"The Burmese military's linked objectives, expanded military control of the country and large-scale international investment to pay for it, are mutually incompatible. Following their suppression of the 1988 Democracy Movement, the generals decided to increase the size of the armed forces from 186,000 to 500,000 in order to have a permanent military presence in most parts of the country. This involved up to US$2 billion of arms imports, mainly from China, a large recruitment drive and a reordering of the military command structure. Lacking the necessary funds to pay for military expansion following the failure of the previous regime's economic autarchy (and/or seeking a credible source of income to launder the revenues from Burma's illegal exports, mainly heroin), the junta opened the country to international investment, but the increased militarisation of the state and the military's continued stranglehold on the main sectors of the economy impeded the economic liberalisation and institutional reform needed by investors. In the civil war, the enhanced capacity of the re-armed and enlarged Burma Army allowed it to move from a strategy of seasonal combat to one of occupation. However, lack of discipline and the low level of soldiers' pay have led to the army living off the land, destroying the local economy, carrying out massive violations of human rights, further alienating the local population and creating refugee flows to neighbouring countries. The combination of a sinking economy, a large, badly-paid army and a tradition of warlordism could lead to a break-up of the country into a number of fiefdoms run by regional commanders and ethnic chiefs. Such a scenario should be taken seriously by the Tatmadaw, the neighbours and the international community..." Published in French as "La destruction de l'economie birmane par les militaires" though it was originally written in English with the title "Once the Ricebowl of Asia".