"Executive Summary The primary objective of this CAR Assessment on Sagaing Region is to support the Nexus Response Mechanism (NRM) and its partners in assessing current needs, priorities, and dynamics for the purposes of response planning. However, it is also designed as a public document, to be made available to the wider Myanmar aid community to better enhance understanding of local contexts, present community perceptions, and identify thematic and geographic dynamics and issues. It is not intended as a comprehensive or project-level needs assessment - it is instead intended as a broad and holistic assessment of the humanitarian, development, and political situation and operating environment in Sagaing Region. Prior to the February 2021 coup, the predominantly Bamar Sagaing Region was largely peaceful, and although it was underdeveloped and impoverished it was also highly agriculturally productive. Since the coup, Sagaing Region has become one of, if not the, epicentre of the Myanmar crisis. Sagaing Region’s population was heavily supportive of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and mass protests against the coup quickly turned to SAC crackdowns, and anti-coup armed group formation in the form of NUG-aligned People’s Defence Forces; indeed, Sagaing hosts more PDFs than any other region in the country. Now, the region is characterised by widespread violence, daily human rights abuses, regular village raids and burnings, and one of the largest ongoing displacement crises in the world. Responding to this context should be considered one of the paramount challenges facing the international Myanmar aid community; this is complicated by the fact that Sagaing region poses one of the most severe access challenges in Myanmar. Direct programming in Sagaing region is complicated not only by ongoing conflict conditions, but by political barriers imposed by the SAC and the fact that the large majority of pre-conflict CSOs in Sagaing Region have been dissolved. However, local responders do exist; albeit in a variety of forms. New CSOs have been established throughout Sagaing, with varying capacities, and largely funded by local and international private donations. New NUG-aligned revolutionary governance structures also exist, having largely supplanted SAC structures in many parts of the region, and vary widely in capacity, authority, and reach. New education and healthcare networks have formed, although they operate under considerable constraints and should by no means be considered sufficient for the needs facing the population. There are three key thematic considerations in Sagaing Region: › Sagaing region hosts the largest number of displaced people in Myanmar. Much of this displacement is temporary, with IDPs fleeing from their villages during conflict, raids, and crackdowns. Much of it is not; hundreds of villages have been fully or partially destroyed, and many displaced people will not return to their villages of origin for the foreseeable future. The displacement situation in Sagaing region is now a long term concern, with few prospects for durable solutions. › Local livelihoods have been devastated by the conflict; that said, there are still opportunities to contribute to local livelihoods provision, and doing so is essential. Agriculture is the cornerstone of Sagaing’s economy. Producers are under significant pressure due to skyrocketing costs and access restrictions, and many are wholly unable to farm their fields due to conflict and displacement. That said, Sagaing region is still producing agricultural goods, and markets do remain largely functional even in areas that have fallen out of the control of the SAC; indeed, some parts of Sagaing region are exporting crops to other parts of Myanmar. These functional local agriculture systems are critical to not only the population reliant on them for livelihoods, but the population of IDPs that are now reliant on locally produced agricultural goods. › SAC education and healthcare systems have largely collapsed in much of Sagaing Region. NUG-linked systems and local education and healthcare networks are functional in many locations, and are attempting to fill gaps; private clinics also remain functional in some locations. However, their capacity is limited by both funding and access constraints. Moreover, both alternative healthcare and education providers appear to be seen by the SAC as indistinguishable from local armed revolutionaries; as such, they are regularly targeted by security forces. These systems are under severe pressure and face numerous risks; however, they are also critical to meeting skyrocketing needs..."