Executive Summary: The SPDC presented its ?Seven-Step Roadmap to Democracy” (the ?Roadmap Process?) in 2003. The first four steps related to the development of a new constitution, which was drafted with virtually no public participation, then adopted and approved in a referendum orchestrated by the regime. The Burmese government announced that public support for the new constitution was 92.48 percent. The 2010 elections are an integral part of the final steps of the Roadmap Process, and are viewed as important initiatives towards lifting Burma out of its desperate economic and social circumstances. The regime declared its election laws on March 8, 2010. The electoral administration was appointed unilaterally by the regime on March 11, 2010, and soon showed itself to heavily favor the regime and its allies. The Union Election Commission (UEC) lacked independence; the SPDC directly appointed its members with no public input. Political parties had to register with the Union Election Commission and request permission to run. The election laws were developed by the military government and effectively prohibited longstanding opponents of the regime from contesting the elections. One of the laws, on political party registration, resulted in the silencing of many of the most prominent opposition voices. It required all political parties to register or reregister in order to remain in existence and compete in the elections. But parties could do so only if none of their members were currently imprisoned based on a court conviction. This requirement presented parties with a choice of either expelling prominent imprisoned members, or declining to reregister. Many countries demanded the release of Burma?s democratic icon, and Nobel Laureate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and her full participation in the election. However, the National League for Democracy soon announced it would boycott the election rather than banish its leader. The UEC failed to step in to ensure a level political playing field, and the use of government resources for political purposes was common. Eventually, 47 political parties attempted to register. The UEC initially approved 42 to contest the elections. However, the commission then dissolved five of the parties, leaving 37 approved parties and over 80 individual candidates. Nationwide, there were over 35,000 polling stations. The largest party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), grew out of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a regime-created and -run organization that has received substantial government support since 1993. The USDP registration application listed 27 ex-military officers among its members, along with the sitting prime minister and other government ministers. The election laws prohibited civil servants from being members of political parties, but the election administrators declared that ministers were not civil servants, a decision that was clearly meant to favor the USDP. Many political parties met the requirement to submit party membership lists and name their candidates before the deadlines. However, other parties said they were struggling to raise funds and meet the necessary requirements in the short time remaining before the election. By election day, 23 parties remained to participate in the elections. Many ethnic politicians saw this election as a rare opportunity to campaign for ethnic rights and democracy. Therefore, they formed new parties to run in the elections. Some ethnic armed groups agreed to be transformed into members of the junta-controlled Border Guard Force (BGF). The Censorship Board (The Press Scrutiny and Registration Board, or PSRB) issued a directive prohibiting all weekly publications in the country from publishing any commentary or analysis on the electoral laws. Also, the approved political parties needed to apply for permission from the PSRB within 90 days after registering with the UEC for permission to print their own campaign materials. Each party had also to deposit 500,000 Kyats (USD 500) with the PSRB. The UEC announced nine restrictions for campaign speeches, while also limiting each party to 15 minutes of media airtime each. Media organizations and political parties faced numerous obstacles, such as only having 15 minutes of airtime for the entire campaign, restrictions, communications and internet slowdowns, threats of punishment, and cyber-attacks. U Thein Soe, the commission chairman, declared, ?The country does not need any foreign journalists or observers.” Only 25 journalists working for the foreign media, along with two Chinese correspondents, were allowed to cover the polls. While these elections clearly fell short of international standards, they marked an important step forward towards a more democratic state. Political parties, candidates, and voters were well aware that the playing field for these elections were not level, but many decided to take advantage of the small window of political space that was opened. It is important to acknowledge that while the campaign environment was highly constrained and many irregularities were observed on election day ? and advance voting was especially open to abuse ? this does not necessarily fatally undermine all of the results of this election. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) enjoyed access to state resources and attempted to coerce voters into supporting the party. This had an effect on some voters, particularly those in more rural areas and some state employees who did not feel that they could exercise their vote freely. But the majority of the Burmese people resisted such pressure and voted for the party of their choice. Unilaterally dismissing the results of these elections underestimates the potential that the elections hold. Twenty-three out of 37 approved parties successfully contested the elections. The USDP won 129 out of 168 seats in the National Parliament, 259 out of 325 seats in the People?s Parliament, and 494 out of 661 seats in Regional and State Parliaments. For the final results of Burma?s 2010 elections, the regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won approximately 76.48 percent of the seats in the National Parliament (Amyotha Hluttaw) and the People?s Parliament (Pyithu Hluttaw). Following the regime?s Seven-Step Roadmap and the SPDC-written constitution, the new parliaments were convened on January 31, 2011. The USDP took all important positions, including president, vice president, all parliament speakers. All of the earning and spending cabinets are held by former members of the USDP and the military. The Union Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) consists of 659 representatives. The number of USDP representatives in the Union Parliament totals 388, with an additional 166 military appointees. Non-USDP parties contribute 105 representatives. There are 435 representatives in the People?s Parliament (Pyithu Hluttaw). The USDP contributes 259 representatives. There are 110 military appointees and 66 representatives from other parties. The National Parliament (Amyotha Hluttaw) has 224 representatives, with 129 belonging to the USDP, and 56 of them military appointees. Opposition parties provide 39 representatives. There are 883 representatives in regional and state parliaments. USDP has 494 representatives, while military appointees total 222. All other parties contribute 167 representatives to these parliaments. During the election period, it became increasingly clear that the use of advance votes obtained through coerced voting or outright fraud was a major problem. These advance votes were often taken before the official advance voting period of November 5?6. This advance voting seems to be part of a systematic operation to give the USDP an insurmountable lead before Election Day. These ballots were generally