Description:
Executive Summary:
"Myanmar?s latest peace conference, held on 24-29 May 2017, made welcome progress.
Following a deal brokered by China on the eve of the meeting, more armed groups
came to Naypyitaw than expected. On the final day, they agreed on 37 ?principles” for
a future peace accord, including a key provision that the state will be a federal democracy.
Yet despite these steps forward, fundamental questions remain regarding where
the peace process is heading and how many armed groups are ready to participate.
Without new momentum and broader participation, a negotiated end to the conflict
will remain elusive.
Until just days before the conference, the dynamics appeared much bleaker. The
event had been delayed by three months as the government struggled to convince
more armed groups to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Only a few
of the planned subnational preparatory dialogues had been held, and others ?
involving the Shan and Rakhine armed groups ? had been blocked by the authorities,
adding to frustration. In a further setback, in April the powerful United Wa State
Party (UWSP) convened a summit of seven north-east-based armed groups. They
issued a statement rejecting the current National Ceasefire Agreement text ? an
accord signed in 2015 by eight armed groups and the government that paved the way
for political talks ? and announcing a new alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation
and Consultative Committee (FPNCC, ?Wa alliance”). A deadlock appeared inevitable
since the government and military continued to insist that only by signing the existing
ceasefire agreement could armed groups join the peace process.
What would have been a high-profile failure of Aung San Suu Kyi?s signature initiative
was only avoided through Beijing?s last-minute shuttle diplomacy. After
obtaining concessions from the Myanmar government and military, a Chinese envoy
convinced representatives of the seven north-eastern armed groups to attend the
conference. As a result, fifteen of 21 armed groups were present for the opening ?
the eight that signed the ceasefire agreement and the seven in the new Wa alliance
? a symbolically important win for the government. Beyond symbolism, this also set
an important precedent by allowing three previously-excluded groups ? the Kokang,
Palaung and Arakan armies ? to join negotiations. It also could open up new channels
of communication with groups in the Wa alliance.
Yet progress should not be overstated. The Wa alliance groups attended the opening
session and dinner but were not permitted to participate in substantive sessions
and returned to Kunming two days before the end of the conference. They remain
unwilling to sign the current ceasefire agreement and the government remains unwilling
to revise it. It is unclear how much appetite there is on all sides for concessions
needed to bring these groups into the peace process.
Discussions with the armed groups that signed the ceasefire agreement also were
far from smooth. Key ?principles” related to self-determination and the possibility
for states to have their own constitutions within a future federal structure could not
be agreed as groups opposed the quid pro quo requirement that they reject any
possibility of secession. This failure to achieve what should have been an acceptable
compromise ? state constitutions are a longstanding demand of ethnic communities
Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar
Crisis Group Asia Report N°287, 29 June 2017 Page ii
and no group wishes to secede ? highlighted deficiencies in the process and lack of
trust. Furthermore, the principles that were agreed were pushed through the plenary
without discussion.
With its last-minute intervention, China has assumed a high-profile role in the process.
But the extent of its commitment remains unclear and its interests do not necessarily
align with those of a robust peace process. If it stays focused only on delivering
symbolic wins at critical moments, little may change. But if China is determined to see
sustainable peace on its border, it can use its considerable leverage as well as sophisticated
diplomacy and mediation to push all sides to compromise."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report N°287
Date of Publication:
2017-06-29
Date of entry:
2017-07-01
Grouping:
- Individual Documents
Category:
Language:
English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
Local URL:
Format:
pdf
Size:
311.96 KB
