"In recent years, Myanmar’s decision-makers have interacted with Chinese partners on infrastructure and investment projects in a seemingly dichotomous manner. But in a sense their decisions reflect a practical logic that takes into account the concerns of both the communities affected by those projects and the population at large. The abrupt suspension in 2011 of the billion-dollar hydropower dam project at Myitsone in Kachin State and the more recent agreements entered into by the current government to bring Myanmar closer into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) orbit present contrasting examples of Myanmar’s approach to Chinese projects in the country. Myanmar hit the “pause” button in its infrastructure deals with China on 30 September 2011, when the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government led by President Thein Sein suspended the Myitsone dam project for the duration of his administration. That administration ended in March 2016, and the question of whether the project should be resumed or not, and of whether something else could be done with it, has become a heated and emotional issue. In today’s Myanmar, the democratically-elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government seems to have moved to the “fast-forward” option in its economic interactions with China. A memorandum of understanding for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) was signed in September 20181. A related agreement to develop a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu in southern Rakhine State, together with a special economic zone (SEZ), was signed in November 2018. The 1,700-kilometer corridor would connect Kunming, the capital of China's Yunnan Province, to Myanmar's major economic centres – Mandalay and then Yangon — and to the Kyaukphyu SEZ. It would link the least and most developed areas of the country..."