Executive Summary: For 15 years, there has been a steady stream of newspaper stories, scholarly monographs and books that have referred inter alia to the existence of Chinese military bases in Burma. This apparent intrusion by China into the northern Indian Ocean has strongly influenced the strategic perceptions and policies of Burma?s regional neighbours, notably India. Reports of a large signals intelligence collection station on Great Coco Island in the Andaman Sea, for example, and a naval base on Hainggyi Island in the Irrawaddy River delta, have been cited as evidence that Burma has become a client state of China. Other observers have seen the existence of such bases as proof of China?s expansionist designs in the Indian Ocean region and its global ambitions. Few of these reports drew on hard evidence or gave verifiable sources to support their claims, but repeated denials of a Chinese military presence in Burma by Rangoon and Beijing were brushed aside. As these reports proliferated, they were picked up by respected commentators and academics and given fresh life in serious studies of the regional strategic environment. Each time they were cited in books and reputable journals they gained credibility, and it was not long before the existence of Chinese bases in Burma was widely accepted as an established fact. In 2005, however, the Chairman of the Indian Defence Force?s Chiefs of Staff Committee conceded that reports of a Chinese intelligence facility on one of Burma?s offshore islands were incorrect. At the same time, he announced that there were no Chinese naval bases in Burma. There are a number of possible explanations for these statements, but this remarkable about-face, on two issues that have preoccupied Indian defence planners for more than a decade, must throw doubt on the claims of other ?Chinese bases? in Burma. It also raises a number of serious questions about current analyses of China?s relations with Burma, and of China?s strategic interests in the northern Indian Ocean region. It is possible to identify three schools of thought regarding China?s relations with Burma. The ?domination? school believes that Burma has become a pawn in China?s strategic designs in the Asia–Pacific region, and is host to several Chinese military facilities. The ?partnership? school sees a more balanced relationship developing between Beijing and Rangoon, but accepts that China has acquired bases in Burma as part of a long term strategy to establish a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean. The ?rejectionist? school, however, emphasises Burma?s strong tradition of independence and Rangoon?s continuing suspicions of Beijing. This school claims that, despite the conventional wisdom, Burma has been able to resist the enormous strategic weight of its larger, more powerful neighbour. Some members of this school argue that Burma has the whip hand in its relations with China, and has been able successfully to manipulate Burma?s sensitive geostrategic position to considerable advantage. While acknowledging the close bilateral ties that have developed since 1988, they are sceptical of claims that China has any military bases in Burma.