China-Burma relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"PolOff on March 14 conveyed to MFA reftel points
urging China to make clear to the Burmese regime that the
planned May referendum on the regime?s draft constitution
should adhere to internationally accepted standards for free
and fair elections and referenda. MFA International
Organizations and Conferences Department UN Division Deputy
Director Sun Xiaobo said China has not received a briefing
from UN Special Advisor Gambari on the results of his trip to
Burma and does not want to jump to conclusions. However,
China?s preliminary view is that Gambari "achieved some
progress," though China does not deny there remain
"reasonable concerns." Sun said Gambari has emphasized that
his work is "a process," and China believes engagement with
Burma will require "patience and persistence" and problems
"cannot be resolved by one or two visits." On the prospect
of UN Security Council action, Sun said China?s view is that
the Security Council is not an appropriate forum to discuss
Burma. Other fora, like the UN
Secretary General?s "Friends of Burma" group, are more
appropriate and useful."
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2008-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2011-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"...Director Gordon said an "historic opportunity"
exists to achieve political reconciliation in Burma.
Aung San Su Kyi and the military regime are both
showing some flexibility. The unity of the
international community, Gordon emphasized, is crucial
if we hope to make a difference in the behavior of the
Burmese regime. VFM Wang acknowledged that events in
Burma were a problem, but described the unrest in
Burma as an "internal affair" that does not impact
regional stability. Ultimately, VFM Wang said, it is
up to the parties in Burma to reach a solution. China
welcomes the role played by the international
community so long as those efforts are consistent with
encouraging a Burmese solution..."
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2007-11-14
Date of entry/update:
2011-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"...At the September 25 regular MFA press briefing,
spokeswoman Jiang Yu said stability in Burma serves the
interests of Burma and the international community and that
China sticks to a policy of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries, in response to several questions
on China?s reaction to demonstrations in Burma. China hopes
and believes Burma?s Government and people can handle the
current situation and achieve stability and economic
development..."
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2007-09-25
Date of entry/update:
2011-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"...At the September 27 regular MFA press briefing,
spokeswoman Jiang Yu said China has been closely following
the situation in Burma and hopes that all parties exercise
restraint so as to avoid escalation or a negative effect on
regional stability. She also expressed hope that the press
would report on the situation in Myanmar truthfully with no
"exaggerated hype." Some in the press had attacked China out
of "ulterior motives," she said. Asked to clarify, Jiang
said everyone had read the reports and seen examples. Asked
if China would support a UN Security Council Resolution on
Burma, she said the Security Council had discussed this topic
and the Chair had spoken to the press. She said the
international community should provide "constructive
assistance" to relax the situation in Myanmar and China
supports the mediation of the UN Secretary General. Asked if
any high-level visits had taken place between China and
Burma, she said she had no information but had already made
China?s position clear. Asked specifically if China
condemned the violence in Myanmar, Jiang refused to answer
because the journalist asking "had come late to the press
conference."..."
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2007-09-27
Date of entry/update:
2011-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
PolOff on June 26 delivered to MFA reftel points
seeking China?s help in shaping the international responses
to a revised UN appeal and the imminent UN report on needs in
Burma after Cyclone Nargis. Drawing on reftel points, PolOff
emphasized that China should join the international community
in making clear to Burmese authorities that further
assistance will depend on full access, transparency and
accountability. PolOff added that donors should provide
assistance according to proven international models that rely
on community input, that assistance should not reinforce
Burmese Government abuses and that underlying problems in
Burma are political.
¶2. (C) MFA International Organizations and Conferences
Department UN Division Deputy Director Sun Xiaobo said he
would convey U.S. views to senior MFA officials. He said his
initial reaction was that China?s views on the situation in
Burma are somewhat different. China believes it is
imperative that the international community continue
assistance to the Burmese Government and the Burmese people.
An ASEAN-led mechanism is in place to act as a bridge between
the Burmese Government and donors. Donors should make full
use of this mechanism to sort out differences but assistance
should not be delayed. Finally, Sun said, the international
community should not link humanitarian assistance to human
rights issues. "There are appropriate fora to discuss human
rights issues," but such discussions should not be related to
humanitarian assistance, Sun said.
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2008-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2011-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Summary:
China should reconsider its opposition to a UN
Security Council Resolution on Burma, Polmincouns
stressed to MFA Deputy Director General for Southeast
Asia Tong Xiaoling on December 14. The situation in
Burma is harming the peace and security of the region.
Tong said China remains opposed to a resolution.
Separately, the Chinese warned the French Charge that
China has used its veto rarely but might do so on a
Burma resolution. A lower-ranking MFA official told
the French that China remains open to a "strong"
Presidential Statement. End Summary.
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2006-12-14
Date of entry/update:
2011-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
Summary: "Briefing the Ambassador on his recent trip
to Burma, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the ongoing
"political reconciliation and democratic process" are the
domestic affairs of Burma and should therefore be addressed
by the Burmese Government and people themselves. The
international community could be of assistance, but otherwise
should not interfere. VFM Wang said Burmese leaders
described the ongoing dialogue with opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi as "still in the confidence-building period,
clarifying misunderstandings and misgivings." ASSK, the
Burmese leaders complained, is "stubborn," "feels she is
always right and everyone else is always wrong," and is "hard
to talk to." VFM Wang also reported that Burmese leaders
expressed eagerness to resume bilateral dialogue with the
United States; Wang asked pointedly about U.S. willingness.
Drawing upon ref email points, the Ambassador urged China to
use its influence with the regime to promote genuine
dialogue, which would require the rel
ease of opposition leaders from arrest and detention." End
Summary.
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2007-11-21
Date of entry/update:
2011-09-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"...China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China?s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated..."...."...Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma..."
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Singapore, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2009-06-04
Date of entry/update:
2010-12-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"...Visiting EAP Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill
urged VFM Wu Dawei to improve relations with Japan and use
PRC influence to push the Burmese regime to release Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK) during a May 25 working lunch. A/S Hill also
noted the negative impact of PRC/Taiwan competition on
Pacific Island states. Wu stressed that Beijing seeks
improvement of relations with Tokyo but has no choice in its
response if Japan does not handle history issues properly.
He expressed satisfaction with the meeting between Foreign
Ministers Li and Aso. Wu complained about the Burmese
regime, noting that the PRC has raised ASSK but that the
senior military leadership views her as a threat and is
unlikely to release her. Wu closed by urging U.S.
participation in the East Asia Summit and saying that China
will not challenge the U.S. role and our interests in East
Asia. End Summary..."
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2006-06-02
Date of entry/update:
2010-12-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Summary: "If the United States wants to make a difference on
Burma, it should engage directly with General Than Shwe,
Assistant Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai told EAP DAS Eric John
on March 5. In a separate meeting, MFA Director General for
Asian Affairs Hu Zhengyue stressed that State Councilor Tang
"really worked on" the Burmese during his recent visit to
Burma, delivering the message that Burma needs to respond to
the concerns of the international community. DAS John
underlined that the United States is worried that Burma is
headed at high speed in the wrong direction. If it adopts a
constitution excluding certain parties from the political
process, the United States and China could be locked into a
cycle of confrontation over Burma at the United Nations. DAS
John and AFM Cui also discussed the United States? and
China?s overlapping interests in Southeast Asia. With DG Hu,
DAS John emphasized the importance of Indonesia and discussed
instability in East Timor, positive progress in the
Philippines and the situation in post-coup Thailand. EAP DAS
Thomas Christensen joined DAS John at the meetings." End
Summary.
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2007-03-05
Date of entry/update:
2010-12-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
Summary: "China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current ?standstill” in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China?s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime." End summary.
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2008-01-11
Date of entry/update:
2010-12-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
SUMMARY: In an October 13 meeting with EAP A/S Kurt
Campbell, MFA Asian Affairs Department Director General Yang
Yanyi said that China saw many positive aspects in the U.S.
review of its Burma policy and suggested proceeding based on
its conclusion, despite PRC concern over continuing
sanctions. Yang asserted that the junta was committed to
building a peaceful, modern, democratic Burma, but stability
remained paramount to them "for now." She claimed the regime
was committed to a fair election in 2010 and was renewing
efforts on developing the economy. DG Yang cautioned that
the regime could not be replaced, and counseled patience on
development and democratization efforts given the complexity
of Burmese society. Chinese officials had told the Burmese
to consider China?s legitimate interests in dealing with the
situation in Kokang, but also stressed that China would not
interfere in the internal affairs of Burma. A/S Campbell
cautioned that steps by the regime toward progress on nuclear
technology would make dialogue more difficult and the U.S.
and China had a shared interest in partnering to prevent such
progress. END SUMMARY.
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2009-10-14
Date of entry/update:
2010-12-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"...The Chinese Ambassador no longer tried to defend the regime, and acknowledged that the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used their access to the generals to push for change, without much observable result, but remain interested in working with us to promote change. The Ambassador indicated that fear of losing power and economic interests may be the key obstacles keeping the generals away from the negotiating table..."
Source/publisher:
US Embassy, Rangoon via Wikileaks
Date of publication:
2008-01-18
Date of entry/update:
2010-12-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Conclusion: "Since the end of the bipolar system and the
rise of globalization, the world has become
interconnected and interdependent through
culture, economy, and the polity. In order to
provide an accurate strategic foresight of
Sino-Myanmar relations, it is necessary to
understand the historical and present
context, national ambitions, and the current
means available to achieve these goals. At
the same time, to offer a precise forecast,
there is a need to hypothesize the possible
obstacles to these ambitions.
The paper concludes that the period of the
next 5-10 years, from a Chinese standpoint,
will be one of balancing between securing its
economic investment through bilateral
relations between China and ethnic groups,
China and the Junta, and its wish for
stronger involvement in the political arena.
In this quest, China will outbid all other
players; provide economic assistance;
infrastructure building; and a political
umbrella to the international community.
Nonetheless, China will have to face certain
obstacles to achieve these goals, mainly the
growing resentment of local Chinese
presence in Myanmar; border instability;
weak Myanmar governance; and stronger
international sanctions.
Alternatively, from a Myanmarese
standpoint, due to the Junta?s controversial
history, it wants to prove to the regional and
international community that it is a
legitimate government. Through the Seven
Step Roadmap to Democracy and the
election later this year, the Junta wants to
show its credibility as the government of
Myanmar. The Junta has been successful at
making regional actors compete for its
natural resources and its strategic
importance works in its favor. When China,
India, and ASEAN compete for access to
Myanmar, they are supporting the Junta
with financially, which gets translated into
political support. Also, the Junta does not
want foreign involvement in its national
affairs. Therefore, it purposely keeps a low
profile in the international arena. The
obstacles to the achievement of Myanmar?s
goals would be an increase in international
criticism that would pressure China to
further influence the Junta, and ethnic
groups uniting against the government,
which would weaken furthermore the
credibility of the Junta.
In conclusion, in the near future, China?s
economic thirst will be challenged by its
wish to become a regional and international
superpower on the one hand, and on the
other, Myanmar?s Junta will try to convince
its neighbors and the world that its
government is legitimate..."
Billy Tea
Source/publisher:
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies - Delhi (IPCS Research Paper 26)
Date of publication:
2010-09-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-11-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
The main thesis of this paper is to argue that Myanmar is neither a strategic
pawn nor an economic pivot of China in the short and immediate term. Since
1988, Sino-Myanmar entente is uneven, asymmetrical, but nevertheless
reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The strategic entente and economic relations
are a marriage of convenience. However, Myanmar?s strategic location on a
trijunction between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless
economically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is important
for China as a trading outlet to the Indian Ocean for its landlocked inland
provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. Strategically, Myanmar is potentially
important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and its
long-term two-ocean objective. Furthermore, a China-Myanmar nexus is
strategically useful for China to contain India?s influence in Southeast Asia.
Finally, Myanmar is part and parcel of China?s grand strategic design to achieve
its goal of becoming a great power in the 21st century. Despite the more extensive
growing Chinese influence over Myanmar, it is unlikely that Rangoon will
become a strategic satellite base for China. Myanmar?s strong sense of
nationalism, its past ability to successfully deal with foreign powers to preserve
its independence and cultural identity, will likely make Myanmar withstand
most odds.
Poon Kim SHEE
Source/publisher:
China Statistical Yearbook 2001, No. 20, National Bureau of Statistics, Source: China Statistics Press
Date of publication:
2001-00-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-10-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
Format :
pdf
Size:
58.88 KB
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Executive Summary:
The issue of Myanmar has been in the limelight of international affairs for
almost two decades now. Economic sanctions and political isolation have
consistently been the principal policies of the international community in
dealing with the incumbent government in Myanmar. Despite the mounting
pressure, the country?s military rulers have so far chosen to defy the
international outcry, and as a result, a political stalemate has persisted, while
the population of the country continues to struggle to make ends meet.
Twenty years after 1987, Myanmar remains on the UN list of the world?s
Least Developed Countries. Yet, the government that stole the country?s
election is still in power. The impasse itself now becomes a problem, and the
practice, if not the concept, of intervention is open to scrutiny.
Whatever problems Myanmar has today and however severe they may be,
they did not just spring up overnight after the military took power — the
country?s history, beleaguered by violence and turmoil in the past two
centuries, tells us that. Recounting the country?s struggle for independence
and the political upheavals in the decades that followed allows us to gain
insights into the nature of the problems with which the country is grappling
today. Accountable for the problems that presently hinder the democratic
process in Myanmar is a combination of colonial legacy, multi-ethnicity, a
wide range of political interests across communities and, above all, a lack of
national identity that bonds the country together. Without the necessary step
of state building and a process of national reconciliation from within, a host
of political, economic, and ethnic problems cannot be solved.
In regard to the issue of Myanmar, China has all along spoken with a
different voice. The difference is rooted in regional identity and shared views
of history and development. Like many Asian countries, China has had
peaceful as well as troubled relations with Myanmar. The export of Mao?s
revolution and fervent support for a people?s war? to bring about regime
change in neighboring countries and beyond during the most radical period
of China?s modern history bears a striking resemblance to international
10
developments unfolding on the Indo-China Peninsula and elsewhere in the
world today. China?s current foreign policy and, in particular, China?s stance
on the issue of Myanmar, reflects lessons that China has drawn from its own
experience in the past. Economic reform that prospered and served to
stabilize China in the post-Mao era is now making its way to neighboring
Myanmar. This cross-border development (in part joined by ASEAN) has
brought significant changes to the war-torn country of Myanmar; and more
coordinated efforts from the international community along the same lines
would certainly benefit the country and its people in a meaningful way.
Intention and sincerity are crucial in the search for solutions, as indeed the
Six-Party Talks on North Korea demonstrate.
Xiaolin Guo
Source/publisher:
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program - Silk Road Paper, March 2007
Date of publication:
2007-03-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-10-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations, Sanctions - general
Language:
English
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Description:
"While the West would like Myanmar?s November elections to lead toward democracy, China is seeking something far more straightforward: stability.
When the leader of Myanmar?s military government, Than Shwe, visited Beijing earlier this month, he sought to reassure Chinese leaders that elections would not produce any negative fallout along their 2,192-kilometer shared border.
Conflict along the border has been an enduring characteristic of post-independence Myanmar, where a handful of ethnic groups maintain their own territory, militias and political representation.
But Beijing has just cause for concern after the Myanmar military?s August 2009 offensive into the Kokang region shattered a 20-year cease-fire and sent more than 30,000 refugees into China?s Yunnan province..."
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Source/publisher:
Global Post
Date of publication:
2010-10-03
Date of entry/update:
2010-10-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
Chinese authorities are building a fence along the Burmese border near Laiza in Kachin State, reportedly to deter drug traffickers.
Awng Wa, of the Kachin Development Networking Group, based on the Sino-Burmese border, told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday that work began on the fence last month. He said it is expected to be at least 10 km long.
WAI MOE
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2008-12-23
Date of entry/update:
2010-09-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
OVERVIEW:
Myanmar?s 2010 elections present challenges and opportunities
for China?s relationship with its south-western
neighbour. Despite widespread international opinion that
elections will be neither free nor fair, China is likely to
accept any poll result that does not involve major instability.
Beijing was caught off-guard by the Myanmar
military?s offensive into Kokang in August 2009 that sent
more than 30,000 refugees into Yunnan province. Since
then it has used pressure and mediation to push Naypyidaw
and the ethnic groups that live close to China?s
border to the negotiating table. Beyond border stability,
Beijing feels its interests in Myanmar are being challenged
by a changing bilateral balance of power due
to the Obama administration?s engagement policy and
China?s increasing energy stakes in the country. Beijing
is seeking to consolidate political and economic ties by
stepping up visits from top leaders, investment, loans and
trade. But China faces limits to its influence, including
growing popular opposition to the exploitation of Myanmar?s
natural resources by Chinese firms, and divergent
interests and policy implementation between Beijing and
local governments in Yunnan.
The Kokang conflict and the rise in tensions along the
border have prompted Beijing to increasingly view Myanmar?s
ethnic groups as a liability rather than strategic
leverage. Naypyidaw?s unsuccessful attempt to convert
the main ceasefire groups into border guard forces under
central military command raised worries for Beijing that
the two sides would enter into conflict. China?s Myanmar
diplomacy has concentrated on pressing both the main
border groups and Naypyidaw to negotiate. While most
ethnic groups appreciate Beijing?s role in pressuring the
Myanmar government not to launch military offensives,
some also believe that China?s support is provisional and
driven by its own economic and security interests.
The upcoming 7 November elections are Naypyidaw?s
foremost priority. With the aim to institutionalise the
army?s political role, the regime launched the seven-step
roadmap to ?disciplined democracy” in August 2003.
The elections for national and regional parliaments are the
fifth step in this plan. China sees neither the roadmap nor
the national elections as a challenge to its interests.
Rather, Beijing hopes they will serve its strategic and economic
interests by producing a government perceived both
domestically and internationally as more legitimate.
Two other factors impact Beijing?s calculations. China
sees Myanmar as having an increasingly important role
in its energy security. China is building major oil and gas
pipelines to tap Myanmar?s rich gas reserves and shorten
the transport time of its crude imports from the Middle
East and Africa. Chinese companies are expanding rapidly
into Myanmar?s hydropower sector to meet Chinese
demand. Another factor impacting Beijing?s strategy towards
Myanmar is the U.S. administration?s engagement
policy, which Beijing sees as a potential challenge to its
influence in Myanmar and part of U.S. strategic encirclement
of China.
Beijing is increasing its political and economic presence
to solidify its position in Myanmar. Three members of
the Politburo Standing Committee have visited Myanmar
since March 2009 ? in contrast to the absence of any
such visits the previous eight years ? boosting commercial
ties by signing major hydropower, mining and construction
deals. In practice China is already Myanmar?s
top provider of foreign direct investment and through
recent economic agreements is seeking to extend its lead.
Yet China faces dual hurdles in achieving its political and
economic goals in Myanmar. Internally Beijing and local
Yunnan governments have differing perceptions of and
approaches to border management and the ethnic groups.
Beijing prioritises border stability and is willing to sacrifice
certain local commercial interests, while Yunnan values
border trade and profits from its special relationships
with ethnic groups. In Myanmar, some Chinese companies?
resource extraction activities are fostering strong
popular resentment because of their lack of transparency
and unequal benefit distribution, as well as environmental
damage and forced displacement of communities. Many
believe such resentment was behind the April 2010
bombing of the Myitsone hydropower project. Activists
see some large-scale investment projects in ceasefire areas
as China playing into Naypyidaw?s strategy to gain
control over ethnic group territories, especially in resource-
rich Kachin State..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Asia Briefing N° 112)
Date of publication:
2010-09-21
Date of entry/update:
2010-09-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
Updated September 2008...INTRODUCTION:
Amidst recent international interest in China?s moves to secure resources throughout the world
and recent events in Burma1, the international community has turned its attention to China?s role
in Burma. In September 2007, the violent suppression of a peaceful movement led by Buddhist
monks in Burma following the military junta?s decision to drastically raise fuel prices put the
global spotlight on the political and economic relationships between China and neighboring
resource-rich Burma.
EarthRights International (ERI) has identified at least 69 Chinese multinational corporations
(MNCs) involved in at least 90 hydropower, oil and natural gas, and mining projects in Burma.
These recent findings build upon previous ERI research collected between May and August 2007
that identified 26 Chinese MNCs involved in 62 projects. These projects vary from small dams
completed in the last two decades to planned oil and natural gas pipelines across Burma to
southwest China. With no comprehensive information about these projects available in the
public domain, the information included here has been pieced together from government
statements, English and Chinese language news reports, and company press releases available on
the internet. While concerned that details of the projects and their potential impacts have not
been disclosed to affected communities of the general public, we hope that this information will
stimulate additional discussion, research, and investigation into the involvement of Chinese
MNCs in Burma.
Concerns over political repression in Burma have led many western governments to prohibit new
trade with and investment in Burma, and have resulted in the departure of many western
corporations from Burma; notable exceptions include Total of France and Chevron3 of the United
States. Meanwhile, as demand for energy pushes many Asian countries to look abroad for
natural resources, Burma has been an attractive destination. India, Thailand, Korea, Singapore,
and China are among the Asian countries with the largest investments in Burma?s hydropower,
oil and natural gas, and mining sectors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Burma?s oil and
natural gas sectors, for example, more than tripled from 2006 to 2007, reaching US$ 474.
million, representing approximately 90% of all FDI in 2007. While China has embraced a foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states, the line between business and politics in a country like Burma is blurred at best. In pursuit
of Burma?s natural resources, China has provided Burma with political support, 6 military
armaments,7 and financial support in the form of conditions-free loans.8 Investments in Burma?s
energy sectors provide billions of US dollars in financial support to the military junta, which
devotes at least 40% of its budget to military spending, 9 only slightly more than 1% on
healthcare, and around 5% on public education.10 These kinds of economic and political support
for the current military regime constitute a concrete involvement in Burma?s internal affairs.
The following is a brief introduction to and summary of the major completed, current and
planned hydropower, oil and natural gas, and mining projects in Burma with Chinese
involvement. All information is based on Chinese and English language media available on the
internet and likely represents only a fraction of China?s actual investment.
Source/publisher:
EarthRights International
Date of publication:
2008-09-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-09-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English, Burmese, Chinese, Spanish
Format :
pdf
Size:
825.4 KB
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Description:
Three Chinese-made dredgers worth US$ 8.9 million have been delivered to Burma as part of an effort to develop the Irrawaddy River waterway as a new trade route for China. "The neighbouring country expects to expand trade operations for its products, via the [Irrawaddy] river as a gateway to the Bay (of Bengal)", said a Rangoon-based shipping manager. The dredgers are being used to improve river transport from Bhamo, newr the Chinese border, to Minbe, which is to be connected to the Arakan coast by a new highway.
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy", Vol 9. No. 5
Date of publication:
2001-06-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-09-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Waterways, Kunming Initiative, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Although Burma was the first non-socialist country to recognize new China, the
favorable beginning failed to facilitate development of China-Burma relations in the
early period (1949-1953). On the contrary, their relations were ?noncommittal and
very cold”.1 Both sides were suspicious and mistrustful to each other. China
regarded Burma as an underling of imperialist countries. Burma feared that China
would invade it and threaten its national security. The cold condition began to alter
when two countries? Premiers visited each other in 1954. After 1954, Beijing and
Rangoon began to contact closely and frequently, and China-Burma relations entered
the friendly ?Pauk Phaw” (fraternal) era during the Cold War. Some have been
written about general China-Burma relations in the Cold War, but little as yet has
been done in the detail of their ties, particularly the shift in 1954. This study focuses
on the manifestation, the causes and impact of the relations change. The turn of 1954
basically consisted of two dimensions: political and economic relations..."
Fan Hongwei
Source/publisher:
Institute of China Studies University of Malaya - ICS Working Paper No. 2009-21
Date of publication:
2009-05-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-03-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"During the cold war, the relations between China and its peripheries were critical
in China?s foreign relations. Thereinto, China-Burma relations were one of highlights
in Beijing?s peripheral diplomacy. Nevertheless, this issue, rich in significance, has
been not enough understood, particularly the Sino-Burma bonds in the early period
(1949-1953) after the establishment of diplomatic relations. Until now, detailed and
in-depth research on 1949-1953 Sino-Burma relations has not come forth. Although
the early days of the relations were not long, from a small clue one can see that was
coming , and it revealed some impetus and restrictive factors for the relations, such as
ideology, geo-politics, history, and the Cold War setting..."
Fan Hongwei
Source/publisher:
Institute of China Studies University of Malaya - ICS Working Paper No. 2008-19
Date of publication:
2008-10-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-03-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Abstract / Description:
"The 15th century was a period of intense interaction between Ming China and Southeast Asia. The period saw the Ming invade Ðại Việt, expand the scope of the Chinese polity by exploiting and then incorporating Tai polities of upland Southeast Asia, and launch a succession of hugely influential maritime armadas which travelled through Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is argued that these three aspects of Ming policy can be seen as differing types of Ming colonialism greatly affecting Southeast Asia during the 15th century and beyond.
A chronological study of the policies relating to Southeast Asia of the successive Ming rulers is followed by a thematic overview of how the Ming policies actually affected Southeast Asia in the 15th century. This includes reference to effects in the political, economic and cultural topography of Southeast Asia The beginnings of a non-state-sponsored maritime trade between China and Southeast Asia is also investigated."...Keywords: Ming, Southeast Asia, 15th century, Zheng He, Dai Viet, Tai, Malacca.....20 references to Burma
Geoffrey Wade
Source/publisher:
Asia Research Institute National University of Singapore Working Paper 28
Date of publication:
2004-07-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-03-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
Burma?s generals have a history of juggling relations with Washington and Beijing...
"If ever the Burmese regime made it clear it preferred ?Made in America? to ?Made in China,? it would be no surprise to see relations between China and Burma suffer a severe hiccup.
China is now keenly observing Washington?s new policy toward the Burmese regime and Burma?s opposition movement. At the same time, Beijing is observing the unpredictable Naypyidaw regime?s paukphaw (kinship) commitment to China.
Burma?s former dictator, Ne Win, (left) met then US President Lyndon Johnson in 1966.
Burmese military officers used Western weapons to counter Chinese-backed insurgents in the past. They have long memories of Chinese chauvinism and Beijing?s efforts to export communism to Burma and install a government sympathetic to Mao Zedong?s communist ideology.
Those days are long gone. China became Burma?s staunchest ally after the regime brutally crushed the pro-democracy uprising in 1988. For the past 21 years, China has adopted its paukphaw policy toward Burma and played an influential role there..."
Aung Zaw
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 8
Date of publication:
2009-11-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
War and refugees will remain a fact of life in Burma as long as the root causes of conflict in the country?s borderlands remain unaddressed...
"The rout of the ethnic Kokang militia, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, in northern Burma in late August has brought into stark relief what millions of people live with in Burma every day: conflict between the central state and non-state armed militias. For decades, clashes between the Burmese regime?s army and its myriad enemies have been forcing people into hiding or across borders. What is different about the recent fighting is that it involved China—not usually a country that tolerates refugees from Burma or instability along its borders..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 7
Date of publication:
2009-10-00
Date of entry/update:
2010-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
"On August 27-30, 2009, fighting broke out between the Kokang ceasefire group (MNDAA) and the Myanmar/
Burma government army, sending 30,000 refugees across the border into Yunnan province in southwest
China. To some observers, the timing of the conflict -- less than a fortnight after a visit to Myanmar/Burma by
U.S. Senator Jim Webb -- seemed to indicate a calculated maneuver on the part of the ruling generals in Nay
Pyi Taw to test international reactions as well as responses from its neighbors with regards to its exercise of power
in the country's borderlands. The actuality is that the event itself was part of a political process that the military
government embarked upon already twenty years ago. What is special about this summer's conflict itself, though,
is where it occurred and the ethnicity of the population involved, which has implications for peace on the border
and ultimately for bilateral relations between China and Myanmar/Burma."
Xiaolin Guo
Source/publisher:
Institute for Security and Development Policy (Sweden)
Date of publication:
2009-12-02
Date of entry/update:
2010-02-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Behind displays of friendship, Beijing is showing signs that it is losing patience with Burma?s politically inept ruling generals...
"When Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, the second most powerful figure in Burma?s ruling junta, led a high-level delegation to Beijing in mid-June, China?s state-run Xinhua news agency dutifully reported that the visit?s third in six years??was aimed at strengthening friendly and cooperative ties between the two neighboring countries.
Behind the scenes of the outwardly amicable visit, however, the story was not so simple. According to businessmen close to the regime in Naypyidaw, before departing for Beijing, Maung Aye complained that China was meddling in Burma?s affairs. A former commander of the Burmese army?s northern region who once fought several fierce battles against the Chinese-backed Communist Party of Burma in the 1970s and 1980s, Maung Aye has never really trusted Beijing. Now, he grumbled, Chinese leaders were trying to tell Naypyidaw how it should deal with Aung San Suu Kyi, who was facing imprisonment on charges of violating the terms of her house arrest..."
Aung Zaw
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 6
Date of publication:
2009-09-00
Date of entry/update:
2009-12-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Burma?s military junta has to compete with ethnic groups such as the Wa, the Kokang and the Shan to win Beijing?s favor...
"China is the Burmese military junta?s most influential partner? economically, politically and militarily. But despite the close relationship, Beijing has long enjoyed a discreet affair -- a private relationship with the ethnic groups along Burma?s northeastern frontier..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 6
Date of publication:
2009-09-00
Date of entry/update:
2009-12-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
"Each time global attention is focused on events in Myanmar,
concerned stakeholders turn to China to influence
the military government to undertake reforms. Yet simply
calling on Beijing to apply more pressure is unlikely
to result in change. While China has substantial political,
economic and strategic stakes in Myanmar, its influence
is overstated. The insular and nationalistic leaders in the
military government do not take orders from anyone,
including Beijing. China also diverges from the West in
the goals for which it is prepared to use its influence.
By continuing to simply expect China to take the lead
in solving the problem, a workable international approach
will remain elusive as Myanmar continues to play China
and the West against each other. After two decades of
failed international approaches to Myanmar, Western
countries and Beijing must find better ways to work together
to pursue a wide array of issues that reflect the
concerns of both sides.
The relationship between China and Myanmar is best
characterised as a marriage of convenience rather than
a love match. The dependence is asymmetric -- Myanmar
has more to lose should the relationship sour: a
protector in the Security Council, support from a large
neighbour amid international isolation, a key economic
partner and a source of investment. While China sees
major problems with the status quo, particularly with regards
to Myanmar's economic policy and ethnic relations,
its preferred solution is gradual adjustment of policy by
a strong central government, not federalism or liberal
democracy and certainly not regime change. In this way,
it can continue to protect its economic and strategic interests
in the country. In addition to energy and other investments,
Myanmar's strategic location allows China access
to the Indian Ocean and South East Asia.
But Beijing's policy might ultimately have an adverse
effect on Myanmar's stability and on China's ability to
leverage the advantages it holds. Political instability
and uncertainty have resulted in a lack of confidence in
Myanmar's investment environment, and weak governance
and widespread corruption have made it difficult
for even strong Chinese companies to operate there.
Myanmar's borders continue to leak all sorts of problems
-- not just insurgency, but also drugs, HIV/AIDS
and, recently, tens of thousands of refugees. Chinese
companies have been cited for environmental and ecological
destruction as well as forced relocation and human
rights abuses carried out by the Myanmar military. These
problems are aggravated by differences in approach between
Beijing and the provincial government in Yunnan's
capital Kunming, which implements policies towards
the ethnic ceasefire groups.
At the same time, resentment towards China, rooted in
past invasions and prior Chinese support to the Communist
Party of Burma, is growing. Myanmar's leaders fear
domination by their larger neighbour, and have traditionally
pursued policies of non-alignment and multilateralism
to balance Chinese influence. Increasing competition
among regional actors for access to resources and
economic relationships has allowed Myanmar to counterbalance
China by strengthening cooperation with other
countries such as India, Russia, Thailand, Singapore,
North Korea and Malaysia. The military government is
intensely nationalistic, unpredictable and resistant to external
criticism, making it often impervious to outside
influence.
While China shares the aspiration for a stable and prosperous
Myanmar, it differs from the West on how to
achieve such goals. China will not engage with Myanmar
on terms dictated by the West. To bring Beijing on
board, the wider international community will need to
pursue a plausible strategy that takes advantage of areas
of common interest. This strategy must be based on a
realistic assessment of China's engagement with Myanmar,
its actual influence, and its economic and strategic
interests. The West could better engage China to encourage
Myanmar's government to commit to a truly inclusive
dialogue with the opposition and ethnic groups. In
addition to talks on national reconciliation, dialogue
should also address the economic and humanitarian crisis
that hampers reconciliation at all levels of society.
At the same time, China should act both directly and in
close cooperation with ASEAN member countries to
continue support for the good offices of the United Nations
as well as to persuade the military to open up."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Asia Report No. 177)
Date of publication:
2009-09-14
Date of entry/update:
2009-09-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English, Chinese
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.17 MB
Local URL:
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Description:
"This study documents a case where Peking's
policy towards a client Communist movement has been
guided throughout by primary regard for China's
national interest.This is illustrated in the
study's examination of Peking's facility in conducting
a two-level policy, state-to-state and support
of 'insurrection of Peking's readiness to subordinate
Burmese Communist interests to those of China where
necessary; of China's present direction of a "Burmese
Communist" insurgency whose basis is for the most
part neither Burman nor Communist; and of the apparent insistence of Peking that
resolution of continuing
state-to-state differences shall occur only on
its own terms . The study also illustrates that
Chinese material support of Communist insurrection
was in fact significantly less than seemed to be the
case prior to the rupture of Sino-Burmese relations
in 1967, and has been significantly greater since
that time than has come to light...".....The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers --
Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973 -- were made public in May 2007 under the US Freedom of Information Act
Source/publisher:
UN Govt. (The CAESAR, POLO and ESAU Papers)
Date of publication:
1971-07-00
Date of entry/update:
2009-08-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Abstract:
Since abandoning its neutral foreign policy in 1988, Burma?s close
relationship with China has caused considerable unease in the Asia-
Pacific region. While some reporting on the defence and intelligence
links between Rangoon and Beijing has been inaccurate and
misleading, it has helped create the perception of an expansionist
China and led in turn to significant policy changes on the part of
regional countries, particularly India. The future of China?s
relationship with Burma has been interpreted in three ways. The
domination school? sees Burma overwhelmed by China and becoming
a client state. The partnership school? predicts a close and mutually
supportive strategic relationship. The rejectionist school? believes
that Burma can resist China?s enormous strategic weight and remain
independent. All three schools seem to agree, however, that the
Rangoon regime will do whatever is necessary to survive in the face
of increasing international pressure.
Andrew Selth
Source/publisher:
SDSC Working Paper 377
Date of publication:
2003-09-00
Date of entry/update:
2009-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Conclusion:
"Over the past 20 years, a number of myths have arisen about the Coco Islands.
Despite repeated warnings from some Burma-watchers, and attempts by a few
scholars to set the record straight in academic publications, these myths have
proven remarkably resilient. There are a number of reasons for this. One is
simply the lack of verifiable information about the islands, a problem
exacerbated by the unreliability of official statements issued by both the Burmese and Chinese governments. The issue has been greatly complicated,
however, by credulous reporting in the news media and the efforts of activists
and others to pursue their own policy agendas. There are several groups of
different nationalities which stand to benefit from continuing international
concerns about perceived Chinese military expansion into Burma and the
Indian Ocean.
The historical record is sketchy, and reliable data is still scarce, but an accurate
and balanced assessment of developments in the region is critical for an
understanding of Burma?s security, and its influence on the strategic
environment. Serious consideration of these issues demands careful research
and objective analysis, not a reliance on rumours and other marvellous tales?."
Andrew Selth
Source/publisher:
City University of Hong Kong, SEARC Working Paper Series No. 101
Date of publication:
2008-11-00
Date of entry/update:
2009-01-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Summary: Beijing has recently stepped back from its unconditional support for pariah states, such as Burma, North Korea,
and Sudan. This means China may now be more likely to help the West manage the problems such states pose -- but only up to
a point, because at heart China still favors nonintervention as a general policy....."...China's patience with the Burmese junta has been wearing thin recently. For several years, Beijing encouraged it
to undertake Chinese-style economic and political reforms in order to help the regime consolidate its rule, ensure stability,
and regain international acceptability. It supported former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, whom it considered a Deng-style
reformist -- only to see him ousted in 2004. As the Burmese regime hardened further, China's confidence in the junta's
capacity or willingness to reform faded. But Beijing moved from providing encouragement to exerting pressure on the regime
only after its support for the regime was exposed in the UN Security Council. In mid-2006, the United States circulated a
resolution in the Security Council demanding the release of political prisoners, condemning Burma's human rights practices,
and calling for the establishment of a political process that would lead to a genuine democratic transition. China twice
managed to prevent the measure from being considered, and when the United States and the United Kingdom finally brought
it to a vote, last January, China vetoed it (as did Russia) -- the first time since 1973 that Beijing vetoed any matter unrelated to
Taiwan. At the same time, however, Beijing called on the regime to "listen to the call of its own people . . . and speed up the
process of dialogues and reforms...
Shifts in China's policy toward pariah states have been experimental, tentative, and incremental -- and are likely to remain so
in the near future. But the strength of China's position with respect to many pariah states is a reality -- and an opportunity.
Although there is little reason to believe that China is moving toward full alignment with Western policy, it may be prepared to
distance itself from the worst autocracies and rogue states. Even if Beijing's list of such states is likely to remain short, it is
bound to include a number of states that pose important security and humanitarian problems to the United States. In just two
years, China has moved from outright obstructionism and a defensive insistence on solidarity with the developing world to an
attempt to balance its material needs with its acknowledged responsibilities as a major power. And so when Washington and
its allies formulate their policies toward pariah states, they should assume that China, although in some respects an obstacle,
is now also a critical partner."
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Andrew Small
Source/publisher:
"Foreign Affairs", January/February 2008
Date of publication:
2008-02-00
Date of entry/update:
2008-08-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
Staaten wie Russland, Indien, Serbien und die Ukraine liefern bedenkenlos militärische Güter in das Land, dessen Bevölkerung seit Jahrzehnten brutal unterdrückt wird. Insbesondere China verkauft der Junta Waffen in großem Stil: Die Volksrepublik hat sich in den letzten Jahren zu einem der weltweit größten Rüstungsexporteure entwickelt, und auch Myanmar steht auf der Empfängerliste. Waffenlieferungen aus China; Interessen Chinas in Burma; Rolle der UN; Rolle der EU; Military support from China; chinese ambitions in Burma; role of UN; role of EU;
Verena Harpe
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International
Date of publication:
2007-12-00
Date of entry/update:
2008-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
German, Deutsch
more
Description:
This chronology was compiled in 1999 by David Arnott as part of the research for his chapter on Burma-China relations in ?Challenges to democratization in Burma: Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses. Chapter 3 - China?Burma relations” published by International IDEA in 2001.
Most of the extracts are from news sources, notably the official Burmese daily The Working People?s Daily (WPD), re-named The New Light of Myanmar (NLM) in April 1993. Most extracts from 1987-1996 are taken from The Burma Press Summary compiled by Hugh MacDougall. Other sources include the US Govt?s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the Internet version of NLM.
A lighter China-Burma chronology updated to end 2001 exists on The Irrawaddy research pages at http://www.irrawaddy.org/research_show.php?art_id=446
David Arnott
Source/publisher:
WPD, NLM, FBIS ETC.
Date of publication:
1999-00-00
Date of entry/update:
2008-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.84 MB
Local URL:
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Description:
Die Militär-Junta von Myanmar (Burma) strebt vermutlich nach der Atombombe. Während die ganze Welt auf den Iran schaut, gehen in Myanmar Veränderungen vor, die das Schlimmste befürchten lassen: Neu entdeckte Erdgasreserven machen das Land zu einem der wichtigsten Gaslieferanten in Asien. China kooperiert militärisch und wirtschaftlich mit Myanmar, Russland will zivile Nukleartechnik liefern und über Kontakte zu Nordkorea wird gemunkelt. US-Sanktionen, sino-burmesisches Verhältnis, sowjetisch-burmesisches Verhältnis; Außenpolitik;
New gas ressources; foreign policy; sino-burmese relations; soviet-burmese relations
Ian Bremmer
Source/publisher:
Slate/Global Agenda
Date of publication:
2006-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2007-08-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Oil and gas - general, Government of Myanmar (oil and gas), USA-Burma relations, China-Burma relations, Nuclear
Language:
German, Deutsch
more
Description:
Executive Summary:
For 15 years, there has been a steady stream of newspaper stories, scholarly monographs and books that have referred inter alia to the existence of Chinese military bases in Burma. This apparent intrusion by China into the northern Indian Ocean has strongly influenced the strategic perceptions and policies of Burma?s regional neighbours, notably India. Reports of a large signals intelligence collection station on Great Coco Island in the Andaman Sea, for example, and a naval base on Hainggyi Island in the Irrawaddy River delta, have been cited as evidence that Burma has become a client state of China. Other observers have seen the existence of such bases as proof of China?s expansionist designs in the Indian Ocean region and its global ambitions. Few of these reports drew on hard evidence or gave verifiable sources to support their claims, but repeated denials of a Chinese military presence in Burma by Rangoon and Beijing were brushed aside.
As these reports proliferated, they were picked up by respected commentators and academics and given fresh life in serious studies of the regional strategic environment. Each time they were cited in books and reputable journals they gained credibility, and it was not long before the existence of Chinese bases in Burma was widely accepted as an established fact. In 2005, however, the Chairman of the Indian Defence Force?s Chiefs of Staff Committee conceded that reports of a Chinese intelligence facility on one of Burma?s offshore islands were incorrect. At the same time, he announced that there were no Chinese naval bases in Burma. There are a number of possible explanations for these statements, but this remarkable about-face, on two issues that have preoccupied Indian defence planners for more than a decade, must throw doubt on the claims of other ?Chinese bases? in Burma. It also raises a number of serious questions about current analyses of China?s relations with Burma, and of China?s strategic interests in the northern Indian Ocean region.
It is possible to identify three schools of thought regarding China?s relations with Burma. The ?domination? school believes that Burma has become a pawn in China?s strategic designs in the Asia–Pacific region, and is host to several Chinese military facilities. The ?partnership? school sees a more balanced relationship developing between Beijing and Rangoon, but accepts that China has acquired bases in Burma as part of a long term strategy to establish a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean. The ?rejectionist? school, however, emphasises Burma?s strong tradition of independence and Rangoon?s continuing suspicions of Beijing. This school claims that, despite the conventional wisdom, Burma has been able to resist the enormous strategic weight of its larger, more powerful neighbour. Some members of this school argue that Burma has the whip hand in its relations with China, and has been able successfully to manipulate Burma?s sensitive geostrategic position to considerable advantage. While acknowledging the close bilateral ties that have developed since 1988, they are sceptical of claims that China has any military bases in Burma.
Andrew Selth
Source/publisher:
Griffith Asia Institute
Date of publication:
2007-00-00
Date of entry/update:
2007-05-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
General/Strategic, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
How a single news agency report led to the accepted belief that China has a sophisticated intelligence post in Burmese waters
For almost 15 years, there has been a steady stream of newspaper stories, scholarly monographs and books that have referred inter alia to a large Chinese signals intelligence (SIGINT) station on Burma?s Great Coco Island, in the Andaman Sea. Yet it would now appear that there is no such base on this island, nor ever has been. The explosion of this myth highlights the dearth of reliable information about strategic developments in Burma since the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988.
Andrew Selth
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 15, No. 1
Date of publication:
2007-01-00
Date of entry/update:
2006-12-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
General/Strategic, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Over half a century has wrought profound changes in Burmese strategic perspectives that should be understood by those concerned about stability in the region..."
David I Steinberg
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 14, No. 5
Date of publication:
2006-05-00
Date of entry/update:
2006-12-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
The main thesis of this paper is to argue that Myanmar is neither a strategic
pawn nor an economic pivot of China in the short and immediate term. Since
1988, Sino-Myanmar entente is uneven, asymmetrical, but nevertheless
reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The strategic entente and economic relations
are a marriage of convenience. However, Myanmar?s strategic location on a
trijunction between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless
economically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is important
for China as a trading outlet to the Indian Ocean for its landlocked inland
provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. Strategically, Myanmar is potentially
important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and its
long-term two-ocean objective. Furthermore, a China-Myanmar nexus is
strategically useful for China to contain India?s influence in Southeast Asia.
Finally, Myanmar is part and parcel of China?s grand strategic design to achieve
its goal of becoming a great power in the 21st century. Despite the more extensive
growing Chinese influence over Myanmar, it is unlikely that Rangoon will
become a strategic satellite base for China. Myanmar?s strong sense of
nationalism, its past ability to successfully deal with foreign powers to preserve
its independence and cultural identity, will likely make Myanmar withstand
most odds.
Poon Kim SHEE
Source/publisher:
The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University
Date of publication:
2002-00-00
Date of entry/update:
2006-06-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
Format :
pdf
Size:
58.88 KB
Local URL:
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Description:
a symposium on Northeast India
and the look east policy...
The Problem:
Posed by Sanjib Baruah, Visiting Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi...
NORTHEAST INDIA IN A NEW ASIA:
Jairam Ramesh, Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha)...
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES OR CONTINUING STAGNATION:
Sushil Khanna, Professor of Economics and Strategic Management, Indian Institute of Management, Kolkata...
WATERS OF DESPAIR, WATERS OF HOPE:
Sanjoy Hazarika, Managing Trustee, Centre for Northeast Studies and Policy Research, New Delhi and Guwahati...
PROSPECTS FOR TOURISM:
M.P. Bezbaruah, Former Secretary, Ministry of Tourism, Government of India...
OPERATION HORNBILL FESTIVAL 2004:
Dolly Kikon, Member, Working Group, Northeast Peoples? Initiative, Guwahati...
GUNS, DRUGS AND REBELS:
Subir Bhaumik, East India Correspondent, BBC, Kolkata...
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
Jayeeta Sharma, Assistant Professor of History, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA...
TERRITORIALITIES YET UNACCOUNTED:
Karin Dean, Asia Correspondent, ?Postimees?, Bangkok...
COMMUNITY, CULTURE, NATION:
Mrinal Miri, Vice Chancellor, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong...
THE TAI-AHOM CONNECTION:
Yasmin Saikia, Assistant Professor of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA...
THE ETHNIC DIMENSION:
Samir Kumar Das, Reader, Department of Political Science, Calcutta University...
BOOKS:
Reviewed by Nandana Datta, Dulali Nag, Bodhisattva Kar, Nimmi Kurian and M.S. Prabhakara...
FURTHER READING:
Compiled by Sukanya Sharma, Fellow, Centre for Northeast India, South and Southeast Asia Studies, Guwahati...
COMMUNICATION:
Received from C.P. Bhambhri and B.K. Banerji.
Source/publisher:
Seminar magazine
Date of publication:
2005-06-00
Date of entry/update:
2006-05-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English
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Description:
It is known as the ?Road to Nowhere? or ?Ghost Road,? but there are hopes that political and strategic problems can be sidetracked to resurrect the World War II-era Ledo Road, running between India and China through Burma..."...India and China have sometimes made calls to reopen the Ledo Road. They have come from a visiting delegation from the Yunnan Provincial Chamber of Commerce at an international trade fair in Guwahati, the capital of Assam; from the Federation of Indian Export Organizations in Calcutta; and increasingly from a number of individual politicians and members of state governments in India?s northeast, especially from Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Academics have also raised the issue. A handful of people are upbeat about the tourism prospects—of driving air-con jeeps across the mountains and through jungles and exotic places from India to China.
China appears to be the most prepared. It has already greatly upgraded its section of the Burma Road, built in 1937-38, into a modern, partly six-lane mountain highway..."
Karin Dean
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 13, No. 11
Date of publication:
2005-11-00
Date of entry/update:
2006-05-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English
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Description:
"Members of the Communist Party of Burma who have lived in southern China since the party was fractured by a mutiny in 1989 have to be careful not to talk about Beijing?s warm relations with their former enemies in Rangoon
China is watched with awe worldwide as its economy grows at an alarming rate; and with its military might expanding apace, it is already regarded by the US and the West as a superpower. This and the fact that it is the Burmese military regime?s closest ally concerns not just western countries but also many Burmese at home and abroad.
Except for one group of Burmese, who both admire China?s swift rise and act as apologists for Beijing over its relations with Rangoon. They are members of the Communist Party of Burma, long regarded previously as a Chinese-supported threat to Rangoon; now, the less-than 500 CPB members live in the southern Chinese city of Kunming, where they are no longer a threat to anyone..." Describes the situation of former CPB leaders living in China, including Brig. Gen. Kyaw Zaw.
Aung Zaw
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 13, No. 7
Date of publication:
2005-07-00
Date of entry/update:
2006-04-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
Burma?s narrow-minded generals are a barrier to Asian development...
The Burmese junta doubtless believes it is clever in the way it plays its close relationship with China to gain leverage with India and even with fellow Asean members. The play is well recognized internationally, not least in India where realpolitik is adjudged to override commitment to democratic government. But what is less often realized is the damage that Burma?s combination of incompetent and thuggish government is doing to Asian development as a whole...Burma is not just an economic disaster in its own right, it is a major barrier to closer cooperation between South and Southeast Asia. The damage this does becomes clearer as the economies of India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh open up to the outside world, more aware of the benefits of trade and investment flows. South Asia as a whole may finally be about to make some progress towards a trade grouping and India is talking about a deal with Asean. But, as ever, Burma remains a physical obstacle to interaction between South and Southeast Asia as well as casting a shadow over the whole Asean process..."
Philip Bowring
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 13, No. 7
Date of publication:
2005-07-00
Date of entry/update:
2006-04-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations, General
Language:
English
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Description:
"What role does Burma really play in Beijing?s policy plans?
Eleven bilateral agreements. A commitment to cooperate in the war on drugs and cross-frontier crime. And a large measure of mutual praise. Those were the official and much-publicized results of the week-long visit to China in mid-July by Burmese Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt.
...
Central to China?s regional concerns is its very real interest in seeing a stable and economically viable Burmese state on its western frontiers. Some Chinese officials have openly linked stability to "democracy", and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue is on record as urging a "good internal and external environment for Myanmar?s [Burma?s] democratization"..."
Aung Zaw
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 12, No. 7
Date of publication:
2004-07-00
Date of entry/update:
2004-11-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"China?s stability would be strengthened if Burma were economically stable and prosperous. Thus it should increase efforts to work for the economic and political changes in Burma that would allow the country to receive international assistance.
The modernization of China initiated by Deng Xiaoping involved a shift in the conception of national power from a narrow military perspective to Comprehensive National Power, or CNP, currently seen as consisting of the "eight capabilities" of domestic economic activities, science and technology, foreign economic activities, social development, military, government regulation and control, foreign affairs and natural resources..."
David Arnott
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 12, No. 7
Date of publication:
2004-07-00
Date of entry/update:
2004-10-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations, General
Language:
English
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Description:
I Historical preface;
II Strategic relations;
III Drugs in the China–Burma relationship;
IV China-Burma border: the HIV/AIDS nexus;
V Chinese immigration: cultural and economic impact;
VI Opening up southwest China;
VII Gains and losses for various parties where Burma is (a) democratizing or (b) under Chinese
?suzereinty?;
VIII Possible future focus;
IX Conclusions.
"
This paper has argued that China?s support for the military regime in Burma has had negative
consequences for both Burma and China. The negative impact on Burma of its relationship with China
is that it preserves an incompetent and repressive order and locks the country into economic and
political stagnation. The negative impact on China is that Burma has become a block to regional
development and an exporter of HIV/AIDS and drugs.
China?s comprehensive national interests would be best served by an economically stable and
prosperous Burma. China could help the development of such an entity by encouraging a political
process in Burma that would lead to an opening up of the country to international assistance and a
more competent and publicly acceptable administration..."
David Arnott
Source/publisher:
International IDEA
Date of publication:
2001-12-14
Date of entry/update:
2003-07-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations, General
Language:
English
Format :
pdf
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273.78 KB
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Description:
China?s relationship with Burma
Editorial
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy", Vol. 5. No. 2
Date of publication:
1997-05-00
Date of entry/update:
2003-06-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"The Western democracies have declared that their strong stances against the current military regime in Burma reflect principled stands against the 1988 massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators, the failure of the regime to recognize the results of the 1990 general elections (which resulted in a landslide victory for the main opposition parties), and the regime?s continuing human rights abuses. Yet it can be argued that such a strong and sustained position would have been less likely had the Cold War not ended and Burma?s importance in the global competition between the superpowers not significantly waned. Lacking any pressing strategic or military reason to cultivate Burma, and with few direct political or economic interests at stake, countries like the United States and the United Kingdom can afford to isolate the Rangoon regime and impose upon it pariah status. If this was indeed the calculation made in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is possible that the changes that have occurred in the strategic environment since then may prompt a reconsideration of these policies.
Burma lies where South, Southeast, and East Asia meet; there the dominant cultures of these three subregions compete for influence. It lies also across the ?fault lines? between three major civilisations?Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian.1 At critical times in the past, Burma has been a cockpit for rivalry between superpowers. Today, in the fluid strategic environment of the early twenty-first century, its important position is once again attracting attention from analysts, officials, and military planners. Already, Burma?s close relationship with China and the development of the Burmese armed forces have reminded South and Southeast Asian countries, at least, of Burma?s geostrategic importance and prompted a markedly different approach from that of the West..." The PDF version (222K) has a map and a 4-page presentation of Burma's geostrategic position not contained in the html version.
Andrew Selth
Source/publisher:
Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2
Date of publication:
2002-04-00
Date of entry/update:
2003-06-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
English
Format :
pdf
Size:
225.59 KB
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Description:
What lies beneath: Recent closer cooperation between China and Burma...
Chemical warfare: Chinese military connection...
India's irritation: Chinese dream of direct access to the Indian Ocean...
Pave the way southward: China's fungible usage of Japanese ODA...
Imminent political crisis?
Schu Sugawara
Source/publisher:
BurmaInfo (Japan)
Date of publication:
2003-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2003-06-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
Japanese
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Description:
Even the current regime in Beijing must recognize that military rule in Burma is damaging to its own interests as well as those of the Burmese people.
Editorial
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy", Vol. 8. No. 6
Date of publication:
2000-06-00
Date of entry/update:
2003-06-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"In the early 1990s China?s sale of arms to Burma played a crucial role in keeping the Burmese military in power. But this support for the generals in Rangoon is now backfiring, as many of the negative consequences spill over the border into China, writes Andrew Bosson. While China has generally taken a passive stance towards international efforts to pressure Burma to improve its rights record, it would be in Beijing?s best interests to push Rangoon towards economic and political reform, he argues.
The relationship between Burma and China has been harmful to both countries, especially following the Chinese arms deals which preserved the junta in power and locked Burmese political and economic life into a stasis from which it has yet to emerge. The generals seem to have very little idea of how a modern economy functions and are essentially running the country as they would an army. Military expenditures continue to take up about 60 percent of the national budget. Thus it comes as no surprise that the economy is in an advanced state of failure. China also has been damaged economically: Burma?s lack of access to economic development assistance and its collapsed economy leave a gaping hole in the regional development projects the impoverished provinces of southwest China so badly need. China also suffers from the massive spread of HIV/AIDS, drug addiction and crime that have accompanied the massive quantities of heroin being trafficked from Burma into Yunnan Province. The growth of the drug economy in Burma may be traced directly to the lack of the necessary economic and political remedies, which is an indirect result of China?s intervention..."
Andrew Bosson
Source/publisher:
China Rights Forum Journal 2002-03
Date of publication:
2002-11-00
Date of entry/update:
2003-04-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations, General, Economy: general, analytical, statistical (various sources), Drugs: regional and global, Burma: HIV/AIDS-Heroin Nexus
Language:
English
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