"2,146 kilometers of landlocked demarcation is all that cuts through Myanmar and Thailand, two Southeast Asian nations that share a complicated, erstwhile rivalry that has evolved into a mutual bilateralism in the scope of current developments, with the incumbent Prayuth Chan-ocha regime cozying up to the likes of the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces. These two countries are nothing alike; they do not share any linguistic overlap nor do they have any cultural heritages together, and they follow drastically different models of governance. In that sense, they are not complementary to each other, but centuries of warfare and geopolitical realities have shaped a new outlook. Once old foes, Thailand and Myanmar have now basked in a much more intimate and deeper bond, owing to the Thai government’s warmth towards the military-installed regime in Myanmar, due to similarities and parallels between the militaries of both nations, long-standing bastions of power and influence in politics, respectively. Since the Tatmadaw ousted the Aung San Suu Kyi-led government, the Prayuth administration has exercised a policy of soft diplomacy and engaged the Tatmadaw through peaceful politicking and appeasement behind the scenes. In this spirit of opportunism, minute realpolitik, and a much more drastic about-face of national fortunes, they have not only grown closer than ever, but this has also placed Thailand at loggerheads with the contradicting ASEAN doctrine of assertive, overt action condoning the Tatmadaw. Despite Thailand’s efforts towards an active role in the Myanmar peace process, the latest episode by Foreign Minister Don Pramuwinai to defuse tensions and bring an amicable end to the crisis only served to exacerbate an already fraught regional situation. To provide meaningful context, the Foreign Minister facilitated a series of talks between Thailand, ASEAN members, and envoys from the Myanmar junta, such as Myanmar’s foreign minister, Than Swe. In the end, several ASEAN members declined the invitation, embarrassing and thwarting Thailand’s efforts. The fact that the meeting was proposed and arranged only drew biting criticism and backlash. Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a senior fellow of the ISIS (Institute of International Studies) at Chulalongkorn University, argues in an op-ed for the Bangkok Post that Don’s actions seem to be born out of desperation and that there is something much larger at play, presumably vested business interests or priorities that exceed national concerns. It is worth noting that this comes at a crucial juncture for Thailand, following the recent election that witnessed an unprecedented victory by the pro-democracy bloc, particularly the Move Forward Party, which has sought to orient Thailand back to the West and adhere to the ASEAN Five-Point agreement. In that sense, one has to wonder if this misadventure by the Prayuth government is part of something much more indicative in the realm of local politics, one that bypasses geopolitical concerns and delves into a more personal, ideological splinter within Thailand, which the recent election has irreparably carved. Herein, I address three critical takeaways that can be extracted from this strategic blunder and its implications within the framework of future foreign policy directives toward the Myanmar crisis. 1. Authoritarianism in Modern Context The Myanmar crisis is only a footnote in the discussion of authoritarianism in the globalized world, where diplomacy and commerce are shaped by affiliation with regional and intergovernmental blocs. It is an eclectic reverie of different nation-states with diverse economic, national objectives, and ideologies. Countries like Sweden and Finland have discussed entering NATO in light of the Russo-Ukrainian War, while entities like the United Kingdom have departed the EU. All of this is integral to contextualizing the spread and revival of authoritarianism and despotic regimes worldwide. Countries such as India, Hungary, and Russia have experienced democratic backsliding and upheaval, while European nations have turned increasingly nationalistic and right-wing, as seen in Italy. The 20th century observed a political realm shaped by allies and blocs against the backdrop of the Cold War. However, this trend seems to be changing as of late, with countries prioritizing national defense and economic recovery in the post-pandemic world. Germany, for instance, has ramped up its defense spending to its highest levels since the Cold War when it was West Germany. Meanwhile, nations like Venezuela, Iran, and Turkey have isolated themselves from the global community due to social unrest and uncertainty. In the 1990s, there were more democratic countries than authoritarian ones, but this trend has been upended. A pattern of despotic and increasingly autocratic regimes has emerged since the post-2007-2008 financial crisis and the coronavirus pandemic. Analyzing the Myanmar crisis and Thailand’s stakeholdership in it helps understand the connection to authoritarianism. To understand Thailand’s stance on the junta, one must examine the motives behind it. The obvious conclusion is that both countries have militarized natures and benefit from closer ties to prop up and aid each other in the event of a potential Chinese invasion of the Taiwan Strait. However, the real dissection of their relationship is much more nuanced. It is simply a relationship of convenience laced with appeasement and ignorance, part of the larger systemic global trend of authoritarian regimes elevating or supporting other like-minded regimes based on common objectives and similar ideologies. Thailand’s current rapprochement towards Myanmar overlooks a crucial and perhaps obscured problematic reality—the Rohingya refugee crisis and the exodus of migrants to Thailand’s borders. Thailand currently shelters 90,000 refugees, mostly those fleeing the sectarian violence in Myanmar. Issues such as statelessness and integration into society remain pervasive. A glaring fact is that Thailand has not signed the UN charter on Refugees and has recently proposed the now-suspended Torture Act. All of this suggests that Thailand is complicit in some manner by not taking an active hand in dealing with cross-border issues, and it ought to be much more compassionate. One can argue that Thailand is effectively damaging its global credibility by continuously supporting a regime that has shown little regard for human rights or respect for democratic institutions. Whatever stake Thailand has in this, it must not be transactional and purely manufactured out of greed. This may explain the Prayuth government’s reticence on the matter. Of course, one must also consider other factors and scandals, such as the recent uproar over a sitting senator’s business ties to the junta. Overall, it would be better to forget that Thailand and Myanmar form part of the Golden Triangle, the notorious hotbed of drug and crime productivity. With these points in mind, the incoming new pro-democratic administration must reboot its foreign policy initiatives, placing the human cost of crises and wars above other priorities. They should find a locus that allows Thailand to assert its regional strength without losing any leverage, and strive to eliminate the vested interests that foster this affair, particularly the links and business dealings with the junta. 2. The Way Forward 14th May 2023 saw a monumental tectonic shift in Thai politics with Move Forward leading the pack and winning the right to form a government first. While their prospects are bleak as of this writing, their policies and the coalition’s MOU on Myanmar must constitute a return to respectability for Thailand as a regional power after years of mismanagement and ineptness. After all, it is a potential for a restart in Thai attitudes toward foreign policy. The Prayuth government’s current flirtations with the Myanmar government are still a thorn in the side of the incoming coalition’s side. I examine for two reasons why the current government’s Myanmar imbroglio is in fact a political machination deliberately designed to be a chink in the armor for the pro-democracy camp. The first is to flaunt Thailand’s political strength in the region, positioning it as an active actor in ASEAN. However, this gambit has failed because the current government has yet to embrace the current political dynamic in which Thailand has little to no sway in the regional community. It is only a passive driver, unable to effect change to the likes of Indonesia. The current government’s credibility has only backfired from the day it assumed office. Authoritarian regimes thrive on legitimacy and Thailand is no different. From showcasing its global entry through last year’s APEC summit and other gaffes, Thailand has only demonstrated that it is a tiny player, a pawn in an ever-evolving dynamic – the tug of war against America and China for influence through subterfuge, soft power, and neocolonialism. With Move Forward’s Western outlook, Prayuth’s government-crafted blunder seems to have been a ploy, to place the new government on a collision course with the SAC to the extent where mobilization and brinkmanship will be possibilities, with catastrophic ends. Therefore, the onus is on the new government to immediately respond to the Myanmar crisis and that will involve engaging with the junta in ways unseen before in the bilateral history of both nations. 3. Refugees and Reassurance The refugee crisis in Myanmar has dominated popular memory through violent and startlingly graphic depictions portrayed in the media, as well as the persecution and genocide of ethnic groups, to the point where the ICC investigated the aforementioned actions taken against the Rohingya. After 2015, almost 900,000 people of Rohingya descent have fled Myanmar, displaced into neighboring countries. What is most grim is the Myanmar state’s denial of such violence and cleansing, almost tantamount to the conditions faced in apartheid or the Rwandan Genocide. This crisis has taken on a life of its own, transcending a national issue to a global concern that has led to a reevaluation of the treatment and eradication of ethnic minorities in other countries, such as the Uighur extermination camps or Darfur. While this crisis is largely isolated to Myanmar and is insulated, Thailand must be vigilant and willing to speak against this perpetuated injustice, this violation of human rights, and the recognition of the Rohingya as a population severely dispersed by the perils of war. It is not the time for compassion, nor is it time to be a passive bystander. For that, it is Thailand’s role as a neighbor and as an Asiatic power to bring awareness about this critical crisis, to call for accountability, and to portray the crisis in a manner that highlights the multifaceted impacts it has consequently wreaked on a minority group and, by extension, a national state that is interspersed with in-fighting and the re-emergence of a human rights, pro-democratic movement within the country that has captured the global imagination. If Thailand claims to be a democratic polity after the results of this election have been entertained, the responsibility should be placed on its shoulders to become more active in championing democratic ideals in the regional sphere, instead of supplicating and kowtowing to authoritarian regimes that have a lack of interest in following the rule of established law. These three points, I hope, have accurately captured the zeitgeist and future implications of Thailand’s Myanmar policy, and the reader finds this encouraging in the greater strata of things, that the new government will readjust current attitudes toward Myanmar to the point where other stakeholders can actively participate in the peace process without appeasing the junta or supplanting it through force. There is no perfect solution, nor is there a worse outcome. There is only an outcome that will be solely determined by the Myanmar people’s sheer will, and we, as a regional partner, must observe every development while distancing ourselves from the SAC..."