Executive Summary" Before 2000, the idea that Burma might one day become a nuclear power was considered fanciful. Ever since it regained its independence in 1948, Burma had been a consistent supporter of global nuclear disarmament and had played an active role in international organisations dedicated to that end. Nor could it claim the strategic rationale, economic strength or technological expertise to support a nuclear industry, let alone develop a nuclear weapon. Yet, in 2000, the ruling State Peace and Development Council announced that it planned to purchase a small nuclear reactor from Russia. Construction was due to begin in 2003, but was repeatedly postponed, probably due to financial problems. A new agreement was signed in May 2007. The response to the regime?s announcement of a nuclear research program was almost uniformly negative. There was widespread scepticism that Burma could manage such a complex and demanding project, a sentiment shared by the International Atomic Energy Agency. There were also concerns that Burma would be unable to keep secure any radioactive materials produced by the program. There were even claims that the regime secretly planned to use the reactor to build a nuclear weapon. These claims were rightly dismissed as far-fetched and self-serving, but they seemed to be given some substance in 2003 by reports that Burma was developing close links with North Korea, a notorious proliferator of nuclear and ballistic missile technology. Despite the lack of any supporting evidence, some activist groups claim that Burma already possesses nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. It is highly unlikely that Burma currently has any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, from North Korea or anywhere else. Claims that it might try to do so in the future are equally speculative, but are made a little more credible by Burma?s exaggerated threat perceptions. Ever since the armed forces took back direct power in 1988, the regime has been the target of a range of external pressures, including from some of the world?s most powerful countries. The aggressive rhetoric that has accompanied these pressures, and the support openly shown for Burma?s opposition movement, has helped create a siege mentality among Burma?s leaders. Even now, they fear intervention by the United States and its allies ? possibly even an invasion ? to restore democracy to Burma. These concerns have already prompted the regime to consider the acquisition of ballistic missiles. There have also been suggestions that a few Burmese generals envy North Korea?s apparent ability to use its nuclear weapons capabilities to fend off its enemies and win concessions from the international community. It is important not to over-react to these reports. Even if confirmed, they probably reflect the views of a very small minority in Burma?s military hierarchy. Such reports, however, illustrate the scope for misperceptions, on both sides, which can lead in turn to policy errors and even more serious misunderstandings.