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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-19
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.58 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM19.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-19
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.6 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 19.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-19
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 4.67 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-18
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.23 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM18.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-18
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.9 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 18.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-18
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.09 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-17
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-17
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.87 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM17.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-17
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-17
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.84 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 17.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-17
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-17
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.48 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-16
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.32 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM16.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-16
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.73 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 16.3.24_.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-16
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.21 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-15
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 9.11 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM15.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-15
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.73 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 15.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-15
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.84 MB
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Source/publisher: International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-14
Description: "NATIONAL SOCIETY PROFILE: The Myanmar Red Cross Society is the oldest humanitarian organisation in Myanmar. It began its operations in 1920 as a branch of the Indian Red Cross. After Burma formally separated from India in 1937, the Society obtained official national status and was admitted to the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in 1946. The role of the National Society, as enshrined in the Myanmar Red Cross Society Law 2015, mentions it serves independently and voluntarily as the auxiliary strength of the State in the humanitarian field, in accordance with the Red Cross Red Crescent Fundamental Principles. The Myanmar Red Cross Society has an extensive reach and operates through 65 district branches, and branches in each of the country’s 330 townships. The National Society also counts with 17 supervisory committees (states, regions and Naypyitaw Union Territory), and has branches in universities, colleges, and sub-branches at town, ward, village tract and schools across the country. The Myanmar Red Cross Society Strategic Plan (2021-2025) sets the following three goals: Build healthier and safer communities, reduce their vulnerabilities and strengthen their resilience Promote understanding and respect for the Red Cross Principles, Humanitarian Values, and International Humanitarian Law as a means to promoting social cohesion and non-violence Strengthen understanding of the Myanmar Red Cross’s auxiliary role among the humanitarian sector by developing a strong, well-functioning and resourceful National Society. According to its Strategic Plan, 2021–2025, with partner support, the Myanmar Red Cross aims to equip Red Cross volunteers, state, region and township branches and the national headquarters with the technical, financial and material resources “to be a well-functioning National Society with the capacity of providing humanitarian services to the most vulnerable people in Myanmar and beyond”. The National Society plans to extend its traditional emergency response activities – including the delivery of ambulance and first aid services, primary health care, water, sanitation and hygiene services, psychosocial support and protection – while also developing its preparedness through disaster risk reduction, anticipatory action and resilience building. To support these ambitions, the National Society plans to enhance its institutional capacity through branch development and decentralization, volunteer and youth management and capacity building, resource mobilization and human resource management, and partnership frameworks..."
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.81 MB
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Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-14
Description: "Highlights: At the end of February 2024, more than 2.7 million people have been internally displaced in Myanmar and are living in precarious conditions. More than 18.6 million people (including six million children) are in need of humanitarian aid in 2024 more than 18 times the number before the military takeover in February 2021. UNICEF Myanmar launched its 2024 Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal for US$ 208.3 million to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to 3.1 million people, including 2.1 million children. This funding is crucial for UNICEF to ensure children get the basic social services they need, plus meeting multisectoral humanitarian needs across the country. UNICEF aims to reach 850,000 people with critical WASH supplies; 350,000 children and women with primary health care services; and to support more than 890,000 children with access to education services..." Situation in Numbers 6,000,000 children in need of humanitarian assistance 18,600,000 people in need (HAC 2024) 2,448,200 Internally displaced people after 1 February 2021 (UNHCR) 59,300 People displaced to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021 306,200 people living in protracted displacement before February 2021
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 951.36 KB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-14
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 8.94 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM14.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-14
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 2.03 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 14.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-14
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.6 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-13
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-13
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.92 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM13.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-13
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-13
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.61 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 13.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-13
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-13
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.71 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-12
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.91 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM12.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-12
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.44 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 12.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-12
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.4 MB
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Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-03-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-11
Description: "This Situation Update describes events occurring in Tha Htoo (Thaton) Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District, during the period between September 2022 and January 2023, including constant indiscriminate shelling committed by the State Administration Council (SAC) resulting in property destruction, casualties and fear. On November 10th 2022, SAC Military Training Number #9 arrested Kaw Kya Ther villagers by accusing them of being informants for the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and detained them in the camp. As a result, fighting broke out between SAC and PDF, and SAC conducted indiscriminate shelling in the area. On January 11th 2023, the SAC indiscriminately shelled mortars into Maw Lay village tract in three different instances, injuring three villagers, after a drone attack by the local PDF and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). On February 9th 2023, SAC Artillery Unit #314 fired mortars into plantations in Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, injuring another civilian. Villagers are facing livelihood insecurities as a result.[1] Arbitrary arrest of villagers, fighting and shelling On November 10th 2022, State Administration Council (SAC)[2] Military Training Number #9, under Light Infantry Division (LID)[3] #44, based in Ah Lan Ta Ya camp arrested Kaw Kya Ther (Htoe Bo Lin) villagers [unknown number], from Way Raw (Win Yaw) village tract[4], Tha Htoo Township, accusing them of being spies for the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[5]. The next day, on November 11th at about 8:42 pm, fighting broke out between PDF forces, combined with the local Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[6], and SAC Military Training #9 at Ah Lan Ta Ya camp, which is led by the Deputy Battalion Commander [unknown name] and Major Chit Win Thu. During the fighting, SAC shelled eight rounds of mortar into Kaw Kya Ther village, Way Raw village tract, Tha Htoo Township. Therefore, six houses owned by Kaw Kyaw Ther villagers were damaged by the mortar shells’ explosion. During the fighting, three SAC soldiers including Major Chit Win Thu were killed, PDF soldiers confiscated some ammunition from the SAC, and rescued the detained Kaw Kya Ther villagers. Constant shelling conducted by SAC soldiers into villages Since the 2021 coup in Burma, indiscriminate and deliberate shelling conducted by the SAC has been one of the most common attacks [against civilians] happening in Tha Htoo Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. For instance, the SAC K--- army camp, under the command of LID #44, is located in the centre of K--- village, Maw Lay village tract, Tha Htoo Township, beside the village’s main road. SAC troops usually conduct shelling in K--- village [since their camp is located in the centre, and so they shell the surroundings]. One villager from K--- village, Naw[7] H---, reported to KHRG: “I can’t even count [the number of shelling incidents]. Sometimes, they [SAC] shelled every day. […] Three months ago [around September 2022], a mortar landed on my house. And the shrapnel hit my aunt’s house too. […] They [SAC] shelled [mortars] regularly.” Since the [2021] coup, SAC soldiers in Tha Htoo Township have conducted shelling into the villages surrounding their army camps as retaliation after being attacked by local KNLA or PDF soldiers. Other times, they [SAC soldiers] have done it [conduct shelling] when receiving information from their informants about an imminent attack by KNLA and PDF. However, sometimes the SAC has conducted shelling for unknown reasons. Some of the mortars landed on farms and plantations owned by villagers and nearby villages, such as Y--- village, P--- village, L--- village, or K--- village. Some mortars landed in the villages, beside houses, schools and monasteries. Therefore, local villagers, especially villagers who live close to the army camps, have been facing high [security] risks to their lives and fear. They have also suffered injuries and property damage and destruction. According to Naw H---, the witness from K--- village: “Sometimes [mortar shells landed] in our village, near the school, near the monastery, ... Children who attended school know best [have experienced it]. Children [in school] were scared and cried loudly. […] During a shelling [incident in 2022], young children like my nieces were only seven and nine years old. They told me: ‘Moegi [term of affection for women]! [Hearing] mortar shells’ [explosion] sound makes me feel scared. We dare not to walk on the first floor [of the school]; we stay on the ground floor under the bed. Moegi! When the school closes, pick me up, okay?’. I feel pity for the children. […] My niece is only nine years old. She is very intelligent. She said: ‘Moegi, once the shells landed nearby, and I was scared, so I cried and the teacher hugged me. [All children in] the whole school were crying.’ When I heard that, my heart Ummm [felt worried; anxious]!” In January 2023, the army camp in K--- village was operated by SAC battalions under LID #44 and some of their soldiers were based in the monastery. On the morning of January 11th 2023, local PDF and KNLA attacked K--- army camp with a drone. As retaliation, the SAC indiscriminately shelled about five mortar rounds around K--- village area. Two of the mortar shells landed in K--- village, in the Muslim community area. The mortar shells injured two villagers, and killed two of their bulls -which cost about five million kyat [2,378 USD[8]]. It also destroyed one motorcycle, and several parts of their house. Another house was also damaged. The two victims are married and have children. Their children were safe because they were at school. The damages caused major impacts on the family’s livelihood and well-being. After the incident, their neighbours immediately took them to the local W--- clinic, under the Karen National Union (KNU)[9]-controlled territory, for medical treatment. On the same day, from 7 pm to 11 pm, SAC battalions under LID #44 based in K--- army camp shelled three more mortar rounds in K--- village. Two mortar shells landed on a villager’s rubber plantation and one mortar shell landed beside a villager’s house. Before this shelling incident [in the evening], no armed group, either PDF or KNLA, had attacked them [the SAC] and villagers did not receive any prior warning about the shelling. Villagers do not know why the SAC indiscriminately conducted the shelling [in the evening]. The two mortar shells that landed on a rubber plantation also damaged one farm hut, including the roofing. Fortunately, the hut owner was not in the hut [during the incident] so nobody got injured or killed. At about 11 pm, another mortar shell landed beside a villager’s house in K--- village and the shrapnel injured a 52-year-old villager, named Saw[10] O---, on his thigh. The incident happened when he was visiting his friend; the house owner. He was outside of the house chatting with the house owner who was inside the house. The victim explained [to KHRG]: “When I was going [to the friend’s house], [I heard] the sound of [mortars] exploding coming from K--- [army camp] two times. […] When there were no more sounds, I went to the villager’s [his friend’s] house in the village. Soon after I spoke one or two words [with the house owner], mortar shells landed [beside me]. And the shrapnel hit me. […] As soon as I got hit, I fell down. […] My blood flowed down [he sustained heavy blood loss], so it got dark [he fainted].” After, villagers surrounding the incident place went to help Saw O--- by providing first aid, bandaging the wound with a longyi [piece of clothing]. Villagers brought him to a monastery by motorcycle to get medical treatment from an SAC medic who is based in the monastery. The SAC medic injected some [unknown] medication and bandaged the wound. During that night, villagers could not bring him immediately to the Thaton Town hospital [run by the SAC] because of the curfew (enforced by the SAC between 6 pm to 6 am) and the risk of stepping on landmines on the way planted by armed groups. Therefore, he had to wait the whole night and then villagers took him to Thaton hospital the next morning by car. The cost was 50,000 kyat [23.78 USD] for transportation and he had to be in the hospital for eight days. The total cost was about one million kyat [475.51 USD] for medical treatment. According to the victim, Saw O---: “When we went [to the hospital] and I got the X-ray, shrapnel was visible [in the test result]. The doctor took out everything [all shrapnel]. The shrapnel was very big and very long.” When KHRG conducted the interview on January 26th 2023, Saw O--- had already been discharged from the hospital. He could not walk properly yet, so he was not able to work on his farm for his family livelihood. He still had to go to the hospital for further treatment and checks. Therefore, he struggled financially to pay the medical fees for the whole medical treatment. On February 9th 2023, at 10:06 am, SAC Artillery Unit #314 fired 80mm mortars into the rubber plantations near I--- village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, in KNU-controlled territory. Two mortar shells landed in a rubber plantation, damaging 13 rubber trees owned by a villager named Naw A---. A 52-year-old villager named Saw B---, from I---, was minorly injured by the shrapnel on his face, near the eyebrow. Further background reading on the situation of indiscriminate shelling in Southeast Burma can be found in the following KHRG reports: “Taw Oo District Short Update: House burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes by the SAC in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (September to November 2023)”, March 2024 “Dooplaya District Situation Update: SAC indiscriminate shelling and healthcare and livelihood challenges (February to April 2023).”, February 2024. “Mu Traw District Situation Update: SAC air strikes, arrest of villagers, and indiscriminate shelling causing casualties, and landmine explosion, March 2022 to February 2023”, January 2024. Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers' lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023. Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received in December 2022 and January 2023. It was provided by a community member in Doo Tha Htoo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [3] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Burma Army is commanded by a brigadier general and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents. They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army). [4] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village. [5] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalized the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army. [6] The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [7] Naw is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name. [8] All conversion estimates for the kyat are based on the February 7th 2024 mid-market exchange rate of 1,000 kyats to USD 0.48 (taken from https://wise.com/gb/currency-converter/mmk-to-usd-rate). [9] The Karen National Union (KNU) is the main Karen political organisation. It was established in 1947 and has been in conflict with the Burma government since 1949. The KNU wields power across large areas of Southeast Burma and has been calling for the creation of a democratic federal system since 1976. Although it signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015, relations with the government remain tense. [10] Saw is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-11
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.4 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM11.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-11
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.62 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 11.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-11
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.22 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-10
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-10
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.39 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM10.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-10
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-10
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.91 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 10.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-10
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-10
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.54 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-09
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.84 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM9.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-09
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.93 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 9.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-09
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.27 MB
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Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
Description: "On March 4, 2024, the French lawyers William Bourdon and Lily Ravon reported Htoo Htwe Tay Za, also known as Rachel Tayza, to Italian authorities on behalf of Justice For Myanmar, requesting that they investigate her involvement as a shareholder and director of companies that are part of the EU-sanctioned Htoo Group of Companies, and where appropriate, to freeze her assets and to remove her from Italy. Rachel Tayza has continued to reside in Italy and conduct business for the EU-sanctioned Htoo Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate that is owned by her family. Htoo Group is a key node in the Myanmar military’s international network of businesses that provides it with funds, arms and equipment, which aids and abets genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It does this though its network of more than 60 businesses in Myanmar and Singapore in sectors throughout the economy, including extractive industries. Htoo Group is also sanctioned by the US, UK and Canada. In its reasons for sanctions, the EU noted, “Htoo Group of Companies has acted as an intermediary for the provision of military equipment which was used against civilian populations protesting against the 1 February coup, all across the country and in particular in areas with ethnic minorities.” William Bourdon and Lily Ravon also submitted a dossier to Rachel Tayza’s bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which is owned by BNP Paribas, urging that they take action under EU sanctions. Rachel Tayza has been residing in Milan, where she recently completed her studies at a fashion school, supported by proceeds from Htoo Group of Companies, according to a Justice For Myanmar investigation. While in Italy, Rachel has continued to hold shares and act as director of at least seven Htoo Group companies, including ones newly formed after the military’s coup attempt, and those in direct business with the Myanmar army. This includes Ayeyarwaddy Resorts and Lodges Company Limited, which has build-operate-transfer contracts with the Myanmar army’s EU-sanctioned Office of the Quarter Master General. One of their projects is for a commercial project on 22 acres of land in Yangon, which provides the military with approximately USD$1.65 million annually under a 50-year contract, according to Myanmar Investment Commission data released by Distributed Denial of Secrets. Other companies Rachel holds shares in and serves as a director from Italy are Pegu Wood Company Limited, a subsidiary of Htoo Capital Company Limited, and One Fibre Company Limited, a subsidiary of Htoo Tech Company Limited, both established after the military’s illegal coup attempt. Rachel was previously a director and shareholder in the now dissolved Myanmar Avia Export Company Limited, a Myanmar military arms broker that supplied Russian military aircraft and spare parts. Rachel was sanctioned by the USA on January 31, 2023 for her active role in Htoo Group of Companies and for being the adult daughter of the Htoo Group Chairperson, Tay Za. Tay Za is sanctioned by the EU, USA, UK and Canada. Rachel’s brothers, Pye Phyo Tay Za and Htoo Htet Tay Za, are sanctioned by the USA, UK and Canada. In addition to providing arms, Htoo Group donated funds to the Myanmar military in 2017 in support of their campaign of genocide against the Rohingya, a fact noted in the EU’s sanctions designation against the conglomerate. Justice For Myanmar urges the EU to impose sanctions on the whole Htoo Group network of companies and individuals, including Rachel Tayza, as well as all other Myanmar junta cronies and arms brokers. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Weak sanctions enforcement by Italian authorities has allowed Rachel Tayza to do business in Italy that funds an illegal and illegitimate military junta. “Rachel Tayza and her family have long aided and abetted the Myanmar military’s endless war crimes and crimes against humanity through Htoo Group of Companies and profited from the bloodshed of Myanmar people. “Rachel Tayza should be held accountable under EU sanctions and Italy needs to ensure that she and no other Myanmar cronies can do their bloodstained business on Italian soil. “The EU and other governments need to do far more to block the junta’s access to funds and arms through more concerted, strategic and coordinated sanctions that cover whole networks of companies, and through far stronger enforcement. “For three years, the people of Myanmar have courageously resisted the military’s failing attempted coup. “Italy and the EU must stand with the people of Myanmar in the struggle to build a new and inclusive Myanmar that respects human rights and guarantees justice and accountability.”..."
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: Government of Japan
2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
Description: "Even three years after the coup d'état on February 1, 2021, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate as airstrikes and fighting continue throughout the country, killing and injuring many innocent people on a daily basis. According to the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Myanmar announced by OCHA last December, 18.6 million people, including 6 million children, are still in need of humanitarian assistance. Under these circumstances, the Government of Japan has continuously provided humanitarian assistance totaling more than US$109.5 million through international organizations and NGOs since immediately after the coup d'état, directly benefiting the people of Myanmar. In response to the further increase in humanitarian assistance needs for the people of Myanmar, the Government of Japan has now decided to provide additional humanitarian assistance totaling approximately US$37 million. Specifically, through international organizations such as UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, UN Women, and AHA Center as well as NGOs. The assistance will include medical services, improved nutrition for pregnant women and infants, water and sanitation infrastructure, access to education, food and medicine distribution, support for women victims of trafficking in persons, and support for anti-drug measures and rehabilitation. This assistance will be provided not only in Myanmar but also in neighboring Thailand. The Government of Japan will continue to strongly urge Myanmar military to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access and will continue to provide diverse assistance so that as many people as possible can receive the support in need..."
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.06 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM8.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.57 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 8.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.52 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-07
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.95 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM7.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-07
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-07
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-06
Description: "A month after the prime minister of Bangladesh raised concerns about the possibility of Rohingya repatriation, UNHCR representatives in Myanmar met with the junta’s education minister on February 7 to discuss repatriation. Meanwhile, Bangladeshi officials are reluctant to act in any way that might be perceived as taking sides between the junta and the ethnic Arakan Army; Bangladesh has perhaps started to understand there is a new sheriff in Rakhine, just across the Naf River. But what do AA victories mean for the Rohingya repatriation promoted by the UNHCR and the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh? Our answer is that after 45 years of persecution of the Rohingya: Not much. The Rohingya also know that safety conditions have actually become worse in Rakhine since they fled. The million stateless Rohingya refugees living in Cox’s Bazar is still one of the world’s most intractable refugee situations. Their Myanmar homeland insists they are foreigners from Bangladesh; their Bangladeshi hosts insist that they belong in the land of their birth, Myanmar. The rebellious AA insist that they can be part of a new Rakhine, but only if they meet AA conditions, and not as equals. And to top it off, the junta’s military has started to conscript the few Rohingya still in Myanmar to fight against the AA. Humanitarians from the UN, meanwhile, have tired of an impoverished population that has poor English, few urban skills, and is easily dismissed as different and even primitive. Thus, even as hundreds of Rohingya are drowning at sea, the border post to Bangladesh has been captured by AA forces, and Sittwe itself may come under siege, Myanmar, Bangladesh and the UNHCR avoid the subject of resettlement in third countries, claiming simply that “Rohingya refugees require sustained, predictable and adequate financial support to live safely and decently, and to prepare for a sustainable return.” This would perhaps be promising, except that of course the voluntary repatriation policy was tried before, beginning in 1978, the first time UNHCR became involved in a Rohingya refugee movement. The Tatmadaw has repeatedly expelled the Rohingya as a way to reinforce Burmanization policies adopted after the military coup in 1962. Persecuted by Tatmadaw; viewed as primitive by global community? For centuries, Rohingyas lived in Rakhine, predating the British East India Company in 1824, and more were brought in by British colonizers to farm between 1824 and 1938. Many were Muslim but engaged in a range of religious practices also seen in neighboring British Bengal. In 1962, the hyper-nationalist Burmese Buddhist forces of the Ne Win regime seized control, and defined the Rohingya as ineligible for citizenship unless they could prove their ancestors were in Rakhine before the 1824 British conquest. General Ne Win’s military insisted that the Rohingya were foreign citizens and initiated mass deportation of 200,000 in 1978. A quick repatriation occurred with the help of UNHCR. Most were pushed back to Myanmar after an experienced UN observer remarked that the lack of food and basic sanitation in the camps led to them becoming “death traps.” A similar episode happened in 1990 when the military deported 250,000 Rohingya, using Islamophobia to divert attention of the ethnic Bamar from the developments of 1988 pro-democracy movements. And just as in 1978, a quick repatriation was arranged with UNHCR help. History repeated in 2012 when Rakhine was again cleared of Rohingya. The repatriation back to Myanmar was not as aggressive but the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar just grew larger. Then finally in 2017, the greatest expulsion of all was undertaken by the Burmese military, and perhaps another 800,000 Rohingya fled after the Tatmadaw burned villages, committed massacres, and ethnically cleansed Rakhine of its Rohingya population. And still, now seven years later, the international response is ambivalent, even as some 30,000 Rohingya babies are born each year, and hundreds of thousands of young children grow up in refugee camps where radicalization is a predictable by-product. Trapped by righteousness of historical narratives The Rohingya ultimately are trapped between competing and complex historical narratives. Myanmar’s nationalist Burmanization narrative continues to insist that the Myanmar people are defined by government-determined nationalities called Taingyingtha, which are considered sub-groups of the dominant Burmese Buddhist majority. By such definitions, Rohingya were foreigners and intruders from British Bengal; righteousness by this logic demands that they return to its successor state, Bangladesh. And of course, Bangladesh’s own citizenship definition excludes Rohingya because the British in 1824 classified Rohingya as Burmese. To complicate matters further, the Buddhists of Rakhine themselves are in revolt against the Burmese military and have occupied border posts between Myanmar and Bangladesh. The AA’s General Twan Mrat Naing recently told the BBC that, if “Rohingyas or Bengalis or Chittagonian Muslims” would like to enjoy the benefits of equal treatment under [Arakan] law, they must get along with other ethnic groups and abandon contesting “doctored” historical narratives and claims of Rohingyas. In other words, ethnic Rakhine communities, which root their own identity in historical claims of Buddhist Arakan dominance, have attitudes toward the Rohingya that are similar to the heirs of the Konbaung Kingdom ruling from modern Naypyitaw. For all that, nobody has seriously asked the Rohingya where they fit in a future Myanmar or Rakhine. As a result, the million Rohingya are trapped in Cox’s Bazar as wards of the international humanitarian regime represented by the UNHCR. There they are accused of being freeloaders in the international humanitarian system which created the camps in the first place. There they have been repeatedly excluded from their rights as refugees. Jeff Crisp, formerly of the UNHCR, described the Rohingya as being among the most disadvantaged refugees not only because they are caught between Burma and Bangladesh, but because the Rohingya were assumed by the UNHCR to be primitive, and repatriation to Myanmar considered the only solution. They were excluded from the mass resettlement assistance successfully extended to Indochinese, Yugoslavians, Ukrainians, Europeans and millions of others who moved beyond refugee camps while retaining their right to eventually return. And then there is the demography problem… In short, the Rohingya refugee problem cannot be resolved through wishful thinking of the UNHCR, Myanmar or Bangladesh governments about mass repatriation. About 30,000 Rohingya have been born every year in the camps since 2017, a rate that will accelerate soon. Indeed, a 2022 survey showed that 22% of the refugees were under 5 years old, which means they were mostly born in the camps after 2018. Doing nothing is to court a long-term disaster, from the radicalization of the young population, or perhaps a Bay of Bengal typhoon. What this means is that there are now over 1 million Rohingya trapped in the camps. Without resettlement policies, the number will begin doubling every 20 years or so, meaning 1 million will become 2 million. The basic demographic reality is that the population will be young, energetic, and excluded. The question is only what their energies will be turned toward: engagement with the modern world, or rebellion and dreams of violent return. Looking forward: Resolution of refugee problems But the Rohingya situation is not the first seemingly intractable refugee crisis. Indeed, probably the most intractable is the Palestinian refugee crisis which has festered in the Middle East since 1948, and which despite the successful resettlement of millions of Palestinians across the Middle East (2 million in Jordan alone), continues to produce explosions, even in 2024. It is well beyond this article to suggest solutions for the Palestinian refugee situation, except to note that the Palestinian situation is a warning of how badly things can go wrong when there is too much wishful thinking about quick repatriation. But not all refugee situations turn into the Palestinian situation in Gaza. Also relevant for Rohingya refugees is how the Indochinese refugee situation was resolved after perhaps 3 million fled between 1975 and 1990. Perhaps 250,000 died at sea, but the remainder made it to neighboring countries, especially Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines. There they were housed in camps like those in Cox’s Bazar today. There was also of course great hope that “all” would return to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. But most did not. The largest numbers are in the United States, China, and in the case of Cambodians, in Vietnam. More such refugees and their descendants are still in Thailand. Similarly, the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s saw millions resettled in Europe. Decades earlier, 10 million European refugees from World War II were dispersed across Europe, North America and, in the case of the survivors of the Holocaust, to Israel. Following the Bangladesh Revolution in 1972, India and Bangladesh cooperated to resettle 10 million refugees back in Bangladesh – an exception to the general rule that a good proportion of refugees end up resettled outside the home country. Indeed, the current president of Bangladesh, Sheikha Hasina, was herself a refugee in the 1980s. Unresolved refugee crises today also include the millions of Syrians who are hosted mostly in the Middle East or Germany, Ukrainians who have taken sanctuary in European countries, and Venezuelans who are being hosted in Colombia, Ecuador, and other neighboring countries. Refugee problems require regional solutions All this is a way of saying that the Rohingya situation does not need to end up like Gaza, and will not if there is a concerted international effort to address the needs of the Rohingya from a regional perspective, just like was done with the former Yugoslavians, Europeans, and Ukrainians. Myanmar’s war-torn zones are likely to remain unsettled, and in the short term will offer little potential for refugee return – in fact, a premature return to AA territory is likely to victimize the Rohingya further. The mid-term solution is of course to integrate Rohingya into the burgeoning cities of South and Southeast Asia, where there are labor shortages. Indeed, this is happening with Venezuelans in Colombia and Ecuador; Ukrainians in Europe; and Syrians in Turkey and the Middle East. This does not mean that the refugees give up their right to return to a homeland. But spreading responsibility means that the generosity of single hosts is not stretched, and radicalized refugee groups seeking violent return are less likely to develop. Prospects for the Rohingya to return to Myanmar in future can be retained, despite the current uncertainty over when a peaceful return may be possible. And indeed the Rohingya will be the best to judge this. The frustrating aspect, from the perspective of the existing nation-state system, is that such a regional solution implies letting the Tatmadaw get away with atrocities, at least in the short term. It also runs the risk of incentivizing further bad behavior by the Tatmadaw or perhaps even the AA. This is a puzzle for the regional and international actors to ponder. But, to reduce the risk of catastrophe, the UNHCR, ASEAN, and nearby countries need to be more willing to share the burden of hosting Rohingya refugees, which currently falls primarily on Bangladesh, albeit reluctantly. Tony Waters is a Visiting Professor at Leuphana University, Germany, and formerly at Payap University Chiang Mai. R.J. Aung (a pseudonym) is a former peace and development worker in Yangon and Thailand, and a native of Yangon..."
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Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-03-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-06
Description: "This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in Rakhine State. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during Feb. 10-13, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Village markets swelled with activity as most town markets remained closed; Busy markets still lacked many foods and NFIs but all markets had at least some critical goods; Fuel and medicines were scarce, and cooking oil and hygiene products were often unavailable; Retailers sourced goods from other townships, but transport costs continued to drive prices up; Retailers' largest challenge was transportation and its impact on price and supply; Customers may lack cash to buy available goods, as retailers cited weak demand in busy markets. Regional Overview Market Functionality - Village markets remained open even as town markets closed. Town markets in Sittwe and Maungdaw continued operating, and village markets remained open in other townships. Open markets followed regular hours. Market Activity - Village market activity increased as they absorbed volume from closed town markets. Town markets shrank and village markets grew as displaced households filled rural areas and retail followed. Prominant village markets in Ponnagyun and Rathedaung swelled with activity, although this did not always result increased availability of goods. Availability of Goods - Fuel and medicines were scarce, and many foods and NFIs were unavailable. Markets offered a variety of local winter vegetables, but some other goods were hard to find. Low-quality rice was available in village markets (near mills), but regional imports (e.g., NFIs) were more often unavailable. Transport & Logistics - Retailers still sourced goods from neighboring townships, although transport costs continued rising. Some retailers still sourced goods from neighboring townships, while others were deterred and made do with dwindling inventories. Retailer Challenges - Retailers struggled with high transport costs and a resulting drought in supply. Retailers reported weak demand even in village markets with increasing customers, possibly pointing to cashpoor households with little money to spend. Cash access (among retailers) was most challenging for Sittwe retailers but less so among those in villages. Possible Interventions - Retailers felt they could increase local supply with added support. Retailers expressed a willingness and ability to increase supply under more favorable circumstances. Freedom of movement for traders and fuel subsidies or other support for transportation costs were most likely to spur supply, while low-interest loans were less likely. Village retailers appeared more likely than those in towns increase supply, possibly because village markets have grown..."
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-06
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.9 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM6.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-06
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.44 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 6.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-06
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.06 MB
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Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-03-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-05
Description: "This Short Update describes events that occurred in Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District during the period between September and November 2023, including house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes. In September 2023, tensions were heightened between the State Administration Council (SAC) and local armed resistance groups in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, after People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) extrajudicially killed an SAC soldier who had been sent to the area as a spy. After this killing, the SAC burned down at least 27 villagers’ houses in five different villages, shelled mortars into villages, and conducted air strikes in the area, causing three casualties. The shelling injured one villager, damaged five villagers’ houses and one shop, as well as plantations, and killed one cow. The air strikes injured two villagers and damaged a villager’s house.[1] House burning in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract From the second week of August 2023, combined forces of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[2] and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[3] increased their military activities in every village in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. As reported by local villagers, Maung[4] Kyaw Htun, a soldier from State Administration Council (SAC)[5] Infantry Battalion (IB)[6] #39, was ordered by his leader to return to his parents’ village, A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, to investigate the military activities of the KNLA and PDF there while posing as a civilian. Soldiers from the KNLA and PDF knew about this situation. On September 12th 2023, the KNLA and PDF arrested Maung Kyaw Htun whilst he was at his father’s house, took him to a place outside the village, and killed him. Maung Kyaw Htun’s family members went to SAC IB #39 army camp immediately after finding out he was killed and informed the SAC about what had happened. On September 13th 2023, at 6 am, SAC combined forces, including IB #39 which is based in Lay Maing village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, went with five military trucks and two artillery trucks to A--- village, B--- village, and C--- village, in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. At around 10 am on September 14th 2023, these SAC combined forces burned down four houses in B--- village. The owners of those houses are Saw[7] D---, Saw E---, Saw F--- and Saw G---. Also on this day, these SAC combined forces burned down seven houses in C--- village. The owners of those houses are Ko[8] H---, Ko I---, Ko J---, Ko K---, a daughter of Ko K---, Daw[9] L---, and Daw M---. After the SAC troops burned down villagers’ houses in these two villages, they stayed in B--- village for three days. On the third day, September 16th, at 6 am, the SAC troops retreated from the village and returned to their army camp. On the afternoon of September 16th 2023, KNLA and PDF soldiers burned down Maung Kyaw Htun’s father’s house. This contributed to increasingly heightened tensions between local armed resistance groups and SAC troops in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. On October 20th 2023, SAC combined forces, including IB #39, went to N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, where they burned down three villagers’ houses. The owners of those houses are Saw O---, Saw P--- and Saw Q---. On November 12th 2023 at 1:30 pm, the combined forces of the KNLA and PDF attacked these SAC troops using tripwire bombs in a place between A--- village and N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, after which fighting broke out. On the evening of November 12th 2023, the SAC troops burned down nine houses in B--- village, as well as four houses in A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. Villagers whose houses were burned down in B--- village are Saw R---, Saw S---, Saw T---, Saw U---, Maung V---, Naw[10] W---, Naw X---, Saw Y--- and Saw Z---. Villagers whose houses were burned down in A--- village are Aa---, Ko Ab---, Ko Ac--- and Ko Ad---. The SAC combined forces that are based in Lay Maing village, including IB #39, often fired mortar shells into villages and surrounding areas where they thought the KNLA and PDF soldiers might stay, regardless of whether fighting had occurred or not. During the reporting period, the SAC also conducted air strikes in this area. Indiscriminate shelling into Day Loh Mu Nu village tract On October 19th 2023, at around 1 pm, the SAC combined forces, including IB #39 that is based in Lay Maing village, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. These villages include A---, B---, C---, N---, Ae---, Af---, Ag---, and Ah--- villages. One of the mortar shells landed in a shop owned by U[11] Ai--- in C--- village. The mortar shell exploded, damaging the shop. On November 17th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired mortar shells into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a farm near Ae--- village. It exploded and its shrapnel killed a cow owned by Saw Aj---. On November 19th 2023, the SAC troops again indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu area. One of the mortar shells landed in a villager’s house in N--- village. It exploded and damaged the roof of the house owned by Ak---. Shrapnel from the mortar shells also hit other three houses nearby, damaging them. On November 27th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a rubber plantation owned by a villager near Af--- village. It exploded and damaged the rubber plantation. There were no casualties [caused by the shelling] in this village. Also on November 27th 2023, at 9:04 pm, the SAC combined forces based in Lay Maing army camp and Kon Nit Maing (Seven Miles) army camp, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into Ag--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The mortar shells exploded in a rubber plantation owned by a villager, damaging it. Shrapnel from the mortar explosion hit a house owned by a 34-year-old female villager, Naw Al---. She was also hit by the mortar shrapnel, sustaining injuries to her elbow. Air strikes in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract On November 27th 2023, at 3:17 pm, the SAC conducted an air strike in Ah--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The air strike injured two villagers, one of whom was seriously injured. A villager’s house was also damaged by the air strike. Further background reading on the situation on house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes in Taw Oo District, Southeast Burma, be found in the following KHRG reports: “Taw Oo District Situation Update: Fighting, shelling, and house burning in Thandaung Town, and air strikes in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (January to July 2023)”, January 2024 Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers’ lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023. “Taw Oo District Incident Report: Killings, property destruction, and indiscriminate shelling by the SAC in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township (July 2023)”, November 2023. “Taw Oo District Short Update: Air strikes, displacement and property damage in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, July 2023”, August 2023. Burning Karen State: Retaliatory burning of houses and property against rural civilian communities of Southeast Burma (2021 and 2022), March 2023. Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received in November and December 2023. It was provided by a community member in Taw Oo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma (Myanmar), which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army. [3] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed (KNLA) wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [4] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name. [5] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [6] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [7] ‘Saw’ is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name. [8] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives. [9] ‘Daw’ is a Burmese female honorific title used before a person’s name. [10] ‘Naw’ is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name. [11] ‘U’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-05
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.5 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM5.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-05
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.53 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 5.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-05
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 37.02 MB
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Source/publisher: The Canberra Times via Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
Description: "This week, in Melbourne, the Australian government for the second time is hosting leaders for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia Special Summit. It's been six years since the last summit on Australian soil. While many countries in the region have seen economic growth during that time, repression and democratic backsliding has also been growing. The rights of people across the region are being trampled or ignored. The summit is an opportunity to put those issues, and the rights of south-east Asian people, front and center. In 2018, Aung San Suu Kyi represented the government of Myanmar at the summit. Since then, the military has ousted the civilian-led government and has drawn the country into a spiraling human rights and humanitarian crisis. The military has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity - Aung San Suu Kyi is among the tens of thousands arbitrarily detained. She is serving 27 years in prison under a slew of fabricated charges. Six years ago, Hun Sen was Cambodia's leader posing for selfies at Sydney Harbor and brazenly threatening Cambodians who dared to protest that he would "beat them." Now his son Hun Manet is leader. As Human Rights Watch has documented, physical assaults of opposition members have continued. The opposition leader Kem Sokha is serving a 27-year sentence confined to his home, and the main opposition party was banned from contesting the sham 2023 elections. Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited last time and will attend the summit again, but his term is ending. Indonesia's democratic institutions meant to provide a check on power such as the Constitutional Court and Anti-Corruption Commission have been eroded, with a return to dynastic patronage politics. His likely successor is currently the defence minister, Prabowo Subianto - implicated in massacres in East Timor in 1983, and the 1997-1998 kidnappings of activists in Java that led to his dismissal from the army. The lesson is that when there is no proper accountability following a truth commission as in Timor-Leste, even notorious human rights abusers can go on to hold political power. Prabowo has the support of Widodo, who paired his son Gibran Raka to be Prabowo's vice-president. Then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte skipped the last summit. Now it's Ferdinand Marcos jnr son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. His son is desperate to rehabilitate the family name and is being feted by Western leaders from Washington to Canberra. While the Australian government may be relieved to have a non-volatile pro-West partner in Malacaang Palace, the summary killings of drug suspects still occur regularly because of the lack of accountability for police violence. The government refuses to co-operate with the International Criminal Court's investigation into the "drug war" killings, and killings of leftist activists and trade unionists continue, fueled by the authorities' practice of "red-tagging" them as "communists." Thailand's then-Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, who seized power in a 2014 military coup, attended the last summit. As in Myanmar, Thai generals had the foresight to shore up their continued domination of the political process through a constitutional and legal framework that enabled the military to determine who became prime minister. So when the reformist Move Forward Party resoundingly won the most votes in the May 2023 election, entrenched interests had ways to prevent them from assuming power. Now Thailand is ruled by Srettha Thaivisin, a former businessman from the Pheu Thai party, while the former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is back home, on parole and holding court for ruling party politicians. Malaysia's leader in attendance is Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who doggedly won the last election after years of trumped-up charges against him. As Anwar struggles to hold together a fragile coalition of parties, many of his promises for reform have gone unmet. Vietnam and Laos both remain Communist Party states that don't even pretend to hold independent elections. Laos is chairing ASEAN this year. Vietnam is enjoying attention from Western capitals and companies looking to "de-risk" from China. Meanwhile, its crackdowns have intensified against activists, including environmental defenders. This regional backsliding on democracy and human rights should be of immense concern to the Australian government and Australians. The government is rightly worried about the Chinese government's growing influence in the region. Across south-east Asia, Chinese companies as part of China's mass surveillance infrastructure are building "smart" city systems that collect massive amount of personal and other data without oversight. Beijing is actively seeking to shore up support for votes from governments in the region to evade accountability at the United Nations and in the global arena. And it is pressing south-east Asian governments to return dissidents and ethnic Uyghurs, sending a stark reminder to Chinese nationals that even if they have left the mainland, they are not truly safe. Instead of taking bold steps to defend democracy and human rights, Australia and other democratic governments have shown less willingness to hold human rights abusers responsible if those abusers are strategic allies, trade partners in "de-risking," or otherwise considered helpful in containing China. The approach is deemed "pragmatic" but involves passively monitoring the decline of human rights and democracy across the region or raising matters privately, where there is little chance of impact. Meanwhile, civil society activists, government critics and journalists are facing intimidation, threats, harassment, and in some cases physical attacks. ASEAN has proven woefully inadequate in addressing regional human rights crises - most starkly evident with its impotent and ineffectual response to atrocities in Myanmar. This is hardly likely to improve now that Laos is the chair. Australia should use this summit to press for meaningful co-ordinated action on Myanmar. Australia is right to forge greater trade and security ties and strengthen its relationships in the region. But those ties alone will not be enough to stop the authoritarian slide. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up each other's human rights concerns..."
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Source/publisher: Government of Thailand
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
Description: "On 1 March 2024, H.E. Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, participated in the Interactive Dialogue on High Commissioner’s Oral Update on Myanmar during the 55th Session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, Switzerland. On this occasion, Ms. Usana Berananda, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations Office at Geneva, delivered a statement by Thailand, stating that as an immediate neighbour, Thailand is deeply concerned about the current situation in Myanmar, especially the plight of people in the country. For this reason, Thailand has undertaken the initiative to upscale humanitarian assistance along the Thai - Myanmar border to support the implementation of the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. In addition, Thailand hoped that ASEAN, neighbouring countries, and external partners would seek to build on this initiative by encouraging all parties to work towards dialogue, reconciliation, and a return to democracy, with a goal to achieve a peaceful, stable, and unified Myanmar where human rights of the Myanmar people are fully respected. On the same day, VFM also met with H.E. Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations in Geneva to share Thailand’s visions in enhancing the effectiveness of HRC, especially in emergency situations. VFM reaffirmed Thailand’s readiness to work with all countries and stakeholders to advance the work of the HRC..."
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.64 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM4.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.8 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 4.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.12 MB
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Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-03-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-03
Description: "This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 3 March, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued end of March 2024. HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES • Across Myanmar 18.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024, with people struggling to survive amid conflict and insecurity, civilian safety and protection threats, as well as soaring inflation that is affecting people’s ability to meet basic needs. • Conflict spans various parts of the country with a deteriorating situation in Rakhine, as well as the Northwest and Southeast, driving new displacement. Nationwide, more than 2.7 million people are now displaced. • In Rakhine, people were killed and injured in Sittwe when a stray shell, landed in the downtown market on 29 February. • The closure of roads and waterways in Rakhine since the renewed conflict in November 2023 has led to food scarcity and other supply shortages, as well as increased prices of essential goods. • The situation in northern Shan has been relatively stable following the ceasefire agreed in January. However, landmine contamination, recruitment by armed groups, isolated tensions and movement restrictions remain a threat to local communities. UN staff temporarily relocated from Lashio will soon be returning due to the improved security situation. • Active fighting, administrative restrictions being imposed by all sides, and violence and harassment of humanitarian personnel remain key barriers to accessing affected people and providing lifesaving assistance. • At least 3.2 million people were reached with assistance in 2023 however this support is not as deep or sustained as planned due to underfunding and access constraints. • Through the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan aid workers aim to reach 5.3 million people with urgent assistance for which $994 million is required. A repeat of 2023 funding levels (HRP 37 per cent funded) in 2024 would be catastrophic for affected people..."
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-03
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.46 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM3.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-03
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.5 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 3.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-03
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.14 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-02
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.44 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM2.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-02
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 2.04 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 2.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-02
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.2 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-01
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.32 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM1.3.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-03-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-01
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.8 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 1.3.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-03-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-01
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 5.84 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-29
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.06 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM29.2.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-29
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.63 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 29.2.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-02-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-29
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.67 MB
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Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-28
Sub-title: Albanese, Southeast Asian Leaders Should Address Myanmar, Other Regional Crises
Description: "Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders. Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years, and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members. Key concerns include the need for stronger sanctions against Myanmar and ending attacks on dissidents in Cambodia and Vietnam, and security forces’ targeting of activists in the Philippines. (Sydney) – Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Albanese will host leaders from nine of the countries making up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit on March 4 to 6, 2024, in Melbourne. The 60-page report, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia,” summarizes critical human rights issues that Albanese should raise at the summit. Human Rights Watch urged the Australian government to put its values as a rights-respecting democracy at the core of its relations with ASEAN countries. As the Australian government approaches the summit with the goal of removing blockages to regional economic cooperation, it should not bypass human rights concerns in the hopes that they will resolve themselves, because they will not. “This high-level meeting would be a lost opportunity for Australia and the people of ASEAN countries if the Australian government were to gloss over human rights issues,” said Daniela Gavshon, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Australian government should send the message that human rights violations are a key foreign policy concern.” It will be especially important for Australia to guide discussion toward human rights since the subject has been left off the summit agenda. The summit marks 50 years of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations. Over the past five decades, successive Australian governments have pursued closer economic, security, and political partnerships with ASEAN countries. Australia continues to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asian countries to offset the shift in global power dynamics. United States influence in the region is being challenged by the growing political, economic, and military clout of a more assertive China. To counter China’s threat to human rights and the rules-based international order, Australia should center its dialogue with ASEAN leaders on the rights of Southeast Asian people rather than just on strengthening friendly relations. The anniversary presents a unique opportunity to reflect on human rights in the region and to reframe the next 50 years of Australia-ASEAN cooperation. Albanese has already projected the next half-century to be “even more successful than the last” for ASEAN-Australia relations, and pledged A$95.4 million (US$63.9 million) to kick-start Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040. In a February letter, Human Rights Watch urged Prime Minister Albanese to press for commitments from individual countries at the summit, and raise specific human rights issues with individual governments. “Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members,” Gavshon said. “Australia’s failure to directly address human rights concerns at the summit would be a propaganda coup for abusive leaders, and it will embolden new ASEAN leaders to continue the human rights abusing legacies of their predecessors.” In its most serious human rights lapse, ASEAN has not dealt with the spiralling humanitarian and human rights crisis in Myanmar. The consequences have spilled over the borders of Thailand, India, and China, and contributed to the continued suffering of ethnic Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh. Tens of thousands have sought safety in neighboring countries since the 2021 coup by the Myanmar military. In addition, Rohingya who fled crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in 2017 cannot return. Given increasing insecurity and deteriorating conditions in the camps housing one million Rohingya in Bangladesh, 4,500 made the high-risk sea voyage to Indonesia or Malaysia in 2023, according to the United Nations refugee agency. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus – which Myanmar’s junta repudiated days after agreeing to it in April 2021 – is not a viable framework for dealing with a military that continues to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes. Australian and ASEAN governments should agree to enforce sanctions against Myanmar, including those newly imposed by Australia on banks and jet fuel suppliers, in their own jurisdictions. Together, Albanese and Southeast Asian leaders should commit to strengthening multilateral action at the UN Security Council. Among other key rights issues to be addressed is the Thai and Cambodian governments’ cooperation to uncover, intimidate, and arrest Cambodian civil society activists in Thailand. In Vietnam, the government systematically suppresses freedom of expression and other basic liberties. In the Philippines, the security forces target activists, rights defenders, and journalists, often with deadly results. State-sponsored discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia remains pervasive. On an institutional level, ASEAN purports to respect the human rights of its 685 million citizens. However, its Human Rights Declaration and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) have no real impact. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its own domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up allies’ human rights concerns, Human Rights Watch said. “The 50th anniversary of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations marked at this summit could be a turning point,” Gavshon said. “Looking forward to 2040, the region will face environmental challenges, economic uncertainty, and strategic competition, but these challenges can be lessened if governments show respect for human rights and democracy.”..."
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Source/publisher: UN Development Programme (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-28
Description: "By United Nations Development Programme FEBRUARY 28TH, 2024 Three years on from the military takeover in Myanmar, stories across the country chronicle the danger and desperation that continues to mark each day for many. The deepening conflict and crisis has plunged the country’s economy into turmoil, taking incomes and jobs with it, and collapsing public services. The impact of it all is wearing on millions of people, as they struggle to make it through each day. The economy has entered a phase where the growth rate has reached rock bottom, showing no signs of recovery. The World Bank has downgraded the growth projection for 2024 from three percent to one percent. Farm incomes are hardest hit, and states and regions where the conflict has intensified are the worst affected. Migration is rampant, often the only lifeline for people who have exhausted all other options. For development and humanitarian agencies knowing where to focus their efforts, under such precarious circumstances, has become a challenge. Yet despite incredible hardship, Myanmar's people are resiliently pursuing ways to make life better for themselves and their neighbours -- from starting new businesses to fighting to protect the country's precious mangroves. UNDP is supporting their efforts, particularly among the most vulnerable. A joint UNDP and UN Women survey found that in this dire environment, women face a disproportionate share of negative consequences as incomes fall, employment opportunities decline dramatically, unpaid work burdens increase, and insecurity and fear rise. Daw Tin Mar Win, who even before the present crisis struggled to find enough work as a day labourer, has now branched out into goat farming and is already passing on her skills to her children. "UNDP's support has been a lifeline, providing me with a reliable job and income," she said. "I had no experience with goats and lacked confidence. UNDP's training boosted my confidence and taught me how to start my goat farm." Insecurity is both physical, due to widespread conflict, but it is also about the vulnerability that arises from the lack of social safety nets, money, and livelihoods. Without these, many are eating less, forgoing healthcare, taking on unsustainable debts, and selling assets. The country's small farmers have been grappling with additional challenges, particularly in Shan State, where most of Myanmar's food is produced. Among other things, seed and fertilizer prices have risen and supply chains have been disrupted. UNDP is working with farmers to provide the extra solar-powered irrigation needed for growing rice, garlic, tomatoes and chillies, and techniques to reduce the amount of fertilizer needed for healthy crops..."
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-28
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 6.86 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM28.2.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-28
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.31 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 28.2.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-28
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 5.98 MB
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Source/publisher: UN Women (New York)
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
Description: "Ma Shwe said she “was just a young girl” when an act of sexual violence perpetrated by a man from her village crushed her self-confidence and left her feeling terrified. Ma Shwe, who is identified by a pseudonym to protect her identity, was raised in a small farming village in Myanmar with about 200 households. After the attack, she felt judged by her community, shamed, and outcast. “I was afraid to live in my environment, and so I left my home and village,” she said. She only felt safe enough to return when she found that the perpetrator had also left the village, and enough time had passed that it seemed clear he would not return. By then, Ma Shwe had a child, and she wanted to live with her family and raise her child in her home village. However, upon her return, she continued to feel judged by those around her, and as she dealt with the ongoing physical and mental health impacts of the violence, it was a daily struggle to feel safe and comfortable. “I used to feel shy and afraid of people,” she said, “but there was a training in my village on gender-based violence and I attended. After the training I felt that I can accept being alive.” Ma Shwe accessed that training and a range of services, including counselling sessions, with the support of a local women-led organization, one of several groups that UN Women works with across Myanmar to reach women and girls who have experienced or are at risk of experiencing gender-based violence. A representative from that organization said that, when Ma Shwe first approached the group, “she cried openly because of the comments from some people around her and every day was a time of worry and sadness for her.” “However, she attended the awareness sessions and accepted that it was not her fault. In addition, she was able to regain her self-confidence and acceptance of her own existence as she received timely counselling sessions,” the representative said, asking that their name and organization not be made public for security concerns. Ma Shwe also attended training courses and awareness raising sessions that were delivered through a digital learning platform. A wide range of people in the community, including men and boys, used that platform and attended the in-person sessions, which aimed to break down harmful social norms and attitudes that perpetuate violence and discrimination against women and girls. “After the training, I saw that the views of the people around me had changed a lot”, Ma Shwe said. “This change is important. It makes people feel equal and understand everyone has rights, so they learn to value each other.” UN Women works with other UN agencies, including the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and local partner organizations to prevent gender-based violence and offer response services across Myanmar. From 2021 to 2023, UN Women and UNFPA reached more than 16,000 women through a joint programme on preventing and responding to gender-based violence. Of those women, 1,290 received legal advice and assistance, psychosocial support, and referrals to other services. More than 800 women-headed households received cash assistance and food, and also accessed services including mental health and psychosocial support. As fighting in Myanmar continues to escalate and the economic, political, and humanitarian crisis worsens, civilians’ coping capacities are stretched to the limit. A new joint programme supported by the Government of France will provide additional support for UN Women and UNFPA to deliver services aimed at preventing gender-based violence in communities affected by the conflict, including livelihood support and access to emergency services. The country’s broader crisis is perpetuating gender disparities in employment and increasing vulnerability to trafficking and gender-based violence including sexual exploitation, harassment, and intimate partner violence, which Myanmar women have said is the most common form of gender-based violence in their communities.[1] Women’s organizations in Myanmar play a vital role in preventing and responding to gender-based violence by providing services at the community level, bolstering women’s empowerment, and reaching those at risk of being left behind. While Ma Shwe continues to struggle with the impact of the violence that was perpetrated against her, she now feels more comfortable in her community. She said she has hope for the future and even dreams of one day opening her own business. She said, “I feel like I've got my own life back, and I'm not afraid of people anymore.” [1] Findings from focus group discussions conducted for 2023 Multi Sectoral Needs Analysis..."
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
Description: "A deadly stampede outside a passport office that took two lives and unending lines outside embassies - these are just some examples of what has been happening in Myanmar since the announcement of mandatory conscription into the military. Myanmar's military government is facing increasingly effective opposition to its rule and has lost large areas of the country to armed resistance groups. On 1 February 2021, the military seized power in a coup, jailing elected leaders and plunging much of the country into a bloody civil war that continues today. Thousands have been killed and the UN estimates that around 2.6 million people been displaced. Young Burmese, many of whom have played a leading role protesting and resisting the junta, are now told they will have to fight for the regime. Many believe that this is a result of the setbacks suffered by the military in recent months, with anti-government groups uniting to defeat them in some key areas. "It is nonsense to have to serve in the military at this time, because we are not fighting foreign invaders. We are fighting each other. If we serve in the military, we will be contributing to their atrocities," Robert, a 24-year-old activist, told the BBC. Many of them are seeking to leave the country instead. "I arrived at 03:30 [20:30 GMT] and there were already about 40 people queuing for the tokens to apply for their visa," recalled a teenage girl who was part of a massive crowd outside the Thai embassy in Yangon earlier in February. Within an hour, the crowd in front of the embassy expanded to more than 300 people, she claims. "I was scared that if I waited any longer, the embassy would suspend the processing of visas amid the chaos," she told the BBC, adding that some people had to wait for three days before even getting a queue number. In Mandalay, where the two deaths occurred outside the passport office, the BBC was told that there were also serious injuries - one person broke their leg after falling into a drain while another broke their teeth. Six others reported breathing difficulties. Justine Chambers, a Myanmar researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies, says mandatory conscription is a way of removing young civilians leading the revolution. "We can analyse how the conscription law is a sign of the Myanmar military's weakness, but it is ultimately aimed at destroying lives... Some will manage to escape, but many will become human shields against their compatriots," she said. Myanmar's conscription law was first introduced in 2010 but had not been enforced until on 10 February the junta said it would mandate at least two years of military service for all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27. Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson for the military government, said in a statement that about a quarter of the country's 56 million population were eligible for military service under the law. The regime later said it did not plan to include women in the conscript pool "at present" but did not specify what that meant. The government spokesperson told BBC Burmese that call-ups would start after the Thingyan festival marking the Burmese New Year in mid-April, with an initial batch of 5,000 recruits. The regime's announcement has dealt yet another blow to Myanmar's young people. Many had their education disrupted by the coup, which came on top of school closures at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2021, the junta suspended 145,000 teachers and university staff over their support for the opposition, according to the Myanmar Teachers' Federation, and some schools in opposition-held areas have been destroyed by the fighting or by air strikes. Then there are those who have fled across borders seeking refuge, among them young people looking for jobs to support their families. Young Burmese confront dashed dreams in exile Why India wants to fence its troubled Myanmar border In response to the conscription law, some have said on social media that they would enter the monkhood or get married early to dodge military service. The junta says permanent exemptions will be given to members of religious orders, married women, people with disabilities, those assessed to be unfit for military service and "those who are exempted by the conscription board". For everyone else, evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine. But Robert doubts the regime will honour these exemptions. "The junta can arrest and abduct anyone they want. There is no rule of law and they do not have to be accountable to anyone," he said. Wealthier families are considering moving their families abroad - Thailand and Singapore being popular options, but some are even looking as far afield as Iceland - with the hope that their children would get permanent residency or citizenship there by the time they are of conscription age. Others have instead joined the resistance forces, said Aung Sett, from the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, which has a long history of fighting military rule. "When I heard the news that I would have to serve in the military, I felt really disappointed and at the same time devastated for the people, especially for those who are young like me. Many young people have now registered themselves to fight against the junta," the 23-year-old told the BBC from exile. Some observers say the enforcement of the law now reveals the junta's diminishing grip on the country. Last October, the regime suffered its most serious setback since the coup. An alliance of ethnic insurgents overran dozens of military outposts along the border with India and China. It has also lost large areas of territory to insurgents along the Bangladesh and Indian borders. According to the National Unity Government, which calls itself Myanmar's government in exile, more than 60% of Myanmar's territory is now under the control of resistance forces. "By initiating forced conscription following a series of devastating and humiliating defeats to ethnic armed organisations, the military is publicly demonstrating just how desperate it has become," said Jason Tower, country director for the Burma programme at the United States' Institute of Peace. A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses Who are the rulers who executed Myanmar activists? Mr Tower expects the move to fail because of growing resentment against the junta. "Many youth dodging conscription will have no choice but to escape into neighbouring countries, intensifying regional humanitarian and refugee crises. This could result in frustration growing in Thailand, India, China and Bangladesh, all of which could tilt away from what remains of their support for the junta," he said. Even if the military does manage to increase troop numbers by force, this will do little to address collapsing morale in the ranks. It will also take months to train up the new troops, he said. The junta had a long history of "forced recruitment" even before the law was enacted, said Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. "So the law may merely serve as a facade for forcibly conscripting new recruits into the military. With a severe shortage of manpower, there is no time to wait for the lengthy and gradual process of recruiting new soldiers, prompting [officials] to exploit the law to swiftly coerce people into service," he said. Even for those who will manage to escape, many will carry injuries and emotional pain for the rest of their lives. "It has been really difficult for young people in Myanmar, both physically and mentally. We've lost our dreams, our hopes and our youth. It just can't be the same like before," said Aung Sett, the student leader. "These three years have gone away like nothing. We've lost our friends and colleagues during the fight against the junta and many families have lost their loved ones. It has been a nightmare for this country. We are witnessing the atrocities committed by the junta on a daily basis. I just can't express it in words."..."
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.75 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM27.2.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.62 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 27.2.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.2 MB
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Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Description: "This Short Update describes events that occurred in Kaw T’Ree (Kawkareik) Township, Dooplaya District, in November 2023. On November 2nd 2023, combined troops of Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) attacked State Administration Council (SAC) Infantry Battalion (IB) #32 army camp near A--- village, Maw Hkee village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, by drone, and fighting broke out. Following this, SAC troops heavily shelled into A--- village and surrounding villagers’ plantations during the whole day. In fear, villagers from A--- village fled to B--- area, an internally displaced people (IDP) site. Moreover, the SAC shelling into A--- village created fear for villagers in neighbouring villages to live and work in their village.[1] SAC shelling after fighting in Kaw T’Ree Township On November 2nd 2023, in the morning, at 7:20 am, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[2] Battalion #201, combined with Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA)[3] troops, dropped three shells by drone into State Administration Council (SAC)[4] Infantry Battalion (IB)[5] #32 army camp near A--- village, Maw Hkee village tract[6], Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. SAC IB#32 Battalion Commender's name is Kyaw Zin Oo. Following the shelling, fighting broke out, and stopped at 10:40 am. Though the fighting stopped, the SAC soldiers shelled [rounds of] 120mm, 81mm, and 60mm mortar shells and [fired rounds from an] RPG7 [rocket-propelled grenade launcher] into A--- village and nearby plantations for the whole remaining day. As a result, some shells landed on corn fields and pea plantations, creating fear for villagers to go and harvest rice and peas from the plantations, though it was time to harvest crops. [Due to the shelling, several buildings such as a church, a school and a house were damaged, but no villagers were injured.] As reported by a local villager to KHRG, villagers from A--- village did not dare to live in their village, so they sought shelter in B--- area [an IDP site located at the Thai-Burma border]. Villagers from [nearby villages such as] C--- village and D--- village, in Maw Hkee village tract, were also living in fear. As a result of this incident, villagers feel that they must be wary when moving around their villages, working in plantations, or going to school, for example. They also feel trapped because of this fear of moving around. Further background reading on the situation of indiscriminate shelling and displacement in Southeast Burma can be found in the following KHRG reports: “Dooplaya District Situation Update: Indiscriminate shelling of villages causing displacement and livelihood difficulties (March to May 2023)”, January 2024. “Dooplaya District Short Update: Killing, house burning, shelling, and displacement, from January to February 2023”, December 2023. “Dooplaya District Incident Report: A villager was killed by SAC shelling in Noh T’Kaw (Kyainseikgyi) Township, June 2023”, December 2023. “Dooplaya District Incident Report: Threat, forced labour, indiscriminate shelling and looting in Kaw T’Ree Township, March 15th 2023”, June 2023. “Dooplaya District Short Update: Indiscriminate shelling and a landmine explosion in Noh T’Kaw Township, June to September 2022”, April 2023. Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received in November 2023. It was provided by a community member in Dooplaya District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed (KNLA) wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [3] The Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) was founded on July 17th 2022 by Brigadier-General Nerdah Bo Mya. Nerdah Bo Mya, former Commander-In-Chief of the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), was dismissed by the KNU in 2022. KTLA operates in two districts in Southeast Burma, in KNU-controlled areas, namely Mergui-Tavoy and Dooplaya districts. In Dooplaya District, they operate in alliance with resistance armed groups. KTLA battalions in Mergui-Tavoy District are in conflict with both SAC and KNLA troops. [4] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [5] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are understrength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [6] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village..."
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Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Sub-title: They were returning home after the junta enacted a military conscription law.
Description: "More than 100 ethnic Rakhine youths detained by Myanmar’s junta as they returned by bus to Rakhine state from the commercial capital Yangon last week remained incommunicado on Monday, with relatives expressing concern that they were forcibly recruited to join the military amid a rollout of the country’s conscription law. Junta troops arrested the youths on Feb. 20 at a checkpoint in Shwe Pyi Thar township, according to a monk who was a fellow passenger on one of the buses and who lobbied to authorities on their behalf. “Of the three buses that were stopped, the two that I tried to intercede for carried between 90 and 100 passengers [in total],” said the monk who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke to RFA Burmese on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “The last thing I knew, they were arrested,” he said. “The reason I know this is because they entered the military checkpoint and never came out.” The youths, aged between 18 and 30, had been working in garment, shoe and other factories in Yangon, the monk said. They were returning to their homes in the Rakhine townships of Myepon, Minbya, Mrauk-U, and Kyauktaw because their wards in Yangon would no longer register them as guests and they feared arrest after the junta enacted the military conscription law earlier this month. They departed the Aung Mingalar Bus Yard in two buses operated by the Aung Si Khaing bus service and a third operated by the Pwint Phyu bus service, the monk said. The buses typically carry up to 50 passengers. The youths are currently being held at the junta troop unit in Yangon region’s Hlaing Tharyar township, he said, adding that he had been unable to contact them as of Monday. No contact since arrest The military has suffered heavy losses on the battlefield in recent months – most notably in western Rakhine state, where the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, ended a ceasefire in November and has since gone on to capture six townships. On Feb. 10, the junta enacted the People’s Military Service Law, sending draft-eligible civilians fleeing from Myanmar’s cities. They say they would rather leave the country or join anti-junta forces in remote border areas than fight for the military, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat. RFA Burmese has since received reports of recruitment roundups and arrests of young people, despite pledges from authorities that the law will not be enforced until April. A relative of one of the detained youths told RFA that 14 of them are from his home village of Ywa Thar Yar, in Myebon township’s Yaw Chaung district. “Four are male and 10 are female,” he said. “We haven’t had any contact with them since their arrest. They were working in factories in Yangon.” The relative urged the junta to “release them as soon as possible,” as they had committed no crimes and were supporting their families with their income. Aid workers confirmed to RFA that more than 100 Rakhine youths were arrested at the checkpoint on Feb. 20, but were unable to provide the details of those in custody, such as their names, ages or hometowns. Nowhere is safe Residents said that in the past two weeks, authorities in Yangon and Mandalay have been strictly enforcing the Guest List Law, which mandates either seven days’ imprisonment or a fine of 10,000 kyats (about US$5) for those who fail to register. And last week, junta troops arrested around 600 civilians after their flights from Yangon landed at two airports in Rakhine state, according to family members and sources with knowledge of the situation, who said the military is holding them on suspicion of attempting to join the armed resistance. A young Rakhine man working in Yangon told RFA that the junta is arresting people from his state who are living in the city “even if they are registered on guest lists,” but said returning home isn’t safe either. “Now, if you go back to Rakhine, you will be arrested at Sittwe Airport … [or] at Kyaukpyu Airport. But if you stay [in Yangon], there are difficulties with the military service law,” he said. “I fled here to avoid the fighting in Rakhine, but it’s not safe here either. That’s just the current situation." Rakhine military commentators told RFA they believe that the junta is likely targeting youths returning to Rakhine state because they “fear they will join the AA.” Attempts by RFA to contact junta spokesperson Maj. General Zaw Min Tun for comment on the detention of young people in Shwe Pyi Thar township went unanswered Monday. On Feb. 20, the AA said in a statement that the junta is “unlawfully arresting Rakhine people” in cities such as Yangon and Mandalay to use as soldiers, in addition to subjecting them to daily discrimination, torture, extortion, and execution. The group called on Rakhines fleeing fighting in the state to move to territory under its control, instead of relocating to the cities..."
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Sub-title: In Part 2 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description: "The Resistance Let’s start with the difference between an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) and a People’s Defense Force (PDF). Put simply and broadly, a PDF does not seek autonomy within the State, while autonomy within a federal state (but no longer succession) is a key demand of most EAOs.[1] PDFs were created in response to the 2021 coup, while EAOs uniformly pre-dated it. Some but not all PDFs are connected to the NUG, although the term PDF also includes Local Defense Forces (LDFs), which are autonomous. Taking PDFs and EAOs as a whole, Andrew Selth estimates ‘up to 250 loosely organised local defence groups, urban resistance cells and EAOs… there could be about 25,000 active members of the various militias and resistance groups, and a further 30,000-35,000 in the relevant EAOs.’ This and other claims arrive with the caveat that no one has an accurate macro-level tally: local organizations are the only ones likely to have accurate estimates, but those too would be limited and area-specific data, which is constantly shifting. Therefore, any tally is out-of-date soon after it occurs. Ethnic Armed Organizations Regarding EAOs, in 2018, I wrote about the failure of the deposed civilian government’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and that relates to Selth’s key use of the word relevant. His count of 30,000-35,000 EAO troops discounts EAOs not currently at war with the junta, most through ceasefires – a situation that predates the current junta’s seizure of power. Let’s briefly consider EAO numbers as a whole, because those with ceasefires still represent potential combatants. The sit-tat’s aforementioned manner of signing and breaking ceasefires is a deadly game, and EAO’s with current ceasefires know that they are not durable. Estimates of pre- and post-coup EAO numbers (i.e. not PDFs) are represented in the table below: * includes reserves. ** indicates no known or significant change from pre-coup numbers Since the coup, we can only note that EAO numbers have increased. If Ye Myo Hein’s estimates are correct, there is at least a parity between EAO numbers overall and the sit-tat’s human resource capacity. Prior to the October 27 offensive, the disorganization of the resistance was what in part held back faster territorial acquisition and greater sit-tat attrition. The sit-tat, in many ways inept, at least acknowledges the stark fact that it can’t fight the strongest EAOs, and so it continued to play the aforementioned game of musical chair ceasefires. The momentum building against the sit-tat makes this option less attractive for EAOs. Back to Selth’s ‘relevant,’ select EAOs falling under the China-backed Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC), deserve particular mention. The FPNCC is a negotiating block created and led by the United Wa State Party (UWSP), which formed out of the remnants of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989. The UWSP for its part has been built by China into the largest, best armed, and most cohesive EAO in the country, and perhaps after the now-defunct Wagner Group and the thoroughly desiccated Islamic State, is now the largest non-state armed group on the Asian continent. The Three Brotherhood’s AA, MNDAA, and TNLA are under the FPNCC umbrella, as are the National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla), and the Shan State Army North (linked to the Shan State Progress Party). Unlike many an EAO alliance, the FPNCC proved more durable, and at present it contains the absolute majority of EAO fighters countrywide. The Chin National Front’s (CNF) armed forces are allied with several newly formed Chinland Defense Forces – which are PDF groups based in Chin State. Their exponential post-coup growth is noteworthy and harken back to the CNF’s bloody and unexpected arrival on the resistance scene in the mid-1990s after they were trained and armed by the KIA. An outlier in the EAO continuum is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Other Rohingya groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and other EAOs, regard it as a terrorist organization, with links to other Jihadist groups worldwide, although ARSA denies this. ARSA have also been implicated in massacres in Rakhine. They are mostly involved in intra-Rohingya political struggles in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and are more actively engaged in killing Rohingya alternates to their authority there, and occasional Bangladeshi security officials, than killing sit-tat in Rakhine. Rohingya people, as far as the author is aware, have no representation in PDFs, nor are they part of any resistance not wholly concerned with their own specific ethno-religious-territorial concerns. This is despite some outreach on the part of NUG to build bridges with Rohingya, firstly by actually using the word ‘Rohingya’, in contrast to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, who only referred to them as Bengalis in order to cement the claim that they were recent migrants from Bangladesh. NUG has since acknowledged the violence they were subjected to by the sit-tat, but has hardly acknowledged the structural violence adhered to by the NLD against them. And so NUG’s claims – that it would provide justice, repatriation, and reparation for Rohingya – are yet to be tested. People’s Defense Forces The most recent PDFs in Myanmar began forming and arming immediately after the 2021 Military coup. However, they have a long and potted history in Myanmar, explained by Jasnea Sarma at the University of Zurich as follows: In the past too there used to be such groups. They went by different names like Swan Ar Shin စွမ်းအားရှင်, ပြည်သူ့တဝန် or civilian task force, ရွာတာဝန်ပြည်သူ့စွမ်းအားရှင် or village task force etc) . These groups were driven by self-defence and formed often as a response to circumstance, namely local protection from threats. The post-coup PDFs, often referred to as ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် or ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်, are a direct response to the coup, all fighting the sit tat, but they do mimic the workings of these older groups. This explains in-part why it’s difficult to clearly understand which PDF is aligned with which group. They are not necessarily always linked to previously elected representatives, although many are. Not all PDFs are tied to NUG. Many are now allied with EAOs, some are standalone, with occasional alliances of convenience. There are many composed mainly of armed university students assisted by EAOs. Some also have church affiliations. What’s important is that they have arms and can maintain a defensive posture and have been extremely important and effective after the 2021 coup. History tells us that if anything, they will keep forming in (and around) Burma, adapting to the needs. Jasnea Sarma PDFs have been able to mount effective resistance across Bamar areas and have been able to recruit a significant number of fighters, including former soldiers and police officers; as mentioned, many Bamar youth in Sagaing and Magwe who might have joined the sit-tat are in PDFs instead. They have also received weapons from abroad, although most of their firearms originate from actions against the sit-tat or from select EAOs. Local manufacture of firearms also occurs, but the artisanal nature of these operations not only limits their impact, but poses danger to both manufacturer and shooter. Civilian drone conversion is another factor. Regarding numbers, NUG claims 50-100,000 fighters in 259 trained PDF battalions and 401 LDFs. The formal size of a PDF battalion is 200 personnel, but some are up to 500. Hein estimates that PDF personnel numbered 40,000 as of February 2022, with no less than 30,000 LDF personnel. These PDFs are concentrated in the Anyar theatre of Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay, where there are at least 15,000 PDF and 20,000 LDF combatants. As of November 2022, independent observers speaking with Ye Myo Hein estimated that 30 percent of PDFs/LDFs fell under the command of NUG, 40 percent had some links to NUG, while 30 percent were wholly independent. At the local level, it’s likely that all PDFs have more authority than local NUG representation. They’re armed, after all. However, some PDFs are under the control of NUG (which raised $44 million for its defense ministry alone in its first 14 months), with a clearer integration between the two, rather than the diffuse and grassroots nature of many other PDFs which resemble the franchise nature of many an insurgency. However, the PDFs face deep challenges, including a lack of coordinated leadership, limited support from the international community, and even the populations of some areas they control, due to the predatory behavior of select groups. Limited resources are worth highlighting: Min Zaw Oo from the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security estimated to Deutsche Welle that at the beginning of 2022, only 10 percent of PDFs had automatic weapons, although they are now generally better armed. Despite this, we have evidence of local support, of retention in numbers, of the capacity of fighters, all found in the sit-tat body count the PDFs are responsible for. Overall, the balance of personnel favors the armed resistance. Credibility Issues The support EAOs might give to PDFs in particular and the NUG in general is constrained by the lack of credibility the deposed civilian government had with some EAOs. AA chief General Twan Mrat Naing summarized it well: “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people, but after they came to power, they didn’t keep the promise. So we have learned the lesson and we are not naive anymore.” The past relationships of many EAOs with the deposed civilian government surely shapes EAO relations with the NUG and PDFs and this issue will come to the forefront in any NUG-EAO victory. Promises of federalism will not be taken at face value. International Support for the Sit-tat Since the coup, elements of the “international community” have imposed sanctions on the sit-tat and affiliated individuals. The countries and institutions most in support of NUG are peripheral in comparison to the countries which maintain pragmatic relations with the sit-tat. Who cares about Switzerland when you’ve got China? While, as mentioned, sanctions may bite because of the predominance of the US dollar, this is not an insurmountable issue for either the junta or allies who seek alternates to said dollar. China and Russia protect the sit-tat from United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolutions, and both can offer the veil of legitimacy to any staged elections. India and other Myanmar neighbors must keep their options open with a state they must trade with and absorb refugees from. China In 2004 the sit-tat began reaching out to “the west”, which was seen as a hedge against China’s hegemony in the region. The situation is now an inverse of the one which led to the removal of Khin Nyunt and his China clique two decades ago. China’s support is crucial to the sit-tat’s survival. However, China’s nuanced approach to the Three Brotherhood Alliance reflects both a loss of patience and a hedging of bets. Since the February 2021 coup, China has justified engagement with the sit-tat to both support stability and ensure bilateral relations, although a recent USIP report showed how, with regard to stability, the opposite is occurring, with negative implications for China. China also cites principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Implicitly, Myanmar is firmly within China’s sphere of influence. The notion of a ‘sphere of influence’ was once imagined to be terminally ill by liberal internationalists, but it is both healthy and real, and extends to China’s drug control policy as well as its vaunted Belt and Road Initiative, which binds Myanmar and her eastern neighbors to China, economically and infrastructurally. The bond already exists culturally, in Yunnan in particular. China is Myanmar’s predominant economic partner, much to India’s consternation (see below), and has invested heavily in Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure development, and natural resource extraction, providing a much-needed source of economic support for the country, both under the civilian government and the latest junta. Myanmar, however, has a considerable amount of authority in the relationship. Key Chinese investments include the Kyaukphyu deep sea port, power plant, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which will connect Kyaukphyu and Yunnan via pipeline and reduce China’s reliance on fuel shipments through the Straits of Malacca; the Mee Lin Gyaing natural gas power plant in Ayeyarwady; and numerous others. This is imperial thinking of a scale not comprehensible to many a government, especially ones who only see foreign relations through the prism of their own domestic elections, and still others who automatically discount the effectiveness of state-controlled enterprises in favor of the sacraments of a ‘free market’. This relationship has not always been so smooth. Myanmar and China cooperated in the subjugation of Chinese Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) forces which had fled Yunnan and established themselves in Shan in the late 1940s, with a delusion that they would one day re-invade with the support of the CIA. Those wash-outs were a theoretical threat to the China’s ruling communists, entirely overblown. The dregs of the GMD in Shan, unlike the sit-tat, was an institution entirely hollowed out by corruption, and was generally only interested in making money. China-Myanmar cooperation was, at the time, an aberration. During the Cold War, Myanmar considered China both rival and threat. After the dictator Ne Win’s expulsion of large numbers of ethnic Chinese in the late 1960s, China increased support to Communist Party of Buma (CPB) forces in Bago Yoma, just north of Yangon, while Red Guard ‘volunteers’ supporting the CPB invaded Northern Shan in 1968. Reconciliation began after the death of Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as China’s paramount leader in the late 1970s. The CPB’s vocal support for the ’Gang of Four’, a faction of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials whom Deng had purged, led Deng’s support to the CPB to decline. The removal of the sit-tat’s ‘China clique’ in 2004 did not end Chinese overtures and investments, although the derailing of the Myitsone dam project in 2011 was a further hiccup in the relationship. Since the coup, China has not only blocked efforts to impose sanctions on Myanmar but has increased its own investments. Even before the recent offensive, China hedged its bets vis a vis the sit-tat, and the civilian government they deposed, with EAOs, though the FPNCC; a coalition of EAOs that were by and large excluded from peace process before the coup. China’s facilitation with these EAOs led to ceasefires which allowed the overextended sit-tat to reallocate overextended forces elsewhere. China also froze out the western powers that sought to engage FPNCC, leaving those westerners – “conflict” and “peacebuilding” experts and the like – to content themselves with NCA signatories, the KNU and NMSP especially. China’s relations with FPNCC members continued after the latest offensive; indeed, it is likely that the Three Brotherhood Alliance alerted China of its intentions in advance. China’s continued subtle approach toward both the sit-tat and the alliance reflects their stated policy of non-interference, but it also likely reflects a loss of patience in the sit-tat’s sheltering of the operations of ethnic Chinese criminal gangs in Shan and elsewhere. The October 27 Offensive has resulted in the capture and extradition of numerous of these criminals to China, and China has also mediated temporary ceasefires between the warring parties which will likely peter out soon due to the sit-tat’s incorrigible belief in its own battlefield genius, despite all evidence to the contrary. China also extends the occasional fig leaf to NUG, while explicitly stating their displeasure at the NUG’s continued relations with Western powers. This seems mostly for show. NUG, for its part, has issued a policy paper on China which includes support for the ‘One China’ policy. If NUG were to emerge victorious in the struggle against the sit-tat, China would find itself temporarily sidelined, because despite its insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its dealings with the current sit-tat is implicitly a bet on its success. However, this sidelining would be temporary. China simply has too much authority—economic, political, and otherwise. Russia The sit-tat hedges its China bets with Russia. During the Cold War, Myanmar was closely aligned with the Soviet Union—the USSR even built the Inya Lake Hotel following Nikita Khrushchev’s 1958 visit—and Russia retains much of that goodwill. This remains, however, a relationship of convenience: the sit-tat needs arms, and Russia needs cash. Russia is currently the sit-tat’s largest arms supplier, and this includes artillery and fighter jets. This cooperation extends to tourism, trade, and nuclear energy. Russia also blocks UNSC attempts to sanction the sit-tat. Russia’s support to development of nuclear energy in Myanmar is of particular note: the sit-tat claims that such development is peaceful. However, surely Min Aung Hlaing is following the example of Kim Jong Un and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), just as Kim learned from what happened to Moammar Qaddafi in Libya. Weapons of mass destruction are protective amulets westerners also believe in. India India’s position toward the sit-tat and the February 2021 coup has been aptly described as ‘fractured between words and deeds’ – sweet diplomatic words about upkeeping democracy, and deeds reflecting an extremely short-sighted military, political, and economic support for the junta, as well as a reluctance to understand the important role of other resistance actors. India tries to maintain a positive relationship with whoever happens to be running Myanmar, and the reason is a) China, and b) security in Northeastern India, including counterinsurgency along the long and porous border with Myanmar. This border security also involves China, which regards Northeastern India’s Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet. India’s current policy dates back to at least 1988. Like China, India justifies this engagement with the principle of non-interference and the need for stability. During the brief democratic transition, it maintained a balance in its relations with the sit-tat and the civilian government, with the aim of promoting its strategic interests in the region, including security, energy, and connectivity. India has reverted to its pre-democratic stance, maintaining positive relations with the current junta to the extent that the Modi government has downplayed junta bombs erroneously falling into Indian territory and return soldiers safely back to Myanmar who escape to safe Indian army/paramilitary controlled areas. Myanmar is an important partner for India’s ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to deepen India’s ties with Southeast Asia and strengthen its position as a regional power. It is seen as key to India’s energy security, with several major projects underway, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project which connects Sittwe and NE India, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway; India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The sit-tat’s attitude toward India is more transactional. They look the other way while Indian Naga, Meitei, Mizo and other insurgents to use Myanmar as a base. The sit-tat likely see the presence of these foreign insurgents as useful bargaining chips in any negotations with Indian authorities. The insurgents pay for the privilege in the form of protection fees, and they purchase weapons and supplies from local sit-tat as well.[15] Other neighbors are less, but still, important: Thailand has maintained a pragmatic relationship with the powers that be in Myanmar since the departure of the Raj. Bangladesh, despite the burden of the expelled Rohingya, and delays to their repatriation, does likewise. Near neighbors have had to be more serious than the utopian foreign policies of distant states. Short-term predictions Who’d have known? That three years on this fight would continue. That the Bamars would lead it. That some EAOs would finally, meaningfully, join forces, not only with one another, but with PDFs. That the sit-tat would shrink in the face of it. What we’ve learned firstly is that the sit-tat is an ineffective and inefficient war-making enterprise. They draw from the same limited toolbox across juntas and acronyms; they don’t seem to have any new ideas, other than conscription. And so, while they won’t likely collapse anytime soon, they will continue to weaken and bleed. We will see more defections, more forced conscription, and ever less enthusiasm for the fight. We may even see foreign support for the sit-tat in the form of foreign fighters, namely Russian military, although the parameters of this limit the extent of it: firstly, sit-tat ego needs to be overcome; second, China needs to approve. Such foreigners would be labelled ‘advisors’, and the resistance would have no small fun in killing them. The sit-tat’s brutality will increase within an ever-shrinking space. We can anticipate a further revamping of the sit-tat’s ‘Four Cuts’ (လေးဖြတ် ဗျူဟာမှာ/ ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်) counterinsurgency strategy, first used in the 1960s in the Bago Yoma – an area that remains depopulated to the present day. Four Cuts aims to deny food, funds, intelligence and recruits to enemies of the state, and involves large-scale detentions, population transfers, and the inevitable killings. This is already happening, especially in order to secure transport routes, and we can anticipate more systematic actions in the Bamar heartlands of Sagaing and Magwe in particular, where the sit-tat will attempt to depopulate inconvenient areas whose populations they cannot adequately control. Given attrition rates and growing emphasis on less reliable militias, in addition to growing financial shortfalls, we can anticipate the sit-tat’s further loss of territory, with the junta essentially surrendering remaining tracts of Chin, Kayah, Northern Shan, and Rakhine in particular. The same will happen in Bamar areas in which Four Cuts cannot be effectively implemented; they will fall back to flatlands distinguished by all-weather roads, and EAO and to a lesser extent PDF territories will expand in response. Personnel attrition will lead to a further reliance on air power, which in turn leads to more reliance on Russia for planes, parts, and training. Areas of the country controlled by the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other members of the FPNCC which have ceasefires with the junta will continue to expand and assert sovereignty. So will independent-minded BGFs and criminal gangs. The oft-claimed fiction that Myanmar is a state will become ever more untenable. Ultimately, we will witness a desiccated sit-tat ruling a desiccated Bamar space, surrounded by enemies. This will also prove untenable: the international community has no stomach for any new states, and this includes China and Russia. The future Myanmar will be federal by fiat. It’s worth returning to the dream of impending collapse: a remote possibility that still cannot be discounted. The degrading of such an institution as the sit-tat occurs at what looks to be a slow pace which suddenly accelerates. If enough officers believe it is going to happen, their own individual decisions will combine to make it happen. What happened to Romania in December of 1989 illustrates such a process. Political wits once said of Romanians that they were like corn mush in that they could be boil forever yet never explode, but they had the strength to boo the dictator in Timisoara, on live television. The regime, at that moment, ended, because it ended in the minds of its enforcers, who shot Ceausescu and his wife and then turned on one another in a brief killing frenzy while re-labelling themselves a democratic opposition. The sit-tat’s implosion would be far bloodier, and that sour-faced major general I ran into in Paletwa in 2019 will be either in front of the firing squad or behind the rifle stock. The one thing we can bank on is that the people of Myanmar will continue to suffer..."
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (Geneva)
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Description: "Louise Taylor 1 February 2024 marked the third anniversary of the coup in Myanmar. Although there is much geopolitical tension and conflict at the moment occupying people’s minds, with developments in the Middle East and Ukraine particularly dominating the news, the situation in Myanmar been delicately avoided by donors and international partners for some time. However, as the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index shows, organized crime in Myanmar has significantly worsened, to the point that the country currently has the highest levels of organized criminality in the world. Furthermore, Myanmar’s resilience to organized crime has weakened significantly since its low ranking in 2021. The gap between its criminality and resilience scores is so large that it has no meaningful global comparator. This calls for urgent intervention in Myanmar and could be a cautionary tale for countries such as Ecuador and Haiti, whose emerging crime–resilience gap scores may not be at this critical juncture yet but are steadily approaching Myanmar’s dire, unenviable situation. In 2021, Myanmar’s criminality score of 7.59 (out of 10, where 10 is the worst ranking), placed it third among all countries in the world. By 2023, a score of 8.15 propelled Myanmar to the top of the global ranking, i.e. it has the highest levels of criminality globally. The most significant increases in its criminal market scores (one component of the criminality ranking) were in non-renewable resource crimes (following a surge in illegal rare earth mining after the 2021 coup) and human trafficking, where cases of forced labour and of trafficking for forced criminality and marriage, as well as the plight of the Rohingya people, were exacerbated by the conflict and subsequent sanctions imposed by the international community. Myanmar’s score for criminal actors (the other component of the criminality ranking) also jumped between 2021 and 2023 – with a particular upward trend for foreign (namely Chinese) actors operating in the country – to a record 9 out of 10. This now matches the score also reached by state-embedded actors, who are active in most, if not all, criminal markets. In particular, state-embedded actors are facilitators in Myanmar’s drug markets (where the country scores 10 for synthetic drugs). Overall, Myanmar has the highest combined score for criminal actors in the world. But the biggest shifts are seen in Myanmar’s ability to resist and withstand organized crime. The Index shows that the more a country is affected by conflict or instability, the more likely it is to have reduced resilience to organized crime. Myanmar is no exception. The country’s resilience score, already low at 3.42 (out of 10) in the 2021 edition of the Index, slid to a paltry 1.63 in 2023. This is not the lowest score in the world – Libya and Afghanistan rank lower – but two key findings are nonetheless striking. First, the country has seen a drop of between 1 and 3 points in every single resilience indicator. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the gap between criminality and resilience is so large that it puts Myanmar eons away from any other country. In 2021, the gap between criminality and resilience was 4.17 points, but by 2023 it had widened to an alarming 6.52 points (the gap ‘growth’ between 2021 and 2023 is shown in the figure below, alongside other countries that also experienced growth gaps). The biggest resilience score drop was seen in the international cooperation indicator, which fell from 5.0 to 2.0. Much of this can be explained by the decisions of many international partners not to engage directly with the military government, and Myanmar’s exclusion from international forums, and information and exchange mechanisms until the coup is resolved. Donors suspended their government-to-government aid agreements, partnerships and projects after the coup, and promised to support more civil society and humanitarian projects. However, these promises may not have been realized. Aid delivery and programming in Myanmar is challenging. Civil society and communities are literally under fire; there are difficulties in getting funding into Myanmar (possibly complicated by the unintended consequences of the Financial Action Task Force blacklisting); and there are concerns about the safety of project staff. Data from the OECD shows a considerable 85% drop in overall aid contributions since 2021 – arguably at a time when intervention and support are most urgently and desperately needed. There were other demands on donors during this period, such as Ukraine, which saw a surge in aid in 2022. However, in December 2023, the UN reported ‘gross underfunding’ for the estimated 1.9 million people who had been prioritized for aid. The drop in donor activity and aid, and the knock-on effect of limited programming and interventions, has also affected the ability to monitor the situation in Myanmar. This has been exacerbated by a significant decline in the resilience capacity of non-state actors. This is not surprising, given the well-documented targeting of civilians and the repressive tactics of the military government. The conflict in Myanmar has not only increased vulnerability, but the resulting lawlessness has fuelled crime and enabled new illicit markets to consolidate. Myanmar scores 7.5 for the cyber-dependent crimes market. Cyberscam centres have sprung up across the country, particularly in border towns and special economic zones, facilitated by state-embedded and Chinese actors. The cyberscam phenomenon is also an example of how domestic criminality, if left unchecked and unregulated, can affect the stability and security of neighbouring countries – such as Thailand –, the wider region and the world. The scale of cyberscam activity has become so significant that it appears to have even affected China’s delicate geopolitical balance in the region, eventually forcing Beijing to issue arrest warrants for key figures linked to cyber fraud in Myanmar’s Shan State. The absence of scrutiny in Myanmar has therefore not only contributed to the widening and deepening of the country’s crime–resilience gap, but has also been instrumental in allowing rising criminality to have reach and impact far beyond its borders. While cyber fraud in Myanmar has attracted much international scrutiny and attention, it is primarily a manifestation of an internal, complex picture of intertwined criminality, vulnerability and risk. The ‘gap’ that exists for Myanmar is a canary in the coal mine for us all – it needs to be top of the agenda in 2024 for governments and civil society practitioners alike. Prescribing a tonic of acute diplomatic attention, rapid redirection of aid and programming efforts that navigate complexity to create innovative solutions to address state-embedded criminality while supporting and building community resilience is an urgent imperative for the country. This analysis is part of the GI-TOC’s series of articles delving into the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The series explores the Index’s findings and their effects on policymaking, anti-organized crime measures and analyses from a thematic or regional perspective..."
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 5.88 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM26.2.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.89 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 26.2.24_.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.28 MB
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-25
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 7.3 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM25.2.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-25
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 12.85 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 25.2.24.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-25
Type: Individual Documents
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Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-24
Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (Na Bet), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (Tin Tein Yan), and Yinmarbin (Yin Paung Taing). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Prices for rice and pulses rose at least 8% in January, although cooking oil prices fell 6% or more; Vegetable prices fell 9% or more across markets with lower prices for onion, eggplant, and long bean; Meat and fsh price trends varied by market with Myaung and Ye-U experiencing lower prices; Prices for hygiene products were largely stable except in Monywa where prices were generally higher; Most NFI prices increased 3-12% in Monywa, and prices for tarps and other NFIs rose 2-7% across markets; Monywa saw a second month of broad price hikes, although increases this month were more limited to NFIs; Yinmarbin saw notable price stability in January after notable price increases for NFIs in December. Product-Level Price Changes Essential Foods – Prices for rice and pulses rose at least 8% in January, although cooking oil prices fell 6% or more. Prices for rice and pulses increased in three of fve markets monitored, rising at least 8% and 6%, respectively. By contrast, cooking oil prices declined for a second straight month, falling 6% or more across markets. Vegetables – Many vegetable prices fell at least 9%, with lower prices in most markets monitored. Long bean, eggplant, and onion fell in three of fve markets, declining at least 3%, 17%, and 23%, respectively. Prices for green chili fuctuated, while garlic prices rose 4-14%. Prices for watercress were stable. Meat and Fish – Meat and fsh price trends varied by market again in January, with lower prices in Myaung and Ye-U. Meat and fsh prices fell at least 6% in Myaung and at least 13% in YeU. Meat and fsh prices were stable in Shwebo and Yinmarbin, and they fuctuated 12-15% in Monywa. Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products were fairly stable in January, except in Monywa where prices rose. Prices for hygiene products rose 3-6% in Monywa, but elsewhere there were few clear trends. Prices for hygiene products fuctuated up to 33% in a few isolated cases but were otherwise mostly unchanged. Prices for hygiene products were stable in Shwebo. Other NFIs – NFI prices rose again in Monywa, and they increased moderately in other markets. Prices for plastic tarps, mosquito nets, longyis, and towels, were up 2-7% in most markets in January. Prices increased 3-12% for all NFIs monitored in Monywa, marking a second straight month of signifcant price hikes there. NFI prices were stable in Yinmarbin, where they rose sharply last month..."
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-24
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 8.2 MB
Local URL: PDF icon KM24.2.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher: News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
2024-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-24
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 2.01 MB
Local URL: PDF icon mal 24.2.24_.pdf
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Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
2024-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-24
Type: Individual Documents
Format : pdf
Size: 1.18 MB
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Source/publisher: Reporters Without Borders (Paris)
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Description: "Myat Thu Tun is the fifth Myanmar journalist to be killed by the junta since the coup d'état in February 2021. His body was recently found buried, riddled with bullets and marked by signs of torture. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on the international community to take action to force the junta to stop this massacre. The buried body of Myanmar journalist Myat Thu Tun was recently found in the town of Mrauk-U, in the western Rakhine region, along several bodies of prisoners buried in an air shelter, and was reportedly marked with gunshot wounds and signs of torture, according to a statement by the rebel troops of Arakan Army on 11 February 2024. "This shocking murder bears the hallmark of the Myanmar military junta, which for three years now has imposed a climate of terror on all media professionals and is once again demonstrating its ruthless violence. We call on the international community to step up pressure on the Myanmar regime to cease its campaign of terror against reporters and release the 62 journalists and press freedom defenders detained in the country. Cédric Alviani RSF Asia-Pacific Bureau Director The victim, Myat Thu Tun, also known as Phoe Thiha, had been held in prison since his arrest at his home in September 2022, and was awaiting trial on charges of "disseminating false information" and "inciting hatred", under Article 505(a) of the Penal Code, which carries a penalty of up to three years imprisonment. Before the coup in February 2021, he had worked for various Myanmar media outlets, including the Democratic Voice of Burma, 7 Days Journal and The Voice Journal. At the time of his arrest in September 2022, he was still working for local media Western News in the western state of Rakhine. Myat Thu Tun is the fifth journalist to be killed by the military junta since the coup d'état in February 2021. Freelance photojournalists Aye Kaw and Soe Naing were also murdered in detention, while the founder of the Khonumthung News Agency Pu Tuidim and the editor of the Federal News Journal Sai Win Aung were both shot by the army while reporting on the ground. Myanmar, ranked 173th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2023 World Press Freedom Index, is one of the world’s biggest jailers of journalists with 64 detained, second only to China..."
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Source/publisher: Doctors Without Borders
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Description: "More than three years since a military coup in Myanmar led to a surge in conflict across the country, the United Nations estimates that almost two million people have been internally displaced by the ongoing violence, while thousands more have fled to neighbouring countries. In Rakhine State – an area in the west of Myanmar that has seen a particular increase in fighting since November 2023 – the humanitarian crisis created by this conflict comes on top of several other pre-existing emergencies, the most significant of which is the continuing fallout from large-scale and violent attacks against the area’s Rohingya ethnic minority in 2017, which drove hundreds of thousands to flee for their lives across the border into Bangladesh. More than six years later, close to one million Rohingya remain trapped in miserable conditions in the overcrowded camps of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, while many of the estimated 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar are confined to dismal fenced camps or rural villages, are prohibited from moving without approval from the authorities, and face ongoing persecution in their daily lives. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been responding to the needs of the region’s Rohingya communities for more than three decades. In Myanmar, we operate two humanitarian medical projects in Rakhine State, where we are one of the only providers of essential health services for many Rohingya, who have been stripped of their citizenship by the ruling authorities. As a direct result of this imposed statelessness, the Rohingya endure discrimination and exclusion across all aspects of their lives, including restrictions on their freedom of movement, education and livelihoods opportunities, as well as access to healthcare. (Elsewhere in Myanmar, we also operate in the conflict-affected areas of Shan and Kachin.) MSF is also the largest provider of health services in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, where we run hospitals and provide critically needed primary and secondary care, including sexual and reproductive healthcare and mental health services for a population with few other options. In Malaysia, MSF runs clinics for Rohingya patients, many of whom endure appalling conditions and indefinite confinement in immigration detention centres. As a result, MSF has seen first-hand the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Myanmar, and the continued suffering of the Rohingya, whose statelessness leaves them with nowhere to go —facing indefinite encampment in squalid conditions in Bangladesh, unable to return safely to Myanmar, and unwelcome in other parts of the region. We have also borne witness to the failure of the international community to find a solution to this crisis, and to the increasing global indifference to the plight of the Rohingya, as the world’s attention has been drawn to other emergencies. Stateless and in need of assistance That indifference is particularly alarming given the dependence of many Rohingya on humanitarian assistance for survival. In Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees do not have the right to leave their camps and are not legally allowed to work. That leaves them trapped and dependent on international support — support that has been reducing year on year, leaving them stuck in increasingly deplorable living conditions. Meanwhile, the Rohingya still in Rakhine State also depend on international humanitarian agencies for some of their most fundamental needs. And yet, not only have the authorities in Myanmar often deliberately blocked humanitarian activities in Rakhine State (where renewed violence is also currently making it extremely difficult for our teams to operate), but what response exists remains critically under-funded by humanitarian donors. A crisis where Canada makes a difference Canada is an important actor in this context. Since the start of the current Rohingya displacement crisis in 2017, when violence drove so many Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh, Canada has played a leading role in the international response, both as a donor and through its humanitarian diplomacy. Canada’s willingness to take action, starting with the appointment of a Special Envoy to Myanmar in the first months following the August 2017 attacks, through to the launch in 2018 of Canada’s strategy to respond to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh, was based on recommendations made in Special Envoy Bob Rae’s report that same year. This highlighted the urgency of the crisis to other member states in the international community at a critical time, as did Canada’s efforts to fund and help facilitate the global humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar. Through its official strategy, Canada committed to “alleviating the humanitarian crisis; encouraging positive political developments in Myanmar; ensuring accountability for the crimes committed; [and] enhancing international cooperation.” Canada must renew its Rohingya and Myanmar strategy In March 2024, however, Canada’s strategy (which was renewed for a second phase in 2021) is set to expire, and these objectives remain mostly unmet. In part that is because the context has changed: since the coup of 2021, for example, the situation for people in Myanmar has deteriorated significantly. At the time of writing, communities in many of the areas where MSF is present remain in grave danger while their villages are used as battlegrounds. Meanwhile, the emergence of a number of other international crises have directed the world’s attention away from Myanmar, Bangladesh and the Rohingya. But that loss of global attention is precisely why Canada’s continued engagement on this emergency is so crucial. It is also why MSF is calling on Canada to renew its strategy for a third phase – because we are already seeing the impact that reduced donor engagement is having on our Rohingya patients and their communities. In Cox’s Bazar alone, some of our facilities are becoming increasingly overburdened as other humanitarian actors depart for lack of funding. Our teams are also seeing the consequences of reduced water and sanitation services, increased violence in the camps (including sexual violence), and outbreaks of disease amid deteriorating conditions. In Myanmar, Rohingya and other communities in Rakhine are facing increasingly desperate circumstances as assistance continues to dwindle and conflict further reduces humanitarian activities. A global humanitarian priority As an independent humanitarian medical organization, MSF will continue to deliver critically needed care ourselves to displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh, Myanmar and beyond, whatever the commitment by international humanitarian donors may be. But we can’t do it alone. So it is crucial that Canada and other governments continue to make the Rohingya a priority for humanitarian assistance funding. And since financial support alone will not solve this crisis (nor alleviate the conflict in Myanmar), sustained diplomatic engagement is also essential. Such efforts should focus on ensuring a safe and sustainable future for the Rohingya, and an end to their statelessness. Through the launch of its strategy in 2018, Canada made an important commitment to these objectives, and to the Rohingya people. As the global response to their suffering continues to wane, and amid the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Myanmar – and in the face of a growing number of other international crises consuming global resources and attention – that commitment is needed now more than ever..."
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Source/publisher: International Rescue Committee
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Description: "Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, February 23, 2024 — IRC teams on the ground in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, are reporting growing numbers of people arriving at the Myanmar border as conflict continues to push people out of their hometowns. With over 2.7 million people internally displaced in Myanmar - 800,000 of whom have been displaced since October 2023 - the humanitarian crisis in the region is likely to worsen at an alarming pace. Despite the Bangladesh government refusing to accept any more refugees, citing the large numbers they have been hosting for over six years, the IRC is monitoring the situation and preparing to scale up our refugee response inside Cox’s Bazar refugee camp, should this decision change. Already, Cox’s Bazar is home to one million Rohingya refugees who fled persecution in August 2017. Since then, they have remained trapped in inadequate living conditions, including overcrowding and poorly built shelters prone to flooding or catching fire. This week, IRC Bangladesh held a two-day exhibition and panel event, “Through the Lens of Hope: Rohingya Crisis Unfolded” calling on world leaders to highlight their growing needs retrain their attention and remember those people who have been living in camps in Cox’s Bazar for years without adequate shelter or support. The overall humanitarian situation in Cox’s Bazar is poised to worsen and, as the conflict in Myanmar continues to escalate close to the border, especially in Rakhine State, Bangladesh urgently requires the support of the international community, including donors, to properly support those who are seeking safety from the conflict. The IRC began responding to the Rohingya crisis in August 2017 and launched its response officially in March 2018. With over 400 staff in Bangladesh and operating across 27 camps across the district, our teams provide essential healthcare to the host community as well as the Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar, as well as reproductive and maternal healthcare, child protection, education, prevention and response to Gender-Based Violence, and Emergency Disaster Risk Reduction (EDRR)..."
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Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Feb 15 to 21, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Rakhine State, Kachin State, Shan State, Kayah State, Kayin State, and Mon State from February 15th to 21st. Over 100 civilians died by the arrest and killing of Military Troops and 4 women including an aged girl were raped and killed. Military Junta arrested and blackmailed the civilians by using the Conscription Law in many places around the country. About 20 civilians died and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 6 underaged children died when the Military Junta committed abuses. A civilian also died by the landmine of the Military Junta..."
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Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Sub-title: The military has suffered numerous battlefield setbacks in Rakhine state and elsewhere in recent months.
Description: "Myanmar’s junta is offering freedom of movement to Rohingya Muslims restricted to camps for the displaced in Rakhine state as part of a bid to entice them into military service amid the nationwide rollout of a conscription law, according to sources in the region. The enactment of the People’s Military Service Law on Feb. 10 has sent draft-eligible civilians fleeing from Myanmar’s cities, saying they would rather leave the country or join anti-junta forces in remote border areas than fight for the military, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat. Myanmar’s military is desperate for new recruits after suffering devastating losses on the battlefield to the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, in Rakhine state. Since November, when the AA ended a ceasefire that had been in place since the coup, the military has surrendered Pauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Myay Pon and Taung Pyo townships in the state, as well as Paletwa township in neighboring Chin state. But rights campaigners say the junta is drafting Rohingya into military service to stoke ethnic tensions in Rakhine state, while legal experts say the drive is unlawful, given that Myanmar has refused to recognize the Rohingya as one of the country’s ethnic groups and denied them citizenship for decades. Some 1 million ethnic Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh since 2017, when they were driven out of Myanmar by a military clearance operation. Another 630,000 living within the country are designated stateless by the United Nations, including those who languish in camps for internally displaced persons, or IDPs, and are restricted from moving freely in Rakhine state. Residents of the Kyauk Ta Lone IDP camp in Rakhine’s Kyaukphyu township told RFA Burmese that junta forces, including the township administration officer and the operations commander of the military’s Light Infantry Battalion 542, took a census of the camp’s Muslims for the purpose of military service on Monday. Junta personnel compiled a list of more than 160 people deemed eligible for conscription and informed them they would have to take part in a two-week military training program, according to one camp resident who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “The township administration officer came … and told us that Muslims must also serve in the military, but we refused to follow his order,” the resident said. “Then, the military operations commander arrived here along with his soldiers, and forced us to do so under the military service law. They collected the names of more than 160 people.” Freedom of movement Some 1,500 Rohingyas from around 300 families have been living at Kyauk Ta Lone since ethnic violence forced them to flee their homes in Kyaukphyu 12 years ago. Since taking the census on Monday, junta officers have repeatedly visited the camp, trying to persuade Rohingya residents to serve in the military with an offer of free movement within Kyaukphyu township, said another camp resident. “They won’t guarantee us citizenship,” he said. “But if we serve in the military, we will be allowed to go freely in Kyaukphyu.” Other camp residents told RFA they “would rather die” than serve in the military, and suggested the recruitment drive was part of a bid by the military to create a rift between them and ethnic Rakhines – the predominant minority in Rakhine state and the ethnicity of the AA. No date was given for when the training program would begin, they said. After receiving training, the recruits would be assigned to a security detail along with junta troops guarding routes in and out of Kyaukphyu, and dispatched to the battlefield “if necessary.” Rohingya IDPs are afraid to serve in the military, but are unable to flee the camp because it is surrounded by junta troops, residents added. Other recruitment efforts The military service census at the Kyauk Ta Lone IDP camp came as Rohingyas in the Rakhine capital Sittwe, the Rakhine townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, and other parts of Kyaukphyu reported that junta troops have been arresting and collecting data from members of their ethnic group as part of a bid to force them into military training. On Monday and Tuesday evening, military personnel arrested around 100 Rohingyas of eligible service age from the Buthidaung villages of Nga/Kyin Tauk, Tat Chaung, Pu Zun Chaung and Kyauk Hpyu Taung, said a resident who also declined to be named. “People doing business in the village were arrested. Village elders were also arrested,” said the resident, who is also a Rohingya. “At least one young person from every house was arrested and taken to the army. The parents of those who were arrested are quite worried now.” Junta troops said that the AA had established camps near the Rohingya villages and residents would have to undergo military training to defend the area, he added. They said the residents would be equipped with weapons and returned to their villages after the training was complete. Rohingyas in Sittwe and Maungdaw, where an AA offensive is now underway, also reported junta census efforts and pressure to join military training. They said that larger villages are expected to provide 100 people for training, while smaller ones should send 50 residents. Law does not apply A lawyer who is representing Rohingyas in several legal cases told RFA that the People’s Military Service Law “does not apply” to members of the ethnic group because they do not have citizenship status in Myanmar. He added that the junta's attempt to recruit Rohingyas is part of a bid to drive a wedge between them and the people of Myanmar, many of whom oppose the military regime. Nay San Lwin, an activist on the Rohingya issue, said that the junta hopes to divert attention from its losses to the AA in Rakhine state by igniting tensions between ethnic Rakhines and Rohingyas. “If the Rohingyas are forced into their army, there could be a lot of problems between the Rakhines and the Rohingyas,” he said. “That's what they want. Once that happens, they’ll drop all support for the Rohingyas as usual. But the main reason is to use the Rohingyas as human shields.” Nay San Lwin noted that as successive governments in Myanmar have denied the Rohingya citizenship, there should be no pressure to force them to serve in the military. The junta has released no information on efforts to recruit Rohingyas in Rakhine state and attempts by RFA to contact junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun and Rakhine State Attorney General Hla Thein, who is the junta’s spokesman in the region, went unanswered Thursday. The AA issued a statement on Wednesday calling on ethnic Rakhines to take refuge from junta oppression – which it said includes unlawful arrests, extortion, forced military recruitment, and extrajudicial killings – in AA-controlled territory, instead of fleeing to other areas of the country. Conscription eligibility According to Myanmar’s compulsory military service law, men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 face up to five years in prison if they refuse to serve for two years, while highly skilled professionals aged 18-45 must also serve, but up to five years. More than 13 million of the country’s 54 million people are eligible for service. Conscription is slated to be implemented at the end of April 2024, with a goal of recruiting up to 60,000 service members each year, in batches of around 5,000 people..."
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