they got there. Since we started the fight, we had to finish it. We couldn’t tell if we hit the children, because we were firing from far away. We couldn’t see them clearly as they were with the junta troops. We could only see the junta troops and fired at them.
He continued, saying: “During the fight, kids and moms were screaming things like, ‘Oh, my son,’ or ‘Oh, my daughter,’ frightened. We heard the junta troops ordering them to stop screaming.”
Describing the aftermath of the offensive and seeing the civilians’ dead bodies, the resistance fighter said: “We did [see the bodies] after the troops fled. … I couldn’t bring myself to check on the children I didn’t have the courage to check on the children when asked. When I saw their bodies, I couldn’t stop crying and was too scared to uncover them.”
He continued, saying:
The youngest one, a child, was found a bit away from the group and was still breathing at first. I called a medic, but the child died on the way. I didn’t know where he was shot, but the medic said he was hit in the back. He was the youngest boy [Li Reh], and I couldn’t save him.
Photographs and videos on file with BWCI and Fortify Rights show the six dead bodies, including 45-year-old Law Mae and seven-year-old Ma Nang Khin with gunshot wounds to the head.
Relatives of the women and children described the impact. One woman said, “[The military] took everything. … I don’t know what to say. I lost my sisters. My elder sister, my younger sister, my nieces.”
A 55-year-old Karenni farmer also described how Myanmar military soldiers ransacked his home during the same attack, saying: “[The soldiers] looked inside the hut to see if anyone was inside and stirred things up before heading back downstairs. We could see and hear them as they looted the house.”
When the junta soldiers arrived, the farmer hid in his uncut fields, saying, “Otherwise, we would have been exposed and potentially shot on sight.”
Starting November 11, 2023, KNDF, together with other ethnic resistance organizations, initiated “Operation 1111” to attack the Myanmar military in Karenni State. The KNDF, KA, and People Defense Forces (PDF) has liberated Demoso, Mese and Ywar Thit and Shadaw townships in Karenni State. The battle that liberated Shadaw took place between January 15 and February 12, 2024.
At the time of writing, KNDF continued to detain three junta soldiers captured during the battle in Shadaw Township.
International humanitarian law—known as the laws of war—is applicable in the situation of Karenni State, where armed conflict is taking place between the Myanmar military and armed resistance organizations including KNDF, KA, and other resistance fighters. The Geneva Conventions expressly guarantee the protection of civilians “against all acts of violence.”
On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military launched a deadly coup d’état, killing untold numbers of civilians and imprisoning tens of thousands of others in a bid to secure nationwide political power. In February 2022, Fortify Rights released a flash report documenting how the Myanmar military massacred civilians, used human shields, and committed other atrocities in Karenni State in acts that amount to war crimes. The junta’s ongoing attack against civilians provides further evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
“The IEC and NUG should work cooperatively with international accountability mechanisms to address ongoing war crimes in Karenni State,” said John Quinley, Director at Fortify Rights. “Both parties to the conflict should uphold the laws of war, including ensuring that the rights of prisoners of war are respected.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of publication:
2024-06-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Junta-controlled media blames death on rebel fighters.
Description:
"A senior Buddhist monk in Myanmar was shot dead Wednesday in his car as it left an airport in the central Mandalay region — an attack perpetrated by junta soldiers, according to another monk who was in the car with him.
Junta-controlled media, however, blamed the death of Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa, the abbot of Win Neinmitayon Monastery in the Bago region and retired member of the State Sangha Nayaka Committee, which oversees the nation’s Buddhist clergy, on rebel fighters.
Television broadcaster MRTV announced that the abbot’s car was caught in a firefight between junta troops and guerillas from the rebel People’s Defense Forces, resulting in the vehicle overturning and the abbot’s death.
But in a video that spread on social media Thursday, the abbot’s colleague, Sayadaw Bhaddanta Gunikabhivamsa, who was a passenger in the car at the time of the attack, said junta soldiers in a truck fired around seven or eight shots at the car, killing the abbot and injuring himself and the driver.
“[I said] how can you soldiers be so cruel?” the monk recounted. “They replied that they did not know monks were inside the car.”
The soldiers said they believed the car was an enemy vehicle because the windows were closed, so they shot at it, he said.
Gunikabhivamsa’s account appeared to match a report on the incident submitted by the chief of the Mandalay Region Religious Affairs Department, the online journal The Irrawaddy reported.
The report cited local authorities who said soldiers conducting a security patrol killed the abbot when they shot at his vehicle after he did not pull over as instructed.
RFA contacted junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for comment, but did not receive a response.
RFA could not reach the Mandalay PDF for comment, either.
Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa will be cremated on June 27..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Society and Culture, Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Buddhism in Burma - general
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Description:
"On this International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) stresses the serious harm inflicted by armed actors committing conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Southeast Burma, and its profound impact on local communities. Today, KHRG calls on the international community and relevant stakeholders to condemn the dire human rights situation in Burma, to take decisive action to end the abuses perpetrated against civilians, including by protecting them from sexual violence, and to stand in solidarity with survivors, their families, and those who support them.
Conflict-related sexual violence, used as a tactic of war and torture, both in areas of active fighting and in the broader theatre of war, is a heinous crime and a violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. It has devastating physical, sexual, reproductive, and mental health consequences for survivors and destroys the social fabric of communities. Often, victims/survivors, more commonly women and girls, do not report the incident nor they seek medical care due to fear, stigma or prevailing insecurity. Survivors and their families face many challenges, including coping with physical injuries, psychological impacts, high medical costs, and livelihood challenges.[1] Villagers in Southeast Burma have experienced decades of violent attacks, including the use of CRSV, by the State Administration Council (SAC) and the Border Guard Force (BGF).[2] The perpetrators enjoy total impunity and have never faced prosecution for their crimes. As such, the very presence of Burma Army soldiers in and near villages generates insecurity for female villagers, leading many to send young women into hiding when Burma Army soldiers are nearby.[3]
CRSV is also being committed since the 2021 coup. In March 2023, a SAC sergeant of Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #340 sexually abused his 7-year-old stepdaughter at a SAC army camp in Meh Klaw village tract, Bu Tho Township, Mu Traw (Hpapun) District. The girl, who lived with her mother and the perpetrator in the army camp reported that she had been abused by the sergeant several times before, in the absence of her mother. Before the daughter disclosed the abuse, the victim’s mother was unaware of her husband’s crime. Living in the military camp, the family was afraid of the sounds of shelling, had difficulty in getting food, and did not feel safe reporting the crime to SAC authorities. Finally, with the assistance of local KNU leaders from the village tract, the mother and her two daughters were able to leave the SAC army camp and return to their village, in April 2023. No action has been taken against the perpetrator, as the incident remained unreported to SAC authorities.[4]
The issue of impunity, of knowing that a Burma Army soldier can commit rape and other acts of sexual violence, and not be punished, feeds the pathology that keeps this problem terrible and growing. According to the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (OSRSG-SVC), emerging concerns and trends related to conflict-related sexual violence include the strategic use of violence in the selective targeting of victims.[5] The fear of sexual violence is a significant motive for displacement among villagers in Southeast Burma, and the threat of sexual violence continues to serve as a driver, hindering the return of communities, especially in the absence of accountability for this crime.[6] CRSV cases are widely underreported and there is still a significant lack of support for the long-term effects of trauma.[7] Mental health and psychosocial support interventions are essential components of a comprehensive package of care aimed at protecting or promoting psychosocial well-being and/or preventing or treating mental disorders in survivors of sexual violence.[8] Today, KHRG also praises the efforts made in this direction by local civil society and non-governmental organisations, including the Karen Women Organisation (KWO), and we advocate that further international support should be made available for them to enhance the effectiveness of these services.
On this day, 19th June 2024, KHRG condemns the crimes of sexual nature being used by the Burma Army, which pose a grave threat to civilians’ safety, dignity and lives. We reaffirm our commitment to and solidarity with survivors whose rights have been denied. Therefore, KHRG urges:
All relevant regional and international actors to take immediate action to bring to justice in international courts and tribunals those military leaders in Burma who have ordered, instigated, permitted or condoned conflict-related sexual violence; Local actors to continue and expand their work for the benefit of survivors of CRSV and their communities, including by providing medical and psychological services to trauma survivors, and by addressing the stigma and discrimination that may arise within local communities; The international community and humanitarian actors to deepen their engagement with local civil society organisations and support them in strengthening programmes to implement appropriate and effective long-term support services for victims of sexual violence and their families..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Discrimination/violence against women: reports of violations in Burma, Human Rights Watch Reports on Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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288.42 KB 314.47 KB 363.67 KB
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, and Rakhine State from June 8th to 14th. The Military Junta Troop arrested a youth for Military Service from Nyaung-U Township, Mandalay Region, and tortured and murdered. The Military Junta did not confirm Cyber Security Law, but Junta troops checked the Mobile Phones at their controlled places and arrested and blackmailed the VPN users. Almost 100 civilians from the Magway Region and Shan State were arrested as human shields.
Over 20 civilians died, and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian died and one was injured by the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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288.44 KB 307.09 KB 129.35 KB
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"As we convene here in the Council, yet again discussing Myanmar, we are bearing witness to a country being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime. Myanmar is in agonizing pain. And the disintegration of human rights continues at breakneck speed. This is a crisis emblematic of a decades-long legacy of military domination, the stifling of dissent, and division,” Türk told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
“And right now, these very same dynamics are playing out in terrifying form with the Rohingya and Rakhine communities.We are hearing stories of horrific war tactics, such as beheadings. Midnight drone attacks. The burning of homes as people sleep. People being shot at as they flee for their lives,” he said.
“The military has lost control over a considerable amount of territory. So it is resorting to increasingly extreme measures. Forced conscription. Indiscriminate bombardment of towns and villages. Brutal atrocity crimes,” the High Commissioner said.
“The Myanmar military continues to gain access to foreign currency and weapons it needs to sustain its campaign of terror, while international financial support for the people of Myanmar is meagre at best,” Turk said.
On a recent visit to Southeast Asia, the High Commissioner met with Myanmar civil society to discuss the spiralling regional impacts and the urgent need for leadership and influence to halt the catastrophe in Myanmar.
In Malaysia, he met with representatives of almost all ethnic communities from Myanmar, noting that a few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to meet with Rohingya and other ethnic communities around one table.
“I also witnessed a profound sense of hope. In my discussions with Myanmar civil society, human rights defenders and refugee communities, it was clear to see there is a new generation of young people from all ethnic communities leading the struggle to create an inclusive vision for the future of Myanmar,” he said.
“We are witnessing a people’s revolution against decades of oppression and violence,” Türk said.
In some areas outside the military’s control, new local governance structures have emerged, supported by ethnic armed groups and activists alike. They are providing food, shelter, education and healthcare for hundreds of thousands who are otherwise receiving little to no humanitarian support. And they are delivering critically needed protection services in the complete absence of a functioning public system.
Armed conflicts continue to rage brutally across the country, taking an increasingly grim toll on the lives of civilians, Türk said. The UN Human Rights Office is investigating several reported attacks against civilians in Rakhine State and Sagaing over recent days with large numbers of civilians allegedly killed -- in airstrikes, naval artillery barrages and shootings.
In a cynical move, the military has pressured and threatened young Rohingya men to join their ranks. Some reports have indicated thousands of Rohingya youth have been conscripted into the very same forces that displaced hundreds of thousands of their community in 2016 and 2017.
In response, the Arakan Army has exhorted Rohingya to fight with them against the military. They have targeted their communities by forcibly displacing residents. On multiple occasions, they have detained or killed men of fighting age who they suspected of taking up arms against them.
“These tactics have brought back the shocking images and memories from 2017 of systematic terrorisation, persecution and forced displacement of populations,” the High Commissioner said.
And tens of thousands of civilians from these communities have been forced to flee, among them entire Rohingya communities with no guarantees of finding safe haven. Over one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are still living in limbo in dire conditions, with no prospect for durable solutions.
“The violence must end. The attacks against civilians must end. The forced conscription must end. And the denial of humanitarian aid must end,” Türk said..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2024-06-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"In eerie echoes of the brutality of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, the Myanmar military junta is killing and torturing people as it desperately tries to hang on to power in a country inaptly dubbed the “Golden Land”.
Just over the last couple of weeks, the horrific story has been exposed of a brutal and vicious massacre of over 50 people in the village Byai Phyu, which is just outside the Rakhine State capital of Sittwe. This is one of many massacres and killings since the 2021 military coup, displaying the brutality of this “Pol Pot-like regime” that appears to hate its countrymen and women. Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing appears to encourage this horrific behaviour of his troops.
More than 170 soldiers are believed to have raided the village Byai Phyu as part of operations to tackle the Arakan Army (AA) that has grabbed a number of towns and junta military positions in Rakhine.
Witnesses told the media that everyone in the village, which has just over 1,000 households, were kept out in the open for two days, under the sun, with little or nothing to eat or drink, while dozens of men were tied, blindfolded and some taken away in trucks for further interrogation. Many are yet to return.
According to a BBC report, men who had tattoos showing support for the AA were singled out for especially harsh treatment, locals said. One eyewitness said the soldiers cut out the tattooed skin, poured petrol onto it and set it alight. Men were taken away one by one, brutalized and shot. Several women were gang-raped. Valuables were looted. Another eyewitness recalled an army officer telling the villagers he had come from the fighting in northern Shan State, where the military suffered heavy losses under Operation 1027 late last year, to take his revenge on them.
The National Unity Government (NUG) said in a statement that 51 people aged between 15 and 70 were “violently tortured and killed”. The AA estimates the death toll to be more than 70 people.
The Myanmar junta has denied the accusations, but it is clear that this is yet another massacre perpetrated by soldiers on civilians, displaying a level of brutality on a par with Pol Pot and the Killing Fields of Cambodia.
“Myanmar’s Year Zero” is happening in front of our eyes – unlike the killings in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 that took place behind a security curtain and media blackout. Independent media reported Myanmar’s Byai Phyu massacre a day after it happened, details beginning to emerge a day or two later. Various organizations including the United Nations have spoken out. But it appears tough to hold the Myanmar junta accountable. The junta has no honour and no soul, using their troops to raise fear amongst the population.
“Vicious cruelty” is how the AA referred to this massacre. While some might argue that comparing Min Aung Hlaing to Pol Pot – responsible for the murder of close to 2 million Cambodians – doesn’t quite fit, anybody hearing the testimony of the survivors of the Byai Phyu massacre will recognize the similarly between the brutality of the Khmer Rouge and the brutality of the Myanmar junta soldiers. They are perpetrating horrific crimes against humanity, a clear breaking of the laws of war..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of publication:
2024-06-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
The hard-hit middle class is searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after three years of war.
Description:
"The rumors were everywhere: A politically connected crony, U Thein Wai, better known as Serge Pun, was called in for questioning.
While he was not arrested, the military’s questioning of the CEO of Yoma Bank and eight directors of other subsidiaries under his control is another indicator of just how dire Myanmar’s economic situation is.
The 71-year old Sino-Burmese tycoon sits atop a massive business empire of some 50 different interrelated companies. The most important of these are First Myanmar Investment Company (FMI), Serge Pun and Associates (SPA), and, of course, Yoma Bank.
While largely invested in real estate through Yoma Land, SPA is one of the largest conglomerates in the country, with investments in real estate, construction, banking and financial services, Suzuki automobile assembly, the KFC franchise and healthcare.
Yoma Bank is one of the largest private banks in Myanmar and has been in important overseas conduit, especially after the US government sanctioned two state banks in June 2023.
Yoma Bank has ties to the military, lending to both the military-owned Mytel and Pinnacle Asia, which is owned by Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Mon.
In November 2022, the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally called, bestowed on him the honorific Thiri Pyanchi, granted for outstanding performance.
Pun’s ties to the military are deep enough that the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation divested their 4.55% equity stake in Yoma Bank in December 2022, selling it to FMI.
This is not to say that Pun has been completely pro-military. Compared to other cronies, he’s been much less so. He’s hedged his bets and incorporated holdings in Singapore and Hong Kong. Arguably he would be a lot wealthier were it not for the coup, but he’s worked within the reality of the coup.
So what prompted the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs, the feared military intelligence service, to come calling?
In short, facilitating capital flight.
Real estate roadshow
In late May, a group of five executives of a real estate firm, Minn Thu Co., held an unauthorized roadshow, selling Bangkok condominiums. Minn Thu had allegedly established unauthorized bank accounts in Thailand to facilitate the sales.
Thai real estate is being pitched to Burmese as a safe investment at a time when the kyat has fallen to a record low of over 5,000 kyat per dollar, while soaring inflation eats into the currency’s purchasing power.
Gold has reached record rates: 5.8 million kyat per tical (15.2 grams, .54 oz) – 4.5 times the pre-coup rate of 1.3 million kyat. Over 20 gold dealers have been arrested recently, accused of engaging in speculation.
The beleaguered middle class is desperately searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after more than three years of conflict.
Four of the five businessmen who staged the roadshow have been arrested, and one other executive is at large.
To serve as a deterrent to others, the junta arrested three people who purchased the condos, having illegally transferred assets overseas.
Yoma Bank is believed to have assisted in financing the purchases by transferring assets to Bangkok in violation of the junta’s currency controls.
Military intelligence officials are also investigating whether Yoma Bank is offering what are de facto mortgages for overseas real estate, as an investment vehicle, in contravention of Myanmar law.
In recent days, the junta has expanded their investigation into over 100,000 private bank transfers.
Capital flight began immediately after the coup. Radio Free Asia reported the purchase of THB2.5 billion (US$69 million) and THB 3.7 billion (US$100 million) in Thai real estate in 2022 and 2023, respectively.
In the first quarter of 2024, Burmese were the second largest group of foreign nationals to invest in Thai real estate, according to the Bangkok Post, having purchased at least 384 units, worth THB2.2 billion ($60 million).
Estimates, though, are far higher, as many properties are believed to have been purchased using Thai nominees.
Focus on funds
And of course, the revelation that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s own children have moved their own assets to Thailand was a huge embarrassment for the regime. Aung Pyae Sone owns a condominium worth around $1 million in Bangkok, while Khin Thiri Thet Mon has two accounts at Siam Commercial Bank.
Reports are emerging that Khin Sri Thet Mon purchased a condo in the ultra swank SCOPE Langsuan, which was completed in May 2023, and where a three bedroom unit sells for $4.2 million to over $15 million.
The SAC has deployed uniformed personnel to both public and private banks since mid-2021 to block transfers to the civil disobedience movement, the National Unity Government, and ethnic resistance organizations. But soon after that, they also began monitoring capital flight.
The junta is increasingly cracking down on the informal banking sector, known as hundi, that is used by at least 40 percent of overseas workers.
In early June, the regime froze the accounts of 39 additional hundi dealers, following the crackdown on 20 others in January.
The hundi system keeps desperately needed foreign exchange out of the formal banking system, where people and companies are forced to convert it to kyat at artificially low exchange rates.
Given the state of the economy, capital flight is the rational choice for Burmese with the means..
The World Bank has reported on the dire state of the economy, which has shrunk by nearly 20% since the coup. The poverty rate is now 32%, while 2024 GDP growth estimates have been halved to 1%.
The NUG estimates that the junta has printed 30 trillion kyat (US$11.5 billion) since the coup, a leading – though not the only – cause of inflation, which is now at 30%. The kyat has lost 22% of its value.
Public debt is soaring. Currently at 63% of GDP, compared to 42% under the ousted Aung San Su Kyi government, and it is expected to worsen as revenue collection is collapsing.
A recent report by the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar shows that only one of 51 townships that have border crossings is under stable junta control, with four more under their proxy militias, which has led to a loss of significant amounts of customs duties.
Pinching trade
More importantly, the junta has restricted the volume of trade that can be transacted in local currencies. The World Bank reported that exports fell by 13% and imports by 20% in the first six months of 2024, but that cross border exports, except for gas, fell by 44%, while imports fell by 71%.
In early June, the junta announced further restrictions and controls on importers to stop the outflow of hard currency.
Military losses have forced the Ministry of Oil and Gas Enterprise to abandon two oil fields. Oil and gas production generates some $1.5 billion, half of the regime’s foreign exchange earnings.
Meanwhile, attempts to increase the number of tourists have largely faltered..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Bangladesh: Low voter turnout and partisan violence mar local body elections
Bangladesh recorded an increase in political violence in May compared to the month prior, coinciding with the first three phases of polling for the upazila parishad (sub-district council) elections; the final phase is scheduled for 5 June.1 The principal opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the elections alongside other parties, calling them “farcical” and questioning the Election Commission’s independence.2 The boycott left electoral competition between rival factions within the ruling Awami League (AL), which has precluded candidates from using the party’s official electoral symbol in an attempt to make the polls more competitive.3 During the first three phases of polling, which had low voter turnout, deadly clashes between supporters of rival candidates led to dozens of injuries and at least four fatalities. While most clashes took place between rival AL or independent candidates, isolated clashes between supporters of the AL and BNP also occurred, even as some BNP leaders contesting in defiance of the party diktat were expelled.4 The BNP’s decision to boycott these elections follows their boycott of the general elections held in January 2024, when the party had led nationwide demonstrations over its concerns regarding the Election Commission’s ability to hold free and fair elections under the incumbent AL government.5
For more, see ACLED’s report on The Violent Politics of Bangladesh’s 2024 Elections.
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India: General elections continue amid partisan violence and claims of voter suppression
India’s 18th general elections continued in May, with polling for four of the scheduled seven phases spread across the month ahead of a final round of voting that was held on 1 June.6 Amid the elections, the states of West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh saw increases in political violence, where the majority of voting was completed in May. In West Bengal, which often has high levels of partisan violence, a significant amount of violence was related to inter-party clashes and the targeting of rival politicians, with the majority of clashes taking place between supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the incumbent party in the national government, and the Trinamool Congress (TMC), the ruling party at the state level. In Nandigram city, the killing of a female BJP leader on 22 May, days before polling for the sixth phase, prompted violent demonstrations. While the victim’s family blamed the TMC for her death, the TMC claimed that it was the result of a factional feud within the BJP.7
In Uttar Pradesh, allegations of voter suppression, mainly targeting the Muslim community, threatened the election’s integrity. Outside polling centers in Sambhal district, police personnel were accused of assaulting Muslims and stealing their identification cards, preventing them from voting. Opposition politicians alleged that this harassment was designed to benefit the Hindu nationalist BJP’s electoral chances.8
For more on the unrest around the 2024 Indian elections, see ACLED’s Special Election Series on India.
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Myanmar: Civilians subject to military airstrikes and retaliation
Military airstrikes and retaliation targeting civilians continued in the month of May in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions. On 9 May, the military conducted an airstrike on a monastery compound in Saw township where local businessmen and National Unity Government-affiliated administrators were gathering to discuss trade and checkpoint taxation, killing at least 16 people.9 Two days later, the military used bombs and machine gun fire during three airstrikes on the Ma Gyi Oke village school in Tabayin township, where locals, including anti-military resistance group members, were gathering to access Starlink internet, killing seven people and injuring 23 others.10 Locals believe the military acted with precise intelligence of the gatherings, deliberately targeting them. Dozens of people are reported to have been killed in more than 30 airstrikes that hit Magway and Sagaing regions in May.
Meanwhile, the military carried out multiple retaliatory ground assaults on civilians in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions. In Myinmu township, the military shot and killed at least 30 men in Let Htoke Taw village monastery after they failed to reveal a local defense force’s camp location on 11 May.11 The military claimed they entered the village in retaliation for a resistance group attack against a military convoy en route from the Wanbao copper mining project a few days prior.12 This also followed a deadly clash in Myingyan township in which several resistance groups coordinated an attack on suspected pro-military Pyu Saw Htee militia members in Son village on 9 May. At least 30 people were reportedly killed in the crossfire.13 Ten more locals, including some children, were then tortured and killed in other retaliatory attacks in Paungbyin and Myingyan townships on 17 May.
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New Caledonia: Proposed electoral reforms trigger deadly rioting
Proposed voting reforms triggered weeks of rioting in New Caledonia that left at least nine people dead, including two gendarmeries. Riots broke out after the French National Assembly approved a proposal on 13 May that would unfreeze the list of eligible voters in New Caledonia for the provincial electoral body and open it to people who have lived in the country for at least 10 years.14 The violence led the French government to declare a state of emergency on 15 May and deploy 3,000 troops from mainland France.15 New Caledonia’s airport also closed, prompting foreign governments to stage military evacuation flights for stranded tourists.16 The proposed electoral reform is opposed by members of the Indigenous Kanak independence movement in New Caledonia, which sees it as an attempt to dilute Kanak voting power and undermine future possibilities of independence.17 This is the largest and deadliest outbreak of rioting in New Caledonia since ACLED coverage began in 2021.
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Papua New Guinea: Deadly communal violence breaks out in Bogia, Madang province
In Madang province, an attempted robbery escalated into deadly communal violence in Bogia district. In mid-May, robbers seized a motorized boat on the Ramu River, reportedly believing its occupants were carrying cash from selling vanilla and cocoa. After finding none, they plunged the passengers into the water and disembarked. The incident led to a series of violent confrontations involving people from Dakit, Guaia, and Kumnug villages, which reportedly saw five people beheaded and one shot dead, and 20 houses torched.18 Security personnel intervened in some of the violence and detained six suspects.19 While responsibility for the initial attacks remains unclear, several gangs, including the Het Wara Gang and Albu Youths Gang, have operated in Mandang, carrying out killings, rapes, and mass displacements.20
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**Thailand: **Violence in the Deep South continued with tactical and symbolic actions
The Deep South remains persistently volatile, with suspected separatists maintaining heightened levels of activity for the second consecutive month following an upswing in activity during Ramadan. On 6 May, a bomb concealed in a gas tank attached to a stolen motorcycle was triggered in Bang Nak, Narathiwat city, injuring nine people, including two public health officers. The attack was claimed by state authorities to have been intended to cause fear and sabotage tourism revenues.21 On 16 May, separatists set fire to car tires and CCTV cameras in eight locations of Rueso District, Narathiwat Province, coinciding with the 29th anniversary of the Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP).22 Founded by the late Jehkumir Kuteh, the GMIP has a history of political violence but has been relatively inactive since 2004. Violence in the Deep South often increases at times of peace discussions between separatists and the state, but it is unclear if the events in May are related to any existing dialogue.23
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Taiwan: Nationwide protests erupt in opposition to KMT-backed legislative reform bill
On 21 May, in one of the largest peaceful protest movements seen in Taiwan in the last decade, over 30,000 people, including representatives from over 40 civic groups, protested at the Legislative Yuan in Taipei.24 The crowds protested against a legislative reform bill, backed by opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) parties, that expands the power of parliament. The bill’s proponents are attempting to push it through the Legislative Yuan without consultation with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The bill would allow legislators to unilaterally question, or demand information from, any government official, including newly inaugurated president Lai Ching-te. It also contains a ‘contempt of legislature’ clause that could punish those under investigation for asking questions or behaving in any way deemed to be non-compliant.25 Protesters brandished sunflowers along with their placards and banners — echoing the historic sunflower movement in 2014, which saw hundreds of thousands demonstrating against a trade agreement similarly forced through the legislature by the KMT.26 Protesters returned to the Legislative Yuan on 24 May in a crowd of up to 100,000 people and in lesser numbers in Kaohsiung, Chiayi City, Tainan City, Changhua City, Taichung City, Magong City, and Taitung City.27..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication:
2024-06-10
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Description:
"During a critical briefing on June 13th, Wiroj expressed concerns that the army's drone capability is falling behind in confronting modern-day threats in Thailand’s western border areas. Highlighting the urgency, he noted that while the army plans to procure an additional fleet of 10 drones for fiscal 2025, this number is insufficient to counteract current security threats.
Wiroj pointed out that both Myanmar’s Tatmadaw troops and various armed ethnic groups operating in the region already employ advanced drone technology. These include attack drones armed with missiles and surveillance drones, posing significant challenges to Thai security forces, who currently rely solely on surveillance drones.
Expressing frustration, Wiroj stated, "The Thai army does not possess any attack drones and faces immense difficulties due to the variety of drones it uses from different countries, such as Israel, Turkey, and China, which complicates tactical coordination during field missions."
Moreover, Wiroj revealed that drug and human traffickers in the border areas are increasingly using drones to locate authorities, further complicating the security situation.
Equally troubling is the lack of anti-drone weapons within the army’s current arsenal. This shortage leaves gaps in the army's capability to neutralize hostile drones, hence increasing their vulnerability.
In addition, Wiroj mentioned funding concerns, noting that the 40 million baht allocated for repairing the army's wheeled personnel carriers in fiscal 2025 is grossly inadequate. These rough-terrain combat vehicles are crucial for maintaining security along the expansive 2,400-kilometre Thai-Myanmar border.
Wiroj's revelations paint a troubling picture of the Thai army’s preparedness and highlight the growing need for technological enhancement and funding to address evolving security challenges in the region..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Now
Date of publication:
2024-06-14
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Rebel forces are targeting them for helping the ruling junta
Description:
"More than 80 junta-appointed administrators across Myanmar have been assassinated for aiding or participating in the military conscription of civilians since the draft was announced in February, according to an RFA tally.
In all, 82 village and ward administrators, clerks and others have been killed in the past four months, according to statements from the People’s Defense Force militias, largely made up of ordinary citizens who have taken up arms against the military rulers.
Myanmar’s ruling junta activated the mandatory conscription law, dormant since 2010, as it lost ground — and troops — to ethnic armies and PDF guerilla fighters.
The law allows for men ages 18 to 45 and women ages 18 to 35 to be drafted into the armed forces for two years. Medical doctors and other specialists up to age 45 must serve for three years.
Evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine.
Rebel groups have sought to undermine the draft, and killing those ordered to carry it out has been one way.
“In the past, administrators were well-regarded by the people,” said a relative of an administrator killed in Yangon. “Now, they are becoming widely disliked by the public. Even after his death, his remaining family members face ostracism.”
‘Only one fitting punishment’
In Yangon, administrators in Kungyangon, Insein and North Dagon townships were killed after resistance forces warned them to resign, to stop supporting the junta, and to stop conscripting civilians.
“If they continue these actions without compliance, then there is only one fitting punishment during the revolution,” said an official from the People's Defense Force of Shwebo township in northwestern Myanmar’s Sagaing region.
In the central Mandalay region, two dozen administrators have been killed during the past four months — the highest number of fatalities in a single region or state — followed by Magway region with 18 fatalities.
Nearly 40 administrators have resigned, other officials said.
Residents say that some administrators are extorting amounts equivalent to hundreds of U.S. dollars from civilians who refuse to perform military service.
An administrator in Ayeyarwady region, who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons, said he is waiting for the junta to approve his resignation.
“I won’t continue because my family's lives are in danger,” he said. “Although I have resigned, the head [of the township’s General Administration Department] will not accept it. As a result, our lives are now filled with chaos and uncertainty.”
The military council has not issued any statements about the administrators’ deaths.
‘Alternative strategies’
A former military officer, who also requested anonymity for safety reasons, said civilian conscription efforts have not slowed down despite the number of administrators who have been killed.
“If one administrator dies, the next assigned administrator will continue the task,” he said. “Killing individuals will not stop the process. If this method fails, the military will pursue alternative strategies.”
The junta’s Central Body for Summoning People’s Military Servants based in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyitaw said it would work with security forces in relevant states and regions to step up protection for administrators.
Political analyst Than Soe Naing said administrators are arbitrarily mistreating civilians under the pretext of the law.
“There is no police department to lodge complaints about these cases, nor a court to file a lawsuit,” he said.
“When the public protests, they are met with gunfire, torture and imprisonment,” he said. “These actions have persisted, leading the public to resist this unjust law in acts of civil disobedience.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"JAKARTA – ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) call on the international community to monitor, and take preventive actions to discourage, the use of judicial instruments to dissolve the Move Forward Party (MFP), which won the most number of seats in the Thai general elections in May 2023 and is currently the largest party in the Thai parliament.
The possible dissolution, which could take place as early as the third week of June, would lead to at least a 10-year ban on the executive members from participating in formal politics. The Election Commission and the Constitutional Court have stated that the MFP’s campaign promise to reform the lèse-majesté law is equivalent to an attempt to overthrow the democratic government with the King as Head of State.
The probable judicial overreach risks encroaching on the prerogative of the legislative branch and blatantly disregards the principle of the separation of powers. “By preventing parliamentarians from deliberating on the law that is not in line with international human rights standards, the court undermines the very idea of democracy as it puts that specific law beyond the reach of any amendments,” APHR Chair and Indonesian Member of Parliament Mercy Chriesty Barends said today.
APHR also calls on international human rights mechanisms and the international community to explore various tools in international law to hold those committing judicial harassment in Thailand accountable.
“Democracy in Thailand is backsliding, not only due to a military coup, but also through dubious interpretations of laws employed to target opposition politicians. If the Move Forward Party is banned, like the Future Forward Party in 2019, millions of people will be disenfranchised, and unrest that could destabilize Thailand is a real possibility,” said APHR Co-Chair and former Malaysian MP Charles Santiago. “This would not only hurt Thailand’s democratic development, but would further harm the economy and damage the reputation and legacy of the current Thai government.”
Prior to this, the MFP was blocked from leading the coalition government by the institutionalized counter-majoritarian mechanism in the Thai military-drafted constitution. Its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, along with other leading members of parliament have individually been faced with an ongoing campaign of judicial harassment.
Apart from the cases against the MFP and its MPs, the overall human rights trend in Thailand is worrisome. The use of lèse-majesté laws and computer crime accusations to charge and jail those who voice dissenting opinions is on the rise. Surprisingly, these violations are increasing while Thailand is campaigning for its seat at the UN Human Rights Council.
“APHR urges the international community to continue monitoring the deteriorating human rights and democratic situation in Thailand and to take appropriate measures to protect not only parliamentarians at risk but also other political prisoners,” said Barends.
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"13 June 2024: The United States (US) Government and United Nations (UN) member States must respond to rapidly evolving dynamics on the ground in Myanmar by providing material and political support to the country’s many resistance actors and taking action to protect civilians from escalating junta atrocities, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M founding members Yanghee Lee and Chris Sidoti and members of the SAC-M team this month travelled to Washington, D.C. and New York in the United States to speak to members of the United States Government, UN member States and representatives of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG).
The visit coincided with the third anniversary of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/287 on the situation in Myanmar, adopted on 18 June 2021. Since then, the Myanmar military junta’s sustained attack on the civilian population has created an unprecedented humanitarian and human rights disaster in Myanmar. The crisis is severely undermining the stability and security of the entire region. Despite this, the General Assembly has not addressed the situation since Resolution 75/287.
Conflict dynamics in the country have evolved significantly since nationwide resistance first emerged in response to the Myanmar military’s coup attempt on 1 February 2021. International actors have a responsibility to respond to the new dynamics on the ground and move beyond their current wait-and-see approach to the crisis by taking decisive action to alleviate the suffering of civilians and protect human rights in Myanmar now.
SAC-M calls on the UN General Assembly to adopt a new resolution on Myanmar that recognises the importance of the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organisations (EROs) and broader civil society in realising the federal democratic will and aspirations of the Myanmar people. The General Assembly must address Myanmar’s humanitarian emergency by calling for the massively scaled-up provision of humanitarian assistance directly to the Myanmar people, including through cross-border channels, by coordinating directly with the NUG, EROs and broader civil society. Furthermore, the General Assembly must call on all States to immediately cease all transfers of arms, munitions, military equipment and dual use items, as well as jet fuel, to the Myanmar military junta.
It has been one and a half years since the UN Security Council attempted meaningful action on Myanmar. The junta has refused to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2669 on Myanmar since it was adopted in December 2022. The United Kingdom, as the permanent Security Council member that informally leads on Myanmar issues, has been failing in its responsibility to push the Council to address the growing emergency in Myanmar. The Council’s dysfunction on Myanmar reached a new low in April when Myanmar’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, was barred from speaking at an open briefing on Myanmar. SAC-M considers this denial of speaking rights to a permanent representative of a concerned country as setting an extremely dangerous precedent.
The Security Council must adopt a new resolution on Myanmar under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that refers the whole situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. If the Security Council can’t, or won’t, act, the General Assembly must establish a special international criminal tribunal for Myanmar to begin prosecutions of Myanmar military leaders for the most serious international crimes committed in the country.
Finally, SAC-M urges the US Government to return the more than US$1 billion of frozen Myanmar national reserves held by the US Federal Reserve since February 2021, or at least the substantial interest accrued since then, to the legitimate representatives of the Myanmar people: the NUG, EROs, and broader civil society. These funds would provide a lifeline for resistance authorities to address the massive humanitarian needs of the population and strengthen governance capacity and service delivery in areas of the country under their expanding control..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime blocked Facebook and other messaging apps following the 2021 coup in a bid to restrict freedom of expression and communication that it believes threatens its rule.
Myanmar people were using virtual private networks (VPNs), either paid or free versions, to bypass the restrictions.
However, the regime recently banned the use of VPN services in the country, and residents are now reporting difficulties accessing Facebook and other social media platforms.
Ma Wai Phyo Myint, who heads Myanmar’s branch of Access Now, which promotes digital rights around the world, recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how the VPN ban will affect Myanmar people’s access to information and the ability of resistance groups to coordinate their efforts.
People are reporting difficulties using VPNs. What is happening?
The regime blocked access to websites, Facebook, WhatsApp and other messaging platforms in 2021 and 2022. They used blacklisting and whitelisting, handing lists of websites that they wanted blocked to telecom operators and internet service providers.
This time is different. They have bypassed telecom operators and internet service providers and are directly controlling [the internet] from Naypyitaw. We are waiting to see if they will deploy firewalls like China.
People say they can’t use certain VPNs. Which ones?
Local organizations are checking. Some VPNs can still be used. Local organizations say the regime listed VPN servers in late 2023 and early 2024. It has blocked access to widely used VPNs including Psiphon. This includes the paid version [as well as the free version].
The point of using a VPN is to make your browsing history and location untraceable by military and government organizations. Your data are not safe unless you use a secure VPN. So, why haven’t they blocked access to widely available VPNs yet? Perhaps they want to keep monitoring, which is a cause for concern.
People in China can still access banned sites despite the VPN ban? Is there any way to bypass the restrictions in Myanmar?
This is a technical issue and we are still trying to figure out what exactly the regime is doing. Then, we will talk with VPN service providers about how they can help to restore VPN access in Myanmar. Neither local organizations nor VPN service providers can explain the details now.
Why is the junta banning VPNs?
Mainly, it wants to restrict people’s right to information. Since the coup, it has deployed various measures to restrict the information flow. It imposed restrictions to control widespread criticism on websites and [social media pages] of media outlets, sharing of information about the regime, and coordination of anti-regime efforts. It has tightened this grip over time.
At the same time, it has deliberately kept VPNs usable so it can monitor and collect information [about anti-regime activities]. Lately, however, it has lost control. Despite restrictions on the internet, people are still managing to share information via alternative communication channels.
The regime made threats and arrests to instill fear. But people still found ways to communicate. Unable to restrict information flows, the regime decided to resort to an internet shutdown to keep people in the dark.
The VPN ban will also affect the junta, though it may have alternative communication channels. The ban will impact its business operations and spying mechanisms. Though the ban targets the people, the regime will inevitably be affected. So, the fact that it has resorted to this measure means it is failing.
Are there other ways people can use to share information?
We heard that Facebook use has significantly declined due to the VPN problem. The regime can restrict internet access and information flow for the public. The VPN ban is unprecedented and may have severe impacts.
Thanks to technological advances, even China’s government can’t completely ban VPNs. People can switch to other VPNs, and the regime won’t be able to block all the new technologies. There will be impacts, but people will be able to find ways [to evade the VPN ban] over time.
It is very costly to build firewalls. The regime doesn’t have sufficient resources to deploy firewalls in the long run. People should not underestimate what the regime is doing. Yet at the same time, they should not succumb to unwarranted fear. The regime can’t control everything.
Anti-regime forces are trying to use internet service providers that are not controlled by or tied to the regime. They are trying to get satellite phones and satellite internet, which have become accessible both technically and financially. The regime can’t shut down all the channels.
The junta has been promoting a social media app called MySpace. How far can it go?
It has previously created other apps to replace YouTube and Facebook. No social media app, whether it is MySpace or anything else, will be successful unless people accept it. People have boycotted military-linked products. And they know that any such technology made by the military is intended to monitor the people. So, there is little chance that any app created by the regime will succeed.
But we urge the Apple Store and Google Play Store not to offer these applications. We must continue to push international companies not to accept these apps on their platforms.
Is there anything else you want to say?
China had been the only country to ban the use of VPNs, so this situation is quite serious. I urge international bodies and governments to pay serious attention to this and provide tech and resources so people inside Myanmar can use the internet to keep track of the military situation and anti-regime forces can use communication channels that are not controlled by the regime. We notified the international community two years ago that the regime would do this, but there was almost no response or preparations. We continue to push for international assistance in this urgent matter..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-06-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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Resistance plot to assassinate coup leader Min Aung Hlaing at a bridge-opening ceremony raises hard questions about insurgent tactics
Description:
"Myanmar’s dictator Senior General Min Aung Hlaing showcased a major infrastructure project on June 8, opening the Thanlyin Bridge 3 across the Bago River, linking the commercial capital Yangon with the Thilawa Special Economic Zone.
Started in 2019 with a 31 billion yen (US$197 million) loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the bridge symbolizes economic progress under the State Administration Council (SAC) junta that is largely at odds with widespread armed conflict and economic decline its coup has caused.
Just days later, however, military-controlled media announced that security forces had thwarted a plot to attack the bridge opening ceremony. Several people were arrested with two 107mm rockets and launching gear in a workers’ housing area close to the bridge. Two more were arrested the following day with another rocket.
SAC-aligned media claimed that “(o)n the morning of June 8, 2024, in an old wooden cabin in the shipyard workers’ housing area in Ward 61 of Dagon Myothit (Seikkan) Township… several UG (underground) members were apprehended…(a)ccording to a report from a concerned resident opposed to terrorism.”
The military media, which can never resist displaying a “perp-chart” of mug shots and alleged connections between the conspirators, designated some of them as “rocket shooter”, “shooter assistant”, and “situation monitor.”
It claimed that a man called “Arkar Min (yet to be apprehended) of the Brigade Drone Force PDF (People’s Defense Force) provided instructions on how to use rockets via Instagram in the third week of April 2024.” Another alleged leader, Phyu Hnin Aye, was designated as “Rocket shooting director (at large from Mae Sot).”
The SAC has accused the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) of being behind the alleged plot but stopped short of designating it as an attempt on Min Aung Hlaing’s life. If that was the intention, it raises questions over the ability of the resistance forces to mount an operation that could have decapitated the SAC’s topmost leadership.
Two days after the incident, in a speech published in state media, Min Aung Hlaing “stressed the need to wipe out terrorists in Yangon Region…(he) underscored that as terrorists attempt to commit terror acts, taking a chance in unguarded moments of security forces, individuals have to monitor the movements of terrorists with security awareness and knowledge to ensure peace and stability.”
A rare admission of instability or the fears of a war criminal who just lived through a possible assassination plot? How many other attempts have been made to target who must be the most hated man in Myanmar?
There was an initial optimism among many Myanmar resistance forces that the SAC second in command, Vice Senior General Soe Win, had been killed in a drone strike in mid-April at the military Southeast Command in Mawlamyine.
Not seen for several weeks, speculation swirled that he had been severely injured, that he was in intensive care in Yangon, or that he had been transferred to a hospital in India but he soon resurfaced in apparently fine health.
The anti-SAC resistance has been making increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the largely symbolic drone attack on the military fortress capital of Naypyidaw in early April, which didn’t cause much damage but must have jarred the military leadership to some extent.
But the bridge plot reveals several larger trends in the war against the SAC. On the one hand, it illustrates that urban operations, which have been largely low-level, sporadic and in decline over the past year, are still viable if an urban cell can form, operate, plan and surveil a target, and smuggle into Yangon ordnance to carry out an attack. More dramatic would have been an actual launch of the rockets.
Another interpretation would suggest that the security services’ intelligence capabilities are sufficient to thwart such resistance operations, as they have managed to do in many large urban spaces such as Yangon and Mandalay.
There were numerous predictions that a surge of urban uprisings would follow the successful Operation 1027 in northern Shan state in October, which saw insurgents seize scores of towns and over 200 military positions. But this failed to materialize, partly because of the difficulty in staging urban operations in Myanmar’s proficient and ruthless police state.
The incident also reveals the air of twisted normalcy that hums through Yangon, where the regime’s top leader, Japanese engineers from the Nippon Koei Company and reviled SAC members like the former Karen leader Mahn Nyein Maung open new infrastructure as if the situation is stable.
The regime blithely claimed the bridge “will help utilize the East-West Economic Corridor, which will benefit the Hpa-an/Myawady area, as well as the development of Mon and Kayin states and the improvement of connection with regional countries” – areas the embattled regime has largely lost control over, including that crucial section of the Asia Highway.
But the bridge operation also raises important questions about resistance targeting choices. 107mm rockets have been used in multiple battlefronts in Myanmar, and are notoriously inaccurate and prone to malfunction.
Originally developed by the Chinese military in the 1960s, in a multiple launch system called a Type 63, the rockets can be used in very low-tech mode, often simply propped on a stand or sandbag and ignited using a simple battery in a “fire and forget” fashion. They have a range of several kilometers with a blast radius of 12 meters and were popular with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in their resistance against the Soviets.
107mm rockets have become a weapon of choice for many Myanmar resistance groups, before and after the coup, used in multiple attacks on built-up areas or airfields. Resistance forces deployed 12 against Mandalay’s Tada U airport in January, with only five actually igniting.
The military airfield at Nam Paung near the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina was targeted in April, but it’s not clear how much damage was inflicted. The rockets are plentiful, easy to use and indicative of the asymmetric nature of Myanmar’s scattered armed conflicts.
But two recent incidents deserve greater scrutiny over the decision-making protocols of anti-military resistance forces. The SAC claims that a large number of 107mm rockets were captured in early February in the city of Bago, and that the “Dark Side Revolution Burma” (DSRB) PDF was planning attacks on tea shops and restaurants where large crowds were gathered to watch the annual Myanmar Academy Awards ceremony on television.
There is no confirmation that the group was actually planning such an attack against civilians. The DSRB is not a widely active organization, so this could potentially be a false flag accusation of the SAC.
Yet in April in Pyin U Lwin, during the annual Thingyan water festival, the Mandalay PDF fired nearly a dozen rockets into the large town, striking a military academy and wounding several cadets, but also hitting a monastery and hospital, killing two Buddhist monks and severely wounding a number of civilians including children.
It wasn’t widely raised at the time but this is potentially a war crime committed by resistance forces. The use of indiscriminate weapons, especially in built-up areas, could also be in breach of international humanitarian law.
The targeting of Min Aung Hlaing with such unguided munitions in a large crowd of civilians could also have constituted a war crime if it had not been thwarted. But the “bridge plot” should also serve as a moment of clarity for the resistance.
Targeting large crowds with indiscriminate weapons is something the SAC does on a daily basis, murdering civilians across the country with airstrikes and artillery. For anti-SAC forces, even those plotting the assassination of senior regime figures, extreme or desperate measures may have a counter-productive effect if innocent civilians become collateral damage..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2024-06-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"In a country thick with spies and informers, suspicion can be
crippling. History shows that confidence is hard to win back.....We hear a lot these days about the “trust deficit” and “the loss of social capital”. Thanks to a succession of royal commissions, parliamentary inquiries, media investigations and revelations by whistle blowers, many Australians have lost confidence in their most cherished institutions. Faith in politicians, public servants, bankers, churchmen and other traditional authority figures is said to be at an all-time low.
This phenomenon has real world consequences. According to Jerry Useem, writing in The Atlantic, high levels of trust are important for social cohesion, political stability and even economic growth. A downward trust spiral, on the other hand, has the opposite effect. One study has found that, more than 30 years after the Berlin Wall came down, fully half of the income disparity between East and West Germany could be traced to the legacy of informers employed by the Stasi, East Germany’s notorious Ministry for State Security. As Useem wrote, “The legacy of broken trust has proved extraordinarily difficult to shake”.
This statement prompts a comparison between East Germany under the communists and Myanmar under successive military regimes. Both countries had (and, in Myanmar’s case still has) the reputation of being brutal police states. Both regimes relied on hundreds of thousands of informers to spy on their fellow citizens, undermining social cohesion.
It has been estimated that in the 1980s, when the Stasi was at its most powerful, there were 200,000 inoffizielle mitarbeiter, or “unofficial collaborators”. In a population of 16 million, that was one informer for every 50 to 60 people.
The equivalent statistics for Myanmar are more difficult to estimate, but by some calculations the ratio is even higher. Under the Ne Win regime (1962–88), it was widely believed that one in ten Burmese were dalan, or informers. After the 1974 U Thant disturbances in Rangoon, for example, Western diplomats estimated that 20% of the country’s tertiary students were informers. Some of them actively supported the generals, but most were forced to cooperate with the regime.
The junta places a high priority on the identification, location and removal of anyone deemed a threat to the regime, a definition with a very wide meaning.
After the abortive 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) expanded, extending its reach across the entire country. As part of that process, it recruited even more informers. In those pre-digital days (in Myanmar, at least) their contribution to the regime’s mass surveillance of Burmese society was critical. In 1998, one observer wrote that “one in seven (or even one in five) Burmese are informers”.
This claim is valid, but a little misleading. The number and concentration of informers varied between locations, with far fewer located in the rural districts where most Burmese lived. Even so, as another Myanmar watcher suggested in 2001, it was commonly believed that in the urban areas there was one informer for every ten houses. If this was true, then it means that the ratio of informers to other citizens in Myanmar was higher than in East Germany, a country where, in Timothy Garton Ash’s words, the Stasi became “a default global synonym for the secret police terrors of communism”. Under successive military regimes in Myanmar, the DDSI could claim a similar standing.
In one sense, however, the actual numbers do not matter. It is the perception that counts. This was a key feature of both the East German and Burmese surveillance systems. Because no-one knew who was an informer, it was widely assumed that they were everywhere. This had the effect of sowing suspicion and shutting down discussion of politically sensitive subjects.
As a Burmese journalist told the writer Emma Larkin: “It doesn’t make any difference whether they have informers or not. It is enough that we believe their informers are everywhere. After that, we do their work for them.” As Larkin noted, even without the technological means available to other oppressive regimes, in Myanmar “Big Brother really is everywhere”.
This situation only eased slightly under Aung San Suu Kyi’s quasi-civilian government, between 2016 and 2020.
Since the 2021 military coup, the level of surveillance in Myanmar has greatly increased. The country is thick with spies and informers, both paid and unpaid. The junta places a high priority on the identification, location and removal of anyone deemed a threat to the regime, a definition with a very wide meaning. The regime now has greater technical means to monitor the population, but it still relies heavily on human intelligence.
As so often happens in these circumstances, the competition between informers and those secretly working against the regime has turned into a nasty war within a war. The resistance knows that informers pose perhaps the most serious threat to their lives and ability to continue their struggle. Like so many insurgents before them, in many different countries, they have retaliated against informers with a campaign of “targeted killings”.
Many in the resistance appear to subscribe to the views of the legendary Irish guerrilla leader Michael Collins, who said in 1920 that “There is no crime in detecting and destroying, in war-time, the spy and the informer.” Male and female, young and old, service and civilian, no-one has been spared by the opposition’s so-called urban guerrilla units.
Even before the coup, levels of social trust in Myanmar were very low. In 2014, for example, the Asia Foundation conducted a nation-wide survey and asked the question: can most people be trusted? 77% of respondents answered “no”. To a similar question about their close neighbours, 43% still answered in the negative. Trust in government institutions varied but they also fared badly in the survey.
The 2021 coup, and the bitter civil war that has followed, has clearly made this situation much worse. Many communities, normally divided by other things, have been brought together by their shared fear and hatred of the junta. However, in other ways deep divisions have opened up in Myanmar over political allegiances, military tactics and social mores.
To return to the arguments made by Jerry Useem, the lack of trust that has blighted Myanmar for more than half a century will need to be taken into account in any consideration of the country’s future. Myanmar badly needs leaders in whom most people can put their trust. In the past, Aung San Suu Kyi has filled this role, but she will be in prison for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, as the civil war grinds on, Myanmar’s social capital diminishes further and the trust spiral continues downwards..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of publication:
2024-06-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"This Incident Report describes two events that occurred in Kaw T’Ree (Kawkareik) Township, Dooplaya District, in November and December 2023. On November 4th 2023, State Administration Council (SAC) conducted an air strike into E--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, and injured an 11-year-old boy, Saw A---, on the leg, while he was near his house. The boy was immediately sent to a hospital in Hpa-an Town by his parents to receive treatment, and later transferred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwaw village tract, Ta Kreh (Paingkyon) Township, Hpa-an District. On December 2nd 2023, at 8 am, the SAC dropped a 500-pound bomb into F--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township. The bomb injured a pregnant villager named Ma B---. Her husband sent her to D--- clinic, in Nabu [T’Nay Cha] Township, Hpa-an District, but she was referred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwaw village tract, as this clinic was better equipped to treat her.[1]
[Excerpt]
Part 1 – Incident Details
Type of Incident
Air strike
Date of Incident(s)
November 4th 2023 and December 2nd 2023
Incident Location
(Village, Township and District)
E--- section and F--- section, in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District.
[...]
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On November 4th 2023 [in the morning], fighting broke out between State Administration Council (SAC)[6] soldiers [unknown battalion] against combined forces from People’s Defence Force (PDF)[7] and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[8] in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. At around 10 am, the SAC conducted an air strike [and one bomb landed] inside E--- section, Kawkareik Town. [At the time,] Saw A--- (11 years old), a Grade-3 [primary school] boy, was with his grandmother [in their house in E--- section], and went outside of the house to urinate. While he was urinating, he was hit by shrapnel [from a bomb] on the right calf. His grandmother heard him being wounded by the shrapnel and immediately called his parents, who sent him [by car] to a hospital in Hpa-an Town, Hpa-an District [located one hour away] to receive treatment. When he reached the hospital, he had very low blood pressure [due to blood loss], thus it could not be predicted whether he would live or not. Saw A--- received treatment on time and was saved. [His parents paid for the treatment themselves, and did not receive assistance from any organisations]. By November 30th 2023, his wound was not fully healed, so he received further treatment at C--- clinic, in Naw Kwaw village tract, Ta Kreh (Paingkyon) Township, Hpa-an District. [C--- clinic is under the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)[9], so treatment was free of charge.] Regarding the incident, his mother expressed: “In this political situation, it is not convenient to work. Our financial situation is becoming more difficult. It’s really sad to witness my son experience it [the attack].”
On December 2nd 2023, at 8 am, the SAC conducted an air strike into F--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. The shrapnel [from the dropped bomb] injured Ma B---, a woman nine months pregnant, on the left side of her back. At the time, she was gathering things inside her house to flee [as villagers could hear the sound of aircraft approaching them]. Her husband witnessed what happened to his wife, as he was on his motorbike and had just started the engine. He immediately sent his wife to D--- clinic, Meh Pah Leh village tract, Nabu [T’Nay Cha] Township, Hpa-an District. It was hard to perform surgery on a woman who was nine months pregnant, so at 10 am she was referred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwee village tract, [which is better equipped]. Regarding the incident, Ma B--- expressed: “A 500-pound bomb, dropped from the aircraft, injured villagers. And I don’t know how many were killed by it. I don’t want to put the blame on anyone when such things happen. But for certain, I’m very sad and feel bad about the incident.”..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-05-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"30 May 2024: The trajectory of the conflict in Myanmar has accelerated rapidly in favour of the country’s resistance actors, finds a new briefing paper published by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) today. The junta is not the de facto government of Myanmar as it is not in effective control of the state. International actors should immediately revise policies that are bound by that false assumption and instead massively scale-up support to Myanmar’s many resistance actors, SAC-M said.
The briefing paper, ‘Effective Control in Myanmar 2024 Update’, presents a picture of the dynamics of contestation and control across all of Myanmar more than three years since the beginning of an historic national uprising in response to the Myanmar military’s attempted coup of 1 February 2021. SAC-M finds that armed resistance to the junta has expanded across the country and that the junta has proven incapable of reversing, or even arresting, the rate of its military losses to resistance forces, which have accelerated considerably since October 2023.
“We had identified that the trajectory of the conflict favoured the resistance in 2022, when the prevailing narrative within the international community was that the military was in control and would soon be holding elections,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “Since then, the overall trajectory of the conflict has accelerated further in favour of the resistance. The junta is not a de facto government as it is not in effective control of the state. The international community must understand this reality and work directly with resistance authorities and civil society to deliver urgent aid and assistance to the Myanmar people.”
Several years of sustained pressure from acts of non-violent and armed nationwide resistance paved the way for a series of rapid military advances against the junta by resistance forces beginning in October 2023. Between October 2023 and April 20241, the junta lost meaningful ground access to the majority of townships on Myanmar’s international borders and 55 cities and towns were taken by resistance forces.
The junta has responded to its mounting military losses by escalating its commission of atrocities against civilians, increasingly through airstrikes and artillery. 2.7 million people have been internally displaced since the coup and 18.6 million people require humanitarian assistance as a result of junta attacks and junta blockades on vital humanitarian assistance. The majority of those in dire need are in areas outside of stable junta control, where the junta has limited capacity to address the humanitarian crisis it has deliberately created.
“The military junta is refusing to meet the demands of the democratic revolution, despite the historic advances being made by Myanmar’s allied resistance forces. The junta shows only a commitment to further violence and suppression,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The international community must act to protect people from the junta’s atrocities against civilians by ceasing all transfers of arms and imposing comprehensive arms embargoes, strengthening financial sanctions on the junta and referring the entire situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.”
SAC-M’s analysis published today, an update to its 2022 analysis on effective control, features three maps2 depicting illustrative visualisations indicating degrees of contestation and control across Myanmar’s varied geography. The qualitative assessments used to produce the visual models were guided by internationally accepted criteria for determining whether an entity has effective control as a de facto government of a state, derived from international case law. Those criteria include the acceptance of the population, the capacity to administer functions of government and degree of permanency, in addition to taking control of territory into account.
SAC-M finds that resistance groups collectively have greater control in more territory than the junta, but no one group exercises de facto power over the state itself. Governance capacity across the country remains weak, including for resistance authorities, who are straining to meet the growing humanitarian needs of the population and protect civilians from escalating junta violence.
“Fears of increased violence as inevitable should the junta collapse, fail to account for the fact that the main source of violence and instability in Myanmar is the junta,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The path towards lasting peace and stability for Myanmar is through realisation of the unified federal democratic aspirations of the Myanmar people and their legitimate representatives: the National Unity Government, National Unity Consultative Council, ethnic revolutionary organisations and broader civil society. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international community have a moral and political responsibility to the people of Myanmar to do everything in their power to support this outcome as quickly as possible.”
The international community must respond to Myanmar’s fluid and complex crisis in a manner that accepts the dynamics on the ground and upholds obligations under international law to facilitate the clearly stated democratic aspirations of the Myanmar people. Included in SAC-M’s recommendations to States, the United Nations and ASEAN, are immediate actions that must be taken to undermine the military junta’s ability to commit atrocities and to massively scale-up provision of humanitarian assistance to people in need through direct coordination with resistance authorities and civil society. Longer-term support from the international community will be critical for resistance actors to build the capacity of government departments and services and to promote economic development in post-revolution Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-05-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has made numerous requests to the Myanmar military for information related to the many serious crimes that we are investigating. These include crimes allegedly committed by the Myanmar security forces and by armed groups. To date, the military has not responded to any of these requests. Today the Mechanism has sent a new request and is issuing this statement in the hope that it will lead to a response.
Today’s request asks for information about the capture and killing of two young men in Myauk Khin Yan village in the Magway Region. In a video widely circulated on the internet, armed men tied the two men and hung them from a tree, then built a fire beneath and killed the men by burning them alive.
Video footage showing the brutal treatment of these young men circulated on social media in early February 2024. The two victims, identified in media coverage as Phoe Tay and Tha Htaung, were in their early twenties and allegedly members of anti-junta group the Yaw Defence Force.
The Mechanism is conducting an impartial and independent determination of the facts surrounding this incident, including the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. As part of this investigation, the Mechanism has asked the Myanmar military to share with it any information about the units in the area and their commanders, the circumstances of the victims’ detention and treatment, and the persons seen committing the torture and killings.
I urge the Myanmar military to fully cooperate with the Mechanism, as called for in numerous resolutions by the United Nations Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, by giving us access to the country and sharing requested information. The evidence collected by the Mechanism is used to objectively investigate and to build criminal cases against those perpetrators responsible for the most serious international crimes. The goal is to break the cycle of impunity, including for persons so brazen as to commit such sadistic and inhumane crimes, and to bring justice for the people of Myanmar.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files that can be used by authorities to prosecute individuals in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-05-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Chin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from May 15th to 21st. Over 200 men from Magway Region, Yangon Region, and Shan State were arrested for 2nd batch of Military Service and blackmailed. Military Junta Troop and staff who work for the Military collected money from the cars and passengers and also were getting money for making NRC cards (National Registration Citizenship).
Over 20 civilians died, and over 50 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 8 underaged people died and 5 were injured when the Military committed Human rights abuses. A civilian also died by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-05-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Bangkok —
Interviews have begun with Myanmar refugees living in Thailand who are eligible for a new resettlement program in the United States, the Thai government said.
Thailand said it hopes the first group may get to move by the end of the year.
Some 90,000 refugees live in nine camps on the Thai side of the border to escape fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic minority rebel armies vying for autonomy. Some of the refugees were born in the camps, which started to form in the mid-1980s, and many have lived in them for decades.
Persistent fighting in Myanmar, amplified by a military coup in February 2021, has kept most from returning home.
Aiming to give the refugees a safe way out of the camps, Thailand, the United States and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees announced the resettlement plan in May 2023.
One year on, Thailand’s Ministry of Interior says that the Thai government and UNHCR have finished checking the personal information of the refugees to verify their eligibility for the program. More than 80,000 refugees were deemed eligible, and nearly all of them told officials they wanted to resettle.
“After that, the U.S. team went to the first two camps for interviews, which have already been done,” Zcongklod Khawjang, an interior ministry official in charge of overseeing the resettlement program, told VOA this week.
The two camps — Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin — are among the smallest of nine and host about 8,750 refugees combined.
Zcongklod said the U.S. Embassy in Thailand has not told the Thai government when the authorized refugees would be resettled or when interviews in the other seven camps would begin. But he added that Thailand was expecting the “first batch” to move to the U.S. sometime this year.
Hayso Thako, a joint secretary with the Karen Refugee Committee, one of the charities working in the camps, said he received the same message from the UNHCR at a meeting in March.
“They said most probably the first group would be able to leave by the end, almost the end of this year,” he said.
The UNHCR declined to comment on when resettlement might begin and referred the question to the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok declined to provide a time frame.
“Resettlement operations are ongoing in cooperation with the UNHCR and the Royal Thai Government,” the U.S. Embassy told VOA by email, attributing the comment to “a U.S. official.”
The embassy also would not say how many of the 80,000-plus eligible refugees the U.S. was prepared to take in, either annually or in total. Zcongklod said the embassy has not provided the Thai government with those figures, either.
The Border Consortium, a network of charities that coordinate much of the international aid that reached the camps, said it has not been provided with official figures but said plans for the program appear to have been scaled down over time.
“Figures have changes. At the beginning, it was this number of people who could be resettled … and maybe now it could be a lower number of people who could be resettled,” Leon de Riedmatten, executive director of The Border Consortium, told VOA.
Even so, he said, “It’s important for the residents in the camps themselves that there is still the possibility of resettlement. I think this is the main message, even if it’s not going to be so many people who are going to be resettled to the United States.”
Thailand has denied the refugees a regular path to gaining permanent legal residence and keeps tight control over their movements in and out of the camps.
Myanmar’s 2021 coup brought the country's brief experiment with democracy to a halt, plunging it into civil war and dashing hopes that the refugees could return safely anytime soon.
Hayso Thako and de Riedmatten said it would help if other countries committed to taking in some of the refugees.
Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told VOA it has encouraged more countries to join the resettlement program.
A previous program ended about five years ago after resettling thousands of refugees in the United States and a few other countries.
Without a clear idea of how many of the refugees the new program can handle, and no end in sight to the civil war raging in Myanmar, charities say the Thai government should also give the refugees the opportunity to settle permanently in Thailand.
“I think it’s key. It’s very, very important, because we cannot expect that all these refugees will be resettled. We cannot expect also that a large part of these refugees will return to Myanmar. So the ones, the majority, who will be left in the camps should have a better future,” de Riedmatten said.
Even after four decades, most of the camps still lack electricity and running water. Most homes are huts of bamboo and eucalyptus poles topped with thatched roofs.
The refugees are mostly barred from studying or working outside of the camps, have few job opportunities inside and receive an average of about $9 in food aid a month.
Some advocates say a growing sense of despair across the camps is causing a rise in domestic abuse, gang violence, drug use and suicide.
“Living in the camps is not easy,” Eh Nay Moo, 30, who fled Myanmar with his parents when he was three years old, told VOA.
“Here, we are just illegal people. … There is no freedom for us. Going here and there outside of the camp, we are not allowed,” he said from Mae La, the largest of the nine camps on the border.
Having spent almost his entire life in the camps, Eh Nay Moo said he cannot imagine returning to Myanmar but sees no real future for himself in the camps.
Eh Nay Moo said he has applied for the new resettlement program and is eagerly awaiting an interview.
“If I get a chance to move to the U.S. … I believe that I will get more opportunity or freedom to do and live my life as a human being,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2024-05-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karen and other refugees from Burma in Thailand - general reports and articles
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Description:
"Scam centers have plagued the border areas of Thailand, Myanmar and China as nationals from all three countries are tricked into – and subsequently enslaved in – online fraud. Typically, the businesses force trafficked workers to call people across Asia and convince them to deposit money in fake or fraudulent investments.
Tens of thousands involved in the criminal schemes were deported from Myanmar in 2023 by both junta and rebel army officials. Many are linked to forced labor, human trafficking and money laundering, which proliferated after COVID-19 shut down casinos across Southeast Asia.
In March, more than 800 Chinese nationals were deported from Myawaddy township’s infamous gambling and scam center, Shwe Kokko, in Myanmar’s Kayin state, in relation to online fraud. An investigation by RFA found that up to 3,000 foreign nationals are being held at the casino, including people from Thailand, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia and Uganda.
RFA Burmese recently spoke with Major Naing Maung Zaw, spokesperson for the ethnic Karen Border Guard Force, or BGF, which controls Myawaddy township. He said that the BGF is cooperating with China to eradicate money laundering and online scam operations in Kayin state and has vowed to evict foreign nationals involved in the activities from Myawaddy by the end of October.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: The Karen BGF has issued a notice to foreigners engaged in online business in the vicinity, including Myawaddy in Karen state, mandating their departure within six months. Why did you make this announcement?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: The intent is to gradually resolve the issue by prompting the departure of these people, thereby mitigating the prominence of this particular locale in the illicit [online fraud] business sector ... While the problem has recently surfaced in Myawaddy, its roots stretch both domestically and internationally over an extended period of time … So far, the situation hasn’t reached a critical level, but there’s increased pressure.
RFA: Since the BGF issued the notice, have any foreigners left?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: Yes, some foreigners went home. Those who came here via agents, they are secretly leaving the region.
RFA: Why is the BGF giving them six months to leave?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: Many critics … [are] dismissing this plan as mere theatrics, [since the BGF is] stretching it out to six months. While there may be some truth to their assertions, we must also consider the social implications.
We called on these companies and they came to negotiate. I have already told them that whether [their business] is legal or illegal, they must vacate the premises on their own terms … They must remove all relevant equipment from their workplaces. These factors necessitate careful consideration.
‘We don’t accept this willingly’
RFA: How many foreigners are working in these online businesses?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: That's hard to say. I prefer to have an exact number if I’m going to answer something. Currently, I think there are a few thousand.
RFA: When did these foreigners come to Kayin state?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: They arrived relatively recently. To be frank, the issue arose here not too long ago. Myawaddy is the most recent center for the [online fraud] business in Myanmar.
RFA: When they first came to Kayin state, did you try to stop them?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: We only became aware of the matter regarding [online fraud] when others drew attention to it. Our primary focus is on land leasing. Our goal is singular and simple … to embark on a new city project. We will develop our region. We have started to implement it in order to provide employment opportunities to residents.
We do not accept this [scam] situation willingly … In the past, we had restrictions on this [kind of business], and contracts were already in place. We are prepared to provide proof of the timing and terms of our contractual agreements at any time.
‘A gradual exodus’
RFA: Now that the [BGF] commanders have given them six months, they will continue to operate their businesses. What are you going to do about continued illicit activities?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: Since we made the announcement, we established a supervisory team to monitor and inspect the businesses for possible closure. It is already being implemented.
It’s important to remember that when there are thousands of people in one place, it is impossible to send all of them home in a short time ... We’re not giving them time to run their businesses. They have to pack their belongings to leave, making it logistically difficult for large groups to depart all at once. Instead, they are trickling out gradually – just a few individuals initially, gradually increasing over time. Our approach aims to facilitate a gradual exodus of these people.
RFA: The Thai and Chinese governments, as well as the U.S. government, are trying to crack down on these money scamming gangs. Are you in communication with these countries?
Major Naing Maung Zaw: We have maintained regular communication with the Chinese embassy and have been engaged in ongoing efforts. Now, the Chinese news media has also started talking about it.
We have a history of facilitating the repatriation process for foreigners, coordinating closely with the Chinese, Thai, and American embassies upon their requests via official letters ... They give us locations and we find their people. There have been a lot of cases where we have returned the concerned to the embassies with the assistance of the Myanmar police force. Our commitment moving forward is to continue to address [the issue of scam operators] domestically, ensuring the well-being of all involved parties..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-05-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
more