"The rhetoric of “standing up” to China, showing Pakistan “its place,” and protecting “every inch” of national territory are powerful, and intertwined, drivers of modern India’s foreign policy.2 The 2017 Sino–Indian military standoff in Doklam at the Bhutan tri-junction reified some of these narratives as the crisis re-focused attention on (a) the risk of active conflict between the two powers over an unsettled border dispute and (b) India’s management of relations with smaller neighbors in light of strategic rivalry with China.3 Indeed, China’s expanding economic footprint in South Asia as part of the Belt-and-Roads Initiative (BRI) has increased stress on India to compete with Beijing for maintaining strategic influence over its smaller neighbors.4 Throughout the Doklam crisis, which occurred in the backdrop of India’s refusal to join the BRI, New Delhi sought to secure its “special relationship” with Bhutan and not lose territory to China.5 What went largely unnoticed was New Delhi’s troop build-up at the tri-junction with Myanmar.6 Given the situation in Doklam, this was a logical military precaution from an Indian standpoint. The difference remains that unlike Bhutan, India does not have special relations with Myanmar. If anything, Myanmar is heavily dependent on China, and India has failed to become a credible counterbalance, despite reinvigorating its “Act East” policy, which emphasizes economic connectivity to Southeast Asia via Myanmar.7 Regardless of these contextual differences, it is conventional wisdom that strategic rivalry with China drives India’s “Act East” policy, and territorial sensitivities inform its tactical response to crises such as Doklam. Especially vis-à-vis Myanmar, existing literature emphasizes competition with China as decisive in shaping India’s foreign policy.8 Though the role of domestic and bureaucratic politics is appreciated, these drivers are not considered critical..."