China-Burma relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"The Myanmar Government recently agreed to begin work on key projects under the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) agreement which is part of Chinese’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Experts, including voices from the World Bank, have pointed out that Myanmar’s growth will largely depend on major BRI infrastructure projects that get underway this year.
The 1,700-kilometre-long CMEC will start in China’s Yunnan Province, go through Myanmar’s major economic cities – Mandalay in central Myanmar, the commercial capital of Yangon—and reach the coast at Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Rakhine State. The proposal includes upgrades to three major roads through Mandalay and Muse on the Myanmar side of the border with China, and some other roads in Shan State.
An estimated $2 billion will be spent in the initial stages of the project which is expected to be made up of 24 projects in total..."
Source/publisher:
"Belt & Road News"
Date of publication:
2019-01-26
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The matters relating to promoting economic and trade cooperation between Myanmar and China and the use of Chinese currency in bilateral trade, were discussed at the 5th meeting of the Joint Committee for Myanmar-China Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation, according to the Ministry of Planning and Finance.
The meeting also focused on the establishment of Myanmar-China economic corridor, the use of the Chinese government’s buyer loans and soft loans, the joint implementation of five-year development program for economic and trade cooperation, cooperation in Kyaukphyu deep seaport project, industrial zone project, train and expressway, trans-national power lines and others, the establishment of Myanmar-China border economic cooperation zone and cooperation in substitute crops.
The first meeting of its kind was held in Myanmar in 2005, the second in China in 2008, the third in Myanmar in 2014 and the fourth in China in 2017 and the fifth in Myanmar in 2019..."
Source/publisher:
"Eleven Media Group"
Date of publication:
2019-06-18
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"As buildings after buildings spring up in Shwe Kokko, a remote Karen border town bordering Thailand, many wonder if this mega-project real estate development is just an ordinary undertaking spearheaded by the Jilin Yatai Group of China, together with Colonel Saw Chit Thu, chief of the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF).
The Jilin Yatai Group was registered with the Ministry of Planning and Finance under the name Myanmar Yatai International Trading Co Ltd in February 2017.
Shwe Kokko, a former garrison town of Karen National Liberation Army formerly known as Kawmoora or Wangkha, is controlled by Saw Chit Thu, who is the chief of Karen BGF recognized by the government and affiliated to the Myanmar Army or the Tatmadaw.
Myanmar Times of September 18, 2018 reported the signing of agreement between Saw Chit Thu and the Chinese company in September 2017, organized by the China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs.
This project, dubbed as “Chinatown” by the locals is in fact so ambitious that it is touted as an equivalent of being second only to Hong Kong, China’s special administrative region under one country two system. Reportedly, a 70-year lease from the Myanmar government has been secured, which may be extended up to 99 years..."
Source/publisher:
"BNI Multimedia Group"
Date of publication:
2019-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, Thailand-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Reading news reports coming out of Myanmar, I am always taken with the debate over the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Of particular interest are the new China-Myanmar economic corridor and the debate over its winners and losers, as well as the nature of China’s intentions behind the ambitious infrastructure project.
Some commentators point out the sovereign risk associated with allowing China to build and participate in key infrastructure development in Myanmar. I argue that the BRI should be viewed as a “win-win” rather than as a threat or a form of predatory economics by which the Chinese can export their infrastructure construction model, which heavily relies on state-owned enterprises.
This article is written by Andre Wheeler, a CEO of Asia Pacific Connex, with more than 25 years of experience in international business and he is working on his doctorate on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on infrastructure and logistics in Asean. It first appeared on Myanmar Times under a Creative Commons License and is reproduced here with the author’s permission..."
Source/publisher:
"AEC News Today"
Date of publication:
2019-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"An economic zone will soon be built in Kanpaiktee at the Myanmar - China border, according to Ministry of Commerce.
At the zone there will be truck parking, warehouses, and modern equipment to check installed.
The President Office has ordered the central and working committee concerning building of Myanmar-China border economic cooperation zone to perform coordinated tasks and they have been carried out, claimed Deputy Minister for Commerce Aung Htoo.
He continued saying that there will be basic infrastructure such as staff housing, weighing machines, and X-ray machines will all be a part of the economic zone.
As China is Myanmar’s largest border trade partner, the economic zone, when complete, will help substantially in promoting local goods and services as well as create job opportunities for Myanmar citizens. It will offer a wider scope for bilateral trade cooperation including schemes to invest in factories and mills as well as develop a more robust tourism sector. Over a longer term, the economic zone is also expected to help raise exports across the border, helping to reduce the country’s trade deficit..."
Source/publisher:
"Eleven Media Group"
Date of publication:
2019-07-17
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, Border Trade with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Shwe Kokko, a remote town along Myanmar’s Moei River, is the latest odd and bold outpost of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Description:
"The town is still under construction but it already has a distinct Chinese flavor. There are Chinese restaurants, beauty salons and karaoke parlors. Chinese residents live in temporary barrack-style buildings while waiting for new apartment blocks and villas to be completed.
Other buildings resemble huge warehouses and what could be offices for businesses or administration. Even the armed security guards outside some of the houses where the migrants live have Chinese characters on their armbands. But this is not yet another construction project in China.
Rather, it is all happening at Shwe Kokko, an enclave on the Myanmar side of the Moei river that forms the border with Thailand some 500 kilometers northwest of Bangkok and 420 kilometers east of Yangon, Myanmar’s commercial capital.
The border enclave is controlled by a local ethnic Karen warlord, Chit Thu, who has made peace with the Myanmar military and converted his armed units into an officially recognized Border Guard Force (BGF)..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times"
Date of publication:
2019-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The confluence of the Ayeyarwady River and the Mali and the N'Mai rivers. The Myitsone dam was to be located a mile downstream of this point. Photo: Yu Jincui/GT
A campaign aimed at putting an end to the Myitsone Dam project is reportedly to be held in Myanmar's Yangon on Monday, which Chinese experts said will exert a negative influence on the Southeast Asian country's economic development.
Politicians and activists, as well as civil society representatives will gather in Yangon on Monday to protest against the Myitsone Dam, Frontier Myanmar magazine reported.
In an interview with Frontier Myanmar, U Aung Soe Myint, a leader of the movement, said that they had invited NGOs, political parties and environmental experts from every state and region of Myanmar to join the protest. The group will also form an executive committee to devise strategies to campaign against the dam.
Gu Xiaosong, an expert on Southeast Asian studies at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Sunday that the protest is driven predominantly by political reasons.
"Some organizations are incited by certain Western forces which are trying to damage China-Myanmar relations. It is not really out of concern for the environment as they have declared," Gu said, adding that most ordinary citizens who were instigated to join the protest have no idea of the real situation.
The dam, which was suspended in 2011, has cost Chinese financiers and contractors dearly. It is one of the key issues to be addressed between the two countries..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Rivers Network" via Global Times
Date of publication:
2019-04-01
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other hydropower projects (global, regional), Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"China’s new ambassador to Myanmar said he would push for deeper “practical cooperation” on Beijing’s grand infrastructure projects in the country while working to advance bilateral relations.
One day after President U Win Myint accepted the credentials of Ambassador Chen Hai in Naypyitaw, the Chinese Embassy issued a statement on Wednesday regarding their discussion in the Credentials Hall at the Presidential Palace.
Chen said China and Myanmar currently maintain good relations but said he expected many new opportunities to improve it would arise.
The 20th Chinese ambassador to Myanmar vowed to advance mutual trust between the two countries and deepen “practical cooperation” on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), under which it plans to implement more than three dozen projects, including mega-infrastructure projects, in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2019-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Topic:
BRI corridors in Myanmar, Development opportunities for Myanmar, Substantial risks to natural capital
Topic:
BRI corridors in Myanmar, Development opportunities for Myanmar, Substantial risks to natural capital
Description:
"The report recommends: 1. The need to ensure that the BRI follows a sustainability criteria or standard based on ‘Guidance on the Building of the Green Belt and Road’ released from the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, global sustainability standards or nationally developed standards for sustainable infrastructure development.
2. More assessments to better understand risks related to for example floods, erosion and biodiversity, and for this information to be incorporated into road plans and designs as well as high quality Environmental Impact Assessments and Environmental Management Plans (EIAs).
3. Avoid negative environmental and social impacts through assessing multiple costs of road location and planning.
4. The BRI design should enhance environmental, social and economic benefits, including buffer zones, re-vegetation of slopes and wildlife corridors.
5. Myanmar civil society should be included at all levels and stages of project planning to avoid negative social and environmental impacts and optimise benefit sharing of the BRI in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Mekong Eye" via Myanmar Times
Date of publication:
2018-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, Natural Disasters - General, Biodiversity - Burma/Myanmar-related
Language:
more
Description:
"China and Myanmar have developed fruitful cooperation in the infrastructure construction of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China has been supporting Myanmar in advancing the transportation infrastructure construction including railways, roads, airports, ports, electricity and telecommunication, to inject strong impetus for Myanmar's economic development.
It is noted that an offshore pilotage stand in Myanmar under the CMEC was completed recently, which is of considerable significance to Myanmar's economic development.
The pilotage stand, located about 20 nautical miles in southwestern of the Yangon River estuary in Myanmar, can provide safer and more efficient pilotage services for all types of ships entering and leaving the port.
As for capacity cooperation, the two countries have jointly built a gas-fueled power plant in Myanmar under the CMEC, to relief the power supply issues in Myanmar.
It is noted that the gas-fueled power plant is capable of generating an estimated 1.274 billion kilowatt-hours of clean electricity annually, feeding power demand of 2.7 million Burmese.
The Myanmar government reveals that the country will continue to develop power construction to achieve full coverage of electricity across the country by 2030..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua Silk Road Information Service"
Date of publication:
2019-07-31
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Trade disruption from recent attacks by armed groups along the Myanmar-China border may last longer than the attack on the 105th mile camp that occurred in late 2016.
Description:
"The 105th mile camp trading post, which comprises checkpoints and other government offices, lies near the town of Muse in Northern Shan State just across the border from Ruili in China’s Yunnan province.
Observers including political analysts and traders said it could last longer than the 10 day suspension when the 105 camp trading post was attacked.
Insurgents from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army (AA) under the umbrella of the Northern Alliance launched coordinated attacks on a military academy in Pyin Oo Lwin on the Mandalay-Muse trade route as well as a toll gate and the Gote Twin police post on the Nawngcho trade route on August 15, which also saw the Gote Twin bridge blown up.
Insurgents also destroyed or damaged several other bridges at Chin Shwe Haw southeast of Muse along the border with China on August 17. Trading activities along the border has also been disrupted.
As of August 21, the border trading posts in these areas have not been reopened while no traffic has been allowed on the Mandalay-Muse and Theinni-Kunlong-Chin Shwe Haw routes that lead to these trading posts..."
Source/publisher:
"Belt & Road News"
Date of publication:
2019-08-24
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Border Trade with China, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"A seminar on China-Myanmar sustainable development and cooperation under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor was held in Myanmar’s Yangon Monday.
The seminar was jointly hosted by the Center for Myanmar Affairs Studies, Myanmar and the Institute of Myanmar Studies, China’s Yunnan University.
The Monday seminar featured discussions under the topics Green Energy Technologies and Sustainable Development, Governance: Problems and Challenges, and Progress of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, respectively.
During the discussions, Zaw Aung, an independent researcher, said that the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is a two-way connectivity between Myanmar and China and is mutually beneficial to both countries from bilateral trade and investments.
The CMEC is an important impetus for the sustainable development of Myanmar’s economy through attracting the investment of the neighbor countries, mainly China, ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and East Asia, he added, stressing that the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor which is a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will play a significant role in the logistic and trade infrastructure investments in next decade..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua"
Date of publication:
2019-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"A recent political talk-show on Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the topic of China’s political influence in Myanmar mentioned the Arakan Army’s (AA) endorsement of China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It was taken as a remarkable testimony of bowing to a regional power.
In fact, it is not only the AA that is kowtowing to China but also the seven-member Federal Political and Negotiation Consultative Committee (FPNCC) has also been staunchly behind it. The FPNCC is made up of United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and AA.
Generally, China employs a government-to-government and party-to-party two-pronged relationship with Myanmar as it usually does with the other countries. But lately, with the ambitious BRI mega project, it seems to have added another channel which is military to military.
The FPNCC relies heavily on China for arms, munitions, uniforms, food supplies, and also two-way trade which involves exporting natural resources and mineral extraction, among others, from the EAOs’ side and importing needed consumer goods from China.
One outstanding example of Chinese influence was China’s pressure on the Tatmadaw, which is bitterly against some FPNCC members, to invite the FPNCC to the second (May 2017) and third (July 2018) 21st Century Panglong – Union Peace Conferences (21PC-UPC). The FPNCC was also not too keen to attend the conference as it has its own approach to handle the peace process..."
Source/publisher:
"BNI Multimedia Group"
Date of publication:
2019-08-05
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Non-Ceasefire Groups, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"A village militia chief and his wife were shot dead Tuesday evening by unknown gunmen in Myanmar’s war-ravaged northern Shan state, while a government official said recent coordinated attacks by rebel armies in the region have seriously affected crucial trade routes with China.
Chinese-speaking and Shan-speaking assailants killed Win Maung, militia chief of Mong Yang village-tract, and his wife when they threw explosives and fired several shots from all directions into his home and a nearby office in the village in Lashio township, locals and a family member who survived the attack said.
Win Maung’s two sons and two daughters were away from home on a trip when the attack occurred, but his grandson was in the house and managed to escape.
“I heard the blasts sounding like fireworks,” the grandson said. “I tried to hide, but my grandfather told me to leave the house. I asked him to come with me, but he didn’t. I jumped out of the house and ran into the fields.”
He said he caught up with other villagers who ran from the village during the attack, and they tried to hide on the other side of the river..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA"
Date of publication:
2019-08-21
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Non-Ceasefire Groups, Armed conflict in Shan State - general articles, Border Trade with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Following the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang’s Myitkyina visit that took place from 28 to 29 December 2018, where he met leaders of political parties and social organizations in Kachin State, news have been making the rounds that the ambassador has been bossy and even intimidating when interacting with the Kachin leaders during his visit.
Reportedly, during the visit, ambassador Hong Liang met with chairman of the Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP) Manam Tu Ja, chairman of the Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State (UDP-KS) U Hkyet Hting Nan, chairman of the Kachin Democracy Party (KDP) Gumgrawng Awng Hkam, chairman of the Lisu National Development Party U Si Phar Lar Lu (U Shwe Minn), chairman of the Shan Ethnic Affairs Society (Northern Myanmar) U Sai San Wae and chairman of the Kachin Baptist Convention Hkalam Samson.
According to the The Irrawaddy report on January 9, when the Chinese ambassador met Gumgrawng Awng Hkam and Rev. Hkalam Samson respectively at Palm Spring Hotel in Myitkyina, he warned them not to be so cordial and friendly with western diplomats, otherwise they would face serious consequences. Both claimed that the ambassador briefed them in a bossy manner, warning them not to oppose Chinese projects in Kachin State, including the controversial Myitsone hydro-power project.
The meeting with the Chinese ambassador came after the US and UK ambassadors visited Kachin State. During their meetings in Myitkyina with Kachin political leaders and other prominent members of the Kachin community, both ambassadors discussed the peace process, the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), promotion of education and health and free and fair elections. Both Gumgrawng Awng Hkam and Rev. Hkalam Samson attended those meetings. Consequently, Kachin politicians invited the ambassadors to open liaison offices in Myitkyina in order to promote relations..."
Source/publisher:
"BNI Multimedia Group"
Date of publication:
2019-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Dams and other hydropower projects (global, regional), Assessment of hydropower projects in Burma/Myanmar, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Japan-backed Thilawa Special Economic Zone is one of nation’s few economic and infrastructure success stories
Description:
"Every morning hundreds of cars, trucks and other vehicles carrying factory workers squeeze into a two-lane bridge across Yangon’s Bago river.
The buzz of industrial activity results in often nightmarish traffic jams, a rare phenomenon for Myanmar’s still nascent and in many ways hamstrung manufacturing sector.
Initiated by then-president Thein Sein in 2013, the Japan-backed Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is widely viewed by business leaders as Myanmar’s foremost economic success story.
It also has advocates in high political places, with de facto national leader Aung San Suu Kyi repeatedly hailing Thilawa as a “crowning success” that “highlights the type of positive partnership that can be achieved between our respective public and private sectors.”
The 2,500-hectare Thilawa has so far secured over US$1.6 billion in approved investment, including from multinationals such as German retail group Metro AG, US aluminum can manufacturer Ball and Japanese automaker Toyota..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times"
Date of publication:
2019-08-19
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Other Special Economic Zones, Burma's economic relations with Japan, Burma's economic relations with China, Japan-Burma relations, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Seven years after it was suspended, the Chinese developer of the Myitsone Dam is ramping up efforts to lobby residents amid a strengthening of China-Myanmar relations.
Description:
"MUNG RA stands on stage, looking out over the thousands of anti-dam protesters who have come to the confluence where the Ayeyarwady River originates on October 1 to celebrate the seventh anniversary of the suspension of the Myitsone Dam.
At the edge of the crowd are English signs with the words “No Dam” and “Free Streaming the Ayeyarwady”. Many people in the audience have pinned badges to their clothing with anti-dam messages.
Mung Ra waves a book: Answering Questions on the Extraction of Hydroelectricity from the Ayeyarwady Myitsone, Upper Reaches and River Valley.
Published by the dam’s investor, China’s State Power Investment Corporation, it includes a wide range of information on the series of dams the company wants to build on the Ayeyarwady and its tributaries, the N’mai and the Mali rivers, including the structure and potential environmental impact of these dams, and the financial and other benefits for Myanmar. It also explains the company’s investment in the project to date, including the support it has provided to communities displaced by the 6,000 megawatt Myitsone dam project.
“The book mentions our resettlement and the health and livelihood assistance [the company gave] but it’s just full of fake information. We never received this [assistance] in the past and we are not receiving it now,” Mung Ra tells the crowd.
Mung Ra should know. Originally a resident of Daung Bum, a village located near Myitsone, in 2009 he was forced to move with his family to Maliyang, one of two model villages build by SPIC (then known as China Power Investment Corporation) to house people displaced to make room for the mega-dam, which would flood an area the size of Singapore..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication:
2018-11-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, The impact of natural disasters on the environment and people of Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"At a fruit market in Wanding, Ruili, a county on the China-Myanmar border, workers are transferring watermelons and muskmelons from Myanmar to heavy trucks which will soon leave for Beijing, Shanghai and other cities in China.
"Burmese fruit tastes good and enjoys great popularity among Chinese people," Said Liu Hongfang, a manager of the market. "About 400 Burmese trucks (3,000 tons) of fruit come and go in the market every day."
Thanks to closer cooperation between China and Myanmar, the company has expanded its scale and business, built refrigeration houses in Wanding and worked with locals of Mandalay to grow watermelon.
There are only about 400 km from Mandalay to Myanmar's border town of Muse, next to Ruili in southwest China's Yunnan province, but it would take the truck drivers two days because of the narrow and zigzag roads, according to Liu..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua"
Date of publication:
2019-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi made her first diplomatic visit to Cambodia this week, underscoring the similarities between two countries that find themselves increasingly isolated from the international community.
According to the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suu Kyi arrived in Cambodia on April 29, flying from Beijing where she and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen attended the second Belt and Road Forum.
While the statement claimed the visit would strengthen cooperation within Asean – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – Myanmar and Cambodia have been stumbling blocks to the bloc’s effectiveness, with both seen as being more loyal to China..."
Source/publisher:
"South China Morning Post"
Date of publication:
2019-04-30
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"China and Myanmar have developed fruitful cooperation in the infrastructure construction of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China has been supporting Myanmar in advancing the transportation infrastructure construction including railways, roads, airports, ports, electricity and telecommunication, to inject strong impetus for Myanmar's economic development.
It is noted that an offshore pilotage stand in Myanmar under the CMEC was completed recently, which is of considerable significance to Myanmar's economic development.
The pilotage stand, located about 20 nautical miles in southwestern of the Yangon River estuary in Myanmar, can provide safer and more efficient pilotage services for all types of ships entering and leaving the port.
As for capacity cooperation, the two countries have jointly built a gas-fueled power plant in Myanmar under the CMEC, to relief the power supply issues in Myanmar.
It is noted that the gas-fueled power plant is capable of generating an estimated 1.274 billion kilowatt-hours of clean electricity annually, feeding power demand of 2.7 million Burmese.
The Myanmar government reveals that the country will continue to develop power construction to achieve full coverage of electricity across the country by 2030..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua Silk Road Information Service"
Date of publication:
2019-08-01
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"In late April, Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi visited Beijing to take part in the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. There China and Myanmar signed three bilateral cooperation agreements, discussed the extensive promotion of their relations and conducted constructive consultations on Myanmar's peace process and stability in the border areas.
However, no agreement was reached on the Myitsone dam project, despite public fears in Myanmar that construction of the dam, in limbo since 2011, would soon be revived.
For weeks leading up to the forum, the Myitsone controversy had dominated local media headlines and spurred protests. On February 7, about 10,000 Kachin locals held a rally in the state capital of Myitkyina to oppose the Myitsone project they said would devastate the environment and displace families. On April 1, about 200 anti-Myitsone environmental activists and writers held a meeting in Yangon and established a national committee to oppose it..."
Source/publisher:
"South China Morning Post"
Date of publication:
2019-05-01
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories
Language:
more
Topic:
We should not play down the geopolitical consequences of the Chinese-led globalization that BRI v.2.0 represents.
Topic:
We should not play down the geopolitical consequences of the Chinese-led globalization that BRI v.2.0 represents.
Description:
"Last week, China hosted the second Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation in Beijing. This was an occasion to take stock, as well as introduce course corrections into the process of unrolling the six-year old Belt and Road Initiative.
37 countries and 29 international organizations participated in the event, with notable presence of Russian President Putin, President Pinera of Chile, President Ueli Maurer of Switzerland, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte of Italy and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Prominent India’s neighbors who marked their presence over there were President Bindiya Bhandari of Nepal, Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan, State Counsellor Aung San Su-Kyi of Myanmar. The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and managing director of the IMF Christine Lagarde also attended the event.
The first phase of BRI was an unfolding of China constructing connectivity hardware — railway lines, highways, ports and pipelines. The emphasis now is to improve the software — international cooperation, trade agreements, customs and taxation procedures and financial processes, which is to be linked with China’s overall plans for transforming its domestic economy to emphasize “quality construction” based on innovation and science and technology. On the other hand there is a conscious effort to connect it to a new phase of Chinese global policy which seeks to expand China’s geopolitical reach by assisting developing countries to overcome poverty and joblessness..."
Source/publisher:
"Observer Research Foundation (ORF)"
Date of publication:
2019-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar’s government is hungry for the investment boost, but the costs must be weighed as well.
Description:
"Two years after the Belt and Road Summit in Beijing, Myanmar seems ready to be integrated into Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative via the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) — despite criticisms and concern over a potential debt trap. A 1,700-plus kilometer corridor stretching from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province in China, to the seaport at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, CMEC will be one of the largest single packages of foreign direct investment in Myanmar in decades, and the government in Naypyitaw is anticipating a quick economic lift.
Ranging from trade to technology, China and Myanmar’s Pauk Phaw (fraternal) relationship is advancing. A drafted but delayed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is expected to be signed in the upcoming weeks and will become the first agreement to be inked by the newly appointed minister of planning and finance. Despite some concern over the affordability, the initial proposal incorporates over 20 projects as early harvest projects within CMEC for an estimated budget of $2 billion. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation took the largest slice of the pie, with $400 million planned for upgrading irrigation systems.
The total estimated budget of $2 billion, however, does not include the cost of major infrastructure projects to be implemented by the Ministry of Construction and Ministry of Transportation and Communication. Three major road upgrade projects, the construction and renovation of airports, and the development of inland port projects, are all planned without any feasibility studies and budget estimates to date. In drafting the proposal, these projects seem to have a political green light from the cabinet, but so far there has not been much debate over or attention paid to these initiative. The biggest concern is how to finance the infrastructure development..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat"
Date of publication:
2018-08-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Topic:
Myitsone Dam; Kachin; Myanmar; development; conflict; China
Topic:
Myitsone Dam; Kachin; Myanmar; development; conflict; China
Description:
"Myanmar has seen numerous violent
uprising in recent decades (Smith, 2007;
Sadan, 2016). Ceasefire agreements have
been struck with a number of armed actors
but these have been focused on economic
development, rather than on resolving
political grievances. The underlying notion
guiding this strategy has been that weak
economic development rather than poor
governance or lack of political inclusion lies
at the heart of local opposition (Brenner,
2017). Incentivised by the plentiful natural
resources present in conflict-affected,
minority-ethnic dominated states, Chinese
ventures have dominated investments in
these areas. One of the more spectacular
infrastructure projects funded by a Chinese
company is the Myitsone Dam in Kachin
State, on which work was suspended in 2011
following public protest (Kiik, 2016b;
Kirchherr, Charles and Walton, 2017)..."
Source/publisher:
"UI Paper"
Date of publication:
2019-04-00
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, Armed conflict in Kachin State - ceasefires and ceasefire talks
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.06 MB
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Description:
"Myanmar is sandwiched between two very large neighbours – China and India. Relations with China are not currently cordial, especially among the Myanmar people, who retain memories of numerous undue political and economic interactions and incidents.
Historically, China is seen as an intruder rather than an equal partner, and even investments from China have unfair terms. In addition, regular border conflicts add to the already growing suspicion and negative image of China. India, on the other hand, plays a much smaller role. Its biggest investment in Myanmar is through the Kalaton project which is worth just US$ 8.5 million. The previous government tried a two-prong strategy – one prong to develop ties with pro-west India and another to facilitate China’s goal of having access to the Indian Ocean.
China is implementing the One Belt, One Road initiative. Three interesting observations can be made about the current geopolitical situation here:
First, China’s One Belt, One Road appears to exclude Myanmar. Secondly, United Wa State Army (UWSA) is taking a lead over other seven Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), and is trying to replace the Myanmar government-sponsored Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with another ceasefire agreement. Thirdly, the UWSA’s Pangsang Summit declared that the One Belt, One Road strategy of China might have positive direct impacts on Myanmar’s ethnic regions.
The Pangsang Summit was held on February 22, organised by UWSA and Mongla Army/ National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). NCA non-signatory groups – Arakan Army, Kachin Independence Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Shan State Army and two special guests – also attended the summit.
Some attendees to Pangsang Summit are also members of United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The UNFC is currently negotiating with the government in order to sign the NCA. Meanwhile, the Wa group and its partners have demanded a new ceasefire agreement instead of the NCA..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Eye
Date of publication:
2017-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar needs to enact a series of measures to ensure that Belt and Road Initiative projects benefit the nation and its citizens as much as they do big Chinese companies.
Description:
"“As a rule, the police are soft on the tough and tough on the soft,” recalled the veteran Chinese democracy activitist, Mr Zha Jianguo, of his time behind bars in China.
In a New Yorker piece by his sister, Ms Zha Jiangying, published in December 2018, Zha said: “If they sense a weakness in you, it will bring out the bully in them.”
It would be wise for Myanmar’s leaders from both the government and civil arenas to heed the implications of Zha’s observation. The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April was followed by Myanmar and China inking three bilateral agreements: an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, an MoU on a five year economic and trade development cooperation plan, and an MoU on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Plan spanning 2019 to 2030.
However, caution has gradually emerged over the BRI, as shown by Myanmar’s recent approval of only nine of China’s 38 proposed “early harvest” projects. State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s comment at the forum that projects need to “not only be economically feasible but also socially and environmentally responsible” and be fully supported by local communities, is an example of Myanmar’s growing wariness in dealing with China. Significantly, the MoU for the CMEC included provisions to allow Myanmar to seek financing from international financial institutions when implementing projects, invite international tenders for investment, and choose projects to maximise mutual benefit.
These moves point to a shift in Myanmar’s approach to China that involves treading more gently and is a welcome development in bilateral relations. However, there are still many issues that need to be addressed. The public has not been told about where negotiations stand on the future of the much-despised Myitsone Dam – a situation not helped by a condescending comment from the outgoing Chinese ambassador, Mr Hong Liang, that “foreign forces” were involved in opposing the resumption of work on the project..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication:
2019-08-02
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Just a few months before 2012 by-elections, a group of concerned citizens worried about the fate of Myitsone gathered together at a location overlooking the confluence of three rivers in Myitkyina, Kachin State. A man walked to a podium with the assistance of a friend and said, with tears in his eyes, that the Ayeyarawady River was the lifeline of the whole of Myanmar and it’s endangered and near extinct flora and fauna would be diminished forever if and when the planned Myitsone hydropower dam was built there. The man was U Ohn an eminent environmentalist who loves his country.
Thanks to public awareness campaigns launched by environmentalists, protest campaigns launched by CSOs, and media coverage about the dangers of the dam, protests against it construction were launched. The Myitsone dam project consists of building seven dams with the main dam at the confluence (Myitsone) of the Maykha and Malikha Rivers, five more dams on Maykha and a dam on Malikha Rivers will also be built for power generation.
The estimated installed capacity of the project is 21,600 MW. According to 2015 statistics, Myanmar is currently generating just over 5,000 MW in the entire country so the installed capacity of the Myitsone dam will be over four times that of total power generation in the country. The then military regime and China Power Investment Corporation signed a MoU to build the dam in 2006.
After completion, 90% of the power generated will be sold to China and Myanmar will receive the remaining 10%.
At that time, the deafening sounds of protest against Myitsone and calls for ‘Save the Irrawaddy’ echoed throughout the entire country. As a result, in 2012, President Thein Sein made the stunning announcement that the project would be suspended during his five-year tenure and he won the hearts of the people..."
Source/publisher:
"Mekong Eye" via Mizzima
Date of publication:
2016-07-18
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, Chinese investment, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Topic:
Foreign investors are still showing interest in Rakhine State despite sanctions and international pressure applied due to the political unrest. And now that the state has better access to electricity, conditions are looking better for businesses to enter the state or expand.
Topic:
Foreign investors are still showing interest in Rakhine State despite sanctions and international pressure applied due to the political unrest. And now that the state has better access to electricity, conditions are looking better for businesses to enter the state or expand.
Description:
"Projects related to China’s One Belt, One Road initiative remain a focus, with the Kyaukphyu special economic zone (SEZ), which comprises a deep-sea port, industrial park and housing, being a major pull of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the state. The industrial park will support businesses involved in aquaculture, livestock and garment industries while the deep-sea port and its facilities will connect Myanmar with a regional network of economies including China, India and Asean.
Plans to develop the SEZ was first announced in September 2013 and a consortium led by Beijing-based CITIC Group Corporation Ltd that included Thailand’s Charoen Pokphand Group Co Ltd was awarded the project at the end of 2015. However, it was not until November last year that a framework agreement was signed between the Myanmar government and CITIC, which also saw the original price-tag of US$7.5 billion reduced to US$1.3 billion.
Rakhine State chief minister U Nyi Pu said among the projects within the SEZ, Forging The Future Co Ltd and Myanmar Bright Prospect International Logistics Co Ltd have proposals to set up prawn farming, support a jetty project on Made island and build a five-star hotel on Ramree island..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times"
Date of publication:
2019-08-12
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s government signed two memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and an agreement letter with China at Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum on Thursday, detailing strengthened cooperation between the countries on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), trade and technology.
According to the Ministry of Information, Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang were present to witness the signing of the documents.
The ministry’s statement said that a China-Myanmar Economic Corridor cooperation (2019-2030) MOU was signed by Myanmar’s Ministry of Planning and Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency.
In September, a 15-point MOU for the CMEC was signed. The economic corridor is set to be part of Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which aims to construct basic infrastructure connecting key economic centers in Myanmar. Under the MOU, the governments agree to collaborate on projects in a number of sectors including basic infrastructure, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, transport, finance, human resources development, telecommunications, and research and technology..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2019-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"An office of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor of the China Enterprises Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar (CECCM) was inaugurated in the Myanmar capital on Friday.
Speaking at the opening ceremony of the office in Zabuthiri town, Myanmar Deputy Minister of Commerce U Aung Htoo expressed his belief that the office could help offer better job opportunities for the trade link between the two countries.
The 1,060-km pipeline that carries crude oil and natural gas from the Middle East to China and links Myanmar's coastal town Kyaukphyu with southwest China's Kunming city, is part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
Chinese Ambassador Hong Liang said the branch office in Nay Pyi Taw promotes communication and cooperation between the CECCM and relevant Myanmar government departments. It also helps the Chinese embassy better implement its work and benefits companies participating in the Belt and Road Initiative.
Secretary-General of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) U Aung Kyi Soe said the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor Office will help entrepreneurs of the two countries run their business transparently and smoothly and also help create job opportunities for the people..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua Net"
Date of publication:
2019-05-17
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
A Shanghai blockchain company claimed it intended to set up a special economic zone in a rebel-held border area of eastern Shan State where it would issue digital currencies and IDs to the local population.
Description:
"Executives from Shellpay Internet Technology Co, in a Channel News Asia (CNA) broadcasting programme aired last December, said that the firm was granted a piece of land by the general office of “Peaceful Liberation Alliance of 7 States” in April 2018 as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to issue digital coins and e-citizenship.
Jane Zhang Hong, CEO of Shellpay and who identified herself as the director of the SEZ’s digital economy bureau, said the objective is to “improve" the "dirt-poor" locals and develop the region.
She told CNA that she wanted to create “the world's first digital economy experiment with 40 million people [in Myanmar] who are dirt-poor” through a “Yongbang SEZ”.
The disputed area, covering 220 square kilometres, is located within the Mong La Special Administrative Region 4 in eastern Shan. Run by the rebel group known as the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the enclave bordering China’s Yunnan province is known for being a infamous hub for prostitution, gambling and crime. The rebels signed a Union-level ceasefire agreement in December 2011.
Despite legally under Nay Pyi Taw’s sovereignty, Mong La functions more as an integral part of China than of Myanmar, with Chinese business people, linked to business activities in Yunnan, running hotels, restaurants, shops, brothels and casinos, catering for the thousand of Chinese customers visiting Mong La every day. Chinese language and Chinese yuan are used..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times"
Date of publication:
2019-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations, “One Belt, One Road” initiative
Language:
more
Description:
"At a fruit market in Wanding, Ruili, a county on the China-Myanmar border, workers are transferring watermelons and muskmelons from Myanmar to heavy trucks which will soon leave for Beijing, Shanghai and other cities in China.
"Burmese fruit tastes good and enjoys great popularity among Chinese people," Said Liu Hongfang, a manager of the market. "About 400 Burmese trucks (3,000 metric tons) of fruit come and go in the market every day."
Thanks to closer cooperation between China and Myanmar, the company has expanded its scale and business, built refrigeration houses in Wanding and worked with locals of Mandalay to grow watermelon.
There are only about 400 kilometers from Mandalay to Myanmar's border town of Muse, next to Ruili in Southwest China's Yunnan province, but it would take the truck drivers two days because of the narrow and zigzag roads, according to Liu.
"What's worse, if a traffic accident occurs, the fruit will rot on the road," she added..."
Source/publisher:
"Chinadaily"
Date of publication:
2019-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Border Trade with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"At the second Chinese Belt and Road Forum (BRF) attended by Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in April 2019, three MoUs were signed to strengthen cooperation on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) integral to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This was the latest in a series of MoUs reached between China and Myanmar on the CMEC in recent years.
Myanmar’s increasing dependence on China in dealing with internal and external challenges and Beijing’s ability to leverage Naypyidaw’s strategic compulsions to its advantage has been a defining featuring of the current bilateral relationship. China has been extending political and financial support to the Myanmar government in managing the country’s ethnic conflicts along their shared borderlands and protecting it at the United Nations for atrocities against the Rohingyas.
China-Myanmar relations entered a difficult phase soon after Myanmar initiated political reforms in 2011. Suspension of the Chinese-backed Myitsone dam and outflow of refugees into China as ethnic conflicts intensified along China-Myanmar borders sparking tensions between the two countries. Concerns over increased involvement of Western countries in Myanmar’s ethnic peace process in the following years and the desire to push forward the BRI motivated Beijing to improve ties with the Myanmar government.
Subsequently, relations improved when Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s party the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in early 2016. This coincided with increasing international condemnation of Myanmar over the handling of the Rohingya crisis, particularly after August 2017. China aligned itself with the Myanmar government’s interests on the Rohingya crisis and the ethnic peace process. This allowed Beijing to minimise the role of other external players, on the one hand and obtain strategic projects in Myanmar, on the other.
China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on cooperation within “the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative” in May 2017 when Aung San Suu Kyi attended the first Chinese BRF. Five months later, the CMEC was proposed and an official agreement on the “Y-shaped” corridor was signed September 2018 to connect China’s Kunming to Mandalay and then extending east and west respectively to Yangon and Kyaukpyu..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation (ORF)
Date of publication:
2019-05-15
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, “One Belt, One Road” initiative
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Behind closed doors, Myanmar has moved a step closer to approving the ambitious, multi-billion dollar China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
Description:
"then Minister for Planning and Finance U Kyaw Win arrived at the State Guesthouse in Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan Province, to meet Mr Ning Jizhe, vice chairperson of China’s National Development and Reform Commission.
Kyaw Win was three days into a visit to China with a delegation of 56 businesspeople from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the country’s peak business body.
That morning, he negotiated a draft Memorandum of Understanding for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a wide-reaching initiative that was formally announced by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi in November 2017.
The CMEC agreement is two things. First, it is a physical corridor that would connect China’s landlocked Yunnan through Mandalay to Kyaukphyu and Yangon, on new roads and a high-speed railway, in what Wang called a “three-pillar giant cooperation pattern”.
Second, it is a conceptual corridor. The overall aim is greater economic integration through initiatives such as industrial zones, trade quotas and tax breaks, but the CMEC can also include cooperation in areas not directly connected to the economy, such as disaster mitigation and public health.
The CMEC agreement is likely to see tens of billions of dollars of investment funnelled into Myanmar from private and state-owned Chinese firms under the One Belt, One Road initiative.
Despite the significance of the agreement for Myanmar’s future, the talks have taken place behind closed doors and with almost no public consultation. State media did not report on Kyaw Win’s trip to Kunming, and details of the February talks were not made public..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication:
2018-09-26
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"In South Asia now, geo-economics seems all set to shape the region's geo-politics with Beijing's ambitious US$
50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), designed ostensibly to integrate economies of the restive
Xingian and western provinces with that of Pakistan. But its real strategic objective is to develop the sea ports
of Pakistan's Baluchistan to enable western China and the energy-rich Central Asian republics to gain
unfettered access to the Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
In this background, China’s reported move to build an economic corridor with Myanmar is cause for some
concern in India. The idea of a separate China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) was pushed through during
the recent visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Myanmar following his successful efforts to persuade
Myanmar and Bangladesh to discuss the Rohingya problem across the table and work out a framework of
agreement to a phased programme of their repatriation to Rakhine. The Chinese have apparently done a lot of
hard work to bring home to the Myanmarese Army the point that the global community and the UN system will
never accept the expulsion of Rohingyas as it violates human rights and the customary international law of
citizenship.
The significance of Chinese intervention, the first time in history in a long-drawn-out dispute involving two
states, which till 1935, were parts of the British Raj, cannot be missed by strategic analysts, as it has demonstrated growing Chinese influence in Myanmar and Bangladesh, both of which share borders with India and are
of vital importance to the success of India’s Act East Policy.
The CMEC might have come as a surprise as it runs parallel to the Bangladesh-China-India and Myanmar
Initiative (BCIM), but the fact remains that it has been a non-starter, especially after China launched CPEC,
which passes through the areas of Jammu and Kashmir under illegal occupation of Pakistan and is seen as a
China-led initiative..."
Source/publisher:
"Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW)"
Date of publication:
2018-01-00
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
158.21 KB
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Three locations have been identified by Myanmar and Chinese officials under a memorandum of understandingfor the border economic cooperation core zones of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
Description:
"U Khin Maung Lwin, deputy secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, told the Myanmar Times that the country’s central committee for the Border Economic Cooperation Zone (BECZ), which met recently, decided on the areas for the core zones at Muse and Chin Shwe Haw in the northern part of Shan State and Kan Pite Tee in Kachin State.
He said the ministry would initiate a call for applications for expressions of interest (EOI) soon, adding that for the agreed upon Muse core zone, an export product manufacturing processing and warehouse area would be located at Panghsang (KyuKoke)-Wantain-Nwan Yin (Kyin San Kyawt)-Mantman (Shweli) while an import processing and warehouse area would be located at Salant (Manhiro)-Salin and Namkhang-Naungtaung.
The Chinese have also started processing works on their side of the border.
However, only Myanmar-owned companies will be allowed to participate in the bidding although foreign investors can still participate by holding up to a maximum 35 percent stake in such companies.
“We won’t allow 100pc foreign investment. It is important because it is border trade zone,” said U Khin Maung Lwin.
Local companies will have to present a detailed concept plan of their potential investment and source of their capital investment. “They will have to present EOI application on how they would implement projects,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times"
Date of publication:
2019-06-07
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
In 2011, construction work on a massive dam project in Myanmar's restive Kachin state was halted after large protests. China is now lobbying hard for the work to resume, but as BBC News Burmese's Soe Soe Htoon found, local people are still not convinced t
Description:
""I always cry every time I talk about the dam," says Jar Lie.
Eight years ago, she was forced to abandon her 40 acres of farmland and move to a resettlement village in Aung Myin Tha, around six miles (nine kilometres) away.
Her land was to be flooded by the vast reservoir created by the $3.6bn (£2.8bn) Chinese-financed Myitsone dam, at the source of the Irrawaddy river. Her new village has a market, a hospital, sealed roads and a school, all provided by the company building the dam, Beijing's State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC).
But Jar Lie says that without farming land, life here is very difficult.
"We could eat what we grew before; there was no need to buy anything. Here without land we can't do anything; we don't know how to earn money. I am very sick here."
The dam was due to be completed this year - but so far work has barely begun, and the project has exposed simmering tensions over the balance of power between China and the country it often refers to as its younger brother. The Myitsone was to be the largest of seven dams SPIC is promising to build in the region, to provide quickly-developing Myanmar with much-needed electricity.
By some estimates, the project would by itself generate more energy than the entire country produces now.
The full contract the former military government signed with SPIC has never been publicly released. But in a rare interview in May, with BBC News Burmese, the former deputy minister of Myanmar's state power company, U Maw Thar Htwe, confirmed the most provocative part of the deal - that 90% of the electricity the dam generated would go back over the border to China.
According to U Maw Thar Htwe, the government will get a 10% stake in the dam but will only see a return on its investment two decades after it starts operations..."
Source/publisher:
BBC News
Date of publication:
2019-07-27
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, The impact of natural disasters on the environment and people of Burma/Myanmar, Biodiversity - Burma/Myanmar-related
Language:
more
Description:
" Environmentalists, scientists, writers and monks called for the cancellation of the Myitsone dam at a meeting in Yangon on Monday, at which a committee was formed to fight for the termination of the US$3.6 billion, China-backed project.
The meeting came amid pressure from Beijing for work to resume on the dam and followed State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s March 20 comment that the 6,000MW project needed to be considered from “a wider perspective”.
Work on the dam, on the Ayeyarwady River about 42 kilometres upstream from the Kachin State capital Myitkyina, was suspended by President U Thein Sein in September 2011 amid escalating and emotionally charged protests against the project.
A joint venture between China’s State Power Investment Corporation and a Myanmar conglomerate, Asia World, began work on the dam in 2009 under a memorandum of understand signed by the ruling military junta and the Chinese government three years earlier.
An agreement provided for most of the power generated by the massive dam, which would inundate an area as big as Singapore and displace thousands of people, to be exported to China.
Speakers at the April 1 meeting included retired government meteorologist and founder of Myanmar Climate Change Watch, Dr Tun Lwin, 71, who challenged one of Aung San Suu Kyi’s March 20 comments about the project.
The State Counsellor was quoted as saying that if her National League for Democracy government broke promises made by a previous administration, it would lose credibility with investors.
Tun Lwin said there were examples of governments not keeping promises for the sake of their people and the national interest, citing the decision by the Malaysian government to cancel China-backed infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars.
“I want the government to listen to the people and cancel the Myitsone project,” he said. “Otherwise I believe the future will not be pleasant.”
In his speech Tun Lwin said he did not support the Myitsone dam because the Ayeyarwady River was more important than Myanmar itself. Global warming was already leading to water shortages, he said, and blocking the flow of the river would endanger the country’s future access to water.
The former director-general of the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology also expressed regret that his warnings about the impact of climate change on Myanmar were largely ignored.
“Sadly, no one has listened enough, especially government officials. This is the fate of our country,” said Tun Lwin, adding that the average temperature in Myanmar had risen by about 1.4 degrees Celsius over the past 50 years..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication:
2019-04-02
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, Climate Change - Migration Regional, The impact of natural disasters on the environment and people of Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"China’s hurry to revive the Myitsone dam projects has renewed concerns among ethnic Kachin and Myanmar’s people. Last week thousands of people in Kachin state protested, calling once again for a permanent stop to the projects.
This latest demonstration follows several discussions about the resumption of the projects. For example, at an investment summit in Naypyitaw on 29 Jan, U Thaung Tun, the minister for investment and foreign economic relations, said the government wants to find a solution for the projects because the government values its relationship with China.
So far, none of the leaders has given a clear answer to the public concerning the projects. When meeting with religious leaders and representatives from ethnic groups on the Kachin State Day on 10 Jan, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not give a specific answer on whether Myanmar will continue the projects. Likewise, the commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing also did not give a clear answer on whether the project would be stopped when a group of religious leaders met him in Myitkyina on 5 February.
Then who can give the answer that people deserve? The answer is China. There are threefold things that China should do.
First, China should publicly reveal the contract of the Myitsone dam projects which was signed with the previous military regime in 2006. In late January, Dr Zaw Myint Maung – Vice Chairman of NLD party and Chief Minister of Mandalay region said ‘we do not know the detailed information of the contract.” It implies that even some leaders do not know the information written on the contract. Thus, China should now reveal detailed information about the contract.
Second, China should disclose the full list of people, if any, who have allegedly taken bribes from China Power Investment Corporation (CPI). Unsubstantiated rumours have spread that some prominent leaders, religious leaders, high officials from the Border Guard Force (BGF) and militia have received bribes.
Last but not least, China should heed the voices of Myanmar’s citizens. It is understandable that China wants to push the project forward in order to help meet the power demands of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, China should not neglect people, particularly those who were forced to relocate due to the dam project in the Myitsone. Their request is simple: permanently stopping the project. Furthermore, China should respect the Pawkhpaw – brotherhood – relation with Myanmar, as they have many more investment projects across the country..."
Source/publisher:
"BNI Multimedia Group" via Mizzima
Date of publication:
2019-02-18
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, “One Belt, One Road” initiative
Language:
more
Description:
"In a rare concession to public pressure, Myanmar’s government on Friday ordered the suspension of a controversial hydroelectric project financed and led by a state-owned Chinese company.
The Myitsone dam project would have been the first to span the Irrawaddy River, the largest waterway in Myanmar, and was a showcase project for the previous military government. The halt in construction was a victory for dissidents in a country with a long history of stifling opposition.
A number of prominent people inside Myanmar, including writers, scientists and the Nobel Peace laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had opposed the project. The government’s announcement underscores the nascent stirrings of democracy in Myanmar, also known as Burma, after a nominally civilian government took control from a military junta in March.
The dam’s suspension was a blow to China, long considered a benefactor to the government in Myanmar. China Power Investment, a state-run Chinese company, was leading the construction of the project, which would have delivered electricity to southern China. It is unclear how the suspension will affect six other Chinese-led hydroelectric projects in northern Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The New York Times"
Date of publication:
2011-09-30
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, The impact of natural disasters on the environment and people of Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar has been part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) development strategy since its adoption by the Chinese government and it is willing to continue participating in beneficial projects, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said on Wednesday.
Description:
"The state counsellor made the remark in a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping, according to Voice of America’s Myanmar service.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was in Beijing to attend the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, which started Thursday and ends Saturday.
Before the official start of the forum, she paid a call on the Chinese president to express her appreciation for the strengthening of bilateral relations between China and Myanmar as well as future cooperation under the BRI.
President Xi said he desired the strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation with Myanmar within the BRI framework.
According to a statement from the Office of the State Counsellor, the heads of state also discussed the acceleration of cooperation between the two countries to improve the lives of their citizens.
Observers said that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is expected to sign agreements for more projects under the BRI at the forum.
Minister of Transport and Communications U Thant Sin Maung, Minister of Electricity and Energy U Win Khaing, Deputy Minister of Commerce U Aung Htoo, and Deputy Minister of Planning and Finance U Set Aung are also attending the forum.
Of the 40 projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor initiative, Myanmar will prioritise nine of them in power, roads, bridges, communications, construction, agriculture, research, and technology.
Besides national-level projects, China’s Yunnan province is proposing smaller projects in Myanmar.
Also, Guangdong Province Deputy Administrator Qu Yang said during the Guangdong- Myanmar Commerce and Investment Conference earlier this year that the province will cooperate with Myanmar in four sectors under the BRI.
The meeting on Wednesday also discussed China’s continuing help for Myanmar’s efforts to achieve peace and national reconciliation, ensure border stability and law enforcement, repatriate refugees in Rakhine State, cooperate on international relations, and promote tourism.
Next year will mark 70 years of diplomatic relations between China and Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times"
Date of publication:
2019-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The Myanmar government, led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), has agreed with China to seek a solution to the controversial Myitsone dam project that will satisfy both sides, outgoing Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang said on Tuesday.
Description:
"“We are seriously concerned about the project. We agreed with the Myanmar government to find a solution that will not harm bilateral relations,” he said. “I firmly believe our relations will be better if we can solve this problem.”
Hong is set to leave his post at the end of the month. On Tuesday, he invited a select group of local journalists for a briefing at his residence.
The US$3.6 billion, 6000MW Myitsone dam in Kachin State is funded by China’s state-owned State Power Investment Corporation. Its construction was suspended by former president U Thein Sein in 2011 after widespread protests over social and environmental concerns.
People are wondering about the future of the project, as State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is under pressure from China to make a decision.
The State Counsellor has not revealed the details of the talks with China on the dam but she has promised to disclose any deal they reach.
The uncertainty has triggered speculation. Some say the dam would be re-sized or delayed until after the 2020 general election. Others say it would be stopped completely. “No need to worry about Myitsone,” Hong said. “When the results (of the negotiations) come out, cooperation between Myanmar and China will move forward”.
Hong admitted that the suspension of the project has been an obstacle to greater economic cooperation between China and Myanmar. He added that China suffered a big loss due to the suspension of the project for the past eight years.
He expressed concern that some groups are using the impasse over the project to advance their political interests. “A group is spreading misinformation about the Myitsone project, as they want to disturb Myanmar’s democratic reform process and Myanmar-China bilateral relations,” Hong said, without elaborating..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times"
Date of publication:
2019-05-22
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Myanmar's State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi on Wednesday ahead of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation to be held from April 25 to 27 in Beijing.
Noting the profound "Paukphaw" (fraternal) friendship between China and Myanmar, Xi said China is willing to carry forward the traditional friendship of the two sides, increase mutually beneficial cooperation and push forward bilateral relations constantly.
In light of the celebrations next year that will mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Myanmar diplomatic relationship, the two sides should actively conduct interactions at all levels and people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and focus their pragmatic cooperation more on areas related to people's livelihood, so as to continuously consolidate public support for bilateral friendship, Xi said.
China supports Myanmar in developing its economy and improving people's livelihood, and appreciates the efforts of the Myanmar's government to advance domestic peace and reconciliation, Xi said.
China is willing to work with Myanmar to safeguard the security and stability in China-Myanmar border areas and ensure the safety and normal order of border residents, he said.
China highly appreciates the establishment of a steering committee by the Myanmar's government for implementation of tasks related to the Belt and Road Initiative, which is chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, Xi said.
China is willing to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with Myanmar under the Belt and Road framework, and accelerate the development of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, so as to bring more concrete benefits to the two peoples, he said.
Noting that China is a close and friendly neighbor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi expressed gratitude to China's efforts to support the peace, stability and development of Myanmar.
Myanmar has supported the Belt and Road Initiative since the very beginning and has been active in expanding cooperation with China, and it believes joint construction of the initiative will lead to greater well-being in the world and the region, enhance Myanmar-China friendship and cooperation, and bring concrete benefits to the two peoples, she said.
Myanmar is willing to work with China to safeguard the security and stability in border areas, she said.
Myanmar appreciates China's position in upholding the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and is willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with China on multilateral affairs, she added..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua Net"
Date of publication:
2019-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"China-Myanmar cooperation under" Belt and Road"
တရုတ်-မြန်မာ Belt and Road အစကောင်းတစ်ရပ်..."
Source/publisher:
China Embassy in Myanmar
Date of publication:
2019-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-08-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"With Myanmar being an important country under the Belt and Road Initiative, Yoma Strategic Holding’s Melvyn Poon says the company is putting much investment into local consumer products and services. Speaking beside the Belt and Road Summit 2018, he sees trade opportunities arising between Myanmar and the Chinese mainland particularly in agriculture and processing while Hong Kong is a supply chain and finance centre for new infrastructure and investment..."
Source/publisher:
HKTDC
Date of publication:
2018-08-27
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"In Burma, workers are building one of the most lucrative foreign-funded development projects in the country's history. Twin oil and gas pipelines will stretch from Burma's west coast to its northeast border and into energy-hungry China. They are expected to earn Burma about $1 billion per year, but, as VOA's Daniel Schearf reports from Mandalay, not everyone is a supporter..."
Source/publisher:
VOA News
Date of publication:
2012-05-05
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Voters in Myanmar will be going to the first elections in 20 years on Sunday, even as the military government faces severe international trade sanctions.
But China continues to invest billions of dollars, fuelled mostly by an appetite for natural resources.
Al Jazeera's correspondent, not being named due to Myanmar's reporting restrictions, reports from Mandalay where the signs of China's growing influence are clearly visible. (Nov 05, 2010)..."
Source/publisher:
Al Jazeera English
Date of publication:
2010-11-06
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Lowy Institute East Asia Research Fellow Aaron L Connelly speaks to the BBC's Sharanjit Leyl about the purpose and implications of a new China-Myanmar oil pipeline..."
Source/publisher:
BBC World News
Date of publication:
2017-04-18
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Chinese products has been dominating the daily lives of Myanmar people for their lower prices and good qualities..."
Source/publisher:
New China TV
Date of publication:
2016-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has wrapped up a visit to Myanmar in which he met his counterpart and de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi. It was the first visit by a foreign official since the new government took office. What statement is intended with this visit, and what can be expected from the China-Myanmar relationship going forward? Suu Kyi will likely be appointed to a role similar to prime minister, although the bill was opposed by the country's remaining military powers. What should her priorities be? And will a strong relationship with China help her in the formidable tasks of stabilizing the country and boosting economic growth? Join us for a discussion with Mr. Victor Gao, one of the directors of the China-Myanmar Friendship Association; Mr. Alistair Cook, research fellow with the Center for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS) at Nanyang Technological University; and Mr. Murray Hiebert, deputy director and senior fellow, Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS..."
Source/publisher:
CGTN
Date of publication:
2016-04-07
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"A huge petrochemical facility is up in Kyaukphyu, in Rakhine State in Myanmar. Built by China National Petroleum Corporation as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, it poses threat to the logistical flows of oil and gas supplies to China, and affects petrochemical industries across the Straits of Malacca, including Singapore..."
Source/publisher:
CNA Insider
Date of publication:
2018-09-13
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"China's president and premier met world leaders in Beijing on Wednesday ahead of the opening of the Belt and Road conference showcasing a Chinese initiative to help build ports, railways and other infrastructure in the developing world.
Chinese President Xi Jinping shook hands with Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi at the Great Hall of the People and extended his welcome.
"China and Myanmar should promote traditional friendship and close cooperation," Xi said, noting that this was Myanmar's second planned appearance at the Belt and Road conference.
Aung San Suu Kyi praised the Belt and Road, saying it would help strengthen friendship between the two countries.
"We have been involved in BRI since its inception, and we wish to be part of the process by which it will prove to be of great benefit," she said.
Xi also met Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the Secretary General of Japan's ruling Liberal Democrats, Toshihiro Nikai, to discuss the Belt and Road initiative.
Also on Wednesday, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met the leaders of Chile, Mongolia, Ethiopia, and the International Monetary Fund at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.
The meetings and conference are casting a spotlight on complaints the projects leave some countries with too much debt.
Asian and African leaders plan to press for relief from politically volatile debt burdens at the Belt and Road conference that begins on Thursday in Beijing. That could bring a note of tension to an event meant to be an official celebration of President Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy initiative.
The Belt and Road has stirred anxiety in Washington, Moscow and Tokyo about Beijing's strategic ambitions as well as how projects are devised, managed and financed.
The meeting will bring together leaders or envoys from three dozen countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, Serbia, Myanmar and Kenya..."
Source/publisher:
AP Archive
Date of publication:
2019-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"For some villagers along Myanmar's border with Thailand, the promise of a new road is a threat to life as they know it.
But others see it as an opportunity.
Al Jazeera's Mohammed Jamjoom reports on how a Chinese construction project is threatening a fragile peace in Myanmar's Kayin state..."
Source/publisher:
For some villagers along Myanmar's border with Thailand, the promise of a new road is a threat to life as they know it. But others see it as an opportunity. Al Jazeera's Mohammed Jamjoom reports on how a Chinese construction project is threatening a fra
Date of publication:
2019-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Foreign investment in mining, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Interview on the implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for Myanmar and its people.
China’s BRI is a large infrastructural undertaking that seeks to reactivate the legendary Silk Roads. Myanmar is China's closest link to the Indian Ocean, which makes the country strategically important for the maritime segment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, especially with the two countries propelling the China-Myanmar economic corridor in 2017.
Former Ambassador U Nyunt Maung Shein and Chariman of the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies replies during a regional workshop in Myanmar on the security implications of BRI’s maritime segment..."
Source/publisher:
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Date of publication:
2018-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
CITIC-led consortium this month started legally required impact assessments but the controversial $1.3 billion mega-project is still far from a done deal
Description:
"Myanmar’s US$1.3 billion Kyaukphyu deep-sea port project, a China-backed scheme under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is one small step closer to realization.
CITIC Group Corporation, the Chinese state firm leading the project, started this month a legally required environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) and preliminary geological survey, the first signs of on-the-ground progress for the mega-project.
The moves come eight months after Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government inked a framework agreement with a CITIC-led consortium. The agreement fell short of, but paved the way for, an actual concession-granting deal.
The CITIC-led consortium, comprised of four other Chinese enterprises and Thailand’s Charoen Pokphand Group, aims to develop the port as part of a special economic zone (SEZ) in Myanmar’s conflict-ridden Rakhine state.
Negotiations for the mega-project, green-lighted by previous president Thein Sein, stalled in the first two years of Suu Kyi’s government, either for reasons of red tape or lingering official unease over the scheme.
When contacted by Asia Times, a CITIC representative declined to speculate on when the two parties would conclude the ongoing talks..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times"
Date of publication:
2019-07-15
Date of entry/update:
2019-07-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"A cross the river from Myanmar’s colonial-era old capital of Yangon, low-slung shanties dot rice fields that extend into a bucolic rural distance.
But that could soon change if local property developers and their deep-pocketed Chinese backers build the Yangon New City Project, an ultra-modern design with glass tower high rises some here are already referring to as “Chinatown.”
The first phase of the mega-project will reportedly cover 8,000 hectares of land west of the Yangon river and will be led by the New Yangon Development Company Limited (NYDC).
The new company was incorporated in March 2018 as a public-private partnership with Serge Pun, one of Myanmar’s wealthiest tycoons. Pun, a Sino-Myanmar who was born in Yangon and spent the 1960s in China, serves as NYDC’s chief executive.
Pun returned from exile in 1991, the darkest years of military rule, and with the help of high-level connections was able to acquire lands which he developed into housing estates and business zones. His vast wealth stems from investment in real estate development, manufacturing, and banking. In May last year, NYDC signed a US$1.5 billion framework agreement with China’s state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), which will build infrastructure including bridges, roads, a power station and water treatment plants for the new city.
In return, CCCC has been granted by the Yangon regional government rights to 28 square kilometers in the new city for unspecified purposes.
The lack of transparency and CCCC’s dubious reputation in the region has stirred controversy around a project that, if completed, will dramatically and immutably change Yangon’s old-world look and feel.
The deal is widely seen by observers in Yangon as part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Other BRI projects in Myanmar include a high-speed railroad designed to connect the Chinese border with the western Myanmar port of Kyaukphyu and hydropower projects in Kachin and Shan states..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
Asia Times
Date of publication:
2019-06-02
Date of entry/update:
2019-06-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"This really matters in Myanmar, where the economy has become greatly reliant on Chinese capital and labour, to say nothing of the waves of people and goods that cross the vast, mountainous borderlands.
Millions of words have already been spilled on the big strategic dilemmas related to China in Southeast Asia: the Straits of Malacca; the South China Sea; String of Pearls; One Belt, One Road.
And yet it is not through these top-tier considerations that the most important story will be told.
What is often forgotten is the extent of everyday connections between Southeast Asia and its giant neighbour to the north. While this might be most obvious in Singapore – and across the region in the bustling urban neighbourhoods where Chinese migrants have found their homes and fortunes – the fact is that “Chineseness” is everywhere.
For most Southeast Asian governments this presents a confused mix of risks and opportunities. They certainly benefit from the talent and energy of the Chinese in their midst. In some cases, their assimilation into the national mainstream is almost complete.
Thailand, as an example, was astonishingly successful in the way that it absorbed millions of Chinese. Their descendants have the great advantage of taking Thai names to go with their accents, mannerisms and ideologies. It would be hard to imply that many remain“foreigners”: The simple fact is that they have melted in.
The same cannot be said for Chinese in some other parts of the region. They often tend to be marked apart by cultural, linguistic and religious differences that have the tragic potential to antagonise their neighbours. The region has a long and ignominious history of anti-Chinese sentiment, which sometimes ignites short-lived violent episodes.
Attacks on Chinese in Indonesia in the late 1990s show how political instability can go hand-in-hand with violence targeting an obvious minority. Anti-Rohingya campaigns in Myanmar take a similar tone. Sadly, at times of crisis there are often too few voices of moderation and inclusion.
For it is such inclusion, and a moderate vision of national belonging, that will keep the balance in China’s relationship with Southeast Asia. The Chinese government, increasingly bold in projecting power beyond its borders, appreciates the great significance of the Chinese population across this region. Even where they no longer speak their ancestral language and have few current ties to their old country, it makes sense to keep them on-side.
What about the Chinese in Myanmar today? Most are yet to be absorbed to quite the same extent as their cousins across the border in Thailand. Their assimilation has come later, and has been slower.
In living memory there were anti-Chinese movements in the country, all heavily politicised at a time when the Burmese Socialist government was going toe-to-toe with its Communist foes..."
Nicholas Farrelly
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Times
Date of publication:
2015-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2019-06-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"A statement from the Chinese government on Sunday has renewed concerns among ethnic Kachin over the stalled Myitsone dam project. In the statement, the Chinese Embassy in Yangon claimed that Kachin political leaders and social organizations had a “positive attitude” toward the dam. It added that “local people of Kachin State do not oppose the Myitsone hydropower project; it is some individuals and social organizations from outside that oppose the project.”
Three Kachin political parties and community leader Rev. Hkalam Samson immediately issued a statement of their own to insist that China’s claims were false and misleading.
It is obvious that the people of Myanmar, and the Kachin in particular, have been opposed to the Myitsone dam projects even before it forced thousands of Kachin villagers to relocate.
Myitsone is hardly China’s only planned dam in Myanmar. It also hopes to build dams in Lasa on the Mali River and in Khaunglanghpu, Phizaw, Lakin and Pashe on the Nmai River. A dam on the Nmai in Chiphwi is already finished..."
JOE KUMBUN
Source/publisher:
The Irrawaddy
Date of publication:
2019-01-15
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Had its original construction schedule not been derailed by controversy and public condemnation, leading to its suspension in 2011, the Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam hydropower project near the source of the Irrawaddy River in Kachin State would be operational by now as scheduled.
It has been eight years since the suspension. Currently, the project site on the bank of the river is mostly deserted. When it was launched on Dec. 21, 2009, the Myanmar Investment Commission estimated total investment in Myitsone Dam would amount to US$4.3 billion (6.54 trillion kyats). The project was in the middle of construction when it was halted in September 2011. Before the suspension, resettlement at the dam site was finished, and site formation, water supply, electricity and transportation facilities had commenced, according to its Chinese developer, State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC), which was known as China Power Investment (CPI) until 2015.
Despite recent pressure from China to resume the dam’s construction, anti-dam sentiment is still on the rise among the public. Recently, prominent civil society leaders, environmentalists, writers and artists announced that they would launch a one-dollar campaign to collect money from the public to compensate China in exchange for scrapping the project. The campaign clearly reflects how unpopular the project is among Myanmar people. They don’t like it because the project near the confluence of the Maykha and Malikha rivers, which gives rise to the Irrawaddy River, would destroy the country’s lifeline waterway, which runs through the country from north to south before emptying into the Andaman Sea. For Myanmar people, the river is the source of their identity because the Irrawaddy valley is the cradle of Myanmar civilization. Furthermore, they fear the dam would disrupt the flow of sediment along river, harming agricultural livelihoods. Plus, the dam site is reportedly seismically unstable; a collapse would have the potential to flood an area twice the size of Singapore.
It’s interesting to note how such a controversial mega project came into existence. The following is a brief flashback summarizing the development of the Myitsone Dam issue and identifying those involved in the project’s inception at a time when Myanmar was under military rule.
Beginnings
It all started with the Ministry of Electrical Power’s hydropower project master plan for the upstream Irrawaddy River basin in Kachin State in late 2005. The plan was initially developed with Yunnan Machinery (Equipment) Export & Import Company (YMEC) and Kunming Hydropower Institute of Design. The plan was scrapped when the ministry was reformed in May of the following year as the Ministry of Electric Power-1 (MOEP-1) for generating electrical power and the Ministry of Electric Power-2 for distribution..."
Source/publisher:
The Irrawaddy
Date of publication:
2019-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Work on a high-speed rail line linking Yangon to China’s Yunnan province, as well as Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, is expected to start within two months, China Daily newspaper reported on November 21.
Should the plan come to fruition, the 1920-kilometre (1200 miles) Yunnan-Yangon line will be able to carry trains travelling at up to 240 kilometres an hour (km/h).
China scholars told The Hindu newspaper that the lines were part of a wider effort to deepen engagement with its Southeast Asian neighbours, officials said last week. According to Wang Mengshu, a consultant for the Chinese Academy of Engineering, said studies are also being conducted to link Yunnan’s capital – Kunming – with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. In August, the Ministry of Railways also sent a team to Thailand to explore investing in a US$25.6-billion, 240km/h high-speed railway and rail network.
Mr Wang, who is a professor with the Chinese Academy of Engineering, told The Hindu in an interview earlier this year that construction had already begun on a line connecting Kunming with Singapore. The Southeast Asian network, he said, could be completed as early as 2020. Beijing’s increased infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia, analysts say, is part of a larger effort to expand economic and strategic influence in the region. Beijing hopes the investment will also ease anxieties among its ASEAN neighbours over the impact of China’s rising economic influence.
China ratified the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) pact with the regional bloc but in the process has created a fast-widening trade imbalance in its favour, in part fuelled by the flooding of the ASEAN market with Chinese goods. This has led to strains in commercial relationships with many ASEAN countries. The trade deficit grew to $21.6 billion last year. A number of countries have also voiced concern over the pattern of Chinese investments, which have generally targeted resources such as oil and minerals..."
Kyaw Hsu Mon, agencies
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Times
Date of publication:
2010-11-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, “One Belt, One Road” initiative
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Ja Hkawn still remembers the day all the residents of a nearby village were forcibly driven across the river by the local authorities. It was in late May 2010. The villagers of Mali Zup were given just three days to pack their belongings. She saw the villagers carrying their possessions on their shoulders and rounding up their livestock. As they headed to their “new place” across the river, their footsteps were heavy. Some shed tears as they left.
In April of the following year, Ja Hkawn, who was then a resident of Tang Hpre village, faced the same fate as her Mali Zup neighbors. The whole village was forced to move to a new place—Aung Myin Tha, 8 miles to the south.
The reason for the forced relocations: to make way for a mega-dam to be built by China Power Investment Corporation (CPI), now known as State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC).
“I’ve never liked it here—I long to go back to my village,” Ja Hkawn said. She misses her old village located at the confluence of the May Kha and Mali Kha rivers; life is hard in Aung Myin Tha, as the new location is not arable, but built on rocky red soil.
Once a landowner with several acres on which she grew seasonal vegetables, the 53-year-old Kachin woman now—like many others—scratches out a living as a vendor with the support of local NGOs, selling organic soap, local snacks and T-shirts emblazoned with the slogans “No Dam” and “Long Live Irrawaddy” to tourists in Myitsone. One of Kachin State’s major landmarks, and a must-see for visitors to the area, Myitsone is the point at which the confluence of the May Kha and Mali Kha rivers gives rise to Myanmar’s lifeline, The Irrawaddy River. The confluence is recognized by the Organization for World Wildlife Conservation as a place of biodiversity and natural heritage. During a recent visit there, The Irrawaddy witnessed a busload of Chinese tourists visiting the area..."
Nan Lwin
Source/publisher:
The Irrawaddy
Date of publication:
2019-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Construction of the China-Myanmar railway is expected to speed up as a vital segment within Myanmar saw a positive breakthrough during the just-concluded Belt and Road forum in Beijing.
During the opening day of the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation on Thursday, Li Changjin, chairman of the China Railway Group Company (CRGC), handed over a feasibility report on the Muse-Mandalay Railway project to Myanmar's Minister for Transport and Communications U Thant Sin Maung.
The railway starts from Muse, a major land port of Myanmar that borders the southwestern Chinese city of Ruili, and stretches southward to Mandalay, the second largest city of the country. The 410 kilometer-long project will connect the Chinese rail network through Ruili and serves as an important part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
In October 2018, representatives from both countries signed a memorandum of understanding, kicking off the feasibility research on this project. Following the agreement, the China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEC), a member of CRGC, conducted a geological survey and analysis in Myanmar..."
Yang Jinghao
Source/publisher:
China Global Television Network (CGTN)
Date of publication:
2019-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"China Railway Eryuan Engineering Corporation (CREEC) has started a partial survey for the Muse-Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railway line, part of the China –Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the project, expected to be one of the largest road and railway projects in the country, last October.
The project calls for the building of a high-speed railway line from Kunming, China, to Muse on the Myanmar-China border and from there to Mandalay and terminating in Kyaukphyu in Rakhine. The survey project Muse to Mandalay the 430km line is expected to support trains travelling at up to 160kmh and will feature seven cargo stations and five passenger stations.
China is said to view the project to connect the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and deepwater port in Myanmar as something that will benefit both countries under the larger CMEC umbrella,.
“CREEC, at their cost, has started a ground survey for the project and wants to proceed with the construction, but Myanmar hasn’t given any commitment beyond signing the MOU,” U Htaung Shan Khan, general manager of planning and administration of Myanmar Railways told The Myanmar Times.
“They want to construct the railway and run trains, but we have to consider Myanmar’s own interests and policies and the surveying for the project in Mandalay has been allowed,” he said.
However, former Thibaw MP U Ye Tun, whose township is located along the projected route of the railway, says the survey should be conducted for the entire route instead of just from Muse to Mandalay..."
Chan Mya Htwe
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Times
Date of publication:
2019-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Workers in southwest China’s Yunnan province recently finished laying the tracks down for a section of two major railways in southwest China. One railway will connect Yunnan to the neighbouring Tibet. The other connects Yunnan to the neighbouring country of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
South China Morning Post
Date of publication:
2018-04-04
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"WHEN THE Chinese embassy in Yangon posted a Xinhua article about State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s meeting with Chinese Premier Mr Li Keqiang to Facebook on April 26, the solitary comment below the post was, “How about Myitsone dam?”
It summed up the singular lens through which many in Myanmar have come to view bilateral relations over the past six months, and the growing concern that the Myanmar government, under pressure from China, might agree to proceed with the US$3.6 billion megadam in Kachin State, which was suspended in September 2011.
These concerns reached a crescendo on April 20 when hundreds of civil society leaders gathered at Yangon’s Novotel Hotel and announced a “one dollar campaign” aimed at collecting $1 from every citizen to raise funds to compensate China for scrapping the Myitsone Dam. They also addressed an open letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping saying that a dam on the Ayeyarwady River was unacceptable to the people of Myanmar.
This civil society event was held just four days before Aung San Suu Kyi left for the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, from April 25-27. The forum brought together dozens of world leaders to discuss Xi’s signature – and controversial – foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative.
But when Aung San Suu Kyi returned from Beijing, the tone had clearly shifted. Media coverage trumpeted the 1 billion yuan ($148 million) grant that China had promised for economic and technical assistance. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement released on April 29 said this would be for “livelihood improvement, feasibility study for major projects and humanitarian assistance for the IDPs in northern part of Myanmar”. Three memoranda of understanding were also signed, but they appeared to cover broad areas of cooperation rather than individual projects.
Instead of Myitsone or the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone in Rakhine State, the state counsellor’s meeting with Xi focused on other issues of importance to the bilateral relationship, such as import quotas on rice, combating illegal border trade and human trafficking, supporting the peace process and defending Myanmar at the United Nations and other international fora.
So, what happened? Ma Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, a lead researcher at the Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar in Yangon who focuses on Myanmar-China relations, said most observers had expected that detailed discussions would be held on specific projects, including Myitsone, in bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Forum.
In response to growing criticism of BRI, China wanted to use the forum as an opportunity to “show that BRI is mutually beneficial and to be implemented at the comfort level of the receiving countries”, she said. In the context of Myanmar, that meant avoiding any rhetoric on the need to proceed with Myitsone or other major infrastructure projects. Government spokesperson U Zaw Htay has said that Myitsone was not discussed in bilateral meetings.
“I think many observers in Myanmar are relieved that the agreements they reached do not seem to be binding,” Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee told Frontier. “But it is important to note that the detailed project discussions will take place with individual ministries, which can be much more low profile. Thus, we also need to keep our eyes on to the negotiation of these individual projects as well.”
Another close observer of China-Myanmar relations, U Maung Maung Soe, said the documents signed at the forum did not appear particularly significant..."
Thomas Kean
Source/publisher:
Frontier Myanmar
Date of publication:
2019-05-08
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, China-Burma relations, Burma's economic relations with China
Language:
English
more
Description:
"The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could bring opportunities to Myanmar and the region, Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi said here on Monday.
At the first meeting of the steering committee for implementation of tasks relating to the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, Aung San Suu Kyi also stressed the need to work on the projects under the BRI in harmony with the country's national priorities and said that the welfare of the people will be counted while implementing the projects.
The BRI could promote cooperation in all sectors including infrastructure, the state counselor added.
Vice-President U Myint Swe called for the engagement between respective ministries and regional governments for better implementation of projects under the framework of BRI and highlighted the need to choose the right projects which can promote the development of the country and its people.
The steering committee which was formed in the end of September, 2018, is chaired by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi. Vice-President U Myint Swe serves as vice chairman and other ministers and regional chief ministers are the members..."
Source/publisher:
Asia & Pacific
Date of publication:
2019-02-19
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
China’s influence in Myanmar manifests on three different levels. At the bilateral level, the government and the military establishment of Myanmar receives diplomatic dividends for maintaining good ties with China. At the domestic political level, China’s relations with the country’s ethnic organizations makes it an important stakeholder in the ongoing reconciliation process. Finally, at the economic level, a lack of alternatives makes Naypyidaw reliant on Chinese investments, thereby ensuring favorable policies towards China over the longer term, notwithstanding regime changes.
Despite Myanmar’s increasing outreach to the outside world, Chinese engagement with the military and political elites in the country is still strong. Although Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationship with China has been complicated given her stature as a pro-democracy leader, in her more recent political career as State Counsellor she has a pragmatic route with regard to foreign policy. Her official visits to China have been viewed as largely fruitful, resulting in a greater understanding between the two countries, and helping shield Myanmar from international ostracism.
Source/publisher:
The Diplomat
Date of publication:
2019-05-07
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Other Special Economic Zones
Language:
English
more
Description:
"PRECIOUS little information has emerged about the agreements that Myanmar signed late last month at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.
Myanmar signed a handful of agreements at the forum, including two memorandums of understanding, an economic and technical cooperation agreement, and an “early harvest” project list. Neither government has released detailed information on the contents of these agreements, including whether they are binding in any way.
The bigger story from the Belt and Road Forum, which fell April 25-27, appears to have been what Myanmar didn’t sign.
Sources within and close to the government, as well as in the diplomatic and business communities, have told Frontier that China had been pressuring Myanmar before the forum to sign a number of project-specific agreements, including for some “controversial” projects.
The Myanmar government refused to sign the agreements at the Belt and Road Forum, citing the need to conduct further assessments on the proposed projects, and instead committed only to more general MOUs.
The sources were unable to confirm the number, indicating it could have been four to six additional agreements.
China responded to this rejection by “dipping into its pocket”, as one government source put it, and instead proposing the economic and technical cooperation agreement with the grant.
Before the forum “all sorts of hand grenades were being thrown around, on Myitsone for example”, said Mr Sean Turnell, an economic adviser to State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. “Maybe it is just part of the usual thing you do before a big meeting – get all the ambit claims out there. But in the meetings themselves [in Beijing], the atmospherics were good.”
Turnell described it as a “fantastic” outcome for Myanmar. “The Chinese essentially agreed with the position here – that a lot of these projects are good but it’s up to the governments to negotiate them project by project,” he said..."
Thomas Kean
Source/publisher:
Frontier Myanmar
Date of publication:
1970-01-01
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"If the strategically important Kyaukpyu deep sea port in Rakhine State is developed systematically, it will help the country’s trade sector grow, said Mr Hong Liang, the Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar.
Myanmar is implementing three special economic zones, including the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port and the Kyaukpyu SEZ.
“The deep sea port will play a pivotal role in the development of the country. Imported goods are flowing into Myanmar through Singapore, resulting in additional cost. There is still no deep sea port in Myanmar. By doing so, the implementation of the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port will promote trade as well as foreign investment. It will also contribute to the peace and stability of Rakhine State,” said the Chinese ambassador.
He made the remarks at the 1st China-Myanmar tea party with media agencies.
The Kyaukpyu SEZ aims to build an economic corridor between China, India, and the ASEAN countries. The initiative began in December, 2015. A Chinese corporation is developing the deep sea port and the SEZ.
The deep sea port will have the capacity to handle 7.8 million tons of goods and 4.9 million containers yearly. The Kyaukpyu SEZ will be established over 1,000 hectares of land.
The government is inviting investors to invest in building fundamental infrastructure, such as electricity, telecommunication, water facility, and road upgrade. The deep sea port is expected to reach a developed stage in 20 years..."
Myint Maung Soe
Source/publisher:
Global New Light of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2019-05-23
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations, Other Special Economic Zones
Language:
English
more
Description:
"The country is likely to see an economic rise due to abundant low-cost labour compared to other countries in the region. Myanmar has suffered from international sanctions for years, as well as severe import restrictions imposed by the former junta. Many economists say there is likely to be huge economic growth in Myanmar after joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The Belt and Road initiative or the New Silk Road is a modern initiative put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, which aims to expand China’s transport and communication network and connect China with many of the world’s economies under the umbrella of “joint profit”. This initiative is cross-border and not limited to the Asian region, reaching many geographically distant countries. Of course, neighbours have the largest share of the projects raised by this initiative. It is logical that the nearest countries are the first beneficiaries of such a huge project.
When dealing with the special relationship between the Chinese and Myanmar and the political and economic relations that bring them together, more emphasis should be placed on the economy. Chinese investor plays a key role in supporting Myanmar’s economy.
Today, many Chinese companies in Myanmar are investing in natural resources and introducing advanced technology to the country. For its part, the Chinese government attaches great importance to the promotion of investment in Myanmar because of the great benefit to China, based on the economic studies that push the Chinese government to move towards this neighbouring country.
China is an important political and economic player in Myanmar, through China’s projects to build bridges, roads, ports and many other vital projects, which serve the Belt and Road Initiative. But the truth is, if China had not been this huge economic giant, the relationship between the two countries would not have been so remarkable.
Today, China, through projects in Myanmar such as the Belt and Road Initiative, creates many job opportunities for the people of Myanmar and makes the government of Myanmar welcome China in its territory..."
MOHAMAD ZREIK
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Times
Date of publication:
2019-05-17
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"ON OCTOBER 30, 2018, Mottama Holdings invited journalists to a high-profile “topping-out” ceremony for its M Tower project, a 26-storey office building near Hledan junction in Yangon that used prefabricated steel structure from the company’s factory in the city.
After putting in place the final steel beam – complete with gold-coloured bolts – more than 100 metres above Pyay Road, company chair U Yang Ho hailed a “new era” for Myanmar’s construction industry, one in which steel would replace reinforced concrete as the building material of choice for high-rise projects. M Tower, he added, “will become a prominent landmark in Yangon”.
Behind the scenes, though, there was less rosy news. Twelve days earlier, one of Mottama’s key partners, Chinese firm Sino Great Wall, had received notice from regulators in China that it was under investigation for suspected violations of information disclosure rules.
Sino Great Wall won the US$80 million engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract for M Tower in January 2016, shortly before its share price peaked at 14.4 yuan, giving it a market capitalisation of 23 billion yuan ($3.4 billion). At the time, Sino Great Wall was winning billions of dollars of foreign EPC contracts and billing itself as a “leading private enterprise along the Belt and Road” – a reference to President Xi Jinping’s signature trade and investment initiative launched in 2013.
Today Sino Great Wall’s share price is just 2.29 yuan. The company’s debt-to-net-asset ratio is more than 120 percent, and it is facing litigation from nearly a dozen creditors due to 2.7 billion yuan of overdue loans. Rather than a poster-child for BRI, Sino Great Wall has become a cautionary tale of debt-fuelled overexpansion.
Since the company’s financial problems came to light in the second half of 2018, Sino Great Wall has been forced to scale back its international ambitions considerably. It is unclear whether this has affected M Tower, which is due for completion in 2020. A crane atop the building’s steel frame sat idle earlier this month and there were few workers at the site, but Mottama did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
Sino Great Wall’s Yangon office – just 100 metres from M Tower – was locked when Frontier visited, but nearby residents said the office was more of a dormitory, and staff were still living there and working at the M Tower site. The company also did not respond to emailed questions.
However, the Chinese firm’s problems appear to have affected several other projects in Myanmar, including Min Residences, a high-end condominium development in Yangon’s Mayangone Township comprising more than 600 apartments.
Sino Great Wall corporate filings show that it won a $120 million EPC contract from Mottama and Singapore-listed Oxley Holdings to build the project’s three towers in January 2016, at the same time as the M Tower contract. Despite assurances from Mottama and Oxley that work would begin in September 2017, little progress appears to have been made.
Sino Great Wall has also won three contracts from Oxley totalling nearly $500 million for property projects in Cambodia.
But the three firms had even bigger plans in Myanmar..."
Thomas Kean
Source/publisher:
Frontier Myanmar
Date of publication:
2019-05-14
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, China-Burma relations, Burma's economic relations with China
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Controversy continues over a suspended mega-dam project, backed by China, on the Irrawaddy River in Kachin State. The social and environmental consequences of the proposed project cast a shadow not only over the local Kachin population but over all the nationalities of Myanmar. Public awareness is growing why protecting the Irrawaddy is of national importance.
I am from Myitkyina, a Kachin, born and bred in the town just 27 miles downstream from where the Mali and N’Mai Rivers merge to form the great Irrawaddy, the life blood of our nation. Myitsone, the confluence site, also has added significance for us Kachins: it is the heartland of our cultural identity. So it would not be a stretch to say that the Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) is part of my life, just as it is for all who call Myanmar their home.
To have the Irrawaddy flow freely for all time is a cause very dear to my heart. And putting my money where my mouth is, I used the US$ 50,000 I received from the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation as seed money to establish the non-profit organisation Airavati with a few like-minded friends in 2014. Airavati's major work entails preserving the environment, culture and way of life of the diverse communities that flourish along the Irrawaddy's path – from its watersheds in the upper reaches of Kachin State to the delta region in Myanmar’s south.
The Irrawaddy is a precious national heritage. From time immemorial, the Bamar and other ethnic nationalities have lived and thrived along its riverbanks. Not only is it an amazing natural ecosystem, it is also an icon of our cultural and national identity. If we do not safeguard this treasure, we will suffer from its devastating loss, just as our neighbors to our immediate east did when the Chinese dammed the Mekong River within their borders. The impact on downstream countries like Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam has been disastrous and irreversible.
Protecting the Irrawaddy, therefore, is of national importance as the whole country's fate and existence depend upon it. Building a dam near the confluence site, or the Myitsone Dam Project as it is called, poses irreparable cultural, ecological and economic damage to the nation. Furthermore, the existential threat posed by the Myitsone Dam on communities within the reservoir inundation areas and those downstream is enormous, given that they are in an earthquake-prone zone.
In the meantime, communities in the confluence area have been forced to relocate, living in limbo in places where they cannot engage in their traditional livelihoods. Moreover, the lack of transparency and consultation with communities whose lives would be directly impacted have given rise to passionate opposition against the project, not just by the Kachin people but by all Myanmar nationals who love and cherish the Irrawaddy for practical as well as sentimental reasons.
We the peoples of Myanmar, with roots in different parts of the country, may differ in ethnicity, language and faith systems, but when it comes to saving the Irrawaddy, we are of one mind. This unity of purpose will empower us as we harness it in taking steps to put a stop to a project that will do irreparable harm to our beloved Irrawaddy. If we, each and every one of us Myanmar citizens, dig deep into our pockets and collectively make one-time or multiple-time one dollar donations, we will surely reach the goal of repaying the debt incurred when the previous government signed on to an ill-conceived, Chinese-funded mega project that will bring no benefit to Myanmar nationals..."
Lahpai Seng Raw
Source/publisher:
Transnational Institute (TNI)
Date of publication:
2019-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Dams and other projects on rivers in Burma/Myanmar (countrywide), Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"The Myanmar government recently agreed to begin work on key projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) agreement which is part of Chinese’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Experts, including voices from the World Bank, have pointed out that Myanmar’s growth will largely depend on major BRI infrastructure projects that get underway this year.
The 1,700-kilometer-long CMEC will start in China’s Yunnan Province, go through Myanmar’s major economic cities—Mandalay in central Myanmar, the commercial capital of Yangon—and reach the coast at Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Rakhine State. The proposal includes upgrades to three major roads through Mandalay and Muse on the Myanmar side of the border with China, and some other roads in Shan State.
An estimated $2 billion will be spent in the initial stages of the project which is expected to be made up of 24 projects in total.
Among the 24 proposed CMEC projects, Myanmar has agreed to speed up the process of nine major projects, which include the Kyaukphyu SEZ in the west, the New Yangon City Development in Yangon and the border economic cooperation zones in Kachin and Shan states..."
Nan Lwin
Source/publisher:
The Irrawaddy
Date of publication:
2019-01-24
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, arrived in Beijing on Wednesday (April 24) ahead of the second Belt and Road Forum. Suu Kyi is expected to sign agreements on numerous belt and road projects during his trip.
While Suu Kyi tries to maintain good relations with China by attending the summit and calling on the public to uphold foreign investment projects signed by previous administrations, domestic backlash against the China-backed Myitsone Dam Project has grown stronger.
Thousands of protesters rallied in northern Myanmar on Monday (April 22) against revival of the suspended project, citing potential environmental damages and human displacement, according to Radio Free Asia.
Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch said on Sunday (April 21) that China should respect human rights and commit to transparency when pushing and implementing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), citing some BRI projects’ failures to complete adequate environmental and social impact assessments.
Suu Kyi has faced strong criticism after she defended the imprisonment of two Reuters journalists Wa Long and Kyaw Soe Oo, who investigated the Myanmar military’s massive execution of the Rohingya community, a Muslim minority group living in the country’s Rakhine state.
Myanmar’s Supreme Court rejected the journalists’ final appeal on Tuesday (April 23) and sentenced Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo to seven years in prison. Their in-depth reporting of Rohingya crisis won the 2019 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting..."
Source/publisher:
Taiwan News
Date of publication:
2019-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Inadequate land laws have opened rural Myanmar to rampant land grabbing by unscrupulous, well-connected businessmen who anticipate a boom in agricultural and property investment. If unchecked, the gathering trend has the potential to undermine the country’s broad reform process and impede long-term economic progress.
Under the former military regime, land grabbing became a common and largely uncontested practice. Government bodies, particularly military units, were able to seize large tracts of farmland, usually without compensation. While some of the land was used for the expansion of military bases, new government offices or infrastructure projects, much of it was used either by military units for their own commercial purposes or sold to private companies.
The threat of military force meant there was little grass roots opposition to these land seizures and few avenues to secure adequate compensation. That’s changed under the new democratic order as local communities band together to fight back against seizure of their lands. Many of the current land disputes date to the period before the 2010 general elections that ushered in President Thein Sein’s reformist quasi-civilian government.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation’s Department of Agricultural Planning reported in January 2010 that 216 companies had received a total of 1.75 million acres (708,200 hectares) of farmland in the form of state concessions. Many of the disputes now being contested are related to land taken in the mid- to late-1990s. A significant proportion of the land grabbing during this period took place in ethnic-majority states in the country’s peripheral regions.
This was especially the case in areas along the border with China in Kachin and Shan States and along the border with Thailand in the Karen and Mon States. The army has maintained a strong presence in these areas to battle ethnic insurgencies and uphold tenuous ceasefires with other insurgent organizations. Much of the land was taken for military camps and military access roads, but also for commercial projects either run by the military or companies with ties to the military. Significant land grabbing also took place in the Sagaing and Irrawaddy Divisions.
The confiscation of land has been repeatedly documented since the 1990s by human-rights groups such as the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), and Earth Rights International (ERI), as well as numerous smaller grassroots organizations.
With new hope for an economic revival and rising property prices sparked by Thein Sein’s reformist government, land grabbing has continued in many of these areas and has also increased in central Myanmar and in Rakhine State in the west of the country. Current land grabbing is forcing farmers off their land for commercial agri-business ventures, infrastructure projects, tourism development, industrial facilities and gas pipelines.
Political and economic reforms, together with relaxed sanctions and a better relationship with the West, have raised expectations of a foreign investment-led economic boom. The government has actively encouraged more investment in agriculture, one of the country’s more laggard economic sectors, by promoting the country’s former role as the « rice bowl of Asia » and highlighting its potential for commercial agriculture..."
Brian McCartan
Source/publisher:
SOUTHERN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS NEWSWIRE
Date of publication:
2013-03-11
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Tenure insecurity in Burma (including land grabbing), Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Since January, residents of Namjim Village northwest of the Kachin State capital Myitkyina have witnessed a number of Chinese workers bustling around the area.
Around 10 kilometers from the village, just across the Namkoi River, Chinese workers have been conducting a ground survey for a project site.
The road connecting Namjim Village to the project site is very rocky and at some points extremely narrow. The location of this project is not near the China-Myanmar border where Chinese investors usually prefer to carry out their investment projects.
Now, however, a Chinese company has announced grand plans to build the massive Myitkyina Economic Development Zone (MEDZ) on approximately 4,700 acres of land along the historic Ledo Road. The Ledo Road was built during World War II to enable the Western allies to deliver supplies to China and thus aid the war effort against Japanese forces. It was an overland connection between Ledo in India’s Assam and Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province. Experts say China has chosen the area strategically, with an ultimate aim to link it with India as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.
The Yunnan Tengchong Heng Yong Investment Company (YTHIC) and the Myitkyina Economic Development Zone Committee (MEDZC), formed by Kachin State government, are expected to invest a combined total of more than US$400 million in the MEDZ which is to include nearly 500 factories and 5,000 buildings at the project site located 25 kilometers from Myitkyina.
Strategic importance
Currently, Kachin State is home to a number of China-backed investments ranging from hydropower to mining to agriculture. But the MEDZ was one of the lesser-known China-backed projects to be planned for the state—that was until Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang’s visit to the site area in late December 2018. The Chinese ambassador said the economic zone will be a crucial part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is being implemented under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor agreement. The initiative is President Xi’s grand vision to create a network of trade routes from China to Europe passing through Central Asia, the Middle East and Russia. Unveiled in 2013, the BRI aims to ultimately encompass nearly 70 countries and two-thirds of the world’s population.
As well as the MEDZ, both Myanmar and China have planned to construct another $5-million “economic cooperation zone” as part of the BRI plan in Kanpiketi, a town in Kachin State’s Special Region 1, which is under the control of a militia group called the New Democratic Army-Kachin.
The MEDZ investors signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in May 2018. The Chinese company, YTHYIC, is owned by the Yunnan Baoshan Hengyi Group and Tengchong Border Economic Cooperation Zone, a company based in Baoshan, Yunnan. The former’s company chairperson met several ministers in Naypyitaw last year to discuss the construction of the economic development zone in detail.
According to the MoU viewed by the Irrawaddy, both sides will collaborate to draw up a master plan, to calculate the estimate cost, rules and regulations, the share ratio and other framework details based on the project investment procedures. Moreover, YTHIC and the state government have agreed to establish a joint venture company to implement the zone —a collaboration between YTHIC and the government-affiliated company. Both sides also agreed that YTHIC would cover expenses such as feasibility studies and the environmental impact assessment (EIA). Later, the joint venture company must pay back all expenses to the YTHIC...."
Nan Lwin
Source/publisher:
The Irrawaddy
Date of publication:
2019-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-10
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Individual Documents
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English
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"For Myanmar, the stakes couldn’t be higher. This will be one of the most important weeks for the National League for Democracy since it took office in March 2016. The decisions that it makes will have implications for the economy, domestic politics and international relations for years to come.
The Belt and Road Forum is primarily about improving the image of the Belt and Road Initiative. Asked about criticism of the BRI at a press conference on April 19, Chinese Foreign Minister Mr Wang Yi said the strong attendance list was a “vote of confidence” in the BRI.
The Chinese government under President Xi Jinping wants to be able to show the world that the BRI is moving forward. Accordingly, Myanmar has in recent months come under intense pressure from China to give the green light to a range of BRI-related projects, including the stalled Myitsone Dam in Kachin State.
State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will travel to Beijing for the forum, where she is also expected to hold bilateral meetings with Chinese leaders. It is likely that the two sides will announce agreements on several projects. The agreements may not necessarily cover the finer details, but they will be taken as a crucial signal of Myanmar’s willingness to move forward with these projects.
In Myanmar, all eyes will be on whether there is an announcement regarding Myitsone. Suspended in September 2011, the project epitomises the unhappy legacy of bilateral economic cooperation under Myanmar’s military junta, when deals were cut in secret with the generals and the wishes of the people of Myanmar were ignored.
Myanmar is increasingly dependent on China for political protection as a result of the Tatmadaw’s actions in Rakhine State, and also for its ability to influence the peace process. This would appear to give China the upper hand in any negotiations.
But it would be a mistake for China to railroad the Myanmar government into resuming the Myitsone project. Yes, there are signed agreements that need to be taken into consideration. But the success of the BRI in Myanmar will depend on China’s ability to tailor its approach to fit the Myanmar context, where there remains widespread mistrust of Chinese actors and their intentions..."
Source/publisher:
Frontier Myanmar
Date of publication:
2019-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"The controversial Myitsone Dam project in Myanmar's Kachin state has been suspended for over two years now and stop-work costs, amounting to millions of US dollars, are mounting. But no resolution seems to be in sight for this China-contracted project. The company, China Power Investment, may be facing losses, but local Myanmar citizens want the government to scrap the development entirely. In this exclusive report, Channel NewsAsia's May Wong, had the rare opportunity to visit the project site and speak with those involved..."
Source/publisher:
Channel News Asia (CNA)
Date of publication:
2013-08-29
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Water security (global, regional), Dams and other projects on rivers in Burma/Myanmar (countrywide), Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"The BRI is colossal infrastructure and connectivity initiative of the Chinese government, loosely based on two main routes: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In Chinese language the initiative is called “yidai yiliu”, translated as “one belt one road”. The English name has switched from the previous One Belt One Road or OBOR to the now widely accepted BRI.
The name is not the only moving piece. The BRI is fluid – a constantly evolving concept that has changed considerably since its first announcement in 2013. While large investment projects characterised the initial phase, it now focuses on high-quality development, mirroring China"s growth path from "high-speed" to "high-quality".
The very nature of BRI has also evolved as well. It started as a China-driven plan to connect the Eurasian region, but the Chinese government now aims to make this a "platform", open for all countries to take part, and for all interested investors to collaborate.
One challenge that many non-Chinese observers, especially in Europe and in the US, struggle with is the "vagueness" of the BRI concept. The BRI brand is broad enough to encompass many projects and ideas. While this makes the BRI flexible to evolve, it also makes it difficult to pinpoint its exact scope. What makes an infrastructure project a BRI project? And does it matter to be able to define it? To avoid potential misuse of the term, the Chinese government is moving toward developing a BRI project database..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Times
Date of publication:
2019-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2019-05-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
"On January 12th, the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Myanmar issued a statement warning Myanmar that if it failed to resolve the dispute over the stalled Myitsone Hydropower Dam project in Myanmar’s northern state of Kachin, “confidence of Chinese entrepreneurs in investing in Myanmar” would be “seriously hurt” (Global Times, February 21). A fortnight prior to this statement, the PRC Ambassador to Myanmar, Hong Liang, visited the Kachin capital of Myitkyina, where he met local Kachin groups and religious leaders to win their support for revival of the controversial Chinese-backed dam project. Hong reportedly warned them against opposing Chinese projects, including the Myitsone project, in the Kachin state (The Irrawaddy, January 9). PRC officials have reportedly been visiting the homes of Kachin villagers to canvass support for the project (The Irrawaddy, September 13, 2018).
The $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project is a Sino-Myanmar joint venture: Myanmar’s Ministry of Electric Power and a domestic conglomerate, Asia World, as well as the PRC’s state-run China Power Investment Corporation, signed a memorandum of understanding in 2006; work on the project began subsequently in December 2009. In September 2011, amid protests over the Myitsone Dam’s social and environmental costs, Myanmar’s then-President Thein Sein announced the suspension of the project, citing the “will of the people” (Mizzima, September 30, 2011). Since coming to power in January 2016, Myanmar’s ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) has avoided making a decision on the project’s future. But with State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi due to meet Chinese leaders on the sidelines of the upcoming Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, where the Myitsone project is bound to come up for discussion, the NLD government will need to decide the fate of the project before Suu Kyi leaves for Beijing (The Irrawaddy, April 5). This will not be an easy decision, as the government is caught between mounting pressure from the PRC and calls from the people of Myanmar to cancel the project..."
Sudha Ramachandran
Source/publisher:
The Jamestown Foundation
Date of publication:
2019-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2019-04-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Dams and other projects on rivers in Burma/Myanmar (countrywide), Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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''A mid increased pressure from China to resume construction of the controversial Myitsone hydropower dam in the far north of Myanmar, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi has said the public should think about the project “from a wider perspective,” Myanmar website The Irrawaddy reported on March 14.
The project, a joint venture with Chinese interests, was suspended in 2011 by then president Thein Sein amid widespread concern over the dam’s social and environmental impacts. Anti-Chinese demonstrations were also held in many towns in Myanmar.
Suu Kyi did not say whether the project should be scrapped or continued and the uncertainty has led to renewed protests...''
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
Asia Times
Date of publication:
2019-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2019-04-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Dams and other projects on the Irrawaddy and its tributories, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more
Description:
''The New Silk Road is China's grand trillion-dollar strategy to link up 65 countries and 4.4 billion people.
In this episode, we look at a massive Chinese petrochemical hub which has been built in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar, close to where the Rohingya crisis is still unfolding. How will this project shape Myanmar's economy?...''
Pearl Forss
Source/publisher:
CNA
Date of publication:
2018-09-25
Date of entry/update:
2019-04-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
English, (Burmese with English Sub-title)
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Description:
"Myanmar lawmakers have sounded alarm over the country’s high and rising debts owed to China, urging the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government to pay back the loans as fast as possible to avoid a sovereignty-eroding debt trap.
With foreign exchange reserves at a meager US$6.35 billion in 2018 and the national debt estimated at US$10 billion, of which $4 billion is now owed to China, parliamentarian Than Soe recently suggested sending rice instead of dollars to China.
Whether China would accept such a deal remains to be seen. The interest rate on most Chinese loans is a whopping 4.5%, believed to be the highest rate among all the foreign government and financial institutions that Myanmar now owes.
Most of Myanmar’s foreign debt was accumulated between 1988 and 2011, a period when the country was subjected to Western sanctions imposed against the previous military regime’s poor rights record.
At the time, China was the only major foreign donor willing to lend generously to the ostracized regime. Myanmar’s over two decades of international isolation left it heavily indebted to Chinese monetary institutions...''
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
Asia Times
Date of publication:
2019-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2019-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Other Special Economic Zones, China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"That is changing now under nominal national leader Aung San Suu Kyi, notably at a time her elected government faces rising fire from Europe and America for the Rohingya crisis, a military-driven expulsion of over 700,000 refugees the United Nations suggests had ?genocidal intent.”
China has seized on Myanmar?s renewed international pariah status to push forward its corridor ambition. On September 10, the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the construction of a so-called ?China-Myanmar Economic Corridor”, or CMEC,
The CMEC is envisioned as a 1,700 kilometer-long corridor of roads and railroads connecting the Chinese city of Kunming, the capital of China?s southern Yunnan province, with three Myanmar commercial centers, namely Mandalay, Yangon and the Kyaukpyu port and economic zone that lets out on the Indian Ocean..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times"
Date of publication:
2018-09-24
Date of entry/update:
2018-11-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
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Description:
??To understand China?s top priority in Myanmar, forget Beijing?s involvement in the country?s sputtering peace process, or efforts to restart its backed but now suspended US$3.9 billion Myitsone hydroelectric dam, or even securing rights to extract copper at the locally resisted Letpadaung mine outside of Mandalay.
Those are all subordinate interests to what China really wants in Myanmar: economic and strategic access to the Indian Ocean through a deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar?s western Rakhine state, a crucial link in Beijing?s US$1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)...??
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times"
Date of publication:
2018-06-05
Date of entry/update:
2018-11-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
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Description:
"Before the West started paying real attention to the Rohingya crisis, Myanmar?s democratic transition was something of a cause celebre. But in reality, the country is still under military sway, and the democratic West is still less influential in Myanmar than China. Beijing?s interests are still a decisive economic influence in the country, which is clearly a potentially crucial partner in China?s gargantuan Belt and Road initiative.To be sure, China is just one of Myanmar?s heavyweight international protectors, which also include Russia and India. These three countries all share certain urgent concerns, among them the threat of militant radical Islamism. Connections have been drawn between Rohingya militants and Pakistani extremist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, this just as Beijing is increasing pressure on Pakistan to curb its support for fundamentalist groups that could threaten Chinese interests in Asia.
As it surveys this troubling map ? which also includes an insurgency among the Uighur Muslims of China?s own Xinjiang province ? Beijing views Myanmar?s crackdown not as a domestic problem for a junior partner, but as another front in a wider struggle for stability.
And just as Myanmar fits into that particular Chinese strategy, it also has a part to play in various others..."
Source/publisher:
The Conversation
Date of publication:
2018-01-11
Date of entry/update:
2018-11-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
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Description:
"YANGON (Reuters) - Energy-hungry Myanmar is in initial talks to buy electricity from China, according to officials and documents reviewed by Reuters, in the latest sign of warming ties with Beijing under leader Aung San Suu Kyi..."
Source/publisher:
Reuters
Date of publication:
2017-08-04
Date of entry/update:
2018-09-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar is in China?s embrace today. Facing political pressure and the threat of sanctions over the situation in Rakhine State, the government is seeking China?s diplomatic and economic support.
It seems China will not hesitate to assist Myanmar. However, Myanmar?s approach will be cautious and calculated as it also fosters other friendships in the region.
The government of Myanmar and its powerful military consider China an important and strategic partner but don?t want to be seen as relying heavily on China alone..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-12-05
Date of entry/update:
2017-12-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
Abstract: "The massive overseas expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a central aspect of China?s ?rise? to great-power status. There is significant disagreement, however, over how to interpret SOEs? role. Are they instruments of Chinese statecraft, being directed purposefully from Beijing as part of a ?grand strategy?? Or are they relatively autonomous, profit-maximising businesses, their free-wheeling behaviour often undermining Chinese foreign policy? Finding that there is evidence for both theses, we provide a framework to explain this. We propose theorising party-state/SOEs relations using the concepts of state transformation and regulatory statehood. We show that the Chinese state?s fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s has substantially increased SOE autonomy and weakened but also transformed the executive?s control, reconfiguring it towards a regulatory mode of governance. Party-state/SOEs relations are thus characterised not by direct command and control but weak oversight and ongoing struggles within the party-state. We illustrate this using a case study of China Power Investment Corporation and its Myitsone hydropower dam project in Myanmar. Here, a central SOE clearly defied and subverted central regulations, profoundly damaging Sino-Myanmar state-to-state relations. Party-state authorities are now struggling to rein in this and other central SOEs."
KEYWORDS: China, state transformation, regulatory state, state-owned enterprises, corporate governance, Myanmar
Lee Jones, Yizheng Zou
Source/publisher:
New Political Economy, Volume 22, 2017 - Issue 6
Date of publication:
2017-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2017-09-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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"...
The Myanmar Times
Monday, 11 September 2017
| Myanmar Edition
The Myanmar Times
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Home » Business » Myanmar?s bargaining power rises along the Belt and Road
Myanmar?s bargaining power rises along the Belt and Road
Thompson Chau 11 Sep 2017
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi meets Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo: EPA
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi meets Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo: EPA
AS Hong Kong?s second Belt and Road Summit started today in the city The Myanmar Times asked two experts from The Economist Intelligence Unit and Lau China Institute at King?s College, London for their input regarding the dynamics of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China in relation to Myanmar and ASEAN.
Much of the focus on China?s grand scheme in Myanmar has surrounded the development of the proposed Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and deep-sea port in Rakhine State. However, the BRI has a much broader implication on Myanmar both economically and politically.
Back in 2014, Professor Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese Studies and director of the Lau China Institute at King?s College, London, wrote that China can no longer reign supreme in many ASEAN member states, despite its economic muscle.
?Chinese investment and trade are all welcome [in Cambodia], but the days of Beijing supremacy are long over," he wrote in an article.
?A similar pattern can be seen in Vietnam, Myanmar, the Philippines and Laos. The era of stark choices between friends and enemies fostered by the Cold War has left a region with blurred allegiances and almost constantly changing loyalties,” he argued, adding that ?China can search for leverage in vain in this new context, but it knows than even endless amounts of trade, aid, and financial largesse don?t buy much any longer.”
Myanmar?s trump card
These days, Nay Pyi Taw has more options beyond Beijing.
?Myanmar occupies a unique position. It has travelled in the last few years from being a relatively dependent partner of China because of its diplomatic and economic isolation to one which, because of reforms and changes in the country, now has a much more diverse group of relations.
?This has allowed it more autonomy and a less severe form of China-centric links. It?s newly evolving relations with the US and the EU mean it simply has, very suddenly, more options,” he said.
Still, China?s leverage over some ethnic armed groups in Myanmar can be seen as a political ?trump card” over Nay Pyi Taw. The ethnic peace process is a top priority for State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the participation of those ethnic armed groups is essential for the peace process..."
Thompson Chau
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times"
Date of publication:
2017-09-11
Date of entry/update:
2017-09-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Topics: Conflict, Development, Foreign Relations, Rakhine State, Rohingya...China resisted stronger involvement by the UN council in addressing Myanmar?s crisis.
In March, China, together with Russia, blocked a brief UNSC statement when the 15-member body met to discuss the situation in Rakhine state...hina continues to provide diplomatic protection to Myanmar as some Western nations press the government and military on the Rakhine issue.
More than ever, China has remained a key ally to the government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—who?s support in the West is now lukewarm at best.
China?s motives in backing Myanmar are said to include a desire to expand its foothold in Myanmar and acting to limit Western influence spreading among its neighbors.
As a major investor in Myanmar, China is looking for a seaport in Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State, on the Bay of Bengal—the country clearly has strategic interest in the Indian Ocean..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-09-01
Date of entry/update:
2017-09-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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"Recovering Influence and Checking Rivals...The developing friendship between Burma and the United States prompted China to start searching for new ways to shore up the relationship. In 2012, academic-style journals in China ran several articles analyzing what went wrong with Beijing?s Burma policy and what could and should be done to rectify it. One proposed measure was to launch a public relations campaign in Burma aimed at overhauling China?s current negative image in the country. Beijing also began furiously reaching out to other elements of Burmese society—including the NLD and other democrats—utilizing the CPC?s ?government-to-government,” ?party-to-party,” and ?people-to-people” strategy that lies beyond the CPC?s previous limited circle of regime leaders and their business cronies.
In addition to these ?soft power? tools, Beijing also has access to a range of more kinetic options as well as an ability to either facilitate or frustrate any efforts by Burmese leaders to assert control over and establish a durable peace in the totality of Burmese territory. Since 2011, China has been carefully implementing this mix of hard and soft power tools to regain a position of leverage with both the Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi governments..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-06-09
Date of entry/update:
2017-06-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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1978 to 1988: Rapprochement and Stalemate..."
Part 3 of a 5-part series...
1978 to 1988: Rapprochement and Stalemate...
"This decade was a period of gradual rapprochement between Burma and China—and a virtual standstill in the previously extremely heavy fighting between Burmese government forces and the CPB. Following Ne Win?s trips to China and Cambodia in 1977, Deng Xiaoping paid a politically important visit to Rangoon on January 26-31, 1978. Diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level between China and Rangoon had been restored in 1970, but it was not until Deng?s visit that the hitherto strained relationship between the two countries could be described as reasonably normal. Aid to the CPB was downgraded, but not completely cut off. The official Chinese policy from 1979-88 was also characterized by the rather contradictory Chinese concept of differentiating between ?party-to- party” relations and ?government-to government” ties—a meaningless distinction in the Chinese context since the party in any case formed the government in Beijing..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-06-07
Date of entry/update:
2017-06-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Part 4 of a 5-part series...
2011-to present: Burma-US Relations, Its Complicated:...
"Western sanctions did not cause Burma?s economic—and strategic—fall into the hands of the Chinese, as many foreign observers have argued. But Western policies certainly made it easier for China to implement its designs for Burma. This, in return, caused some in the West to criticize a policy of isolating Burma and ?handing it over to China.” These concerns were outlined as early as June 1997 in a Los Angeles Times article by Marvin Ott, an American security expert and former CIA analyst. ?Washington can and should remain outspokenly critical of abuses in [Burma]. But there are security and other national interests to be served?it is time to think seriously about alternatives,” Ott concluded.
But the turn took some doing. Between 2000-2008, the George W. Bush administration?s bipartisan Burma policy not only maintained sanctions put in place by Congress during the Clinton administration but added new ones in an attempt to support Burma?s democratic forces. In the wake of the 2007 Saffron Revolution?s popular uprising and the regime?s disastrous response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the Bush administration did seek to take advantage of additional space to support civil society on the ground by expanding humanitarian assistance and other programs inside the country, but overall it maintained a hard line against the regime?s leadership..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-06-08
Date of entry/update:
2017-06-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Pauk-Phaw and its Evolution..."Pauk-phaw” was a term coined in the 1950s to describe the supposedly friendly and close relationship between China and Burma. It may be translated as ?fraternal” but, according to Burma expert David Steinberg, it ?has a closer Chinese connotation of siblings from the same womb [and] was used uniquely for Burma.” A memorial to honor the pauk-phaw relationship was erected in Mangshi in China?s Yunnan province in 1956 and the term was invoked as recently as September 2010, when Burmese junta leader Snr Gen Than Shwe paid an official visit to China.
But despite such diplomatic niceties, relations between China and Burma have not always been especially cordial. China, a vast, mainly inland, empire, has always looked for outlets to the sea for its land-locked western and southwestern provinces. That policy began as far back as the 18th century and manifests itself today in the ?One Belt, One Road” development strategy proposed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping to open new trade routes between China and Eurasia. The Burma corridor gives China access to South- and Southeast Asia as well as the entire Indian Ocean region, and has, therefore, always been of utmost strategic importance to whoever is in power in China..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-06-05
Date of entry/update:
2017-06-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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1962 to 1978: Brothers No More:...
"It is generally assumed that Sino-Burmese relations took a turn for the worse in 1967, when anti-Chinese riots broke out in Rangoon. The fervor of the Cultural Revolution influenced the Chinese community in the Burmese capital and many young Sino-Burmese began wearing red Mao badges.
This violated an official Burmese regulation banning the display of such political symbols in public, and the young ?Red Guards” were ordered to take off their badges. When some of them resisted, anti-Chinese riots broke out in June and July that year.
Chinese shops and homes were ransacked and looted, and many Sino-Burmese were killed. A mob even attacked the Chinese embassy in Rangoon before the situation was brought under control. However, the role of the authorities in this affair was a matter of dispute: the Chinatown riots in Rangoon came at a time when there were acute shortages of rice and basic food supplies in Rangoon. According to eyewitnesses, the police did not interfere with the killings and the looting until the Chinese embassy was attacked. It is widely believed that Burma?s military government encouraged the riots in order to deflect attention from the country?s internal problems at that time.
The incident was followed by the withdrawal of ambassadors from both capitals and the expulsion of the ?Xinhua” (New China News Agency) correspondent in Rangoon. Beijing also suspended its aid program to Burma, granted under the 1960 friendship treaty. Radio Beijing began broadcasting fierce attacks on the Ne Win government branding it ?fascist.” On January 1968, heavily armed CPB units crossed from China into northeast Burma. The Chinese Communist Party decided to lend all-out support to its fellow communist Burmese-sister party..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-06-06
Date of entry/update:
2017-06-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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"Beijing has asserted strong influence on the direction and terms of Aung San Suu Kyi?s drive to achieve reconciliation in the war-plagued nation...The second in a planned series of meetings between the Myanmar military, the government and various ethnic armed groups aimed at establishing peace in the country?s decades-long civil war was concluded last week in the capital Naypyitaw. The clear winner of the event?s deliberations: China.
Myanmar authorities insisted before the meeting that talks would not he held with three of the seven ethnic armed groups active in the country?s conflict-ridden north because they had taken up arms after the peace process began.
The groups that were invited to the conference were told they must sign a detailed accord, known as the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), before any major political talks are held.
Yet China flew representatives from all seven northern armed groups, none of which have signed the NCA, in a chartered plane that departed from the nearby Chinese city of Kunming and landed in Naypyitaw. The move effectively presented Myanmar?s civil and military authorities with a fait accompli to include the ethnic armies that Beijing tacitly backs in the peace process..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times"
Date of publication:
2017-06-03
Date of entry/update:
2017-06-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Despite cordial diplomatic and growing economic ties, Myanmar?s defense doctrine is still geared to guard against a possible Chinese invasion...Despite official rhetoric of cooperation and friendship, China-Myanmar relations are still calibrated along the lines of an aggressive superpower and a vulnerable smaller neighbor. Myanmar?s political reforms, introduced in 2011, were prompted more by a military desire to lessen dependence on China, which grew under US and Western imposed sanctions, than a newfound appreciation of democracy..."
Bertil Lintner
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times"
Date of publication:
2017-06-03
Date of entry/update:
2017-06-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"As a platform to implement the Belt and Road initiative, the establishment of cross-border economic cooperation zones with neighboring countries can help promote economic prosperity in border regions and boost bilateral trade, experts said, noting that the zones are likely to play a crucial role in driving local economies by around 2020.
The comments came after the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the establishment of a China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone with the Ministry of Commerce of Myanmar on Tuesday in Beijing..."
Ma Jingjing
Source/publisher:
"Global Times"
Date of publication:
2017-05-17
Date of entry/update:
2017-05-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"China?s ?One Belt, One Road? initiative is new to many of the Burmese public, though the magnitude of the massively ambitious project would need a specialized task force to understand.
Burma?s Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will soon visit China to attend a two-day summit on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), referring to the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road
China is building a network of highways, railroads, and maritime routes, known as the modern Silk Road, which will link it to Central Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.
Burma?s official position on the initiative is unclear, but the developing nation is likely to play a role in the grand scheme. How Burmese leadership will handle the impact of the far-reaching project is also unclear. Are they well equipped enough to understand BRI and enter into negotiations with the Chinese, who have major business and strategic interests in Burma?..."
Editorial
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy"
Date of publication:
2017-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2017-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma relations
Language:
English
more