"In 2012, religious violence exploded in the Rakhine state of western Myanmar.1 Thousands of Buddhists participated in attacks against the Ro- hingyas, a Muslim ethnic minority. Rakhine nationalists contested the status of Rohingya and claimed they were illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. The conflict led to a large outflow of refugees and internally displaced more than 150,000 people.2 But in 2013 and 2014, the violence took an unexpected turn. Riots spread to more than 20 different towns in central and lower Myanmar, much beyond Rakhine state. The targets were Muslims, rather than Rohingyas per se, and had little to do with the ethnonationalist conflict in the Rakhine state.3 Monks played a key role in turning the localized conflict into a broader anti-Muslim movement. They aimed at promoting and protecting Buddhism against what they perceived as a Muslim invasion. Exploiting and fanning fears, they stirred up anti-Muslim sentiments while condoning and even participating in the violence. Why did monks use a somewhat localized, if already dramatic conflict in the Rakhine state to create a larger, anti-Muslim one? We argue that scapegoating is an important, and neglected, aspect of monks’ participation in religious violence. It is one of many strategies to strengthen their appeal and to justify their leadership position. Fomenting fear of minorities, protesting against an oppressive state, or providing wel- fare for victims of tragedy can all contribute to enhancing their social and political status.4 Targeting vulnerable religious minorities is one way to gain visibility, to strengthen their autonomous networks, and to increase their social credentials. Two factors condition why and when scapegoating becomes a use- ful strategy. First, it is effective mostly in decentralized religions. With no central institution that grants authority or creates hierarchy, leadership and influence rest more directly on each religious leader’s capacity to remain relevant and to attract new followers. There are few checks on leaders’ in- terpretation of scriptures or their investment in social and political action. Competition arises among religious leaders seeking to gain power relative to their peers or other social elites. Entrepreneurial leaders might target the state or a regime deemed to be causing harm to their flock, thereby ex- ploiting popular grievances for moral gain. Alternatively, they might target minorities by tapping into popular fears, anxieties, and stereotypes. Second, the political environment shapes the strategy that religious lead- ers adopt, with liberalization being particularly prone to scapegoating. Under authoritarian rule, antiregime coalitions often arise with religious leaders well positioned to lead them. Yet, in a liberalized regime, such broad coalitions dissolve. Religious leaders become only one of several competing elites, and their moral and social authority is challenged by rising, alternative sources of societal values and education. We demonstrate our claim, empirically, by analyzing two episodes of monks’ participation in religious violence. As we will show in the following sections, there are striking parallels between the violence of the 1920–1930s and more recent violence against Muslims. We compare the most recent wave of mobilization, which started in 2007 with the Saffron Revolution, with another wave in the 1920s, when monks were leading actors in the nascent anticolonial and nationalist mobilization in colonial Burma.5 While they originally targeted the colonial government (1920s) and the authoritar- ian regime (2007), some monks then shifted the target to minorities, mostly Indians, Rohingyas, and Muslims..."