"...Myanmar?s political transition is an unusual phenomenon: it is self-made, without any external agency supervising, monitoring or enforcing it. It also derives its power, and authority from the popular support it generates, with or without elections to legitimise it, because of the wider political support it enjoys for the moment. Any ?incentives” for those in real control to continue the transition are contained within the process, either in terms of positive options that become available (such as substantial new trade or investment or funding), or in terms of negative options that disappear (lifting of political sanctions, economic sanctions, and inclusion in regional development arrangements, rather than exclusion). The other main characteristic of Myanmar?s transition is that it is tolerated and in principle supported by those giving up power ? the military ? who can allow it to continue, or who can block it, partially or totally. In all of this, external influences play an important part, but are not critical; they can be supportive, collaborative and expect considerable benefits for their own interests, but they should anticipate a perhaps less than perfect ?Myanmar” solution, and cannot count on imposing their own wishes or creating ?mirror” copies of their own socio-economic paradigms. In Myanmar, new institutions are being established but are not necessarily yet fully tested; and old institutions are being (slowly) transformed, but are often still incapable of producing the hoped for results. In such circumstances, it can hardly be surprising that many of Myanmar?s ?reforms” since 2011 are incomplete, are not delivering all the outcomes hoped for, or in many instances, have not yet even begun to be carried out in any concrete way. Some changes can be implemented by announcement alone, and might rely on general goodwill or on willingness to give things ?a go” to see whether or not they can work reasonably well..."